Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)

[Aimee Farr]

David Honig said:

> At 05:24 PM 4/15/01 -0500, Aimee Farr wrote:
> >Bear said:
> >> >Nobody in conventional
> >> >business is going to want to do a deal with someone when they can't
> >> >create a legally enforceable contract.
> >
> >Actually, I'm past this. I don't need it.
> >
> >My problem is the value of the information within an information
> mercantile
> >system - which involves policing the polycentric merchant community.
> >Otherwise, such a system would become subject to "information
> policymaking,
> >information peacekeeping / diplomacy - massive misinformation."
> Just basic
> >abuse considerations, but with extreme ramifications in the
> context of the
> >"Intel agora" hypothetical I posed.
>
>
> You've identified one of several attacks on a distributed
> reputation system.
> The next step is to identify solutions to these problems.
> Then iterate, until you're proposing really hard attacks on the part of
> your adversary.  At which point you've learned something.
>
> Remembering that disinfo, psyops, nym-unmasking, and other forms of social
> engineering
> are available options.  If you can tie the meat to the T-shaped
> crucifix and
> inject what you want, you win.
>
> That's the game.  But you knew that.

Hm.

> If you wish to claim that enforcable contracts require meatspace identity,
> claim that, and listen to the discussion.

No, I don't claim that meatspace identity is necessary, and I have read some
"smart contract" theory. (I was dealing with the diplomatic and licensure
peculiarities of my hypothetical, and agency theory, but that is a
discussion for elsewhere.)

Nevertheless,.... my hypothetical principals say that reputational system
accountability and escrow concepts alone are highly inadequate in the
proposed transactional environment. Because of the unique injuries which
could result, in certain circumstances any adequate remedy necessarily
involves unmasking the "bad infomerchant." Additionally, within this
"unique" transactional environment, participants must know that should
circumstances warrant, there is accountability beyond the reputational
system.

In regard to your Rabbi polycentric governance, I guess you could allow for
unmasking by the use of an anonymous (possibly elected by lot) tribunal,
allowing for the extreme situation where a participating info merchant could
be unmasked. Of course, identity could not be knowable/vulnerable to
discovery at any other time, or in any other circumstance. Nevermind how you
would do it, what do you call it? (I realize most of you would call it
stupid.) Identity escrow?

> Don't play with us unless you're sincere.

Ok.

> "Like sodium and water",

C-4.

~Aimee