Paranoid Encryption Standard (was Re: Rijndael & Hitachi)

[Ed Gerck]

"Arnold G. Reinhold" wrote:

> At 2:14 PM -0700 10/20/2000, Bram Cohen wrote:
> >This is just silly. There's nothing wrong with Rijndael.
> ...
> Testing is the most expensive part of any new cipher effort.  So I
> think there is a practical basis for at least asking if there is a
> simple way to combine the AES finalists and take advantage of all the
> testing that each has already undergone.  And, IMHO, it is an
> interesting theoretical question as well.  Even if the answer is
> "yes," I am not advocating that it be used in most common
> applications, e.g network security, because there are so many greater
> risks to be dealt with. But it might make sense in some narrow, high
> value, applications.

...which should then use OTPs, no?  The whole point of AES was a combination
of efficiency versus security. Otherwise, just use TripleDES.

Getting Rijndael in use, out on its own, is the best way to verify whether it
works well -- as efficiently and as securely as desired. This is the way to gain
confidence, by testing. Trust is earned.

Cheers,

Ed Gerck