encrypted FM radio hiss

[Bill Stewart]

At 11:04 AM 7/27/98 -0700, David Honig wrote, about (Real, not Pseudo) RNGs:
>Poor RNG ----> XOR ----> BlockCipher ----> improved RNG?
>                 ^                    |
>                 |____________________|
>The output of a good block cipher in feedback mode will pass Diehard tests,
>though it is not crypto-secure.
>From an information theoretic perspective, in the above scheme, you are
>slowly adding entropy to the output stream, at a rate determined by the
>actual number of bits/iteration and the bits/symbol of your poor random
>numbers.

It's an interesting problem, and I doubt there's a consensus on strength,
in particular, on how much randomness is left after you take a
random sample out of the system.  I'd feel much better if you
also ran the output through a keyed hash before giving it to anyone
(e.g. run pairs or triples of 64-bit blocks plus a private salt through MD5.)
With a perfectly strong RNG, the output should also be perfectly strong,
though with a weak RNG, the block cypher does add some correlation.

You definitely should trash the initial outputs, until you've added
enough bits of real randomness that the block chaining step has
probably accumulated a whole block's worth of randomness.
Otherwise, the first round of block cypher is an ECB on a small
set of input data (e.g. 64 possible values of one 1 and 63 0s
fed into a DES cracker.)


				Thanks! 
					Bill
Bill Stewart, bill.stewart at pobox.com
PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF  3C85 B884 0ABE 4639