Traceable Infrastructure is as vulnerable as traceable messages.

[Aimee Farr]

Tim May:

> Just so. And some of the recent "remailers can't work" critics 
> (Dillinger, Farr) are breathtakingly ignorant of what was common 
> knowledge in 1992. Worse, they haven't heeded recommendations that 
> they get themselves up to speed.

I didn't say that.

I think Ray really did, either.
 
> There is no sign that even the technologies described above 
> (wireless, throwaways, worm-based, surreptitious, etc.) are needed to 
> achieve excellent untraceability. A distributed set of remailers in N 
> different jurisdictions is quite robust against prosecutorial fishing 
> expeditions, though not as robust as we want against attacks by much 
> more capable adversaries.
> 
> Ways to increase robustness have been discussed many times. (Increase 
> N, increase pool sizes at each stage, adopt constant-bandwidth 
> approaches like Pipenet, throw in wireless and "rooms full of 
> remailers" approaches, even adopt DC-Net methods as cores for 
> sub-nets.)
> 
> Dillinger and Farr have described only sophomoric attacks. Even the 
> remailers of 1995-6 defeated the Scientologists.
> 
> Crap about IP addresses being traceable is just obfuscation to cover 
> basic ignorance of how remailer networks work.
> 
> 
> --Tim May
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Timothy C. May         tcmay at got.net        Corralitos, California
> Political: Co-founder Cypherpunks/crypto anarchy/Cyphernomicon
> Technical: physics/soft errors/Smalltalk/Squeak/agents/games/Go
> Personal: b.1951/UCSB/Intel '74-'86/retired/investor/motorcycles/guns