CDR: Re: Lions and Tigers and Backdoors, oh, my...

[Trei, Peter]

> ----------
> From: 	Ray Dillinger[SMTP:bear at sonic.net]
> Sent: 	Wednesday, September 27, 2000 4:39 PM
> To: 	Trei, Peter
> Cc: 	cypherpunks at cyberpass.net
> Subject: 	RE: CDR: Re: Lions and Tigers and Backdoors, oh, my... 
> 
> 
> 
> On Wed, 27 Sep 2000, Trei, Peter wrote:
> 
> >Can you document this claim of the existance of 'help fields' in
> >Netscape? 
> 
> Not directly I can't, at least not without betraying someone.
> In retrospect, I should've used a nym to make the statement 
> to keep him out of trouble.
> 
I don't accept this. You should be able to: generate traffic dumps 
pointing to the 'help field', and showing where it fits within the SSL
specifications. This is hardly rocket science.  There is no need to
compromise anyone whatsoever. Put forward the evidence, so we
can independently confirm it.

This sort of thing happens every year or two on this list. Someone
makes a claim which, if true, has interesting and/or important
implications. However, the nature of the claim is one which is
quite capable of verification. The onus is placed on the claiment
to 'put up or shut up'. Usually, they shut up. Examples of
such claims include:

* PGP has a secret backdoor. (OK: Here's the source: Where is it?)
* gcc is hacked to stick secret backdoors into PGP. (OK: Here's the source:
Where is it?)
* All gcc binaries will stick the PGP hacking code into gcc when compiling
gcc.
     (Here's a dump: show us.)
* Emily Dickinson hid her boyfriends initials in her poems. 
	(Here's some statistical tests you need to run: Show us).

So I call upon you: Put up or Shut up.

> >I am (to put it mildly) astonished by this claim, and
> >more than a little skeptical. I was aware of the Workfactor
> >Reduction field in the export 'aka International' version of Lotus Notes
> >(which this 'help field' seems identical to), but was not aware
> >of it being included in any other application.
> 
> Okay, let's forget what I know from people I don't want to drag 
> into the fire and go through it from the "circumstantial" angle.
> 
> What does it mean when Lotus Notes has to put a work reduction field 
> in their product in order to get export approval status, and then 
> doesn't talk about it?  But lots of other companies who also don't 
> talk about it, with stronger-seeming crypto get export approval 
> status? 
>        <you brought it up, you document it...>
> 
Huh? "Doesn't talk about it"? It was announced with fanfare at the 
RSA Data Security conference a few years ago. There were press
releases. It was widely discussed on this list. I invented the term
'espionage enabled' to describe this kind of application. Lotus got
a lot of flack about it, but persisted. Some customers even bought
it, noteably the Swedish government (See Risks Digest
http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/19.52.html#subj1).

> What does it mean when banks refuse to work with earlier versions 
> of Netscape claiming it's because the security certs are expired -- 
> but when new security certs are downloaded and installed, they 
> still refuse to work with earlier versions of netscape and refuse 
> to tell you why? (This, btw, was what made me suspicious in the 
> first place and why I started digging...)
> 	<http://banking.wellsfargo.com/>
> 
Well, it could mean that they want to use Web features available in 
later versions but not in earlier ones. Or maybe there are known 
security holes in earlier editions. Wells Fargo has actually been 
ahead of the curve at times: they were one of the first sites to
require 128 bit encryption.

> What does it mean when Lew Giles, even after the rules change to the 
> BXA-controlled system, made a living going around convincing 
> engineers working for american companies to compromise their products'  
> security? With or without knowledge of the companies' execs?
>         <http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-9902.html#backdoors>
> 
Is it after BXA? Bruce notes that the stories are all at least two years
old,
which would place them in very early 1997 at latest. I can't remember when
the switch took place. Of course, if LG was doing this (and I have no real
doubt that the NSA might try), it's excreable, but what is the relevance to
products today? He can no longer seriously threaten to hold up export.

