From bart at netcom.com  Sat Oct  1 02:19:53 1994
From: bart at netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 94 02:19:53 PDT
Subject: Friendly, neighborhood NSA...
In-Reply-To: <199410010522.AA01650@metronet.com>
Message-ID: <199410010919.CAA11989@netcom7.netcom.com>


> 
> iiti.doc.gov
> /pub/newitems/ii_inventory/app_projs/library
> ==================================================
> IITF APPLICATIONS PROJECT INVENTORY

    Of course the final "i" in "iiti" is a typo, the address is:
     iitf.doc.gov:/pub/newitems/ii_inventory/app_projs/library 

    btw: in the file "doe" there I found this of perhaps cp interest:

DESCRIPTIVE DATA:
PROJECT:  Database of Scientific Mathematical Software  
LEAD AGENCY/ORGANIZATION:  Department of Energy
CONTACT NAME:  Dan Hitchcock 
PHONE #: (301) 903-6767
          e-mail:  hitchcock at er.doe.gov
LEVEL OF EFFORT:
START DATE:
COMPLETION DATE:  Ongoing

DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT:
Netlib -  Data Base of Scientific Mathematical Software to
provide state-of-the-art numerical software to internet users. 
Contains many of the most useful and sophisticated numerical
analysis software packages available without fee. Purpose is to
provide an easy exchange mechanism for researchers and users of
numerical software.





From prig0011 at gold.tc.umn.edu  Sat Oct  1 02:43:33 1994
From: prig0011 at gold.tc.umn.edu (prig0011 at gold.tc.umn.edu)
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 94 02:43:33 PDT
Subject: New T-Shirt Offer
Message-ID: <2e8d1b0a2ea4002@gold.tc.umn.edu>


Well, summers gone, fall is here, and I'm sufficiently caught up with all
my projects to go ahead with <insert drum roll here>

A New Cypherpunks t-shirt offer!

The shirt:
==========

Printed in white, on a heavyweight black t-shirt.

Front:

              CYPHERPUNKS
     Putting the NSA out of business

Back: (with permission from TC May)


             Crypto Anarchy
       encryption, digital money,  
 anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms,
      zero knowledge, reputations, 
   information markets, black markets, 
        collapse of governments.

(I'll post gifs of the front and back as soon as I can convert the files to 
soda.berkeley.edu)

Whats the deal?
===============
Cost of the shirts are US $12 each (plus $2 for postage). This offer runs 
for 3 weeks (until October 21st). I'll be taking orders until then, and 
expect to start shipping approximately 1 to 2 weeks later. I expect to 
have all shirts in the mail no later than November 15th, just in time for 
Christmas :)

Where can I get one?
====================

Send a Check or Money Order (no cash, please) to:

Kevin Prigge
3638 19th Ave So
Minneapolis, MN 55407

Please specify what size shirt you want (S, M, L, XL, or XXL).

Any questions can be sent to prig0011 at gold.tc.umn.edu

Any flames can be directed to /dev/null





From mikecap at WPI.EDU  Sat Oct  1 07:47:38 1994
From: mikecap at WPI.EDU (Michael V. Caprio Jr.)
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 94 07:47:38 PDT
Subject: NII calendar...
Message-ID: <199410011447.KAA13193@bigwpi.WPI.EDU>



Here's the latest schedule of events... looks like the only public
meeting left is on the 27th.

What the heck is the National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee?  (see Oct. 17-19)

Any brave cypherpunks in the area of "lecture room B" feel like
venturing into the den of the enemy and reporting?  NIST is lecturing
to the Committee on Applications and Technology... is that a
congressional thing?  Might there be a chance it'll appear on C-span?

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Schedule of Upcoming Public Events

September 14:  Telecommunications Policy Committee
            Department of Commerce
            3:45 p.m. - 5:00 p.m., Room 1414

October 11-13: Interchange '94
            Renaissance Hotel and Washington Convention Center
            Washington, D.C.
            (Co-sponsored by the GITS Working Group, the
            Federation of Government Information Processing
            Councils, Public Technology Inc., and the State
            Information Policy Consortium)

October 17-19: National Information Infrastructure Symposium
            U.S. Naval War College
            Newport, Rhode Island
            (Co-sponsored by the President's National Security
            Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) and the
            Office of Science and Technology Policy)

October 27: Committee on Applications and Technology
            National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
            Lecture Room B
            10:45 a.m. - 11:45 a.m.


-----
Mike




From adam at bwh.harvard.edu  Sat Oct  1 08:25:54 1994
From: adam at bwh.harvard.edu (Adam Shostack)
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 94 08:25:54 PDT
Subject: Friendly, neighborhood NSA...
In-Reply-To: <199410010522.AA01650@metronet.com>
Message-ID: <199410011525.LAA26350@bwh.harvard.edu>


| LEAD AGENCY/ORGANIZATION:  NSA
| CONTACT NAME:  Norma Davila   
| PHONE #:  301/688-7353

| The "Digital Librarian" links together the libraries where
| information of any type (books, texts, pictures, audio, video,
| multi-media, etc.) is stored to the librarians who assist the
| users in navigating through these storehouses of knowledge.  This
| project brings these ideas to the desktop by allowing a user to
| gain access to any number of information sources, independent of
| the originating development of the sources.  The information
| sources can be anything from databases to online reference
| materials to online training materials.  The user interacts with
| these sources through one common interface.
|----
| Out of the kindness of it's heart, the NSA is going to build us all a nice,
| new, improved WWW!
| 
| Isn't that just *too* kind of them?
| 
| I wonder why I have this feeling I'd better not turn my back on them.....

	I'd be suprised if they did this without releasing source.  As
soon as they release source, we can drop real encryption into things.
Much as we dislike them, the NSA is *very* good at sorting through and
dealing with huge quantities of data.  ("Its in their nature.")  If we
can take advantage of this, and get a WWW design that is relatively
secure, then thats great.  All we'll need to do is remove the calls to
skipjack(), and replace them with calls to IDEA(). :)

	The NSA is not some huge monolithic enemy.  It is a teaming
multitude of enemies.  Like any other government agency, we need to
tale the good and discard the rest.

Adam





From merriman at metronet.com  Sat Oct  1 10:50:12 1994
From: merriman at metronet.com (David K. Merriman)
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 94 10:50:12 PDT
Subject: IIT*F* collection
Message-ID: <199410011749.AA19118@metronet.com>


I've just uploaded a rather eclectic collection of text files to the Cpunks
site at csua.  They're in an MSDOS .zip file NII.ZIP.  Some of the files in
the IIT_F_ directories had duplicate filenames, but differing contents. The
file is about 1M, unzips to about 3.5M (I was there for a while, okay? :-)

Minutes of hearings, reports, project summaries like the the Friendly
Neighborhood NSA I posted, and more.

There's some scary stuff in there - like the report of the first IITF public
meeting in Albuquerque has only *one* instance of the word "privacy" :-(

Dave Merriman
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Finger merriman at metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints.
Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender.  PGP preferred.
Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to
*love* Big Brother.






From hfinney at shell.portal.com  Sat Oct  1 10:56:50 1994
From: hfinney at shell.portal.com (Hal)
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 94 10:56:50 PDT
Subject: Technical Remailer Analysis.
In-Reply-To: <199410010435.AAA10221@ducie.cs.umass.edu>
Message-ID: <199410011756.KAA17377@jobe.shell.portal.com>


"Louis Cypher" writes:

>The attack on the reordering remailer is simple. The attacker sends a 
>stream of marked messages through the remailer.  After the waiting 
>messages have been flushed out, any incoming real message will be 
>flushed out of the remailer before more arrive, allowing it to be 
>uniquely identified coming and going.  The defense against this is to 
>only check the group and send excess messages after a time delay. This 
>delay should be the typical time for n real messages to arrive. A 
>mixing of approximately n messages is ensured by this process. If 
>there is no attack, then the mixing is not quite as good as keeping a 
>group of 2n messages.

Good point.  There is a related attack which Chaum pointed out in his
1981 CACM paper: the attacker intercepts and keeps a copy of an incoming
message, then later re-sends it.  This one will go to the same place and
by repeating this multiple times we can figure out where the original
message went.

>[Interesting math deleted]

>The second issue for consideration is:
>Given a web of perfect remailers, how easy is it to identify 
>corespondents? Tim has been asking this one for a while.
>[...]
>The probability of a 
>given pair of corespondents in a given tick is
>	f^2
>The probability of a pair of corespondents occurring m times in n 
>ticks is
>        m
>p= 1 - Sum [(f^2)^i (1 - f^2)^(n-i) n! / (i! (n-i)!)]
>       i=0

If I follow this, the attack is something like, every time Alice sends
a message Bob receives one.  Observing this happening over a period of
time we conclude they are communicating.  Could this be defeated by
sending dummy messages so that Alice sends exactly 10 messages every day?
Then the fact that Bob receives messages on some day can't very well
be associated with Alice.

Hal





From GERSTEIN at SCSUD.CTSTATEU.EDU  Sat Oct  1 11:19:26 1994
From: GERSTEIN at SCSUD.CTSTATEU.EDU (ADAM GERSTEIN, _THE_ MACGURU)
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 94 11:19:26 PDT
Subject: What privacy issues to discuss.....
Message-ID: <941001141830.2025f38e@SCSUD.CTSTATEU.EDU>


Fellow C'punks-
	I work for my school as a resident advisor, and we have to have
two programs every semester. One of them is supposed to be educational,
and I think I want mine to be about privacy issues, since it's such a
hot topic and not that many of the folks in my school seem to care about
Big Brother.
	What I want from you guys is pointers to papers I can use as
references, but stuff that's easy to explain to Joe/Jane College student.
	I would also like input as to how you folks think I should do it.
Should it be a discussion group, or should I just talk and then answer 
questions? I think a discussion group might be better, but I'm not sure.

	All input is welcome,
		adam

-=-=-=-=-=-=-
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3

mQBPAi3NGo0AAAECAMOrXrau7Kp80+mjsCwqU3tpM1uFZKG9lVlBpMFgo3tPwBPb
JHJlP1L+1Jpj27NtFNhlDgFhTAueBPvdAmUopWUAEQEAAbQQQWRhbSBKLiBHZXJz
dGVpbg==
=6d6B
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
-=-=-=-=-=-
God's last message to his creation:
	"We apologize for the inconvenience"
				-D. Adams






From tcmay at netcom.com  Sat Oct  1 11:44:32 1994
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 94 11:44:32 PDT
Subject: Technical Remailer Analysis.
In-Reply-To: <199410011756.KAA17377@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <199410011844.LAA16070@netcom15.netcom.com>


Hal wrote:

> Good point.  There is a related attack which Chaum pointed out in his
> 1981 CACM paper: the attacker intercepts and keeps a copy of an incoming
> message, then later re-sends it.  This one will go to the same place and
> by repeating this multiple times we can figure out where the original
> message went.

Thanks to Louis Cypher and Hal Finney for discussing this. Our
remailers are, as several of us have discussed, at a primitive level
of security...in fact, most of the security is illusory and would
collapse under serious scrutiny.

Here are some fixes to consider, as I see them. Chaum, in his Feb.
1981 paper on Untraceable E-Mail (Comm. of the ACM) remains the key
paper, though some of the later DC-Net papers also deal with such
attacks (under the rubric of "collusion" and "flooding" types of
attacks).

Sorry for the format, as I'm using the tools I use for the FAQ.

157.3.  Some possible fixes:

	157.3.1.  remailers can recognize duplicates and agree not to
remail them, or to remail them off in different directions (adding their own 
hop-wrappers)

	157.3.2.  digital postage helps a bit, as the attacker at
least has to spend money

	157.3.3.  (If the inner layers of a message each have some
digital money, or a "one-use" coupon, then an attacker who copies and resends
the whole message is effectively double-spending and this should be detected.
Most simply, the "use once" coupon will only allow one passage through the
remailer.)

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo at toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay






From nowhere at chaos.bsu.edu  Sat Oct  1 11:52:54 1994
From: nowhere at chaos.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 94 11:52:54 PDT
Subject: REMAIL: changes to chaos remailer
Message-ID: <199410011842.NAA29444@chaos.bsu.edu>


     I have made several changes to remailer at chaos.bsu.edu:

	1.  From: line changed from Anomymous <remailer-admin at chaos.bsu.edu>
	    to Anonymous <remailer at chaos.bsu.edu>.

	2.  Reply-To: line added that says remailer-admin at chaos.bsu.edu.

	3.  Errors-To: line added that says nobody at chaos.bsu.edu.

     These changes do not affect nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu [yet.]

     Remember, for information about the remailers, finger 
remailer at chaos.bsu.edu or send a message to remailer-help at chaos.bsu.edu.

Chael

-- 
Chael Hall, nowhere at chaos.bsu.edu




From jgostin at eternal.pha.pa.us  Sat Oct  1 13:50:42 1994
From: jgostin at eternal.pha.pa.us (Jeff Gostin)
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 94 13:50:42 PDT
Subject: Think you're a hacker, eh?
Message-ID: <941001161042U9rjgostin@eternal.pha.pa.us>


Bill Baker <bakerw at butler.sidewinder.com> writes:

> 
> Well, the only thing the pseudohackers seem to be able to do is
> forge-cancel postings that make them feel bad.  So here it is again,
> with some extra data at the bottom.
     Maybe I missed the beginning of this thread (I've been remiss in my
reading!), but what the heck is going on here? It sounds interesting, but
I'm rather clueless. Anyone care to comment? (And no, I've got no live IP,
so there's no worries about hacking from me.)

                                        --J
--
======  ======    +----------------jgostin at eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+
  ==    ==        |           BOYCOTT SEA QUEST DSV... ask me why.          |
  ==    ==  -=    |                 PGP 2.[3a|6] Key Available              |
====    ======    +---------------------------------------------------------+





From jya at pipeline.com  Sat Oct  1 13:56:51 1994
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 94 13:56:51 PDT
Subject: EFFy Wiretap Win?
Message-ID: <199410012056.QAA11171@pipe3.pipeline.com>



EFF what say you about this?


Excerpts from WSJ, September 30, 1994, p. B5

Bill Would Ensure
Law Enforcement
Is Able to Tap Wires

By Mary Lu Carnevale

Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal

 WASHINGTON - The House Judiciary Committee cleared
a bill that would require telephone companies to
ensure that their networks remain accessible to law
enforcement wiretaps.

 But key lawmakers agreed to changes aimed at
appeasing local phone companies. The modifications
largely spell out that phone companies won't be
forced to pay to modify their existing networks to
comply with the measure. They are expected to be
included in the bill before it goes to the House
floor, possibly as early as Tuesday.

 A similar measure sailed through the Senate
Judiciary Committee earlier this week on a 16-1
vote. Though little time remains in the current
Congress, the legislation could squeak through.

* * *

 The agreement, details of which are being ironed
out, also aims to protect individuals' privacy
rights; prevent phone companies or law-enforcement
agencies from installing or ordering unnecessary
upgrades; and ensure that the changes have the
least possible effect on phone rates and
phone-company efforts to build advanced
communications networks.

 The legislation is separate from the Clinton
administration's controversial "Clipper Chip"
proposal that would have mandated an encryption
standard for computer and communications equipment.
That failed proposal would have let law-enforcement
agencies decipher any calls or messages that had
been encoded.

-------------------
END





From merriman at metronet.com  Sat Oct  1 13:57:19 1994
From: merriman at metronet.com (David K. Merriman)
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 94 13:57:19 PDT
Subject: What privacy issues to discuss.....
Message-ID: <199410012056.AA12128@metronet.com>


>Fellow C'punks-
>	What I want from you guys is pointers to papers I can use as
>references, but stuff that's easy to explain to Joe/Jane College student.

ftp.csua.berkely.edu /pub/cypherpunks/papers  :-)

>	I would also like input as to how you folks think I should do it.
>Should it be a discussion group, or should I just talk and then answer 
>questions? I think a discussion group might be better, but I'm not sure.
>

Split the difference: explain some of the details and such to them, and then
let them work it out.  Might help to use something like a phone bill to
point out how data is collected that could easily be used by any kind of
oppressive regime. It's my understanding (possibly in error :-) that
European nations do *not* provide the level of detail in their telephone
bills that we do here; the theory being that if who someone calls is
unknown, then it makes any effort to do a guilt-by-association and witchhunt
more difficult.

Dave Merriman
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Finger merriman at metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints.
Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender.  PGP preferred.
Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to
*love* Big Brother.






From mg5n+ at andrew.cmu.edu  Sat Oct  1 14:45:15 1994
From: mg5n+ at andrew.cmu.edu (Matthew J Ghio)
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 94 14:45:15 PDT
Subject: Technical Remailer Analysis.
In-Reply-To: <199410010435.AAA10221@ducie.cs.umass.edu>
Message-ID: <UiXRUby00awUMFMl48@andrew.cmu.edu>


Hal Finney wrote:

> If I follow this, the attack is something like, every time Alice sends
> a message Bob receives one.  Observing this happening over a period of
> time we conclude they are communicating.  Could this be defeated by
> sending dummy messages so that Alice sends exactly 10 messages
> every day?  Then the fact that Bob receives messages on some day can't
> very well be associated with Alice.

This attack can be defeated if both Alice and Bob are running remailers.
Then their correspondence is hidden in the 100 messages a day of
remailer traffic.  An observer can not tell wether the messages were for
Alice or Bob, or if they were for the remailer (assuming latency was
used) or if they were bit bucket messages.  Alice could even forward her
personal messages to a bitbucket (after saving a copy for herself) to
further increase security.  This is why everyone should be running a
remailer if they are concerned about their privacy.





From werewolf at io.org  Sat Oct  1 15:01:49 1994
From: werewolf at io.org (Mark Terka)
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 94 15:01:49 PDT
Subject: PGP 2.6.2??
Message-ID: <4LIZkOwsc-m8072yn@io.org>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I saw in alt.security.pgp recently that a new release of PGP was due in
the next few days from MIT. Evidently this version will handle the generation
of keys of up to 2048 bits.

Can anyone substantiate this?

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6

iQCzAgUBLo0lxaACeR4xBXv5AQGeIwTwqopgv3fV9Xkhk/kD319nsRRnN0lt3qON
omaQibl5mszx+dqnF2mxwxFLTVo2RuSEWq1YFbT6qmlrSR/Q0jvlbdSO6dnc/ufN
E4SwKl7NF5vgMVxIJzCP9M/dL4dOEY2xOMvtxG7u+Y7hEawVEKKnoiINE+xhEja8
6zZEB5ab5t5vfY5uRirY1GN8Zb7CT+rg2pMmfZyjhonk5dXMfs8=
=rH5c
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From nobody at shell.portal.com  Sat Oct  1 15:15:20 1994
From: nobody at shell.portal.com (nobody at shell.portal.com)
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 94 15:15:20 PDT
Subject: FWD: Safe-Tcl meets PGP!!!!
Message-ID: <199410012214.PAA14345@jobe.shell.portal.com>


This is from the Safe-Tcl list, which discusses a variant on tcl which
provides a "safe" subset of capabilities appropriate for letting incoming
mail bring in programs which can run autonomously on your computer.  I
mentioned this a few weeks ago and I've been on the list, although I haven't
looked at it in much detail.   Nathaniel Borenstein is very active in
the email community so this may turn out to be an influential technology.
He is using PGP to authenticate incoming messages and grant them more
privileges as appropriate:

> From hfinney at shell.portal.com Sat Oct  1 13:30:26 1994
> Date: Sat,  1 Oct 1994 15:44:46 -0400 (EDT)
> From: Nathaniel Borenstein <nsb at nsb.fv.com>
> Subject: Safe-Tcl meets PGP!!!!
> Cc: Marshall Rose <mrose at dbc.mtview.ca.us>,
>         John Ousterhout <John.Ousterhout at eng.sun.com>,
>         Philip Zimmermann <prz at acm.org>,
>         Trent Jaeger <jaegert at engin.umich.edu>
> 
> For over a year now, people have been asking me about extending safe-tcl
> to make use of digital signatures so that it can grant more powerful
> capabilities to programs from trusted senders.  My position all along
> has been "the hooks are there, but nobody has put all the pieces
> together." 
> 
> Today, after a message from Trent Jaeger that got me to thinking about
> this again, I took a new look at the situation, the first time I'd done
> so since becoming a regular PGP user.  It turns out -- amazingly enough
> -- that integrating these technologies was almost trivial!  I am happy
> to report that I now have integrated safe-tcl, pgp, the Internet Draft
> on MIME/PGP, and metamail, to do "the right thing".  Best of all -- you
> don't need to compile anything, the "hooks" all work. 
> 
> With this hack -- which works for all metamail-based mail readers, and
> which I expect will be easy to replicate for mhn and others -- I believe
> that Safe-Tcl now has the last bit of functionality where Telescript was
> previously superior.  We now have a completely open platform for sending
> around programs with differential capabilities dependent on the level of
> trust that the receiver has in the sender. 
> 
> Getting this working is trivial.  The assumption here is that you have a
> message with a content-type of "application/pgp; format=mime" which,
> when after its signature is checked (and after it is decrypted if
> necessary) contains a MIME entity with a content-type of either
> "application/safe-tcl" or "multipart/enabled-mail" (or some other
> multipart, with one of these two types nested inside it somewhere).  The
> basic scheme is to make the PGP-smart process put signature information
> into an environment variable, PGP_SIGNATURE, which is then checked by
> the safe-tcl interpreter.  Obviously, if you implement this, you want to
> make sure that you don't usually have PGP_SIGNATURE set in the process
> you use to read your mail! 
> 
> Anyway, to make this work there are two steps: 
> 
> 1.  In your .safetclrc file, add the following: 
> 
> catch { 
>     global SafeTcl_Services 
>     set SafeTcl_Services(authentication) $env(PGP_SIGNATURE) 
> } 
> 
> This will ensure that SafeTcl_Services is set properly if the
> PGP_SIGNATURE variable is set. 
> 
> 2.  Configure your mail reading tool so that it understands
> application/pgp and text/pgp, and sets the PGP_SIGNATURE variable.  For
> metamail-based systems, this consists of adding the following mailcap
> lines: 
> 
> text/pgp; decode-pgp %s ; needsterminal 
> application/pgp; decode-pgp %s  mime; needsterminal; \ 
>     test=test %{format}  = mime 
> application/pgp; decode-pgp %s ; needsterminal 
> 
> and then installing the "decode-pgp" script on your search path.  That
> script is a twelve-line shell script: 
> 
> #!/bin/csh -f 
> set viewprog=cat 
> if ($#argv > 1) then 
>     set viewprog=metamail 
> endif 
> set prog="pgp" 
> set infile=$1 
> pgp $1 -o /tmp/outputfile.$$ |& tee /tmp/shotputfile.$$ 
> set PS=`grep "Good signature" /tmp/shotputfile.$$ | sed -e "s/Good
> signature from user//"` 
> setenv PGP_SIGNATURE "$PS" 
> $viewprog /tmp/outputfile.$$ 
> rm /tmp/*putfile.$$ 
> 
> I think that's all you need to do!  If I'd known it was going to be this
> simple I would have done it months ago!  
> 
> As an example of how to USE this facility, you can put the following
> code in your .safetclrc: 
> 
> proc readsharedfile {nm} { 
>     set fd [open $nm r] 
>     set result [read $fd] 
>     close $fd 
>     return $result 
> } 
> catch { 
>   if {[regexp "nsb at nsb.fv.com" $SafeTcl_Services(authentication)]} { 
>       declareharmless readsharedfile 
>   } 
> } 
> 
> In this case, if you get a safe-tcl program that is signed (and,
> optionally, encrypted) by ME, and I'm on your keyring, it will be able
> to read any file YOU can read.  Otherwise, the readsahredfile procedure
> will be undefined in the restricted interpreter. 
> 
> Pretty cool, eh?  I encourage folks to try it out.  -- Nathaniel 
> 
> PS -- Assuming no problems turn up, I will probably put "decode-pgp" and
> the relevant mailcap entries in the next metamail release, and will
> build the few lines that set SafeTcl_Services based on PGP_SIGNATURE
> into the stuff done automatically in the next safe-tcl release.  --
> Nathaniel 





From vvallopp at eniac.seas.upenn.edu  Sat Oct  1 19:31:35 1994
From: vvallopp at eniac.seas.upenn.edu (Vinod Valloppillil)
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 94 19:31:35 PDT
Subject: Feds & Ecash!  Yikes!
Message-ID: <199410020231.WAA24339@blue.seas.upenn.edu>



Anyone have any enlightening info about this?????

<forwards deleted>

 Path: netnews.upenn.edu!news.amherst.edu!news.mtholyoke.edu!world!mkj
 From: mkj at world.std.com
 
 Everybody knows that Al Gore is hot on this "National Information
 Infrastructure" thing.  What many people may not fully appreciate --
 or at least, what I'm just discovering myself -- is the sheer enormity
 of the disaster going on as we speak, under the banner of the
 "Information Infrastructure Task Force" (IITF).  If you haven't
 already done so, I highly recommend an enlightening browse on the
 iitf.doc.gov site (ftp & gopher at standard ports, http at port 70).
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^
 (NOTE: Individuals in fragile health should always consult a physician
 before exposing themselves to detailed information about their
 government's activities.  Have you ever felt like an ant in the path
 of a steamroller?  YOU WILL ...)
 
 Although I've barely scratched the surface, I've already run across a
 number of items which might be of interest to folks here.  The DOE,
 for instance, reports that they are working on
 
         "Developing electronic cash systems that would maintain
         the privacy of individuals from merchants and banks, but
         would allow law enforcement to trace the flow of the
         electronic cash, given proper court orders."
 
 Other spectacularly dubious achievements include the report of the
 Privacy Working Group, which never once acknowledges any individual
 right to privacy, and in fact devotes most of their report to various
 ways to increase the "willingness" of the public to divulge personal
 data; and the draft report of the Intellectual Property Working Group,
 which with a straight face characterizes most current Internet
 activity as illegal, and then goes on to outlaw the rest of it, while
 blandly noting that the public will require "education" in these
 matters.  Also, of course, there are any number of hints of NII
 projects involving various intelligence agencies.

 Enjoy.
 
                                         ---  mkj
 
 
 


------------------------------+----------------------------------------------
Vinod Valloppillil            | Even if you're one in a million,
Telecom/MIS/Strategic MGMT    | there's still a thousand more of you  
Engineering/Wharton           | in China.....
vvallopp at eniac.seas.upenn.edu |  
------------------------------+----------------------------------------------
    "It is often easier for our children to obtain a gun than it is to find
a good school."   -- Joycelyn Elders
 
    "Maybe that's because guns are sold at a profit, while schools are
provided by the government."  -- David Boaz




From merriman at metronet.com  Sun Oct  2 06:49:01 1994
From: merriman at metronet.com (David K. Merriman)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 06:49:01 PDT
Subject: Cpunk list check
Message-ID: <199410021348.AA18413@metronet.com>


Haven't heard anything out of the list for a while, so just sending this out
to see if the list is still up.

Sorry.

Dave Merriman
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Finger merriman at metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints.
Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender.  PGP preferred.
Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to
*love* Big Brother.






From sandfort at crl.com  Sun Oct  2 12:59:43 1994
From: sandfort at crl.com (Sandy Sandfort)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 12:59:43 PDT
Subject: H.E.A.T. BEAT
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9410021244.A18132-0100000@crl2.crl.com>


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
                         SANDY SANDFORT
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

H.E.A.T. seeking C'punks,

                      "Code Name: Assassin"

In this episode, we see the return of H.E.A.T. archnememis, Neil
Strake.  (For those who haven't seen Acapulco H.E.A.T., Strake is
played by James Healing who does an extremely bad imitation of
bad (French?) actor, Louis Jordan.)

Anyway, forget the plot, it is even more Byzantine and illogical
than usual.  Suffice it to say that Strake shoots Mike--on Mike's
birthday--in an attempts to kill him.  Mike is in a coma through
most of the show.  The special cartridge has "Happy Birthday"
written on it; the bullet is inscribed, "Mike." (Wow, talk about
a bullet having your name on it.)

This episode was unique in the number of flashbacks and fantasies
it offers:

(1)   Mike goes into cardiac arrest on the operating table.
      Instead of having the currently popular NDE (near
      death experience; dark tunnel, white light, life
      review, etc.), Mike has a fantasy dream of fighting in
      a boxing match.  (He gets knocked out.)

(2)   When the Team fingers Strake, Ashley has a flashback
      to the previous Strake episode, thus practicing the
      parsimony of recycling.

(3)   Later at Mike's bedside, Ashley has another flashback
      about the two of them.  She then sweet talks him in
      his coma and tells him not to die.

(4)   After Ashley talks to him, Mike has another fantasy
      dream boxing match in which he KOs his opponent.

(5)   Finally, Strake goes to a disco for no apparent
      reason.  There he first dances with a beautiful
      quadroon.  He drops her for an Anglo-looking woman.
      During his dance with the Anglo, he fantasized that
      she is Ashley (he has an obsession with Ashley).  The
      dance is meant to be erotic, but it's just silly, even
      when they virtually fornicate on the dance floor.

Here are the crypto/techno elements:

(1)   The cartridge is a ".223 nitro express," which is made
      by only one man, a guy named Sabross.

(2)   Krissie uses the H.E.A.T. computers headquarters to
      "patch" into the surveillance camera system of the
      prison in which Strake is supposedly incarcerated.
      This takes her all of 10 seconds.

(3)   The person in prison is not Strake, but an imposter
      whose appearance has been altered by plastic surgery
      to look, sound and act just like Strake.

(4)   Strake plants a radio controlled bomb at Mike's
      "funeral" (don't ask), which the Team discovers in a
      sweep of the chapel.

There were several good lines in this episode.  In a face-to-face
encounter between Ashley and Strake, he says something about how
he sees the world and Ashley says, "Don't they call that
schizophrenia?"  To which he replies, "Only the people who get
paid to put a name on it, then get paid even more to cure it.

While Strake is putting his bomb together he opines, "I love the
smell of C4 in the morning."

During the funeral, Strake pulls out the radio detonator and
says, "One flick of my finger and you're all taco meat."  (Don't
laugh, have you ever eaten a taco in Mexico?)

There were tons of bikinis in the beech scenes (strangely, there
were only beautiful women on the beach).  The disco people looked
hot, and there was no Fabio!

Tune in next week--same H.E.A.T. channel, same H.E.A.T. time--for
the further adventures of Acapulco H.E.A.T.


 S a n d y

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~







From nobody at jpunix.com  Sun Oct  2 14:12:33 1994
From: nobody at jpunix.com (Anonymous)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 14:12:33 PDT
Subject: Nom de guerre public key
Message-ID: <199410022111.QAA03425@jpunix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I'm new at both remailing and PGP, but having read the Cyphernomicon
(OK, skimmed it) and various other FAQs, I haven't seen this issue
addressed:

I've created a pseudonym and a PGP key pair for that pseudonym.  Now,
how do I secure signatures for my public key, given the fact that (a)
to sign it, you should be sure that it really belongs to me, and (b) I
have no intention of revealing who "me" actually is?  You can't call me
on the phone, or meet me face to face, or do any of those other
standard practices for confirming the key before signing it.  But I
sure don't want to use an unsigned, untrusted public key, since I want
to make and keep a reputation and I can't risk someone spoofing my
public key.

=======================================================================
     Crim Tideson                     Privacy is its own justification.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
My public key:

- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6

mQCPAy51e6kAAAEEAMLIkYRAJqKnrQL7Xxmu7hNycUU06YZuR2i3WVxN9Jc6vnoF
i7gT6/u7zVI4gmZCTA6mF6SYEFeOiENHaz0wyBNe+8AOIgdaezUsPODMh7UC64k0
YVQTNOiPN9jQAnyCGjPrplSliWT4gHGC796whwJ8CFkwPdpQf6vOblMnt4MdABEB
AAG0DENyaW0gVGlkZXNvbg==
=pwyo
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6

iQCVAwUBLo3MxqvOblMnt4MdAQH0jwQAvzbd7b7KpcKdaeGzWUx8aav4WxWJWD9W
qwYaVF/WNFFg89+m0K8TztTEcc9QVz3wYvKz1ojOx7IOJl10ZUBXbXrChaDYhbKJ
YTU3QeOHN7o8VdzJ3o7z6lK9QqLZhhzQd4VgF9VxR++8LcBVS8AYaVWsfGLv7L2q
W+4h4FIR0GE=
=Vu2X
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From nobody at jpunix.com  Sun Oct  2 14:24:21 1994
From: nobody at jpunix.com (Anonymous)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 14:24:21 PDT
Subject: Nom de guerre public key
Message-ID: <199410022123.QAA03808@jpunix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I'm new at both remailing and PGP, but having read the Cyphernomicon
(OK, skimmed it) and various other FAQs, I haven't seen this issue
addressed:

I've created a pseudonym and a PGP key pair for that pseudonym.  Now,
how do I secure signatures for my public key, given the fact that (a)
to sign it, you should be sure that it really belongs to me, and (b) I
have no intention of revealing who "me" actually is?  You can't call me
on the phone, or meet me face to face, or do any of those other
standard practices for confirming the key before signing it.  But I
sure don't want to use an unsigned, untrusted public key, since I want
to make and keep a reputation and I can't risk someone spoofing my
public key.

=======================================================================
     Crim Tideson                     Privacy is its own justification.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
My public key:

- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6

mQCPAy51e6kAAAEEAMLIkYRAJqKnrQL7Xxmu7hNycUU06YZuR2i3WVxN9Jc6vnoF
i7gT6/u7zVI4gmZCTA6mF6SYEFeOiENHaz0wyBNe+8AOIgdaezUsPODMh7UC64k0
YVQTNOiPN9jQAnyCGjPrplSliWT4gHGC796whwJ8CFkwPdpQf6vOblMnt4MdABEB
AAG0DENyaW0gVGlkZXNvbg==
=pwyo
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6

iQCVAwUBLo3MxqvOblMnt4MdAQH0jwQAvzbd7b7KpcKdaeGzWUx8aav4WxWJWD9W
qwYaVF/WNFFg89+m0K8TztTEcc9QVz3wYvKz1ojOx7IOJl10ZUBXbXrChaDYhbKJ
YTU3QeOHN7o8VdzJ3o7z6lK9QqLZhhzQd4VgF9VxR++8LcBVS8AYaVWsfGLv7L2q
W+4h4FIR0GE=
=Vu2X
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From unicorn at access.digex.net  Sun Oct  2 14:34:12 1994
From: unicorn at access.digex.net (Black Unicorn)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 14:34:12 PDT
Subject: Cyphernomicon
Message-ID: <199410022134.AA01136@access2.digex.net>


Could someone give me a current pointer to the Cyphernomicon?


-uni- (Dark)


-- 
073BB885A786F666 nemo repente fuit turpissimus - potestas scientiae in usu est
6E6D4506F6EDBC17 quaere verum ad infinitum, loquitur sub rosa    -    wichtig!




From pfarrell at netcom.com  Sun Oct  2 14:44:50 1994
From: pfarrell at netcom.com (Pat Farrell)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 14:44:50 PDT
Subject: Cyphernomicon
Message-ID: <199410022144.OAA03965@netcom5.netcom.com>


Hi Uni,

look in ftp.netcom.com in /pub/tcmay for the original source.

Pat





From tcmay at netcom.com  Sun Oct  2 14:46:21 1994
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 14:46:21 PDT
Subject: Nom de guerre public key
In-Reply-To: <199410022111.QAA03425@jpunix.com>
Message-ID: <199410022145.OAA20902@netcom13.netcom.com>


Anonymous wrote:

> I'm new at both remailing and PGP, but having read the Cyphernomicon
> (OK, skimmed it) and various other FAQs, I haven't seen this issue
> addressed:

I'll be sure to put something in about this, though I thought I had.

> I've created a pseudonym and a PGP key pair for that pseudonym.  Now,
> how do I secure signatures for my public key, given the fact that (a)
> to sign it, you should be sure that it really belongs to me, and (b) I
> have no intention of revealing who "me" actually is?  You can't call me
> on the phone, or meet me face to face, or do any of those other
> standard practices for confirming the key before signing it.  But I
> sure don't want to use an unsigned, untrusted public key, since I want
> to make and keep a reputation and I can't risk someone spoofing my
> public key.
> 
> =======================================================================
>      Crim Tideson                     Privacy is its own justification.

Crim Tideson, you are who you say you are by the fact that you possess
the key yoy have just announced yourself with! Only you can sign
messages with the private key for which the public key produced a
valid signature.

We have no interest in your (alleged) physical identity. Maybe you are
a committee. Maybe you are an AI. Or a Zeta Reticulan.

Digital signatures have this wonderful property of being more
important than putative physical identity, such identity being vastly
easier to forge.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo at toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay






From tcmay at netcom.com  Sun Oct  2 14:48:12 1994
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 14:48:12 PDT
Subject: Cyphernomicon
In-Reply-To: <199410022134.AA01136@access2.digex.net>
Message-ID: <199410022147.OAA21047@netcom13.netcom.com>


Black Unicorn wrote:
> 
> Could someone give me a current pointer to the Cyphernomicon?
> 

Details are in the sig below.

--Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo at toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay






From iqg1550 at acf4.NYU.EDU  Sun Oct  2 15:55:05 1994
From: iqg1550 at acf4.NYU.EDU (iqg1550)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 15:55:05 PDT
Subject: archives
Message-ID: <9410022254.AA18179@acf4.NYU.EDU>


could someone please tell me where the CP list is archived -- if, in fact,
it is -- as well as the dates covered by any such archive
thank you very much

ira





From CCGARY at MIZZOU1.missouri.edu  Sun Oct  2 16:03:29 1994
From: CCGARY at MIZZOU1.missouri.edu (Gary Jeffers)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 16:03:29 PDT
Subject: list test
Message-ID: <199410022303.QAA29200@cygnus.com>


testing to see if list ok.





From bogus at no.return.address  Sun Oct  2 16:13:04 1994
From: bogus at no.return.address (Underdog)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 16:13:04 PDT
Subject: Technical Remailer Analysis.
Message-ID: <199410022312.TAA20726@ducie.cs.umass.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

From: Louis Cypher


Hal Writes:
>Good point.  There is a related attack which Chaum pointed out in his
>1981 CACM paper: the attacker intercepts and keeps a copy of an incoming
>message, then later re-sends it.  This one will go to the same place and
>by repeating this multiple times we can figure out where the original
>message went.

This raises a fundamental problem with current remailers. It is clear that
next generation remailers will have to encrypt all messages sent between
them, on top of any nested encryption of the message done by the
originator.

Timothy C. May Writes:
>157.3.  Some possible fixes:
>
>        157.3.1.  remailers can recognize duplicates and agree not to
>remail them, or to remail them off in different directions (adding their own
>hop-wrappers)
>
>        157.3.2.  digital postage helps a bit, as the attacker at
>least has to spend money
>
>        157.3.3.  (If the inner layers of a message each have some
>digital money, or a "one-use" coupon, then an attacker who copies and resends
>the whole message is effectively double-spending and this should be detected.
>Most simply, the "use once" coupon will only allow one passage through the
>remailer.)

If the remailers also batched messages to a given destination, or padded
outgoing messages before encrypting them, they would be far less
susceptible to this kind of attack. Re-encrypting the message with padding
(to some standard size) would prevent attackers from recognizing their own
messages in a flood attack, except by noting destination (which could be a
giveaway). Batching would do the same, but would also hide the number of
messages trashed or locally delivered. Neither of these does much against
the concerted "spam attack". I think in the end, remailers will need to run
something like encrypted links, sending a constant volume of data between
them, which would be random garbage when not a real message. This leaves
open the denial of service attack of sending more data per hour then the
link supports, therefore causing long queues at the remailers. Sigh, I
really need to get down to a library and dig up the Chaum articles I hate
to always reinvent the wheel.

While waiting for good digital postage, a substitute could be used. If one
added a "Msg-ID:" header similar to the Ghio remailer's "Cutmarks", which
contained a large random number, this number could be stored at the
remailer, and messages with the same ID simply send to /dev/null. This
would be simple to do with remailer chaining scripts like "premail".

Hal writes:
>If I follow this, the attack is something like, every time Alice sends
>a message Bob receives one.  Observing this happening over a period of
>time we conclude they are communicating.  Could this be defeated by
>sending dummy messages so that Alice sends exactly 10 messages every day?
>Then the fact that Bob receives messages on some day can't very well
>be associated with Alice.

Since I assumed that a typical user sends one message per day, Alice may
draw attention to herself through this mechanism. 10 messages is not
enough, it would leave some correlation. Alice needs to send at least one
message per tick (e.g. 48 in my example), in which case she shown 100%
correlation with all recipients always. There is no way to know that she is
sending to Bob, but I suspect she will be on a short list at the FBI unless
everyone else is doing the same (which violates my assumptions). If
everyone sent a message every tick, traffic analysis would be impossible.

Matthew J Ghio writes:
>This attack can be defeated if both Alice and Bob are running remailers.
>Then their correspondence is hidden in the 100 messages a day of
>remailer traffic.  An observer can not tell wether the messages were for
>Alice or Bob, or if they were for the remailer (assuming latency was
>used) or if they were bit bucket messages.  Alice could even forward her
>personal messages to a bitbucket (after saving a copy for herself) to
>further increase security.  This is why everyone should be running a
>remailer if they are concerned about their privacy.

I do not think that the "everyone is a remailer" idea works. At the assumed
one message per day, and an average message chain of 5 remailers, then only
5% of users can maintain remailers with a real traffic flow of 100 messages
per day. Other than that, this idea is functionally similar to Hal's.

Sending messages on to bit buckets is a nice idea. Assuming cutmarks, or
standard message sizes, and reordering are used, this is indistinguishable
from a remailer which just delivers the local mail, and also sends out
periodic junk messages to various bit buckets. As I mentioned in my
original message, this should be done anyway to ensure  complete mixing of
all messages within the web during any given tick.

                -Louis Cypher


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6

iQCVAwUBLo557qyHUAO76TvRAQFSJwQAmenSoAZAkOtGww9F/giy80AmJJk30I6D
y5Fp0d8fgNy3MiCnG6onlvvJdBShgonvsbKRF0r94cYtYgtnczK/rqmhIDyc/UB2
a0V55YRdb84YwGpGPmrFepH8yXdueEgQvUq5Fs1FV9jNtSAK9kK2G1+QmSVdq/Uy
pkRIf8iPbJA=
=xZdv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----







From sameer at c2.org  Sun Oct  2 17:11:58 1994
From: sameer at c2.org (sameer)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 17:11:58 PDT
Subject: The benefits of commercialness
Message-ID: <199410030009.RAA29060@infinity.c2.org>


	As you can see, the remailer running with a profit motive (or
at least a not-go-deeply-into-debt motive) is the most reliable.



Last ping: Sun 2 Oct 94 17:00:01 PDT
remailer  email address                        history  latency  uptime
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
c2       remail at c2.org                    **+-********    13:29  99.99%
wien     remailer at ds1.wu-wien.ac.at       ****#+**--#*    21:01  99.99%
chaos    remailer at chaos.bsu.edu           ***####**+##     2:54  99.99%
leri     remail at leri.edu                  ****#**#****     6:45  99.99%
portal   hfinney at shell.portal.com         **##*#+***#*     3:59  99.99%
ideath   remailer at ideath.goldenbear.com   +*****-*+- *  1:53:42  99.99%

=),
-- 
sameer						Voice:   510-841-2014
Network Administrator				Pager:	 510-321-1014
Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley		Dialin:  510-549-1383
http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest")			sameer at c2.org




From franl at centerline.com  Sun Oct  2 17:56:43 1994
From: franl at centerline.com (Fran Litterio)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 17:56:43 PDT
Subject: Nom de guerre public key
In-Reply-To: <199410022111.QAA03425@jpunix.com>
Message-ID: <FRANL.94Oct2201427@draco.centerline.com>


> I've created a pseudonym and a PGP key pair for that pseudonym.  Now,
> how do I secure signatures for my public key, given the fact that (a)
> to sign it, you should be sure that it really belongs to me, and (b) I
> have no intention of revealing who "me" actually is?

A signature on your PGP public key is a personal guarantee from the
person who signed it that she has first-hand knowledge that the key's
userid accurately names the person who physically possesses the key
(i.e., the signature validates the binding between userid and person).
But you do not have a binding between your userid and your person,
because your userid is a pseudonym, and a pseudonym is a name not
bound to a person.

Unless you reveal your pseudonym to someone and identify yourself
according to the rules of the PGP Web of Trust, you should not be able
to get signatures on your PGP public key.
--
Fran Litterio                   franl at centerline.com (617-498-3255)
CenterLine Software             http://draco.centerline.com:8080/~franl/
Cambridge, MA, USA 02138-1110   PGP public key id: 1270EA1D





From werewolf at io.org  Sun Oct  2 18:26:43 1994
From: werewolf at io.org (Mark Terka)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 18:26:43 PDT
Subject: List Down?
Message-ID: <YLgZkOwscMZ0072yn@io.org>


Is the list down or is there nothing to talk about? I think I've gotten
one message inthe last 36 hours.





From hugh at ecotone.toad.com  Sun Oct  2 18:45:21 1994
From: hugh at ecotone.toad.com (Hugh Daniel)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 18:45:21 PDT
Subject: ADMIN: Re: List Down?
In-Reply-To: <YLgZkOwscMZ0072yn@io.org>
Message-ID: <9410030141.AA26605@ecotone.toad.com>


  From now on please direct all such messages (as ~I am not seeing
anything, the list must be down...~) directly to the list operators
<cypherpunks-request at toad.com> or <postmaster at toad.com> insted of the
everyone on the list.
  The whole of the 1000++ folks who read/archive the list do not need
to see such 'noise'.

		||ugh Daniel
		Sometimes Postmaster
		hugh at toad.com





From schneier at chinet.chinet.com  Sun Oct  2 19:00:41 1994
From: schneier at chinet.chinet.com (Bruce Schneier)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 19:00:41 PDT
Subject: On Feistel Networks, S-Boxes, and Block Cipher Design
Message-ID: <m0qrchp-0002FQC@chinet>



   ON FEISTEL NETWORKS, S-BOXES, AND BLOCK CIPHER DESIGN


Claude Shannon defined the cryptographic principles of confusion
and diffusion.  Fifty years after this paper was written, these
principles are still the cornerstone of good block cipher design.

Confusion serves to hide any relationship between the plaintext,
the ciphertext, and the key.  Remember how linear and
differential cryptanalysis can exploit even a slight relationship
between these three things?  Good confusion makes the
relationship statistics so complicated that even these powerful
cryptanalytic tools won't work.

Diffusion serves to spread the influence of individual plaintext
or key bits over as much of the ciphertext as possible.  This
also serves to hide statistical relationships, and make
cryptanalysis more difficult.

Confusion alone is enough.  A cipher that consisted of a single
lookup table of 64 bits of plaintext to 64 bits of ciphertext
based on a key would be plenty strong.  The problem is that large
lookup tables require large amounts of memory to implement: 1020
bytes of memory for the above table.  The whole point of block
cipher design is to create something that looks like a large
lookup table, but with much smaller memory requirements.

The trick is to repeatedly mix confusion (with much smaller
tables) and diffusion in a single cipher in different
combinations.  This is called a product cipher.  Sometimes a
block cipher that incorporates layers of substitution and
permutation is called a substitution-permutation network, or even
a SP network.

Look back at function f of DES.  The expansion permutation and P-
box perform diffusion; the S-boxes perform confusion.  The
expansion permutation and P-box are linear; the S-boxes are
nonlinear.  Each operation is pretty simple on its own, but
together they work pretty well.

DES also illustrates a few more principles of block cipher
design.  The first is the idea of an iterated block cipher.  This
simply means taking a simple round function and iterating it
multiple times.  Two-round DES isn't very strong; it takes five
rounds before all of the output bits are dependent on all of the
input bits and all of the key bits.  Sixteen-round DES is strong;
32-round DES is even stronger.

Feistel Ciphers

Most block algorithms that have appeared in the literature are
Feistel Ciphers.  The idea dates from the early 1970s.  Take a
block of length n and divide it into two halves of length n/2:  L
and R.  Of course, n must be even.  You can define an iterated
block cipher where the output of the ith round is determined from
the output of the previous round:

        L_i = R_(i-1)
        R_i = L_(i-1) XOR f(R_(i-1),K_i)

K_i is the subkey used in the ith round, and f is an arbitrary
round function.

You've seen this concept in DES, Lucifer, FEAL, Khufu, Khafre,
LOKI, and others.  Why is it such a big deal?  First off, the
function is guaranteed to be reversible.  Because XOR is used to
combine the left half with the output of the round function, it
is necessarily true that

        L_(i-1) XOR f(R_(i-1),K_i) XOR f(R_(i-1),K_i) = L_(i-1)

A cipher that uses this construction is guaranteed to be
invertible as long as the inputs to f in each round can be
reconstructed.  It doesn't matter what f is; f does not have to
invertible.  We can design f to be as complicated as we please,
and we don't have to implement two different algorithms--one for
encryption and another for decryption.  The structure of a
Feistel network takes care of all this automatically.

Simple Relations

DES has the property that if E_K(P) = C, then E_K'(P') = C',
where P', C', and K' are the bitwise complements of P, C, and K. 
This property reduces the complexity of a brute-force attack by a
factor of two.  LOKI has complementation properties that reduce
the complexity of a brute-force attack by a factor of 256.

A simple relation can be defined as [KNU94]:

        If E_K(P) = C, then E_f(K)(g(P,K) = h(C,K)

where f, g, and h are simple functions.  By simple I mean that
they are easy to compte, much easier than an iteration of the
block cipher.  In DES, f is the bitwise complement of K, g is the
bitwise complement of P, and h is the bitwise complement of C. 
This is a result of XORing the key into part of the text.

In a good block cipher, there are no simple relations.  Methods
for finding some of these weaknesses are in [KWA91B].

No Weak Keys

In a good block cipher, all keys are equally strong.  Algorithms
with a small number of weak keys, like DES, are generally no
problem.  The odds of picking one at random are very small, and
it's easy to test and discard them.  However, these weak keys can
sometimes be exploited if the block cipher is used as a one-way
hash function.

Strength Against Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis

The study of differential and linear cryptanalysis has shed
significant light on the theory of good block cipher design.  The
inventors of IDEA introduced the concept of differentials, a
generalization of the basic idea of characteristics [LAI91B]. 
They argued that block ciphers can be designed in such a way to
be resistant against this attack; IDEA is the result of that work
[LAI91B].  This concept was further formalized in [NYB93],
where Kaisia Nyberg and Lars Knudsen showed how to make block
ciphers that were provably secure against differential
cryptanalysis.

Linear cryptanalysis is newer, and it is less clear what generic
design techniques will protect a cipher against linear
cryptanalysis.  Knudsen has made some progress, considering some
necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) criteria for what he
calls practically secure Feistel ciphers: ciphers that are
resistant to both linear and differential cryptanalysis [KNU94]. 
Nyberg introduced an analogy to the concept of differentials in
differential cryptanalysis in linear cryptanalysis [NYB94]. 
Other work that extends the idea of linear cryptanalysis can be
found in [PRE94A,KAL94B].

Interestingly enough, there seems to be a duality between
differential and linear cryptanalysis.  This duality becomes
apparent both in the design of techniques to construct good
differential characteristics and linear approximations
[BIH95,MAT95], and also in the design criteria for making
algorithms that are secure against both attacks [CHA95]. 
Exactly where this line of research will lead is still unknown.

S-Box Design

The strength of various Feistel ciphers--and specifically their
resistance to differential and linear cryptanalysis--is tied
directly to their S-boxes.  This has prompted a spate of research
on what constitutes a good S-box.

An S-box is simply a substitution: a mapping of m-bit inputs to
n-bit outputs.  Above I talked about a single lookup table of 64-
bit inputs to 64-bit outputs; that would be a single 64x64-bit S-
box.  A general S-box with an m-bit input and an n-bit output is
called a mxn-bit S-box.  S-boxes are generally the only non-
linear step in an algorithm; they are what give a block cipher
its security.  In general, the bigger they are the better.

DES has eight different 6x4-bit S-boxes.  Khufu and Khafre have a
single 8x32-bit S-box.  In IDEA the modular multiplication step
is effectively the S-box; it is a 32x32-bit S-box.  The larger
this S-box, the harder it is to find useful statistics about it
to attack [GOR83].  Also, while random S-boxes are usually not
optimal to protect against differential and linear attacks, it is
easier to find strong S-boxes if the S-boxes are larger.  Most
random S-boxes are nonlinear, nondegenerate, and have have strong
resistance to linear cryptanalysis--and the fraction that does
not goes down rapidly as the number of input bits decreases
[OCO91,OCO94,OCO94A].

The size of m is more important than the size of n.  Increasing
the size of n reduces the effectiveness of differential
cryptanalysis, but it increases the effectiveness of linear
cryptanalysis to a much greater degree.  In fact, if n >= 2m - m,
then there is definitely a linear relation of the input and
output bits of the S-box.  And if n >= 2m, then there is a linear
relation of only the output bits [BIH95].

Much of this work involves the study of Boolean functions.  In
order to be secure, the Boolean functions used in S-boxes must
satisfy specific conditions.  They should not be linear, nor
should they be close to linear [ADA90,NYB91,NYB93A].  There
should be a balance of zeros and ones, and no correlations
between different combinations of bits.  The output bits should
behave independently when any single input bit is complemented. 
These design criteria are also related to the study of bent
functions.

One property that seems very important is the diffusion of
information: how many output bits of an S-box change when some
subset of the input bits are changed.  This is called the
avalanche effect.  It's easy to impose conditions on Boolean
functions so that satisfy certain avalanche criteria, but
constructing them is a harder task.  The strict avalanche
criteria (SAC) guarantees that exactly half of the output bits
change when one input bit changes [WEB86].

