Telnet-ietf: AUTH, ENCRYPT

[Name Withheld by Request]

Heads up:
	A discussion is starting up on the telnet-ietf list re: adding
message integrity checking to option negotiation, so it can't be hacked
with an active attack to defeat, for example, the AUTH and ENCRYPT options.
Highlights:
	- Authentication and encryption are (should be) orthogonal.
	- The "default" encryption should be something stronger than DES
	  OFB, which supposedly was chosen to accomodate dog-slow PCs.
	- Negotiation for non-authenticated, non-encrypted connections has to
	  be protected, too, to prevent attacks.

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