Analysis of proposed UK ban on use of non-escrowed crypto.

[Hallam-Baker]

Kent Crispin wrote:

> Thus, in PGPs case at least, if you want escrowed encryption, then
> you must escrow the signature key.

Hence the DSA which is a signature algorithm that does not do
encryption. I think the use of the same key for both is a bad idea BUT
note that if you have a secure signature scheme you don't need an
encryption key at all.

Simply generate yourself a fresh set of public key parameters for each
communication in the manner of IPSEC. The hard problem of setting up
security is knowing the identity of the other party. All else pales into
insignificance in comparison.

Consider the following scenario. SMTP is adjusted so that it has a DH
key exchange crypto option. A typical conversation becomes:-

EHELO You-got-crypto-mate?
269 Yeah I have crypto
XCHAL RSA 248af23876acdef
270 [key-id] [DHparameters e, n, e^x mod n] [sig-of-challenge+DH-params] 
XENCRYPT [IV] [e^y mod n] 

[Conversation continues encrypted under key e^y^x mod n AND keybits 
padding out messages as appropriate.]


Now this type of scheme could be implemented without a certificate
infrastructure and severly increase the difficulty of snooping. In that
case the message would be sent even though [sig-of-challenge+DH-params]
was absent. But with a CA infrastructure you could make sure that you
hads contacted the correct machine, one authorised to accept mail for
fred at ibm.com] all you need is a means of hacking the following assertion
into X509v3:

"Is authorized user of DNS namespace identifier matching"

Add in a date and the protocol could be made very reilient and entirely
transparent. Now that mail is moving away from godamn awfull crap like
sendmail towards engineered systems like notes or exchange adding in
protocol extensions becomes easier.

If the mail sending agent knows that mail to a particular host should be
sent encrypted the system can be made much more transparent than PGP or
S/MIME. Like the punters might be able to use it without getting screwed
too often.


I think email security has often been the perfect being the enemy of the
good. One huge problem has been braindamaged ideas about routing email
through store and forward mailers rather than connecting to the real
destination to start with. 


	Phill