writes:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
> On Wed, 1 Oct 1997, Anonymous wrote:
>
> [...]
>
> > Legalize drugs!
> > The War on Drugs *created* all of the current problems in this area
> > by making minute amounts of forbidden substances worth more than
> > precious metals.
>
> I have to aggry with Anon here, the legalisation of drugs combined with a
> harm minimisation program has a good chance in resulting in less deaths
> and crime.
Check out the fairly successful Swiss program, distributing heroin cheaply
to registered addicts.
---
Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
From ravage at ssz.com Thu Oct 2 07:07:24 1997
From: ravage at ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 22:07:24 +0800
Subject: index.html
Message-ID: <199710021409.JAA26061@einstein.ssz.com>
CNN logo
Navigation
Infoseek/Big Yellow
Pathfinder/Warner Bros
Main banner AST. Working for your business. rule
BOY SHOOTS SISTER FOR TALKING ON PHONE TOO LONG
October 1, 1997
Web posted at: 11:11 p.m. EDT (0311 GMT)
ORANGE PARK, Florida (AP) -- A 14-year-old boy shot his sister for
talking on the telephone too long, a law enforcement official said.
The boy, who was not identified because of his age, was charged with
attempted murder. His 15-year-old sister was treated for a gunshot
wound to her chest and released from a hospital.
The boy said that his sister was getting on his nerves for talking
on the phone too long, the sheriff's office said.
He said he took his mother's .22-caliber revolver from a locked box
in her bedroom. The girl was reading a book when she was shot
Monday. When officers arrived, the boy was talking on the phone.
"I could understand a temper thing, but this kid had the gun for
four or five hours before he went into his sister's bedroom and shot
at her twice," said sheriff's Sgt. Wes Gronikowski.
Copyright 1997 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This
material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or
redistributed.
_________________________________________________________________
Infoseek search ____________________ ____ ____
_________________________________________________________________
rule Message Boards Sound off on our
message boards
You said it... [INLINE] AST. Working for your business. rule
To the top
� 1997 Cable News Network, Inc.
All Rights Reserved.
Terms under which this service is provided to you.
From ravage at ssz.com Thu Oct 2 07:09:48 1997
From: ravage at ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 22:09:48 +0800
Subject: index.html
Message-ID: <199710021408.JAA26033@einstein.ssz.com>
CNN logo
Navigation
Infoseek/Big Yellow
Pathfinder/Warner Bros
Main banner Visit Regal at Buick.com rule
NATIONWIDE CRACKDOWN ON MAIL FRAUD BEGINS
Mail fraud graphic October 1, 1997
Web posted at: 11:11 p.m. EDT (0311 GMT)
WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Federal, state and local law enforcement
agencies joined hands with more than 1,500 private sector volunteers
Wednesday to launch a nationwide crackdown on mail fraud.
"Project Mailbox," initiated by the Federal Trade Commission, U.S.
Postal Inspection Service, the National Association of Attorneys
General and the American Association of Retired People, targets con
artists who use mass mail to defraud consumers.
The FBI estimated several years ago that an estimated $40 billion a
year is lost to mail and telemarketing scams that include a range of
deceptive claims such as phony bills, bogus advance-fee card offers
and false contest claims.
One goal of the new effort is to get a more accurate and up-to-date
estimate on the size and nature of this problem. To assist, AARP is
asking members to turn over unsolicited and suspicious mail to law
enforcement officials. The coalition is also launching a consumer
education campaign.
rule
Related sites:
Note: Pages will open in a new browser window
* AARP
* Federal Trade Commission
* United States Postal Service
External sites are not endorsed by CNN Interactive.
_________________________________________________________________
Infoseek search ____________________ ____ ____
_________________________________________________________________
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message boards
You said it... [INLINE] Visit Regal at Buick.com rule
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Terms under which this service is provided to you.
From 53199432 at hotmail.com Thu Oct 2 23:00:10 1997
From: 53199432 at hotmail.com (53199432 at hotmail.com)
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 23:00:10 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Upgrade to first class - nearly every time you fly...
Message-ID: <199876432.GAA98685498@aol.com>
To respond to this message, DO NOT HIT REPLY! (nothing will happen)
Rather, use the link at the end of the message.
***********************************************************
UPGRADES to first class (domestic and international), the latest 'Two-for
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end
END
From pooh at efga.org Thu Oct 2 08:02:27 1997
From: pooh at efga.org (Robert A. Costner)
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 23:02:27 +0800
Subject: Remailer advertising
In-Reply-To: <3.0.3.32.19971002024633.032b0028@mail.atl.bellsouth.net>
Message-ID: <3.0.3.32.19971002103137.03132df0@mail.atl.bellsouth.net>
At 04:12 AM 10/2/97 -0600, Racist Remailer wrote:
> Also, advertising could be sent to the originator of anonymous
>remail,
This does seem like a second place that remailer advertising could be
"sold." Advertising to the sender side seems like a better idea than
recipient advertising, but I'm not sure it would go over very well either.
When the crypto vote recently came up in Congress, I suggested putting
"advertising" about the vote on outgoing remailer messages. This would
have involved promotion of non EFGA web pages. The owners of such web
pages, who are pro-crypto, did not care for the association with a remailer.
For a recipient side ad, I thought of simply sending out a terms of service
message, perhaps replaced in the future by paid advertising. We discussed
this, and decided that users would be bothered by getting return email when
they send the remailer a message. We considered sending a return message
not with each message, but say only once per month, or only once every two
weeks. Feedback I got on this was that users would not like the remailer
acknowledging them. Obviously we would have to build some database of who
sent something when in order to make this work. A database of who has sent
a message in the last two weeks is just another chink in the armor waiting
to be exploited.
-- Robert Costner Phone: (770) 512-8746
Electronic Frontiers Georgia mailto:pooh at efga.org
http://www.efga.org/ run PGP 5.0 for my public key
From frantz at netcom.com Thu Oct 2 08:11:08 1997
From: frantz at netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 23:11:08 +0800
Subject: Why? (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199710012159.QAA20763@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID:
At 2:59 PM -0700 10/1/97, Jim Choate wrote:
>> From: Bill Frantz
>> At 7:49 PM -0700 9/30/97, Jim Choate wrote:
>> >My original question still stands, why would I or any other party choose to
>> >use an anonymous remailer for anything other than the original 3 items I
>> >mentioned previously.
>
>> I have heard of people's posts being brought up in employment
>> interviews. A rational person might want to express controversial opinions
>> anonymously.
>
>And your point is? My personal opinions have nothing to do with my
>professional career and yours shouldn't either. I would love to have a
>company bring up my past posts, makes it easy to decide if I want to work
>there or not.
>
>If you want to work for such a company and you know their views and your
>views are in conflict then I would say you need a shrink not an anon.
>remailer.
You see my stand in the .sig below. (Hint, it is my "true name".)
However, I am willing to admit that others may see it differently and want
to use remailers.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz | Internal surveillance | Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506 | helped make the USSR the | 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz at netcom.com | nation it is today. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA
From theSameGuy at theSamePlace.Old Thu Oct 2 08:19:41 1997
From: theSameGuy at theSamePlace.Old (The Same Guy)
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 23:19:41 +0800
Subject: InfoWar 27 / Part III of The True Story of the InterNet
In-Reply-To: <6489040e71db5edc2ab5e653cb709620@anon.efga.org>
Message-ID: <3433B3D6.28DB@theSamePlace.Old>
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
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Type: text/html
Size: 12587 bytes
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URL:
From frantz at netcom.com Thu Oct 2 08:20:02 1997
From: frantz at netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 23:20:02 +0800
Subject: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet orcrypto"
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID:
At 11:16 AM -0700 10/1/97, Alex Le Heux wrote:
>You people just don't get it do you? A gun has one purpose: To kill. Just like
>any other tool, a gun, if it is available _will_ be used at some point.
When I was on my high school rifle team, I thought the one purpose of guns
was to poke holes in a piece of paper closer to the center of the
bull's-eye than the other team could.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz | Internal surveillance | Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506 | helped make the USSR the | 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz at netcom.com | nation it is today. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA
From theSameGuy at theSamePlace.Old Thu Oct 2 08:24:01 1997
From: theSameGuy at theSamePlace.Old (The Same Guy)
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 23:24:01 +0800
Subject: InfoWar 27 / TEXT
Message-ID: <3433B47B.7D3F@theSamePlace.Old>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The True Story of the InterNet
Part III
InfoWar
Final Frontier of the Digital Revolution
Behind the ElectroMagnetic Curtain
by TruthMonger
Copyright 1997 Pearl Publishing
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
InfoWar Table of Contents
* Anarchist Post of the Century
Alex Le Clue
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anarchist Post of the Century
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Mr. Policeman is Your Friend
From: Tim May
To: cypherpunks at cyberpass.net
>Electronic Frontier Canada's David Jones (djones at insight.dcss.McMaster.CA)
>posted the following to the EFC mailing list:
>2. If cops can read E-mail, so can the bad guys
> http://www.efc.ca/pages/media/gazette.24sep97.html
Let's not forget that cops are often the bad guys.
And I don't mean this in a macho, off-the-pigs way. I mean that throughout
history the "cops" are those who have enforced the laws and whims of
tyrants, who have arrested and tortured and executed dissidents and
nonconformists of all flavors, and who were the "King's men" in the times
of the Founders.
Even in more recent decades in the U.S., don't forget it was "cops" who
harassed civil rights workers, who broke up perfectly legal strikes, who
arrested and imprisoned Eugene Debs for speaking out against the draft in
particular and a foolish war, WW 1, in general, and so on. One need only
look to J. Edgar Hoover and his police state measures.
(In fact, the very term "police state" tells us all we need to know about
whether or not "Mr. Policeman is Your Friend" is always, or even most of
the time, true.)
And with full awareness that I am invoking Godwin's Law, the "cops" in
Europe in the 1933-45 period were the enforcers of Hitler's policies.
Here's a list of some folks throughout history and in various regimes who
would likely have reason not to want to escrow their keys with the local
police:
Jews, Catholics, Protestants, atheists, heretics, schismatics, heathens,
poets, authors, Scharansky, Solzhenitsyn, refuseniks, Chinese dissidents,
students in front of tanks, Branch Davidians, Scientologists, Jesus,
Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, African National Congress, UNITA, Thomas Jefferson,
Patrick Henry, colonial rebels, patriots, Tories, Basque separatists,
Algerian separatists, secessionists, abolitionists, John Brown, draft
opponents, communists, capitalists, imperialist lackeys, anarchists,
Charlie Chaplin, Galileo, Joan of Arc,, Martin Luther, Martin Luther King,
Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael, civil rights workers, Margaret Sanger, birth
control activists, abortionists, anti-abortionists, Michael Miliken, Robert
Vesco, Marc Rich, Nixon's Enemies, Hoover's enemies, Clinton's enemies,
Republicans, Democrats, anarchists, labor organizers, pornographers,
readers of "Playboy," viewers of images of women whose faces are uncovered,
Amateur Action, Jock Sturges, violators of the CDA, alt.fan.karla-homulka
readers, Internet Casino customers, Scientologists, Rosicrucians,
royalists, Jacobeans, Hemlock Society activists, Jimmy Hoffa, John L. Lewis,
Cesar Chavez, opponents of United Fruit, land reformers, Simon Bolivar,
Robin Hood, Dennis Banks, American Indian Movement, Jack Anderson, Daniel
Ellesberg, peace activists, Father Berrigan, Mormons, Joseph Smith,
missionaries, Greenpeace, Animal Liberation Front, gypsies, diplomats, UN
ambassadors, Randy Weaver, David Koresh, Ayatollah Khomeini, John Gotti,
Papists, Ulstermen, IRA, Shining Path, militia members, tax protesters,
Hindus, Sikhs, Lech Walesa, Polish labor movement, freedom fighters,
revolutionaries, Ben Franklin, Thomas Paine, and "suspects"
--Tim May
The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^2,976,221 | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alex Le Clue
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Axle Le Clue shook his head in disbelief, as he read the CypherPunks list
post that had been sent by his clueless Doppelganger, Alex Le Heux.
Subject: Re: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or crypto"
From: alexlh at xs4all.nl (Alex Le Heux)
To: cypherpunks at cyberpass.net
Bullshit. People in the US rarely use their weapons against oppressive
governments or political turbulence. Most guns that are used against
another person there are used to commit crime or to defend against
those armed criminals.
Anonymous wrote:
>Let's also take a look at the Dutch performance during their
>occupation. While there certainly were many courageous Dutch people
>who helped refugees (at great personal risk, to say the least), and
>there were many courageous Dutch people who were in the resistance,
>there were also many Dutch people who did not perform so well. Not
>only were a large number of Jewish people turned in by Dutch
>informers, but there were even Dutch SS units.
You have a nerve. You, coming from a country where people are still
regularly killed in the name of racism, tell me this?!
Alex
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0
Charset: noconv
iQA/AwUBNDNpTNuYAh4dUSo/EQK3bwCeKJv4AW0kOwjSRitLi7HDa7KEaW8AoN4F
OwK1wOG19pazc93T1twP1Evp
=FsmU
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Axle Le Clue had been following this thread, in which a large number of
CypherPunks had contributed their perspective, to little effect, for the
most part.
Alex Le H[clu]e[less]ux, despite a variety of sensible, well-reasoned posts
by a number of different American CypherPunks, seemed to remain, in his own
mind, a world-class expert on a country in which he did not reside.
What was especially sad, was that the poor, dumb fucker wasn't even a spook.
Axle Le Clue decided that, since the rather civil posts by the other list
members were not helping his clueless twin from across the sea to come
half-way to his senses, that he would step into his VerityMonger suit and
bring the boy up to speed on what an ignorant asshole he was making of
himself.
It was the least he could do for an evil twin�
Subject: When you realize that you're too stupid to live, you can borrow my
gun.
From: Axellc at xsDRUGS4all.hi (Axle Le Clue)
To: cypherpunks at Algebra.COM
Alex,
Did you know that all Europeans are exactly 5' 7" tall, have light brown
hair and limp slightly when they walk? I know this because I watch TV and
that makes me a goddamn fucking expert on you low-life foreigners who aren't
like us, over here.
If you disagree with my view of your region of the world, then why don't you
get your head out of your fucking ass so that you have an outside chance of
expressing an opinion or viewpoint that you didn't suck out of the cocks of
the mass media when it comes to our region of the world.
I saw a news story on TV the other day about two senior citizens who drew
down on a would-be robber in a restaurant, or some such, using their illegal
guns, which they carried for their own protection.
Yep, I saw it in the news once.
Today some kid slashed his mater's throat, and then went to school and
whacked out a couple of his classmates with a rifle. I have seen this every
half-fucking-hour since it happened, and will no doubt be shown all of the
messy details another few hundred times before the mass media who seem to be
in charge of spoon-feeding people like yourself their world-view is done
creating your reality for you.
You want nerve, pal? I've got the fucking nerve to suggest that you petition
your fucking government to take in a few million US government created
nigger crack-heads, so that your country can teach our citizens how to treat
them with love and respect.
To tell the truth, I'd rather you took the white-bread junkies, because my
nigger drug addict acquaintances have treated me much better than my honkey
junkie pals.
Correct me if I'm wrong (but I never am), but it seems to me that Europe is
not even interested in saving our Black-African Americans from the horrible
abuse they suffer as a result of our country's racism. Come and get 'em�see
if they'll go.
The US has racial problems because we have different races. We also have a
whole shitload of racial harmony.
All over the world, there are a variety of countries engaged in mass murder
and genocide, at any given point in time. You try coming to the US and
slaughtering even a few thousand of any particular race, religion, or ethnic
group, and you won't even be able to take a wild guess at the number of
people of various races, religions and ethnic groups that will be on your
ass like shit on stink.
You hypocritical piece of shit--having the fucking audacity to conceitedly
brag about how the people of Europe have "put the crap of WWII behind us"
and suggest that it is something that we "haven't managed to do."
Want the cold, hard facts of life, Bubba?
You didn't put WWII 'behind' you. We did!
Gun-loving Americans conquered your continent and gave you your countries
back instead of enslaving you, like every other winner in history has done.
Some of us discriminate against Jews. Do you know why?
Because we HAVE some!
We were giving them refuge while Europe was massacring them by the millions.
Now you have the balls to say we're not all treating them right all of the
time.
Buy a fucking clue!
NEWS FLASH!!!
Fascism hadn't died, it has just gone underground and crept into every facet
of life through the corporate and government power mongers.
The government and the mass media are working the citizens like dumb fish on
a hook, who are still trying to swallow the worm. There is a New World Order
on the way, and it isn't going to be any prettier than the last time it was
tried.
You can dismiss as paranoid ranters and ravers, those who decry the
increasing loss of our freedom and privacy, but you would be better served
to listen and learn from them, rather than criticize their determination to
defend their liberty, to the death, if necessary.
Why? Because these are the same people who defended Europe's liberty, to the
death.
The danger is not the freedom lovers who are armed and declaring the line
they will not let others step over, in compromising their rights and
freedoms.
The danger is the sheeple who believe the government and their media shills
when they say that the Thought Police only want Austria. The Privacy Police
only want the Jews.
The danger is the sheeple who buy the government lie that they need to deny
us our rights and freedoms to solve the problems that they, themselves, have
created.
If you can't see this clearly, then there is nothing that I or any of the
other CypherPunks can say to change your perception of the source of
creeping fascism that is leading to yet another attempt to create a New
World Order.
I love the American people. I despise the secret American government. I feel
the same about many other countries I have lived in or visited.
I do not want to see your children, or mine, fighting in the future over
what color to paint their prison cells, instead of fighting to escape, and
be free. When the cattle cars stop at the end of the line, the people you
find there are not nearly as civil and reasonable as the ones who checked
your identity cards at the beginning of the trip, to make sure that you were
properly processed according to your rights under the law.
I think you are an idiot to believe that the threat of weapons in the hands
of the citizens is a greater threat than weapons only in the hands of the
rich and powerful. However, if Europe is conquered by the forces of evil,
once again, I am sure that myself and many other Americans will do what we
can to come pull your ass out of the fire.
It may take a little longer, this time, though, since we may have to kick
our own fascist government's ass before we come kick the shit out of your
dictators.
No need to thank us�it's just the way Americans are.
VerityMonger
"If you want to conquer the world, you're going to have to come through me."
("Do you feel lucky, Hitler? Well�do you?)
Copyright "Anonymous TruthMonger "
"You can't get there from here."
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
"WebWorld & the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs"
"InfoWar (Part III of 'The True Story of the InterNet')
Soviet Union Sickle of Eunuchs Secret WebSite
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From anon at anon.efga.org Thu Oct 2 08:34:29 1997
From: anon at anon.efga.org (Anonymous)
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 23:34:29 +0800
Subject: Remailers and ecash (fwd)
Message-ID:
Jim Choate:
>For the sender to chain from remailer to remailer to destination the
>destination has to be in the header info somewhere. Now in the most secure
>system each packet header will only contain the address of the next hop. When
>the next site gets it the packet contents are de-crypted (otherwise reading
>the chaining info is trivial) and the contents are uncovered to reveal another
>packet with the next hop header and another encrypted block. And on and on
>we go.
>
> packet system?>
Jim Choate has been amazingly clueless throughout this discussion, but
this takes the cake. Does he really not know about encrypted nested
chaining? My God! Of course remailers work this way, Jim. They've
worked this way practically from the beginning. All remailers work this
way. The mixmaster remailers are built around this idea, making each
packet a constant size and adding dummy packets as new ones are stripped
off, so outgoing messages look just like incoming ones.
How can you be arguing about remailers when you know so little about how
they work?
> hop header depended on which key was used to decode it.
> In other words, remailer A's key will produce one next hop
> address while remailer B's key will send it elsewhere. This
> is a subset of the different plaintext - same cyphertext
> problem - a hard problem as I understand it. Find two
> distinct texts that encrypt with different keys to the
> same cyphertext>
That won't help. There would be no point in doing this. I'd ask you
to explain, but that would just prolong the agony.
From nobody at REPLAY.COM Thu Oct 2 08:42:21 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 23:42:21 +0800
Subject: Stronghold
Message-ID: <199710021515.RAA14546@basement.replay.com>
C2Net was wrong to censor the cypherpunks list in the guise of moderation.
It was wrong to send threatening letters to people who claimed its
products were weak. The whole moderation/censorship experiment was a
terrible mistake. The actions taken by C2Net were completely unjustified.
At the same time, it is dishonest to say that its products have
backdoors or are weak. There is no evidence whatsoever that this
is the case.
It may stretch the intellects of some cypherpunks beyond the breaking
point to hold these two views about matters at the same time. In the
black and white world where some cypherpunks live, a company which
tries to prevent criticism is evil, hence it must be fraudulent as well.
More mature list readers will recognize that a company or a person can
be wrong in some actions while being right in other ways.
The burden of proof in claiming that there is a weakness in someone's
security product is on those making the claim. Compare the unfounded
statements by Vulis with the carefully documented breaks of weak
software by Ian Goldberg, David Wagner, John Kelsey, and Bruce Schneier.
What if Goldberg and Wagner had claimed that Netscape's RNG seeding was
weak, without providing any more evidence than that claim? What if
Schneier et al had broken cellular phone encryption without backing it
up? They would have been justifiably ignored.
If anyone really does believe that C2Net's products have backdoors or
weaknesses, why don't they present them? Either they want people to keep
using C2Net's supposedly broken products, which reflects badly on them,
or they want people to stop but they are unable to present any evidence
of these purported weaknesses.
When Vulis or anyone else claims Stronghold is broken, ask him why he is
presenting his claims in a form which will cause people to keep using
this "broken" software. Does he want people to have weak encryption?
Is he in favor of backdoors? If not, he would surely present evidence
of the weaknesses, if there is any. Make Vulis explain his motivations
when he makes these claims.
From dlv at bwalk.dm.com Thu Oct 2 08:51:53 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 23:51:53 +0800
Subject: Stronghold
In-Reply-To: <199710021247.OAA00552@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID:
nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) writes:
>
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM writes:
> >
> > Anonymous writes:
>
> > > Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM writes:
>
> > > Those who are newcomers to the list should know that Vulis has never
> > > presented any evidence substantiating his vague claims that Stronghold
> > > is insecure or has backdoors (or whatever the claims were). Vulis is
> > > conducting a personal vendetta against one of C2Net's staff members and
> > > anyone who happened to be or become associated with him.
>
> > Nor do I have to present any evidence.
>
> You misordered this: it should say "Nor do I have any evidence to
> present."
Nope. Like I said, I'm not selling Stronghold or any competing product, I
don't lose anything when someone foolishly buys it, so why should I present
any evidence? I (and several other people on this mailing list) were threatened
by C2Net's lawyers; so to avoid unpleasant disputes, I told them I won't be
publishing whatever I might know about their product.
> > I'm not the one selling StrongHold.
>
> No, you're the one trying to torpedo its sales to get back at certain
> individuals for some perceived slight.
No I'm not. What do I lose if someone not affiliated with me makes a
foolish purchasing decision?
That's why I complied with C2Net's request not to publish my opinions of
their product.
>
> > I have received several threatening communications from C2Net's lawyers,
> > which were discussed at length on this list. To avoid unpleasant disputes
> > I agreed not to disseminate my opinions about StrongHold.
>
> Amazingly, C2Net doesn't like to see its product publicly slandered
> by reptiles like Vulis. If Vulis' opinion were based on anything
> other than personal ill will - ie, if he had ever actually downloaded
> and examined Stronghold and found any problems with it - he would have
> a leg to stand on. As it is, his allegations are completely unfounded.
If this were true, then C2Net would encourage me to publicly present whatever
"evidence" I have so they'd be able to refute it. This is not what they
asked me to do.
> > Please keep this in mind if you consider buying it.
>
> Keep in mind that anything Vulis says is in all likelihood a complete
> lie.
Keep in mind that "anonymous" is probably an employee of C2Net. Several of
C2Net's shills used to post C2Net propaganda withouy revealing their C2Net
affiliation; they switched to anonymous remailers when their nyms were exposed.
---
Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
From wendigo at ne-wendigo.jabberwock.org Thu Oct 2 08:54:47 1997
From: wendigo at ne-wendigo.jabberwock.org (Mark Rogaski)
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 23:54:47 +0800
Subject: Forwarded mail...
In-Reply-To: <199710020409.AAA19702@mx01.together.net>
Message-ID: <199710021536.LAA19561@deathstar.jabberwock.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
An entity claiming to be Brian B. Riley wrote:
:
: ... nothing personal, but why is it people keep deluding themselves
: with the idea that they can shoot to wound. You cannot know what a
Because that's what all the cops on TV do. Most people see non-lethal
leg shots on TV all the time, so they assume that it's probable. Even
worse was "The A-Team" where hundreds of rounds were fired, but no one
ever got hurt. It was intended to reduce the amount of violence on TV,
but (in my opinion) only made gunplay seem like a safe recreational
activity.
Most of the people who talk about non-lethal wounding have very little
experience with firearms. A few years ago, I was in school in a small
PA town. The local cops shot and killed a kid who rushed at them with a
knife. Most of the people I knew couldn't understand why the cop (who
was in no way a gung-ho type, but competent and stable) didn't "just shoot
him in the leg". I would ask them if they knew what shooting a moving
target, in an uncertain situation, in the middle of the night was like.
Most of them had never even held a gun, but they had seen the cop show
last night and KNEW it was possible.
Doc
- --
[] Mark Rogaski "That which does not kill me
[] wendigo at pobox.com only makes me stranger."
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From attila at hun.org Thu Oct 2 09:24:32 1997
From: attila at hun.org (Attila T. Hun)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 00:24:32 +0800
Subject: counter-intuitive -- spam is good for you. anonymous assholes are your friend
In-Reply-To: <199710021138.NAA23846@xs1.xs4all.nl>
Message-ID: <19971002.155729@hun.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
on or about 971002:1338
Zooko Journeyman purported to expostulate:
+So maybe _that's_ why I've found it rewarding to select _for_
+anonymous posts instead of against in recent times.
+And why I toy with the notion of fomenting the kind of infowar "war
+games" that Phill Hallam-Baker hates.
yes, Zooko, go for it; Phill needs all the help he can get to
shake out his obviously poorly maintained and porous node which
he has claimed to be secure.
if Phill is secure, what difference does it make if you assault
him? my guess is he is not secure, and probably has no clue how
to get from there to secure.
--
"When I die, please cast my ashes upon Bill Gates.
For once, let him clean up after me! "
______________________________________________________________________
"attila" 1024/C20B6905/23 D0 FA 7F 6A 8F 60 66 BC AF AE 56 98 C0 D7 B0
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From tcmay at got.net Thu Oct 2 09:41:43 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 00:41:43 +0800
Subject: Kill All The NIGGERS (Vote for Bob Dole))
In-Reply-To: <34337389.21D9@dev.null>
Message-ID:
At 6:28 AM -0700 10/2/97, S. M. Halloran wrote:
>Racist Remailer wrote on 2 Oct 97:
>
>[manifest immaturity deleted]
>
>Okay, on whose watch did this one get out?
>
>(Yes, I did reply, and yes, I plead guilty for keeping this thread
>going by having done so...so do you too have to reply?)
>
I expect you're new on the list, having only seen your name the last few
days. Welcome to the list.
As for "on whose watch did this one get out?" question, I hope you are not
assuming or expecting that remailer operators screen messages for
politeness, or even for sedition, libel, and copyright violation?
Remailers simply remail. Some remailers have elected to have lists of
addresses they will not send to (like *.whitehouse.gov), and some limit
sizes, and a few other such things. But neither _content_ nor _title_ is a
screening criterion by any remailer I have heard of.
Get used to it.
(Oh, and please send posts to one of the "real" Cypherpunks lists, not the
temporary toad.com address.)
--Tim May
The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^2,976,221 | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
From attila at hun.org Thu Oct 2 10:06:48 1997
From: attila at hun.org (Attila T. Hun)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 01:06:48 +0800
Subject: Mr. Policeman is Your Friend
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <19971002.164428@hun.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
on or about 971001:1644
Tim May purported to expostulate:
[snip antecedent]
+Let's not forget that cops are often the bad guys.
[read Tim's excellent analysis and list in original]
the thin blue line: just whose side are the police on?
"the police are the lowest element of our society"
(either Cato or Marcellus at the time of Julius Caesar)
the cop is often a thug with a clean enough record to join the force
and continue his trade.
if you want to break heads, join the police; if you want to
destroy buildings, join the fire department.
these [wo]men may be public servants, but as Tim points out, just
who is the master. In the US, "We the people" should be the masters,
but are we? obviously not.
read my DejaVu - Cypherpunks as Philosopher Kings. yes, it is
inflammatory, but the cards are on the table. we're being set
up to have less rights that are available under the UN declaration
which has the same right of assembly and protest --as long as it is
not against the security of the state.
if guns are outlawed, only outlaws will have guns. obvious,
particularly in America; but think of another implication:
if the government of the US no longer truly represents
"We the people," is not the government an outlaw government?
"if guns are outlawed, only outlaws will have guns" takes
on a whole new meaning...
and, remember, we are not fighting a war with guns; we are fighting a
war for the control of communication and information and that is one
of the primary functions of cypherpunks: to ensure the freedom of
speech, including [specifically] encrypted speech.
--
"Experience keeps a dear school, but fools will learn in no other."
--Benjamin Franklin
______________________________________________________________________
"attila" 1024/C20B6905/23 D0 FA 7F 6A 8F 60 66 BC AF AE 56 98 C0 D7 B0
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=OPCA
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From nobody at REPLAY.COM Thu Oct 2 10:08:15 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 01:08:15 +0800
Subject: Stronghold
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <199710021649.SAA24741@basement.replay.com>
Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM writes:
>
> I (and several other people on this mailing list) were threatened
> by C2Net's lawyers; so to avoid unpleasant disputes, I told them I won't be
> publishing whatever I might know about their product.
You obviously didn't know anything about it anyway.
> > No, you're the one trying to torpedo its sales to get back at certain
> > individuals for some perceived slight.
>
> No I'm not.
An obvious lie. Big surprise.
> That's why I complied with C2Net's request not to publish my opinions of
> their product.
You complied no doubt because you knew that your 'opinions' were baseless,
and that you had no defense to a libel suit.
> If this were true, then C2Net would encourage me to publicly present whatever
> "evidence" I have so they'd be able to refute it. This is not what they
> asked me to do.
You have no evidence, Liar. I'm sure they simply asked you to stop
publishing lies about them.
> Keep in mind that "anonymous" is probably an employee of C2Net.
Actually I'm not. Even so, this is just another wormy tactic to
deflect attention from the fact that you're lying.
> Several of
> C2Net's shills used to post C2Net propaganda withouy revealing their C2Net
> affiliation; they switched to anonymous remailers when their nyms were exposed.
I have little doubt that this is just another unfounded allegation
from the mouth of Dimitri Vulis, Noted Liar.
-Frondeur
From attila at hun.org Thu Oct 2 10:30:16 1997
From: attila at hun.org (Attila T. Hun)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 01:30:16 +0800
Subject: Mr. Policeman is Your Friend
In-Reply-To: <199710020639.IAA23181@ankara.duzen.com.tr>
Message-ID: <19971002.171414@hun.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
on or about 971002:0941
"S. M. Halloran" purported to expostulate:
[snip - part of original text follows at the end of new message]
the US initiated "Civil Rights" legislation at the
Federal level to deal with the abuse of a persons
liberty. It has been used many ways, but its original
intent was to be able to charge, convict, and punish
racist miscreants in the South for murdering Civil
Rights activists who would walk scott free when tried
for murder as white juries would not convict them
(twelve "good" men unanimously). The statue was
effectively retroactive.
another perfect example, although I personally think
poorly applied as I knew the Sergeant who was scapegoated
when they convicted the animal who deserved it: The
Rodney King case. A suburban white jury not-guiltied
the four officers, except one "hung" count on the
animal. The Feds stepped in and charged them with Civil
Rights violations.
for a hilarious exposition on impartial juries, read
Mark Twain's Virginia City writings.
The animal and the Sergeant were convicted; the judge
sentenced them to 30 months or something; the Feds
appealed since it was less than the guidelines, and the
appeals court sent it back for resentencing; the judge
repeated the sentence; by this time they were free
anyway. The argument on the sentence is probably still
going on...
however, specifically to your question of an additive
sentence for a person operating under the colour of law:
no --except, the prosecutor could file additional
charges of 'operating under the colour of law' --and the
judge could specify that the sentence for that violation
is to run after the others which would extend the time
(often referred to as "running wild").
The remedy is there; the difficulty is in getting it
applied unless the case is notorious.
and, it provides for penalties ranging all the way to
the death penalty. a very comprehensive, catch-all law
which is rarely applied equally.
another great American legal innovation which is even
more of travesty: RICO --Racketeering Influenced
Corrupt Organizations. it only takes 3 in the
conspiracy to invoke it, and by itself it has a
mandatory 20 years no parole; if it is 6 or more people,
it is life without parole.
common law no longer exists in the US. the courts are
all Admiralty Courts where the only habeus corpus you
have is what the court might gratuitously grant you.
FDR sold the country into legal bankruptcy on 9 Mar 33
pledging all Americans and their property as collateral.
Bankruptcy is a contract matter, and as such is not
subject to common law. Americans live by being licensed
to exist --the license starts with the social security
number which is now required to be issued at birth.
--
"When I die, please cast my ashes upon Bill Gates.
For once, let him clean up after me! "
______________________________________________________________________
"attila" 1024/C20B6905/23 D0 FA 7F 6A 8F 60 66 BC AF AE 56 98 C0 D7 B0
+I have a question: has any jurisdiction (local, state, federal) in
+the U.S. resolved the hyprocrisy--maybe better to phrase "double
+standard"--wherein citizens who commit crimes against persons who
+perform duties under the color and badge of authority--namely the
+police--are charged with additional offenses specific for crimes
+against govt officers--but govt officers who commit crimes against
+citizens while in the performance of duties under the color and badge
+of authority would suffer the same penalty as citizens who commit
+crimes against "just" citizens? --
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From rah at shipwright.com Thu Oct 2 10:33:42 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 01:33:42 +0800
Subject: new release of Crowds
Message-ID:
--- begin forwarded text
X-Authentication-Warning: akalice.research.att.com: majordomo set sender to
owner-crowds-talk at research.att.com using -f
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 10:28:06 -0400 (EDT)
From: Mike Reiter
To: crowds-talk at research.att.com
Subject: new release of Crowds
Sender: owner-crowds-talk at research.att.com
Precedence: bulk
Crowds 1.0.3 is now available. If you already agreed to our license
on our web page, there's no need to do it again; just send email to
crowds-support at research.att.com
from the previous email address that you gave us, and we'll send 1.0.3
to you.
The main change in 1.0.3 is a configuration file that eliminates the
need for command-line arguments to anon.pl, and that also enables us
to ship distributions ready to join our crowd (i.e., the registration
step is eliminated). Hopefully this will make Crowds easier to use.
- Mike
--- end forwarded text
-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/
From anon at anon.efga.org Thu Oct 2 11:03:30 1997
From: anon at anon.efga.org (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 02:03:30 +0800
Subject: CDA protects against liability
Message-ID: <066c1dbe1946e2f31eaf54f722772af6@anon.efga.org>
Another case where the CDA protected against liability. Remailer ops
should look into this.
http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/7361.html:
A San Francisco judge has ruled that a lawsuit that
sought to force an Internet service provider to silence a Usenet
participant is barred by the federal Communications Decency Act.
At issue was a claim by San Francisco Satanists Michael and Lilith
Aquino that San Diego-based ElectriCiti Inc. "breached its duty to the
[plaintiffs] and to other Internet users" by failing to take action against
an anonymous Usenet poster.
The newsgroup participant allegedly harassed Michael Aquino, a
former US Army lieutenant colonel and the leader of the Temple of
Set, and his wife, Lilith. The claimed harassment took the form of
messages referring to the Aquinos' involvement in a ritual child-abuse
investigation in San Francisco in the 1980s. The couple was never
charged with any wrongdoing.
Superior Court judge David Garcia accepted ElectriCiti's contention
that the lawsuit violated a little-discussed and still-in-force CDA
provision that exempts ISPs from liability for content transmitted on
their networks. The law states that "no provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information content provider."
The decision is one of three such cases nationwide that have been thrown
out because they attempted to hold ISPs responsible for subscribers'
speech, said ElectriCiti's attorney, Roger Myers.
From tcmay at got.net Thu Oct 2 11:35:38 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 02:35:38 +0800
Subject: Request for illegal electronic surveillance examples and cases
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID:
At 7:40 PM -0700 10/1/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>So I'm putting together a special report featuring examples of illegal
>wiretapping by governments -- to show why we shouldn't trust them with
>mandatory domestic key escrow. Also illegal electronic surveillance,
>generally speaking. Especially more recent ones. Maybe non-U.S. examples
>too.
>
>Any suggestions? I'm thinking things like: MLKjr, Mrs. Roosevelt, _Irvine_,
>_Socialist Workers Party_, Dewey-FBI alliance, mail opening, Emma Goldman,
>Brownell's blanket microphone surveillance, _Katz_, _Alderman_, CISPES.
As others have noted, Bamford's "The Puzzle Palace" is chock-full of
examples of government surveillance of cable and telephone traffic,
including cozy deals with ITT to have them turn over all cable traffic.
Ditto for other telecom carriers.
And the UK-USA agreement enables "cross-surveillance," where GCHQ can do
COMINT in the U.S., and NSA can do COMINT in the U.K and its colonies,
without technically violating charters and laws. (Someone described a room
at Fort Meade where a full-time staff of British and American agents
cross-fertilize their products--if the NSA wants some traffic surveilled,
the GCHQ can punch in a few commands, get the traffic, and then "share" it
with their American counterpart).
