From shipley at dis.org  Mon Feb  1 04:30:16 1993
From: shipley at dis.org (shipley at dis.org)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 04:30:16 PST
Subject: mh wrappers for pgp.
Message-ID: <9302011223.AA06080@merde.dis.org>




-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----




#!/usr/local/bin/tperl4.010
#!/usr/local/bin/perl

# pgpedit V1.0
# Mon Feb  1 04:10:42 PST 1993
# Peter Shipley (shipley at utter.dis.org -or- shipley at berkeley.edu)

# to install (mh instructions)
# place this script in your path (eg ~/bin)
# create few links:
#
#       ln -s /usr/local/mh/bin/repl ~/bin/pgprepl
#       ln -s /usr/local/mh/bin/comp ~/bin/pgpcomp
#
# Add the following to your .mh_profile:
#
#       pgprepl: -editor pgpedit
#       pgpcomp: -editor pgpedit
#
# To use just use the commands pgprepl or pgpcomp instead of repl or comp
#



require "sys/wait.ph";

#custom stuff here

#default editor
$defaulteditor="/usr/ucb/vi";


$pgpcommand="/usr/local/bin/pgp -sta +clearsig=on";

$debug=0;

#test the arg count
    die "bad argument count" if ($#ARGV > 0);

#set the umask to something really paranoid
    umask(07177);

#set the path if there is not one
    $ENV{'PATH'} = '/bin:/usr/ucp:/usr/bin' unless $ENV{'PATH'};

# get the editor
    if ($ENV{'VISUAL'}) {
	$editor=$ENV{'VISUAL'} ;
    } elsif ($ENV{'EDITOR'}) {
	$editor=$ENV{'EDITOR'} ;
    } else {
	$editor = $defaulteditor;
    }

    $editor = $defaulteditor if $editor =~ /pgpedit/ ;

# prepare the file.
    &prepfile($ARGV[0]);

# run the editor
    &runeditor($ARGV[0]);

# have pgp sign the file
    &SignMailFile($ARGV[0]);

# the end
    exit 0;



sub SignMailFile {

    local($INPUT) = @_;

    local($BODY) = "/tmp/pgp$$.body";
    local($PGPBODY) = "$BODY".".asc";


    print "$INPUT \n" if ($debug);

    open(INPUT, "+>>$INPUT" ) || die "failed to open $INPUT: $!\n";
    seek(INPUT,0, 0);

    open(BODY, "+>$BODY") || die "failed to open $BODY: $!\n";
    select(BODY); $| = 1; select(STDOUT);

line:
    while (<INPUT>) {
	if (/^--------/) {
	    $where = tell;
	    last;
	}
    }


    print STDERR "$BODY \n" if ($debug);

    while (<INPUT>) {
	print BODY $_;
    }

    print STDERR  "$pgpcommand $BODY\n" if ($debug);

    `$pgpcommand $BODY`;

    truncate(BODY, 0); unlink($BODY); close(BODY);


    open(PGPBODY) || die "failed to open $PGPBODY: $!\n";

    truncate(INPUT,$where) || warn "failed to truncate file $FILE: $!\n";
    seek(INPUT,$where,0);

    print INPUT "\n\n";

    print INPUT <PGPBODY>;

    truncate(PGPBODY, 0); unlink($PGPBODY); close(PGPBODY);

    return;
}



sub prepfile {

    local($FILE) = @_;
    local(@data);


    open(FILE, "+>>$FILE" ) || die "failed to open $FILE: $!\n";
    seek(FILE, 0, 0);

    while(<FILE>) { push (@data, $_); last if ( /^--------/ ); }

#	push (@data, "\n\n\n");

    while(<FILE>) { last if (/^-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----/); }

    if( !eof(FILE) ) {

	while(<FILE>) { 
	    last if (/^-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----/);
	    push (@data , $_); 
	}

	seek(FILE, 0, 0);
	truncate(FILE, 0);

	print FILE @data;

    }
    close(FILE);
	
    return;
}


sub runeditor {
    local($file) = @_;
    local($pid);

FORK: {
	if ($pid = fork) {
		wait;
	} elsif (defined $pid) { # $pid is zero here if defined
		exec "$editor $file";
	} elsif ($! =~ /No more process/) {     
		# EAGAIN, supposedly recoverable fork error
		sleep 5;
		redo FORK;
	} else {
		# weird fork error
		die "Can't fork: $!\n";
	}
}
    return;
}

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK20WHMhmn7GUWLLFAQFBawF6AuCjRKbZQcAM1NFXwrYO1MLmTvPcV7FC
loRe/LqIoNwMST9sKfDFNSBoKmvCEaaB
=Cjuz
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From tcmay at netcom.com  Mon Feb  1 10:53:30 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 10:53:30 PST
Subject: Eudora mail reader for the Macintosh
Message-ID: <9302011849.AA21976@netcom.netcom.com>



(I wrote this as a reply to Dave Deltorto, then realized there may be other
Mac-using cypherpunks for whom this might be useful.)

Meta-message to list: I propose a brief AGENDA ITEM on mail readers like
Eudora and the DOS versions, as part of our understanding of what mail
readers are out there and what may need to be hacked to incorporate PGP.
RIPEM, etc. I'll speak very briefly on Eudora, and others can speak on
others readers. How's this sound?

Dave Deltorto writes: (part of some e-mail we exchanged....nothing
sensitive, so I hope Dave doesn't mind me quoting it and distributing it to
the List.) BTW, Dave is referring to my "Top Ten Reasons I Don't Use PGP"
article I sent out to this list a few months back and which I forwarded to
him recently.

>Listen, in case I didn't mention this, I DID enjoy your Top Ten spoof, and I
>sort of figured that by now you had the MacPGP (do you have the .73 beta?).

I have the 0.5.3 version, which seems to work OK. Eudora (the mail reader
program) has made reading PGP messages much easier--I automatically get all
my mail, cut the PGP messages into the clipboard, insert them into Vantage
(a text editor), rename them "message.asc", close the file, then tell
MacPGP to decrypt them. Seems to work, and is a whole lot better than
having to zmodem each file individually! (In case you're wondering, the
combination of NETCOM, Emacs, etc. would not allow me to cut-and-paste into
or out of the editor, hence the need to zmodem the files back to my home
machine. Eudora takes care of all of this!

I wrote, and then Dave replied:

>>>By the way, I've been using "Eudora," an automated mail delivery and
>>>retrieval system for the Mac. If you're interested, I can show it to you at
>>>the next Cypherpunks meeting.
>
>Yes, I am very interested in Eudora. Could I use it to automatically gather
>my Internet mail off the Well? I don't know anything about it, so that may be
>a dumb question, but I look forward to meeting you at the next meeting where
>you can clue me in and show it to me.

I'll bring a copy of Eudora 1.3b119 to the next meeting (Feb. 13th). I had
to ResEdit some stuff to make it work with NETCOM, with the help of a
friend. Stuff like login name, location of the POP server, and expected
responses. Getting it to work on the W.E.L.L. may take some hacking, but
I'm sure it'll work.

(NETCOM is a wonderful service, though, and you should seriously consider
using it instead of the W.E.L.L....fixed monthly fee for unlimited use. If
you're within one of the many POPs (points of presence, not to be confused
with the "Post Office Protocol" cited above!) in the Bay Area (or L.A.,
Seattle, Portland, Sacramento, etc.), the connections are free. Also, you
get 5 MB of storage for files, buffer space, etc., instead of the measly
W.E.L.L. allotment.)

-Tim
 


--

Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: waiting for the dust to settle.








From jwn2 at qualcomm.com  Mon Feb  1 11:23:40 1993
From: jwn2 at qualcomm.com (John W Noerenberg)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 11:23:40 PST
Subject: Eudora mail reader for the Macintosh
Message-ID: <9302011922.AA19052@harvey>


At 10:49 AM 2/1/93 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote:
>
>I'll bring a copy of Eudora 1.3b119 to the next meeting (Feb. 13th). I had
>to ResEdit some stuff to make it work with NETCOM, with the help of a
>friend. Stuff like login name, location of the POP server, and expected
>responses. Getting it to work on the W.E.L.L. may take some hacking, but
>I'm sure it'll work.

The official release of 1.3 should be available  from our ftp site on the
3rd.  That's the day we are scheduled to go golden with the PC and Mac
verisons.

There will be other ftp sites as well.  Send a note to
eudora-info at qualcomm.com for our canned reply.

john noerenberg
jwn2 at qualcomm.com
noerenberg.j (Applelink)
===========================================================
That which has always been accepted by everyone, everwhere,
is almost certain to be false.
-- John Millington Synge "Tel Quel" [1943]
===========================================================






From pfarrell at cs.gmu.edu  Mon Feb  1 12:05:13 1993
From: pfarrell at cs.gmu.edu (Pat Farrell)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 12:05:13 PST
Subject: MAILreaders: NUpop
Message-ID: <9302012000.AA19337@cs.gmu.edu>


I've been playing with NUpop, (a PC program) and am impressed with it.
It would help bring PGP to the masses, except that currently the source
is not available. The author says that supporting external filter programs
is on his list, but it is a long list.

The home FTP site for nupop is casbah.acns.nwu.edu in the /pub/nupop
directory. Current field release is nupop103.zip, with nupop110.zip
in 'beta' stages. It is widely available - ask archie.

While I really like NUpop, unless the sources become available, or
the priority of external filters gets higher on the list, we need
to look elseware. 

Can someone with experience with Eudora for the PC give a short review?

Thanks
Pat

Pat Farrell,      Grad Student                       pfarrell at cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
PGP key available via finger or request           #include standard.disclaimer





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Mon Feb  1 16:04:42 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 16:04:42 PST
Subject: Remailer abuse?
In-Reply-To: <9301302324.AA01308@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9302020002.AA18305@soda.berkeley.edu>


Re: adding notes indicating remailing.

There is a standard RFC-822 field, Comment, which would be perfect for
just such an application.  The original remailer I wrote added the
header field Remailed-By to indicate this.

You could also use another standard 822 field, Sender, as follows:

	Sender: anonymous remailing service <remailer at host>

Either way, the note goes in the header, where it can be seen or
stripped, but in any case handled without munging the message body.

Eric





From huntting at glarp.com  Mon Feb  1 16:41:08 1993
From: huntting at glarp.com (Brad Huntting)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 16:41:08 PST
Subject: Remailer abuse?
In-Reply-To: <9302020002.AA18305@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <199302020039.AA00440@misc.glarp.com>



> The original remailer I wrote added the header field Remailed-By to indicate this.

Custom headers in RFC822 messages must begin with "X-".  Making up
new headers that dont begin with "X-" is unnessary and violates
the standard.

> You could also use another standard 822 field, Sender, as follows:

> 	Sender: anonymous remailing service <remailer at host>

Unfortunatly, some broken mail user agents reply to "Sender" instead
of "From" or "Reply-To" (which also violates the standard).


brad





From wcs at anchor.ho.att.com  Mon Feb  1 17:37:37 1993
From: wcs at anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705 wcs@anchor.ho.att.com)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 17:37:37 PST
Subject: turning on yourself during car stops
Message-ID: <9302020136.AA03738@anchor.ho.att.com>


> >From: Peter Honeyman <honey at citi.umich.edu>

> >i believe there is a special exception related to automobiles
> >that makes them subject to search without a warrant when the
> >driver is placed under arrest.  but check with a lawyer.

Just be sure not to get out of your car -  there are different rules that apply 
to cars without occupants in them, though your state's rules may  vary.

But it's much better to avoid getting to that stage.  Be friendly in your
non-cooperation, and if a hostile-looking  cop wants to see whether your papers are in order, give him your license,  registration, insurance papers, 
*and* your ACLU card ("Don't leave home without it").

As a friend of mine says to cops, "If you've got a legal right to search 
my car, I'm sure you will, but if you need my permission, you don't have it."

Of course, this is no longer really cypherpunks material, just regular punks :-)

			Bill Stewart, somewhere in New Jersey




From phr at napa.Telebit.COM  Mon Feb  1 21:54:00 1993
From: phr at napa.Telebit.COM (Paul Rubin)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 21:54:00 PST
Subject: DES flushed from numerical recipes
Message-ID: <9302020552.AA00120@napa.TELEBIT.COM>


Fans of the Numerical Recipes book might like to know there's a second
edition out.  It includes quite a few improvements, and a much expanded
chapter on random number generation.  However, the DES routine from
the first edition has been flushed on the grounds that it was too slow
to be useful as an RNG.  Oh well.





From nobody at soda.berkeley.edu  Mon Feb  1 22:35:41 1993
From: nobody at soda.berkeley.edu (nobody at soda.berkeley.edu)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 22:35:41 PST
Subject: Remailer abuse
Message-ID: <9302020633.AA16727@soda.berkeley.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

From: Brad Huntting <huntting at glarp.com>

> Custom headers in RFC822 messages must begin with "X-".  Making up
> new headers that dont begin with "X-" is unnessary and violates
> the standard.

What RFC 822 actually says is this:
  
    4.7.4.  EXTENSION-FIELD
    
    	A limited number of common fields have been defined in
    this document.  As network mail requirements dictate, additional
    fields may be standardized.  To provide user-defined fields with
    a measure of safety, in name selection, such extension-fields will
    never have names that begin with the string "X-".
    
    	Names of Extension-fields are registered with the Network
    Information Center, SRI International, Menlo Park, California.
    
    4.7.5.  USER-DEFINED-FIELD
    
    	Individual users of network mail are free to define and
    use additional header fields.  Such fields must have names which
    are not already used in the current specification or in any
    definitions of extension-fields, and the overall syntax of these
    user-defined-fields must conform to this specification's rules for
    delimiting and folding fields.  Due to the extension-field
    publishing process, the name of a user-defined-field may be pre-empted.
    
    Note: The prefatory string "X-" will never be used in the names of
    Extension-fields.  This provides user-defined fields with a protected
    set of names.

I must say, this is a refreshingly non-facist RFC.  There are few of
the prohibitions which we are accustomed to seeing in these "laws of
the net".  In particular, users can use any header fields they want,
as long as they aren't already used; they only risk being made obsolete
if their chosen field names become used.  That's why people use X-.

Hal
74076.1041 at compuserve.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK23k7agTA69YIUw3AQFUTAP/UScvi9FOj4o31sjsqmz/xIJ90KB7WnK5
8m4yKX/p46IbH9+FhSvgBfURokh7+dSk91+GR6NPM/4rXEm+5aMbee6uuMsJaTF/
qPmmen1JnvtabTZi9s0HeQ2frqK7kolr0GIair7U8CiPhX1QVNx0IwzYB6g9YQmP
Zv84fGUzGEw=
=U54Y
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From julf at penet.FI  Mon Feb  1 23:19:13 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 23:19:13 PST
Subject: Remailer abuse?
In-Reply-To: <199302020039.AA00440@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9302020824.aa17567@penet.penet.FI>



> > You could also use another standard 822 field, Sender, as follows:
> 
> > 	Sender: anonymous remailing service <remailer at host>
> 
> Unfortunatly, some broken mail user agents reply to "Sender" instead
> of "From" or "Reply-To" (which also violates the standard).

Right. I am using this method on anon.penet.fi, and get *lots* of
incorrectly addressed stuff sent to the administrator because of this.
The worst culprits seem to be the BITNET LISTSERV (oh no, not again!),
VMS Mail-32 or DECMail or whatever, and elm/pine...

There was actually a case of a interaction of VMS mail and CC:mail that
caused the final recipient to *only* get the "Sender:" field, not the
"From:" field...

	Julf






From ghabrech at ultrix.ramapo.edu  Mon Feb  1 23:34:20 1993
From: ghabrech at ultrix.ramapo.edu (The Knight of Ni)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 23:34:20 PST
Subject: Remailer abuse?
Message-ID: <9302020736.AA25954@ultrix.ramapo.edu>


just got a ton of mail regarding the Remailer abuse.  This wouldn't have 
anything to do with the loophole in the telnet sendmail port (25) would it.
 Thanx,

Ghabrech at ultrix.ramapo.edu

P.S. I heard that PGP version 2.1 was out.  I used gopher but could not find
it.  Which sites would have it?

Thanx again, L8R





From 72466.3616 at CompuServe.COM  Tue Feb  2 10:43:17 1993
From: 72466.3616 at CompuServe.COM (Don Henson)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 93 10:43:17 PST
Subject: Is this real?
Message-ID: <930202183156_72466.3616_EHB40-5@CompuServe.COM>


-->

Is this real?
-kuech-

<--

Is what real?

Don Henson
PGP key available on request







From hkhenson at cup.portal.com  Tue Feb  2 11:22:11 1993
From: hkhenson at cup.portal.com (hkhenson at cup.portal.com)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 93 11:22:11 PST
Subject: NEWS!  Steve Jackson case
Message-ID: <9302021032.1.23048@cup.portal.com>


I pulled this off comp.org.eff.news.  I imagine many of you on both 
the extropian and cypherpunk list have been following this, but since 
there was no mention . . . . It is related to extropians because Steve 
is an Alcor member and Alcor once had similar problems (we sued the 
county using the same statute because our BBS was taken without a 
proper warrant and got $30k in an out of court settlement.)  This is a 
report of day three of the trial which ended last week.  There is more 
on the other two days posted in comp.org.eff.talk.  Enjoy.  

Thanks to wixer!pacoid at cs.utexas.edu (Paco Xander Nathan) for posting, 
Joe Abernathy for excellent reporting, *many* thanks to EFF and 
especially John Gilmore (EFF founder and owner of toad.com--home of the 
cypherpunks list) and congratulations to Steve Jackson!  Keith Henson 

-------

Steve Jackson Games/Secret Service wrapup

By JOE ABERNATHY
Copyright 1993, Houston Chronicle

AUSTIN -- An electronic civil rights case against the Secret Service 
closed Thursday with a clear statement by federal District Judge Sam 
Sparks that the Service failed to conduct a proper investigation in a 
notorious computer crime crackdown, and went too far in retaining 
custody of seized equipment. 

The judge's formal findings in the complex case, which will likely set 
new legal precedents, won't be returned until later. 

A packed courtroom sat on the edge of the seat Thursday morning as 
Sparks subjected the Secret Service agent in charge of the 
investigation to a grueling dressing-down. 

The judge's rebuke apparently convinced the Department of Justice to 
close its defense after calling only that one of the several 
government witnesses on hand. Attorney Mark Battan entered subdued  
testimony seeking to limit the award of monetary damages. 

Secret Service Special Agent Timothy Foley of Chicago, who was in 
charge of three Austin computer search-and-seizures on March 1, 1990, 
that led to the lawsuit, stoically endured Spark's rebuke over the 
Service's poor investigation and abusive computer seizure policies. 
While the Service has seized dozens of computers since the crackdown 
began in 1990, this is the first case to challenge the practice. 

"The Secret Service didn't do a good job in this case. We know no 
investigation took place. Nobody ever gave any concern as to whether 
(legal) statutes were involved. We know there was damage," Sparks said 
in weighing damages. 

The lawsuit, brought by Steve Jackson Games of Austin, said that the 
seizure of three computers violated the Privacy Protection Act, which 
provides First Amendment protections against seizing a publisher's 
works in progress. The lawsuit further said that since one of the 
computers was being used to run a bulletin board system containing 
private electronic mail, the seizure violated the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act in regards to the 388 callers of the 
Illuminati BBS. 

Sparks grew visibly angry when it was established that the Austin 
science fiction magazine and game book publisher was never suspected 
of a crime, and that agents did not do even marginal research to 
establish a criminal connection between the firm and the suspected 
illegal activities of an employee, or to determine that the company 
was a publisher. Indeed, agents testified that they were not even 
trained in the Privacy Protection Act at the special Secret Service 
school on computer crime. 

"How long would it have taken you, Mr. Foley, to find out what Steve 
Jackson Games did, what it was?" asked Sparks. "An hour? 

"Was there any reason why, on March 2, you could not return to Steve 
Jackson Games a copy, in floppy disk form, of everything taken? 

"Did you read the article in Business Week magazine where it had a 
picture of Steve Jackson -- a law-abiding, tax-paying citizen -- 
saying he was a computer crime suspect? 

"Did it ever occur to you, Mr. Foley, that seizing this material could 
harm Steve Jackson economically?" 

Foley replied, "No, sir," but the judge offered his own answer. 

"You actually did, you just had no idea anybody would actually go out 
and hire a lawyer and sue you." 

More than $200,000 has been spent by the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation in bringing the case to trial. The EFF was founded by 
Mitchell Kapor amid a civil liberties movement sparked in large part 
by the Secret Service computer crime crackdown. 

"The dressing-down of the Secret Service for their behavior is a major 
vindication of what we've been saying all along, which is that there 
were outrageous actions taken against Steve Jackson that hurt his 
business and sent a chilling effect to everyone using bulletin boards, 
and that there were larger principles at stake," said Kapor, contacted 
at his Cambridge, Mass., office. 

"We're very happy with the way the case came out," said Shari Steele, 
who attended the case as counsel for the EFF. "That session with the 
judge and Tim Foley is what a lawyer dreams about." 

That session seemed triggered by a riveting cross-examination of Foley 
by Pete Kennedy, Jackson's attorney. 

Kennedy forced Foley to admit that the search warrant did not meet 
even the Service's own standards for a search-and-seizure, and did not 
establish that Jackson Games was suspected of being involved in any 
illegal activity. 

"Agent Foley, it's been almost three years. Has Chris Goggans been 
indicted? Has Loyd Blankenship been indicted? Has Loyd Blankenship's 
computer been returned to him?" 

The purported membership of Jackson Games employee Blankenship in the 
Legion of Doom hacker's group triggered the raids that day on Jackson 
Games, Blankenship's home, and that of Goggans, a Houstonian who at 
the time was a University of Texas student. No charges have been 
filed, although the computer seized from Blankenship's home -- 
containing his wife's dissertation -- never has been returned. 

After the cross-examination, Sparks questioned Foley on a number of 
key details before and after the raid, focusing on the holes in the 
search warrant, why Jackson was not allowed to copy his work in 
progress after it was seized, and why his computers were not returned 
after the Secret Service analyzed them, a process completed before the 
end of March. 

"The examination took seven days, but you didn't give Steve Jackson's 
computers back for three months. Why?" asked an incredulous Sparks. 
"So here you are, with three computers, 300 floppy disks, an owner who 
was asking for it back, his attorney calling you, and what I want to 
know is why copies of everything couldn't be given back in days. Not 
months. Days. 

"That's what makes you mad about this case." 

The Justice Department contended that Jackson Games is a manufacturer, 
and that only journalistic organizations can call upon the Privacy 
Protection Act. It contended that the ECPA was not violated because 
electronic mail is not "intercepted" when a BBS is seized. This 
argument rests on a narrow definition of interception.





From eric at synopsys.com  Tue Feb  2 11:43:39 1993
From: eric at synopsys.com (eric at synopsys.com)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 93 11:43:39 PST
Subject: Remailer abuse
Message-ID: <199302021942.AA14986@gaea>



Nobody (well, actually Hal) writes:

>> What I could do, if more "problem" messages come through, is create a
>> list of people _not_ to forward mail to.
>>
>> Hal
>> 74076.1041 at compuserve.com

Another suggestion is to invert this:  create a list of addresses that
the remailer WILL send mail to.  But, that's STUPID, you say.  Well,
maybe, but I don't think so.  It is, however, sneaky.  If you run a
remailer, you should be registered with other remailers so they can
use you to forward stuff.  This places you on thier list of OK places
to remail stuff to.  Remailers should exchange these lists to keep
them up to date.  This, of course, encourages people to run remailers,
which is what we want.  It also silences any objections from people
concerning anonymous abuse, since you have to explicitly ask for
anonymous mail by running a remailer.

One problem this doesn't solve is how to send anonymous mail to
someone who hasn't registered, since that's exactly what we're trying
to avoid.  Someone could offer a human remailing service which
moderated the messages it sent through.  Using such a service, you
could request someone to run a remailer.  A cheaper service could just
send a standard message to an address that you send to it.  In all
these cases, the service provider is responsible for the content of
the messages sent out, and consequently would want to be very
conservative.

-eric messick

P.S.  Note the change in my address.  I've just changed jobs and am
now eric at synopsys.com.  All my old addresses (eric at parallax.com,
eric at toad.com) forward.





From fnordbox!loydb at cs.utexas.edu  Tue Feb  2 15:44:06 1993
From: fnordbox!loydb at cs.utexas.edu (Loyd Blankenship)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 93 15:44:06 PST
Subject: NEWS!  Steve Jackson case
Message-ID: <9302022204.AA00avp@fnordbox.UUCP>


:"How long would it have taken you, Mr. Foley, to find out what Steve
:Jackson Games did, what it was?" asked Sparks. "An hour?
:
:"Was there any reason why, on March 2, you could not return to Steve
:Jackson Games a copy, in floppy disk form, of everything taken?
:
:"Did you read the article in Business Week magazine where it had a
:picture of Steve Jackson -- a law-abiding, tax-paying citizen --
:saying he was a computer crime suspect?
:
:"Did it ever occur to you, Mr. Foley, that seizing this material could
:harm Steve Jackson economically?"
:
:Foley replied, "No, sir," but the judge offered his own answer.
:
:"You actually did, you just had no idea anybody would actually go out
:and hire a lawyer and sue you."

This particular exchange makes me warm & tingly inside... :-)


:"Agent Foley, it's been almost three years. Has Chris Goggans been
:indicted? Has Loyd Blankenship been indicted? Has Loyd Blankenship's
:computer been returned to him?"

No, it hasn't. <sigh> Hopefully this will motivate them to return it. While
I can't get too excited about the then state-of-the-art 286 system, I'd
*really* like the laser printer back, and Whitney wants her papers returned.

Loyd

***************************************************************************
* loydb at fnordbox.UUCP	     Call the Fnordbox BBS   *	Loyd Blankenship  *
* GEnie: SJGAMES	    2 v32bis lines, 24 hrs   *	PO Box 18957	  *
* Compu$erve: [73407,515]	 512/444-2323	     *	Austin, TX 78760  *
* cs.utexas.edu!dogface!fnordbox!loydb		     *	512/447-7866	  *
***************************************************************************







From Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU  Tue Feb  2 16:55:29 1993
From: Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU (Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 93 16:55:29 PST
Subject: Remailer changes.
Message-ID: <9302030054.AA17885@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>


Hal Finney's remailer writes:
>Remailed-By: Hal Finney <hal at alumni.caltech.edu>
>Remail-Notice: This message is NOT from the person listed in the From
> line.  It is from an automated software remailing service operating at
> that address.  Please report problem mail to <hal at alumni.caltech.edu>.

I have taken similar precautions with my remailer...  as you can tell
from the header lines.  I'm still having trouble convincing my system
adminstrator to install PGP v2.1 (or even v2.0).  For some reason, he
seems to be ignoring my messages.  Since I only have a limited
knowledge of C, I really don't know how to fiddle around with the PGP
*.C source files too much, otherwise, I would install it myself.  

The error that I keep getting running under SunOS version 4.1.3 is:
> make sun4gcc
make all CC=gcc LD=gcc OBJS_EXT=sparc.o \
CFLAGS="-O -fpcc-struct-return -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32"
gcc -O -fpcc-struct-return -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  pgp.c
In file included from pgp.c:109:
/usr/include/stdlib.h:18: conflicting types for `abort'
<built-in>:0: previous declaration of `abort'
/usr/include/stdlib.h:26: conflicting types for `exit'
<built-in>:0: previous declaration of `exit'
*** Error code 1
make: Fatal error: Command failed for target `pgp.o'
Current working directory /tmp/pgp21/src
*** Error code 1
make: Fatal error: Command failed for target `sun4gcc'

If anyone can help me out, please e-mail me *DIRECTLY* and not to the list.
-- 
+==== Internet: babani at cs.buffalo.edu ===+======== Amateur-Radio: N2LYC ======+
!      Bitnet: V078LNGT at ubvms.BITNET     |        UUCP: rutgers!ub!babani     !
! Alternate: an173 at cleveland.freenet.edu | Plsure dpnds on the othrs prmison. !
+==  PGP key available. (If you don't know what a PGP key is... find out!)  ==+





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Tue Feb  2 19:20:21 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 93 19:20:21 PST
Subject: mail policy
In-Reply-To: <9302020633.AA16727@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302030317.AA06908@soda.berkeley.edu>


Brad:
>> Custom headers in RFC822 messages must begin with "X-".  

As Hal points out, this is not true.

Hal:
>In particular, users can use any header fields they want,
>as long as they aren't already used; they only risk being made obsolete
>if their chosen field names become used.  

Let me make this point explicit, in case I haven't done so recently.

	Anonymity and pseudonymity should be standard
	features of electronic mail systems.

When I first picked the names for the header fields, I read RFC-822
carefully, and specifically chose *not* to use X- extension headers.
I fully intend to write an RFC, an extension to RFC-822, which
describes the syntax and semantics of anonymous/pseudonymous mail
messages.  There will likely be another describing the operation of a
"standard remailer."

(A note about MIME: I'm talking about the transport system here,
underneath the layers that MIME puts on.  At least that's the idea.)

The current policies favoring named mail originate in the conflation
of two notions of security.  The first, delivery security, is that the
mail be delivered correctly, i.e., delivered at all, to the correct
person, in a timely fashion, without alteration of the contents.  The
second, liability security, is that the provider of mail not be held
liable for content.  The provider removes liability by transferring it
to the sender of the message, who must therefore remain named.

One goal of remailer work is to cleave these two notions apart.  A
provider of email services should be responsible for accurate and
timely delivery, but should have no concern for or hand in content.
The service that the provider is offering is just that, computer
services.  It is not monitoring, not oversight, and not censorship.
Just as the phone company provides a communication channel on which I
may put whatever content I desire, so should any e-mail system offer
a communication channel and only a communication channel.

The origin, I believe, of this confusion is that e-mail systems were
by and large developed for internal uses and not for the open market.
That internal use, broadly conceived, might be for the military, for
academic research, or for intra-corporate memos.  In other words these
systems were provided (mostly) free of incremental charge to the
users.

In this environment, where service is being provided by context, it
was the legitimate concern that the provider might be held liable,
since the provider, in some strong sense, had caused the service to
exist in the first place.  When the social structures and situations
or e-mail communications were all so similar, this system worked out
fine.

Today, however, people seek out e-mail services for their direct
utility.  These people often have no prior relation with their service
provider; indeed, they wish not to be tied to a particular provider as
a guard lest the quality of the service suffer.  These people pay for
service themselves, typically.

And hence the separation between liability security and delivery
security is complete.  I want to buy common carriers of e-mail.  I
want bit pipes.  (Or, perhaps, in the e-mail world, bit bucket
brigades.)

But the standards of yesteryear are still with us.  The structure of
named mail persists.  We are changing that.  We do not wish to remain
skulking in the corners of respectability.  We want to be standard.
We want the standards, too, to be ours and to reflect our concerns.

Let us act with the care and deliberation that behoove all those who
wish to create standards to which others comply.

Onward.

Eric





From phantom at u.washington.edu  Tue Feb  2 20:21:20 1993
From: phantom at u.washington.edu (The Phantom)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 93 20:21:20 PST
Subject: I've had many requests for this, so here it is.
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9302022028.A12526-c100000@stein.u.washington.edu>


These are the instructions for the remailer set up on one of my accounts,
dubbed the 'phantom remailer' by some. These instructions are available by
fingering phantom at mead.u.washington.edu. 

Recently I had problems with the receiveing and decryption of encrypted
PGP messages, but everything is functional now. 

Please note the syntax: if you don't include the '::'s, the message will
end up in my mailbox! (this goes for all remailer systems).

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


If you wish to bounce anonymous mail (remail):
- ----------------------------------------------
include the line "Request-Remailing-To: <user at host>" in the mail 
header, then the body of the message will be forwarded to the recipient.

- -or-
include the lines

::
Request-Remailing-To: <user at host>

in the body of the mail message, of which the rest of message will 
be forwarded to the recipient.


If you wish to send encrypted mail to remail:
- ---------------------------------------------
include the line "Encrypted: PGP" in the mail header, then the body
will be decrypted and searched for the above-mentioned convention for
finding the recipient.

- -or-
include the lines

::
Encrypted: PGP

in the body of the mail message, of which the rest of the message will
be decrypted and searched for the above-mentioned convention for finding
the recipient.

Recently, I was having problems with the encryption part of the remailer, 
but that has been fixed. The remailer phantom at mead.u.washington.edu is now
fully functional.

To encrypt the message for the remailer to decypher, you must use
the remailer's public key, which follows.



- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1

mQCNAitcsHIAAAEEAPZ3Ex1rEwKLeANRoaRyTA72htDFGiGPmWkowByZyUtRkTRp
Vs/WdhgoJ1VLz76Chyb63I+ejpekeJfOud98gMh2HtVoTjNGYAawpCKo15tFyzYn
BFYVy0NjroyxwM6YnPCsYfYMpvyjEa5mfgrlyzvYBBeTDRD89vYoe7Eue0fDAAUR
tDJBbm9ueW1vdXMgUmVtYWlsZXIgPHBoYW50b21AbWVhZC51Lndhc2hpbmd0b24u
ZWR1PokAlQIFECtcqWpkhnxaNc7AOQEBZ+8EAIOOvsFf/niUrWw0BRvPhSEmtzrA
kQJt3q7kPXutjj3IsJ1/oR8oGhv4iPQ5BmNvvd5dnsbbCqOurhaftVgzlSpyQcYi
VryeNVvpdeX1+VTS7N+lAHVAlqnimoaEtUUIftDoDIjNNKRDi+nU4GbbL+1MqveC
1LKQMIi1WPjr6Wpw
=1XNo
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK29GmvYoe7Eue0fDAQHxYwP/UapN+FYiB1J3ek18QiaXCJ90rcwFOx79
Mz596NYL/NArGCDGd/RPbEqBG0lpGW4H71TSvPK/G26ImyxgEvmjeMqBhB6jWZZK
Xh0zgd+cGN9DS4N5EOvvt0N2CaVGTPNO2uqyXuGM8j2GfV++2E0RHApeuDirooc1
sYyj1iiKYDk=
=LZMq
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Matt Thomlinson
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom at u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 528-5732
PGP 2.0 key availaible via email or finger phantom at hardy.u.washington.edu






From mimir at u.washington.edu  Tue Feb  2 23:42:29 1993
From: mimir at u.washington.edu (Al Billings)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 93 23:42:29 PST
Subject: Lame Gurus (fwd)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05y.9302022338.A20963-d100000@carson.u.washington.edu>



 Here is an interesting (or maybe not) current use for one of the anon
remailers.