> What does it mean when PGP has a "flaw" introduced into its 
> Additional Decryption Keys at the same time NAI is seeking 
> export approval for it?  And NAI gets export approval, and 
> then nobody notices the flaw for several years after, and 
> then they go oops, it was just a mistake?
> 	<in light of recent news, I don't figure I have 
> 	to document this one>
> 
> What does it mean when a CEO who actually can and does review 
> code, so subverted engineers can't seem to get one past him, in 
> a meeting with NSA officials refuses to compromise -- and one of 
> the spooks loses his cool and offers to run the guy over in the 
> parking lot?  I'll explain this one to you...  it means that spook 
> _HAD_NEVER_SEEN_ anyone refuse to compromise, and had no fucking 
> clue what to do.  That's if you buy the "he just lost his cool" 
> story.  On the other hand, death threats may be policy and this 
> was just the first time they were needed.  And on the gripping 
> hand, maybe it's just the first time it was *reported*.  Not very 
> many execs would talk about something like that, and I figure most 
> who've experienced it probably just shut up and gave the spooks 
> whatever they wanted.
> 
> <Considering your address, I figure you know about this one, 
>  so I'm not going to bother documenting it. >
> 
> Lew Giles and its ilk had to have some kind of bargaining position, 
> and if export approval was forthcoming without subverting security 
> in some way, would have had none.  The only way a spook could lose 
> his cool and offer Bidzos a death threat would be if that spook were 
> totally unfamiliar with people not compromising.  
> 
Actually, I know of at least one other case where a major exec at a
crypto company threw NSA people out on their ears after they 
offered to write some software to help with a project.

I think you're confusing two different types of subversion.

1. Company policy based subversion.

This is the type where word comes down from above to put in 'helper
fields', etc. I can't see this happening in any company which was not
simply a LEA front (such as Crypto-AG). The liability would be simply
too great, the exposure too likely. This would require a large number
employees and former employees to know, yet keep their mouths 
shut. When exposed, the officers of the company would be subject
to criminal fraud and conspiracy charges, as well a variety of civil
suits. It's simply a non-starter. Lew Giles can make as many pleas
as he wishes; but I don't think he'll get many results.

2. Individual treachery.

This type involves corrupting one or more engineers, whether via money,
threats, or misplaced appeals to patriotism. This is more likely to 
succeed in the short term than type 1, but is very fragile for several 
reasons familiar to anyone who has done commercial software development.

* Peer code reviews mean that many eyes look at the code.
* Employee turnover in the field is high - 30-50% year. Thus, bugs
  inserted by earlier compromised employees are unlikely to
  last through many release cycles, as new employees come in
  and say 'Oops - Joe forgot to init the PRNG properly - lets fix
  that!'
* Source code management systems make it very difficult to a single
  actor to monkey with code secretly, and even harder to cover his
  tracks. 

> You may consider me paranoid, but I'm telling you that the case of 
> Lotus Notes was just the one that people found out about.  If Lotus 
> had to do that to get export approval from the BXA, then so did 
> everybody else. I do not buy the story that what happened to PGP 
> was an accident; on the contrary, it was just NAI doing what they 
> had to do to get approval to put it up for international downloads, 
> the same as Lotus just did what it had to do.  And, I'm telling 
> you now, the same as AOL and Microsoft did what they had to do with 
> the browsers.
> 
> 				Ray
> 
Actually, it's pretty clear what happened with most of those cases
where companies were allowed to ship strong crypto overseas
before most of the restrictions were lifted. They all involved products
where at least one party of the communications was a large
organization or company which was subject to, and could be counted
on complying with, sub poenas and court orders. Thus the authorities
had another route by which to acquire content in which they were
interested. 

I have little doubt that government organizations have attempted to
subvert commercial crypto at various times in various ways. However,
the 'help fields' you describe are simply implausible in open protocols
such as SSL. Again, I ask you to point to the evidence. I and others
have already run the searches you suggested and come up dry. Where
are the URLs?

As it stands, you are spreading FUD. 

Peter Trei