PGP Employee on MKR

[Kent Crispin]

On Fri, Oct 24, 1997 at 03:31:48AM -0700, mark at unicorn.com wrote:
> 
> As I said before, the SMTP filter is not the evil aspect of your design,
> it's the enforced encryption to multiple recipients.

Gee, Mark, I thought it was the SMTP filter that did the enforcing.  
Maybe if PGP didn't call it "CMR" but instead called it something 
neutral like the "key link field".
>  
> >The fact is, nobody has come up with a scenario where PGP's CMR feature
> >can be turned into GAK in any practical way. 
> 
> I just have. Now try to explain it away.

Let's see, your scenario involves putting super sniffers at strategic
positions throughout the net, and passing laws that not only supports
this, but makes it illegal to go around them.  I suggest that if such
laws are passed PGP's software is the least of your problems.

To make it plain, Mark, I "explain it away" this way:  fundametally, 
your scenario assumes what it is trying to prove -- you assume that 
incredibly draconian laws are in place, and then you use that 
assumption to prove that incredibly draconian laws are in place.  
This is known as "circular reasoning" -- perhaps you've heard of it? 

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html