Transforming variable- to fixed-length keys

Deranged Mutant WlkngOwl at unix.asb.com
Sat Jul 6 14:15:29 PDT 1996


On  7 Jul 96 at 1:47, pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote:
[..]
> I've run into a problem in writing a general-purpose n-byte input to m-byte
> output transformation function.  What this does is take an arbitrary-length
> user key and transform it to a fixed-length encryption key (for example an
> entered passphrase into a 112-bit triple-DES key).  The constraints on memory
> usage are:
>  
> - The input (user) key can't be altered (you can't change data passed in by the
>   caller)
> - The user key can't be copied to an internal buffer (it can be of arbitrary
>   length, and is sensitive material so shouldn't be copied elsewhere)
>  
> In other words there's no temporary storage available apart from what's
> provided in the output key.  This is almost always a different length from the
> input key.
>  
> Some other constraints are:
>  
> - The transformation must be algorithm-independant (it shouldn't, for example,
[..]
> - The transformation must be able to be iterated to make a password-guessing
>   attack harder to perform.

Hmm. What about the following:

  Use a constant (non-weak) key for a cipher (perhaps the hash of 
  the passphrase under certain circumstances?)

  For iteration-0, CFB (or some other feedback mode)-encrypt the
  passphrase from the input buffer   to the output buffer (assuming the
  library doesn't require that the plaintext and ciphertext be in the same
  buffer)

  For following iterations, repeatedly CFB-encrypt the buffer,
  using a counter in data bytes.

This method could use hash algorithms in MDC or Luby-Rackoff forms
as well as block ciphers (and perhaps some stream ciphers).

Another method might be to seed a PRNG similar to that used in PGP 
2.x with the passphrase, have it stir the bytes a number of times, 
and then use the output as the key:

  randPoolAddBytes(passphrase, passlen);
  for(i=0;i<iterationCount;i++) randPoolStir();
  randPoolGetBytes(key, keylen);

> Here's my initial approach, if anyone has any comments to make on this or knows
> of a better way to do it, please let me know.
[..]
> The first stage in the key hashing prepends the length of the string as a
> big-endian 16-bit count to the user key:
>  
>     +------+-------------------------------------------------------+
>     |Length|                      User Key                         |
>     +------+-------------------------------------------------------+
>  
> The aim of the hashing is to reduce this variable-length input string to a
> fixed-length key appropriate to the encryption algorithm being used.  This is
> done by treating the user encryption keys as circular buffers and repeatedly
> hashing chunks of the user key and xoring the result into the output buffer.
[..]
> Since the input to the hash function is much larger than its output, a
> significant amount of the user key affects each chunk of the encryption key.
> The size of each "chunk" is determined by the hash function being used.  For
> example with the MD4 hash function, 64 bytes of user key affect each 16 bytes
> of encryption key.
[..]

Questions: Are you using the previous chaining-variables/hash for 
each successive chunk?  How do you pad passphrases that are smaller 
than the minimum input for a hash function?



Rob.
 
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        AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl at unix.asb.com>
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