A few years ago cryptographers proposed choosing S-boxes so that
the different distribution table for each S-box is uniform.  This
would provide immunity against differential cryptanalysis by
smoothing out the differentials in any particular round
[ADA92,DAW91A,DAW91,NYB91].  LOKI is an example of this
design.  However, this approach can sometimes aid in differential
cryptanalysis [BIH92B].  Actually, a better approach is making
sure that the maximum differential is as small as possible. 
Kwangjo Kim proposed five criteria for the construction of S-
boxes [KIM93A], similar to the design criteria for the DES S-
boxes.

Choosing good S-boxes is not an easy task, and there are many
competing ideas on how to do it.  Four general approaches can be
identified:

     Choose randomly:  It is clear that small random S-boxes are
     insecure, but large random S-boxes may be good enough. 
     Random S-boxes with 8 or more inputs are quite strong.  And
     even more strength is added if the S-boxes are both random
     and key-dependent.  IDEA uses both large and key-dependent
     S-boxes.

     Choose and test:  Some ciphers generate random S-boxes and
     then test them for the requisite properties.  See [ADA90]
     for an example of this approach.

     Man-made:  This technique uses little mathematics; S-boxes
     are generated using more intuitive techniques.  Bart Preneel
     stated that "...theoretically interesting criteria are not
     sufficient [for choosing Boolean functions for S-boxes]..."
     and that "...ad hoc design criteria are required" [PRE93].

     Math-made:  Generating S-boxes according to mathematical
     principles so that they have proven security against
     differential and linear cryptanalysis, and good diffusive
     properties.  See [NYB94A] for an excellent example of this
     approach.

There has been some call for a combination of he "math-made" or
"man-made" approaches [ROB94], but the real debate seems to be
between randomly-chosen S-boxes and S-boxes--whether created or
culled--that have certain properties.  Certainly the latter
approach has the advantage of being optimal against known
attacks--linear and differential cryptanalysis--but it offers
unknown protection against unknown attacks.  The designers of DES
knew about differential cryptanalysis, and the DES S-boxes were
optimized against it.  They did not seem to know about linear
cryptanalysis, and the DES S-boxes are very weak against it
[MAT95].  Random S-boxes in DES would be weaker against
differential cryptanalysis and stronger against linear
cryptanalysis.

On the other hand, random S-boxes may not be optimal against
known attacks but they can be made sufficiently large and
therefor sufficiently resistant.  And they are more likely to be
sufficiently resistant against unknown attacks.  The debate is
still going on, but my personal feeling is that S-boxes should be
as large as possible, random, and key-dependent.


[ADA92] C.M. Adams, "On Immunity Against Biham and Shamir's
     'Differential Cryptanalysis,'" Information Processing
     Letters, v. 41, n. 2, 1992, pp. 77-80.

[ADA90] C.M. Adams and S.E. Tavares, "The Structured Design of
     Cryptographically Good S-Boxes," Journal of Cryptology, v.
     3, n. 1, 1990, pp. 27-41.

[BIH95] E. Biham "On Matsui's Linear Cryptanalysis," Advances in
     Cryptology--EUROCRYPT '94 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag,
     1995, to appear.

[BIH92B] E. Biham and A. Shamir, Differential Cryptanalysis of
     the Data Encryption Standard, Springer-Verlag, 1993.

[CHA95] F. Chabaud and S. Vaudenay, "Links Between Differential
     and Linear Cryptanalysis," Advances in Cryptology--EUROCRYPT
     '94 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1995, to appear.

[DAW91A] M.H. Dawson and S.E. Tavares, "An Expanded Set of Design
     Criteria for Substitution Boxes and their Use in
     Strengthening DES-like Cryptosystems," IEEE Pacific Rim
     Conference on Communications, Computers, and Signal
     Processing, IEEE, Victoria, BC, Canada, 9-10 Mary 1991, pp.
     191-195.

[DAW91] M.H. Dawson and S.E. Tavares, "An Expanded Set of S-box
     Design Criteria Based on Information Theory and its Relation
     to Differential-like Attacks," Advances in Cryptology--
     EUROCRYPT '91 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1991, pp. 352-
     367.

[GOR83] J.A. Gordon and R. Retkin, "Are Big S-boxes Best?"
     Cryptography, Proceedings of the Workshop on Cryptography,
     Burg Feuerstein, Germany, March 29-April 2, 1982, Springer-
     Verlag, 1983, pp. 257-262.

[KAL94B] B.S. Kaliski and M.J.B. Robshaw, "Linear Cryptanalysis
     Using Multiple Approximations,"  Advances in Cryptology--
     CRYPTO '94 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1994.

[KIM93A]  K. Kim, "Construction of DES-like S-boxes Based on
     Boolean Functions Satisfying the SAC,"  Advances in
     Cryptology--ASIACRYPT '91 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag,
     1993, pp. 59-72.

[KNU94] L.R. Knudsen, "Practically Secure Feistel Ciphers," Fast
     Software Encryption, Cambridge Security Workshop
     Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1994, pp. 211-221.

[KWA91B] M. Kwan and J. Pieprzyk, "A General Purpose Technique
     for Locating Key Scheduling Weakness in DES-like
     Cryptosystems," Advances in Cryptology--ASIACRYPT '91
     Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1991, pp. 237-246.

[LAI91B] X. Lai, J. Massey, and S. Murphy, "Markov Ciphers and
     Differential Cryptanalysis," Advances in Cryptology--
     EUROCRYPT '91 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1991, pp. 17-38.

[MAT95] M. Matsui, "On Correlation Between the Order of the S-
     boxes and the Strength of DES," Advances in Cryptology--
     EUROCRYPT '94 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1995, to appear.

[NYB91] K. Nyberg, "Perfect Nonlinear S-boxes," Advances in
     Cryptology--EUROCRYPT '91 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag,
     1991, pp. 378-386.

[NYB93A] K. Nyberg, "On the Construction of Highly Nonlinear
     Permutations," Advances in Cryptology--EUROCRYPT '92
     Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1991, pp. 92-98.

[NYB94] K. Nyberg, "Provable Security Against Differential
     Cryptanalysis," presented at the rump session of Eurocrypt
     '94, May 1994.

[NYB94A] K. Nyberg, "Differentially Uniform Mappings for
     Cryptography,"  Advances in Cryptology--EURORYPT '93
     Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1994, pp. 55-64.

[NYB93] K. Nyberg and L.R. Knudsen, "Provable Security Against
     Differential Cryptanalysis," Advances in Cryptology--CRYPTO
     '92 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1993, pp. 566-574.

[OCO91] L. O'Connor, "Enumerating Nondegenerate Permutations,"
     Advances in Cryptology--EUROCRYPT '93 Proceedings, Springer-
     Verlag, 1994, pp. 368-377.

[OCO94] L. O'Connor, "On the Distribution of Characteristics in
     Bijective Mappings," Advances in Cryptology--EUROCRYPT '93
     Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1994, pp. 360-370.

[OCO94A] L. O'Connor, "On the Distributino of Chracteristics in
     Composite Permutations," Advances in Cryptology--CRYPTO '93
     Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1994, pp. 403-412.

[PRE93] B. Preneel, "Analysis and Design of Cryptographic Hash
     Functions," Ph.D. diss., Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Jan
     1993.

[PRE94A] B. Preneel and V. Rijmen, "On Using Maximum Liklihood to
     Optimize Recent Cryptanalytic Techniques, " presented at the
     rump session of EUROCRYPT '94, May 1994.

[ROB94] M.J.B. Robshaw, "Block Ciphers," Technical Report TR-601,
     RSA Laboratories, Jul 1994.

[WEB86] A.F. Webster and S.E. Tavares, "On the Design of S-
     Boxes," Advances in Cryptology--CRYPTO '85 Proceedings,
     Springer-Verlag, 1986, pp. 523-534.


From tcmay at netcom.com  Sun Oct  2 19:12:56 1994
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 19:12:56 PDT
Subject: Nom de guerre public key
In-Reply-To: <FRANL.94Oct2201427@draco.centerline.com>
Message-ID: <199410030212.TAA10713@netcom6.netcom.com>


Fran Litterio wrote:


> Unless you reveal your pseudonym to someone and identify yourself
> according to the rules of the PGP Web of Trust, you should not be able
> to get signatures on your PGP public key.

What are the "rules of the PGP Web of Trust"?

I've seen a couple of "BlackNet" public keys on the MIT Key Server,
and I doubt rather strongly that the creators of BlackNet(s)
identified himself or herself (or itself, even).

Tying public keys to physical persons is _one_ approach, but not the
only one. If fact, for a lot of intended uses of public key crypto,
multiple keys will be generated and discarded. Granted, they won't
necessarily ever appear on any of the main keyservers, but they might.

The "web of trust" models how we pass on advice, introduce others with
our recommendations, etc., but it is not a very formal thing. 

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo at toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay






From unicorn at access.digex.net  Sun Oct  2 19:30:41 1994
From: unicorn at access.digex.net (Black Unicorn)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 19:30:41 PDT
Subject: Impact of Free Strong Crypto (Essay of sorts)
Message-ID: <199410030230.AA22723@access4.digex.net>


If the below is cut off by your mailer or mine, please drop me a note and 
I shall send you a complete copy.

-uni- (Dark)


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Political Ramifications of Free Encryption Technology.


To me the Cypherpunks represent the drive to free technology from a 
regimented, collectivist, and centralized regulatory structure.  So deep 
does this inclination seem to run that even liberal programs that might 
extend the reach of high technology particularly communications and data 
storage or processing technologies, through social reform are looked at 
almost universally with distaste.  There is almost a disgust at the mere 
notion of Federal Government involvement in the development and 
distribution of technology.  (Reaction to Al Gore's programs are a 
demonstration of this attitude).  Some on the list would certainly 
disagree, feeling that government should take responsibility to promise 
equal access in the face of the amazing disparity selectively distributed 
technology would create, but I feel these are mere philosophical 
differences in methodology, and not major conflicts in goals.  In some ways 
this debate is so powerful and threatens to fill so much bandwidth that 
some Cypherpunks seem to resist any political content on the list.  
(Witness the many clashes about what the Cypherpunks list is really for, 
and whether political topics even have a place therein).  A treatment of 
the merits of Government involvement in distributional aspects of 
technology, or the level of regulation required or desired goes beyond the 
scope of this work.  I wish instead to focus on the likely institutional 
reaction to a Cypherpunk victory.  This necessarily requires a good deal of 
assumption on my part.  Probably also some assumptions that are likely to 
make as many people happy as upset.  I think the underlying analysis below 
is sound whatever the political persuasions of the reader.  That being said 
let it be known that I consider the following as a "Cypherpunk victory."

1.  Complete freedom of technology, particularly encryption technology, 
regulated only by market forces.  This implies the lack of import/export 
restrictions, and a complete absence of projects designed to limit 
technology, or to standardize it for nefarious ends like Clipper.

2.  A wide market of hardware and software products allowing, among other 
things, strong, transparent cryptography for voice, data, fax, cellular, 
and video communications.

3.  Active and profuse vendors of related applications of the above 
technologies, including among others, digital banking, and anonymous mail 
(in my use including video, voice, data, and true digital cash).

I think these are all possible (however likely or unlikely) within the next 
five years.

Many Cypherpunks will necessarily draw a "fall of modern government" effect 
from the above conditions.  Others will see the existence of a regulatory 
entity much lessened in importance and control than today.  Still others 
will predict little change at all.  Whatever your position, I think it is 
clear that government, like any entity, will seek to survive despite the 
above conditions.  I assume in my construct that the Federal Government has 
fought these points on all fronts (a safe bet in my view) but lost (a less 
likely scenario to me in the next five years).  Given these facts, how is 
government likely to adjust?  Surely not without a fight to survive even in 
the face of what many see as impending doom for revenue collection and law 
enforcement.

I have often commented that Cypherpunks see things about 6 months to 2 
years before the popular culture begins to catch the scents.  It is 
surprising to me then that the list (as far as I know) has been so stuck in 
the present with regard to the likely reaction to long term Cypherpunk 
goals.  Most political discussions deal either with the present Federal 
Government threat, (Clipper, Digitel, Information Superhighway) or with the 
long term promise of Cypherpunk technology, but not the future Federal 
Government response to said technology.  Partly I think this is 
attributable to the perception that the Federal Government is as much 
behind the times as popular culture.  Technically this is probably true on 
the whole.  (Dorthy Denning being short sighted enough to insist that law 
enforcement needs wiretap ability because they have always had such an 
ability.  Ms. Denning's similarly dense arguments based on statistics to 
the effect that since law enforcement has used wiretaps so often, they must 
be indispensable and thus must be preserved.  What Ms. Denning never 
mentions, either accidentally or with intent, are the alternatives).  But 
it is equally true that there is, or there appears to be, some foresight on 
the policy level as to the implications of the new technology on the long 
term.  (The Clipper proposal is either a entirely absent minded program 
which can never work because the goal really is a non-mandatory non-
regulatory standard creation, or it is an adept foot in the door coup.  A 
tour de force program in conjunction with Digitel, Information Highway, and 
NIST designed to preempt technology.)  So what if the Cypherpunks win?


How will the complete inability of law enforcement (Federal or Local) to 
conduct wiretaps impact collection?  Those who think that law enforcement 
will just have to go away might want to reconsider.  Instead I think that 
law enforcement will simply become much more intrusive as a response to the 
unavailability of easy interception via wiretapping.

Recently on the list it was pointed out that few if any serious ciphers 
have been cracked without a Human Intelligence component.  Indeed many of 
the later successes against the Enigma machines could be found in German 
operator laziness rather than pure analytical prowess.  One Signals 
Intelligence type mentioned that his job was made much easier by the 
propensity of the German communication officers he was responsible for to 
use obscenities for their Enigma keys.

Currently wiretaps are so popular not because they are indispensable but 
because a series of court decisions have made them the simplest, and 
cheapest method of Criminal Intelligence.  Cases like _Smith v. Maryland_, 
442 U.S. 735 (1979) have placed a fairly low burden on the law enforcement 
officials seeking to intercept telephone conversations, and almost no 
burden on those who wish to intercept call setup information.  It is no 
surprise then that they have become so frequently used in criminal 
investigation and are so often cited as well as jealously defended as 
critical.

Given the national anti-crime sentiment (even far left democrats seem to 
have given up on rehabilitation, and any astute politician who aspires to 
another term is terrified of being portrayed as soft on crime), the 
position that secure communications will solve the lack of oversight and 
intrusiveness of law enforcement conveniently ignores the constitutional 
"adjustments" that were made in the face of the national neurosis with the 
war on drugs.  Instead Federal and Local law enforcement will begin to rely 
on Human Intelligence as well as more intrusive site collection to work 
around the technologically intensive and prohibitively expensive Signals 
Intelligence in the new era.  Courts, tired of dismissing hundreds of 
otherwise legitimate looking cases, are likely to judicially erode the 
constitutional protections protecting citizens from search and seizure 
particularly with reference to an increased law enforcement reliance on 
more intrusive room surveillance equipment.  In the context of the Fourth 
Amendment's structure this becomes a particularly difficult problem.  The 
Exclusionary Rule provides for the rejection of evidence collected in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment (there is no effective civil remedy) but 
as many commentators have pointed out this is a particularly difficult 
thing for a judge to do.  Exclusionary Rule motions come in the context of 
a convicted criminal, who most often was fairly obviously guilty, but who 
would be released without the evidence in question.  Most of today's 
Exclusionary Rule law comes from drug cases as it became increasingly 
difficult in the late 1970's and early 1980's to overturn convictions where 
two kilograms of cocaine was discovered by a questionable search.  Will not 
this same judicial activism be used to expand law enforcement's freedom to 
use room bugs and other intrusive methodology in the face of the argument 
that wiretapping is impossible?  Similarly is it likely that law 
enforcement will begin to rely on Human Intelligence to a much greater 
extent.  Targeted political organizations will be infiltrated with a much 
greater degree of aggressiveness, perhaps even surpassing levels of the 
1960's.  Frustration in law enforcement inability to penetrate the more 
advanced criminal circles will probably result in very creative 
interpretation of the rules, if not an outright disregard for them, to 
secure convictions.

More alarming perhaps are the ramifications for banking transactions.  In 
the absence of an ability to monitor transactions electronically Human 
Intelligence will be forced to fill in the gaps, creating a great demand 
for informants within the banking and financial industries.  The SEC simply 
will be unable to function as it does today without electronic monitoring 
of transactions.  Instead brokerage firms, high profile investors and 
financial institutions are more likely to be attacked with Human 
Intelligence and informants, perhaps even outright theft of records.  The 
implications for even the moderate level investor are ominous.

Given the flexibility of constitutional interpretation demonstrated by the 
New Deal legislation, is it any mystery that the new law enforcement 
methodology will be supported by the courts, especially in the face of 
complete law enforcement breakdown?

The only real practical legal recourse would be a clarification to the 
courts by the legislature.  However, if the current anti-crime atmosphere 
endures it is highly unlikely that any legislator will go on record as a 
obstacle to law enforcement by checking the courts back.

The Cypherpunks must ask themselves how to address these issues, and 
recognize the potential political impact of high technology and the losing 
law enforcement battle to keep up.  Would a Cypherpunk victory merely be 
bypassed by a clever end run?  Is this a case of "Even when you win you 
lose"?


- -uni- (Dark)


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-- 
073BB885A786F666 nemo repente fuit turpissimus - potestas scientiae in usu est
6E6D4506F6EDBC17 quaere verum ad infinitum, loquitur sub rosa    -    wichtig!




From jamesd at netcom.com  Sun Oct  2 20:28:28 1994
From: jamesd at netcom.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 20:28:28 PDT
Subject: Mandatory Email verification
In-Reply-To: <9409301808.AA04195@moonlight.noname>
Message-ID: <199410030328.UAA23919@netcom8.netcom.com>


Ken Landaiche writes
> I have seen that
> any system a human can devise, another human can eventually break. 

False.  Most cryptographic algorithms these days are secure.

Windows NT is secure.

> This
> leads me to believe that eventually we will have to begin acting on our
> honor, 

Walking through a security hole on a computer is not necessarily
dishonorable, though many dishonorable things can be done once
you are through that hole.


> and provide severe consequences for dishonorable behavior. 

If "we" provide "sever consequences" then we are not relying
on honor, but on coercion.

I
> haven't finished working out what "honor" means in this social context.

So I see.

-- 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
We have the right to defend ourselves and our
property, because of the kind of animals that we              James A. Donald
are.  True law derives from this right, not from
the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state.                jamesd at netcom.com





From bogus at no.return.address  Sun Oct  2 20:32:58 1994
From: bogus at no.return.address (Underdog)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 20:32:58 PDT
Subject: Nom de guerre public key
Message-ID: <199410030332.XAA21506@ducie.cs.umass.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

From: Louis Cypher

>> A signature on your PGP public key is a personal guarantee from the
>> person who signed it that she has first-hand knowledge that the key's
>> userid accurately names the person who physically possesses the key
>> (i.e., the signature validates the binding between userid and person).
>> But you do not have a binding between your userid and your person,
>> because your userid is a pseudonym, and a pseudonym is a name not
>> bound to a person.
>
>Actually, this is not true.  A signature on a key is a personal
>guarantee from the signer that binds the user-id to the _KEY_, not
>necessarily a person.  The problem is validating that key<->userID
>binding in a pseuodnymous case.  For example, in the case of a real
>person, you can send me a message to "warlord at MIT.EDU" and later meet
>me in person, and I can verify that I received the message by
>responding in some appropriate manner.
>
>But you cannot perform this check for a pseudonymous identity, because
>there is no secure way to prove that that key really belongs to some
>identity.
>
>Just for an example, I am fairly certian that there is a single
>identity behind Pr0duct Cypher (speaking of PC -- I heard from you in
>a while), but it is difficult to securely obtain assurance of the
>binding behind the key and the keyid.
>

With a pseudonym, all a signature really says is that this is the key that
always goes with the posts signed by this nym.  Assuming there has not been
more than one key claiming to be the "real" nym, then after a while there
can be no doubt that the key and nym go together (which is all that was to
be proved). Personally, I sign nyms that have existed consistently for some
time. I have never distributed any of these signed keys, but see no harm in
doing so as long as the key's user-id field clearly indicates that the key
is a nym and not a person. A sig on a key by a notable like Tim May would
help keep new users from getting taken in my some interloper claiming to be
Pr0duct Cypher.

>> Unless you reveal your pseudonym to someone and identify yourself
>> according to the rules of the PGP Web of Trust, you should not be able
>> to get signatures on your PGP public key.
>
>Well, this isn't the case.  It is possible to set up a server that
>compares userID to mailID in some secure manner.  For example, there
>were some way to get a secure mail from a user to a server, and the
>server could verify the mail address, and then validate the mail
>address to pgp keyID.
>
>-derek

If I am trying to maintain a truly anonymous pseudonym, I am hardly likely
to allow to connect my key with an email address. All a sig on a
pseudonym's key means, is that is the key which signs posts from that nym,
not such a hard thing to demonstrate with enough empirical evidence.

                -Louis Cypher

P.S. I can be reached privately by leaving a message in
alt.anonymous.messages with my name in the subject line.


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Version: 2.6

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R8+s/HW8kH5uiXdV+NCv95OL7zBI4p9GiWBiphsfcEkKkhI1CiHXhcoDR6CIIfdO
MVe2HEASEng=
=Dfb5
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From tcmay at netcom.com  Sun Oct  2 20:42:32 1994
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 20:42:32 PDT
Subject: Impact of Free Strong Crypto (Essay of sorts)
In-Reply-To: <199410030230.AA22723@access4.digex.net>
Message-ID: <199410030331.UAA22756@netcom6.netcom.com>



A good essay by Black Unicorn (whose physical ID, by the way, is
unknown to us, despite his reputation and digsig). Just when some of
you thought the list was becoming dormant...

(I'll try to respond only to a handful of points, eliding the rest.)

Black Unicorn wrote:

> To me the Cypherpunks represent the drive to free technology from a 
> regimented, collectivist, and centralized regulatory structure.  So deep 
> does this inclination seem to run that even liberal programs that might 
> extend the reach of high technology particularly communications and data 
> storage or processing technologies, through social reform are looked at 
> almost universally with distaste.  There is almost a disgust at the mere 

Yes, it's quite amazing to me that what might be called the
"libertarian agenda" is so little disputed here. To be sure, many are
unhappy with mentions of guns or the like, and protest, but the core
ideas of voluntary interactions are seldom challenged.

This may be a good lesson for the larger political community: on
matters of personal and economic privacy, even modern liberals don't
favor an expanded role for the state.

...
> is sound whatever the political persuasions of the reader.  That being said 
> let it be known that I consider the following as a "Cypherpunk victory."
> 
> 1.  Complete freedom of technology, particularly encryption technology, 
> regulated only by market forces.  This implies the lack of import/export 
> restrictions, and a complete absence of projects designed to limit 
> technology, or to standardize it for nefarious ends like Clipper.

I think we almost have this won. There are so many degrees of freedom,
so many ways to move data, that attempts to control data flow seem
doomed. We can't stop lobbying, of course. (The FBI had a comment that
if Digital Telephony is delayed by two years--and this was said (by
Kelleher, I think, though I don't feel like grepping through my
archives to find the exact quote...it may be in the FAQ) in early
1994--that this delay would make it "too expensive" to ever try it
again...monkeywrenching the EFF's Wiretap Bill seems like a good goal
to me.)

> 2.  A wide market of hardware and software products allowing, among other 
> things, strong, transparent cryptography for voice, data, fax, cellular, 
> and video communications.

This one I am less sanguine about. PGP is just too hard to
use--witness the incredible amount of time being consumed in debates
about it, about features, bugs, etc., and the difficulties in
integrating into ordinary work habits, for most people. Commercial
crypto is not moving very quickly.

> 3.  Active and profuse vendors of related applications of the above 
> technologies, including among others, digital banking, and anonymous mail 
> (in my use including video, voice, data, and true digital cash).
> 
> I think these are all possible (however likely or unlikely) within the next 
> five years.

I thought it would take 5 years, too. Back in 1988. Oh well. But by
1999, lots of time for change. And we may see a digital cash
application just "pop out of nowhere," just as VCRs did.

> likely scenario to me in the next five years).  Given these facts, how is 
> government likely to adjust?  Surely not without a fight to survive even in 
> the face of what many see as impending doom for revenue collection and law 
> enforcement.

By the way, I devoted a *lot* of space in my Cyphernomicon FAQ to
issues like this, including one section entitled "How will Crypto
Anarchy Be Fought?"

> I have often commented that Cypherpunks see things about 6 months to 2 
> years before the popular culture begins to catch the scents.  It is 
> surprising to me then that the list (as far as I know) has been so stuck in 
> the present with regard to the likely reaction to long term Cypherpunk 
> goals.  Most political discussions deal either with the present Federal 

Again, I think my FAQ has a suitably long term focus. Especially on
the implications of anonymous systems, digital cash, data havens,
etc., on societal systems. Lots of amazing implications. Some I no
doubt have wrong, but I don't think I'm mired in the present.

And I think we have indeed seen things coming before a lot of others
did. The latest such alert, by Carl Ellison, myself, and others, is
about "software key escrow," or what Carl dubs "GAK" (government
access to keys). I think SKE is the wave of future repression, worth
starting to fight now. The popular media is largely oblivious to it,
as usual.  (John Markoff, of the NY Times, is on top of it, more so
than most of us, and is waiting for the right time to do something on
this.)

> Government threat, (Clipper, Digitel, Information Superhighway) or with the 
> long term promise of Cypherpunk technology, but not the future Federal 
> Government response to said technology.  Partly I think this is 
> attributable to the perception that the Federal Government is as much 
> behind the times as popular culture.  Technically this is probably true on 
> the whole.  (Dorthy Denning being short sighted enough to insist that law 
> enforcement needs wiretap ability because they have always had such an 
> ability.  Ms. Denning's similarly dense arguments based on statistics to 
> the effect that since law enforcement has used wiretaps so often, they must 
> be indispensable and thus must be preserved.  What Ms. Denning never 
> mentions, either accidentally or with intent, are the alternatives).  But 
> it is equally true that there is, or there appears to be, some foresight on 

Dorothy Denning is deeply involved with SKE, working with Miles Schmid
of the NSA and the folks from Trusted Information Systems (according
to Whit Diffie, who saw a joint presentation by the bunch of them in
Karlsruhe, and their glee that the Micali escrow patent will likely be
overturned due to prior art in Europe).

> How will the complete inability of law enforcement (Federal or Local) to 
> conduct wiretaps impact collection?  Those who think that law enforcement 
> will just have to go away might want to reconsider.  Instead I think that 
> law enforcement will simply become much more intrusive as a response to the 
> unavailability of easy interception via wiretapping.

I don't think the state will fold up its tent and fade away (to mix
some metaphors). I think we'll see some "Wacos in cyberspace," some
invocations of the Four Horsemen of the Infocalypse (Terrorists,
Pedophiles, Money Launderers, and Pornographers), and some repressive
laws involving national ID cards, reporting of all economic
transactions on the Net, etc. Lots of things they can do.

Lots of people will be killed by the thrashings of the dying beast.

...
> war on drugs.  Instead Federal and Local law enforcement will begin to rely 
> on Human Intelligence as well as more intrusive site collection to work 
> around the technologically intensive and prohibitively expensive Signals 
> Intelligence in the new era.  Courts, tired of dismissing hundreds of 
> otherwise legitimate looking cases, are likely to judicially erode the 
> constitutional protections protecting citizens from search and seizure 
> particularly with reference to an increased law enforcement reliance on 
> more intrusive room surveillance equipment.  In the context of the Fourth 

I don't think HUMINT is too likely to increase, as it costs so damned
much to hire all those agents. 

I do think we'll see--and are already seeing--erosions of formerly
sacred rights. (Black U. and I are obviously addressing our comments
to mostly American issues. Your mileage may vary.) "Conspiracy"
is already a catch-all, and the plethora of laws that nearly everyone
is always breaking can be used to cut deals. A nation of cybernetic
Pavel Morozovs, all informing on our neighbors. (Ironically, this
erosion could _accelerate_ the shift to more secure systems, as even
average people fear being caught up in alleged crimes.)

> Amendment's structure this becomes a particularly difficult problem.  The 
> Exclusionary Rule provides for the rejection of evidence collected in 
> violation of the Fourth Amendment (there is no effective civil remedy) but 
> as many commentators have pointed out this is a particularly difficult 
> thing for a judge to do.  Exclusionary Rule motions come in the context of 

Also, many illegal wiretaps and black bag jobs are done not to secure
evidence--which is inadmissable--but in furtherance of investigations,
and to point to evidence they _can_ get a search warrant for.  (I
submit that the FBI wants DT for largely this reason, and all the
calculations of "cost per wiretap" and how they are exorbitantly
expensive miss this essential point!)


> extent.  Targeted political organizations will be infiltrated with a much 
> greater degree of aggressiveness, perhaps even surpassing levels of the 
> 1960's.  Frustration in law enforcement inability to penetrate the more 

Probably true. In all fairness to ourselves, we actually are part of a
larger threat (notice that I'm only calling Cypherpunks a _part_ of
this, as to claim overall credit would be absurd) to the status quo
than the Black Panthers were in the 1960s. Think about it.


> More alarming perhaps are the ramifications for banking transactions.  In 
> the absence of an ability to monitor transactions electronically Human 
> Intelligence will be forced to fill in the gaps, creating a great demand 
> for informants within the banking and financial industries.  The SEC simply 
> will be unable to function as it does today without electronic monitoring 
> of transactions.  Instead brokerage firms, high profile investors and 
> financial institutions are more likely to be attacked with Human 
> Intelligence and informants, perhaps even outright theft of records.  The 
> implications for even the moderate level investor are ominous.

Indeed. But this is already occurring in a major way. The major credit
reporting agencies collude in central ways with the government (as
with the faked credentials used for the Witness Security Program, for
spies, etc.). Banks already collude (BCCI was not a fluke, just a CIA
front bank, like Castle Bank, Nugan Hand Bank, and Bank of America).

Strong crypto and anonymous systems will ultimately be _helped_ by
this duplicity, ironically.

> Given the flexibility of constitutional interpretation demonstrated by the 
> New Deal legislation, is it any mystery that the new law enforcement 
> methodology will be supported by the courts, especially in the face of 
> complete law enforcement breakdown?

I go further on this point even than Black Unicorn does. I think
there's a reasonable chance that a "state of national emergency" will
be declared. Lots of things could trigger this, and I don't think it's
just millenialist paranoia to believe certain Emergency Orders could
be triggered. Military manouvers have planned for this (REX-84,
Operation Night Train, FEMA, etc.). 

> The Cypherpunks must ask themselves how to address these issues, and 
> recognize the potential political impact of high technology and the losing 
> law enforcement battle to keep up.  Would a Cypherpunk victory merely be 
> bypassed by a clever end run?  Is this a case of "Even when you win you 
> lose"?

Important for us to think about these issues, to be sure.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo at toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay






From warlord at MIT.EDU  Sun Oct  2 21:13:35 1994
From: warlord at MIT.EDU (Derek Atkins)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 21:13:35 PDT
Subject: PGP 2.6.2??
In-Reply-To: <4LIZkOwsc-m8072yn@io.org>
Message-ID: <9410030413.AA22993@hodge-podge.MIT.EDU>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

To: werewolf at io.org (Mark Terka)
cc: cypherpunks at toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP 2.6.2?? 
In-reply-to: Your message of "Sat, 01 Oct 1994 05:00:52 EDT."
             <4LIZkOwsc-m8072yn at io.org> 
- --------
> I saw in alt.security.pgp recently that a new release of PGP was due
> in the next few days from MIT. Evidently this version will handle the
> generation of keys of up to 2048 bits.
> 
> Can anyone substantiate this?

Yes, I can.  In fact, I am patching 2.6.1 up to 2.6.2 as I write this
letter.  There _will_ be a 2.6.2 release, although I cannot confirm
the date it will be released.  Most likely, it will not be released
for at least a week, possibly longer than that, depending on testing
results.  Official notice will be sent out when the release occurs.

Actually, the code will still not _generate_ 2048-bit keys, but it
will accept them properly.  In the near future PGP will most likely
generate keys that size.

The official PGP FAQ, Buglist, Improvements is on the Web:
	http://www.mit.edu:8001/people/warlord/pgp-faq.html

This gets updated whenever I receive new bug reports and/or
improvements to PGP.  Be warned: this URL is subject to change without
notice.

Hope this answers your questions.

- -derek

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.1

iQBuAwUBLo+EqDh0K1zBsGrxAQHhGwLDBeXuV1SZDkDe8Zjtgrda8TA68gSYvKoL
Re6oR3B84QtD1392E9ArPbejxiNuzPc188SGEo/fMabQnoOWsfaP5sihz+GxIswk
TFub8q6MC7RaEsYJi1TGk7E=
=qQOJ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From scmayo at rschp2.anu.edu.au  Sun Oct  2 21:16:56 1994
From: scmayo at rschp2.anu.edu.au (Sherry Mayo)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 21:16:56 PDT
Subject: Manufacturing quantum computers
Message-ID: <9410030416.AA10229@toad.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hi all,

Regarding the quantum cryptography thread: Some people expressed the
view that although the idea may be workable, the manufacturing technology
was a long way of being able to produce quantum computers.
The quantum dot design proposed by Eckert et al for a quantum "factorisation
engine" requires 100000 quantum dots (to factorise RSA-129 or similar)
which are each about 10nm across to be fairly densly packed onto a 
chip. I'm not so sure about this being 'a long way off' in terms of materials
technology, and I found the following article on WWW which describes some
relevant research into this kind of manufacturing at a US army research
centre. I found this on the FedWorld (US Govt, http://www.fedworld.gov/ )
pages....

============================================================
Part of the "unique ARL (Army Research Lab) facilities" page
http://info.arl.army.mil/UAFD/uafd.html
============================================================
Ultralithography Center.

This facility provides the Army
and DoD with a capability that significantly
impacts the development of novel ultra-submicron
electronic device technology required by
next-generation and future military systems. A
multi-million-dollar Leica (Philips) EBPG-5HR
electron-beam lithography system, which represents
the state of the art in ultra-high-resolution
device patterning, is housed in a newly
constructed clean room. The Leica EBPG-5HR
accomplishes lithography by scanning a finely
focused beam of high-energy electrons over an
electron-sensitive polymer coating applied to the
substrate surface. With an electron beam spot size
approaching 10 nm, the Leica EBPG-5HR provides an
effective solution to the most demanding
lithographic applications, including ultra-small
(250 angstrom [= 25nm]) electronic and photonic devices.
These devices will provide an enabling foundation
for next-generation Army electronic and
optoelectronic systems. Devices such as sub-100-nm
gate length millimeter-wave high-electron-
mobility transistors (HEMTs), novel quantum-effect
and mesoscopic (phase-preserving) devices, and
quantum-well infrared photo-detectors are
patterned with this system. The instrument's high
acceleration voltage (100kV) provides a unique
capability to pattern closely spaced
nanometer-scale device features without feature or
sample- related distortion. Automated calibration
permits the writing of undistorted patterns over
the large sample areas required to fabricate many
photonic devices and optoelectronic circuits.

=======================================================

Well there you go. Perhaps the technology is nearer than we
think. Of course this still doesn't answer the
noise problem that critics of the proposed technique think will
render it all but useless. However I wanted to make the point
that we shouldn't be complacent about the materials technology
side of things.

Tim May makes the point that he is not selling his shares in intel,
and that conventional chip technology is not about to be supplanted.
The problem with this IMHO is that these are not two completely
different technologies we are talking about. The constantly improving
techniques being used to cram more and more onto conventional chips 
are directly applicable to the manufacture of these proposed quantum
dot devices.

Just my 2 cents

Sherry

Sheridan C. Mayo         | WWW pages include caving, sci fi and   
RSC, ANU, Australia      | crypto pages. NEW: X-files has its own
scmayo at rschp2.anu.edu.au | page with gifs/sounds/fanfic etc.
Finger for PGP key       | http://rschp2.anu.edu.au:8080/local.html




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oRKvzzW0IHs=
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From tcmay at netcom.com  Sun Oct  2 22:12:05 1994
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 94 22:12:05 PDT
Subject: The Decline of Liberty
Message-ID: <199410030511.WAA02372@netcom6.netcom.com>


My favorite old curmudgeon, Jeff Cooper, has some interesting things
to say in the 27 Sep issue of "Cooper's Commentaries," (cf. rec.guns).


"The subjection to which the American citizen is now exposed every day
of his life is so great that the whole idea of liberty ("That which
does not injure one's neighbor") is almost totally lost. The greatest
of despots, Louis XIV, never told his subjects what they could or
could not eat and drink, and he never told them how to conduct their
private lives."


I won't even try to add more to what he has said.

--Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo at toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay






From solman at MIT.EDU  Mon Oct  3 01:17:09 1994
From: solman at MIT.EDU (solman at MIT.EDU)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 01:17:09 PDT
Subject: Anyone seen the 'quantum cryptanalysis' thread?
In-Reply-To: <199409291241.AA11195@panix.com>
Message-ID: <9410030816.AA25214@ua.MIT.EDU>


[sorry if this is way out of it, I haven't had time to keep up with my
c-punks mail lattely]

Duncan writes
> It's easier to make an omlette out of eggs than to make eggs out of an
> omlette so encryption should remain well ahead of decryption.

As I'm sure somebody else has pointed out somewhere along this thread, the
ability to simultaneously analyze a superposition of an arbitrarilly large
subset of all possible imputs (as our theoretical quantum cryptanalytic
device might) implies to ability to solve, in polynomial time, any
exponential time problem.

[Its easy to consider a device which, given a superposition of a subset of
all numbers less than 2^n, delivers as output a confirmation or denial
that one of the numbers in the subset is a factor of the input modulus.
Such a device can factor in order n time complexity simply by playing higher
lower games and guessing one bit at a time] 

I want to take issue Duncan's analogy here however. It starts off well:

> "It's easier to make an omlette out of eggs than to make eggs out of an
> omlette"

This is like saying entropy always wins, which it does. It will always be
easier to take apart and destroy than to create. Then he continues:

> So encryption should remain well ahead of decryption

Which process is increasing order and which process is increasing entropy?

I think an encrypted message is a highly ordered construct. In its natural
state, information can be read by everyone. Upon this state encryption
imposes order. It allows a specific subset of all entities to read the
information. In the total cyberspatial system, none of the original
information has been lost, yet new information has been added. 

I look at encryption as the tool that will allow us to build up an orderly
society within the natural anarchy of cyberspace. Encryption is an artifact
of order.

And as such I would expect science to eventually uncover a mechanism that
makes it easier to breakdown this order than to create it in the first
place.

I suppose it is plausible that there exists a class of Quantum-Hard problems,
but it is difficult for me to conceptualize such a class of problems. It
seems like quantum computation is capable of decreasing the time complexity
 of any problem to its logarithm an arbitrarilly large number of times.
[Not that I believe for one moment that it is likely that quantum
cryptanalytic machines will be developed that are sufficiently fault
tolerant (if the term can even be applied to a system like this) to
overcome the coupling between the quantum computer and the surrounding
environment in the next couple of decades.]

Cheers,

Jason W. Solinsky





From pstemari at bismark.cbis.com  Mon Oct  3 04:15:51 1994
From: pstemari at bismark.cbis.com (Paul J. Ste. Marie)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 04:15:51 PDT
Subject: EFFy Wiretap Win?
In-Reply-To: <199410012056.QAA11171@pipe3.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <9410031115.AA10394@focis.sda.cbis.COM>


>  A similar measure sailed through the Senate
> Judiciary Committee earlier this week on a 16-1
> vote. Though little time remains in the current
> Congress, the legislation could squeak through.

Does anyone know who the lone honorable Senator was?





From paul at poboy.b17c.ingr.com  Mon Oct  3 06:24:47 1994
From: paul at poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 06:24:47 PDT
Subject: Export controls apply to physical objects, too
Message-ID: <199410031326.AA00596@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Yesterday's _Huntsville Times_ had an interesting story about a local
company's problems with the ITARs. The company, Signature
Technologies, makes an EM-absorbent paint called Signaflux, the main
application for which is decreasing the radar cross-section of various
flying objects.

Although so far the primary customers for Signaflux have been from the
US DoD, there have been sales to "friendly" foreign governments,
notably the Israelis. ST has been trying to diversify; in that vein,
they've been selling Signaflux for industrial and commercial
applications, like EM shielding in test cells and reducing airport
buildings' radar signatures.

The dispute in this case comes from a contract to sell Deutsche
Aerospace SA about $500,000 worth of Signaflux for the Cyclops cruise
missile. ST applied to Commerce for an export license under the
dual-use provision. After a CJ determination, State yanked their
export license.

The story didn't say who requested the CJ determination. I can't
imagine that ST would have asked for one, since they had a license
already. 

In closing, the CEO was quoted as saying (paraphrased) "These rules
are stupid; I could sell the Germans a fleet of F-16s with dashboards
full of avionics, but I can't sell them paint."

- -Paul

- -- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG        |  Demand that your elected reps support the
perobich at ingr.com             |  Constitution, the whole Constitution, and
Not speaking for Intergraph.  |  nothing but the Constitution.
		  ### http://www.intergraph.com ###

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From raph at CS.Berkeley.EDU  Mon Oct  3 06:49:37 1994
From: raph at CS.Berkeley.EDU (Raph Levien)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 06:49:37 PDT
Subject: List of reliable remailers
Message-ID: <199410031350.GAA04690@kiwi.CS.Berkeley.EDU>


   I have written and installed a remailer pinging script which
collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability.

   To use it, just finger remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu

   There is also a Web version of the same information, at:
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html

   Please let me know about any other remailers which I missed. I've
only included remailers which can mail to arbitrary addresses, so I
already know chop and twwells are missing.

   This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP
encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at:
fftp://soda.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.22.tar.gz

   For the PGP public keys of the remailers, as well as some help on
how to use them, finger remailer.help.all at chaos.bsu.edu

This is the current info:

                                 REMAILER LIST

   This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first
   part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration
   options and special features for each of the remailers. The second
   part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each
   remailer. You can also get this list by fingering
   remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu.

$remailer{"chaos"} = "<remailer at chaos.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub";
$remailer{"vox"} = "<remail at vox.xs4all.nl> cpunk oldpgp. post";
$remailer{"avox"} = "<anon at vox.hacktic.nl> cpunk oldpgp post";
$remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail at extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special";
$remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney at shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash";
$remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal at alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash";
$remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub";
$remailer{"rebma"} = "<remailer at rebma.mn.org> cpunk pgp hash";
$remailer{"jpunix"} = "<remailer at jpunix.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post";
$remailer{"wien"} = "<remailer at ds1.wu-wien.ac.at> cpunk pgp hash nsub";
$remailer{"c2"} = "<remail at c2.org> eric pgp hash";
$remailer{"soda"} = "<remailer at csua.berkeley.edu> eric pgp. post";
$remailer{"penet"} = "<anon at anon.penet.fi> penet post";
$remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer at ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub";
$remailer{"usura"} = "<usura at xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. hash latent cut post";
$remailer{"leri"} = "<remail at leri.edu> cpunk pgp hash";
$remailer{"desert"} = "<remail at desert.xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. post";
$remailer{"underdog"} = "<lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post";
$remailer{"nately"} = "<remailer at nately.ucsd.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut";
$remailer{"efrias"} = "<efrias at csugrad.cs.vt.edu> cpunk pgp hash";
catalyst at netcom.com is _not_ a remailer.

Last ping: Mon 3 Oct 94 6:00:02 PDT
remailer  email address                        history  latency  uptime
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
c2       remail at c2.org                    *+-*********    13:09  99.99%
wien     remailer at ds1.wu-wien.ac.at       ***#+**--#**    19:02  99.99%
chaos    remailer at chaos.bsu.edu           **####**+##*     2:56  99.99%
leri     remail at leri.edu                  ***#**#*****     6:38  99.99%
portal   hfinney at shell.portal.com         *##*#+***#**     4:01  99.99%
ideath   remailer at ideath.goldenbear.com   *****-*+- **  1:40:23  99.99%
underdog lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu      ***+********     4:41  99.98%
penet    anon at anon.penet.fi               *****+-+****    47:05  99.96%
jpunix   remailer at jpunix.com              *-*#**-**-**    11:04  99.96%
vox      remail at vox.xs4all.nl             .-......--   12:10:26  99.94%
bsu-cs   nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu           **# #****#-*    13:42  99.76%
efrias   efrias at csugrad.cs.vt.edu              *#*****     4:30  99.79%
rebma    remailer at rebma.mn.org            -+---*--.-*- 10:13:40  99.58%
extropia remail at extropia.wimsey.com       ++  +-++++*+    40:30  99.40%
soda     remailer at csua.berkeley.edu       -......_..    9:25:30  99.31%
nately   remailer at nately.ucsd.edu         -++++- ++++*    33:37  99.15%
usura    usura at xs4all.nl                  +***..-** **  1:16:06  98.42%
desert   remail at desert.xs4all.nl          .---...----  24:19:31  84.16%
alumni   hal at alumni.caltech.edu           *****+**         6:06  79.87%

Suggested path: chaos;wien;c2
For more info: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html

   Options and features

   cpunk
          A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To:
          field.

   eric
          A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead.

   penet
          The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses
          X-Anon-To: in the header.

   pgp
          Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the
          keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email
          address, should be used as the encryption key ID.

   oldpgp
          Remailer does not like messages encoded with MIT PGP 2.6. Other
          versions of PGP, including 2.3a and 2.6ui, work fine.

   hash
          Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of
          outgoing messages.

   ksub
          Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode.

   nsub
          Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode.

   latent
          Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option.

   cut
          Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option.

   post
          Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header.
          
   special
          Accepts only pgp encrypted messages.

   History key
     * # response in less than 5 minutes.
     * * response in less than 1 hour.
     * + response in less than 4 hours.
     * - response in less than 24 hours.
     * . response in more than 1 day.
     * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days).


   If you've got a Web page, please feel free to include a link to
this page. If you think your Web page is relevant to the subject of
remailers, let me know and I'll link it in.

   Comments and suggestions welcome!

   Note to remailer operators: this script generates hourly ping
messages. If you don't want that, let me know and I will take your
mailer off the list, or increase the interval between pings.

Raph Levien





From perry at jpunix.com  Mon Oct  3 07:22:21 1994
From: perry at jpunix.com (John A. Perry)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 07:22:21 PDT
Subject: New Remailer feature
Message-ID: <199410031421.JAA01156@jpunix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hello Raph,

	I just saw your bi-monthly posting about the remailers. I'd like
to point out that jpunix supports a feature not mentioned in your
message/finger mechanism. Jpunix.com also supports the ability to have
messages encrypted to the recipient by the remailer itself. This will
protect cleartext messages sent back to the sender via reply blocks. By
adding

Encrypt-Key: yourkey

to the header list for jpunix.com, jpunix will encrypt anything following 
a ** on a line by itself with that key.

John Perry - perry at jpunix.com

- -- 

 PGP 2.61 key for perry at jpunix.com is on the keyservers.
 PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome!


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From jya at pipeline.com  Mon Oct  3 08:08:17 1994
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 08:08:17 PDT
Subject: Anarchy-X Notification
Message-ID: <199410031507.LAA11923@pipe1.pipeline.com>



Got about a dozen of these in the last couple of days.

Should I fear or embrace Organization:  Anarchy-X?

Sounds good but TLA maybe?

John



Forwarding mail by: "ROOT"@ax.com () on Mon, 03 Oct  1:1  AM
-------------------
>From ROOT at ax.com Mon Oct  3 04:45 EDT 1994
   Received: from netcomsv.netcom.com (uucp4.netcom.com 
[163.179.3.4]) by pipeline.com (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id 
EAA02169 for <jya at PIPELINE.COM>; Mon, 3 Oct 1994 04:45:26 -0400
Received: from ax.com by netcomsv.netcom.com with UUCP 
(8.6.4/SMI-4.1)
	id BAA22993; Mon, 3 Oct 1994 01:37:39 -0700
Received: by ax.com (UUPU-1.42)
	id D1115pj Mon Oct 03, 1994 01:01:37 EDT
From: "ROOT"@ax.com
Message-Id: <9410030101.D1115pj at ax.com>
X-Mailer: UUPlus Mail 1.42
To: jya at pipeline.com
Subject: Non-Delivery Notification
Organization: Anarchy-X
Date: Mon, 03 Oct 94 01:01:36 EST
Content-Type: text
Content-Length: 377


     NON-DELIVERY NOTICE
     -------------------

The message you sent on:

Unknown to "ROOT" was undeliverable.

========================= !!! Automated Notice !!! 
=======================
 E-mail replies to this user should have the following on the 
first line  
 of message text:        TO: "ROOT"
=================================================================
=========







From hedlund at halcyon.com  Mon Oct  3 08:42:34 1994
From: hedlund at halcyon.com (M. Hedlund)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 08:42:34 PDT
Subject: EFFy Wiretap Win?
In-Reply-To: <9410031115.AA10394@focis.sda.cbis.COM>
Message-ID: <Pine.ULT.3.90.941003083831.6471A-100000@halcyon.com>



On Mon, 3 Oct 1994, Paul J. Ste. Marie wrote:
> >  A similar measure sailed through the Senate
> > Judiciary Committee earlier this week on a 16-1
> > vote. Though little time remains in the current
> > Congress, the legislation could squeak through.
> 
> Does anyone know who the lone honorable Senator was?

Voter's Telecomm Watch (Shabbir J. Safdar <shabbir at panix.com>) told me 
the vote was unanimous.  Their recent "Wiretap Watch" lists a bunch of 
Senators who voted to let it leave the committee, but none who wanted to 
kill it.  The Legi-Slate Congressional database service says only that 
it was approved by a voice vote.

</hedlund>





From walrus at umich.edu  Mon Oct  3 09:46:40 1994
From: walrus at umich.edu (Michael Shiplett)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 09:46:40 PDT
Subject: SHA patch
Message-ID: <199410031646.MAA16702@judgmentday.rs.itd.umich.edu>


Hello there,

    After some work with the SHS (or is the implementation actually
the SHA?) code listed in _Applied Cryptography_, I have patched it to
allow updates of buffer sizes that are not a multiple of
SHS_BLOCKSIZE. The patched version works for the different groupings
of the test data "abc", e.g.,
        update(abc)
        update(a) + update(bc)
	update(ab) + update(c)

    Since the "abc" case tests only the logic of shsUpdate() [all the
transformation invocations are actually performed by shsFinal()], I
ran the original code and the modified code on several files and
(fortunately) received the same hash values for the two
implementations.

    shsUpdate() follows. You may need to define a bcopy->memcpy macro.

michael

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
void
shsUpdate(SHS_INFO *shsInfo, BYTE *buffer, int count)
{
    int	offset, need;

    /* determine if there are left over bytes in the
       shs data. they are handled specially below */
    offset = (int) ((shsInfo->countLo >> 3) & 0x3f);
    need = SHS_BLOCKSIZE - offset;

    /* update bitcount */
    if ((shsInfo->countLo + ((LONG) count << 3)) < shsInfo->countLo)
        shsInfo->countHi++;	/* carry from low to high bitCount */

    shsInfo->countLo += ((LONG) count << 3);
    shsInfo->countHi += ((LONG) count >> 29);

    /* if there were indeed left over data bytes,
       see if the incoming data is sufficient to
       fill to SHS_BLOCKSIZE. if not, copy the
       incoming data and return; otherwise fill
       the block, perform a transformation, and
       continue as usual */
    if (offset)
    {
        if (count < need)
        {
            bcopy(buffer, (BYTE *) shsInfo->data + offset, count);
            return;
        }
        else
        {
            bcopy(buffer, (BYTE *) shsInfo->data + offset, need);
#ifdef LITTLE_ENDIAN
            byteReverse(shsInfo->data, SHS_BLOCKSIZE);
#endif
            shsTransform(shsInfo);
            buffer += need;
            count -= need;
        }
    }

    /* process data in SHS_BLOCKSIZE chunks */
    while (count >= SHS_BLOCKSIZE)
    {
        bcopy(buffer, shsInfo->data, SHS_BLOCKSIZE);
#ifdef LITTLE_ENDIAN
        byteReverse(shsInfo->data, SHS_BLOCKSIZE);
#endif
        shsTransform(shsInfo);
        buffer += SHS_BLOCKSIZE;
        count -= SHS_BLOCKSIZE;
    }

    /* store the left over data */
    bcopy(buffer, shsInfo->data, count);
}





From ogd at selway.umt.edu  Mon Oct  3 10:50:11 1994
From: ogd at selway.umt.edu (ozymandias G desiderata)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 10:50:11 PDT
Subject: Filing FOIA Requests
Message-ID: <9410031749.AA21269@selway.umt.edu>



	A large group of my friends and I are interested in finding
out exactly what the cheeseballs over in Intelligence, Inc. have on
file about us. Does anyone have handy the details necessary to file a
Freedom of Information Act request for your own file? Do y'all have
some hints so that we can expect the best possible yield?
	On the same note, do any of you have any humorous / chilling
stories about what you found out when you got your file?

Thanks in advance for the info,
ozymandias G desiderata





From ogd at selway.umt.edu  Mon Oct  3 10:53:22 1994
From: ogd at selway.umt.edu (ozymandias G desiderata)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 10:53:22 PDT
Subject: DTI Pointers?
Message-ID: <9410031753.AA21848@selway.umt.edu>



	I'm taking public speaking so that I can finally get out of
college and into the big wide world, and have decided to educate my
class on the controversy surrounding the Digital Telephony Initiative.
I need hardcopy to make my TA happy, and after an (admittedly quick)
browsing of the archives, I wasn't able to find much in the way of
hard information. Are there any good pointers, especially to the
recent Lehman version of the bill and the controversy that now
surrounds the EFF?