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 93 22:44:09 EST
From: aliquis <an1226 at anon.penet.fi>
To: future at nyx.cs.du.edu
Subject: Lame Gurus

Yawn.  CYBERPUNK: Virtual sex, smart drugs and synthetic
rock 'n' roll!  --TIME cover 8 February 1993.

Sure, but do they know how to set their umask values so that
people can't peek?  La-de-dah, let's check on one of the gurus...
(BTW, if you enjoy this, & you can get on the WELL, try some
of the other cyberpunk.gods from B. Sterling on.  Not that
they have anything much of interest....)
[Actual session script, edited only to protect the guilty.]
==============================================================

$ telnet well.sf.ca.us
Trying... Connected to WELL.SF.CA.US, a SEQUENT-S27 running DYNIX.

This is The WELL

DYNIX(R) V3.1.0  (well)

Type    newuser    to sign up.
Type    trouble    if you are having trouble logging in.

login: xxxxx
Password:
Last login: Tue Feb  2 XX:XX:XX from Xxxxxxx.xxx.xxxx

        DYNIX(R) V3.1.4 NFS  #2 (): Tue Mar 31 12:38:27 PST 1992
        ========================================================

    You own your own words. This means that you are responsible for the
    words that you post on the WELL and that reproduction of those words
    without your permission in any medium outside of the WELL's conferencing
    system may be challenged by you, the author.

    Thanks for dropping into the WELL.

    If you haven't changed your password since October 15, 1992,
    please do so now.  Type:  change password  at an OK prompt.  
  
    ****************************************************************

well 1: grep "Tim Leary" /etc/passwd
timleary:xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx:9339:200:Tim Leary:/uh/39/timleary:/usr/shell/menu
well 2: cd /uh/39/timleary
well 3: ls -l
total 54
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well           728 Jun 12  1992 1
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well           441 Jun 12  1992 240
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well           479 Jun 12  1992 29
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well           403 Jun 12  1992 359
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well           535 Jun 12  1992 42thnnks
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well          1096 Jun 12  1992 60
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well          1096 Jun 12  1992 62
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well          2051 Jun 12  1992 animatemcs
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well         11360 Jun 12  1992 animatemike
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well          4141 Jun 12  1992 barlow
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well           523 Jun 12  1992 barlow2
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well             0 Jun 12  1992 c
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well            11 Jun 12  1992 cbf.002464
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well             0 Jun 12  1992 cbf.005371
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well           527 Jun 12  1992 cbf.022859
-rw-------  1 timleary  well             4 Jun 12  1992 dead.letter
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well           727 Jun 12  1992 hlr
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well           403 Jun 12  1992 info
-rw-------  1 timleary  well         16663 Jan  9 23:43 mbox
-rw-------  1 timleary  well           452 Jan  9 23:36 q
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well           341 Jun 12  1992 xmodem.log
well 4: cat 29
>From rusirius Sun Jun 24 11:58:18 1990
Received: by well.sf.ca.us (4.12/4.7)
id AA02393; Sun, 24 Jun 90 11:58:15 pdt
Date: Sun, 24 Jun 90 11:58:15 pdt
From: rusirius (Mondo 2000)
Message-Id: <9006241858.AA02393 at well.sf.ca.us>
To: timleary
Subject: Re:  Masonicks
Status: RO

Yeah, great to have you virtually in the kitchen.  Hope Steve might
be helpful. He's advising us.  Good business head!  Ill further discuss
the Burroughs thing with Mu & be back to you during the week.

well 5: echo Heh He He He
Heh He He He
well 6: exit
well 7: logout

Connection closed by Foreign Host
$ 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.







From 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM  Wed Feb  3 00:03:20 1993
From: 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM (Hal)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 93 00:03:20 PST
Subject: Remailer lists.
Message-ID: <930203075239_74076.1041_DHJ30-1@CompuServe.COM>


I have been working on a document describing in some detail how to use
the Cypherpunks anonymous remailers.  It is pretty long, about 25K,
but I'll post it here in a few days.

Meanwhile, here is a list of the current remailers which I know about.
If anyone else is running a remailer based on Eric Hughes' original
design, please let me know and I'll add it to the list.

All of the following remailers accept the basic "Request-Remailing-To"
remailing request:

	hh at pmantis.berkeley.edu
	hh at cicada.berkeley.edu
	hh at soda.berkeley.edu

The following remailers also accept the "Encrypted: PGP" function.
The public keys for all of the remailers (plus the special one mentioned
below) are in the keyring file below.  They can all be used for
anonymous addresses as described in the full document.

	phantom at mead.u.washington.edu
	hal at alumni.caltech.edu
	remailer at rebma.mn.org
	elee7h5 at rosebud.ee.uh.edu
	hfinney at shell.portal.com

The next remailer is a variant on the Cypherpunks remailers.  It will
work _only_ with encrypted messages, using its public key (in the keyring
file below).  But it allows a simpler syntax.  It is not necessary to
put "Encrypted: PGP" into the message header.  In addition, the "::" pasting
operator is assumed, so you can leave that off.  Also, instead of
"Request-Remailing-To:" you can say just "To:".  So messages are much
simpler in format for this remailer.  This remailer runs at:

	remail at extropia.wimsey.com


Here is a PGP keyring file containing keys for the encryption based
remailers listed here:

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1
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=UbNP
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----


Hal Finney
74076.1041 at compuserve.com






From maloned at ul.ie  Wed Feb  3 01:17:07 1993
From: maloned at ul.ie (Declan Malone)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 93 01:17:07 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302021905.AA24282@itdsrv1.ul.ie>


subscribe Declan Malone
thanks you.





From fnerd at smds.com  Wed Feb  3 07:52:54 1993
From: fnerd at smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 93 07:52:54 PST
Subject: psEUDORAndom
Message-ID: <9302031531.AB24340@smds.com>


While searching (in Eudora) for the word "eudora", I found instead
the word "pseudorandom."  One more property of "living at the P.O.?"

-fnerd
quote me
fnerd at smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)






From covin at cs.uchicago.edu  Wed Feb  3 13:03:37 1993
From: covin at cs.uchicago.edu (covin at cs.uchicago.edu)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 93 13:03:37 PST
Subject: remailer modification: mailing list demon
Message-ID: <9302032102.AA22822@tartarus.uchicago.edu>



I have just joined this list, but I'm told that there was a recent discussion
about the problem of mailing-list aliases making the names of all the list
members publically available.  I.e., if you've established a mailing list
via a sendmail alias, certain sendmail commands will return the list of mailing
addresses associated with the alias.

I had been considering writing a mail-redistributing program, structurally 
similar to the user-account anonymous remailers, to get around this problem.
I'm told that this was discussed on this list, and that the conclusion was that
the sendmail hole could actually be plugged using regular sendmail features.

Could someone send me either a copy or a pointer to a copy of that discussion,
and/or the sendmail fix?

Thanks much,

                            -David





From fnerd at smds.com  Wed Feb  3 14:32:39 1993
From: fnerd at smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 93 14:32:39 PST
Subject: CFP '93 roommates?
Message-ID: <9302032112.AA15127@smds.com>


Fellow Extropians, Cypherpunks, and Computer Freedom and Privacy seekers--

Is anyone else hoping to share a room at the SF Airport Marriot for CFP '93?
The rates are $99 per room, single or multiple occupancy, for
conference attendees, with a limited block of rooms available, offer
expires Feb 9.

Please respond to

	sw at smds.com

NOT to fnerd.  Thanks.  (My fnerd mail goes through a two-day-long pipeline.)

--Steve Witham
sw at smds.com





From tribble at xanadu.com  Wed Feb  3 17:33:30 1993
From: tribble at xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 93 17:33:30 PST
Subject: [markets!uunet!starr.com!alta: How to e-mail the White House]
Message-ID: <9302032358.AA00498@xanadu.xanadu.com>


Hi Folks,

	The following is NOT a joke.  It is a real service being
provided by President Clinton.  If you feel you have something to  
say,
send them a letter.  I heard they will reply to most messages.

 From: The White House <75300.3115 at compuserve.com>

          As you know, this is the first time in history that the
White House has been connected to the public through electronic mail.
We welcome your comments and suggestions for ways to improve your
Public Access E-mail program.

      Jock Gill
      Electronic Publishing
      Public Access E-mail
      The White House
      Washington, D.C.

      75300.3115 at Compuserve.com
      CLINTON PZ on America Online

------- End of Forwarded Message










From ghabrech at ultrix.ramapo.edu  Wed Feb  3 22:10:44 1993
From: ghabrech at ultrix.ramapo.edu (The Knight of Ni)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 93 22:10:44 PST
Subject: [markets!uunet!starr.com!alta: How to e-mail the White House]
Message-ID: <9302040613.AA26938@ultrix.ramapo.edu>


I would like to welcome the whitehouse to the net.  It's nice to give the
public an easy way to make suggestions to somebody who would otherwise be
inaccessible (sp?, sorry no spell check). I hope that the users of the net
make use of this great opportunity.

Thanx,

George A. Habrecht

ghabrech at ultrix.ramapo.edu





From mcdchg!marcal!apres!system  Wed Feb  3 22:29:32 1993
From: mcdchg!marcal!apres!system (System Operator)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 93 22:29:32 PST
Subject: 5th Amendment and Encryption
Message-ID: <cH9eyB7w164w@apres.UUCP>


For what it's worth, at H0H0 Con in December John Draper
related a story about a run-in with the BART police, and the
confiscation of "hundreds" of floppy disks.  John indicated
that information was stored in encrypted form, and that
the authorities were unable to read it.

Since John is on this list, perhaps he can elaborate.

Dan

--
system at apres.UUCP (System Operator)
Applied Research (cryptography & security BBS)  1 708 639 8853






From crunch at netcom.com  Thu Feb  4 00:19:52 1993
From: crunch at netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 00:19:52 PST
Subject: Elaborating on BART pigs
Message-ID: <9302040819.AA11336@netcom2.netcom.com>


Dan says:

>John indicated
>that information was stored in encrypted form, and that
>the authorities were unable to read it.
>Since John is on this list, perhaps he can elaborate.

Yes,  I can...  Certainly.   I was using a Mac with a
HyperDrive,  and kept all me personal Email and job bids
encrypted using the "Security" program provided for the
HyperDrive users.    I don't know how many files I had
encrypted,   but if the police had somehow managed to
decrypt it,  they would be very dissapointed,  as I'm sure
they would find much use if any of it as evidance that I
was involved in any kind of conspiracy or something.   I was
just a neat program,  easy to use,   and after I archived
the programs,  I encrypted it,  and used a secret
key "Pigs suck" at the time.

Oh,  one other thing,  the new OOP version of the MacPGP Shell
is coming along quite nicely,   Blair has been very responsive
to provide me with a good solid design,  thus requiring little
interaction,   and those little GUI's are coming along just 
fine,  than you...

More later..
JD





From deltorto at aol.com  Thu Feb  4 03:38:32 1993
From: deltorto at aol.com (deltorto at aol.com)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 03:38:32 PST
Subject: White Mail
Message-ID: <9302040639.tn05266@aol.com>


Guys & Gals,

Here's a tidbit I thought you'd all like to know about:

(from Network World, 1 Feb. 1993, p. 37)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
E-MAIL RULING MAY HAMPER CLINTON ADMINISTRATION

Washington, D.C. - A recent federal court ruling requiring the preserva
tion of the Bush administration's electronic mail tapes has left many
considering the ramifications for E-mail utilization in the Clinton White
House and the private sector.

Federal Judge Charles Richey ruled that President Bush's E-mail falls under
the 50-year-old Federal Records Act and cannot be destroyed until it has been
reviewed under stringent guidelines for its preservation. This ruling, which
is aimed at uncovering information concerning the Iran-Contra scandal, is the
first time electronic communications has fallen under the auspices of the
act.

Although the ruling is currently being appealed and it is unclear whether the
Bush administration will comply with the order, it has several implications
for the new White House staff.

"It will provide a real problem for the Clinton administration," said Michael
Cavanagh, executive director of the Electronic Mail Association here. The
ruling applies to all White House E-mail, Cavanagh said, even the most casual
conversations. "It will be difficult for them to do their job as efficiently
as they could if they were allowed to use E-mail freely," he said.

-- Combing Through Trash

Cavanagh likened the ruling to requiring that the contents of every White
House wastebasket be saved forever. "That enters the realm of ridiculousness,
but maybe that's what's happened with electronic mail in this decision."

Others were not so sure. "It's one of those issues that has a balance on both
sides." said Ronald Plesser, a partner in the Washington law firm of Piper
and Marbury and the former telecommunications team leader for the Clinton
transition. "From a freedom of information perspective, it's a good decision.
>From an E-mail decision, we're concerned about it, but I don't think it's
overpowering."

Plesser said the ruling would encourage the White House staff to treat
sending E-mail as if they were writing a memo, rather than using it in an
informal manner.

"I understand the concern that E-mail will now be a record and it may
discourage some informal discussions," he said. "On the other hand, I think
the issues in the case are broader than E-mail and relate to all records of
public policy that should not be destroyed, and I'm in favor of that."

He did caution that the ruling will not automatically make all White House
E-mail public information because President Clinton will still have the
option of using his executive privilege to prevent information from being
subpoenaed.

-- Private Sector Implications

Beyond the White House, however, the implications for the private sector are
minimal.

"This doesn't have any direct ramifications for the business sector,"
Cavanagh said. "There certainly is not going to be a law requiring every
private company to keep everything on their computer disks forever; you'd
have to carve out something the size of the state of Wyoming to store those
computer disks."


Both Cavanagh and Plesser were in favor of having some kid of E-mail
retention policy, as do most businesses in the private sector. Once a
specified period has elapsed during which the information may be needed to
reconstruct certain events, for example, it can be destroyed.

"Increasingly, businesses institute retention policies for electronic mail
tapes and other computer tapes [in addition to paper records]," Cavanagh
said. "Generally, that's the correct route to go."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------





From deltorto at aol.com  Thu Feb  4 04:32:55 1993
From: deltorto at aol.com (deltorto at aol.com)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 04:32:55 PST
Subject: How to e-mail the White House
Message-ID: <9302040732.tn05372@aol.com>


>> The following is NOT a joke.  It is a real service being
>>provided by President Clinton.  If you feel you have something to  
>>say, send them a letter.  I heard they will reply to most messages.
>>
>> From: The White House <75300.3115 at compuserve.com>
>>
>>          As you know, this is the first time in history that the
>>White House has been connected to the public through electronic mail.
>>We welcome your comments and suggestions for ways to improve your
>>Public Access E-mail program.

Ladies & Gents, I think a group letter would be appropriate from all of us.
What an opportunity. I love this country sometimes, y'know?

  dave

PS: Extra special thanks to Mr. Tribble for finding this. Where did you pick
it up?





From ncselxsi!drzaphod at ncselxsi.netcom.com  Thu Feb  4 07:45:53 1993
From: ncselxsi!drzaphod at ncselxsi.netcom.com (DrZaphod)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 07:45:53 PST
Subject: A Group Note From CypherPunks
Message-ID: <24111.drzaphod@ncselxsi>


>>> From: The White House <75300.3115 at compuserve.com>

 From deltorto at aol.com
>Ladies & Gents, I think a group letter would be appropriate from all of us.
>What an opportunity. I love this country sometimes, y'know?

     Excellent Idea!  What better way to secure our position on cryptography
and privacy then to write a little note to Bill.  go for it.. and we can all
read it, make suggestions, and add bits.. incidentally, I've already sent my
PGP key down to the White House.. |-]
TTFN!

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod at ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized





From crunch at netcom.com  Thu Feb  4 11:28:33 1993
From: crunch at netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 11:28:33 PST
Subject: Group note
Message-ID: <9302041928.AA05061@netcom2.netcom.com>



>     Excellent Idea!  What better way to secure our position on cryptography
>and privacy then to write a little note to Bill.  go for it.. and we can all
>read it, make suggestions, and add bits.. incidentally, I've already sent my
>PGP key down to the White House.. |-]
>TTFN!

I didn't go that far,  but if we decide to send a letter to the White
House this way,   we all should collaborate on what to say,  in relation
to our concerns,  etc.   Then  each of us can "Sign" the letter
using our PGP Signatures.

I also thought about sending my PGP key,  but still deciding on what I
want to say relating to my personal concerns.

JD





From tribble at xanadu.com  Thu Feb  4 11:33:45 1993
From: tribble at xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 11:33:45 PST
Subject: How to e-mail the White House
In-Reply-To: <9302040732.tn05372@aol.com>
Message-ID: <9302041741.AA03899@xanadu.xanadu.com>


	 PS: Extra special thanks to Mr. Tribble for finding this. Where did you pick
	 it up?

Thanks for the thanks, but I just forwarded it.  I don't know who
originated the message.  Afterward I noted that the chatty part of the
message sounded like I had written it.  We can appropriately give
thansk to a now anonymous source :-)

dean





From pmetzger at shearson.com  Thu Feb  4 12:59:35 1993
From: pmetzger at shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 12:59:35 PST
Subject: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Message-ID: <9302042024.AA09970@maggie.shearson.com>


Thought I'd forward this.


----- Begin Included Message -----

>From libernet-request at dartmouth.edu Wed Feb  3 18:51:12 1993
Resent-Message-Id: <4fQ2vaH0BwxI41u9ED at transarc.com>
Resent-Date: Wed,  3 Feb 1993 15:45:26 -0500 (EST)
Resent-From: Lyle_Seaman at transarc.com
Resent-To: libernet at dartmouth.edu
X-Andrew-Widereply: netnews.sci.crypt
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Path: andrew.cmu.edu!bb3.andrew.cmu.edu!news.sei.cmu.edu!cis.ohio-state.edu!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!usenet.ins.cwru.edu!agate!doc.ic.ac.uk!rhbnc!andy
From: andy at csqx.cs.rhbnc.ac.uk
Subject: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Organization: RHBNC
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1993 16:07:01 GMT
Lines: 94
Sender: libernet-request at dartmouth.edu
X-Mailing-List: libernet at Dartmouth.EDU
Content-Length: 4387

  Having finally managed to track down a copy of last Sunday's `Sunday
Times', here is the text of the article describing changes to the GSM
mobile communications standard.

  The A5 `scrambling code' refered to in the article is the stream cipher
between the mobile and base stations, which uses a 64-bit key derived from
an initial authentication exchange.  Whilst it's not exactly secret, as
many people involved with developing GSM need to know the details, it is
covered by non-disclosure agreements.

  `New Scientist' also have an article on GSM in this week's issue.

andy
--

`The Sunday Times',  31 January 1993.   Main section, p. 12.  (Home News)

SPYMASTERS ORDER REDESIGN OF `TOO SECURE' MOBILE PHONES  by Christopher Lloyd

[Cartoon of a ridiculous mobile handset with various antennaea and dishes
protruding.  It is being held by a dismayed, purple-suited, man whilst a
sign reads: "New! GCHQ-approved mobile phone".]

  The next generation of mobile telephones has proved so secure against
tapping that it is to be made less safe on the advice of the intelligence
services.  The phones, based on coded digital technology, will have their
technology modified so that spies can continue to eavesdrop on private
conversations.

  The changes, ordered by a European Community (EC) telecommunications
committee in Brussels, are being made at the insistance of European
governments, including Britain's.  They fear that surveillance operations
against drug barons, the criminal underworld and foreign powers could be
undermined.

  Digital mobiles phones, based on a system called GSM, are already
replacing standard analogue networks across the world. They are equipped
with a sophisticated scrambling code called A5, offering protection from
interception equivelant to many military systems.

  It is this code that is to be replaced by one called A5X, to allow
undercover eavesdropping to continue.

  Last week a Department of Trade and Industry spokesman confirmed changes
were being introduced to make it easier for security agencies - ranging
from GCHQ, the British government's listening post near Cheltenham, to the
FBI in America - to eavesdrop.

  "Alternatice coding is being developed for the reasons you have
outlined," he said.  "There is a general desire for this among the
governments of Europe."

  The department, which issues export licenses for the phones, is
particularly concerned that the original A5 technology should not be sold
to countries that may adapt it for military applications. 

  In America, the FBI has voiced similar concern.  Nestor Michnyak,
spokesman for the FBI headquarters in Washington, said that digital
technology was advancing so fast that counter-surveillance was in danger
of being undermined.

  "We are trying to get companies and manufacturers to work with us to
allow us to maintain the surveillance operations we have undertaken since
the late 1960s," he said.  "All we are asking is to be able to continue to
do what we are currently doing and we want the same access we are having
now."

  Manufacturers of GSM mobile phones will be forced to adapt products to
work with the new codes.  Motorola, one of the leading makers of the
digital mobile handsets, complained that costs may rise as a result.

  "We are flying blind here," said Larry Conlee, the assistant general
manager of Motorola's European cellular division.  "The GSM system has
ended up more secure than it should have been for the commercial market
and now we're trying to recover from it."

  Vodafone, Britain's largest analogue mobile phone company, which has
already installed 250 GSM base stations covering 50% of the UK population,
said its network will need to be adapted to accept the new codes.

  "Government authorities have made it known that they don't want this
high level of encoding," said Mike Caldwell, the spokesman for Vodafone.

  Caldwell said the problem with the original system was that it would
take security services weeks rather than minutes to decode the
conversations they wanted to bug.  Despite the changes, it will be still
virtually impossible for any amateur eavesdropper to intercept calls made
on the digital mobile phones.

-- 
Andy Thomas
Information Security Group,  Department of Computer Science
Royal Holloway,  University of London   TW20 0EX, England
Internet:  andy at dcs.rhbnc.ac.uk   phone: + 44 784 443696


----- End Included Message -----






From jpp at markv.com  Thu Feb  4 14:09:22 1993
From: jpp at markv.com (Jay Prime Positive)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 14:09:22 PST
Subject: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <9302042024.AA09970@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9302041407.aa14565@hermix.markv.com>


Speculation: The "A5 `scrambling code'" is used as the spreading code
for a spread spectrum radio.

Spread spectrum radio has some features cypherpunks may find
interesting: both stegnagraphic and cryptographic.  A Spread Spectrum
signal is usualy based on xoring a very high rate "pseudorandom"
bitstream with the intelligence to be transmitted.  The resulting wide
spectrum signal is usualy transmitted via radio.  As a result the
signal is very hard to notice since the watts/hz can be orders of
magnitude under normal narrow band signals (stegnography).  As a
second result, once detected the signal cannot be understood without
syncronizing an identicle "pseudorandom" bitstream at the reciever
(cryptography).  The reason that gov't types would fear the dispersal
of the technology is obvious.  Btw. many of the wireless lans use
exactly this technology.

j'





From ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu  Thu Feb  4 16:03:52 1993
From: ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu (ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 16:03:52 PST
Subject: White House letter
Message-ID: <9302050002.AA11919@longs.lance.colostate.edu>


Hello, I think the official cyberpunk White House (Pres. Bill Clinton)
letter would be a great idea, although my experience is that the more
you want to say, the more people will say "that's not for cypherpunks
to say" or "I don't agree with that as a cypherpunk" and that it will
be hard to build consensus. But, on the other hand, a lot of
cypherpunks are kind of extremists that may even say some things don't
go far enough.  Anyway, here are some possible topics, as bland as I
can make them (but are all actually highly controverial):

1. Off the tip of the mailing list's tongue, phone encryption
particularly in cellular and hand-held phones.  The recent article from
the Sunday Times posted here stated that

> Despite the changes, it will be still
>virtually impossible for any amateur eavesdropper to intercept calls made
>on the digital mobile phones.

Hm, that's pretty questionable. Maybe we shouldn't make it a black and
white issue, but codes seem to me to be either broken or unbroken, and
the former is insecure and unusable whereas the latter is not.  There
are already examples of situations where lack of encryption led to
outrageous breaches of privacy--both Princess Diana and her previous
husband can attest to that!

Clinton could put pressure on intelligence agencies in the U.S. to
allow strong encryption for cellular phones, pass laws, or whatever,
and eventually commit to security in phone calls.  What do you think,
cypherpunks?  Should the government be allowed to wiretap "at all"?  Is
it a "right" of the government? (prepare for the flames)  Should we
insist on completely unlimited use of cryptography?  Is any other
scenario practical?  Is anything but this inevitable? (uh oh, some
opinion creeping in there)

Introduction of strong cryptography in hand-held phones could be *the*
stepping stone for widespread introduction of cryptography, if the
battle is won and becomes publicized enough.  I think if this was
painted in the right way, we could really get a lot of public support
for ideas like "I should be able to know when someone is listening to
my calls" or "I should be able to protect from that" or "I know when
somebody opens my mail, why not my phone calls?" or "that's not
something I want my government to be doing anyway".

2. The new national network NREN supported by the NSF will have massive
data communications capabilities, many times the bandwidth of the
current internet.  There are plenty of "guidelines" that could be
established on its use.  For example, how about commercial traffic? 
Are there restrictions on traffic?  I think the "new world highways"
analogy works here. While we can get and go on a highway whenever we
want, and carry loads up to certain reasonable restrictions, we have to
get licensed. Also, commercial companies rely on them heavily and our
economy is immensely dependent on them (they benefit it immensely). 
Should we oppose all taxes and licensing? Limitations on total traffic
permitted?  Believe it or not, these will become *hot* issues soon. 
Bigger than the time the FCC was thinking of taxing modem use.  Keep in
mind, we might be able to make arguments that the ideas like "volume"
are somewhat obsolete in terms of networks, in which in many cases
sending very large amounts of data is as costly (or even less so,
because of overhead) than sending smaller amounts.  Even if someone was
charged based on quantity of use, the actual money involved would have
to be something like $.0001/meg (I hope).

3. There are lot of restrictions and regulations on networks right now.
 For example, there are rules that prevent telephone companies from
providing "information services" over telephone lines, apparently
originating by rather bold but successful cable company lobbyists. 
Should these be removed?

4. Fiber optics will be penetrating into a lot of homes over the next
few years.  This will be related to the network expansion mentioned
above.  Should these be maintained and installed by private companies? 
Should there be limitations on the size of the companies running the networks?

5. In the letter, we should look at trying to explain our interests and
backgrounds.  Who ARE we to ask these things?  A bunch of teenage
computer geeks and hackers?  Computer professionals with a serious
interest in privacy, with important tax-paying jobs?  I don't really
know the answer to this one!

I'd be willing to hammer up some rough drafts, if no one objects, but
we need to hash this out, and decide about some kind of voting
procedure, I would say (majority passing? line-item veto?)

I suppose the one really major consensus of the cypherpunks is the
commitment to cryptography and the believe that it should be
unregulated and freely used.  So, if all this sounds too involved, we
could go the simple route and just fix up Eric Hugh's group charter to
send to Pres. Clinton.

ltr.



P.S. Here's a product that would *really* bring the issue of
cryptography to the forefront, making the public aware of it and
partial to it, and is just waiting to be invented by somebody with a
flair for electronics, packaging, and marketing.  Encryption technology
is becoming pretty inexpensive, and even some simple techniques are
better than nothing and not trivial to get around for the big
bureacracies that do wiretapping.  Imagine a single little plastic cup
that could be placed over a phone reciever with all the cheap
encryption electronics built in (maybe even analog based).  Market it
in every drugstore and discount store in existence in real flashy ways.
 Protect your calls! Just slip it on your phone! Use it to talk to your
friends! etc. introducing the CRYPTOCUP only $9.99.  The thing could be
adaptive, like pick one of 10 or 100 preprogrammed codes when it finds
another of the same at the other end of the line.  Or, maybe some
one-time PADs could be used by the users using touch-tones.

You could even market it as a child's toy: imagine that the kid could
slip it over his mouth and yell through it.  Another kid with a
receiving speaker could decrypt this into earphones or something.  Now,
to other kids on the playground, all they hear is goofyspeak that
sounds like pig latin from the pair, but the two kids are able to talk
about throwing snowballs at Suzy or whatever (endless laughs and
hilarity).  You could have all kinds of spiffy TV commercials with
little kids pretending to be spies, with the costumes and everything.
Wow!  You could sell a LOT of these if it was done right.  This would
be like the 20th century equivalent of the cups-and-string thing. 
(Just make sure I get plenty of royalties :)

Or how about this?  For us cypherpunks, the "kids toy" thing could be
little cover for the use that it was *designed* for: use over phones. 
The "kid toy" thing would just be a way to get it to be widespread so
that everybody had one and knew what it did.  Then, the rumors would
start. Wow! They fit on phones!  Drug dealer's use em!  People having
affairs use 'em!  Businessmen use 'em!  EVERYBODY uses em! Coach to
team player: did you remember your CUP?  Yes Sir!  Coach starts yelling
plays at quarterback.  Girlfriends would ask their boyfriends to slip
'em on before they started (do you have the PROTECTION with you?).
Then, we take over the world. HAHAHAHA <- evil laugh

If this was cheap enough, people might buy it just for the novelty of
it.  Especially if you don't have to choose the code, just slip it on
and it works (maybe with the better versions, you could pick the code).
 The point is, infiltrate the economy to the point where any kind of
silly regulation of "cryptography" would be perceived as completely
ridiculous by the general population.  "What are we going to do?"
They'd say, "register every kid's CRYPTOCUP?  HAHAHAHAHA!" <- side
splitting laugh at the sheer stupidity of government.  (Yeah, we have a
great one---once they even tried to regulate CRYPTOCUPS! HAHAHAHA! <-
now sides starting to hurt)

OK (regaining my composure and sanity), so if we're really boring, I
suppose we could go the route of just pressing for encryption in
cellular phones.  Or maybe just the middleaged employed people on the
group could go that route, and all the teenage hackers work on the toy.

P.S. how big is cypherpunks now anyway?  I'm interested in embarrassing
myself in front of as many people as possible. :)





From jcoryell%nwu.edu at UICVM.UIC.EDU  Thu Feb  4 16:51:11 1993
From: jcoryell%nwu.edu at UICVM.UIC.EDU (John Coryell.)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 16:51:11 PST
Subject: How to e-mail the White House
In-Reply-To: <9302041741.AA03899@xanadu.xanadu.com>
Message-ID: <9302050051.AA07524@toad.com>


>         PS: Extra special thanks to Mr. Tribble for finding this. Where did y
>pick
>         it up?
>
>Thanks for the thanks, but I just forwarded it.  I don't know who
>originated the message.  Afterward I noted that the chatty part of the
>message sounded like I had written it.  We can appropriately give
>thansk to a now anonymous source :-)
>
>dean

I've seen it broadcast on a number of listservs, actually; I don't
think it's being kept to any degree of secrecy.  However, nearly every
place it was posted soon found follow-ups reporting receiving undelivered
mail messages.  Maybe it's encrypted.

John Coryell.





From huntting at glarp.com  Thu Feb  4 17:37:15 1993
From: huntting at glarp.com (Brad Huntting)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 17:37:15 PST
Subject: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <9302042024.AA09970@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <199302050136.AA14323@misc.glarp.com>


> Caldwell said the problem with the original system was that it
> would take security services weeks rather than minutes to decode
> the conversations they wanted to bug.  Despite the changes, it will
> be still virtually impossible for any amateur eavesdropper to
> intercept calls made on the digital mobile phones.

The quotes I've heard are more like "any county sherif with a
radiomodem and a pc will be able to tap any conversation in range.

It's probably just as well.  Since end to end encryption is the
only reasonable solution anyway.


brad





From huntting at glarp.com  Thu Feb  4 17:48:18 1993
From: huntting at glarp.com (Brad Huntting)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 17:48:18 PST
Subject: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <9302041407.aa14565@hermix.markv.com>
Message-ID: <199302050147.AA14360@misc.glarp.com>



> Speculation: The "A5 `scrambling code'" is used as the spreading code
> for a spread spectrum radio.

It would seem that both the sender and reciever need to be exactly
syncronized to within 1/4 of a bit for this to work.  Since voice
data requires about 64Khz, if you spread this by a factor of 32
(for a scrambling frequency of 2.048Mhz) this would mean the sender
and reciever would need to be synced to well within 500ns of each
other.

Isn't this a bit difficult?  How do they do it?


brad





From crunch at netcom.com  Thu Feb  4 19:05:21 1993
From: crunch at netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 19:05:21 PST
Subject: White house letter
Message-ID: <9302050305.AA21371@netcom2.netcom.com>



>4. Fiber optics will be penetrating into a lot of homes over the next
>few years.

What about adding the issue of government grants for R&D on new technology
in Data Networking,  Virtual reality,  and other new technologies.  Or
at least generious tax breaks to encourage R&D.

JD





From jpp at markv.com  Thu Feb  4 19:45:57 1993
From: jpp at markv.com (Jay Prime Positive)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 19:45:57 PST
Subject: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <199302050147.AA14360@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9302041944.aa08169@hermix.markv.com>


Brad Huntting <huntting at glarp.com> asks:
>[...]this would mean the sender and reciever would need to be synced
>to well within 500ns of each other.  Isn't this a bit difficult?  How
>do they do it?

  You are right.  This is perhaps *the* central design issue of this
kind of spread spectrum system.

  One standard solution is to use "gold codes".  Gold codes are
special in that they are very self dissilimar.  That is they look very
unlike any shifted version of themselves.  So you can build a very
simple corelator which tries all the possible shiftings of a code to
the signal, until one pops up with "low frequency" data rather than
"high frequency" noise.

  Another is to begin a transmission with a special sync header (and
concievably intersperse additional ones bassed on the expected
frequency of loss of lock).  Currently available PLL's working at
900MHz have very low phase noise, and I can imagine the construction
of fixed frequency PLL's with even lower phase noise.

  A third is to transmit BOTH the spreading code, and the data.  You
can think of this technique as sending two channels of data, one which
is all 1's (or 0's), the other which is a little more interesting.
The two channels are then combined at the reciever to yield the data.

  A fourth is to use an externaly generated sync signal -- for example
a radio transmission that both sender and reciever can hear.  (For
this aplication, I don't see how this would be used...)

  Aditional solutions are possible.  (What is this S.A.W. thing I read
about??)

j'






From libert at citi.umich.edu  Thu Feb  4 20:03:03 1993
From: libert at citi.umich.edu (Tom Libert)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 20:03:03 PST
Subject: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Message-ID: <9302050403.AA10938@toad.com>


Jay Prime Positive <jpp at markv.com> writes:
>  A fourth is to use an externaly generated sync signal -- for example
>a radio transmission that both sender and reciever can hear.  (For
>this aplication, I don't see how this would be used...)

Some spread spectrum systems synchronize using the (very accurate)
time signals provide by Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites.

>  Aditional solutions are possible.  (What is this S.A.W. thing I read
>about??)

I don't know where you read it, but it might stand for "Surface
Acoustic Wave".





