REMAIL: problems

[Sameer]

In message <9306291227.AA00990 at kolanut>, Joe Thomas writes:
> 
> Consider cryptographic secret-sharing protocols.  If we have 20 remailers,  
> each remailer could split his key into 20 pieces, 15 of which would be  
> necessary to reconstruct the key.  When a remailer goes down, the key could  
> be reconstructed and given to a substitute remailer.  The system can survive  
> the loss of 5 remailers, and would require a collaboration of 15, or 3/4 of  
> the remailer operators to intentionally break the security.
> 
> Joe
	This secret sharing *does* look very appealling.
	How would the substitute remailer be chosen? Very difficult to
build, however, as it would require a great deal of similarity between
remailer software.
	How can a key be split into 20 pieces while only requiring [any?] 15
to work? Redundancy?

	It would be a good idea to have two sorts of keys for each
remailer, maybe. One key for normal usage and another key for
communication between remailers, key-part distribution, etc.

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