Are remailers designed to be knocked down?

[Alan Bostick]

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The Scientology wars are spilling over into alt.usenet.kooks again, and
Keith Henson had this odd thing to say.  I thought Cypherpunk discussion
of Keith's thesis would be interesting.


hkhenson at netcom.com (Keith Henson) wrote:

> henry (henri at netcom.com) wrote:

> : if the remailers are merely toys, capable of being knocked
> : down like dominoes by some fringe-cult of psychopathic dimwits,
> : it's better to find that out now than wait for a situation
> : where someone's life or death could be determined by the 
> : security of remailer-chaining and encryption against a 
> : determined opponent.
> 
> Ah, but the remailers are *designed* to be knocked down.  The
> are not expected to last if they are being used for serious 
> causes.  But the package for doing another one and getting it
> hooked into the network is easy to install--even in a user
> act.  Knocking out a remailer will usually halt the effort to
> get back at the person/persons who were spilling the beans.
> Social factors involved here.  If any of you would like to 
> help, offer to run a remailer for a while.  Consider it a 
> temporary civic duty.  Keith Henson
> 
> 

Alan Bostick               | "The thing is, I've got rhythm but I don't have
mailto:abostick at netcom.com | music, so I guess I could ask for a few more 
news:alt.grelb             | things." (overheard)
http://www.alumni.caltech.edu/~abostick

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