[Fwd: EECS Colloquium Monday Oct 5]

Robert Hettinga rah at shipwright.com
Tue Sep 29 22:23:42 PDT 1998




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Subject: EECS Colloquium Monday Oct 5


Appended is the notice of an EECS Colloquium by Radia Perleman, on
Monday Oct. 5.  Please post and/or forward as appropriate.

Peter Elias
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			     MIT-EECS
			1998 Fall Semester
			 Colloquium Series


	       	  How to Misuse Good Cryptography
	       And Create Insecure Network Protocols

			  Radia Perlman
		  Boston Center for Networking
			SUN Microsystems



			     ABSTRACT


A common misconception is that security flaws involve abstruse
mathematical weaknesses in cryptographic algorithms. While it is
possible to have weak cryptographic algorithms, the world does not
need insecure cryptographic systems in order to design, build, and
deploy insecure network protocols.

This talk discusses example mistakes people have made when designing
or implementing network protocols. Examples include an e-mail standard
that allowed forging of signatures, a public key scheme less secure
than a secret key scheme, a system that thought encryption implied
integrity protection, and public key chain rules that are unworkable
in practice.


		          October 5, 1998
			        4-5 pm
		 Edgerton Hall, 34-101 (50 Vassar St)
		         Refreshments at 3:45


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-----------------
Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at philodox.com>
Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'






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