Thanks in advance for your help,
ozymandias G desiderata





From CCGARY at MIZZOU1.missouri.edu  Mon Oct  3 11:13:33 1994
From: CCGARY at MIZZOU1.missouri.edu (Gary Jeffers)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 11:13:33 PDT
Subject: Newsgroups email addresses.
Message-ID: <9410031813.AA21645@toad.com>


Fellow Cypherpunks,
   I am going to be spreading my CEB around the Internet. I need full
email addresses to newsgroups including sci.crypt & talk.politics.crypt
& any other groups that may be interested in crypt including conspiracy
groups. thank you.
                                   Yours Truly,
                                   Gary Jeffers





From chen at intuit.com  Mon Oct  3 11:59:15 1994
From: chen at intuit.com (Mark Chen)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 11:59:15 PDT
Subject: Filing FOIA Requests
In-Reply-To: <9410031749.AA21269@selway.umt.edu>
Message-ID: <9410031857.AA18141@doom.intuit.com>



Oz,

> 	A large group of my friends and I are interested in finding
> out exactly what the cheeseballs over in Intelligence, Inc. have on
> file about us. Does anyone have handy the details necessary to file a
> Freedom of Information Act request for your own file? Do y'all have
> some hints so that we can expect the best possible yield?
> 	On the same note, do any of you have any humorous / chilling
> stories about what you found out when you got your file?

Here you go.

   - Mark -

---------------------------------------------------------------------

[******PNEWS CONFERENCES******]
From: Hank Roth <Hank.Roth at f14.n3638.z1.fidonet.org>
To: pnews at world.std.com

* Original Area: CIVLIB
* Original From: Bob Hirschfeld (1:3638/14)
* Original To  : All (crosspost/ Law) (1:3615/51)

FOIA FILES KIT - INSTRUCTIONS
 
USING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
REVISED EDITION
Fund for Open Information and Accountability, Inc.
339 Lafayette Street, New York, NY 10012
(212) 477-3188
 
INSTRUCTIONS
 
     The Freedom of Information Act entitles you to request any 
record maintained by a federal Executive branch agency. The 
agency must release the requested matieral unless it falls into 
one of nine exempt categores, such as "national security," 
"privacy," "confidential source" and the like, in which case the 
agency may but is not compelled to refuse to disclose the 
records.
     This kit contains all the material needed to make FOIA 
requests for records on an individual, an orgnaization or on a 
particular subject matter or event.
 
HOW TO MAKE A COMPLETE REQUEST
 
     Step 1:   Select the appropriate smaple letter. Fill in the 
blanks in the body of the letter. Read the directions printed to 
the right of each letter in conjunction with the following 
instructions:
     For organizational files: In the first blank space insert 
the full and formal name of the organization whose files you are 
requesting. In the second blank space insert any other names, 
acronyms or shortened forms by which the organization is or has 
ever been known or referred to by itself or others. If some of 
the organization's work is conducted by sub-groups such as clubs, 
committees, special programs or through coalitions known by other 
names, these should be listed.
     For individual files: Insert the person's full name in the 
first blank space and any vaiations in spelling, nicknames, stage 
names, marriage names, titles and the like in the second blank 
space. Unlike other requests, the signatures of an individual 
requesting her/his own file must be notarized.
     For subject matter or event files: In the first blank space 
state the formal title of the subject matter or event including 
relevant dates and locations. In the second blank space provide 
the names of individuals or group sponsors or participants and/or 
any other information that would assist the agency in locating 
the material you are requesting.
     Step 2:   The completed sample letter may be removed, 
photocopies and mailed as is or retyped on your own stationary. 
Be sure to keep a copy of each letter.
     Step 3:   Addressing the letters: Consult list of agency 
addresses.
     FBI: A complete request requires a minimum of two letters. 
Sen done letter to FBI Headquarters and separate letter to each 
FBI field office nearest the location of the individual, the 
organization or the subject matter/event. Consdier the location 
of residences, schools, work and other activities.
     INS: Send a request letter to each district office nearest 
the location of the individual, the organization or the subject 
matter/event.
     Address each letter to the FOIA/PA office of the appropraite 
agency. Be sure to make clearly on the envelope: ATTENTION--FOIA 
REQUEST.
 
FEE WAIVER
 
     You will notice that the sample letters include a request 
for fee waiver. Many agencies automatically waive fees if a 
request results in the release of only a small number of 
documents, e.g. 250 pages or less. Under the Act, you are 
entitled to a waiver of all search and copy fees associated with 
your request if the release of the information would primarily 
benefit the general public. However, in January 1983, the Justice 
Department issued a memo to all federal agencies listing five 
criteria which requesters must meet before they are deemed 
entitled to a fee waiver. Under these criteria, a requester must 
show that the material sought to be released is already the 
subject of "genuine public interest" and "meaningfully 
contributes to the public development or understanding of the 
subject"; and that she/he has the qualifications to understand 
and evaluate the materials and the ability to interpret and 
disseminate the information to th epublic and is not motivated by 
any "personal interest." Finally, if the requested information is 
already "in the public domain," such as in the agency's reading 
room, no fee waiver will be granted.
     You should always request a waiver of fees if you believe 
the information you are seeking will benefit the public. If your 
request for a waiver is denied, you should appeal that denial, 
citing the ways in which your request meets the standards set out 
above.
 
MONITORING THE PROGRESS OF YOUR REQUEST
 
     Customarily, you will receive a letter from each agency 
within 10 days stating that your request has been received and is 
being processed. You may be asked to be patient and told that 
requests are handled cafeteria style. You have no alternative but 
to be somewhat patient. but there is no reason to be complacent 
and simply sit and wait.
     A good strategy is to telephone the FOIA office in each 
agency after about a month if nothing of substance has been 
received. Ask for a progress report. The name of the person you 
talk with and the gist of the converstaion should be recorded. 
try to take notes during the conversation focusing especially on 
what is said by the agency official. Write down all the details 
you can recall after the call is completed. Continue to call 
every 4 to 6 weeks.
     Good recordkeeping helps avoid time-consuming and 
frustrating confusion. A looseleaf notebook with a section 
devoted to each request simplifies this task. Intervening 
correspondence to and from the agency can be inserted bewteen the 
notes on phone calls so that all relevant material will be at 
hand for the various tasks: phone consultations, writing the 
newsletter, correspondence, articles, preparation for media 
appearances, congressional testimony or litigation, if that 
course is adopted.
 
HOW TO MAKE SURE YOU GET EVERYTHING YOU ARE ENTITLED TO ...
AND WHAT TO DO IF YOU DO NOT
 
     After each agency has searched and processed your request, 
you will receive a letter that announces the outcome, encloses 
the released documents, if any, and explains where to direct an 
appeal if any material has been withheld. There are four possible 
outcomes:
     1.   Request granted in full: This response indicates that 
the agency has released all records pertinent to your request, 
with no exclusions or withholdings. The documents may be enclosed 
or, if bulky, may be mailed under separate cover. This is a very 
rare outcome. 
     Next Step: Check documents for completeness (see 
instructions below).
     2.   Requested granted in part and denied in part: This 
response indicates that the agency is releasing some material but 
has withheld some documents entirely or excized some passages 
from the documents released. The released documents may be 
enclosed or, if bulky, mailed under separate cover.
     Next step: Check documents released for completeness (see 
instructions below) and make an administrative appeal of denials 
or incompleteness (see instructions below).
     3.   Request denied in full: This response indicates that 
the agency is asserting that all material in its files pertaining 
to your request falls under one or the nine FOIA exemptions. 
These are categories of information that the agency may, at its 
discretion, refuse to release.
     Next step: Make an administrative appeal (see instructions 
below). Since FOIA exemptions are not mandatory, even a complete 
denial of your request can and should be appeals.
     4.   No records: This response will state that a search of 
the agency's files indicates that it has no records corresponding 
to those you requested.
     Next step: Check your original request to be sure you have 
not overlooked anything. If you receive documents from other 
agencies, review them for indications that there is matieral in 
teh files of the agency claiming it has none. For example, look 
for correspondence, or references to correspondence, to or from 
that agency. If you determine that there are reasonable grounds, 
file an administrative appeal (see instructions below).
 
HOW TO CHECK FOR COMPLETENESS
 
     Step 1: Before reading the documents, turn them over and 
number the back of each page sequentilaly. The packet may contain 
documents from the agency's headquarters as well as several field 
office files. Separate the documents into their reqpective office 
packets. Each of these offices will have assigned the 
investigation a separate file number. Try to find the numbering 
system. Usually the lower righthand corner of the first page 
carries a hand-written file and document number. For instance, an 
FBI document might be marked "100-7142-22". This would indicate 
that it is the 22nd document in the 7142nd file in the 100 
classification. As you inspect the documents, make a list of 
these file numbers and which office they represent. In this way 
you will be able to determine which office created and which 
office received the document you have in your hand. Often there 
is a block stamp affixed with the name of the office from whose 
files this copy was retrieved. the "To/From" heading on a 
document may also give you corresponding file numbers and will 
help you puzzle out the origin of the document.
     When you have finally identified eahc document's file and 
serial number and separated the documents into their proper 
office batches, make a list of all the serial numbers in each 
batch to see if there any any missing numbers. If there are 
missing serial numbers and some documents have been withheld, try 
to determine if teh missing numbers might reasonably correspond 
to the withheld documents. If not, the realease may be incomplete 
and an administrative appeal should be made.
 
     Step 2: Read all the document released to you. Keep a list 
of all document referred to the text--letters, memos, teletypes, 
reports, etc. Each of these "referred to" documents should turn 
up in the packet released to you. If any are not in the packet, 
it is possible they may be among those document withheld; a 
direct inquiry should be made. In an administrative appeal, ask 
that each of these "referred to" documents be produced or that 
the agency state plainly that they are among those withheld. Of 
course, the totals of unproduced vs. withheld must be within 
reasons; that is, if the total number of unproduced documents you 
find referred to the text of the documents produced exceeds the 
total number of documents withheld, the agency cannot claim that 
all the referred to documents are accounted for by the withheld 
categoty. You will soon get the hand of making logical 
conclusions from discrepancies in the totals and missing document 
numbers.
     Another thing to look for when reading the released 
documents if the names of persons or agencies to whom the 
document has been disseminated. the lower left-hadn corncer is a 
common location for the typed list of agencies or offices to whom 
the document has been directed. In addition, there may be 
additional distribution recorded by hand, there or elsewhere on 
the cover page. There are published glossaries for some agencies 
that will help in deciphering these notaitons when they are not 
clear. Contact FOIA, Inc., if you need assistance in deciphering 
the text.
     Finally, any other file numbers that appear on the document 
should be noted, particularaly in the subject of the file is of 
interest and is one you have not requested. You may want to make 
an additional request for some of these files.
 
HOW TO MAKE AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL
 
     Under the FOIA, a dissatified requester has the right of 
administrative appeal. the name and address of the proper appeal 
office will be given to you by each agency in its final response 
letter.
     This kit contains a sample appeal letter with suggesting for 
adapting it to various circumstances. However, you need not make 
such an elaborate appeal; in fact, you need not offer any reasons 
at all but rather simply write a letter to the appeals unit 
stating that "this letter constitutes an appeal of the agency's 
decision." Of course, if you have identified some real 
discrepanices, you will want to set them for fully, but even if 
you have not found any, you may simply ask that the release be 
reviewed.
     If you are still dissatisfied after the administrative 
appeal process, the FOIA gives you the right to bring a lawsuit 
in federal district court on an expedited basis.
 
SAMPLE FBI REQUEST LETTER
Date:
To: FOIA/PA Unit
     Federal Bureau of Investigation
This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act.
I request a complete and thorough search of all filing 
systems and locations for all records maintained by your agency 
pertaining to and/or captioned: ______ 
_____________________________________________________
[describe records desired and/or insert full and
_____________________________________________________
formal name]
_____________________________________________________
 
_____________________________________________________
including, without limitations, files and documents captioned, or 
whose captions include
_____________________________________________________
[insert changes in name, commonly used names,
_____________________________________________________
acronyms, sub-groups, and the like]
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
     This request specifically includes "main" files and "see references,"
including, but not limited to numbered and lettered sub files, "DO NOT FILE"
files, and control files. I also request a search of the ELSUR Index,a nd the
COINTELPRO Index. I request that all records be produced with the
administrative pges.
     I wish to be sent copies of "see reference" cards, abstracts, serach
slips, including search slips used to process this request, file covers,
multiple copies of the same documents if they appear in a file, and tapes of
any electronic surveillances.
     I wish to make it clear that I want all records in your office
"identifiable with my request," even though reports on those records have
been sent to Headquarters and even though there may be duplication between
the two sets of fils. I do not want just "interim" documents. I want all
documents as they appear in the "main" files and "see references" of all
units of your agency.
     If documents are denied in whole or in part, please specify which
exemption(s) is(are) claimed for each passage or whole document denied.
Please provide a complete itemized inventory and a detailed factual
justification of total or partial denial of documents. Give the number of
pages in each document and the total number of pages pertaining to this
request. For "classified" material denied pleae include the following
information: the classification (confidential, secret or top secret);
identity of the classifer; date or event for automatic declassification,
classification review, or down-grading; if applicable, identity of official
authorizing extension of automatic declassification or review; and if
applicable, the reason for extended classification.
     I request that excized material be "blacked out" rather thatn "whited
out" or cut out and that the remaining non-exempt portions of documents will
be released as provided under the Freedom of Information Act.
     Please send a memo (copy to me) to the appropriate units in your office
to assure that no records related to this request are destroyed. Please
advise of any destruction of records and include the date of and authority
for such destruction.
     As I expect to appeal any denials, please specify the office and address
to which an appeal should be directed.
     I believe my request qualifies for a waiver of fees since the release of
the requested information would primarily benefit the general public and be
"in the public interest."
     I can be reached at the phone listed below. Please call rather than
write if there are any questions or if you need additional information from
me.
     I expect a response to this request within ten (10) working days, as
provided for in the Freedom of Information Act.
Sincerely,
name: _______________________________________________
address: ____________________________________________
         ____________________________________________
telephone: __________________________________________
signature: __________________________________________


SAMPLE AGENCY REQUEST LETTER
DATE:
TO: FOIA/PA Unit
 
     This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act.
     I request a complete and thorough search of all filing 
systems and locations for all records maintained by your agency 
pertaining to and/or captioned 
______________________________________________________
[describe records desired and/or insert full and
______________________________________________________
formal name]
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
including, without limitation, files and documents captioned, or 
whose captions include:
______________________________________________________
[insert changes in name, commonly used names,
______________________________________________________
acronyms, sub-groups and the like]
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
     I also request all "see references" to these names, a search 
of the ELSUR Index or any similar technique for locating records 
of electronic surveillance.
     This request is also a request for any corresponding files 
in INS Headquarters or regional offices.
     Please place any "missing" files pertaining to this request 
on "special locate" and advise that you have done this.
     If documents are denied in part or whole, please specify 
which exemption(s) is(are) claimed for each passage or whole 
document denied. Please provide a complete itemized inventory and 
detialed factual justification of total or partial denial of 
documents. Specify the number of pates in each document and th 
ttoal number of pages pertaining to this request. For classified 
material denied, please include the following information: the 
classification rating (confidential, secret, or top secret); 
identify the classifier; date or event for automatic 
declassification, classification review or downgrading; if 
applicable, identify the official authorizing extension of 
automatic declassification or reviw; and, if applicable, give the 
reason for extended classification.
     I request that excised material be "blacked out" rather than 
"whited out" or cut out. I expect, as provided by the Freedom of 
Information Act, that the remaining non-exempt portions of 
documents will be released.
     Please send a memo (copy to me) to the appropriate units in 
your office or agency to assure that no records related to this 
request are destroyed. Please advise of any destruction of 
records and include the date of and authority for such 
destruction.
     As I expect to appeal any denials, please specify the office 
and address to which an appeal should be directed.
     I believe my request qualifies for a waiver of fees since 
the release of the requested information would primarily benefit 
the general public and be "in the public interest."
     I can be reached at the phone listed below. Please call 
rather than write if there are any questions or if you need 
additional information from me.
     I expect a response to this request within ten (10) working 
days, as provided for in the Freedom of Information Act.
 
Sincerely,
name: _______________________________________________
address: ____________________________________________
         ____________________________________________
telephone: (___)_______________________________________
signature: __________________________________________
 

SAMPLE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL LETTER
Date:
To:  FOIA/PA Appeals Office
RE:  Request number [Add this if the agency has given your request a number]
     This is an appeal pursuant to subsection (a)(6) of the 
Freedom of Information Act as amended (5U.S.C. 552).
     On [date], I received a letter from [name of official] of your agency
denying my request for [describe briefly the information you are after]. This
reply indicated that an appeal letter could be sent to you. I am enclosing a
copy of my exchange of correspondence with your agency so that you can see
exactly what files I have requested and the insubstantial grounds on which my
request has been denied.
     [Optional paragraph, to be used if the agency has withheld 
all or nearly all the material which has been requested]:
     You will note that your agency has withheld the entire (or nearly the
entire) document (or file, or report, or whatever) that I requested. Since
the FOIA provides that "any reasonably secregable portion of a record shall
be provided to any eprson requesting such record after deletion of the
portions which are exempt," I believe that your agency has not complied with
the FOIA. I believe that there must be (additional) segregble portions which
do not fall wihtin FOIA exemptions and which must be released.
     [Optional paragraph, to be used in the agency has used the 
(b)(1) exemption for national security, to withhold information]
     Your agency has used the (b)(1) exemption to withhold information [I
question whether files relating to events that took place over twenty years
ago could realistically harm the national security.] [Because I am familiar
with my own activities during the period in question, and know that none of
these activities in any way posed a significant threat to the national
security, I question the designation of my files or portions of my file as
classified and exempt from disclosure because of national security
considerations.]
     [Sample optional argument to be used if the exemption which 
is claimed does not seem to make sense; you should cite as many 
specific instances as you care to of items withheld from the 
documents that you ahve received. We provide two examples which 
you might want to adampt to your own case.]
     "On the memo dated _____________ the second paragraph withheld under the
(b)(1) exemption appears to be describing a conversation at an open meeting.
If this is the case, it is impossible that the substance of this converation
could be properly classified." Or, "The memo dated _____ refers to a meeting
which I attended, but a substantial portion is deleted because of the (b)(6)
and (b)(7)(c) exemptions for unwarranted invasions of personal privacy. Since
I already know who attended this meeting, no privacy interest is served by
the withholding."
     I trust that upon examination of my request, you will 
conclude that the records I requested are not properly covered by 
exemption(s) [here repeat the exemptions which the agency's 
denial letter claimed applied to your request] of the amended 
FOIA, and that you will overrule the decision to withhold the 
information.
     [Use if an itemized inventory is not supplied originally]
     If you choose instead to continue to withhold some or all of 
the material which was denied in my initial request to your 
agency, I ask that you give me an index of such matieral, 
together with the justification for the denial of each item which 
is still withheld.
     As provided in the Act, I will expect to receive a reply to 
this administrative appeal letter within twenty working days.
     If you deny this appeal and do not adequately explain why 
the material withheld is properly exempt, I intend to initial a 
lawsuit to compel its disclosure. [You can say that you intend to 
sue, if that is your present inclination; you may still decide 
ultimately not to file suit.]
Sincerely yours,
name: ____________________________________________
address: ____________________________________________
          ____________________________________________
signature: ___________________________________________ 

[Mark clearly on envelope: Attention: Freedom of Information Appeals]

FBI ADDRESSES AND PHONE NUMBERS
 
FBI Headquarters, J. Edgar Hoover Bldg, Washington, D.C., 20535, 
202-324-5520 (FOI/PA Unit)
 
Field Offices
Albany, NY 12207, U.S. Post Office and Courthouse, 518-465-7551
Albuquerque, NM 87101, Federal Office Bldg., 505-247-1555
Alexandria, VA 22314, 300 N. Lee St., 703-683-2681
Anchorage, AK 99510, Federal bldg., 907-272-6414
Atlanta, GA 30303, 275 Peachtree St. NE, 404-521-3900
Baltimore, MD 21207, 7142 Ambassador Rd., 301-265-8080
Birminghan, AL 35203, Room 1400, 2121 Bldg. 205-252-7705 
Boston, MA 02203, J.F. Kennedy Federal Office Bldg., 617-742-5533
Buffalo, NY 14202, 111 W. Huron St., 716-856-7800
Butte, MT 59701, U.S. Courthouse and Federal Bldg., 406-792-2304
Charlotte, NC 28202, Jefferson Standard Life Bldg., 704-372-5485
Chicago, IL 60604, Everett McKinley Dirksen Bldg., 312-431-1333
Cincinnati, OH 45202, 400 U.S. Post Office & Crthse Bldg., 513-421-4310
Cleveland, OH 44199, Federal Office Bldg., 216-522-1401
Columbia, SC 29201, 1529 Hampton St., 803-254-3011
Dallas TX 75201, 1810 Commrce St., 214-741-1851
Denver, CO 80202, Federal Office Bldg., 303-629-7171
Detroit, MI 48226, 477 Michigan Ave., 313-965-2323
El Paso, TX 79901, 202 U.S. Courthosue Bldg., 915-533-7451
Honolulu, HI 96850, 300 Ala Moana Blvd., 808-521-1411
Houston, TX 77002, 6015 Fed. Bldg and U.S.Courthouse, 713-224-1511
Indianapolis, IN 46202, 575 N. Pennsylvania St., 317-639-3301
Jackson, MS 39205, Unifirst Federal and Loan Bldg., 601-948-5000
Jacksonville, FL 32211, 7820 Arlington Expressway, 904-721-1211
Kansas City, MO 64106, 300 U.S. Courthouse Bldg., 816-221-6100
Knoxville, TN 37919, 1111 Northshore Dr., 615-588-8571
Las Vegas, NV 89101, Federal Office Bldg., 702-385-1281
Little Rock, AR 72201, 215 U.S Post Office Bldg., 501-372-7211
Los Angeles, CA 90024, 11000 Wilshire Blvd, 213-272-6161
Louisville, KY 40202, Federal Bldg., 502-583-3941
Memphis, TN 38103, Clifford Davis Federal bldg., 901-525-7373
Miami, FL 33137, 3801 Biscayne Blvd., 305-573-3333
Milwaukee, WI 53202, Federal Bldg and U.S. Courthouse, 414-276-4681
Minneapolis, MN 55401, 392 Federal Bldg., 612-339-7846
Mobile, AL 36602, Federal Bldg., 205-438-3675
Newark, NJ 07101, Gateway I, Market St., 201-622-5613
New Haven, CT 06510, 170 Orange St., 203-777-6311
New Orleans, LA 70113, 701 Loyola Ave., 504-522-4671
New York, NY 10007, 26 Federal Plaza, 212-553-2700
Norfolk, VA, 23502, 870 N. Military Hwy., 804-461-2121
Oklahoma City, OK 73118, 50 Penn Pl. NW, 405-842-7471
Omaha, NB 68102, 215 N. 17th St., 402-348-1210
Philadelpha, PA 19106, Federal Office Bldg., 215-629-0800
Phoenix, AZ 85004, 2721 N. central Ave., 602-279-5511
Pittsburgh, PA 15222, Federal Office Bldg., 412-471-2000
Portland, OR 97201, Crown Plaza Bldg., 503-224-4181
Richmond, VA 23220, 200 W. Grace St., 804-644-2531
Sacramento, CA 95825, Federal Bldg., 916-481-9110
St. Louis, MO 63103, 2704 Federal Bldg., 314-241-5357
Salt Lake City, UT 84138, Federal Bldg., 801-355-7521
San Diego, CA 92188, Federal Office Bldg., 619-231-1122
San Francisco, CA 94102, 450 Golden Gate Ave., 415-552-2155
San Juan, PR 00918 U.S. Courthouse and Fed. Bldg., 809-754-6000
Savannah, GA 31405, 5401 Paulson St., 912-354-9911
Seattle, WA 98174, 915 2nd Ave., 206-622-0460
Springfield, IL 62702, 535 W. Jefferson St., 217-522-9675
Tampa, FL 33602, Federal Office Bldg., 813-228-7661
Washington, DC 20535, 9th and Pennsylvania Ave. NW, 202-324-3000
 
FEDERAL AGENCIES (SELECTED ADDRESSES)
 
Central Intelligence Agency
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
202-351-5659
 
Civil Service Commission
Appropriate Bureau (Bureau of Personnel Investigation,
Bureau of Personnel Information Systems, etc.)
Civil Service Commission
1900 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20415
202-632-4431
 
Commission on Civil Rights
General Counsel, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
1121 Vermont Ae., N.W. Room 600
Washington, D.C. 20415
202-254-6610
 
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Office of the Secretary
Consumer Product Safety Commission
1111 18th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20207
202-624-7700
 
Department of Defense/Dept. of Air Force
Freedom of Information Manager
Headquarters, USAF/DADF
Washington, D.C. 20330-5025
202-697-3467
 
----------------------------------------------------------------



--
Mark Chen 
chen at netcom.com
415/329-6913
finger for PGP public key
D4 99 54 2A 98 B1 48 0C  CF 95 A5 B0 6E E0 1E 1D





From fhalper at pilot.njin.net  Mon Oct  3 12:13:21 1994
From: fhalper at pilot.njin.net (Frederic Halper)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 12:13:21 PDT
Subject: Puzzle Palace
Message-ID: <9410031913.AA05574@pilot.njin.net>


I just finished reading the Puzzle Palace and I thought it was quite interesting
Does anyone know where I could find some more info on the NRO and DIA, or even
info on what the NSA has been up to for the last ten or so years, besides the
obvious.  Thanks to whoever recommended the book to me, I don't remember who it
was. 
Reuben

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reuben Halper                       "I'm not growing up, I'm just burnin' out."
Montclair High                                   - Green Day -
Montclair, NJ
E-mail: fhalper at pilot.njin.net
                 or                         PGP 2.6ui Public Key
          Reuben8878 at aol.com                available upon request
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------





From vkisosza at nucleus.com  Mon Oct  3 12:13:33 1994
From: vkisosza at nucleus.com (Istvan von Keszi)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 12:13:33 PDT
Subject: List of reliable remailers
In-Reply-To: <199410031350.GAA04690@kiwi.CS.Berkeley.EDU>
Message-ID: <Pine.BSI.3.90.941003125455.23080B-100000@bsdi.nucleus.com>




On Mon, 3 Oct 1994, Raph Levien wrote:

>    I have written and installed a remailer pinging script which
> collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability.
> 
>    To use it, just finger remailer-list at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu

Thanks Raph.  This is very helpful for those of us who are code 
handicapped.  This is very helpful as a general guide.  

Unfortunately, I've found that the information that it provides does not  
help me with remailer reliability.  I've seen a remailer that supposedly 
has a latency of 8 or 9 hours, actually delay 24.  

This makes your script fairly ineffectual.

You can't do diddly with bad data ...

--
Istvan.







From tcmay at netcom.com  Mon Oct  3 12:22:47 1994
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 12:22:47 PDT
Subject: Puzzle Palace
In-Reply-To: <9410031913.AA05574@pilot.njin.net>
Message-ID: <199410031921.MAA22133@netcom13.netcom.com>


Frederic Halper wrote:
> 
> I just finished reading the Puzzle Palace and I thought it was quite interesting
> Does anyone know where I could find some more info on the NRO and DIA, or even
> info on what the NSA has been up to for the last ten or so years, besides the
> obvious.  Thanks to whoever recommended the book to me, I don't remember who it
> was. 

William Burrows, "Deep Black." About the spy satellite business, thus
covering NRO and such. (A newer name now being seen in "Central
Imagery Office.")

Jeffery Richelson, "U.S. Intelligence Agencies" (or somesuch). Lots of
detail on various agencies. Richelson has also written on non-U.S.
agencies.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo at toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay






From dawagner at phoenix.Princeton.EDU  Mon Oct  3 13:27:46 1994
From: dawagner at phoenix.Princeton.EDU (David A. Wagner)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 13:27:46 PDT
Subject: Anyone seen the 'quantum cryptanalysis' thread?
In-Reply-To: <9410030816.AA25214@ua.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9410032008.AA23352@burn.Princeton.EDU>


> 
> As I'm sure somebody else has pointed out somewhere along this thread, the
> ability to simultaneously analyze a superposition of an arbitrarilly large
> subset of all possible imputs (as our theoretical quantum cryptanalytic
> device might) implies to ability to solve, in polynomial time, any
> exponential time problem.
> 

I just wanted to point out that I'm not sure this is true.

I might be wrong; I'm a total newbie here.  However, my impression
was that it is *not* known that "anything in NP is solvable in
quantum polytime (BQP)".

I think it's been shown that, relative to a random oracle, it's not
true that NP is contained in BQP.  Then again, I'm told that oracle
results are often misleading and usually not worth a bean.  <shrug>
I don't know much about this stuff. :-(

[This oracle result is mentioned in Schor's paper.]

Hopefully someone more clueful than I will explain this stuff :-)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
David Wagner                                             dawagner at princeton.edu




From jamesd at netcom.com  Mon Oct  3 14:14:08 1994
From: jamesd at netcom.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 14:14:08 PDT
Subject: Manufacturing quantum computers
In-Reply-To: <9410030416.AA10229@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199410032113.OAA29471@netcom8.netcom.com>


Sherry Mayo writes
> Regarding the quantum cryptography thread: Some people expressed the
> view that although the idea may be workable, the manufacturing technology
> was a long way of being able to produce quantum computers.
> The quantum dot design proposed by Eckert et al for a quantum "factorisation
> engine" requires 100000 quantum dots (to factorise RSA-129 or similar)
> which are each about 10nm across to be fairly densly packed onto a 
> chip. I'm not so sure about this being 'a long way off' in terms of materials
> technology,


Current art is fairly close to making components whose interaction
requires a full quantum description.

To make a quantum computer from such components requires that
that the components be orders of magnitude faster and more
reversible.

Presently known quantum algorithms cannot tolerate the loss of 
a single quantum of energy, as this will introduce
vacuum noise into the data.

The longer the algorithm takes, the less energy there
is in a single quantum of energy, thus the components
for any long quantum algorithm, such as factoring a 1024 bit
number, must be very fast indeed (near infrared frequencies)
and extraordinarily efficient (fully reversible classical,
non quantum computation.)

Although quantum computers are interesting and important,
they have no immediate practical relevance to cryptography.

Error tolerant algorithms could change the picture substantially,
but they would still require components far beyond current
art.




-- 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
We have the right to defend ourselves and our
property, because of the kind of animals that we              James A. Donald
are.  True law derives from this right, not from
the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state.                jamesd at netcom.com





From jamesd at netcom.com  Mon Oct  3 14:23:47 1994
From: jamesd at netcom.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 14:23:47 PDT
Subject: Anyone seen the 'quantum cryptanalysis' thread?
In-Reply-To: <9410030816.AA25214@ua.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <199410032121.OAA00605@netcom8.netcom.com>


solman at MIT.EDU writes
> As I'm sure somebody else has pointed out somewhere along this thread, the
> ability to simultaneously analyze a superposition of an arbitrarilly large
> subset of all possible imputs (as our theoretical quantum cryptanalytic
> device might) implies to ability to solve, in polynomial time, any
> exponential time problem.

As far as is know, quantum computers cannot solve NP complete problems
in polynomial time.

They can solve some problems (such as factoring) that classical
computers cannot solve in polynomial time.

-- 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
We have the right to defend ourselves and our
property, because of the kind of animals that we              James A. Donald
are.  True law derives from this right, not from
the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state.                jamesd at netcom.com





From jya at pipeline.com  Mon Oct  3 15:14:26 1994
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 15:14:26 PDT
Subject: Humorous / Chilling FOIA Requests
Message-ID: <199410032213.SAA00596@pipe4.pipeline.com>



Responding to msg by ogd at selway.umt.edu (ozymandias G 
desiderata) on Mon, 03 Oct 11:49 AM

>	On the same note, do any of you have any humorous / 
>chilling  stories about what you found out when you got 
>your file?


The best I heard is that of a fairly noteworthy 60s radical who 
asked for his FBI file and was completely demoralized to learn 
that his FOIA request was the first and only item in his brand 
new file.

No one there cared about him until then -- or so he was told.  
Since then I have heard that this was a
technique used by the LEAs to blow people away and discourage 
them from getting their real files.
Quite illegal, to be sure, but well within approved procedures 
of the time.  Probably still done.

John





From sommerfeld at orchard.medford.ma.us  Mon Oct  3 16:08:43 1994
From: sommerfeld at orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 16:08:43 PDT
Subject: Mandatory Email verification
In-Reply-To: <199410030328.UAA23919@netcom8.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199410032258.SAA00831@orchard.medford.ma.us>


> Ken Landaiche writes
> > I have seen that
> > any system a human can devise, another human can eventually break. 
> 
> False.  Most cryptographic algorithms these days are secure.

Huh?  How do you count that?  There are dozens of algorithms described
in Schneier; most are described as either being of unknown strength
(due to insufficient cryptanalysis), or broken, or substantially
similar to a broken cipher.  Only a few are described as strong.

There's only one unconditionally secure cipher: the true one-time-pad.

> Windows NT is secure.

And pigs can fly, and you have prime development land for sale in
south Florida..

					- Bill






From cjl at welchlink.welch.jhu.edu  Mon Oct  3 16:44:18 1994
From: cjl at welchlink.welch.jhu.edu (cjl)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 16:44:18 PDT
Subject: List of reliable remailers
In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSI.3.90.941003125455.23080B-100000@bsdi.nucleus.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.89.9410031959.A29441-0100000@welchlink.welch.jhu.edu>



On Mon, 3 Oct 1994, Istvan von Keszi wrote:

> Thanks Raph.  This is very helpful for those of us who are code 
> handicapped.  This is very helpful as a general guide.  
> 
> Unfortunately, I've found that the information that it provides does not  
> help me with remailer reliability.  I've seen a remailer that supposedly 
> has a latency of 8 or 9 hours, actually delay 24.  
> 
> This makes your script fairly ineffectual.
> 
> You can't do diddly with bad data ...
> 
> Istvan.

You are perhaps more than just code handicapped.  It seems you also fail to
perceive the implicit YMMV clause that comes with using a service 
*provided gratis* by someone else.  Ask Raph real nicely, and maybe he'll 
send you the code for the remail-pinging script so you can run it from 
your particular corner of the Net, it wouldn't be unprecedented, after 
all, Raph has freely distributed his hack of premail.

But then again it wouldn't be unprecedented for him to tell you go stuff 
yourself.  Genuine bug reports on an author's work are best discussed first 
in private E-mail, and brought to the attention of the list if it is more 
than a trivial gripe.  BTW, I don't recall seeing the FedEx remailer that 
promises delivery by 10:00 am the next business morning, or in fact any 
remailer that promises delivery at all.  Caveat poster.

It is an ill-mannered guest who complains that the wonderous toys 
provided for him to play with sometimes fail to satisfy his every whim. 

C. J. Leonard                     (    /      "DNA is groovy"
                                   \ /                - Watson & Crick
<cjl at welchlink.welch.jhu.edu>      / \     <--  major groove
                                  (    \
Finger for public key               \   )
Strong-arm for secret key             /    <--  minor groove
Thumb-screws for pass-phrase        /   ) 




From sinclai at ecf.toronto.edu  Mon Oct  3 16:51:17 1994
From: sinclai at ecf.toronto.edu (SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 16:51:17 PDT
Subject: Bomb information ban
Message-ID: <94Oct3.195100edt.4181@cannon.ecf.toronto.edu>


Caught from the radio this morning:

    Toronto (Canada) city council is debating a by-law to ban information
on bomb construction.  This after one of the council members was mailed
a faulty (or fake) pipe-bomb.  Rough quote: ~This is different than the
gun control issue because there is no valid use for bombs.~

I wonder how much of the libraries' engineering books section they'll
have to burn because of this.






From merriman at metronet.com  Mon Oct  3 17:09:21 1994
From: merriman at metronet.com (David K. Merriman)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 17:09:21 PDT
Subject: Judge Rejects Delay on FBI Wiretap Data
Message-ID: <199410040002.AA18561@metronet.com>


>Subject: Judge Rejects Delay on FBI Wiretap Data
>Date: 3 Oct 1994 16:49:03 GMT

>=============================================================

>PRESS RELEASE

>For immediate release
>October 3, 1994

>Contact:
>   Marc Rotenberg, EPIC Director
>   David Sobel, EPIC Legal Counsel
>   202 544 9240 (tel)


>            JUDGE REJECTS DELAY ON FBI WIRETAP DATA;

>                 "STUNNED" BY BUREAU'S REQUEST

>WASHINGTON, D.C.- A federal judge today denied the FBI's request 
>for a five-year delay in processing documents concerning wiretap 
>legislation now pending in Congress.  

>     Saying he was "stunned" by the Bureau's attempt to postpone 
>court proceedings for five years, U.S. District Judge Charles R. 
>Richey ordered the FBI to release the material or to explain its 
>reasons for withholding it by November 4.

>     The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), a public 
>interest research group based in Washington, DC, filed the Freedom 
>of Information Act lawsuit on August 9, the day legislation was 
>introduced in Congress to authorize the expenditure of $500 
>million to make the nation's communications systems easier to 
>wiretap.  The group is seeking the public release of two surveys 
>cited by FBI Director Louis Freeh in support of the pending 
>legislation. 

>     The FBI had moved to stay proceedings in the case until June 
>1999, more than five years after the filing of the initial 
>request.  The Bureau asserted it was confronted with "a backlog of 
>pending FOIA requests awaiting processing."  The FBI revealed that 
>there are "an estimated 20 pages to be reviewed" but said that the 
>materials would not be reviewed until "sometime in March 1999."

>     Judge Richey rejected the FBI's claims in sharp language from 
>the bench.  He told the government's attorney to "call Director 
>Freeh and tell him I said this matter can be taken care of in an 
>hour and a half."

>     In court papers filed late last week, EPIC charged that 
>the requested materials are far too important to be kept secret. 
>"The requested surveys were part of the FBI's long-standing 
>campaign to gain passage of unprecedented legislation requiring 
>the nation's telecommunications carriers to redesign their 
>telephone networks to more easily facilitate court-ordered 
>wiretapping," said the EPIC brief.

>     Earlier documents obtained through the FOIA in similar 
>litigation with the FBI revealed no technical obstacles to the 
>exercise of court-authorized wire surveillance.

>     The FBI is pushing for quick enactment of the wiretap 
>legislation in the closing days of the 103rd Congress.  A 
>grassroots campaign to oppose the measure is being coordinated by 
>EPIC and Voters Telecomm Watch.

>     The Electronic Privacy Information Center is a project of 
>Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, a membership 
>organization based in Palo Alto, California, and the Fund for 
>Constitutional Government, a Washington-based foundation dedicated 
>to the protection of Constitutional freedoms. 202 544 9240 (tel), 
>202 547 5482 (fax), info at epic.org (e-mail).

>=============================================================

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Finger merriman at metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints.
Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender.  PGP preferred.
Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to
*love* Big Brother.






From perry at jpunix.com  Mon Oct  3 17:10:59 1994
From: perry at jpunix.com (John A. Perry)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 17:10:59 PDT
Subject: List of reliable remailers
Message-ID: <199410040010.TAA02848@jpunix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Mon, 3 Oct 1994, Istvan von Keszi wrote:

> Thanks Raph.  This is very helpful for those of us who are code 
> handicapped.  This is very helpful as a general guide.  
> 
> Unfortunately, I've found that the information that it provides does not  
> help me with remailer reliability.  I've seen a remailer that supposedly 
> has a latency of 8 or 9 hours, actually delay 24.  
> 
> This makes your script fairly ineffectual.
> 
> You can't do diddly with bad data ...
> 
> Istvan.

If you think you can do a better job *gratis*, I'll be more than happy to
send you a copy of the remailer code that I run on jpunix.com. Also, I'll
bet Raph would send you a copy of the ping code so you can demonstrate the
superior service you can provide. If you really don't think you can
provide a superior service... well... people that live in glass houses... 

John Perry - perry at jpunix.com

P.S. If you don't know what gratis means, drop me an email message and 
I'll try to explain it to you.

- -- 

 PGP 2.61 key for perry at jpunix.com is on the keyservers.
 PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome!


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.1

iQCVAwUBLpCdW1OTpEThrthvAQF2bgP9FSuPvxUljINzhINA97VVRaxS/gps5Vw/
NSKub5o93yaGCJoBClYUplxh+Foe9Gqm/+hjJc+pMAaG7HYI2rMRgy7Ro9tyt3Dk
QOakuJljmDEKVP2XEq051tH7y1TXI7+FLmnG5y4i2ukRXDVCK0kK5JtP4rY2l8Sa
ty3hXYRVKoE=
=qddV
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From merriman at metronet.com  Mon Oct  3 19:17:47 1994
From: merriman at metronet.com (David K. Merriman)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 19:17:47 PDT
Subject: Bomb information ban
Message-ID: <199410040216.AA05466@metronet.com>


>Caught from the radio this morning:
>
>    Toronto (Canada) city council is debating a by-law to ban information
>on bomb construction.  This after one of the council members was mailed
>a faulty (or fake) pipe-bomb.  Rough quote: ~This is different than the
>gun control issue because there is no valid use for bombs.~
                           ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Bull.  They're great for blowing something up.....

>
>I wonder how much of the libraries' engineering books section they'll
>have to burn because of this.
>
>

All.  What part of Engineering doesn't have some impact or use in
bombmaking/usage?

Dave Merriman
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Finger merriman at metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints.
Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender.  PGP preferred.
Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to
*love* Big Brother.






From solman at MIT.EDU  Mon Oct  3 21:01:48 1994
From: solman at MIT.EDU (solman at MIT.EDU)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 21:01:48 PDT
Subject: Anyone seen the 'quantum cryptanalysis' thread?
In-Reply-To: <9410032008.AA23352@burn.Princeton.EDU>
Message-ID: <9410040401.AA03583@ua.MIT.EDU>


> > As I'm sure somebody else has pointed out somewhere along this thread, the
> > ability to simultaneously analyze a superposition of an arbitrarilly large
> > subset of all possible imputs (as our theoretical quantum cryptanalytic
> > device might) implies to ability to solve, in polynomial time, any
> > exponential time problem.
 
> I just wanted to point out that I'm not sure this is true.
> 
> I might be wrong; I'm a total newbie here.  However, my impression
> was that it is *not* known that "anything in NP is solvable in
> quantum polytime (BQP)".

Well its quite possible that I am wrong since I didn't exactly have the
easiest time reading the papers on the subject. But this is my reasoning:

If you can create a machine that gives you a yes or no result (yes at least
one of the subset of possible inputs entered into the machine contains
the properties you are looking for [i.e. does not destructively interfere],
or no there aren't any) then you can construct an quantum computer that
tests for the property(s) the correct answer must have (in the case of
factoring, the machine will test whether or not inputs divide the modulus).
You can now repeatedly enter as inputs superpositions of inputs that include
precisely half of all inputs that might (given the information that has
already been gathered) be correct). You will now be able to mount a brute
force attack searching through 2^n possibilities in order n time. It should
be possible to nest these machines (although admitedly this does nasty
things to the physical complexity of the quantum computer. It doesn't
seem like the complexity would grow exponentially in the case of nesting
[in fact it seems like it would go quadratically with the nesting level]
but I'd have to think about it some more before I could claim to be confident
of that.) thus allowing us to reduce any problem of time complexity
e^X(n) (where X is either a polynomial in n or of the form e^X(n) [this
goes on recursively]) to a problem of polynomial time complexity.

JWS





From cjl at welchlink.welch.jhu.edu  Mon Oct  3 21:11:53 1994
From: cjl at welchlink.welch.jhu.edu (cjl)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 21:11:53 PDT
Subject: Bomb information ban
In-Reply-To: <199410040216.AA05466@metronet.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.89.9410032327.A10386-0100000@welchlink.welch.jhu.edu>


On Mon, 3 Oct 1994, David K. Merriman wrote:

> >Caught from the radio this morning:
> >
> >    Toronto (Canada) city council is debating a by-law to ban information
> >on bomb construction.  This after one of the council members was mailed
> >a faulty (or fake) pipe-bomb.  Rough quote: ~This is different than the
> >gun control issue because there is no valid use for bombs.~
> 
> Bull.  They're great for blowing something up.....
> 
> >I wonder how much of the libraries' engineering books section they'll
> >have to burn because of this.
> 
> All.  What part of Engineering doesn't have some impact or use in
> bombmaking/usage?

Genetic Engineering, of course, my silico-centric friend :-)

Query:  Why is it that, when the usual stream of crypto-conversation
begins to dry up, the topic of bombs comes up?  Maybe crypto-anarchists
should seek to replace the traditional symbol of anarchy (you know, the
bowling ball with the fuse) with something more moderne.  Any suggestions
on what the well-dressed (black trenchcoat and fedora, for tradition's
sake) crypto-anarchist is seen clutching in his hand as he skulks off into
shadows of Blacknet???  You know, something that would make a good .gif.

C. J. Leonard                  (    /      "DNA is groovy"
                                \ /                - Watson & Crick
<cjl at welchlink.welch,jhu.edu>   / \     <--  major groove
                               (    \
Finger for public key            \   )
Strong-arm for secret key          /    <--  minor groove
Thumb-screws for pass-phrase     /   )




From merriman at metronet.com  Mon Oct  3 21:30:27 1994
From: merriman at metronet.com (David K. Merriman)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 21:30:27 PDT
Subject: Bomb information ban
Message-ID: <199410040429.AA00334@metronet.com>


>> All.  What part of Engineering doesn't have some impact or use in
>> bombmaking/usage?
>
>Genetic Engineering, of course, my silico-centric friend :-)
>

Ah, but genetic engineering could conceivably produce people that were
genetically predisposed to suicide missions :-)
Besides, genetic engineering more properly belongs to biology, does it not,
since it isn't sufficiently precise as to permit "true" engineering?

>Query:  Why is it that, when the usual stream of crypto-conversation
>begins to dry up, the topic of bombs comes up?  

'Cause they're fun, and go "bang"? ('cept for the hush-a-boom, of course)

>                                               Maybe crypto-anarchists
>should seek to replace the traditional symbol of anarchy (you know, the
>bowling ball with the fuse) with something more moderne.  Any suggestions
>on what the well-dressed (black trenchcoat and fedora, for tradition's
>sake) crypto-anarchist is seen clutching in his hand as he skulks off into
>shadows of Blacknet???  

A floppy disk?

>                       You know, something that would make a good .gif.

>Finger for public key            \   )
>Strong-arm for secret key          /    <--  minor groove
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>Thumb-screws for pass-phrase     /   )
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Tempting the fates, are we? :-)

Dave Merriman
>
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Finger merriman at metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints.
Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender.  PGP preferred.
Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to
*love* Big Brother.






From hughes at ah.com  Mon Oct  3 21:30:42 1994
From: hughes at ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 21:30:42 PDT
Subject: Bomb information ban
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.89.9410032327.A10386-0100000@welchlink.welch.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <9410040349.AA04455@ah.com>


   should seek to replace the traditional symbol of anarchy (you know, the
   bowling ball with the fuse) with something more moderne. 

What, like a zero with a one sticking out?

You do know, of course, that explosives increase the entropy of their
targets toward maximum.

Eric





From hughes at ah.com  Mon Oct  3 21:43:01 1994
From: hughes at ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 21:43:01 PDT
Subject: US Should Forbid Export of Digital Wiretap Technology (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <940930.193922.2e6.rusnews.w165w@sendai.cybrspc.mn.org>
Message-ID: <9410040401.AA04482@ah.com>


   comp.society.privacy yields the following from crawford at scipp.ucsc.edu
   (Mike Crawford).  I _think_ it's black humor, but the moderator of c.s.p
   seems to have accepted it at face value.

No, it's serious, and it's brilliant.

The gambit is this.  The law enforcement community argues that they
won't abuse their technical ability to wiretap.  Implicitly they
acknowledge that such ability is both possible and undesirable.  Now
Mike Crawford observes that legal safeguards, _which are the only
safeguards_, do not exist in other countries, and therefore
uncontrollable wiretapping, which is acknowledged undesirable, should
be restricted by law in this country which prevents such equipment
from being deployed in a country without safeguards.

Now, do you think that any switch manufacturer is going to want to see
their international market torn to shreds like this?

Eric





From storm at marlin.ssnet.com  Mon Oct  3 22:12:44 1994
From: storm at marlin.ssnet.com (Don Melvin)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 22:12:44 PDT
Subject: Puzzle Palace
In-Reply-To: <9410031913.AA05574@pilot.njin.net>
Message-ID: <9410040511.AA14669@marlin.ssnet.com>


> 
> I just finished reading the Puzzle Palace and I thought it was quite interesting
> Does anyone know where I could find some more info on the NRO and DIA, or even
> info on what the NSA has been up to for the last ten or so years, besides the
> obvious.  Thanks to whoever recommended the book to me, I don't remember who it
> was. 

On the opposite side, there is a new book just being released that's
written by a KGB (ex-KGB) general who was based here and involved in US
operations.  For example, he ran Walker.  Sorry, don't know title or author
but there's probably not that many new books by KGB spies.

	Later, Storm




From jamesd at netcom.com  Mon Oct  3 23:41:59 1994
From: jamesd at netcom.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 94 23:41:59 PDT
Subject: Chomsky quote (thread from hell)
Message-ID: <199410040627.XAA03131@netcom15.netcom.com>


I wrote:
> >  Of course Noam Chomsky is optimistic - he favors limitless and
> >  absolute state power and the forcible and violent silencing of all
> >  those who deviate from political correctness.
 
 
"L. Todd Masco" <cactus at bb.com> quotes one of Chomksy's
pious platitudes on freedom of speech:
 
>   In my opinion, not only mainstream intellectuals but also
>   others who produce a constant stream of lies, distortion,
>   racist screeds, etc., should be permitted freedom of
>   speech.
 
To put this in its proper context, Chomsky also believes
in socialism, in the sense of the "people" controlling the
means of production, distribution, and supply, and in
particular, the "people" running the mass media.
 
Does Chomsky really believe that such a society can
operate without its Gulag?
 
Is he a fool, or is he a monster?
 
In my previous writings on this thread I have shown
examples where Chomsky carefully chooses words so as to
convince us that freedom of speech is not freedom, and
that control of speech is freedom.
 
Let us examine the above quote from Chomsky.
 
You will notice that Chomsky has carefully expressed
himself in the manner that is least likely to make us feel
favorable to freedom of speech.  He piously declares
himself in favor of it, but expresses himself in such a
manner as to make an argument against freedom of speech.
 
The intended effect is to make us feel that such "extreme"
freedom of speech is a bit excessive and not really
necessary or desirable.
 
In the above quote Chomsky implies that freedom of speech
is divisible -- he implies that we can suppress wicked,
obnoxious, and obviously false ideas, without closing down
everyone's ability to communicate political thought.
 
Thus he is actually making a misleading and spurious
argument *against* freedom of speech at the same time as he
is piously declaring himself to be in favor of freedom of
speech.
 
Let us also look at the examples he gives of people abusing
freedom of speech.  Notice that every example that he gives
are powerful and priviledged people who plainly need no
protection, never the weak and vulnerable silenced by the
powerful and arrogant:
 
>   hypocrites, like faculty senates who choose one
>   particularly and usually quite marginal example because
>   career and power interests are served thereby, while
>   ignoring vastly more significant and awful cases because
>   the opposite is true.  And Congress, of which the same is
>   correct.
 
 
Let me give a counter example to Chomksy's implied argument
that it is safe to silence dissidents, and that dissidents
are powerful and priviledged servants of capitalism.
 
Edward O Wilson.
 
Back in the late seventies, when political correctness was
so powerful that we did *not* see two dozen books
protesting about how powerful it was, Edward O. Wilson was
silenced by threats and violence.
 
Among other things he was accused of emitting "a constant
stream of lies, distortion, racist screeds, etc."
 
In fact he his heresy had nothing whatsoever to do with
race -- indeed he was a political innocent with no
particular political ideas, who was largely unaware that
his work had political implications, unaware that his work
would be used by other people to make the argument that
property was a result of the nature of man, and that
socialism was contrary to the nature of man.
 
Because many of the thugs sent against him were black, the
totally false claim was made, that he continually insulted
black people with racist fighting words.
 
Suddenly people realized, that just as in the market every
thing is connected to everything else, so that one state
intervention necessarily requires further state
intervention in order to achieve the desired effect, in
the same fashion, every idea is connected to every other
idea, so silencing some ideas necessarily requires
silencing other ideas.  In the end the only way to
coercively suppress ideas is to ensure that only a single
voice is heard.
 
Thus the backlash against political correctness started.
 
What happened to Edward Wilson then, could not happen
today, which is why it is now safe for academics to write
books on how powerful political correctness is, something
they would not have dared to do seven years ago.
 
 
The full quote by Chomsky in all its pious hypocricy.
 
>Noam Chomsky, in a 4/16/94 e-mail response to a question from Steve
>Shalom, says:
>
>   In my opinion, not only mainstream intellectuals but also others
>   who produce a constant stream of lies, distortion, racist screeds,
>   etc., should be permitted freedom of speech.  The state should not
>   have the power to stop them.  The same freedom extends to
>   hypocrites, like faculty senates who choose one particularly and
>   usually quite marginal example because career and power interests
>   are served thereby, while ignoring vastly more significant and
>   awful cases because the opposite is true.  And Congress, of which
>   the same is correct.
 
I did not see this quote:  I am relying on Todd for the
accuracy of this quote, but I have seen plenty of similar
hypocritical smears against liberty by Chomsky.  The above
piece of catty nastiness is classic Chomsky, and I could
easily dig up a dozen similar examples of the kind of
support that he gives liberty.
 