Bamford's updated edition is not out yet, so far as I know. Maybe it'll
have more recent examples, especially involving computers and networks.
As I'm not a professional telecom exec, or spook, most of my examples
either comes from books (Bamford, Kahn, Burnham, etc.), or from anecdotal
examples given. Anecdotes are hard to verify. But here are a few:
- a Minneapolis friend of mine told me that the huge Cargill operation, the
world's largest grain-trading company, and privately held, was using crypto
in messages to Europe and Asia. They were asked by the NSA to stop, or to
provide NSA with a key. Obviously this could only have happened if NSA or
GCHQ were intercepting and attempting to decode. (My Minneapolis friend
told me this in 1988. I don't have any details beyond this.)
- someone told me that transcontinental telephone lines were routed in the
60s and 70s deliberately over Indian reservations in the Rocky Mountain
states, and that the NSA used their "sovereign nation" status to skirt U.S.
laws about domestic surveillance. (True or not, I can't say. Maybe a
telecom buff here can see if any unusual jogs in the routing of the
LongLines can be seen, jogs that take them into Indian Reservations in
Utah, Colorado, etc., which is where I heard the intercept sites are
located.)
- more locally, I have been struck by the confluence of certain
capabilities right in my own area. The Defense Language School is in
Monterey, California. AT&T also operated their "simultaneous translation"
service there (or did, last time I heard)...this service allows a speaker
of Arabic, say, to speak to a speaker of Bantu, by means of experts in
these areas. And not far away is a major signal processing Cray complex,
ostensibly related to undersea sonar analysis, but usable in other ways.
The Naval Postgraduate School and a couple of foreign relations think tanks
are also in the area. Finally, or maybe not finally, the major West Coast
satellite earth station is located in Jamesburg, California, in an RF quiet
valley at the end of Carmel Valley. (Bamford also discusses this. Some of
the other major earth stations have already been identified as NSA
intercept points, such as the one in the valley in West Virginia.)
(Were I writing a novel, I would use this confluence to suggest that this
site is used for translating a lot of foreign language conversations
crossing this major West Coast earth station. The huge pool of foreign
language experts in the Monterey Bay area, what with DLS and ancillary
facilities, including the Naval Postgraduate School, and the presence of a
good cover for a major computer installation....)
- look also into the Red Squads in major American cities, where cops
ignored surveillance warrants to compile dossiers. (I believe the State of
Israel, often involved in such things as a cutout for the U.S., was
involved in some of these. In L.A., at least.)
- Frederick Forsythe has a fine new novel out, "Icon," which details
exhaustively (and probably correctly, given his other research) how
Russia's version of the NSA, now called FAPSI (standing for something in
Russian about radio), is supplementing its meader state funding by
freelancing for corporations and mafia groups which want ELINT and COMINT
on their rivals.
Anyway, finding _concrete_ evidence for surveillance, at least in recent
years, is not a lightweight project. It took Bamford years of research,
FOIAs, and so on.
Good luck.
--Tim May
The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^2,976,221 | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
From declan at well.com Thu Oct 2 11:48:16 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 02:48:16 +0800
Subject: Request for illegal electronic surveillance examples and cases
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID:
Thanks, all, for the suggestions. Unfortunately my time is limited: my
deadline is tonight. I'm working on a roundup of pre-reported
cases, not reporting out new ones. (at least for this project)
My best source so far is the 1976 Church Committee documents. Gentry's bio
of J. Edgar Hoover is a good one too. Burnham lent me a copy of his "Above
the Law" book about the DoJ which I haven't finished yet. Haven't read
Puzzle Palace in a while, probably don't have time to reread that.
-Declan
From shamrock at cypherpunks.to Thu Oct 2 12:09:24 1997
From: shamrock at cypherpunks.to (Lucky Green)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 03:09:24 +0800
Subject: Stronghold
In-Reply-To: <199710021515.RAA14546@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID:
On Thu, 2 Oct 1997, Anonymous wrote:
>
> C2Net was wrong to censor the cypherpunks list in the guise of moderation.
> It was wrong to send threatening letters to people who claimed its
> products were weak. The whole moderation/censorship experiment was a
> terrible mistake. The actions taken by C2Net were completely unjustified.
Where do people get these bizarre ideas? C2 didn't censor the list. A guy
who happened to work for C2 dropped some messages from one list. The
messages still went out on the unfiltered list. Had he worked for Mc
Donald's or the the NYC Sanitiation Department, would you blame them for
this as well?
-- Lucky Green PGP encrypted email preferred.
"Tonga? Where the hell is Tonga? They have Cypherpunks there?"
From tcmay at got.net Thu Oct 2 12:34:55 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 03:34:55 +0800
Subject: Request for illegal electronic surveillance examples and cases
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID:
At 11:33 AM -0700 10/2/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>Thanks, all, for the suggestions. Unfortunately my time is limited: my
>deadline is tonight. I'm working on a roundup of pre-reported
>cases, not reporting out new ones. (at least for this project)
Meaning nothing against Declan personally, this "my deadline is tonight" is
one of the reasons I almost never read news magazines anymore.
(I stupidly bought a copy of something "Time" calls "Time Digital," as it
seemed to have some of my acquaintances in it. I should've spotted the jive
by the title on the cover, "Our Exclusive Ranking of the Cyber Elite." Lots
of one-line quoting of pundits, shots of the overexposed geekbabe Pohlese,
and fatuous nonsense about what it means to be rich in Silicon Valley. I
wouldn't have believed it could be possible, but "Time Digital" is far,
far worse than "Wired." Here's to hoping it dies a merciful death in the
next few months.)
--Tim May
The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^2,976,221 | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
From minow at apple.com Thu Oct 2 12:44:25 1997
From: minow at apple.com (Martin Minow)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 03:44:25 +0800
Subject: Possible Security Hole in Internet Explorer 4.0
Message-ID:
>From a message in MacOSRumors (I have
not independently verified this)
--- Begin quote ---
Internet Explorer 4.0 ships with major security hole....
With the Microsoft Internet Explorer 4.0 for Windows release only hours
old, users have already discovered a major security hole that smacks
painfully of Big Brother:
Most folks will remember the Netscape java bug that allowed you to snoop on
what people where visiting. Well IE4.0 goes a bit further than this -
Logging of your actions, even when you would otherwise be shielded by
proxies is BUILT-IN.
The channel definition format (.CDF)
http://www.microsoft.com/standards/cdf-f.htm
includes a LOGTARGET feature that allows a web site provider to make your
browser deliver logs of your usage via an http post or put. Even hits from
cache are logged. This is all not so good and getting worse. Not only is
the information posted material, you wouldn't want to give to a provider,
(considering) "http post/put" is normally spoofable anyway.
Unanswered question for next time - or for folks with more time than me to
follow up Can you put other sites in your channel definition and get logs
of when they read your competitor's site (with this system)?
Definitely not confidence-inspiring. It appears the Mac version is affected
by this same problem, as well...and neither platform has any means of
disabling this "feature" at present.
---
[Internet Explorer 4.0 has not yet been released for the Macintosh platform.]
Martin Minow minow at apple.com
From declan at well.com Thu Oct 2 12:46:10 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 03:46:10 +0800
Subject: Request for illegal electronic surveillance examples and cases
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID:
Heh. I've never actually published anything in Time Digital. The one piece
I worked on for them was a full-page interview with Crypto-czar David
Aaron that was supposed to happen when he was in town in January.
But he blew me and the photographer off and left town without being
interviewed.
I learned much later that he always hated the term "crypto-czar," which I
(and my co-authors) coined in an article we wrote a year ago breaking the
news on his appointment. Maybe that's why he ducked out.
-Declan
On Thu, 2 Oct 1997, Tim May wrote:
> At 11:33 AM -0700 10/2/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
> >Thanks, all, for the suggestions. Unfortunately my time is limited: my
> >deadline is tonight. I'm working on a roundup of pre-reported
> >cases, not reporting out new ones. (at least for this project)
>
> Meaning nothing against Declan personally, this "my deadline is tonight" is
> one of the reasons I almost never read news magazines anymore.
>
> (I stupidly bought a copy of something "Time" calls "Time Digital," as it
> seemed to have some of my acquaintances in it. I should've spotted the jive
> by the title on the cover, "Our Exclusive Ranking of the Cyber Elite." Lots
> of one-line quoting of pundits, shots of the overexposed geekbabe Pohlese,
> and fatuous nonsense about what it means to be rich in Silicon Valley. I
> wouldn't have believed it could be possible, but "Time Digital" is far,
> far worse than "Wired." Here's to hoping it dies a merciful death in the
> next few months.)
From declan at well.com Thu Oct 2 12:49:57 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 03:49:57 +0800
Subject: CDA protects against liability
In-Reply-To: <066c1dbe1946e2f31eaf54f722772af6@anon.efga.org>
Message-ID:
Remember that the CDA "protects against liability" since the online
services cut a deal during the legislative process.
In other words AOL & co lobbied to have provisions inserted to get them off
the hook, even though individual users would still be screwed when the act
became law.
Another case of corporations selling out civil liberties.
-Declan
At 13:46 -0400 10/2/97, Anonymous wrote:
>Another case where the CDA protected against liability. Remailer ops
>should look into this.
>
>http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/7361.html:
From nobody at REPLAY.COM Thu Oct 2 13:26:03 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 04:26:03 +0800
Subject: None Re: Remailers and ecash (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199710020549.AAA24606@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <199710022004.WAA17386@basement.replay.com>
Jim Choate wrote:
> Shure they do because one of the things I would love to do is run a
> commercial anon remailer.
[snip]
> You obviously have never done business with me. I've turned more than
> one customer away because they were either stupid or wanted something that
> was completely out of line.
When all your customers are anonymous, you don't get to be very choosy.
From alexlh at xs4all.nl Thu Oct 2 13:40:27 1997
From: alexlh at xs4all.nl (alexlh at xs4all.nl)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 04:40:27 +0800
Subject: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or crypto"
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID:
On Wed, 1 Oct 1997, Matt Elliott wrote:
[snip]
> >You people just don't get it do you? A gun has one purpose: To kill. Just like
> >any other tool, a gun, if it is available _will_ be used at some point.
>
> Yea, so what is your point. As long as it is lawfull killing that seems to
> me to be the point to use a gun. For lawfull purposes. Criminals will
> always be using guns anyway. If they take away guns people will just find
> another just as forcefull method of defending them selves. I have a potato
> gun that will put a 3 inch hole in just about any living creature. I'm
> going to take it deer hunting this winter. It will be cool to say I shot a
> dear with a potato and a can of hair spray (the propelant)
I completely disagree. I bet you'd disagree too when the cops come to take
you away for using illegal crypto. It would be totally lawful. But that's
besides the point.
Killing people is NOT a good thing. It never is. It might be unavoidable
in a you-or-him situation, but that doesn't make it a good thing.
Would you like to be shot? No? Not even if someone else claims he has a
good reason to? I think this goes for most people. So the best that you
can do it claim that _you_ think there's a good reason to kill someone.
This is not a working theory for a community.
Alex
---
I dabble in techno-house and sometimes,
I do that badass hip-hop thang...
But the F U N K gets me every time!
From anon at anon.efga.org Thu Oct 2 14:04:52 1997
From: anon at anon.efga.org (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 05:04:52 +0800
Subject: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or crypto"
Message-ID:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Alex Le Heux wrote:
>On 2 Oct 1997 01:29:33 +0200, in list.cypherpunks you wrote:
>>Cynthia Brown wrote:
>>>On Wed, 1 Oct 1997, Alex Le Heux wrote:
>>>> This sucks.
>>>
>>>I agree wholeheartedly.
>>
>>>IMNSHO the best way to fight crime is not with bigger guns than the
>>>"bad guys", but with better social programs such as universal health
>>>care, and improved day care so single parents can show their kids
>>>what a productive lifestyle looks like.
>>
>>Of course you agree wholeheartedly, you are an exploiter. It is
>>wrong. You should be ashamed of yourself.
>
>Can you explain who exactly exploits who here?
How about our friend J.F. Avon? He has the misfortune to share
citizenship with Ms. Brown. Thus, while he may be minding his own
business, doing nobody any harm, and pursuing happiness, should he
decline to spend thousands of hours of his life working to pay money
into Ms. Brown's socialist schemes, armed men will come to his house,
put him in a cage, and leave him there for years.
That's not a very friendly way to treat a neighbor, is it?
In the United States, many thousands of people correctly recognize
this situation. Many thousands of people are gun owners. Many
thousands of people are not only gun owners, but combat veterans. The
logical outcome would be great violence directed towards the
government. Yet, this has not happened (recently ;-).
Why? Certainly if the sums at stake were involved between
governments, there would be fodder for many wars.
The only conclusion that can be drawn is that civilians, even armed
civilians with combat experience, are so overwhelmingly peace loving
that they will bend very far backwards to avoid trouble, even if it
means thousands of hours of work. Can the same be said of career
military or government people?
>PS. What's the point in posting anonymous when you have this sig?
>
>>Editor in Chief
>>Smile Magazine
>>http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html
>>http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html
Tools which are not used are not improved.
Monty Cantsin
Editor in Chief
Smile Magazine
http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html
http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html
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From anon at anon.efga.org Thu Oct 2 14:07:24 1997
From: anon at anon.efga.org (Georgia Cracker Remailer Administrator)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 05:07:24 +0800
Subject: CDA protects against liability
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID:
On Thu, 2 Oct 1997, Declan McCullagh wrote:
> At 13:46 -0400 10/2/97, Anonymous wrote:
> >Another case where the CDA protected against liability. Remailer ops
> >should look into this.
> >
> >http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/7361.html:
This remailer-op, while not previously aware of the case, is well-aware of
that provision of the CDA, but has not yet had the need or opportunity to
use it as a legal defense. The reference is Public Law 104-104, Title V,
Subtitle A, Sec. 502 as it amends (47 U.S.C. 223). The text of this law is
available on-line at:
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c104:S.652.ENR:
My interpretation of this is: Anonymous remailers are internet service
providers.
--
For information on this anonymous remailing system, send the subject
"remailer-help" to or visit our web pages at
http://anon.efga.org/anon/. To contact the operator directly, send mail
to . For general information and discussion about
anonymous remailers, send a message with "subscribe" in the body to
.
From anon at anon.efga.org Thu Oct 2 14:10:17 1997
From: anon at anon.efga.org (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 05:10:17 +0800
Subject: Remailers and ecash
Message-ID: <5e155060a3b43cba398de593edc98bd6@anon.efga.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
An anonymous brother wrote:
>Given: We want more (reliable) remailers
> But someone has to pay for them
>
>Conjecture: New remailers can be financed by charging the users a fee per
> message to use the remailers.
>
> If a remailer charges a fee, the number of users will be reduced to
> those who are willing to pay the fee.
>
> When the number of users is reduced, the potential for traffic analysis
> is increased, which reduces the value of the remailer.
>
> If the value of the remailer is reduced, it will not be worth the cost
> to many users, and those users will seek a less expensive, higher
> traffic remailer.
>
> Thus, the commercial remailer is forced to lower its prices until it is
> unprofitable.
>
>Conclusion: Pay-per-message commecial remailers are not economically viable.
You know how the remailer operators do all their work now for free
because they believe in it? And how all this software has been
written and given away because people believe in it? Maybe some other
people will help pay for the maintenance of the remailers because they
believe it is the right thing to do.
Especially since it need not be forever.
And, I have to believe that out of the millions of well heeled
Internet users, there are enough privacy oriented people to pay for a
small remailer network, at the very least. We just have to get the
ball rolling, that's all.
> - Pay a flat fee per month for remailer access
This is isormorphic to using ecash if you want to keep the messages of
each user disassociated from each other.
> - Everyone a remailer. Remailers only accept messages from other
> remailers. To use remailers you must run a remailer.
I don't grow my own wheat, grind it up, and then make my own bread. I
also prefer not to run a remailer.
> - Pay for access to an anonymous message pool
Interesting!
> - Sell cpu cycles in exchange for remailer access
If we use ecash, you can sell anything in exchange for remailer access.
Monty Cantsin
Editor in Chief
Smile Magazine
http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html
http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html
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From declan at well.com Thu Oct 2 14:12:41 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 05:12:41 +0800
Subject: CDA protects against liability
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID:
There have been a bunch of other cases involving the deal-cutting portion
of the CDA. I believe the Drudge lawsuit complaint refers to them. If not,
AOL's response to the complaint certainly will.
-Declan
On Thu, 2 Oct 1997, Georgia Cracker Remailer Administrator wrote:
> On Thu, 2 Oct 1997, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>
> > At 13:46 -0400 10/2/97, Anonymous wrote:
> > >Another case where the CDA protected against liability. Remailer ops
> > >should look into this.
> > >
> > >http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/7361.html:
>
> This remailer-op, while not previously aware of the case, is well-aware of
> that provision of the CDA, but has not yet had the need or opportunity to
> use it as a legal defense. The reference is Public Law 104-104, Title V,
> Subtitle A, Sec. 502 as it amends (47 U.S.C. 223). The text of this law is
> available on-line at:
>
> http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c104:S.652.ENR:
>
> My interpretation of this is: Anonymous remailers are internet service
> providers.
>
> --
> For information on this anonymous remailing system, send the subject
> "remailer-help" to or visit our web pages at
> http://anon.efga.org/anon/. To contact the operator directly, send mail
> to . For general information and discussion about
> anonymous remailers, send a message with "subscribe" in the body to
> .
>
>
>
From jad at dsddhc.com Thu Oct 2 14:20:26 1997
From: jad at dsddhc.com (John Deters)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 05:20:26 +0800
Subject: Secure phone
In-Reply-To: <199710021621.JAA26807@proxy4.ba.best.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.3.32.19971002155954.00bfc7e0@labg30>
At 09:21 AM 10/2/97 -0700, you wrote:
>At 11:13 PM 10/1/97 -0700, Lucky Green wrote:
>> Bad idea. You don't want people to have to look up keys to use your device.
>> Some people may not want to be listed in the phone book. Not to mention
>> that a PKI adds an additional and unnecessary layer of complexity. Just use
>> DH and have the parties each read half of a hash of the public
>> exponentials. No keys to store, no keys to remember, no keys to compromise.
>
>Trouble is this exposes the system to the man-in-the-middle attack. Perhaps
>you could take advantage of the real time nature of the system to prevent
>man in the middle, by constructing a protocol such that man in the middle
>will invariably time out during the connection setup, or produce an
>audible lag problem in speech.
The MITM attack is thwarted by Lucky's note:
>> DH and have the parties each read half of a hash of the public
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>> exponentials. No keys to store, no keys to remember, no keys to compromise.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Each party reads off a series of digits displayed on their screen. Out
loud. To each other. Over the secure phone.
The MITM attacker can't duplicate the hash on both ends, because a hash of
the public keys used to make the connection are different between the
MITM's public key and the real public keys.
Here's a secure conversation (assume for the moment that the addition below
represents a strong hash):
Alice <-------------------------------------> Bob
PK=1234 PK=5678
1234+5678=6912 5678+1234=6912
Alice reads 69 over the phone, and Bob reads 12 back to her.
Alice and Bob proceed to have a private conversation.
Now, since Mallory has to create a PK, he cannot just duplicate
Alice's 1234, because he'd also need the private key to decrypt the
conversation. Likewise, he cannot duplicate Bob's 5678. He has to
generate his own PKs in an attempt to fool Bob & Alice.
Alice <-----> Mallory <-> Mallory <---------> Bob
PK=1234 PK=1111 PK=2222 PK=5678
1234+1111=2345 5678+2222=7900
Alice reads "23" over the phone, and Bob reads "00" back.
Since Alice's hash function said she should hear "45" back from
Bob, and Bob's screen said he should have heard "79" from Alice,
Alice and Bob decide to talk about the weather, and how pretty
the trees are in certain cities.
Mallory could try to thwart this by impersonating Bob's voice to
Alice, saying "45", and Alice's voice to Bob, saying "79"
(Mallory does, of course, know these numbers), but if Bob & Alice
know each other, this probably won't work too well. Mallory would
have to be able to cut into the conversation real-time, undetected.
Now, of course, Mallory could hire Anna & Barry to pull the whole
impersonation thing off, so that for the entire conversation Alice
talks to Barry and Anna talks to Bob, each thinking that they're
really talking to the other, but that's also fraught with risk.
I'm sure they could pull it off on TV, though :-)
So, it'd go full circle back to pass phrases again.
"I hear the cherry trees are lovely in Washington D.C."
"I wouldn't know, I've never visited Washington in the spring."
"I agree, the weather is usually too wet."
John
--
J. Deters "Don't think of Windows programs as spaghetti code. Think
of them as 'Long sticky pasta objects in OLE sauce'."
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NET: mailto:jad at dsddhc.com (work) mailto:jad at pclink.com (home) |
| PSTN: 1 612 375 3116 (work) 1 612 894 8507 (home) |
| ICBM: 44^58'36"N by 93^16'27"W Elev. ~=290m (work) |
| For my public key, send mail with the exact subject line of: |
| Subject: get pgp key |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
From anon at anon.efga.org Thu Oct 2 14:26:00 1997
From: anon at anon.efga.org (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 05:26:00 +0800
Subject: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or crypto"
Message-ID: <306a8be32556b32fa66d425f7b89bcfd@anon.efga.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
My brother VerityMonger wrote:
>Fascism hadn't died, it has just gone underground and crept into
>every facet of life through the corporate and government power
>mongers. The government and the mass media are working the citizens
>like dumb fish on a hook, who are still trying to swallow the
>worm. There is a New World Order on the way, and it isn't going to be
>any prettier than the last time it was tried.
No doubt VerityMonger knows this, but many others may not: "New World
Order" was a phrase originally coined by Josef Goebbels.
Interestingly, the term "European Community" arose out of German
industrial discussion groups in ~1944 who were trying to find a way to
salvage the German position at the time. One idea was to make peace
and attempt to establish a "European Community".
Monty Cantsin
Editor in Chief
Smile Magazine
http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html
http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html
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From cynthb at sonetis.com Thu Oct 2 14:31:00 1997
From: cynthb at sonetis.com (Cynthia Brown)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 05:31:00 +0800
Subject: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or cryp
In-Reply-To: <199710020617.IAA23092@ankara.duzen.com.tr>
Message-ID:
On Thu, 2 Oct 1997, S. M. Halloran wrote:
> Painting America with a rather broad brush, aren't you? I never went
> to a school--and I attended public schools for ALL of my
> education--which had a metal detector. But comparing America and
> Canada is pretty much apples and oranges again. Do you [in Canada]
> really have our ethnic mix?
Not identical, but we have large groups from various parts of the world,
and we are by no means ethnically uniform. The two most numerous, of
French and British Isles descent, have very different cultures; Vancouver
has large communities from Asia; etc. etc. And my brush is no broader than
the "all government workers are lazy, corrupt little power-trippers"
mantra that appears here so often, uncontested.
> America's violence problem is not one bit related to guns everywhere
> in the street. There are much deeper problems, including distrust
> between ethnic groups. The O.J.Simpson was a real eye-opener on
> black-white relations, for example, and I think the Native Americans
> have yet really to speak about the shitty way they have been treated
> over the years. By the way, have Canada's European descendants come
> to proper terms with its native American neighbors?
Granted that the guns are a symptom and not the underlying problem.
However, having them readily available makes it that much more likely
that a person will do something regrettable in a fit of rage (or just
plain annoyance).
Our history is not squeaky clean either, but at least we're trying to
settle things by negotiation and referenda instead of violence.
> Now you're talking! Don't ever repent for thinking clearly. But do
> keep in mind that not all people who own guns and wear red plaid
> Pendletons and sport scraggly beards are the neoFascists of tomorrow.
Agreed. There are also dedicated, hard-working, community-oriented
policemen out there. (I'm probably going to get flamed for daring to
say that, but tough.)
Cynthia
===============================================================
Cynthia H. Brown, P.Eng.
E-mail: cynthb at iosphere.net | PGP Key: See Home Page
Home Page: http://www.iosphere.net/~cynthb/
Junk mail will be ignored in the order in which it is received.
Klein bottle for rent; enquire within.
From nobody at REPLAY.COM Thu Oct 2 14:31:58 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 05:31:58 +0800
Subject: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or crypto"
Message-ID: <199710022114.XAA25096@basement.replay.com>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Alex Le Heux wrote:
>>>You people just don't get it do you? A gun has one purpose: To
>>>kill. Just like any other tool, a gun, if it is available _will_ be
>>>used at some point.
>>
>>Although guns are obviously designed for killing things, this does
>>not mean that they will be used. This can be seen from the
>>statistics. There are far fewer murders than there are guns.
>>Almost all of them are never used for killing someone.
>
>You can't deny that the more guns there are available, the more
>people will get shot.
Oh yes, I can. In fact, I believe the opposite is the case. The
statistics bear this out. But, your claim was that a weapon will
eventually be used to kill somebody. I guess it's clear at this point
that this was wildly inaccurate.
>There may be some people that are capable of owning a gun and using
>it wisely (ie. not), but I don't believe that this is a significant
>fraction of any population.
You should come to the United States and spend some time around the
shooting community. The people are real pleasant, real easy to get
along with, and real careful with their weapons.
>>You are also not considering the case where one person has a gun and
>>another does not. The situation is more stable if both people are
>>armed. (And don't claim you are talking about disarming a whole
>>society. You aren't, just part of it.)
>
>Urgl? The situation only becomes more explosive if both sides are
>armed.
That can occur, but in general nobody likes to be shot. Even if you
are going to shoot your opponent regardless, if he has a gun you move
more cautiously.
>Look at the arms race, which is now, thank god, over. I am amazed at
>the amount of restraint both sides displayed during that time,
>although it's been really close a few times.
What would have happened if the Russians didn't develop nuclear
weapons? I think they would have been nuked sooner or later, don't
you?
And, we aren't talking about an arms race, here. We are talking about
whether citizens are allowed to own a few rifles.
>It's really simple: If there are no guns, no one will get shot.
You will find this difficult to achieve, however.
>I _am_ talking about disarming a population. I don't know which 'it'
>I'm not part of, but I am definately not part of the 'it' that
>promotes death by gunshot.
You are not talking about disarming the police and the military are
you? Just as I thought: you only want to disarm the civilians.
That's not such a great idea, judging by history.
>>>So making sure there are lots of guns around only serves to make a
>>>lot of people very dead. This is a Bad Thing.
>>
>>Depends who they are. Bet the Dutch resistance made good use of
>>their weaponry, eh?
>
>Even if they did, dead people are still a Bad Thing. We had no
>quarrel with the soldiers the resistance killed. Neither did most of
>them had any quarrel with us. Just like the US troopers in Vietnam or
>some other place.
Are you arguing that the Dutch resistance should not have resisted? I
believe they did the right thing, myself. I do not believe it was a
Bad Thing. I believe it was a Good Thing. I believe they did not
kill enough people.
>>Be aware that the gun control lobby has often used misleading
>>statistics. For instance, you will hear a lot about "handgun
>>deaths". It turns out that most of these are suicides. While
>>undesirable, most people perceive a difference between somebody
>>killing themselves and a nutcase doing his thing at a school.
>
>I am not the gun control lobby,...
No, but it appeared that you may have been misled by them.
>I am a citizen in a mostly gun-free society, and glad of it. People
>getting shot here, be it robbery, suicide, police violence or self
>defence is a rare occurence.
Police violence is caused by gun ownership? I doubt this very much.
>Over her, drive-by shootings are something from fairy tales.
Oddly enough, this is mostly true here as well.
It is unclear what is magical about the words "drive by shooting." I
believe this phrase lacks real content and is simply a trigger for
hysteria.
The implication is that people are randomly firing on people in the
streets. While this may occur once in a great while, it is extremely
uncommon. Usually people kill for a reason. Usually they are trying
to kill their enemies. In the U.S., this is often related to the
black market.
Whether somebody kills their enemy from a car or not is irrelevant.
Monty Cantsin
Editor in Chief
Smile Magazine
http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html
http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html
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From declan at well.com Thu Oct 2 14:51:45 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 05:51:45 +0800
Subject: Crypto-continuation in Washington: FBI/DoJ keep up the pressure
Message-ID:
Crypto is hot in Washington. Don't think the battle's over; it's just
beginning:
* This afternoon when the Senate Intelligence committee met to consider a
new CIA deputy director, Sen. Bob Kerrey said "there's a real urgency" to
get an encryption bill passed. (Presumably, that would be his bill, the
"Key Escrow Infrastructure" McCain-Kerrey/S.909.) Anyone still think that
the Senate will do the right thing on crypto? Think again...
* Last week Janet Reno talked at her weekly press conference about
balancing law enforcement rights with privacy rights -- through mandatory
domestic key escrow.
* Yesterday Louis Freeh spoke at length before the House International
Relations committee about the spread of nuclear weapons... and reminded
committee members about the problems the FBI has with nonescrowed crypto...
* Sen. Jon "Mandatory Domestic Key Escrow" Kyl said on Sunday that the
Clinton administration's export controls on crypto were *not tight
enough*...
More info:
http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1385,00.html
http://www.jya.com/declan8.htm
-Declan
****************
HEARING OF THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
NOMINATION OF LT.-GEN. JOHN A. GORDON
TO BE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CHAIRMAN: SENATOR RICHARD SHELBY (R-AL)
106 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC
2:00 P.M. EDT
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1997
SEN. KERREY: I hope no doubt that you've heard of and perhaps had the
opportunity to read the recommendations made by Senators Helms and
Moynihan, but I think they're excellent. It's an excellent examination of,
first, the need in some instances to classify, as well as the need to
examine that classification system.
It's not really a question, General Gordon. I think it's
imperative that, on the issue of encryption, that the president exert some
authority and try to pull together the congressional leaders and say, "We
need a secure public network." There's counter-intelligence concerns.
There's national security issues here at stake, obviously, balanced against
the concerns for civil liberties and the concern for commercial interests
and the need to develop.
But there's lots of action up here on the Hill, both in the House
and the Senate, in half a dozen committees or eight or nine committees, or
Lord knows how many altogether, more than I realized existed. And I think
there's a real urgency to get something passed both for the private sector,
so they can have some stability, but also on the public-sector side, so we
can protect the nation's interests.
MR. GORDON: Senator, I have not delved that deeply into the
encryption issue. I certainly take your point on this point. But I do
know that if the Senate does confirm me that that will be squarely on my
plate.
****************
ATTORNEY GENERAL JANET RENO'S WEEKLY MEDIA AVAILABILITY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, DC
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1997
Q No, wait -
ATTY GEN. RENO: You've got to be quicker than that.
Q (Inaudible) - yes, ma'am. Director Freeh and Director
Constantine both have complained that U.S.-made encryption devices are
giving the drug cartels an advantage whereby interdiction becomes impaired.
Would you favor, as Mr. Freeh does, some kind of giving of the keys to
these devices to the FBI and DEA?
ATTY GEN. RENO: I don't think that Director Freeh favors giving
keys to the FBI and to the DEA.
Q No?
ATTY GEN. RENO: What Director Freeh has talked about is what we
have today - if someone is going to tap a phone, they don't just go in and
tap the phone, if they're going to do it legally. What law enforcement
does is it develops probable cause to believe that the telephone is being
used to commit a crime and that to overhear would provide evidence of a
crime. That is submitted to a judge, both in federal court and in many
states courts where wiretapping is authorized. The judge reviews the
sufficiency of the affidavits in support of the petition and enters an
order directing the telephone company to provide that opportunity.
What Director Freeh is hoping to achieve is the same thing with
respect to encrypted products; so that the court would direct that the key
be provided to the telecommunications system, or the other system, in order
to decrypt the encoded message.
What we're trying - what the administration is trying to do is to
recognize that there are two important interests at stake here. One is the
law enforcement interest, which is so vital with respect to terrorists,
with respect to being able to decrypt the drug dealer's computer when I - I
can get a search warrant now and seize his black book and I can read his
black book or decipher what he's talking about. But if he can encrypt the
information on his computer, that will be a significant obstacle to law
enforcement.
At the same time, the whole purpose of encryption with modern
telecommunication is to provide for the privacy interest, of commercial
interest of the average citizen. And so I think it's important that we
work together to ensure the law enforcement capacity and ensure that the
present capacity to get court-ordered authorities for surveillance are
continued and are made real, while at the same time ensuring privacy.
Q So you're saying that the phone company would have the
responsibility? Do they have the capability of encrypting?
ATTY GEN. RENO: The phone company doesn't have it. There would be
a system whereby a key would be provided through third parties or
otherwise. But this is something that we need to work together on to
ensure that law enforcement interests are protected and that privacy
interests are protected as well.
****************
HEARING OF THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: ORGANIZED CRIME
CHAIRED BY: REPRESENTATIVE BEN GILMAN (R-NY)
LOUIS FREEH, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
2172 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1997
10:00 A.M EDT
REP. : Following up on what Mr. Hyde said on your need to
fight international crime and terrorism, what do you need, as an agency
director and for your agency, in terms of specifics to wage a fight that
you can win?
MR. FREEH: Yes, sir. As I mentioned in my statement, I think we
need it on three levels. We need the permanent and minimal FBI presence
overseas to develop the kinds of relationships that Dr. de Gennaro and I
have had now for 18 years.
We have asked for, and the Congress approved last year, in August
of 1996, a plan to expand the FBI's Ligat (sp) program from approximately
23 to 43 Ligats. That would call for, by the end of 1999, 146 special
agents in 42 different countries with 116 support employees. That's a
total of 262 people. As I mentioned, the plan was submitted last year. It
wasn't just an FBI plan. It was jointly submitted by the State Department
and the attorney general. And we've asked for funding in the 1998 and 1999
budgets to reach that level.
We've also asked for a continuation of the training. As I
mentioned, we've been able to train thousands of police officers around the
world. The benefit of that training is two-fold. First of all, we can
give them what they need most of all, which are the basic tools to conduct
their own investigations.
Just as importantly, we develop through those relationships, as Dr.
de Gennaro described it, the cop-to-cop contacts and relationships. So an
FBI agent or a DEA agent can pick up the phone and speak to a police
commander in Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan, if that's the place where we need to
do our work. So the training is a very important part of the whole program.
And again, and finally, we need the technological tools to do our
work. We have to be able to communicate rapidly and securely. We have to
deal with encryption. We have to deal with cyber-crime. And those are all
part of a larger technological challenge which we're trying to meet.
[...]
REP. LINDSEY GRAHAM (R-SC): Thank you, John.
Director Freeh, appreciate your testimony. It's been quite
riveting, actually. One of the briefing papers we have indicates that the
American public, in a recent poll, whatever you want to take polls worth,
say that 70 percent of the American people who were surveyed found it
likely that the United States could be attacked by terrorist groups within
the next decade using smuggled nuclear devices. If you were asked that,
what category would you be in?
MR. FREEH: I think it's a threat and a possibility that should
occupy our highest priority. I think we've seen attacks certainly in
Oklahoma, in New York City. We know that many of the state sponsors of
terror, including Iran, are rapidly and very aggressively acquiring nuclear
technology, both in terms of warheads and launching devices. We know that
many of the state sponsors of terrorism, particularly Iran, sponsor and
fund and control Hezbollah groups, including groups which have connections
and operations in the United States.
So the links, although I don't think I've seen them in a documented
form, clearly suggest that if a terrorist is willing to use a truck bomb to
blow up a building with thousands of people at risk, the accomplishment of
the particular objective would not be changed or influenced by the
opportunity to use a much more devastating (nuclear?) or biological or
chemical agent.
So I think we have to take the possibility extremely seriously and
we have to take drastic steps to try to prevent and detect that.
****************
[This thanks to John Young. --Declan]
Remarks by Senator Jon Kyl at the First International Conservative
Congress--September 28, 1997
[...]
The Clinton Administration pursues a foreign policy without
clear goals or the will to act decisively and is squandering
the national security means left to it by a dozen years of
Republican presidency. It emphasizes hope over reality and
reliance on arms control agreements like the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty, and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) over a
stronger defense. And political benefit over national
security, as in its decisions to cave in to the concerns of
some in industry in irresponsibly relaxing export controls on
key items like encryption technology and supercomputers.
****************
-------------------------
Declan McCullagh
Time Inc.
The Netly News Network
Washington Correspondent
http://netlynews.com/
From brianbr at together.net Thu Oct 2 15:02:48 1997
From: brianbr at together.net (Brian B. Riley)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 06:02:48 +0800
Subject: Forwarded mail...
Message-ID: <199710022139.RAA31541@mx02.together.net>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
On 10/2/97 11:36 AM, Mark Rogaski (wendigo at ne-wendigo.jabberwock.org)
passed this wisdom:
>An entity claiming to be Brian B. Riley wrote:
>
>:: ... nothing personal, but why is it people keep deluding
>themselves : with the idea that they can shoot to wound. You cannot
>know what a
>
>Because that's what all the cops on TV do. Most people see
>non-lethal leg shots on TV all the time, so they assume that it's
>probable. Even worse was "The A-Team" where hundreds of rounds were
>fired, but no one ever got hurt. It was intended to reduce the
>amount of violence on TV, but (in my opinion) only made gunplay
>seem like a safe recreational activity.
