cfs & remailers

[Jim Hart]

Bill O Hanlon:
> In that case, even if I were to keep logs, all that anyone would know from
> a message is that a particular user used a remailer, or that a particular
> cleartext message had a certain remailer as its jumpoff point.  Not both.

They'd learn both if they had snooped the entire remail chain (which
is the equivalent of collusion).   Going back and retrieving logs
for all the the links, after the snoopers have discovered an
important message they want to trace, is both an easier and a more 
likely attack than wiretapping all the links in real time in 
anticipation of an important message -- unless the remailer 
operators snoop-proof their logs.

Also keep in mind that, given the lack of a good user interface,
there is currently too little properly encrypted and nested remailer
traffic to create anything approaching a true digital mix.

Jim Hart				
hart at chaos.bsu.edu