NYT on GAK

[John Young]

   The New York Times, September 11, 1995, p. D7.


   Technology / Peter H. Lewis

   On The Net. Privacy for computers? Clinton sets the stage
   for a debate on data encryption.


   In terms of its ability to raise the nation's blood
   pressure, the debate over data encryption has not yet
   reached the same levels as gun control.

   But last week the Clinton Administration appeared to set
   the stage for an equally divisive debate over the degree to
   which businesses and individuals have the right to keep
   secrets when using telephones, computers and other forms of
   electronic communications.

   In two days of public hearings last week in Gaithersburg,
   Md., home of the National Institute of Standards and
   Technology, the Administration introduced its long-awaited
   proposals to relax restrictions on the export of
   cryptographic software.

   The Administration drew a line in the virtual sands of
   cyberspace, signaling that it is willing to permit
   Americans to put stronger cryptographic locks on their
   electronic data only if a spare key to those locks is made
   available on demand to law-enforcement agencies.

   There looms the conflict. Although the debate is about
   export controls the "export" issue is irrelevant in today's
   era of global electronic networks. Placing a common privacy
   program on an Internet computer in Austin, Tex., is
   effectively no different from sending a shrink-wrapped copy
   of the program to Moscow.

   The real issue is how much privacy the Government is
   willing to allow its own citizens, and the latest word from
   the Clinton Administration is that the right to electronic
   privacy, like the right to bear arms, is not absolute.

   Cryptography is the science of secret writing. In this
   digital era, it applies not just to notes, but also to
   telephone calls, money transfers, bank and credit card
   records, electronic mail, faxes and other computer files.

   The Clinton Administration's goal is to allow Americans to
   use the strongest possible cryptographic technology, while
   at the same time preserving the ability of law-enforcement
   agencies to perform court-authorized wiretaps as part of
   the effort to catch drug dealers, terrorists, child
   pornographers and other miscreants.
             
   In other words, it favors strong cryptography, but not too
   strong.

   The strength of cryptographic software is measured by the
   length of the software key necessary to encode and decode
   a message. The longer the key, the harder it is for an
   unauthorized user to decipher the message.

   In recent years, the Government has generally permitted
   Americans to export cryptographic software with key lengths
   up to 40 bits. Experts say that 40-bit keys are secure from
   casual snooping, but will fall quickly to a determined
   codebreaker.

   Last week, after more than a year of intense analysis, the
   Government introduced what it said was the best possible
   compromise.

   Under the new policy, companies can export encryption
   algorithms using 64-bit keys, which are much more secure,
   but only if spare keys are given to "escrow agents" who
   would make them available to lawenforcement agents under
   standard legal procedures, similar to legal wiretaps
   authorized by a judge. Otherwise, the 40-bit limit
   continues to apply.

   Such a "key escrow" scheme is anathema to many privacy
   advocates who fear Government abuses. The Government first
   proposed a key escrow system with its so-called Clipper
   Chip, a technology that failed to win acceptance even as a
   voluntary standard.

   The new scheme is somewhat more palatable than Clipper. Key
   escrow is still unpopular with American computer and
   software companies, which say it prevents them from
   competing against foreign companies that have no similar
   constraints, and with many multinational corporations,
   which say it prevents them from working with foreign
   companies that do not especially care for the idea of Uncle
   Sam holding the keys to their data banks.

   "If this was intended to be any sort of compromise, I don't
   think it achieved its end," said Whitfield Diffie, a Sun
   Microsystems enginePs who attended the meetings. "I didn't
   see anybody who was enthusiastic."

   Raymond G. Kammer, deputy director of N.l.S.T., suggested
   that the hearings last week were intended to elicit public
   comment, and that the Administration's final position on
   cryptographic policy were still under analysis.

   But the emergence of key escrow issues at the N.l.S.T.
   proceedings suggests that key escrow is emerging as a
   nonnegotiable demand by some factions of the Clinton
   Administration, especially the Justice Department and the
   Federal Bureau of Investigation, led by Louis Freeh.

   "If this fails," said a figure familiar with the
   Administration's thinking on the proposed change in
   cryptographic policy, "it's going to lead to a very
   divisive debate. And the irony, for libertarians who oppose
   key escrow, is that if it fails, I am convinced that Louis
   Freeh cannot be true to his job without proposing domestic
   controls on data encryption."

   "He's not going to give up without a fight, and neither is
   the Justice Department," said the figure, who spoke on the
   condition he not be identified.

   Others say they do not think the Clinton Administration has
   yet arrived at a concrete position, even after more than a
   year of study and debate. "I don't think it's a final
   offer," said John Gilmore, an engineer at Cygnus Support,
   a computer company in Mountain View, Calif. "It looks to me
   like a weak strawman, a first offer, a proposal to dance."

   The question is whether American citizens and businesses
   have the patience to wait for the music to start. And the
   issue may be moot, anyway because the Internet is no more
   controlled by the United States than is the United Nations.

   "The Internet Architecture Board has specifically decided
   to ignore export controls in designing the security
   infrastructure for the next generation of Internet
   protocols," Mr. Gilmore said. "The Internet of 1998 will
   provide automatic, secure, and fully private communication,
   without key escrow, internationally."

   In other words, the Internet community is already planning
   to jump over the new line in the sand drawn last week by
   the Administration. Cryptogrophy that is stronger than the
   Government's proposed system will be built into the
   Internet by a dozen countries, and American companies and
   individuals would be foolish not to use it.

   At that point, millions of Americans will come into direct
   conflict with Government policy, and the popular
   gun-control bumper sticker may be replaced by one that says
   "If cryptography is outlawed, only outlaws will have
   cryptography."

   [End]