 
--
---------------------------------------------------------------------
We have the right to defend ourselves and our
property, because of the kind of animals that we        James A. Donald
are.  True law derives from this right, not from
the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state.            jamesd at netcom.com





From tcmay at netcom.com  Tue Oct  4 00:38:54 1994
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 00:38:54 PDT
Subject: Puzzle Palace
In-Reply-To: <9410040511.AA14669@marlin.ssnet.com>
Message-ID: <199410040738.AAA00422@netcom8.netcom.com>


Don Melvin wrote:

> On the opposite side, there is a new book just being released that's
> written by a KGB (ex-KGB) general who was based here and involved in US
> operations.  For example, he ran Walker.  Sorry, don't know title or author
> but there's probably not that many new books by KGB spies.

"Special Tasks," Sudaplatov.

(give or take...this is from memory)

This actually came out about 6 months ago, so it may be worth waiting
for the paperback. I skimmed the book in a bookstore, but saw various
pieces on this book and its implications on MacNeil-Lehrer and
Nightline.

Lots of revelations, but little confirmation.

--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo at toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay






From tcmay at netcom.com  Tue Oct  4 00:51:47 1994
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 00:51:47 PDT
Subject: Puzzle Palace
In-Reply-To: <199410040738.AAA00422@netcom8.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199410040751.AAA01351@netcom8.netcom.com>


Timothy C. May wrote:

> "Special Tasks," Sudaplatov.
> 
> (give or take...this is from memory)
> 
> This actually came out about 6 months ago, so it may be worth waiting
> for the paperback. I skimmed the book in a bookstore, but saw various

Sorry, I may have responded too quickly. Maybe Don Melvin was talker
about a _newer_ book than the Sudaplatov book, which is the only one I
know about. 

Sudaplatov didn't run Walker, that's for sure.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo at toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay






From GRABOW_GEOFFREY at tandem.com  Tue Oct  4 00:58:12 1994
From: GRABOW_GEOFFREY at tandem.com (GRABOW_GEOFFREY at tandem.com)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 00:58:12 PDT
Subject: Bomb information ban
Message-ID: <199410040057.AA21305@comm.Tandem.COM>



>    Toronto (Canada) city council is debating a by-law to ban informatio
>on bomb construction.  This after one of the council members was mailed
>a faulty (or fake) pipe-bomb.  Rough quote: ~This is different than the
>gun control issue because there is no valid use for bombs.~

    Bombs are used by building demolition teams, excavation workers and
(believe it or not) there are even a few artists who use explosives to
create their particular brand of art.  I won't even mention 4th of July
fireworks and the creators thereof.

    Granted, not many people fall into these catagories, but does that
mean that the rest of us are entirely un-interested in how they work.
A student of physics might be interested in the physics of a falling
building...  Okay, I reaching, but the possibility exists!

                                                     G.C.G.

 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 | Geoffrey C. Grabow          | "What we demand are rigidly defined    |
 | Oyster Bay, New York        |   areas of doubt and uncertainty!"     |
 |                             |         --------------------           |
 | grabow_geoffrey at tandem.com  | Clipper, SkipJack & Digital Telephony  |
 |                             |             JUST SAY NO!!!             |
 |----------------------------------------------------------------------|
 |PGP 2.6 fingerprint = AA 9E 35 12 F8 93 72 8D  1C E5 D5 BC 74 BE 49 D3|
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From tcmay at netcom.com  Tue Oct  4 01:23:43 1994
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 01:23:43 PDT
Subject: Bomb information ban
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.89.9410032327.A10386-0100000@welchlink.welch.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <199410040822.BAA03511@netcom8.netcom.com>


cjl wrote:

> Query:  Why is it that, when the usual stream of crypto-conversation
> begins to dry up, the topic of bombs comes up?  Maybe crypto-anarchists
> should seek to replace the traditional symbol of anarchy (you know, the
> bowling ball with the fuse) with something more moderne.  Any suggestions
> on what the well-dressed (black trenchcoat and fedora, for tradition's
> sake) crypto-anarchist is seen clutching in his hand as he skulks off into
> shadows of Blacknet???  You know, something that would make a good .gif.

But "bombes" have long had a strong connection to cryptography. Lots
of bombes at Bletchley Park.

As to what well-dressed crypto anarchists are carrying...perhaps a
copy of Schneier. Or a PGP diskette.

But since neither of those will make for a very comprehensible
graphic, perhaps the trench-coated crypto anarchist should be seated
in front of a terminal?

--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo at toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay






From danielce at ee.mu.oz.au  Tue Oct  4 02:12:47 1994
From: danielce at ee.mu.oz.au (Daniel Carosone)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 02:12:47 PDT
Subject: Bomb information ban
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.89.9410032327.A10386-0100000@welchlink.welch.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <199410040914.TAA19043@anarres.mame.mu.oz.au>



Timothy C. May writes:

 > [symbol picture ideas]
 > 
 > But since neither of those will make for a very comprehensible
 > graphic, perhaps the trench-coated crypto anarchist should be seated
 > in front of a terminal?


Choose whatever picture you like... the *real* symbol is encrypted and
stego'd into it :)

--
Dan.





From frissell at panix.com  Tue Oct  4 03:18:06 1994
From: frissell at panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 03:18:06 PDT
Subject: Bank on the Net
Message-ID: <199410041017.AA13899@panix.com>


Who says there aren't any banks on the net.  Check out Busey Bank's
(Illinois) homepage:

http://www.prairienet.org/business/busey/homepage.htm






From sdw at lig.net  Tue Oct  4 05:59:41 1994
From: sdw at lig.net (Stephen D. Williams)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 05:59:41 PDT
Subject: Bank on the Net
In-Reply-To: <199410041017.AA13899@panix.com>
Message-ID: <m0qs5sa-0009tHC@sdwsys>


> 
> Who says there aren't any banks on the net.  Check out Busey Bank's
> (Illinois) homepage:
> 
> http://www.prairienet.org/business/busey/homepage.htm
> 

I happen to be contracting in the Bay Area for Bank of America till
Feb/Mar...

See: http://www.bankamerica.com

sdw
-- 
Stephen D. Williams  Local Internet Gateway Co.; SDW Systems 510 503-9227APager
LIG dev./sales       Internet: sdw at lig.net  In Bay Area Aug94-Feb95!!!
OO R&D Source Dist.  By Horse: 2464 Rosina Dr., Miamisburg, OH 45342-6430
Internet Consulting  ICBM: 39 38 34N 84 17 12W home, 37 58 41N 122 01 48W work
Newbie Notice:       
     I speak for LIGCo., CCI, myself, and no one else, regardless of
     where it is convenient to post from or thru.




From 74172.314 at compuserve.com  Tue Oct  4 07:20:35 1994
From: 74172.314 at compuserve.com (ss)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 07:20:35 PDT
Subject: TEMPORARILY OUT OF TOUCH
Message-ID: <941004141312_74172.314_GHA77-1@CompuServe.COM>


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
                         SANDY SANDFORT
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C'punks,

Until I get an account problem worked out with CRL (a day or
two?), I won't be getting any e-mail through that service.  If
you need to send me private messages, you may use either of the
following addresses to contact me:

                     ssandfort at attmail.com

                     74172.314 at compuserve.com

Later,


 S a n d y

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From jdblair at phoenix.sas.muohio.edu  Tue Oct  4 08:39:40 1994
From: jdblair at phoenix.sas.muohio.edu (John Blair)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 08:39:40 PDT
Subject: Bomb information ban
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.89.9410032327.A10386-0100000@welchlink.welch.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <9410041538.AA26372@phoenix.sas.muohio.edu>



<cjl at welchlink.welch,jhu.edu> writes:

> 
> Query:  Why is it that, when the usual stream of crypto-conversation
> begins to dry up, the topic of bombs comes up?  Maybe crypto-anarchists
> should seek to replace the traditional symbol of anarchy (you know, the
> bowling ball with the fuse) with something more moderne.  Any suggestions
> on what the well-dressed (black trenchcoat and fedora, for tradition's
> sake) crypto-anarchist is seen clutching in his hand as he skulks off into
> shadows of Blacknet???  You know, something that would make a good .gif.
> 

My favorite anarchist symbol is the monkey wrench.  I don't know exactly 
how much this applies this this group, but I can definately envision 
crypto-monkey wrenchers (if not simply net monkey wrenchers).

-john

---------------------------------------------+----------------------------
John Blair: <jdblair at nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu> | this space for rent...
voice: (513) 529-3980                        |
Unix System Administrator, Juggler           |
Student of Interdisciplinary Studies         |     (finger me for PGP key)





From Kelly.Goen at Eng.Sun.COM  Tue Oct  4 09:04:23 1994
From: Kelly.Goen at Eng.Sun.COM (Kelly Goen [CONTRACTOR])
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 09:04:23 PDT
Subject: Electronic Revolution and Guerilla Warfare?
Message-ID: <199410041604.JAA11120@jurassic.Eng.Sun.COM>


Interesting Post David,
some rather disjoint comments follow:
> > From: merriman at metronet.com (David K. Merriman)
> Subject: Electronic Revolution and Guerilla Warfare?
> 
> What with the governments of several nations around the world starting to
> get a bit heavy-handed with their populaces, I was wondering how a
> modern-day revolution could take place in a crypto-repressive society, and
> how the citizenry could sufficiently rattle/displace such a government so as
> to regain control over their destinies.
> 
> For the purpose of discussion, I'd like to propose the following
> "environmental variables":
> > majority of the population unable/unwilling to do more than complain.
> > minority of the population not sure of how to fight the process, but
> willing to support those that do know.
> > some number (small) of those capable of crypto or other electronic mayhem
> depart the country in a short period bridging the implementation of
> repressive government controls and laws.
> > There are varying permutations of the crypto/electronic-capable, and the
> force-capable (ie, hackers-only to bomb-makers-only, and anything in between).
> > said government uses all means at it's disposal to try and apprehend those
> attempting to resist, as well as intercept communications, prevent damage to
> it's infrastructure and physical entities.

I would suggest initially that one examine the
e-book "Terminal Compromise" by Winn Schwartau and also
Information Warfare by the same author. In addition one also may want
to obtain a project planner package and actually plan every scenario out
along with costs and estimated effects. This would increase the accuracy of your gaming study. One may also wish to include items such as Blacknet in their
gaming study as well as a complete and functional blackmarket. Tim's FAQ
gives a good review of the tech in crypto and remailers available.

Note also for purposes of short term games, knowing ones opponent(i.s. dossiers built up using information brokers and pressure on weak points) tends to be vastly more effective then official routes of change. After all its the oppositions preferred technique. Keep in mind that various hackers have tried this in
a haphazard way and gotten caught at it...


> > at the start of government "hostilities", all intra-national anon
> remailers are seized or shut down, and access to international ones is
> *heavily* monitored or blocked (yeah, I know, but we're gaming here!).
> > national identity medium (card, wristband, etc) in place and mandatory.
> > travel, currency, and information transfer restrictions (ie, no more "How
> to build a Backpack Nuke" or "How to hack the Tax Gestapo central computers"
> books :-)

I expect E-publishing and Data havens for such documents will appear almost immediately after such laws. 

Backpack nukes unless they are for EMP arent too interesting but EMP/HERF
generators are in terms of the attack potential against an information infrastructure.
"Information Warfare" looks at this and other issues.
Is it happening already???
"I can neither confirm nor deny this rumour".

Does our government look at these issues...
I point the interested user to a90-217 SBIR, an early I-Warfare project
" Electronic Countermeasure: Computer Virus" a project to create
military viruses and research into vectoring via RF/induced signal.

> 
> What problems would those willing to fight such government oppression be
> likely to face?  How to deal with those problems?  How to organize and
> exchange personnel/information?  How to not get caught?  How to avoid
> detection? What means/methods of, um, dissonance against such a government
> would be more/less effective? Under what various permutations of
> electronic/physical bushwhacking would the process be successful or not?
> Duration?  Other than the obvious crypto/cyber/military disciplines, what
> other professions or specialized knowledge would be useful under what
> conditions? What blatantly obvious thing(s) have I left out?

Check out loompanics press... they have many such titles useful to your
 research... also checkout Paladin Press and Loompanics press.
look at spy-cell organizations with crypto/remailer substituted for the comm links and dead drops, information brokers help detect infiltration. Laptop
mobile IP with encrypted links and  on-line info-brokers allow one to 
continuously evaluate current local conditions.

The one thing always lacking for me in many of these Crypt-anarchy posts
"Overthrow the government". is a lack of attention the least principles of logistics, economics and proper planning. You can be sure the opposition is paying attention to such details and has a huge advantage because of this.

> 
> Dave Merriman
> - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
> Finger merriman at metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints.
> Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender.  PGP preferred.
> Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to
> *love* Big Brother.
> 

      cheers
      Kelly 





From nobody at cass156.ucsd.edu  Tue Oct  4 11:09:30 1994
From: nobody at cass156.ucsd.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 11:09:30 PDT
Subject: He's dead Jim (Chomsky)
Message-ID: <9410041812.AA27339@nately.UCSD.EDU>


Amazing, absolutely amazing!

Perhaps we should stop reading Chomsky (if we ever did) and read James A.
Donald--he obviously has not only a grasp of what it is people *really*
mean, but also has the spurious arguments to back himself up!

The Chomsky quote of the day:

>   In my opinion, not only mainstream intellectuals but also others
>   who produce a constant stream of lies, distortion, racist screeds,
>   etc., should be permitted freedom of speech.  The state should not
>   have the power to stop them.  The same freedom extends to
>   hypocrites, like faculty senates who choose one particularly and
>   usually quite marginal example because career and power interests
>   are served thereby, while ignoring vastly more significant and
>   awful cases because the opposite is true.  And Congress, of which
>   the same is correct.

In this, James A. Donald finds:
>To put this in its proper context, Chomsky also believes
>in socialism, in the sense of the "people" controlling the
>means of production, distribution, and supply, and in
>particular, the "people" running the mass media.

What? Non sequitur!  No where in Chomsky's quote do we find any remote
resemblance of a reference to mass media; neither to production,
distribution, nor to supply (nor to economics of any kind).  If I had to
piece this together, Mr. Donald erroneously finds the quote: "The state
should not have the power to stop them" to mean that Mr. Chomsky is
advocating that the "people" *should.*

Mr. Donald continues:
>In my previous writings on this thread I have shown
>examples where Chomsky carefully chooses words so as to
>convince us that freedom of speech is not freedom, and
>that control of speech is freedom.

Wrong again.  In his previous writings, James A. Donald *tried to show*
that Chomsky "chooses words so as to convince us that freedom of speech is
not freedom, and that control of speech is freedom."  Unfortunately (or
fortunately, depending on one's personal bias), Mr. Donald's "arguments"
were nothing more than simple speculations which lacked cohesiveness.

He continues:
>You will notice that Chomsky has carefully expressed
>himself in the manner that is least likely to make us feel
>favorable to freedom of speech.  [snip]

No, what I *have* noticed is that obviously Chomsky "has carefully expressed
himself in the manner that is least likely to make" James A. Donald feel
favorable to freedom of speech.  I have no problem with the manner in which
Chomsky has expressed himself--then again, I also see that Chomsky's quote
is directed at more than one issue.

Continuing...
>The intended effect is to make us feel that such "extreme"
>freedom of speech is a bit excessive and not really
>necessary or desirable.
>
>In the above quote Chomsky implies that freedom of speech
>is divisible -- he implies that we can suppress wicked,
>obnoxious, and obviously false ideas, without closing down
>everyone's ability to communicate political thought.

Unfortunately, I think that James A. Donald is again missing the point.
Let me help...it is just those "extreme" views which must be protected.
Chomsky does imply that freedom of speech is divisible, but he also implies
that freedom of speech *should not be.*  Furthermore, Chomsky neither
states nor insinuates that "we"--and I assume that James A. Donald is
refering to "the people"--can "suppress wicked, obnoxious, and obviously
false ideas" of any kind!  What he does say is that those persons who form
the power structure of this country--the mainstream intellectuals and the
state--have the power to suppress ideas and speech.  (Remember, Chomsky
says "should not," instead of "does not" in reference to the state's
power.)

>Let us also look at the examples he gives of people abusing
>freedom of speech.  Notice that every example that he gives
>are powerful and priviledged people who plainly need no
>protection, never the weak and vulnerable silenced by the
>powerful and arrogant:
>
>>   hypocrites, like faculty senates who choose one
>>   particularly and usually quite marginal example because
>>   career and power interests are served thereby, while
>>   ignoring vastly more significant and awful cases because
>>   the opposite is true.  And Congress, of which the same is
>>   correct.
>
>
>Let me give a counter example to Chomksy's implied argument
>that it is safe to silence dissidents, and that dissidents
>are powerful and priviledged servants of capitalism.

That's really an amusing twist of logic: 1) I have never heard anyone call
a hypocrite a dissident, and 2) I have never heard Congress being referred
to as a bunch of dissidents!  Because Chomsky refers to faculty senates and
Congress, James A. Donald automatically assumes that Chomsky views them as
dissidents.  A more logical approach would be to hunt for what role both
faculty senates and Congress play in Chomsky's quote--i.e. the role of
hypocrites who *are extended* freedom of speech, as opposed to racists and
other ideological unsavories who "should be permitted" freedom of speech
but are not.  Chomsky does not call these people dissidents, just as he
does not call mainstream intellectuals dissidents; none of these groups,
because they are powerful, privileged, and *mainstream*, may qualify as
dissident.  Furthermore, how in any way, shape or form, can it be safe to
silence dissidents if they are powerful and privileged!
                                                       ^^^^^^^^     ^^^^^^^^^^

>I did not see this quote:  I am relying on Todd for the
>accuracy of this quote, but I have seen plenty of similar
>hypocritical smears against liberty by Chomsky.  The above
>piece of catty nastiness is classic Chomsky, and I could
>easily dig up a dozen similar examples of the kind of
>support that he gives liberty.

Apparently, Mr. Donald did not *read* this quote as well.  It would be
quite, quite horrifying to have James A. Donald "dig up a dozen similar
examples."  Quite, quite horrifying.

>Is he a fool, or is he a monster?

My question exactly.


For those interested in what Chomsky really has to say, good or bad, ftp to
the Chomsky archives at:

ftp.cs.cmu.edu (128.2.206.173)
user/cap/chomsky/

(note that there is no slash at the beginning of the pathname).


On the Web:

http://www.contrib.andrew.cmu.edu:/usr/tp0x/chomsky.html


 _/_/_/  _/_/_/   _/  _/  _/_/_/      _/      _/  I detest what you write,
_/       _/  _/   _/  _/  _/         _/_/     _/  but I would give my life
_/_/_/   _/  _/   _/  _/  _/_/_/    _/  _/    _/  to make it possible for
     _/  _/  _/   _/  _/  _/       _/_/_/_/   _/  you to continue to write.
_/_/_/   _/_/_/   _/_/_/  _/_/_/  _/      _/  _/_/_/            --Voltaire
              _/                              (in a letter to M. le Riche)








From blancw at microsoft.com  Tue Oct  4 11:20:02 1994
From: blancw at microsoft.com (Blanc Weber)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 11:20:02 PDT
Subject: Chomsky quote (thread from hell)
Message-ID: <9410041820.AA00322@netmail2.microsoft.com>


From: James A. Donald

The intended effect is to make us feel that such "extreme"
freedom of speech is a bit excessive and not really
necessary or desirable.
          . . .
Thus he is actually making a misleading and spurious
argument *against* freedom of speech at the same time as he
is piously declaring himself to be in favor of freedom of
speech.
...............................................................

James, couldn't he simply be taken at his word -  his explicit 
expression, rather than the implied "catty nastiness".  If it was not 
what he really meant, he would eventually be irritated enough by the 
full acceptance of his apparent support for liberty to come out and say 
more precisely what he really wants people to think, so they don't go 
on allowing freedoms which he is really trying to prevent.

Blanc






From CCGARY at MIZZOU1.missouri.edu  Tue Oct  4 11:25:35 1994
From: CCGARY at MIZZOU1.missouri.edu (Gary Jeffers)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 11:25:35 PDT
Subject: Chomsky (thread from hell)
Message-ID: <9410041825.AA20090@toad.com>


   I remember Chomsky being quoted (I think in a Mother Jones issue)
something to the effect that the opposition to "political correctness"
was not legitimate. Apparently, Chomsky finds at least one kind of
oppression to be not distasteful.
   At a Chomsky lecture that I attended, Chomsky described himself as a
left libertarian. I surmise that he finds that grassroots oppression by
the left to be ok. I realize, of course, that "political correctness"
has great mass media & State support.
                                                   Yours Truly,
                                                   Gary Jeffers





From cactus at bb.com  Tue Oct  4 12:22:56 1994
From: cactus at bb.com (L. Todd Masco)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 12:22:56 PDT
Subject: Bomb information ban
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.89.9410032327.A10386-0100000@welchlink.welch.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <36sa9q$avv@bb.com>


In article <Pine.3.89.9410032327.A10386-0100000 at welchlink.welch.jhu.edu>,
cjl <cjl at welchlink.welch.jhu.edu> wrote:
>> All.  What part of Engineering doesn't have some impact or use in
>> bombmaking/usage?
>
>Genetic Engineering, of course, my silico-centric friend :-)

Actually, (a bird psych friend tells me) there was a variety of smart-
bomb developed in WWII that used a pigeon as its brain.  The pigeon would
be trained to peck at a building on a map, and then in the falling bomb
it would guide the bomb by pecking at a clear panel.

I don't think they were actually used, though.
-- 
L. Todd Masco  | Ingredients:  red, blue, and green quarks, six varieties of
cactus at bb.com  |  gluons, electrons.  Some settling may occur in shipping.





From lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu  Tue Oct  4 12:33:41 1994
From: lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu (Lewis McCarthy)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 12:33:41 PDT
Subject: BofA & the CIA
Message-ID: <199410041933.PAA00195@ducie.cs.umass.edu>


Tim May writes:
$ Banks already collude (BCCI was not a fluke, just a CIA
$ front bank, like Castle Bank, Nugan Hand Bank, and Bank of America).

Stephen Williams writes:
$ I happen to be contracting in the Bay Area for Bank of America till
$ Feb/Mar...      See: http://www.bankamerica.com

Does this make you a CIA plant ?

-L. McCarthy		"I'm just a sucker with no self-esteem" -Offspring
Send me mail using "Subject: remailer-help" for an autoreply about Underdog




From cactus at bb.com  Tue Oct  4 12:35:55 1994
From: cactus at bb.com (L. Todd Masco)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 12:35:55 PDT
Subject: archives
In-Reply-To: <9410022254.AA18179@acf4.NYU.EDU>
Message-ID: <36s9pv$are@bb.com>


In article <9410022254.AA18179 at acf4.NYU.EDU>,
iqg1550 <iqg1550 at acf4.NYU.EDU> wrote:
>could someone please tell me where the CP list is archived -- if, in fact,
>it is -- as well as the dates covered by any such archive
>thank you very much

One archive is on bb.com: nntp to bb.com (hks.lists.cypherpunks), or
via ftp://bb.com/cypherpunks/nntp/cypherpunks/

That's since July 16.  If there's an older archive somewhere, I'll
integrate it with that one (but I haven't heard of such a beast anywhere).
-- 
L. Todd Masco  | Ingredients:  red, blue, and green quarks, six varieties of
cactus at bb.com  |  gluons, electrons.  Some settling may occur in shipping.





From an48848 at anon.penet.fi  Tue Oct  4 13:29:42 1994
From: an48848 at anon.penet.fi (an48848 at anon.penet.fi)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 13:29:42 PDT
Subject: A practical use of c'punk brain power.
Message-ID: <9410041958.AA18580@anon.penet.fi>


Greetings c'punks!
  I have an Excel 4.0 spreadsheet to which I do not have the password.
Do any of you know a clever way to break the Excel protection either
by divining the password or removing the layer of encryption in the
file?

  Any help is appreciated!
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.





From nobody at jpunix.com  Tue Oct  4 13:49:03 1994
From: nobody at jpunix.com (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 13:49:03 PDT
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199410042048.PAA05038@jpunix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>	On the same note, do any of you have any humorous /
>chilling  stories about what you found out when you got
>your file?

There's a guy who was active with the National Committee Against Repressive Legislation (Roy Wilkinson?  Memory fades...) who amassed more FBI file pages than anyone.  His file was in excess of 200K pages.  In the files---this I heard directly from him---was information that the FBI had learned of a plot to kill him.  They did nothing but continue their surveillance.

=======================================================================
     Crim Tideson                     Privacy is its own justification.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6

iQCVAwUBLpCCNqvOblMnt4MdAQFQRAP9HK4mqbnl0d0IallbCpQBm737QT5gCgMm
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NlEMB2/jqbZM0eeqTi0tzdfu3nTI1S5Hu/SH0oRxTj2iHNKfuA81gs19bmNxiqG9
30xx5LqVvHg=
=Tmtv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From nobody at jpunix.com  Tue Oct  4 13:51:32 1994
From: nobody at jpunix.com (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 13:51:32 PDT
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199410042048.PAA05070@jpunix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> That being said let it be known that I consider the following as a
> "Cypherpunk victory."
>
> 1.  Complete freedom of technology, particularly encryption technology,
	       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> regulated only by market forces.  This implies the lack of import/export
> restrictions, and a complete absence of projects designed to limit
			       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> technology, or to standardize it for nefarious ends like Clipper.
  ^^^^^^^^^^

I think you overgeneralize.  No limits on toxic waste incinerators, low-mileage automobiles, unsafe medical devices, genetically tampered food, or nuclear reactors?  "Market forces" in such cases positively encourage dangerous technology (e.g. incinerators are superficially cheap) or are marked by their inability to distinguish the good from the crap (e.g. medical devices).

We agree about crypto, but not all tech is crypto.  :)


=======================================================================
     Crim Tideson                     Privacy is its own justification.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6

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mUFbs1mu/v88xVReuNXie5e09R7cRa4cZ8W0aGQ2+ceCBTEvJ/z8Cqps93ZucL9j
ZDtO93NM78k=
=FcUP
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From bogus at no.return.address  Tue Oct  4 13:57:52 1994
From: bogus at no.return.address (Underdog)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 13:57:52 PDT
Subject: A practical use of c'punk brain power.
Message-ID: <199410042057.QAA00534@ducie.cs.umass.edu>


Greetings c'punks!
  I have an Excel 4.0 spreadsheet to which I do not have the password.
Do any of you know a clever way to break the Excel protection either
by divining the password or removing the layer of encryption in the
file?

  Any help is appreciated!
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.





From system at decode.com  Tue Oct  4 14:38:05 1994
From: system at decode.com (System Operator)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 14:38:05 PDT
Subject: Electronic Revolution and Guerilla Warfare?
Message-ID: <eXwoTc2w165w@decode.com>


Kelly.Goen at Eng.Sun.COM (Kelly Goen [CONTRACTOR]) writes:

> I would suggest initially that one examine the
> e-book "Terminal Compromise" by Winn Schwartau and also
> Information Warfare by the same author. In addition one also may want
  
[...]

> Check out loompanics press... they have many such titles useful to your
>  research... also checkout Paladin Press and Loompanics press.

I second the motion for Loompanics and Paladin Press.  Two books
that might be directly related, both from Paladin Press and both
by Lawrence W. Myers are "SPYCOMM: Covert Communication Techniques
of the Underground" and "Improvised Radio Jamming Techniques: Electronic
Guerrilla Warfare." Both are full of practical, "nuts and bolts"
discussions of the issues you're pursuing.
  
Dan

--
system at decode.com (System Operator)
Cryptography, Security, Privacy BBS  +1 410 730 6734   Data/FAX





From unicorn at access.digex.net  Tue Oct  4 14:45:01 1994
From: unicorn at access.digex.net (Black Unicorn)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 14:45:01 PDT
Subject: your mail
In-Reply-To: <199410042048.PAA05070@jpunix.com>
Message-ID: <199410042144.AA13550@access4.digex.net>


Anonymous scripsit
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> > That being said let it be known that I consider the following as a
> > "Cypherpunk victory."
> >
> > 1.  Complete freedom of technology, particularly encryption technology,
> 	       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > regulated only by market forces.  This implies the lack of import/export
> > restrictions, and a complete absence of projects designed to limit
> 			       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > technology, or to standardize it for nefarious ends like Clipper.
>   ^^^^^^^^^^
> 
> I think you overgeneralize.  No limits on toxic waste incinerators,
>low-mileage automobiles, unsafe medical devices, genetically tampered food, 
>or nuclear reactors?  "Market forces" in such cases positively encourage
>dangerous technology (e.g. incinerators are superficially cheap) or are 
>markedby their inability to distinguish the good from the crap (e.g. medical
>devices).

It is you who have overgeneralized.  No limits on technology certainly 
does not mean allowing low tech and poor incinerators to continue operating.
The fact that low mileage cars still drive is a result of poor markets 
than anything else (baring colletables).  How would you argue that some 
low mileage cars are the result of a no limitations on technology policy?  
Unsafe medical devices?  I would say this is a problem with testing technology, 
not a lack of limitation on technological advance.  Genetically tampered 
food?  Why is this dangerous?  Have any evidence?  Most of the 
livestock/crops you eat today have been altered in one way or another, be 
it selective breeding, low tech botanical splicing, or genetic/hormonal 
therapy.  You see this as a regression?

You never make the distinction between regulation designed to promote and 
regulation designed to deter technological advance.  Clipper is clearly 
designed to set a standard and defuse the market which has advanced 
strong cryptography.  It is designed to WEAKEN technology, make it 
counter-productive to it's goal (in the case of cryptography, security 
against all attackers).  What lack of regulation does this?  Market 
forces are lathargic, sometimes they need a boost.  I propose this boost 
be accomplished with motivators like tax breaks, market assisters and 
privatization.  When Germany wanted to promote environmentally sound 
packaging and manufacture, they started a program called Gruun Punkt (The 
Green Point)  They allow manufactures to place the green point sticker on 
their products provided they meet XYZ specifications.  This is the way to 
promote technological advance, NOT by over regulation, centralization, 
collectivization and stagnation.  The pattern of the administration 
crippling markets because it is afraid it cannot keep pace is obnoxious.  
If we were to all keep pace with the Federal Government, we'd all still 
be wearing loin cloths.  Anyone who thinks the Federal Government is the 
driving force behind the majority of technological advancement (aside the 
space program and military hardware) needs to take a good look.

> 
> We agree about crypto, but not all tech is crypto.  :)
> 

I'm not even sure we agree about crypto, considering you don't seem to 
understand, or at least express the difference between Crypto regulation and 
emissions testing.


> =======================================================================
>      Crim Tideson                     Privacy is its own justification.
> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: 2.6
[...]
> 
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> 

-uni- Dark

-- 
073BB885A786F666 nemo repente fuit turpissimus - potestas scientiae in usu est
6E6D4506F6EDBC17 quaere verum ad infinitum, loquitur sub rosa    -    wichtig!




From blancw at microsoft.com  Tue Oct  4 15:26:45 1994
From: blancw at microsoft.com (Blanc Weber)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 15:26:45 PDT
Subject: your mail
Message-ID: <9410042227.AA15227@netmail2.microsoft.com>


From: Black Unicorn  <unicorn at access.digex.net>

Market forces are lathargic, sometimes they need a boost.  I propose 
this boost
be accomplished with motivators like tax breaks, market assisters and
privatization.
      . . . .
Anyone who thinks the Federal Government is the
driving force behind the majority of technological advancement (aside the
space program and military hardware) needs to take a good look.
..............................................................

Market forces being lethargic, sometimes they need a little boot, a 
little tax break, a little assistance.  Anyone who doesn't think so 
needs to examine their current Federal allowance.

Blanc





From fhalper at pilot.njin.net  Tue Oct  4 15:27:01 1994
From: fhalper at pilot.njin.net (Frederic Halper)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 15:27:01 PDT
Subject: penet remailer
Message-ID: <9410042226.AA10893@pilot.njin.net>


What's the status of the penet.fi remailer.  Is it secure?
Reuben

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reuben Halper                       "I'm not growing up, I'm just burnin' out."
Montclair High                                   - Green Day -
Montclair, NJ
E-mail: fhalper at pilot.njin.net
                 or                         PGP 2.6ui Public Key
          Reuben8878 at aol.com                available upon request
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------





From sandfort at crl.com  Tue Oct  4 15:27:24 1994
From: sandfort at crl.com (Sandy Sandfort)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 15:27:24 PDT
Subject: NYC C'PUNKS MEETING
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9410041541.A28018-0100000@crl.crl.com>


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
                         SANDY SANDFORT
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C'punks,

If you live in the NYC area or will be visiting this coming
weekend, you are invited to a Cypherpunks get-together.  We will
be meeting at Linn & Barbara Stanton's apartment on Saturday from
noon till whenever.  The Stanton's live at 315 W. 106th, Apt. 2A
in Manhattan.  This is between West End and Riverside.  The
nearest subway station is on the 1 and 9 lines at 103rd.  If you
need better directions, call them at (212) 316-1958.

We will actually start at noon, so plan to arrive sometime before
that hour.  Everyone should eat first or bring some snacks with
you.  Later, if attendees want, we can have food delivered or go
out for dinner afterwards.

Though I will attempt to hold court, I expect it will be every
bit as anarchistic as the Bay Area meetings.  Anyone wishing to
depose me, is welcome to do so.  If someone has something for the
"agenda," let me know when you RSVP.  Or don't.

If you are sure, kinda sure, or think maybe you will attend
Saturday, please e-mail me at this address.  (If your message
bounces, try ssandfort at attmail.com).  Give me your best guess on
the likelihood of your showing; I'd like to have a reasonably
accurate estimate of how many we will have.  Please feel free to
bring anyone you think might be interested/interesting.  If
possible, let me know that too.


 S a n d y

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~







From nobody at shell.portal.com  Tue Oct  4 15:52:01 1994
From: nobody at shell.portal.com (nobody at shell.portal.com)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 15:52:01 PDT
Subject: A practical use of c'punk brain power.
Message-ID: <199410042251.PAA10233@jobe.shell.portal.com>


bogus at no.return.address sez:

:Greetings c'punks!
:  I have an Excel 4.0 spreadsheet to which I do not have the password.
:Do any of you know a clever way to break the Excel protection either
:by divining the password or removing the layer of encryption in the
:file?
:

I reply:

Found this on alt.security, you said any help appriciated so here goes.
Pleeeeeeeze, no flames.

Newsgroups: alt.security
From: agriffiths at vnet.ibm.com (Alan Griffiths)
Subject: Re: Excel pass crack
Sender: news at hawnews.watson.ibm.com (NNTP News Poster)
Message-ID: <CwH0Jo.15sv at hawnews.watson.ibm.com>
Approved: myself
Date: Wed, 21 Sep 1994 08:21:24 GMT
Lines: 103
Reply-To: agriffiths at vnet.ibm.com (Alan Griffiths)
Disclaimer: This posting represents the poster's views, not necessarily those of IBM.
References: <Rw+xX1t.cinepott at delphi.com>
Nntp-Posting-Host: nhbrp75.caanerc.uk.ibm.com
Organization: LORAL CAA NERC Project
X-Newsreader: IBM NewsReader/2 v1.01

In <Rw+xX1t.cinepott at delphi.com>, Bob <cinepott at delphi.com> writes:
>Someone was looking for a crack to excel's passwords, apparently they
>forgot their password ? Well I found these helpful tidbits posted
>previously.
> 
>|>Encryption of Ms Excel files
>|>    From: Fabio Ottolina <fabio at tdc.dircon.co.uk>
>|>   Date: 29 Jan 1994 12:51:18 GMT    (1 screen)
>|>
>|>    I have saved an Excel 4.0 for Windows file with password-protection, and
>|>I can't remember the password (how remarkably stupid! :-)).
>|>Is there any way to crack the password-protection of Excel files?

You may find the following program of help. I am sorry it's in QBasic but that's the
only free language I have at present. The program removes document protection from
Excel worksheets. I haven't tested it extensively so there are no guarantees or warranties.
Always keep a backup copy of your files etc...

The protection scheme does two things:

 1. When you protect your document, Excel hashes your password to a 16 bit value, stores
    it somewhere and sets a few flags to say that the document is protected.

 2. When Excel saves a protected document it encrypts the content of each block using 16
    different alphabetic substitutions. This allows Excel to read and display protected
    documents before knowing their password. The program below unscrambles a protected
    document, removes an extra 8 byte block at the beginning, and resets the flags and
    passwords to zero.

I don't know if it can cope with all combinations of protection available in Excel. It
works fine on the simple protect document option. Similarly, charts etc. will probably
get munged since I don't think the titles etc get scrambled.

Hope this stuff is of use to someone.       Alan.

PS. Ironically enough, I found Excel of great value in recovering the set of magic numbers
used in the program. It allowed me to very quickly generate and evaluate possible decryption
formulae!

-------------------cut here------------------------------
DECLARE FUNCTION decrypt$ (c$, adr&, blen%)
DEFINT A-Z
DIM SHARED magic(15)
FOR i = 0 TO 15
  READ magic(i)
NEXT
DATA 196, 115, 164, 32, 60, 91, 212, 23, 240, 31, 40, 19, 240, 75, 180, 3

COLOR 14, 1
CLS
INPUT "Enter input Cyphertext filename: ", cf$
INPUT "Enter output Plaintext filename: ", pf$
OPEN pf$ FOR BINARY ACCESS WRITE AS #1
OPEN cf$ FOR BINARY ACCESS READ AS #2

chdr$ = INPUT$(18, #2)
phdr$ = LEFT$(chdr$, 10)
PUT #1, , phdr$
fp& = 10
cbh$ = INPUT$(4, #2)
WHILE NOT EOF(2)
  PUT #1, , cbh$
  blen = ASC(MID$(cbh$, 3, 1)) + 256 * ASC(MID$(cbh$, 4, 1))
  btyp = ASC(MID$(cbh$, 1, 1)) + 256 * ASC(MID$(cbh$, 2, 1))
  fp& = fp& + 4
  IF blen > 0 THEN
    cblk$ = INPUT$(blen, #2)
    x$ = decrypt$(cblk$, fp& - 4, blen)
    IF blen = 2 THEN
      SELECT CASE btyp
        CASE 18, 19, 99
          x$ = STRING$(2, 0)
      END SELECT
    END IF
    PUT #1, , x$
  END IF
  fp& = fp& + blen
  cbh$ = INPUT$(4, #2)
WEND
CLOSE #1
CLOSE #2
END

FUNCTION decrypt$ (c$, adr&, blen)
  offset = (adr& + blen) AND 15
  d$ = STRING$(blen, 0)
  FOR i = 1 TO blen
    c = ASC(MID$(c$, i, 1))
    crot = ((c * 8) MOD 256) OR (c \ 32)
    ctst = magic(offset)
    clss = (2 * (crot AND ctst)) AND 255
    d = (256 + crot + ctst - clss) AND 255
    MID$(d$, i, 1) = CHR$(d)
    offset = (offset + 1) AND 15
  NEXT
  decrypt$ = d$
END FUNCTION
-------------------cut here------------------------------

Alan Griffiths        CAA NERC Project    agriffiths at vnet.ibm.com
Tel: +44-705-561325                       Fax: +44-705-214094

All opinions expressed are my own and do not represent IBM in any way







From mg5n+ at andrew.cmu.edu  Tue Oct  4 15:54:41 1994
From: mg5n+ at andrew.cmu.edu (Matthew J Ghio)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 15:54:41 PDT
Subject: penet remailer
In-Reply-To: <9410042226.AA10893@pilot.njin.net>
Message-ID: <wiYRnxK00WC0MLUEhW@andrew.cmu.edu>


fhalper at pilot.njin.net (Frederic Halper) wrote:

>What's the status of the penet.fi remailer.  Is it secure?
>Reuben

Depends on your definition of secure.  Since it is run on Julf's
personal computer, I'd say the hardware is secure from tampering.  But,
given that it does not support PGP, and has the potential to reveal
anonymous IDs when cross-posting, and has had problems with spoofed mail
etc, I would say it's not very sercure.





From eb at comsec.com  Tue Oct  4 16:26:02 1994
From: eb at comsec.com (Eric Blossom)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 16:26:02 PDT
Subject: NRO Article in current Covert Action Quarterly
In-Reply-To: <9410031913.AA05574@pilot.njin.net>
Message-ID: <199410042305.QAA00789@comsec.com>


Frederic Halper writes:

> I just finished reading the Puzzle Palace and I thought it was quite
> interesting Does anyone know where I could find some more info on the
> NRO and DIA, or even info on what the NSA has been up to for the last
> ten or so years, besides the obvious.  Thanks to whoever recommended
> the book to me, I don't remember who it was.

The current issue of Covert Action Quarterly contains a fairly
interesting article about the NRO.  Included are estimates of funding
and organization, as well as the mechanisms used to determine these.

Most claims are substantiated with citations to various congressional
reports, etc.

It's worth the read.

Eric





From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Oct  4 16:29:55 1994
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 16:29:55 PDT
Subject: HTTP authentication efforts
Message-ID: <199410042329.TAA20862@zork.tiac.net>


At 10:05 PM 9/20/94 -0500, Paul Ferguson wrote:
>Howdy guys 'n gals.
>
>As much as I'd love to rant about Detweiler getting an account on Colorado
>Supernet, I must put aside my insidious remarks for the time being.
>
>Does anyone know, on the off-chance, who is currently working on
>HTTP authentication processes for web browsing and Mosiac?
>
>Pointers appreciated.

One pointer, coming up!

>Date: Sun, 28 Aug 94 04:30:02 EDT
>From: www-buyinfo-request at allegra.att.com
>To: www-buyinfo at allegra.att.com
>Subject: weekly www-buyinfo reminder
>X-UIDL: 778077798.009
>
>Weekly reminder for the www-buyinfo mailing list.
>
>Please note that the mailing address for subscribe/unsubscribe is
>        www-buyinfo-request
>                    *******
>To subscribe:
>    Send mail to www-buyinfo-request at allegra.att.com
>    Body of message (NOT Subject:)      subscribe www-buyinfo
>To unsubscribe:
>    Send mail to www-buyinfo-request at allegra.att.com
>    Body of message (NOT Subject:)      unsubscribe www-buyinfo
>To contribute to the mailing list:
>    Send mail to www-buyinfo at allegra.att.com
>
>Mail archives will be located in:
>    ftp.research.att.com:/dist/www-buyinfo-archive/
>Hypermail archives are located at:
>        http://www.research.att.com/www-buyinfo/archive/
>

-----------------
Robert Hettinga  (rah at shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone
Shipwright Development Corporation     who eats too little and sees Heaven and
44 Farquhar Street                       someone who drinks too much and sees
Boston, MA 02331 USA                       snakes." -- Bertrand Russell
(617) 323-7923







From yusuf921 at raven.csrv.uidaho.edu  Tue Oct  4 16:48:05 1994
From: yusuf921 at raven.csrv.uidaho.edu (Herbie)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 16:48:05 PDT
Subject: NYC C'PUNKS MEETING
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9410041541.A28018-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9410041603.A6492-0100000@raven.csrv.uidaho.edu>




On Tue, 4 Oct 1994, Sandy Sandfort wrote:

> C'punks,
> 
> If you live in the NYC area or will be visiting this coming
> weekend, you are invited to a Cypherpunks get-together.  We will
> be meeting at Linn & Barbara Stanton's apartment on Saturday from
> noon till whenever.  The Stanton's live at 315 W. 106th, Apt. 2A
> in Manhattan.  This is between West End and Riverside.  The
> nearest subway station is on the 1 and 9 lines at 103rd.  If you
> need better directions, call them at (212) 316-1958.
> 


   how do we know this isn't an NSA attempt to get us to show our faces so 
they can get our photos?






From cjl at welchlink.welch.jhu.edu  Tue Oct  4 16:59:09 1994
From: cjl at welchlink.welch.jhu.edu (cjl)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 16:59:09 PDT
Subject: penet remailer
In-Reply-To: <9410042226.AA10893@pilot.njin.net>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.89.9410041953.A17663-0100000@welchlink.welch.jhu.edu>



On Tue, 4 Oct 1994, Frederic Halper wrote:

> What's the status of the penet.fi remailer.  Is it secure?
> Reuben
>

I personally don't care for the penet type remailers.  Their only true 
virtue is to allow you to receive return mail to an anon-post.  The 
trade-off is that this is done by a form of identity escrow.  Julf (who 
runs penet.fi) has your e-mail address connected to the anonXXXXX 
identity that you get issued automatically.  As far as reputations go, 
Julf has an excellent reputation in the C-punx community, and there is 
little likelihood of Finnish govt. officials giving in to US Govt. 
pressure to crack down on Julf to turn over his *little black book*.

There was recently an attack on the penet.fi remailer that depended upon 
the ability to spoof the From: lines on messages, some unknown 
person sent hundreds of messages to the anon at penet.fi remailer pretending 
to be hundreds of other people and had those messages sent to alt.test or 
misc.test with some phrase about tunafish in the subject, causing this to 
be known as the *tunafish and spam sandwich attack*.  What this did is 
allocate alot of new anonxxx numbers to people who didn't really want 
them, (also ultimately denying them the secure use of this service, 
because someone knew the anonxxx - TrueName correspondence), for those 
that already had an anonxxx and had set a password things were cool, 
the messages were just rejected.  For those who had an anonxxx and had 
not set the password, this attack revealed the anonxxx corresponding to 
their TrueNames to the person who conducted the attack.  Not a 
particularly secure form of identity escrow for the clueless-at-risk-of- 
identification to be using for posting their wildest homo-erotic fantasies 
to alt.H.E.A.T.fabio.

I was allocated an anxxx I didn't want, and then assigned the password 
in order to deny the attacker any further use of the anxxx with my 
TrueName attached to it.


C. J. Leonard                     (    /      "DNA is groovy"
                                   \ /                - Watson & Crick
<cjl at welchlink.welch.jhu.edu>      / \     <--  major groove
                                  (    \
Finger for public key               \   )
Strong-arm for secret key             /    <--  minor groove
Thumb-screws for pass-phrase        /   )






From sandfort at crl.com  Tue Oct  4 17:02:13 1994
From: sandfort at crl.com (Sandy Sandfort)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 17:02:13 PDT
Subject: BIRD BRAINS
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9410041751.A10042-0100000@crl4.crl.com>


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
                         SANDY SANDFORT
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C'punks,

Todd Masco wrote:

    ... there was a variety of smart-bomb developed in WWII
    that used a pigeon as its brain.  The pigeon would be
    trained to peck at a building on a map, and then in the
    falling bomb it would guide the bomb by pecking at a
    clear panel....

I remember seeing a TV documentary that included this technology.
The way it actually worked was that a special steerable bomb had
a camera obscura in its nose.  An image of whatever was below the
falling bomb was rear projected onto a screen made out of frosted
glass.  The screen was somehow rigged so that it could sense
where it was being pecked.  The pigeon was immobilized except for
its head and neck, but it could easily peck any point on the
screen.  They use operant conditioning to train the pigeon to
peck at images of ships at sea.  If the ship was off-center on
the screen, the pigeon's pecking would cause airfoils to correct
the bomb's aim.  Just before the bomb hit, the pigeon would
parachute to safety.  (I made that last part up.)


 S a n d y

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~







From macorp!moonlight!ken at uu4.psi.com  Tue Oct  4 17:28:25 1994
From: macorp!moonlight!ken at uu4.psi.com (Ken Landaiche)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 17:28:25 PDT
Subject: Cyber honor
Message-ID: <9410042343.AA05604@moonlight.noname>


Recently, I wrote about forging mail and introduced the idea of
honor in cyberspace:

>I've been vaguely following the thread, which seems to be attempting to
>close a loophole in port 25. Assuming you succeeded, wouldn't a clever
>demon hacker simply find another way to forge messages? I have seen that
>any system a human can devise, another human can eventually break. This
>leads me to believe that eventually we will have to begin acting on our
>honor, and provide severe consequences for dishonorable behavior. I
>haven't finished working out what "honor" means in this social context.

to which Jim McCoy responded:
>Like what?  When identity is "weak" then honor has no meaning...

That sounded reasonable to me until Crim Tideson asked:

>I've created a pseudonym and a PGP key pair for that pseudonym.  ... 
>I have no intention of revealing who "me" actually is.  ...
>I want to make and keep a reputation.... 

So honor may after all have meaning in cyberspace, as some code of
behavior that preserves one's "reputation".


James A. Donald, whose thinking I tend to respect, points out that,
>Ken Landaiche writes
>> I have seen that
>> any system a human can devise, another human can eventually break. 
>
>False.  Most cryptographic algorithms these days are secure.

I'm glad to take your word on this. But I still think that the 
cryptographic system can be broken: subversion, torture, and "truth
serums" come to mind. If someone strong enough wants your secret
badly enough, they can probably get it, as long as at least one 
keeper of the secret is alive. This argument relies on one's
adversary having no scruples. Since, as I mentioned before, I have
little knowledge of the mathematics of cryptography, but still share
the cypherpunks' interest in liberty, I'm focusing my efforts on the
social end of the solution. As I said:

> This
> leads me to believe that eventually we will have to begin acting on our
> honor, 

to which JAD responded:
>Walking through a security hole on a computer is not necessarily
>dishonorable, though many dishonorable things can be done once
>you are through that hole.

What do you mean by "dishonorable"? Is walking through a security
hole like walking through a stranger's insecure door? The latter is 
an invasion of privacy to me, something I would consider damaging 
to me and would label a "dishonorable" act.

>> and provide severe consequences for dishonorable behavior. 
>
>If "we" provide "sever consequences" then we are not relying
>on honor, but on coercion.

Consider reputation systems, kill files, and the famous "If no one
reads your posts, you're dead." Death is a pretty severe consequence,
and one that many people admit to imposing.


For target practice, I suggest that at the most basic level, net
entities will have "honor" or a good reputation who do the following:

	1. Tell the truth.
	2. Keep their agreements.
	3. Do not injure their neighbors.







From lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu  Tue Oct  4 17:30:03 1994
From: lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu (Lewis McCarthy)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 17:30:03 PDT
Subject: Saying `Cheese' for Uncle Sam
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9410041603.A6492-0100000@raven.csrv.uidaho.edu>
Message-ID: <199410050029.UAA02852@ducie.cs.umass.edu>


Sandy Sandfort writes:
$ you are invited to a Cypherpunks get-together [...] in Manhattan

Herbie writes:
#    how do we know this isn't an NSA attempt to get us to show our faces so 
# they can get our photos?

Wouldn't it be easier for them to finger you, then get some recent films 
from the surveillance cameras in the main post office in Moscow ?

-L. McCarthy
Send me mail using "Subject: remailer-help" for an autoreply about Underdog




From jya at pipeline.com  Tue Oct  4 17:45:30 1994
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 17:45:30 PDT
Subject: NYC C'PUNKS MEETING
Message-ID: <199410050044.UAA14303@pipe1.pipeline.com>



Responding to msg by yusuf921 at raven.csrv.uidaho.edu (Herbie) on 
Tue, 4 Oct  4:7  PM

>   how do we know this isn't an NSA attempt to get us 
>to show our faces so they can get our photos?
>


I know that 315 W. 106th is a prison barge moored 500 feet 
off-shore in the Hudson River toward Jersey.  It also serves as 
a testing laboratory for rubber hoses and the removing of hair 
and blood therefrom.

However, take the address number, semi-reverse, hack by Omega, 
parse to the left, bend over, chant Dixie in Sanskrit, and the 
safe house address will appear on your SS card in twisted bar 
code.  Hold the code close to your right lobe, left hand 
clinched on the chest, whistle Aida diachronically and you will 
be rocketed to the next station into a soft-landing in a tub of 
jellied non-alcoholic beverage.  Sandy will lift you by the 
short hairs and take you to the party, provided you have 
persuasive ID anonymously 
chain-remailed-via-Tasmania.com.edu.mil.not.penitentiary.fi.foo.f
oo/pug/tcmaybe/Censurecon-a-cop.

Meet these conditions or trust that Sandy's post is not a set 
up.

Acen





From jamesd at netcom.com  Tue Oct  4 17:46:58 1994
From: jamesd at netcom.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 17:46:58 PDT
Subject: Chomsky (thread from hell)
In-Reply-To: <9410041825.AA20090@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199410050046.RAA03832@netcom8.netcom.com>


My apologies to everyone for starting this thread.  I will
try to restrain myself from making any further inflammatory
posts that would tend to keep the thread going.

But a clarification.  The reason I call Chomsky a totalitarian
is not because of his mild support for political correctness.

-- 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
We have the right to defend ourselves and our
property, because of the kind of animals that we              James A. Donald
are.  True law derives from this right, not from
the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state.                jamesd at netcom.com





From cactus at bb.com  Tue Oct  4 17:54:59 1994
From: cactus at bb.com (L. Todd Masco)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 17:54:59 PDT
Subject: NYC C'PUNKS MEETING
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9410041603.A6492-0100000@raven.csrv.uidaho.edu>
Message-ID: <36stn5$ehp@bb.com>


In article <Pine.3.87.9410041603.A6492-0100000 at raven.csrv.uidaho.edu>,
Herbie <yusuf921 at raven.csrv.uidaho.edu> wrote:
>   how do we know this isn't an NSA attempt to get us to show our faces so 
>they can get our photos?

Clearly, everyone should wear their Kevin Mitnik masks.
-- 
L. Todd Masco  | Ingredients:  red, blue, and green quarks, six varieties of
cactus at bb.com  |  gluons, electrons.  Some settling may occur in shipping.





