Remailers & liability

[Matts Kallioniemi]

At 23:28 1996-05-27 -0700, Greg Broiles wrote:
>If I have some idea who the remailer operator is, and
>they are root, I feel like I learn something if the operator says "My system
>doesn't log traffic." If the operator isn't in a position to know (because
>they're not root) or if I don't have a reason to trust them, I assume the
>remailer is logging traffic. And a remailer that logs traffic may be more
>dangerous than no remailer at all, because the amount of security provided
>is illusory. 

One benefit of non root / anonymous remailers is deniability. When the
police come knocking on root's door, root can say that he didn't know about
the kiddie porn remailer and he will shut it down asap. It will be hard to
prove that he had intent to run a remailer (assuming that remailers are
outlawed, like they are in France?).

A remailer that logs traffic is still useful because it will take the enemy
some time and money to get the log. With plenty of remailers in your chain,
that's plenty of time and money, and hopefully at least one remailer isn't
keeping logs.

Matts