Solution for US/Foreign Software?

David A Wagner daw at boston.CS.Berkeley.EDU
Wed Dec 6 17:25:52 PST 1995


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In article <199512062229.RAA16714 at universe.digex.net>,
Scott Brickner <sjb at universe.digex.net> wrote:
> 
> I agree.  It does bring to mind an idea, though.  Netscape builds an
> exportable system by choosing a random 128 bit number and then just
> including 88 bits of it in plaintext.
> 
> This means one of two things.  Either there's a field which holds the
> "key", but the export version stores 88 bits plain + 40 bits cipher,
> and knows this structure, or there's a field which holds the 128 bit
> enciphered key, and a second field which holds the 88 bits of plaintext
> key.
> 

It's the former (in SSL v2.0).

I looked into this, because the former version can be vulnerable to
related-key attacks, if not done right.  SSL v2.0 does it right.
(In particular, SSL v2.0 hashes both the 88 bit salt + 40 bit secret
to get all the cipher keys.)

> 
> In the former, the patch would be more significant, but still possible.
> You'd disable the "write the plain" part and extend the "decode the
> cipher" part to decode all 128 bits --- probably just a loop test.
> 

(And you'd have to change the cipher type from RC4-40 to RC4-128.)

Or write a local proxy to convert from RC4-40-salted to RC4-128.
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