Guerilla Internet Service Providers

[Jon Lasser]

On Mon, 1 Jan 1996, Lucky Green wrote:

> At 15:14 1/1/96, Mike McNally wrote:
> >Lucky Green writes:
> > > But how many of them [ IP providers ] will be willing to forward
> > > certain newsgroups if doing so carries a mandatory 10 year prison
> > > term? Hint: count the number of  narcotics dealers that advertize
> > > in your local yellow pages.
> >
> >But an IP provider doesn't have to know that it's "forwarding" *any*
> >newsgroups; all it has to know is that IP packets are moving between
> >my PC and the outside world.  It doesn't have any way of knowing what
> >those packets contain and doesn't want to.
> 
> Some site in physical space has to host the nntpd, the ftpd, and the httpd.
> That site will be subject to search, seizure, and arrest and conviction of
> owner.
> 
> If you don't have a host, there won't be any packets to forward.

This is _exactly_ where the transnational nature of the Internet becomes 
successful, when combined with strong crypto. If the sites coming into 
your machine are encrypted, nobody outside of your system (perhaps only 
you) know that said newsgroups, websites, etc. are being hit. If the site 
they originate from is determined to be offshore, they can't stop the 
site. Probably. Subject, at least, to foreign cooperation or direct 
CIA/NSA involvement.

The potential for traffic analysis is the danger here. If an "FBI 
International Data Laundering Expert" testifies in court that said data 
came from a site known to be frequented solely by so-and-sos, all the 
strong crypto in the world won't stop the average jury from convicting you.

Carl Ellison (among others, I'm sure) has suggested various means of 
foiling traffic analysis among a group of trusted conspirators, using a 
token-ring-like routing scheme. I'm not completely convinced that it's 
robust enough, but a variation on it is probably adaptable.

The point-to-point nature of the internet is also its achilles heel, as 
far as traffic analysis is concerned... the troubles faced by traditional 
cypherpunk remailers, the generalized problem of anonymous message 
distribution, and such are the current limits of consideration on the 
list (as far as I'm thinking right now... I may be wrong).  However, the 
problem of, say, webservers collecting statistics on users, would be moot 
should it be possible for truly anonymous websurfing (I'm convinced that 
traditional http proxies have the same flaws as traditional cypherpunk 
remailers).

More work needs to be done on untracable, yet at least modestly 
efficient, truly anonymous routing, even in a system where many of the 
participants, and perhaps even one of the endpoints, is or is willing to 
"cheat."

Jon Lasser
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jon Lasser                <jlasser at rwd.goucher.edu>            (410)494-3072 
          Visit my home page at http://www.goucher.edu/~jlasser/
  You have a friend at the NSA: Big Brother is watching. Finger for PGP key.