Secure remailers, was Race Bit: C

[Steve Schear]

>At 04 Sep 1996 15:21:54 -0800, jim bell wrote:
>Perhaps the most ominous part of making "use of encryption to thwart an
>investigation" illegal is _not_ that remailer operators might be prosecuted,
>but that they might NOT be prosecuted in a deal where (in exchange for not
>being prosecuted) they continue to operate the remailer, "cracked" or
>sabotaged so that they share all the info with the cops.  While even that
>won't make chained remailers totally useless, eventually suspicions of such
>a crack will surface, which will help sabotage the credibility of all
>remailers,
>not just the ones that have been "stung."
>

Yes, that is why there needs to be a move to place all 'critical' portions
of remailers and other important servers inside trusted hardware which is
highly resistant to compromise.  All access to sensitive information (e.g.,
keys) inside these modules should require multiple parties in several
countries (not just the operator of the server) to cooperate.  Properly
structured (such controls could effectively thwart law enforcement
compromise.



PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61  81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9
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