From jpp at markv.com  Thu Feb  4 20:06:05 1993
From: jpp at markv.com (Jay Prime Positive)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 20:06:05 PST
Subject: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Message-ID: <9302042004.aa08268@hermix.markv.com>


I speculated:
> Speculation: The "A5 `scrambling code'" is used as the spreading code
> for a spread spectrum radio.

  But I now belive I was wrong.  A reader, who I will allow to remain
unnamed, informed me that there is only one SS cellular comunication
system -- interestingly enough they were using it at the time!  They
told me that the GSM system is narrow band.  So I now ...

Speculate: The "A5 `scrambling code'" is an actual cypher system.  But
the key is negociated between the phone and the cell, not the phone
and the other phone.


j'






From ncselxsi!drzaphod at ncselxsi.netcom.com  Thu Feb  4 21:01:52 1993
From: ncselxsi!drzaphod at ncselxsi.netcom.com (DrZaphod)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 21:01:52 PST
Subject: White House letter
Message-ID: <67402.drzaphod@ncselxsi>


In Message Thu, 04 Feb 93 17:02:44 -0700,
  longs.lance.colostate.edu!ld231782 at netcomsv.netcom.com writes:

>Hello, I think the official cyberpunk White House (Pres. Bill Clinton)
>letter would be a great idea, although my experience is that the more
>you want to say, the more people will say "that's not for cypherpunks
>to say" or "I don't agree with that as a cypherpunk" and that it will
>be hard to build consensus. But, on the other hand, a lot of
>cypherpunks are kind of extremists that may even say some things don't
>go far enough.

     I think to start off and get attention and respect from the big white
house we should simply send our stance on encryption and why it shouldn't be
regulated.. I think this is the common goal among all the cypherpunks on
this list [ that is except the NSA folks who are listening in |-] ].

     I think, for now, we just want to let people know that there IS a
specific group of individuals who are willing to protest for their right to
privacy [you are, aren't you?] and follow up with suggestions to specific
issues in later messages to the White House.  and YES we should definately
send all our public keys along with the message.. basically telling the
government that we DO enjoy extreme privacy in part of our lives and would
like to see it extended to all forms of communication.
TTFN!

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod at ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized





From Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU  Thu Feb  4 21:13:16 1993
From: Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU (Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 21:13:16 PST
Subject: White House letter
Message-ID: <9302050513.AA11882@toad.com>


Dear ld231782,

I believe that a good letter to the President has _one_ theme.  If
it comes out to more than one, write more than one letter.

My own emphasis would be on computer security concerns, and the legitimate
privacy, anonymity, and electronic-cash interests of Internetters.  Aren't
these the issues which bring us together as cypherpunks?


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr at cs.cmu.edu)


p.s.  Here are two draft letters for your consideration.

Dear President Clinton,
   Bring democracy to the bits!  Let's take a vote among all the bits 
   to decide which value, 0 or 1, is most correct.  Then we can set all
   bits to that value and they will all be equal!
Best regards,  The Cypherpunks (Socialist Subgroup).

Dear President Clinton,
   Freedom for the bits!  We will not rest until each bit is free to
   determine its own natural orientation without outside coercion.  The
   good news is, you don't need to do anything at all; merely get out of
   the way of the free market, and the bits will free themselves.
Best regards,  The Cypherpunks (Anarchist Subgroup).





From tribble at xanadu.com  Thu Feb  4 23:33:01 1993
From: tribble at xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 23:33:01 PST
Subject: [uunet!bigtex.cactus.org!wixer!wixer.cactus.org!jagwire: white house email (fwd)]
Message-ID: <9302050132.AA05527@xanadu.xanadu.com>


> From jmedway at ccwf.cc.utexas.edu  Wed Feb  3 20:24:33 1993
> From: jmedway at ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (johnjmedway)
> Message-Id: <9302031943.AA23259 at huey.cc.utexas.edu>
> Subject: white house email
> To: jagwire at wixer.cactus.org (Dan Zappone),
>         resmith at ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Rob Smith)
> Date: Wed, 3 Feb 93 13:43:54 CST
> X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL11]
> 
> One of my coworkers passed this out to all of us @ work.
> 
> Spread el verbum.
> 
> 
> >>  Subject: White House email address
> >>
> >>  I thought you might find this interesting...
> >>  
> >>  
> >>       ================= { Begin included text } =====================
> >>  
> >>  >
> >>  > How's this for interesting?
> >>  > We just got wind of it down here... :)  Barbie
> >>  > - --------
> >>  >
> >>  > President Clinton (The White House) = 75300.3115 at Compuserve.com
> >>  >
> >>  > : Here's something you might find useful...  President Clinton's email
> >>  > : address.  (Obviously, he has people to screen it for him!)  A friend
> >>  > : just emailed this to me.
> >>  > :
> >>  > : >Posted-Date: 27 Jan 93 20:19:51 EST
> >>  > : >Date: 27 Jan 93 20:19:51 EST
> >>  > : >From: The White House <75300.3115 at compuserve.com>
> >>  > : >Subject: Re: Press Briefing, January 27, 1993
> >>  > : >
> >>  > : > Thank you for your recent electronic mail message to the White
> >>  > : > House.  As soon as practicable it will be sent to the appropriate
> >>  > : > office for consideration.  You should receive a written reply in due
> >>  > : > course.  Unfortunately, we are not yet ready to respond substantively
> >>  > : > to your message by electronic mail.  We appreciate your patience as 
> >>  we
> >>  > : > implement our new electronic systems.
> >>  > : >
> >>  > : > As you know, this is the first time in history that the
> >>  > : > White House has been connected to the public through electronic
> >>  > : > mail.  We welcome your comments and suggestions for ways to 
> >>  improve
> >>  > : > your Public Access E-mail program.
> >>  > : >
> >>  > : >      Regards,
> >>  > : >      Jock Gill
> >>  > : >      Electronic Publishing
> >>  > : >      Public Access E-mail
> >>  > : >      The White House
> >>  > : >      Washington, D.C.
> >>  > : >
> >>  > : >      75300.3115 at Compuserve.com
> >>  > : >      CLINTON PZ on America Online
> >>  > : >
> >>  > : > PS: If you did not include your U.S. mail return address in your
> >>  > : > message and you want a reply, please send your message again and
> >>  > : > include that information.
> >>  >
> >>  > ------- End of Forwarded Message
> >>  >
> >>  >
> >>  
> 
> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> jmedway at ccwf.cc.utexas.edu       "Be careful what you're doing,
> aka john j medway                 you're messing up my life."
>                                   -- John Lydon aka John Rotten
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> 





From karn at unix.ka9q.ampr.org  Fri Feb  5 00:02:23 1993
From: karn at unix.ka9q.ampr.org (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 00:02:23 PST
Subject: spread spectrum synchronization
Message-ID: <9302040757.AA02215@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>


Synchronization is indeed one of the more complex parts of a spread
spectrum system. But there are standard, well studied ways to do it,
and any of several textbooks have good descriptions. It's more tedious
than difficult. A good job for VLSI.

The "gold codes" you mention are simply one family of spreading
sequences.  There are others.  You'd search for signals that use them
in the same way you'd search for any kind of spreading sequence -- by
searching the sequence space until you find a correlation between the
incoming signal and your local copy of the spreading sequence. You
detect this by the sudden increase in narrowband signal energy seen at
the output of the despreader around the nominal carrier frequency when
you're within a chip of the correct time. You then lock onto and track
the spreading sequence with a circuit very similar to a phase locked
loop.

Practical spread spectrum systems aid this process either by
synchronizing the spreading sequence to a common clock source, or by
using a small enough spreading sequence to make searching the entire
sequence feasible.

In our CDMA cellular system, we use both approaches and several
ordinary LSFR PN sequences (not Gold codes). There's a "short PN" code
(2^15 chips long) common to all cells that can be found by a mobile
within a few seconds of being turned on, and an additional per-user
"long code" (2^47-1 chips) that is synchronized with the aid of GPS
receivers at the cells. Both operate at the same chip rate (1.2288
Mhz).

The gory details can be found by anonymous FTP to lorien.qualcomm.com,
in /pub/cdma. Read the "overview" document first.

Phil






From sDun at isma.demon.co.uk  Fri Feb  5 03:23:58 1993
From: sDun at isma.demon.co.uk (Stephen Dunne)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 03:23:58 PST
Subject: How to e-mail the White House
In-Reply-To: <9302050051.AA07524@toad.com>
Message-ID: <728928401snx@isma.demon.co.uk>


In article <9302050051.AA07524 at toad.com> you write:
>>         PS: Extra special thanks to Mr. Tribble for finding this. Where did y
>>pick
>>         it up?
>>
>>Thanks for the thanks, but I just forwarded it.  I don't know who
>>originated the message.  Afterward I noted that the chatty part of the
>>message sounded like I had written it.  We can appropriately give
>>thansk to a now anonymous source :-)
>>
>>dean
>
>I've seen it broadcast on a number of listservs, actually; I don't
>think it's being kept to any degree of secrecy.  However, nearly every
>place it was posted soon found follow-ups reporting receiving undelivered
>mail messages.  Maybe it's encrypted.
>
>John Coryell.
>
Nah!! It's Compu$erve bouncing mail because the mail-box is probably full.
I can very easily imagine the net totally flooding it!! :-)

Stephen
-- 
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Stephen Dunne                             DoD#767 sdun at isma.demon.co.uk   |
|International Securities Market Association       I speak for me,thats all|
|Voice (+44) 71-538-5656    Fax (+44) 71-538-4902  PGP 2.1 key available   |
|We are not affiliated to any other Demon.Co.Uk site. (especially Evil!)   |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+





From ncselxsi!drzaphod at ncselxsi.netcom.com  Fri Feb  5 07:29:48 1993
From: ncselxsi!drzaphod at ncselxsi.netcom.com (DrZaphod)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 07:29:48 PST
Subject: White House letter
Message-ID: <23473.drzaphod@ncselxsi>


In Message Thu, 4 Feb 1993 23:22-EST,
  GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU!Marc.Ringuette at netcomsv.netcom.com writes:

>Dear President Clinton,
>   Bring democracy to the bits!  Let's take a vote among all the bits
>   to decide which value, 0 or 1, is most correct.  Then we can set all
>   bits to that value and they will all be equal!
>Best regards,  The Cypherpunks (Socialist Subgroup).
>
     This one soundz a bit like self-rightiousness [sp?] FIND WHAT IS RIGHT
AND MAKE EVERYBODY "RIGHT".  I think that's what they're [we're?] already
doing.

>Dear President Clinton,
>   Freedom for the bits!  We will not rest until each bit is free to
>   determine its own natural orientation without outside coercion.  The
>   good news is, you don't need to do anything at all; merely get out of
>   the way of the free market, and the bits will free themselves.
>Best regards,  The Cypherpunks (Anarchist Subgroup).

     I like this one.. |-]
TTFN!

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod at ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized





From ncselxsi!drzaphod at ncselxsi.netcom.com  Fri Feb  5 07:29:50 1993
From: ncselxsi!drzaphod at ncselxsi.netcom.com (DrZaphod)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 07:29:50 PST
Subject: White House Replies
Message-ID: <23484.drzaphod@ncselxsi>


The White House writes:

> PS: If you did not include your U.S. mail return address in your
> message and you want a reply, please send your message again and
> include that information.

     Well this is completely useless, isn't it.. If we imagine this
logically we can see masses of e-mail entering the White House while snail
mail trickles out... Definately a buffer problem |-].  At least they're
trying, I suppose.  TTFN!

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod at ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized





From deltorto at aol.com  Fri Feb  5 08:46:33 1993
From: deltorto at aol.com (deltorto at aol.com)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 08:46:33 PST
Subject: Dear Mr. President
Message-ID: <9302051147.tn12993@aol.com>


Here are a few thoughts on the letter we will send to Bill.

[A] We should make up a key for the whole group with an insanely long
password and all get together and sign it in person.

[B] We should send our message to Bill _heavily_ encrypted and as anonymously
as possible (I'm talkin' to you remailer studs), and we should send the key
under a separate 'envelope.' I suggest that this will definitely get the
White House's attention (probably a lot of other people at the No Shit
Association too, but hey...).

[C] Beyond a congratulatory notes that he has actually bothered to take the
Presidency "online," the letter might focus on two main areas:

1. Technology/Privacy:
- Privacy and how important it is to the preservation of Democracy.
Mentioning the White House email situation to bring it home.
- Advancement of technology and how the Government can support us by getting
the fuck out of the way and/or providing R&D support (hear, hear, Crunch).
I.e let's get those data highways rolling along.
- How we feel about the various Intelligence Services of the US Government
and how taming them might improve our international reputation. And tell them
not to fuck with our mobile phones, etc.

Politics:
We might also mention how nice it is that he supports Family Values (unlike
Bush and rich Cronies), how savvy he is to leave gays in the military alone
(unlike most of the GI's I have ever heard of, who mercilessly harrass
women), what a good thing it is to house homeless people in unused military
barracks and how important it is to send aid to Russia before they come over
here and try to live in our unused military barracks, stuff like that.

[D] Let's make it a nice letter, full of support, good vibes and humor. We
are an interesting group of engineers, artists and creative people and he
should be reminded that we are watching him and that he has some support. The
guy has a tough job cleaning up all the shit the Bushmen left behind. He
deserves some goodwill.

[E] ?

  dave





From dead at phantom.com  Fri Feb  5 10:05:43 1993
From: dead at phantom.com (Bruce Fancher)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 10:05:43 PST
Subject: Dear Mr. President
In-Reply-To: <9302051147.tn12993@aol.com>
Message-ID: <m0nKXN7-000k1sC@phantom.com>


>Politics:
>We might also mention how nice it is that he supports Family Values (unlike
>Bush and rich Cronies), how savvy he is to leave gays in the military alone
>(unlike most of the GI's I have ever heard of, who mercilessly harrass
>women), what a good thing it is to house homeless people in unused military
>barracks and how important it is to send aid to Russia before they come over
>here and try to live in our unused military barracks, stuff like that.

	Why don't we just stick to privacy and encryption and leave out
everything else?  There is no way I'm going to affix my name to a letter
expressing any of the above opinions. 

-- 
Bruce Fancher -+- dead at phantom.com






From thug at phantom.com  Fri Feb  5 10:18:57 1993
From: thug at phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 10:18:57 PST
Subject: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Message-ID: <m0nKXZq-000k1sC@phantom.com>



According to what I read it seems that the whole issue of cellular radio
signal encryption is really a non-issue.  They could have the most secure
standard for radio signal encryption and it wouldn't matter.  The FBI
already uses tie lines and REMOBs (remote observation units) at the telephone
switching centers to access the conversation on any particular local loop
(phone number) that they want.  I know, because in my younger days as a phone
phreak my friends and I used to play with REMOBs and BLV all the time, so 
I personally know that they exist.  

What makes you think they don't have the same kind of REMOB/BLV capability
to the cellular telephone switches?  I mean, if a conversation is scrambled
from the mobile phone to the switch over the radio, it must be unscrambled
at the switch before it can be transmitted over the trunk lines into the
PSTN network, and that's where the FBI places their tie-lines and REMOB
units.

Like someone else in this thread already mentioned, high-level end-to-end
encryption is the only way to protect your privacy.

Thug 





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Fri Feb  5 10:31:51 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 10:31:51 PST
Subject: Dear Mr. President
In-Reply-To: <9302051147.tn12993@aol.com>
Message-ID: <9302051829.AA09975@soda.berkeley.edu>



I applaud the Clinton administration for making itself available via
email.  I do not think it advisable, however, to send a single
cypherpunks letter.  Rather I urge all interested parties to compose
their own letters, and send them in separately.

Stress privacy, and technological defenses thereto.

At risk of offensively stating the obvious, I also urge the following
general writer's guidelines:

1) Engage brain before typing.  Think about the one thing you want to
talk about, and talk about that.

2) Do not be paranoid.  Do not rant.  These are a sure ways to
indicate that more money should be budgeted for public relations.

3) Be brief.  If you cannot summarize your argument into a single
paragraph, neither will the reader of the mail.  The mail system is
already overloaded, and concision indicates politeness.

4) Write in standard English.  Use a spelling checker, and use
complete sentences.

5) Offer to help.  Offer to make timely review of proposed policies.
If they accept your aid, keep your promises.

6) Have someone else read your letter for content and for form.  You
can do this yourself if you put the text aside for a week or two.
Remember that obsession with keeping every cleverness you think up in
a text is the surest way to ensure that it never improve.

Eric





From crunch at netcom.com  Fri Feb  5 10:50:46 1993
From: crunch at netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 10:50:46 PST
Subject: A Bug?
Message-ID: <9302051847.AA05772@netcom3.netcom.com>



  Don't know if it's something stupid I'm doing,  or if there's a bug
in the Mac PGP 2.1,   but after selecting Text only,  and Radix 64
mode,   after encrypting the text,   I lose all carriage returns
after decrypting it.   Almost everything I get had no carriage
returns in it.    I use the Think C editor,  or BBEdit for editing
my text.   Is there an option that permits PGP to retain the carriage
returns?

JD





From Eric.Fogleman at analog.com  Fri Feb  5 10:52:13 1993
From: Eric.Fogleman at analog.com (Eric Fogleman)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 10:52:13 PST
Subject: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Message-ID: <9302051849.AA18299@ack.adstest.analog.com>


(Thug writes)

> According to what I read it seems that the whole issue of cellular radio
> signal encryption is really a non-issue.  They could have the most secure
...
> What makes you think they don't have the same kind of REMOB/BLV capability
> to the cellular telephone switches?  I mean, if a conversation is scrambled
...

If getting around GSM encryption is no problem, then why are governments
pushing the issue?

Eric Fogleman






From pmetzger at shearson.com  Fri Feb  5 10:53:24 1993
From: pmetzger at shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 10:53:24 PST
Subject: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Message-ID: <9302051715.AA22381@maggie.shearson.com>


> From: Brad Huntting <huntting at glarp.com>
> 
> It would seem that both the sender and reciever need to be exactly
> syncronized to within 1/4 of a bit for this to work.  Since voice
> data requires about 64Khz

Just as a point of information, you can compress voice into 4kbit/sec
without any real loss of quality.

Perry





From crunch at netcom.com  Fri Feb  5 11:01:06 1993
From: crunch at netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 11:01:06 PST
Subject: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Message-ID: <9302051857.AA06134@netcom3.netcom.com>



>What makes you think they don't have the same kind of REMOB/BLV capability
>to the cellular telephone switches?  I mean, if a conversation is scrambled
>from the mobile phone to the switch over the radio, it must be unscrambled
>at the switch before it can be transmitted over the trunk lines into the
>PSTN network, and that's where the FBI places their tie-lines and REMOB
>units.

As far as I know,   most cellular interfaces to the BOC system is
digital.    But I suppose there might be some interface somewhere.
I'll put a few "feelers" out and see what I come up with.

JD

(Scuse line noise..)





From gnu  Fri Feb  5 11:17:05 1993
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 11:17:05 PST
Subject: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <9302051715.AA22381@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9302051916.AA23983@toad.com>


> > ... voice data requires about 64Khz...

Actually I think you meant 64 kbits/sec.

> Just as a point of information, you can compress voice into 4kbit/sec
> without any real loss of quality.

I wouldn't say "without any real loss of quality".  I have an AT&T secure
phone on loan for evaluation (attendees at the last Mt. View cypherpunks
meeting have played with it).  It compresses voice to 4800 b/s then encrypts
it and uses a stripped down V.32 modem to send it.

The voice is intelligible on the other end, but there is definitely a
loss of quality.  It sounds like you are talking through the bubbler
in an aquarium (underwater).  But it is possible to recognize
someone's voice on the other end, at least when you already know who
it is.  "No real loss of quality" goes way too far.

By the way, I have public domain (federally written) code that
compresses voice down to this size.  It's called CELP, Code Excited
Linear Prediction.  The only catch is the code they wrote runs much
slower than realtime (on workstations).  My guess is that there are
significant speedups that we could make by hacking on it and running
gprof.  Van Jacobson has done some work on this, but his policy seems
to be to sit on anything good for two to three years before releasing
it.  Anyone interested in beating him to the net with something that
would compress voice (or voicemail) in realtime on a 486 or a SPARC?

	John





From thug at phantom.com  Fri Feb  5 11:40:52 1993
From: thug at phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 11:40:52 PST
Subject: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <9302051849.AA18299@ack.adstest.analog.com>
Message-ID: <m0nKYr1-000k1tC@phantom.com>


(Eric Fogleman writes)
> (Thug writes)
> > According to what I read it seems that the whole issue of cellular radio
> > signal encryption is really a non-issue.  They could have the most secure
> ...
> > What makes you think they don't have the same kind of REMOB/BLV capability
> > to the cellular telephone switches?  I mean, if a conversation is scrambled
> ...
> 
> If getting around GSM encryption is no problem, then why are governments
> pushing the issue?
> 
> Eric Fogleman

The first reason is that they want to steer people's attentions away from the
real issues.  Thus if they are defeated on this one, they can say "Oh well,
we'll be nice guys and you chaps this one.. but from now on leave us alone and
let us go about our business of protecting you from yourselves." Basically,
they want to fight us every step of the way, to make sure we don't get close
enough to really start eating into their security..

The second reason of course is that they want to play super g-men, and ride
around in vans full of cellular equipment following their suspects around
the city.  It's just too damn boring for them to dail up a REMOB at the
cellular switch and listen in that way in the confort of their own offices.
They need outdoor recreation, they need to feel like they're all James Bond
or something.  That's what the second reason is.

Practically speaking though, cellular encryption does hamper their ability
to listen in.  Because sometimes they don't have access to the REMOB at
a cellular switch, like when they are listening in without a warrant.  If
they access the REMOB, that would be noted in a log somewhere and then they
could have problems if the suspect finds out they were wiretapping without
a warrant.  If they just pick it off the air, they don't need a warrant. If
they do a wiretap the old way, they do.  Hence, secure cellular encryption
would actually prevent unauthorized wiretapping, which is something they
never seem to mention to the people they are empowered to protect. 

 
Thug 





From crunch at netcom.com  Fri Feb  5 12:20:11 1993
From: crunch at netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 12:20:11 PST
Subject: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Message-ID: <9302052019.AA05398@netcom2.netcom.com>


Gilmore writes:

>Anyone interested in beating him to the net with something that
>would compress voice (or voicemail) in realtime on a 486 or a SPARC?

I used to build voice scramblers,  but mostly in hardware using
a Psuedo noise source.    It wirked pretty good,  but had to
compress the bandwidth down to about 2kHz.   Thus the reason
why it sounds like talking in a tunnel.    Has anyone done a
feasability study on whether of not a 486 or Sparc station can
do this in real time?

It would seem to me that Voice mail systems should incorperate
this in their system,   thus scrambling the messages unless a
access code can be used to retrieve it.   

JD





From julf at penet.FI  Fri Feb  5 12:22:44 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 12:22:44 PST
Subject: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <9302051715.AA22381@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9302052105.aa02995@penet.penet.FI>



> Just as a point of information, you can compress voice into 4kbit/sec
> without any real loss of quality.

GSM uses 11.5 kbit/s. GSM is also supposed to provide a digital 9600 bd
async connection, but I have not yet seen any implementations of data
GSM. Some manufacturers are promising to ship products supporting it during
1993...

	Julf






From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Fri Feb  5 12:25:23 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 12:25:23 PST
Subject: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <9302051849.AA18299@ack.adstest.analog.com>
Message-ID: <9302052022.AA16372@soda.berkeley.edu>


Eric Fogleman writes:

>If getting around GSM encryption is no problem, then why are governments
>pushing the issue?

Cryptography is all economics.  Every barrier adds cost to interception.

Eric






From deboni at diego.llnl.gov  Fri Feb  5 12:44:58 1993
From: deboni at diego.llnl.gov (Tom DeBoni)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 12:44:58 PST
Subject: hardware scramblers
Message-ID: <9302052040.AA24629@diego.llnl.gov>


I don't know a whole lot about this subject, but I'd like to hazard a suggestion
about hardware scramblers. I once upon a time saw an article in some source,
perhaps Popular Science or the like, on how to build a cheap voice scrambler
for telephones using a circuit called a ring demodulator (or something like
that). The curcuit had a ring of diodes, looking like a bridge rectifier,
with the voice and noise source feeding in and some function of the inputs
feeding out. The idea was to pick a radio station at random, use its audio as
a noise source, and let your partner at the other find the station that
renders the signal comprehensble. This only works if both parties have access
to the same radio signals, and can easily be defeated in short order by any
eavesdroppers with radios, but taping your conversation does them no good.
Further, it's cheap, requires no compression or sophisticated hardware, and
uses the whole telephone voice bandwidth.

I've never tried this, so I don't know how well it works, but since it's an
old idea, perhaps it could be dressed up for modern needs.

Tom DeBoni
deboni at llnl.gov





From phiber at eff.org  Fri Feb  5 13:25:04 1993
From: phiber at eff.org (Phiber Optik)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 13:25:04 PST
Subject: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <m0nKYr1-000k1tC@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <199302052123.AA26150@eff.org>


I must admit, the last thing I would've thought I'd see on this list is
mindless, uninformed blabbering about "REMOBz".
Give it a rest, will ya?






From ncselxsi!chasw at netcom.com  Fri Feb  5 15:22:47 1993
From: ncselxsi!chasw at netcom.com (Charles E. Wareing)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 15:22:47 PST
Subject: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <199302052123.AA26150@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9302052253.AA16230@ncselxsi.UUCP>


> 
> I must admit, the last thing I would've thought I'd see on this list is
> mindless, uninformed blabbering about "REMOBz".
> Give it a rest, will ya?

Maybe I'm a little out-of-sorts today, but...

I've heard (via Tv reports, reading, etc) that PhiberOptik (paraphrasing
here) "...knows more about Phone Systems than most Bell engineers".  Why
on Earth would you respond the way you did, rather than:

   1. Ignoring it
   2. Providing pointers to technical sources
   3. Refuting it with information.

I flame about *lots* of stuff, though I am, after all, a Sensei. Lose 
sight of your ability to teach, and you are nothing more than another
Technocrat.



-- 
Charlie Wareing    [:-)>             * "If it ain't broke, don't fix it"
chasw at ncselxsi.uucp                  * "If it's jammed, force it. If it
ELXSI 6400s fixed while you wait.    *   breaks, it needed replacing anyway."





From gnu  Fri Feb  5 16:12:59 1993
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 16:12:59 PST
Subject: CELP speech compression code at cygnus.com:/pub/celp.speech.tar.Z
Message-ID: <9302060012.AA00780@toad.com>


The code is up for FTP where you-all can get it.  I made both compressed
and gzip'd versions (gzip gives smaller files than compress, is faster
to decompress, but slower to compress).

-rw-rw-r--   1 gnu      cygnus    2571835 Feb  5 16:04 celp.speech.tar.Z
-rw-rw-r--   1 gnu      cygnus    2099441 Feb  5 16:09 celp.speech.tar.z

Much of the tar file is samples of compressed and uncompressed speech,
(used for testing the code).  The actual C code is about 340K uncompressed,
and there's also a Fortran version in there.

I have a copy of the actual compression standard, but not online.
The Information Liberation Front is welcome to a copy -- maybe
I should just leave it on the table at the next meeting and hope someone
"anonymously" picks it up and scans it in.  It's public domain, so
there's no special thrill from liberating it.

	John





From pmetzger at shearson.com  Fri Feb  5 18:57:18 1993
From: pmetzger at shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 18:57:18 PST
Subject: CELP speech compression code at cygnus.com:/pub/celp.speech.tar.Z
Message-ID: <9302060139.AA06488@maggie.shearson.com>


> From: gnu at toad.com (John Gilmore)
> 
> The code is up for FTP where you-all can get it.  I made both compressed
> and gzip'd versions (gzip gives smaller files than compress, is faster
> to decompress, but slower to compress).
> 
> -rw-rw-r--   1 gnu      cygnus    2571835 Feb  5 16:04 celp.speech.tar.Z
> -rw-rw-r--   1 gnu      cygnus    2099441 Feb  5 16:09 celp.speech.tar.z
> 
> Much of the tar file is samples of compressed and uncompressed speech,
> (used for testing the code).  The actual C code is about 340K uncompressed,
> and there's also a Fortran version in there.
> 
> I have a copy of the actual compression standard, but not online.
> The Information Liberation Front is welcome to a copy -- maybe
> I should just leave it on the table at the next meeting and hope someone
> "anonymously" picks it up and scans it in.  It's public domain, so
> there's no special thrill from liberating it.

It occured to me that some people might not get the significance of all
this, so prehaps I ought to amplify. 

With the ability to compress speech down into the
same baud rate as, say, a V.32 modem, all one would have to do to have
perfectly secure voice communications is replace your phone with a
setup that took in your speech, digitized it, compressed it, encrypted
it, and sent it over the modem to the other side where this would be
inverted. Fast enough software compression of voice would mean any PC 
with a DSP card and a V.32 modem could become an unbreakable scrambler.
The chief problem is that the DSP needed to do decent compression is
very crunchy, and encryption also tends to be crunchy, so there aren't
typically enough cycles on your average PC. Of course, were someone to
commercially market a board that did all this in hardware...

Perry





From phiber at eff.org  Sat Feb  6 00:09:28 1993
From: phiber at eff.org (Phiber Optik)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 93 00:09:28 PST
Subject: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <9302052253.AA16230@ncselxsi.UUCP>
Message-ID: <199302060808.AA04899@eff.org>


> 
> > 
> > I must admit, the last thing I would've thought I'd see on this list is
> > mindless, uninformed blabbering about "REMOBz".
> > Give it a rest, will ya?
> 
> Maybe I'm a little out-of-sorts today, but...
> 
> I've heard (via Tv reports, reading, etc) that PhiberOptik (paraphrasing
> here) "...knows more about Phone Systems than most Bell engineers".  Why
> on Earth would you respond the way you did, rather than:
> 
>    1. Ignoring it
>    2. Providing pointers to technical sources
>    3. Refuting it with information.
> 
> I flame about *lots* of stuff, though I am, after all, a Sensei. Lose 
> sight of your ability to teach, and you are nothing more than another
> Technocrat.
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Charlie Wareing    [:-)>             * "If it ain't broke, don't fix it"
> chasw at ncselxsi.uucp                  * "If it's jammed, force it. If it
> ELXSI 6400s fixed while you wait.    *   breaks, it needed replacing anyway."
> 
> 
OK, you forced me into it.  Sigh.  The reason for the short quip is because
I know the person who posted it, and I get rather impatient after the 
thousandth time hot air starts up the silly rumor mill.
A telecom manufacturing company by the name of Teltone makes a product called
a REMOBS, for REMote OBservation System (their part number M240, M241, M242).
Somewhere along the line, numerous years ago, someone must've thought this was
a "cool" name, and wrote a text file which was uploaded to various "underground
BBS's", making up a whole fantasy story that this is some top secret system,
and one could simply dial into it, enter a code in touch-tone, enter a phone
number, and proceed to listen in on a conversation.  THIS IS COMPLETE NONSENSE.
Because of this misinformation, every time some kid comes across some unknown
phone number (anything from phone company test lines, to beepers), they claim
they've found a "REMOB".  There's always some blatant liar who contributes to
the propaganda by claiming they listen in to phone lines.
The actual product (go ahead and order the specs), is to sample trunk quality
by making a metallic connection.  The archaic M240 from the 70's, was for
electromechanical switches, the M241 was a portable model, and I believe the
M242 was for electronic switches.  They do have a remote feature, which allows
one to enter a code and specify a sequence of digits indicating a certain
trunk (depending on however it was wired in).  It's a rather low-tech piece of
equipment, and suffice to say, the BOCs DO NOT USE IT.  There are a number
of trunk and line testing systems which have been in standard use in the RBOCs
for years.  The fabled "REMOB" is not one of them.  In brief, the Switching
Control Centers (SCCs) and Network Terminal Equipment Centers (NTECs) use a
system called CAROT (Centralized Automatic Reporting On Trunks), a batch system
that in turn uses the complement of standard test lines (1004Hz S/N, type 105
ATMS, short ckt, open ckt, impedance, etc, etc.) to provide more than adequate
testing of trunks.  Digital switches (i.e. 5ESS and DMS100) have their own
trunk testing facilities.  As far as line testing goes, the Repair Service
Bureau (RSB) uses a plethora of systems.  Namely LMOS/MLT (Loop Maintenance
Operations System/Mechanized Line Testing), Tracker, Predictor, etc., etc.
I could go on and on, but I think I've made my point.
It's a SCIENCE, and it's silly to even consider such an irrelevant piece of
garbage as a REMOBS.  It's a gross and purposeless rumor, and now you see
why I hesitated wasting the time in explaining all this, because it comes up
OVER and OVER and OVER.






From ncselxsi!drzaphod at ncselxsi.netcom.com  Sat Feb  6 09:27:02 1993
From: ncselxsi!drzaphod at ncselxsi.netcom.com (DrZaphod)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 93 09:27:02 PST
Subject: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Message-ID: <30494.drzaphod@ncselxsi>


In Message Fri, 5 Feb 93 13:14:58 EST,
  phantom.com!thug at netcomsv.netcom.com (Murdering Thug) writes:

>According to what I read it seems that the whole issue of cellular radio
>signal encryption is really a non-issue.  They could have the most secure
>standard for radio signal encryption and it wouldn't matter.  The FBI
>already uses tie lines and REMOBs (remote observation units) at the telephone
>switching centers to access the conversation on any particular local loop
>(phone number) that they want.

     The reason cells are encrypting is to protect against "unauthorized
persons" [i.e civilians who havn't joined the fedz and DON'T live off other
people's money [ours]].  I think this is another case that shows: letting
other people encrypt your data for your protection never works out to be
much good.  I agree with Thug in that we need to employ our OWN encryption
from one end to the other.  That CRYPTOCUP soundz pretty good right about
now.  TTFN!

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod at ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized





From thug at phantom.com  Sat Feb  6 12:16:33 1993
From: thug at phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 93 12:16:33 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302060139.AA06488@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <m0nKvtB-000jrIC@phantom.com>


Perry E. Metzger writes:
> It occured to me that some people might not get the significance of all
> this, so prehaps I ought to amplify. 
> 
> With the ability to compress speech down into the
> same baud rate as, say, a V.32 modem, all one would have to do to have
> perfectly secure voice communications is replace your phone with a
> setup that took in your speech, digitized it, compressed it, encrypted
> it, and sent it over the modem to the other side where this would be
> inverted. Fast enough software compression of voice would mean any PC 
> with a DSP card and a V.32 modem could become an unbreakable scrambler.
> The chief problem is that the DSP needed to do decent compression is
> very crunchy, and encryption also tends to be crunchy, so there aren't
> typically enough cycles on your average PC. Of course, were someone to
> commercially market a board that did all this in hardware...

