standardizing encryption

[Firebeard]

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>>>>> dformosa  writes:

d> On Thu, 4 Sep 1997, Nobuki Nakatuji wrote:

>> Do you think do to use standardizing encryption?  I think It isn't
>> too very good.

d> Rather then being not too good, it is infact neccery.  Unless we
d> have a standard, secure encrytion system, cryto is next to useless.

d> What is the use of encrypting your email if the recpent can't
d> decode it.

	I think a standard algorithm would be a bad idea, because that 
implies someone choosing what algorithm to be the standard.  Better is 
publicly known formats and algorithms, so that the strengths of the
algorithms can be tested, and multiple products can implement the same 
formats and algorithms, and compete on the basis of features and
usability, rather than FUD-based claims of security.  This may result
in multiple formats and algorithms being used, and that's all for the
best, so that when one algorithm is compromised, others are available
to be switched to.

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