... oh, I well know the answer to the question ... just waxing a
little bit rhetorical ... I would seriously like to be there to look
into they eyes of the yahoos who so bithely espouse dropping the
hammer on a person right after they have watched the life drain from
someones eyes the for very first time and see just how well they feel
and how cocky and cavalier they still are. I wouldn't wish that burden
on anyone. You just can have no idea unless you have been there. We
send men off to war and then get all upset when so many come back with
there brains on crooked ... the sheeple have no idea what they have
done to these men (and now women) !!!
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Brian B. Riley --> http://www.macconnect.com/~brianbr
For my PGP Keys
"...error reading WinOS. (A)bort, (R)etry, (M)acintosh?"
From anon at anon.efga.org Thu Oct 2 15:15:31 1997
From: anon at anon.efga.org (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 06:15:31 +0800
Subject: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or crypto"
Message-ID: <49688cba207d1bb86d63bc14117aab4e@anon.efga.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Alex Le Heux wrote:
>On 2 Oct 1997 00:24:27 +0200, Anonymous (sic) wrote:
>>Alex Le Heux wrote:
>>>Maybe you haven't noticed, but seen on 2000 year scales, the entire
>>>world is constantly in a state of war. Europe isn't special in that
>>>regard.
>>
>>I guess the conclusion, then, is that gun control is bad for the
>>whole world, not just Europe.
>
>Eh, no. The conclusion would be that gun control or no gun control
>does not affect the amount of war in the world at all.
It certainly affect civilians! Most of the people who die in wars are
not in armies. They are in villages, towns, and cities. Roughly 50
million people died in World War II. Perhaps 15 million (numbers
approximate) were soldiers. Being unarmed is often unlucky.
>>>And even if I had my AR15 then, it wouldn't help me a lot against
>>>guided missiles and mortar fire.
>>
>>It's harder to police a hostile population which is well armed.
>
>True, but imho this will only result in more people getting killed.
It can result in that, certainly. But somehow the next time your
country is overrun, I doubt you would take your weapons (assuming you
had any) and give them to the invader in the hope that this will
increase the likelihood of your survival.
>Any invader would not beat about the bush in the US, they'll make
>very clear that they'll have nothing to do with citicens defending
>their own homes. They'll just blow up the home from a distance.
Ah, if they know which home to blow up they will. But they won't.
(Unless they get their hands on the government gun registration
records. Then they'll know which homes to go to.)
>>>And anyway, "to defend yourself in a war" is not one of the usual
>>>arguments against gun control.
>>
>>The popularity of an argument can be independent of its worth.
>>
>>"To defend yourself in general" is commonly used. War, oppressive
>>government, and political turbulence are the most likely situations
>>in which people need their weapons, even in the United States.
>
>Bullshit. People in the US rarely use their weapons against oppressive
>governments or political turbulence.
Sometimes we do. Study the Black Panthers.
You raise a good point, though. I believe that widespread gun
ownership acts as a dampener on conflict. People discover that they
really can respect Group X enough to cut some kind of deal rather than
herding them into concentration camps.
The dynamic here is probably complicated. It isn't as simple as "Oh,
we don't want to go after them, they have guns!" That underlies the
process, but usually it translates into respect. (Look at how people
feel about a "Mafia Don" versus "some greaseball working in a
restaurant". Most people despise the man in the restaurant, even
though when presented in neutral terms they claim to respect his
behavior. What's the difference between these two people? It isn't
that one is the nicer guy.)
Should things progress to the point where armed troops are attempting
to haul people out of their homes, the availability of firearms acts
to drawn attention to what is happening. The people committing the
acts are getting very strong signals that Something Is Wrong. The
cost of collecting people increases dramatically when they are armed.
In Berlin the assembly area for Jewish people was originally somewhere
in the center of the city where other civilians could see what was
going on. This caused discomfort and a certain amount of unrest
amongst the population, so they moved the assembly area to the
outskirts. But, there would be no denying the implications of
automatic weapons fire all over the city.
Would this guarantee survival? No, it would not. But, in my opinion,
it would increase the odds. You can imagine it going wrong: "We won't
be safe until we get rid of all those Jews and they damned assault
rifles!" But, probably it would go the right way.
>Most guns that are used against another person there are used to
>commit crime or to defend against those armed criminals.
- From day to day this may be true. But we are talking about those
exceptional circumstances that arise every few decades, especially in
countries where the peasants are not allowed to own weapons.
And, you might want to take a look at the numbers. How many people
have been murdered outright by their own governments in the 20th
century? (This number excludes wars, which probably isn't
reasonable.)
It clocks in at well over 100 million. (Anybody have the actual
number?) It takes a lot of bar shootings to get up to those kinds of
numbers.
>>I have to confess that I am surprised at the level of resentment
>>among the members of various Europeans countries feel towards other
>>European countries. For example, the Germans don't like the Dutch
>>because when they visit they are treated badly by, among others, the
>>police. The Dutch don't like the Germans because, well, they got to
>>know them a little too well in the 1940s and they are nursing the
>>grudge.
>>
>>With that sort of situation, anything can happen and it can happen
>>quickly, even if things seem mellow right now. And these little
>>resentments and jealousies are felt between far more groups in
>>Europe than just between the Dutchies and the Germans.
>
>Excuse me? Have you ever even been in Europe? In the last 50 years I
>mean? You are so full of shit here, it's incredible. I hereby invite
>you to come over, and stay a while. I have a comfy couch.
Thank you for your kind offer. If things go to hell here in the U.S.
in the next couple of years I may take you up on it.
Yes, I have been in Europe. I drew my conclusions from talking to and
observing many Europeans. It wasn't what I expected, but it caused me
to understand European history a little better.
In the U.S., even when we are ragging on another ethnic group or
another country, there is always this feeling in the air that is sort
of naughty and low class to be doing it. In Europe, I did not sense
this at all. (That's not all bad. It's not hypocritical.)
People had all sorts of interesting views about people in other
countries. I was particularly shocked by European anti-semitism. You
can find people in the U.S. who will talk about "those New York Jew
bankers" and the like, but I hadn't really seen hardcore anti-semitism
before. By hardcore, I mean people who see all Jewish people as
belonging to the same nationality, regardless of their passport. And,
they don't think of this as a particularly remarkable thing. They see
it as just one of those obvious facts that it would be foolish to
deny.
Jewish friends who travel in Europe have had repeated experiences
where people want to treat them as Jews, rather than as Americans of
the Jewish religion, which is what they are.
>Anyone in Europe can go anywhere else, and be treated reasonably to
>very well. We in Europe have put the crap of WWII behind us a long
>time ago. Something that you haven't managed to do apparently.
>
>The Dutch are absolutely not 'nursing a grudge'. Come and visit.
>You'll see.
I did see. It was most interesting. I had a long conversation with a
Dutch man once. He was very pleasant, civilized, and intelligent.
Then he started telling me about the Germans and how pushy they were,
how they always butt in line, etc. etc. I've heard similar things
from other Dutch people. I personally witnessed a (very minor)
incident.
I have some German friends who were foully treated by the police in
the Netherlands, too. These people are decent, polite, professional
people. I have no doubt they did nothing whatsoever to provoke this
treatment. (By "no doubt" I mean that we are talking about the most
civilized people I have ever known.) But, they will never return to
the Netherlands and I don't blame them.
You might want to try a little experiment. Are you capable of
appearing to be German? If you can get the style and the body
language down, try coming into the Netherlands as a German visitor and
see what kinds of response you get. If you can really fool people
into thinking you are German you will probably learn something
interesting about your country. (It might be hard to pull this off,
though.)
>>Let's also take a look at the Dutch performance during their
>>occupation. While there certainly were many courageous Dutch people
>>who helped refugees (at great personal risk, to say the least), and
>>there were many courageous Dutch people who were in the resistance,
>>there were also many Dutch people who did not perform so well. Not
>>only were a large number of Jewish people turned in by Dutch
>>informers, but there were even Dutch SS units.
>
>You have a nerve. You, coming from a country where people are still
>regularly killed in the name of racism, tell me this?!
Now, now, now. Don't get all excited. I said it was nice country,
didn't I? I said some bad things about my own country, didn't I? The
fact is, I think if you randomly selected people from the Netherlands,
in general you would do pretty well.
However, let's not deny what happened historically. Even nice
appearing people do bad things. And they aren't always Nazis, either.
As for racism, Europe is not without racism. It's hard to quantify it
and hard to compare, but I suspect to a very great extent, America is
seen as being racist because we discuss it, feel guilty about it, and
try (sort of) to do something about it. (Never mind all of the ethnic
groups in the U.S. that find they are able to live together
harmoniously, even though their ancestors in Europe were continuously
at each other's throats.)
I've had two American friends who were beaten in Europe in racial
incidents. One was white, one was black. One of them spent time in
the hospital. Both crossed the racial line all the time in the U.S.
without incident.
>>I basically think well of the Netherlands and its people, but it is
>>important to recognize that certain unpleasant characteristics exist
>>in a large portion of the population of even a nice country. It is
>>unlucky to pretend that these characteristics can never be expressed.
>
>We absolutely not pretending that this can never be expressed. In
>fact, it's being expressed every day. We have our neo-nazi political
>parties too. It's just that we here have learned our lesson, and very
>few people actually listen to them.
This may be true, but it's hard to tell. The climate is not conducive
right now, either. What would happen if it suddenly became clear that
anti-semitism would promote one's career? I think you would find them
coming out of the woodwork again.
>>What would have happened if the citizens of El Salvador were
>>adequately armed? One thing you wouldn't see is a death squad going
>>into a neighborhood to kick down some innocent's door and murder him
>>or his family. At least, you wouldn't see it twice.
>
>Sure you would. It just would be that more bloody. The fact that
>someone is armed has never stopped anyone from attacking. You just
>make sure that your shot is the first and hits.
What are people in death squads like? Believe it or not, they are not
so different from ourselves. They also have fears. People do, in
fact, act on their fear from time to time. If you think that while
you are busy "shooting first" at some guy that maybe his neighbors
won't mind blowing your head off for it, you are going to behave more
cautiously.
At the very least, it will cut down your nightly "take" by at least
70%. That's a big deal if you are part of the surviving group.
>>People who are well armed are less likely to become pawns, victims,
>>or slaves. That is desirable.
>
>They are just more likely to become dead.
If you were faced with somebody you believed would enslave you, would
you throw away your weapon in the hopes your life would be spared? I
doubt this very much.
>>Incidentally, the consistent support the U.S. government has shown
>>for murderous or even genocidal governments is of great concern to
>>those of us who live in the U.S. It is unlikely that these tactics
>>won't be used here were there a serious political struggle and a
>>disarmed population.
>
>- From over here it appears that the majority of Americans doesn't
>really give a shit. Correct me if I'm wrong.
It was hypothetical. I don't know if such a serious political
struggle will arise in the near future.
If most Americans don't give a damn, it will be very unlucky for
troublemakers like the cypherpunks. In fact, though, most Americans
do give a damn. Look at the great effort the government has to go
through to get Americans into wars. It is a source of endless
frustration to the elite that the population won't just hop into wars.
Wilson and Roosevelt were both elected on peace platforms before
getting us into the World Wars.
Monty Cantsin
Editor in Chief
Smile Magazine
http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html
http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html
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BCZWhnUci5gFM1Pa1AAM7HNwkohFMfEsX1dpKr56NbziT1QwUXLHUzW8Qxf+OB2h
6p+xLwcWzFNzpyN6CzJHbxaB0S9PVIuy9zMDz3xMynaAy3S+2zmVaw==
=tIFo
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
From anon at anon.efga.org Thu Oct 2 15:39:08 1997
From: anon at anon.efga.org (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 06:39:08 +0800
Subject: Stronghold
Message-ID: <7e7cbf50cd157c6bdeb66f4d1f93136a@anon.efga.org>
>> C2Net was wrong to censor the cypherpunks list in the guise of
>> moderation. It was wrong to send threatening letters to people who
>> claimed its products were weak. The whole moderation/censorship
>> experiment was a terrible mistake. The actions taken by C2Net were
>> completely unjustified.
>
>Where do people get these bizarre ideas? C2 didn't censor the list. A
>guy who happened to work for C2 dropped some messages from one
>list. The messages still went out on the unfiltered list. Had he
>worked for Mc Donald's or the the NYC Sanitiation Department, would
>you blame them for this as well?
C2 employees informally mentioned libel suits to several cypherpunks,
such as Tim May. Given that a good percentage of the company, perhaps
a majority, was involved with this incident, it seems reasonable to
judge the character of the company based on these actions.
This incident changed my view of C2 considerably. Initially I held
them in the highest regard. No longer.
(Your employment by C2 should have been mentioned in your post. Many
people on the list may not know about it. It is relevant.)
From brianbr at together.net Thu Oct 2 16:07:42 1997
From: brianbr at together.net (Brian B. Riley)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 07:07:42 +0800
Subject: Forwarded mail... (fwd)
Message-ID: <199710022252.SAA29198@mx01.together.net>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
On 10/2/97 2:35 AM, Jim Choate (ravage at ssz.com) passed this wisdom:
>Remember: A gun is like a finger, just point it at what you want to
>hit.
>
>I have met hundreds of great shots in my life, there are many
>people forwhom this sort of behaviour would not be delusional. My
>grandfather (who you'll hear more about in a minute) used to
>delight us as small kids by lighting matches stuck in wood fence
>posts with a .22 pistol from about 50 yds. My cousin from Louisiana
>likes to shoot squirrels (if you can callit that) by passing the
>bullet just in front of their nose, causes lung hemorraghes and
>they just fall off the limb. Me, I always miss or blow theirteeny
>little head off, it's apparently a game of 1/4 inches. I work with
>anex-gomer (ie USMC) pilot who is quite phenomenal with his .357
>Desert Eagle,his groupings are just about an inch at 25 yds.
None of these targets shoots back ... none of these targets pump up
much adrenaline. I would never call myself a great shot (I did qualify
expert at both rifle, M-14, "A" course and pistol, .45, 1911A1), and I
can tell you of making several 25-35 yard snap shots in the jungle at
moving shooting targets with the adrenaline driving my eyeballs
through the roof ... but they were exactly that, pure reflex, center
of body mass shots, under max pressure. I must in all fairness recall
the other three to six shots each time that could have gone anywhere
and probably did.
The point is, "shooting to wound" is a dangerous delusion! *no one*
can predict what a bullet will do when it enters the body. The rule I
have always followed is don't take out your gun unless you are going
to use it; don't use it unless you intend to kill. Makes decisions
much easier on that basis.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0
Charset: noconv
iQA/AwUBNDQjysdZgC62U/gIEQL2pwCfYadqKN/3+wKF1BYC7MZxp8y3ud0An1L4
yXD3o+rsefpV8FO8MqD6OEtl
=GHfD
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Brian B. Riley --> http://www.macconnect.com/~brianbr
For PGP Keys
"The Box said Win '95 or better - So I used a Macintosh!"
-- Harold Herbert Tessman
From ant at notatla.demon.co.uk Thu Oct 2 16:27:50 1997
From: ant at notatla.demon.co.uk (Antonomasia)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 07:27:50 +0800
Subject: Quor's cipher
Message-ID: <199710022135.WAA02655@notatla.demon.co.uk>
Antonomasia wrote:
> My attack takes a long chunk of known text and looks for repetition.
>
> ppppppppppppppp.11.pppppppppppppppppppppp
> ccccccccccccccc.22.cccccccccccccccccccccc
>
> When a two neighbouring p-c pairs are the same you can test
> whether they have the same value of a and b.
> (That is a_n == a_n+1 and b_n == b+n+1, a != b usually.)
>
> This involves 16 inputs to each byte - very cheap.
> What I really want next is to know "a".
nobody at REPLAY.COM wrote:
> Wouldn't this only happen (on average) in one out of every 65536 p-c
> pairs?
Yes (counting only those we test).
> Since the state array is changed entirely with every 128 bytes
> encrypted, 1 out of 2^16 doesn't seem to help much.
This finding doesn't uncover a great deal, I agree, and what it does
uncover is transient.
1 out of 2^16 is the number of pairs we test to find a point
with the property we're looking for. The measures to compare
this to are:
message length several times 65k is fairly low
cost of testing low
benefit of test when passed also low :-(
The changes are regular though, progressing through the array in two
places. That's why I proposed testing neighbouring p-c pairs because
you can be almost sure the relevant state (and it's which part of the
state array is relevant that's uncertain) is the same for the two. In
fact it would be nice to spot this:
ppppppppppppppp.11.ppppppppppppppppppppp
ccccccccccccccc.22.ccccccccccccccccccccc
and see that a and b were the same, but the underlying
state array changed in a relevant way. This would be indicated by
a slightly less than total match, but still rare enough not to be
a fluke. This could allow you to test possible values of a and b,
and perhaps get 4 bits of a. But a and b don't persist over nearby
bytes so I'm not clear what I'd do if I got them.
What it would be nice to have next is a more damaging result emerge
from this or some other observation so that we could determine more
of the state without going to long range comparisons. This cypher
is constructed differently from RC4 or fish - not as simple as WAKE
but broadly comparable to Sapphire II. I think I'll enlist the help
of a search engine. It's more than likely there other things waiting
to be done to this. Quor's friend 'nobody' has actually put some crypto
on the list -let's see what we can do with/to it.
--
##############################################################
# Antonomasia ant at notatla.demon.co.uk #
# See http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/ #
##############################################################
From rah at shipwright.com Thu Oct 2 16:31:22 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 07:31:22 +0800
Subject: Hansa.net's LOCI encourages development of e-commerce financial products and services
Message-ID:
--- begin forwarded text
X-Authentication-Warning: fma66.fma.com: majordomo set sender to
owner-espam at lists.espace.net using -f
X-Orig-From: "Bell, Lynwood"
X-e$pam-source: Various
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Mime-Version: 1.0
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 13:44:21 -0400
To: espam at intertrader.com
From: Robert Hettinga
Subject: Hansa.net's LOCI encourages development of e-commerce financial
products and services
Sender: owner-espam at lists.espace.net
Precedence: bulk
Reply-To: e$@thumper.vmeng.com
---------------------------------------------------------------------
This mail is brought to you by the e$pam mailing list
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From: "Bell, Lynwood"
Reply-To: hansa at ibm.net
Organization: The Span-Hansa Group
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "Hettinga, Robert"
CC: "Cate, Vince"
Subject: Hansa.net's LOCI encourages development of e-commerce financial
products and services
Bob, I just announced this today for our public company. It might
be appropriate to send it to either or both of your e$lab and FC98
mailing lists. I am not going to be able to accommodate hundreds
of ventures but, given that some will have their own resources,
money, etc. and only want the venue and the Bank to play with...
it may be very interesting for all of us. Add this to the pot
in whatever way you feel is appropriate.
Cheers,
Lyn
-------------
Hansa.net Global Commerce, Inc.
The Hansa Bank Bldg, Box 213, Landsome Road, The Valley, Anguilla,
B.W.I., TV1 02P Phone (264) 497-3800, Fax 497-3801, email
hansa at ibm.net
PRESS RELEASE FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Hansa.net and Hansa Bank join forces to encourage the development of
e-commerce financial products and services to further expand
Hansa.net's offerings of Location Optimized Commerce on the Internet
(LOCI ).
October 1, 1997 - Hansa.net Global Commerce, Inc. together with Hansa
Bank & Trust Company Limited, both of Anguilla, British West Indies,
and both members of the Span-Hansa Group, have agreed to jointly
sponsor emerging Internet technologies which will enhance e-commerce
through specifically tailored banking and financial applications.
Lynwood S. Bell, Chairman of Hansa Bank, the controlling shareholder
of Hansa.net a publicly traded company, said "Many excellent start-up
companies lack a vehicle through which to perfect their product or
service and to test their market acceptance. Most traditional
domestic banks, encumbered with vast legacy systems and bureaucracies
are reluctant to entertain these developers in live trials. The Hansa
Bank, a British regulated private merchant and investment bank
offering a full range of banking and brokerage services, has agreed
to provide platforms for approved developers and to participate
actively with them. All applications will be thoroughly screened,
carefully controlled in their development and testing phases and will
be completely isolated from the Bank's existing business. The Bank
expects that some of these products may eventually result in leading
edge products and services for the Bank."
Hansa.net's role will be to assist in marketing any developed
products to other banks and financial institutions. As well
Hansa.net's existing LOCI clients are expected to benefit from the
Bank's new or enhanced services.
The first project, currently undergoing final review prior to being
accepted by the Bank for testing, involves a Dutch developer of
digital chequing. Plans are to demonstrate the product at the
Financial Cryptograph 98 Conference, February 23-26, 1998 (see
http:www.fc98.ai). Hansa Bank is one of the sponsors of this
conference.
Vince Cate, an Internet and cryptography expert recently featured in
Forbes and Wired Magazines is participating with Hansa.net and Hansa
Bank on this project. He said, "Many brilliant e-commerce ideas and
products never reach the market because they have no incubator or no
real life environment in which to test. Hansa.net and Hansa Bank
provide both. As well, Anguilla is the perfect venue for such
development in terms of sample size, global perspective, government
support, and of course, the absence of any taxes. We fully expect
that many of the products developed will end up in companies which
are incorporated and reside here in Anguilla."
About Hansa.net and the related Span-Hansa Group
Hansa.net was founded in 1978 for computer systems development and
software design. In 1985 the company went public, and subsequently
expanded into software product development, marketing, and
international trade technology. Hansa.net's primary role is to
coordinate all of the elements of Location Optimized Commerce on the
Internet (LOCI pronounced "low-see") for its clients. Hansa.net
trades on the Vancouver Stock Exchange under the symbol "HAN"
Both companies are part of the Span-Hansa Group comprised of ten
organizations doing business in as many international locations. The
Group's activities also include the financing of intellectual
property, public stock offerings, acquisitions and mergers, and
consulting on international business structures and trade. The Group
maintains offices in Amsterdam, Barbados, and Anguilla,
More information on the Span-Hansa Group and on other Span-Hansa
strategic partners can be found on the Company's Internet home page:
http://www.hansa.net.
Lynwood S. Bell
President
Contact: Hansa.net - Lynwood Bell Vince Cate
(264) 497-3800 hansa at ibm.net (264) 497-3255
vince at offshore.com.ai
The Vancouver Stock Exchange has neither approved nor
disapproved of this release.
======================================================================
LYNWOOD BELL - Span-Hansa Group, Hansa.net Global Commerce, Hansa Bank
http://www.hansa.net
======================================================================
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Where people, networks and money come together: Consult Hyperion
http://www.hyperion.co.uk info at hyperion.co.uk
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Like e$? Help pay for it! See
Or, for e$/e$pam sponsorship,
---------------------------------------------------------------------
--- end forwarded text
-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/
From anon at anon.efga.org Thu Oct 2 18:16:52 1997
From: anon at anon.efga.org (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 09:16:52 +0800
Subject: Stronghold
Message-ID: <8cd59c62a1a9f29e5e18bebd3faa1b3f@anon.efga.org>
Lucky Green writes:
> On Thu, 2 Oct 1997, Anonymous wrote:
>
> >
> > C2Net was wrong to censor the cypherpunks list in the guise of moderation.
> > It was wrong to send threatening letters to people who claimed its
> > products were weak. The whole moderation/censorship experiment was a
> > terrible mistake. The actions taken by C2Net were completely unjustified.
>
> Where do people get these bizarre ideas? C2 didn't censor the list. A guy
> who happened to work for C2 dropped some messages from one list. The
> messages still went out on the unfiltered list. Had he worked for Mc
> Donald's or the the NYC Sanitiation Department, would you blame them for
> this as well?
Are you serious? The messages dropped were those which made (spurious)
claims of weaknesses in C2 products. And later messages were dropped
which attempted to discuss the dropping of earlier messages.
The effect was that subscribers to the filtered list not only were not
exposed to the messages critical of C2, they were prevented from knowing
that a controversy existed about the filtering policies.
There can be little doubt of the truth of these facts. One of us is
remembering things wrongly.
And yes, if the moderator were a McDonalds employee and he not only
dropped messages which criticized McDonalds, but also filtered out later
messages complaining about his actions, then I'd jolly well blame him.
From blancw at cnw.com Thu Oct 2 18:34:37 1997
From: blancw at cnw.com (Blanc)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 09:34:37 +0800
Subject: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or crypto"
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19971002182138.006b0274@cnw.com>
Individuals need ways to defend themselves from the physical aggression of
others. One of the reasons why people associate into societies, cities,
and governments, is for the advantages of protection which can be achieved
by large numbers of people acting in concert against their common enemy.
They also insitute police forces and national defense agencies for the same
reason: defense against physical aggression.
Everyone on the planet has enemies, and anyone can become, or behave
essentially as, an enemy - even someone's physically stronger kid brother
who decides to hit them with a stone because of talking on the phone too
long, even a former lover/husband who decides to kill their girlfriend/wife
out of jealousy.
Stalkers, thieves, rapists, drug addicts, perverts, etc., or just real
animals from the animal kingdom, strike at the most inopportune times, when
there are no officially sanctioned police forces around to be of help.
But even if there were security guards constantly available at every street
corner or planted inside one's house, the principle is the same: people
are physially vulnerable and need defense from those who would take
advantage of them, who would by weaken them and do physical harm.
Guns are imperfect tools and humans are often imperfect fools in the use of
them. Se la vie. Nevertheless, until the design of guns is improved, or
until there is a better weapon, a better tool invented which can be used by
individuals - independently of organized defense agencies - for their own
use in regard of their own safety, guns will be manufactured, sold, and
bought. And used.
Killing people is a Bad Thing, but there exist people who don't prevent
themselves from doing harmful, destructive things to others. At that
particular point in time, when they are about to commit their crime against
another, their potential victims are in the position of having to do
something of practical use, and quickly. They could use karate, or
ju-jitsu, or ninja stars, or call their dog to attack, or yell for help, or
use their special pocket knife, or run, or use a gun. But they must do
*something*, they must employ some means to prevent from being harmed, or
from having their valuables taken, or else suffer the consequences of
debility or death.
Such is the position which an "out-of-control" person can put one in. It
is possible to reason that such uncontrolled people need to have been
raised better, could have received psychological assistance, should have
been given an alternative view of life, might have been presented with
better values and philosophies, etc. But you have to also consider how
much intellectual support any individual must be provided - must they be
programmed from birth with the proper structure of behavior, in order to
have around oneself the convenience of living with "good people" who are
not inimical to the society? (and would that be a society of real humans,
of interest to other real humans) Is what a person makes of themselves
ultimately a personal project, or is it to be pre-determined and
continuously managed by others (parents, teachers, guidance counselors,
psychologists, government clerks, policing agencies, government agencies,
government leaders). When you relate to a person, will you be relating to
someone with their own identity and personal ambitions, who make
independent decisions about the actions they take, or only to a product of
other people's influence?
In any case, when someone behaves counter to your own wishes and seeks do
with you what they will, or to take from you what they will, including your
life, you must determine whether to allow it or how to prevent it - and if
moved to prevent it, what will work to accomplish that. It might be
necessary to kill that Bad Person (though not their whole family or
relatives or neighborhood or race or country).
..
Blanc
From ravage at ssz.com Thu Oct 2 18:39:29 1997
From: ravage at ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 09:39:29 +0800
Subject: Forwarded mail... (fwd)
Message-ID: <199710030143.UAA28689@einstein.ssz.com>
Forwarded message:
> Subject: Re: Forwarded mail... (fwd)
> Date: Thu, 2 Oct 97 18:52:18 -0400
> From: "Brian B. Riley"
> None of these targets shoots back ... none of these targets pump up
> much adrenaline.
I have been shot at several times, some were hunting accidents and some were
intentional. I did not freek out nor did my adrenalin rush impede my ability
to think or to react. I did shoot back in each case. I am still alive and
don't have a single bullet hole in my body so I must be doing something
right. Don't know about them, I left the area in every case ASAP.
> can tell you of making several 25-35 yard snap shots in the jungle at
> moving shooting targets with the adrenaline driving my eyeballs
> through the roof
My house at 1am is not comparable to the jungle nor is the psychological
situation comparable either. I am not confused about where or what is going
on nor am I worried about making my tour. I am faced with the clear situation
of somebody who wants to do me bodily harm. That doesn't scare me, it pisses
me off to no end. When I get a rush I don't shake and such, I get very calm
and methodical. It's only after the crisis has passed that I tend to sit down
and shake like hell.
> The point is, "shooting to wound" is a dangerous delusion!
No shit. Let me make this clear. The ONLY way I would even consider shooting
to wound was if the burglar was CLEARLY UNARMED, and the only reason that
would happen was because in Texas shooting unarmed persons, even burglars,
is illegal other than that you'd be dead. In any other situation my intent is
to kill, kill, kill. As I said before, I would start with a center chest body
shot and work up (which is natural since the aim point for successive shots
will rise).
> have always followed is don't take out your gun unless you are going
> to use it; don't use it unless you intend to kill. Makes decisions
> much easier on that basis.
We agree on this point.
____________________________________________________________________
| |
| The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there |
| be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. |
| |
| -Alan Greenspan- |
| |
| _____ The Armadillo Group |
| ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA |
| /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ |
| .', |||| `/( e\ |
| -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate |
| ravage at ssz.com |
| 512-451-7087 |
|____________________________________________________________________|
From ravage at ssz.com Thu Oct 2 18:50:54 1997
From: ravage at ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 09:50:54 +0800
Subject: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or (fwd)
Message-ID: <199710030155.UAA28754@einstein.ssz.com>
Forwarded message:
> Date: Thu, 02 Oct 1997 18:22:26 -0700
> From: Blanc
> Subject: Re: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or
> crypto"
> Stalkers, thieves, rapists, drug addicts, perverts, etc., or just real
> animals from the animal kingdom, strike at the most inopportune times, when
> there are no officially sanctioned police forces around to be of help.
I have to object to the inclusion of drug addicts, they do what they do
because the legislators and police want to stick their noses in other
peoples business. If drug addicts resort to crime then society as a whole
must garner some of the responsibility of putting them in that situation.
In short the methods we use to control drug use in this country promote
crime. This does not apply to others who would do this anyway and happen to
take drugs, which means the drug laws are clearly unreasonable.
> something of practical use, and quickly. They could use karate, or
> ju-jitsu, or ninja stars, or call their dog to attack, or yell for help, or
Isn't killing dogs a bad thing? I am shure my dog thinks so. Perhaps their
is a lesson to be had in comparative psychology here. It's much easier to
ask another entity to die for you because you consider them different and
therefore of less value in the grand scheme of things. Human history is full
of such instances. This also happens to be the rationale a lot if not all
burglars use to justify their actions as well.
____________________________________________________________________
| |
| The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there |
| be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. |
| |
| -Alan Greenspan- |
| |
| _____ The Armadillo Group |
| ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA |
| /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ |
| .', |||| `/( e\ |
| -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate |
| ravage at ssz.com |
| 512-451-7087 |
|____________________________________________________________________|
From ravage at ssz.com Thu Oct 2 19:16:57 1997
From: ravage at ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 10:16:57 +0800
Subject: None (fwd)
Message-ID: <199710030225.VAA28934@einstein.ssz.com>
Forwarded message:
> Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 22:04:09 +0200 (MET DST)
> Subject: Re: Remailers and ecash (fwd)
> From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
> When all your customers are anonymous, you don't get to be very choosy.
Shure you can. The operator offers a simple service, resend email
anonymously. If the result of that email is the anon user bringing hardship
on the remailer cancel their account. If they do it again, cancel it again.
Such is the woes of a commercial remailer. Outside of that, if they don't
like the fact that I won't do other things for them when they are anonymous
that is too bad.
Like I said, I offer specific services with specific goals for a specific
fee. If the results are not what you wanted, too bad. You want my other
services then you'll have to give up the anonymity because I need a certain
level of security that dealing with anonymous customers simply can't provide.
I would operate a commercial remailer, I would limit my services to keeping
the remailer up and the accounts valid so long as the money flowed in from
the users, period. I don't do dedicated lines, security audits, development,
etc. to anonymous customers.
____________________________________________________________________
| |
| The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there |
| be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. |
| |
| -Alan Greenspan- |
| |
| _____ The Armadillo Group |
| ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA |
| /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ |
| .', |||| `/( e\ |
| -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate |
| ravage at ssz.com |
| 512-451-7087 |
|____________________________________________________________________|
From ravage at ssz.com Thu Oct 2 19:17:00 1997
From: ravage at ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 10:17:00 +0800
Subject: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or crypto" (fwd)
Message-ID: <199710030217.VAA28885@einstein.ssz.com>
Forwarded message:
> Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 16:47:32 -0400
> From: Anonymous
> Subject: Re: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or crypto"
> The only conclusion that can be drawn is that civilians, even armed
> civilians with combat experience, are so overwhelmingly peace loving
> that they will bend very far backwards to avoid trouble, even if it
> means thousands of hours of work. Can the same be said of career
> military or government people?
A D E C L A R A T I O N
By the REPRESENTATIVES of the
U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A,
In GENERAL CONGRESS assembled.
[deleted material]
Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not
be changed for light and transient Causes; and accordingly all Experience
hath shewn, that Mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are
sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the Forms to which they
are accustomed.
[deleted material]
____________________________________________________________________
| |
| The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there |
| be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. |
| |
| -Alan Greenspan- |
| |
| _____ The Armadillo Group |
| ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA |
| /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ |
| .', |||| `/( e\ |
| -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate |
| ravage at ssz.com |
| 512-451-7087 |
|____________________________________________________________________|
From nobody at REPLAY.COM Thu Oct 2 19:36:45 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 10:36:45 +0800
Subject: None Re: Remailers and ecash
In-Reply-To: <5e155060a3b43cba398de593edc98bd6@anon.efga.org>
Message-ID: <199710030205.EAA01934@basement.replay.com>
Monty Cantsin wrote:
> > - Everyone a remailer. Remailers only accept messages from other
> > remailers. To use remailers you must run a remailer.
>
> I don't grow my own wheat, grind it up, and then make my own bread. I
> also prefer not to run a remailer.
You don't have to. You pay someone to bake your bread for you, and you can
pay someone to run your remailer for you.
This idea has been around since remailers began. The basic premise is that
a group of remailers are set up which only accept mail from other remailers.
A pinging system can be set up to verify that all the remailers are
operating correctly.
The catch is that in practice each remailer is only required to accept mail
from other remailers, but can actually accept mail from anybody the operator
wants to. So if you don't want to run a remailer, just pay someone to run a
remailer on your behalf, and then you can send anonymous messages through
that person's site.
Thus forwarding within the remailer network is free, but it costs money to
insert new messages. This scheme is a little more flexible than attaching
ecash to each message because you can arrange any type of fee schedule you
like, such as a flat rate per month.
There's also the reverse of this, where remailers accept from anyone, but
only send to other remailers. Thus you have to pay to get your messages
out of the remailer network. This is more restrictive because the payment
must be anonymous.
> > - Pay for access to an anonymous message pool
>
> Interesting!
Sign up with an ISP that offers alt.anonymous.messages. This one is a
no-brainer. (and profitable for the ISP)
This results in a system where sending messages is essentially free (since
free remailers exist) but it costs money to receive them. So far it seems
to be successful, at least for those who pay a flat fee for usenet access.
From hallam at ai.mit.edu Thu Oct 2 19:53:15 1997
From: hallam at ai.mit.edu (Phillip Hallam-Baker)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 10:53:15 +0800
Subject: counter-intuitive -- spam is good for you. anonymous assholes are your friend
Message-ID: <01BCCF84.84FC2100.hallam@ai.mit.edu>
On Thursday, October 02, 1997 11:54 AM, Attila T. Hun [SMTP:attila at hun.org] wrote:
> if Phill is secure, what difference does it make if you assault
> him? my guess is he is not secure, and probably has no clue how
> to get from there to secure.
Because when you ring the alarm bell on my system
it is answered by law enforcement and it costs about
$10,000 a time to deal with the issue.
Setting off fire alarms costs real money.
Incidentally the security line you are pushing is a crock.
To get real security I believe you have to have feedback
and monitoring. This is especially important in an institutional
setting where you may not have complete control of critical
infrastructure. For my application simply hoping the guys
with the white hats find security holes before those in the
black ones do is simply not enough.
In any case I'm not as complacent as Attila seems to think
the security model has been amply reviewed by the best
in the field.
Threatening to catch the malefactor and put him behind bars
is a valuable additional security tool. The more bad guys
there are behind bars the less time I have to spend worrying.
Phill
From dlv at bwalk.dm.com Thu Oct 2 19:54:10 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 10:54:10 +0800
Subject: Request for illegal electronic surveillance examples and cases
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <2TRyDe3w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Declan McCullagh writes:
>
> Heh. I've never actually published anything in Time Digital. The one piece
> I worked on for them was a full-page interview with Crypto-czar David
> Aaron that was supposed to happen when he was in town in January.
>
> But he blew me and the photographer off and left town without being
> interviewed.
Mabe he didn't want Declan to forge quotations from him, as Declan was shown
to do in his Netly news hatched jobs.
---
Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
From dlv at bwalk.dm.com Thu Oct 2 19:57:02 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 10:57:02 +0800
Subject: CDA protects against liability
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID:
Declan McCullagh writes:
>
> Remember that the CDA "protects against liability" since the online
> services cut a deal during the legislative process.
>
> In other words AOL & co lobbied to have provisions inserted to get them off
> the hook, even though individual users would still be screwed when the act
> became law.
>
> Another case of corporations selling out civil liberties.
Remind me how some crypto-peddlers endorse bills that would criminalize
domestic crypto use in exchange for their being able to export their
(weak) systems.
---
Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
From dlv at bwalk.dm.com Thu Oct 2 19:57:58 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 10:57:58 +0800
Subject: Stronghold
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID:
Lucky Green writes:
>
> On Thu, 2 Oct 1997, Anonymous wrote:
>
> >
> > C2Net was wrong to censor the cypherpunks list in the guise of moderation.