This is a device waiting to be built, if it has not been built already.
I would estimate that a pair of such stand-alone encrypted telephones can
be built for under $2000 and about a month or two of development time.

And why are you limiting this to V.32 (9600bps)?  V.32bis (14.4k bps) modem
chips cost maybe 20% more than v.32 chips in quantity.

Even higher speeds are available if you're willing to go that far.  Zyxel
v.32bis modems have proprietary 16.8 kbps and 19.2 kbps full duplex raw
modulation rates, but they use DSPs instead of modem chips like the
ones from Rockwell, AT&T, and Intel.  I believe there are some v.FAST
(not CCITT compliant) modems like the one's from Motorola (Codex) that
can do 21.6 kbps and 24.0 kbps.  I believe the final speed of v.FAST once
standardized by the CCITT will be 28.8 kbps.

Even so, if CEPT coding provides somewhat intelligeable speech at 4800 bps,
then I am sure the sound quality at 14,400 bps is at least as good as
regular analog telphone conversations when it comes to voice.

Consider a device that uses this: 

       A. a dedicated CEPT codec chip if they currently exist
            OR
          a DSP chip programmed for CEPT compression coding/decoding 

       B. a high-speed dedicated DES chip
            OR 
          a RISC microcontroller (i960/amd29k) to do IDEA or LOKI 

       C. a quality UART like the Zilog SCC or National 16550AFN 

       D. an external 14,400 bps modem ( v.42 & v.42bis turned off)

                  _____         _____         _____          _____
  earpiece <-----|     |       |     |       |     |        |     | 
                 |     |  bus  |     |  bus  |     | RS-232 |     |
                 |  A  |-------|  B  |-------|  C  |--------|  D  |-----: RJ-11
                 |     |       |     |       |     |        |     |       jack 
mouthpiece >-----|_____|       |_____|       |_____|        |_____| 
                                                |
                                                |
                                           dialing keypad
                                         on/off-hook switch
                                             circuit

Of course, if the FBI's Digital Telephony act passes it would be illegal to
sell such devices if they do not have a back door.  HOWEVER, it would not
be illegal to build such devices for personal use.  Hence, one may publish
the schematics and DSP/microcontroller source code to such a device and
let people build them themselves.  However, the masses would not benefit
from this.  Only those with the skills or those with the money (mafia/drug
lords) to pay those with the skills, would be able to produce such devices
for their own use.  The FBI's proposal would not stop the people they want
to catch most from using encryption.  The FBI is wasting their time, and
taking away our rights for no good reason.

I assume a black market for such devices as the above already exists and
will expand massively as the price of DSPs and RISC microcontrollers
drops.  The logical end result would be to put this whole device onto a
single VLSI chip, and selling such crypt-phones for $100-200 a pop to the
mases, but there's a snowballs chance in hell of that happening if the world's
governments have anything to do with it.


Thug





From dclunie at pax.tpa.com.au  Sat Feb  6 16:33:58 1993
From: dclunie at pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 93 16:33:58 PST
Subject: PAX code posted
Message-ID: <9302070032.AA03792@britt>


After many requests from loyal fans, I have posted the ugly and crude
scripts that used to be the PAX anonymous and encrypted remailing
service to alt.sources.






From karn at qualcomm.com  Sat Feb  6 18:17:30 1993
From: karn at qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 93 18:17:30 PST
Subject: White Mail
Message-ID: <9302070216.AA22433@servo>



>E-MAIL RULING MAY HAMPER CLINTON ADMINISTRATION

Hmm, I wonder what would happen if they start using PGP? After all,
the Federal government has full rights to use RSA. (Dunno about IDEA).

I have mixed feelings on this issue. On the one hand, the people have
a right to know how government authority is being exercised. On the other
hand, even people in government have privacy rights. And if you mandate
that their email is a public record, then they will just find other ways
to have private conversations.

Maybe the real answer lies in not giving them so much power in the first place.

Phil






From a2 at well.sf.ca.us  Sat Feb  6 22:05:56 1993
From: a2 at well.sf.ca.us (Arthur Abraham)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 93 22:05:56 PST
Subject: It's the Information, (that keeps you from being) Stupid!
Message-ID: <199302070603.AA14462@well.sf.ca.us>


Charles E. Wareing writes:

>I've heard (via Tv reports, reading, etc) that PhiberOptik (paraphrasing
>here) "...knows more about Phone Systems than most Bell engineers".  Why
>on Earth would you respond the way you did, rather than:
>
>   1. Ignoring it
>   2. Providing pointers to technical sources
>   3. Refuting it with information.

I strongly support this statement, particularly 3.

-a2.





From marc at Athena.MIT.EDU  Sat Feb  6 22:06:54 1993
From: marc at Athena.MIT.EDU (Marc Horowitz)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 93 22:06:54 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <m0nKvtB-000jrIC@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9302070605.AA27822@hodge>


>> Of course, if the FBI's Digital Telephony act passes it would be illegal to
>> sell such devices if they do not have a back door.  

Not True.

The proposed legislation states:

	  (a)  Providers of electronic communication services and private 
    branch exchange operators shall provide within the United States 
    capability and capacity for the government to intercept wire and 
    electronic communications when authorized by law:  

This law does not prevent *users* from providing *end-to-end*
encryption.

This does not mean that they might not try to remove this right in the
future, but they haven't gone that far yet.

		Marc





From shipley at tfs.COM  Sat Feb  6 22:16:48 1993
From: shipley at tfs.COM (Peter Shipley)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 93 22:16:48 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <m0nKvtB-000jrIC@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9302070615.AA19855@edev0.TFS>



>
>And why are you limiting this to V.32 (9600bps)?  V.32bis (14.4k bps) modem
>chips cost maybe 20% more than v.32 chips in quantity.
>


at Interopt I heard some voice demos that were at 9600 4800 and 2400 baud
the 2400 sounded a phoneme chip but was *very* resionable.


		-Pete






From phiber at eff.org  Sat Feb  6 22:49:38 1993
From: phiber at eff.org (Phiber Optik)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 93 22:49:38 PST
Subject: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <9302061733.AA10282@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199302070648.AA14155@eff.org>


> 
> Thanks for going into more detail on the REMOB fantasy.
> 
> Can you tell the group what facilities are available that actually do
> allow a technician to monitor a particular line (or group of lines),
> e.g. what could a telco emp or a phone phreak do (regarding a short or
> long term wiretap) if they wanted?  And what facilities are *actually
> used* when a court-ordered wiretap is implemented?  My impression is
> that the two are different.
> 
> 	John
> 
I'm glad you brought up this subject, John, because there is indeed a good
deal of misinformation in this area.
I'll start off with some of the numerous facilities available to a telco
technician.  The first I'll mention is MLT (Mechanized Loop or Line Testing),
a system which is part of the LCAMOS group of systems (Loop and Cable Admini-
stration Maintenance Operations System).  Used by Repair Service Attendants,
it's seamlessly accessed through LMOS (Loop Maintenance Operations System),
when the attendant specifies a 'mask' (form type) that would involve a real-
time test to be performed.  At the heart of LMOS is a System 370-type pro-
cessor.  Attendants access the various functions through a Front End (FE)
system, commonly running Unix.  The data comprising customer records and
their corresponding trouble reports/service histories is kept on a high-
capacity storage system (nicknamed the HICAPs).  Each front-end accesses
data from different HICAPs for the respective areas they cover.  Getting
back to masks, when the attendant gets a call on 611, upon the customer
hanging up, they usually issue the TEST mask, which accesses MLT which in
turn establishes a metallic connection to the phone line.  MLT then carries
out impedance, capacitance, frequency/amplitude response tests (at 404Hz,
1004Hz, and 2804Hz, standard), tests for line activity, etc., etc.  The
attendant then has the option to open a trouble record (using the ESTablish
mask), to initiate further testing and repair, possibly dispatching someone,
etc.  I'm getting a bit off topic, but I thought some background was in order
rather than just saying "MLT monitors lines, so there".  What I'm driving at
in this scenario is that there is also a mask known as TV, for Trouble
Verification.  The /FORm associated with this mask requests such information
as the phone number, the 3-digit employee code, a callback number for security,
and the type of TV (RCA, Magnavox, Toshiba, just kidding :), types being talk,
(the attendant can be heard) or monitor without speech path, to name the most
relevant.  It would not be impossible to substitute "someone with a computer
and the know-how" in the place of the word "attendant", but don't overestimate
this possibility.  It's bragged about FAR more than it is actually done.  But
it remains a possibility.
I'll continue this in successive messages, so it's in manageable chunks.






From phiber at eff.org  Sat Feb  6 23:44:31 1993
From: phiber at eff.org (Phiber Optik)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 93 23:44:31 PST
Subject: (Non)Privacy in Phone System...
Message-ID: <199302070743.AA14539@eff.org>


My last message was about LMOS/MLT, and MLT's monitoring capabilities of
subscriber lines.  Another phone company testing system worth mentioning
is SARTS (and DACS and SMAS.  That's three, but they're related.)  SARTS
is the Switched Access Remote Test System, and is used in testing special
service circuits.  And what's special service?  A lot of things that AREN'T
POTS (Plain Old Telephone Service).  Anything from WATS service, to digital
carriers (DDS, T1, etc.), and so on.  And it's the hard working men and women
of the aptly named Special Services Center (or just "Special Services") who
oversee nearly every aspect of installation and maintenance.  Ah, yes.
(Clears throat)  The reason I mention them is because every digital carrier
goes through your friendly neighborhood BOC central office, whether it be
a company's private carrier or someone's dedicated connection to the Internet
(EFF's, toad's, etc.).  Like MLT is a system used to test subscriber lines
in real time, so SARTS is a system used to test special service circuits.
In conjunction with SMAS (Switched Maintenance Access System), and the ability
to jack-in with their favorite test equipment (such as the much liked T-BERD),
together they make up an unbeatable arsenal in trouble shooting.  So why do
they screw up your leased-line service?  There are three rules in maintenance:
Training, training, and, of course, training.  Or lack thereof.
The lovely system which complements these, and even supercedes the need for
SMAS points, is DACS, the Digital Access and Cross-connect System.  One of its
most notable abilities, is providing per-channel 64kbps (DS0) electronic
cross-connection and test access to individual channels, IN ANALOG OR DIGITAL
FORM, from a T1 (DS1).  Sounds neat.  The FBI says "It can't be done!  You
have to make it built in!"  But it IS built in, they're just not allowed to
play with it (or are they anyway?)  Life is funny sometimes.

I'm going to pause for now, and concentrate on my Sherlock Holmes movie.
I'll see if my messages are well received, and pick it up tomorrow.






From jim at tadpole.com  Sun Feb  7 02:03:20 1993
From: jim at tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 02:03:20 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
Message-ID: <9302071001.AA00783@ono-sendai>



> From: Peter Shipley <shipley at tfs.COM>

> >And why are you limiting this to V.32 (9600bps)?  V.32bis (14.4k bps) modem
> >chips cost maybe 20% more than v.32 chips in quantity.
> 
> at Interopt I heard some voice demos that were at 9600 4800 and 2400 baud
> the 2400 sounded a phoneme chip but was *very* resionable.

Quite likely what you heard were 9600/4800/2400bps (bits per second),
not baud.  The two are different.  2400bps compression of voice is
quite a bit beyond current GP CPUs.

Also, note that 9600 baud (V.32 carriers) are based on a 2400bps carrier.
(And if they're not, I'm sure someone will correct me.)  2400 baud modems
are based a bit rate something less than 2400bps, though I can't remember
exactly what it is right now.

Jim






From jim at tadpole.com  Sun Feb  7 02:58:06 1993
From: jim at tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 02:58:06 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
Message-ID: <9302071056.AA00916@ono-sendai>


> And why are you limiting this to V.32 (9600bps)?  V.32bis (14.4k bps) modem
> chips cost maybe 20% more than v.32 chips in quantity.
> 
> Even higher speeds are available if you're willing to go that far.  Zyxel
> v.32bis modems have proprietary 16.8 kbps and 19.2 kbps full duplex raw
> modulation rates, but they use DSPs instead of modem chips like the
> ones from Rockwell, AT&T, and Intel.  I believe there are some v.FAST
> (not CCITT compliant) modems like the one's from Motorola (Codex) that
> can do 21.6 kbps and 24.0 kbps.  I believe the final speed of v.FAST once
> standardized by the CCITT will be 28.8 kbps.

I don't see how a 28.8kbps (raw) data rate is possible, as the Shannon
limit for a POTS line is 22kbps.  Certainly parts of the phone system
no longer impose the narrow bandwidth that are part of the 'spec', but
one can not always depend on getting a line that exceedes the published
parameters of the phone system.

The Rockwell (RC96AC/RC96ACL/RC144AC/RC144ACL) modem chip (set) has an
on-board codec that does ADPCM in hardware.  It makes for a very nice
programable answering machine.  Interestingly, the designers guide has
someting to say about bit rates.

At a sampling rate of 7.2 KHz, (the only sample rate this chipset
supports) 8 bit samples are presented at a bit rate of 57600 bps.  Add
in a start/stop bit, and you now need a DTE rate of 72,000 bps.  Most
UARTS don't support this rate, and thus you will need to find one that
will run at 115.2 Kbps.

Drop to 4 bit samples, and you get a bit rate of 28,800 bps, for a
required async DTE speed of 36,000.  (or 38400 bps on most uarts.)

I'm also fairly sure that recent Zyxel modems (e.g. the U-1496) use
this Rockwell chip(set), and not a dedicated DSP.

Jim





From p00258 at psilink.com  Sun Feb  7 06:35:39 1993
From: p00258 at psilink.com (A.J. Janschewitz)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 06:35:39 PST
Subject: Request from a new reader.
Message-ID: <2938181047.1.p00258@psilink.com>


I am new to this group and apologize if my request is covered in a FAQ. 
Would someone kindly point me to an FTP site or the location of a binary 
application that can be used to encrypt/decrypt text in an MS-DOS 
environment? I understand that PGP is UNIX-based, unless there is a DOS 
version of which I am unaware, but that's why I'm reading this group.

Thank you in advance for your help.

==a.j.==





From dionf at ERE.UMontreal.CA  Sun Feb  7 09:13:29 1993
From: dionf at ERE.UMontreal.CA (Francois Dion)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 09:13:29 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302071001.AA00783@ono-sendai>
Message-ID: <9302071709.AA28201@brise.ERE.UMontreal.CA>


Beyond the ultraworld of Jim Thompson:
> 
> 
> > From: Peter Shipley <shipley at tfs.COM>
> 
> > at Interopt I heard some voice demos that were at 9600 4800 and 2400 baud
> > the 2400 sounded a phoneme chip but was *very* resionable.
> 
> Quite likely what you heard were 9600/4800/2400bps (bits per second),
> not baud.  The two are different.  2400bps compression of voice is
> quite a bit beyond current GP CPUs.

Well, almost true. 9600 baud !=9600 bps in modems. 9600 bps modems are actually
2400 token per seconds, with each token beeing 4 bit long. 2400 bps modems
are also 2400 bauds (token per seconds) like the 9600 bps modems, but with each
token beeing 1 bit.

> Also, note that 9600 baud (V.32 carriers) are based on a 2400bps carrier.

No, it's the inverse 9600 bps are based on 2400 baud.

> (And if they're not, I'm sure someone will correct me.)  2400 baud modems
> are based a bit rate something less than 2400bps, though I can't remember
> exactly what it is right now.

No, a 2400 bps modem is 2400 baud because each token is 1 bit long.

Ciao,
-- 
Francois Dion
    '  _   _   _ 
 CISM (_) (_)  _) FM       Montreal , Canada       Email: CISM at ERE.UMontreal.CA
      (_)  / . _)             10000 Watts          Telephone no: (514) 343-7511
_______________________________________________________________________________
Audio-C-DJ-Fractals-Future-Label-Multimedia-Music-Radio-Rave-Video-VR-Volvo-...







From thug at phantom.com  Sun Feb  7 09:46:59 1993
From: thug at phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 09:46:59 PST
Subject: Modem Based Crypto Telephones
In-Reply-To: <9302071056.AA00916@ono-sendai>
Message-ID: <m0nLG0P-000jpMC@phantom.com>


jim at tadpole.com writes:
> thug at phantom.com writes:
> > Even higher speeds are available if you're willing to go that far.  Zyxel
> > v.32bis modems have proprietary 16.8 kbps and 19.2 kbps full duplex raw
> > modulation rates, but they use DSPs instead of modem chips like the
> > ones from Rockwell, AT&T, and Intel.  I believe there are some v.FAST
> > (not CCITT compliant) modems like the one's from Motorola (Codex) that
> > can do 21.6 kbps and 24.0 kbps.  I believe the final speed of v.FAST once
> > standardized by the CCITT will be 28.8 kbps.
> 
> I don't see how a 28.8kbps (raw) data rate is possible, as the Shannon
> limit for a POTS line is 22kbps.  Certainly parts of the phone system
> no longer impose the narrow bandwidth that are part of the 'spec', but
> one can not always depend on getting a line that exceedes the published
> parameters of the phone system.

Then how come Hayes demonstrated their v.FAST modems at Fall Comdex '92 in
Las Vegas.  According to the report on Comdex I am reading, the Hayes
modem dialed up another modem at Hayes headquarters in Atlanta and set
up a perfect 28.8 kbps full duplex raw data link.  With v.42bis the two
modems were exchanging text at close to 115.2 kbps.

> The Rockwell (RC96AC/RC96ACL/RC144AC/RC144ACL) modem chip (set) has an
> on-board codec that does ADPCM in hardware.  It makes for a very nice
> programable answering machine.  Interestingly, the designers guide has
> someting to say about bit rates.
> 
> At a sampling rate of 7.2 KHz, (the only sample rate this chipset
> supports) 8 bit samples are presented at a bit rate of 57600 bps.  Add
> in a start/stop bit, and you now need a DTE rate of 72,000 bps.  Most
> UARTS don't support this rate, and thus you will need to find one that
> will run at 115.2 Kbps.

This is way more than what is needed for telephone quality audio.  I
have programmed voice mail systems based on Dialogic hardware.  They use
a simple ADPCM codec and 6,000 4-bit samples/second.  This gives you
a audio bandwidth of 3khz, basically telephone quality.  At this rate,
we're talking about 6,000 x 4 bits = 24,000 bps.  And this is WITHOUT 
any kind of advanced compression.  A v.FAST modem doing 24.0 kbps
like the Motorola Codex can handle this now, and 28.8 kbps modems
can handles this and provide a 4kbps digital subcarrier for carrying
data with voice.  For instance, I could be having an encrypted conversation
with you and at the same time, I can send you a spreadsheet file at 4 kbps.
Obviously since the entire 28,800 bps stream would be encrypted, the
spreadsheet file would be encrypted as well.

You can also get excellent quality using 4800 samples/second using 3-bit
ADPCM samples.  This would give you 14,400 bps and an analog bandwidth
of 2400hz.  This is lower than phone quality which is 3000hz, but anything
above 2400hz is really useless for transmitting a male speaking voice
which hardly ever goes past 2000hz.  A female voice on the other hand might
sound somewhat distorted if everything above 2400hz is chopped off.  However,
using a DSP, one may shift the 0-2400hz bandwidth to 300-2700hz using a
toggle switch.  Thus all a female would have to do is toggle a switch on
the cryptophone to tell the other side about the shift.
 
> I'm also fairly sure that recent Zyxel modems (e.g. the U-1496) use
> this Rockwell chip(set), and not a dedicated DSP.

No, Zyxel uses a DSP. They are always updating their DSP roms to provide
new features.  Not only do Zyxel modems provide v.32/v.32bis/v.42/v.42bis,
and MNP 1-5, but also MNP 10, Caller ID, Voice Mail, and proprietary
16.8 kbps and 19.2 kbps full duplex modes. 

As soon as ISDN hits the streets, we won't have to worry about bandwidth
since it will be quite easy to build an all-digital crypto-phone that
provides end-to-end encryption based on a public key system.

Picture this: an ISDN phone that can operate in normal or encrypted mode,
that has a small 20mb 1.8" hard disk or flash eprom card to store the public
keys of all the people that you converse with who have similar phones.  In
fact, it is possible to set up a trusted centralized public key directory
assistance like service, which would contain perhaps everyone's public key,
and could be queried automatically at the beginning of each call.  The 20mb
storage could be a public key storage cache for people you call frequently,
while the public key directory assistance is used for people who you only
plan to call once.  On the other hand, a centralized authority is always
bad when it comes to security.  A PGP-like scheme of decentralized public
key distribution is much safer.  If Bob wants to give Mike's public key
(which is stored in Bob's phone) to Joe, all Bob has to do is call up
Joe, tell Joe that he that he wants to give him's Mike's phone number and
public key. Bob then presses a button on his phone and instantly uploads
Mike's public key to Joe's phone, either via a digital subchannel, or
via the main channel (and interrupt the conversation for a few seconds),
like the old video phones used to do to transmit still frames. 
 

Thug





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Sun Feb  7 18:38:49 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 18:38:49 PST
Subject: Request from a new reader.
In-Reply-To: <2938181047.1.p00258@psilink.com>
Message-ID: <9302080236.AA05195@soda.berkeley.edu>


anon-ftp to soda.berkeley.edu::pub/cypherpunks.  There's a copy of PGP
there.  Get the .zip version; it's a PC binary.  PGP was originally
written on PC's and later moved to Unix.

Eric





From phiber at eff.org  Sun Feb  7 21:22:26 1993
From: phiber at eff.org (Phiber Optik)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 21:22:26 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302071001.AA00783@ono-sendai>
Message-ID: <199302080521.AA05963@eff.org>


> 
> 
> > From: Peter Shipley <shipley at tfs.COM>
> 
> > >And why are you limiting this to V.32 (9600bps)?  V.32bis (14.4k bps) modem
> > >chips cost maybe 20% more than v.32 chips in quantity.
> > 
> > at Interopt I heard some voice demos that were at 9600 4800 and 2400 baud
> > the 2400 sounded a phoneme chip but was *very* resionable.
> 
> Quite likely what you heard were 9600/4800/2400bps (bits per second),
> not baud.  The two are different.  2400bps compression of voice is
> quite a bit beyond current GP CPUs.
> 
> Also, note that 9600 baud (V.32 carriers) are based on a 2400bps carrier.
> (And if they're not, I'm sure someone will correct me.)  2400 baud modems
> are based a bit rate something less than 2400bps, though I can't remember
> exactly what it is right now.
> 
> Jim
> 
> 

I'd wanted to say something about this for quite some time.  Everyone gets it
wrong, and let's just say you were CLOSE.  Lemme give a quick run down...
bps, or bits-per-second, is the bit rate of the datastream.  Now the rate
of MODULATION is called baud, named after the transmission engineer 
(telegraphy), Baudot.  Very simply, when you divide the bit-rate by the number
of bits per symbol, you get baud.  Everyone is in the (bad) habit of saying
'baud' for everything, because in FSK systems which code 1 bit per symbol
(only two phases), bps = baud.  But then and ONLY then.  They are not
universally synonymous.  But don't feel bad, the entire modem INDUSTRY gets it
wrong, too.  We're all throw backs to the 300 baud days, when 300 baud was
the same as 300 bps, the Bell 103 standard.  This was also true for 110 baud,
and the Bell 202 standard (1200 baud half-duplex).  Now then, when 1200 bps
FULL duplex was designed by CCITT, it was the V.22 standard.  The Bell system
created the Bell 212A standard.  In either case (they were slightly different),
Differential Phase Shift Keying (DPSK) was the modulation scheme, with four
phases, and TWO bits per symbol to encode each phase.  Hence, the full duplex
1200 bps standard modulates at a rate of 600 bauds.  Yes, in engineering, you
say 1 baud, and 2 or more bauds, but just saying baud is accepted.  Another
principle was introduced, called scrambling (that noise sound you hear when
modems handshake is the scrambler kicking in).  This alleviates the fact that
the higher the rate of modulation, the more likely that multiple identical
symbols in a row will cause phase sync errors.  The scrambler ensures that
a bit (1 or 0) does NOT get modulated to the same phase repeatedly.  This is
similar to digital carrier systems, which use AMI (Alternate Mark Inversion),
and have schemes such as BnZS or HDB3 (Binary N Zero Substitution and High
Density Binary 3).  But lemme not confuse you.  I was just drawing up the
parallel.  The scrambler is just a pseudorandom sequence generator (there's a
descrambler, too).  Phases are measured in degrees (360), and each phase is
encoded depending on the number of bits per symbol.  In V.22 and Bell 212A,
there are four phases, 0, 90, 180, and 270.  And each phase is coded with two
bits, or dibits (two bits per symbol, remember?)
Now, we all use the CCITT standard for 2400 bps.  It's called V.22bis.
It uses a scheme known as QAM, Quadrature Amplitude Modulation.  The rate
of modulation is also 600 bauds, but the use of amplitude as well as phase
come into play, and double the throughput.  There are four levels of phase,
and four levels of amplitude, encoded using 4 bits per symbol (quadbits). 
Isn't this fun?  There are a few 4800 bps systems, none of which really matter.
For 9600 bps, we use recommendation V.32.  QAM again, (as was 4800 and 2400),
with two modes of operation: 16 carrier states, and 32 achieved using trellis
encoding.  16 carrier states equals 4 bits per symbol again (QUADrature), and
simple arithmetic should tell you that the modulation rate is 2400 bauds.
V.32bis is an improved (and clever) scheme, with a bit rate of 14400 bps.
Everything I mentioned are full duplex systems (except Bell 202).  Higher bit
rates are achievable in half duplex systems, these modems are generally used
for transfers (polling for mail/news).
Oh, don't forget our error correction/compression protocols.  V.42 (EC), and
V.42bis (EC and compression) being the most common.  V.42bis can achieve a
maximum of 4:1 compression ratio, increasing throughput.  There's also your
Microcom Networking Protocol (MNP), MNP level 5 being the most common and
usually used at lower data rates.

Whew.  I'm probably giving you guys information overflow, so I'll end it for
now.  Just remember.  You measure the speed of a modem in BITS PER SECOND,
NOT BAUD.

See ya.






From phiber at eff.org  Sun Feb  7 21:38:33 1993
From: phiber at eff.org (Phiber Optik)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 21:38:33 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302071709.AA28201@brise.ERE.UMontreal.CA>
Message-ID: <199302080537.AA06100@eff.org>


> 
> No, a 2400 bps modem is 2400 baud because each token is 1 bit long.
Well, almost.  You got 9600 bps right.
I hope you read my message.

> 
> Ciao,
> -- 
> Francois Dion
>     '  _   _   _ 
>  CISM (_) (_)  _) FM       Montreal , Canada       Email: CISM at ERE.UMontreal.CA
>       (_)  / . _)             10000 Watts          Telephone no: (514) 343-7511
> _______________________________________________________________________________
> Audio-C-DJ-Fractals-Future-Label-Multimedia-Music-Radio-Rave-Video-VR-Volvo-...
> 
> 
> 






From karn at qualcomm.com  Sun Feb  7 22:07:22 1993
From: karn at qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 22:07:22 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
Message-ID: <9302080605.AA27589@servo>


At  7 Feb 04:56 CST, Jim Thompson wrote:

>I don't see how a 28.8kbps (raw) data rate is possible, as the Shannon
>limit for a POTS line is 22kbps.  Certainly parts of the phone system
>no longer impose the narrow bandwidth that are part of the 'spec', but
>one can not always depend on getting a line that exceedes the published
>parameters of the phone system.

Where do you get this figure of 22 kbps? I would tend to dispute it since
I use a Codex FAST modem on my SLIP link and it really does run at 24.0 kb/s
on the wire (not counting compression). The throughput display often reads
30 kb/s even when I'm shipping a pre-compressed or encrypted binary file,
although that's a phony figure because it includes the asynch
start/stop bits that aren't actually sent over the wire.

The usual Shannon limit of a phone line is more like 30 kb/s, although
it can vary enormously. Generalizations are dangerous. At the very least,
you can certainly say that it's no greater than 64kb/s, since it's almost
certain that your call passes through a mu-law codec somewhere.

Back to vocoders, their quality does tend to be a strong function of data
rate. 8kb/s CELP is really not that bad - a little warbly when there's
background noise, but not objectionably so in my opinion. In a mobile
telephone
environment (where I'm familiar with it), it's *much* less objectionable
than the usual impairments you get from ordinary FM analog transmission.

4kb/s is noticeably worse. Things get rapidly better as you go above 10-12
kb/s with present algorithms. Also, vocoders need not be constant rate.
Ours selects
one of four rates on the fly depending on voice activity, which doubles
capacity in a CDMA radio environment. It'd also be useful in a packet
network, although
the small frame sizes (2/5/10/22 bytes) can make header overhead rather
significant.







From fnordbox!loydb at cs.utexas.edu  Sun Feb  7 22:34:38 1993
From: fnordbox!loydb at cs.utexas.edu (Loyd Blankenship)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 22:34:38 PST
Subject: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Message-ID: <9302080056.AA00azz@fnordbox.UUCP>



:(Thug writes)
:
:> According to what I read it seems that the whole issue of cellular radio
:> signal encryption is really a non-issue.  They could have the most secure
:...
:> What makes you think they don't have the same kind of REMOB/BLV capability
:> to the cellular telephone switches?	I mean, if a conversation is scrambled
:...

Eric Fogleman writes:
:
:If getting around GSM encryption is no problem, then why are governments
:pushing the issue?


This actually hits on one of my favorite rant topics. The feds like to
scream about how hard it is to tap a phone line with digital switching et
al, but don't talk about the fact that anyone with half a brain can tap a
line using the phone company's LMOS.

The only rational theory I've come up with to explain this is that the feds
aren't worried about court-ordered wiretaps, but about illegal wiretaps.
I bet there's a *lot* of monitoring going on out there that they can't get
a court order for, so they're doing it themselves. Monitoring without the
cooperation of the phone company will get harder when the company starts
paying more attention to security -- whether through encryption or simply
using a shredder. :-)

Loyd

***************************************************************************
* loydb at fnordbox.UUCP	     Call the Fnordbox BBS   *	Loyd Blankenship  *
* GEnie: SJGAMES	    2 v32bis lines, 24 hrs   *	PO Box 18957	  *
* Compu$erve: [73407,515]	 512/444-2323	     *	Austin, TX 78760  *
* cs.utexas.edu!dogface!fnordbox!loydb		     *	512/447-7866	  *
***************************************************************************







From root at extropia.wimsey.com  Sun Feb  7 22:51:41 1993
From: root at extropia.wimsey.com (Anonymous)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 22:51:41 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199302080630.AA01555@xtropia>


Hi - I tried to use the anon.penet.fi remailer and got a warning that
some people had hacked it to find out for which anonymous ID any user
had.  It sounded like they would forge mail from the person they wanted
to find out about, have it go through penet, and then go to themselves.
Then they could look and see what anonymous ID it seemed to come from.

This has been fixed by making people register a password with the remailer
and then use it whenever they want to forward mail.

I'd like to see some discussion here about this problem so that other
remailers can avoid it.





From uni at acs.bu.edu  Mon Feb  8 00:55:17 1993
From: uni at acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 00:55:17 PST
Subject: Remailers (List available)
Message-ID: <9302080853.AA166918@acs.bu.edu>



I was hopeing to find a list of the remailers available that use PGP for
traffic encryption.

I noticed that the PAX scripts were made public recently, does anyone plan
to employ them at any of the current remailing sites?

Despite its problems, I thought PAX was on the right track with regard to 
tactics....
Comments?






From jim at tadpole.com  Mon Feb  8 02:16:02 1993
From: jim at tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 02:16:02 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
Message-ID: <9302081014.AA01029@ono-sendai>


The shannon limit of 22kpbs has something to do with the
frequency response of a 'standard' (old, non digital) POTS
phone line.

But you should know, you're Phil Karn (and I'm not.)

Jim





From julf at penet.FI  Mon Feb  8 03:34:59 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 03:34:59 PST
Subject: Remailers (List available)
In-Reply-To: <9302080853.AA166918@acs.bu.edu>
Message-ID: <9302081238.aa22866@penet.penet.FI>



> I noticed that the PAX scripts were made public recently, does anyone plan
> to employ them at any of the current remailing sites?

I was planning on doing it last weekend, but the urgent password fixes 
I had to implement at anon.penet.fi screwed up my plans. But Real Soon Now...

	Julf (admin at anon.penet.fi)






From julf at penet.FI  Mon Feb  8 07:36:58 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 07:36:58 PST
Subject: 
In-Reply-To: <199302080630.AA01555@xtropia>
Message-ID: <9302081609.aa24308@penet.penet.FI>



> Hi - I tried to use the anon.penet.fi remailer and got a warning that
> some people had hacked it to find out for which anonymous ID any user
> had.  It sounded like they would forge mail from the person they wanted
> to find out about, have it go through penet, and then go to themselves.
> Then they could look and see what anonymous ID it seemed to come from.

Precisely!

> This has been fixed by making people register a password with the remailer
> and then use it whenever they want to forward mail.

Yeah. A bit cumbersome, but at least it is an attempt to find a workable
compromise between security and ease of use. The password is only
required if you intend to mail to "unregistered" addresses.

	Julf






From dorn at indigo.mese.com  Mon Feb  8 07:56:35 1993
From: dorn at indigo.mese.com (ALAN DORN HETZEL JR)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 07:56:35 PST
Subject: *Private* E-Mail to White House
Message-ID: <00967ACF.B07B7BE0.15202@INDIGO.MESE.COM>



Maybe we should suggest as a central theme to our first letter that the
White House should set up one or more PGP keys of their own.  The main
purpose being that then one could E-Mail someone in the administration
with reasonable certainty that the message could neither be intercepted
nor tampered with.  Of course, once they get around to responding via
e-mail, it works both ways....

Alan Dorn Hetzel, Jr.
dorn at indigo.mese.com

p.s. I'm not wired up with PGP yet because i'm using a VAX running VMS
     and DECUS UUCP.  Has anybody ported PGP to this platform?  Ideas?





From John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG  Mon Feb  8 07:59:06 1993
From: John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 07:59:06 PST
Subject: CLINTON'S E-MAIL HOAX
Message-ID: <4809.2B768048@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>



from: john.nieder at f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org

>The White House writes:

> PS: If you did not include your U.S. mail return address in your
> message and you want a reply, please send your message again and
> include that information.

]     Well this is completely useless, isn't it.. If we imagine this
]logically we can see masses of e-mail entering the White House while snail
]mail trickles out... Definately [sic] a buffer problem |-].  At least
]they're trying, I suppose...

