Quantum Leaps in PGP

TruthMonger tm at dev.null
Sun Oct 19 10:01:34 PDT 1997



Fabrice Planchon wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 18, 1997 at 08:53:14PM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
> > Now I understand the French have switched position: you can use
> > encryption without a license *provided* that it has master key access
> > for the government.
... 
> > With the pgp standard as is french government could insist that people
> > use pgp5.x.  pgp5.x provides a reasonablly useful framework for the
> > french government to adapt to be used as a master access system.

> http://www.lemonde.fr/multimedia/sem4297/textes/act42972.html
>
> It's in french, so I won't quote. The article has a very neutral
> position, but they point out exactly the same thing as you.

  From Privacy Protection for the Individual to the Government Choice
in SnoopWare. Is it possible to do that while keeping your panties on?
Perverted minds want to know...

> > If on the other hand pgp5.x were to use only single recipients for
> > confidentiality, and to base company recovery of encrypted mail
> > folders on key recovery information stored locally alongside the
> > mailbox the system would be less useful to the french government.

  True. This is why it seems all the more odd that PGP leapt over the
obvious to introduce *exactly* what Lying Jackoff Fuck Louis J. Freeh
is asking for--***___IMMEDIATE___*** access to communications.
  Corporate Message Recovery amounts to a _Real-Time_Wiretap_ on email
communications. 

Bonus Question: "Why would a government agency bother with getting a
  court order to _use_ a key they are already in possession of, and
  how would we know if they use it, if they don't have to go to an
  outside source to get possession of it?"

Bonus Prize: One freeh bomb.

Bonus Stupid Question: "Why don't you give me your life savings, to 
  hold for you, and I will only spend it after getting permission
  from someone who won't know whether I am spending it, or not,
  anyway."

Bonus Stupid Prize: One freeh-dumb.

  The government is quite simply trying to poke enough holes in a
variety of privacy/security areas, so that they can shine 'a thousand
points of light' into our private affairs and communications.
  In order to spy on everyone in a corporation, would you rather have
to break a thousand keys, or just one key? Hmmm...tough question...

TruthMonger







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