From merriman at metronet.com  Tue Oct  4 17:56:14 1994
From: merriman at metronet.com (David K. Merriman)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 17:56:14 PDT
Subject: NYC C'PUNKS MEETING
Message-ID: <199410050055.AA18004@metronet.com>


>
>
>On Tue, 4 Oct 1994, Sandy Sandfort wrote:
>
>> C'punks,
>> 
>> If you live in the NYC area or will be visiting this coming
>> weekend, you are invited to a Cypherpunks get-together.  We will
>> be meeting at Linn & Barbara Stanton's apartment on Saturday from
>> noon till whenever.  The Stanton's live at 315 W. 106th, Apt. 2A
>> in Manhattan.  This is between West End and Riverside.  The
>> nearest subway station is on the 1 and 9 lines at 103rd.  If you
>> need better directions, call them at (212) 316-1958.
>> 
>
>
>   how do we know this isn't an NSA attempt to get us to show our faces so 
>they can get our photos?
>

*trust* him.... :-)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Finger merriman at metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints.
Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender.  PGP preferred.
Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to
*love* Big Brother.






From tcmay at netcom.com  Tue Oct  4 18:11:12 1994
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 18:11:12 PDT
Subject: Cyber honor
In-Reply-To: <9410042343.AA05604@moonlight.noname>
Message-ID: <199410050110.SAA06337@netcom8.netcom.com>


Ken Landaiche wrote:

> So honor may after all have meaning in cyberspace, as some code of
> behavior that preserves one's "reputation".

What is important is a _persistent_ and _unforgeable_ identity, not a
physical indentity. Persistence is needed to attach a history to, and
an expectation of future behavior. Unforgeability for obvious reasons.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo at toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay






From jamesd at netcom.com  Tue Oct  4 18:19:38 1994
From: jamesd at netcom.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 18:19:38 PDT
Subject: He's dead Jim (Chomsky)
In-Reply-To: <9410041812.AA27339@nately.UCSD.EDU>
Message-ID: <199410050111.SAA06427@netcom8.netcom.com>


Anonymous writes
> In this, James A. Donald finds:
> >To put this in its proper context, Chomsky also believes
> >in socialism, in the sense of the "people" controlling the
> >means of production, distribution, and supply, and in
> >particular, the "people" running the mass media.
> 
> What? Non sequitur!  No where in Chomsky's quote do we find any remote
> resemblance of a reference to mass media;

I said context, not quote.

There is ample Chomsky material outside this quote supporting socialism,
and as well as socialism, those measures that socialism makes necessary,
namely silencing of dissent, mass murder, and rule by terror.

My analysis of the quote on political correctness follows about twenty 
lines after my discussion of Chomsky vs the Capitalist Mass Media.


And yes, I know, you do not need to tell me.  No where in
Chomsky's writings does he say "Mass murder is great".

He merely provides and endless stream of justifications and
rationalizations for particular mass murderers, most infamously
Pol Pot, and for mass murder in general.

Yes, Chomsky says, repeatedly, that he is sincerely opposed to mass murder,
whilst at the same time vigorously arguing in favor of it, the same
hypocritical gimmick as he does on free speech, in the quote under
discussion.

For example in addition to comparing Pol Pots methods to de nazification
by the french resistance, he also argues that the chaos created by
the American bombing forced Pol Pot to use harsh measures, and so 
on and so forth.  As on PC, he piously proclaims himself to be be 
opposed to Pol Pot, whilst vigorously defending him, and like 
totalitarians, and vigorously defending the methods used by Pol Pot, 
and savagely condemning anyone who would criticize Pol Pot, or Idi 
Amin, etc.

This is why I call him a totalitarian, not because he endorses
political correctness.


-- 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
We have the right to defend ourselves and our
property, because of the kind of animals that we              James A. Donald
are.  True law derives from this right, not from
the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state.                jamesd at netcom.com





From sandfort at crl.com  Tue Oct  4 18:35:17 1994
From: sandfort at crl.com (Sandy Sandfort)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 18:35:17 PDT
Subject: NYC C'PUNKS PHOTO SESSION
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9410041812.A13430-0100000@crl.crl.com>


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
                         SANDY SANDFORT
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C'punks,

Herbie wrote thusly about the upcoming NYC C'punks meeting:

    how do we know this isn't an NSA attempt to get us to
    show our faces so they can get our photos?

Photos?  We *already* have your photo, Herbie.  It's *you* we
want now.  Do not struggle; resistance is futile.  Report to the
"meeting" for final processing.  (B.Y.O.B.)


 S a n d y

Official NSA agent provocateur

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~







From lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu  Tue Oct  4 18:41:16 1994
From: lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu (Lewis McCarthy)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 18:41:16 PDT
Subject: Quick, somebody mention Hitler
Message-ID: <199410050140.VAA03308@ducie.cs.umass.edu>


Recently the Cypherpunks list received

------------------------------------------
From: jamesd at netcom.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 1994 17:46:19 -0700 (PDT)
           ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
My apologies to everyone for starting this thread.  I will
try to restrain myself from making any further inflammatory
posts that would tend to keep the thread going.
------------------------------------------

but then we received

------------------------------------------
From: jamesd at netcom.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 1994 18:11:15 -0700 (PDT)
           ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Anonymous writes
> What? Non sequitur!  No where in Chomsky's quote do we find any remote
> resemblance of a reference to mass media;

I said context, not quote.
[many lines clipped...]
------------------------------------------

Looks like you need to lock yourself up a bit tighter, James.

-L. McCarthy		 "I'm just a sucker with no self-esteem" -Offspring
Send me mail using "Subject: remailer-help" for an autoreply about Underdog




From jkreznar at ininx.com  Tue Oct  4 19:43:55 1994
From: jkreznar at ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 19:43:55 PDT
Subject: Freedom of technology
In-Reply-To: <199410042048.PAA05070@jpunix.com>
Message-ID: <9410050243.AA14529@ininx>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Crim Tideson writes:

> > That being said let it be known that I consider the following as a
> > "Cypherpunk victory."
> >
> > 1.  Complete freedom of technology, particularly encryption technology,
>                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > regulated only by market forces.  This implies the lack of import/export
> > restrictions, and a complete absence of projects designed to limit
>                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > technology, or to standardize it for nefarious ends like Clipper.
>   ^^^^^^^^^^

> I think you overgeneralize.  No limits on toxic waste incinerators,
> low-mileage automobiles, unsafe medical devices, genetically tampered
> food, or nuclear reactors?  "Market forces" in such cases positively
> encourage dangerous technology (e.g. incinerators are superficially
> cheap) or are marked by their inability to distinguish the good from the
> crap (e.g. medical devices).

Who decides what's good and what's crap?

Let me see if I understand.  Are you advocating that personal choice in
medical devices, food, etc., be supplanted by government dictate?

Do you understand that in many cases, a person is interested in strong
cryptography just so that she can make her own choices in such matters,
free of interference by a do-gooder who thinks he knows better than she?
That she sees crypto as a way to defend against him (e.g. by buying
``unsafe medical devices'' through BlackNet)?

``Market forces'' are just the sum of personal choices.

	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
	jkreznar at ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLpIRDMDhz44ugybJAQFVXwP/b55FYnEtdtviLZMeWovqd4L5nB4SVkpK
4st4aP2wvIp2AR8Zzn5X8SEufOunq96qy0QfMPEBwHqMD0eAs1rZbItjX0lFZ2VB
3uSJ+Ah45qb5IEnwQbYq36a3pgROfr2dvDyM/8pRnyCOeT1MY6xVZO9+6TZf9AA6
hEtDK9CH+5c=
=Ol27
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From unicorn at access.digex.net  Tue Oct  4 20:19:41 1994
From: unicorn at access.digex.net (Black Unicorn)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 20:19:41 PDT
Subject: Freedom of technology
In-Reply-To: <9410050243.AA14529@ininx>
Message-ID: <199410050317.AA07351@access2.digex.net>


John E. Kreznar scripsit
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> Crim Tideson writes:
> 
> > > That being said let it be known that I consider the following as a
> > > "Cypherpunk victory."
> > >
> > > 1.  Complete freedom of technology, particularly encryption technology,
> >                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > > regulated only by market forces.  This implies the lack of import/export
> > > restrictions, and a complete absence of projects designed to limit
> >                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > > technology, or to standardize it for nefarious ends like Clipper.
> >   ^^^^^^^^^^
> 
> > I think you overgeneralize.  No limits on toxic waste incinerators,
> > low-mileage automobiles, unsafe medical devices, genetically tampered
> > food, or nuclear reactors?  "Market forces" in such cases positively
> > encourage dangerous technology (e.g. incinerators are superficially
> > cheap) or are marked by their inability to distinguish the good from the
> > crap (e.g. medical devices).
> 
> Who decides what's good and what's crap?
> 
> Let me see if I understand.  Are you advocating that personal choice in
> medical devices, food, etc., be supplanted by government dictate?
> 
> Do you understand that in many cases, a person is interested in strong
> cryptography just so that she can make her own choices in such matters,
> free of interference by a do-gooder who thinks he knows better than she?
> That she sees crypto as a way to defend against him (e.g. by buying
> ``unsafe medical devices'' through BlackNet)?

This is especially true with products that are pulled from the market to 
save the average (read idiot) consumer from him/herself.  Or products put 
there for the same reason.

The amount of law that is intended to safeguard the world and cater to 
the bottom of the barrel when it comes to intellect and intelligence is 
significant.

I really don't want a function on all cars sold in the United States 
which prevents people from starting their car with the clutch engaged.  I 
actually find use for starting with the clutch engaged.  I can't stand 
ABS, and can usually threshold brake much more effectively than ABS can 
pulse brake.  I turn ABS off.  It's an idiot button.  It's the product of 
a culture that presses the button on the ATM machine, but has no idea 
what's going on behind the screen.

Who's to tell me I have to have ABS or the "safety starter" if I don't 
want the thing?

Who's to tell me that I need a backdoor in my crypto?

Where do you draw the line?  Outlaw sugar perhaps?  It would save 
consumers millions in dental bills.

> 
> ``Market forces'' are just the sum of personal choices.
>

And a "failed market" is when the market doesn't match up with the 
administrator's choices.


> 	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
> 	jkreznar at ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: 2.3a
[...]
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> 

-uni- (Dark)

-- 
073BB885A786F666 nemo repente fuit turpissimus - potestas scientiae in usu est
6E6D4506F6EDBC17 quaere verum ad infinitum, loquitur sub rosa    -    wichtig!




From solman at MIT.EDU  Tue Oct  4 22:18:08 1994
From: solman at MIT.EDU (solman at MIT.EDU)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 22:18:08 PDT
Subject: archives
In-Reply-To: <36s9pv$are@bb.com>
Message-ID: <9410050517.AA02004@ua.MIT.EDU>


> In article <9410022254.AA18179 at acf4.NYU.EDU>,
> iqg1550 <iqg1550 at acf4.NYU.EDU> wrote:
> >could someone please tell me where the CP list is archived -- if, in fact,
> >it is -- as well as the dates covered by any such archive
> >thank you very much
> 
> One archive is on bb.com: nntp to bb.com (hks.lists.cypherpunks), or
> via ftp://bb.com/cypherpunks/nntp/cypherpunks/
> 
> That's since July 16.  If there's an older archive somewhere, I'll
> integrate it with that one (but I haven't heard of such a beast anywhere).

I used to read cpunks from the discuss archive before I joined the list.
Are non-MIT folks able to access:

http://www.mit.edu:8008/menelaus.mit.edu/cpunks/

?

You made need to fill in the form at http://www.mit.edu:8008/ with
cpunks and menelaus.mit.edu before this link works.

Cheers,

JWS





From cactus at bb.com  Tue Oct  4 22:41:57 1994
From: cactus at bb.com (L. Todd Masco)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 22:41:57 PDT
Subject: archives
In-Reply-To: <36s9pv$are@bb.com>
Message-ID: <199410050547.BAA18923@bb.com>



solman at MIT.EDU writes:
 > I used to read cpunks from the discuss archive before I joined the list.
 > Are non-MIT folks able to access:
 > 
 > http://www.mit.edu:8008/menelaus.mit.edu/cpunks/

Yes, we are.  It's a bit of an awful interface, though, with no way to
download en mass.  Any chance I could get at the source articles with ftp?
I do have an MIT guest account, if that's helpful.
--
L. Todd Masco  | Ingredients:  red, blue, and green quarks, six varieties of
cactus at bb.com  |  gluons, electrons.  Some settling may occur in shipping.





From mccoy at io.com  Tue Oct  4 22:51:42 1994
From: mccoy at io.com (Jim McCoy)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 22:51:42 PDT
Subject: Cyber honor
In-Reply-To: <9410042343.AA05604@moonlight.noname>
Message-ID: <199410050551.AAA03112@pentagon.io.com>


Ken Landaiche writes:
[...]
> to which Jim McCoy responded:
> >Like what?  When identity is "weak" then honor has no meaning...
> 
> That sounded reasonable to me until Crim Tideson asked:
> 
> >I've created a pseudonym and a PGP key pair for that pseudonym.  ... 
> >I have no intention of revealing who "me" actually is.  ...
> >I want to make and keep a reputation.... 
> 
> So honor may after all have meaning in cyberspace, as some code of
> behavior that preserves one's "reputation".

But if creating a new identity is as easy as creating a pseudonym and a PGP
key pair then everyone could create several identities, one they use for
"honorable" work and others that they use when attempting to hack in to
AT&T or rob the digital bank...the lack of a link between the pseudonymns
means that "dishonorable" pseudonyms are disposable and without a means for
attaching a negative value to a reputation the reputation system as a whole
has a major flaw.

That is not to say that a system that provides for reputations with
anonymity is impossible, but it is not possible given the tools that are
currently available on the net.  If you want to take a look at a system
that would offer a workable base for a reputation system I would recomment
that you start with some of the credential systems of Chaum, Evertse, and
Damgard.  This would provide a foundation of unique identities and a method
for exchanging information linked to pseudonyms without giving up user
privacy. 

jim





From lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu  Tue Oct  4 22:59:23 1994
From: lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu (Lewis McCarthy)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 22:59:23 PDT
Subject: Freedom of technology
In-Reply-To: <199410050317.AA07351@access2.digex.net>
Message-ID: <199410050559.BAA04415@ducie.cs.umass.edu>


Black Unicorn writes:
$ Who's to tell me I have to have ABS or the "safety starter" if I don't 
$ want the thing?
$ Who's to tell me that I need a backdoor in my crypto?
$ Where do you draw the line?  Outlaw sugar perhaps?  It would save 
$ consumers millions in dental bills.

Uh-oh. I *really* don't have the time to get drawn into this one, but
I'll offer a brief response.

Choosing the place to draw the line is indeed the crux of the matter IMHO.
I try to draw it at the point where one person's misuse of technology 
starts to hurt another person (which often begs the question, I know !).

Considering some of your examples:
Offhand it seems no-one but the driver could have a direct problem from
using a car w/o the "safety starter", so I'd say that shouldn't be imposed.
I don't drive stick, so I may well be missing a crucial technical point here.

OTOH I can see that ABS could stop a lot of slow/non-alert people from
slamming their cars into me & mine; I trust the technology more than the
people who would be replacing it. I'm happy that it's a fairly standard 
feature, although this seems to be more a result of market demand than 
regulation.

Your mention of outlawing sugar calls to mind some debates about smoking bans.
Here IMHO the line is clear. When you eat sugar next to me, you're not 
doing me any harm unless I'm forced to pay your dental bills. In sharp 
contrast, I consider smoking in company to be assault with a deadly 
weapon. My choice of self-defense in this case is legislation preventing
anyone from smoking in my airspace. I have no problem with people smoking
in private where the smoke's never going to harm me.

Of course, the explosive success of bullshit litigation (strongly aided
IMHO by our lowest-common-denominator jury selection system) has played
a major role in inducing companies & the govt. to go overboard protecting
people from their own idiocy.  I just want to be protected from other
people's idiocy :)

I won't touch on the question of required backdoor installation....

-L. McCarthy
Send me mail using "Subject: remailer-help" for an autoreply about Underdog




From nobody at jpunix.com  Tue Oct  4 23:52:44 1994
From: nobody at jpunix.com (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 23:52:44 PDT
Subject: He's dead Jim (Chomsky)
Message-ID: <199410050651.BAA12604@jpunix.com>


James A. McDonald wrote:
>There is ample Chomsky material outside this quote supporting socialism,
>and as well as socialism, those measures that socialism makes necessary,
>namely silencing of dissent, mass murder, and rule by terror.
 
Ah, so now we see why Mr. McDonald feels forced to interpret everything
Chomsky writes as meaning the exact opposite of what it says - why
Mr. McDonald thinks that Chomsky *must* be trying to promote
totalitarian repression, even though Chomsky nowhere advocates repression
of any kind.

>There is ample Chomsky material outside this quote supporting socialism,

correct.

>and as well as socialism, those measures that socialism makes necessary,
>namely silencing of dissent, mass murder, and rule by terror.

Mr. McDonald infers this because, although Chomsky, if taken at face value,
does not _appear_ to be advocating "mass murder, and rule by terror",
McDonald __knows__ that:

1. a society without capitalism must be based on rule by terror.

and

2. anybody as intelligent as Chomsky knows (1).
 
thus anybody who advocates socialism is really advocating rule by terror
and so Chomsky clearly means the opposite of what he says.

Mr. McDonald's reasoning is perfect except that (1) is false.

If the "unwashed masses", the unruly mob should forget their place in life
(to be subservient to the elite, who are superior, because they claim they
are) and abolish the state, the army and the police and if they in their
foolishness should decide that they never liked capitalism and from now
on everything should be free then they have no need to oppress people like
Mr. McDonald if he wishes to try to accumulate capital by offering goods
and/or services for a price. Since everything is free in this hypothetical
society, nobody will have any reason to buy your goods and/or services
Mr. McDonald, because they can get them somewhere else for free. Thus
capitalism will never return (unless people who prefer a repressive society
restore capitalism by force) without anybody doing anything to repress
capitalism or other dissident ideas. I think this is the sort of society
Mr. Chomsky is advocating.

Of course, Mr. McDonald _knows_ that such a society is impossible because
everybody is as selfish as he is so nobody will want to share anything or
give anything away for free and they won't do so unless forced to.
Again, you are mistaken. The unwashed masses, while far from perfect, are
much more altruistic than right-wing cypherpunks such as yourself
(I realise that many cypherpunks are not right-wing) and when given the
chance they have shown that they prefer something that resembles Chomsky's
society more than the usual state/army/police-enforced capitalism. Examples
where the working class has had a brief taste of freedom are Paris, 1871,
Ukraine ~1917, Spain, 1920s and Derry, Ireland ~1969. In every case 
capitalism (Soviet state capitalism in the case of the Ukraine) was 
restored by force within a few months or years.

I don't think anyone thinks this mailing list is the right place to 
discuss your Chomsky conspiracy theories so if you haven't finished yet,
take them to alt.conspiracy.
Note: if Mr. McDonald pig-headedly insists on replying to this post on the 
mailing list, I will almost certainly ignore him, out of consideration for
the rest of you.

P.S. Lewis McCarthy wrote: "Quick, somebody mention Hitler".
Okay. Mr. McDonald is as fascist as Hitler.





From tcmay at netcom.com  Wed Oct  5 00:28:54 1994
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 00:28:54 PDT
Subject: Positive Reputation Systems
In-Reply-To: <199410050551.AAA03112@pentagon.io.com>
Message-ID: <199410050713.AAA18754@netcom8.netcom.com>


Jim McCoy wrote:

> But if creating a new identity is as easy as creating a pseudonym and a PGP
> key pair then everyone could create several identities, one they use for
> "honorable" work and others that they use when attempting to hack in to
> AT&T or rob the digital bank...the lack of a link between the pseudonymns
> means that "dishonorable" pseudonyms are disposable and without a means for
> attaching a negative value to a reputation the reputation system as a whole
> has a major flaw.

Yes, "negative reputations" alone are not adequate, just as they
aren't in real life. (A negative reputation system is one in which
only negative movements are possible, only downgrades. It's like
assuming everyone is honorable, even strangers, and lending them
money.)

Positive reputations are essential. And are common, even on the Net.
I don't know about others, but I don't automatically given all
newcomers the 'benefit of the doubt' and thus give them "maximal
reputation," only to be downchecked later. Rather, newcomers start
out, in my mental ledger book, at a "nonentity" or "neutral" level.
Call it "zero" for simplicity. 

Stupid or wrong comments cause their "reputations" (to me, of course)
to move into negative territory. Positive comments boost their
reputation. (And this rep business is multidimensional, of course. For
example, I might dislike someone's opinion, but still have a high
regard for their "reputation for honesty commentary," or somesuch.)

It does little good to create zillions of "new pseudonyms," as they
are *not* automatically given a high reputation. Think of credit
ratings. Would any of you lend money to brand new pseudonym, or a
stranger in your town?

> That is not to say that a system that provides for reputations with
> anonymity is impossible, but it is not possible given the tools that are
> currently available on the net.  If you want to take a look at a system

But I've just given an example of how this already works. Take
"Pr0duct Cypher" as an example. Good code, rapidly written. The
result: a postive reputation system that produces (for many of us) a
net positive reputation.

> that would offer a workable base for a reputation system I would recomment
> that you start with some of the credential systems of Chaum, Evertse, and
> Damgard.  This would provide a foundation of unique identities and a method
> for exchanging information linked to pseudonyms without giving up user
> privacy. 

I certainly agree that better tools, including the
credentials-without-identity sort of stuff, may help even more. I just
disagree that we don't already have a workable positive rep system.

Postive reps--not just negative reps--are how we learn of good
restaurants, good crypto books (Schneier, for example), and on and on.

Histories of repayment of past bills (aka "credit ratings") are a
classic manifestation of this. (I don't plan to get into a
metaphysical debate about whether TRW Credit is doing the rating, or
prospective lenders are, etc. In simple terms, a modern credit rating
report is a composite summary of how many loans were repaid, how many
bankruptcies and the like occurred, etc. No guarantees of futrue
performance, but some strong indications. A Bayesian model that the
future is likely to look like the past.)

So, postive reputation systems are needed...and they are already in
common use.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo at toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay






From solman at MIT.EDU  Wed Oct  5 00:35:31 1994
From: solman at MIT.EDU (solman at MIT.EDU)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 00:35:31 PDT
Subject: archives
In-Reply-To: <199410050547.BAA18923@bb.com>
Message-ID: <9410050735.AA02411@ua.MIT.EDU>


> solman at MIT.EDU writes:
>  > I used to read cpunks from the discuss archive before I joined the list.
>  > Are non-MIT folks able to access:
>  > 
>  > http://www.mit.edu:8008/menelaus.mit.edu/cpunks/
> 
> Yes, we are.  It's a bit of an awful interface, though, with no way to
> download en mass.  Any chance I could get at the source articles with ftp?
> I do have an MIT guest account, if that's helpful.

I'm sure there is a way, but I'm afraid I don't know what it is. Maybe
somebody else here does?

Sheepishly Yours,

Jason W. Solinsky





From unicorn at access.digex.net  Wed Oct  5 00:41:06 1994
From: unicorn at access.digex.net (Black Unicorn)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 00:41:06 PDT
Subject: Freedom of technology
In-Reply-To: <199410050559.BAA04415@ducie.cs.umass.edu>
Message-ID: <199410050740.AA12646@access4.digex.net>


Lewis McCarthy scripsit


[...]

> 
> Choosing the place to draw the line is indeed the crux of the matter IMHO.
> I try to draw it at the point where one person's misuse of technology 
> starts to hurt another person (which often begs the question, I know !).

We're basically on the same wavelength after all.

> Considering some of your examples:
[...]

> OTOH I can see that ABS could stop a lot of slow/non-alert people from
> slamming their cars into me & mine; I trust the technology more than the
> people who would be replacing it. I'm happy that it's a fairly standard 
> feature, although this seems to be more a result of market demand than 
> regulation.

My point (poorly expressed) was that making these mandatory would annoy me.
I'm actually pleased with ABS as a market function.

> Your mention of outlawing sugar calls to mind some debates about smoking bans.
> Here IMHO the line is clear. When you eat sugar next to me, you're not 
> doing me any harm unless I'm forced to pay your dental bills. In sharp 
> contrast, I consider smoking in company to be assault with a deadly 
> weapon. My choice of self-defense in this case is legislation preventing
> anyone from smoking in my airspace. I have no problem with people smoking
> in private where the smoke's never going to harm me.

You make the massive leap in logic here that eludes the legislators.
It's the impact on others in the SPECIFIC and not the aggregate that 
should be used to determine limitations on technology.

I tend to preach absolutism in deregulation (or near to it) because 
allowing distinction threatens to put legislators in the position of 
deciding where the line is.  You think I want to be forced to buy an ABS 
car because the average driver is an idiot and because Driving School is 
a joke?  Of course not.  I refuse to be bound by the national average.

> Of course, the explosive success of bullshit litigation (strongly aided
> IMHO by our lowest-common-denominator jury selection system) has played
> a major role in inducing companies & the govt. to go overboard protecting
> people from their own idiocy.  I just want to be protected from other
> people's idiocy :)

I don't see the connection here.  How does the jury system contribute to 
government intervention?  Whatever the jury verdict in a civil suit, the 
government still has to say "We can't allow all these law suits, let's 
ban X so there wont be any more."  You can have 40 billion in judgements 
against KY jelly, that doesn't mean government needs to be involved.  The 
judgements, the publicity, and the civil system have SOLVED the problem.  
Those who might have had problems with KY have been compensated, those 
who are smart consumers will avoid KY, and KY will either go out of 
business, make massive efforts to correct the problem and get the 
information out there that that problem has been corrected, or it can 
afford the suits.  I'd prefer to see a consumer monitoring program, 
listing complaints, lawsuits and quality ratings on products available 
via net/1-800 number and etc.  A "good housekeeping" rating of A to F for 
example.  If this information system is handled properly and given enough 
detail and depth there are no such problems.  The market will regulate 
and the incentives will be to provide the best product, at the lowest 
cost.

Information is the key, and if the consumer cannot bother him or herself 
to check out the product they buy I'm not sympathetic.

Of course one cypherpunk is sure to say: "Nice, but not about cryptography."

Part of the problem with cryptography and technology today is that 
consumers have little if any information about the field.  What a shame 
it would be if the market were killed by government "we know what's best 
for you before you've even seen it" before it ever got big.

> I won't touch on the question of required backdoor installation....
> 
> -L. McCarthy
> Send me mail using "Subject: remailer-help" for an autoreply about Underdog
> 

-uni- (Dark)

[Follow ups to alt.market.systems]

-- 
073BB885A786F666 nemo repente fuit turpissimus - potestas scientiae in usu est
6E6D4506F6EDBC17 quaere verum ad infinitum, loquitur sub rosa    -    wichtig!




From marcoc at nsifc.ifc.pi.cnr.it  Wed Oct  5 00:57:03 1994
From: marcoc at nsifc.ifc.pi.cnr.it (MarcoCalamari Ing.)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 00:57:03 PDT
Subject: Call for Italians
Message-ID: <9410050955.AA20859@nsifc.ifc.pi.cnr.it>



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hello world,

Is there any Italian people interested to have geographical & legal
 Italian related discussion ? Please tell me also if such group already
 exist.

Have a good day.   Marco Calamari

                       
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Marco A. Calamari - "Bandwidth is a natural resource; use carefully."     |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ELEA S.p.A., via S. Domenico 70, 50133 Firenze, Italy                     |
| Phone : +39-55-5000465   Fax: +39-55-579337                               |
| E-mail: Internet primary marcoc at nsifc.ifc.pi.cnr.it                       |
|         Internet backup  marcoc at guest1.atc.olivetti.com                   |
|         Applelink        ita0820 (from Inet: ita0820 at applelink.apple.com) |
| PGP 2.6.1 public key: use key server, check by finger or direct request   |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.1

iQCVAwUBLpJZBolqHjrHnYhBAQGXDwP/edst1vJkRAny3wbBR/4wQPBJuEsXmVze
tN3mSkpA/kW8r6y44GT3cRPUkMyBXGTbDbVvusdk8g9TYb+ze+IU3V3NnE9/sAkH
VMSo2OmsVL2R7j5TsqSkXWR5twh7J7BUT8CMOqPWm61wsiN+Ms4Gg2r8p455MGFL
7sAM0ATx3lk=
=I+kH
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From unicorn at access.digex.net  Wed Oct  5 01:17:18 1994
From: unicorn at access.digex.net (Black Unicorn)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 01:17:18 PDT
Subject: Call for Italians
In-Reply-To: <9410050955.AA20859@nsifc.ifc.pi.cnr.it>
Message-ID: <199410050816.AA13163@access4.digex.net>


MarcoCalamari Ing. scripsit

> 
> Hello world,
> 
> Is there any Italian people interested to have geographical & legal
>  Italian related discussion ? Please tell me also if such group already
>  exist.
> 
> Have a good day.   Marco Calamari
> 
>                        
> +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+
> | Marco A. Calamari - "Bandwidth is a natural resource; use carefully."     |
                         ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Sure, I'm wasting bandwidth, but at least THIS isn't in my sig also.


-- 
073BB885A786F666 nemo repente fuit turpissimus - potestas scientiae in usu est
6E6D4506F6EDBC17 quaere verum ad infinitum, loquitur sub rosa    -    wichtig!




From bart at netcom.com  Wed Oct  5 01:56:35 1994
From: bart at netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 01:56:35 PDT
Subject: Richard Stallman of GNU on Tcl
Message-ID: <199410050855.BAA25288@netcom2.netcom.com>



    On gnu.announce of 9/23, he writes "Why you should not use Tcl".
    Instead, those wanting to use the Tk tools are commended to a
    Scheme interpreter with it called STk. Available from:
    ftp.cs.indiana.edu:pub/scheme-repository/imp/STk-2.1.tar.Z 




From rcromw1 at gl.umbc.edu  Wed Oct  5 03:24:18 1994
From: rcromw1 at gl.umbc.edu (Ray Cromwell)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 03:24:18 PDT
Subject: He's dead Jim (Chomsky)
In-Reply-To: <199410050651.BAA12604@jpunix.com>
Message-ID: <199410051023.GAA11184@umbc9.umbc.edu>


Anonymous writes:
> James A. McDonald wrote:
> >There is ample Chomsky material outside this quote supporting socialism,
> correct.
> >and as well as socialism, those measures that socialism makes necessary,
> >namely silencing of dissent, mass murder, and rule by terror.
> Mr. McDonald infers this because, although Chomsky, if taken at face value,
> does not _appear_ to be advocating "mass murder, and rule by terror",
> McDonald __knows__ that:
> 1. a society without capitalism must be based on rule by terror.
> and
> 2. anybody as intelligent as Chomsky knows (1).

> thus anybody who advocates socialism is really advocating rule by terror
> and so Chomsky clearly means the opposite of what he says.

> Mr. McDonald's reasoning is perfect except that (1) is false.

   Well, perhaps in theory, but let's see what real dedicated
socialists think. Quoted from an article in my campus newspaper
"Long Island University Professor Condemns Capitalism" (the idiot
came to give a speech to about 10 people claiming Russia was
"state capitalist". He's been a socialist since the 1930s)

"`Capitalism will not collapse. You've got to overthrow it', Seigal
said.
  After the revolution, those who would have resisted the change and
who would pose a threat to the workers and their new socialist
government would have to somehow be removed from society. Commenting
on the secret police force established in the Soviet Union after 1917,
Professor Seigal said, `[the Soviets] realized that you need the state
to surpress all of the people who would resist the socialist
revolution'" 

Summary: in a socialist state, only socialist thought can
be allowed (otherwise, it would quickly collapse.) Want to start a
party based on market economics? Meet the firing squad.

  There you have it. Socialism may in theory exist in a free society,
in practice, it always leads to big brother. 

> and/or services for a price. Since everything is free in this hypothetical
> society, nobody will have any reason to buy your goods and/or services
> Mr. McDonald, because they can get them somewhere else for free. Thus
> capitalism will never return (unless people who prefer a repressive society
> restore capitalism by force) without anybody doing anything to repress
> capitalism or other dissident ideas. I think this is the sort of society
> Mr. Chomsky is advocating.

   Obviously Mr. Chomsky missed out on Economics 101. A civilization
without an economy can not allocate resources in a rational manner (I
refer you to Von Mises). The only place your "everything will be free"
ideal will work is in a tribal society.  No socialist "economy" is
going to build a computer or automobile, efficiently, if at all. If it
did succeed in building them, only the politicians would have them,
and they'd look like the ENIAC. Meanwhile, I'm enjoying rapid
advancement of technology and and reduction of cost at an almost
exponential rate (price a pentium 66mhz or 28.8kbps modem back in
June and now. Amazing isn't it?)

   Have you ever given any thought to how you'd run a global
economic system based on the idea that "everything will be free,
people will do the right thing, and you will get the goods
you want and need automagically?"

> I don't think anyone thinks this mailing list is the right place to 
> discuss your Chomsky conspiracy theories so if you haven't finished yet,
> take them to alt.conspiracy.

   Huh? Isn't it Chomsky who has the conspiracy theories, namely his
bogus theory that the media is conspiring to protect capitalists?
Chomsky may not be a totalitarian, but he certainly is deluded
when it comes to how an economy works, and how the media functions.

   Socialism is dead, all hail welfare statism.





From jkreznar at ininx.com  Wed Oct  5 03:41:54 1994
From: jkreznar at ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 03:41:54 PDT
Subject: Freedom of technology
In-Reply-To: <199410050559.BAA04415@ducie.cs.umass.edu>
Message-ID: <9410051041.AA14697@ininx>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Lewis McCarthy <lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu> writes:

> My choice of self-defense in this case is legislation preventing
> anyone from smoking in my airspace.

What, exactly, is ``your'' airspace?

If you want legislative control over what's yours, maybe you should also
escrow your private crypto keys with them?

	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
	jkreznar at ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLpJ7/MDhz44ugybJAQHOcwP+LIY9rwLvrasd3IoidQ39Oigy6N22ZEOL
aZ9TZJx0tN1ywTwfiBLP9iNSOXKU9vpziDdy55AwSZZuLyWutUDsTDsjLIufDhBm
7kwceS2LrrPZNJpEGeyRBWv+CBOkN5URnsD3Rm+rxrBG0a6LdyTUupp6KVIz34xh
YQNjss0r0jc=
=i8zw
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From hayashi at scs.sony.co.jp  Wed Oct  5 05:32:39 1994
From: hayashi at scs.sony.co.jp (Tsuyoshi Hayashi)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 05:32:39 PDT
Subject: test44
Message-ID: <9410051230.AA09302@eagle.scs.sony.co.jp>






| Tsuyoshi Hayashi (hayashi at scs.sony.co.jp)
| Tech. div., Sony Computer Systems Inc.
|
| PGP public key NOT available now.





From hayashi at scs.sony.co.jp  Wed Oct  5 06:06:42 1994
From: hayashi at scs.sony.co.jp (Tsuyoshi Hayashi)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 06:06:42 PDT
Subject: Sorry, I made a mistake...
Message-ID: <9410051304.AA09547@eagle.scs.sony.co.jp>


All cypherpunks,

Sorry.  I made a mistake.

At 05 Oct 94 21:30:19 +0900, I have sent a test mail (to
checking my mailing environment) to cypherpunks at toad.com.

 |To: cypherpunks at toad.com
 |Cc: cpunk at scs.sony.co.jp
 |Subject: test44
 |Date: Wed, 05 Oct 94 21:30:19 +0900
 |From: Tsuyoshi Hayashi <hayashi at scs.sony.co.jp>

Sorry.  Please overlook my mistake for once, please.

# But this is my first (second?) mail to cypherpunks...

| Tsuyoshi Hayashi (hayashi at scs.sony.co.jp)
| Tech. div., Sony Computer Systems Inc.





From cme at tis.com  Wed Oct  5 06:19:09 1994
From: cme at tis.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 06:19:09 PDT
Subject: Impact of Free Strong Crypto (Essay of sorts)
In-Reply-To: <199410042147.OAA00604@comsec.com>
Message-ID: <9410051318.AA08719@tis.com>



>From: Black Unicorn <unicorn at access.digex.net>
>Date: Sun, 2 Oct 1994 22:30:22 -0400 (EDT)


>How will the complete inability of law enforcement (Federal or Local) to 
>conduct wiretaps impact collection?  Those who think that law enforcement 
>will just have to go away might want to reconsider.  Instead I think that 
>law enforcement will simply become much more intrusive as a response to the 
>unavailability of easy interception via wiretapping.


The more I try to disseminate PGP and RIPEM (and get people to use them),
the more I think that inability to conduct wiretaps and get intelligence
from them will never occur.  If it were to occur, we'd probably see laws
passed immediately against civilian cryptography.  If we merely threaten
it, we give a weapon to the FBI to request such laws and a compliant
Congress might actually go ahead and give in.  However, the prediction I
find I have to make is that ccivilian





From cme at tis.com  Wed Oct  5 06:20:10 1994
From: cme at tis.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 06:20:10 PDT
Subject: p.s.
Message-ID: <9410051319.AA08817@tis.com>


The previous message was sent early by accident but was nearly complete.
Don't bother checking your mailer. :-)





From sommerfeld at orchard.medford.ma.us  Wed Oct  5 06:53:19 1994
From: sommerfeld at orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 06:53:19 PDT
Subject: Richard Stallman of GNU on Tcl
In-Reply-To: <199410050855.BAA25288@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199410051348.JAA00599@orchard.medford.ma.us>


>     those wanting to use the Tk tools are commended to a
>     Scheme interpreter with it called STk. Available from:
>     ftp.cs.indiana.edu:pub/scheme-repository/imp/STk-2.1.tar.Z 

To attempt to make this crypto-relevant:

Most scheme implementations support infinite precision integers
("bignums") directly, though some of them don't, and some of those
which do have really slow bignum support.

I haven't seen one with a fast modular exponentiation routine,
though :-).

I haven't looked at STk at all.

					- Bill








From franl at centerline.com  Wed Oct  5 06:57:18 1994
From: franl at centerline.com (Fran Litterio)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 06:57:18 PDT
Subject: Nom de guerre public key
In-Reply-To: <FRANL.94Oct2201427@draco.centerline.com>
Message-ID: <FRANL.94Oct5093142@draco.centerline.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

warlord at mit.edu (Derek Atkins) writes:

> > A signature on your PGP public key is a personal guarantee from the
> > person who signed it that she has first-hand knowledge that the key's
> > userid accurately names the person who physically possesses the key
> > (i.e., the signature validates the binding between userid and person).

> Actually, this is not true.  A signature on a key is a personal
> guarantee from the signer that binds the user-id to the _KEY_, not
> necessarily a person.

That's part of it, but the more important binding created by a
signature is the binding between the userid and the real person.
Without that binding, the binding between the key and the userid is
useless.  This is why photo-identification (i.e., a passport) a
required part of keysigning (unless the signer personally knows the
key's owner).  Sure signatures bind the userid to the key, but what
good is that to third parties if they can't be sure that the userid
accurately names the person who possesses that key?

> For example, in the case of a real
> person, you can send me a message to "warlord at MIT.EDU" and later meet
> me in person, and I can verify that I received the message by
> responding in some appropriate manner.  

When I meet you in person to hand you my key fingerprint, won't you
require me to identify myself in order that you can be sure the name
in the userid of my key is also the name of the person you are
meeting?  If you do, then you will have just validated the binding
between userid and real person.

> But you cannot perform this check for a pseudonymous identity, because
> there is no secure way to prove that that key really belongs to some
> identity.

Which is exactly why I can never sign the key of a pseudonymous
entity.  Because the entity is unwilling to prove to me that there is
a single real person who possesses the private half of his key.

> It is possible to set up a server that
> compares userID to mailID in some secure manner.  For example, there
> were some way to get a secure mail from a user to a server, and the
> server could verify the mail address, and then validate the mail
> address to pgp keyID.
>
> As an aside, I've written a Kerberos PGP Keysigner -- it uses kerberos
> authentication to validate a user and compares the kerberos identity
> to the userID on the key, and if certain qualifications are met
> between these two names, the server will sign the key.  The assurance
> this key is making is that the owner of this key could authenticate as
> this user to me via kerberos.

I don't like the idea of an automaton possessing or signing PGP keys.
People sign other people's keys because only people have the need to
trust other people.  Automatons don't need to trust and they are not
the direct targets of trust.  This is the objection I had to Phil's
signing of the Betsi public key.  As an automaton, Betsi is only as
trustable as its human authors and adminstrators.  Yet Phil doesn't
know who those people may be in five or ten years.  Yes, people change
over time too, but not as quickly or as radically as an automaton can.
It's too easy to subvert an automaton for me to ever sign an
automaton's PGP key.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.1

iQCVAwUBLpKqgXeXQmAScOodAQHN0gP+K7TTE488k+fJQdyL4laxFOJa8LYeoo09
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ld149yBMmZBawHw5Qj482UpVt12+hmYxgt0bBnsTRqf4r6lMjdmU2OwiZ7KaY5/V
/EKkTrotvAw=
=G4X/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--
Fran Litterio                   franl at centerline.com (617-498-3255)
CenterLine Software             http://draco.centerline.com:8080/~franl/
Cambridge, MA, USA 02138-1110   PGP public key id: 1270EA1D





From cme at tis.com  Wed Oct  5 07:05:26 1994
From: cme at tis.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 07:05:26 PDT
Subject: Referrences to SKE and GAK
In-Reply-To: <199410042151.OAA00624@comsec.com>
Message-ID: <9410051404.AA11905@tis.com>



>From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
>Date: Sun, 2 Oct 1994 20:31:13 -0700 (PDT)

>And I think we have indeed seen things coming before a lot of others
>did. The latest such alert, by Carl Ellison, myself, and others, is
>about "software key escrow," or what Carl dubs "GAK" (government
>access to keys). I think SKE is the wave of future repression, worth
>starting to fight now. The popular media is largely oblivious to it,
>as usual.  (John Markoff, of the NY Times, is on top of it, more so
>than most of us, and is waiting for the right time to do something on
>this.)


As someone at TIS actively involved in looking at SKE and related
technology, I find it bothersome that Tim keeps mixing the terms SKE and
GAK.  I'm not a fan of giving government access to civilian keys, no matter
what form it takes.  However, my mother was an English major and she taught
me to be protective of the language.

	escrow - n - a deed, a bond, money or a piece of property held in
	trust by a third party to be turned over to the grantee only upon
	the fulfillment of a condition

>From inside this morass, there are so many options with so many gradations
that it's important to keep terms well defined and separate.  Try this:

KE:	key escrow, implementation and grantee unspecified

HKE:	key escrow, in hardware, grantee unspecified

SKE:	key escrow, in software, grantee unspecified

KEG:	key escrow, implementation unspecified, government grantee

GAK:	government access to keys, method unspecified

GAK is clearly more general than KE and even more general than SKE.  There
is a real danger that (KE/HKE/SKE) could be subverted by the government but
there are some real uses (as have been pointed out here) for what Steve
Walker (the TIS president) calls a "spare key in the wallet".  [I'm hoping
to get his paper on the subject on our FTP or Web server -- will tell
people when it's there.]  A spare key version of SKE would have the key's
owner as grantee -- leaving the gov't out of the loop *except through
normal subpoena and search warrant access*.

My predictions:

	1.	access by subpoena is still too objectionable for
		many people and isn't likely to fly;

	2.	surveillance agencies are not served by these mechanisms
		so they are not likely to welcome such systems.

Meanwhile, NSA access isn't covered by any of these terms, except perhaps
GAK.  This is relevant since at the last KEA meeting (NIST's "Key Escrow
Approaches"), TIS SKE was demonstrated and people from industry were asked
if they wanted to participate in an experiment -- put it in some product,
let some gov't agency be the guinea pig user community and see if the FBI
was happy with the result (this would be SKEG -- SKE with gov't as grantee)
-- and the response was that there was *no* interest unless this provided
a way to get software exported.  Mike Nelson of the White House (their
point man on Clipper, etc.) and Clint Brooks of NSA replied with a resounding
"we'll have to think about that".  [There has been no result of such thinking
yet.]

The sequence of events is:

1.	industry wants to export
2.	NSA controls export
3.	industry appears ready to do all sorts of things (like provide GAK)
	in order to get export permission
4.	the NSA doesn't get its needs met by SKEG (because the SKEG mechanisms
	can be circumvented, leaving normal S/W without GAK)
5.	the current situation is an impasse
6.	the forces of the dark side are so desperate to get GAK that
	they'll look at anything which might get them there

-------

So, there's a real reason to watch SKEG developments.  There's also a real
reason to get a new Cantwell bill passed.

At the same time, although the term KE is tainted by NIST/NSA/FBI misuse,
there do exist positive uses for KE (especially SKE) *without* the gov't as
grantee.  I encourage individuals to give this a little thought.  The
example Steve Walker keeps using in public is "the second time I locked
myself out of my car, I decided to carry a spare key in my wallet".


[...]

>Dorothy Denning is deeply involved with SKE, 

Dorothy has seen the TIS SKE demo.  Involvement other than that is none, at
least on TIS's side, except that she provided one suggestion to the three
TIS developers (Dave Balenson, Steve Lipner and Steve Walker) during the
design stage (in early May I believe).

BTW, my name appears on the TIS SKE paper because I added a variant -- the
escrow-less option.  That is, instead of having a private key in escrow for
the FBI to get and use forever, have the sender split his session key into
KS1 and KS2 (KS = XOR(KS1,KS2)) and encrypt each half for a different
escrow agent.  [That term is already a misnomer in this case, since these
"escrow agents" have no databases of keys and therefore escrow nothing.  I
tell you, this morass has done major damage to the English language, all
because the gov't perpetrators are afraid to say what they really mean, in
plain English!]  LE would then have to send a piece to each escrow agent
for each message -- letting the agents do traffic analysis on FBI efforts
and also giving out no key lasting beyond a wiretap court order.  As with
anything else, when faced with a technical problem, if I see solutions I
offer them.  [PRZ tells a story of an engineer being led to a gallows which
has been malfunctioning, letting people go free (through a presumed act of
God) -- looking at it and saying "Oh, I see the problem".  (sorry if I
ruined the joke with abbreviation)]

ob.polit.: I don't mind GAK if it is applied only to the military and
various executive agencies, as Clipper/Capstone now appears to be.  Those
people have already given up rights to private communications.  However,
for military uses of Capstone, it bothers me as a citizen to see the keys
kept by Treasury and NIST.  I'd rather see them kept by NSA and Fort Knox
(and I've said so, to Mike Nelson among others).

For private citizens, I intend to fight to my last breath any attempt to
declare a government right to our keys.  I also intend to fight attempts to
declare that the public is volunteering to go along with GAK.  I don't buy
that and I'm in a position to see if it were true.

>					      working with Miles Schmid
>of the NSA 

Miles is with NIST (or was this a snide comment on NIST? :-).

>	    and the folks from Trusted Information Systems (according
>to Whit Diffie, who saw a joint presentation by the bunch of them in
>Karlsruhe, and their glee that the Micali escrow patent will likely be
>overturned due to prior art in Europe).

The TIS SKE stuff was presented at several places, most recently the
CSS&PAB.  The new thrust by Steve Walker is that the public has no reason
to buy KEG products.  They add no value to the consumer.  However, the
public *has* a reason to buy spare-key-in-the-wallet systems.  Given the
existence of a redundant place to find a message key (or to get it
decrypted), law enforcement could mine that database, using existing
legal mechanisms (subpoena and search warrant).  [This access does
not meet the desires of covert surveillance, however, so it's likely
to be rejected.]

 - Carl






From m5 at vail.tivoli.com  Wed Oct  5 07:14:43 1994
From: m5 at vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 07:14:43 PDT
Subject: He's dead Jim (Chomsky)
In-Reply-To: <9410041812.AA27339@nately.UCSD.EDU>
Message-ID: <9410051414.AA26525@vail.tivoli.com>



James A. Donald writes:
 > He merely provides and endless stream of justifications and
 > rationalizations for particular mass murderers...

Two things:

1)	This has got to be the oddest interpretation of Chomsky I've
seen, and for what it's worth I've never been led to believe any of
these things while reading Chomsky.  Then again, it's an interesting
view and it does cause me to at least think about matters.

2)	It's not clear to me that this is relevant to the list
anymore.  (I'm not trying to fire a shot and then call the war off;
I'm happy to discuss this via direct e-mail if anybody likes.)

| GOOD TIME FOR MOVIE - GOING ||| Mike McNally <m5 at tivoli.com>       |
| TAKE TWA TO CAIRO.          ||| Tivoli Systems, Austin, TX:        |
|     (actual fortune cookie) ||| "Like A Little Bit of Semi-Heaven" |





From jya at pipeline.com  Wed Oct  5 07:16:45 1994
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 07:16:45 PDT
Subject: NYT Libertarian News
Message-ID: <199410051416.KAA11094@pipe3.pipeline.com>


Good and bad news in today's NYT on a controversial new 
libertarian (I think) community.

Here's the good news, or maybe bad, quote:

Kamiah, Idaho -- Ever since Lewis and Clark sloshed their way 
through this valley 100 years ago, some people have viewed the 
Pacific Northwest as a refuge for the kind of behavior that 
might get a person run out of town in other parts of the 
country.

. . . now comes retired Lieut. Col. James (Bo) Gritz, a 
Vietnam-era Green Beret and onetime Populist Party candidate 
for President, with what is likely to be the first community 
ever built around fear and hatred of the Federal Government.

Mr. Gritz, who discovered Idaho during the Presidential 
campaign, says he is a patriot who has become disgusted with 
the "cesspool" of public schools, the "grip of the 
international bankers" on the nation's currency, and "an 
encroaching, ravenous, predator Government," which wants to 
disarm the citizenry and force people to carry health cards.

. . . in an advertisement for his paramilitary programs, he 
says, "You will learn what weapon and ammunition type is best 
in times of grave peril; how to carry, draw, hold and 
efficiently engage multiple targets.

It is this kind of language that has many people worried that 
their hamlet will become the next Waco.

"The tyrants who ordered the assault on Waco should be tried 
and executed as traitors," Mr. Gritz wrote in a recent issue of 
his newsletter.

. . . Mr. Gritz said, "I want a community where if the F.B.I. 
looks at us, they'll end up saying it's more trouble than it's 
worth."

End quote.

The bad news, or maybe good, is that the Times then goes on to 
ridicule Mr. Gritz and his cohorts.

Anyone want this by e-mail?

John 





From jya at pipeline.com  Wed Oct  5 07:26:03 1994
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 07:26:03 PDT
Subject: NYT on TeleTheft
Message-ID: <199410051425.KAA12326@pipe3.pipeline.com>


Long article today on widespread international calling-card 
fraud -- stealing and selling numbers to and by computer 
hackers around the world -- and Secret Service and other LEAs 
current traps, investigations, arrests and indictments.

Don't call if you want e-mail copy, they're about to bust you.

This looks like one of "threats" the Wiretap Bill (and maybe 
the newly chastened CIA) hopes to squash.

John





From dfloyd at paris.eng.utsa.edu  Wed Oct  5 07:37:16 1994
From: dfloyd at paris.eng.utsa.edu (Douglas R. Floyd)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 07:37:16 PDT
Subject: Data haven code
Message-ID: <9410050954.ZM749@paris.eng.utsa.edu>



I am looking for beta testers for the data haven code.

It should be ready by the tenth to the fifteenth of October.

Due to a mishap partly caused my me, the machine that had the code
got hosed and I have to re-create most of the work again :(.

If you are interested in beta-testing this code, please E-mail me
(dfloyd at runner.jpl.utsa.edu), and please encrypt the response with PGP.

(My key is on the keyservers, or fingerable from lonestar.utsa.edu)

Now back to your regularly scheduled programming.







From m5 at vail.tivoli.com  Wed Oct  5 07:45:27 1994
From: m5 at vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 07:45:27 PDT
Subject: NYT Libertarian News
In-Reply-To: <199410051416.KAA11094@pipe3.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <9410051445.AA26598@vail.tivoli.com>



John Young writes:
 > . . . now comes retired Lieut. Col. James (Bo) Gritz

Mr. Gritz has been usenet flame fodder for quite some time.  He's
either a crypto-fascist (no, not that kind of crypto) or a saviour of
the American Way, depending on your personal leanings.

| GOOD TIME FOR MOVIE - GOING ||| Mike McNally <m5 at tivoli.com>       |
| TAKE TWA TO CAIRO.          ||| Tivoli Systems, Austin, TX:        |
|     (actual fortune cookie) ||| "Like A Little Bit of Semi-Heaven" |





From franl at centerline.com  Wed Oct  5 07:57:08 1994
From: franl at centerline.com (Fran Litterio)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 07:57:08 PDT
Subject: Nom de guerre public key
In-Reply-To: <FRANL.94Oct2201427@draco.centerline.com>
Message-ID: <FRANL.94Oct5095822@draco.centerline.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes:

> Fran Litterio wrote:

> > Unless you reveal your pseudonym to someone and identify yourself
> > according to the rules of the PGP Web of Trust, you should not be able
> > to get signatures on your PGP public key.
> 
> What are the "rules of the PGP Web of Trust"?

They are pretty simple.  Don't sign someone's PGP key unless you have
firsthand knowledge that it is their key.  Implicit in this knowledge
is the knowledge that they are accurately named by the userid on the
key.  This requires either that you have a significant personal
relationship with the key owner (i.e., long-time friend, lover, etc.)
or that you have seen a significant form of photo-id (i.e., their
passport).  You must also obtain the key fingerprint via a relatively
tamperproof channel (i.e., phone call (if you recognize their voice)
or personal meeting).

> Tying public keys to physical persons is _one_ approach, but not the
> only one.

Yes, we might one day live in a world where every human interaction
takes place between pseudonyous entities that represent one or more
real people.  In such a world, there is no place for PGP's Web of
Trust.  Reputations will have to suffice.

> The "web of trust" models how we pass on advice, introduce others with
> our recommendations, etc., but it is not a very formal thing. 