> > It was wrong to send threatening letters to people who claimed its
> > products were weak. The whole moderation/censorship experiment was a
> > terrible mistake. The actions taken by C2Net were completely unjustified.
>
> Where do people get these bizarre ideas? C2 didn't censor the list. A guy
> who happened to work for C2 dropped some messages from one list. The
> messages still went out on the unfiltered list. Had he worked for Mc
> Donald's or the the NYC Sanitiation Department, would you blame them for
> this as well?
Lucky is lying: the censored articles were also filtered from the list which
was billed as being unfiltered.
---
Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
From ravage at ssz.com Thu Oct 2 20:12:35 1997
From: ravage at ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 11:12:35 +0800
Subject: Remailers and ecash (fwd)
Message-ID: <199710030325.WAA29273@einstein.ssz.com>
Forwarded message:
> Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 11:33:00 -0400
> From: Anonymous
> Subject: Re: Remailers and ecash (fwd)
> Jim Choate:
>
> >For the sender to chain from remailer to remailer to destination the
> >destination has to be in the header info somewhere. Now in the most secure
> >system each packet header will only contain the address of the next hop. When
> >the next site gets it the packet contents are de-crypted (otherwise reading
> >the chaining info is trivial) and the contents are uncovered to reveal another
> >packet with the next hop header and another encrypted block. And on and on
> >we go.
> >
> > > packet system?>
>
> Jim Choate has been amazingly clueless throughout this discussion, but
> this takes the cake. Does he really not know about encrypted nested
> chaining? My God! Of course remailers work this way, Jim. They've
> worked this way practically from the beginning. All remailers work this
> way.
No they don't, all remailers do not encrypt their outgoing as a matter of
course (do any currently do it as a matter of course? I would bet not if I
were a gambler). The remailer you used to send this didn't use encryption on
its outgoing or else I wouldn't be able to read it. The last time I looked
about a year ago the vast majority of remailers didn't encrypt their outgoing
traffic as a matter of course, it required the user to do it (I suspect this
is still true). Furthermore I specificaly used the word 'set' to mean a group
of remailers acting in concert such that this encryption happened
automaticaly - I know the answer already - No, there are no sets (ie a
cooperative network) of remailers (Mixmaster operaters included) implimenting
this unless the user goes to extreme and does it all themselves. As a matter
of fact there appears to be little to no cooperation between remailer
operators. There are no remailer key servers to manage the server and user
keys so the user must contact each remailer and obtain the key which is
itself open to traffic analysis, note that such first contacts by definition
have to be in the clear. Hope that Mallet starts their analysis AFTER you
get your keys or else. If this process can't occur automagicaly there is
little commercial utility for the system - it's too cumbersome.
> The mixmaster remailers are built around this idea, making each
> packet a constant size and adding dummy packets as new ones are stripped
> off, so outgoing messages look just like incoming ones.
First off, the size of the packets in no way effects the succes of a traffic
analysis, only a cryptanalysis of their contents. Traffic analysis looks at
four things: the incoming packet header, the outgoing packet header, and
the times of receipt and transmission.
The idea behind latency is that if it is chosen correctly and the packet
re-transmission falls outside the analysis window there is no way to
correlate the incoming and outgoing traffic. From the analysis engines
perspective the events are distinct and non-related. Simply re-ordering the
packets at re-transmission time does nothing if I set the window larger than
the time it takes to resend the original traffic and the cover traffic.
Setting the analysis window to infinity also causes the analysis overhead to
grow quickly though this means that re-ordering and latency are irrelevant.
A party implimenting traffic analysis is probably not going to look at the
contents until they have a clear understanding of the traffic flow between
the surveiled parties. At that point it is cheaper to look at the involved
parties and see if one of them has a weakness that can be exploited (ie
offer immunity to a herion addict) over doing actual expensive
cryptanalysis. If you can subvert a member you are in the classic
man-in-the-middle position.
When the Austin Cpunks looked at Mixmaster about 1.5 years ago for several
months it became clear that as implimented currently Mixmaster can't easily
support public remailer key servers or automated non-user-involved chaining
and processing (encryption & decryption). Shure the packets look the same,
but unless you as the sender go in and manage that material you are shit out
of luck. The remailers can't do it themselves without user intervention,
that's economicly not viable.
> > > hop header depended on which key was used to decode it.
> > In other words, remailer A's key will produce one next hop
> > address while remailer B's key will send it elsewhere. This
> > is a subset of the different plaintext - same cyphertext
> > problem - a hard problem as I understand it. Find two
> > distinct texts that encrypt with different keys to the
> > same cyphertext>
>
> That won't help. There would be no point in doing this. I'd ask you
> to explain, but that would just prolong the agony.
It is actualy quite simple why you would want to do this. You could then in
effect send the same packet (identical in every bit) to a set of remailers.
Each remailer would then decode the packet and send it on. All but one would
go to bogus addresses and the one remailer with the right key would get to
resend to the next remailer(s). Plus none of the outgoing traffic would be
to the same server, further complicating analysis. This also gives the user
some control over how much cover traffic gets generated. However Mallet
doesn't know which packets are which and therefore must follow every packet.
This multiplies the number of hops in the traffic analysis that need to be
analyzed. As mentioned in one of my previous posts, in this situation the
complexity goes up by a power causing the required computing resources to
trace the traffic to quickly become excessive.
Sine this is so painful for you, I assume this is the end of this
discussion.
____________________________________________________________________
| |
| The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there |
| be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. |
| |
| -Alan Greenspan- |
| |
| _____ The Armadillo Group |
| ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA |
| /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ |
| .', |||| `/( e\ |
| -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate |
| ravage at ssz.com |
| 512-451-7087 |
|____________________________________________________________________|
From ravage at ssz.com Thu Oct 2 20:28:33 1997
From: ravage at ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 11:28:33 +0800
Subject: None (fwd)
Message-ID: <199710030342.WAA29338@einstein.ssz.com>
Forwarded message:
> Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 04:05:48 +0200 (MET DST)
> Subject: Re: Remailers and ecash
> From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
> A pinging system can be set up to verify that all the remailers are
> operating correctly.
It will certaily tell you if the system is network aware, as to internal
operation and its validity it says nothing. If you want to test it you must
send each remailer in the network a message with a final destination of the
source. If you don't get it back you know the remailer is not online. This
is called a 'loopback'.
> Thus forwarding within the remailer network is free,
So as long as I only send traffic to other remailers the electricity and
such are not charged? How does my local electric company measure this?
If the remailer is turned on there is a cost. Unless you are getting charged
by the packet the cost of operating is indipenant of the traffic until you
have to increase your clogged pipe. Commercialy irrelevant approach.
> insert new messages. This scheme is a little more flexible than attaching
> ecash to each message because you can arrange any type of fee schedule you
> like, such as a flat rate per month.
But it doesn't pay for the cover traffic. It also short changes the
man-in-the-middle remailers since they have to spend resources without
getting recompensed. This would indicate that there is little financial
motive to operate a remailer that deals only with other remailers.
> There's also the reverse of this, where remailers accept from anyone, but
> only send to other remailers. Thus you have to pay to get your messages
> out of the remailer network. This is more restrictive because the payment
> must be anonymous.
So what keeps me from submitting message after message and never pulling
them out? I guess you just keep paying the bills to pay for the increasing
traffic and the need to increase your pipe to carry it. Commercialy
irrelevant. Also, consider the exponential expansion from cover traffic.
> Sign up with an ISP that offers alt.anonymous.messages. This one is a
> no-brainer. (and profitable for the ISP)
>
> This results in a system where sending messages is essentially free (since
> free remailers exist) but it costs money to receive them. So far it seems
> to be successful, at least for those who pay a flat fee for usenet access.
So what if I use a free-net or perhaps one of the free machines at the
public library or at the local college? Or the system at work?
____________________________________________________________________
| |
| The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there |
| be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. |
| |
| -Alan Greenspan- |
| |
| _____ The Armadillo Group |
| ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA |
| /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ |
| .', |||| `/( e\ |
| -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate |
| ravage at ssz.com |
| 512-451-7087 |
|____________________________________________________________________|
From theSameGuy at theSamePlace.Old Thu Oct 2 20:33:17 1997
From: theSameGuy at theSamePlace.Old (The Same Guy)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 11:33:17 +0800
Subject: And with the money you save on rent, you can...
Message-ID: <34345F32.A8C@theSamePlace.Old>
* A Washington Post report in March on prison corruption in
Mexico revealed that drug traffickers supposedly under maximum
security actually have "spacious rooms, cooks and maids, cellular
phones, a gymnasium, a sauna, and manicured gardens where they
host barbecues," among other things. And in May, the New York
Times revealed that a federal jail in Brooklyn has been run as a
"Mafia social club," where family business "sit-downs" featured
smuggled-in meatballs, manicotti, vodka, and wine. And in May,
imprisoned Gangster Disciple leader Larry Hoover was convicted in
Chicago of running a vast prison drug operation in which he
typically issued memos and gave orders by cellular phone while
wearing $400 alligator boots and eating specially prepared food in
his cell.
To read these News of the Weird newspaper
columns from the past six months, go to
http://www.nine.org/notw/notw.html
(That site contains no graphics, no photos, no video clips, no
audio. Just text. Deal with it.)
From anon at anon.efga.org Thu Oct 2 20:33:46 1997
From: anon at anon.efga.org (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 11:33:46 +0800
Subject: Kitsch!
Message-ID: <75c67c8f9904d007da656e3085a83f1b@anon.efga.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
- From the "Unberable Lightness of Being" by Milan Kundera.
Part Six, "The Grand March"
Section 6
Sabina's initial inner revolt against Communism was aesthetic rather
than ethical in character. What repelled her was not nearly so much
the ugliness of the Communist world (ruined castles transformed into
cow sheds) as the mask of beauty it tried to wear - in other words,
Communist kitsch. The model of Communist kitsch is the ceremony
called May Day.
She had seen May Day parades during the time when people were still
enthusiastic or still did their best to feign enthusiasnm. The women
all wore red, white, adn blue blouses, and the public, looking on from
balconies and windows, could make out various five-pointed stars,
hearts, and letters when the marchers went into formation. Small
brass bands accompanied the individual groups, keeping everyone in
step. As a group approached the reviewing stand, even the most blase
faces would beam with dazzling smiles, as if trying to prove they were
properly joyful or, to be more precise, in proper agreement. Nor were
they merely expressing political agreement with Communism; no, theirs
was an agreement with being as such. The May Day ceremony drew its
inspiration from the deep well of the categorical agreement with
being. The unwritten, unsung motto of the parade was not "Long live
Communism!" but "Long live life!" The power and cunning of Communist
politics lay in the fact that it appropriated this slogan. For it was
this idiotic tautology ("Long live life!") which attracted people
indifferent to the theses of Communism to the Communist parade.
Section 7
Ten years later (by which time she was living in America), a friend
of some friends, an American senator, took Sabina for a drive in his
gigantic car, his four children bouncing up and down in the back. The
senator stopped the car in front of a stadium with an artificial
skating rink, and the children jumped out and started running along
the large expanse of grass surrounding it. Sitting behind the wheel
and gazing dreamily after the four little bounding figures, he said to
Sabina, "Just look at them." And describing a circle with his arm, a
circle that was meant to take in stadium, grass, and children, he
added, "Now, that's what I call happiness."
Behind his words there was more than joy at seeing children run and
grass grow; there was a deep understanding of the plight of a refugee
from a Communist country where, the senator was convinced, no grass
grew and no children ran.
At that moment an image of the senator standing on a reviewing stand
in a Prague square flashed through Sabina's mind. The smile on his
face was the smile Communist statesmen beamed from the height of their
reviewing stand to the identically smiling citizens in the parade
below.
Section 8
How did the senator know that children meant happiness? Could he
see into their souls? What if, the moment they were out of sight,
three of them jumped the fourth and began beating him up?
The senator had only one argument in his favor: his feeling. When
the heart speaks, the mind finds it indecent to object. In the realm
of kitsch, the dictatorship of the heart reigns supreme.
The feeling induced by kitsch must be a kind the multitudes can
share. Kitsch may not, therefore, depend on an unusual situation; it
must derive from the basic images people have engraved in their
memories: the ungrateful daughter, the neglected father, children
running on the grass, the motherland betrayed, first love.
Kitsch causes two tears to flow in quick succession. The first tear
says: How nice to see children running on the grass!
The second tear says: How nice to be moved, together with all
mankind, by children running on the grass!
It is the second tear that makes kitsch kitsch.
The brotherhood of man on earth will be possible only on a base of
kitsch.
Section 9
And no one knows this better than politicians. Whenever a camera is
in the offing, they immediately run to the nearest child, lift it in
the air, kiss it on the cheek. Kitsch is the aesthetic ideal of all
politicians and all political parties and movements.
Those of us who live in a society where various political tendencies
exist side by side and competing influences cancel or limit one
another can manage more or less to escape the kitsch inquisition: the
individual can preserve his individuality; the artist can create
unusual works. But whenever a single political movement corners
power, we find ourselves in the realm of totalitarian kitsch.
When I say "totalitarian," what I mean is that everything that
infringes on kitsch must be banished for life: every display of
individualism (because a deviation from the collective is a spit in
the eye of the smiling brotherhood); every doubt (because anyone who
starts doubting details will end by doubting life itself); all irony
(because in the realm of kitsch everything must be taken quite
seriously); and the mother who abandons her family or the man who
prefers men to women, thereby calling into question the holy decree
"Be fruitful and multiply."
In this light, we can regard the gulag as a septic tank used by
totalitarian kitsch to dispose of its refuse.
Section 10
The decade immediately following the Second World War was a time of
the most horrible Stalinist terror. It was the time when Tereza's
father was arrested on some piddling charge and ten-year-old Tereza
was thrown out of their flat. It was also the time when
twenty-year-old Sabina was studying at the Academy of Fine Arts.
There, her professor of Marxism expounded on the following theory of
socialist art: Soviet society had made such progress that the basic
conflict was no longer between good and evil but between good and
better. So shit (that is, whatever is essentially unacceptable) could
exist only "on the other side" (in America, for instance), and only
from there, from the outside, as something alien (a spy, for
instance), could it penetrate the world of "good and better."
And in fact, Soviet films, which flooded the cinemas of all
Communist countries in that cruelest of times, were saturated with
incredible innocence and chastity. The greatest conflict that could
occur between two Russians was a lovers' misunderstanding: he thought
she no longer loved him; she thought he no longer loved her. But in
the final scene they would fall into each other's arms, tears of
happiness trickling down their cheeks.
The current conventional interpretation of these films is this: that
they showed the Communist ideal, whereas Communist reality was worse.
Sabina always rebelled against that interpretation. Whenever she
imagined the world of Soviet kitsch becoming a reality, she felt a
shiver run down her back. She would unhesitatingly prefer life in a
real Communist regime with all its persecution and meat queues. Life
in the real Communist world was still livable. In the world of the
Communist ideal made real, in that world of grinning idiots, she would
have nothing to say, she would die of horror within a week.
The feeling Soviet kitsch evoked in Sabina strikes me as very much
like the horror Tereza experienced in her dream of being marched
around a swimming pool with a group of naked women and forced to sing
cheerful songs with them while corpses floated just below the surface
of the pool. Tereza could not address a single question, a single
word, to any of the women; the only response she would have got was
the next stanza of the current song. She could not even give any of
them a secret wink; they would immediately have pointed her out to the
man standing in the basket above the pool, and he would have shot her
dead.
Tereza's dream reveals the true function of kitsch: kitsch is a
folding screen set up to curtain off death.
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From pooh at efga.org Thu Oct 2 20:35:40 1997
From: pooh at efga.org (Robert A. Costner)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 11:35:40 +0800
Subject: Traffic Analysis
Message-ID: <3.0.3.32.19971002232810.03514efc@rboc.net>
I'm curious about traffic analysis capability. While I don't know the
exact figures involved, I'd say that Cracker throws away about 10% of the
messages it receives. Admittedly, these are probably not encrypted
messages (I don't know. Humans do not get to read the messages.) Does
this make traffic analysis more difficult?
On the other side, if Cracker were to send out more messages that it takes
in, or just replace these thrown away messages with random noise messages,
perhaps encrypted, would this foil traffic analysis?
Or suppose Redneck sent each nym an encrypted message each day, or more
often? This would be a pure nonsense message just sent out to foil traffic
analysis. Since the server generated the nonsense message internally,
there would be no matching incoming message for Redneck.
-- Robert Costner Phone: (770) 512-8746
Electronic Frontiers Georgia mailto:pooh at efga.org
http://www.efga.org/ run PGP 5.0 for my public key
From twm at dev.null Thu Oct 2 20:35:58 1997
From: twm at dev.null (Tim W. May)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 11:35:58 +0800
Subject: Not that I'm a troublemaker...
Message-ID: <3434631F.4451@dev.null>
THE CLASSIC MIDDLE NAME (continued)
* In Alabama, murderer Billy Wayne Waldrop was executed in
January, and the next month, murderer Dudley Wayne Kyzer was
turned down for parole. Two weeks later, murderer Coleman
Wayne Gray was executed in Virginia. In May, murderer Larry
Wayne White was executed in Texas. In July, Maryland inmate
Richard Wayne Willoughby was sentenced to life in prison for
killing another inmate. And once again this April 19, the nation
was reminded that the Oklahoma City bombing date
commemorated not only the seige at Waco, but the 1995 Arkansas
execution of murderer and militia hero Richard Wayne Snell.
AUTHENTICITY: All news stories mentioned in News of the
Weird are from news stories appearing in daily newspapers in the
U. S. and Canada (or occasionally, reputable daily newspapers in
other countries or other reputable magazines and journals). No
so-called supermarket tabloid, and no story that was not intended
to be "news," is ever the source of a News of the Weird story.
From ravage at ssz.com Thu Oct 2 20:39:40 1997
From: ravage at ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 11:39:40 +0800
Subject: Remailer advertising (fwd)
Message-ID: <199710030353.WAA29549@einstein.ssz.com>
Forwarded message:
> Date: Thu, 02 Oct 1997 10:31:37 -0400
> From: "Robert A. Costner"
> Subject: Re: Remailer advertising
> this, and decided that users would be bothered by getting return email when
> they send the remailer a message. We considered sending a return message
> not with each message, but say only once per month, or only once every two
> weeks. Feedback I got on this was that users would not like the remailer
> acknowledging them.
Of course not:
- it provides even more non-covered traffic for Mallet to analyze
- it proves that the remailer is keeping long-term records of its
activity, further prompting Mallet to use rubber-hose crypto or
a covert break-in to recover the data.
A commercial remailers should keep no records and this means that each
submission must include some form of token for immediate payment of access
fees. Further, a secure remailer should NEVER send traffic to a subscriber
as the result of anything other than normal traffic handling.
____________________________________________________________________
| |
| The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there |
| be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. |
| |
| -Alan Greenspan- |
| |
| _____ The Armadillo Group |
| ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA |
| /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ |
| .', |||| `/( e\ |
| -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate |
| ravage at ssz.com |
| 512-451-7087 |
|____________________________________________________________________|
From ravage at ssz.com Thu Oct 2 21:09:25 1997
From: ravage at ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 12:09:25 +0800
Subject: Traffic Analysis (fwd)
Message-ID: <199710030423.XAA29605@einstein.ssz.com>
Forwarded message:
> Date: Thu, 02 Oct 1997 23:28:10 -0400
> From: "Robert A. Costner"
> Subject: Traffic Analysis
> I'm curious about traffic analysis capability. While I don't know the
> exact figures involved, I'd say that Cracker throws away about 10% of the
> messages it receives. Admittedly, these are probably not encrypted
> messages (I don't know. Humans do not get to read the messages.) Does
> this make traffic analysis more difficult?
Why/how does it decide to throw them away? Does the incoming produce cover
traffic even if its thrown away? Traffic analysis generaly does not look at
the contents of the packets, encrypted or not is irrelevant.
I suspect it would lower the estimated ratio of cover traffic if nothing
gets sent out. This would in general lower the cost to analyse the traffic.
I would set it up to send bogus outgoing even if the message was dropped.
That way the analysis would correlate the dropped message to the outgoing
and produce a cover ratio closer to the actual value. Also remember to send
n+1 bogus traffic to make up for the dropped outgoing.
> Or suppose Redneck sent each nym an encrypted message each day, or more
> often?
By 'nym' you mean each subscribed address or to each address used in the
outgoing? I would say it is bad to send to subscribers. It provides
non-covered traffic that identifies your subscribers specificaly (really not
a threat since Mallet already has their original incoming and therefore
their source address) as well as demonstrating that you are keeping long-term
traffic records. The long-term records represent a clear threat to the
security and stability of the remailer. If you send out this cover traffic
regularly then be shure to use some mechanism to select email addresses
randomly or else Mallet will get a list of your bogus addresses and begins
to filter them immediately.
A commercial remailer should not keep records of its use. However, I suspect
that eventualy remailers will be required to keep usage records by law.
____________________________________________________________________
| |
| The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there |
| be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. |
| |
| -Alan Greenspan- |
| |
| _____ The Armadillo Group |
| ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA |
| /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ |
| .', |||| `/( e\ |
| -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate |
| ravage at ssz.com |
| 512-451-7087 |
|____________________________________________________________________|
From tcmay at got.net Thu Oct 2 21:27:58 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 12:27:58 +0800
Subject: Intruder Alert!
In-Reply-To: <01BCCF84.84FC2100.hallam@ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID:
At 7:32 PM -0700 10/2/97, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>On Thursday, October 02, 1997 11:54 AM, Attila T. Hun
>[SMTP:attila at hun.org] wrote:
>> if Phill is secure, what difference does it make if you assault
>> him? my guess is he is not secure, and probably has no clue how
>> to get from there to secure.
>
>Because when you ring the alarm bell on my system
>it is answered by law enforcement and it costs about
>$10,000 a time to deal with the issue.
Hmmmhhh, you must have a law enforcement arrangement different from the
ones around here (here being the Bay Area/Silicon Valley). Around here, law
enforcement is usually the last to be brought in, and they in fact have
little interest in answering computer intrusion alert calls.
If it costs you, or the taxpayers (through your law enforcement situation),
$10,000 for each quiver of your alarm system, maybe you ought to find ways
to cut the costs.
And setting off an alarm is not necessarily a crime, of course. Depends on
where the alarm was placed. If someone bumps a car in a parking lot and
sets off a motion sensor alarm, no crime has generally been committed. At
least this is the situation in all the places I know of.
And if dealing with a false car alarm cost $10,000, or even $100, this
would tell the alarm owner to do something to reduce the number of false
alarms.
>Setting off fire alarms costs real money.
Indeed, because people panic, evacuate, leave work in progress, lose
manufacturing runs, etc. But I can't think of many computer intrusion
alarms which have the same effect, nor should they. If someone sets off
panic alarms because an incorrect password is typed too many times, or some
biometric test fails, or access to some files is unexplained, or whatever
the alarms are, then this is an overreaction.
Better security, better firewalls, write protecting Web sites, air gaps
with the Net, or whatever, these would seem to be better alternatives than
calling in the cops and running up a $10,000 bill for each alarm.
(In any case, cops in my area will definitely _not_ come to my aid if I
call them to report an attempted incursion into my system. Your cops must
be different.)
--Tim May
The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^2,976,221 | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
From ravage at ssz.com Thu Oct 2 21:46:22 1997
From: ravage at ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 12:46:22 +0800
Subject: update.339 (fwd)
Message-ID: <199710030500.AAA29731@einstein.ssz.com>
Forwarded message:
> From physnews at aip.org Thu Oct 2 16:07:42 1997
> Date: Thu, 2 Oct 97 12:42:29 EDT
> From: physnews at aip.org (AIP listserver)
> Message-Id: <9710021642.AA00390 at aip.org>
> To: physnews-mailing at aip.org
> Subject: update.339
>
>
> PHYSICS NEWS UPDATE
> The American Institute of Physics Bulletin of Physics News
> Number 339 October 1, 1997 by Phillip F. Schewe and Ben
> Stein
>
> A NEW THEORY OF NMR FOR EXTENDED OBJECTS.
> Nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) isn't just an imaging
> technique, but a valuable spectroscopic tool for deducing the
> chemical environment and structural layout of atoms in different
> environments. This is because the NMR spectrum of an atom (or
> to be more precise, the spectrum of the atom's nuclear magnetic
> states) is different depending on the local geometry, just as an
> atom's allowed electron energies will be different if the atom is
> suddenly lodged in a crystal with many other atoms. Previous
> NMR theories have been able to explain accurately what the
> NMR spectrum ought to be only for atoms or atom clusters in
> isolation. Now, physicists at UC Berkeley (Steven Louie,
> louie at jungle.berkeley.edu, 510-642-1709) have devised a
> method which for the first time makes possible rigorous
> calculations of the NMR spectra of extended systems such as
> crystals, surfaces, polymers, or even amorphous materials; given
> the coordinates of the atoms, the Berkeley researchers were able
> to predict the spectrum. They tried out their theory on an
> industrially important material---synthetic diamond films used,
> for example, as coatings for tools and engine parts. The
> prediction of the NMR spectrum for carbon atoms in the diamond
> films was in close agreement with the observed spectrum.
> (Francesco Mauri et al., Physical Review Letters, 22 Sept.
> 1997.)
Hell of a way to reverse-engineer just about anything. How long you figure
it will be before they start coming out wit industrial units just for
materials analysis? I wonder how good it would be at determing the layout
of a die through the carrier...
> PARTICLE IDENTIFICATION WITH PROBE MICROSCOPY.
> Scanning tunneling microscopes (STM) provide pretty pictures of
> atoms and can even be used to pluck single atoms from the
> sample surface. But often the identity of that atom (especially if
> it is an impurity) remains unknown. Physicists at Arizona State
> (John Spence, Uwe Weierstall, weierstall at asu.edu) have
> addressed this problem. First, they use a small voltage to remove
> a surface atom or molecule with an STM probe; then a larger
> voltage launches the object from the probe toward a distant
> detector. A measurement of the time of flight (TOF) supplies a
> mass-to-charge ratio for the mystery particle, which in most cases
> will supply the identity of the unknown species. The best
> resolution achieved by other methods of chemical identification
> on surfaces is about 2 nm. This new STM + TOF identification,
> with essentially atomic-level resolution, should be handy in a
> number of research areas, such as catalysis and the study of the
> role of foreign atoms at kinks and steps in crystal growth. This
> work will be reported in a session (NS-TuA, Oct. 21) at the
> upcoming meeting of the American Vacuum Society (Oct. 20-24
> in San Jose). The program for this meeting can be viewed on the
> Internet at this address:
> www.vacuum.org/symposium/program.html. (General press
> contact at the meeting: 408-271-6000.)
Pretty nifty materials analysis tool. Maybe they should shoot the atom toward
the NMR...
> FISSION HELPS SUPERCONDUCTIVITY. One of the
> problems of using high temperature superconductors as wires in
> magnets is that the bundles of magnetic field lines that normally
> stay put in the presence of low currents start to move around
> (dissipating energy thereby) when larger currents are sent through
> the wire sample. Scientists working at Los Alamos have now
> used a proton beam to induce nuclear fission in mercury atoms in
> a mercury/copper oxide superconductor. The defects caused by
> the fissioning atoms splay out in all directions in the
> superconductor crystal and help to snag the wayward field lines.
> This permits the sample to carry much more current. (Nature, 18
> Sept.)
____________________________________________________________________
| |
| The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there |
| be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. |
| |
| -Alan Greenspan- |
| |
| _____ The Armadillo Group |
| ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA |
| /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ |
| .', |||| `/( e\ |
| -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate |
| ravage at ssz.com |
| 512-451-7087 |
|____________________________________________________________________|
From ravage at ssz.com Thu Oct 2 21:47:17 1997
From: ravage at ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 12:47:17 +0800
Subject: index.html
Message-ID: <199710030502.AAA29773@einstein.ssz.com>
CNN logo
Navigation
Infoseek/Big Yellow
Pathfinder/Warner Bros
Main banner Move the corporate ladder to your back yard. Because you
can. VAIO/Sony rule
JUDGE THROWS OUT RUBY RIDGE CHARGES
Randy Weaver's house October 2, 1997
Web posted at: 8:36 p.m. EDT (0036 GMT)
Latest developments:
* Judge invokes double-jeopardy law
* Harris accused of killing U.S. marshal
* Charges against FBI agent unaffected
BONNERS FERRY, Idaho (CNN) -- An Idaho judge dismissed a state
murder charge against a man accused of killing a federal agent in
the Ruby Ridge shootout, saying he can't be tried again after his
acquittal of murder in federal court.
Idaho Magistrate Judge Quentin Harden ruled Thursday that the charge
against Kevin Harris violate a state law barring prosecution of
someone who faced the same charges in another "state, territory or
country."
Prosecutor Denise Woodbury, who charged Harris and FBI marksman Lon
Horiuchi in state court in August, had argued that the state
double-jeopardy law was meant to cover prosecutions in other
countries, not the United States.
"I find that (Idaho law) bars further prosecution of Kevin Harris
for the acts set forth ... in the complaint in this case," Harden
said.
"To rule that the courts of the United States of America do not come
under 'another state, territory, or country' would be an anomalous
result -- giving more credence to the courts of another country than
to the courts of our own nation," Harden wrote.
Harris accused of killing U.S. marshal
Standoff scene
Harris, 29, of Republic, Washington, was accused in the shooting
death of deputy U.S. Marshal William Degan and of shooting at
another agent in the August 21, 1992, shootout that precipitated an
11-day siege at the cabin of white separatist Randy Weaver.
A friend of Weaver's, Harris was staying at the cabin during the
shootout and was wounded by an FBI sniper's bullet. Weaver's
14-year-old son, Sam, was killed in the gunfight. His wife, Vicki
Weaver, was later shot and killed during the siege by the FBI's
Horiuchi.
The shootout has become a rallying point for some groups who believe
federal law enforcement has encroached too much on citizens' rights.
Weaver and Harris were tried and acquitted of federal charges in
1993.
But in August, Woodbury charged Harris with first-degree murder in
Degan's death and assault with a deadly weapon against Arthur
Roderick, another law enforcement officer. Harden also dismissed the
assault charge.
Woodbury also charged Horiuchi with involuntary manslaughter in the
death of Vicki Weaver.
Charges against FBI agent unaffected
Harden's ruling doesn't affect the charge against Horiuchi, who has
never been tried in any court. His lawyers have indicated they will
try to move his case to a federal court.
Harris was at his job as a welder when he received the news that the
murder charge against him had been dismissed, said Diane Peters, his
business partner at Eagle Industries.
"We were hoping what was fair and just would turn out," Peters said.
Harris himself did not return a phone call, and Woodbury declined to
comment on Harden's ruling.
Reuters contributed to this report.
rule
Related stories:
* Both sides decry new Ruby Ridge charges - August 21, 1997
* FBI senior officials won't be charged in Ruby Ridge siege - August
15, 1997
* Former FBI section chief pleads guilty, admits destroying Ruby
Ridge report - October 30, 1996
* FBI official charged with obstruction after concealing Ruby Ridge
report - October 22, 1996
Related sites:
Note: Pages will open in a new browser window
* United States Department of Justice Home Page
* Federal Bureau of Investigation
External sites are not endorsed by CNN Interactive.
_________________________________________________________________
Infoseek search ____________________ ____ ____
_________________________________________________________________
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You said it... [INLINE] Move the corporate ladder to your back yard.
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From geeman at best.com Thu Oct 2 21:49:06 1997
From: geeman at best.com (geeman at best.com)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 12:49:06 +0800
Subject: http:--www.cnn.com-US-9710-01-shooting.update-
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19971002203627.006f3128@best.com>
Crypto relevance? Naturally: this wouldn't have happened if strong crypto
were outlawed!
At 09:51 PM 10/1/97 -0500, Jim Choate wrote:
>
> CNN logo
> Navigation
>
> Infoseek/Big Yellow
>
> TEEN KILLS 2 AT SCHOOL; MOTHER FOUND DEAD AT HOME
>
> Woodham October 1, 1997
> Web posted at: 3:38 p.m. EDT (1938 GMT)
>
> PEARL, Mississippi (CNN) -- A Mississippi teen-ager slashed his
> mother's throat Wednesday morning before going on a shooting rampage
> at his high school that left two students dead and at least six
> wounded, authorities said.
>
> The high school junior, Luke Woodham, was arrested and charged with
> three counts of murder shortly after the shooting at Pearl High
> School, about three miles east of the state capital, Jackson.
>
> Police Chief Bill Slade choked back tears as he told reporters,
> "This was a disgruntled girlfriend-boyfriend thing... We talked to
> the youth. He gave us a statement and his manifesto was that he felt
> he had been wronged."
>
etc,..,.
obligatory pgp key:
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 4.5
mQENAjMPX3sAAAEIAL8U6IqpMkqM3TcIqU/q7iot8pYk4ifVNaNlIYwwoYmPXH/T
dabDzgkQg7h1QsEJU71Ze8EdHmKksfeBEVppJV6X9SyzpFOCgrI/Qr7hMbxnecci
SVk2/B2lf4tUPuqm/DGRfAUcd4iG7Gjhw5GRh9Us/jrEtkqr3iIES+9pSNvrEsgB
xYYR39eaYwe0gheExaO7vtvDDPUM7C3spbcnwOyLCpURpLCAMHUO8DQc2FO/fN4z
TqqIFOect2ea4LYHr0o29RrtY9J85lQj3df8LQvIJWjwzAFfBqOU1KUdXqTayzUj
rvY4ZL/1vhTJ5QmlBJ6ognqwk7PVN0SesspU2okABRG0IGdyZWdnIHBlcnNvbmFs
IDxnZWVtYW5AYmVzdC5jb20+
=H0bC
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
From ravage at ssz.com Thu Oct 2 21:55:01 1997
From: ravage at ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 12:55:01 +0800
Subject: http:--www.cnn.com-US-9710-01-shooting.update- (fwd)
Message-ID: <199710030508.AAA29887@einstein.ssz.com>
Forwarded message:
> From: geeman at best.com
> Date: Thu, 02 Oct 1997 20:47:35 -0700
> Subject: Re: http:--www.cnn.com-US-9710-01-shooting.update-
> Crypto relevance? Naturally: this wouldn't have happened if strong crypto
> were outlawed!
> > TEEN KILLS 2 AT SCHOOL; MOTHER FOUND DEAD AT HOME
> >
> > Woodham October 1, 1997
> > Web posted at: 3:38 p.m. EDT (1938 GMT)
> >
> > PEARL, Mississippi (CNN) -- A Mississippi teen-ager slashed his
> > mother's throat Wednesday morning before going on a shooting rampage
> > at his high school that left two students dead and at least six
> > wounded, authorities said.
This list is involved with much more than just crypto. These were submitted
as further datum in the ongoing guns discussion.
You might try using procmail filtering on 'gun' to eliminate such traffic.
The Cypherpunks Creedo: Empower yourself and quit bothering me.
____________________________________________________________________
| |
| The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there |
| be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. |
| |
| -Alan Greenspan- |
| |
| _____ The Armadillo Group |
| ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA |
| /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ |
| .', |||| `/( e\ |
| -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate |
| ravage at ssz.com |
| 512-451-7087 |
|____________________________________________________________________|
From snow at smoke.suba.com Thu Oct 2 22:13:21 1997
From: snow at smoke.suba.com (snow)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 13:13:21 +0800
Subject: Digital Postage (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199709282104.QAA09234@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <199710030509.AAA00490@smoke.suba.com>
He of the Hyperlong .sig said:
> Ask yourself this, how attractive would the Internet have been if it had
> required users to install and manage multiple communications protocols for
> every connection?
You mean like FTP, NNTP, HTTP, SMTP & etc.?
Rudy can't fail.
From nobody at neva.org Thu Oct 2 22:41:00 1997
From: nobody at neva.org (Neva Remailer)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 13:41:00 +0800
Subject: Remailers and ecash
Message-ID: <199710030536.WAA16213@mail-gw2.pacbell.net>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Anonymous wrote:
>> > - Everyone a remailer. Remailers only accept messages from other
>> > remailers. To use remailers you must run a remailer.
>>
>> I don't grow my own wheat, grind it up, and then make my own bread. I
>> also prefer not to run a remailer.
>
>You don't have to. You pay someone to bake your bread for you, and
>you can pay someone to run your remailer for you.
>
>This idea has been around since remailers began. The basic premise
>is that a group of remailers are set up which only accept mail from
>other remailers. A pinging system can be set up to verify that all
>the remailers are operating correctly.
>
>The catch is that in practice each remailer is only required to
>accept mail from other remailers, but can actually accept mail from
>anybody the operator wants to. So if you don't want to run a
>remailer, just pay someone to run a remailer on your behalf, and then
>you can send anonymous messages through that person's site.
>
>Thus forwarding within the remailer network is free, but it costs
>money to insert new messages. This scheme is a little more flexible
>than attaching ecash to each message because you can arrange any type
>of fee schedule you like, such as a flat rate per month.
This is interesting. One nice feature is that there doesn't need to
be a standardized payment arrangement with all remailers, just the one
you use for your entry point. And, there's nothing that prevents many
remailer networks from overlapping. (Actually, the geometry could
create some neat problems.)
This would be fairly easy to set up, not even really needing client
software modifications.
However, it does have a "commons" problem. No remailer operator has
an incentive to provide really good service. They are all encouraged
to provide the bare minimum remailer service and take advantage of the
other remailers in the network.
