From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:36:54 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:36:54 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: xxxx is exactly right on this. Several years ago I posted to sci.crypt my "novel" idea for packing bits into the essentially inaudible "least significant bits" (LSBs) of digital recordings, such as DATs and CDs. Ditto for the LSBs in an 8-bit image or 24-bit color image. I've since seen this idea reinvented _several_ times on sci.crypt and elsewhere...and I'm willing to bet I wasn't the first, either (so I don't claim any credit). A 2-hour DAT contains about 10 Gbits (2 hours x 3600 sec/hr x 2 channels x 16 bits/sample x 44K samples/sec), or about 1.2 Gbytes. A CD contains about half this, i.e., about 700 Mbytes. The LSB of a DAT is 1/16th of the 1.2 Gbytes, or 80 Mbytes. This is a _lot_ of storage! A home-recorded DAT--and I use a Sony D-3 DAT Walkman to make tapes--has so much noise down at the LSB level--noise from the A/D and D/A converters, noise from the microphones (if any), etc.--that the bits are essentially random at this level. (This is a subtle, but important, point: a factory recorded DAT or CD will have predetermined bits at all levels, i.e., the authorities could in principle spot any modifications. But home-recorded, or dubbed, DATs will of course not be subject to this kind of analysis.) Some care might be taken to ensure that the statistical properties of the signal bits resemble what would be expected with "noise" bits, but this will be a minor hurdle. Adobe Photoshop can be used to easily place message bits in the "noise" that dominates things down at the LSB level. The resulting GIF can then be posted to UseNet or e-mailed. Ditto for sound samples, using the ideas I just described (but typically requiring sound sampling boards, etc.). I've done some experiments along these lines. This doesn't mean our problems are solved, of course. Exchanging tapes is cumbersome and vulnerable to stings. But it does help to point out the utter futility of trying to stop the flow of bits. --Tim -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay at netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP 2.0 and MailSafe keys by arrangement. From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:37:41 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:37:41 1999 Subject: Revealing identities Message-ID: Johan, I haven't been paying close attention to the latest on the anonymity debate, so please tell me if the following has been raised before. In your message <9302260807.aa01498 at penet.penet.FI> of Fri, 26 Feb 93 08:50:19 +0200 on the subject "Moral dilemma." to the cypherpunks list, you mentioned that >One rule is >that I *never* reveal the true identity of an anon user, While I believe that you should be able to use any policy you want for this sort of thing, I do not believe that both your server and this policy can survive together. Because you/the-server cannot censor the content of anonymous postings/mail (you lack the time, and knowledge of what is legal in every corner of the world), you can only withdraw someone's anonymous posting permission in response to complaints to something that they have already posted. I believe that eventually, someone will post something so damaging/incensing that sufficient pressure will be applied that either: the service cannot continue (e.g. disconnected from the network), or you will be forced to reveal or destroy the mappings between alias(es) and user(s). For example, on the cypherpunks list, the question of what would happen if someone claiming responsibility for the New York bombing posted through the anonymous server. Bodies in the US (from people providing parts of the Internet service through to political and criminal bodies such as the FBI/CIA/NSA) could easily apply very strong pressure. Unfortunately, I feel that this pressure will come sooner rather than later because there is nothing preventing people opposed to the anonymous service from making these postings merely to discredit your service. I think that there *MAY* be a way around this. I assume the reasons behind your non-disclosure policy are: i. You cannot decide which identities should be revealed. ii. Revealing an identity removes their anonymity from all of their previous postings, some of which may have had reason to be anonymous. For example, I think it "unjust" to reveal what someone wrote to alt.sex.abuse because they violated copyright or whatever in some other group. The second of these reasons could be avoided by permitting anonymous users to have a different alias for each posting that they make. This would increase the loading on the alias space and records of alias<->ID mappings. I can see no reason why you would need to reveal all of the aliases of one real identity. The decision of when an identity should be revealed could be left to a jury: If you receive a reasonable complaint about a posting (not just a flame, but something more significant such as copyright violation, libel, etc) then you would post this complaint to a group of anonymous jurors who decide on what action should be taken. The plaintiff and defendant could even argue their positions to the jury, and might advertise on a newsgroup asking for assistance from relevant groups (e.g. pro/anti-anonymity groups). The problem now is how to select the jury. Some factors are: i. The number of jurors influences the probability that the decision can be swayed because of the random composition of the jury. So one juror would be too few, 12 as used in orthodox courts might be reasonable, etc. ii. Jurors would not want to spend too much time on the case, so there should be an upper limit on the number of bytes transmitted by defendant and plaintiff, and the time span of the case. iii. The degree of "consensus" required for a decision. Perhaps 2/3 majority is OK, perhaps 75%. The larger the majority required, the less likely that the case will be swayed by the composition of the jury, but also the longer it would take to reach the decision. iv. The jury can't be composed just of users of the anonymous service because of their bias. Perhaps jurors could be selected at random from the names of people who have posted to the news in the past? v. Jurors would have to accept their position -- there's no use in having a juror who doesn't read the information passed to him/her. I feel that the problem of selecting a jury would be easier to solve than that of defending the anonymous service against the uproar that may result from some postings. With this judicial process, anonymous users would also be accountable for what they post. Some other issues would be i. What happens if the jury can't decide? ii. What sort of "punishment" is possible? Warning the person? Barring the person from anonymous posting? Revealing their identity to the necessary body? etc The idea is *VERY* rough at the moment, but perhaps it has some merit? As I see it, the good part for the anonymous service provider is that they do not have to participate in the process (apart from filtering trivial flaming cases from the judicial system), which will avoid claims of bias and lessens your already considerable load. Comments? Tim ---- 8< Cut Here 8< ---- Tim Moors __________________________________________________________ Australian Telecommunications Research Institute .-_!\ GPO Box U 1987 Email: tim at atri.curtin.edu.au / \ Perth, WA 6001 Phone: +61 9 351 3243 \_.