BofA+Netscape

[Kipp E.B. Hickman]

In article <199412132218.QAA06065 at pentagon.io.com>, you write:
> jamesd at netcom.com (James A. Donald) writes:
> [regarding Netscape and IETF work...]
> > 
> > Perry, they are not in trouble.  They are the number one supplier
> > of the internet killer app.
> 
> They are the supplier of the current app-du-jour.  What things look lie in
> five months is another issue completely.
> 
> > The plug for crypto that they have placed in Netscape 0.96 is
> > the number one force bringing crypto awareness to the masses.
> 
> Increasing use of PGP is the number one force bringing crypto awareness to
> the masses, Netscape is just bringing bad crypto to the masses.
> 
> > He said that Netscape would look at IPSP when it was beyond
> > the "near" phase. [...]  The correct response is "Gee that is great.
> > Here are some working demo systems, and some slabs of documentation."
> 
> No, the correct response is to stop idotic measures before the build up
> enough inertia behind them to make it difficult to prevent mistakes from
> being made.  It is interesting that the creators of Netscape quite
> frequently harp on "it is us against the goliath of Microsoft, so we
> deserve the support of the net" and then they go out and do exactly the
> sort of thing that makes Microsoft so unpopular; they take advantage of
> thier market position to force bad technology on others.

If the technology is so "bad", would someone please be so kind as to
inform us what is so "bad" about it? We have a solution for a piece of
the security puzzle: transport security. We admit its
limitations. People keep saying its "bad".

Please put some meat behind the commentary:

Is it insecure? If so, how?

Is there some cipher techonology that it absolutely must support? If
so, which one? why?

etc.

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Kipp E.B. Hickman          Netscape Communications Corp.
kipp at mcom.com              http://www.mcom.com/people/kipp/index.html