Opiated file systems

[Adam Back]

Bill Frantz <frantz at netcom.com> writes:
> At  1:30 PM 7/16/96 -0700, Jim Gillogly wrote:
> >"Deranged Mutant" <WlkngOwl at unix.asb.com> writes:
> >>A problem with a c'punk-style encrypted fs with source code and wide 
> >>distribution is, of course, that attackers will KNOW that there is a 
> >>duress key.
> >
> >Good point.  This suggests a design desideratum for any such system should
> >be that the user may choose not to have a duress key, maintaining
> >semi-plausible deniability for those who choose to have one.
> 
> Perhaps a user settable number of duress keys with different behavior for
> each of them?

I'm not sure what you had in mind for differing behaviours (were you
thinking nuking of data variety?), but I think the option for multiple
hidden file systems may be a feature some people would want.

However, I think it would greatly reduce an individuals plausible
deniability of there existing a 2nd hidden file system, if they admit
to a 1st hidden file system.  They have admitted that they are willing
to play the duress key game, so what's to say they haven't done it
again.

Adam
--
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