Traceable Infrastructure is as vulnerable as traceable messages.

[Ray Dillinger]

On Fri, 3 Aug 2001 mmotyka at lsil.com wrote:

>Nested encryption protects a subverted node from being able to trace the
>entire chain in one fell swoop. 

Take your focus off the individual message.

Okay?  

Now look at the system, the infrastructure, that you need to 
send that message anonymously. It relies on identifiable 
remops existing at known addresses.  Known to the people sending 
messages == known to the cops.

If the law wants to take this thing down, they will  not be 
attacking the strongest point -- ie, trying to trace individual 
messages. 

Instead, they will attack the weakest point -- trying to drive 
remailer operators out of business and thus destroy the 
infrastructure you need.  That is the threat model I'm concerned 
about, and given that network monitoring is now automatable and 
cheap, it is entirely do-able.


>As long as there is one uncompromised node in a chain subversion doesn't
>guarantee a matchup of "from" and "to" but it improves the odds.

So what?  A move by the g8 to protect the "global infrastructure" 
of the Internet, (polspeak for protecting their ability to control 
what the sheep think) followed by laws passed in individual countries, 
would force remops to operate solely in "rogue states", and messages 
to and from them could be screened out pretty simply.  

				Bear