Clipper specifics

[Eli Brandt]

> From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu>
> *create* the field), and it is handled outside the chip, there is no
> guarantee that the system designer does not, for example, encrypt the
> LEEF in the communications transit, thereby completely sabotaging the
> `exploitative' tappability of the chip.
> 
> Hence there is a *very* real possibility that this scheme, or something
> similar, could be used to gain Skipjack-level encryption without any
> key escrow complications. I suspect the NSA is *extremely* worried
> about this.

Their spokesagency, NIST, has said that it will be illegal to encrypt
on top of Skipjack or to mung the LEEF.  Pre-encryption is not
mentioned, AFAIK, and would be borderline impossible to detect anyway.  

As I see it, this is already a restriction on non-Skipjack encryption,
issued in the same document that assured us that no such thing is being
considered.  It's a special case, to be sure, but it clearly asserts a
government power to restrict the means and manner of private
encryption performed entirely within the United States.  This is a key
issue, IMO.

   Eli   ebrandt at jarthur.claremont.edu