JP vs Homer

[Jeff Licquia]

>     We are capable of controlling mail bombs, for instance, in the
>following way:
> 
>     Take an incoming message, capture From: line.  Strip header.  MD5 body.
>Add to sorted table [From: MD5(message) date].  Check for repetition of
>first two fields.  If reps = 1, forward message.  If reps = 2, send message
>to From:  "Possible error.  Two copies of message <message> received."  If
>reps = 0 mod 5, send letter to postmaster at From:.  "Possible mailbomb or
>spam.  <reps> copies of <message> received from <From:> at your site in the
>past week." Clear table of entries more than a week old every midnight.
> 
> 
>     If all remailers did this, then no matter where the net was entered,
>the messages would be rejected.  And spammers/bombers would be spamming/
>bombing their own postmaster.  Probably a bad idea.  If not all did it,
>then add special handling to hit remailer-operator at .  This would encourage
>the operator to auto-magically handle the spam-bomb himself.

This works only if one assumes that the exact same message is posted using
the exact same path.  Granted, it would probably be effective for novice
spammers.

Consider a premail/chain type script and a cleartext spam message.  The
script is executed once every five minutes, say.  When it runs, it creates a
new random path through the remailers, adding encryption wrappers for each
hop.  Your spam detector would miss this one completely unless your remailer
was used as the terminal remailer for a significant number of spams.  More
significantly, the MD5 hashes of each message would be different even if the
same path were used more than once because the PGP session key would be
different (again, unless your remailer would be the terminal remailer in the
particular path that repeated).