-._/ Australia Fax: +61 9 351 3244 o "beLIEve" -- U2 Zoo TV Tour From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:37:43 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:37:43 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: Bill Sommerfeld writes: >For a good time, read the sections from "The Codebreakers" regarding >what kind of lengths war-time censors went through to foil >steganography. > >In this day & age, rearranging the spacing of messages "just for the >heck of it" would be a rather obvious equivalent to what they did back >then (BITNET does things like this today just out of sheer >perversity). So would scrambling the low-order bits of a sound file. Good reminder that the opponents may try to foil (or detect) such schemes. Fortunately, signing such messages will presumably not be illegal (we hope!) and so alterations will show up immediately and cause howls of protest. -Tim May -- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay at netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available. From hellman at isl.stanford.edu Tue Sep 7 12:37:57 1999 From: hellman at isl.stanford.edu (Martin Hellman) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:37:57 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: Subject: Clipper Chip Most of you have seen the announcement in Friday's NY Times, etc. about NIST (National Institute of Standards & Technology) announcing the "Clipper Chip" crypto device. Several messges on the net have asked for more technical details, and some have been laboring under understandable misunderstandings given the lack of details in the news articles. So here to help out is your friendly NSA link: me. I was somewhat surprised Friday to get a call from the Agency which supplied many of the missing details. I was told the info was public, so here it is (the cc of this to Dennis Branstad at NIST is mostly as a double check on my facts since I assume he is aware of all this; please let me know if I have anything wrong): The Clipper Chip will have a secret crypto algorithm embedded in Silicon. Each chip will have two secret, 80-bit keys. One will be the same for all chips (ie a system-wide key) and the other will be unit specific. I don't know what NIST and NSA will call them, but I will call them the system key SK and unit key UK in this message. The IC will be designed to be extremely difficult to reverse so that the system key can be kept secret. (Aside: It is clear that they also want to keep the algorithm secret and, in my opinion, it may be as much for that as this stated purpose.) The unit key will be generated as the XOR of two 80-bit random numbers K1 and K2 (UK=K1+K2) which will be kept by the two escrow authorities. Who these escrow authorities will be is still to be decided by the Attorney General, but it was stressed to me that they will NOT be NSA or law enforcement agencies, that they must be parties acceptable to the users of the system as unbiased. When a law enforcement agency gets a court order, they will present it to these two escrow authorities and receive K1 and K2, thereby allowing access to the unit key UK. In addition to the system key, each user will get to choose his or her own key and change it as often as desired. Call this key plain old K. When a message is to be sent it will first be encrypted under K, then K will be encrypted under the unit key UK, and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part message which will then be encrypted under the system key SK producing E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number; SK} When a court order obtains K1 and K2, and thence K, the law enforcement agency will use SK to decrypt all information flowing on the suspected link [Aside: It is my guess that they may do this constantly on all links, with or without a court order, since it is almost impossible to tell which links over which a message will flow.] This gives the agency access to E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number in the above message. They then check the serial number of the unit and see if it is on the "watch list" for which they have a court order. If so, they will decrypt E[K; UK] to obtain K, and then decrypt E[M; K] to obtain M. I am still in the process of assessing this scheme, so please do not take the above as any kind of endorsement of the proposed scheme. All I am trying to do is help all of us assess the scheme more knowledgably. But I will say that the need for just one court order worries me. I would feel more comfortable (though not necessarily comfortable!) if two separate court orders were needed, one per escrow authority. While no explanation is needed, the following story adds some color: In researching some ideas that Silvio Micali and I have been kicking around, I spoke with Gerald Gunther, the constitutional law expert here at Stanford and he related the following story: When Edward Levi became Pres. Ford's attorney general (right after Watergate), he was visited by an FBI agent asking for "the wiretap authorizations." When Levy asked for the details so he could review the cases as required by law, the agent told him that his predecessors just turned over 40-50 blank, signed forms every time. Levi did not comply and changed the system, but the lesson is clear: No single person or authority should have the power to authorize wiretaps (or worse yet, divulging of personal keys). Sometimes he or she will be an Edward Levi and sometimes a John Mitchell. Martin Hellman ======== And, his permission to repost. PLEASE NOTE HIS "RESTRICTION." --jim ======= From hellman at isl.stanford.edu Tue Sep 7 12:37:57 1999 From: hellman at isl.stanford.edu (Martin Hellman) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:37:57 1999 Subject: Marty's 4/17 Clipper Chip post-to-many ... Message-ID: <8adae482c22dbd963ba836e92e0723e2@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org> Jim, It is fine to post my previous message to cypherpunks if you also post this message with it in which: I ask recipients to be very sparse in their requesting further info from me or asking for comments on specific questions. By this posting I apologize for any messages I am unable to respond to. (I already spend too much time answering too much e-mail and am particularly overloaded this week with other responsibilities.) martin ========= Finally, there has been a significant reponse to this by a cryptoid well-known to all of us. Am seeking permission to repost it, also. --jim Incidentally, Marty sez he had no forewarning that Clipper was about to sail. The NY Times article blind-sided him about 11:30 Thursday night. Sounds like the government is really doing an outstanding job of careful, collaborative policy-making. [Danger! Novice gunslinger is shooting from the hip!] --jim From denning at cs.cosc.georgetown.edu Tue Sep 7 12:37:57 1999 From: denning at cs.cosc.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:37:57 1999 Subject: Clipper Chip Message-ID: <1a306eb9a79382308c1cabac1e90bbba@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org> I just had another conversation with NSA to clarify some of the features of Clipper. Please feel free to distribute this and my other messages on Clipper. The name of the encryption algorithm is "Skipjack." Martin Hellman had written and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part message which will then be encrypted under the system key SK producing E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number; SK} To which I responded: My understanding is that E[M; K] is not encrypted under SK (called the "family key") and that the decrypt key corresponding to SK is held by law enforcement. Does anyone have first hand knowledge on this? I was correct in that E[M; K] is not encrypted under SK. However, Skipjack being a single-key system, there is, of course, not a separate decrypt key for the family key SK. The unit key, also called the "chip key," is generated from the serial number N as follows. Let N1, N2, and N3 be 64 bit blocks derived from N, and let S1 and S2 be two 80-bit seeds used as keys. Compute the 64-bit block R1 = E[D[E[N1; S1]; S2]; S1] (Note that this is like using the DES in triple encryption mode with two keys.) Similarly compute blocks R2 and R3 starting with N2 and N3. (I'm unlear about whether the keys S1 and S2 change. The fact that they're called seeds suggests they might.) Then R1, R2, and R3 are concatenated together giving 192 bits. The first 80 bits form K1 and the next 80 bits form K2. The remaining bits are discarded. The seeds S1 and S2 do not change. The whole process is performed on a laptop computer, and S1 and S2 are supplied by two independent people so that no one person knows both. The same S1 and S2 are used during an entire "programming session" to generate keys for a stream of serial numbers. Everything is discarded at the end (the computer could be thrown out if desired). The serial number is 30 bits and the values N1, N2, and N3 are formed by padding the serial number with fixed 34-bit blocks (separate padding for each value). The resulting keys K1 and K2 are output onto separate floppy disks, paired up with their serial number. Each pair is stored in a separate file. The floppy disks are taken away by two separate people on behalf of the two escrow agencies. Dorothy Denning denning at cs.georgetown.edu ====== >From eff.org!interesting-people-request at netcomsv.netcom.com Mon Apr 19 