CDR: Re: stego for the censored

[Bill Stewart]

At 04:30 PM 10/6/00 -0700, Tim May wrote:
> > The information you need to send is broken up into multiple pieces
> >  and an index. The simplest method would be 
...
>
>In places where crypto is illegal, this approach would also likely be
illegal.
>"But, Obergruppenfuhrer Mueller, I am not actually using crypto. 
>These hundreds of broken up files I have received are merely unwanted 
>messages sent to me. "
>
>BTW, the issue is a lot more than just "plausible deniability." This 
>may work in the U.S., until the Constitution is further shredded. But 
>"plausibility deniability" is not enough when dealing with the 
>Staasi, or SAVAK, or Shin Bet, or the Ayotollahs. Mere suspicion is 
>enough.

The point is that each message doesn't have decryptable cyphertext.
It only has a secret-share that no recipient can decode 
until they have enough shares of the same message,
even if the KGB rubber-hoses them, and the KGB cryptanalysts
won't be able to find anything more than random noise in the message
because with <K shares, that's all you can get.
Now random noise may also be suspicious, but it's less suspicious
than something that's got more structure to it.
Even if they do suspect the recipient and seize his computer,
they'll only get old messages, not the new partially-received ones.



				Thanks! 
					Bill
Bill Stewart, bill.stewart at pobox.com
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