ASN.1 and Kerberos version 5

[Allen B. Ethridge]

>I don't think that the concept of ASN.1 is as bad as Jeff makes out. If it
>worked
>then ASN.1 would be very very usefull. But is just plain don't.
>
>ASN.1 is worse than useless, it means that a very good idea is rendered
>unusable
>because of a baddly botched implementation.
>

I'm not familiar with ASN.1 except for the occasional short piece in various
books.  But i was under the impression that it was similar to the language used
to define TCAP and ROSE standards.  These standards are reasonably well defined.
I've gotten to the point where i get annoyed when working with protocols that
treat everything like abitrarily organized bits and bytes (like NA Cellular
protocols and PGP).

So, would use of the language used to define TCAP and ROSE applications be
a possibility?  I've occasionally thought about developing such a protocol
for PGP.

        allen