SASE Suggestion

[Lance Cottrell]

:Lance Cottrell writes:
:
:> I have been meditating on this problem of return
:> addresses, and have a proposal. The remailers
:> can not be allowed to choose the return path,
:> as any corrupted remailer will corrupt the rest
:> of the path.
:
Jim Miller writes:
:As I understand it, the remailers don't "chose" the return path, Bob (the  
:sender of the original message) choses the return path when he creates the  
:SASE.  All the remailers do is interpret the part of the SASE that becomes  
:readable to them after decrypting the SASE portion sent to them from the  
:previous hop.  If all is working, what becomes readable is the address of  
:the next hop (closer to Bob) and some misc other stuff (postage, maybe,  
:and perhaps another encryption key).
:
:Am I not understanding something correctly?
:
:Jim_Miller at suite.com
:

One SASE scheme recently suggested involved sending a request for
a SASE to a ramailer, stating the number of jumps required. It then
sent it to another remailer, and so on. Each adding a layer, and eventually
sending the results to the desired correspondent. I mentioned that if the
first remailer was corrupted, that the whole chain was (it would only send
to other corrupt remailers).
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Lance Cottrell	who does not speak for CASS/UCSD
loki at nately.ucsd.edu
PGP 2.3 key available by finger or server.

"Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra.  Suddenly
it flips over, pinning you underneath.  At night the ice
weasels come."
			--Nietzsche
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