For example, what would encourage somebody to have a 24 x 7 remailer
service with continuous staffing? This would be desirable because
when the bad guys kick down the door, there is somebody awake to pull
the plug. There are a zillion other features which won't happen if
there isn't a proper incentive.
Monty Cantsin
Editor in Chief
Smile Magazine
http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html
http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
From enoch at zipcon.net Thu Oct 2 22:45:36 1997
From: enoch at zipcon.net (Mike Duvos)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 13:45:36 +0800
Subject: Kevin Harris Charges Dismissed
Message-ID: <19971003054144.19104.qmail@zipcon.net>
An Idaho magistrate dismissed state murder and other charges against Ruby
Ridge defendent Kevin Harris today, citing double jeopardy.
--
Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $
enoch at zipcon.com $ via Finger $
{Free Cypherpunk Political Prisoner Jim Bell}
From ravage at ssz.com Thu Oct 2 22:54:55 1997
From: ravage at ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 13:54:55 +0800
Subject: Digital Postage (fwd)
Message-ID: <199710030610.BAA30179@einstein.ssz.com>
Forwarded message:
> Subject: Re: Digital Postage (fwd)
> Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 00:09:22 -0500 (CDT)
> From: "snow"
> He of the Hyperlong .sig said:
I could make it even longer if it would irritate you more...
> > Ask yourself this, how attractive would the Internet have been if it had
> > required users to install and manage multiple communications protocols for
> > every connection?
>
> You mean like FTP, NNTP, HTTP, SMTP & etc.?
>
> Rudy can't fail.
No, not services, network protocols
TCP/IP/UDP...IPX...NetBUI...Lantastic...MosesLAN...ParNet...etc.
____________________________________________________________________
| |
| The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there |
| be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. |
| |
| -Alan Greenspan- |
| |
| _____ The Armadillo Group |
| ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA |
| /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ |
| .', |||| `/( e\ |
| -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate |
| ravage at ssz.com |
| 512-451-7087 |
|____________________________________________________________________|
From pooh at efga.org Thu Oct 2 23:07:24 1997
From: pooh at efga.org (Robert A. Costner)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 14:07:24 +0800
Subject: Traffic Analysis
In-Reply-To: <199710030423.XAA29605@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.3.32.19971003013456.0356271c@mail.atl.bellsouth.net>
At 11:23 PM 10/2/97 -0500, Jim Choate wrote:
>Why/how does it decide to throw them away? Does the incoming produce cover
>traffic even if its thrown away? Traffic analysis generaly does not look at
>the contents of the packets, encrypted or not is irrelevant.
Remailers in general will throw away messages at times. Sometimes on
purpose, sometimes by accident. This is not replaced by any cover traffic.
For purposes of argument, we could say that a remailer throws away
messages that violate usage policies. This accounts for some amount of
traffic, let's just say 10% to name a figure. Of course this sounds
reprehensible, so you ask what sort of message gets thrown out? Some
examples might be:
* 3,000 copies of the same message to the same person
* Any mail from Sanford Wallace at Cyberpromo.com
* A 300MB mailbomb
Basically some messages that constitute abuse (without examining actual
content) get tossed. These are "valid" messages from people which the
remailer might decide to not continue to send. Much of this mail never
even reaches the remailer code as it gets tossed at an earlier level.
Since about 10% of incoming traffic gets tossed, it would seem that this
would somehow effect traffic analysis. This traffic is not replaced, and
much of the dropped traffic is not even know to the remailer. How much
would this actually effect traffic analysis?
As a side point, software problems will at times cause chained messages to
get tossed. From time to time certain remailers become incompatible with
each other, or user held public keys do not get updated properly. This
will also cause messages to get tossed.
>By 'nym' you mean each subscribed address or to each address used in the
>outgoing? I would say it is bad to send to subscribers.
Cracker sends messages as "Anonymous" and does not allow replies to be
returned to the sender. Redneck on the other hand allows each user to pick
a pseudonym and allows relies to be returned to the sender. This is known
as a "nym". The whole point of a nym is to be able to receive replies (as
well as establish reputation capital). People who have nyms on the
remailer want to receive email back to them. Nyms are managed and
authenticated with PGP. My question is would it foil traffic analysis if a
number of remailer server generated messages were to go out to the nyms
without ever having matching incoming traffic?
>A commercial remailer should not keep records of its use. However, I suspect
>that eventualy remailers will be required to keep usage records by law.
I'd be willing to be involved in a first amendment challenge against any
such law. I suspect we would win in the US. At least we won the last 1st
amendment challenge against remailers. (ACLU vs Miller)
-- Robert Costner Phone: (770) 512-8746
Electronic Frontiers Georgia mailto:pooh at efga.org
http://www.efga.org/ run PGP 5.0 for my public key
From lac at dev.null Thu Oct 2 23:27:01 1997
From: lac at dev.null (Law Abiding Citizen)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 14:27:01 +0800
Subject: Newbie Question
Message-ID: <34348B4C.6B63@dev.null>
I'm new to encryption, having just purchased PGP. I want to abide by
the law, but I don't know who to send a copy of my secret key to.
Do I send it to the FBI guy who shot the unarmed woman, the FBI guy,
Kahoe, who ordered evidence of the FBI murder of citizens destroyed,
or to one of the other four top FBI officials who helped with the
cover-up?
Do I have to send a copy of my secret key to the CIA, as well? If so,
do I just give it to my drug dealer and have him pass it along to his
connection, or should I just give it to a Jewish person and tell them
to have the Mossad pass it along to the CIA?
Also, I like sticking large, foreign objects in my rectum. Can I legally
do that myself, with a toilet plunger, or are they restricted to only
use by LEA's in meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement.
Insincerely,
A.L-A. Citizen
From ravage at ssz.com Thu Oct 2 23:50:48 1997
From: ravage at ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 14:50:48 +0800
Subject: Traffic Analysis (fwd)
Message-ID: <199710030707.CAA30296@einstein.ssz.com>
Forwarded message:
> Date: Fri, 03 Oct 1997 01:34:56 -0400
> From: "Robert A. Costner"
> Subject: Re: Traffic Analysis
> Remailers in general will throw away messages at times. Sometimes on
> purpose, sometimes by accident. This is not replaced by any cover traffic.
Perhaps this should be added.
> For purposes of argument, we could say that a remailer throws away
> messages that violate usage policies. This accounts for some amount of
> traffic, let's just say 10% to name a figure.
Way too high for commercial use. Get it down to something like .01 and that
would be workable I suspect (haven't done the math). Course this raises the
issue of who pays for dumped mail on a commercial box. Should the customer
pay since it was their action that instigated the drop? Or perhaps the
remailer since they were selling a service which they didn't provide at
their discretion?
> Of course this sounds
> reprehensible,
Not to me. It's your box and your money, set any policy that you desire.
If I as a user don't like it, I'll beat feet...
> so you ask what sort of message gets thrown out? Some
> examples might be:
>
> * 3,000 copies of the same message to the same person
> * Any mail from Sanford Wallace at Cyberpromo.com
> * A 300MB mailbomb
Let's generalize a bit to see if we can get a clearer picture.
- traffic that seems to be duplicate.
What if the digital signature on each one is valid implying the
originator intended to send the 3,000 pieces. Do you dump them
and take the money?
- traffic from specific parties whose reputation capital is low.
As a business should this really matter as long as the creetin
pays the bill?
- traffic of an abnormal format
Don't see any issues with this one.
Are there any other classes that you can think of that you might want to
filter on?
> Basically some messages that constitute abuse (without examining actual
> content) get tossed.
Ok, so you are doing header filtering.
> These are "valid" messages from people which the
> remailer might decide to not continue to send. Much of this mail never
> even reaches the remailer code as it gets tossed at an earlier level.
> Since about 10% of incoming traffic gets tossed, it would seem that this
> would somehow effect traffic analysis. This traffic is not replaced, and
> much of the dropped traffic is not even know to the remailer. How much
> would this actually effect traffic analysis?
Let's see if we can put some numbers to it...
We receive n pieces of mail. n/10 is tossed at reception based on header
filtering. For each mail that gets to the remailer code we sent m cover
messages and 1 real message.
So the remailer handles a total of (n - n/10) + (m + 1)(n-n/10) pieces in a
given time period, t. Let z stand for (n - n/10) the actual number of
processible traffic, we can reduce this to z + (m + 1) z.
Let's assume now that we go ahead and transmit cover for those emails we get
something like z + (m + 1) z + m ( n/10 ). We don't add a 1 to the m(n/10)
because we don't have a real outgoing to process.
So the total traffic load of the remailer can be represented by:
L = z + (m + 1) z + m ( n/10 )
or,
L = (n - n/10) + (m + 1)(n - n/10) + m(n/10)
Now if you look at a travelling salesman problem you see quickly that the
complexity grows quite quickly. This produces a traffic analysis load of
something of the form,
T = L ^ v
Where v represents the complexity factor in dealing with the possible
combinations possible.
So, without actualy plugging numbers in there, I would say it looks like a
small increase in output could grow pretty quickly because of the power
growth factor in the extra traffic and processing it.
> As a side point, software problems will at times cause chained messages to
> get tossed. From time to time certain remailers become incompatible with
> each other, or user held public keys do not get updated properly. This
> will also cause messages to get tossed.
Ok, let's add a 'software failure' category.
> Cracker sends messages as "Anonymous" and does not allow replies to be
> returned to the sender. Redneck on the other hand allows each user to pick
> a pseudonym and allows relies to be returned to the sender. This is known
> as a "nym". The whole point of a nym is to be able to receive replies (as
> well as establish reputation capital). People who have nyms on the
> remailer want to receive email back to them. Nyms are managed and
> authenticated with PGP. My question is would it foil traffic analysis if a
> number of remailer server generated messages were to go out to the nyms
> without ever having matching incoming traffic?
If I understand you the remailer would send outbound traffic to its input
for distribution to your subscribers? I don't believe it would factor into
the analysis at all if all the source destinations are the same. Outbound
traffic from party A that went to party B would be important to track. So,
if you wanted to do this sort of stuff and you wanted Mallet to chase their
tail I would randomly pick source addresses from my subscriber base and send
the bogus messages to my subscribers making shure nobody received an email
from themselves. Then it looks like everyone is involved in a conspiracy...
> >A commercial remailer should not keep records of its use. However, I suspect
> >that eventualy remailers will be required to keep usage records by law.
>
> I'd be willing to be involved in a first amendment challenge against any
> such law. I suspect we would win in the US. At least we won the last 1st
> amendment challenge against remailers. (ACLU vs Miller)
It has nothing to do with limiting speech so I doubt you'd have a 1st leg to
stand on. Furthermore, the 1st doesn't guarantee the right to anonymity. If
you want to claim that as a fundamental right you'd need to use the 9th and
10th. It does have to do with being able to trace the perp back if
needed. I am not saying I agree with it, just recognize that reasonable
people will see this lack of tracability via a court order as a clear threat
to their security at all levels.
____________________________________________________________________
| |
| The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there |
| be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. |
| |
| -Alan Greenspan- |
| |
| _____ The Armadillo Group |
| ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA |
| /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ |
| .', |||| `/( e\ |
| -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate |
| ravage at ssz.com |
| 512-451-7087 |
|____________________________________________________________________|
From blancw at cnw.com Fri Oct 3 01:03:33 1997
From: blancw at cnw.com (Blanc)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 16:03:33 +0800
Subject: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or (fwd)
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19971003000347.006ac138@cnw.com>
Jim Choate wrote:
>> Stalkers, thieves, rapists, drug addicts, perverts, etc., or just real
>> animals from the animal kingdom, strike at the most inopportune times, when
>> there are no officially sanctioned police forces around to be of help.
>
>I have to object to the inclusion of drug addicts, they do what they do
>because the legislators and police want to stick their noses in other
>peoples business. If drug addicts resort to crime then society as a whole
>must garner some of the responsibility of putting them in that situation.
....................................................
We weren't discussing why people commit crimes against others, Jim. We
were discussing the disagreeability of having & using guns.
And yes, killing doggies is also a Bad Thing. Generally. ('cept when
they're foaming at the mouth, snarling, with red blazing eyes, lunging
directly at you. That is a Very Bad Doggie.)
..
Blanc
From attila at hun.org Fri Oct 3 01:10:56 1997
From: attila at hun.org (Attila T. Hun)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 16:10:56 +0800
Subject: counter-intuitive -- spam is good for you. anonymous assholes are your friend
In-Reply-To: <01BCCF84.84FC2100.hallam@ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <199710030803.CAA17846@infowest.com>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
on or about 971002:2232
Phillip Hallam-Baker purported to expostulate:
+On Thursday, October 02, 1997 11:54 AM,
Attila T. Hun [SMTP:attila at hun.org] wrote:
+> if Phill is secure, what difference does it make if you assault
+> him? my guess is he is not secure, and probably has no clue how
+> to get from there to secure.
+Because when you ring the alarm bell on my system
+it is answered by law enforcement and it costs about
+$10,000 a time to deal with the issue.
+Setting off fire alarms costs real money.
my only comment is: "may you have many false alarms."
waving the big stick of law enforcement as a warning is nothing
more than a pre-potty trained bully with a bunch of goons to
back him up as he stomps around his playpen.
law enforcement did not deterred the hacks on the state department,
the FBI, and even the CIA. I dont advocate the hacks, but it is
amusing to watch the great watchdogs of security take a hit.
with your spoiled brat rantings, you make your site as tempting as
some of the other nose tweakers who need a serious attitude adjustment
in other words, get off your fucking horse, it has a broken leg.
dont forget to call home, your mums waiting.
attila out
+Incidentally the security line you are pushing is a crock. To get real
+security I believe you have to have feedback
+and monitoring. This is especially important in an institutional
+setting where you may not have complete control of critical
+infrastructure. For my application simply hoping the guys with the
+white hats find security holes before those in the black ones do is
+simply not enough.
+In any case I'm not as complacent as Attila seems to think the security
+model has been amply reviewed by the best
+in the field.
+Threatening to catch the malefactor and put him behind bars is a
+valuable additional security tool. The more bad guys there are behind
+bars the less time I have to spend worrying.
+ Phill
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3i
Charset: latin1
Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be
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o5jKmAAV5mXBS13Vvm8EBb+Z4znGlyFxrW8WB+Tx9TXwYSAENKvGt2fnMkv82yuK
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OQ5j/wh/rqc=
=Ezsh
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
From attila at hun.org Fri Oct 3 01:32:32 1997
From: attila at hun.org (Attila T. Hun)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 16:32:32 +0800
Subject: Crypto-continuation in Washington: FBI/DoJ keep up the pressure
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <130bbbb.13e6d@hun.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
anyone have any doubt about my "Call to arms against F[reeh,uck]"?
read what Declan said; the Congresscritters are just regrouping.
the man must be stopped: Freeh Fuck wants to make J. Edgar Hoover
look like a saint, garter belt and all. Hoover looked like the
slimeball he was; F[reeh,uck] looks like the Hollywood stereotype of
the valiant and honest defender of the American way.
just wait for the hammer to fall in some rider to a spending bill;
American legislative morality is pure snake shit amorality.
--
"Experience keeps a dear school, but fools will learn in no other."
--Benjamin Franklin
______________________________________________________________________
"attila" 1024/C20B6905/23 D0 FA 7F 6A 8F 60 66 BC AF AE 56 98 C0 D7 B0
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3i
Charset: latin1
Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be
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Wa0mPoYVDijwdFLqO5WCqCvIPxAdi0dG67TdYTd5zd07ViFdNJS9fwNEI5M4TPh5
/SXae6MgAzonphYXThyn4QtsF377qZySXNNTpBMXFx50XhPMs/fvYmYRmEVInAQV
VGOIfqCpI0w=
=Gonb
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
From attila at hun.org Fri Oct 3 02:29:21 1997
From: attila at hun.org (Attila T. Hun)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 17:29:21 +0800
Subject: NYTimes Editorial slams F[reeh,uck] and calls on Clinton to stamp it out!
Message-ID: <130bbbb.14ef7@hun.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
The lead editorial, the stated opinion of the paper
itself, in this mornings NYTimes slams F[reeh.uck]'s
initiative as "crossing the line" and that Clinton
"needs to stamp out a bad idea."
strong words, newspaper policy editorial, important
words. The NYTimes actually has a clue, a strong
clue.
support the NYTimes! The NYTimes syndicate feeds
thousands of the US papers, particularly the small
town papers and is considered gospel by many.
http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/editorial/03fri4.html
The Clinton Administration has proposed several
unworkable plans over the years to keep powerful
encryption programs that scramble telephone and computer
messages out of the hands of foreign terrorists and
criminals. But it has never tried to put the need to
eavesdrop on criminals above the privacy rights of
ordinary Americans. Last month the F.B.I. Director,
Louis Freeh, crossed that line by urging Congress to
outlaw the manufacture and distribution of encryption
programs the Government cannot instantly crack....
...The plan is unworkable because uncrackable encryption
software is readily available abroad. Congress could
try to forbid Americans to use any unbreakable
encryption, regardless of who makes it. But that would
trample on rights that Americans jealously protect to
communicate free of Washington's interference.
The best way to reduce many types of industrial and
financial crime is to provide citizens powerful
encryption so they can communicate without fear of
corporate spies and thieves....
...
Before encryption controls pick up more momentum, the
White House needs to stamp out a bad idea.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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Charset: latin1
Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be
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=7ZNz
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
From pooh at efga.org Fri Oct 3 02:44:59 1997
From: pooh at efga.org (Robert A. Costner)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 17:44:59 +0800
Subject: Traffic Analysis
In-Reply-To: <199710030707.CAA30296@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.3.32.19971003054158.006d9664@mail.atl.bellsouth.net>
At 02:07 AM 10/3/97 -0500, Jim Choate wrote:
>> For purposes of argument, we could say that a remailer throws away
>> messages that violate usage policies.
>
>Way too high for commercial use. Get it down to something like .01 and that
>would be workable I suspect (haven't done the math).
You may be confusing actual traffic, with valid customer traffic. (BTW -
the 10% reject figure was totally pulled out of the air. Since there is no
logging on a remailer, I'm just making an educated guess.) Almost all
commercial sendmail implementations reject a large amount of traffic and
call it "spam filtering". It's very effective, but the fact is that
incoming mail traffic is blocked before any program such as a remailer can
see the messages. Some of this is done by IP address, some is done through
other methods. I'm merely suggesting that a commercial remailer will have
similar policies. A remailer will also toss any email that is not
addressed to a deliverable recipient. Apparently some people can't type.
:) I'm not suggesting anything is happening here other than what occurs
with an ISP and normal email. Or what usage polices claim are allowable.
I'm merely pointing out that like any ISP, some mail is tossed.
>Course this raises the
>issue of who pays for dumped mail on a commercial box. Should the customer
>pay since it was their action that instigated the drop? Or perhaps the
>remailer since they were selling a service which they didn't provide at
>their discretion?
For usage policies, I would think it is the originating user's fault. For
middleman mail rejects, it is the middleman remailer's fault. For public
key errors, it is the originating user's fault. For the cases mentioned, I
wouldn't put the blame on the initial remailer.
>Let's generalize a bit to see if we can get a clearer picture.
....
>Are there any other classes that you can think of that you might want to
>filter on?
You can sum it up by saying messages are tossed due to
* Spam
* Denial Of Service (DOS) attacks
* typing errors
>If I understand you the remailer would send outbound traffic to its input
>for distribution to your subscribers? I don't believe it would factor into
>the analysis at all if all the source destinations are the same. Outbound
>traffic from party A that went to party B would be important to track.
Giving an example that overly simplifies things... I think my idea here was
that for some number of nyms, they would each receive an average of, say,
five messages each day. All five messages would be addressed from the
remailer and PGP encrypted. Four of the messages would be from real people
trying to communicate with the owner of the nym. One would be a bogus
message sent to confuse traffic analysis. All four real messages would
come into the remailer encrypted to the remailer and addressed to the
remailer. My thought was that fake outgoing messages to the nym would look
identical to real messages, thereby helping obscure the "mix" just a little
better. This helps hide the identity of the sender of the email that is
headed to a nym.
To define nym again, a nym is someone who has registered a real email
address with the remailer. For instance, ravage at anon.efga.org might remail
to ravage at ssz.com. So it would be possible for someone to send a message
to remailer at anon.efga.org that would ultimately arrive at ravage at ssz.com,
but the sender would have no idea of who the final destination of the
email. The remailer keeps this info in an internal database (as it must)
and is not available to anyone other than the remailer software. There
would be no way, without traffic analysis, for a connection to be made
between the sender and the recipient.
>It has nothing to do with limiting speech so I doubt you'd have a 1st leg to
>stand on. Furthermore, the 1st doesn't guarantee the right to anonymity.
Having just spent a year and a half involved in a federal court case over
the 1st amendment right to anonymity on the net, and winning, I'd have to
disagree with you here. Our affidavit specifically mentioned remailers,
among other things.
-- Robert Costner Phone: (770) 512-8746
Electronic Frontiers Georgia mailto:pooh at efga.org
http://www.efga.org/ run PGP 5.0 for my public key
From nobody at REPLAY.COM Fri Oct 3 03:44:04 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 18:44:04 +0800
Subject: Low blow (but a *good* one!)
Message-ID: <199710031022.MAA22951@basement.replay.com>
Alex Le Heux wrote:
Anonymous wrote:
>Let's also take a look at the Dutch performance during their
>occupation. While there certainly were many courageous Dutch people
>who helped refugees (at great personal risk, to say the least), and
>there were many courageous Dutch people who were in the resistance,
>there were also many Dutch people who did not perform so well. Not
>only were a large number of Jewish people turned in by Dutch
>informers, but there were even Dutch SS units.
You have a nerve. You, coming from a country where people are still
regularly killed in the name of racism, tell me this?!
Alex
------------
The Same Old Guy replied:
Want the cold, hard facts of life, Bubba?
You didn't put WWII 'behind' you. We did!
Gun-loving Americans conquered your continent and gave you your
countries back instead of enslaving you, like every other winner in
history has done.
*** Certified Low Blow ***
Some of us discriminate against Jews. Do you know why?
Because we HAVE some!
*** Certified Low Blow ***
We were giving them refuge while Europe was massacring them by the
millions. Now you have the balls to say we're not all treating them
right all of the time.
Buy a fucking clue!
From edwin at witcapital.com Fri Oct 3 04:14:44 1997
From: edwin at witcapital.com (edwin at witcapital.com)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 19:14:44 +0800
Subject: IPO ALERT: C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. Available Through Wit Capital
Message-ID: <199710031057.DAA22277@toad.com>
Wit Capital Corporation is pleased to announce that we are able to provide first-come first-serve participation in the following initial public offering:
Issuer: C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. is the largest third party logistics company in North America with 1996 gross revenue of $1.6 billion. The company is a global provider of multimodal transportation services and logistics solutions through a network of 116 offices in 38 states and Canada, Mexico, Belguim, The United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy, Singapore and South Africa.
Security: Common Stock
Expected Size of Offering: 10,578,396 shares
Expected Price Range: $15.00 to $17.00
Managing Underwriters: BT Alex Brown Incorporated, Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated, Piper Jaffray Inc.
If you think you may be interested in this Initial Public Offering available first- come first-serve through Wit Capital, please visit http://www.witcapital.com. You can view, print or download the Preliminary Prospectus from our New Issues Section. Investors can also call Wit Capital at (888) 4-WITCAP for more information.
A REGISTRATION STATEMENT RELATING TO THESE SECURITIES HAS BEEN FILED WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION BUT HAS NOT YET BECOME EFFECTIVE. THESE SECURITIES MAY NOT BE SOLD NOR MAY OFFERS TO BUY BE ACCEPTED PRIOR TO THE TIME THE REGISTRATION STATEMENT BECOMES EFFECTIVE. THIS COMMUNICATION SHALL NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFER TO SELL OR THE SOLICITATION OF AN OFFER TO BUY, NOR SHALL THERE BE ANY SALE OF THESE SECURITIES IN ANY JURISDICTION IN WHICH SUCH OFFER, SOLICITATION OR SALE WOULD BE UNLAWFUL PRIOR TO REGISTRATION OR QUALIFICATION UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS OF SUCH JURISDICTION.
Wit Capital Corporation
Member NASD SIPC
From phelix at vallnet.com Fri Oct 3 04:46:55 1997
From: phelix at vallnet.com (phelix at vallnet.com)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 19:46:55 +0800
Subject: Stronghold
Message-ID: <3438505d.13845235@128.2.84.191>
>Nope. Like I said, I'm not selling Stronghold or any competing product, I
>don't lose anything when someone foolishly buys it, so why should I present
>any evidence? I (and several other people on this mailing list) were threatened
>by C2Net's lawyers; so to avoid unpleasant disputes, I told them I won't be
>publishing whatever I might know about their product.
>
So, why don't you (and several other people on this mailing list) use the
ananymous remailers to present your evidence. Others have wondered why
people would use remailers. Here's a prime example. Use the remailer (if
you have anything to say).
From ravage at ssz.com Fri Oct 3 05:22:03 1997
From: ravage at ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 20:22:03 +0800
Subject: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or (fwd)
Message-ID: <199710031234.HAA30845@einstein.ssz.com>
Forwarded message:
> Date: Fri, 03 Oct 1997 00:08:09 -0700
> From: Blanc
> Subject: Re: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or
> (fwd)
> >> Stalkers, thieves, rapists, drug addicts, perverts, etc., or just real
> >> animals from the animal kingdom, strike at the most inopportune times, when
> >> there are no officially sanctioned police forces around to be of help.
> >
> >I have to object to the inclusion of drug addicts, they do what they do
> >because the legislators and police want to stick their noses in other
> >peoples business. If drug addicts resort to crime then society as a whole
> >must garner some of the responsibility of putting them in that situation.
>
> We weren't discussing why people commit crimes against others, Jim. We
> were discussing the disagreeability of having & using guns.
True but my objection is to the line of reasoning you use to get to where
you are. Let me try another example...
"Stalkers, thieves, rapists, Jews, perverts, etc., or just real animals..."
____________________________________________________________________
| |
| The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there |
| be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. |
| |
| -Alan Greenspan- |
| |
| _____ The Armadillo Group |
| ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA |
| /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ |
| .', |||| `/( e\ |
| -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate |
| ravage at ssz.com |
| 512-451-7087 |
|____________________________________________________________________|
From jeffb at issl.atl.hp.com Fri Oct 3 07:03:16 1997
From: jeffb at issl.atl.hp.com (Jeff Barber)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 22:03:16 +0800
Subject: Stronghold
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <199710031359.JAA17350@jafar.issl.atl.hp.com>
Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM writes:
>
> Lucky Green writes:
> > Where do people get these bizarre ideas? C2 didn't censor the list. A guy
> > who happened to work for C2 dropped some messages from one list. The
> > messages still went out on the unfiltered list.
> Lucky is lying: the censored articles were also filtered from the list which
> was billed as being unfiltered.
This is revisionist history. I can't recall any intimation at the
time that any messages were filtered from the unfiltered list.
Obviously I can't say whether _all_ the censored articles came out
on the unfiltered list. But I do know that I received at least one
message from Vulis with an unsubstantiated allegation [of a secret
backdoor, I think?] in Stronghold on the unfiltered list, as well as
some later complaints from Vulis that Sandy's filtering was unfair
and hypocritical. Unfortunately I didn't save the original message--
I just wrote it off as the typical Vulis spew.
-- Jeff
From ulf at fitug.de Fri Oct 3 07:06:10 1997
From: ulf at fitug.de (Ulf =?iso-8859-1?Q?M=F6ller?=)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 22:06:10 +0800
Subject: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or crypto"
In-Reply-To: <6489040e71db5edc2ab5e653cb709620@anon.efga.org>
Message-ID:
Anonymous writes:
>I have to confess that I am surprised at the level of resentment among
>the members of various Europeans countries feel towards other European
>countries. For example, the Germans don't like the Dutch because when
>they visit they are treated badly by, among others, the police.
Nonsense.
From ravage at ssz.com Fri Oct 3 07:46:09 1997
From: ravage at ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 22:46:09 +0800
Subject: Traffic Analysis (fwd)
Message-ID: <199710031449.JAA31060@einstein.ssz.com>
Forwarded message:
> Date: Fri, 03 Oct 1997 05:41:58 -0400
> From: "Robert A. Costner"
> Subject: Re: Traffic Analysis
> At 02:07 AM 10/3/97 -0500, Jim Choate wrote:
> >> For purposes of argument, we could say that a remailer throws away
> >> messages that violate usage policies.
> >
> >Way too high for commercial use. Get it down to something like .01 and that
> >would be workable I suspect (haven't done the math).
>
> You may be confusing actual traffic, with valid customer traffic. (BTW -
> the 10% reject figure was totally pulled out of the air. Since there is no
> logging on a remailer, I'm just making an educated guess.) Almost all
> commercial sendmail implementations reject a large amount of traffic and
> call it "spam filtering". It's very effective, but the fact is that
> incoming mail traffic is blocked before any program such as a remailer can
> see the messages. Some of this is done by IP address, some is done through
> other methods. I'm merely suggesting that a commercial remailer will have
> similar policies.
Duh. Look you picked the numbers and the scenarios, if you got a bitch about
'em talk to yourself...their your ugly baby.
> >Course this raises the
> >issue of who pays for dumped mail on a commercial box. Should the customer
> >pay since it was their action that instigated the drop? Or perhaps the
> >remailer since they were selling a service which they didn't provide at
> >their discretion?
>
> For usage policies, I would think it is the originating user's fault.
Acceptable.
> For
> middleman mail rejects, it is the middleman remailer's fault.
So how do we rollback the payments if say the nth hop breaks the delivery?
If I were a user and one of the remailers dropped the traffic I would want
all my money back, I'm paying for delivery to a specific party.
It is clear that the n-1 remailers has no claim to the charges since the
email was not delivered to the recipient. Yet, it is not fair to take their
income simply because some other remailer dropped mail due to a policy
problem, which they clearly didn't have since they delivered the traffic to the
next hop successfuly. Perhaps the remailer with the restrictive hop should
pay the n-1 remailers. This would certainly provide clear financial
incentive for remailers to have liberal fair use policies (which I support
fully) and act as true commen-carries simply doing a job mechanicaly like
the phone system or the network infrastructure itself. The bottem line is
that if commercial anonymous remailers will survive they have to be as
liberal with handling traffic as my routed is.
> For public
> key errors, it is the originating user's fault.
Is it? If this were commercial systems the key server would NOT be on any
remailers involved otherwise we have a prime target for man-in-the-middle
attacks. So, assuming the user gets the key and the remailers get the keys
from a 3rd party server which delivers the incorrect keys for whatever
reason. Who pays for the failure then? To me it looks like the key server,
but they aren't involved in traffic control but key control. While it is
clearly fair to charge them for costs (say 1 remailer hop) incurred due to
bad keys (which could be the original submitters fault), who pays the other
remailers who handle the traffic and loose the income through no fault of
their own?
Also, what happens if the key is good but the software glitches (which is
indistinguishable from a bad key at the source level)? Are you proposing
we re-send for free all along the chain? I don't think the remailers which
succeded will take kindly to that.
If the MTBF for a remailer is n then the MTBF for m remailers is n*m. In
other words the remailer chain gets less reliable as it gets longer.
> >If I understand you the remailer would send outbound traffic to its input
> >for distribution to your subscribers? I don't believe it would factor into
> >the analysis at all if all the source destinations are the same. Outbound
> >traffic from party A that went to party B would be important to track.
>
> Giving an example that overly simplifies things... I think my idea here was
> that for some number of nyms, they would each receive an average of, say,
> five messages each day. All five messages would be addressed from the
> remailer and PGP encrypted.
Let me say it again, traffic analysis doesn't look at the contents,
cryptanalysis does. Whether the contents are encrypted or not is irrelevant.
The word 'encrypted' NEVER occurs in traffic analysis. You encrypt the
contents because it is assumed that the network analysis has already
succeeded.
Ok, so the recipient has no way to reply to specific parties unless the
contents contain the source address in a source encrypted block. In such a
case Mallet is going to look at the recipient and begin traffic analysis on
them. Which Mallet is going to do as soon as they either submit or recieve
traffic from that node anyway. Seems moot. An effective Mallet collects
statistics on all participants indiscrimenantly.
This is another example of the apparently unrecognized and implicit
assumption that Mallet is only going to look at one party in the chain.
Bad assumption. Traffic analysis will succeed ONLY if the *network* is
analyzed, not some specific node in that network.
This sounds like a message pool where a recipient must attempt decode on
every packet they recieve. The ones not meant for them fail. I don't believe
this is a commercialy viable process because of the amount of work on the
recipients machine.
I have a further question. The cover traffic that shows up in the recipients
mailbox unrequested is spam isn't it? Also, when the recipient uncovers the
last block is it going to say "This space intentionaly left blank"? Or can
users of your remailer expect to recieve email full of hex gibberish they
can't decode since they don't have a key? My suspicion is that if you are
sending cover traffic to anything other than a /dev/null recipient
with an a priori agreement you are not going to keep your users long.
> Four of the messages would be from real people
> trying to communicate with the owner of the nym. One would be a bogus
> message sent to confuse traffic analysis.
Turn those numbers around and you might manage to cover the traffic.
The cover traffic MUST be greater than the 'real' traffic to be effective.
My suspicion based on about 4 months of playing with MixMaster 1.5 years ago
is that this ratio must be several orders of magnitude unless your traffic
is measured in the millions+ of transactions per day.
> All four real messages would
> come into the remailer encrypted to the remailer and addressed to the
> remailer. My thought was that fake outgoing messages to the nym would look
> identical to real messages, thereby helping obscure the "mix" just a little
> better. This helps hide the identity of the sender of the email that is
> headed to a nym.
All the outgoing traffic better look the 'same' it's nothing but a standard
TCP/IP routing header and the contents (which we never look at). The
remailer software is irrelevant on this issue. Traffic analysis relies on
the stability of the protocols and their source & destination info not what
they are used for.
As for the rest of it, take the equation I gave in a previous email and feed
it into a spreadsheet. Develop the equations that define the network using
the same sort of structures and proceedures you use for a travelling
salesman problem (check a local library). If you're asking me to do that
work then I need money, I'll talk about work for free - I don't do work
for free.
> email. The remailer keeps this info in an internal database (as it must)
> and is not available to anyone other than the remailer software.
The remailer only needs records of transactions while a transaction remains
un-committed. The only long term record it should keep is the number of
transactions processed and how much money is currently on the books.
The records are not available unless somebody cracks the box and begins to
tool around the OS ... Mallet is pretty sneaky he reads CERT and collects
hacker software too. If your remailer is keeping records of transactions
after the transactions close you are not secure. You are actualy providing
further incentive to Mallet.
> Having just spent a year and a half involved in a federal court case over
> the 1st amendment right to anonymity on the net, and winning, I'd have to
> disagree with you here. Our affidavit specifically mentioned remailers,
> among other things.
Just exactly where is anonymity mentioned in the 1st? And since it clearly
is not how do you extend:
ARTICLE I.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
Is your claim that the remailer is a press? (I rhetoricaly bet not) If so
then every computer irrespective of use is a press and protected. Are you
going to follow this line in future cases?
Or is your argument that the traffic is speech and therefore the carrier of
the traffic is immune to prosecution? If so you may have some problems in
the future when the judges and prosecutors get a better clue. Because the
1st's speech clause protects the source of speech not the carrier - that's why
the founding fathers specificaly mention freedom of the press - to extend
that protection to the carrier. Or did you use the commen-carrier approach?
My money is that you used the second line of reasoning which means you can
expect it to be over-turned in the coming years. Unless somebody manages to
get a court to recognize computers as presses and extend those protections
fully or networked computers (not the applications they are put to) in
general as commen-carrier the battle isn't over.
Now if you throw the 9th and 10th in there (which I further rhetoricaly bet
you didn't) you got a winning combo.
Rhetorical question: do you realize that all networked computers are
remailers at the routed level? Did you extend your
argument thusly?
____________________________________________________________________
| |
| The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there |
| be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. |
| |
| -Alan Greenspan- |
| |
| _____ The Armadillo Group |
| ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA |
| /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ |
| .', |||| `/( e\ |
| -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate |
| ravage at ssz.com |
| 512-451-7087 |
|____________________________________________________________________|
From minow at apple.com Fri Oct 3 08:00:59 1997
From: minow at apple.com (Martin Minow)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 23:00:59 +0800
Subject: New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dreamed of"
Message-ID:
An article in today's (Fri, Oct 3) New York Times (CyberTimes)
describes the new release of "PGP for Business Security 5.5," which
contains mechanisms that incorporate key recovery mechanism that can either
be volontary or be enforced by using PGP's software for controlling a
company's SMTP server -- the server can verify that all encrypted messages
include the corporate public key (or conform to other corporate policies):
"The new version also includes some of the most sophisticated techniques
for enforcing this policy through the corporation. The most novel may be a
new version of software controlling a company's SMTP server, the machine
that acts as the central mailroom for a corporation. PGP provides a
software agent that will read all of the mail to make sure that it complies
with the corporate policy. This may include requiring all messages to be
signed with digital signatures or include a backdoor that the management
can use to read the message. If the software agent discovers a message
violates the policy, it can either return it to sender or simply log a copy.
"PGP implements the backdoor with a central key. Each message is encrypted
with both the public key of the recipient and the public key of the
management. The message can only be read by someone holding the
corresponding private keys, in this case the recipient and the management.
The software allows the management to use different master keys for
different departments by customizing the software.