]DrZaphod

The White House E-Mail gambit is a gimmick without substance.  One -
according to a previous Cypherpunks post, the e-mail isn't getting
through; two - they want mailing addresses for acknowledgement, which is
absurd for any number of obvious reasons (take your pick or come up with
your own); finally (this is the _real_ kicker), tonight's news informs
me that the Clinton White House is making a "symbolic" cost-cutting
gesture by reducing staff "up to 25%."  Where will these reductions come
from?  "The reductions will come mostly from staff whose job is to
respond to mail from the public."
     This hoax is the biggest joke since Rush Limbaugh gave out his
CompuServe address.  A collective Cypherpunk e-letter to Slick?  Let's
not & say we did...[yawn!]

      JN

["The White House is informed that no group or persons are authorized by
  Mr. Nieder to speak on his behalf, including Mr. Clinton."]

... Source: "Deniable Asset Squares Up" - San Francisco, CA  
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG





From phiber at eff.org  Mon Feb  8 08:50:43 1993
From: phiber at eff.org (Phiber Optik)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 08:50:43 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302081014.AA01029@ono-sendai>
Message-ID: <199302081649.AA13414@eff.org>


> 
> The shannon limit of 22kpbs has something to do with the
> frequency response of a 'standard' (old, non digital) POTS
> phone line.
> 
> But you should know, you're Phil Karn (and I'm not.)
> 
> Jim
> 

I spent the time posting a considerable message about this subject last night,
and I've yet to see it echoed back to me on the list.  Did ANYONE get it?
Topics were Shannon's capacity formula, Shannon limit, Nyquist 2-bit rule, etc.
I'd be very annoyed if it just 'disappeared' into the bit-bucket.






From phiber at eff.org  Mon Feb  8 09:09:16 1993
From: phiber at eff.org (Phiber Optik)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 09:09:16 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302081700.AA02209@ono-sendai>
Message-ID: <199302081708.AA13952@eff.org>


> 
> haven't seen it.
> 
OK, fearing the worst (maybe I forgot to CC my message to cypherpunks, but I'm
sure I did), I'll repost my original message.  It was a God-sent that I got 
cut off last night while composing it, and expreserve preserved it.
Here it is:

> 
> > ... because in FSK systems which code 1 bit per symbol
> > (only two phases), bps = baud.  But then and ONLY then....
> 
> Uhh, don't you mean two frequencies?  FSK is Frequency Shift Key, not
> Phase Shift Key (PSK).. ;-)
> 
> Actually, I KNOW you meant this, and it was probably just a typo,
> right?
> 
> -derek
> 
Woops!  Sorry.  To compensate, I'll give more information.  In the Bell 103
system (FSK), the frequencies are 2125Hz for answer, and 1170Hz for originate
carriers, with the frequency shifts being +/- 100Hz.  Compare with CCITT's
V.21, and substitute the carrier frequencies with 1750 and 1080Hz.  Same
+/- 100Hz shifting.

Someone else mentioned the almighty Claude Shannon in another message concern-
ing maximum bit-rate of a voice channel, and I wanted to clear up what was 
said.  Shannon's capacity formula said capacity in bits-per-second equals
bandwidth of channel in hertz times the base-2 (binary) logarithm of one plus
the signal (in watts) to noise (in watts) ratio.  As a side note, I say watts
because commonly, today, you measure signal and noise levels in decibels (dB),
and the S/N ratio is in dBm's (decibels per milliwatt).
In the phone system, we say a voice frequency channel (VFC) has a bandwidth of
4kHz.  In-band signalling is approximately from .3 to 3kHz.  This formula
(yielding the Shannon limit) is based on a "Gaussian Band Limited Channel"
(GBLC), which is an approximation of a VFC, with a signal wave of S watts
at the input of an "ideal" low-pass filter, subjected to Gaussian noise with
a mean power of N watts (uniformly).  Written, it's C = W log2(1 + S/N).
A simple example you can do in your head is W=3000Hz, pick an S/N of 1023,
1+1023 is 1024, and base-2 log of 1024 is simply 10, 3000 * 10 is 30000, so
Shannon's limit for these values is C = 30000bps.  Play with it.  Bear in mind,
Shannon didn't consider intersymbol interference.  Nyquist did.  Compare this
to Harry Nyquist's 2-bit rule, 2W, or double the bandwidth, and get the maximum
bit rate (this line of thinking led him to the infamous Nyquist sampling
theorem, sample at a rate twice the bandwidth of a channel, and you have all
the information you need to reconstruct it at the receiving end).  But Nyquist
deals only with binary systems.  Shannon's formula shows that theoretically
you could increase the data rate indefinitely by increasing the S/N ratio.
We achieve this in modern modulation systems by using multilevel systems,
(M-ary for short, with M > 2), and hence the protocols I described in my
previous message.  We can apply Nyquist's 2-bit rule to the multilevel system
by saying 2W log2 M bps is achievable, with an acceptable error rate.  As we
increase M (number of bits per symbol), so we have to find ways to increase
the signal to noise ratio, to maintain an acceptable error rate.
The whole thing is stupendously interesting to me, as I hope it is to the
rest of you folks.  To blow your mind with sheer genius, read Shannon's
classic "A Mathematical Theory of Communication" in Bell System Tech Journal,
July and October of '48 at your local university.  Also Nyquist's "Certain
Topics in Telegraph Transmission Theory", April '28.  Know your roots.

Good night.







From 72466.3616 at CompuServe.COM  Mon Feb  8 09:13:25 1993
From: 72466.3616 at CompuServe.COM (Don Henson)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 09:13:25 PST
Subject: White House Mail
Message-ID: <930208170504_72466.3616_EHB51-2@CompuServe.COM>


Can someone repost the email address for the White House.  I seem to have
misplaced my copy.  :(

Don Henson
PGP key on request






From karn at qualcomm.com  Mon Feb  8 09:48:14 1993
From: karn at qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 09:48:14 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
Message-ID: <9302081746.AA00348@servo>


Sounds like we need a new unit that specifically means "bits/sec" but
is easier to say. How about "Shannons", as in "I just bought a 14.4
kiloshannon modem". :-)

Phil






From karn at qualcomm.com  Mon Feb  8 09:48:44 1993
From: karn at qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 09:48:44 PST
Subject: Modem Based Crypto Telephones
Message-ID: <9302081747.AA00377@servo>


It's true, dialup modems are becoming so fast that low bit rate vocoders
may well prove unnecessary for a secure phone with good voice quality. But
vocoders are still handy for allowing the use of a slower modem (e.g., over
impaired lines, such as those with a lot of taps :-)) and for freeing up
bandwidth that you might want to use for other purposes (e.g., data).

Phil






From karn at qualcomm.com  Mon Feb  8 13:24:26 1993
From: karn at qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 13:24:26 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
Message-ID: <9302082123.AA00695@servo>



>Shannon didn't consider intersymbol interference.

Sure he did. That's why the bandwidth term appears in his channel capacity
equation.

Shannon built on and generalized Nyquist's earlier work. Shannon's law
says only that it is theoretically *possible* to signal over a bandlimited
AGWN channel with specific bandwidth and S/N ratio with arbitrarily low
error as long as the signalling speed is less than the channel capacity
as given by his formula. What it doesn't show is *how* to do it. In
this respect, Shannon's law is much like the 2nd law of thermodynamics;
it tells you how efficient you can make a heat engine in theory, but it
doesn't tell a turbine designer how to shape his blades.

By the way, just to bring this back to crypto, everyone should be aware
that not only did Claude Shannon establish modern information theory,
he also wrote a seminal paper that established much of modern cryptography.
It was originally written during WWII and classified at that time, but
it was declassified soon after the war and appeared in the BSTJ in 1948,
I believe. Probably the most well known aspect of this paper is his
discussion of "product ciphers", whereby you can combine different
ciphers that are by themselves relatively weak (substitution and
permutation, which he calls "confusion" and "diffusion") and produce
a far more powerful cipher. DES is based on this principle, as are other
modern ciphers.

I bet this is one paper that the NSA wishes had never been declassified.
Far more important, in my opinion, than anything by Friedman.

Phil







From p00258 at psilink.com  Mon Feb  8 16:00:51 1993
From: p00258 at psilink.com (A.J. Janschewitz)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 16:00:51 PST
Subject: White House Mail
In-Reply-To: <930208170504_72466.3616_EHB51-2@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <2938301699.1.p00258@psilink.com>


>Can someone repost the email address for the White House.  I seem to have
>misplaced my copy.  :(

Allegedly 75300.3115 at compuserve.com

==a.j.==





From deltorto at aol.com  Mon Feb  8 17:32:31 1993
From: deltorto at aol.com (deltorto at aol.com)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 17:32:31 PST
Subject: E Pluribus Unum
Message-ID: <9302082032.tn29952@aol.com>


Fellow Cyphers,

Eric Hughes contributed:
>>I applaud the Clinton administration for making itself available via
>>email.  I do not think it advisable, however, to send a single
>>cypherpunks letter.  Rather I urge all interested parties to compose
>>their own letters, and send them in separately.

and also:
>>3) Be brief.  If you cannot summarize your argument into a single
>>paragraph, neither will the reader of the mail.  The mail system is
>>already overloaded, and concision indicates politeness.

These appear to be contradictory statements. I believe that sending a
powerful concise letter _together_ makes it more likely that it will be read,
and even more likely that it will be responded to. Otherwise, we're just a
bunch of nutty "individuals."

On the other hand I am repenting my suggestion that we _might_ include
anything political in our missive. This was ill-concieved on my part and I
have now "engaged my brain" (it's also not 4 am, heh-heh) and agree with
various other contributors that our message should be unidirectional and very
brief. I don't think it should be "cutesy" however, as much as I personally
enjoyed Marc Ringuette's "bit" suggestion #2:

>>Dear President Clinton,
>>   Freedom for the bits!  We will not rest until each bit is free to
>>   determine its own natural orientation without outside coercion.  The
>>   good news is, you don't need to do anything at all; merely get out of
>>   the way of the free market, and the bits will free themselves.
>>Best regards,  The Cypherpunks (Anarchist Subgroup).

Basically I like the underlying idea here (the track of allowing 'natural
orientation without outside coercion'), but I'd avoid the "anarchist"
tendencies, as they tend to render an otherwise approcahable letter "void"
for government bureaucrats perusing gigs of email to Bill & Co.

Eric suggests that we:
>>Stress privacy, and technological defenses thereto.

I agree. Especially the technological expertise side, as this is what
differentiates us from the mass of other people crying about privacy.

>>2) Do not be paranoid.  Do not rant.  These are a sure ways to
>>indicate that more money should be budgeted for public relations.

This is well-met. I totally back off from my previous political slant in
favor of getting _through_.

>>4) Write in standard English.  Use a spelling checker, and use
>>complete sentences.

What a concept. After reading a few months worth of mail on this list, I can
only agree.

>>5) Offer to help.  Offer to make timely review of proposed policies.
>>If they accept your aid, keep your promises.

This is my favorite suggestion. Imagine if they gave us all jobs at the NSA.
Heh-heh-heh.

Now, I have a general question: what is the current status of the White House
email capability as far as everyone can tell? Has anyone had a response yet,
by email or snailmail? Is there a possibility that this IS a hoax and that we
should just send paper mail instead?

    ddt





From fnerd at smds.com  Mon Feb  8 21:03:21 1993
From: fnerd at smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 21:03:21 PST
Subject: SunExpress to expand "unlockable" software distribution
Message-ID: <9302090339.AB10263@smds.com>


gnu at toad.com (John Gilmore) says:

>It would probably be a public service if some interested parties were
>to determine the ``encryption'' method that Sun Express, the standard
>Sun ``license manager'', and other packages use.  At the moment, the
>details of these technologies are not described in the public
>literature (as far as I know).
>
>Rather than have these companies discover years too late that their
>"unlockable" software is really unlockable by anyone who understands
>cryptography, it'd be better for them to learn it this year, while
>they are still handling low volumes of programs that way.  Also maybe
>they will stop dumping these programs-that-you-have-but-must-pay-to-run on us.
>
>	John 

I was in a meeting where the license manager technology was explained from
a semi-technical, semi-business point of view.

 o  There's a standard that many companies are using.  It's for the rpc
    interface between licensed programs and license managers.  The
    program calls the manager, tells it a couple things, and asks,
    is it okay for me to run?

 o  License managers vary in the kinds of licenses they can support.
    There's enough variety of license possibilities to make your
    head swim.

 o  License managers generally work from "licenses," which are text files
    on your computer that describe the terms of particular licenses in a 
    license-manager-specific language.

 o  I think they use RSA, MD5, etc., for instance in signing logs that they
    keep.

 o  License-managers are themselves expensive and licensed, with a variety
    of up-front/per platform/per site/per end user/per developer license 
    combinations as well as the feature variety I mentioned.

I could probably find out what public documents exist if nobody else on the
list knows.

-fnerd
quote me
fnerd at smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)






From 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM  Mon Feb  8 22:43:57 1993
From: 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM (Hal)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 22:43:57 PST
Subject: Debate about anon posts
Message-ID: <930209063752_74076.1041_DHJ31-1@CompuServe.COM>


For those interested, there has been an active debate on the Usenet
newsgroup news.admin.policy about whether anonymous posting should be
allowed on technical newsgroups.  Johan Helsingius's anonymous server at
anon.penet.fi is being widely attacked for allowing this function.  Several
questionable messages have been posted to various groups using this server
and some of these are being used as examples of why anonymous posting should
not be allowed.
 
There have been about 50 messages on the topic, with probably 40+ being
generally opposed to anonymous posting on the non-"personal" groups, and
only a few being in favor.
 
I don't really know how much influence that newsgroup has on the Usenet
anarchy but there certainly does seem to be a lot of opposition to anonymity.
Since it is an important part of our Cypherpunk ideals I think we need to
give some thought to how to "sell" the idea of anonymous mail and postings
to the net community.
 
Hal Finney
74076.1041 at compuserve.com







From phiber at eff.org  Tue Feb  9 01:17:08 1993
From: phiber at eff.org (Phiber Optik)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 01:17:08 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302081750.AA02290@ono-sendai>
Message-ID: <199302090915.AA07775@eff.org>


> 
> So, what is a 'typical' S/N ratio for a POTS call?
> 
> 

Good question.  By the way, I think I may have slipped and reversed my units
in signal to noise ratios.  A minor typo.  The signal and noise are in dBm's
(decibels per milliwatt), and the resultant S/N ratio is in dB's (decibels).
A little background info: the ideal voice frequency channel has a FLAT
amplitude/frequency response, that is, it's uniform over the pass-band
(approx. .3 to 3kHz).  In reality, this isn't the case, but we want it to
be as close as possible.  In North America, we test signal level at 1kHz
(precisely 1004).  If we input a signal at -10dBm, we want -10dBm at the 
output.  The common type of test-line in the phone system for this purpose
is nicknamed the "milliwatt test", and is a continuous interrupted 1004Hz
tone.  Depending on the nature of the channel being tested, there would be
acceptable guidelines that would have to be met with.  For example, a typical
S/N value might be 40dB, based on customer satisfaction of line quality.
Another common test-line in wide use is the type-105 ATMS, Automatic Trans-
mission Measurement System (nicknamed "responders").  Signalled with Multi-
Frequency tones (MF), it is capable of doing: signal at 404, 1004, and 2804Hz
at two different levels (for comparative S/N ratios at the low, middle, and
top portion of the passband, a major improvement on the older "sweep tone"
method), and two types of noise (again I remember at two levels), the most
common being C-message noise (dBrnC).  C-message weighting is the modern means
of measuring signal and noise amplitude/frequency response, based on today's
telephone handsets (there were two previous major Western Electric weightings,
144 and F1A, now obsoleted).  The standard reference frequency (1004Hz), was
established by picking a frequency in the pass-band where the signal level
was JUST discernible by the human ear, and is between -85 to -90dBm, and the
derived units are positive.  We consider the noise measurement knowing the
zero reference (ideally 0 dB difference at the reference frequency), and the
weighting characteristics of the C-message standard telephone handset.
Unfortunately, I can't draw you a chart, but there is a characteristic curve
of frequency-response in weightings of channel noise for the C-message handset.
Noise measurement instruments have artificial filters that simulate the
response of the modern handset.
Am I making any sense?  I hope I am.  What I'm getting at, is that the accept-
able guidelines of signal and noise levels is simply based upon a chosen
standard handset sensitivity.  Got it?  C'mon!  It's easy!






From phiber at eff.org  Tue Feb  9 01:39:03 1993
From: phiber at eff.org (Phiber Optik)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 01:39:03 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302082123.AA00695@servo>
Message-ID: <199302090937.AA07958@eff.org>


> 
> 
> >Shannon didn't consider intersymbol interference.
> 
> Sure he did. That's why the bandwidth term appears in his channel capacity
> equation.
> 
(stuff deleted)
I was probably being unclear.  According to my text, Shannon's capacity formula
does not account for intersymbol interference.  My text also states that 
Nyquist used intersymbol interference as a limit in his 2-bit rule.  I'm
considering my text to be correct, because the capacity formula doesn't account
for the imperfections (like intersymbol interference) and other problems
encountered in practice (envelope delay distortion, the need for echo cancell-
ation, etc.).  And in your words, it says that you can, but it doesn't say how.
For those who just tuned in, intersymbol interference refers to when the 
residual tail or bounce of a dying pulse interferes with a subsequent pulse.






From miron at extropia.wimsey.com  Tue Feb  9 03:12:48 1993
From: miron at extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 03:12:48 PST
Subject: Anonymous pool created
Message-ID: <199302091046.AA09900@xtropia>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

From: miron (Miron Cuperman)
To: cypherpunks at toad.com
Subject: Anonymous pool created

The pool is basically a mailing list with automatic maintenance.
The intention is that you add a reply-to: header to your anonymous
mail (or mention it somewhere in your mail) pointing at the
pool address.  Make sure that your correspondent put some identifying
marks on the reply (like encrypting it with your public key, and/or
putting your pseudonym on the Subject: line) so you can tell it apart
from the rest.  Of course, you should first subscribe to the pool.

Your anonymous reply address you should mention is:
	pool0 at extropia.wimsey.com

All admin requests (handled by a program):
	pool0-request at extropia.wimsey.com

All problems to:
	miron at extropia.wimsey.com

The following Subject: lines are recognized:

subscribe
unsubscribe
help

and others - described in the help file.  Matching is actually quite
loose, so don't worry about whitespace or anything like that.

Experiments are welcome.
- -- 
        Miron Cuperman <miron at extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
                       <miron at cs.sfu.ca>           | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            |
cyberspacecomputingcryptoimmortalitynetworkslaissezfaire

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK3eLOZNxvvA36ONDAQEjfAP+LqMzz6ffgTcuVxnzivZKKAJHY7kzo6V2
cobwO4fWPOdw6m3TdJnX/++hit0nAiFOg5TZWMqJiUw/p51qcPIHxXvsw0Hq9mN5
y8eKoZDVVuALZD3IRzAbWuZ9gT404q5sUej7T8k/Ykf51fIMy29JXxAl00sXvRzi
mI0NNzykWSc=
=J84n
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From wayner at cs.cornell.edu  Tue Feb  9 05:22:03 1993
From: wayner at cs.cornell.edu (Peter Wayner)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 05:22:03 PST
Subject: Convincing people the value of anonymity...
Message-ID: <9302091320.AA19183@brokk.cs.cornell.edu>



I would think that many people who hang out on technical
newsgroups would be very familiar with the anonymous review
procedures practiced by academic journals. There is some value
when a reviewer can speak their mind about a paper without
worry of revenge. Of course everyone assures me that the system is never
really anonymous because there are alwys only three or four people qualified
to review each paper. :-) 

Perhaps we should go out of our way to make anonymous, technical
comments about papers and ideas in the newsgroups to fascilitate
the development of an anonymous commenting culture in cypberspace.

-Peter Wayner





From covin at cs.uchicago.edu  Tue Feb  9 07:52:26 1993
From: covin at cs.uchicago.edu (covin at cs.uchicago.edu)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 07:52:26 PST
Subject: E Pluribus Unum
Message-ID: <9302091551.AA27230@tartarus.uchicago.edu>


>Now, I have a general question: what is the current status of the White House
>email capability as far as everyone can tell? Has anyone had a response yet,
>by email or snailmail? Is there a possibility that this IS a hoax and that we
>should just send paper mail instead?

What excellent timing you have.  I recently received this from a
friend:

[Forwarded, now several times...]

   January 31, 1993
 
                Important Information RE: E-Mail to the White House
 
        Yesterday, I saw several postings related to the E-mail address
   for the White House.  Along with a good number of others, I worked
   throughout the campaign as part of a network of E-mail volunteers
   for the Clinton campaign, so I can pass along some important
   information about that E-mail account.  The account is actually the
   personal compuserve account of Jock Gill.  Jock worked hard (along
   with a handful of programming volunteers, BBS operators, listserver
   maintainers, and computer sophisticates at places such as Marist
   College, MIT, San Francisco, Chicago, and elsewhere) during the
   campaign to put together an E-mail system for national campaigning.
   The system was later expanded to accommodate all three major
   Presidential campaigns.  It was an innovative, highly successful
   effort and it played a huge role in getting campaign position
   statements out to a wide public.  Things posted from that address
   found their way into the virtual reality as the messages got passed
   along many networks from their original posting.  Several weeks
   before the Inauguration of President Clinton, Jeff Eller was
   appointed by the President-Elect to have overall charge of
   establishing something which has never existed--an interactive
   public access E-mail system into the White House and into other
   offices of the administration.  Jock Gill was then hired by the
   administration to work under Jeff Eller.  Currently, Jock Gill is
   working in an office located in the Old Executive Office Building
   across the street from the White House.  At this point, he is
   working alone, without a staff.  His current assignment is to use
   the E-mail system (as during the campaign) to issue official copies
   of White House statements, the texts of press briefings and press
   conferences, copies of Executive Orders and Presidential Memos, and
   the like to the virtual world of E-mail.  Since the compuserve box
   is a regular personal mail box, it gets filled quickly, especially
   given the high volume of mail now beginning to arrive with the broad
   dissemination of his address.  Those of you who have sent E-mail to
   that address may well have received an error message stating that
   the box is full.  That's another way of saying it has been
   overwhelmed.  Jock has asked those of us who have been part of the
   volunteer E-mail team to help him out while he works to get a good
   interactive system up and running.  Basically, he has asked that
   everyone cooperate and not begin sending a barrage of E-mail to that
   compuserve address.  The White House itself employs a large staff to
   handle snail mail.  Actually, at this point in the development of
   the White House E-mail system, you will probably get your message
   through to the administration quicker through ordinary snail mail
   and telephone.  Later, once the administration's E-mail team
   develops the system they want and need, E-mail contacts should
   became the easier route.  All things in their time.  Once the E-mail
   address was circulated together with the heading the "White House",
   everyone understandably believed a real system was up and running.
   Not quite yet.
 
   SUGGESTION:  Use the compuserve address you have judiciously,
   reserving it for absolutely vital contacts.  Until such time that a
   real public access White house E-mail system is operational,
   consider relying on the traditional means of contacting the
   administration.  Given what they had to start with from the previous
   administration (scratch), I have every reason to expect that Jeff
   Eller and Jock Gill will work well--and as quickly as possible--to
   get an interactive system up and running.  But it will take time and
   patience.  We can all help them achieve that effort best if we
   refrain from acting as if that non-existent system were already in
   place.  PLEASE HELP RELAY THIS CONTEXT AND SUGGESTION TO OTHER
   NETWORKS AND INDIVIDUALS.  Thanks.
 
                Snail Mail Address and Phone Numbers -- White House
 
        White House Numbers:
            The President                 (202) 456-1414
            White House Comment Line      (202) 456-1111
                 (To register your opinion on an issue)
            When bill signed or vetoed    (202) 456-2226
 
            Vice President                (202) 456-2326
                                          (202) 456-7125
 
        Mailing Address:
 
            The White House
            1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
            Washington DC  20500
 
   ------
        Jon Darling
        PITT/Johnstown  -- January 31, 







From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Tue Feb  9 08:51:58 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 08:51:58 PST
Subject: Debate about anon posts
In-Reply-To: <930209063752_74076.1041_DHJ31-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302091649.AA25077@soda.berkeley.edu>


More important than anonymity in a public forum such as Usenet is
pseudonymity.  A strictly anonymous posting might well be ignored, and
in cases should be.  An alternate identity, however, can be more
easily believed if it has said useful things in the past.

After all, most of the people I know on the net are as good as
pseudonyms to me.  I've never met them, have never even had voice
contact, and am unlikely to ever.  This is the case for everyone.  We
rely on the human net of familiarity to assure us that these are real
people.

But a pseudonym on the net looks to us like "someone else's friend."
We can't verify everyone personally, but we assume that someone has.
Therefore pseudonyms will always be possible on the net.

Indeed, they are already mostly with us.

Eric





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Tue Feb  9 09:09:07 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 09:09:07 PST
Subject: E Pluribus Unum
In-Reply-To: <9302082032.tn29952@aol.com>
Message-ID: <9302091706.AA25713@soda.berkeley.edu>


I said, in effect:

-- Send your own mail, not from the group.
-- Be brief; the system is overloaded.

Dave responds:

>These appear to be contradictory statements. I believe that sending a
>powerful concise letter _together_ makes it more likely that it will be read,
>and even more likely that it will be responded to. Otherwise, we're just a
>bunch of nutty "individuals."

The particular advice to send individual mail stems from the following
method that organizations estimate demographics:

	"Count each letter as standing for the opinion of N people."

Were we a well-known, well-respected organization, such as, say, ANSI,
or IEEE, then a group letter carries weight.  As it is, however, the
cypherpunks are neither, and our goals, well, less than fully affirmed
by the general public.

Hence, I urge people to send individual letters.  In our context many
letters carry greater weight than one.  In the same vein, I urge people
to each compose a separate letter.  Many copies of an identical letter
are much less useful.

I wrote:
>Stress privacy, and technological defenses thereto.

This topic has many aspects.  Writing on this topic will not mean a
duplication of effort, merely a replication of concern.

>I agree. Especially the technological expertise side, as this is what
>differentiates us from the mass of other people crying about privacy.

That bit about "crying about" is exactly what I wish to avoid.  First
of all, in cryptography relying on others to grant you privacy doesn't
even work.  And second, asking for help to allow us to help ourselves
taps into deep currents in the U.S. culture.

>On the other hand I am repenting my suggestion that we _might_ include
>anything political in our missive. 

One of my own political principles is as follows:

	"If your issue becomes a partisan issue, then you've lost."

It is much easier to convince all sides of a dispute of the same thing
than to convince one side and have them convince the others.

Eric





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Tue Feb  9 09:12:00 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 09:12:00 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302082123.AA00695@servo>
Message-ID: <9302091709.AA25872@soda.berkeley.edu>


>By the way, just to bring this back to crypto, everyone should be aware
>that not only did Claude Shannon establish modern information theory,
>he also wrote a seminal paper that established much of modern cryptography.

Not only that, he was single handedly responsible for the 15 minute
delay rule in reporting stock market transactions.  Evidently he
applied information-theoretic techniques to the data and was able to
make a load of money at it.  I have no references on this, and would
love to see some.

Eric





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Tue Feb  9 09:16:15 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 09:16:15 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <199302081708.AA13952@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9302091713.AA25988@soda.berkeley.edu>


Phiber writes:
>Shannon's capacity formula said capacity in bits-per-second equals
>bandwidth of channel in hertz times the base-2 (binary) logarithm of one plus
>the signal (in watts) to noise (in watts) ratio.  

Properly it is the integral of the S/N function over frequency, but that's
a simple continualization of the stated formula.

Eric





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Tue Feb  9 09:49:49 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 09:49:49 PST
Subject: February 13 meeting
Message-ID: <9302091745.AA27350@soda.berkeley.edu>


Cypherpunks physical meeting

Noon sharp, Saturday, February 13, 1993
Cygnus Support Offices, Mt. View, California, USA

I apologize for not getting out an announcement for the the last
meeting.  It showed, both in attendance and organization.  My regrets.

I make a solemn promise to be there before 12:00 p.m.  Let's start on
time for a change.

I hear that photographers are going to be there, so if you don't want
to be photographed, bring your favorite mask.  They're nice
photographers and they'll ask your permission first so that you don't
have to wear your mask at all times.

Eric

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

AGENDA
======

-- The Ultra random number generator.  I presume Scott Collins is
going to talk on this, since he mentioned this, but I have not heard
from him. (Hint, hint) Ultra is a new random number generator designed
by some statisticians. It allegedly has extremely long period, good
distribution properties, and a fast implementation, since it is based
on the borrow from a subtract operation.

-- Eric Messick will present his posting on envelopes.  If any of you
need another copy of this, the address of his that I remember is
eric at toad.com.

-- Arthur Abraham will present on hash functions.  The talk will
include discussion of generally desirable properties and some specific
algorithms.

-- Some people wanted to talk about the Sidelnikov comments on PGP, but
I don't have a presenter yet.

-- And the usual progress reports and chat.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

DIRECTIONS
==========

	Cygnus Support
	1937 Landings Drive
	Mt. View, CA  94043
	+1 415 903 1400   switchboard
	+1 415 903 1418   John Gilmore

Take US 101 toward Mt. View.  From San Francisco, it's about a
40-minute drive.  Get off at the Rengstorff Ave/Amphitheatre Parkway
exit.  If you were heading south on 101, you curve around to the
right, cross over the freeway, and get to a stoplight.  If you were
heading north on 101, you just come right off the exit to the
stoplight.  The light is the intersection of Amphitheatre and
Charleston Rd.  Take a right on Charleston; there's a right-turn-only
lane.

Follow Charleston for a short distance.  You'll pass the
Metaphor/Kaleida buildings on the right.  At a clump of palm trees and
a "Landmark Deli" sign, take a right into Landings Drive.  At the end
of the road, turn left into the complex with the big concrete
"Landmark" sign.  Follow the road past the deli til you are in front
of the clock tower that rises out of one of the buildings, facing you.
Enter through the doors immediately under the clock tower.  They'll be
open between noon and 1PM at least.  (See below if you're late.)

Once inside, take the stairs up, immediately to your right.  At the top
of the stairs, turn right past the treetops, and we'll be in 1937 on 
your left.  The door is marked "Cygnus".

If you are late and the door under the clock tower is locked, you can
walk to the deli (which will be around the building on your left, as
you face the door).  Go through the gate in the fence to the right of
the deli, and into the back lawns between the complex and the farm
behind it.  Walk forward and right around the buildings until you see
a satellite dish in the lawn.  Go up the stairs next to the dish,
which are the back stairs into the Cygnus office space.  We'll prop
the door (or you can bang on it if we forget).

Or, you can find the guard who's wandering around the complex, who
knows there's a meeting happening and will let you in.  They can be
beeped at 965 5250, though you'll have trouble finding a phone.

Don't forget to eat first, or bring food at noon!  I recommend hitting
the burrito place on Rengstorff (La Costen~a) at about 11:45.  To get
there, when you get off 101, take Rengstorff (toward the hills) rather
than Amphitheatre (toward the bay).  Follow it about ten blocks until
the major intersection at Middlefield Road.  La Costen~a is the store
on your left at the corner.  You can turn left into the narrow lane
behind the store, which leads to a parking lot, and enter by the front
door, which faces the intersection.  To get to the meeting from there,
just retrace your route on Rengstorff, go straight over the freeway,
and turn right at the stoplight onto Charleston; see above.

See you there!

	John Gilmore








From dsinclai at acs.ucalgary.ca  Tue Feb  9 10:39:45 1993
From: dsinclai at acs.ucalgary.ca (Douglas Sinclair)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 10:39:45 PST
Subject: PGP key by finger
Message-ID: <9302091838.AA29640@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>


To all those that asked - my PGP 2.1 key is now available for finger.
I appologize to all for the technical difficulties.
-- 
Vercotti: I was terrified of him.  Everyone was terrified of Doug.  I've seen
          grown men pull their own heads off rather than see Doug.  Even
          Dinsdale was frightened of Doug.
Interviewer: What did he do?
Vercotti: He used sarcasm.  He knew all the tricks, dramatic irony,
          metaphor, bathos, puns, parody, litotes and satire.
			-- Monty Python, Episode 14
PGP 2.1 Key by finger





From pmetzger at shearson.com  Tue Feb  9 11:39:59 1993
From: pmetzger at shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 11:39:59 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
Message-ID: <9302091839.AA09736@maggie.shearson.com>


> From: Eric Hughes <hughes at soda.berkeley.edu>
> 
> >By the way, just to bring this back to crypto, everyone should be aware
> >that not only did Claude Shannon establish modern information theory,
> >he also wrote a seminal paper that established much of modern cryptography.
> 
> Not only that, he was single handedly responsible for the 15 minute
> delay rule in reporting stock market transactions.  Evidently he
> applied information-theoretic techniques to the data and was able to
> make a load of money at it.  I have no references on this, and would
> love to see some.

I don't believe this. You can buy data feeds that give you instant market
data, rather than 15 minute delayed information. I've worked for
operations like Morgan Stanley's Analytic Proprietary Trading Group,
and although I've seen some neat tricks applied to market data, I've
never heard tell of Shannon developing any, nor is there any delay
in the data such groups use for trading.

Perry





From cp at jido.b30.ingr.com  Tue Feb  9 13:07:00 1993
From: cp at jido.b30.ingr.com (Craig Presson)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 13:07:00 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302091839.AA09736@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <199302092105.AA01119@jido.b30.ingr.com>


In <9302091839.AA09736 at maggie.shearson.com>, Perry E. Metzger writes:
|> > From: Eric Hughes <hughes at soda.berkeley.edu>
[...]
|> > Not only that, he was single handedly responsible for the 15 minute
|> > delay rule in reporting stock market transactions.  Evidently he
|> > applied information-theoretic techniques to the data and was able to
|> > make a load of money at it.  I have no references on this, and would
|> > love to see some.
|> 
|> I don't believe this. You can buy data feeds that give you instant market
|> data, rather than 15 minute delayed information. I've worked for
|> operations like Morgan Stanley's Analytic Proprietary Trading Group,
|> and although I've seen some neat tricks applied to market data, I've
|> never heard tell of Shannon developing any, nor is there any delay
|> in the data such groups use for trading.
|> 
|> Perry

In particular, Compuserve subscribers get 15-minute old stock
quotes for free, and pay extra to get closer to real-time.

To quote an advert from Open Systems (Propaganda) Today:
"            SuperHackers
D.E. Shaw & Co., a small, ... algorithmic trading firm,
seeks brilliant, world-class software professionals to
help create Wall Street's future. ..."