20:07:50 1993 Posted-Date: Mon, 19 Apr 1993 21:17:27 -0500 From: David Farber X-Sender: farber at linc.cis.upenn.edu Subject: More technical details -- Chipper To: interesting-people at eff.org (interesting-people mailing list) Personal note. Denning suggests such firms as " SRI, Rand, Mitre, the national labs (Sandia, LANL, Los Alamos), Treasury, GAO" as possible escrow organizations. I personally believe that firms which get their funding from the government are just too susceptible to pressure which we have seen historically. It would be best to use organizations that have a more arms length relationship with the government so everyone believes the escrows task is being performed properly. Dave From: smb at research.att.com (Steven Bellovin) Subject: More technical details Date: 19 Apr 93 13:43:46 GMT Here are some corrections and additions to Hellman's note, courtesy of Dorothy Denning. Again, this is reposted with permission. Two requests -- first, note the roles of S1 and S2. It appears to me and others that anyone who knows those values can construct the unit key. And the nature of the generation process for K1 and K2 is such that neither can be produced alone. Thus, the scheme cannot be implemented such that one repository generates the first half-key, and another generates the second. *That* is ominous. Second -- these postings are not revealed scripture, nor are they carefully-crafted spook postings. Don't attempt to draw out hidden meanings (as opposed to, say, the official announcements of Clipper). Leave Denning out of this; given Hellman's record of opposition to DES, which goes back before some folks on this newsgroup knew how to read, I don't think you can impugn his integrity. Oh yeah -- the folks who invented Clipper aren't stupid. If you think something doesn't make sense, it's almost certainly because you don't understand their goals. --Steve Bellovin ----- Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 07:56:39 EDT From: denning at cs.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning) Subject: Re: Clipper Chip To: (a long list of folks) I was also briefed by the NSA and FBI, so let me add a few comments to Marty's message: The Clipper Chip will have a secret crypto algorithm embedded in The algorithm operates on 64-bit blocks (like DES) and the chip supports all 4 DES modes of operation. The algorithm uses 32 rounds of scrambling compared with 16 in DES. In addition to the system key, each user will get to choose his or her own key and change it as often as desired. Call this key plain old K. When a message is to be sent it will first be K is the session key shared by the sender and receiver. Any method (e.g., public key) can be used to establish the session key. In the AT&T telephone security devices, which will have the new chip, the key is negotiated using a public-key protocol. encrypted under K, then K will be encrypted under the unit key UK, and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part message which will then be encrypted under the system key SK producing E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number; SK} My understanding is that E[M; K] is not encrypted under SK (called the "family key") and that the decrypt key corresponding to SK is held by law enforcement. Does anyone have first hand knowledge on this? I will also check it out, but this is 7am Sunday so I did not want to wait. The unit key will be generated as the XOR of two 80-bit random numbers K1 and K2 (UK=K1+K2) which will be kept by the two escrow The unit key, also called the "chip key," is generated from the serial number N as follows. Let N1, N2, and N3 be 64 bit blocks derived from N, and let S1 and S2 be two 80-bit seeds used as keys. Compute the 64-bit block R1 = E[D[E[N1; S1]; S2]; S1] (Note that this is like using the DES in triple encryption mode with two keys.) Similarly compute blocks R2 and R3 starting with N2 and N3. (I'm unlear about whether the keys S1 and S2 change. The fact that they're called seeds suggests they might.) Then R1, R2, and R3 are concatenated together giving 192 bits. The first 80 bits form K1 and the next 80 bits form K2. The remaining bits are discarded. authorities. Who these escrow authorities will be is still to be decided by the Attorney General, but it was stressed to me that they will NOT be NSA or law enforcement agencies, that they must be parties acceptable to the users of the system as unbiased. Marty is right on this and the FBI has asked me for suggestions. Please pass them to me along with your reasons. In addition to Marty's criteria, I would add that the agencies must have an established record of being able to safeguard highly sensitive information. Some suggestions I've received so far include SRI, Rand, Mitre, the national labs (Sandia, LANL, Los Alamos), Treasury, GAO. When a court order obtains K1 and K2, and thence K, the law enforcement agency will use SK to decrypt all information flowing on the suspected link [Aside: It is my guess that they may do this constantly on all links, with or without a court order, since it is almost impossible to tell which links over which a message will flow.] My understanding is that there will be only one decode box and that it will be operated by the FBI. The service provider will isolate the communications stream and pass it to the FBI where it will pass through the decode box, which will have been keyed with K. for "the wiretap authorizations." When Levy asked for the details so he could review the cases as required by law, the agent told him that his predecessors just turned over 40-50 blank, signed forms every time. Levi did not comply and changed the system, but the lesson is clear: No single person or authority should have the power to authorize wiretaps No single person does, at least for FBI taps. After completing a mound of paperwork, an agent must get the approval of several people on a chain that includes FBI legal counsel before the request is even taken to the Attorney General for final approval. Dorothy Denning From denning at cs.georgetown.edu Tue Sep 7 12:37:58 1999 From: denning at cs.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:37:58 1999 Subject: Marty's 4/17 Clipper Chip post-to-many & Dorothy's 4/8 response Message-ID: <5f4f1a395e5d370f678c533a1fafa331@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org> Fine with me. Post anywhere. Dorothy ===== From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:39:11 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:39:11 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: <778e3d9ab54852047b1495c426841802@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org> Based on previous experience, a couple more will appear overnight. Hal Finney hfinney at shell.portal.com From tapen_sinha at macmail.bond.edu.au Tue Sep 7 12:40:06 1999 From: tapen_sinha at macmail.bond.edu.au (Tapen Sinha) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:40:06 1999 Subject: on line books (not just in risk mgmt) Message-ID: <2449ef0c725cc01648335423491a45b8@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org> If you are looking for information on new books, how to buy them (on line!) and review of these books, there is a neat way to do it on internet: telnet books.com if the above does not work on your machine, try telnet 192.148.240.9 It will ask you a bunch of questions (like your name and address) and then you can look at info on books by author, subject... You can look at reviews of those books too. You can order books by email even (have your credit card handy)! It can be quite useful. A word of caution: there are some unhappy users out there who claim that they got billed for books they did not order. tapen_sinha at macmail.bond.edu.au From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:40:11 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:40:11 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: "S. Boxx" tries to scare us by writing: > >(To the insiders: it will be quite awhile before we sort everything out >and file charges, so be patient.) Perhaps as long as several millenia, eh? -- Lefty (lefty at apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:. From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:41:31 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:41:31 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Curve Encrypt is now also available by ftp from csn.org: csn.org:/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/curve_encrypt