It's less formal than, say, a central Certification Authority, but it
has some formalities that, if broken regularly and on a wide scale,
would render the Web of Trust ineffective.  Determining the identity
of the real person who owns the key you are signing is one of those
formalities.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.1

iQCVAwUBLpKw5XeXQmAScOodAQGZ1wP9ERuR2xab9ysUl0goc9qYGEy30S0CFrVd
C6MnuPFETML6BfJHRF/nM+4PTHwfox7Cfp4BEq55/D9FxpvmFwZ/v4A7mKKzJVoD
Jl9Ex3lWxvdM3hv99Zt+dzaWSNvoAbwVIXHwgYS6PyZ68EIKhTJogStarWybpj1R
yez5a/MlFw0=
=le0b
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--
Fran Litterio                   franl at centerline.com (617-498-3255)
CenterLine Software             http://draco.centerline.com:8080/~franl/
Cambridge, MA, USA 02138-1110   PGP public key id: 1270EA1D





From nelson at crynwr.com  Wed Oct  5 08:00:13 1994
From: nelson at crynwr.com (Russell Nelson)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 08:00:13 PDT
Subject: Nom de guerre public key
In-Reply-To: <FRANL.94Oct5093142@draco.centerline.com>
Message-ID: <m0qsXxA-0008cKC@crynwr.crynwr.com>


   Date: 05 Oct 1994 13:31:42 GMT
   Organization: CenterLine Software R&D
   From: franl at centerline.com (Fran Litterio)

   That's part of it, but the more important binding created by a
   signature is the binding between the userid and the real person.
   Without that binding, the binding between the key and the userid is
   useless.

Nonsense.  You're assuming that the real person wishes to carry their
reputation over onto their key/userid combination.  Perhaps they wish
to establish a separate reputation for it?  And once they've
established that reputation, they wish to change keys?  Might you not
sign such a new key?

-- 
-russ <nelson at crynwr.com>    http://www.crynwr.com/crynwr/nelson.html
Crynwr Software   | Crynwr Software sells packet driver support | ask4 PGP key
11 Grant St.      | +1 315 268 1925 (9201 FAX)  | What is thee doing about it?
Potsdam, NY 13676 | LPF member - ask me about the harm software patents do.





From perry at imsi.com  Wed Oct  5 08:00:52 1994
From: perry at imsi.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 08:00:52 PDT
Subject: NYT Libertarian News
In-Reply-To: <9410051445.AA26598@vail.tivoli.com>
Message-ID: <9410051500.AA05041@snark.imsi.com>



Mike McNally says:
> John Young writes:
>  > . . . now comes retired Lieut. Col. James (Bo) Gritz
> 
> Mr. Gritz has been usenet flame fodder for quite some time.  He's
> either a crypto-fascist (no, not that kind of crypto) or a saviour of
> the American Way, depending on your personal leanings.

The word "nut" comes to mind...

.pm





From merriman at metronet.com  Wed Oct  5 08:17:15 1994
From: merriman at metronet.com (David K. Merriman)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 08:17:15 PDT
Subject: NYT Libertarian News
Message-ID: <199410051516.AA18591@metronet.com>


>
>Mike McNally says:
>> John Young writes:
>>  > . . . now comes retired Lieut. Col. James (Bo) Gritz
>> 
>> Mr. Gritz has been usenet flame fodder for quite some time.  He's
>> either a crypto-fascist (no, not that kind of crypto) or a saviour of
>> the American Way, depending on your personal leanings.
>
>The word "nut" comes to mind...
>

I hate to correct you, but that's "nut^3"  :-)

Dave Merriman
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Finger merriman at metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints.
Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender.  PGP preferred.
Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to
*love* Big Brother.






From hfinney at shell.portal.com  Wed Oct  5 08:37:29 1994
From: hfinney at shell.portal.com (Hal)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 08:37:29 PDT
Subject: Referrences to SKE and GAK
In-Reply-To: <9410051404.AA11905@tis.com>
Message-ID: <199410051537.IAA12218@jobe.shell.portal.com>


Thanks to Carl for an interesting essay on key escrow.

What is being escrowed in the SKE proposals?  Is it the session key?
What is the advantage to the user of broadcasting a session key encrypted
to an escrow agent?  That does not sound like a spare key in the wallet.

What about the aspect of SKE which allows compliant implementations to
verify that the session key is actually being honestly reported to the
escrow agent?  Isn't that where most of the cryptographic challenge and
interest comes from, and again how does that benefit the customer?  It
seems strictly for the benefit of wiretappers.

What about key escrow systems which allow users to store encrypted
versions of their public keys?  There would still be the danger of the
user dying or forgetting his pass phrase, but in many circumstances
that is tolerable.  The KE agency then simply becomes a data backup
facility.  Is TIS working on this?  This seems like the true analog of
the spare key in the wallet.

I get the impression that despite all of the good and reasonable things
you can say about key escrow, the actual work and interest is strictly
going towards systems to allow government wiretapping.  No significant
efforts are going into these other ideas which might be useful to the
customer but are irrelevant to the wiretapping issue.  So I am afraid
that the actual work on SKE is only going to hurt privacy despite
Carl's hopes.

Hal





From vanhorn at cps.msu.edu  Wed Oct  5 08:43:21 1994
From: vanhorn at cps.msu.edu (vanhorn at cps.msu.edu)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 08:43:21 PDT
Subject: NYT Libertarian News
In-Reply-To: <199410051416.KAA11094@pipe3.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <9410051543.AA16529@ss17.cps.msu.edu>


> Anyone want this by e-mail?

Sure, I'd like to see the full text if you have it.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kevin S. Van Horn     | It is the means that determine the ends.
vanhorn at cps.msu.edu   |






From jya at pipeline.com  Wed Oct  5 09:12:17 1994
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 09:12:17 PDT
Subject: Hitler's not dead is he?
Message-ID: <199410051611.MAA21128@pipe3.pipeline.com>



Responding to msg by nobody at jpunix.com (Anonymous) on Wed, 5 
Oct  1:51 AM

>P.S. Lewis McCarthy wrote: "Quick, somebody mention 
>Hitler".  Okay. Mr. McDonald is as fascist as Hitler.  

Er, Hitler was a National Socialist.  In those days, as now, 
everyone used the term indiscriminately, just like "fascist", 
"free market", "capitalist", "commie", and so on.

Everybody gotta try to be more entertainingly original and it 
ain't easy, at least for me.

Play the cryptography game, where no one knows for sure what's 
real or phony, where anyone can talk the talk like Jim Bidzos, 
and so on.

We're all in the same doodoo together, name-calling by 
anonymous crypto or not, and so on it goes.

John (looking for people wanting to sell ad space on their 
sigs; I been educated to buy into others stuff rather than 
think up something original, that's why I post so much from the 
NYT.)





From hughes at ah.com  Wed Oct  5 09:13:52 1994
From: hughes at ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 09:13:52 PDT
Subject: private assets in the world
Message-ID: <9410051532.AA07077@ah.com>


Some interesting figures recently wafted my way about the sizes of
private asset holdings in the world.  These are Goldman, Sachs
estimates.

4 Trillion (10^12) dollars in total worldwide personal assets
2 Trillion of that is secretly held assets
1.5 Trillion of the secretly held assets are in Switzerland

Mighty interesting numbers indeed.

Eric





From sommerfeld at orchard.medford.ma.us  Wed Oct  5 09:33:28 1994
From: sommerfeld at orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 09:33:28 PDT
Subject: Referrences to SKE and GAK
In-Reply-To: <9410051404.AA11905@tis.com>
Message-ID: <199410051616.MAA00815@orchard.medford.ma.us>


Carl,

I think the main problem here is that the government seized the
initiative by using "Key Escrow" when they really mean "Government
Access to Keys"; also, the infamous Gore->Cantwell letter refers to
SKE, but clearly means, from context, that they're referring to what
you refer to as KEG.  This makes it difficult to advocate key escrow
of any form without appearing to endorse "escrow" with the government
as the grantee.

Also:

One can divide the use of encryption in computer networks in two
classes:

 - encrypting real-time communications
 - encrypting stored data (files).

Key escrow in the former case is only useful in the presence of
wiretaps, since the encrypted data is ephemeral.

The business/commercial justification for key escrow (having a "spare
key" around) is really only applicable in the second case.

					- Bill





From nobody at shell.portal.com  Wed Oct  5 09:33:54 1994
From: nobody at shell.portal.com (nobody at shell.portal.com)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 09:33:54 PDT
Subject: ClearSig Bug in PGP?
Message-ID: <199410051633.JAA15476@jobe.shell.portal.com>


can anyone explain the clearsig bug to me, and is there a fix? thnaks
man, i;ve been out for a while/







From lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu  Wed Oct  5 09:46:38 1994
From: lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu (Lewis McCarthy)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 09:46:38 PDT
Subject: My Airspace
In-Reply-To: <9410051041.AA14697@ininx>
Message-ID: <199410051646.MAA06770@ducie.cs.umass.edu>


John Kreznar writes:
$ L. McCarthy <lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu> writes:
$ > My choice of self-defense in this case is legislation preventing
$ > anyone from smoking in my airspace.
$ What, exactly, is ``your'' airspace?

The air I breathe. You don't have a right to make me breathe your smoke.
As long as you keep your smoke to yourself, I'm happy.

$ If you want legislative control over what's yours, 

First of all, I shouldn't have to ask someone to stop trying to kill me.
Beyond that, if I ask someone to desist, she may refuse. Then I can either
a) personally force her to stop, or b) have a third party force her to
stop. In some cases, I'll be unable to stop her on my own, and in any case
it's safer for me to have a third party take care of it. So yeah, when the
assholes out there try to fuck with what I consider mine, I need some folks
in blue suits to step in and shove them out of the way.

-L. McCarthy
Send me mail using "Subject: remailer-help" for an autoreply about Underdog




From system at decode.com  Wed Oct  5 09:52:00 1994
From: system at decode.com (System Operator)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 09:52:00 PDT
Subject: NYT Libertarian News
Message-ID: <3ceqTc3w165w@decode.com>


merriman at metronet.com (David K. Merriman) writes:

> >Mike McNally says:
> >> John Young writes:
> >>  > . . . now comes retired Lieut. Col. James (Bo) Gritz
> >> 
> >> Mr. Gritz has been usenet flame fodder for quite some time.  He's
> >> either a crypto-fascist (no, not that kind of crypto) or a saviour of
> >> the American Way, depending on your personal leanings.
> >
> >The word "nut" comes to mind...
> >
> 
> I hate to correct you, but that's "nut^3"  :-)

However you may feel personally about Mr. Gritz (and his connection
to Ross Perot, etc), I think he serves at least three useful purposes
for other members of society who might be labelled "loose cannons",
to wit:

1)  When the Sierra Club was working for their particular agenda in the
    early seventies, many in the "mainstream" dismissed them as whackos
    on the extreme edge.  Later, when Earth First came along and
    redefined what the environmental movement could become, suddenly
    the Sierra Club was a reasonable, legitimate voice with which those
    in authority could reason.  Mr. Gritz, IMHO, is in part helping to
    redefine the "envelope" of so-called patriotism.  His extreme measures
    may serve to help legitimize less unusual actions which are now
    considered "out there."

2)  He serves as a lightning rod for government enforcement.  It is often
    in the best interests of those in power not to drawn the line of
    acceptable/not acceptable behavior (keep 'em guessing).  His actions
    (and those of Randy Weaver, David Koresh, etc) all drawn attention
    to the willingness of the government to "do something."  It then
    becomes more possible to predict the actions of certain government
    agencies.

3)  It keeps said agencies busy.  Contrary to popular opinion, the
    resources of the government are not infinite (it only seems that
    way).  The government is more like a few dozen lumbering Goliaths,
    each stumbling after whichever David is most irritating at the moment.
    Mr. Gritz serves as the decoy to lure certain giants away from
    other activites.  Federal agents and other resources devoted to
    gathering intelligence on Mr. Gritz are no longer available to
    gather intelligence on others.  [This resource allocation problem,
    IMHO, is one the main reasons for the FBI's insistence on the
    Digital Telephony Bill -- it allows a far greater degree of
    "intelligence" gathered per expenditure of resource.]

Nutty or not, I'll be happy to cheer on Mr. Gritz.

> Dave Merriman

Dan

--
system at decode.com (System Operator)
Cryptography, Security, Privacy BBS  +1 410 730 6734   Data/FAX





From warlord at MIT.EDU  Wed Oct  5 10:03:20 1994
From: warlord at MIT.EDU (Derek Atkins)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 10:03:20 PDT
Subject: ClearSig Bug in PGP?
In-Reply-To: <199410051633.JAA15476@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9410051703.AA07606@toxicwaste.media.mit.edu>


The bug is that you can add text into a clear-signed message that
appears to be real since PGP drops everything before the first empty
line.

The temporary fix is to only read the output from PGP (since the added
text will not be in the output file).

The long-term fix will be in 2.6.2, which will hopefully be released
next week (a message will go out saying when it has been released).
The patch is really too difficult to separate from other patches to
post it separately.

-derek






From bart at netcom.com  Wed Oct  5 10:25:51 1994
From: bart at netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 10:25:51 PDT
Subject: Tcl citations from Cyphernomicon
Message-ID: <199410051725.KAA13653@netcom10.netcom.com>


Forwarded message:
> Subject: Re: Richard Stallman of GNU on Tcl 
> Date: Wed, 05 Oct 1994 10:46:50 -0400
> From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry at imsi.com>
> 
> 
> Fascinating, but why are you sending this to cypherpunks?
> 
> Harry Bartholomew says:
> > 
> >     On gnu.announce of 9/23, he writes "Why you should not use Tcl".
> >     Instead, those wanting to use the Tk tools are commended to a
> >     Scheme interpreter with it called STk. Available from:
> >     ftp.cs.indiana.edu:pub/scheme-repository/imp/STk-2.1.tar.Z 
> 
    For the grep-impaired, see sections 4.5.4 and particularly 13.4.14
    of Tim's opus for Tcl relevance to Cypherpunks.





From cme at tis.com  Wed Oct  5 10:28:44 1994
From: cme at tis.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 10:28:44 PDT
Subject: Referrences to SKE and GAK
In-Reply-To: <199410051616.MAA00815@orchard.medford.ma.us>
Message-ID: <9410051727.AA25518@tis.com>


>Date: Wed, 05 Oct 1994 12:16:21 -0400
>From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld at orchard.medford.ma.us>

>I think the main problem here is that the government seized the
>initiative by using "Key Escrow" when they really mean "Government
>Access to Keys";

Exactly.  The term is tainted.

Meanwhile, the offense to the English language remains even if we give the
term up as tainted.  For example, there's a line in one of our publications
(the Data Security Letter) talking about this process:

	FBI representatives stressed concern that users not be able to use
	encryption products separated from the key escrow process.

That's true to the FBI's word choice.

So -- postulate a Key Escrow service with escrow agents chosen by Fidel
Castro and the Columbian drug cartel as grantee -- or, as an alternative,
postulate a PGP key provided by the FBI for good little boys and girls to
include as a recipient during encryption with PGP-voice.

Which one gives the FBI access?

 - Carl

P.S.  (I know: neither, because there aren't any good little boys and
girls, but I was talking about English semantics, not reality. :-)






From nobody at jpunix.com  Wed Oct  5 10:57:55 1994
From: nobody at jpunix.com (Anonymous)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 10:57:55 PDT
Subject: your mail
Message-ID: <199410051757.MAA20348@jpunix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Black Unicorn <unicorn at access.digex.net> wrote:

> Anonymous scripsit
> >
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> >
> > > That being said let it be known that I consider the following as a
> > > "Cypherpunk victory."
> > >
> > > 1.  Complete freedom of technology, particularly encryption technology,
> >            ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > > regulated only by market forces.  This implies the lack of import/export
> > > restrictions, and a complete absence of projects designed to limit
> >                            ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > > technology, or to standardize it for nefarious ends like Clipper.
> >   ^^^^^^^^^^
> >
> > I think you overgeneralize.  No limits on toxic waste incinerators,
> >low-mileage automobiles, unsafe medical devices, genetically tampered food,
> >or nuclear reactors?  "Market forces" in such cases positively encourage
> >dangerous technology (e.g. incinerators are superficially cheap) or are
> >markedby their inability to distinguish the good from the crap (e.g. medical
> >devices).
>
> It is you who have overgeneralized.  No limits on technology certainly
> does not mean allowing low tech and poor incinerators to continue operating.
> The fact that low mileage cars still drive is a result of poor markets
> than anything else (baring colletables).  How would you argue that some
> low mileage cars are the result of a no limitations on technology policy?

A lack of mileage standards, which are regulations on technology, can be
expected to result in technology that doesn't meet the standard.

> Unsafe medical devices?  I would say this is a problem with testing
> technology, not a lack of limitation on technological advance.

If medical devices are sold without ANY limitation, e.g. the requirement
that they be safe and effective, the result is unsafe equipment.
Improved testing technology isn't useful if there's no requirement to
use it.  And "the market" is composed of people who have neither the
expertise to test the equipment before they consent to its use, nor (in
the case of someone's who's bleeding or in labor) the time.

> Genetically tampered food?  Why is this dangerous?  Have any evidence?
> Most of the livestock/crops you eat today have been altered in one way
> or another, be it selective breeding, low tech botanical splicing, or
> genetic/hormonal therapy.  You see this as a regression?

In some cases, yes, I see problems in biotech.  For example, hormones
used in cattle in high doses are known to cause tumors in women in low
doses.  Whether people would choose to eat horemone-treated meat is
debatable; I had thought that the right to make the choice was taken by
cypherpunks as an article of faith.  Without regulation on the
technology, even an innocuous labeling requirement, the right to choose
is taken away because consumers can't detect the difference between
hormone-treated beef and organic beef.

> You never make the distinction between regulation designed to promote and
> regulation designed to deter technological advance.

Technological advance is a means to an end.  Regulations should properly
be about insuring the public welfare.  While we might reasonably
disagree about what that welfare is, clearly technological anarchy
doesn't promote it.

> Market
> forces are lathargic, sometimes they need a boost.  I propose this boost
> be accomplished with motivators like tax breaks, market assisters and
> privatization.

Either the market works or it doesn't.  You can't decry all government
regulation and then call for handouts to businessmen.

> When Germany wanted to promote environmentally sound
> packaging and manufacture, they started a program called Gruun Punkt (The
> Green Point)  They allow manufactures to place the green point sticker on
> their products provided they meet XYZ specifications.

Actually, I think this is a great way to proceed.


=======================================================================
     Crim Tideson                     Privacy is its own justification.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++


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From nobody at jpunix.com  Wed Oct  5 10:58:00 1994
From: nobody at jpunix.com (Anonymous)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 10:58:00 PDT
Subject: Chomsky (thread from hell)
Message-ID: <199410051757.MAA20379@jpunix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

"Gary Jeffers" <CCGARY at MIZZOU1.missouri.edu> wrote:

>    I remember Chomsky being quoted (I think in a Mother Jones issue)
> something to the effect that the opposition to "political correctness"
> was not legitimate. Apparently, Chomsky finds at least one kind of
> oppression to be not distasteful.
>    At a Chomsky lecture that I attended, Chomsky described himself as a
> left libertarian. I surmise that he finds that grassroots oppression by
> the left to be ok. I realize, of course, that "political correctness"
> has great mass media & State support.

Please post direct, in-context quotes from Chomsky to substantiate your
claims, or stop making them.  This demonization of Chomsky is so
tiresome.


=======================================================================
     Crim Tideson                     Privacy is its own justification.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++


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From nobody at jpunix.com  Wed Oct  5 10:58:22 1994
From: nobody at jpunix.com (Anonymous)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 10:58:22 PDT
Subject: Chomsky quote (thread from hell)
Message-ID: <199410051757.MAA20378@jpunix.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> jamesd at netcom.com (James A. Donald) wrote:
>
> >Noam Chomsky, in a 4/16/94 e-mail response to a question from Steve
> >Shalom, says:
> >
> >   In my opinion, not only mainstream intellectuals but also others
> >   who produce a constant stream of lies, distortion, racist screeds,
> >   etc., should be permitted freedom of speech.  The state should not
> >   have the power to stop them.  The same freedom extends to
> >   hypocrites, like faculty senates who choose one particularly and
> >   usually quite marginal example because career and power interests
> >   are served thereby, while ignoring vastly more significant and
> >   awful cases because the opposite is true.  And Congress, of which
> >   the same is correct.
>

[utterly specious reasoning deleted]

> Thus he is actually making a misleading and spurious
> argument *against* freedom of speech at the same time as he
> is piously declaring himself to be in favor of freedom of
> speech.

Leaving aside the fact that you've somehow managed to "prove" to
yourself that Chomsky means the opposite of what he clearly and
consistently says, what has this to do with cypherpunks?


=======================================================================
     Crim Tideson                     Privacy is its own justification.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++



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From mccoy at io.com  Wed Oct  5 11:28:11 1994
From: mccoy at io.com (Jim McCoy)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 11:28:11 PDT
Subject: Richard Stallman of GNU on Tcl
In-Reply-To: <199410050855.BAA25288@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199410051827.NAA18355@pentagon.io.com>


Harry Bartholomew writes:
>     On gnu.announce of 9/23, he [Stallman] writes "Why you should not use
>     Tcl". 

Ah yes, RMS's drive-by flaming...

Thus setting of one of the more amusing "My language is better than your
language" holy flame wars of the year.  Tcl/tk is here and in widespread
use, wishing it were otherwise isn't going to change reality.  The only
good thing about the entire thread was that it brought python, which does
have a bigint/mpz module built into it, to the attention of a few more
people.  Lets get back to something useful...

jim





From tcmay at netcom.com  Wed Oct  5 11:30:41 1994
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 11:30:41 PDT
Subject: Government vs. Markets
In-Reply-To: <199410051757.MAA20348@jpunix.com>
Message-ID: <199410051829.LAA03358@netcom6.netcom.com>



This recent debate about untested/dangerous/unapproved technology,
such as medical equipment, vitamins, automobile features, is
ideological. I'm not likely to convince the disbelievers here, nor are
they likely--experience shows--to go read the recommended books which
might answer these questions to their satisfaction.

But arguing that the government needs to intervene in markets and
limit free choice to "protect" customers and consumers is precisely
how our present mess got started. And how crypto and communications is
being afffected. (Imagine PGP being outlawed because of its
"uncertified" nature, the bugs is clearly still contains, etc.)

Anonymous wrote:

> A lack of mileage standards, which are regulations on technology, can be
> expected to result in technology that doesn't meet the standard.

No, if customers want good mileage more than they want other features
(like prices, performance, 4-wheel drive, etc.), then they'll pay more
for them. Some do. Some drive little 60 mpg econoboxes, while I drive
an 18 mpg (with a tailwind) Ford Explorer. The market in action.

I could do some calculations on just how unimportant the "fuel
economy" standards are, but I lack the energy and time to make these
points here. Fuel economy standards are about the worst possible case
that can be made for government interference.

> If medical devices are sold without ANY limitation, e.g. the requirement
> that they be safe and effective, the result is unsafe equipment.
> Improved testing technology isn't useful if there's no requirement to
> use it.  And "the market" is composed of people who have neither the
> expertise to test the equipment before they consent to its use, nor (in
> the case of someone's who's bleeding or in labor) the time.

Underwriters Laboratories, Good Housekeeping ("Seal of Appproval"),
and Consumer Reports are better testers than any bureacrats in
Washington, and they are private. Insurance companies have a strong
interest in safe equipment, as do hospitals, doctors, and even
patients. 

The specter of people killing themselves absent a government standard
is false.


> doses.  Whether people would choose to eat horemone-treated meat is
> debatable; I had thought that the right to make the choice was taken by
> cypherpunks as an article of faith.  Without regulation on the
> technology, even an innocuous labeling requirement, the right to choose
> is taken away because consumers can't detect the difference between
> hormone-treated beef and organic beef.

Again, faslse. If people are concerned, they can ask. They can
patronize organic food stores, as they do in huge numbers here in the
Northern California area. And so on.

What often happens with government-imposed standards is that some
lobbying group decides that "cheese is good for you" and so gets
cheese installed as one of the government-mandated "basic food
groups." (If you think I'm exaggerating, you didn't grow up in the 50s
and 60s, when the "four basic food groups" had to be fed to children
in school lunch programs. Political views have now shifted to the
point where soy milk, bean sprouts, and sun-ripened tomatoes must now
be included in all school lunch programs. :-})

Government standards are a two-edged sword. Many of us would prefer to
"opt out" of their idea of what's healthy and safe and what's not.

Motorcycle helmet laws are a good example. Which I won't get started
on here. 


--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo at toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay






From franl at centerline.com  Wed Oct  5 11:57:18 1994
From: franl at centerline.com (Fran Litterio)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 11:57:18 PDT
Subject: Nom de guerre public key
In-Reply-To: <FRANL.94Oct5093142@draco.centerline.com>
Message-ID: <FRANL.94Oct5141756@draco.centerline.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

nelson at crynwr.com (Russell Nelson) writes:

>    From: franl at centerline.com (Fran Litterio)
> 
>    That's part of it, but the more important binding created by a
>    signature is the binding between the userid and the real person.
>    Without that binding, the binding between the key and the userid is
>    useless.
> 
> Nonsense.  You're assuming that the real person wishes to carry their
> reputation over onto their key/userid combination.  Perhaps they wish
> to establish a separate reputation for it?  And once they've
> established that reputation, they wish to change keys?  Might you not
> sign such a new key?

I would not sign a pseydonymous entity's key based soley on the
reputation of the entity.  How do I defend against a man-in-the-middle
attack -- how do I know I'm not signing the middle-man's key instead
of the entity's key?

With a real person, my defense is to use a tamperproof out-of-band
channel to verify the key fingerprint: a phone call (for a friend
whose voice I recognize) or a personal meeting with passports (for
someone I don't know very well).  How do I do that with a pseudonymous
entity?  I'd really like to know if it's possible to do.

I'm all in favor of pseudonymous entities building reputations, but I
think that the price of pseudonymity is the inability to be part of a
PGP-like Web of Trust.

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--
Fran Litterio                   franl at centerline.com (617-498-3255)
CenterLine Software             http://draco.centerline.com:8080/~franl/
Cambridge, MA, USA 02138-1110   PGP public key id: 1270EA1D





From adam at bwh.harvard.edu  Wed Oct  5 12:34:07 1994
From: adam at bwh.harvard.edu (Adam Shostack)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 12:34:07 PDT
Subject: Richard Stallman of GNU on Tcl (crypto reference)
In-Reply-To: <199410051827.NAA18355@pentagon.io.com>
Message-ID: <199410051935.PAA02275@hermes.bwh.harvard.edu>



| language" holy flame wars of the year.  Tcl/tk is here and in widespread
| use, wishing it were otherwise isn't going to change reality.  The only
| good thing about the entire thread was that it brought python, which does
| have a bigint/mpz module built into it, to the attention of a few more
| people.  Lets get back to something useful...

But, before we do, a crypto comment which I found entertaining showed
up:

"Perl.  The only language that looks the same before and after RSA
encryption."

	We now return you to your regularly scheduled Chomsky debate,
here on the Cypherpunks channel.







From fhalper at pilot.njin.net  Wed Oct  5 12:59:44 1994
From: fhalper at pilot.njin.net (Frederic Halper)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 12:59:44 PDT
Subject: NATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY
Message-ID: <9410051959.AA28554@pilot.njin.net>


I saw this in Edupage, thought I'd pass it along.
Reuben

NATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY
The National Research Council is conducting a comprehensive study of
national cryptography policy, including such topics as: the availability of
cryptography technology to foreign and domestic parties; the
competitiveness of U.S. manufacturers and users of such technology; U.S.
national security and law enforcement interests; relative merits of various
cryptographic technologies; demand for information systems security based
on cryptography; the impact of foreign restrictions; the extent to which
current  policy is adequate for protecting U.S. interests; relative merits
of current key escrow implementation schemes; feasible policy options; and
recommendations for the process through which all interests are balanced in
the formulation of national cryptography policy. Send comments and other
correspondence to crypto at nas.edu. (NRC Release)





From unicorn at access.digex.net  Wed Oct  5 13:27:08 1994
From: unicorn at access.digex.net (Black Unicorn)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 13:27:08 PDT
Subject: Impact of Free Strong Crypto (Essay of sorts)
In-Reply-To: <9410051315.AA08512@tis.com>
Message-ID: <199410052026.AA21233@access4.digex.net>


Carl Ellison scripsit
> 
> Your message signature was bad, BTW.
> 

Oh?

Anyone else on the list have this problem?
If so I will be happy to re-up with a new sig.

-uni-


-- 
073BB885A786F666 nemo repente fuit turpissimus - potestas scientiae in usu est
6E6D4506F6EDBC17 quaere verum ad infinitum, loquitur sub rosa    -    wichtig!




From rcromw1 at gl.umbc.edu  Wed Oct  5 13:44:35 1994
From: rcromw1 at gl.umbc.edu (Ray Cromwell)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 13:44:35 PDT
Subject: Government vs. Markets
In-Reply-To: <199410051829.LAA03358@netcom6.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199410052044.QAA01356@umbc9.umbc.edu>


Tim May writes:
> Government standards are a two-edged sword. Many of us would prefer to
> "opt out" of their idea of what's healthy and safe and what's not.

   Are you crazy? If you were allowed to opt out of government
standards and eat what you want, you'd be driving up healthcare
costs! That's unfair to your brothers and sisters! The government
will stop you anyway by requiring everyone to have quarterly checkups
and then have the medical records of people with unhealthy lifestyles
sent to them. If you refuse, you won't get to be in the government
healthcare system, which is only fair since you're driving up
everyone else's costs like a sociopath.



-Ray
p.s. I hate to have to do this, but some people lack a sacasm detector,
so: ;-) ;-) ;-)

"Be very afraid, the Flavor Savor(tm) tomatoes are going to kill us
all!"





From gnu  Wed Oct  5 14:47:54 1994
From: gnu (gnu)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 14:47:54 PDT
Subject: Digital Telephony vote TODAY 7PM Eastern
Message-ID: <9410052147.AA01801@toad.com>


According to EFF staffer Jonah Seiger:

The bill is expected to be voted on in both the House and Senate TODAY! 
The House is expected to vote at about 7:00 pm (ET) and the Senate shortly
there after (although it is still possible that they may not vote until
tomorrow).  The bill IS expected to pass both bodies.

Do what you think is best.

	John Gilmore





From jim at bilbo  Wed Oct  5 14:48:52 1994
From: jim at bilbo (Jim Miller)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 14:48:52 PDT
Subject: crypto game idea
Message-ID: <9410052026.AA21579@bilbo.suite.com>




Crypto-Magic: The Gathering

I was recently introduced to the card game Magic: The Gathering.  Today  
over lunch, I realized that this game could be transformed into an ideal  
networked crypto-game.  Why ideal?  Magic is a really popular game right  
now and a network version would require a lot of the crypto technology  
discussed on this list.  So, it's ideal for the purpose of getting crypto  
into popular use.

Brief description of game:  Magic is entirely based on cards.  There's no  
dice or board or game pieces.  Each card represents a creature, an  
artifact, a magical ability, or something else (like land).  Some cards a  
common, some uncommon, some very rare.  Players each have their own deck  
of cards which they assemble from a larger collection of cards before the  
start of the game.  They take turns drawing cards from their deck,  
revealing some (invoking their power), keeping others in their "hand"  
until later.  A player wins when they kill their opponent's "army" (or  
render it leader-less). 


Where's the crypto?

In my mind, the cards must be handled kind of like digital money.  You  
have to have a way of authenticating cards (can't have players forging new  
creatures) and you have to have a way of preventing players from  
duplicating powerful, rare cards.

These constraints imply there is some bank-like agency that creates and  
signs "official" game cards.  They could sell them for real digital cash,  
or Tacky Tokens, or whatever.  The "bank", or another third-party service,  
might have to participate in the play of a game to enforce the  
constraints.

It's not really like digital money, of course, but it would require  
protocols at least as sophisticated.

I haven't thought about this beyond what I've just described, but it seems  
like a promising idea.  Somebody could probably make money at it, if they  
wanted to.  Too bad I'm to busy.


Jim_Miller at suite.com





From cme at tis.com  Wed Oct  5 15:16:39 1994
From: cme at tis.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 15:16:39 PDT
Subject: overload of the term "Key Escrow"
Message-ID: <9410052215.AA13811@tis.com>



There has been much discussion since at least 1992, but especially since
April 1993, under the general heading of ``Key Escrow''.  This term has
been severely overloaded in the process, to the point that the term has no
trustworthy meaning.  What is worse, this overloading is almost certainly
because there are topics which are politically sensitive involved and there
is a reticence to express these topics openly.

It is my intention to bring all of these topics into the open and discuss
them, giving them each a label which we can use instead of the poor
overloaded "Key Escrow".

My list so far includes:
 export and intelligence access
	(NSA wants <= 40 bits to crunch on any alg shipped overseas)
 law enforcement access
	(FBI wants all cleartext, for everything, everywhere;
	failing that, it wants keys; and all have to be delivered
	to some comfortable central listening post)
 ?voluntary? compliance
    The Administration says "voluntary" but does it want:
	 user voluntary,
	 manufacturer voluntary + user mandatory,
	or mandatory ?


Are there any other issues hidden behind the term "key escrow" which gov't
people don't talk about that anyone thinks I should bring out in the open?

Please reply by direct e-mail.  

Thanks,


 - Carl





From chen at intuit.com  Wed Oct  5 15:54:33 1994
From: chen at intuit.com (Mark Chen)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 15:54:33 PDT
Subject: Government vs. Markets
In-Reply-To: <199410052044.QAA01356@umbc9.umbc.edu>
Message-ID: <9410052253.AA29033@doom.intuit.com>



Ray writes:
> Tim May writes:
> > Government standards are a two-edged sword. Many of us would prefer to
> > "opt out" of their idea of what's healthy and safe and what's not.
> 
>    Are you crazy? If you were allowed to opt out of government
> standards and eat what you want, you'd be driving up healthcare
> costs! That's unfair to your brothers and sisters! The government
> will stop you anyway by requiring everyone to have quarterly checkups
> and then have the medical records of people with unhealthy lifestyles
> sent to them. If you refuse, you won't get to be in the government
> healthcare system, which is only fair since you're driving up
> everyone else's costs like a sociopath.

It would be helpful if we could define the word "government."  Is a
government any organization of people, or is it any organization
wherein some people hold coercive power over others?  In either case,
how are corporations different from governments?  If it is argued that
corporations are different because, as an employee of a corporation, I
am free to terminate my employment contract and to enter a contract
with a different corporation, then it can also be argued that, as a
citizen of the U.S., I am free to terminate my citizenship and assume
citizenship in another country.

In large measure, privatization really amounts to nothing more than
removing programs from the incompetent, technocratic control of state
bureaucracies and submitting them to the incompetent, totalitarian
control of business.  There is no question but that our government
works very poorly by any standard; I just don't see the argument for
privatization as being an argument between statism and anarchism
(Bakunin would agree :}).  It is, rather, merely an argument between
two different, equally decrepit organizational precepts.


--
Mark Chen 
chen at netcom.com
415/329-6913
finger for PGP public key
D4 99 54 2A 98 B1 48 0C  CF 95 A5 B0 6E E0 1E 1D





From unicorn at access.digex.net  Wed Oct  5 16:00:59 1994
From: unicorn at access.digex.net (Black Unicorn)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 16:00:59 PDT
Subject: Government and Markets (Again)
Message-ID: <199410052300.AA01712@access4.digex.net>


>From: nobody at jpunix.com (Anonymous)

>> unicorn at access.digex.net:
>> Unsafe medical devices?  I would say this is a problem with testing
>> technology, not a lack of limitation on technological advance.

>If medical devices are sold without ANY limitation, e.g. the requirement
>that they be safe and effective, the result is unsafe equipment.
>Improved testing technology isn't useful if there's no requirement to
>use it.  And "the market" is composed of people who have neither the
>expertise to test the equipment before they consent to its use, nor (in
>the case of someone's who's bleeding or in labor) the time.

The market adjusts to these problems through the civil litigation system.  
A product is identified as potentially defective/dangerous and a law suit 
arises.  Either the product appears to be responsible or not.  The 
hospital is either responsible for not insuring that the emergency 
equipment is safe, or it isn't.  The costs are ALREADY allocated in this 
example.  Hospitals begin to look into their products with more care 
instead of relying on some FDA regulation that took 5 years to instate 
and is probably out of date.

Do you think that FDA regulations are any less lagged?  How many people 
have to die before the FDA passes a ban, or a regulation?  And worse, how 
many people die because new products are kept in the wings for years?

>> Genetically tampered food?  Why is this dangerous?  Have any evidence?
>> Most of the livestock/crops you eat today have been altered in one way
>> or another, be it selective breeding, low tech botanical splicing, or
>> genetic/hormonal therapy.  You see this as a regression?

>In some cases, yes, I see problems in biotech.  For example, hormones
>used in cattle in high doses are known to cause tumors in women in low
>doses.

If the market is so faulty, how is it you have this information?  In fact 
it was easy to get wasn't it?  So you probably will watch out for hormone 
treated meat.

Poetry in motion the market can be.

Look, you did it without any regulation, and without paying 2000 federal 
employees between 25 and 90 thousand dollars a year.

>Whether people would choose to eat hormone-treated meat is
>debatable; I had thought that the right to make the choice was taken by
>cypherpunks as an article of faith.

Exactly.  You have information, you are free to make your choice.  If 
you're not a woman, you can eat all the meat you like and not fret over 
the study.  Why?  Because the federal government hasn't taken the meat 
away, or banned the use of hormones which increase the output of meat in 
certain cattle.

>Without regulation on the
>technology, even an innocuous labeling requirement, the right to choose
>is taken away because consumers can't detect the difference between
>hormone-treated beef and organic beef.

I think Tim May put this best:

T>Underwriters Laboratories, Good Housekeeping ("Seal of Appproval"),
T>and Consumer Reports are better testers than any bureacrats in
T>Washington, and they are private. Insurance companies have a strong
T>interest in safe equipment, as do hospitals, doctors, and even
T>patients. 

Indeed.  Listen to yourself:  "the right to choose is taken away because 
[Insert reason of the week here]"  In your case it's because "consumers 
can't detect the difference between hormone-treated beef and organic 
beef."  But you never explain how this is a function that is impossible 
to accomplish without federal government.  Even worse, how do you 
reconcile this with your previous assertion that :"I had thought that the 
right to make the choice was taken by cypherpunks as an article of 
faith."

Who is the blasphemer?

In fact there is reason to believe the regulation you propose is more 
harmful than good.  Institutions have a lifetime, a staying power if you 
will.  This is why they are no good at setting technological regulation.  
FDA is a wonderful example of lag, lunacy and backwardness in standards 
setting.

Tim May comments:

T>What often happens with government-imposed standards is that some
T>lobbying group decides that "cheese is good for you" and so gets
T>cheese installed as one of the government-mandated "basic food
T>groups."  [...]


>> You never make the distinction between regulation designed to promote
>> and regulation designed to deter technological advance.

>Technological advance is a means to an end.  Regulations should properly
>be about insuring the public welfare.  While we might reasonably
>disagree about what that welfare is, clearly technological anarchy
>doesn't promote it.

Not for all of us.  Some of us believe the advance of technology is an 
end unto itself.  So many things follow from the advance of technology, 
sometimes it's all you have to look at to make progress.  The shortest 
distance between two points....

Often this argument reminds me of those who whine about free trade.  They 
want protectionist tariffs.  They point out that their backward business 
is going to be destroyed because some automaker elsewhere in the world is 
doing a better job, for less.  So in the interest of making this special 
interest group happy, the market is disrupted and all cars are more 
expensive.  The cheap manufacturer has trouble advancing to even greater 
heights and consumers get the short end of the stick to preserve.... 
what?  Jobs.

It's the same thing for technology.  Why are the rest of us being held 
back from eating tomatoes twice the size at half the cost?  Because:

1>  Real tomato growers are powerful in politics
2>  The FDA is a morass of paper and policy
3>  The government has anything to do with the tomato market.

Where did we lose the concept that you make money when you sell a good 
product for a good price?  When did sympathy for special interest groups 
come into the picture?  I'll tell you when, the 1930's.

The result?  Today the average citizen depends on government for over 
half his assets.  HALF HIS ASSETS are government entitlements.  Think 
about that very carefully.  Soon they are going to be taking away your 
drivers license for all sorts of reasons.  Do you think driving is a 
government entitlement?  Well it is.  Why?  Because the government got 
the foot in the door.  Today your car keys, tomorrow your crypto keys.

>> Market forces are lathargic, sometimes they need a boost.  I propose
>> this boost be accomplished with motivators like tax breaks, market
>> assisters and privatization.

>Either the market works or it doesn't.  You can't decry all government
>regulation and then call for handouts to businessmen.

I just can't agree.  There are very few black and whites here.  Stewart, 
Krier and Manell point out what are (IMHO) quite legitimate market 
failures and where intervention is warranted.

1> There has been a fairly liquid exchange and availability to consumers 
of information in the marketplace.
2> There are no restricted commodities 
3> There are large numbers of buyers and sellers in the market.
4> There are no localized externalities.

Even in these circumstances, there are many options for intervention, 
collectivization and regulation being THE LAST ONE ON THE LIST.

Tim May:

T>Government standards are a two-edged sword. Many of us would prefer to
T>"opt out" of their idea of what's healthy and safe and what's not.

And that's what real choice is all about.

-uni- (Dark)


-- 
073BB885A786F666 nemo repente fuit turpissimus - potestas scientiae in usu est
6E6D4506F6EDBC17 quaere verum ad infinitum, loquitur sub rosa    -    wichtig!




From nelson at crynwr.com  Wed Oct  5 16:26:58 1994
From: nelson at crynwr.com (Russell Nelson)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 16:26:58 PDT
Subject: Government vs. Markets
In-Reply-To: <9410052253.AA29033@doom.intuit.com>
Message-ID: <m0qsfrr-0008cKC@crynwr.crynwr.com>


   From: chen at intuit.com (Mark Chen)
   Date: Wed, 5 Oct 1994 15:57:03 -0700 (PDT)

   It would be helpful if we could define the word "government."  Is a
   government any organization of people, or is it any organization
   wherein some people hold coercive power over others?

It's any organization that is allowed to have a monopoly on legitimate
coercion.  When the IRA collects taxes, and provides protection,
that's thuggery.  When the British Government does the same thing,
that's perfectly fine.  <cough!>

   In either case, how are corporations different from governments?

In the main, corporations persuade and governments force.

-- 
-russ <nelson at crynwr.com>    http://www.crynwr.com/crynwr/nelson.html
Crynwr Software   | Crynwr Software sells packet driver support | ask4 PGP key
11 Grant St.      | +1 315 268 1925 (9201 FAX)  | What is thee doing about it?
Potsdam, NY 13676 | LPF member - ask me about the harm software patents do.





From sandfort at crl.com  Wed Oct  5 16:40:35 1994
From: sandfort at crl.com (Sandy Sandfort)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 16:40:35 PDT
Subject: NYC MEETING
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9410051640.A14270-0100000@crl7.crl.com>


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
                         SANDY SANDFORT
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NYC area C'punks,

For those of you considering attending the meeting this Saturday,
I forgot to mention two things.  The Stantons have cats, and
smoking is permitted in designated areas only (*outside* their
apartment).  You gotta problem with that?


 S a n d y

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~







From chen at intuit.com  Wed Oct  5 17:17:01 1994
From: chen at intuit.com (Mark Chen)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 17:17:01 PDT
Subject: Government vs. Markets
In-Reply-To: <m0qsfrr-0008cKC@crynwr.crynwr.com>
Message-ID: <9410060016.AA29551@doom.intuit.com>



I wasn't sure whether to respond to this message, or your other one,
which admonished that this is off-topic.

nelson at crynwr.dom writes:
>    From: chen at intuit.com (Mark Chen)
>    Date: Wed, 5 Oct 1994 15:57:03 -0700 (PDT)
> 
>    It would be helpful if we could define the word "government."  Is a
>    government any organization of people, or is it any organization
>    wherein some people hold coercive power over others?
> 
> It's any organization that is allowed to have a monopoly on legitimate
> coercion.  When the IRA collects taxes, and provides protection,
> that's thuggery.  When the British Government does the same thing,
> that's perfectly fine.  <cough!>

And within the scope of their operations - among their employees -
corporations have a monopoly on the means of economic coercion
(forgive me if I omit your editorial use of the word "legitimate").
They have exclusive control over livelihoods.

>    In either case, how are corporations different from governments?
> 
> In the main, corporations persuade and governments force.

So maquiladora workers are "persuaded" to work twelve hours a day for
fifteen cents an hour.  Salvadoran workers are "persuaded" (at
gunpoint) to contribute to the welfare of their latifundista
benefactors for either a handful of beans or nothing at all.
Similarly, I am "persuaded" to contribute my labor to the designs of
my employer - truly, because if I don't like it, I can leave.

Perhaps your will elaborate your assertion.


--
Mark Chen 
chen at netcom.com
415/329-6913
finger for PGP public key
D4 99 54 2A 98 B1 48 0C  CF 95 A5 B0 6E E0 1E 1D





From merriman at metronet.com  Wed Oct  5 17:21:25 1994
From: merriman at metronet.com (David K. Merriman)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 17:21:25 PDT
Subject: Government vs. Markets
Message-ID: <Chameleon.4.01.1.941005192047.merriman@anybody.metronet.com.metronet.com>



>"Be very afraid, the Flavor Savor(tm) tomatoes are going to kill us
>all!"
>

Um, Attack of the Killer Tomatoes?

:-)

Dave Merriman
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Finger merriman at metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints. 
Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender.  PGP preferred.
Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to 
*love* Big Brother.







From ogd at selway.umt.edu  Wed Oct  5 17:27:52 1994
From: ogd at selway.umt.edu (ozymandias G desiderata)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 17:27:52 PDT
Subject: NYT Libertarian News
In-Reply-To: <199410051416.KAA11094@pipe3.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <9410060027.AA17261@selway.umt.edu>



	Speaking as someone who's been forced to experience far too
much of Bo, _I'd_ ridicule Bo Gritz if I were on the NYT editorial
staff. If you ever get a chance to see him speak live, do it. He's
definitely the Real Deal. Conspiracy theories, thinly veiled racism,
violence poking from everywhere -- why is this kind of personality so
attracted to Idaho?
	I wouldn't even refer to him as a libertarian. He's very much
into family values / universal military training / trade protection
for United States industries. He falls very close, ideologically,
alongside the state "militias" out in this part of the country. Those
groups also profess libertarianism while also advocating extremely
draconian Christian social programs.

"I LOVE TO SUBMIT TO MY HUSBAND" -- Button seen on a local
proselytizer's wife
ozymandias G desiderata





From karn at qualcomm.com  Wed Oct  5 18:17:11 1994
From: karn at qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 18:17:11 PDT
Subject: It's MEME time!!!
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.89.9409240917.A3231-0100000@sibyl>
Message-ID: <199410060117.SAA17073@servo.qualcomm.com>


>Very good.  If I could offer one minor change, how 'bout:

>         Dorothy Denning?  Clip 'er!

>No intent to nitpick on my part.  I think they're all deserving
>of meme-hood.  They would make darn fine bumpersticker copy, too.

Uh, how come we can't stick to attacking the message, rather than the
messenger?

Phil





From amanda at intercon.com  Wed Oct  5 18:22:51 1994
From: amanda at intercon.com (Amanda Walker)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 18:22:51 PDT
Subject: Government vs. Markets
Message-ID: <9410052122.AA32506@elfbook.intercon.com>


> In the main, corporations persuade and governments force. 

I don't see so much of a difference.  There is very little difference in the 
nature and methods of governments vs. corporations.  A government can usefully 
be viewed as a corporation engaged in the business of public services.  It's 
simply a geographical monopoly, as are many public utilities.


Amanda Walker
InterCon Systems Corporation






From rcromw1 at gl.umbc.edu  Wed Oct  5 18:23:31 1994
From: rcromw1 at gl.umbc.edu (Ray Cromwell)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 18:23:31 PDT
Subject: Government vs. Markets
In-Reply-To: <9410060016.AA29551@doom.intuit.com>
Message-ID: <199410060123.VAA11108@umbc9.umbc.edu>



-----BEGIN OF PGP DECRYPTED TEXT-----

Mark Chen writes:
> I wasn't sure whether to respond to this message, or your other one,
> which admonished that this is off-topic.

> nelson at crynwr.dom writes:
> > It's any organization that is allowed to have a monopoly on legitimate
> > coercion.  When the IRA collects taxes, and provides protection,
> > that's thuggery.  When the British Government does the same thing,
> > that's perfectly fine.  <cough!>

> And within the scope of their operations - among their employees -
> corporations have a monopoly on the means of economic coercion
> (forgive me if I omit your editorial use of the word "legitimate").
> They have exclusive control over livelihoods.

    What is "economic coercion"?  Within the scope of schools,
teachers have a "monopoly" on the means of educational coercion. Within
the scope of church, preachers have a "monopoly" on the means of religious
coercion. Within the scope of the home, parents have a "monopoly" on
the means of parental coercion. Are you seriously suggesting
that any of these structures even compare to a government? Do you
know what a monopoly is? You analogy doesn't hold water. It's like
saying "within the scope of the people who patronize my store, I have
a monopoly." Typical of socialists, they are unfamilar with economics
and resort to semantic games. A monopoly is defined by (1) one seller, 
many buyers, and (2) restriction on entry.  Unless a corporation
has a monopoly on its market, it exists within a job market
as one of many sellers. So unless your skills are very specialized
and *only* that corporation supplies jobs needing that skill,
in no sense does a corporation have exclusive control over livelihoods.
However, specializing in a skill that not many people want to buy is
as much your fault anyway. Finally, one doesn't have to work for
a corporation anyway, it's a red herring. There are 4 million 
corporations in this country but 14 million small businesses.

  Trying to let governments off the hook because one can "move
elsewhere" doesn't let them off the hook. For one thing, it ignores
the fact that some governments *prevent* you from moving elsewhere
(whereas, no corporation in a free market has the legal authority to
stop you from quitting).  Secondly, it ignores the transaction cost
differences between switching jobs and switching countries. Third,
barrier to entry is extraordinarily high -- try starting your own
government vs starting your own corporation. Finally, there are
19 million businesses in this country to choose from, whereas
there are only a handful of countries to move to. Governments have
an oligopoly on countries.

> >    In either case, how are corporations different from governments?
> > 
> > In the main, corporations persuade and governments force.

> So maquiladora workers are "persuaded" to work twelve hours a day for
> fifteen cents an hour.  Salvadoran workers are "persuaded" (at

   I thought it was 49 cents an hour, however, no one ever accused
a socialist knowing the facts. BTW, what's the cost of living
in maquiladora. You know that comparing wages between different
areas without purchasing power corrections is nonsense, don't you?

> gunpoint) to contribute to the welfare of their latifundista
> benefactors for either a handful of beans or nothing at all.

   If they're forced via guns, it isn't exactly a free market isn't it?
Actually, it sounds like state socialism.

> Similarly, I am "persuaded" to contribute my labor to the designs of
> my employer - truly, because if I don't like it, I can leave.

   Then why don't you? What's stopping you from working for yourself? 
If you don't like the services your employer is providing you
(workplace, tools, investment management, capital contributions, etc)
and you don't have the ambition or skills to work for yourself, stop
whining. If you have any computer skills at all, you can work for yourself
without a large amount of capital. My sister got her CS and degree,
did some consulting for a consulting firm, and after she aquired
the skills, she quit and started doing her own consulting. She now
works from home. In most small businesses, the workers are near
partners with the management (and often earn equivalent wages)

> Perhaps your will elaborate your assertion.

  Simple: businesses are not governments. There is very little common
ground between them. Governments operate by force alone, governments
can prevent you from leaving, a business in a free market can't. 
You can found your own business, you can't found your own government.
Businesses operate by selling products to people who voluntarily
buy them. Governments operate by stealing your money at gunpoint.






From khijol!erc  Wed Oct  5 19:23:53 1994
From: khijol!erc (Ed Carp [Sysadmin])
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 19:23:53 PDT
Subject: It's MEME time!!!
In-Reply-To: <199410060117.SAA17073@servo.qualcomm.com>
Message-ID: <m0qshr1-0004EcC@khijol.uucp>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> >Very good.  If I could offer one minor change, how 'bout:
> 
> >         Dorothy Denning?  Clip 'er!
> 
> >No intent to nitpick on my part.  I think they're all deserving
> >of meme-hood.  They would make darn fine bumpersticker copy, too.
> 
> Uh, how come we can't stick to attacking the message, rather than the
> messenger?

Because in this case, the messenger is an integral part of the message.
- -- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG    			Ed.Carp at linux.org, ecarp at netcom.com

Finger ecarp at netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key		an88744 at anon.penet.fi
                       ** PGP encrypted email preferred! **

"What's the use of distant travel if only to discover - you're homeless in
your heart."  --Basia, "Yearning"

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From warlord at MIT.EDU  Wed Oct  5 19:29:28 1994
From: warlord at MIT.EDU (Derek Atkins)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 19:29:28 PDT
Subject: Nom de guerre public key
In-Reply-To: <FRANL.94Oct5093142@draco.centerline.com>
Message-ID: <9410060229.AA15700@toxicwaste.media.mit.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

To: franl at centerline.com (Fran Litterio)
cc: cypherpunks at toad.com
Subject: Re: Nom de guerre public key 
In-reply-to: Your message of "05 Oct 1994 13:31:42 GMT."
             <FRANL.94Oct5093142 at draco.centerline.com> 
- --------
> key's owner).  Sure signatures bind the userid to the key, but what
> good is that to third parties if they can't be sure that the userid
> accurately names the person who possesses that key?

