Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?

[jim bell]

At 09:44 PM 11/7/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote:
>At 5:12 PM -0800 11/7/96, jim bell wrote:
>>accessible to the common man?  Suppose, say, the approval of one million
>>citizens was the only thing necessary to have an assassination legally
>>accomplished?   Or, more likely in practice, the vote of a million citizens
>>was interpreted as a kind of terminal veto over that particular politician
>>or government employee, who would have to resign or face the (lethal)
>>consquences!  In that case, assassinations wouldn't be seen as bad, they'd
>>be the natural consequence of a politician who overstays his welcome and
>>ignores numerous warnings.
>
>Nothing in any version of AP I have seen makes any stipulation that the
>payment is "one person, one vote."

That's because my hypothetical was intended to reflect a very non-AP 
situation, although maintaining the assassination/resignation angle.  The 
issue was whether people would see political assassination as being 
desirable or undesirable.  Conventional wisdom is that it's undesirable.  On 
the contrary, I speculated that to a great extent, the desirability of it 
depends somewhat on who is getting killed (or forced to resign) but also 
whether or not the average citizen has a say in selecting the target.*

Unlike AP, which seems (to a few people, at least; not me!) to have a 
problem that "any" arbitrarily small number of people could buy a hit, the 
hypothetical alternative I presented at least requires a million people to 
agree.  If we assume there are 180 million adults in the US, for example, 
and assuming that the votes are limited to adults, letting 1 million people 
make such a decision is somewhat akin to giving 0.6% of the population veto 
power over the rest's attempts to manipulate (regulate, tax, etc) them.  
This isn't as good, in my opinion, as "pure" AP, but it would be far better 
than what we have now.  

I contend, but I can't prove, that if you give the ordinary citizen a say in 
the matter, and also if you ensure that the target always has the option of 
resignation, at that point this could turn into a very popular system that 
is seen as being the norm.  There would be little sympathy for politicians 
who resist; just as there is little sympathy now for a politician who, 
despite losing the election, barricades himself in his office and refuses to 
turn over power to the winner.  "It's just not done!"



*  A few years ago, I recall reading a study where test subjects were asking 
to individually perform some task requiring thought and concentration, but 
were exposed to loud irritating music.  One half of the subjects had no 
control over the music, the other half could turn it off if they wanted to.  
It turned out that merely having control over the music made people feel 
better about the situation, EVEN IF they _didn't_ choose to exercise that 
control by turning the music off!   If this effect worked in the political 
arena, the ability to bump off (or force to resign) an official would make 
people feel better about the government, even in situations where they 
didn't exercise this option.  This might make you think that nothing might 
happen, until you realize that the officialdom will have to adjust to the 
new reality as well, and they'll just have to (in this hypothetical) get 
used to the fact that one million people could bounce them out on their 
collective asses...or worse.

Jim Bell
jimbell at pacifier.com