Quickremail v1.0b

[Lance Cottrell]

At 3:36 PM 5/28/96, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote:
>From:   IN%"matts at pi.se"  "Matts Kallioniemi" 28-MAY-1996 06:08:28.40
>
>>Why would anyone set up a remailer at Lance's (or Sameer's) machine?
>>They have remailers running already. If the thugs break root and obtain
>>one remailer key from a machine, they probably get all the keys on that
>>machine, compromising all the remailers in one single attack. Or am I
>>missing something? Is there any benefit of multiple remailers on a machine
>>where root is running his own remailer?
>
>        Well, the advantages are: A. I get Lance's help more quickly in setting
>up this one, so I can later go to other machines (preferably out of the
>country) and set things up the same way there (getting Mixmaster from an
>out-of-US source, of course); and B. supporting the efforts of Sameer, Lance,
>et al by paying them some money. While multiple ISPs are certainly
>preferable (to avoid one rubber-hose (e.g., law enforcement) breaking from
>getting everything), your argument assumes that all the machines at a given
>ISP are linked together such that if one is broken, the rest are - which
>isn't very good from a security standpoint, so I'd hope it _isn't_ the case.
>
>        Thanks,
>        -Allen

In addition, it is more remailers which need to be shut down to bring the
remailer system down. At this point I think we need to think of robustness
against shutdowns in our threat models, in addition to the usual
considerations of traffic analysis. With all the shutdowns, the most
immediate need is for more remailers.

        -Lance

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Lance Cottrell   loki at obscura.com
PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server.
Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available!
http://www.obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com

"Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra.  Suddenly
it flips over, pinning you underneath.  At night the ice
weasels come."
                        --Nietzsche
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