Remailer hating Nazis

Anonymous nobody at REPLAY.COM
Mon Aug 18 01:51:19 PDT 1997

Anonymous wrote:
> There are lots of good reasons to use remailers, but thinking that you are
> not responsible for your actions is not one of them.  Anything you send
> may be around to haunt you for many years to come.

> If you believe that any computer sytem is foolproof... you have a lot to
> learn.  There is always a possibility that people will found out your real
> identity and where you live, through a human error or a flaw in the
> remailer.  (Right, toto?).

  Right, small, warm-blooded creature.
  There are a plethora of available avenues for surruptitious agents to
exploit InterNet technology and methodology in order to reveal both your
identity and the content of your communications.
  To truly achieve anonymity and privacy, one should be prepared to use
the strictest standards of paranoia, the full capabilities of privacy
and anonymity tools, and personal methodologies aimed at thwarting
unlikely and/or impossible surveillance techniques as well as the
currently known methods.

  Beyond the mere technology itself, one must consider the possibile
use of psychological manipulation of individuals and groups into a
specific mindset that, combined with an analysis of the individual's
natural psychological profile, can enable a surreptitious entity to
move the individual toward patterns or processes which will make
the technological tools of identity and information analysis more

 For example, take the fictitious case wherein an individual is prone
to using only two different remailers, say, for instance, the remailer
at c2net and the remailer at
 Suppose that the remailer at c2net was being monitored surreptitiously
by an agent who had access to their system, but either had no way to 
access messages encrypted to the remailer, or their efforts to monitor 
the remailer seemed to be thwarted at times by another, unknown entity
with access to the system.
  The surreptitious agent could arrange to have the c2net remailer shut
down under some pretext, and seed the monitored individual's private
email, mailing lists, and newsgroups with subtle pointers/suggestions
as to the reliability/security, etc., of another remailer which was
more securely under the agent's control, say, for instance, a remailer
  After the monitored individual has begun using the remailer at, then the agent would proceed to do the same thing in regard
to the remailer at, and another remailer controlled by the
agent or associates of the agent, say, for instance the remailer at

  The agent is now in a postion to have the majority of the monitored
individual's communications vulnerable to identity, information and
traffic analysis, and thus will have an enormous amount of information
to work with should the individual occasionally spread their anonymous
communications through remailers that the agent may have less complete
access to.
  If we suppose that the agent also is able to manipulate the monitored
individual into sending the agent email that is encrypted to several
recipients, including the agent or the agent's associates, then we see
that the agent now has an even broader database of known information
which can be analyzed to provide clues as to the identity of and the
information sent by others who communicate with the individual who is
being monitored.

  This fictitious example, if it came to pass, would serve to provide
information to the agent which could be used to more effeciently 
target those who would be subjected to more restricted forms of
surveillance, such as monitoring of the physical signals given off
by their computer, keyboard, and monitor.
  All in all, the small, warm-blooded creature is correct in implying
that one should always keep a shotgun by their computer, in the firm
knowledge that the dogs of war do not always bark to announce their

> Greets to all my friends in domestic surveilance.

  And greets to all of my friends who are watching your friends.

Anonymous ReMonger

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