On the crime bill and remailers

[Eric Hughes]

   Black Unicorn <unicorn at access.digex.net> writes:
   >But they are so targeted to prevent GOVERNMENT 
   >observation and intercepts, that they just plain look bad.

   I strongly disagree with this.  Anonymous remailers as presently constructed
   will be almost completely ineffective against any significant government
   attempts to surveil email traffic.

Is this the national security part of government, or the law
enforcement part of government?  Certainly the national security
apparatus has the technical means to defeat the current remailers,
but does the FBI or (even more unlikely) the local cops?

True, the FBI could ask for a data tap on the connections to a
remailer, but they would have to know how to do it, first, and in any
case it would be very expensive.  Compatible remailers spanning the
globe could be argued evidence of an attempt to thwart law enforcement
access by internationalization.  Certainly remailers hinder law
enforcement, if not actually prevent it.

And in the end, it's a court that decides, not a military tribunal.
Uni's argument is worth examining and does not fall down on its face.

Eric