Traceable Infrastructure is as vulnerable as traceable messages.

[Ray Dillinger]

On Fri, 3 Aug 2001, Jim Choate wrote:


>But the only place they can trace messages in a 'small world' model is at
>source/destination link, which means they're already on top of you. If
>they're out fishing all they'd see is a bunch of packets sent between
>remailers with the body encrypted several layers deep with keys held by a
>variety of people.

the point is, that's enough.  Both endpoints on such a packet's 
route are participants, obviously.  If they want to shut it 
down, and they have seen such a packet, they have two people 
they can shut down.  Repeat ad nauseam, and the infrastructure 
is destroyed.  They don't have to trace individual messages 
if they can make the software illegal. 

And in an agent provocateur mode, the software is illegal the 
minute they want it to be -- all they have to do is show a 
DMCA violation (which they can manufacture at will) and declare 
the software illegal as a "circumvention device".

>With Plan 9 that would require them to outlaw using a particular OS. Maybe
>in a lot of places, but not in the US.

Really?  I guarantee you that if a particular OS gets in the way 
of those with power, they can declare it a "circumvention device" 
the same as any other software.  

>> That is the threat model I'm concerned 
>> about, and given that network monitoring is now automatable and 
>> cheap, it is entirely do-able.
>
>If you stick with current paradigms.

Bingo.  That is absolutely the point.  The current paradigm being 
the Internet as we know it.

				Bear