Guaranteed snake-oil, er, privacy...

[aba at atlas.ex.ac.uk]

geeman at best.com writes:
>	The 
>        posting(s) concern an extremely easy to use, unbreakable system 
>        for encrypting all user sensitive data going out over Internet.
>        As a reference to its unbreakability, I refer you to an 
>        article by Paul Leyland on Internet at:
>
>               http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/otp.html
>
>        Mr. Leyland refers to some problems, which our PCX 
>        system addresses and resolves.

Some corrections: I (Adam Back) wrote the www page you refer to, the
attribution to Paul Leyland <pcl at oucs.ox.ac.uk> on that page is
refering to his implementation of a OTP in 1 line of C which I
included with permission:

main(i,c)int*c;{for(c=fopen(c[1],"r");i=~getchar();putchar(getc(c)^~i));}

>        Mr. Leyland refers to some problems, which our PCX 
>        system addresses and resolves.

Neglecting the misattribution, some comments on IPG's claims are in
order.  My page mentions that OTPs are provably secure:

: "OTPs are provably unconditionally secure"

BUT, I also go to great pains to make clear that the security of OTPs
rests critically on the true randomness of the PAD:

: <H3>Generating OTPs</H3>
: 
: It can't be stressed enough how important it is to have a truly random
: OTP.  Just using the <TT>random()</TT> function provided with C
: libraries is nowhere near good enough, these typically have a seed of
: one 32 bit word, so that even if you used the millisecond of your
: clock as a seed the whole system could be broken with a brute force
: keysearch of all possible seeds.  In cryptographic terms a 32 bit
: keyspace is tiny, and would take a negligble amount of compute time to
: break.
: 
: <P>
: 
: Basically if you use pseudo-random number generators they are going to
: be the weak point in the system, unless you have external input like a
: radio-active decay card, or timings of the milliseconds between
: keystrokes with proper entropy estimation as used by PGP.

I'm sure everyone reading understands ad nauseum about OTPs etc, but I
would like to take the opportunity to distance myself from any claims
being made by IPG, and to state categorically as the author of the www
page quoted that I do not agree with IPG interpretation of what one
can legitimately call a secure OTP system.

I think (and this has been pointed out repeatedly to POTP in the past)
that you would go a lot further if you made realistic claims, and used
standard nomenclature.

If you have a new stream cipher using a PRNG, say so, publish the
algorithm for peer review, and go from there.  It is the calling it
something which it is not which generates criticism out of hand.
People look no further.  I'd suggest replacing marketing at IPG with
some one who can at least sound convincing.  As lots of people have
said: publish the algorithm.

Adam