Traceable Infrastructure is as vulnerable as traceable messages.

[Declan McCullagh]

On Sun, Aug 05, 2001 at 04:07:14PM +0300, Sampo Syreeni wrote:
> Now, the above is of course fiction, for now at least. But keeping such
> widescale attacks on the infrastructure part of the threat model is not,
> IMHO, a bad idea. The discussions on stego, disposable remailers, physical
> broadcast technology and the like are part of that, and serve to lay the
> groundwork in case shit one day does hit the fan.

Last I checked, the vast bulk of remailers were in North America and
Europe. Given sufficient provocation (Bush twins kidnapped, Osama
talking biochemwomdterror in DC), I could easily see a coordinated set
of pre-dawn raids to "gather evidence" and seize computers as part of
a criminal investigation. Obviously the servers would have to be held
as potential evidence for a trial - did they keep logs? our techs will
find out - which could take a decade. This would cripple the current
remailer network and generate almost no public outcry beyond the
cypherpunks and such.

-Declan