CDR: How the Feds will try to ban strong anonymity

[Declan McCullagh]

I wrote in another thread:
>framework to reasonably exist. Cypherpunkish technology will create 
>underground markets, anonymous distribution methods, and so on, and the 
>only way to enforce such regulations will be for the Feds/Mounties to take 
>drastic steps. (For instance, strong anonymity is an emergent property of 
>a distributed network combined with strong encryption. Restricting strong 
>anonymity means key escrow.)

Perhaps I overstated my argument above. It seems to me that if the Feds 
want to restrict strong anonymity, they have some choices:

* Make it a felony (death penalty may have some deterrent effect) to take 
advantage of it.
* Require key escrow/key recovery/message recovery/Clipper
* Require that anonymous remailers or similar devices implement identity 
escrow/keep logs
* Ban Internet service providers/backbone providers from accepting traffic 
from an anonymous remailer node (a tricky tactic, this, since end-of-chain 
remailers are relatively few compared to the middle-of-chain ones, at least 
today).
* Do the same thing with outgoing traffic directed to the first remailer node
* Ban the operation or hosting of remailers, and work internationally to do 
the same thing, through G8, Council of Europe, UN

Anything else?

-Declan