How can e-cash, even on-line cleared, protect payee identity?

[Lucky Green]

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In article <199510260424.OAA12383 at sweeney.cs.monash.edu.au>,
jirib at sweeney.cs.monash.edu.au (Jiri Baum) wrote:


> What you'd really want is for Alice to pay for the new coins in ecash.

Right.

> I'm wondering whether a "coin-changer" would be easier or harder to
> set up than a "bank" (from regulatory point of view).

I don't think it would be any easier to set up. Harder perhaps, since its
sole purpose is money laundring. However, if there are several Ecash
currencies there is a legitimate need for Ecash currency arbitration. Who
is to stop the following protocol?

US Ecash -> Swedish Ecash
Swedish Ecash -> US Ecash

The resulting coins are no longer traceable unless the repayer cooperates.
The repayer (or in this case currency arbitrator) keeps of course a
percentage at each transaction. No different than a Casa de Cambio. It can
be set up anywhere and even be done anonymously. I am working on an
implementation.
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