Geiger and long, unreadable lines

[Adam Back]

Dimitri Vulis <dlv at bwalk.dm.com> writes on cpunks-flames:
> Adam Back <aba at dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes on cpunks-flames:
> >
> > Mr William H. Geiger III "Author of E-Secure" writes on cpunks:
> > > <sigh> for the benifit of those misfortunate enough to be still working on
> > > dumb terminals I have disabled my PGP script until I have time to add a
> > > word wrap routine to it.
> >
> > <sigh> it is you who were demonstrating your ineptitude by spewing
> > 120+ line length postings.  Why is it so difficult for you to keep
> > under 80 chars?  Would you like some technical assistance?  Notice how
> > near every one else apart from yourself is managing to keep under 80
> > chars?
> 
> Notice how near every one else apart from yourself bends over for the NSA,
> and is willing to use a 40-bit key "escrowed" with the feds?  Why is it so
> difficult for you to keep under 40 bits? Would you like some technical
> assistance? Why are you setting yourself apart from the Internet community
> that so happily embraces GAK? Why do you desire "privacy" for your traffic
> when everyone else does not? What have you got to hide? Are you looking to
> transmit child pornography, bomb-making instructions, and/or cannabis
> legalization propaganda? We better have a look at your hard disk soon.

btw Dimitri, a crypto question:

Diffie-Hellman key generation, there are two main ways of generating
the diffie-hellman prime modulus, method 1:

	p = 2q+1

where q is a prime also.

And method 2:

	p = r.2q+1

where q is a prime and r is a randomly generated number.

With method 1, the security parameter is the size of p in bits (or
size of q, as they are related).

With method 2, there are two security parameters, size of q and size
of p in bits.  

Method 2 has the advantage that key generation is faster as it is
quicker to generate new random numbers r, than to repeatedly generate
trial prime q as you have to do in method 1.  However is the security
weaker in method 2?  What size of p and q do you have to use to get
the same security as for same size of p in bits as in method 1?  What
should be the relationship between the size of p and q?

(this isn't cpunks, this is cpunks-flames, so your non-crypto pledge
shouldn't hold, besides Sandy has a stated policy of killing the whole
thread, so I thought it amusing to continue your crypto relevance in
moving on to technical topics rather than political)

Adam
--
print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`