Read /mpj/README.MPJ for the characters to replace ??????? -- Will Curve Software -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLT7KqsJkEfxTVMrJAQFpwAQAsH+WpW2gVs5wKXUE/iMTf8uqjnp6ePlj CJMHFfq8WVy1yoq6nY68Gy3YHLSPB2c70hrSb87N5sKu3Y+zZRKFUYjPfEYreuNT 6RXnSFYrCdqElKS3juFDuW/UwPnARUBAskvt/UJIMByzlkLwHopGMI7igu4z9utA qJmyR9qS7qE= =tTdn -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:41:54 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:41:54 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:44:16 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:44:16 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: Sandy - The system I saw on CNN actually tracked the bullets' paths through the air, creating a trail back to the firing point. The system wasn't described because, as the announcer claimed, the process hadn't been patented yet. Curt From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:45:34 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:45:34 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: On Tue, 19 Jul 1994 nobody at shell.portal.com wrote: > Isn't a "Kragen" a fictional sea beast, something like a giant squid or What does this have to do with crypto? From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:45:37 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:45:37 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: Yes, I remember that now. My interpretation, though, was that with the bank's help you could tell when a coin had been re-used. This could impair the anonymity of the cash. Generally in the analysis of these proto- cols one wants anonymity even if the bank and the other participants collude. That is the whole point of cryptographic (non-transferable) cash, after all; otherwise the bank could just use the "Poor Man's Cash" idea which Tim May suggested here last year and just issue cash in the form of magic numbers with no blinding or digital sigs. Hal From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:45:37 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:45:37 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: <7f123bca9c99147d74bf41762653bb0d@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org> I read this paper some time ago. Couldn't the cash still be detected as having belonged to the original owner even after you have transferred it? If so, then the other requirement is that you must transfer it anonymously, otherwise they can still get back to you. An example would be if you are doing something which the government doesn't like, such as shipping tracts advocating egalitarianism to a country with explicitly racist policies. The government might be able to put pressure on some members of the organization and use this (in effect) "marked money" to find the others. If you pass the money on to someone else, but they know it came from you, and then the government comes to them, determines that this is "dirty money" (which was given to the threatening egalitarians) they can say "who did you get this from" and your jig is up. Hal From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:46:11 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:46:11 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: > Come to think of it, the PALs on US weapons are primarily > electromechanical in nature. You get the EWO, you punch in the > supplied code into the PAL, and off you go. I'm not sure that RSA > would a whole lot of use as part of the PAL mechanism itself (except > for signature verification, which is certainly important.) Speculation on sci.crypt some time ago was that, for at least some relatively recent model nukes, the code supplied to the PAL contained encrypted timing information needed for the bomb to ignite. If you bypass the PAL, you don't provide the timing info, and the bomb fizzles because of an asymmetric implosion.. But then, "those who know aren't telling, and those who are telling don't know.." - Bill From mkj at world.std.com Tue Sep 7 12:46:19 1999 From: mkj at world.std.com (Mahatma Kane-Jeeves) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:46:19 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: <494bb80c8841a466ab8f422c37af7e97@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org> Has anyone here seen the so-called Lehman Panel report? It is available by ftp from ftp.uspto.gov, in the directory /pub/nii-ip. It is offered there in several formats. The deadline for comments is September 7th. (Sorry about the short notice, but I've only just recently discovered the report myself.) The Lehman Panel is more officially known as the "Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights", a subcommittee of President Clinton's "Information Infrastructure Task Force". The Lehman Panel report makes a number of recommendations concerning changes to current intellectual property law, in light of challenges presented by the National Information Infrastructure (NII) project. This appears to me to be quite an important report, which could play a major role in shaping vital aspects of our near-future society. I find the whole approach taken by the panel disturbing, though perhaps not surprising. Very briefly, my general concerns are these: There appears to be a natural tension between current intellectual property law and the widespread deployment of computer networking. (John Barlow has put it more simply: "Copyright is dead".) The Lehman panel's report, rather than trying to accomodate and adapt to the inevitable effects of the NII, instead recommends tightening up existing laws, and expanding their scope, in an attempt to preserve the status quo and protect established interests. It seems to me that this approach would dramatically undercut the potential of the NII, making many of its most natural uses and benefits illegal. Worse, I believe this approach would create a body of law which will make speed limits look well-respected by comparison, and any attempt to enforce these laws is likely to be destructive and unpleasant for all of us. There are numerous other, more specific things in this report which make me unhappy, too -- such as the presumption that the NII should be little more than a new marketplace for old businesses; the creation of gratuitous new rights for major record labels which would hurt artists, and would enable the record companies to control the digital audio server industry; and most frightening of all, the shameless suggestion that the public schools should be used to pound these new rules into the heads of children as early as Kindergarten. I've obviously considered firing off a letter of comment myself, but after I calmed down I realized how little impact that would be likely to have. So I decided the most constructive thing I could do would be to post this "alert" here, in the hope that someone with better qualifications and resources than myself might pick up the ball. Thanks for your attention. --- mkj From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:48:06 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:48:06 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, A friend has been communicating with an expert involved in the court case against the government in the Waco massacre. There are some technical issues that some Cypherpunks may be able to shed some light on. Before and while the compound burned, FBI helicopters continually overflew the area. They preportedly recorded events using FLIR (Forward Looking Infrared Radar) and thermal imaging technology. Given the compound's frame structure, the effects of the fire on these techniques, etc., why would FLIR and thermal imaging be used and what information would be gathered? If someone on the list knows anything about these technologies, please let me know by private e-mail. