Another Netscape Bug (and possible security hole)

[John Lull]

On Fri, 22 Sep 1995 09:47:35 -0400, herbs at interlog.com (Herb Sutter)
wrote:
 
> Don't just look at this bug, though... check ALL your static buffers and
> include code to check for overflow writes.  For example, if Netscape is
> written in C or C++ and the above code uses strcpy(), you could change
> strcpy() to strncpy() everywhere (and then set the last char to null in case
> strncpy() didn't).  Your programmers will know what I mean.

Better yet, ban both strncpy and strncat.  Replace them with
differently-named routines (strbcpy and strbcat?) that, given a buffer
length, are GUARANTEED to always give you a properly terminated string
that (including the terminator) does not overflow the specified
buffer.

Even better, use a good string class that does all this automatically
all the time.