... "Bruce Schneier, an encryption expert and author of the popular book
Applied Cryptography, said that the new announcement "sounds like
everything the FBI ever dreamed of." He also predicts that criminals will
find ways to circumvent the restrictions while honest people may be more
vulnerable to illicit use of the master key."
---
Coincidently, the same issue of the New York Times has an editorial
attacking
FBI director Louis Freeh's request that Congress "outlaw the
manufacture and distribution of encryption programs the Government cannot
instantly crack.
Martin Minow minow at apple.com
From stutz at dsl.org Fri Oct 3 08:04:00 1997
From: stutz at dsl.org (Michael Stutz)
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 23:04:00 +0800
Subject: Crowds as an anonymous remailer
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID:
On the subject of Crowds
(), a distributed
system for anonymous Web browsing, I was wondering if anyone knew of any
attempts or efforts to create a decentralized remailer network in the same
manner -- can such a thing be done, and be useful?
Such a system might work quite like Crowds (or could even be a subset of
Crowds itself, or based on it, as the source is available), with a small
"jondo" program running on each host in the remailer network. To send an
anonymous message you must be running a jondo, hence you are part of the
network. The jondo takes your message, encrypts and randomly forwards it to
any jondo in the network, which then either re-forwards it to another jondo
or its final destination.
There is no way for the recipient to know who the original sender was other
than that sender was part of the crowd running the jondos, and there is no
central remailer machine to target since the "remailer" consists of a
network of machines running these jondos. As members increase, the network
performance as well as the degree of anonymity increases (imagine, for
instance, if such a program came with Linux as a standard part of the OS).
m
email stutz at dsl.org Copyright (c) 1997 Michael Stutz; this information is
free and may be reproduced under GNU GPL, and as long
as this sentence remains; it comes with absolutely NO
WARRANTY; for details see .
From anon at anon.efga.org Fri Oct 3 09:31:14 1997
From: anon at anon.efga.org (Anonymous)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 00:31:14 +0800
Subject: legal question of DSA-based signatures?
Message-ID: <7d2e0ce68df7b504bbaa2caf842eb8f4@anon.efga.org>
I have before me a statement made by Information Security Corp.:
"The Comptroller General has ruled that, for the purposes of electronic
commerce, DSA-based digital signatures are as legally binding as hand-
written signatures."
Can anyone verify this?
From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com Fri Oct 3 10:00:48 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 01:00:48 +0800
Subject: Stronghold
In-Reply-To: <199710021247.OAA00552@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.3.32.19971003094023.0352ea6c@ctrl-alt-del.com>
At 10:45 AM 10/2/97 EDT, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
>> Amazingly, C2Net doesn't like to see its product publicly slandered
>> by reptiles like Vulis. If Vulis' opinion were based on anything
>> other than personal ill will - ie, if he had ever actually downloaded
>> and examined Stronghold and found any problems with it - he would have
>> a leg to stand on. As it is, his allegations are completely unfounded.
>
>If this were true, then C2Net would encourage me to publicly present whatever
>"evidence" I have so they'd be able to refute it. This is not what they
>asked me to do.
But it is what you *SHOULD* do. If you have evidence, then present it. If
not, then you are just blowing smoke and FUD.
C2Net should have demanded proof instead of getting defensive. That
worries me, not because of "hidden backdoors", but because it shows lack of
confidence in their own products. But lack of confidence has nothing to do
with actual strength of the product.
>> > Please keep this in mind if you consider buying it.
>>
>> Keep in mind that anything Vulis says is in all likelihood a complete
>> lie.
>
>Keep in mind that "anonymous" is probably an employee of C2Net. Several of
>C2Net's shills used to post C2Net propaganda withouy revealing their C2Net
>affiliation; they switched to anonymous remailers when their nyms were
exposed.
Well, I am *NOT* an employee of C2Net.
Put up or shut up.
If you have evidence, then show it.
This "stronghold is weak" rant sounds much like the Creationists on
talk.origins. They make pronouncements and then expect others to disprove
them. The real world does not work like that. (I guess they do not teach
the scientific method at any school you have ever attended. Or maybe you
just skipped class...)
I personally think the reason you do not show it is because you do not HAVE
any evidence.
You have lied about people to justify your petty little hatreds before.
(Accusing people you do not know of child mollestation is an old favorite
of yours.) This one seems to fall into that category as well.
If you do have evidence and refuse to post it, then you are just helping
C2Net.
---
| "That'll make it hot for them!" - Guy Grand |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.|
| http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/ |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|
From declan at well.com Fri Oct 3 11:05:25 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 02:05:25 +0800
Subject: Netly News special report: "The Privacy Snatchers"
Message-ID:
Recently the FBI has started to demand a creepy new anti-privacy
law. It requires that all future technologies -- from cell
phones to WordPerfect -- include a kind of electronic peephole
to let law enforcement agents snoop through your private files
and communications without your knowledge or permission. One
House committee has already approved the FBI's bill.
Such easy access is the fantasy of every unethical policeman and
corrupt bureaucrat. Now, the police say they'll never peek
through this peephole without a judge's approval. But history
reveals that time and again, the FBI, the military and other law
enforcement organizations have ignored the law and spied on
Americans illegally, without court authorization. Government
agencies have subjected hundreds of thousands of law-abiding
Americans to unjust surveillance, illegal wiretaps and
warrantless searches. Eleanor Roosevelt, Martin Luther King,
feminists, gay rights leaders and Catholic priests were spied on.
Even Supreme Court justices were monitored. Can we trust the FBI?
Visit the Netly News for a special report on The Privacy Snatchers:
http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1466,00.html
-Declan
------
http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1466,00.html
The Netly News (http://netlynews.com/)
October 3, 1997
The Privacy Snatchers
By Declan McCullagh (declan at well.com)
------
-------------------------
Declan McCullagh
Time Inc.
The Netly News Network
Washington Correspondent
http://netlynews.com/
From anon at anon.efga.org Fri Oct 3 11:13:56 1997
From: anon at anon.efga.org (Anonymous)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 02:13:56 +0800
Subject: Stronghold
Message-ID: <7b12b2df380aa9e3ba09439e3676b9b1@anon.efga.org>
Jeff Barber writes:
> This is revisionist history. I can't recall any intimation at the
> time that any messages were filtered from the unfiltered list.
There were three lists. The unfiltered list did not go through the
moderator's hands in any way and continued to received all messages
(which is how unfiltered subscribers found out about the problem).
The filtered list had the posts approved by the moderated. Then there
was supposed to be a "flames" list where the moderator sent posts he
had rejected. In theory, the moderated+flames lists should have the
same contents as the unfiltered list. Here is the original statement
by the moderator laying out his policy:
> 3) Cypherpunks who wish to read all posts to the list may do so
> by taking advantage of either of two optional lists. The first
> (cypherpunk-flames at toad.com), will consist solely of messages
> expurgated from the main Cypherpunks list. (Those who subscribe
> to "flames" will be able to easily monitor my moderating
> decisions.) The second (cypherpunks-unedited at toad.com), will
> contain all posts sent to Cypherpunks. It will be the equivalent
> of the current open, unmoderated list. It will appeal to those
> who don't want list moderation.
>
> 6) Because every message submitted to Cypherpunk will be posted
> to two of the three sister lists, I don't intend to lose much
> sleep over whether or not this or that moderating decision was
> perfect. I will do the best job I can, within the constraints
> listed here. If I err, it isn't fatal. Everyone who wants one
> will have two Cypherpunk venues for their posts. Sounds fair
> enough to me. What do you think?
Here is a message from a pseudonymous poster laying out what actually
happened. Many list members may not have seen this message, unless they
were subscribed to the unfiltered list.
> Well, as it turns out, a number of messages have made it neither to
> cypherpunks nor to cypherpunks-flames. Making matters worse, however,
> not only are certain messages being suppressed from both lists, but
> even messages mentioning that fact get suppressed from both the
> cypherpunks and the cypherpunks-flames lists!
and here is a letter to him from the moderator, confirming this fact:
> Hi,
>
> On 7 Feb 1997, Against Moderation wrote:
>
> > What I object to more strongly and think is wrong is the
> > fact that it went to *neither* list.
>
> Unfortunately, it's not as simple as that. As soon as I can
> arrange it with John, I am going to stop moderating the list.
> In the interim, I *will not* be sending your post onto either
> the Flames or the Moderated lists. This is done for legal
> reason. As it is, you have already published a libel on the
> unedited list by repeating Dimitri's libel. This exposes you to
> legal liability, but as an anonymous poster, you are somewhat
> insulated from the consequences of your act.
In sum, no messages were filtered from the unfiltered list, which
is how cypherpunks who avoided moderation learned of the situation.
The messages were eliminated from the regular (moderated) list, but they
were not sent to the "flames" list, contrary to the stated policies.
No hint was given to the subscribers to the moderated list, which was
the majority, that this was being done. Messages referring to these
facts were also filtered. A sad episode indeed.
From pooh at efga.org Fri Oct 3 11:25:56 1997
From: pooh at efga.org (Robert A. Costner)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 02:25:56 +0800
Subject: legal question of DSA-based signatures?
In-Reply-To: <7d2e0ce68df7b504bbaa2caf842eb8f4@anon.efga.org>
Message-ID: <3.0.3.32.19971003133109.03358310@mail.atl.bellsouth.net>
At 12:17 PM 10/3/97 -0400, Anonymous wrote:
>I have before me a statement made by Information Security Corp.:
>
>"The Comptroller General has ruled that, for the purposes of electronic
>commerce, DSA-based digital signatures are as legally binding as hand-
>written signatures."
>
>Can anyone verify this?
My first thought is.. which country are you talking about?
The question is a complex one. The first question is, what is meant by a
signature? Courts have rules that valid signatures include and "X",
spitting on the document, and signing "Mickey Mouse" (an actual case).
Even a "/s" at the end of a document would constitute a signature.
The second question is of more concern. Signatures are linked in law to
"writings." In order to consider a digital signature, you must first
define the concept of a "writing." Is electronic mail or an electronic
document a writing? Is a facsimile copy a writing? Recently, a US based
state level supreme court ruled that faxes were not writings, but rather
were "beeps and chirps". Since faxes are not writings, a faxed signature
was ruled to not be a valid signature anywhere within the state.
This is a problem that digital signature law must consider. How to make an
electronic document a writing. Currently states are doing so by passing
laws that explicitly define electronic documents as writings.
-- Robert Costner Phone: (770) 512-8746
Electronic Frontiers Georgia mailto:pooh at efga.org
http://www.efga.org/ run PGP 5.0 for my public key
From declan at well.com Fri Oct 3 13:03:34 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 04:03:34 +0800
Subject: Anne Wells Branscomb and other information
Message-ID:
Anne Wells Branscomb has died. She was 68. A longtime communications and
computer lawyer, she significantly shaped the world of information and
Net-policy. (I met her once, at a Computers Freedom and Privacy
conference.) Her short biography is at: http://www.ngi.org/AWB/
On a different note, congratulations to:
* Solveig Singleton, the new director of information studies at the Cato
Institute.
* Bruce Schneier and EPIC's Dave Banisar, for their book released last
month, "The Electronic Privacy Papers."
* EPIC's Marc Rotenberg and Phil Agre, for their book released this month:
Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape, edited by Philip E. Agre and
Marc Rotenberg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997).
* Bob Palacios, former webmaster for the Center for Democracy and
Technology, who's moving on to a new job at a Rockville, MD software
company. (I understand CDT needs a new webmaster.)
Also, I hear the Competitive Enterprise Institute, a free-market thinktank
in Washington, DC, is looking for a full-time analyst to do Internet policy
work for them. Stuff like privacy, Net-regulation, free speech. Email me
for contact info.
-Declan
-------------------------
Declan McCullagh
Time Inc.
The Netly News Network
Washington Correspondent
http://netlynews.com/
From rah at shipwright.com Fri Oct 3 13:45:07 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 04:45:07 +0800
Subject: legal question of DSA-based signatures?
Message-ID:
--- begin forwarded text
X-Sender: kaye at popd.ix.netcom.com
Mime-Version: 1.0
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 12:18:36 -0700
Reply-To: Digital Signature discussion
Sender: Digital Signature discussion
From: Kaye Caldwell
Subject: Re: legal question of DSA-based signatures?
To: DIGSIG at VM.TEMPLE.EDU
The document to which this refers is posted at:
http://www.softwareIndustry.org/issues/docs-org/cg-opinion.pdf
At 01:23 PM 10/3/97 -0400, you wrote:
>I think I already know the answer to this, but it might be fun to have the
>word with the bark on it...
>
>If you reply to this, I'll pass it on to the cypherpunks list.
>
>Notice that the question comes through an anonymous remailer.
>
>Cheers,
>Bob Hettinga
>--- begin forwarded text
>
>
>Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 12:17:32 -0400
>From: Anonymous
>Comments: This message was remailed by a FREE automated
> remailing service. For additional information on this service,
> send a message with the subject "remailer-help" to
> remailer at anon.efga.org. The body of the message will be
> discarded. To report abuse, contact the operator at
> admin at anon.efga.org. Headers below this point were
> inserted by the original sender.
>Subject: legal question of DSA-based signatures?
>To: cypherpunks at cyberpass.net
>Sender: owner-cypherpunks at cyberpass.net
>Precedence: bulk
>Reply-To: Anonymous
>X-Loop: cypherpunks at cyberpass.net
>
>I have before me a statement made by Information Security Corp.:
>
>"The Comptroller General has ruled that, for the purposes of electronic
>commerce, DSA-based digital signatures are as legally binding as hand-
>written signatures."
>
>Can anyone verify this?
>
>--- end forwarded text
>
>
>
>-----------------
>Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
>e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
>"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
>[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
>experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
>The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/
>Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!:
>
>
--- end forwarded text
-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/
Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!:
From devnull at bureau42.ml.org Fri Oct 3 13:45:18 1997
From: devnull at bureau42.ml.org (Anonymous (via bureau42 remailer))
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 04:45:18 +0800
Subject: C'Punk Action Project - Help the Newbie
Message-ID:
A Law Abiding Citizen wrote:
>
> I'm new to encryption, having just purchased PGP. I want to abide by
> the law, but I don't know who to send a copy of my secret key to.
We need to compile a list of people that law-abiding citizens can send
copies of their secret keys.
I will start the list with those that the LAC has already mentioned.
Surely other C'punks will have their own nominees for this position
of supreme trust.
1. The FBI guy who shot Randy Weaver's wife.
2. The FBI guy, Kahoe, who ordered evidence of the FBI murder of
citizens destroyed.
3. One of the other four top FBI officials who helped with the
cover-up?
4. Your drug drug dealer, to pass along to his CIA connection.
5. A Jewish person, to give to the Mossad, to pass on to the CIA.
6. The NYC cop with the toilet plunger in his hand.
From declan at well.com Fri Oct 3 14:05:43 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 05:05:43 +0800
Subject: Note to cypherpunks in Chile
Message-ID:
Next week I'll be speaking at REUNA-InternetWorld'97 in Santiago, Chile,
staying at the Hotel Plaza San Francisco. I'd love to meet anyone who wants
an update on U.S. Net-politics (or vice versa).
-Declan
-------------------------
Declan McCullagh
Time Inc.
The Netly News Network
Washington Correspondent
http://netlynews.com/
From thorel at netpress.fr Fri Oct 3 14:21:52 1997
From: thorel at netpress.fr (Jerome Thorel)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 05:21:52 +0800
Subject: D. DENNING's report
Message-ID:
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: text/enriched
Size: 513 bytes
Desc: not available
URL:
From nobody at REPLAY.COM Fri Oct 3 14:21:56 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 05:21:56 +0800
Subject: Guilt
Message-ID: <199710032110.XAA00881@basement.replay.com>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Anonymous wrote:
>Alex Le Heux wrote:
>Anonymous wrote:
>>Let's also take a look at the Dutch performance during their
>>occupation. While there certainly were many courageous Dutch people
>>who helped refugees (at great personal risk, to say the least), and
>>there were many courageous Dutch people who were in the resistance,
>>there were also many Dutch people who did not perform so well. Not
>>only were a large number of Jewish people turned in by Dutch
>>informers, but there were even Dutch SS units.
>
>You have a nerve. You, coming from a country where people are still
>regularly killed in the name of racism, tell me this?!
>Alex
>------------
>The Same Old Guy replied:
>
>Want the cold, hard facts of life, Bubba?
>You didn't put WWII 'behind' you. We did!
>Gun-loving Americans conquered your continent and gave you your
>countries back instead of enslaving you, like every other winner in
>history has done.
>
>*** Certified Low Blow ***
>Some of us discriminate against Jews. Do you know why?
>Because we HAVE some!
>*** Certified Low Blow ***
>
>We were giving them refuge while Europe was massacring them by the
>millions. Now you have the balls to say we're not all treating them
>right all of the time.
>Buy a fucking clue!
Monty Cantsin is feeling a bit guilty about starting this. While
there is some value in taking the smug Europeans down a few notches,
it is beginning to look as if some Americans need to be taken down a
few notches as well.
"The Secret War Against the Jews: How Western Espionage Betrayed the
Jewish People" by John Loftus and Mark Aarons.
Pages 49-50:
"In 1943 the Holocaust was in full operation, but in April of that
year in Bermuda, a conference of British and American officials
formally decided that nothing should be done about it. They 'ruled
out all plans for mass rescue.' The British Foreign Office and the
U.S. State Department were both afraid that the Third Reich would be
quite willing, indeed eager, to stop the gas chambers, empty the
concentration camps, and let hundreds of thousands, if not millions,
of Jewish survivors emigrate to freedom in the West. The Foreign
Office 'revealed in confidence' to the State Department its fear that
Hitler might permit a mass exodus. If approaches to Germany to
release Jews were 'pressed too much that is exactly what might
happen.'[46]
"The bigoted reality behind the Secret Report of the Easter 1943
Bermuda Conference was that not a single Allied nation wanted to let
teh Jews settle in its country. The unspoken consensus was that it
was better to let Hitler handle them than arrange a mass evacuation to
the United States, England, or Canada. In short, the Jews were
expendable to the war effort.[47] Only after the war was it confirmed
that a rescue operation to the Nazi concentration camps could have
been successful. 'Marshal of the RAF Sir Arthur `Bomber` Harris
declared afterwards that a rescue plan was `perfectly feasible, but I
was never asked to undertake it.`'[48]
"No one campaigned to rescue the Jews because the leaders of the
Western nations had deliberately withheld the truth about the
Holocaust from their own citizens. After verification by each of the
Allied intelligence services, the body counts of murdered Jews were
quietly classified as early as September 1941."
Pages 70-71:
"Ibn Saud had no intention of ever letting a single Jew emigrate to
Palestine. President Roosevelt discovered this for himself, but too
late.
"In February 1945, just before he died, President Roosevelt
personally met Ibn Saud. He attempted to enlist the king's support
for the Zionist solution, but Ibn Saud firmly rejected the idea,
instead suggesting that the Allies should give 'them and their
descendants the choicest lands and homes of the Germans who oppressed
them' or that the Allied countries take in the Jews themselves.[57]
"The king's vehement opposition to Jewish migration was a bit of a
shock to Roosevelt, who was strongly sympathetic to the Zionist cause.
Yet none of the Western nations was ever prepared to take more than a
handful of Holocaust survivors. As one book showed, the Canadian
policy was 'none is too many.' The king seemed to recognize this, and
he reminded Roosevelt that Palestine had already taken 'its fair share
of refugees from Europe.'
"Suddenly the president's sympathy for the Jews was wavering. He
told Ibn Saud that 'he would do nothing to assist the Jews against the
Arabs and would make no move hostile to the Arab people.' Roosevelt's
new policy was to be netural, but neutral in favor of the Arabs.[58]
It was an uncomfortable lesson for the ailing president. The choice
seemed clear enough. The United States could help the Jews found
their home in Palestine, or it could have Saudi Arabia's oil as the
engine room for postwar dominance. It seemed to Roosevelt that could
not have both. He chose oil."
Footnotes, Chapter 2:
[46] David Wyman, "The Abandonment of the Jews" (New York: Pantheon,
1984), p. 342
[47] For accounts of the official policies of the various Allied
governments, see Walter Laqueur, "The Terrible Secret" (London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1981); and Martin Gilbert, "Auschwitz and
the Allies" (London: Michael Joseph/Rainbird, 1981).
[48] Ricahrd Deacon, "The Israeli Secret Service" (London: Sphere,
1979), p. 29.
Footnotes, Chapter 3:
[57] The king's ". . . firmness disconcerted Roosevelt, who seems to
have believed a few hours' personal chitchat and some lavish
Lend-Lease assistance would win the King of Arabia to his
purpose.
"The president tried another tack. He was counting on the
legendary hospitality of the Arab, he said, to help solve the
problem of Zionism. But [the king] did not see why the Arabs of
Palestine should feel especially hospitable towards the Jews.
"'Make the enemy and the oppressor pay,' he said; 'that is
how we Arabs wage war.'
"It was not the Arabs of Palestine who had massacred the
Jews. It was the Germans and, as 'a simple bedouin,' the Sa'udi
king could not understand why the president seemed so eager to
save Germany from the consequences of its crimes. . . ." Kelly,
"Arabia, the Gulf and the West" (New York: Basic Books, 1980),
pp. 271-272.
[58] Returning to Washington, a chastened Roosevelt told Congress that
"from Ibn Saud, of Arabia, I learned more of the whole problem of
the Moslems and more about the Jewish people in 5 minutes than I could
have learned by the exchange of a dozen letters." Ibid., p. 272.
Monty Cantsin
Editor in Chief
Smile Magazine
http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html
http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html
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From jim.burnes at n-o--s-p-a-m.ssds.com Fri Oct 3 14:27:16 1997
From: jim.burnes at n-o--s-p-a-m.ssds.com (Jim Burnes)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 05:27:16 +0800
Subject: C'Punk Action Project - Help the Newbie
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <199710032105.PAA07558@denver.ssds.com>
> Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 16:18:53 GMT
> From: Anonymous (via bureau42 remailer)
> Subject: C'Punk Action Project - Help the Newbie
> To: cypherpunks at toad.com
> A Law Abiding Citizen wrote:
> >
> > I'm new to encryption, having just purchased PGP. I want to abide by
> > the law, but I don't know who to send a copy of my secret key to.
>
> We need to compile a list of people that law-abiding citizens can send
> copies of their secret keys.
> I will start the list with those that the LAC has already mentioned.
> Surely other C'punks will have their own nominees for this position
> of supreme trust.
>
> 1. The FBI guy who shot Randy Weaver's wife.
> 2. The FBI guy, Kahoe, who ordered evidence of the FBI murder of
> citizens destroyed.
> 3. One of the other four top FBI officials who helped with the
> cover-up?
> 4. Your drug drug dealer, to pass along to his CIA connection.
> 5. A Jewish person, to give to the Mossad, to pass on to the CIA.
> 6. The NYC cop with the toilet plunger in his hand.
>
7. How about the hit sqaud (from BATF, DEA, Border Patrol, Forest
Service, etc [I'm not kidding]) who killed Donald Scott in Orange
County because they wanted his primo land surround by national
forest. Crufted some excuse about pot on his land. No pot, but
when they forcibly entered early in the morning and accosted his
wife, they shot him when he tried to protect her. The local DA said
they lost their "moral compass".
8. The military guys who killed the shepard in Texas.
9. The police chief currently Wacoizing an elderly woman cuz
she refused to be hauled off (for psychiatric treatment) and
sacrifice her land to the hungry wolves waiting to sell it off.
10. The wonderful people who organize the presidential debates
which denied the libertarian cadidate (on the ballot in all 50,
before Perot) participation in the debates. When libertarians
peaceably assembled at the debate site they were cordoned off by SS
in black ninja suits, MP5 submachine guns and german shepards. Local
police then descended on one of the libertarians taking pictures and
beat him senseless, saying "we know what your up to!". I guess he
was trying to excercise his right to disagree with fascism.
(personally witnessed this one and got it on hi-q video). Little to
no news coverage.
11. Any number of participants at Waco.
12. We could just go on and on....
Jim Burnes
Engineer, Western Security, SSDS Inc
jim.burnes at ssds.com
----
Sometimes it is said that man cannot be trusted with the government
of himself. Can he, then, be trusted with the government of others?
Or have we found angels in the forms of kings to govern him? Let
history answer this question. -Thomas Jefferson, 1st Inaugural Addr
From wfgodot at advicom.net Fri Oct 3 14:49:26 1997
From: wfgodot at advicom.net (Michael Pierson)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 05:49:26 +0800
Subject: Freedom of Encryption: Is it SAFE?
Message-ID: <199710032138.QAA29873@vespucci.advicom.net>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
There has been much discussion recently concerning how to fix
certain flaws, or block various amendments in encryption
legislation being shepherded through Congress. A far more
fundamental problem with these legislative efforts from the
beginning was that they involved an implicit concession to the
idea that a U.S. citizen's freedom to privately exchange
information in whatever coding scheme he or she might choose
required some kind of government affirmation or ratification as
validation. Once one seeks for the government's deigning to
"affirm the rights of United States persons to use and sell
encryption", it can (and does) then easily proceed to attach
conditions and caveats to these "affirmed" rights. In the
process the surveillance hawks within the government have
managed, with hardly any struggle, to advance the appearance of
legitimacy for their claims of authority to regulate this form of
expression.
Now comes an expectation that the nature of these "affirmed
rights" should be tailored to address "the concerns of national
security and the federal law enforcement community." This same
community has on occasion complained about how their efforts to
fight organized crime and terrorism are being thwarted by not
having the modern newspeak disguised equivalent of "Writs of
Assistance" (and they are arguably making progress toward
acquiring just such powers IMO). Very few politicians are
willing to commit the heresy of clearly and staunchly asserting
that the information coding methods used by citizens are under
no obligation to pass any litmus test, or to be subject to any
kind of prior approval or restraint determined by criteria of
the law enforcement establishment or anyone else. If the Feds
lament that this will make their job harder, too bad. In the
words of Orson Welles: "Only in a police state is the job of a
policeman easy."
When these various legislative efforts attempted to reach beyond
the issues of export restrictions to address those of domestic
use, they became a doubtful and dangerous fix to something that
wasn't broke in the first place. If the Government is intent on
"abridging the freedom" to use strong encryption domestically, a
legislative affirmation of these rights is feeble comfort at
best. If I'm seeking to protect my possessions, I don't ask a
thief to affirm my property rights.
Of course, even the export question is really about the aims of
the state's surveillance constituency to obstruct the wide
deployment of strong encryption domestically, and its
interoperability on the internet as a whole. Challenging the
derisible bogosity of the "preventing the Evil Ones from
acquiring this technology" rationale that is invoked to justify
these restrictions was not something legislation was likely to do
with any great vigor. Legislation to "relax" these restrictions
involves lending credence to the dubious assumption that these
restrictions had any constitutional validity to begin with.
Any bill that would have truly provided for the statutory
endorsement of the acceptably uncompromised use of strong
encryption never really had much more than a snowball's chance in
hell of actually being signed into law given the current
political balance of power, did it? Far more likely, was that it
could be corrupted and hijacked as a vehicle to further the very
type of restrictions it was purportedly intended to relieve. A
collateral consequence is an increased arrogance and presumption
among lawmakers that it is their prerogative to act to define for
us citizens, what freedoms for domestic use of encryption we
should be permitted. The growing gallery of GAK amendments and
competing legislative proposals now emerging appears to support
this sad scenario.
It's starting to look like the prospects for meaningfully
improving the situation with encryption legislation in the
current political environment were about as promising as the
prospects of a neophyte gambler coming out ahead at a crooked
casino. I expect any apparent winnings in the end will come with
a catch between the lines in the fine print, if they come at all.
In any case, whatever is legislatively affirmed can later be
legislatively denied. What a King presumes is his to grant, he
usually presumes is his to revoke as well.
In the end, what will have really been gained by this legislative
venture, and what will have been explicitly or implicitly
surrendered? As I see it, at this point the issue isn't about
counting wins, it's about cutting losses.
Freedom of encryption.... Is it SAFE? I don't think so.
- -Michael
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From anon at anon.efga.org Fri Oct 3 15:20:37 1997
From: anon at anon.efga.org (Anonymous)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 06:20:37 +0800
Subject: Stronghold
Message-ID:
At 09:40 AM 10/3/97 -0700, Alan wrote:
>At 10:45 AM 10/2/97 EDT, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
>
>>> Amazingly, C2Net doesn't like to see its product publicly slandered
>>> by reptiles like Vulis. If Vulis' opinion were based on anything
>>> other than personal ill will - ie, if he had ever actually downloaded
>>> and examined Stronghold and found any problems with it - he would have
>>> a leg to stand on. As it is, his allegations are completely unfounded.
>>
>>If this were true, then C2Net would encourage me to publicly present whatever
>>"evidence" I have so they'd be able to refute it. This is not what they
>>asked me to do.
>
>But it is what you *SHOULD* do. If you have evidence, then present it. If
>not, then you are just blowing smoke and FUD.
While it is true that Dmitri is a proven liar in the grand tradtion
of the Soviet Union (shout a lie long enough and loud enough and
eventually some people will start to believe it), and a pathological
homophobic bigot (who secretly enjoys sucking cock but wears womens
clothing to disguise himself), he was absolutely right in decrying the
moderation experiment that was thrown at the list earlier.
Sandy did drop his C2 rantings from both moderated and flames lists,
because he considered them libelous. That's a line of bullshit -- it
wasn't for him to decide libel or not. It's for a jury to decide.
Sandy wouldn't have been held responsible in either case because he
could have hidden behind the "ISP protection" clause of the CDA.
As a moderator who was tasked with spreading the bullshit in one of
two places, he simply could have thrown it to either of the lists
and claimed it was his duty as moderator to put it out.
Of course, by that time Dmitri had so little reputation capital that
Gilmore patched Majordomo so it wouldn't even respect a subscription
request for him.
Dmitri's allegations shouldn't even have gone to the flames list --
they should have gone to the moderated list. If Stronghold has a
weakness, or even a perceived weakness, it's crypto relevant. But,
when Dmitri writes anything, he's got to attach a "cocksucker this"
or "molester that", which makes everything he writes libelous. So,
even if he had proof that Lying Fuck Freeh were a axe-murderer, he'd
fuck it up and call him "Louis Freeh (cocksucker)", which would
continue to throw his credibility down the toilet.
Ultimately, Dmitri's allegations of weaknesses in Stronghold, true or
not, are totally irrelevant. Without mathematical proof of a weakness,
he simply cannot be believed to ever be telling the truth. So, if
C2 said to him in private e-mail, "if you call Sameer a cocksucker one
more time, we'll slap a libel suit across your emigrant ass, take back
your green card, deport you and tell Russia that you called Yeltsin a
cocksucker," well, I can understand why he shut up.
Actually, I don't think Dmitri knows of any real weaknesses. As I
recall, I think he made up some fictitious homosexual connection
between Sameer and a law-enforcement agent and suggested that there
was a "back door" in Stronghold (pun intended.) Of course, I didn't
archive any of his spew from back then. Nobody did, he raved so
long and loud at the moderation and Gilmore and everybody that it
was all my delete key could do to keep up with his shit.
So, don't hold your breath waiting for a repost of previous lies
from our dear Kook of the Fucking Century. He might get caught,
so he's moved on to new lies now.
Cannonymous
From eb at comsec.com Fri Oct 3 16:52:34 1997
From: eb at comsec.com (Eric Blossom)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 07:52:34 +0800
Subject: Secure phone
In-Reply-To: <3.0.3.32.19971002155954.00bfc7e0@labg30>
Message-ID: <199710032326.QAA19691@comsec.com>
>The MITM attack is thwarted by Lucky's note:
>>> DH and have the parties each read half of a hash of the public
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>> exponentials. No keys to store, no keys to remember, no keys to compromise.
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>
>Each party reads off a series of digits displayed on their screen. Out
>loud. To each other. Over the secure phone.
>
>The MITM attacker can't duplicate the hash on both ends, because a hash of
>the public keys used to make the connection are different between the
>MITM's public key and the real public keys.
In addition, to keep life even more interesting, prior to exchanging
the public exponentials g^x and g^y, commitments (hashes) to those
values are exchanged... If the commitments don't match the final
values, the protocol terminates. See http://www.comsec.com/vp1-protocol.ps
for all the details.
Eric
From dlv at bwalk.dm.com Fri Oct 3 17:22:21 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 08:22:21 +0800
Subject: C'Punk Action Project - Help the Newbie
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID:
Anonymous (via bureau42 remailer) writes:
> 6. The NYC cop with the toilet plunger in his hand.
This would make a nice GAK icon... (Bloody) blunger in one hand,
keys or an oversized telephone received in the other.
---
Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
From ghio at temp0126.myriad.ml.org Fri Oct 3 18:06:08 1997
From: ghio at temp0126.myriad.ml.org (Matthew Ghio)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 09:06:08 +0800
Subject: Quor's cipher
In-Reply-To: <199710022135.WAA02655@notatla.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <199710040102.VAA21655@myriad>
> Antonomasia wrote:
>
> > My attack takes a long chunk of known text and looks for repetition.
> >
> > ppppppppppppppp.11.pppppppppppppppppppppp
> > ccccccccccccccc.22.cccccccccccccccccccccc
> >
> > When a two neighbouring p-c pairs are the same you can test
> > whether they have the same value of a and b.
> > (That is a_n == a_n+1 and b_n == b+n+1, a != b usually.)
> >
> > This involves 16 inputs to each byte - very cheap.
> > What I really want next is to know "a".
>
>
> nobody at REPLAY.COM wrote:
>
> > Wouldn't this only happen (on average) in one out of every 65536 p-c
> > pairs?
>
> Yes (counting only those we test).
>
> > Since the state array is changed entirely with every 128 bytes
> > encrypted, 1 out of 2^16 doesn't seem to help much.
>
> This finding doesn't uncover a great deal, I agree, and what it does
> uncover is transient.
What about this:
If (a+b)^(a0+b0) == 0, then the plaintext is the same as the ciphertext.
This happens for one out of every 256 bytes. Ordinarilly this isn't a
problem, but if the key is reused, and there is no IV, it can leak a byte
of plaintext.
So it seems that you would need to change the key for each message, or at
least use a random initialization vector.
From stewarts at ix.netcom.com Fri Oct 3 20:38:46 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 11:38:46 +0800
Subject: commercial remailers and anonymous customers
In-Reply-To: <199710030225.VAA28934@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.3.32.19971003103708.0069ee68@popd.ix.netcom.com>
>> When all your customers are anonymous, you don't get to be very choosy.
Sameer's C2.Net used to be an ISP business, providing privacy services,
and he found that enough of his anonymous customers were problem customers
that it was a real pain to support. Similarly, remailer operators often
spend a lot of time dealing with spammers and harassers. (An important part
of the job is maintaining blocking lists of people who don't want mail.)
However, you can keep track of your anonymous customers - have them use
pseudonyms, e.g. PGP signatures maintaing a consistent identity even though
you don't know the True Name of the customer or whether one customer
is using multiple pseudonyms, and if you kill off one customer you can't
be sure they won't come back with a new pseudonym.
>Like I said, I offer specific services with specific goals for a specific
>fee. If the results are not what you wanted, too bad. You want my other
>services then you'll have to give up the anonymity because I need a certain
>level of security that dealing with anonymous customers simply can't provide.
For the most part, that security involves three aspects
- making sure you get paid (so make anonymous customers pay in advance)
- keeping one customer from cracking into your system and your other customers'
(internal firewalls help; may be more work/money than it's worth.)
- not having cops raiding you or angry global villagers with flamethrowers showing up.
Besides, lots of people deal with anonymous customers every day;
they don't call themselves John Doe, they call themselves Foo Corporation
and operate from 1234 Main St. Suite 67, which is a mailbox...
Thanks!
Bill
Bill Stewart, stewarts at ix.netcom.com
Regular Key PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639
From ravage at ssz.com Fri Oct 3 20:47:31 1997
From: ravage at ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 11:47:31 +0800
Subject: index.html
Message-ID: <199710040400.XAA00040@einstein.ssz.com>
CNN logo
Navigation
Infoseek/Big Yellow
Pathfinder/Warner Bros
Main banner Visit Regal at Buick.com rule
REPORT: PARENTS SOUGHT TREATMENT FOR TEEN SLAYING SUSPECT
The suspect's house October 3, 1997
Web posted at: 4:18 a.m. EDT (0818 GMT)
JACKSON TOWNSHIP, New Jersey (AP) -- Three days before 11-year-old
Eddie Werner vanished while selling candy door-to-door, the parents
of the teen accused of killing him reportedly asked a judge to lock
up their son.
The parents of the teen asked a Family Court judge on September 24
to place him in a residential psychiatric treatment center in a bid
to get his violent behavior under control, The Star-Ledger of Newark
reported Friday.
Instead, he was allowed to remain at home. Werner
Last Saturday, Werner disappeared as he sold candy and wrapping
paper for a school fund-raiser. His body was discovered Monday night
in a wooded area between the neighborhoods where he and the suspect
lived.
Authorities have not released the name of the suspect because he is
under 18.
On Thursday, prosecutors said they believe the suspect was molested
by a 43-year-old New York man who met him through an online chat
room and arranged trysts.
Monmouth County Prosecutor John Kaye said Stephen Simmons, 43, of
Holbrook, New York, and the suspect met at New Jersey motels and at
Simmons' home for sex several times over the past 13 months. Simmons
The boy's parents learned of the meetings and informed police.
Simmons, who has been charged with third-degree sodomy and could
face other charges, was arrested on September 24 -- the same day the
suspect's parents made their request of the judge.
