NetScape's dependence upon RSA down for the count!

[Don Stephenson]

I haven't read the SSL spec for a while but my understanding was that 
the server passed it's public key to the client via a certificate 
signed by a mutually trusted certificate authority (i.e., Verisign).

How would the filter be able to forge such a certificate ?

- Don



> From jbass at dmsd.com Sat Sep 30 16:47:11 1995
> Date: Sat, 30 Sep 95 16:39:57 -0600
> From: jbass at dmsd.com (John L. Bass)
> To: www-security at ns2.rutgers.edu, cypherpunks at toad.com
> Subject: Re: NetScape's dependence upon RSA down for the count!
> 
> >   jbass at dmsd.com writes:
> >    > client ->       filter                          Client sends packet with K(c)
> >                 filter ->       Server          filter forwards packet with K(f)                filter       <- Server          Server sends encrypts with K(f)
> >    > client       <- filter                          filter re-encrypts with K(c)
> >    >
> >    > As the protocol progresses the filter also uses the master key,
> >    > and follows the renegotiation as the master key expires.
> > 
> > Yeah, but in order for this to work, the fake server needs to know
> > netscape.com's private (secret) key, no?
> > 
> > -jon
> 
> No ... the public part of any server private key is held by the filter
> and not returned to the client. The client only encrypts with public
> keys provided by the filter. The Server only encrypts with public keys
> provided by the filter. The filter has cleartext of the entire session.
> 
> John
> 
>