more steganography talk
Jim Miller
jim at bilbo.suite.com
Fri Mar 4 15:18:38 PST 1994
Eric Hughes writes:
> Assume one hundred each for 10 billion persons. That's
> 2^40 keys, or an effective key length of 40 bits. Since
> there are not more than 2^16 public keys right now (a
> generous estimate) we can assume that this technique is
> insecure for public keys.
>
I'm not really sure what you mean by "insecure for public keys". I'm
not trying to achieve "security through obscurity". I'm trying to
achieve "deniability through obscurity".
If the reverse steg process makes it look like all, or even many,
files contain hidden messages, even when they don't, then you can
plausible deny knowledge of a suspicious bit pattern in any specific
file.
Jim_Miller at suite.com
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