This may be drifting off-topic, unless someone sees a way to finance
anarcho-ventures with high-tech arbitrage. I suppose Perry would be in
the middle of any such cabal -- or maybe he isn't saying ;-)
        ^
       /
------/---- cp at jido.b11.ingr.com (Craig Presson)
     /
    /





From wcs at anchor.ho.att.com  Tue Feb  9 17:10:58 1993
From: wcs at anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_StewartHOY0021305)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 17:10:58 PST
Subject: CELP speech compression code at cygnus.com:/pub/celp.speech.tar.Z
Message-ID: <9302100110.AA09266@toad.com>


Forwarded for Bill Stewart, who I assume wanted it posted.

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

John, Perry, and others have been commenting on the use of CELP voice compression
and crypto with V.32 or better modems to give end-to-end encrypted speech.
Perry says:
> Fast enough software compression of voice would mean any PC 
> with a DSP card and a V.32 modem could become an unbreakable scrambler.
> The chief problem is that the DSP needed to do decent compression is
> very crunchy, and encryption also tends to be crunchy, so there aren't
> typically enough cycles on your average PC. Of course, were someone to
> commercially market a board that did all this in hardware...

(Please excuse any shameless references to my employer's fine hardware products :-);
I do science fiction, er, um, systems engineering, not hardware...
and it's been a while since our chip people were in my building.)

It may not all be packaged on a single board, but it shouldn't be real tough.
PC and Mac Boards with AT&T DSP32C chips were out several years ago,
which provided something like 25 MFLOPS, which was more than enough
to do voice compression and have leftover guts for crypto
(or use your 386; DES at 9600 baud shouldn't cause much heartburn.)
I assume that by now there are reasonably-priced floating-point DSP boards
from several different vendors out, and AT&T makes modem chipsets and
supporting A/D and fixed-point DSP integer-crunchers.
If CELP can be done in integers, I'd guess you could chain together a
couple DSPs and put together a board for ~$100-150 parts-cost.

Also, how much can you do with the various SoundBlaster-related boards?

			Bill 






From fen at genmagic.genmagic.com  Tue Feb  9 18:27:21 1993
From: fen at genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 18:27:21 PST
Subject: ["Joyce K. Reynolds": RFC1421 on Privacy Enhancement for Electronic Mail]
Message-ID: <9302100227.AA06002@>


Date: Tue, 09 Feb 93 20:46:25 -0500
From: James M Galvin <galvin at TIS.COM>
Sender: pem-dev-relay at TIS.COM

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR
Content-Domain: RFC822
Originator-ID-Asymmetric: MEYxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSQwIgYDVQQKExtUcnV
 zdGVkIEluZm9ybWF0aW9uIFN5c3RlbXMxETAPBgNVBAsTCEdsZW53b29k,02
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,UYBpHzD3lP5l8Wi2DzdTRPWoag3lQ7NrqmF0U+cfykK
 VCKx5jxPRR9CaWaddI5QobfpA4hsIVA12ZpsPzmyo9g==

- ------------------------------------------------------------------------
This message digitally signed with Privacy Enhanced Mail.  Get your copy
of the Internet reference implementation from "pem-info at tis.com".


- ------- Forwarded Message

Message-ID: <199302092257.AA29999 at zephyr.isi.edu>
Sender:     ietf-announce-request at IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US
From:       "Joyce K. Reynolds" <jkrey at isi.edu>
To:         IETF-Announce:;@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US
cc:         jkrey at isi.edu
Date:       Tue, 09 Feb 93 14:56:08 PST
Subject:    RFC1421 on Privacy Enhancement for Electronic Mail


- - --NextPart


A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.


        RFC 1421:

        Title:      Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:
                    Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication
                    Procedures
        Author:     J. Linn
        Mailbox:    104-8456 at mcimail.com
        Pages:      42
        Characters: 103,894
        Obsoletes:  RFC 1113


This is one of a series of documents defining privacy enhancement
mechanisms for electronic mail transferred using Internet mail
protocols.  This document is the outgrowth of a series of meetings of
the Privacy and Security Research Group (PSRG) of the Internet
Research Task Force (IRTF) and the PEM Working Group of the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF).  The author would like to thank the
members of the PSRG and the IETF PEM WG, as well as all participants
in discussions on the "pem-dev at tis.com" mailing list, for their
contributions to this document.

This is now a Proposed Standard Protocol.

This RFC specifies an IAB standards track protocol for the Internet
community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.
Please refer to the current edition of the "IAB Official Protocol
Standards" for the standardization state and status of this protocol.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

This announcement is sent to the IETF list and the RFC-DIST list.
Requests to be added to or deleted from the IETF distribution list
should be sent to IETF-REQUEST at CNRI.RESTON.VA.US.  Requests to be added
to or deleted from the RFC-DIST distribution list should be sent to
RFC-REQUEST at NIC.DDN.MIL.

Details on obtaining RFCs via FTP or EMAIL may be obtained by sending
an EMAIL message to "rfc-info at ISI.EDU" with the message body 
"help: ways_to_get_rfcs".  For example:

        To: rfc-info at ISI.EDU
        Subject: getting rfcs

        help: ways_to_get_rfcs

Requests for special distribution should be addressed to either the
author of the RFC in question, or to NIC at NIC.DDN.MIL.  Unless
specifically noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for
unlimited distribution.

Submissions for Requests for Comments should be sent to
RFC-EDITOR at ISI.EDU.  Please consult RFC 1111, "Instructions to RFC
Authors", for further information.


Joyce K. Reynolds
USC/Information Sciences Institute

...

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant Mail Reader 
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version
of the RFCs.

- - --NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

- - --OtherAccess
Content-Type:  Message/External-body;
        access-type="mail-server";
        server="mail-server at nisc.sri.com"

Content-Type: text/plain

SEND rfc1421.txt

- - --OtherAccess
Content-Type:   Message/External-body;
        name="rfc1421.txt";
        site="nic.ddn.mil";
        access-type="anon-ftp";
        directory="rfc"

Content-Type: text/plain


- - --OtherAccess--
- - --NextPart--

- ------- End of Forwarded Message

-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----







From fen at genmagic.genmagic.com  Tue Feb  9 18:28:23 1993
From: fen at genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 18:28:23 PST
Subject: ["Joyce K. Reynolds": RFC1423 on PEM: Algorithms, Modes and Identifiers]
Message-ID: <9302100228.AA06013@>


Date: Tue, 09 Feb 93 20:47:29 -0500
From: James M Galvin <galvin at TIS.COM>
Sender: pem-dev-relay at TIS.COM

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR
Content-Domain: RFC822
Originator-ID-Asymmetric: MEYxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSQwIgYDVQQKExtUcnV
 zdGVkIEluZm9ybWF0aW9uIFN5c3RlbXMxETAPBgNVBAsTCEdsZW53b29k,02
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,SZBZEw1TKP4Mj68wVUb3t1uGaXKAhRfRScqDkULDMuG
 WRwco4HpFmpJxuBUzPLhysLhi0Rn6D9yG+YxFnZE4bA==

- ------------------------------------------------------------------------
This message digitally signed with Privacy Enhanced Mail.  Get your copy
of the Internet reference implementation from "pem-info at tis.com".


- ------- Forwarded Message

Message-ID: <199302092258.AA00118 at zephyr.isi.edu>
Sender:     ietf-announce-request at IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US
From:       "Joyce K. Reynolds" <jkrey at isi.edu>
To:         IETF-Announce:;@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US
cc:         jkrey at isi.edu
Date:       Tue, 09 Feb 93 14:56:45 PST
Subject:    RFC1423 on PEM: Algorithms, Modes and Identifiers


- - --NextPart


A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.


        RFC 1423:

        Title:      Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:
                    Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers      
        Author:     D. Balenson
        Mailbox:    balenson at tis.com
        Pages:      14
        Characters: 33,277
        Obsoletes:  RFC 1115


This document provides definitions, formats, references, and citations
for cryptographic algorithms, usage modes, and associated identifiers
and parameters used in support of Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) in the
Internet community.  This is one of a series of documents defining
privacy enhancement mechanisms for electronic mail transferred using
Internet mail protocols.  This document is the outgrowth of a series
of meetings of the Privacy and Security Research Group (PSRG) of the
Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) and the PEM Working Group of the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).

This is now a Proposed Standard Protocol.

This RFC specifies an IAB standards track protocol for the Internet
community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.
Please refer to the current edition of the "IAB Official Protocol
Standards" for the standardization state and status of this protocol.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

This announcement is sent to the IETF list and the RFC-DIST list.
Requests to be added to or deleted from the IETF distribution list
should be sent to IETF-REQUEST at CNRI.RESTON.VA.US.  Requests to be added
to or deleted from the RFC-DIST distribution list should be sent to
RFC-REQUEST at NIC.DDN.MIL.

Details on obtaining RFCs via FTP or EMAIL may be obtained by sending
an EMAIL message to "rfc-info at ISI.EDU" with the message body 
"help: ways_to_get_rfcs".  For example:

        To: rfc-info at ISI.EDU
        Subject: getting rfcs

        help: ways_to_get_rfcs

Requests for special distribution should be addressed to either the
author of the RFC in question, or to NIC at NIC.DDN.MIL.  Unless
specifically noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for
unlimited distribution.

Submissions for Requests for Comments should be sent to
RFC-EDITOR at ISI.EDU.  Please consult RFC 1111, "Instructions to RFC
Authors", for further information.


Joyce K. Reynolds
USC/Information Sciences Institute

...

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant Mail Reader 
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version
of the RFCs.

- - --NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

- - --OtherAccess
Content-Type:  Message/External-body;
        access-type="mail-server";
        server="mail-server at nisc.sri.com"

Content-Type: text/plain

SEND rfc1423.txt

- - --OtherAccess
Content-Type:   Message/External-body;
        name="rfc1423.txt";
        site="nic.ddn.mil";
        access-type="anon-ftp";
        directory="rfc"

Content-Type: text/plain


- - --OtherAccess--
- - --NextPart--

- ------- End of Forwarded Message

-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----







From fen at genmagic.genmagic.com  Tue Feb  9 18:29:09 1993
From: fen at genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 18:29:09 PST
Subject: ["Joyce K. Reynolds": RFC1424 on Key Certification and Related Services]
Message-ID: <9302100228.AA06016@>


Date: Tue, 09 Feb 93 20:47:53 -0500
From: James M Galvin <galvin at TIS.COM>
Sender: pem-dev-relay at TIS.COM

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR
Content-Domain: RFC822
Originator-ID-Asymmetric: MEYxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSQwIgYDVQQKExtUcnV
 zdGVkIEluZm9ybWF0aW9uIFN5c3RlbXMxETAPBgNVBAsTCEdsZW53b29k,02
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,ev2s1woCBNlMsuccJpIUAAEuV9gQZZs5hbHG3fCPYxb
 hxSChOjQSJRO3cIf6/GyzyJYhRt7jZDc9VH+YLuPMeg==

- ------------------------------------------------------------------------
This message digitally signed with Privacy Enhanced Mail.  Get your copy
of the Internet reference implementation from "pem-info at tis.com".


- ------- Forwarded Message

Message-ID: <199302092258.AA00165 at zephyr.isi.edu>
Sender:     ietf-announce-request at IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US
From:       "Joyce K. Reynolds" <jkrey at isi.edu>
To:         IETF-Announce:;@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US
cc:         jkrey at isi.edu
Date:       Tue, 09 Feb 93 14:56:52 PST
Subject:    RFC1424 on Key Certification and Related Services


- - --NextPart


A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.


        RFC 1424:

        Title:      Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:
                    Part IV: Key Certification and Related Services
        Author:     B. Kaliski     
        Mailbox:    burt at rsa.com
        Pages:      9
        Characters: 17,537
        Updates/Obsoletes:  none


This document describes three types of service in support of Internet
Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM): key certification, certificate-
revocation list (CRL) storage, and CRL retrieval.  This is one of a
series of documents defining privacy enhancement mechanisms for
electronic mail transferred using Internet mail protocols.  This
document is the product of many discussions at RSA Data Security, at
Trusted Information Systems, and on the <pem-dev at tis.com> mailing
list.  This document is the product of the Privacy-Enhanced Electronic
Mail Working Group.

This is now a Proposed Standard Protocol.

This RFC specifies an IAB standards track protocol for the Internet
community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.
Please refer to the current edition of the "IAB Official Protocol
Standards" for the standardization state and status of this protocol.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

This announcement is sent to the IETF list and the RFC-DIST list.
Requests to be added to or deleted from the IETF distribution list
should be sent to IETF-REQUEST at CNRI.RESTON.VA.US.  Requests to be added
to or deleted from the RFC-DIST distribution list should be sent to
RFC-REQUEST at NIC.DDN.MIL.

Details on obtaining RFCs via FTP or EMAIL may be obtained by sending
an EMAIL message to "rfc-info at ISI.EDU" with the message body 
"help: ways_to_get_rfcs".  For example:

        To: rfc-info at ISI.EDU
        Subject: getting rfcs

        help: ways_to_get_rfcs

Requests for special distribution should be addressed to either the
author of the RFC in question, or to NIC at NIC.DDN.MIL.  Unless
specifically noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for
unlimited distribution.

Submissions for Requests for Comments should be sent to
RFC-EDITOR at ISI.EDU.  Please consult RFC 1111, "Instructions to RFC
Authors", for further information.


Joyce K. Reynolds
USC/Information Sciences Institute

...

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant Mail Reader 
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version
of the RFCs.

- - --NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

- - --OtherAccess
Content-Type:  Message/External-body;
        access-type="mail-server";
        server="mail-server at nisc.sri.com"

Content-Type: text/plain

SEND rfc1424.txt

- - --OtherAccess
Content-Type:   Message/External-body;
        name="rfc1424.txt";
        site="nic.ddn.mil";
        access-type="anon-ftp";
        directory="rfc"

Content-Type: text/plain


- - --OtherAccess--
- - --NextPart--

- ------- End of Forwarded Message

-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----







From fen at genmagic.genmagic.com  Tue Feb  9 20:47:39 1993
From: fen at genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 20:47:39 PST
Subject: ["Joyce K. Reynolds": RFC1422 on Certificate-Based Key Management]
Message-ID: <9302100447.AA06381@>


Date: Tue, 09 Feb 93 20:46:59 -0500
From: James M Galvin <galvin at TIS.COM>
Sender: pem-dev-relay at TIS.COM

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR
Content-Domain: RFC822
Originator-ID-Asymmetric: MEYxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSQwIgYDVQQKExtUcnV
 zdGVkIEluZm9ybWF0aW9uIFN5c3RlbXMxETAPBgNVBAsTCEdsZW53b29k,02
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,SdwD9j3bEJftgUxTr4Oxa2StKH4giFOjvS5ey4B578J
 pEMgQYtXDXhzX4eNKmV23FducCqWXBaOHL2zvK7jK5A==

- ------------------------------------------------------------------------
This message digitally signed with Privacy Enhanced Mail.  Get your copy
of the Internet reference implementation from "pem-info at tis.com".


- ------- Forwarded Message

Message-ID: <199302092258.AA00113 at zephyr.isi.edu>
Sender:     ietf-announce-request at IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US
From:       "Joyce K. Reynolds" <jkrey at isi.edu>
To:         IETF-Announce:;@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US
cc:         jkrey at isi.edu
Date:       Tue, 09 Feb 93 14:56:39 PST
Subject:    RFC1422 on Certificate-Based Key Management


- - --NextPart


A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.


        RFC 1422:

        Title:      Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:
                    Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management      
        Author:     S. Kent
        Mailbox:    kent at BBN.COM
        Pages:      32
        Characters: 86,085
        Obsoletes:  RFC 1114 


This is one of a series of documents defining privacy enhancement
mechanisms for electronic mail transferred using Internet mail
protocols.  This memo is the outgrowth of a series of meetings of the
Privacy and Security Research Group of the Internet Research Task
Force (IRTF) and the Privacy-Enhanced Electronic Mail Working Group of
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).  The author would like to
thank the members of the PSRG and the PEM WG for their comments and
contributions at the meetings which led to the preparation of this
document.  The author also would like to thank contributors to the
PEM-DEV mailing list ("pem-dev at tis.com") who have provided valuable
input which is reflected in this memo.

This is now a Proposed Standard Protocol.

This RFC specifies an IAB standards track protocol for the Internet
community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.
Please refer to the current edition of the "IAB Official Protocol
Standards" for the standardization state and status of this protocol.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

This announcement is sent to the IETF list and the RFC-DIST list.
Requests to be added to or deleted from the IETF distribution list
should be sent to IETF-REQUEST at CNRI.RESTON.VA.US.  Requests to be added
to or deleted from the RFC-DIST distribution list should be sent to
RFC-REQUEST at NIC.DDN.MIL.

Details on obtaining RFCs via FTP or EMAIL may be obtained by sending
an EMAIL message to "rfc-info at ISI.EDU" with the message body 
"help: ways_to_get_rfcs".  For example:

        To: rfc-info at ISI.EDU
        Subject: getting rfcs

        help: ways_to_get_rfcs

Requests for special distribution should be addressed to either the
author of the RFC in question, or to NIC at NIC.DDN.MIL.  Unless
specifically noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for
unlimited distribution.

Submissions for Requests for Comments should be sent to
RFC-EDITOR at ISI.EDU.  Please consult RFC 1111, "Instructions to RFC
Authors", for further information.


Joyce K. Reynolds
USC/Information Sciences Institute

...

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant Mail Reader 
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version
of the RFCs.

- - --NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

- - --OtherAccess
Content-Type:  Message/External-body;
        access-type="mail-server";
        server="mail-server at nisc.sri.com"

Content-Type: text/plain

SEND rfc1422.txt

- - --OtherAccess
Content-Type:   Message/External-body;
        name="rfc1422.txt";
        site="nic.ddn.mil";
        access-type="anon-ftp";
        directory="rfc"

Content-Type: text/plain


- - --OtherAccess--
- - --NextPart--

- ------- End of Forwarded Message

-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----






From sdw at sdwsys.lig.net  Tue Feb  9 21:23:07 1993
From: sdw at sdwsys.lig.net (Stephen D. Williams)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 21:23:07 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302071056.AA00916@ono-sendai>
Message-ID: <9302100519.AA12969@sdwsys.lig.net>


> 
> I don't see how a 28.8kbps (raw) data rate is possible, as the Shannon
> limit for a POTS line is 22kbps.  Certainly parts of the phone system
> no longer impose the narrow bandwidth that are part of the 'spec', but
> one can not always depend on getting a line that exceedes the published
> parameters of the phone system.
My impression was that most of the new systems dealt with variable 
bandwidth automatically.  28.8kbps might only be acheived on a higher
quality line.  The stated rates are max, not nominal.
> 
...
> I'm also fairly sure that recent Zyxel modems (e.g. the U-1496) use
> this Rockwell chip(set), and not a dedicated DSP.
They told me they use their own design 'datapump', and I know they use
a 68K (I swapped the rom in mine).
> 
> Jim
> 

Also, from a previous note, you wouldn't want to turn off V.42/V.42bis
since that is where the error correction is.  Also, even on compressed
data, you get some additional bandwidth because it does packetized 
synchronous data.  This gets close to 8bits/byte instead of 10 (start,
stop).

I get around 1760cps for LZW (zoo/compress) data.
This is Zyxel to non-zyxel (Cerfnet or World).

sdw





From elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU  Tue Feb  9 22:58:55 1993
From: elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU (Karl Barrus)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 22:58:55 PST
Subject: anonymous script
Message-ID: <199302100657.AA06626@Menudo.UH.EDU>


Cypherpunks,

Out of curiosity, what are the approximate computer ratios among this
list?  That is, how many people use MSDOS, how many use Mac's, how
many Amigas, many have Unix, how many have VMS?  

I'm just curious because it recently struck me that not everyone here
is running Unix, and thus can't really use the scripts I've written
(which help use the anonymous remailers).  So I wrote a helper program
in C++ for MSDOS, but after looking at the code, I've decided to bury
it and replace it with the following MSDOS script (at bottom of this
message). 

Also, I'm curious because I'm thinking of writing some help programs
for the digital bank, which will help automate interactions with the
bank.  

------8< cut here >8------
@echo off
rem anonmail.bat - MSDOS script to assist in using the anonymous remailers
rem Karl L. Barrus - elee9sf at menudo.uh.edu

if '%3'=='' goto help

echo :: > zzztemp1.txt
echo Request-Remailing-To: %2 >> zzztemp1.txt
echo. >> zzztemp1.txt

if '%3'=='1' goto noencrypt
if '%3'=='2' goto noencrypt
if '%3'=='3' goto noencrypt
if '%3'=='4' goto encrypt
if '%3'=='5' goto encrypt
if '%3'=='6' goto encrypt
if '%3'=='7' goto encrypt
if '%3'=='8' goto encrypt
if '%3'=='9' goto special

echo Improper choice.
goto done

:noencrypt
copy zzztemp1.txt + %1 zzztemp3.txt

goto done

:encrypt
if '%3'=='4' set pgpremail=hal at alumni.caltech.edu
if '%3'=='5' set pgpremail=remailer at rebma.mn.org
if '%3'=='6' set pgpremail=elee7h5 at rosebud.ee.uh.edu
if '%3'=='7' set pgpremail=phantom at mead.u.washington.edu
if '%3'=='8' set pgpremail=hfinney at shell.portal.com

echo :: > zzztemp2.txt
echo Encrypted: PGP >> zzztemp2.txt
echo. >> zzztemp2.txt

pgp -ea zzztemp1.txt %pgpremail% 
copy zzztemp2.txt + zzztemp1.asc + %1 zzztemp3.txt

goto done

:special
if '%3'=='9' set pgpremail=remail at extropia.wimsey.com

copy zzztemp1.txt + %1 zzztemp2.txt
pgp -ea zzztemp2.txt %pgpremail%
copy zzztemp2.asc zzztemp3.txt

goto done

:help
echo  Usage: anonmail filename destination_address remailer_number
echo  1: hh at pmantis.berkeley.edu          no encryption
echo  2: hh at cicada.berkeley.edu           no encryption
echo  3: hh at soda.berkeley.edu             no encryption
echo  4: hal at alumni.caltech.edu           encryption
echo  5: remailer at rebma.mn.org            encryption
echo  6: elee7h5 at rosebud.ee.uh.edu        encryption
echo  7: phantom at mead.u.washington.edu    encryption
echo  8: hfinney at shell.portal.com         encryption
echo  9: remail at extropia.wimsey.com       special
echo NOTE: final output will be placed in the filename specified
:done
del %1
rename zzztemp3.txt %1
del zzz*.*



/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf at menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus at tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/





From miron at extropia.wimsey.com  Tue Feb  9 23:52:32 1993
From: miron at extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 23:52:32 PST
Subject: The role of pools
Message-ID: <199302100735.AA16769@xtropia>


A pool is used for *replying* to anon mail.  The problem is that it's hard  
to build a system that allows replies to anon email and still maintains  
absolute security.  One way is to broadcast the reply.  A pool does just  
that - it's basically a mailing list.  It could be a newsgroup.

Since any of the subscribers to the pool could be the intended recipient  
of any particular message, it would be very hard to use the pool to trace  
the anonymous recipient.

-- 

        Miron Cuperman <miron at extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
                       <miron at cs.sfu.ca>           | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            |
cyberspacecomputingcryptoimmortalitynetworkslaissezfaire





From John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG  Wed Feb 10 01:58:55 1993
From: John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 01:58:55 PST
Subject: E Pluribus Unum
Message-ID: <4833.2B78CB7D@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>



 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks
 BK> From: deltorto at aol.com
 BK> I believe that sending a
 BK> powerful concise letter _together_ makes it more likely that it will
 BK> be read, and even more likely that it will be responded to. Otherwise,
 BK> we're just a bunch of nutty "individuals."

Well, while I am personally of the opinion that this undertaking is of
neglible value for the sweat expended anyway, I would suggest that the
eventual note (if any) not presume to represent anyone but the
individual signatories.

 BK> On the other hand I am repenting my suggestion that we _might_ include
 BK> anything political in our missive.

Good.  The surreal laundry-list of crackpot causes in CPSR's written
agenda has gained them my absolute opposition & has probably turned off
others as well.  It would be a mistake for Cypherpunks to drag in
outside issues.

 BK> I don't think it should be "cutesy"

Of course not.  There's no quicker way to the bit bucket, assuming this
entire e-mail flap isn't a bad joke in the first place.

 >>Stress privacy, and technological defenses thereto.

 BK> I agree.

Me three.

 BK> Especially the technological expertise side, as this is what
 BK> differentiates us from the mass of other people crying about privacy.

A good point!  Nothing impresses bureaucrats like "experts" [cough!].

 >>5) Offer to help.  Offer to make timely review of proposed policies.
 >>If they accept your aid, keep your promises.

 BK> This is my favorite suggestion. Imagine if they gave us all jobs at
 BK> the NSA. Heh-heh-heh.

You wouldn't like it.

 BK> Now, I have a general question: what is the current status of the
 BK> White House email capability as far as everyone can tell? Has anyone
 BK> had a response yet, by email or snailmail? Is there a possibility that
 BK> this IS a hoax and that we should just send paper mail instead?

Check my previous message.
        JN

... Source: "Another Burned-Out Spook for Peace," S.F., CA
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG





From miron at extropia.wimsey.com  Wed Feb 10 02:51:55 1993
From: miron at extropia.wimsey.com (miron at extropia.wimsey.com)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 02:51:55 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302071056.AA00916@ono-sendai>
Message-ID: <1993Feb10.101337.17788@extropia.wimsey.bc.ca>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

sdw at sdwsys.lig.net (Stephen D. Williams) writes:

>Also, from a previous note, you wouldn't want to turn off V.42/V.42bis
>since that is where the error correction is.  Also, even on compressed
>data, you get some additional bandwidth because it does packetized 
>synchronous data.  This gets close to 8bits/byte instead of 10 (start,
>stop).

I think that you *do* want to turn off V.42.  V.42 does error
correction by using error detection and retransmission.  This
introduces variable delay and throughput, which are unacceptable in
a real-time application like voice.

I think that error correction through error correction codes is
the way to go.

- -- 
        Miron Cuperman <miron at extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
                       <miron at cs.sfu.ca>           | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            |
cyberspacecomputingcryptoimmortalitynetworkslaissezfaire

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK3i7lZNxvvA36ONDAQF3sQP+Ibesz2FVTGLfWL0Xsjj5X1jFkEU807va
+qpmDLDGghgdM5xCpc+Xv8Zl8lJx356WMPrbZfdshumXtmjsqf33Wq6fcAUse87k
6nsPiTkDpWnsga9g6oKUjPjTuQUcdk7VzrosJ+l3MAnvhQ0bD1TJD2ySIQk8NIPV
+uGM5Ore+6Q=
=7ViZ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

New signature on my key:

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1

mQCNAiqvJ10AAAED/jXfntqmsRjJRYoxYTxLO7obzMfzgUNtSDEawb3Suj4UO1xq
uARc25PJNAHQhIa83Yxf9z/R/3AjwmYrZqxvB2RkLPTjTmzQd04fypsZToiR/TlM
5F43JCuCM779mAir9Idy1CQzXQ2bn89eUZaVhOUJzNgndl+wLpNxvvA36ONDAAUR
tCxJbW1vcnRhbCBGcmVlZG9tIDxtaXJvbkBleHRyb3BpYS53aW1zZXkuY29tPokA
lQIFECtQgZGoEwOvWCFMNwEB4ecD+wdqaIGhJgfhlY+ypQwmgN3ytgUi/MjgmUdT
B2qfjRj0uhyXOPegSQ+n0ZF4wHEo1a2osdAo387iYHNebqAOv1+3xM10beI/RNT1
dZwUcm/LXwuCRACAqlL5lB5cQNy4ZbG/QvioAWYqqq6g9ftiI6Z1nkvZ6mIb9QZv
WBCysIj8iQCVAgUQKxc8tJNxvvA36ONDAQG/bQP+Mgq7zP0M/7BMstZhllrH3Cck
nNGQP3/+QUALSKzosw0xJJfTIbA4+aoQjvXQFKi+5MCU0GaoGsyuXQGnluzGkI3w
XDcxzR7Hl97V5+hyRWNc0sw/QbimWvQAUwDgpc0T4x/AsUx34Zx3G5+ujTIqgHKC
wfBD6ib6u61E8jLz38+JAEUCBRArDHAdS60iYsR4D/cBAZCdAXwPRl2uvP6QwCC4
4A0GFufGbm3NqThNaDfuGn+JTYIR8htb8hRUg8SM2G8zpyNnWNA=
=AVXx
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----





From thug at phantom.com  Wed Feb 10 08:47:10 1993
From: thug at phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 08:47:10 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <1993Feb10.101337.17788@extropia.wimsey.bc.ca>
Message-ID: <m0nMKUy-000k1hC@phantom.com>


miron at extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman) writes:
> sdw at sdwsys.lig.net (Stephen D. Williams) writes:
> 
> >Also, from a previous note, you wouldn't want to turn off V.42/V.42bis
> >since that is where the error correction is.  Also, even on compressed
> >data, you get some additional bandwidth because it does packetized 
> >synchronous data.  This gets close to 8bits/byte instead of 10 (start,
> >stop).
> 
> I think that you *do* want to turn off V.42.  V.42 does error
> correction by using error detection and retransmission.  This
> introduces variable delay and throughput, which are unacceptable in
> a real-time application like voice.
> 
> I think that error correction through error correction codes is
> the way to go.

Exactly.  v.42/v.42bis packetizes the data stream and, depending on the
CODEC, would have adverse effects on voice quality.

I don't know if CELP requires an error-free transmittion stream from
codec to codec.  If it doesn't then that's great, I hope it self-synchronizes
itself after a byte or two of garbage coming through. Big deal, so you hear
a click or pop of static, so what.. you get that with analog lines.

On the other hand, since this stream will also be encrypted, it is unlikely
that errors could not mangle the entire conversation, and screw up the
encryption.  A single byte of garbage can unsync both encryption/decryption
sides and things could get very messy.

Here's how to deal with error checking/correction.  You CAN use v.42/v.42bis
if both crypto-phones offer somekind of FIFO chip in between the modem and
the crypto-chip.  This can smooth out a packety/bursty stream into a smooth
24kbps data stream. However, the resending of large packets by v.42 might
cause some wierd sound delays similar to what you hear on satellite circuits.

The best solution, as suggested by Miron is to use forward error correction.
There is plenty of bandwidth in a 19.2/21.6/24.0/28.8 kbps connection to
send CELP nybbles or bytes each along with their own ECC code. I believe a
4 bits of CELP would require 3 bits of ECC.  In any case, there is enough
bandwidth on a 19.2 kbps modem carrier to send a fully encrypted and fully
forward error corrected 9600 bps CELP stream. Let's assume we use a 4-bit
ECC code for each 4 bits of data, thus doubling our bandwidth.

Here's how it would look:

                                           9.6kbps    19.2kbps
sending:                                    |           |
                                            v           v 
voice ----> CELP ------------>     IDEA    --- ECC -------------v 
            coder    9.6kbps     encryption    coding         raw 19.2 
                                                             modulation
                                                                v 
                                                 9.6kbps  19.2k |
receiving:                                        |         |   |
                                                  v         v   |
voice <---- CELP <------------     IDEA       <------ ECC ------+ 
           decoder   9.6kbps     decryption           correction




Thug 





From tcmay at netcom.com  Wed Feb 10 11:57:33 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 11:57:33 PST
Subject: Timed-Release Crypto
Message-ID: <9302101955.AA09009@netcom.netcom.com>



Cypherpunks,

I want to share with you folks some preliminary ideas on "timed-release
cryptographic protocols," that is, methods for sending encrypted messages
into the future.

These ideas need more work, but since I have recently mentioned them to Hal
Finney, Max More, Mark Miller, and perhaps others, I guess it's time to say
something here.

Why would anyone want to send encrypted (sealed) messages into the future?

1. Foremost, to send money into the future, while protecting it in the
meantime from seizure, taxation, etc. This might be of interest to cryonics
folks who want to arrange for their own revival/reanimation at some time in
the future. (Existing systems have relied on creating endowments, insurance
contracts, trust funds, and the like. The trust of the agent is the means
for sending funds into the future--clearly this agent could be compromised,
raided, taxed, put out of business, etc. Though I am personally not a
cryonics client, I began thinking about this problem in 1989 and talked it
over with Phil Salin, who, ironically, is now himself in cryonic
suspension.)

2. To fulfill contracts with long payoff dates. One might wish to deliver
money at some future date, or to supply information at some future date.

3. "In the event of my death"-type messages, with guaranteed delivery of
some message or text in the event that something happens (or, of course,
that the message is not "countermanded" by the sender).

4. A software publisher might place source code in a timed-release escrow,
agreeing to release the code in 10 years, for whatever reason. (Of course,
he may lie, but that's another issue. Possibly the digital time-stamping
work of Haber and Stornetta can be used.)

I'm sure you can think of other uses. I argue that this timed-release
message is a kind of cryptographic primitive...though it may be argued that
it's just a variant of an ordinary message transmission, albeit one through
time instead of through space.

Diving right in, some approaches:

A message is encrypted (standard public key means, though private key
methods work the same way) and "sent out." Perhaps into a network of
remailers or a Cuperman-style "pool" (BTW, my compliments to Miron C. for
deploying such a thing..the first of many, I suspect). The encrypted
message is just a "passive" item in this scheme...it stays encrypted, is
available to all, etc. (in other words, the security of the message being
time-released does not in any way depend on hiding the existence or
location of the encrypted message, though of course it is important that
the encrypted message be widely distributed and not explicitly advertised
or tagged as being a timed-release message. 

(Detail note: Why not? Because some governments may see timed-release
messages as automatically being tax-avoiding, cryonics-supporting,
seditious, etc., messages and may attempt to hunt down and erase any such
messages...perhaps via "hunter-killer crypto viruses" or somesuch.)

Let us suppose the encrypted message is to be unlocked in 30 years. (It
could also be when some recognized event occurs, such as a Mars landing or
the death of the sender, or whatever...you'll see how this works). How can
the decryption key be prevented from being used in the meantime?

(To make this clear: both the encryted message _and_ the decryption key are
"in circulation" during all of those 30 years. Any scheme that relies on
the sender himself keeping the decryption key "secret" for those 30 years
is of course no fun at all...it's just what we have today and involved no
new cryptographic primitives, just ordinary human-mediated secrecy.) 

But if the encrypted message and the decryption key are both in circulation
for all of those 30 years, what's to keep someone from decrypting the
message in _one_ year, for example?

The answer: independent escrow agents who handle large volumes of messages
and agree to hold them for various amounts of time. Because they have no
idea of what's insided the encrypted messages they hold--and some may be
"test" messages deposited deliberately by reputation-rating or
credentialling agencies, such as "Consumers Crypto Guide"--and because
their business is holding things in escrow, they will not generally open
messages before the time specified.