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:48:45 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:48:45 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: Nathan Zook wrote: > There can be little question that any attacks on remailers and civilian > strong crypto will face challenges on the basis of Free Speech and Equal > Protection. The question is: can the state show compelling interest? I > believe that it can. Anonymous agents, by their very nature, are immune > from state restraint. Since our entire legal system centers around state > restraint, I believe that Free Speech and Equal Protection will fall to the > four horsemen. But mail and messages from "foreigners" is also "immune from state restraint," and yet we haven't seen either a ban on mail from outside the U.S. or a requirement that such mail be inspected, identified, etc. (I'm not sure if your line "our entire legal system centers around state restraint" refers to state constraint of citizens, as you seem to imply in your conclusion, or constraint _of_ the state, as the Constitution seems to imply.) Likewise, if I receive a letter, open it, and find a request to remail it to another address, isn't this equivalent to our remailers? Does this imply a compelling State need to open all mail? Does the plotting of various crimes in private homes imply a compelling State need to place microphones and video cameras in such places? Clearly not, so I don't think the privacy of e-mail will soon be breached just because there are some abuses in some people's minds. > There is the general question of political speech. Unfortunately, there is > little anonymous _US_ political speech. Furthermore, sedition is a crime, .... > I believe, therefore, that both the court and the dissent bode poorly for > anonymous encrypted mail. But anonymous handbills are quite common, posted all over the place here in my home town, and the Supreme Court ruled quite properly that identities are not required for speech. Likewise, radio call it shows are dominated by anonymous call-ins. Ditto for "Name Witheld by Request" letters to the editor, etc. Lots of speech is not anonymous, because Congresscritters are identified, because Rush Limbaugh obviously _wants_ his name publicized, because I want my name attached to my views, etc. But not because there's any law saying political speech cannot be anonymous. Quite the contrary. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay at netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Cypherpunks list: majordomo at toad.com with body message of only: subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tc/tcmay From jimp at wired.com Tue Sep 7 12:49:18 1999 From: jimp at wired.com (Jim Petersen) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:49:18 1999 Subject: Why Doesn't Wired..... In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <4d08848dffcdbd0f7a5839bb1547e3d4@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org> In article , werewolf at io.org (Mark Terka) wrote: > .....if it is sooooooo hooked in the online culture have a PGP public key > that 'net users could use to send in their credit card numbers for > subscriptions? Here it is. We're just implementing it. Send us a message (send to talk2subs at wired.com) -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.7 mQCOAy8EM1EAAAEEANqhOZTAwWI/99ZZ7t77VHH02n+xM4CQEk2DJe2zZhpjKP8v EHndzBPr3dIsHOZUJABi7ztk5NiQhNVR5EBE7Tqz/7HhGFUE2ErVjAS3OQckcmvW BrCgNXfe0G4tlX1paXFGHsoVT3UgE2IKjttwmZA1WtOH1lbgLCGi/5f257vHAA9A AbQnV2lyZWQgQ2lyY3VsYXRpb24gPHRhbGsyc3Vic0B3aXJlZC5jb20+ =xdqc -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -- Jim Petersen Argue for your limitations.... jimp at wired.com And they are yours. From david at arch.ping.dk Tue Sep 7 12:49:18 1999 From: david at arch.ping.dk (David Stodolsky) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:49:18 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: According to rules recently adopted, Judges-L FAQ ver. 2.1, one must register before being subscribed to the List. The Registration Form is at the end of the Judges-L FAQ below. Please read the Cancel Messages FAQ first, if you have not already done so. It has been posted to news.admin.policy. Judges-L Registrar, dss ============================================================ Welcome to Judges-L The following Frequently Asked Questions with answers are designed to assist you in interacting with other subscribers to the Judges' List and thereby assist users of the NetNews system in dealing with certain types of abusive messages. Please do not post to the List until you have been a subscriber for a couple of weeks, so you can avoid the most common mistakes made by new subscribers. Alternatively you can review the activities of the List by retrieving archives of recent discussions. You can retrieve the list of archives by sending "INDEX Judge-L" (not including quotation marks) to LISTSERV at UBVM.CC.BUFFALO.EDU (or LISTSERV at UBVM.BITNET). You can then order these files with a "GET Judge-L LOGxxxx". For example, to get the first month's archive, send the command "GET JUDGES-L LOG9409" to retrieve the archive for September of 1994. You can unsubscribe by sending the command "UNSUB JUDGES-L" in the body of a message to LISTSERV at UBVM.CC.BUFFALO.EDU (or LISTSERV at UBVM.BITNET). Please retain this message for future reference. ------------------------------------------------- Judges-L: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) ver. 2.1 What is the Judges-L? The Judges' List (Judges-L at UBVM.cc.buffalo.edu or JUDGES- L at UBVM.BITNET) is a LISTSERV mail distribution list. Messages for distribution must be sent to one of these addresses. Subscription and other LISTSERV commands must be sent to LISTSERV at UBVM.cc.buffalo.edu or LISTSERV at UBVM.BITNET. How does the Judges' List work? The List distributes messages to a panel of Judges who cancel multiple posts to NetNews immediately. The List is used to help Judges organize themselves, finalize policy, and set procedures to enforce rules. It is primarily directed to those who issue cancels. Secondarily, to those who survey cancels issued, in order to ensure that the cancel facility is not being abused. It is not the intention of the Judges to regulate the content of articles posted. The protection of the NetNews system from overload by posts to multiple newsgroups is the focus of the activity. Widespread posting of off-topic material and overloads of individual newsgroups is a secondary focus of discussion. Mechanisms for the control of automatic posting software or automatic cancellation software is within the scope of discussion. Security mechanisms to facilitate the cancellation of abusive posts is also within the scope of the List. Certain activities, such as voting, are restricted to registered Judges. A Judge registers by supplying verifiable identity information to the Registrar. This information must be traceable to a primary identification document, such as a birth certificate. Supplied information is used only for the registration of a Judge. A digital signature, signed by a recognized certification authority can satisfy this requirement. The Registrar will acknowledge that registration has succeeded. Another option is transmission of a verifiable name, address, and telephone number (including best times to telephone). Any finger, X.500 directory, or Network Information Center entries, should also be supplied, in order to reduce the need for telephonic contact (use the form at the end of this post). Random checks may be undertaken from time to time to confirm the integrity of registration information. The List Registrar is currently David S. Stodolsky at address: david at arch.ping.dk. How are decisions made? There are two types of messages distributed via the List. The first type is an informational message. The second type is an action message, which notifies readers that an official response is requested or pending. A response to a previous message must begin with the characters "Re: " (note the trailing space). A message that starts a new discussion must not start with these characters. Action messages must be indicated by a message subject that starts with all capital letters. Current message subject precursors are: :"COMPLAINT: " - a complaint about a message that someone wants cancelled :"CANCEL: " - a complaint about an inappropriate cancel message :"DRAFT: " - a request for preliminary input on a proposed action :"OPINION: " - a proposed action not directly related to a complaint :"ACCEPTED: " - an accepted action Decisions are preferably reached by consensus. The consensus is indicated by at least one week passing after an action message, or the last comment on an action message, has been distributed. Thus, if an OPINION message is posted and no comments are made in response to it for a week, it is considered to have achieved a consensus. The message will then be redistributed in exactly the same form, but with the ACCEPTED message precursor. If no objections are registered within a week, then this opinion becomes valid. (Objections at this stage can only be procedural, such as failure to incorporate corrections or not allowing adequate time for comments.) If comments are received, they must be answered or incorporated into the accepted message. In the case of extensive revision, the message should be distributed again with an OPINION message precursor. Accepted messages are transferred to the file area for permanent storage. Accepted opinions are also posted to USENET with "Judges" as their sender. In the case that a consensus is not reached within three weeks after the final posting of an action message, the author of the message can call for a vote. After the call, the List Registrar will post the email addresses of registered voters. A voter is registered if s/he supplied registration information to the Registrar prior to the first presentation of the action item. Votes are directed to the author, or other designated vote counter, and may include a statement. After a week, all votes and comments are posted. If a complaint achieves majority support, it can be reposted as ACCEPTED. Contributed statements must be included. Opinions require two-thirds support to achieve acceptance. If you reply to a message, but change the subject or address a side issue, change the subject line of the post using the "was" construction [i. e., New subject (was: Old subject)]. This is particularly important with action items, which can be delayed otherwise. Do I have to wait a week before acting on a complaint? No. Any Judge can act on a complaint at any time. The List and the person who submitted the complaint must be notified immediately. If a complaint receives no response, it is assumed to be invalid. A week after the final comment on a complaint, it may be reposted, including all comments, with an "ACCEPTED: " subject precursor. This is normally done by the Judge who initially responded to the complaint. Unless there are objections, it is transferred to the file area one week later. A Judge must not be the first respondent to a complaint submitted on her/his behalf. A Judge should only respond to a complaint if confident that the response is appropriate. New Judges can develop their reputations by closely monitoring the List. This permits routine abuse to handled promptly by new Judges. More experienced Judges can then concentrate on handling complicated complaints or on incorrect responses made by novices. What is the correct style for a message? Messages to the List must follow USENET guidelines. See "Guidelines for posting on Usenet" and "Hints on writing style for Usenet" in the newsgroup "news.announce.newusers". Specifically, spell check your message and review it for accuracy. If you are irritated or upset, put it aside for a day, and then read both the message you are replying to and your response again. All messages to the List are archived and permanently available to subscribers. What should I do about inappropriate messages? Faulty or inappropriate messages should be ignored. You may notify the sender directly by email that there is a problem with such a message. Since action items cannot be ignored, inappropriate messages of this type may result in censure of the sender. When in doubt as to the type of a message you are sending, do not use an action precursor. If it definitely is an action message, post it using the "DRAFT: " message precursor first, and allow at least a week for feedback. Draft messages should be used in all cases except where time is of the essence. Posting of a draft message immediately fixes the registered voters on the item, but reduces the risk of repeated updates while in the "OPINION: " phase. Since opinion messages require responses within a week, it is more likely that the feedback to them will be negative and will be less complete than feedback to a draft. Can a message that has appeared on the Judges-L be reposted? Only your own words can be reposted and only by you. Authors retain a non-exclusive non-transferable copyright on their own writing sent to the List. "Fair use" is limited to single words. The non-exclusive transfer of copyright to the List Registrar ensures that the author can continue to use the words they have sent to the List, while at the same time those words can be used in a well controlled manner, for example, in an opinion issued by Judges-L. This is essential to the function of the List, since a participant in a dispute might try to block publication of an opinion by asserting copyright over crucial writing, if not pleased with the decision. The non-transferability of the copyright retained by the author makes it impossible for List policy to be circumvented by a (legal) person who collects copyrights from various authors. It also ensures that only persons bound by the List policy can use material sent to the List in other contexts. This could also be crucial in stopping misuse of writing sent to the List. "Fair use" is limited to single words. Copying of more than a single word violates fair use, since repeatedly copying pairs of words would permit the transfer of collective works from the List. That is, if pairs of words from a message were transferred repeatedly under "fair use", the original message could easily be assembled from the machine readable fragments: "Copying shall not be used to create or to replace or substitute for anthologies, compilations, or collective works..." {From the guidelines developed by the Ad Hoc Committee on Copyright Revision, the Author-Publisher Group, and the Association of American Publishers. COPYRIGHT LAW AND MULTIMEDIA DEVELOPMENT IN EDUCATION [DRAFT VERSION] in a document assembled by the Academic Computing Technologies Group, Johnson County Community College, Overland Park, KS 66210 (in Mich Kabay <75300.3232 at compuserve.com>. [27 December 1994]. RISKS of guessing at Fair Use. RISKS DIGEST 16.68. [URL: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/16.68.html]} Any subscriber posting messages to the Judges-L is bound by this copyright policy. Material posted by others falls under a Judge-L compilation copyright. Writing by persons not posting to the List themselves is covered by a compilation copyright held by the sender and the List, and subject to the same restrictions, where ever applicable, as original writing. The terms "writing" and "words" are construed to include all forms of expression subject copyright, such as drawings, recorded sounds, and so on. External archives of Judges-L messages and opinions can only be maintained if explicit written permission is given. Subscribers may, however, maintain archives of messages they have received while subscribed to the List, but only for their own private use and only as long as they remain subscribers. Can I disclose information received from the List to third parties (persons not on the List)? No. Privacy of messages sent to the List is crucial for the List to be able to perform its conflict resolution functions. Privacy makes uninhibited expression more likely, thus aiding in fact finding and resolution of disputes. It also protects authors from having their words used out of context. Finally, it inhibits persons not satisfied with a List decision from taking their complaints to another forum. The ability to achieve a final resolution of conflict is one of the major advantages of a judicial ruling. What if I do not follow these guidelines? Any person who provides false registration information will be prohibited from any use of the List for a period of five years and their postmaster, employer, or service provider will be notified thereof. At the end of that period a new registration form may be submitted. The document must be signed under penalty of perjury and notarized. Any person misusing information from the List is subject to immediate unsubscription for a period of one year. A censure opinion must be submitted to the List immediately thereafter and copied to the person affected. All messages concerning the case must be copied to the concerned person, who may reply directly to the List. If the List has been set to automatically reject messages from the person as a result of abuse of the List, the person may select a representative to forward their replies. If the censure fails, the person will immediately be resubscribed. In any case of involuntary unsubscription or of censure that casts doubt upon the honesty of a Judge, resubmission of registration information signed under penalty of perjury and notarized is required. If you abuse the List by sending messages, you may be asked to stop sending for a period of six months, by issuance of an opinion. If you fail to honor this request, then your messages will be automatically rejected for a period of one year. An abuser may reapply after that time by sending a request to Dimitri Vulis (dlv at dm.com). In extreme cases, abusers will be unsubscribed from the List for a one-year period. Further problems will result in an abuser's postmaster being notified, or if the abuser is a postmaster, the notification will go to an employer or service provider. The Judges reserve the right to counter any continuing abuse of the List without further notice. Severe abuse can result in immediate action by a List Owner or Site Administrator. The Judges' List must be notified when any such action is taken. How do I request censure of a Judge? A Judge can submit an OPINION message to the List requesting that an abusive Judge cease, for example, sending to the List. Alternatively, the message can be directed to the Registrar, who will post it to the List, confirming that the message was submitted by a Judge, who wishes to remain anonymous. Other comments on the case may be directed to the Registrar, if authors wish to remain anonymous. In the case that a vote becomes necessary, the Registrar will randomly select nine Judges, if that many are available. They will be privately requested to deliver their votes to a designated Vote Counter. If three-fourths of the votes support the request, it will be posted as an ACCEPTED opinion by the Vote Counter. Dimitri Vulis (dlv at dm.com) receives such votes. How is conflict of interest avoided in censure cases? Any selected Judge directly involved in the dispute must notify the Registrar that they are not available to vote. In the case this withdrawal could affect the vote outcome, a new Judge will be randomly selected. The accused may advise the Registrar that certain Judges are directly involved and should not be selected. No more than one-third of Judges may be designated as unsuitable. Neither the Registrar nor the Vote Counter may serve as voters in censure cases. Why should I use this List instead of a newsgroup? Discussions of abusive practices also occur in the newsgroups, for example, news.admin.policy. That newsgroup has over 50,000 readers and over 50% of articles are crossposted. Each post, therefore, uses a minimum of 20 man- hours of readers' time, even if each reader spends only a second reading the subject line of an article. Examination of the post itself can lead to ten times that amount of time being used, or even more. It is suggested, therefore, that posts to newsgroups be limited to novel incidents, with the potential for generating a new policy consensus. Routine abuse can be handled in a much more economical manner, if it is referred to this List. Another advantage of using the List for cancel notifications is the almost immediate delivery of email. Newsgroup propagation is significantly slower, meaning that duplicate cancels may be issued. This can create problems and certainly means unnecessary work for administrators. Consensus rarely occurs in newsgroups, if there is even the slightest disagreement on an issue. In order to create an alternative to arbitrary cancellation, cancellation wars between posters and administrators, and so on, it is important to reach a consensus through a process that is open and fair. A list makes it more likely that every person sees the same material, which cannot be assured with people browsing newsgroups. Also, lists are less "public", so there is less incentive for people to defend positions, merely because they have taken them. This is a well know problem in international negotiations. These factors, when combined with the procedures suggested here, make reaching a consensus on the List much more likely than in a newsgroup. Another advantage of List operation is the privacy of the List archives. This makes it less likely that disputants seize upon details of statements made by Judges as indicating support for their position. The transfer of completed decisions to the publicly assessable file area, on the other hand, make them more likely to be used as guidance in dispute resolution. These completed decisions can also be used as a database of known offenders, in order to facilitate dealing with repeated abuse. This effect is even stronger in the case of accepted opinions, which are posted to USENET. Finally, there are some people who cannot understand that it is not OK to do anything that is not explicitly against some "law." These people need some "legal" decisions to abide by, because they will not stop abusive activities otherwise. They may also view cancellation of their articles as abridging their "free speech" or "restraining their trade" and take their complaint to a court. The Judges-L can be the court of first instance, thereby reducing the risk of interference by governmental authorities with activities on the Net. ----------------------------------------------------------- Judges-L Registration Form This form serves as a copyright agreement, non-disclosure agreement, and oath: I have read and understood the Cancel Messages Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) list and the Judges-L FAQ. I understand why archive privacy is required and the role confidentiality plays in dispute resolution. I agree to: a) respect the Judge-L copyright and report any violations thereof. b) avoid disclosing information received from the List to third parties (persons not on the List) and report any violations of this policy. c) store messages received from the List in a manner that prevents disclosure to third parties (at minimum, password protection on a publicly accessible system, or residential level physical security for unprotected files or messages that have been printed ). d) destroy all copies of messages from the List within 14 days of unsubscribing (this does not apply to setting an address to "no mail", which stops transmission of messages). e) follow the procedures accepted by the Judges (subscribers to Judges-L). f) tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, in messages sent to the List or directly to persons subscribed to the List. That is, I agree that deception is to be avoided, either through incorrect statements or omission of relevant facts. If statements made in good faith are later found to be incorrect, the correct information will be supplied without delay. Not withstanding the above, if another subscriber is mislead by my statement and makes an incorrect statement on the List as a result, I will correct that person in a message to the List. g) base any decision I make as a Judge only on messages to the List. If I receive communications concerning a matter under deliberation on Judges-L by other means (i. e., private mail, news, etc.), I will send a notice to the List. If I do not disclose the information, I will state why. Further, I will state whether I feel receipt of the information disqualifies me from further participation in the deliberation and why. h) attempt to influence a Judges-L decisions only through messages posted to the List under my registered name. I understand that if I violate this agreement I may be subject to censure and that an accepted censure opinion may be posted to the Judges-L public file area and published in appropriate USENET newsgroups. I agree to accept any such ruling as final. Replace underlines "____" completely (in relevant items) with your information and return to: david at arch.ping.dk Last name __________________________ Other names, initials, titles, etc. ________________________ Address __________________________ City, State, Country, ZIP, etc. __________________________ Telephone number (include country code) ____________________ Best times to Phone From _____ to _____ and _____ to _____ Work or other address __________________________ City, State, Country, ZIP, etc. __________________________ Telephone number (include country code) ____________________ Best times to Phone From _____ to _____ and _____ to _____ Finger entry _________________________ X.500 directory listing _________________________ Network information center entries _________________________ _________________________ Other directory entries _________________________ _________________________ _________________________ _________________________ ----------------------------------------------------------- =========================================================== David S. Stodolsky, PhD * Social * Internet: david at arch.ping.dk Tornskadestien 2, st. th. * Research * Tel.: + 45 38 33 03 30 DK-2400 Copenhagen NV, Denmark * Methods * Fax: + 45 38 33 88 80 From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:49:22 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:49:22 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: In article <199502090413.UAA24481 at largo.remailer.net>, eric at remailer.net writes: > From: "Kipp E.B. Hickman" > > You are right here. However, our observation is that an interesting > chunk of the world is moving towards using X.509 based certificate > infrastructures for many things. > > It's that interesting chunk that RSADSI is pointing out to you. When > you see the world through the eyes of a vendor ... Actually we are getting strong interest from almost everybody but RSA. I imagine that RSA may have some plans in this area, but what they are is unknown to me. > And you know, of course, that PEM really stands for Patent Extension > Mechanism. Har! Besides the certificate problems, are there other problems with PEM that have prevented its adoption? > I don't really blame you much. I mean TIPEM handles all the X.509 > stuff just fine and PGP can't get out even the simplest of libraries, > or even a partial library. Our implementation supports this X.509 stuff as well. We don't have a DUA yet though... --------------------------------------------------------------------- Kipp E.B. Hickman Netscape Communications Corp. kipp at netscape.com http://home.mcom.com/people/kipp/index.html From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:50:25 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:50:25 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: In article <9508181739.AA21179 at sulphur.osf.org>, rsalz at osf.org (Rich Salz) writes: > > There is no word as to how to become a KSA. Netscpe has > >ignored the question on several occaisons. > > I'm fairly sure that I remember Taher saying at the W3C security > meeting that they intend to do this, and that hardcoding the CA's > into the library was as quick hack. I also have the impression > that they don't know how to do it, but my recollection is fuzzier there. It has been stated publicly several times that we do plan to allow user configurable certificate authority and server trust. A user will be able to configure their browser to talk to servers that have certificates signed by any CA they choose to trust. --Jeff -- Jeff Weinstein - Electronic Munitions Specialist Netscape Communication Corporation jsw at netscape.com - http://home.netscape.com/people/jsw Any opinions expressed above are mine. From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:51:07 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:51:07 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: Hal Finney wrote: > I'm not sure how to do it for software, but for novels it > should be easy to fingerprint. Every couple of pages the > author writes a sentence twice in different forms. This would > not take a great deal of extra effort on the part of the > author. Perhaps. Some authors might be offended by the idea that using a different form of a sentence doesn't affect the work. > Perhaps a similar approach could be applied to software, where > in many cases a couple of statements could be trivially > interchanged, or other kinds of simple transformations could > be manually generated. Those could be marked by the > programmers without too much extra work. Sounds like a disaster to me, unless it can be done automatically, by a proven-correct program. I used to use commercial compilers that (at least claimed to) put their "stamp" on the assembly code they generated, so they could sue if you released a product without having a license for the compiler. Bugs are bad enough as it is; we don't need extra ones that only show up in some copies! Will French From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:52:13 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:52:13 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: When and where is the monthly Bay Area cypherpunks meeting? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Kevin S. Van Honr | Uncle Sam needs YOU! vanhorn at architext.com | But not vice versa. From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:52:29 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:52:29 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: It is interesting that the situation is so symmetrical. Given collusion with the bank by the other party, with regular ecash we protect Alice's but not Bob's anonymity. With this "reverse ecash" we protect Bob but not Alice. (Alice is the payor, Bob the payee.) If people were allowed to exchange coins anonymously, either system will provide anonymity for both parties. (In the reverse ecash system Alice hands the the blinded proto-coins along with some regular coins to the bank and receives blinded new coins.) Earlier there was discussion of an ecash coin-exchanging service ("Charlie") designed to provide payee anonymity in the regular ecash system. Bob would send his newly-received coins to Charlie along with blinded proto-coins. Charlie would then exchange them at the bank and send the new (blinded) coins back to Bob. Charlie and Bob can be anonymous to each other, but Bob has to trust Charlie with his coins. A similar service would work for the reverse ecash system to protect Alice's anonymity. Bob blinds some proto-coins and sends them to Alice, who further blinds them and sends them to Charlie along with some regular coins of the same values. Charlie exchanges the regular coins for new coins using the doubly blinded proto-coins. He gives the blinded coins back to Alice, who unblinds them and gives them to Bob, who removes the last blinding to reveal the valid coins. It is Alice in this protocol who has to trust Charlie with her coins. Hal From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:56:45 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:56:45 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: I put I time line I've been keeping for my own reference up at: http://rpcp.mit.edu/~reagle/commerce/line.html > --> The following is an extension of a timeline detailing the protocol > battles for Internet side credit card encryption and "processing" that > was an appendix of a paper Brett Leida and myself wrote. (One day it > will be on-line, as you can see, our argument that Visa/MC should > cooperate was a good one!)] > > I'll add to it as time goes on, and hopefully updates should find > there way to the web server eventually. > > I tried to provide the best reference I could, you can try to email me > if you need more info... > > _______________________ Regards, Talent develops in tranquillity, character in the full current of human life. -Goethe Joseph Reagle http://farnsworth.mit.edu/~reagle/home.html reagle at mit.edu 0C 69 D4 E8 F2 70 24 33 B4 5E 5E EC 35 E6 FB 88 From Anonymous Tue Sep 7 12:57:54 1999 From: Anonymous (Anonymous) Date: Tue Sep 07 12:57:54 1999 Subject: No Subject Message-ID: Ayse Sercan wrote: > At any rate, if I were the mother, and my kid was being led away by a > clerk who could have been the very pervert who thought that those nude > pictures meant child pornography, I'd certainly do everything in my power > to protect my child from such an individual. That's rediculous. The mother did not flip because Zona led the child away. The mother flipped when asked about the photos. This caused Zona to not want the child to see argument. The mother just has serious problems in general. She feels justified in trashing the place and throwing the lamp, which is why she refused the punishment and took 30 days in jail. She, in the presence of her child, was wrong to get violent. She has a lack of control. -- 617/253-6515 http://grim.media.mit.edu From adri3874o16 at ping.at Sat Sep 11 08:54:15 1999 From: adri3874o16 at ping.at (adri3874o16 at ping.at) Date: Wed, 11 Sep 1999 09:54:15 -0600 Subject: PROTECT YOURSELF AGAINST HARMFUL VIRUSES 9486BVfF-8 Message-ID: <004e13d37e3b$8387e7c0$8ce51ec2@vjxhpj> ATTENTION: This is a MUST for ALL Computer Users!!! *NEW-Special Package Deal!* Norton SystemWorks 2002 Software Suite -Professional Edition- Includes Six - Yes 6! - Feature-Packed Utilities ALL For 1 Special LOW Price! 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