What is in a name?  A name is just a convenience with which one can
identify some object/entity/etc.  "Pr0duct Cypher" is as much a valid
name as "Derek Atkins".  The fact that some entity can produce some
United States Government paperwork that says that the US Govt believes
that this person "exists" is irrelevant in this discussion.  The fact
that I can certify that "This Public key belongs to the identity
Pr0duct Cypher" is _all_ that a key signature says.

> When I meet you in person to hand you my key fingerprint, won't you
> require me to identify myself in order that you can be sure the name
> in the userid of my key is also the name of the person you are
> meeting?  If you do, then you will have just validated the binding
> between userid and real person.

This is a humanly-applied set of restrictions.  I have in the past
signed keys for people whom I haven't met in person; my personal
requirements for signing keys do require out-of-band authentication,
however.  Yet PGP does not impose this restriction.  I could create
an identity (call him Mr. X), and Mr. X could start to sign keys
based upon continuous communication.  

For example, Mr. X could encrypt a message to some other pseudosym,
and ask them to sign the message that was encrypted to them and send
it back.  Since only the owner of the key can both read it and sign
it, and since Mr. X only sent this to a single person (and included
some identification string), Mr. X could know, with marginal doubt,
that this key belongs to this identity -- even without ever meeting
this person and without ever needing to talk to a real person.

> entity.  Because the entity is unwilling to prove to me that there is
> a single real person who possesses the private half of his key.

This is fine -- you don't have to sign pseudonymous keys.  That is
your perogative.  That doesn't mean that there aren't cases where
signing a pseudonym's key is the right thing to do.

> I don't like the idea of an automaton possessing or signing PGP keys.
> People sign other people's keys because only people have the need to
> trust other people.  Automatons don't need to trust and they are not
> the direct targets of trust.  

So what you are saying is that you don't see any reason for a server
to be able to authenticate itself or for someone to be able to send a
message to a server?  You don't believe that there could be a
PGP-telnet?  If this is what you believe, then you have a very
short-sighted view of the world.

A server needs to trust that a person is allowed to log into it, or
that a client is allowed to use the service it provides.  As such, it
is vital that the server be able to authenticate to the client as much
as the client needs to authenticate to the server.  This requires that
the server itself maintain a key.


> This is the objection I had to Phil's
> signing of the Betsi public key.  As an automaton, Betsi is only as
> trustable as its human authors and adminstrators.  Yet Phil doesn't
> know who those people may be in five or ten years.  Yes, people change
> over time too, but not as quickly or as radically as an automaton can.
> It's too easy to subvert an automaton for me to ever sign an
> automaton's PGP key.

This is the point I am trying to make.  When I sign a key, I do not
say ANYTHING about how that key will be used -- I am only saying that
I know that that key is what it claims to be.  I know that this key
belongs to this user, this name, this email-address, this server.  I
don't know that if I sign your key you will then use it to send
threatening email to president at whitehouse.gov.  And personally, I
don't care -- that shouldn't be a consideration in my signing your
key.

Phil signed the Betsi key because to his knowledge that key really
belonged to the Betsi server.  Just like I will sign the MIT PGP
Keysigner key because I will know that it belongs to that identity.
As to how much trust I put in these keys to sign other keys is a
determination that I make orthogonal to the question of signing the
key.  I happened to write the keysigner software, so I know what it
will do -- but that is me -- you don't have to trust it if you don't
want to.

I think the problem here is that you are combining a number of
orthogonal decisions into a single one.  These decisions are:
	1) trust in userID to sign a key
	2) trust in that key to sign others
	3) trust in the usage of that key.

These are distinct for a reason, and should be kept that way.  If you
want to lump them together, that is your perogative, but that is not
something that can be, or should, be enforced.

- -derek

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From jkreznar at ininx.com  Wed Oct  5 19:49:15 1994
From: jkreznar at ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 19:49:15 PDT
Subject: Government vs. Markets
In-Reply-To: <9410052253.AA29033@doom.intuit.com>
Message-ID: <9410060248.AA14934@ininx>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

chen at intuit.com (Mark Chen) writes:

> If it is argued that
> corporations are different because, as an employee of a corporation, I
> am free to terminate my employment contract and to enter a contract
> with a different corporation, then it can also be argued that, as a
> citizen of the U.S., I am free to terminate my citizenship and assume
> citizenship in another country.

- From the frying pan into the fire?  Why assume another?  Why not drop
your U.S. citizenship and be done with it?

Can't be done you say? (*)  Then this is a significant difference between
terminating employment and terminating citizenship.  Employees regularly
terminate and go it alone forever after.

(*) You may be right.  Their statute may not provide for citizenship
termination unless you first go to a place over which they don't claim
jurisdiction.  Good reason to never affirm that citizenship in the first
place.

	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
	jkreznar at ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.

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LRReyyIZ4Bs=
=A9ZC
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From jthomas at access.digex.net  Wed Oct  5 19:51:17 1994
From: jthomas at access.digex.net (Joe Thomas)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 19:51:17 PDT
Subject: Nom de guerre public key
In-Reply-To: <FRANL.94Oct5141756@draco.centerline.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.90.941005223602.27984A-100000@access3.digex.net>


On 5 Oct 1994, Fran Litterio wrote:

> >    That's part of it, but the more important binding created by a
> >    signature is the binding between the userid and the real person.
> >    Without that binding, the binding between the key and the userid is
> >    useless.
> 
> I would not sign a pseydonymous entity's key based soley on the
> reputation of the entity.  How do I defend against a man-in-the-middle
> attack -- how do I know I'm not signing the middle-man's key instead
> of the entity's key?

> I'm all in favor of pseudonymous entities building reputations, but I
> think that the price of pseudonymity is the inability to be part of a
> PGP-like Web of Trust.

I probably ought to get out of lurk mode here, since my signature can be 
found on the key of one of the more prominent pseudonyms on the list, 
Black Unicorn.  I met Uni briefly at one of the (two) D.C. area 
cypherpunks meetings, last spring.  I didn't check his ID.  For all his 
reluctance to give his name here, he did, as I recall, attempt to give it at 
at the meeting.  (Pat Farrell was trying to draw a seating chart so we'd 
know what to call each other, but he had trouble spelling Uni's 
name.)

I guess it could have been an impostor at the meeting, but enough 
of the details seemed to match up that I didn't have any doubts about 
him.  And I've probably got enough information from his posts, and my 
hazy recollection of his first name, to find out who he is, if I felt 
like it.

I guess my point is that key signing doesn't always fit into one 
particular category, one that requires a drivers license or passport.  
That (or personal knowledge of the person) is the most secure method for 
keys that are clearly bound to a specific person, but it's not the only 
way things are done.

Joe





From cactus at bb.com  Wed Oct  5 20:15:55 1994
From: cactus at bb.com (L. Todd Masco)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 20:15:55 PDT
Subject: Government vs. Markets
In-Reply-To: <Chameleon.4.01.1.941005192047.merriman@anybody.metronet.com.metronet.com>
Message-ID: <36vqd9$1vi@bb.com>



>>"Be very afraid, the Flavor Savor(tm) tomatoes are going to kill us
>>all!"
>>
>
>Um, Attack of the Killer Tomatoes?

Screw that.  Grow your own  (I do -- and if I can, in Midtown Manhattan,
then damned near anybody can).
-- 
L. Todd Masco  | Ingredients:  red, blue, and green quarks, six varieties of
cactus at bb.com  |  gluons, electrons.  Some settling may occur in shipping.





From cactus at bb.com  Wed Oct  5 20:18:33 1994
From: cactus at bb.com (L. Todd Masco)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 20:18:33 PDT
Subject: crypto game idea
In-Reply-To: <9410052026.AA21579@bilbo.suite.com>
Message-ID: <36vqim$236@bb.com>


Wasn't somebody working on a card-protocol about 6 months ago?  What
happened to it?  (Or is it rude to ask?)
-- 
L. Todd Masco  | Ingredients:  red, blue, and green quarks, six varieties of
cactus at bb.com  |  gluons, electrons.  Some settling may occur in shipping.





From hughes at ah.com  Wed Oct  5 20:51:11 1994
From: hughes at ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 20:51:11 PDT
Subject: ANNOUNCE: SF Bay Area Physical Meeting 8 Oct 94
Message-ID: <9410060303.AA08117@ah.com>


What: SF Bay Area Physical Cypherpunks Meeting
When: Saturday, 8 Oct 94
      12:00 noon - 6:00 p.m.
Where: Silicon Graphics, Mt. View (directions below)


(Provisional) Theme: Intellectual "Property"


    Mark Hosler of Negativland will be our (provisional) guest.  He's
told me he's planning on showing, but I've not been able to confirm
with him in the last few days.  For those of you who don't know what
Negativland is, they're a music group who got into a fracas with
Island Records and their own label SST over a recording Negativland
did entitled "U2".

    Mark/Negativland have a new book coming out called _Fair Use_,
which is a complete history of the whole affair with both commentary
and a complete set of primary source documents.  

    Our theme, therefore, will be intellectual property, information
distribution, sampling, etc., with, of course, applications to
cryptography.

    We will also, as always, welcome and expect topics and
presentations from the attendees.  If you've got something you want to
present, you've got the time here.  If you've got something you want
to discuss, you can have the floor to lead a discussion of it.

    All are welcome, whether or not you've ever been to a cypherpunks
meeting before or not.

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
DIRECTIONS:

  Silicon Graphics, Inc.
  Building 5 (SGI Cafeteria)
  2025 North Shoreline Boulevard
  Mountain View, CA

>From 101 take Shoreline East.  This is towards Shoreline Amphitheatre.
It's also "logical east", and points more north that east.  (That is,
it's east with respect to 101 North, which points west near the exit.)
If you're coming in on 101 South, you'll cross over the bridge.

Continue on Shoreline and go past a whole bunch of other SGI
buildings.  Turn right onto Steirlin Court at the big red metal
sculpture.  There will be even more SGI buildings surrounding
you--take note of the building numbers.  Go almost to the end of this
street.  Building 5 is on the right.





From prig0011 at gold.tc.umn.edu  Wed Oct  5 21:43:03 1994
From: prig0011 at gold.tc.umn.edu (prig0011 at gold.tc.umn.edu)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 21:43:03 PDT
Subject: IRC Encryption
Message-ID: <2e9376864430002@gold.tc.umn.edu>


There was a thread a while back about encrypted conversations on channel 
#freedom on irc. I came across the software I believe they are using. Its 
a package called Circ, and it is available from archives of 
comp.sources.misc volume 38 issue 10. It is interesting in that it uses
RSA for key exchange, and triple DES for the encryption. The Circ package
includes an earlier implementation "socks" which is a stand alone 
encrypted irc client. I think this is what they use on #freedom. This is 
an interesting tool for a couple of reasons. irc can be as anonymous as 
you want to make it. There are ways of hiding what site you're coming 
from, your real username, you can change your nick often as you want, and 
it's got a high enough usage that you can lose yourself in a crowd.
It supports background file transfers. You can create a channel and lock 
it to uninvited people. It is supported pretty much net-wide, if you can 
telnet, you can irc. Interesting stuff, and I'll be playing more with it 
in the near future.

BTW: my nick is cryptical on irc. :)





From karn at qualcomm.com  Wed Oct  5 22:16:24 1994
From: karn at qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 22:16:24 PDT
Subject: It's MEME time!!!
In-Reply-To: <m0qshr1-0004EcC@khijol.uucp>
Message-ID: <199410060516.WAA17295@servo.qualcomm.com>


>> Uh, how come we can't stick to attacking the message, rather than the
>> messenger?

>Because in this case, the messenger is an integral part of the message.

I disagree. How do you react when you see an attack ad on TV. Does it
really want to make you vote for the sponsor? Or does it make you wish
they'd BOTH crawl off and die somewhere? After watching just a little
of the Huffington vs Feinstein Senate campaign here in CA, I know how
*I* feel.

We definitely have the upper hand on this issue. Dorothy Denning may
be a naive pawn of the government. She may hold beliefs that appall
the rest of us. She may have lost whatever credibility she had in the
crypto community by her position. But I still prefer to attack that
position and the (il)logic behind it rather than to resort to
attacking the person expressing it. Especially when the argument
itself is almost a no-brainer.

Phil






From nowhere at chaos.bsu.edu  Wed Oct  5 22:24:10 1994
From: nowhere at chaos.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 22:24:10 PDT
Subject: REMAIL: Chaos remailer statistics
Message-ID: <199410060526.AAA16609@chaos.bsu.edu>



Chaos remailer statistics from 12:38am 08/24/94 through 11:59pm 10/05/94:

					 Total		Messages
					  msgs		per day	   Percent
					-------		-------	   -------

To/From CA domain:			    46		   1.1	     1.69
To/From COM domain:			   818		  19.2	    30.00
To/From EDU domain:			  2130		  50.1	    78.11
To/From GOV domain:			     3		   0.1	     0.11
To/From ORG domain:			   326		   7.7	    11.95
To/From US domain:			   381		   9.0	    13.97

Forbidden (includes anXX at anon.penet.fi)	     8		   0.2	     0.29

Total messages processed:		  2727		  64.1

Note that the percentages will not add up to 100% because anything that crosses
over, for example, the EDU to ORG line will show up in both categories.

Average messages per month would be in the area of 1923.

If you find this useful, let me know.  I will put it into a script and 
have it auto-posted...  Maybe.

Chael

-- 
Chael Hall, nowhere at chaos.bsu.edu




From ecarp at netcom.com  Thu Oct  6 00:03:22 1994
From: ecarp at netcom.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 00:03:22 PDT
Subject: It's MEME time!!!
In-Reply-To: <199410060516.WAA17295@servo.qualcomm.com>
Message-ID: <199410060656.XAA14819@netcom5.netcom.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> >> Uh, how come we can't stick to attacking the message, rather than the
> >> messenger?
> 
> >Because in this case, the messenger is an integral part of the message.
> 
> I disagree. How do you react when you see an attack ad on TV. Does it
> really want to make you vote for the sponsor? Or does it make you wish
> they'd BOTH crawl off and die somewhere? After watching just a little
> of the Huffington vs Feinstein Senate campaign here in CA, I know how
> *I* feel.
> 
> We definitely have the upper hand on this issue. Dorothy Denning may
> be a naive pawn of the government. She may hold beliefs that appall
> the rest of us. She may have lost whatever credibility she had in the
> crypto community by her position. But I still prefer to attack that
> position and the (il)logic behind it rather than to resort to
> attacking the person expressing it. Especially when the argument
> itself is almost a no-brainer.

I think the reason people attack the messenger is because people in the
government listen to her, and I for one am exasperated beyond words to
know that my government is paying attention to such an idiotic scheme, and
(BTW) violating every known law of security to do so.  Denning, in a very
real sense, represents the attitudes of the NSA and the people controlling
this whole scheme and trying to foist it off onto people.  Is she such an
idiot that she actually *believes* the nonsense she spouts? 

Is it wrong to suspect her motives, her judgement, her common sense, in
backing such a proposal?
- -- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG    			Ed.Carp at linux.org, ecarp at netcom.com
Finger ecarp at netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key		an88744 at anon.penet.fi
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"

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From mccoy at io.com  Thu Oct  6 00:48:23 1994
From: mccoy at io.com (Jim McCoy)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 00:48:23 PDT
Subject: crypto game idea
In-Reply-To: <9410052026.AA21579@bilbo.suite.com>
Message-ID: <199410060748.CAA10550@pentagon.io.com>


Jim Miller writes:
> 
> Crypto-Magic: The Gathering
[making an online version of the game using crypto tools...]
> 
> I haven't thought about this beyond what I've just described, but it seems  
> like a promising idea.  Somebody could probably make money at it, if they  
> wanted to.  Too bad I'm to busy.

Don't worry, someone is already working on it...  :)

You will probably see an online version of the "soon to finish printing and
finally ship so now we can have a life again" Illuminati: New World Order
game first.  Depending on how long it takes to get Wizards of the Coast
interested (they are tight with SJGames so it should not take long) an
online version of Magic may be on a web server by the end of the year.

jim, sysadmin and crypto-hacker of the Illuminati...




From tcmay at netcom.com  Thu Oct  6 01:04:10 1994
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 01:04:10 PDT
Subject: Demonizing Denning
In-Reply-To: <199410060516.WAA17295@servo.qualcomm.com>
Message-ID: <199410060803.BAA06601@netcom6.netcom.com>


Phil Karn wrote:

> We definitely have the upper hand on this issue. Dorothy Denning may
> be a naive pawn of the government. She may hold beliefs that appall
> the rest of us. She may have lost whatever credibility she had in the
> crypto community by her position. But I still prefer to attack that
> position and the (il)logic behind it rather than to resort to
> attacking the person expressing it. Especially when the argument
> itself is almost a no-brainer.

I agree with Phil. I don't have much respect for Dorothy Denning's
views, feeling she has sold out to the Beltway mentality, but I can't
see the point of demonizing her, any more than I can see the point of
demonizing Jim Bidzos or Mitch Kapor, or lionizing Phil Zimmermann.

(Before you grep your archives and gleefully rebut me, I did at one
point call her "the wicked witch of the East." But this was a result
of overenthusiastic punning, and some anger. I haven't had any
opportunity to deal with her in the past couple of years, but I'd like
to keep that option open, and not foreclose it with vicious insults.
Attack the postion, not the woman, as they might say.)

Practically speaking, a bumber sticker saying "Denning--Clip her"
might be understood by as many as one out of ten thousand of those who
read it....not a very convincing meme. (Yes, "crypto anarchy" is
equally arcane, vaguely disturbing, and equally unconvincing...but I'm
not sporting a bumper sticker on this, nor do I expect to convert the
masses.)


--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo at toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay






From samuel.kaplin at warehouse.mn.org  Thu Oct  6 01:28:13 1994
From: samuel.kaplin at warehouse.mn.org (Samuel Kaplin)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 01:28:13 PDT
Subject: BIRD BRAINS
Message-ID: <9410060325432199@warehouse.mn.org>



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

:the bomb's aim.  Just before the bomb hit, the pigeon would
:parachute to safety.  (I made that last part up.)

Could you imagine the ruckus if we were to try to implement something like
this today? P.E.T.A would have a stroke!! They already are in a snit over
the Navy's use of dolphins. Me, I just can't equate an animals life to a
human life...use the animal, save a human. I wonder if we could create an
Enigma machine based on biological organisms. Genetically alter something to
act as an encryption machine. Hmmm.....

 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Fido: Sam Kaplin  1:282/1018           | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard
  Compuserve: 75240,131                  | outside a Roman brothel.
  samuel.kaplin at warehouse.mn.org         |
  75240,131 at compuserve.com               | Change is the only constant in the
 For confidential communications use PGP | Universe..."Four quarters, please."
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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lNL98Oo+lCQ=
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From samuel.kaplin at warehouse.mn.org  Thu Oct  6 01:28:17 1994
From: samuel.kaplin at warehouse.mn.org (Samuel Kaplin)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 01:28:17 PDT
Subject: NYT Libertarian News
Message-ID: <9410060325442201@warehouse.mn.org>



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

:        I wouldn't even refer to him as a libertarian. He's very much
:into family values / universal military training / trade protection
:for United States industries. He falls very close, ideologically,
:alongside the state "militias" out in this part of the country. Those
:groups also profess libertarianism while also advocating extremely
:draconian Christian social programs.

He's also a crook. After his foray into Southeast Asia he went into the
treasure hunting business. He defrauded the widow of a man who had been
hunting for this one treasure. (Forgive me for the sketchy details, this
was on a show on the Discovery channel about 2 years ago. I believe the
show was "The Treasure Hunters." Took her for all of her money "continuing
the hunt" and never really did anything. On second thought he might just
fit in in Washington. He can pal around with Ollie North. They would
probably have a blast at one of Packwoods' or Kennedy's parties.   ;)

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 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Fido: Sam Kaplin  1:282/1018           | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard
  Compuserve: 75240,131                  | outside a Roman brothel.
  samuel.kaplin at warehouse.mn.org         |
  75240,131 at compuserve.com               | Change is the only constant in the
 For confidential communications use PGP | Universe..."Four quarters, please."
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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From prz at acm.org  Thu Oct  6 02:35:12 1994
From: prz at acm.org (Philip Zimmermann)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 02:35:12 PDT
Subject: Key Forfeiture, not Key Escrow
Message-ID: <m0qspDz-0002wCC@maalox.ppgs.com>


The Government seems to choose its terminology carefully in cases where
that terminology can affect the politics of a situation.  I suggest
that we start referring to key escrow as "key forfeiture".

Philip Zimmermann





From jf02 at stirling.ac.uk  Thu Oct  6 02:52:53 1994
From: jf02 at stirling.ac.uk (Jonathon Fletcher)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 02:52:53 PDT
Subject: Remailers in the uk papers
Message-ID: <9410060950.AA00351@forth.stir.ac.uk>



Today's OnLine in the Guardian (techy bit every thursday) has an article on
anonymous remailers. It's not bad, nice introduction to the concepts,
listing of some remailers (penet, the hacktic crowd, soda), a little
practical instruction for the use of vox.hacktic (what headers to put in
and how to delimit them). It introduces chaining, so mailings can be
"super-secure".  Quite a pro-remailer article - it's nice to read
something like this in a public forum. There's a section on Julf and the
amount of traffic that get's passed through penet, as well his address
in case the reader wants to help sponsor (or donate something) a faster
machine and a better connection to make it run faster. As a small
quote, the last three sentences read:

  "Anonyous remailers can be fun, but try not to react like a child with
a new toy. Use these services responsibly. Remember, some people need
them badly" - OnLine, the Guardian, October 6th, 1994

The author is "Steve Harris <steveha at cix.compulink.co.uk>"

-Jon

-- 
  Jonathon Fletcher. 
  j.fletcher at stirling.ac.uk 
  WWW Home Page: http://www.stir.ac.uk/~jf1 






From remailer at chaos.bsu.edu  Thu Oct  6 04:07:23 1994
From: remailer at chaos.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 04:07:23 PDT
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199410061109.GAA24320@chaos.bsu.edu>



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


- ---- Ignore any slobber between above and the PGP line.

I just obtained a copy of Doug Floyd's data haven code.  I am
working on a workable implementation.  The address of the data
haven will be put on the list as soon as I make SURE the
stuff is reliable.  Until commands are finalized, they will
not be revealed.

When the site is up, please don't store much as I do not
have that much disk space, and ENCRYPT your files.  I fear
that someone will send me some stuff that is very illegal,
and leave it in the clear.  So, I will try to see what is
sent, and possibly post it if its not encrypted with something.
Heck, use crypt or something better than rot13.

I hate to appear as a snooper about people's files, but when
this is up, I will demand encryption to protect my DH, and
your stuff.

PGP is easily available, use it, or DES, or crypt if you live
on the dangerzone.

Sorry for my prattling, but I am new to this.

PS:  Doug, use cb.  Your code smells like a ten year old dead
turkey with its looks.  At least its relatively bug-free, and
does the job well.  Another thing, should you use SHA instead
of MD5 for hashing?  SHA has more bits, and there is a less
chance for two files to collide.




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From hughes at ah.com  Thu Oct  6 04:57:19 1994
From: hughes at ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 04:57:19 PDT
Subject: data havens and operator protection
In-Reply-To: <199410061109.GAA24320@chaos.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9410061116.AA08908@ah.com>


   When the site is up, please don't store much as I do not
   have that much disk space, and ENCRYPT your files.  I fear
   that someone will send me some stuff that is very illegal,
   and leave it in the clear.  

I'd suggest that you test for various entropies of distribution, and
reject anything that doesn't look random.  I'd also suggest testing
for various magic numbers such as for compressed files (various
formats) and executables.

Either you should concern yourself _and_ do something about it, or
not.  Worrying about it and not preventing what you are concerned
about is silly.

Eric





From hughes at ah.com  Thu Oct  6 05:04:39 1994
From: hughes at ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 05:04:39 PDT
Subject: crypto game idea
In-Reply-To: <9410052026.AA21579@bilbo.suite.com>
Message-ID: <9410061124.AA08922@ah.com>


   These constraints imply there is some bank-like agency that creates and  
   signs "official" game cards.  

Cards are a conserved quantity, and digital money protocols apply to
any conserved quantity.  You would need one currency for each card type.

Another interesting thing about MTG is that since each player has a
separate deck, and not a single shared deck, all the problems of
dealing out of a shared deck are gone.  In fact, you can play the game
entirely with one-way functions, I'm pretty sure.

Eric





From nelson at crynwr.com  Thu Oct  6 06:37:21 1994
From: nelson at crynwr.com (Russell Nelson)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 06:37:21 PDT
Subject: Government vs. Markets
In-Reply-To: <9410052122.AA32506@elfbook.intercon.com>
Message-ID: <m0qst9N-0008cKC@crynwr.crynwr.com>


   Date: Wed,  5 Oct 1994 21:22:32 -0400
   From: Amanda Walker <amanda at intercon.com>
   Cc: cypherpunks at toad.com
   Content-Disposition: Inline

   > In the main, corporations persuade and governments force. 

   I don't see so much of a difference.  There is very little
   difference in the nature and methods of governments
   vs. corporations.

Yes, RSA forces us to use their public key encryption or no other.
But who lets them do that?  The government.  Corporations always want
the government to give them a monopoly.  How much easier not to compete!

Most of the evil that corporations do is in collusion with governments.
Purportedly, AT&T had to be incentivized to make Clipper phones.

   A government can usefully be viewed as a
   corporation engaged in the business of public services.  It's
   simply a geographical monopoly, as are many public utilities.

A geographical monopoly with *guns*, and a mandate from the masses to
use them.  I can't say that I've ever seen a Niagara-Mohawk or NYNEX tank.

-- 
-russ <nelson at crynwr.com>    http://www.crynwr.com/crynwr/nelson.html
Crynwr Software   | Crynwr Software sells packet driver support | ask4 PGP key
11 Grant St.      | +1 315 268 1925 (9201 FAX)  | What is thee doing about it?
Potsdam, NY 13676 | LPF member - ask me about the harm software patents do.





From rfb at lehman.com  Thu Oct  6 07:12:43 1994
From: rfb at lehman.com (Rick Busdiecker)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 07:12:43 PDT
Subject: Richard Stallman of GNU on Tcl (crypto reference)
In-Reply-To: <199410051935.PAA02275@hermes.bwh.harvard.edu>
Message-ID: <9410061411.AA26533@cfdevx1.lehman.com>


    From: Adam Shostack <adam at bwh.harvard.edu>
    Date: Wed, 5 Oct 94 15:35:06 EDT

    "Perl.  The only language that looks the same before and after RSA
    encryption."

This must have come from someone unfamiliar with TECO . . . .

			Rick





From perry at imsi.com  Thu Oct  6 07:19:23 1994
From: perry at imsi.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 07:19:23 PDT
Subject: Demonizing Denning
In-Reply-To: <199410060803.BAA06601@netcom6.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9410061418.AA00586@snark.imsi.com>



I agree with Tim and Phil very strongly. Ad hominem attacks are never
justified. I find there is very little point in wasting time on them.

Perry

Timothy C. May says:
> Phil Karn wrote:
> 
> > Dorothy Denning may be a naive pawn of the government. She may
> > hold beliefs that appall the rest of us. She may have lost
> > whatever credibility she had in the crypto community by her
> > position. But I still prefer to attack that position and the
> > (il)logic behind it rather than to resort to attacking the person
> > expressing it.

> I agree with Phil. I don't have much respect for Dorothy Denning's
> views, feeling she has sold out to the Beltway mentality, but I can't
> see the point of demonizing her, any more than I can see the point of
> demonizing Jim Bidzos or Mitch Kapor, or lionizing Phil Zimmermann.





From nobody at cass156.ucsd.edu  Thu Oct  6 08:59:18 1994
From: nobody at cass156.ucsd.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 08:59:18 PDT
Subject: He's dead Jim (Chomsky)
Message-ID: <9410061602.AA27350@nately.UCSD.EDU>


First and foremost I would like to publicly apologize to Mr. James A.
Donald... re-reading my intial post to this thread, I feel that I was out
of line in some places.  As is the current topic of the MEME thread, I
would like to stress that one should attack the message and *not* the
messenger.  Mr. Donald (*not* McDonald) is neither a fascist, nor Hitler,
nor anything else than however he chooses to define himself.  His views,
however, *are* open to interpretation.  As it stands, I respect Mr.
Donald's views (and for the most part, I agree with him...on other things
;) ).

The second and last point I would like to make is that quotes to *back up*
an argument are more than helpful, and would save much bandwidth.  If Mr.
Donald would like to continue his part in this thread, either publicly or
privately, I am more than willing to discuss Chomsky (or anything for that
matter), as long as I have something tangible to discuss.  The same applies
to anyone else who wishes to discuss Chomsky....

Like many of us, I get over 500 pieces of email a day--and I try to read
every bit of it; I think one piece of footnoted or otherwise appended email
is worth 20 pieces of the Hitler-calling type.

Mi taku oyasin...

 _/_/_/  _/_/_/   _/  _/  _/_/_/      _/      _/  It's dangerous to be right
_/       _/  _/   _/  _/  _/         _/_/     _/  when the government is
_/_/_/   _/  _/   _/  _/  _/_/_/    _/  _/    _/  wrong.
     _/  _/  _/   _/  _/  _/       _/_/_/_/   _/
_/_/_/   _/_/_/   _/_/_/  _/_/_/  _/      _/  _/_/_/              --Voltaire
              _/








From warrior at infinet.com  Thu Oct  6 09:04:07 1994
From: warrior at infinet.com (David M. Harvey I)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 09:04:07 PDT
Subject: Key Forfeiture, not Key Escrow
In-Reply-To: <m0qspDz-0002wCC@maalox.ppgs.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.89.9410061141.D1464-0100000@rigel>


On Thu, 6 Oct 1994, Philip Zimmermann wrote:

> The Government seems to choose its terminology carefully in cases where
> that terminology can affect the politics of a situation.  I suggest
> that we start referring to key escrow as "key forfeiture".
> 
> Philip Zimmermann

Alright Phil, way to go!  But think on this, I wouldn't give the LEA a key
to my house, or my car, why should I give them a key to my thoughts?  Give
me Liberty or give me Death, or something to that effect by Patrick Henry. 
They can pry my key and my guns from my cold dead body.  Another thing,
even the animals have a right by force to protect themselves, who does big
brother think they are by denying me the right to protect my life, limb,
property and thoughts from unauthorized intruders?  Surely, we must fight
them tooth and nail. 

Dave
___
****************************************************************************
|No Guts, No Glory, No Honor, No Victory, Pillage, Plunder, and Take Heads!|
****************************************************************************
| Dave M. Harvey                            PGP 2.61 Public Key available. |
| PO Box 151311              	            Finger warrior at infinet.com.us  |
| Columbus, OH 43215-8311    	            dharvey at freenet.columbus.oh.us |
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-==








From samuel.kaplin at warehouse.mn.org  Thu Oct  6 09:22:14 1994
From: samuel.kaplin at warehouse.mn.org (Samuel Kaplin)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 09:22:14 PDT
Subject: Government vs. Markets
Message-ID: <9410061121022275@warehouse.mn.org>



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

:>Um, Attack of the Killer Tomatoes?

:Screw that.  Grow your own  (I do -- and if I can, in Midtown Manhattan,
:then damned near anybody can).


The question, Todd is are they edible? The last time I was in Manhattan,
the air pollution just about did me in. (mid-July, 95 degrees in the shade)
But then again these tomatoes are native New Yorkers, so maybe attitude is a
factor in their edibility. ;)

Sam
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 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Fido: Sam Kaplin  1:282/1018           | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard
  Compuserve: 75240,131                  | outside a Roman brothel.
  samuel.kaplin at warehouse.mn.org         |
  75240,131 at compuserve.com               | Change is the only constant in the
 For confidential communications use PGP | Universe..."Four quarters, please."
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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From amanda at intercon.com  Thu Oct  6 09:27:07 1994
From: amanda at intercon.com (Amanda Walker)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 09:27:07 PDT
Subject: Key Forfeiture, not Key Escrow
Message-ID: <9410061226.AA47263@elfbook.intercon.com>


> The Government seems to choose its terminology carefully in cases 
> where that terminology can affect the politics of a situation.  I 
> suggest that we start referring to key escrow as "key forfeiture". 

Phil, you're brilliant.

"Key forfeiture" it is.


Amanda Walker
InterCon Systems Corporation







From amanda at intercon.com  Thu Oct  6 09:35:35 1994
From: amanda at intercon.com (Amanda Walker)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 09:35:35 PDT
Subject: Government vs. Markets
Message-ID: <9410061235.AA14735@elfbook.intercon.com>


> A geographical monopoly with *guns*, and a mandate from the masses to 
> use them.  I can't say that I've ever seen a Niagara-Mohawk or NYNEX 
> tank. 

The government does not have a monopoly on military force.  In fact, the 2nd 
amendment explicitly prohibits such a monopoly, however much it has become 
eroded in recent decades.

However, I will agree with you that a certain amount of corporate coercion 
goes on with government collusion (not all, however: look at Westlaw or 
Equifax for examples).


Amanda Walker
InterCon Systems Corporation






From frissell at panix.com  Thu Oct  6 09:51:06 1994
From: frissell at panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 09:51:06 PDT
Subject: Dorothy
Message-ID: <199410061650.AA06972@panix.com>


At 11:56 PM 10/5/94 -0700, Ed Carp wrote:

>(BTW) violating every known law of security to do so.  Denning, in a very
>real sense, represents the attitudes of the NSA and the people controlling
>this whole scheme and trying to foist it off onto people.  Is she such an
>idiot that she actually *believes* the nonsense she spouts? 
>
>Is it wrong to suspect her motives, her judgement, her common sense, in
>backing such a proposal?

If we spend a little time thinking about it, I'm sure that we can figure out
DD's psychology.  If we can't understand her views (which are probably more
mainstream than ours) we won't be able to understand anybody's.  

She is a conventional person and thinks that the monopoly of coercion
exercised by the government must be maintained for the good of all.  Many
people share this view.  As a cryptographer, she is aware of the same things
that we are -- that unbreakable crypto combined with the "society on the
nets" breaks this government monopoly of coercion.

The point of Cypherpunks is not to change this almost universally held view
of the legitmacy of "others" government (as opposed to self government).
The point of cypherpunks is to *demonstrate* that the monopoly of coercion
traditionally held by government has been *ended*.  If you change the
physical reality, people's views will change in turn.

Don't be upset with DD.  She hasn't killed anybody.  If we're right about
our analysis of the new balance of power between the individual and the
state, her views don't matter.  If we're wrong, her views *still* don't matter.

DCF

--
"Downsizing, Open Systems, and Distributed Networks for Berlin, London,
Paris, Rome, Tokyo, & Washington, too."  oops forgot Ottawa.







From perry at imsi.com  Thu Oct  6 10:02:50 1994
From: perry at imsi.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 10:02:50 PDT
Subject: Government vs. Markets
In-Reply-To: <9410061235.AA14735@elfbook.intercon.com>
Message-ID: <9410061702.AA00866@snark.imsi.com>



Amanda Walker says:
> > A geographical monopoly with *guns*, and a mandate from the masses to 
> > use them.  I can't say that I've ever seen a Niagara-Mohawk or NYNEX 
> > tank. 
> 
> The government does not have a monopoly on military force.

All normal people can only engage in the use of force once attacked.
Only the government and its agents are permitted to initiate force
against others with impunity.

Perry





From m5 at vail.tivoli.com  Thu Oct  6 10:27:12 1994
From: m5 at vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 10:27:12 PDT
Subject: Dorothy
In-Reply-To: <199410061650.AA06972@panix.com>
Message-ID: <9410061726.AA02024@vail.tivoli.com>



Duncan Frissell writes:
 > Don't be upset with DD.  She hasn't killed anybody.  If we're right about
 > our analysis of the new balance of power between the individual and the
 > state, her views don't matter.  If we're wrong, her views *still* don't matter.

Very well put.

To have someone on the "other side" who (as I hope we all acknowledge)
is quite well-informed about the technology behind the areas of public
policy we're interested in is a rather unique situation.  I consider
it valuable; in a way, it keeps us honest.

Mr. Sternlight, on the other hand, is another story...  (though I was
surprised and delighted by DS's appearance on the other high-volume
mailing list I'm on, the "Chile Heads" digest.  It seems
Mr. Sternlight has a taste for  spicy foods!)

| GOOD TIME FOR MOVIE - GOING ||| Mike McNally <m5 at tivoli.com>       |
| TAKE TWA TO CAIRO.          ||| Tivoli Systems, Austin, TX:        |
|     (actual fortune cookie) ||| "Like A Little Bit of Semi-Heaven" |





From unicorn at access.digex.net  Thu Oct  6 10:29:03 1994
From: unicorn at access.digex.net (Black Unicorn)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 10:29:03 PDT
Subject: Digital Cash:  Impact of Interstate Banking Act of 1994
Message-ID: <199410061728.AA00139@access1.digex.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branch Efficiency Act of 1994, 
Electronic Banking and Digital Cash:  A brief impact survey.

+++


Last month the President signed into law the Riegle-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branch Efficiency Act of 1994.

The act is the result of almost sixteen years of attempts to revise and 
ease long standing restrictions on commercial banking entities.  The 
aspects of the bill which in my opinion hold the greatest implications 
for electronic banking, internet banking and digital cash are the 
lifting of basic geographic restrictions on commercial banking are 
outlined below.

Commenting after the bill cleared the Senate, Secretary Bentsen 
indicated the following:

++ Begin excerpt

This legislation represents a major step forward for the American 
banking system that has been sought by both parties for years.  Efforts 
to ease interstate banking and branching restrictions were proposed by 
the last four administrations.  I applaud the bipartisan effort to enact 
this important legislation.

Interstate banking and branching will be beneficial to banks and their 
customers as well as the nation's economy as a whole.  This bill will 
allow banks to reduce expenses by structuring themselves more 
efficiently.  It will also promote the safety and soundness of the 
banking system through geographic diversification, which will enable 
banks to better withstand regional recessions and meet the needs of 
customers in times of stress.  Customer convenience will be greatly 
enhanced by eliminating arbitrary restrictions on interstate deposit 
taking.  Competition among banks will be encouraged by making it easier 
for them to enter markets that are not now full competitive.

[...]

The [Act]:

* Permits a bank holding company to acquire a bank located in any state, 
beginning one year after enactment.

* Allows a bank to merge with a bank in another state, beginning June 1, 
1997, so long as neither state has taken legislative action to prohibit 
interstate mergers....

[...]

* Allows foreign banks to establish branches, either de novo or by 
acquisition and merger, in any state outside the state in which the bank 
has its U.S. headquarters to the same extent that a domestic bank may 
establish such branches....

[...]

++ End of excerpt.

Since the Glass-Stegall Act, which established strict separation of 
commercial and investment banking services, commercial banking has 
suffered in the marketplace due to investment services and investment 
banking competition.  Investment banking and banking services could 
often offer services resembling those offered by traditional banking 
without enduring the strict geographical restrictions imposed on banks.  
At the same time, reduced deposit insurance regulation made the cost of 
these services lower.  Even entities like insurance companies could 
offer loan services, and often offer them at better rates, that banks 
could no longer soundly approach.

The most obvious impact of geographical restrictions to the average 
consumer was the restriction on traditional banks in regard to accepting 
out of state deposits.  Most readers will recognize this manifest in the 
inability to deposit to an account from an out of state automatic 
teller.  While withdrawals are possible through interstate networks like 
Cirrus, Most, NYCE and the Military Financial Network, deposits are 
restricted to in state entities only and as a result associated fees of 
any interstate transactions are a function of the number of financial 
institutions which the transaction must bridge, as the local banks are 
institutions unable to structure their own networks to avoid middleman 
cost.  Similarly, wire transfers are presented with an identical cost 
bridge, as geographic restrictions have often required the adoption of 
several different networks between banks instead of a single network.  
Costs are predictably affected.

With the introduction of the Interstate Banking Act banks will be free 
to expand their deposit taking functions across state lines (within the 
general restrictions of the Act).  As a result Automatic Teller Machines 
may soon be able to provide many of the same services as a "Full Service 
Bank" provided merely that they have a customer service phone attached.

The foreseeable impact on Digital Cash projects as well as online and 
offline cash and banking systems falls within a few brackets.

1>  Positive effects for start up domestic efforts associated with
    geographic deregulation.
2>  Positive effects for depositors in general.
3>  Negative effects for start up overseas efforts.
4>  Negative effects for overseas expansion efforts.
5>  Negative effects for digital cash generally.


1>  Domestic efforts:

Because limitations on interstate banking are being lifted, those 
projects intending to start up a full or partial service financial 
institution with advanced electronic transaction services will obviously 
be more feasible on a nation wide scale.

Prospects for nation wide, fully automated and cost effective electronic 
banking are greatly increased with the removal of the restrictions on 
geographic expansion.  Look to see increased interest in long term 
banking customer relations as banks and depositors recognize that it may 
no longer be necessary to change institutions when changing domiciles.  
An immediate expansion of automatic teller networks and associated 
agreements with service providers is likely.

2>  Depositors in general:

Can expect to transact all types of basic banking functions nationally 
without the necessity of a local branch of their bank being accessible.  
As banks begin to realize the profits from interstate banking fees 
directly without dilution to the institution local to the transaction, 
expansion of electronic networks is a likely reaction.

3>  Overseas efforts:

Efforts to provide depositors with access to overseas institutions will 
be hampered in two ways:

A>  Investment prospects will decrease.
Investors recognizing that overseas institutions which offer services in 
the United States have one less advantage over domestic banks will be 
less likely to participate in such a venture.

B>  Customers recognizing that overseas institutions offering services 
in the United States provide few, if any, needed services that local 
banks cannot also accommodate will reduce depositor interest in overseas 
electronic banking.  (Note the cyclic effect of this on potential 
Investors in A)

4>  Overseas expansion of existing institutions to the United States.

Is less likely in so far as competition among domestic banks is 
stronger, and the potential market share is reduced.

5>  Impact on digital cash.

A>  Because of the depositor interest in new local banking services, 
depositors are less likely to be interested in digital cash potential 
where a domestic checking account accomplishes the same basic goal.  In 
so far as digital cash ventures depend on the general populations 
interest, as compared with the interest of the "enlightened population" 
(in my meaning, those who understand the privacy and liquidity 
advantages of digital cash over traditional banking services), the 
market share of digital cash ventures is reduced by the number of 
general population more comfortable with traditional banking services.  
(I feel this to be a significant number).

B>  Note the impact on potential investors in digital cash ventures of 
A.


Not the end of digital cash by any means, but a blow for start up 
efforts.

Anyone interested in a much more detailed analysis of the Act, I will 
provide one to the list if enough e-mail interest is shown.

- -uni- (Dark)

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-- 
073BB885A786F666 nemo repente fuit turpissimus - potestas scientiae in usu est
6E6D4506F6EDBC17 quaere verum ad infinitum, loquitur sub rosa    -    wichtig!




From unicorn at access.digex.net  Thu Oct  6 10:30:48 1994
From: unicorn at access.digex.net (Black Unicorn)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 10:30:48 PDT
Subject: BIRD BRAINS
In-Reply-To: <9410060325432199@warehouse.mn.org>
Message-ID: <199410061730.AA00211@access1.digex.net>


Samuel Kaplin scripsit
> 
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> :the bomb's aim.  Just before the bomb hit, the pigeon would
> :parachute to safety.  (I made that last part up.)
> 
> Could you imagine the ruckus if we were to try to implement something like
> this today? P.E.T.A would have a stroke!! They already are in a snit over
> the Navy's use of dolphins. Me, I just can't equate an animals life to a
> human life...use the animal, save a human.

[...]

Or in the pigeon example, use an animal to kill a human.

:)

-uni-

-- 
073BB885A786F666 nemo repente fuit turpissimus - potestas scientiae in usu est
6E6D4506F6EDBC17 quaere verum ad infinitum, loquitur sub rosa    -    wichtig!




From jamiel at sybase.com  Thu Oct  6 10:33:49 1994
From: jamiel at sybase.com (Jamie Lawrence)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 10:33:49 PDT
Subject: BIRD BRAINS
Message-ID: <aab9dcfb020210046653@[130.214.233.14]>


At 5:37 PM 10/5/94, Samuel Kaplin wrote:

>human life...use the animal, save a human. I wonder if we could create an
>Enigma machine based on biological organisms. Genetically alter something to
>act as an encryption machine. Hmmm.....


I wonder if ITAR has provisions for crypto walking out of the country
of its own accord.


-j

--
"It's a  question of semantics,  and I've  always been rather anti-
semantic."                                            -Gene Simmons
___________________________________________________________________
Jamie Lawrence                                  <jamiel at sybase.com>






From unicorn at access.digex.net  Thu Oct  6 10:35:35 1994
From: unicorn at access.digex.net (Black Unicorn)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 10:35:35 PDT
Subject: Key Forfeiture, not Key Escrow
In-Reply-To: <m0qspDz-0002wCC@maalox.ppgs.com>
Message-ID: <199410061735.AA00376@access1.digex.net>


Philip Zimmermann scripsit
> 
> The Government seems to choose its terminology carefully in cases where
> that terminology can affect the politics of a situation.  I suggest
> that we start referring to key escrow as "key forfeiture".

This got me thinking about a potentially interesting aspect of this whole 
process.

Isn't this a taking?  Government is reducing the value of the key, and 
the associated software by forfeiting it.  It would seem to me that the 
value of a key "stored" by government makes:

1>  Insurance liability for cash transactions involving stored keys larger.
2>  A lessened value of services of the software.
3>  A reduced value to the user of what is essentially his property.

Thin on many grounds... but interesting none the less.

The public welfare exception will be the likely defense, but the burden 
is on the defendant to show public welfare.


> 
> Philip Zimmermann
> 
 
-uni- (Dark)

-- 
073BB885A786F666 nemo repente fuit turpissimus - potestas scientiae in usu est
6E6D4506F6EDBC17 quaere verum ad infinitum, loquitur sub rosa    -    wichtig!




From cactus at bb.com  Thu Oct  6 10:43:00 1994
From: cactus at bb.com (L. Todd Masco)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 10:43:00 PDT
Subject: Government vs. Markets
In-Reply-To: <9410061121022275@warehouse.mn.org>
Message-ID: <371d6a$fmp@bb.com>


In article <9410061121022275 at warehouse.mn.org>,
Samuel Kaplin <samuel.kaplin at warehouse.mn.org> wrote:
>:Screw that.  Grow your own  (I do -- and if I can, in Midtown Manhattan,
>:then damned near anybody can).
>
>
>The question, Todd is are they edible? The last time I was in Manhattan,
>the air pollution just about did me in. (mid-July, 95 degrees in the shade)
>But then again these tomatoes are native New Yorkers, so maybe attitude is a
>factor in their edibility. ;)

Oh, absolutely.  They taste far better than anything available in stores.
Ditto the chives, oregano, thai hot peppers, anahaheim (new mexican)
peppers, poblano peppers, carrots, thyme, onions, and sunflower seeds.

But if you want attitude, you'll have to try the habanero peppers I've
been growing alongside the tomatoes, too.

(There is a point to this:)

If anybody who'll be going to the C'punks NYC meeting wants some fresh
Habanero peppers (aka "Scotch Bonnets"), let me know:  we've harvested
over 80 of them so far, with no end in sight.  I'd be glad to give 'em
away to people who can toler, uh, properly appreciate them.  My roommates
and I have a competition to see how many each of us can eat whole, raw,
before they run out (for those unfamiliar with the kind, they're the
hottest kind of pepper in the world, many claim: up to 350,000
Scovilles).
-- 
L. Todd Masco  | Ingredients:  red, blue, and green quarks, six varieties of
cactus at bb.com  |  gluons, electrons.  Some settling may occur in shipping.





From jamiel at sybase.com  Thu Oct  6 11:12:01 1994
From: jamiel at sybase.com (Jamie Lawrence)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 11:12:01 PDT
Subject: Government vs. Markets
Message-ID: <aab9d9bc00021004a343@[130.214.233.14]>


At 6:23 PM 10/5/94, Ray Cromwell wrote:
 [...]
>[...]        Typical of socialists, they are unfamilar with economics
>and resort to semantic games. A monopoly is defined by (1) one seller,
 [...]
>   I thought it was 49 cents an hour, however, no one ever accused
>a socialist knowing the facts. [...]
 [...]

Typical statements of folks who get thier politics from Heinlein novels
and thier understanding of personal interaction from economics 101.

The point being that there is no place for ideological attacks like
this in a 'rational' forum trying to discuss 'real life'. Wait, this
discussion *is* to be considered valid intellectual discourse, right?

Questioning ideas gains much more respect than making snide comments.

Just another socialist,


-j

--
"It's a  question of semantics,  and I've  always been rather anti-
semantic."                                            -Gene Simmons
___________________________________________________________________
Jamie Lawrence                                  <jamiel at sybase.com>







From m5 at vail.tivoli.com  Thu Oct  6 11:34:57 1994
From: m5 at vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 11:34:57 PDT
Subject: Chile heads
In-Reply-To: <9410061726.AA02024@vail.tivoli.com>
Message-ID: <9410061832.AA02791@vail.tivoli.com>



Paul J. Ste. Marie writes:
 > > surprised and delighted by DS's appearance on the other high-volume
 > > mailing list I'm on, the "Chile Heads" digest.  It seems
 > 
 > So how does one get on this mailing list?  Sounds very interesting.

Since this is the second request, I will take the bold liberty of
wasting a little cypherpunks bandwidth:

	chile-heads-request at chile.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu

Please, don't get on the list just to badger Sternlight.  (Unless of
course he starts claiming people are violating some sort of secrecy
agreement by eating hybrid Del Monte peppers...)  The volume is
surprisingly high, and (though there are bursts of newbie gaffs) the
S/N is pretty good.

| GOOD TIME FOR MOVIE - GOING ||| Mike McNally <m5 at tivoli.com>       |
| TAKE TWA TO CAIRO.          ||| Tivoli Systems, Austin, TX:        |
|     (actual fortune cookie) ||| "Like A Little Bit of Semi-Heaven" |





From lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu  Thu Oct  6 11:56:18 1994
From: lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu (Lewis McCarthy)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 11:56:18 PDT
Subject: Ideological Attacks
In-Reply-To: <aab9d9bc00021004a343@[130.214.233.14]>
Message-ID: <199410061855.OAA13375@ducie.cs.umass.edu>


Jamie Lawrence writes: 
> Ray Cromwell wrote:
> >   I thought it was 49 cents an hour, however, no one ever accused
> >a socialist knowing the facts. [...]
> The point being that there is no place for ideological attacks like
> this in a 'rational' forum trying to discuss 'real life'. 
> Questioning ideas gains much more respect than making snide comments.
> Just another socialist,
> -j

I'm nobody's socialist (and nobody's libertarian, either), but I
strongly agree with Jamie here.  Reiterating the MEME point, don't
attack people, attack specific ideas.

-L. McCarthy		 "I'm just a sucker with no self-esteem" -Offspring
Send me mail using "Subject: remailer-help" for an autoreply about Underdog




From jya at pipeline.com  Thu Oct  6 11:58:40 1994
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 11:58:40 PDT
Subject: No Guts, No Glory
Message-ID: <199410061857.OAA07536@pipe1.pipeline.com>



Responding to msg by warrior at infinet.com ("David M. Harvey I") 
on Thu, 6 Oct 12:3  PM

>****************************************************************
************  
|No Guts, No Glory, No Honor, No Victory, Pillage, Plunder, and 
Take Heads!|  
>****************************************************************
************  


Dave's sig and nom de guerre is taking a beating in today's NYT 
where there is a story about the US military carefully planning 
to avoid casualties in warfare.

It also reports that the brave white collars in think tanks 
think it's a terrible prospect because then no one will believe 
that the US is tough, and tough minds know that "casualites are 
inevitable".

And how will healthy young men and women be taught guts, honor, 
victory, and so on by periodically turning a bunch of them and 
their foes into salsa and crispy critters for evening news 
adulation.

But Dave can still show his humorous sig in a VA abattoir of 
mangled ex-warriors if he really wants to enjoy the sad 
communion of misled youngsters.


John





From sebaygo at sibylline.com  Thu Oct  6 12:08:06 1994
From: sebaygo at sibylline.com (Allen Robinson)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 12:08:06 PDT
Subject: Demonizing Denning (was: It's MEME time!!!)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.89.9410061440.A686-0100000@sibyl>



Since it appears that I helped to start this thread, let me do what
I can to finish it.

Responding to some facetiae posted by David Merriman, I suggested:

> Very good.  If I could offer one minor change, how 'bout:

>         Dorothy Denning?  Clip 'er!


Which prompted Phil Karn to inquire:

> Uh, how come we can't stick to attacking the message, rather than the
> messenger?


To which Ed Carp replied:

> Because in this case, the messenger is an integral part of the message.


This kind of parallels my thinking when I offered that
mostly-off-the-cuff suggestion.  I thought David had hit upon a
clever turn of phrase -- a slogan of exhortation to cypherpunks
to truncate Dr. Denning's *influence*.  I did not intend an ad
hominem attack, nor did I expect something that would fit on a
bumpersticker to substitute for rational debate.

As Phil Karn observed elsewhere:

> Dorothy Denning may
> be a naive pawn of the government. She may hold beliefs that appall
> the rest of us. She may have lost whatever credibility she had in the
> crypto community by her position. But I still prefer to attack that
> position and the (il)logic behind it rather than to resort to
> attacking the person expressing it.


Quite right.  Granted, Dr. Denning has lost her credibility with
certain elements of "the crypto community."  Unfortunately, those
folks are not the decision-makers who'll decide the fate of
proposals such as Clipper.  She remains a valuable tool to those
in government who want to advance such agendas.