"Aha!," I hear you exclaim, "Tim's scheme depends solely on the trust of
these escrow agents, and that's no different from depositing a sealed
envelope with your friendly lawyer and asking him to promise not to peek."

Here's how crypto and reputation-based sytems make my scenario different
(and stronger, I am arguing):

- an ecology of many escrow services, many pools, many encrypted-message
senders makes for a more robust system against subversion of any single
agent.

- no escrow agent knows what is contained in a sealed message, hence the
tempation to peek is reduced. (A wrinkle: escrow agents, like remailers,
will probably go to automatic hardware that is tamper-resistant (cf.
discussion of tamper-resistant or tamper-responding, modules in the Crypto
Glossary distributed at the first physical Cypherpunks meeting and
available in the archives). Thus, the hardware will automatically execute
certain protocols and make peeking a pain.)

- the best escrow agents (someday) may in turn increase security and their
own reputations by in turn using secondary contracts, i.e., by contracting
with _other_ escrow agents to seal parts or all of their messages.

- what results is that the original message is scattered around in various
publicly available locations (perhaps paid-for by dribbles of cryto-money
from crypto escrow agents, but this is a detail easily worked out in
various ways). The decryption key to the original message is itself broken
up into several or many pieces and scattered to a network of
"remailer"-like agents (they are essentially "remailers into the future,"
by agreeing as part of their protocol to hold messages for some amount of
time). As time passes, these various messages (pieces, remember) are
retrieved, forwarded, and generally bounced around the network.

- some escrow agents may be just "fixed delay" nodes. For example, "Alice's
Rest Stop" remailer node widely advertises that it will take in messages
and simply delay them for some fixed time, e.g., for a year. For some fee
based on message size. (Clearly the fixed time delay is a crufty approach,
much less flexible than variable delays negotiated by the messages
themselves, but it makes the idea clearer in some ways: a network of many
such one-year delays could thus "send" a message into the future in
one-year jumps.)

(It is important to remember that these messages are "first-class objects,"
to borrow a phrase, and that all messages essentially look the same and
have the same "rights" (Dean Tribble is probably barfing at my
appropriation of object-oriented lingo, but it seems appropriate). That is,
inspection of the bytes will not reveal to someone whether the message is a
$2 message, a simple love letter, a business contract, a remailed item, a
$100K cryonics payment, etc. Thus, the "authorities" cannot simply target
some class of messages and ban them or launch "hunter-killer crypto
viruses" against them, at least not without shutting down the whole
system!)

- the individual pieces may have instructions attached, such as "You will
be paid 10 crypto credits if you hold me for one year and then decrypt me."
(Not to belabor the point, but the means by which this "contract" can be
enforced are that the escrow agents never know when they're being tested,
when they're being monitored by rating services. This kind of "trust" is
what allows ordinary deposit banks to work...their business is talking
deposits and lending money, not repudiating the honest claims of
customers.)

- thus, I envision a swarm of messages being stored-and-forwarded in space
and time, with an observor seeing only  bits flowing around. Nobody except
the original "launcher" (who needs to be fairly careful about the path he
selects, about robustness against some fraction of the escrow/remailer
agents going out of business, etc.) knows what's going on.

- and as the end of the 30 years period approaches, to continue with the
example I started with, the decryption key gets "reconstituted" in various
ways (depends on what is desired, and how protocols evolve...I don't claim
to have the details already worked out). For example, after 30 years the
various messages stored in escrow accounts are forwarded separately to "The
Immortalist Foundation," which may in fact be a digital pseudonym (as we
have discussed so many times here). This entity puts the pieces together,
sort of like combining the missing pieces of a text and reconstituting a
genie or demon, and finds it can now unlock the original encrypted message.
It finds, say, a million crypto credits, or the location of some physical
treasure, or whatever. 

(Needless to say, there are some obvious questions about what long-term
money will be stable, what banks will still exist after 30 years, and so
on. I expect new forms of time deposits to evolve. Can the original sender
be expected to know what will evolve before he seals his original message?
Some obvious issues to work on--I never claimed it would be trivial, or
static. One approach is to allow some human intervention, where an
"investment agent" opens a digital money message, redeems it, and reinvests
it in some new instrument. As usual, he would not know who the original
investor was and would be "tested" by reputation-rating agencies. It _does_
get complicated, I know.)

The Key Point: Messages sent into this network of remailers, escrow
accounts, pools, and investment agents are untraceable to the sender and
are generally unidentifiable. To break a single message involves breaking
the entire system (or colluding with enough remailer nodes, as in any
DC-Net sort of system). As with remailer networks, the expectation is that
they will become sufficiently pervasive and trans-nationalized that
breaking the entire system is just too painful and difficult (much the way
the Net is already too pervasive to easily shut down, even if some uses of
it are undesirable to various national authorities).

Timed-release messages are objects that can be transmitted, encrypted, and
can carry further instructions on where to mail them next, on how much
digital money to pay to this next link, and various other instructions or
protocols.

(In other words, they are "agents" that can negotiate various contracts,
for remailing , for storage, etc. Since they are "powerless" in a human
sense, their security is provided by double-checks--perhaps by other agents
who are watching and waiting--and by the general "shell-game" system of
reputations, credentialling, and so on.)

To make this scheme clearer in a simple way, I could publicly post an
encrypted message to this list, or in one of the "pools," and then scatter
the decryption key in several pieces with several members of this list,
paying them $1 each to "hold" their piece for, say, a month. At the end of
the month, they would fulfill their end of the bargain by forwarding the
piece they hold to some public place or pool and the decryption key would
be reconstituted (don't press me for exact details....PGP doesn't support
this directly, but could). For robustness against loss of some of the
messages, an n-out-of-m voting scheme could be used (e.g., any 5 of 8
pieces are sufficient to reconstruct the decryption key).

The result is a message from the past, a timed-release message.

I'm anxious to hear your comments. I think such a cryptographic primitive
could be useful for a lot of purposes.

-Tim May

--

Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: waiting for the dust to settle.








From deltorto at aol.com  Wed Feb 10 12:20:37 1993
From: deltorto at aol.com (deltorto at aol.com)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 12:20:37 PST
Subject: Speaking in Tongues
Message-ID: <9302101519.tn42504@aol.com>


>>From:  dmandl at shearson.com
>>Subj:   Re: E Pluribus Unum
>>
>>> From: deltorto at aol.com
>>> 
>>> Fellow Cyphers,
>>> 
>>> Eric Hughes contributed:
>>> >>I applaud the Clinton administration for making itself available via
>>> >>email.  I do not think it advisable, however, to send a single
>>> >>cypherpunks letter.  Rather I urge all interested parties to compose
>>> >>their own letters [etc., etc., etc., etc.]
>>
>>I think I've held my tongue long enough. 

Hmmmm. Perhaps not.   :-D

  ddt

PS: I can't afford six months, but I like (the symbolism of) the idea. There
are much more effective ways of pulling their plug, no?





From miron at extropia.wimsey.com  Wed Feb 10 12:53:21 1993
From: miron at extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 12:53:21 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <1993Feb10.101337.17788@extropia.wimsey.bc.ca>
Message-ID: <1993Feb10.193843.20507@extropia.wimsey.bc.ca>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

thug at phantom.com (Murdering Thug) writes:

>I don't know if CELP requires an error-free transmittion stream from
>codec to codec.  If it doesn't then that's great, I hope it self-synchronizes
>itself after a byte or two of garbage coming through. Big deal, so you hear
>a click or pop of static, so what.. you get that with analog lines.

CELP resyncs.  Not sure how fast.  Maybe after a tenth of a second or so.

On a side note, we are finishing up an implementation of CELP on the
TMS320C5x.  This is a 20 MIPS integer chip.  We are taking up less
than 15 MIPS.  We also know how to write error corrected CELP (such
that bits that cause more significant degradation are protected
better).
- -- 
        Miron Cuperman <miron at extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
                       <miron at cs.sfu.ca>           | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            |
cyberspacecomputingcryptoimmortalitynetworkslaissezfaire

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Version: 2.1

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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU  Wed Feb 10 13:55:53 1993
From: elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU (Karl Barrus)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 13:55:53 PST
Subject: timed-release crypto
Message-ID: <199302102154.AA20926@Menudo.UH.EDU>



Tim May writes:
>...I could publicly post an encrypted message to this list, or in one
>of the "pools," and then scatter the decryption key in several pieces
>with several members of this list, paying them $1 each to "hold" their
>piece for, say, a month.  At the end of the month, they would fulfill
>their end of the bargain by forwarding the piece they hold to some
>public place or pool and the decryption key would be reconstituted...

Cypherpunks, this is an experiment we can try right here right now.
We certainly have the anonymous mail facilities, pools, and
encryption, as well as a digital bank we could use to "pay" people :-)

Splitting a decryption key is fairly easy: we could use the simple XOR
method.  Say you want to encrypt a message of length m and split the
key among n people.  Choose n-1 sequences of m random bits (coin
flips, cryptographically strong pseudo-random number sequences, etc)
and XOR the message with all the random sequences (call the result
M').  Then your split secret is the M' and the n-1 sequences.  To
recover the message, calculate the XOR of M' and the n-1 sequences.
Providing for an n-out-of-m scheme takes more work and number theory,
but that can be done as well.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf at menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus at tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/





From ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu  Wed Feb 10 14:12:43 1993
From: ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu (ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 14:12:43 PST
Subject: Timed-Release Crypto
In-Reply-To: <9302101955.AA09009@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302102211.AA22756@longs.lance.colostate.edu>


This is neat idea, T.C. May. Here are some things that popped into my
head thinking of it.

I think the idea of multiple encryption of the time-delay message would
be extremely useful here. Imagine this. You encrypt a message with as
many layers as there are intermediate escrows.  In other words, a
message is encrypted with layer1 pw, then reencrypted with layer2 pw,
then layer3, etc.  In the decryption message (separate) there is a long
sequence of keys.  The lower-level keys closer to the actual message
are also encrypted by the higher-level keys.  Now, suppose that the way
the message is held is this: after 1 level of protection has elapsed,
the password message and the encryption message are recombined to a
single escrow agent. That agent uses the top-level information (one key
is plaintext (maybe not), or encrypted with that agent's public key, or
whatever) to decode the top-level of encryption.  Then, he again
redistributes the next-lower-level of encryption password message and
actual message to unique escrow agents.

The beauty of this is that a given escrow agent, even once he gets a
password, can only strip off "his" topmost level of encryption (at
least, that's the intent). He is powerless to decrypt all the lower
levels and hence the message itself. Therefore to actually decrypt a
message ahead of time would require the collusion of many operators. 
The message should have some kind of indications at each level when it
is to be "reconstituted" (just add water), and escrow agents of course
should hold or reject messages that are sent to them for premature
decryption.  There is also the distinction of "joiners" and "storers"
although the two could be combined in some way (both are "forwarders").

The final destination should be the destination the original owner
intended, so that there is no final escrow agent that can decrypt the
message.  He only has an encoded message he can pass along, and another
agent only has a meaningless key and the final address as well.  When
the final destination is reached, the last layer of decryption can be
removed by the intended recipient (the money is in -X- account,
password -Y- or whatever).  I.e., the recipient is the final "joiner".

The idea of separating keys and the encoded messages is really
ingenious, and I'd guess this "disassociation" has other uses as well. 
An encrypted message with a password *existing* but *inaccessable* is
just as secure as a message using conventional encryption. In fact,
there is probably an added dimension of security---in most systems
*somebody* knows the key, but here, if it is generated automatically,
even the *key* is unknown for awhile!

Another possibility is to have some kind of standard protocol for time
encrypted messages (this is interesting and seems feasible). Let's say
I want a message [x] to be unencrypted on date [y].  I call a "time
encryption server" and ask for the secret key associated with my
message and date [y].  I encrypt the message and publicize that
version.  The time server is constantly spewing out the daily code for
messages that expire on that date. Anybody just listens to the
broadcast and decrypts the messages in their possession using the key. 
Note however that it is crucial that somehow the key depend on the
message itself (via the hashing approaches), otherwise everybody knows
everybody else's keys ahead of time just by submitting messages to the
server for the particular date.  I suppose public-key encryption could
be used here but I'm hazy on the details.

P.S. this is a really tricky situation compared to above, but it might
be possible to make messages with "insecure" passwords that can be
broken in a few lifetimes from searches. Of course, this depends very
crucially on the pace of technology and the resources devoted to the
cracking, two highly variable factors.

Also, keep in mind that every message in existence relying on
complexity of algorithms is encrypted based on the time-delayed release
of revolutionary and unforeseen computer techniques in cracking... or,
more specifically, the gamble that they will not occur...





From Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU  Wed Feb 10 14:56:23 1993
From: Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU (Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 14:56:23 PST
Subject: Crypto goals
Message-ID: <9302102256.AA29342@toad.com>


Y'know, just defining "what we should want" is one of the biggest
challenges in moving towards the next generation of crypto.  How
about making a list of features we want, and/or a list of scenarios
we want to be able to handle?

Uncontroversial features:
    message privacy
    message anonymity
    message untraceability
    digital cash
    digital time stamps

More difficult/controversial features:
    message invisibility [e.g. in low bits of video signal]
    untraceable access to databases [just anonymous email?]
    electronic black markets [just electronic cash and anonymous email?]
    electronic voting
    m-of-n trust schemes
    time-delay messages [are they useful?]
    executable but non-disassemblable code [is it possible?]
    tagging / un-tagging of copyrighted text [what is possible?]
       [explanation to follow in another message ]

I know how to take a crack at implementing all of these except the last
two, but would benefit from better theoretical and practical work on
all of them.  Most of them are obviously useful, and scenarios come
easily to mind.  

Have I missed anything?


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr at cs.cmu.edu)





From Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU  Wed Feb 10 15:05:36 1993
From: Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU (Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 15:05:36 PST
Subject: Tagging copyrighted text
Message-ID: <9302102305.AA29462@toad.com>


Tim May and many of us argue that copyrights will become unenforceable 
as copying bits becomes cheaper and crypto privacy and anonymity becomes
more widely available.  This will mean that any static collection of
bits will just be FREE.  Musicians will have to make money on live
performances, because they couldn't sell many recordings.  Etc.

A question I've been thinking about is, will Dow Jones be able to charge
for its newswire?  

Step 1:  I subscribe to Dow Jones and then relay each message to a
mailing list, charging them a fraction of the original price.

Step 2:  Dow Jones starts changing random whitespace in the text, in an
attempt to "tag" the text untraceably to trace which subscriber is
leaking the information.  They cancel my subscription.

Step 3:  I get 20 new subscriptions, and use the redundancy to cancel
out Dow Jones's sneaky tagging.

Step 4: ...


Question:  who wins?  I haven't been able to work it out yet, but
it may just be a simple combinatorial exercise.


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr at cs.cmu.edu)





From ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu  Wed Feb 10 17:49:10 1993
From: ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu (ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 17:49:10 PST
Subject: Tagging copyrighted text
In-Reply-To: <9302102305.AA29462@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302110148.AA26737@longs.lance.colostate.edu>


>Tim May and many of us argue that copyrights will become unenforceable 
>as copying bits becomes cheaper and crypto privacy and anonymity becomes
>more widely available.  This will mean that any static collection of
>bits will just be FREE.  Musicians will have to make money on live
>performances, because they couldn't sell many recordings.  Etc.

Er, I'd say this is another instance of cypherpunk extremism: ``The
world as we know it is about to collapse.''  Yes, information will
probably be much freer over the nets, and copyright violations probably
more difficult to pursue and punish.  But think about this: with the
speed and ubiquity of networks, it now becomes possible for every
author or creative artist to keep the only copies of his work. Then, he
could post "links" to it anywhere in the world. When people pass around
the work, they wouldn't pass around the work itself, they'd pass the
"link".  Whenever someone wants to view the work, the link points to
the unchanging address for instantaneous downloading.  A very small
transaction charge is billed to the receiver by the sender. (Of course,
people could write stuff that would actually grab and store the text or
whatever instead of just "play" it. But I'll bet that most people will
eventually say, "why bother?" The direct access will be more convenient
and the charge so minimal.)  Links could be embedded wherever there is
information, like in bibliographies or references or compilations or whatever.

 There are virtually NO MIDDLEMEN---the investment return to the artist
is total.  Contrast this to today's vast overhead with records and
books, for example (these costs are largely associated with
distribution, I'd wager).  Of course, the individual artist is free to
make contracts with knowledgeable cohorts for album cover design or
whatever.  The essence of a copyright is really to give a creative
artist more control over their own works, and global, high-speed,
reliable networks will give artists absolutely unprecedented and
unparalleled control (and yes, I admit, a lack of it too).

Hey, consider that programmers are artists too.  I write some hot
program, but I don't distribute it: I run it on one of my systems as a
sort of network pipe.  People anywhere in the world pipe in their data
and get it back with a small transaction fee to me.  In fact, what I'm
really getting at is treating the entire world like Unix utilities with
standard input and output, sort of like electronic vending machines!  I
can pipe my manuscripts to some address and they pop out edited or
published.  I drop a file on that goofy icon, and it goes to Bill
Clinton.  I could hook up pipes between companies to set up my own
company!  There might be a lot of command line parameters to specify
and plenty of glitches reported on stderr, but it could work...  This
all would happen with commensurate drains on my online account (all
digital transactions, of course).  Imagine that you could write
software that would bill the user!  Big companies do it, why not individuals?





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Wed Feb 10 17:51:26 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 17:51:26 PST
Subject: Wired photo shoot at cypherpunks on Saturday
Message-ID: <9302110148.AA11268@soda.berkeley.edu>


Kevin Kelly, editor of Wired Magazine, former list member, and former
editor of Whole Earth Review, asked me to forward the following
message to the list.

OK, everybody, it's your chance for fame or the avoidance thereof.

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

WIRED magazine is running a story by Steven Levy (Hackers, Artificial Life)
on crypto rebels and the current politics of encryption. The story takes an
extremely sympathetic view of the work  done by this list.

To illustrate this story, WIRED will have a professional photographer at
Cygnus at next Satuday's cyherpunk meeting. He will set up outside of the
meeting area somewhere. WIRED would like to shoot an anonymous group
picture, for those willing to participate. We propose supplying blank face
masks upon with individuals can write their public key. In addition we will
be shooting non-anonymous portraits of some individuals, if they are
willing. We would like it to be fun. We emphasize that this is all voluntary
and will take place away from the meeting area, perhaps before and after the
meeting.

If you have any questions about this you can email me, Kevin Kelly, editor
at WIRED, kk at well.sf.ca.us

We think this article will make a big splash by bringing the issues
you care about into the forefront. Having real people behind the ideas
leads credence to tthe movement. We seek your cooperation.






From kk at well.sf.ca.us  Wed Feb 10 19:02:55 1993
From: kk at well.sf.ca.us (Kevin Kelly)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 19:02:55 PST
Subject: Wired photo shoot at cypherpunks on Saturday
Message-ID: <199302110300.AA18069@well.sf.ca.us>




Thanks.





From Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU  Wed Feb 10 19:31:29 1993
From: Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU (Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 19:31:29 PST
Subject: Tagging copyrighted text
Message-ID: <9302110331.AA05651@toad.com>


Dear ld23178, 

True, the abandonment of copyright isn't going to happen right away.
But I disagree with your claim that on the network of the future the
artist will make a few pennies per copy by being the most convenient
provider of the information.  The author is very unlikely to be the
most convenient and least expensive provider of their work, since they
have no advantage over specialists in the information providing business.

Your point about "unix pipes" across the network is an excellent one,
though.  Information filtering and processing services will be very
valuable and harder to obtain for free.  "Insert a 25c electronic coin
and a pile of news articles, and I'll filter them for you."


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr at cs.cmu.edu)





From karn at qualcomm.com  Wed Feb 10 21:14:12 1993
From: karn at qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 21:14:12 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
Message-ID: <9302110512.AA09668@servo>


At  0:19 2/10/93 -0500, Stephen D. Williams wrote:

>Also, from a previous note, you wouldn't want to turn off V.42/V.42bis
>since that is where the error correction is.  Also, even on compressed
>data, you get some additional bandwidth because it does packetized 
>synchronous data.  This gets close to 8bits/byte instead of 10 (start,
>stop).

As somebody else mentioned, you do want to turn off LAPM/V.42bis when
running a speech application, because speech is a real-time application
and LAPM retransmissions introduce delay. Compression is not likely
to add much but delay either, since the vocoder itself is already
compressing the speech much more effectively than V.42bis, which is
designed specifically for textual information.

Almost all modern modems support synchronous terminals, although the
feature is rarely used. This is how you get around wasting 2 bits out
of every 10 on start and stop bits.

Phil






From fen at genmagic.genmagic.com  Wed Feb 10 21:55:23 1993
From: fen at genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 21:55:23 PST
Subject: Tagging copyrighted text
Message-ID: <9302110555.AA11170@>


Marc Ringuette (mnr at cs.cmu.edu) writes:
> True, the abandonment of copyright isn't going to happen right away.

I agree, too.  But there are many things here to look at.  Economics is
a strange bird, indeed, and I pretend to know little of it.  But here
are some points that the future may bring into focus...


1) It is easy to copy software (music, programs, video, etc.)

2) No matter what copy protection is developed, it will always be easy.

3) People will always pay for the *production* of software
   (a program that needs to be written, or live music, or...)
   (note that the Grateful Dead, top money maker, invites tapers)

4) People will always pay for support, maintenance, storage, etc.
   (note cygnus)

5) Storage and indexing become more valuable as info-quantity grows.

6) Likewise, effecient and accurate filtering (access)

7) People will pay for access to the info they want *now*.

8) Human editors will team with electronic filters to provide this service.


In conclusion, there will always be money to be made.  In (one of) the more
radical futures (that I happen to ascribe to) there will be less income
from past works (ala software patents) and more for storage and timely access.

But the developer of good software (the musician) will always be in demand.

Fen






From marc at Athena.MIT.EDU  Wed Feb 10 22:29:36 1993
From: marc at Athena.MIT.EDU (Marc Horowitz)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 22:29:36 PST
Subject: Tagging copyrighted text
In-Reply-To: <9302102305.AA29462@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302110113.AA20486@binkley.MIT.EDU>


>> Step 2:  Dow Jones starts changing random whitespace in the text, in an
>> attempt to "tag" the text untraceably to trace which subscriber is
>> leaking the information.  They cancel my subscription.

They don't just cancel your subscription.  They sue your butt into
next week.  You can make it harder for them to find you, but if you're
eating into their profits, they will, and the more effort you've made
them go through, the madder they'll be, and the harder their lawyers
will bite.

There's no way to "tag" a document in such a way that the tag cannot
be removed.  At worst, I read the document out loud, and have my
partner rekey it, while rewriting it slightly.  Unless it's something
like poetry which you can't just rewrite, this will pretty much
sanitize the data against any kind of keying.

The fact is, people copy music and software now.  It Happens, and as
much as they wish it didn't, it does.  And when things become more
electronic, it will still happen.  My guess is that unless such
duplication becomes institutionalized, it's not worth the effort to do
anything about it.  And if you start buying things, copying them, and
giving or selling them to lots of other people in an organized way,
the real owners will find you.

		Marc





From tcmay at netcom.com  Thu Feb 11 00:32:21 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 00:32:21 PST
Subject: Tagging copyrighted text
Message-ID: <9302110831.AA00835@netcom.netcom.com>


ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu (I'd use his real name, but this is all
I can find here....why don't people sign their messages?) writes,
commenting on some stuff by Marc Ringuette:

>>Tim May and many of us argue that copyrights will become unenforceable 
>>as copying bits becomes cheaper and crypto privacy and anonymity becomes
>>more widely available.  This will mean that any static collection of
>>bits will just be FREE.  Musicians will have to make money on live
>>performances, because they couldn't sell many recordings.  Etc.
>
>Er, I'd say this is another instance of cypherpunk extremism: ``The

Er, Marc R. didn't say the world as we know it is about to collapse, nor
did I. (BTW, for you cypherpunks, most of this debate about intellectual
property rights took place recently over on the Extropians list.) But I
certainly think some big changes are coming.

>world as we know it is about to collapse.''  Yes, information will
>probably be much freer over the nets, and copyright violations probably
>more difficult to pursue and punish.  But think about this: with the
>speed and ubiquity of networks, it now becomes possible for every
>author or creative artist to keep the only copies of his work. Then, he
>could post "links" to it anywhere in the world. When people pass around
>the work, they wouldn't pass around the work itself, they'd pass the
>"link".  Whenever someone wants to view the work, the link points to
>the unchanging address for instantaneous downloading.  A very small

With music, art, text, or executable code, once it is available for
listening, viewing, reading, or running on the customer's system, it is
also available for copying. This is the whole point--if you can read the
text, you can keep a copy of it. You mention this, but dismiss it as
inconvenient. Well, a popular song may be simultaneously requested by tens
of thousands of listeners....it is hard to imagine the 14 Gigabits per
second (10,000 x CD-quality sound) coming out of someone's home or business
to supply this need! The situation is vastly worse with video, naturally.
(I suppose some "servers," like ftp sites, could be set up to deal with
especially popular movies and music...cumbersome, though. And, yes, fiber
optics can in theory support very high bandwidths, but still not enough to
supply the video rental biz. And this traffic will clog the nets and cause
lots of problems, I would think.)

>transaction charge is billed to the receiver by the sender. (Of course,
>people could write stuff that would actually grab and store the text or
>whatever instead of just "play" it. But I'll bet that most people will
>eventually say, "why bother?" The direct access will be more convenient
>and the charge so minimal.)  Links could be embedded wherever there is
>information, like in bibliographies or references or compilations or whatever.

I agree that hypertext-like embeddings offer some hope, for things like
text especially, as a reader is essentially buying the total package of
texts and links, rather than just some specific text. (But any specific
text becomes vulnerable to "snagging.")

>Hey, consider that programmers are artists too.  I write some hot
>program, but I don't distribute it: I run it on one of my systems as a
>sort of network pipe.  People anywhere in the world pipe in their data
>and get it back with a small transaction fee to me.  In fact, what I'm
.....

Even with much faster networks, remotely running programs introduces lags
and inconveniences, not to mention security problems (e.g., "Now you can
use _our_ word processor at _our_ site to write your love letters!"). If
nothing else, speed of light delays will become very irksome.

But I do agree that "knowledge servers" may be a way for corporate
knowledge to remain bottled up in corporations (for example).

-Tim

--

Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.








From Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU  Thu Feb 11 00:35:37 1993
From: Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU (Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 00:35:37 PST
Subject: Tagging copyrighted text
Message-ID: <9302110835.AA09701@toad.com>


I've been thinking more about how Dow Jones can catch customers which
leak its data.  Let's assume that I, as the thief, get 20
subscriptions, and that Dow Jones tries twiddling the value of various
bits of its output with some probability, differently for each
customer, to catch who's leaking its data.

My strategy as the thief is, whenever the newswire doesn't agree
between all of my subscriptions, they take a majority vote.

How many bits of random tag must Dow Jones add to its newsfeed to catch
a clique of size 20 out of its 10,000 customers?

I think I've narrowed the answer down to between 437 bits and 250 Gbits.

<sigh>


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr at cs.cmu.edu)





From fergp at sytex.com  Thu Feb 11 07:41:38 1993
From: fergp at sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 07:41:38 PST
Subject: Viral encryption
Message-ID: <RqHTyB2w165w@sytex.com>



Greetings, gentlemen and ladies.
 
Having just subscribed to this mailing list, I have several
interesting questions to pose, not exactly knowing which end
of the candle to light first.
 
First off, my background does include some cryptological
overtones. As a non-comissioned officer in the US Army, I
was a COMSEC systems integrator and a COMSEC account custodian.
(Anyone who may be familiar with the job knows the complexities
of involvement.) I now earn my keep as a network systems
integration consultant (great buzzwords) for a highly respected
(and major) computer consultant firm based in the  Washington,
DC area -- far removed from the crypto-analytical sciences
that you folks have an active interest. This job keeps me in the
New York city area four days a week (What personal life?).
 
Secondly, my professional area of expertise is networking (granted,
it _does_ pat the bills). My personal area of expertise (and
enjoyment), is DOS based computer virus "research". I was weened
in IBM system 360/370 assembler (once upon a time) and am quite
adept in the INTEL 80x86 assembler set. (Ralf Brown is one of my
heros.) I "de-program" for hobby; taking things (viruses) apart
to study their possible "interaction" and ability to cause major
problems (sometimes they really do). 
 
You're probably telling yourself at this point, "Gee, I wish this
guy would cut to the chase!" On that note -- I shall. ;-)
 
In the past year, the DOS world has been confronted with several
(two, significantly -- the MtE and more recently the TPE) encryption
"engines" which are being used as "envelopes" for existing viruses.
(Stay with me, now.) They are being called "polymorphs" by those
"in-the-know"; more specifically, polymorphic viruses. The
encryption is weak, compared to DES or RSA comparisons, but they do
pose a major problem to the computer community because of the
technological weaknesses of the antivirus product developers.
Algorithmic development is not exactly their bag of tricks, in most
cases. Most are reliant on pattern matching and have fits when
presented with code that is _totally_ static.
 
Although (I realize that) this conference newsgroup seems
dedicated to privacy and ciphering-related issues, I'm just curious
as to what exposure some of you may have with this type of problem.
(I used to have Kelly Goen to bounce ideas off of, but he seems to
have dropped out of the public eye a few years ago, but yet I see
his name mentioned in the PGP docs.)
 
Any serious responses are quite welcomed at fergp at systex.com.
Public interest responses (I'd hope) will suffice in this area.
 
Cheers from Manhattan.
 
Paul Ferguson                     |
Network Integration Consultant    |  "All of life's answers are
Alexandria, Virginia USA          |   on TV."
fergp at sytex.com     (Internet)    |           -- Homer Simpson
sytex.com!fergp     (UUNet)       |
1:109/229           (FidoNet)     |
         PGP public encryption key available upon request.

---
fergp at sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Sytex Systems Communications, Arlington VA, 1-703-358-9022





From John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG  Thu Feb 11 08:07:30 1993
From: John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 08:07:30 PST
Subject: E Pluribus Doodah
Message-ID: <4843.2B79C930@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>



from: john.nieder at f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org

 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks

 BK> Currently, Jock Gill is
 BK> working in an office located in the Old Executive Office Building
 BK> across the street from the White House.  At this point, he is
 BK> working alone, without a staff.

This week's news indicates to me this will probably not improve.

 BK> The White House itself employs a large
 BK> staff to handle snail mail.

According to Monday night's news, this is from where these vaunted
"symbolic" 25% White House staff cuts will come.

 BK> All things in their time.  Once the
 BK> E-mail address was circulated together with the heading the "White
 BK> House", everyone understandably believed a real system was up and
 BK> running.

Yes, silly us.

 BK> SUGGESTION:  Use the compuserve address you have judiciously,
 BK> reserving it for absolutely vital contacts.

Oh, yes, _certainly_!  The _vital_ stuff should go into a nonexistant
system.  Naturally!

 BK> Until such time that a
 BK> real public access White house E-mail system is operational,
 BK> consider relying on the traditional means of contacting the
 BK> administration.  Given what they had to start with from the
 BK> previous administration (scratch), I have every reason to expect
 BK> that Jeff Eller and Jock Gill will work well--and as quickly as
 BK> possible--to get an interactive system up and running.  But it will
 BK> take time and patience.

Can anyone say, "VAPORWARE"?

 BK> We can all help them achieve that effort
 BK> best if we refrain from acting as if that non-existent system were
 BK> already in place.  PLEASE HELP RELAY THIS CONTEXT AND SUGGESTION TO
 BK> OTHER NETWORKS AND INDIVIDUALS.  Thanks.

Pass it around?  You bet.  It's f*cking _hilarious_!  My guess is that
this gaffe will (or at least ought to) get Gill fired, assuming he
survives this "symbolic" staff downsizing.  I might add that nothing
could be more "symbolic" than the announcement that the cuts will come
from those who actually respond to public input.  This "go away & don't
bother us" move on the part of the Clinton administration indicates that
it obviously doesn't care _what_ America thinks.
.   There is a _bright side_ to this, however:  Would such an
indifferent administration spend resources trying to break our codes
when it doesn't care what we have to say anyway? 8-)
        JN

... We want information./You won't get it!/By hook or by crook, we _will_!  
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG





From John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG  Thu Feb 11 08:07:45 1993
From: John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 08:07:45 PST
Subject: E PLURIBUS DOODAH
Message-ID: <4854.2B7A6A61@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>




from: john.nieder at f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org

 

 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks
 
 BK> Currently, Jock Gill is
 BK> working in an office located in the Old Executive Office Building
 BK> across the street from the White House.  At this point, he is
 BK> working alone, without a staff.
 
This week's news indicates to me this will probably not improve.
 
 BK> The White House itself employs a large
 BK> staff to handle snail mail.
 
According to Monday night's news, this is from where these vaunted
"symbolic" 25% White House staff cuts will come.
 
 BK> All things in their time.  Once the
 BK> E-mail address was circulated together with the heading the "White
 BK> House", everyone understandably believed a real system was up  
and
 BK> running.
 
Yes, silly us...to say nothing of the "CLINTON" AOL address
 
 BK> SUGGESTION:  Use the compuserve address you have judiciously,
 BK> reserving it for absolutely vital contacts.
 
Oh, yes, _certainly_!  The _vital_ stuff should go into a nonexistant
system.  Naturally!
 
 BK> Until such time that a
 BK> real public access White house E-mail system is operational,
 BK> consider relying on the traditional means of contacting the
 BK> administration.  Given what they had to start with from the
 BK> previous administration (scratch), I have every reason to expect
 BK> that Jeff Eller and Jock Gill will work well--and as quickly  
as
 BK> possible--to get an interactive system up and running.  But it  
will
 BK> take time and patience.
 
Can anyone say, "VAPORWARE"?
 
 BK> We can all help them achieve that effort
 BK> best if we refrain from acting as if that non-existent system  
were
 BK> already in place.  PLEASE HELP RELAY THIS CONTEXT AND SUGGESTION  
TO
 BK> OTHER NETWORKS AND INDIVIDUALS.  Thanks.
 
Pass it around?  You bet.  It's f*cking _hilarious_!  My guess is  that
this gaffe will (or at least ought to) get Gill fired, assuming he
survives this "symbolic" staff downsizing.  I might add that nothing
could be more "symbolic" than the announcement that the cuts will  come
from those who actually respond to public input.  This "go away &  don't
bother us" move on the part of the Clinton administration indicates  that
it obviously doesn't care _what_ America thinks.
.   There is a _bright side_ to this, however:  Would such an
indifferent administration spend resources trying to break our codes
when it doesn't care what we have to say anyway? 8-)
        JN
 
... We want information./You won't get it!/By hook or by crook, we  
_will_!
 