"These people had been crying out for help a week before the
incident," the suspect's attorney, Michael Critchley, told The
Star-Ledger. "Everybody should step back and pause a moment before
they put this kid on a pyre and burn him."
The teen-age suspect faces murder, aggravated sexual assault and
robbery charges. Prosecutors were reviewing whether to have him
tried as an adult. memorial
Acquaintances described the suspect as a loner and a bully, but
others said he was an average teen and a good student with an
interest in computers. He built his own Web page, which he filled
with biographical tidbits and exhaustive information about his
favorite rock band, Smashing Pumpkins.
He also explored other regions of the online world. Kaye said
information found on a computer drive seized by prosecutors
indicated the boy was visiting homosexual chat rooms, where he first
met Simmons.
Copyright 1997 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This
material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or
redistributed.
rule
Related stories:
* Violent offenses by teens plunged last year - October 2, 1997
* Door-to-door school sales debated after boy's slaying - October 1,
1997
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From stewarts at ix.netcom.com Fri Oct 3 20:47:59 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 11:47:59 +0800
Subject: Traffic Analysis
In-Reply-To: <3.0.3.32.19971002232810.03514efc@rboc.net>
Message-ID: <3.0.3.32.19971003111250.0069ee68@popd.ix.netcom.com>
At 11:28 PM 10/02/1997 -0400, you wrote:
>On the other side, if Cracker were to send out more messages that it takes
>in, or just replace these thrown away messages with random noise messages,
>perhaps encrypted, would this foil traffic analysis?
All those things help, but Eric Hughes and Raph Levien are doing some work
that looks like it's possible to do traffic analysis as long as you can
tell when messages begin and end. I don't know if their analysis depends on
the fact that messages get smaller as they go through the remailer chain,
or whether it will also affect Mixmaster-style remailers, which split their
messages into constant-sized blocks and mix blocks from different messages.
Some things that could be done include having each remailer add
random-sized padding and re-encrypting before sending to another remailer,
but once you get into that level of work it probably makes sense just to
switch to Mixmaster for most uses.
Thanks!
Bill
Bill Stewart, stewarts at ix.netcom.com
Regular Key PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639
From stewarts at ix.netcom.com Fri Oct 3 20:50:35 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 11:50:35 +0800
Subject: Request for illegal electronic surveillance examples and cases
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <3.0.3.32.19971003104332.0069ee68@popd.ix.netcom.com>
At 11:33 AM 10/02/1997 -0700, you wrote:
>Thanks, all, for the suggestions. Unfortunately my time is limited: my
>deadline is tonight. I'm working on a roundup of pre-reported
>cases, not reporting out new ones. (at least for this project)
>
>My best source so far is the 1976 Church Committee documents. Gentry's bio
>of J. Edgar Hoover is a good one too. Burnham lent me a copy of his "Above
>the Law" book about the DoJ which I haven't finished yet. Haven't read
>Puzzle Palace in a while, probably don't have time to reread that.
Another good book, not that you'll be able to find it by last night, is
"L.A. Secret Police", which was an expose' of the Darryl Gates LAPD's
shadier activities. It's a bit sensationalist, but adds some local-police
balance to the usual Federal cases.
Thanks!
Bill
Bill Stewart, stewarts at ix.netcom.com
Regular Key PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639
From nobody at REPLAY.COM Fri Oct 3 21:58:20 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 12:58:20 +0800
Subject: Stanglehold / Re: Stronghold
Message-ID: <199710040437.GAA21179@basement.replay.com>
Alan wrote:
> C2Net should have demanded proof instead of getting defensive. That
> worries me, not because of "hidden backdoors", but because it shows lack of
> confidence in their own products. But lack of confidence has nothing to do
> with actual strength of the product.
Let's think about this for a moment.
RSA is so confident in their product that they openly challenge
people to prove its strength or weakness, even offering them money
out of their own pocket if they cn do so.
C2Net, at the merest whisper by the least credible of persons,
launches into action an army of litigators to threaten said
individual with dire consequences if they fail to duck and cover,
not to mention 'shut the fuck up.'
Hhhmmmm......
> If you do have evidence and refuse to post it, then you are just helping
> C2Net.
If I had evidence of a backdoor in C2Net's Stronghold software, and
I met with so little support when attacked by them, I would refuse to
post it.
Why? To let all of C2Net's staunch defenders feel all the more confident
in placing their big, hairy balls in the StrangleHold of C2Net's
software.
Of course, if I were C2Net and I *did* have a backdoor built into my
software, I would probably try to link any criticism of my product with
the rantings of mentally unstable paranoics.
Which begs the question, is Dimitri the 'foil' of C2Net, or a 'creation'
of C2Net?
TruthMonger
"Creator of the 2-way mirror."
From dlv at bwalk.dm.com Fri Oct 3 22:34:56 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 13:34:56 +0800
Subject: commercial remailers and anonymous customers
In-Reply-To: <3.0.3.32.19971003103708.0069ee68@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <0X91De7w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Bill Stewart writes:
>
> >> When all your customers are anonymous, you don't get to be very choosy.
>
> Sameer's C2.Net used to be an ISP business, providing privacy services,
> and he found that enough of his anonymous customers were problem customers
> that it was a real pain to support.
Last October, Sammer was being sued for copyright infringement and he claimed
in court papers that he doesn't censor content on C2's ISP. Literally at the
same time he pulled the plug on a C2 account for publishing a Web page
critical of one of Sameer's associates. Here's Sameer's e-mail to that
account:
]From sameer Thu Oct 24 10: 34:59 1996
]Received: (from sameer at localhost) by blacklodge.c2.net (8.7.6/8.7.3) id
]KAA05716; Thu, 24 Oct 1996 10:34:58 -0700 (PDT)
]From: sameer
]Message-Id: <199610241734.KAA05716 at blacklodge.c2.net>
]Subject: Re: www.c2.net/~netscum/mayt0.html
]To: netscum at c2.net
]Date: Thu, 24 Oct 1996 10:34:58 -0700 (PDT)
]Cc: sameer at c2.net
]In-Reply-To: <3279b6dd.124287235 at mail.c2.net> from "netscum at c2.net" at "Oct
] 24, 96 00:26:22 am"
]X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4ME+ PL22 (25)]
]MIME-Version: 1.0
]Content-Type: text/plain; charset=3DUS-ASCII
]Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
]
] I'm sorry. If you don't remove the illegal web pages we're
]going to be forced to shut off your account.
]
]> Dear Sameer,
]>
]> What was reported to you was mistaken. The referenced page contains no
]> libel, and all the claims therein are factually correct and can be proved
]> easily by browing public documents in DejaNews and AltaVista.
]>
]> Good luck in your SPA lawsuit!!
]>
]>
]> On Wed, 23 Oct 1996 12:41:53 -0700 (PDT), sameer posted:
]>
]> > The URL in the subject (http://www.c2.net/~netscum/mayt0.html)
]> > was reported to us as illegal libel. Please note that our policies
]> > forbid any illegal activity on the site. Please remove this page as
]> > soon as possible. Thank you.
]> >
]> > --
]> > Sameer Parekh Voice:
]> 510-986-8770
]> > C2Net FAX:
]> 510-986-8777
]> > The Internet Privacy Provider
]> > http://www.c2.net/ sameer at c2.net
]> >
]>
]
]
]--
]Sameer Parekh Voice: 510-986-8770
]C2Net FAX: 510-986-8777
]The Internet Privacy Provider
]http://www.c2.net/ sameer at c2.net
You'd think that a pathologically litigious liar would know better than
to use terms like "illegal libel"...
Soon after this incident Parekh settled the copyright infringement suit,
pulled the plug on C2net's ISP business, and switched to peddling
(questionable) software.
---
Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
From nobody at REPLAY.COM Fri Oct 3 22:37:35 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 13:37:35 +0800
Subject: FBI trainees good, nab innocent teen-agers
Message-ID: <199710040532.HAA26609@basement.replay.com>
CNN logo
[ISMAP]-Navigation
Infoseek/Big Yellow
Pathfinder/Warner Bros
Main banner AST. Working For Your Business.
rule
FBI trainees goof, nab innocent teen-agers
October 3, 1997
Web posted at: 9:35 p.m. EDT (0135 GMT)
ELIZABETHTOWN, Pennsylvania (AP) -- Armed FBI trainees in
bulletproof vests and camouflage surrounded a group of teen-agers,
handcuffed them and forced them to the ground before realizing they
had the wrong people.
The trainees were taking part in a training exercise at a town
square Wednesday night in which they were apparently supposed to
nab others taking part in the drill.
Instead, up to 30 FBI trainees jumped out of a caravan of vehicles
and descended on the innocent teen-agers, bound their wrists with
plastic ties and ordered them to lie face-down on the sidewalk.
After about 30 minutes, the agents set the teens free.
The FBI would not comment on the specifics of the drill, but an FBI
official apologized Friday and two agents visited the home of one
of the youths Thursday night to express their regrets.
Copyright 1997 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This
material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or
redistributed.
From alexlh at xs4all.nl Fri Oct 3 23:13:11 1997
From: alexlh at xs4all.nl (Alex Le Heux)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 14:13:11 +0800
Subject: New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dreamed of"
Message-ID: <3.0.3.32.19971004062137.007cce40@mail.xs4all.nl>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
On 3 Oct 1997 17:27:29 +0200, in list.cypherpunks you wrote:
>An article in today's (Fri, Oct 3) New York Times (CyberTimes)
>
>describes the new release of "PGP for Business Security 5.5," which
>contains mechanisms that incorporate key recovery mechanism that can
either
>be volontary or be enforced by using PGP's software for controlling
a
>company's SMTP server -- the server can verify that all encrypted
messages
>include the corporate public key (or conform to other corporate
policies):
[snip]
Keep in mind that this is the 'PGP for Business'. Companies often
operate on the principle that email that's sent and received from
their machines is the company's, not the employee's. This is actually
reasonable business practice. Specially when encryption enters the
picture. The employee could walk under a bus, and leave some vital
but encrypted emails in his mailbox. This could be a real problem for
corporations.
Individuals should of course stay as far away from something like
this as possible.
Alex
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0
Charset: noconv
iQA/AwUBNDXEUduYAh4dUSo/EQKERQCg6v6i8v+hvh4/zFDXGEt2e0eyl0kAn2An
2tlYh85ewSbxsCmD8L9H1OI/
=i0zt
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
---
Violence is the last resort of those who have lost all control over a
situation.
From amp at pobox.com Fri Oct 3 23:19:26 1997
From: amp at pobox.com (amp at pobox.com)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 14:19:26 +0800
Subject: New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dreamed of"
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID:
Though I hate the conmcept of key escrow, it actually makes sense for
corporations to be able to have access to internal documents. Why they
think having key escrow in place will stop people from being able to use
other encryption as well is beyond me. I guess it's the same (stupid)
mentality of the feds. They don't think anyone would be smart enough to use
the escrowed encryption a a wrapper for the non-escrowed encryption.
amp
------------------------
From: Martin Minow
Subject: New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dreamed of"
Date: Fri, 03 Oct 1997 07:30:33 -0700
To: risks at csl.sri.com
Cc: cypherpunks at cyberpass.net
An article in today's (Fri, Oct 3) New York Times (CyberTimes)
describes the new release of "PGP for Business Security 5.5," which
contains mechanisms that incorporate key recovery mechanism that can either
be volontary or be enforced by using PGP's software for controlling a
company's SMTP server -- the server can verify that all encrypted messages
include the corporate public key (or conform to other corporate policies):
=snip=
---------------End of Original Message-----------------
------------------------
Name: amp
E-mail: amp at pobox.com
Date: 10/04/97
Time: 00:52:55
Visit me at http://www.pobox.com/~amp
==
-export-a-crypto-system-sig -RSA-3-lines-PERL
#!/bin/perl -sp0777i
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: text/html
Size: 15689 bytes
Desc: not available
URL:
From attila at hun.org Sat Oct 4 00:58:16 1997
From: attila at hun.org (Attila T. Hun)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 15:58:16 +0800
Subject: FBI trainees good, nab innocent teen-agers
In-Reply-To: <199710040532.HAA26609@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: <971004.074923@hun.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
on or about 971004:0732
nobody at replay.com (Anonymous) purported to expostulate:
+
+ ELIZABETHTOWN, Pennsylvania (AP) -- Armed FBI trainees in
+ bulletproof vests and camouflage surrounded a group of teen-agers,
+ handcuffed them and forced them to the ground before realizing
+ they had the wrong people.
+
look at this way: the teenagers have seen first blood; they may be
better prepared for when it is for real
--
"Experience keeps a dear school, but fools will learn in no other."
--Benjamin Franklin
______________________________________________________________________
"attila" 1024/C20B6905/23 D0 FA 7F 6A 8F 60 66 BC AF AE 56 98 C0 D7 B0
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3i
Charset: latin1
Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be
iQCVAwUBNDX2Br04kQrCC2kFAQHMiAP+LueUSQWt333mmVl/e/MtlCQ65fKQ5UoE
RlBd88VoIaTFkdE0lkn/lTYGZg0vbI3k3sUC7tPQ4xdWJMP+oNqLhTlc5BNzrGlU
5tb2d079W97HKlUrGqne01z4lQSc0eIR0wggyIDIBoUo8igvIdjGyXBN1d+dXHvd
XZbmKDOb+GE=
=Ln/r
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
From ccf at dev.null Sat Oct 4 01:04:48 1997
From: ccf at dev.null (C. Crockett Flintstone)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 16:04:48 +0800
Subject: InfoWar 29 / The GeigerText Edition
Message-ID: <3435E835.675F@dev.null>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The True Story of the InterNet
Part III
InfoWar
Final Frontier of the Digital Revolution
Behind the ElectroMagnetic Curtain
by TruthMonger
Copyright 1997 Pearl Publishing
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
InfoWar Table of Contents
* Death & Texas
* 2000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Death & Texas
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
"I see that our link to the past�" Jonathan paused to remember what the hell
the man was calling himself, lately, "�The Same Guy, that's it�"
What had he been about to say?
Jonathan shook his head to clear away the fog that invariably resulted from
use of the Trei Transponder to make contact with�The Same Guy.
"He fucked up the 'Death and Taxes' chapter title." Alexis helped Jonathan
regain his train of thought.
"Oh, yes, thank you." Jonathan sighed, and continued.
"Well, if he fails to pick up the reminder from the LMBoyd sampler, then
there's no telling what the next chapter will be about, since he'll be away
from the 'Home' for the weekend."
Priscilla added, "Perhaps we would have been better off to let him usurp the
TruthMonger multi-user personality, since he seems to have become a one-man
multi-user personality, all on his own."
Bubba Rom Dos laughed, and reminded the others of one of his self-coined
'old-sayings':
"When you talk to yourself, that's normal. When you answer yourself, that's
a little weird, but nothing to seriously worry about. However, when you say,
'Huh?'�you're in big, big trouble."
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Sampler: October 3
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 00:15:01 -0700
From: sampler-request at lmboyd.com
======================================================
Clients write:
"What I think of when somebody says 'death and taxes' is death only collects
once."...
"What gets me is this is supposed to be National Apathy Week, and nobody
cares."...
"What I can't figure out is how hailstones were described before golf balls
were invented."
==============================================
LMBoyd Web Site / U. S. Newspapers / Start Email / Stop Email
http://www.LMBoyd.com/postscript.htm
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Taxes!" The Same Guy exclaimed. "Damn! Taxes�"
The Same Guy looked at the chapter of 'InfoWar' that he had been working on
for the last week. Now it made sense why he couldn't quite get it all to
quite come together.
Still, 'Death and Texas' had been a pretty good guess, since it did tie in
with some of the main players in the worldwide conspiracy destined to come
to fruition at the turn of the millennium.
Someone had gotten to Paula Jones' attorneys and forced them to bow out of
her sexual harassment suit against President Clinton, so that the Puppet
Masters behind the scenes could bring in a heavy-hitter from Texas, and fund
the attack on the President through the spook-connected Rutherford Institute
in Charlottesville, Va.
"Donavan Campbell!" The Same Guy slapped his forehead.
Now the obviously 'wrong' reference in chapter 26, "Everything You Know Is
Wrong," made sense.
"One of the reasons the Author attributed to his becoming a computer guru in
an amazingly short period of time, was his entry into the computer arena as
the apprentice of Bill Campbell, one of the designers of the Adam
motherboards, and the Authors work with retarded children early in life."
The man referred to in this passage was the owner of CCPPR Computers, Inc.,
in Tucson, Arizona. But his name was Bill Williams, not Campbell.
The Same Guy had known that whoever had changed the name in the manuscript
while it was in route to the CypherPunks mailing list was sending a message
to someone that everything they knew about something was wrong, and that it
involved someone named Campbell, from Texas, where the Author had worked
with a number of retarded children. The references to the Feminazis was
another reference to the use of Paula Jones for the attack on the
Presidency, but what about the reference to George Carlin?
The Same Guy had done a quick Web search for Paula Jones and George Carlin
using fuzzy pattern-matching, and came up with the email from CNN's 'Carin'
Dessauer announcing Paula Jones' switch of attorneys.
"Yes, the one-two punch!" The Same Guy had leapt from his chair and given
himself a high-five, causing Baby to look up at him as if she was glad she
was a dog, and therefore in no way related to these crazy humans.
Suddenly, everything was coming full circle�"Full Magic Circle!" The Same
Guy joked to himself, laughing uproariously, and causing Baby to get up and
go into the next room to lay down, lest someone come along and think that
she was associated with this lunatic. Men�
"Sure, pretend you don't know me!" The Same Guy hollered after Baby, knowing
what she was doing.
"Just wait until people around the world are applauding my genius and giving
me the 'Key to the City' for my prophetic foresight. Then you'll be sorry
you're not there to accept the 'Doggie Bone to the City' for standing by my
side, as my faithful companion."
Baby just looked at him from her new spot on the Lazy Boy in the front room,
and put her head down to sleep, not seeming particularly impressed.
"Awe-Stun Taxes." That's what the T-shirts said.
The name of the man who engaged the Author to promote the T-shirts for him
was C. Crockett Flintstone. Crockett was not only person responsible for
introducing the Author to Sam Houston Johnson, and politics, Texas style,
but he was also the reason for the Author's fortuitous encounter with
gomez at basisinc, and his subsequent journey into the bowels of the UNIX
operating system.
And, of course, there was the ugly scene at Don Politico's bar in Austin,
when the Author had introduced the prototype of a bumper-sticker he had come
up with, to sell in Dallas. It said, "Honk if you killed Kennedy."
That was a long, long time ago, but the tangled, twisted trail which had led
The Same Guy to this point in time still revolved around Death and Taxes,
Death in Texas, and now�the Death of Taxes.
But The Same Guy didn't want to write about Death, Taxes, Texas, or any of
that depressing stuff. He was tired of dealing with the Dark Side of the
conspiracy. He wanted to think about the positive things that could be done
to counter the Dark Terror that was about to descend upon the world, once
again. Stuff like nuking DC.
Well, OK, maybe that was a bad example.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Looks like he's done fucking up the chapter." Alexis smiled at Jonathan, as
she put her arms around him and gave him a peck on the cheek.
"Now it's your turn."
"Bubba! Cowboy! Grab the liquor and get your asses out here, we've got work
to do." Jonathan shouted to the two men who were laying in their cots,
trying to recover from the exceedingly long hours they had put in the day
and night before.
"The year 2000." Bubba shouted to Jonathan, dragging himself out of bed. The
Cowboy was rising equally slowly, beside him.
"Already got it." Jonathan pointed to the chapter title that lay waiting for
a reason to exist. He took the bottle from Bubba's hand as the old coot
eased himself into a chair, and poured three shots of bourbon while they
waited for the Cowboy to join them.
Jonathan glanced at Alexis, holding a fourth shotglass in his hand.
"No, I have other things to do, unless you need a woman's presence so that
you guys can keep it in your pants long enough to complete the chapter
without jumping up and down and screaming, 'Nuke DC! Kill! Kill! Kill! Nuke
DC!'."
The Cowboy gave Alexis a peck on the cheek as he passed by, assuring her,
"Run along dear, we have everything under control. As a matter of fact, we
think that after we finish prophesying the past�our past-the CypherPunks'
future�then we will leave it up to the kindlier, gentler CypherPunks, such
as Attila T. Hun, to help light the way for the CypherPunks and the Circle
of Eunuchs to forge a new distant past for ourselves, and a new future for
themselves."
The Cowboy paused, to think about what he had just said, and added, "It's
hard to believe I haven't even had my morning 'hair of the dog' and I'm
already on a roll."
Alexis shook her head and said, "Count me out. Just add a disclaimer at the
end of the chapter which involves the womenfolk from any responsibility for
stirring up the likes of Attila T. Hun and Conan the Destroyer, or whoever
you plan to incite to join in your madness."
"Actually, I think that it is we who are joining in theirs." Bubba said,
sorting through some recent posts to the CypherPunks list.
He turned to Jonathan and the Cowboy, as Alexis joined Priscilla in making
some adjustments to the Trei Transponder.
"Shall we sugar-coat it, or tell it like it is?" Bubba asked his companions.
"The less time we take in the telling, the more time we have for drinking."
the Cowboy turned to Jonathan for his opinion.
"I defer to the wisdom of my elders." Jonathan smiled, pushing his shotglass
forward for a refill.
"OK!" Bubba exclaimed. "Quick and dirty."
"2000. The end."
"Uuhhh, Bubba�" the Cowboy said, "�you wouldn't mind terribly, would you, if
I filled in a few details before we close out the chapter and open another
bottle?"
Bubba waved for the Cowboy to proceed, pouring himself another shot.
The Cowboy decided to lay out the basics and let those actually living in
the era confirm the details of the flow of InformEnergy that lay in their
future if they failed to take steps to counterbalance the attempts of the
Dark Allies to force the past, present and future into a narrow mold
corresponding to the desires of the Evil One.
Now playing at a Whitehouse near you-the one, two punch.
Clinton and Gore are destined to be run out of town on a train, similar to
the Nixon and Agnew railroading. The players behind the scenes laid the
groundwork for setting them up like bowling pins, only to be knocked down
once they had served the purpose of smiling benignly as the shakers and
movers drove the final nail in the coffin of democracy by getting the
line-item veto passed.
Once this was done, most of the substructure was then in place for bringing
in the new millennium with a New World Order, compliments of Josef Goebbels,
George Bush, and a Dictator To Be Named Later (Monty Cantsin?).
There were already non-elected Committees and Commissions in place that had
the power to arbitrarily enact the draconian measures that had been
pre-approved in order to deal with the National Security Emergencies that
were already on the drawing boards, waiting only for all of the pieces to
fall in place.
The last decade of the millennium was mostly used for fine-tuning all of the
parts of the maleficent machines that had been created and developed for the
purpose of providing the physical tools necessary for instituting a
worldwide dictatorship of the Evil One across the face of the earth.
The mass media had been co-opted and brought under control, now being
basically a press-release arm of the government and corporations, through
the influence of powerful figures who pulled their strings from the shadows
above them.
Once the control of the media had been confirmed during Desert Storm, the
process of consolidating that control proceeded rapidly. The government had
given those on the growing InterNet a fairly free rein, in order to let them
remain a large enough threat to the established, mainstream media, that the
government could seal their lips and their loyalty with a fifty billion
dollar digital bandwidth giveaway that would ensure their financial
stability and dominance in the technology of the future.
Little did even the press, let alone the public, know that the import of the
digital bandwidth placed in the hands of the established media was much
greater than it appeared on the surface. The government already had the
technology in place to turn the digital airwaves into the InterNet
technology of the future.
By the time that the new technologies developed in the government's
underground laboratories around the world were revealed to the public as
'new' breakthroughs, they had invariably already been in use for years by
the secret government's agents.
(Like the radar that can see through walls, being 'announced' as a new
technology developed at Lawrence Livermore Labs. CypherPunk Kent Crispin had
known about its existence for years, having used it extensively himself-not
that he didn't trust his wife...)
The World Wide Web was completely under control of the military, having been
carefully woven under the watchful eyes of DARPA, who preferred to
centralize development of the WWW under CERN, in Europe, in order to get
around sticky US laws regarding privacy and freedom. They could move pawns,
shills and agents, such as Tim Berners-Lee, Ben Segal, and Phillip
Hallam-Baker back and forth between CERN, MIT, and other openly clandestine
institutions which served to host the distributed network of quasi-military
secret agents supporting the grand designs of Gomez and the Dark Allies.
The world at large would little notice that the development of the
technology behind the Digital Revolution lie in the same hands as the
development of the atomic bomb and nuclear energy. The military,
high-security scientists, secret committees and clandestine intelligence
organizations-with a background of spooks, spies, and assorted secret
societies and their agents, all having their strings pulled by Puppet
Masters who remained unknown behind the scenes that were being played out on
the stage of everyday reality.
Those who cheered the 'failure' of the Clipper Chip, the 'victory' of the
Bernstein ruling, or the 'defeat' of the CDA, little realized that these
were merely diversionary maneuvers for the real battles which were taking
place in the background, between those who were participating in an
underground war which was for 'all the marbles.'
Like the battles over the intricate details of what types of 'legal'
wiretapping would or would not be 'allowed' by the laws of society, the
openly fought battles over freedom and privacy were being waged only for the
purposes of defining the virtual reality of a world view which was actually
based on an underlying 'operating system' which was hidden from the view of
the 'average user.'
While anti-trust battles were openly being waged with the likes of Microsoft
and Intel, the real deals were being cut in the secret meetings between the
movers and shakers who could say, "Let there be back doors:" and there would
be back doors.
While Jane and Joe Normal were playing with their Graphical User Interfaces,
the operating system of the underlying reality was being defined,
manipulated and controlled by those in the subterranean layers of their
Digital Society-by those with access to the 'Command Line.'
The 'Above-Ground Players' were working a virtual theater in which the
battles they were fighting on the public stage had already been won by the
Authors of the scripts, who remained in the background, already knowing how
the Grand Play would come to an end, in its final scene.
Except for the 'Baker Street Irregulars'�
The CypherPunks had recognized the final challenge being thrown down by
those playing on the outer stage of reality.
"The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography"
Tim C. May's weather-vane signature line pointed out that a new game was
afoot.
What even most of the CypherPunks failed to realize, however, was the timing
of the announced intention to begin enforcement of the draconian measures
being proposed by Lying Fuck Louis Freeh ('eLFeLF' to his friends.)
1999�
Why 1999?
Can you say "Taxes."? Sure you can.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
"WebWorld & the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs"
"InfoWar (Part III of 'The True Story of the InterNet')
Soviet Union Sickle of Eunuchs Secret WebSite
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From root at DosLinux Sat Oct 4 01:50:36 1997
From: root at DosLinux (Harka)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 16:50:36 +0800
Subject: russia_1.html
Message-ID: <199710040438.EAA00226@DosLinux>
Reuters New Media
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Friday October 3 7:09 PM EDT
US Sees No KGB Role in Russia's Nuclear Arms
WASHINGTON (Reuter) - The United States Friday rejected the claim of a
Russian scientist that Moscow had secretly developed nuclear "suitcase
bombs" under KGB orders in the 1970s specifically for terrorist
purposes.
"We have no information or evidence suggesting that nuclear weapons
were ever developed for or put under the control of the KGB, which is
part of the story here," State Department spokesman James Rubin said.
Rubin, reflecting previous U.S. statements, did not deny so-called
"suitcase bombs" may be part of Russia's arsenal.
"We cannot comment...about the precise specifications or dimensions of
any nuclear weapons," he told reporters.
But he repeated the U.S. view that "there is no evidence other than
hearsay to support such claims" that portable Russian nuclear weapons
may have gone missing.
"There's probably no issue where you have the combined resources of
the U.S. government working as well together and with such
determination as the issue of security of nuclear weapons, and we work
on it every day, hundreds if not thousands of people in the
government," he said.
"And if they say that we have no information on this and they say that
these accounts are hearsay, that's pretty compelling," Rubin added.
Testifying before Congress Thursday, Alexei Yablokov, a respected
scientist who served on the Russian National Security Council,
contradicted statements by Russian officials denying the existence of
the weapons and buttressed claims that many of them have gone missing.
"I am absolutely sure that they have been made," he told the House
Military Research and Development subcommittee.
The issue arose when former Russian National Security Adviser Alexandr
Lebed alleged that up to 100 portable suitcase-sized bombs were
unaccounted for since the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union.
According to Lebed, who has agreed to testify before the House
committee later this month, the devices have an explosive capacity of
one kiloton -- the equivalent of 1,000 tons of TNT -- can be activated
by a single person and could kill as many as 100,000 people.
Yablokov said he had spoken to the scientists who worked on the
weapons and so was certain of their existence.
But he said the former Soviet Defense Ministry might never have known
about the so-called "atomic demolition munitions" because they were
developed for the KGB spy service under a secret program.
On the issue of possible missing nuclear weapons, Rubin said Moscow
"continues to assure us that it retains adequate command and control
and that appropriate physical security arrangements exist for these
weapons and facilities."
"We have no reason or evidence to doubt these assurances," he said.
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Questions or Comments
From declan at well.com Sat Oct 4 08:09:08 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 23:09:08 +0800
Subject: Data Protection in the United States: A Rising Tide?
Message-ID:
[From RRE --Declan]
>Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 14:18:57 -0400
>From: Marc Rotenberg
>Subject: EPIC Speech in Brussels
>
>[...]
>
>-------
>
>"Data Protection in the United States: A Rising Tide?"
>
>Marc Rotenberg
>Electronic Privacy Information Center
>Washington, DC
>
>17 September 1997
>19th Intentional Conference on Data Protection
>Brussels, Belgium
>
> Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. I am
>grateful for the opportunity to be with you this morning.
>
> I will speak today on behalf of consumers and users of
>the Internet in the United States. There are few issues of
>greater concern to us than the protection of privacy. You can
>read about this in our newspapers and our magazines. Privacy
>stories routinely appear on the front pages of national
>magazines and in the daily newspapers. In just the past few
>weeks stories about privacy have appeared in Time Magazine,
>the Washington Post and USA Today. So extensive is our
>discussion of privacy concerns that we even export the news
>of our problems. I found a story from the New York Times
>about the use of the Internet to collect detailed personal
>information on the front page of the International Herald
>Tribune that I purchased yesterday morning here in Brussels.
>
> We believe that strong measures must be taken to
>protect personal privacy. You can see this in our responses
>to public polls. We have consistently expressed concern about
>the loss of privacy, and we have consistently shown support
>for new legislation to protect privacy.
>
> We know that law is often an imperfect solution, but we
>are also firm believers in the rule of law. You will
>recognize this if you trace the development of privacy law in
>the United States over the twentieth century. You can see
>this if you understand that our country has always shown
>great regard for the right of privacy and expressed
>widespread concern when privacy was at risk.
>
> So, when I say to you today that privacy is a great
>concern in the United States and that we need to do much more
>to protect it, I do so with the newspaper stories piled high,
>the polling numbers unambiguous, and with a respect for
>history that makes clear that few rights in American life are
>more greatly valued than the right to protect private life.
>
> I will speak now to the three central issues that need
>to be addressed to build a bridge between the United States
>and Europe so that we can enter the information society
>together with mutual standards that protect the privacy
>rights of our citizens . The first issue concerns current
>attitudes of consumers in the United States and the current
>policies of government. The second concerns the short-comings
>of self- regulation. My final point is two recommendations
>for how we should proceed.
>
> First, it is clear the consumers and users of the
>Internet favor the passage of law to protect personal
>privacy. Professor Westin found this year that 58% of the
>American public want government o pass law to protect privacy
>now. And 24% said that government should formally recommend
>privacy standards. Only 15% favored letting groups develop
>voluntary privacy standards and government taking action only
>if real problems arise.
>
> Professor Westin's results are consistent with other
>surveys of attitudes toward privacy in the United States. A
>1991 poll conducted by Time Magazine found that 93% of the
>U.S . public felt that companies that sell personal
>information to others should be required to obtain explicit
>permission. And the most comprehensive poll of Internet users
>ever undertaken found that users of the Internet in the
>United States, on a 1 to 5 scale, said that the Internet
>needs new laws to protect privacy at a level of 3.8.
>
> Public support for privacy legislation is clear.
>
> Second, it is also clear that some political leaders
>favor the adoption of privacy law. While it is true that the
>White House has expressed the opinion that privacy
>legislation is unnecessary at this time, members of Congress
>are of a different opinion. Bills have been introduced in the
>House and the Senate that address a wide range of privacy
>issues. One bill would limit the disclosure of Social
>Security Numbers. Another bill would prohibit Internet
>Service Providers from disclosing customer information
>without consent. A third bill restricts the ability of direct
>marketers to sell information about young children. Several
>bills have been introduced to address public concern about
>unsolicited commercial email. Many other bills are also under
>consideration.
>
> It is also clear that the United States is fully
>capable of enacting privacy laws to address public concern,
>particularly when new technologies threaten personal
>freedoms. In fact, we have passed several laws in a little
>over a decade that specifically target new technologies.
>Privacy protections for cable subscriber records were enacted
>in 1984. Electronic mail was covered in 1986. Video rental
>records gained protection in 1988. Even junk faxes and auto-
>dialers became subject to privacy legislation in 1991.
>
> So, we must observe at this point, that the view of
>some that the United States does not support passage of
>privacy legislation is not supported by the majority of
>people of the United States, many of our elected officials,
>or our recent history.
>
> Much has been said in the last few months in support of
>self-regulation. Self- regulation has been offered as a
>privacy solution, a way to steer a course between government
>control and free market chaos. It is critical to look closely
>at the case for self-regulation.
>
> First, it should be said that the current argument for
>self-regulation is based on a preference and not a principle.
>While much has been said about the "common philosophy" of the
>Administration's policy toward the Internet, it is quite
>clear, some would say painfully clear, that the
>Administration is prepared to regulate if the interest at
>stake is copyright or cryptography./1/
>
> Second, self-regulation as an argument against privacy
>protection is hardly new in the United States. The direct
>marketing industry has argued for more than twenty years that
>it did not need privacy regulation. The result is that today
>Americans receive a flood of junkmail, more junkmail per
>capita than any other country in the world. Millions of
>Americans sign up for the Mail Preference Service to escape
>this onslaught, but there is no assurance that the privacy of
>these people will be protected. Professor Reidenberg and
>Professor Schwartz have shown in their study of data
>protection in the United States that the Mail Preference
>Service is ignored by about half the members of the Direct
>Marketing Association./2/
>
> Self-regulation has also failed repeatedly in the last
>few years as trade groups and individual companies have been
>unwilling to uphold their own principles and their own
>contractual agreements. In 1991 the Direct Marketing
>Association failed to take action against the Lotus
>Marketplace product even though it plainly violated the
>industry's own guideline on the need to offer an effective
>opt-out. Similarly, the DMA failed to take any action against
>Metromail after the company turned a mailing list into a
>look-up service in violation of another DMA edict. Companies
>also appear unable to police themselves. America Online
>entered into a deal with a telemarketing firm even after it
>assured customers in its service agreement that it would not
>disclose telephone numbers to others. There are many other
>similar cases.
>
> Consumer groups challenged these practices, and
>eventually changes were made. But this is hardly proof, as
>some proponents have claimed, that the self- regulatory
>approach is working.
>
> The advocates for self-regulation have also redefined
>privacy in a way that is ultimately harmful to the interests
>of consumers. Instead of focusing on the obligations of the
>organizations that collect personal information to safeguard
>the information and use it only for appropriate purposes, the
>self-regulatory environment has produced numerous proposals
>that all share the common goal of extracting as much
>information from the individual as the individual can be
>coerced to give up by means of contract. A typical
>negotiation in an environment produced by P3 or OPS requires
>consumers to satisfy the information disclosure requirements
>of the business as a condition of gaining access to services.
>
> As my colleague Professor Agre has observed, these
>relationship easily become asymmetric with the organization
>having the greater power to control what information about
>itself is released while simultaneously obscuring the nature
>and scope of the information it has obtained about
>individuals.
>
> Of course, one remains "free" to withhold consent and
>to therefore be denied admission to a web site, service from
>a web-based company, and many other opportunities in the
>Information Society regardless of whether a fair
>justification for the data collection is provided.
>
> Simply stated, self-regulation elevates the principles
>of notice and consent to stratospheric heights and ignores
>virtually all other principles of privacy and data
>protection. It is, to borrow from the British philosopher
>Jeremy Bentham, "contracts on stilts."
>
> This has been made clear by virtually all of the
>proposals in the United States that focus on obtaining
>consent. The most ironic of these was one recommendation
>earnestly made by a government official on this issue of
>children's privacy who proposed in place of legislative
>safeguards the use of biometric identifiers to ensure that a
>parent's consent to make use of a child's data for marketing
>purposes had in fact been obtained.
>
> Self-regulation has also given rise to the emphasis on
>a multiplicity of privacy preferences. But whether
>individuals actually have such diverse privacy preferences,
>particularly in routine commercial transactions or in data
>gathering activity remains to be seen. As Professor Agre
>notes, "particular importance should be paid to uniformity of
>protocols across different industries and applications, so
>that consumers are not overwhelmed by a pointless diversity
>of interfaces and contracts." /3/
>
> He suggests that it will be particularly important to
>look at a broad range of criteria, "including ease of
>understanding, adequacy of notification, compliance with
>standards, contractual fairness and enforceability,
>appropriate choice of defaults, efficiency relative to the
>potential benefits, and integration with other means of
>privacy protection."
