Another problem w/Data Havens...

[Paul J. Ste. Marie]

At 05:05 PM 1/17/95 -0700, Ben.Goren at asu.edu wrote:
> ... That's the main reason why I like my idea of having a trusted encryptor.
>Nobody's suggested that the current timestamp operators would be in Deep
>Doo-Doo if they timestampped some piece of thoughtcrime; why should
>somebody who encrypts be any different? ...

Quite possibly the timestampers would be in trouble, the risk for them is 
the same as the risk for the remailers and the DH operators.  As long as 
some piece of info is considered to be a thought-crime, everyone who accepts 
info from a wide range of sources is at risk.

> ... The service could even be advertised as a different form of timestamping
>(or notarizing). Not only do you get the file back signed, but you get it
>back encrypted and signed. ...

That would still be a useful service, however, but it does transfer the risk 
from the DH operator to the encryptor.  Since he isn't leaving evidence on a 
hard drive, his window of vunerability is somewhat less.

    --Paul J. Ste. Marie
      pstemari at well.sf.ca.us, pstemari at erinet.com