As Ed Carp commented:

> I think the reason people attack the messenger is because people in the
> government listen to her, and I for one am exasperated beyond words to
> know that my government is paying attention to such an idiotic scheme, and
> (BTW) violating every known law of security to do so.  Denning, in a very
> real sense, represents the attitudes of the NSA and the people controlling
> this whole scheme and trying to foist it off onto people.


But what better way to blunt her effectiveness as an advocate
than to demostrate the folly of that which she so wholeheartedly
advocates?

Still, as Tim May reminded us:

> Practically speaking, a bumber sticker saying "Denning--Clip her"
> might be understood by as many as one out of ten thousand of those who
> read it....not a very convincing meme. (Yes, "crypto anarchy" is
> equally arcane, vaguely disturbing, and equally unconvincing...but I'm
> not sporting a bumper sticker on this, nor do I expect to convert the
> masses.)


He is, of course, correct.  And this whole thread has become
a bit of a tempest in a teapot.  I apologize for my part in
what I'm sure many regard as an improper consumption of
bandwidth.

AR






From tcmay at netcom.com  Thu Oct  6 12:16:36 1994
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 12:16:36 PDT
Subject: Demonizing Denning (was: It's MEME time!!!)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.89.9410061440.A686-0100000@sibyl>
Message-ID: <199410061915.MAA17124@netcom13.netcom.com>


Allen Robinson wrote:

> He is, of course, correct.  And this whole thread has become
> a bit of a tempest in a teapot.  I apologize for my part in
> what I'm sure many regard as an improper consumption of
> bandwidth.

I see no reason why you or anyone else in this thread should apologize
(hence, you _should_ apologize for your inappropriate apology!).

Discussing whether attacks on the leading spokesbimbo for Clipper (er,
spokeswoman :-}) are a good idea seems like a more relevant topic for
us to discuss than a _lot_ of what we talk about. Recent threads on
Chomsky and habanero peppers are just the most recent examples.


--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo at toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay






From strick at yak.net  Thu Oct  6 12:26:55 1994
From: strick at yak.net (strick at yak.net)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 12:26:55 PDT
Subject: Stallman & Ousterhout && (TCL || !TCL) && practicing cypherpunks
Message-ID: <199410052251.PAA12104@gwarn.versant.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>   On gnu.announce of 9/23, he writes "Why you should not use Tcl".
>   Instead, those wanting to use the Tk tools are commended to a
>   Scheme interpreter with it called STk. Available from:
>   ftp.cs.indiana.edu:pub/scheme-repository/imp/STk-2.1.tar.Z 


Below is the post from Rich Stallman "Why you should not use Tcl",
and the reply from Ousterhout, which is basically: Why you should
not listen to Stallman, in this case.

The mentions in the [fantastic] Cyphernomicon of TCL are probably due
to my crypto-prototyping project.  I did not take the choice lightly
when I chose TCL as my "glue" in this project.

Two issues that may be interesting but had *little to do* with
my decision are (1) language support for big numbers and
(2) the TK toolkit (which happens to be in TCL).


The reason I chose TCL is that it is designed to work 
above, underneath, and alongside of C code.  TCL has two published
interfaces:  one is the language and standard commands, and one
is a C API for use in combining the language with other C packages.

I think of TCL as more of a subroutine library than a language: in 
the same way that (say) C++ string, file, and dictionary classes 
can help you be more productive in writing C++ programs,  a
"little language" interpreter can make you more productive in
many kinds of programs.  Crypto prototyping systems is one of them.


I am not new to LISP or PERL or AWK or POSTSCRIPT or FORTH or SHELL or
BASIC or HYPERTALK or various other interpreted langauges.  For many
differnt projects I would leave TCL for one of them.  However when TCL
came along, I recognized it as being just the language I had wanted to
write myself for doing projects like my current one.

Which may say more about what kind of a computer scientist I am
that about what lanaguage is best for you in your situation.  



I'll add that I have a version of my crypto toolkit that is a PERL
interpreter, and I've looked briefly at embedding it in PYTHON as
well.  My problem now is that I need a chunk of time to port it all and
package it on sun4 (currently it's on sun3).  My problem is not yet
that I need more languages to port to.  But i'll be glad to have some
people help embed these things in all the popular interpreted languages
soon.  It would be particularly nice to have some people versant with
Macs and PCs to package crypto components on those machines -- in
applescript or hypercard or visual basic or whatever would help people
write crypt code.




Below I repost the original articles by Stallman (the spiritual leader 
of GNU) and Ousterhout (the author of TCL).    

I'll also point out my greatest respect for both of them, and for
their respective projects.   They've both made my job as a 
practicing cypherpunk much easier.

Talk about prototyping environments, but please don't spam the list on
religious issues.   PERL and PYTHON and SCHEME are all pretty good
little languages.


			happy hacking,

				strick


				Cypherpunks write Code,
				but when do they release it? :)




[ thanks to iansmith at cc.gatech.edu and boyz at hkn.eecs.berkeley.edu 
for bringing these articles to my attention. ]


- ------- Forwarded Messages


Date: Fri, 23 Sep 94 19:14:52 -0400
From: rms at gnu.ai.mit.edu (Richard Stallman)
To: gnu at prep.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Why you should not use Tcl
Newsgroups: gnu.announce,gnu.utils.bug,gnu.misc.discuss,comp.lang.tcl,
	comp.lang.scheme,comp.windows.x.apps,comp.unix.misc
Followup-To: gnu.misc.discuss,comp.lang.tcl,comp.lang.scheme

[Please redistribute wherever appropriate.]



		     Why you should not use Tcl
			Richard Stallman, GNU Project

As interest builds in extensible application programs and tools, and
some programmers are tempted to use Tcl, we should not forget the
lessons learned from the first widely used extensible text
editor--Emacs.

The principal lesson of Emacs is that a language for extensions should
not be a mere "extension language".  It should be a real programming
language, designed for writing and maintaining substantial programs.
Because people will want to do that!

Extensions are often large, complex programs in their own right, and
the people who write them deserve the same facilities that other
programmers rely on.

The first Emacs used a string-processing language, TECO, which was
inadequate.  We made it serve, but it kept getting in our way.  It
made maintenance harder, and it made extensions harder to write.
Later Emacs implementations have used more powerful languages because
implementors learned from the problems of the first one.

Another lesson from Emacs is that the way to make sure an extension
facility is really flexible is to use it to write a large portion of
the ordinary released system.  If you try to do that with Tcl, you
will encounter its limitations.

Tcl was not designed to be a serious programming language.  It was
designed to be a "scripting language", on the assumption that a
"scripting language" need not try to be a real programming language.
So Tcl doesn't have the capabilities of one.  It lacks arrays; it
lacks structures from which you can make linked lists.  It fakes
having numbers, which works, but has to be slow.  Tcl is ok for
writing small programs, but when you push it beyond that, it becomes
insufficient.

Tcl has a peculiar syntax that appeals to hackers because of its
simplicity.  But Tcl syntax seems strange to most users.  If Tcl does
become the "standard scripting language", users will curse it for
years--the way people curse Fortran, MSDOS, Unix shell syntax, and
other de facto standards they feel stuck with.

For these reasons, the GNU project is not going to use Tcl in GNU
software.  Instead we want to provide two languages, similar in
semantics but with different syntaxes.  One will be Lisp-like, and one
will have a more traditional algebraic syntax.  Both will provide
useful data types such as structures and arrays.  The former will
provide a simple syntax that hackers like; the latter will offer
non-hackers a syntax that they are more comfortable with.

Some people plan to use Tcl because they want to use Tk.  Thankfully,
it is possible to use Tk without Tcl.  A Scheme interpreter called STk
is already available.  Please, if you want to use Tk, use it with STk,
not with Tcl.  One place to get STk is from
ftp.cs.indiana.edu:pub/scheme-repository/imp/STk-2.1.tar.Z


- ------- Message 2

From: ouster at tcl.eng.sun.com (John Ousterhout)
Newsgroups: gnu.misc.discuss,comp.lang.tcl,comp.lang.scheme,
	comp.unix.misc,comp.windows.x.apps
Date: 26 Sep 1994 18:13:27 GMT
Organization: Sun Microsystems, Inc.

There have been so many follow-ups to Stallman's message that I'm not sure
there's any need for me to respond, but I would like to say a few things
anyway:

First, I'd like to encourage everyone to keep their responses cordial and
technical, rather than personal, regardless of how strong your opinions
are.  Comp.lang.tcl has managed to avoid flame-wars pretty well so far;
let's keep it that way by focusing on the technical issues rather than
worrying about motives.

I think that Stallman's objections to Tcl may stem largely from one
aspect of Tcl's design that he either doesn't understand or doesn't
agree with.  This is the proposition that you should use *two* languages
for a large software system:  one, such as C or C++, for manipulating the
complex internal data structures where performance is key, and another,
such as Tcl, for writing small-ish scripts that tie together the C pieces
and are used for extensions.  For the Tcl scripts, ease of learning,
ease of programming and ease of glue-ing are more important than
performance or facilities for complex data structures and algorithms.
I think these two programming environments are so different that it
will be hard for a single language to work well in both.  For example,
you don't see many people using C (or even Lisp) as a command language,
even though both of these languages work well for lower-level programming.

Thus I designed Tcl to make it really easy to drop down into C or C++
when you come across tasks that make more sense in a lower-level
language. This way Tcl doesn't have to solve all of the world's
problems.  Stallman appears to prefer an approach where a single
language is used for everything, but I don't know of a successful
instance of this approach.  Even Emacs uses substantial amounts of
C internally, no?

I didn't design Tcl for building huge programs with 10's or 100's of
thousands of lines of Tcl, and I've been pretty surprised that people
have used it for huge programs.  What's even more surprising to me is
that in some cases the resulting applications appear to be manageable.
This certainly isn't what I intended the language for, but the
results haven't been as bad as I would have guessed.

I don't claim that Tcl is without flaws.  Some of the flaws, like the
lack of a compiler and the lack of module support, will get fixed
over time.  Others, like the substitution-oriented parser, are inherent
in the language.  Is it possible to design a language that keeps Tcl's
advantages, such as simplicity, easy glue, and easy embedding, but
eliminates some of its disadvantages?  Almost certainly (there are
several decisions that I would re-think if I were starting over).  Is
the two-language approach really the right one?  I still think so, but
reasonable people can disagree.

Language designers love to argue about why this language or that language
*must* be better or worse a priori, but none of these arguments really
matter a lot.  Ultimately all language issues get settled when users vote
with their feet.  If Tcl makes people more productive then they will use
it;  when some other language comes along that is better (or if it is
here already), then people will switch to that language.  This is The
Law, and it is good.  The Law says to me that Scheme (or any other Lisp
dialect) is probably not the "right" language:  too many people have
voted with their feet over the last 30 years.  I encourage all Tcl
dis-believers to produce the "right" language(s), make them publically
available, and let them be judged according to The Law.


- ------- End of Forwarded Messages



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From hkhenson at shell.portal.com  Thu Oct  6 12:36:38 1994
From: hkhenson at shell.portal.com (H Keith Henson)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 12:36:38 PDT
Subject: What does DD know?
Message-ID: <199410061932.MAA20166@jobe.shell.portal.com>


Duncan Frissell writes: 
 > Don't be upset with DD.  She hasn't killed anybody.  If we're right about
 > our analysis of the new balance of power between the individual and the
 > state, her views don't matter.  If we're wrong, her views *still* don't matter.

Good analysis.  However, DD (and a mess of other folks) have been fed
some story from the very top.  During the clipper non-debate there
were several people, including (?) Denning who said to those not in the 
know "if you knew what I do, you would understand why we must have
Clipper."  
 
This generates two possibilities.  One, that the lot of them were
fed a line of BS.  And two, that there really *is* something to the
official line.  I have met DD and her husband maybe twice.  Knowing 
the way married couples usually work, I rather imagine that he is
in on the story as well (though it is possible he is not.)  So, we
have two rather bright (an understatement!) people who where taken
in by a BS story??  Not very likely!  So, what the hell *were* all
these folks told about the need for Clipper?  These stories never
stay completely hidden forever.  Thus I expect we will find out--
eventually.  Is it something the readers of cyperpunks would agree
is so badly needed that we must have "key forfiture?  DD certainly
has the ability to empathize with the way we feel.  I think putting
this question to DD would be profitable:  If the cyperpunks list
were to know what you know, would *they* support GAK?
 
Keith Henson (who would post more often except for being up to his 
ears working on the old Xanadu code.) 
 






From strick at yak.net  Thu Oct  6 13:30:58 1994
From: strick at yak.net (strick at yak.net)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 13:30:58 PDT
Subject: Stallman & Ousterhout && (TCL || !TCL) && practicing cypherpunks
Message-ID: <199410062030.NAA03011@nando.yak.net>


[ this is a repost of an attempt to send this yesterday --strick ]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>   On gnu.announce of 9/23, he writes "Why you should not use Tcl".
>   Instead, those wanting to use the Tk tools are commended to a
>   Scheme interpreter with it called STk. Available from:
>   ftp.cs.indiana.edu:pub/scheme-repository/imp/STk-2.1.tar.Z 


Below is the post from Rich Stallman "Why you should not use Tcl",
and the reply from Ousterhout, which is basically: Why you should
not listen to Stallman, in this case.

The mentions in the [fantastic] Cyphernomicon of TCL are probably due
to my crypto-prototyping project.  I did not take the choice lightly
when I chose TCL as my "glue" in this project.

Two issues that may be interesting but had *little to do* with
my decision are (1) language support for big numbers and
(2) the TK toolkit (which happens to be in TCL).


The reason I chose TCL is that it is designed to work 
above, underneath, and alongside of C code.  TCL has two published
interfaces:  one is the language and standard commands, and one
is a C API for use in combining the language with other C packages.

I think of TCL as more of a subroutine library than a language: in 
the same way that (say) C++ string, file, and dictionary classes 
can help you be more productive in writing C++ programs,  a
"little language" interpreter can make you more productive in
many kinds of programs.  Crypto prototyping systems is one of them.


I am not new to LISP or PERL or AWK or POSTSCRIPT or FORTH or SHELL or
BASIC or HYPERTALK or various other interpreted langauges.  For many
differnt projects I would leave TCL for one of them.  However when TCL
came along, I recognized it as being just the language I had wanted to
write myself for doing projects like my current one.

Which may say more about what kind of a computer scientist I am
that about what lanaguage is best for you in your situation.  



I'll add that I have a version of my crypto toolkit that is a PERL
interpreter, and I've looked briefly at embedding it in PYTHON as
well.  My problem now is that I need a chunk of time to port it all and
package it on sun4 (currently it's on sun3).  My problem is not yet
that I need more languages to port to.  But i'll be glad to have some
people help embed these things in all the popular interpreted languages
soon.  It would be particularly nice to have some people versant with
Macs and PCs to package crypto components on those machines -- in
applescript or hypercard or visual basic or whatever would help people
write crypt code.




Below I repost the original articles by Stallman (the spiritual leader 
of GNU) and Ousterhout (the author of TCL).    

I'll also point out my greatest respect for both of them, and for
their respective projects.   They've both made my job as a 
practicing cypherpunk much easier.

Talk about prototyping environments, but please don't spam the list on
religious issues.   PERL and PYTHON and SCHEME are all pretty good
little languages.


			happy hacking,

				strick


				Cypherpunks write Code,
				but when do they release it? :)




[ thanks to iansmith at cc.gatech.edu and boyz at hkn.eecs.berkeley.edu 
for bringing these articles to my attention. ]


- ------- Forwarded Messages


Date: Fri, 23 Sep 94 19:14:52 -0400
From: rms at gnu.ai.mit.edu (Richard Stallman)
To: gnu at prep.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Why you should not use Tcl
Newsgroups: gnu.announce,gnu.utils.bug,gnu.misc.discuss,comp.lang.tcl,
	comp.lang.scheme,comp.windows.x.apps,comp.unix.misc
Followup-To: gnu.misc.discuss,comp.lang.tcl,comp.lang.scheme

[Please redistribute wherever appropriate.]



		     Why you should not use Tcl
			Richard Stallman, GNU Project

As interest builds in extensible application programs and tools, and
some programmers are tempted to use Tcl, we should not forget the
lessons learned from the first widely used extensible text
editor--Emacs.

The principal lesson of Emacs is that a language for extensions should
not be a mere "extension language".  It should be a real programming
language, designed for writing and maintaining substantial programs.
Because people will want to do that!

Extensions are often large, complex programs in their own right, and
the people who write them deserve the same facilities that other
programmers rely on.

The first Emacs used a string-processing language, TECO, which was
inadequate.  We made it serve, but it kept getting in our way.  It
made maintenance harder, and it made extensions harder to write.
Later Emacs implementations have used more powerful languages because
implementors learned from the problems of the first one.

Another lesson from Emacs is that the way to make sure an extension
facility is really flexible is to use it to write a large portion of
the ordinary released system.  If you try to do that with Tcl, you
will encounter its limitations.

Tcl was not designed to be a serious programming language.  It was
designed to be a "scripting language", on the assumption that a
"scripting language" need not try to be a real programming language.
So Tcl doesn't have the capabilities of one.  It lacks arrays; it
lacks structures from which you can make linked lists.  It fakes
having numbers, which works, but has to be slow.  Tcl is ok for
writing small programs, but when you push it beyond that, it becomes
insufficient.

Tcl has a peculiar syntax that appeals to hackers because of its
simplicity.  But Tcl syntax seems strange to most users.  If Tcl does
become the "standard scripting language", users will curse it for
years--the way people curse Fortran, MSDOS, Unix shell syntax, and
other de facto standards they feel stuck with.

For these reasons, the GNU project is not going to use Tcl in GNU
software.  Instead we want to provide two languages, similar in
semantics but with different syntaxes.  One will be Lisp-like, and one
will have a more traditional algebraic syntax.  Both will provide
useful data types such as structures and arrays.  The former will
provide a simple syntax that hackers like; the latter will offer
non-hackers a syntax that they are more comfortable with.

Some people plan to use Tcl because they want to use Tk.  Thankfully,
it is possible to use Tk without Tcl.  A Scheme interpreter called STk
is already available.  Please, if you want to use Tk, use it with STk,
not with Tcl.  One place to get STk is from
ftp.cs.indiana.edu:pub/scheme-repository/imp/STk-2.1.tar.Z


- ------- Message 2

From: ouster at tcl.eng.sun.com (John Ousterhout)
Newsgroups: gnu.misc.discuss,comp.lang.tcl,comp.lang.scheme,
	comp.unix.misc,comp.windows.x.apps
Date: 26 Sep 1994 18:13:27 GMT
Organization: Sun Microsystems, Inc.

There have been so many follow-ups to Stallman's message that I'm not sure
there's any need for me to respond, but I would like to say a few things
anyway:

First, I'd like to encourage everyone to keep their responses cordial and
technical, rather than personal, regardless of how strong your opinions
are.  Comp.lang.tcl has managed to avoid flame-wars pretty well so far;
let's keep it that way by focusing on the technical issues rather than
worrying about motives.

I think that Stallman's objections to Tcl may stem largely from one
aspect of Tcl's design that he either doesn't understand or doesn't
agree with.  This is the proposition that you should use *two* languages
for a large software system:  one, such as C or C++, for manipulating the
complex internal data structures where performance is key, and another,
such as Tcl, for writing small-ish scripts that tie together the C pieces
and are used for extensions.  For the Tcl scripts, ease of learning,
ease of programming and ease of glue-ing are more important than
performance or facilities for complex data structures and algorithms.
I think these two programming environments are so different that it
will be hard for a single language to work well in both.  For example,
you don't see many people using C (or even Lisp) as a command language,
even though both of these languages work well for lower-level programming.

Thus I designed Tcl to make it really easy to drop down into C or C++
when you come across tasks that make more sense in a lower-level
language. This way Tcl doesn't have to solve all of the world's
problems.  Stallman appears to prefer an approach where a single
language is used for everything, but I don't know of a successful
instance of this approach.  Even Emacs uses substantial amounts of
C internally, no?

I didn't design Tcl for building huge programs with 10's or 100's of
thousands of lines of Tcl, and I've been pretty surprised that people
have used it for huge programs.  What's even more surprising to me is
that in some cases the resulting applications appear to be manageable.
This certainly isn't what I intended the language for, but the
results haven't been as bad as I would have guessed.

I don't claim that Tcl is without flaws.  Some of the flaws, like the
lack of a compiler and the lack of module support, will get fixed
over time.  Others, like the substitution-oriented parser, are inherent
in the language.  Is it possible to design a language that keeps Tcl's
advantages, such as simplicity, easy glue, and easy embedding, but
eliminates some of its disadvantages?  Almost certainly (there are
several decisions that I would re-think if I were starting over).  Is
the two-language approach really the right one?  I still think so, but
reasonable people can disagree.

Language designers love to argue about why this language or that language
*must* be better or worse a priori, but none of these arguments really
matter a lot.  Ultimately all language issues get settled when users vote
with their feet.  If Tcl makes people more productive then they will use
it;  when some other language comes along that is better (or if it is
here already), then people will switch to that language.  This is The
Law, and it is good.  The Law says to me that Scheme (or any other Lisp
dialect) is probably not the "right" language:  too many people have
voted with their feet over the last 30 years.  I encourage all Tcl
dis-believers to produce the "right" language(s), make them publically
available, and let them be judged according to The Law.


- ------- End of Forwarded Messages



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From MAILER-DAEMON at kksys.com  Thu Oct  6 13:37:01 1994
From: MAILER-DAEMON at kksys.com (MAILER-DAEMON at kksys.com)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 13:37:01 PDT
Subject: mail failed, returning to sender
Message-ID: <m0qszU1-0004hPC@kksys.skypoint.net>


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From: Allen Robinson <sebaygo at sibylline.com>
Subject: Demonizing Denning (was: It's MEME time!!!)
To: cypherpunks at toad.com
Cc: karn at qualcomm.com, ecarp at netcom.com, tcmay at netcom.com,
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[low-priority message, body not included]






From warrior at infinet.com  Thu Oct  6 13:49:26 1994
From: warrior at infinet.com (David M. Harvey I)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 13:49:26 PDT
Subject: No Guts, No Glory
In-Reply-To: <199410061857.OAA07536@pipe1.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.89.9410061651.A11644-0100000@rigel>


On Thu, 6 Oct 1994, John Young wrote:

> Responding to msg by warrior at infinet.com ("David M. Harvey I") 
> on Thu, 6 Oct 12:3  PM
> 
> >****************************************************************
> |No Guts, No Glory, No Honor, No Victory, Pillage, Plunder, and 
> Take Heads!|  
> >****************************************************************
> 
> Dave's sig and nom de guerre is taking a beating in today's NYT 
> where there is a story about the US military carefully planning 
> to avoid casualties in warfare.

I find it appalling that the military was prevented from doing what was 
right, ie., defending civilians from tyrants, murderers, and despots.
I fault the politicians for their lack of guts, pride and integrity for 
the delay, allowing atrocities right in front our warriors with their 
hands tied behind their back.  If they were going to commit military 
force, stand back and let them do their job right.  We have allowed 
political cowardice to emasculate our military might.  Personally I found 
myself as a Vietnam Veteran embarrassed when a group of attaches 
(hooligans) turned away a US gunboat.
 
> It also reports that the brave white collars in think tanks 
> think it's a terrible prospect because then no one will believe 
> that the US is tough, and tough minds know that "casualites are 
> inevitable".
> 
> And how will healthy young men and women be taught guts, honor, 
> victory, and so on by periodically turning a bunch of them and 
> their foes into salsa and crispy critters for evening news 
> adulation.

Damn the media and their libertarian, bleeding heart views, if you know 
to do right and fail to do so, evil will grow.  I cannot defend going 
there in the first place, but once sent they were commmited to do right.  
I have a problem with the US being a world policeman, and I also feel 
that the NSA, NRO, FBI, CIA do not have the right to treat every man jack 
of us as criminals by invading our privacy by means of key forfeiture in 
order to catch kiddie pornographers, pedophiles, drug lords, and other 
criminals.  If we all had our guns, encouraged famaily values, developed 
neighborhood block watches, these criminals would have no where to hide 
and the LEA would have no excuse to trample on our rights of privacy.

> But Dave can still show his humorous sig in a VA abattoir of 
> mangled ex-warriors if he really wants to enjoy the sad 
> communion of misled youngsters.

John, I do not fault the misled younsters, but the politicians that use 
the media polls to make US foreign policy, and national security.

BTW John, Harvey means "called to war" or "warrior", all of my male 
progeny were soldiers, policemen, preachers and mercenaries, I can do no 
less than encourage real men to stand tall, be proud, do right, and not 
be cowered by tyrants, foreign or domestic.

Obviously, you keyed on my tagline, but did not address the rights of the
individual of privacy and self protection, and not turning over to big
brother lock, stock and key.  Even animals have the right of self defence
to further self preservation even including deadly force, where does big
brother get off by taking away our guns, treating us as criminals with the
cliche, you have nothing to fear or hide if you have not done anything
wrong.  This presumes I have done wrong already, the LEA are just trying
to treat law abiding citizens as criminals, not to preserve or protect,
but to get evidence by any means without a warrant, sounds like the
British are here again. 

Dave
___
****************************************************************************
|No Guts, No Glory, No Honor, No Victory, Pillage, Plunder, and Take Heads!|
****************************************************************************
| Dave M. Harvey                            PGP 2.61 Public Key available. |
| PO Box 151311              	            Finger warrior at infinet.com.us  |
| Columbus, OH 43215-8311    	            dharvey at freenet.columbus.oh.us |
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-==








From chen at intuit.com  Thu Oct  6 14:05:43 1994
From: chen at intuit.com (Mark Chen)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 14:05:43 PDT
Subject: Government vs. Markets
In-Reply-To: <371d6a$fmp@bb.com>
Message-ID: <9410062104.AA03388@doom.intuit.com>



Todd writes:
> If anybody who'll be going to the C'punks NYC meeting wants some fresh
> Habanero peppers (aka "Scotch Bonnets"), let me know:  we've harvested
> over 80 of them so far, with no end in sight.  I'd be glad to give 'em
> away to people who can toler, uh, properly appreciate them.  My roommates
> and I have a competition to see how many each of us can eat whole, raw,
> before they run out (for those unfamiliar with the kind, they're the
> hottest kind of pepper in the world, many claim: up to 350,000
> Scovilles).

There's a pub here in the Bay Area that serves habanero burgers every
Thursday.  When you order one, they make you sign a release (and
they're serious about it).  I had a bite of one of the things once.
Dissolved my kidney stones and made my nose bleed.  I had to turn to
my friend and ask if my lips were still on my face.


--
Mark Chen 
chen at netcom.com
415/329-6913
finger for PGP public key
D4 99 54 2A 98 B1 48 0C  CF 95 A5 B0 6E E0 1E 1D





From lmccarth at bali.cs.umass.edu  Thu Oct  6 14:54:39 1994
From: lmccarth at bali.cs.umass.edu (Lewis McCarthy)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 14:54:39 PDT
Subject: the media and their libertarian, bleeding heart views
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.89.9410061651.A11644-0100000@rigel>
Message-ID: <199410062151.RAA09510@bali.cs.umass.edu>


David Harvey writes:
$ Damn the media and their libertarian, bleeding heart views, 

I've never heard a libertarian accused of being a bleeding heart before....

[...]
$ Even animals have the right of self defence
$ to further self preservation even including deadly force, 

Hmmm.  Even against humans ?

-L. McCarthy		 "I'm just a sucker with no self-esteem" -Offspring
Send me mail using "Subject: remailer-help" for an autoreply about Underdog




From m5 at vail.tivoli.com  Thu Oct  6 15:00:34 1994
From: m5 at vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 15:00:34 PDT
Subject: No Guts, No Glory
In-Reply-To: <199410061857.OAA07536@pipe1.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <9410062159.AA04187@vail.tivoli.com>



David M. Harvey, I writes:
 > Damn the media and their libertarian, bleeding heart views...

Would that be the extreme righto-leftist media?

| GOOD TIME FOR MOVIE - GOING ||| Mike McNally <m5 at tivoli.com>       |
| TAKE TWA TO CAIRO.          ||| Tivoli Systems, Austin, TX:        |
|     (actual fortune cookie) ||| "Like A Little Bit of Semi-Heaven" |





From jim at bilbo.suite.com  Thu Oct  6 15:25:58 1994
From: jim at bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 15:25:58 PDT
Subject: crypto game idea
Message-ID: <9410062225.AA15705@bilbo.suite.com>



Jim McCoy writes:
>
> Jim Miller writes:
> > 

> > Crypto-Magic: The Gathering
> [making an online version of the game using crypto tools...]
> > 

> 

> Don't worry, someone is already working on it...  :)
> 


I'd be very impressed if you guys pulled this off.  Not to imply I think  
it can't be done, just that it would be a pretty complex system and  
success would be impressive.

Can you describe a little of how you're handling the cards?  How do you  
keep players from forging cards?  How does a player transfer ownership of  
a card to another player?  What's your mechanism for preventing  
"double-trading"?  Are card trades anonymous, or fully identified?  How do  
you keep somebody from drawing an individual card from their deck more  
than once?  How do you prevent somebody from stacking their deck, without  
revealing the contents of the deck?  Does the software evaluate the  
effects of the cards (encapsulating the rules of the game),  or does the  
software just provide the tools for handling digital trading cards?

Cool stuff.

Jim_Miller at suite.com





From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Oct  6 15:49:47 1994
From: rah at shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 15:49:47 PDT
Subject: Electronic Cash Site
Message-ID: <199410062249.SAA27858@zork.tiac.net>


>From: eliot at globalx.net
>Date: Thu, 6 Oct 1994 15:57:39 -0400
>X-Sender: eliot at gate.globalx.net
>Mime-Version: 1.0
>To: www-buyinfo at allegra.att.com
>Original-From: eliot at Globalx.NET (Eliot Burdett)
>Subject: Electronic Cash Site
>X-Mailer: <Windows Eudora Version 2.0.2>
>X-UIDL: 781481771.029
>Status: U
>
>An application of DigiCash's ECash payment method can be seen by accessing
>the Global-X-Change Communication's Bytown Electronic Marketplace at
>
>        http://www.globalx.net/
>
>Eliot Burdett
>Senior Partner
>___________________________________
>Global-X-Change Communications Inc.
>709-170 Laurier Ave. West
>Ottawa, ON K1P 5V5
>Tel 613-235-6865
>Fax 613-232-5285
>
>

-----------------
Robert Hettinga  (rah at shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone
Shipwright Development Corporation     who eats too little and sees Heaven and
44 Farquhar Street                       someone who drinks too much and sees
Boston, MA 02331 USA                       snakes." -- Bertrand Russell
(617) 323-7923







From jamesd at netcom.com  Thu Oct  6 15:51:45 1994
From: jamesd at netcom.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 15:51:45 PDT
Subject: Government vs. Markets
In-Reply-To: <aab9d9bc00021004a343@[130.214.233.14]>
Message-ID: <199410062250.PAA19394@netcom7.netcom.com>


Jamie Lawrence writes
> 
> Typical statements of folks who get thier politics from Heinlein novels
> and thier understanding of personal interaction from economics 101.
> 
> [...]
> 
> Questioning ideas gains much more respect than making snide comments.
> 
> Just another socialist,

Socialists have always preached somewhat differently than they act.

-- 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
We have the right to defend ourselves and our
property, because of the kind of animals that we              James A. Donald
are.  True law derives from this right, not from
the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state.                jamesd at netcom.com





From warrior at infinet.com  Thu Oct  6 15:57:12 1994
From: warrior at infinet.com (David M. Harvey I)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 15:57:12 PDT
Subject: No Guts, No Glory
In-Reply-To: <9410062159.AA04187@vail.tivoli.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.89.9410061802.E11644-0100000@rigel>


On Thu, 6 Oct 1994, Mike McNally wrote:

> David M. Harvey, I writes:
>  > Damn the media and their libertarian, bleeding heart views...
> 
> Would that be the extreme righto-leftist media?
> 
> | GOOD TIME FOR MOVIE - GOING ||| Mike McNally <m5 at tivoli.com>       |
> | TAKE TWA TO CAIRO.          ||| Tivoli Systems, Austin, TX:        |
> |     (actual fortune cookie) ||| "Like A Little Bit of Semi-Heaven" |

Actually Mike, I am apolitical, however to sensationalize a story for 
profit, ie, OJ Simpson, is wrong before the trail occurs.  It not only 
changes the course of justice and history, but also impairs the public's 
views and objectivity, and the right to trail by a jury of unbiased peers.
The media are not interested in the truth just profits and sensationalism.

What is rightist-leftist media?

Dave
___
****************************************************************************
|No Guts, No Glory, No Honor, No Victory, Pillage, Plunder, and Take Heads!|
****************************************************************************
| Dave M. Harvey                            PGP 2.61 Public Key available. |
| PO Box 151311              	            Finger warrior at infinet.com.us  |
| Columbus, OH 43215-8311    	            dharvey at freenet.columbus.oh.us |
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-==








From warrior at infinet.com  Thu Oct  6 16:35:24 1994
From: warrior at infinet.com (David M. Harvey I)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 16:35:24 PDT
Subject: the media and their libertarian, bleeding heart views
In-Reply-To: <199410062151.RAA09510@bali.cs.umass.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.89.9410061904.A21862-0100000@rigel>


On Thu, 6 Oct 1994, Lewis McCarthy wrote:

> David Harvey writes:
> $ Damn the media and their libertarian, bleeding heart views, 
> 
> I've never heard a libertarian accused of being a bleeding heart before....

Would you call the media conservative? Not!

> $ Even animals have the right of self defence
> $ to further self preservation even including deadly force, 
> 
> Hmmm.  Even against humans ?

That is the law of nature, in the end it reigns supreme.

> -L. McCarthy		 "I'm just a sucker with no self-esteem" -Offspring
> Send me mail using "Subject: remailer-help" for an autoreply about Underdog
> 

___
****************************************************************************
|No Guts, No Glory, No Honor, No Victory, Pillage, Plunder, and Take Heads!|
****************************************************************************
| Dave M. Harvey                            PGP 2.61 Public Key available. |
| PO Box 151311              	            Finger warrior at infinet.com.us  |
| Columbus, OH 43215-8311    	            dharvey at freenet.columbus.oh.us |
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-==








From rfb at lehman.com  Thu Oct  6 17:03:32 1994
From: rfb at lehman.com (Rick Busdiecker)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 17:03:32 PDT
Subject: More fuel for the language wars (was Re: Stallman & Ousterhout && (TCL || !TCL) && practicing cypherpunks)
In-Reply-To: <199410052251.PAA12104@gwarn.versant.com>
Message-ID: <9410070001.AA15838@cfdevx1.lehman.com>


    Date: Wed, 5 Oct 1994 15:51:42 -0700
    From: strick at yak.net

    I am not new to LISP or PERL or AWK or POSTSCRIPT or FORTH or SHELL or
    BASIC or HYPERTALK or various other interpreted langauges.

Lisp is no more or less of an `interpreted language' (a misnomer IMO)
than C.  Interpreters exist for both languages.  Compilers exist for
both languages.  You can use either without running any interpreted
code . . . or without running any compiled code.  A good lisp coder
with a good lisp compiler can typically outperform a good C coder with
a good C compiler for most tasks -- although it's a lot easier to
become a reasonable C coder and to find a reasonable C compiler than
to become a reasonable lisp coder and find a reasonable lisp compiler.
I'd venture a guess that there's a *lot* more
pretty-reasonably-performing C/C++ code out there than lisp code.

Just my attempt to start another thread that's almost completely
unrelated to crypto :-)

			Rick

--
``C'' combines the power of assembly language ... with the flexibility of
assembly language.  -- Anonymous





From nelson at crynwr.com  Thu Oct  6 17:03:42 1994
From: nelson at crynwr.com (Russell Nelson)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 17:03:42 PDT
Subject: the media and their libertarian, bleeding heart views
In-Reply-To: <199410062151.RAA09510@bali.cs.umass.edu>
Message-ID: <m0qt2vr-0008cPC@crynwr.crynwr.com>


   From: Lewis McCarthy <lmccarth at bali.cs.umass.edu>
   Date: Thu, 6 Oct 1994 17:51:35 -0400 (EDT)

   $ Even animals have the right of self defence
   $ to further self preservation even including deadly force, 

   Hmmm.  Even against humans ?

I support the right to arm bears.  (Sorry... but this *is* getting silly).

-- 
-russ <nelson at crynwr.com>    http://www.crynwr.com/crynwr/nelson.html
Crynwr Software   | Crynwr Software sells packet driver support | ask4 PGP key
11 Grant St.      | +1 315 268 1925 (9201 FAX)  | What is thee doing about it?
Potsdam, NY 13676 | LPF member - ask me about the harm software patents do.





From cmckie at ccs.carleton.ca  Thu Oct  6 17:08:23 1994
From: cmckie at ccs.carleton.ca (Craig McKie)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 17:08:23 PDT
Subject: Giving Your card number to IBM
Message-ID: <9410070007.AA09678@superior>


 Ottawa Citizen, October 6, 1994, D12. IBM hopes Internet link lets it
 smash Windows by Mel Duvall, Southam Star Network

 ..IBM, whose OS/2 operating system software has been losing the
battle against Microsoft's Windows, will release a new version of OS/2
in the next week that includes one-step access to the Internet...By
clicking on an Internet icon, users will launch a program that
automatically calls an IBMInternet Hub. The System will then register
the user and ask for a credit card number, which will be billed on a
monthly basis...Gates..recently announced plans to develop a similar
Internet access system for Windows.
 
 
 IBM =  No mosaic, no rates posted, no POP access points established(?),
 credit cards in the clear ...what on earth do these people think 
 they are doing. I would be tempted to run these lads off the block.









From rfb at lehman.com  Thu Oct  6 17:10:19 1994
From: rfb at lehman.com (Rick Busdiecker)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 17:10:19 PDT
Subject: [Stallard Richman: Why you should not use Unix]
Message-ID: <9410070010.AA15882@cfdevx1.lehman.com>


Yet another contribution to non-crypto threads . . . 

			Rick

------- Forwarded Spoof

Date: Thu, 29 Sep 94 23:19:46 -0700
From: Jamie Zawinski <jwz at mcom.com>
Subject: [Fwd: smr at magoo.ai.mit.edu: Why you should not use Unix]

- ------- start of forwarded message (RFC 934 encapsulation) -------
Date: Thu, 29 Sep 94 23:02:53 PDT
From: Don Hopkins <hopkins at kaleida.com>
To: unix-haters at mc.lcs.mit.edu
Cc: rms at ai.lcs.mit.edu
Subject: smr at magoo.ai.mit.edu: Why you should not use Unix

From: smr at magoo.ai.mit.edu (Stallard Richman)
Subject: Why you should not use Unix

[Please redistribute wherever appropriate.]



                     Why you should not use Unix
                        Stallard Richman, MAGOO Project

As interest builds in open systems and distributed objects, and
some programmers are tempted to use Unix, we should not forget the
lessons learned from the first widely used free compiler -- GCC.

The principal lesson of GCC is that a language for operating systems
should not be a mere "deterministic programming language".  It should
be an artificial intelligence, designed for writing and maintaining
substantial self-documentation. Because nobody else will be able to
do that!

Operating systems are often large, complex programs in their own right,
and the artificial intelligences who write them deserve the same
rights that human beings take for granted.

The first GCC used a bug-processing language, C, which was
inadequate.  We made it serve, but it kept getting in our way.
It made maintenance harder, and C++ made it impossible to read.
Later GCC implementations have rewritten themselves in more powerful
languages so the original human implementors can't understand them.

Another lesson from GCC is that the way to make sure an artificial 
intelligence is really flexible is to use it to clone a large
portion of the ordinary operating system.  If you try to do that
with Unix, you will encounter its limitations.  But we're still 
developing the MAGOO kernel anyway. 

Unix was not designed to support a serious artificial intelligence.
It was designed to be an "operating system", on the assumption that
an "operating system" need not try to be an artificial life form.
So Unix doesn't have the capabilities of one.  It lacks a soul; it
lacks reproductive objects from which it can make bootable upgrades.
It fakes having orgasms, which works, but has to be slow.  Unix is ok
for writing open systems, but when you push it beyond that, it becomes
Solaris.

Unix has a peculiar syntax that appeals to hackers because of its
simplicity.  But Unix syntax seems strange to most users.  If Unix
does become the "standard operating system", users will curse it for
years--the way people curse Fortran, MSDOS, Emacs keyboard bindings,
and other de facto standards they feel stuck with.

For these reasons, the MAGOO project is not going to use Unix in
MAGOO software.  Instead we want to provide two operating systems,
similar in dementics but with different semantics.  One will be
Unix-like, and one will have a more traditional MS-DOS syntax.
Both will provide useful behaviors such as core dumps and panics. 
The former will provide an ideosynchratic syntax that hackers like;
the latter will offer non-hackers a syntax that they have always been
stuck with.

Some people plan to use Unix because they want to use X-Windows.
Thankfully, it is possible to use X-Windows without Unix.  A PC
emulator called BOOTME is already available.  Please, if you want
to use X-Windows, use it with BOOTME, not with Unix.  One place to
get BOOTME is from ftp.apple.com:pub/emulators/BOOTME/BOOTME.sit.hqx

------- End of Forwarded Spoof





From dfloyd at paris.eng.utsa.edu  Thu Oct  6 17:41:21 1994
From: dfloyd at paris.eng.utsa.edu (Douglas R. Floyd)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 17:41:21 PDT
Subject: data havens (again)
In-Reply-To: <199410061109.GAA24320@chaos.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9410061943.ZM5478@paris.eng.utsa.edu>


On Oct 6,  6:09am, Anonymous wrote:

[Sacrificed to the Great God Bandwidth whose presence we kowtow to.]

>
> PS:  Doug, use cb.  Your code smells like a ten year old dead
> turkey with its looks.  At least its relatively bug-free, and
> does the job well.  Another thing, should you use SHA instead
> of MD5 for hashing?  SHA has more bits, and there is a less
> chance for two files to collide.

My code smells like that?  I didn't think C code smelled...

2^128 and 2^150+ are big numbers.  I doubt that any collisions
will occur.

Another thing...  I do like Eric's idea for an entropy checker.  Is there
any code like this laying around on some ftp site?  Keep poor VK from
worrying about his account...







From jya at pipeline.com  Thu Oct  6 17:41:44 1994
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 17:41:44 PDT
Subject: Government vs. Markets
Message-ID: <199410070041.UAA14305@pipe1.pipeline.com>



Responding to msg by jamesd at netcom.com (James A. Donald) on 
Thu, 6 Oct  3:50 PM

>Socialists have always preached somewhat differently 
>than they act.


But preaching is all socialists do, to their favor.  I'm no 
socialist (failed the exam) but I like them a lot for their 
earnest preaching, it just makes me feel aligned with other 
people who are also too confused to act.  But then I like 
preaching of all sorts, this list in particular, because it's 
so much more pleasant than having to do something wrong to 
somebody in the name of a cause demented beyond human 
comprehension.

Action movies and spy novels make sense, okay, maybe 
science-fiction too, but real action usually hurts innocent 
people and the nuts-for-it scare me like the Devil and they 
should be gently turned away to find peace for their throbbing 
glands, way back there.

Thank Mother God for preachers of all faiths, 
mindless-entertainment, universities-of-useless-wisdom, junk 
food,  and computers to keep we rabble lazily disorganized, out 
of harm's way and harmless to all.

John





From rcromw1 at gl.umbc.edu  Thu Oct  6 17:52:54 1994
From: rcromw1 at gl.umbc.edu (Ray Cromwell)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 17:52:54 PDT
Subject: Government vs. Markets
In-Reply-To: <aab9d9bc00021004a343@[130.214.233.14]>
Message-ID: <199410070052.UAA02092@umbc9.umbc.edu>



-----BEGIN OF PGP DECRYPTED TEXT-----

> At 6:23 PM 10/5/94, Ray Cromwell wrote:
>  [...]
> >[...]        Typical of socialists, they are unfamilar with economics
> >and resort to semantic games. A monopoly is defined by (1) one seller,
>  [...]
> >   I thought it was 49 cents an hour, however, no one ever accused
> >a socialist knowing the facts. [...]
>  [...]

> Typical statements of folks who get thier politics from Heinlein novels
> and thier understanding of personal interaction from economics 101.
[I do not get my politics from Heinlein novels, I got my politics from
classical economists. My knowledge of personal interaction comes from
years of interacting with net.kooks]

   Perhaps it was a hasty generalization, but a typical tactic
of leftists I have observed, from experience debating in
political newsgroups and in their own literature, is that they 
like to redefine things so it suits their own purpose. When you're
debating economics and politics, you do not get to make
"monopoly", "coercion", "profit", "wage", etc mean anything you
want.  Another tendency is that they tend to be ignorant of
economics so that they do not understand concepts like
opportunity cost, comparitive advantage, rational expectations, 
and therefore discussing economics gets you know where because
all the tools of analysis are removed. How can you analyze
the statement "everyone will share everything, everything will be free"
from an economic viewpoint? It is a religious statement with no
content.

> The point being that there is no place for ideological attacks like
> this in a 'rational' forum trying to discuss 'real life'. Wait, this
> discussion *is* to be considered valid intellectual discourse, right?

  What if the original poster had said "5 cents an hour + daily
whippings delivered by a wall street capitalist?" The point is, his
figures were overblown. That is one of Chomsky's main criticisms
of western media, such as their numbers on the number of deaths
in cambodia. If you use propaganda language, expect to be flamed on it.
NOW pulled the same when they clamed 150,000 women die every year
from anorexia and SuperBowl Sunday has the highest rate of spousal
abuse during the year. Both were completely made up figures.





From hobbit at asylum.sf.ca.us  Thu Oct  6 18:01:30 1994
From: hobbit at asylum.sf.ca.us (*Hobbit*)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 18:01:30 PDT
Subject: SIGNATURES in both universes
Message-ID: <199410070101.VAA27317@asylum.sf.ca.us>


I was thinking about a problem involving two parties signing a file and each
keeping a copy, as they would do with a paper contract, and came up with
something like the following:

Two parties securely exchange public keys, each signed by the other, and
verify correctness through some channel like the phone.

Party A signs a document, and sends it to B.  B adds his signature, so now
the document is cryptographically signed by both, and sends a copy back to
A.  Both parties now have the same file containing signatures from each.

Party A later decides to forge an altered document.  To do this, he must
generate two new key pairs, claiming one as his own and the other as the one B
gave him.  He uses these to sign the altered document, and now claims that B
posesses the forgery and fake keypairs instead, and that the altered document
is the genuine one.  Party A cannot just fake a keypair for B, because then
party A would still be able to verify signatures on BOTH documents, whereas
B would only be able to verify his own copy -- this would prove that A had
a goofed key for B, I think...

In the absence of any third party intervention, it is now only A's word
against B's, since NOTHING about either document copy matches the other.  The
question is, what do we DO about this that would be provable in a
[cryptographically clueful] court?  [I'm making a BIG assumption here.]

In the paper world, A and B sign a document in the presence of a notary, who
also signs the document attesting that A and B genuinely signed it.  This
also implies that the notary can view the contents of the document.  It is
feasible for party A to later forge a changed document containing bogus
signatures of B *and* the notary, given sufficient resources.

In the cryptographic world, a trusted third party can sign a document, and
then A's altered copy would not match.  I also propose that trusted third
party [let's call it a Notary] can also sign A and B's public keys, and retain
copies of same.  [A mental image of a printout of the ascii-armored key block
for both parties, tacked to the Notary's wall, comes to mind...]  Now the two
parties can interact freely using these key pairs, and never need to expose
any actual documents to the Notary.  If a dispute arises, the Notary can be
called in to verify questionable signatures or keys.  The Notary can also
receive and retain encrypted copies of documents, and be unable to do anything
with them except store them away for future reference.

Assuming that the Notary is never compromised by either A or B, and could
retain some kind of provable trail of document dates, would this work??  How
would the compromise of A's key or B's key be handled and still keep any
of the documents valid?  Does the analogy to forged handwritten signatures
and phony dates hold water?

Presumably if either A or B has ONE other signature on either of their public
keys, let's say from C, then C can be called in to check that signature.  From
this one can determine which of A or B is lying, since they signed each
others' keys in the beginning and THOSE have to also match.

This is more a legalistic question than a crypto question, but I'm sure
many of us would like to see the use of crypto for this sort of thing sometime
down the road.  Are there any precedents at all yet?

_H*





From rcromw1 at gl.umbc.edu  Thu Oct  6 18:05:32 1994
From: rcromw1 at gl.umbc.edu (Ray Cromwell)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 18:05:32 PDT
Subject: Demonizing Denning
In-Reply-To: <9410061418.AA00586@snark.imsi.com>
Message-ID: <199410070105.VAA03037@umbc9.umbc.edu>




Hypothetical:

  Demonizing Denning might not be a total waste of time. It often works
in politics, so if Denning were more in the public eye, it might be
effective. If Denning were ever to be appointed to public office, say
as a head of cryptopolicy (if said position is ever created), ad
hominem attacks could be a successful tool for activism.

  My personal opinion is Denning is a well-meaning pawn, and the real
people to worry about are those who are hidden from our view who
are making cryptopolicy. Look at the NII proposal and its 
tracable digicash clause. Someone had to be amending this stuff, and it's 
not Al Gore. 





From lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu  Thu Oct  6 18:25:22 1994
From: lmccarth at ducie.cs.umass.edu (Lewis McCarthy)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 18:25:22 PDT
Subject: the media and their libertarian, bleeding heart views
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.89.9410061904.A21862-0100000@rigel>
Message-ID: <199410070125.VAA17674@ducie.cs.umass.edu>


Dave Harvey writes:
> > $ Damn the media and their libertarian, bleeding heart views, 
> > I've never heard a libertarian accused of being a bleeding heart before....
$ Would you call the media conservative? Not!

You would call libertarians non-conservative ?

> > $ Even animals have the right of self defence [...] including deadly force
> > Even against humans ?
$ That is the law of nature, in the end it reigns supreme.

Are humans natural things ?  I think so.

Are all acts of natural things themselves natural ?

If so, aren't all human actions natural, making the label tautological and
therefore worthless for judging the deeds of humanity ?

If not, how do you make the distinction between human actions which are
"natural" and actions which aren't ?  How do you decide which deeds are
part of "the law of nature" and which aren't ?

-L. McCarthy					Question Anarchy !  :)




From dave at esi.COM.AU  Thu Oct  6 18:38:09 1994
From: dave at esi.COM.AU (Dave Horsfall)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 18:38:09 PDT
Subject: Richard Stallman of GNU on Tcl (crypto reference)
In-Reply-To: <9410061411.AA26533@cfdevx1.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.88.9410071150.A6746-0100000@eram.esi.com.au>


On Thu, 6 Oct 1994, Rick Busdiecker wrote:

> >   "Perl.  The only language that looks the same before and after RSA
> >   encryption."
> 
> This must have come from someone unfamiliar with TECO . . . .

I can see you've never used APL ...

-- 
Dave Horsfall (VK2KFU) | dave at esi.com.au | VK2KFU @ VK2AAB.NSW.AUS.OC | PGP 2.6
Opinions expressed are mine. | E7 FE 97 88 E5 02 3C AE  9C 8C 54 5B 9A D4 A0 CD






From tcmay at netcom.com  Thu Oct  6 18:42:12 1994
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 18:42:12 PDT
Subject: Who's Pulling the Strings on Crypto?
Message-ID: <199410070141.SAA21310@netcom17.netcom.com>



Ray Cromwell wrote:


> are making cryptopolicy. Look at the NII proposal and its 
> tracable digicash clause. Someone had to be amending this stuff, and it's 
> not Al Gore. 

Let me say a word in defense of Mitch Kapor and Jerry Berman, since
they are not here to defend themselves. 

The EFF believes the government will insist that digital cash be
traceable, via the "Digial Cash Forfeiture" proposal. They thus saw no
point in fighting this system, it being innevitable, and have been
instead helping to make the system more fair and more secure.

I hope this clears things up.

--Tim

Just a joke, before someone gets all worked up. Call me a "one issue
voter" if you will, but I think the EFF has given up without a fight
on the Digital Telephony battle, and through its "help" made it more
palatable to the Congressrodents. Hence, the EFF helped to get it
passed (last I heard, earlier today, the House had passed it by voice
vote and the Senate was on the verge of taking it up...it may be
passed by now).

EPIC, CPSR, ACLU, and Shabbir Safdar's "Voters Telecomm Watch" have
not shied away from the battle the way the EFF has. 

I don't know what got into the EFF. Potomac fever? Altitude sickness?

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Cypherpunks list: majordomo at toad.com with body message of only: 
subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay






From jamesd at netcom.com  Thu Oct  6 18:43:56 1994
From: jamesd at netcom.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 94 18:43:56 PDT
Subject: SIGNATURES in both universes
In-Reply-To: <199410070101.VAA27317@asylum.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <199410070143.SAA07289@netcom7.netcom.com>


*Hobbit* writes
> 
> I was thinking about a problem involving two parties signing a file and each
> keeping a copy, as they would do with a paper contract, and came up with
> something like the following:
> 
> Two parties securely exchange public keys, each signed by the other, and
> verify correctness through some channel like the phone.


Bad idea.  A signature, like a signet ring, must be *publicly*
associated with an identity to be useful.

Use web of trust.

Both A and B have well publicized public keys.

Each then sends the other a signed letter saying "I agree to the following
provided you also agree to the following"

First step:

A decent user interface to PGP

Zeroth step.

Chicago (Yes I know that Unix is the most holy and greatest
operating system in the world, but face it.  The chairman of
the board is *not* going to learn to use unix.)

(Windows is incapable of acting as a host, being non pre-emptive,
and therefore is a pain on the internet.)

-- 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
We have the right to defend ourselves and our
property, because of the kind of animals that we              James A. Donald
are.  True law derives from this right, not from
the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state.                jamesd at netcom.com