>
> Self-regulation has a further problem: it provides a
>very limited view of the problems surrounding privacy
>protection. It focuses on the microeconomic relationship
>between buyer and seller and ignores the larger social
>questions of architecture and design. Should highway systems
>be designed with anonymous toll payment ? Which technologies
>could facilitate commerce and protect privacy ? What stand
>should governments take on the use of cryptography ? Self-
>regulation provides no answers to these questions, it
>provides no mechanisms to find solutions.
>
> Self-regulation have failed to work even in areas where
>public and industry support is overwhelming. The Center for
>Media Education found that more than a year after the release
>of a widely publicized report on children's privacy that
>companies were continuing to collect personally identifiable
>information from children at their web sites without
>disclosing how the information will be used, who will have
>access to it, and without obtaining parental consent. As the
>CME concluded, "it is clear that industry self-regulation
>does not provide adequate protection for children's privacy."
>
> It has been proposed that the Federal Trade Commission
>could enforce a self- regulatory privacy regime by
>prosecuting deceptive trade practices. But the FTC's ability
>to actually enforce privacy protection in this manner is
>highly suspect. First, the legal authority of the FTC under
>section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act typically
>requires a showing of <<<< actual harm ~ to consumers. As those
>who have studied privacy law in the United States know, this
>will be a difficult test to satisfy. But even if this problem
>is overcome, one could well ask why the FTC, if it had such
>legal authority, pursued only one privacy case after two
>years of intense privacy investigation. And in the single
>case that the FTC investigated, the Commission issued an
>opinion only after the company had discontinued the
>challenged practice. There was no actual judgment against the
>firm or any sanction imposed. Finally, what expectation can
>there be that the FTC will pursue any privacy actions in the
>near future when the Commissioner responsible for privacy
>matters has now left the Commission ? One can look to the
>Federal Trade Commission for the enforcement of privacy
>safeguards on the Internet, but you will see only an empty
>chair.
>
> Finally, there is a significant legal objection to
>self-regulation as a means to protect consumer privacy in the
>United States: such an arrangement could be impermissible
>under anti-trust law. It is, as one commentator has noted, a
>violation of competition law for businesses in the same
>market to combine to set the terms of competition and then to
>enforce those terms on their competitors. Establishing
>industry-wide privacy standards could have exactly this
>consequence. Some commentators have suggested that it may be
>possible for such agreements to survive anti-trust scrutiny
>if the codes are sensibly designed and do not discourage
>competition. But drafting such a policy may not be so simple.
>
> What happens, for example, if industry adopts a code
>based on an opt-out procedure and an innovative company,
>recognizing the need for a higher privacy standard, prefers
>to offer an opt-in procedure instead? If the industry
>association discourages the company from offering the higher
>standard, consumers would be harmed and an anti-trust action
>could result. Indeed, there is already anecdotal evidence
>that the marketing industry has engaged in just such
>practices. (Note that in this example a regulatory framework
>that established opt-out in law could still permit the
>innovative company to offer the opt-in procedure.)
>
> What we realize now is that self-regulation provides
>neither the assurance of a legal right nor the innovation and
>competitive benefit of the marketplace. It is simply an
>answer to the question: how do we regulate without the
>government ? This is not a path to privacy protection, it is
>not even privacy policy.
>
>THE FUTURE
>
> It seems to me surprising that we are unable today to
>resolve the privacy differences between Europe and the United
>States particularly as they concern the Internet. Both
>regions share a high regard for privacy and a long privacy
>tradition. Both regions seem eager for greater privacy
>safeguards. We know also that there is a convergence in the
>development of privacy standards around the globe./4/
>
> But even more obviously, the Internet offers the ideal
>environment to establish uniform standards to protect
>personal privacy. This is clear to anyone who recognizes that
>the platform is consistent around the globe, that the
>protocols are consistent, and the customs surrounding
>commercial transactions off-line are surprisingly consistent:
>money buys products and services, the disclosure of one's
>address is necessary to receive delivery of goods, and the
>release of personal financial information may be necessary
>when credit is sought.
>
> For the vast majority of transactions on the Internet,
>simple, predictable, uniform rules offer enormous benefits to
>consumers and businesses. It is clear what the goal is.
>
> We must find a way forward. The Commission would have
>ample justification at this point if it decided to restrict
>certain data flows to the United States because of the
>absence of appropriate privacy safeguards. How can this point
>be disputed? Consumers in the United States know that we lack
>adequate privacy protection.
>
> I think it is time to end what Colin Bennett has
>called "American Exceptionalism.~ There is little support in
>our public attitudes, law, or history for this stance. The
>United States should move quickly to establish a privacy
>agency, and then proceed to explore the application of the
>OECD Privacy Guidelines to the private sector. This useful
>framework provides a strong foundation for the development of
>technical means to protect privacy and the development of new
>privacy standards and legal safeguards. It is already found
>today in several US privacy laws and in the practices of many
>US companies.
>
> I also propose today that the United States, Europe,
>and Asia join together to develop an intentional convention
>on privacy protection based on the OECD Guidelines. A simple
>framework of general goals combined with a consultative
>process that brings together a wide array of countries could
>help ensure that privacy standards are extended to all comers
>of the globe
>
> Only when we have established privacy standards and
>guidelines as strong as security standards and guidelines
>will users of advanced networked services have the trust and
>confidence to participate fully in the Information Society.
>
> It is also my hope that in the process of working
>together toward a common goal that some of the current
>differences between the United States and Europe will
>diminish. There is too much at stake for consumers, and
>citizens, and users of the Internet to risk a clash of
>privacy rules.
>
> We share a common interest in the protection of
>privacy. Let us go forward together and establish the
>policies that will launch the information economies of the
>next era while preserving the personal freedoms we cherish
>today.
>
> I thank you for your attention.
>
>NOTES
>
>/1/ Framework for Electronic Commerce (1997)
>
>/2/ Paul M. Schwartz and Joel R. Reidenberg, Data Privacy Law
>(New York: Michie, 1996).
>
>/3/ Philip E. Agre and Marc Rotenberg, eds., Technology and
>Privacy: The New
>Landscape (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1997)
>
>/4/ Colin J. Bennett, Regulating Privacy (Ithaca: Cornell
>Press, 1992)
>
From dlv at bwalk.dm.com Sat Oct 4 08:27:41 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 23:27:41 +0800
Subject: Stronghold 1/2
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <6e32De9w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
I sent this large article out a while back, and apparently it never showed
up on the mailing list. Perhaps it was too large I'll re-send it again in
two smaller chunks.
This article includes several long quotes. I urge anyone still interested
in the C2Net/StrongHold thread to read the whole thing. I don't expect to
need to contribute to this thread again.
The "anonymous" C2Net shill (easily recognizable) wrote:
>C2Net was wrong to censor the cypherpunks list in the guise of moderation.
>It was wrong to send threatening letters to people who claimed its
>products were weak.
"Moderation" is a misnomer. C2Net engaged in outright fraud by providing
a list which C2Net claimed would contain the articles rejected by the
C2Net moderator, then censoring articles from both the censored and the
uncensored lists. At least one of my articles (not the one about Stronghold;
the one quoting the threatening letter from C2net's lawyers) didn't make
it even to the "unedited" list.
I immediately recognized the "anonymous" shill's hysterical posting style
(repeatedly calling me a "liar" and a closet homosexual, making numerous
references to my ethnicity and visa status (incorrectly)). Do you happen to
remember C2Net's "marketing director" who tried to create the nym "Locutus"
via the remailers, and blew his cover because he couldn't change his style?
>The burden of proof in claiming that there is a weakness in someone's
>security product is on those making the claim.
Nope. The burden of proof is on the vendor selling the product.
In this case, the vendor is unwilling or unable to present any
evidence of the product's security, so it threatens the
security experts who question the product.
>If anyone really does believe that C2Net's products have backdoors or
>weaknesses, why don't they present them?
Because C2net's lawyers have been harrassing those who did - plenty
of their threats are quoted below.
Somebody wrote, and I suspect that it wasn't cc'd to the list,
so I'll skip the name:
>Are you able to tell some one privately what's wrong with it ??
I'm very sorry, but I'd rather not...
Somebody else wrote (my headers are a mess; I apologize profusely
if I'm quoting private e-mail to the list. which I suspect I'm doing)
>I'm pretty curious, because threatening individuals with lawsuits
>for questioning the quality of a product seems like an act of
>desperation. It also seems like it wouldn't hold up in court
>for a minute.
I agree that this is the behavior one would expect from a vendor that has any
confidence at all in its product or in its ability to answer questions about
its product in an uncensored discussion.
>Imagine if McDonalds tried to sue someone that said big macs suck.
>
>The judge would throw out the case after a good belly laugh.
As a matter of fact, McDonald's did sue some folks in the U.K. (where libel
laws are even weirder than in the U.S.) who were basically saying that
hamburgers aren't healthy. The defendants won just recently. One of the
problems with the U.S. legal system that you can be on the defending end
of a totally meritless suit, and still not recover your legal fees when the
suit is laughed out of court.
C2Net's harrassment included calling my home and threatening my mother-in-law;
threatening to seize all my computers as part of the "discovery process"; etc
(check out some of their threats below). Since I have nothing to gain by
publicizing the truth about them, I'd rather not deal with these creeps.
Jeff Barber wrote:
>> Lucky is lying: the censored articles were also filtered from the list which
>> was billed as being unfiltered.
>
>This is revisionist history. I can't recall any intimation at the
>time that any messages were filtered from the unfiltered list.
If you can't recall, I'm quoting a bunch of stuff below. At least one of
my articles, the one quoting the threatening letter from C2net's lawyers,
didn't make it even to the "unedited" list.
The "anonymous" C2net shill further wrote:
>While it is true that Dmitri is a proven liar in the grand tradtion
>of the Soviet Union (shout a lie long enough and loud enough and
>eventually some people will start to believe it), and a pathological
>homophobic bigot (who secretly enjoys sucking cock but wears womens
>clothing to disguise himself),
C2Net's shill called me a liar about a dozen times, yet hasn't presented any
evidence of me ever lying. On the other hand, C2net's claim that I'm a closet
homosexual is an outright lie, typical of Sameer Parekh and his employees.
>Of course, by that time Dmitri had so little reputation capital that
>Gilmore patched Majordomo so it wouldn't even respect a subscription
>request for him.
This is correct: John Gilmore tried to censor me from this mailing list. As
the result, I'm still here, John Gilmore no longer runs this list, and John
Gilmore's "reputation capital" is extremely negative. C2net's shill seems to
approve of Gilmore's actions, demonstrating once again that he he is employed
by a dishonest and dishonorable organization.
>Ultimately, Dmitri's allegations of weaknesses in Stronghold, true or
>not, are totally irrelevant. Without mathematical proof of a weakness,
>he simply cannot be believed to ever be telling the truth. So, if
>C2 said to him in private e-mail, "if you call Sameer a cocksucker one
>more time, we'll slap a libel suit across your emigrant ass, take back
>your green card, deport you and tell Russia that you called Yeltsin a
>cocksucker," well, I can understand why he shut up.
Hmm, I turned in my green card about 12 years ago, when I got naturalized...
For what it's worth, Sameer is an Arab, and we all know the old Arab proverb:
"Women for sons, boys for pleasure, but goats for sheer extasy." However
C2net's barratrous threats were not transmitted by e-mail and had nothing to
do with Sameer's alleged sexual preferences. Rather, I received 5 or 6
threatening phone calls at home from Janet M. Craycroft. Also the following
threatening letter was served on me (on a weekend!)
]Gray Cary Ware
] Frieidenrich
]A professional corporation
]
]Attorneys at Law Janet M. Craycroft
]400 Hamilton Avenue Direct Dial: (415) 833-2297
]Palo Alto, CA 94301-1826 Internet: JCRAYCROFT at GCWF.COM
]Tel (415) 328-6561
]Fax (415) 327-3699 Our File No.
] 9999999
]
] January 21, 1997
]
]
]VIA OVERNIGHT COURIER
]---------------------
]
]
]Mr. Dimitri Vulis
]6767 Burns Street, #4K
]Forest Hills, New York 11375-3555
]
] Re: Internet Postings on Cypherpunks at toad.com
]
]Dear Mr. Vulis:
]
] This firm represents C2Net, a California Corporation. It has come to our attention
]that you are publishing false, defamatory statements about C2Net and its products.
]Specifically, we direct your attention to your January 30, 1997 Internet posting to the
]Cypherpunks at toad.com mailing list which you entitled "Security alert!!!" (A copy of this e-
]mail is enclosed.)
...
] As you are undoubtedly already aware, Stronghold is a web server that protects
]Internet traffic encryption. Stronghold is not a "backdoor" to steal credit card numbers. The
]statements contained in your e-mail directly cast aspersions upon C2Net's product and
]business which will not be tolerated. Dr. Vulis, at a minimum, your e-mail exposes you to
]civil liability for defamation, tortious interference with business relations, interntional
]interference with contractual relations and permits C2Net to seek compensatory damages as
]well as punitive damages against you personally.
]
] C2Net has authorized this firm to take all action necessary to put an immediate stop to
]your actions and conduct as described above, as well as any other conduct or actions
]undertaken by you which might prove to be harmful to C2Net. Such authorization includes
]the filing of a lawsuit against you to obtain injunctive relief as well as compensatory and
]punitive damages.
]
] Given the seriousness of this matter, we insist that you stop disseminating the January
]30 e-mail or any version of such e-mail. If you continue to publish defamatory statements
]about C2Net and its products, we will pursue all remedies against you. So that there is no
]misunderstanding, please confirm in writing by february 4, 1997, that you will agree not to
]further disseminate the January 30 e-mail or versions of such e-mail.
]
] Should you have any questions, please contact me or have your attorney contact me.
]
] Very truly yours,
]
] GRAY CARY WARE & FREIDENRICH
] A Professional Corporation
]
] [Signature]
] Janet M. Craycroft
]
]Enclosure
][deleted]
The letter pretty much speaks for itself. Let me just point out that
1) I never claimed that "Stronghold is a backdoor", which makes no
sense, 2) Sameer Parekh inists on addressing me as "Mr." because he's
a college dropout extremely envious of anyone educated better than him.
>So, don't hold your breath waiting for a repost of previous lies
>from our dear Kook of the Fucking Century.
Yep - since there have been no "previous lies", a repost is impossible.
But here are a few list articles from the time of the "C2Net moderation
experiment". For those who aren't award, Sandy Sandfart is the marketing guy
at C2Net who was trying to "moderate" this mailing list.
Sandy Sandfart posted the following lie (note the date):
]Date: Fri, 7 Feb 1997 11:26:27 -0800 (PST)
]From: Sandy Sandfort
]To: Mike Duvos
]Cc: cypherpunks at toad.com
]Subject: Re: My messages not appearing on either of the lists?
]In-Reply-To: <199702071636.IAA26298 at netcom19.netcom.com>
]Message-Id:
]Sender: owner-cypherpunks at toad.com
]
]~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
] SANDY SANDFORT
] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
]
]C'punks,
]
]On Fri, 7 Feb 1997, Mike Duvos wrote:
]
]> ...Messages apparently do not get moderated in the order in
]> which they are received...
]
]All messages are filtered and posted in the order in which I
]receive them.
]
]
] S a n d y
To which Tim May wrote (and Sandy spiked this article, and many others):
]Message-Id:
]In-Reply-To:
]References:
]Date: Fri, 7 Feb 1997 13:59:23 -0800
]To: cypherpunks at toad.com
]From: "Timothy C. May"
]Subject: More on the Stronghold Charge
]Cc: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
]
]Vulis has sent me private mail, which I won't quote here because of the
]usual netiquette standards that private mail not be quoted (though it's
]legal to do so). He asserts that a few weeks ago he sent criticisms of
]Stronghold out to the Cypherpunks list, and the criticisms did not appear
]on any of the distributed lists.
]
]He claims he then received communications from C2Net of a legal nature,
]threatening him with legal action. I'll let Vulis elaborate if he wishes,
]as I don't know the situation. And I encourage him to do so, for more than
]one reason.
]
]As I just replied to "Against Moderation" on, I would like to see these
]articles which were suppressed. Please repost them to the list, and copy me
]to ensure that I get them.
]
]If this claim is true, that Sandy blocked criticism of Stronghold from
]reaching either the Main list (bad enough), or from even going out at all
]on the Flames list (reprehensible), then this is an extremely serious
]charge.
]
]If the claim is true that Sandy used articles sent to the Cypherpunks list,
]but never distributed to the list, as the basis by the company which
]employs him of legal threats of any kind, then this is even more than just
]"extremely serious."
]
]I would like to hear more from Vulis, and copies of any such articles, and
]of course would like to hear Sandy's version of things.
]
]This is too serious a charge not to resolve.
]
]--Tim May
]
]Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside"
]We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
]---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
]Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
]tcmay at got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
]W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
]Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments.
]"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
]Date: 8 Feb 1997 04:31:15 -0000
]Message-Id: <19970208043115.2364.qmail at anon.lcs.mit.edu>
]From: Against Moderation
]Subject: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation
]To: cypherpunks at toad.com
]Cc: tcmay at got.net
]Precedence: bulk
]
]-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
]
]Well, folks, tonight I have witnessed the frightening dangers of
]moderation and censorship first-hand, and would like to tell you what
]has happened. I think there is an important lesson to be learned from
]these incidents.
]
]Before I explain what has happened, I want to make one thing
]absolutely clear. Though I've thought the moderation of cypherpunks
]was a terrible idea from the start and am even more convinced of it
]now, I don't assign any blame to Sandy. I believe he offered to
]moderate the list with the best of intentions, and I sincerely
]appreciate his efforts to try to revive what was once a fantastic
]mailing list, even if in my opinion those efforts have backfired.
]
]Sandy has been a valuable advocate of cypherpunk beliefs and a lively
]contributor to cypherpunks list for a long time. Though the
]moderation experiment has resulted in some terrible consequences, we
]can't blame him for what has happened. If the events I have witnessed
]tonight occured with such a high-standing member of the cypherpunks
]community in charge, the cause of them can only be the very nature of
]moderation and censorship. I don't think any of us could have done
]much better in Sandy's shoes.
]
]Now, what happened tonight? As some of you may recall, a month or so
]ago I vehemently argued against the elimination of the
]cypherpunks-unedited mailingt list. Some people (though no one
]associated with toad.com) were claiming that 3 mailing lists might be
]too much load, and that having cypherpunks and cypherpunks-flames
]would be enough. I argued that not only would the delay of waiting
]for a decision put alternate cypherpunks moderators at a disadvantage,
]it would make it farm more difficult to convince people of the
]moderator's honesty as there would be no guarantee that messages made
]it to either list. Fortunately, cypherpunks-unedited did get created
](it seems no one "in charge" ever intended not to create it).
]
]Well, as it turns out, a number of messages have made it neither to
]cypherpunks nor to cypherpunks-flames. Making matters worse, however,
]not only are certain messages being suppressed from both lists, but
]even messages mentioning that fact get suppressed from both the
]cypherpunks and the cypherpunks-flames lists!
]
]Here's exactly what happened. I was beginning to believe that Dmitri
]Vulis had sent an (admitedly objectionable) message to the cypherpunks
]mailing list, but that the message had gone to neither the cypherpunks
]nor the cypherpunks-flames lists. Since I was under the impression
]that every article was supposed to go to one list or the other, and
]many people probably still believe that, I mentioned this somewhat
]startling fact on the cypherpunks mailing list, I believe in response
]to a post by Tim May on the same subject.
]
]Tim replied (in a message Cc'ed to cypherpunks--though I don't think
]it went anywhere but to -unedited), asking me in the message, "Can you
]send to the list, with a copy to me, the articles CENSOREDCENSOREDCENS
]OREDCENSOREDCENSORE?" I therefore went back through my mail archives
]and found a copy of the message that I believed had gone to neither
]mailing list. I sent it to Tim and to cypherpunks. I prepended a few
]paragraphs in which I asked people to confirm that the message had
]gone to neither mailing list. Among other things in those paragraphs,
]I stated that Vulis's message was "verifiably false". It was clear
]from the context that I was forwarding this message to ask people
]which lists it had gone to, not because I believed the content to be
]correct or even at all convincing or interesting. That message I
]sent, quoting Vulis's, immediately follows this message, after the
]line '========'.
]
]Then, tonight, I received a message from Sandy, which I include below
]a second '========' marker. In that letter, Sandy had explicitly
]aknowledged not only that he had sent Vulis's letter to neither
]mailing list, but that he wouldn't send my letter to either mailing
]list, either! He claimed that he couldn't forward Vulis's message
]because it was libel, and accused me of committing libel simply by
]quoting Vulis's message, even though I explicitly stated that Vulis's
]message was verifiably false.
]
]Well, this travesty must exposed, even if I can't make known all the
]details for fear of libel charges. I am therefore forwarding
]everything I can to the cypherpunks mailing list, for all to see. As
]you can see, Vulis made unfounded and incorrect charges that a
]particular system contained a security hole. Believe me, if I could
]get into the details of the case I could convince you easily that his
]claim is not true. However, since even quoting that claim apparently
]opens me up to charges of libel, I can't give you the details. Thus,
]I have censored (by overriting original text with the letters
]CENSORED) any portion of quoted messages that might give you an
]indication of what system Vulis actually claimed had a security hole.
]
]This censorship should not, however, affect my main point, and the
]lesson that I hope we can all take away from this. When it comes down
]to it, the details of this case do not matter. What does matter is
]that even when the "good guys" attempt benign censorship, it can have
]frighteningly far-reaching effects on people's ability to discuss
]otherwise reasonable topics such as the mechanics of the cypherpunks
]list. I generally dislike censorship and moderation, but the
]consequences of the cypherpunks experiment have gone far beyond
]anything I could have imagined.
]
]In closing, let me reiterate that I don't think most of this is
]Sandy's, John's, or anyone else's fault. Given the knowledge I have
]of this case, I believe Sandy has unwittingly found himself ensnarled
]in a nasty legal situation where, for fear of legal reprisal he must
]block articles that he has a moral obligation to send to
]cypherpunks-flames. I certainly don't envy his position.
]
][To moderator Sandy: I believe we must get the content of this
]message to the main cypherpunks mailing list. I have done everything
]I can to ensure that the message contains no libel. If, for some
]reason, you still can't send it on to the main cypherpunks mailing
]list, can you please tell me specifically which parts cause problems.
]I will the CENSOR them out and try again. This message contains
]important, highly relevant information for the cypherpunks community.
]Please help me do what it takes to get it accepted by the moderation
]process. Thanks.]
[snip]
]Date: Fri, 7 Feb 1997 16:45:31 -0800 (PST)
]From: Sandy Sandfort
]To: Against Moderation
]Subject: Re: Is Sandy really censoring criticisms of CENSOREDCENSOREDCENSORE?
]In-Reply-To: <19970207220720.15530.qmail at anon.lcs.mit.edu>
]
]~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
] SANDY SANDFORT
] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
]
]Hi,
]
]On 7 Feb 1997, Against Moderation wrote:
]
]> What I object to more strongly and think is wrong is the
]> fact that it went to *neither* list.
]
]Unfortunately, it's not as simple as that. As soon as I can
]arrange it with John, I am going to stop moderating the list.
]In the interim, I *will not* be sending your post onto either
]the Flames or the Moderated lists. This is done for legal
]reason. As it is, you have already published a libel on the
]unedited list by repeating Dimitri's libel. This exposes you to
]legal liability, but as an anonymous poster, you are somewhat
]insulated from the consequences of your act.
]
]If you would like to PRIVATELY discuss this matter with me, I
]would not mind going into more detail with you. Suffice it to
]say, I any re-publication by me of Dimitri's libel would expose
]John and myself to legal liability and could also act to
]insulate Dimitri from liability as a result of CENSOREDCENSOREDCE
]NSOREDCENDOREDCENDOREDC.
]
]Take care,
]
]
] S a n d y
[to be continued]
---
Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
From dlv at bwalk.dm.com Sat Oct 4 08:29:36 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 23:29:36 +0800
Subject: Stronghold
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID:
This is the second chunk of the same.
Tim May described C2net's legal threats:
]Message-Id:
]In-Reply-To: <19970208043115.2364.qmail at anon.lcs.mit.edu>
]Date: Fri, 7 Feb 1997 21:46:10 -0800
]To: Against Moderation , cypherpunks at toad.com
]From: "Timothy C. May"
]Subject: Re: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation
]Cc: hugh at toad.com
]
]At 4:31 AM +0000 2/8/97, Against Moderation wrote:
]>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
]>
]>Well, folks, tonight I have witnessed the frightening dangers of
]>moderation and censorship first-hand, and would like to tell you what
]>has happened. I think there is an important lesson to be learned from
]>these incidents.
]
](long account of getting legal threats for quoting a message about CENSORED
]elided)
]
]This is indeed an important incident. I hope we can discuss it. Many issues
]central to Cypherpunks are involved. To name a few:
]
]* the moderation/censorship issue itself (though we have probably beaten
]this one to death in the last few weeks).
]
]* the "libel" issue, especially as it involves Sandy, his company, and the
]machine the list is hosted from. The introduction of a censor has, as many
]of us predicted, raised serious libel and liability issues. (This is the
]best reason I can think of it to move to an "alt.cypherpunks" system, where
]bypassing of liability, libel, copyright violation, etc., laws is
]naturally handled by the globally decentralized and uncontrolled nature of
]Usenet.)
]
]* conflicts of interest issues. Apparently Sandy feels information
]deleterious to C2Net, having to do with a claimed CENSORED in the software
]product CENSORED, cannot be passed by him to _either_ of the two lists to
]which articles are supposed to be sent. (Sadly, he did not tell us of this
]meta-censorship when it happened. This made what he did deceptive as well
]as wrong.)
]
]* chilling of discussion. As "Against Moderation" notes, merely _quoting_
]the article of another caused Sandy to not only reject his article, but
]also to contact him and raise the threat of legal action. (This even though
]Against Moderation added all sorts of "obviously false" comments to what
]Vulis had written.)
]
]* even more threats. At the request of CENSORED today, I called CENSORED
]and had a verbal communication with him (a nice guy, by the way) about this
]situation. He averred that "you don't want to be pulled into this," and
]suggested that if I post certain things, even quoting the reports that a
]CENSORED exists in CENSORED, I could well be sued by the lawyers of his
]company!
]
]These are issues which remailers, decentralized servers, anonymity, data
]havens, and other Cypherpunks technologies make important issues for us to
]discuss.
]
]
]When did Cypherpunks start thinking about libel? (Obvious answer: when
]_their_ companies were the targets of criticism, lies, libel, whatever.)
]It's not as if insulting or even "libelous" (I'm not a lawyer) comments
]have not been made routinely on the list. Insulting companies and other
]institutions has been standard Cypherpunks fare since the beginning.
]Mykotronx has been accused of high crimes, RSADSI has been declared to be
]placing backdoors in code, Phil Zimmermann has been declared to be an NSA
]plant ("only trust the versions of PGP before he cut the deal to get his
]freedom"), and so on. Think about it. Just about any company with any
]product related to crypto has at one time or another had their motives
]questioned, their products slammed, etc.
]
]Unfortunately, our Late Censor is an employee of one of the companies so
]slammed, and he has reacted by rejecting one or more of these slams without
]bothering to tell the list that he has to do so. (Were it me, I would have
]"recused" myself from the decision, or at least told the list in general
]terms what was going on, or, more likely, resigned as censor. But then I
]would never have been a list.censor in the first place.)
]
]I understand that Sandy is stepping down as our Moderator. The Censor is
]Dead, Long Live Sandy! I expect to harbor no continuing resentment toward
]Sandy (though I expect things will be strained for a while, as might be
]expected).
]
]The issues raised are ugly ones. Here's what scares me: the "precedent" may
]irretrievably be established that companies offended by words on the list
]will threaten legal action to recover their good name. I can imagine
]Mykotronx or even First Virtual citing the actions of C2Net as a precedent
](a cultural precedent, to the extent there is such a thing) for their own
]legal letters.
]
]As with the terrible precedent set by the "even Cypherpunks had to censor
]themselves" experiment, these companies may be able to say "But even a
]Cypherpunk-oriented company realized that the antidote for damaging speech
]was not rebutting speech. No, these Cypherpunks realized that some
]threatening letters and pulling the plug on the speaker was a better
]approach."
]
]And we won't be able to easily argue that Mykotronx has no right to do this
]while C2Net does.
]
]Sandy, in his message a few hours ago to Against Moderation, even made the
]claim (and Sandy _is_ a lawyer, or at least once was) that John Gilmore
]could be held liable for speech on the Cypherpunks list. (I don't doubt the
]"could," but I hate like hell to see a Cypherpunkish company leading the
]charge.)
]
]Perhaps this is true. But the Censorship experiment, and the resulting
]threats of legal action by C2Net to stop mention of the alleged CENSORED in
]their product CENSORED, fuel the fire. Instead of denigrating such legal
]moves--as I'm sure most Cypherpunks would have done a few years ago if
]RSADSI were to try to sue people for making outrageous claims--we have a
]major company consisting of several leading Cypherpunks making just such
]threats.
]
]I'm not a legal scholar, but is it really the case that merely _alluding_
]to the allegedly libelous comments of another is itself a libel? Is a
]reporter who writes that "Person X has alleged that Product Y has a Flaw Z"
]thus committing a libel? (I don't think so, as reporters frequently report
]such things. If merely quoting an alleged libel is also libel, then
]presumably a lot of reporters, and even court clerks reporting on cases,
]are libelers.)
]
](ObLisp reference: quoting an expression ought to have a different return
]value than evaluating an expression! That's what quotes are for.)
]
]My comments this past week have not been motivated by animosity toward
]Sandy, and certainly my comments today are not motivated by any animosity
]about C2Net or any of its employees (including CENSORED, whom I spoke with
]today).
]
]My comments started out as being a summary of why I had left Cypherpunks
]when the Great Hijacking was announced. Since last Sunday, when I issued my
]"Moderation" post, I've only responded to messages I was CC:ed on, or to
]messages on the Flames list, which I subscribed to temporarily to better
]see what Sandy was calling flames. The discovery that certain posts were
]not appearing on either the Main list or the Flames list triggered today's
]comments about Sandy and the alleged CENSOREDCENSOREDCENSORED (blah blah
]blah).
]
]I hope we can declare this Censorship experiment a failure and move on.
]However, it is almost certain that as a result of attempts to suppress
]certain views, that the move back to an unfiltered state will mean that
]some will use anonymous remailers and nym servers to post even _more_
]claims, however outrageous.
]
]This is a predictable effect. Cf. Psychology 101 for an explanation.
]Kicking Vulis off the list predictably produced a flood of Vulis
]workarounds, and a surge in insults via anonymous remailers. Instituting
]censorship of the list triggered a flood of comments critical of the
]experiment, and a predictable "testing" of the censorship limits. And,
]finally, now that C2Net is threatening legal action to stop
]discussion--even in quotes!!--of alleged CENSORED in CENSORED, expect a lot
]of repetition of these claims via remailers. And, I predict, claims about
]CENSORED will even be spread more widely, e.g., on the Usenet.
]
](Sadly, I half expect a letter from some lawyers or lawyer larvae saying I
]am "suborning libel," or somesuch nonsense. As Sandy would say, "piffle."
]Lawyers, take your best shot.)
]Message-Id:
]Date: Sat, 8 Feb 1997 09:22:08 -0800
]To: cypherpunks at toad.com
]From: "Timothy C. May"
]Subject: META: Censorship is Going Way too Far
]
]
]Fellow Cypherpunks (of the virtual community, even if not part of any
]particular version of the list(s)),
]
]
]I am about to drive over the Santa Cruz mountains for today's physical
]meeting at Stanford, and made my last check of the Singapore archive site
]to see if my last several messages to the CP list have appeared. (The
]Singapore site archives the main list every four hours; the latest update
]is 08:15 PST, local time.)
]
]They have _not_ appeared, on either of the two lists, the main list and
]filtered list. I don't know if they have appeared on the "unfiltered" list,
]as I don't have access to an archive site for that, and don't subscribe to
]it. Some of these articles are now more than 18 hours old.
]
](I scanned the archive site carefully and did not see any of my articles.
]If I somehow missed them (all four?!), I apologize to the Moderator and
]will make an appointment with my eye doctor.)
]
]Further, messages dated _much_ later in time are now on the Singapore site,
]meaning they were "approved." (The latest such message I see is from J.
]Blatz, and is dated 2/8/97, 02:58 a.m., EST, which is fully 10 hours after
]the first of my messages which never appeared on either the main list or
]the flames list.)
]
]My articles are dated:
]
]* 2/7/97, 1:46 p.m. PST
]
]* 2/7/97, 1:59 p.m., PST
]
]* 2/7/97, 3:03 p.m., PST
]
]* 2/7/97, 9:46 p.m., PST
]
]I would normally give the message names here, but I suspect that even
]mention of the message titles would cause _this_ message to be filtered
]into the black hole list. So, by avoiding even mention of the message
]titles, I should be safe. Nothing in this message can be considered flamish
](beyond normal criticism) or libelous.
]
](Many articles with dates later than these have already appeared on the
]main list, and some have already appeared on the Flames list. Why have none
]of my articles gone through as of this morning?)
]
]The subjects of my articles deal with the claims made by "Against
]Moderation" and Vulis that certain articles were filtered from the stream
]of articles without appearing on either the main list or the flames list,
]and with no mention by the Moderator of this significant change to the
]moderation policies.
]
]I surmise that my articles are similarly vanishing into a black hole,
]presumably because I have questioned the policies here. (Possibly my
]articles have been side-tracked for further review, or for review by a
]certain company's legal staff, or whatever. If so, this should be explained
]to the main list. And the implications of this, if it is happening, should
]be discussed on the main list.)
]
]By the way, I will deliberately make no mention of the details of my
]articles, or of those by Against Moderation, as I also surmise that any
]articles dealing with a certain product by a certain company will be
]filtered out completely.
]
](I carefully did not repeat the claims made against one of these products
]in my articles, so there is no way under the sun I can be charged in any
]court with "libel.")
]
]To paraphrase the Detweiler of a couple of years ago, "I am quite shocked
]by this situation." It is one thing to filter out posts which contain
]infantile, barnyard taunts and insults, it is quite another to filter out
]_content_.
]
]And it is even worse to not pass on these filtered comments to the "flames"
]list, which was putatively set up to contain such comments. Worse still
]that the list as a whole is not being told of this policy, and that posts
]which mention it are not going out.
]
](There has been some discussion of articles not going out, such as in Igor
]Chudov's recent articles, but I surmise from his article that Igor is
]unaware of the filtering I'm talking about here. I am copying Igor on this
]message, to ensure he knows at least part of what is going on here.)
]
]There is no justification in any of the stated moderation goals for
]blocking articles such as mine, or this one.
]
]As my posts yesterday did not contain flames or insults (beyond normal
]minor turns of phrase some might not like, just as _this_ post contains
]mildly flamish comments if one is so inclined to see _any_ criticism as
]flamish), they should have appeared on the main list. They have not, so
]far, even though articles generated many hours later have already appeared
]on the main list.
]
]And, as of minutes ago, they have not appeared on the Flames list, even if
]the Moderator decided they were flamish. (Even if _one_ was, arguably, not
]all of them were.)
]
]So, we are increasingly in a situation where:
]
]a. the moderation policies appear to be changing on a daily basis
]
]b. articles which are not even flamish are being dumped
]
]c. some of these dumped articles are not even appearing on the "Flames" list
]
]d. the appearance of a conflict of interest is increasing
]
]e. discussion is being squelched
]
]I am cc:ing this message to a handful of Cypherpunks to ensure that it gets
]some propagation before today's meeting.
]
]I find it very sad that things have come to this.
]
]
]--Tim May
I wrote:
]Subject: Re: META: Censorship is Going Way too Far
]From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
]Message-Id: <68qT2D82w165w at bwalk.dm.com>
]Date: Sat, 08 Feb 97 15:39:16 EST
]In-Reply-To: <199702081136.LAA26752 at mailhub.amaranth.com>
]
]"William H. Geiger III" writes:
]>
]> In , on 02/08/97 at 11:22 AM,
]> "Timothy C. May" said:
]>
]> >They have _not_ appeared, on either of the two lists, the main list and
]> >filtered list. I don't know if they have appeared on the "unfiltered" list,
]> >I don't have access to an archive site for that, and don't subscribe to it.
]> >Some of these articles are now more than 18 hours old.
]>
]> All 4 of your post made it to the unfiltered list.
]>
]> I don't know what made it to the moderated/flam list as I had switched to the
]> unmoderated list yesterday morning.
]
]I'm monitoring all 3 lists... A whole batch of Tim's posts made it to the
]cypherpunks-unedited list, but to neither filtered list (he listed them in
]another article that appeared so far on the "unedited" list but not on
]either filtered list).
]
]Also a message on the taboo subject from John Young appeared on 'unedited'
]but not on either filtered list. Its headers were:
]
]]Message-Id: <1.5.4.32.19970207222314.006ca6f0 at pop.pipeline.com>
]]Date: Fri, 07 Feb 1997 17:23:14 -0500
]]To: cypherpunks at toad.com
]]From: John Young
]
](I suppose Sandy can't stop JYA from placing it on his Web site, can he? :-)
]
]A whole lot of my articles over the last week didn't make it to either
]filtered list. This is nothing new... but the following is:
]
]My article, quoting the threatening letter that C2Net's lawyers had sent
]me, has not appeared even on cypherpunks-unedited! Its headers were:
]
]]To: cypherpunks at toad.com
]]Cc: tcmay at got.net,antimod at nym.alias.net
]]From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
]]Message-ID:
]]Date: Sat, 08 Feb 97 11:14:34 EST
]]In-Reply-To: