Cloak and Dollar.
Matthew X
profrv at nex.net.au
Sat May 8 02:15:19 PDT 1999
Counterintelligence Book Review
By CI Centre Professor Hayden B. Peake
Con-Men At The Top?
Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence
By Rhodri JEFFREYS-JONES
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002)
357 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.
In this, his latest assault on American intelligence, Rhodri
JEFFREYS-JONESprofessor of American history at the University of
Edinburghargues that in America there is a special reason why secret
intelligence has tended to run amok with taxpayers money... the emergence,
within intelligence circles, of the confidence man. Using smooth talk,
hyperbole, deception
the American spy
has played a leading part in
the creation of menaces and crises that were by no means always what they
seemed to be. They have ranged from Confederate assassination plots to
Western land fraud, from white slavery to communism, from German sabotage
to Chinese espionage, from crack cocaine scares to digital encryption.
This view is in part provocative, misleading, deceptive and untrue. The
authors confidence man role model is Civil War detective Allan PINKERTON
who, we are told, was dismissed from Abraham LINCOLNs intelligence
service for exaggerating enemy strength. In an attempt to reingratiate
himself with the president, PINKERTON warned of an assassination plot.
For the record, LINCOLN never had an intelligence service and PINKERTON was
not dismissed from anything. Furthermore, PINKERTON warned the president
about the assassination plot before his inauguration, not after. And both
of these events occurred before he made any enemy strength assessments. He
did offer his services to LINCOLN after the inauguration but never received
a response. PINKERTON served General McCLELLAN and quit when his boss was
relieved after Antietam, in 1862, never to return to Washington
officialdom. In short, PINKERTON was a detective and did little for the
intelligence profession beyond embellishing his memoirs with exaggerated
often fictitious exploits.[1]
Although off to a troubling start, nothing diminishes the authors
unrelenting attachment to PINKERTON and his putative legacy¾he appears
throughout the book. This is as difficult to understand as his assertion
that William DONOVAN had become the new PINKERTON¾a truly an odious
comparison. History is challenged further when he claims that Allan
PINKERTON put espionage on a professional basis. There are far better
candidates for this distinction starting with George
WASHINGTON. JEFFREYS-JONES dismisses with gross distortions the formative
contributions of DONOVAN and J. Edgar HOOVER on this point. In any case,
if credit is to be assigned for that contribution, others deserve it, not
PINKERTON.
The FBI does not escape attention and the author consistently fails to
distinguish between the half of the organization concerned with
investigating crime and the portion formed much later, concerned with
espionage. The FBIs predecessor, the Bureau of Investigation (BI), is
identified in the book as an emblematic secret intelligence agency
formed in 1908. In fact, the BI took that name in March 1909 and before
that time there was only a group of federal investigators headed by a Chief
Examiner, Stanley FINCH. He became Chief of the BI in 1909, when no part
of it was an intelligence agency. The JEFFREYS-JONES comment that FBI
Chief Stanley W. FINCH insisted that no daughter, wife, or mother was safe
from white slavery gangs
is out of context to say the least. FINCH,
of course, was never Chief of the FBI. The White Slave controversy of
1910 was investigated by FINCHs BI in its capacity as a federal police
organization charged with investigating and prosecuting crime. Its
involvement with espionage began during WWI and even then was not its major
responsibility. The implicit equating of the BI and later the FBI criminal
investigation activities and their intelligence operations distorts and
misrepresents the legacies of both.
In a remarkable chapter entitled U-1The Agency Nobody Knew, Prof.
JEFFREYS-JONES departs, without explanatory comment, from his con-man
theme to argue that the State Department once controlled American
intelligence through an agency without a name
formed in 1915 that
flourished briefly and dominated the intelligence scene before the FBI
finally made its mark. Insiders referred to it simply as U-1. There is more:
U-1 was so obscure and so secretive that it did not even have to try to
suppress the news of its existence
.It was elitist and snobbish,
intellectual and quiet. It was also in some ways effective, and an emblem
of how American secret intelligence might be organized in the future. Yet
ominously for the quieter mode of espionage, U-1 was dissolved in
1927
. The appellation U-1 stems from terminology introduced following WWI
(p. 60).
As Prof. JEFFREYS-JONES himself acknowledges, what became U-1 after the war
was set up as a coordinating element within the State Department. For
reasons not clear, he attaches organizational powers to it far beyond what
he is able to document. The other elements of American intelligence during
WWI¾the Armys MID, and Navys ONI, the BI, and the Secret Service, were in
no sense subordinate to U-1, an interpretation one might reasonably infer
from his assertions. Nor can U-1 be considered dominant in any sense of
that word. The State Department did run agents in Russia, but so did
MID. U-1s official demise in 1927 came about from its inability to even
coordinate intelligence effectively.[2]
Despite occasional admissions of a deserved reputation for past
successes, JEFFREYS-JONES hammers away at his agenda chronicling the
familiar failures of intelligence in chapters on DULLES and the CIA, the
Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, Watergate, and Iran-Contra. While the basic facts
are correct, JEFFREYS-JONES views each as the logical consequence of a
tradition of hyperbole and spin rather than unsuccessful, if in some
cases cockamamie, attempts to implement Presidential policies aimed at
countering Soviet Cold War realities, or just plain security
failures. There are also comments on the Church Committee hearings that
created a new atmosphere of trust, and some recent counterintelligence
cases--AMES and briefly, HANSSEN--though NICHOLSON and PITTS are excluded.
Returning to his central theme, we learn that the DCIs were not the sole
advocates of the PINKERTON legacy. Recent presidents also encouraged the
con-man tradition. Ronald REAGAN, became a player according to
JEFFREYS-JONES when he told the American people to trust him to twist
the truth in your interest. The words are JEFFREYS-JONES, not
REAGANs. President CLINTON too, played along writes the author, though
he was not so much hooked by the Agency as sold on it. Or as his quote
of Washington Post columnist Mary McGORY puts it, CLINTON dares not lift a
finger against the spooks. All this will surprise many who served during
the CLINTON years.
In the current post Cold War era the CIA and its siblings are portrayed
as the heirs of the con-man tradition underpinning what the author calls
the real American Century, the 21st century, as described by the Cold
War triumphalists. An additional bonus came, he adds, with the events of
September 11, 2001, which created a custom made situation for the
intelligence confidence man and his political allies. Once again, writes
Prof. JEFFREYS-JONES, came the cries to unleash the CIA. Once again it
was tempting to reward failure
. The source of the cries is not given,
the source of the conclusion is obvious. With these deeply held views,
this history of American intelligence ends on a note calling for the
United States intelligence community to become more a part of the wider
world that has inspired and continued to invigorate the great nation of
immigrants. Some in America would argue that goal was achieved long ago.
If the distorted unbalanced assessment of American intelligence presented
by Prof. JEFFREYS-JONES stimulates constructive discussion of all points of
view, it will serve a useful purpose. But as a stand alone survey of the
role of intelligence in America and the world, it is a gross
disservice. The students deserve better and so does American history.
[1] For more on PINKERTONs contribution, see Edwin C. FISHEL, The Secret
War for the Union: The Untold Story of Intelligence in the Civil War
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996).
[2] The documentation given by JEFFREYS-JONES for the creation of U-1 is
slim. Endnote # 3, page 299 gives a clue citing a Frank POLK diary entry
for 16 June 1916, and adding that A more extensive treatment of U-1
is in
JEFFREYS-JONES, American Espionage
though there is nothing there that
documents its creation further. On page 79 of this book, the official end
of U-1 is noted quoting a memo from the Secretary of State. U-1 is
mentioned in Christopher ANDREWs For The Presidents Eyes Only (p. 37)
where the associated endnote indicates it was formed in 1916; the same
diary entry given by JEFFREYS-JONES is cited. George OTOOLE also mentions
U-1, but cites JEFFREYS-JONES American Espionage as his source. Neither
reference indicates that U-1 dominated the intelligence scene or was
elitist and snobbish.
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