remailer resistancs to attack

[Steve Schear]

At 6:37 PM -0800 1/15/98, Tim May wrote:
>At 5:25 PM -0800 1/15/98, Adam Back wrote:
>>Ryan Lackey <rdl at mit.edu> writes:
>>However it seems to me that the weakest point is the remailer network.
>>It seems likely that it would be much easier for governments to shut
>>down the remailer network than it would be to shut down USENET.  There
>>are only around 20 or so remailers, and they all have known IP
>>addresses, operators, localities, etc.  I expect the spooks could shut
>>them down with less than 1 days notice if they wanted to.
>
>Well, I have long argued for the need for thousands of remailers, esp. the
>"everyone a remailer" model.
>
>But, although I agree we need many  more remailers, I think Adam overstates
>the ease with which remailers can be shut down, at least in the U.S.

Came across this paper and thought it might address remailer reliability, "How to Maintain Authenticated Communication in the Presence of Break-ins," http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~tcryptol/OLD/old-02.html

--Steve