 


--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG





From thug at phantom.com  Thu Feb 11 08:55:04 1993
From: thug at phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 08:55:04 PST
Subject: Viral encryption
Message-ID: <m0nMh4s-000k4cC@phantom.com>




As Mr. Ferguson pointed out, polymorphic viruses are making their way into the
DOS world.  This is a problem in the short term, but not in the long term
because people will be changing to memory-protected & file-permission based
operating systems like NT, OS/2 and Unix, where it is very difficult for
most kinds of virus to spread.

I myself am very familiar with the virus underground, so for those who are
not, let me explain the two newest and most deadly virus techniques which
are being seen in the DOS world.

The first is something called "Stealth" viruses.  Stealth viruses imbed
themselves into DOS and intercept disk read calls from applications. If
those read system calls are reading non .EXE or .COM files, then they are
processed normally.  However when an application such as virus scanning
program is reading in .COM and .EXE files (in order to scan them for virus
code), the stealth code in DOS intercepts this and returns to the application
what the .EXE or .COM file would look like if it wasn't infected by the
stealth virus.  Thus, all virus checking programs can be decieved in this
manner.  There are steps to get around this, like booting off of a
write-protected floppy disk (with a clean copy of DOS on it) and running
the virus checking program directly from that floppy.  But people seldom
do that, so the stealth technology is a worthwhile one for virus creators
to pursue.

The second is called "Polymorphic" viruses.  These are viruses which
contain a tiny encryption/decryption engine.  The great thing about
polymorphic viruses is that they encrypt themselves with a different key
each time they replicate (make a new copy of themselves).  The small 
amount of virus bootstrap code which is not encrypted is changed in each
replication by dispursing random NOP's throughout the virus boostrap code.
Thus each sample of polymorphic virus looks completely different to
virus checking programs.  The virus checking programs cannot use
"signature" byte strings to detect polymorphic viruses.

I have seen something called D.A.M.E., also known as Dark Avenger
Mutation Engine.  This is a freeware polymorphic library/kernel/toolkit
which allows anyone to take an ordinary virus and wrap it in a polymorphic
shell.  Thus each new copy of the virus will look completely different
as it replicates.  D.A.M.E. is a great toolkit for those who want to
release new viruses but don't have the skills to write a virus from
scratch.  DAME works very well with Turbo Assembler and MASM.
I believe that DAME II will be coming out sometime this spring. At
least that is what the author has promised.  Among the new features
will be more powerful encryption, stealth capabilities, and compatibility
with Stacker and DR DOS compressed file systems.  I have read that the
author of DAME and DAME II will be coming out with a Virus Construction
Set, which will allow point-n-click building of new viruses using
object oriented techniques.  It works sort of like a Mr. Potatohead,
you point and click on the parts/modules you want and it builds it for
you.  You select the replication method, stealth capability,
polymorphism, and payload module (there are several payloads, varying
from playing music and showing graphics, to printing a text message on
screan, to complete wipe out of the HD). The really wonderful thing
is that you will be able to build your own modules and link them into
the virus.  I am sure a flourishing of third-party modules will occur.

With the VCS, a 9 year old can build a competely new virus just by
pointing, clicking, and dragging, popping up windows and choosing options.

My oh my, aren't we in for fun times ahead...


Thug 







From hanson at ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov  Thu Feb 11 10:44:14 1993
From: hanson at ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov (Robin Hanson)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 10:44:14 PST
Subject: Timed-Release Crypto
In-Reply-To: <9302102211.AA22756@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9302111838.AA02493@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov>


[This is a first post by a crypto-naive person - be kind.]

>Another possibility is to have some kind of standard protocol for time
>encrypted messages (this is interesting and seems feasible). Let's say
>I want a message [x] to be unencrypted on date [y].  I call a "time
>encryption server" and ask for the secret key associated with my
>message and date [y].  I encrypt the message and publicize that
>version.  The time server is constantly spewing out the daily code for
>messages that expire on that date. Anybody just listens to the
>broadcast and decrypts the messages in their possession using the key. 
>Note however that it is crucial that somehow the key depend on the
>message itself (via the hashing approaches), otherwise everybody knows
>everybody else's keys ahead of time just by submitting messages to the
>server for the particular date.  I suppose public-key encryption could
>be used here but I'm hazy on the details.

What came to my mind as I read Tim's message was various competing
timed-key servers, each publishing its public key associated with
various future dates, and promising to release the associated private
key on that date (but not before).  

You then encode your message with an m-of-n scheme using n such
server's keys for your chosen date, and assume at least m of them will
eventually publish their promised key, and assume no more than m of
them will release early.  You then leave it with several escrow
services and ask them to try to decrypt it once a year with the new
year's keys.

To prove to all that a server is untrustworthy, simply reveal its
private key ahead of time, and win a bond posted by the service (easy
to implement - encode some money with the public key, see if anyone
cashes it.)  There are economies of scale in shared monitoring of
trust, so perhaps only a few dozen such servers would be needed.

Hmm.. but how does the server get paid if the public key is public
knowledge?   

Robin Hanson





From tcmay at netcom.com  Thu Feb 11 11:49:55 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 11:49:55 PST
Subject: Timed-Release Crypto
Message-ID: <9302111948.AA22424@netcom.netcom.com>


Robin Hanson writes:

>[This is a first post by a crypto-naive person - be kind.]

>What came to my mind as I read Tim's message was various competing
>timed-key servers, each publishing its public key associated with
>various future dates, and promising to release the associated private
>key on that date (but not before).  

Yes, a market or ecology of servers, with various competing capabilities
and reputations. "Distributed trust" is quite effective. 

(Someone sent me private e-mail saying he didn't like my scheme because it
wasn't as "mathematically solid" as pure encryption schemes. Let me point
out that many crypto schemes involve issues of trust, distributed trust,
collusion, and even trust. "Pure" schemes do not in general exist, except
as very basic operations. As one example, there are no unforgeable "digital
coins." And even the information-theoretically secure "dining
cryptographers" protocol is unsecure given enough collusion. The role of
reputations--common in business and interpersonal dealings--is generally
ignored in the academic crypto community, who end up tearing their hair out
over extremely complicated protocols that attempt to avoid issues of
reputation and economic incentives. Folks like Dean Tribble and Robin
Hanson have a lot to contribute to the actual realization of distributed,
agoric crypto systems.)

>You then encode your message with an m-of-n scheme using n such
>server's keys for your chosen date, and assume at least m of them will
>eventually publish their promised key, and assume no more than m of
>them will release early.  You then leave it with several escrow
>services and ask them to try to decrypt it once a year with the new
>year's keys.
>
>To prove to all that a server is untrustworthy, simply reveal its
>private key ahead of time, and win a bond posted by the service (easy
>to implement - encode some money with the public key, see if anyone
>cashes it.)  There are economies of scale in shared monitoring of
>trust, so perhaps only a few dozen such servers would be needed.

I don't follow this. How do you know a node (=server) hasn't just "peeked."
(BTW, if you've properly split your message/key up, peeking by any one node
will get them nothing--just bits--so they'll be disinclined to ever peek.)
I don't see how anyone but the node itself can discover its private key,
even if it cheats, peeks, or colludes.

(Which is not to say that unreliable or dishonest nodes will not be
revealed. I suspect it'll be more by testing agencies rather than by
(somehow) having the private key revealed...even a dishonest node will keep
its private key private. Possibly there are schemes that would allow proof
of "early opening" (cheating) to be revealed, vaguely analogous to Chaum's
scheme whereby digital money spent twice points to the spender...but
offhand I don't see an approach.)

>Hmm.. but how does the server get paid if the public key is public
>knowledge?   

A node or server gets paid by the digital cash attached either at the time
of arrival at the node (paying "rent" in advance, as it were), or after
decrypting after some amount of time (paying upon "checking out," as it
were). (Any message which doesn't include the necessary payments, by
whatever terms the node has set, doesn't get stored, sent, etc.--we saw a
lot of messages ending up in the bit buckets for failure to follow a
remailer's protocols when we played the "Crypto Game" at the physical
Cypherpunks meetings several months ago.)

The messages or packets sent between nodes can have various sub-parts,
including instructions for remailing (as with any remailer network),
payments for various services (such as holding the message for 2 years, or
splitting the message further, whatever), and so on. In general, each
message is sent to a node, with only that node being able to open it (as
it's encrypted with the public key of the node). Once opened, the node may
find various other messages, payments, instructions, etc.

If you meant something else by your question, I don't get it. Please ask it
again.

-Tim

--

Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.








From hanson at ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov  Thu Feb 11 12:58:09 1993
From: hanson at ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov (Robin Hanson)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 12:58:09 PST
Subject: Timed-Release Crypto
In-Reply-To: <9302111948.AA22424@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302112058.AA03778@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov>


Timothy C. May asks (regarding my naive proposal):

>I don't follow this. How do you know a node (=server) hasn't just
>"peeked."  ... If you meant something else by your question, I don't 
>get it. Please ask it again.

Yeah I think my terseness led to some communication failure.

I was imagining the key server publishing a key which thousands of
folks might then use to close their time capsules.  The key server
doesn't know which messages where are closed with their key, and even
if they did the messages are simultaneously closed with many different
keys, so they'd need wide collusion to peek (including collusion with
one of your escrow message holders).  And as Dorn suggests the escrow
holder of the message can't peek if "message itself could be encrypted
using the intended eventual recipients public key".

Dorn suggests: 
>The servers would generate a key pair on request, for a fee.  Send you
>the public key to encrypt the "message" for storage somewhere.  

I guess this might work, but now you have to be more specific in
telling your escrow service where to look for public keys to decode
you message.  With just a few standard time-key servers, this isn't
needed, and perhaps we could all share the costs of monitoring their
trustworthyness.  Needing just a few, the need might easily be met by
charity.

Robin 





From corwin at Cayman.COM  Thu Feb 11 13:46:35 1993
From: corwin at Cayman.COM (Lord Among Panthers)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 13:46:35 PST
Subject: Timed-Release Crypto
In-Reply-To: <9302112058.AA03778@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov>
Message-ID: <9302112145.AA17000@cuba.Cayman.COM>


Robin  sez

>Dorn suggests: 
>>The servers would generate a key pair on request, for a fee.  Send you
>>the public key to encrypt the "message" for storage somewhere.  
>
> I guess this might work, but now you have to be more specific in
> telling your escrow service where to look for public keys to decode
> you message.  With just a few standard time-key servers, this isn't
> needed, and perhaps we could all share the costs of monitoring their
> trustworthyness.  Needing just a few, the need might easily be met by
> charity.

The escrow services could run the time-key servers (since without the time-key servers, there would be less business for the escrow services).  Getting keys
would then be free and the cost of running the server could be subsidised 
from the cost of storing the message.

corwin





From pete at cirrus.com  Thu Feb 11 14:11:21 1993
From: pete at cirrus.com (Pete Carpenter)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 14:11:21 PST
Subject: E Plurbis Doodah
Message-ID: <9302112212.AA03149@ss2138.cirrus.com>



> from: john.nieder at f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org
>
>    There is a _bright side_ to this, however:  Would such an
> indifferent administration spend resources trying to break our codes
> when it doesn't care what we have to say anyway? 8-)
>         JN

Ah, if only it were so...

Apparently you haven't heard about the new nomination for attorney general.
A prosecutor from Florida with a "get-tough" reputation. Undoubtedly an
anti-drug warrior. And since "everyone knows" that the only reason to hide
information from our "great benevolent government" is to "cover-up illegal
activites", I'm not quite so hopeful.

"Don't blame me, I voted Libertarian"


Pete Carpenter                           pete at cirrus.com
                                
Talk about your plenty, talk about your ills,
One man gathers what another man spills. - Robert Hunter





From richard_mezirka at askinc.ask.com  Thu Feb 11 15:28:50 1993
From: richard_mezirka at askinc.ask.com (Richard Mezirka)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 15:28:50 PST
Subject: pardon me, but it's been deathly quiet
Message-ID: <9302112329.AA02896@askinc.ask.COM>


regrets about the perhaps poor use of scarce bandwidth:

sci.crypt has disappeared from my news server
I haven't seen a cypherpunks mail item for some time... I used to see
something daily, some very interesting/some just valuable to me for
awareness raising value

is anyone there or did all the things we're concerned about come true?
Rich





From ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU  Thu Feb 11 16:17:21 1993
From: ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU (Eli Brandt)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 16:17:21 PST
Subject: Viral encryption
In-Reply-To: <m0nMh4s-000k4cC@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9302120017.AA28034@toad.com>


> From: thug at phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
> I myself am very familiar with the virus underground, so for those who are
> not, let me explain the two newest and most deadly virus techniques which
> are being seen in the DOS world.

[ discusses stealth viruses, around for, oh, five years at least; and
  the MtE. ]

Reasonably accurate discussions, but let's leave the hype for _Time_
and McAfee.  "Stealth" viruses can be detected in memory, if you make
the mistake of getting infected in the first place.  MtE-derived
viruses enjoyed a window of about a month while they could not be
detected by scanners; they had no such reprieve from integrity
checkers.  Big deal.  (Well, from the point of view of a scanner
writer, it must be a pain, but that's not the user's problem.)
Cryptohash integrity checking is probably the way to go in the long
run, but scanners still work.

The "most deadly virus technique", in terms of number of infections
caused, is probably that of boot-sector infection.  Low-tech, but it
seems to work.

> Thug 

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt at jarthur.claremont.edu





From elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU  Thu Feb 11 20:42:11 1993
From: elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU (Karl Barrus)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 20:42:11 PST
Subject: wired & batch file
Message-ID: <199302120441.AA07645@Menudo.UH.EDU>



Cypherpunks,
	Douglas Sinclair has notified me of a slight bug/irritation
with the anonmail.bat script for MSDOS.  When run with no parameters,
file errors are reported since the batch file attempts to delete
nonexistent files.  So I fixed that and have submitted the revised
version to the ftp site.
	Also, in unix I can redirect stderr to /dev/null ( 2> /dev/null).  
Is there a way to do this in MSDOS (I can't seem to find a way).  This
would make the hopmail.bat batch file (similar to hop.mail) easier to
use since the PGP output will be suppressed.
	Finally, crypto is mentioned in WIRED magazine!  It's on the
"HYPE LIST" behind Object Oriented, Post-Modern, Raves, and ahead of
Smart Drugs.  Here is the paragraph on it (bottom of page 87):

Forty years ago cryptography wasn't even popular with mathematicians.
Now it's the hot topic on the net.  You've got the export issue,
always popular since it the [sic] NSA is the villain.  There's the
public key issue - RSA Inc. expressing concern over the public good,
not their profit margins.  Yeah right.  Now we have the
key-registration debate: Should PKC users have to register their keys?
OK, it's a bad idea, but probably a government conspiracy to eliminate
cash, as some rabid defenders of freedom are claiming.  Then there's
David Chaum, the Ted Nelson of the 90's, promoting his ingenious and
impractical crypto-schemes.  Since everyone wants to believe in nice
techno solutions to messy socio-policital problems, expect this issue
to continue its rise up the list.

So, fellow rabid defenders freedom, who is Ted Nelson?? :-)  I guess
I'm too young...

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf at menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus at tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/





From phiber at eff.org  Thu Feb 11 21:43:13 1993
From: phiber at eff.org (Phiber Optik)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 21:43:13 PST
Subject: Viral encryption
In-Reply-To: <9302120017.AA28034@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199302120541.AA06625@eff.org>


> 
> > From: thug at phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
> > I myself am very familiar with the virus underground, so for those who are
> > not, let me explain the two newest and most deadly virus techniques which
> > are being seen in the DOS world.
> 
> [ discusses stealth viruses, around for, oh, five years at least; and
>   the MtE. ]
> 
> Reasonably accurate discussions, but let's leave the hype for _Time_
> and McAfee.  "Stealth" viruses can be detected in memory, if you make
> the mistake of getting infected in the first place.  MtE-derived
> viruses enjoyed a window of about a month while they could not be
> detected by scanners; they had no such reprieve from integrity
> checkers.  Big deal.  (Well, from the point of view of a scanner
> writer, it must be a pain, but that's not the user's problem.)
> Cryptohash integrity checking is probably the way to go in the long
> run, but scanners still work.
> 
> The "most deadly virus technique", in terms of number of infections
> caused, is probably that of boot-sector infection.  Low-tech, but it
> seems to work.
> 
> > Thug 
> 
> 	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
>    Eli   ebrandt at jarthur.claremont.edu
> 

I'm sick and tired of all the virus hoo-hah myself.  The only "anti-virus
software" a hacker needs is DEBUG.  And maybe your favorite sector editor
utility, like DISKEDIT.  Anything more, and you're an embarassment.
Why don't you just send your life savings to McAfee while you're at it.
I could go and quote P. T. Barnum right now, but I think my point is made.






From karn at qualcomm.com  Thu Feb 11 23:09:26 1993
From: karn at qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 23:09:26 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
Message-ID: <9302120707.AA13840@servo>


At 11:41 2/10/93 -0500, Murdering Thug wrote:

>The best solution, as suggested by Miron is to use forward error correction.
>There is plenty of bandwidth in a 19.2/21.6/24.0/28.8 kbps connection to
>send CELP nybbles or bytes each along with their own ECC code.

But modern high speed modems already do quite a bit of FEC. I really
don't think more is really necessary. As long as the decryptor and voice
decoder automatically resynchronize after an error, there's no real
problem with letting a few through. It's certainly preferable to adding
long (or variable) delay.

The sychronization problem seems to occur in "real" (government) secure
phones too. They take a second or two to unmute following loss of clock
synchronization. But not every bit error causes loss of clock synch;
only a really bad line will do that.

Phil








From tcmay at netcom.com  Thu Feb 11 23:36:09 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 23:36:09 PST
Subject: wired & batch file
Message-ID: <9302120734.AA07610@netcom.netcom.com>


Karl Barrus writes:

>        Finally, crypto is mentioned in WIRED magazine!  It's on the
>"HYPE LIST" behind Object Oriented, Post-Modern, Raves, and ahead of
>Smart Drugs.  Here is the paragraph on it (bottom of page 87):

And I'm sure you all know "Wired" is preparing a major article on the
Cypherpunks and crypto. I've seen the Steven Levy rough draft and it looks
good.

>So, fellow rabid defenders freedom, who is Ted Nelson?? :-)  I guess
>I'm too young...

You _must_ be young! Lucky you. 

Ted Nelson is the chief popularizer (and early architect, to be fair) of
"hypertext," or nonlinear, linked writing. As in being able to click on
this word, "hypertext," and see lots of threads taking you off to various
other places, articles, sidebars, and so on. Hypertexts thus transcend the
simple linear writing style enforced on us by paper and books.

Nelson wrote an extremely influential book called "Computer Lib," circa
1975, which described hypertext and accurately predicted many of today's
most important trends. Microsoft Press reprinted it, with corrections and
addditions, a few years back. Definitely recommended!

His project, known as "Xanadu," has been developing for close to 30 years.
About 10 or so years a team of programmers nucleated around Xanadu to
commercialize it. Known as the Xanadu Operating Company, it was funded by
Autodesk (maker of Autocad) from 1988 until just a few months ago, when
Autodesk decided to reorient its efforts. XOC may still be seeking
alternative funding.

Our own Dean Tribble is centrally involved, and other participants included
Mark Miller, Roger Gregory, and various others (some of whom show up on
this list, or at the physical Cypherpunks meetings).

Apple's "HyperCard" was a poor imitation, in the sense that full
bidirectional links were not supported (and some other limitations, though
in fairness to Bill Atkinson and Apple, the original product, codenamed
"WildCard," was not intended to be full hypertext.)

(I use a true hypertext writing system called "StorySpace," for the Mac.
Other platforms have their own such programs. Nothing as grand as Xanadu,
though. And there's a newsgroup called alt.hypertext if you're interested.)

Ted Nelson is living in the Bay Area, working on various projects. He's
shown some interest in crypto things, and talked to some of us at a recent
Hackers Conference about the implications.

Hypertext is definitely a good idea, but the commercialization has been
slow in coming.

-Tim May




>
>/-----------------------------------\
>| Karl L. Barrus                    |
>| elee9sf at menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
>| barrus at tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
>\-----------------------------------/






From tcmay at netcom.com  Thu Feb 11 23:38:01 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 23:38:01 PST
Subject: wired & batch file
Message-ID: <9302120736.AA07718@netcom.netcom.com>


Karl Barrus writes:

>        Finally, crypto is mentioned in WIRED magazine!  It's on the
>"HYPE LIST" behind Object Oriented, Post-Modern, Raves, and ahead of
>Smart Drugs.  Here is the paragraph on it (bottom of page 87):

And I'm sure you all know "Wired" is preparing a major article on the
Cypherpunks and crypto. I've seen the Steven Levy rough draft and it looks
good.

>So, fellow rabid defenders freedom, who is Ted Nelson?? :-)  I guess
>I'm too young...

You _must_ be young! Lucky you. 

Ted Nelson is the chief popularizer (and early architect, to be fair) of
"hypertext," or nonlinear, linked writing. As in being able to click on
this word, "hypertext," and see lots of threads taking you off to various
other places, articles, sidebars, and so on. Hypertexts thus transcend the
simple linear writing style enforced on us by paper and books.

Nelson wrote an extremely influential book called "Computer Lib," circa
1975, which described hypertext and accurately predicted many of today's
most important trends. Microsoft Press reprinted it, with corrections and
addditions, a few years back. Definitely recommended!

His project, known as "Xanadu," has been developing for close to 30 years.
About 10 or so years a team of programmers nucleated around Xanadu to
commercialize it. Known as the Xanadu Operating Company, it was funded by
Autodesk (maker of Autocad) from 1988 until just a few months ago, when
Autodesk decided to reorient its efforts. XOC may still be seeking
alternative funding.

Our own Dean Tribble is centrally involved, and other participants included
Mark Miller, Roger Gregory, and various others (some of whom show up on
this list, or at the physical Cypherpunks meetings).

Apple's "HyperCard" was a poor imitation, in the sense that full
bidirectional links were not supported (and some other limitations, though
in fairness to Bill Atkinson and Apple, the original product, codenamed
"WildCard," was not intended to be full hypertext.)

(I use a true hypertext writing system called "StorySpace," for the Mac.
Other platforms have their own such programs. Nothing as grand as Xanadu,
though. And there's a newsgroup called alt.hypertext if you're interested.)

Ted Nelson is living in the Bay Area, working on various projects. He's
shown some interest in crypto things, and talked to some of us at a recent
Hackers Conference about the implications.

Hypertext is definitely a good idea, but the commercialization has been
slow in coming.

-Tim May




>
>/-----------------------------------\
>| Karl L. Barrus                    |
>| elee9sf at menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
>| barrus at tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
>\-----------------------------------/






From M..Stirner at f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG  Fri Feb 12 03:28:59 1993
From: M..Stirner at f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 03:28:59 PST
Subject: E pluribus doodah
Message-ID: <4868.2B7B7534@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>




from: john.nieder at f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org

 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks

 BK> Currently, Jock Gill is
 BK> working in an office located in the Old Executive Office Building
 BK> across the street from the White House.  At this point, he is
 BK> working alone, without a staff.

This week's news indicates to me this will probably not improve.

 BK> The White House itself employs a large
 BK> staff to handle snail mail.

According to Monday night's news, this is from where these vaunted
"symbolic" 25% White House staff cuts will come.

 BK> All things in their time.  Once the
 BK> E-mail address was circulated together with the heading the "White
 BK> House", everyone understandably believed a real system was up and
 BK> running.

Yes, silly us...particularly with the "CLINTON" AOL address.

 BK> SUGGESTION:  Use the compuserve address you have judiciously,
 BK> reserving it for absolutely vital contacts.

Oh, yes, _certainly_!  The _vital_ stuff should go into a nonexistant
system.  Naturally!

 BK> Until such time that a
 BK> real public access White house E-mail system is operational,
 BK> consider relying on the traditional means of contacting the
 BK> administration.  Given what they had to start with from the
 BK> previous administration (scratch), I have every reason to expect
 BK> that Jeff Eller and Jock Gill will work well--and as quickly as
 BK> possible--to get an interactive system up and running.  But it will
 BK> take time and patience.

Can anyone say, "VAPORWARE"?

 BK> We can all help them achieve that effort
 BK> best if we refrain from acting as if that non-existent system were
 BK> already in place.  PLEASE HELP RELAY THIS CONTEXT AND SUGGESTION TO
 BK> OTHER NETWORKS AND INDIVIDUALS.  Thanks.

Pass it around?  You bet.  It's f*cking _hilarious_!  My guess is that
this gaffe will (or at least ought to) get Gill fired, assuming he
survives this "symbolic" staff downsizing.  I might add that nothing
could be more "symbolic" than the announcement that the cuts will come
from those who actually respond to public input.  This "go away & don't
bother us" move on the part of the Clinton administration indicates that
it obviously doesn't care _what_ America thinks.
.   There is a _bright side_ to this, however:  Would such an
indifferent administration spend resources trying to break our codes
when it doesn't care what we have to say anyway? 8-)
        JN

... We want information./You won't get it!/By hook or by crook, we _will_!



... Forgive your enemies but remember their names.
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET - M..Stirner at f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG





From Barry.Kapke at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG  Fri Feb 12 03:58:40 1993
From: Barry.Kapke at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Barry Kapke)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 03:58:40 PST
Subject: White House email address (fwd)
Message-ID: <4871.2B7B8BC2@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>



=============================================================================
From: DOUGLAS COFFMAN <lefty%MTU.EDU at Kentvm.Kent.edu>
Date:         Thu, 11 Feb 1993 18:01:53 EDT
----------------------------Original message----------------------------
Please pass this info along.

January 31, 1993

              Important Information RE: E-Mail to the White House

     Yesterday, I saw several postings related to the E-mail address for the
White House.  Along with a good number of others, I worked throughout the
campaign as part of a network of E-mail volunteers for the Clinton campaign,
so I can pass along some important information about that E-mail account.
The account is actually the personal compuserve account of Jock Gill.  Jock
worked hard (along with a handful of programming volunteers, BBS operators,
listserver maintainers, and computer sophisticates at places such as Marist
College, MIT, San Francisco, Chicago, and elsewhere) during the campaign to
put together an E-mail system for national campaigning.  The system was later
expanded to accommodate all three major Presidential campaigns.  It was an
innovative, highly successful effort and it played a huge role in getting
campaign position statements out to a wide public.  Things posted from that
address found their way into the virtual reality as the messages got passed
along many networks from their original posting.
     Several weeks before the Inauguration of President Clinton, Jeff Eller
was appointed by the President-Elect to have overall charge of establishing
something which has never existed--an interactive public access E-mail system
into the White House and into other offices of the administration.  Jock Gill
was then hired by the administration to work under Jeff Eller.  Currently,
Jock Gill is working in an office located in the Old Executive Office
Building across the street from the White House.  At this point, he is
working alone, without a staff.  His current assignment is to use the E-mail
system (as during the campaign) to issue official copies of White House
statements, the texts of press briefings and press conferences, copies of
Executive Orders and Presidential Memos, and the like to the virtual world of
E-mail.  Since the compuserve box is a regular personal mail box, it gets
filled quickly, especially given the high volume of mail now beginning to
arrive with the broad dissemination of his address.  Those of you who have
sent E-mail to that address may well have received an error message stating
that the box is full.  That's another way of saying it has been overwhelmed.
     Jock has asked those of us who have been part of the volunteer E-mail
team to help him out while he works to get a good interactive system up and
running.  Basically, he has asked that everyone cooperate and not begin
sending a barrage of E-mail to that compuserve address.  The White House
itself employs a large staff to handle snail mail.  Actually, at this point
in the development of the White House E-mail system, you will probably get
your message through to the administration quicker through ordinary snail
mail and telephone.  Later, once the administration's E-mail team develops
the system they want and need, E-mail contacts should became the easier
route.  All things in their time.  Once the E-mail address was circulated
together with the heading the "White House", everyone understandably believed
a real system was up and running.  Not quite yet.
     SUGGESTION:  Use the compuserve address you have judiciously, reserving
it for absolutely vital contacts.  Until such time that a real public access
White house E-mail system is operational, consider relying on the traditional
means of contacting the administration.  Given what they had to start with
from the previous administration (scratch), I have every reason to expect
that Jeff Eller and Jock Gill will work well--and as quickly as possible--to
get an interactive system up and running.  But it will take time and
patience.  We can all help them achieve that effort best if we refrain from
acting as if that non-existent system were already in place.  PLEASE HELP
RELAY THIS CONTEXT AND SUGGESTION TO OTHER NETWORKS AND INDIVIDUALS.  Thanks.

              Snail Mail Address and Phone Numbers -- White House

     White House Numbers:
          The President                 (202) 456-1414
          White House Comment Line      (202) 456-1111
               (To register your opinion on an issue)
          When bill signed or vetoed    (202) 456-2226

          Vice President                (202) 456-2326
                                        (202) 456-7125

     Mailing Address:

          The White House
          1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
          Washington DC  20500


--
On the Net,

Douglas J. "Lefty" Coffman

lefty at mtu.edu (Preferred)
LEFTY at MTUS5.BITNET or LEFTY at MTUS5.cts.mtu.edu
B0 f- w+ g++ k(+) s h r

=============================================================================--  
Barry Kapke - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!Barry.Kapke
INTERNET - Barry.Kapke at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG





From tcmay at netcom.com  Fri Feb 12 09:40:38 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 09:40:38 PST
Subject: Tagging copyrighted text
Message-ID: <9302121739.AA21361@netcom.netcom.com>


Another thought on "ld231782"'s idea about high-speed networks and copyrights:

>But think about this: with the
>speed and ubiquity of networks, it now becomes possible for every
>author or creative artist to keep the only copies of his work. Then, he
>could post "links" to it anywhere in the world. When people pass around
>the work, they wouldn't pass around the work itself, they'd pass the
>"link".  Whenever someone wants to view the work, the link points to
>the unchanging address for instantaneous downloading.  A very small
>transaction charge is billed to the receiver by the sender.

With fast enough networks, we may see a big decline in sales of programs to
end-users, as the software is made available as "on-line services."
(Obviously this has always been going on, with service bureaus, circuit
design services, etc.)

To make this very concrete, I just installed a new release of the American
Heritage Dictionary, a complete edition with definitions, thesaurus,
anagrams, roots in Latin, Greek, German, Indo-European, etc. Look up a word
and one gets an entire screenful of stuff, including detailed etymologies,
usages, etc.

Now what happens when a "dictionary server" offers to look up a word for,
say, 10 cents? With fast enough networks, of the sort ld231782 proposes,
this could replace the current system in which folks buy their own copies.
(One would still need very high bandwidth programs like editors, word
processors, drawing programs, etc., but some classes of software would be
amenable to this kind of remote access use, especially with very fast
networks.)

There may be attempts to limit this, as with the laws which ban rental of
CDs (but not videos, presumably because few people have two VCRS, while
those renting CDs can presumably easily diub them onto cassettes).

This could also reduce the costs of entry to the market, as new programs
could be offered for sale or access in a low-cost way, such as through
information markets like AMIX.

I'm not taking a moral stand on either side, just noting one more
consequence of extremely high-speed networks.






From fergp at sytex.com  Fri Feb 12 10:38:12 1993
From: fergp at sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 10:38:12 PST
Subject: Hasty analogy (WAS: Viral encryption)
Message-ID: <eLNVyB1w165w@sytex.com>


On Friday, 12 Feb 1993,  Phiber Optik <uunet!eff.org!phiber> wrote -
 
PO> I'm sick and tired of all the virus hoo-hah myself.
PO> The only "anti-virus software" a hacker needs is DEBUG.
PO> And maybe your favorite sector editor utility, like DISKEDIT.
PO> Anything more, and you're an embarassment. Why don't you just
PO> send your life savings to McAfee while you're at it. I could
PO> go and quote P. T. Barnum right now, but I think my point is
PO> made.
 
 My apologies for strayiing even further from the topic, but
 Phyber's comments would not let me let this sleeping dog lie.
 
 Strictly using DEBUG is a bit ridiculous for the "masses", but I
 can understand your sentiment, at least to that end. As far as
 I'm concerned, I can isolate _any_ change in my operating
 environment (be it DOS, Novell NOS, UNIX or whatever, for that
 matter) with the utilities that accompany the operating system
 (and of course, a couple of home-brewed ones to boot). Viruses
 are simply nuisances, for those who are adept enough to bop
 around in assembly code.
 
 Your disdain for "anti-virus software" is shared by many -- even
 shared by myself, to a certain degree. Every time I read an
 advertisement in a trade rag that boasts, "Can now find and eradicate
 new and unknown viruses!" or "Now! Can kill the deadly Mutation
 Engine virus!", I can only shake my head and snicker.
 
 However, there are a couple of genuine "good guys" out there in
 computer land that produces some excellent "anti-virus" software.
 Dr. Alan Solomon (UK) and Fridrik Skulason (Iceland), both of whom I
 know personally, produce perhaps the most effective and timely virus
 detection software in the business. Yes, they both will tell you that
 they use DEBUG to trace code and disassemble.
 
 Sara told me that you were rather impetuous. ;-)
 
 Further discussions relating to thhis topic should be moved to
 comp.virus (virus-l at lehigh.edu) or directed to me by email.
 
Paul Ferguson                   |  "Sincerity is fine, but it's no
Network Integration Consultant  |   excuse for stupidity."
Alexandria, Virginia USA        |                       -- Anonymous
fergp at sytex.com     (Internet)  |
sytex.com!fergp     (UUNet)     |
1:109/229           (FidoNet)   |
         PGP public encryption key available upon request.

---
fergp at sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Sytex Systems Communications, Arlington VA, 1-703-358-9022





From ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu  Fri Feb 12 10:54:02 1993
From: ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 10:54:02 PST
Subject: Viral encryption
In-Reply-To: <199302120541.AA06625@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9302121852.AA07368@longs.lance.colostate.edu>



>I'm sick and tired of all the virus hoo-hah myself.  The only "anti-virus
>software" a hacker needs is DEBUG.  And maybe your favorite sector editor
>utility, like DISKEDIT.  Anything more, and you're an embarassment.
>Why don't you just send your life savings to McAfee while you're at it.
>I could go and quote P. T. Barnum right now, but I think my point is made.

Unfortunately most of humanity is not in the category of "hacker", and
we should be considerate of them.  While we tout cryptography for example
we have to remember that the only way that it will get into the mainstream 
is if it is integrated very nicely into foolproof user-friendly (sorry,
the term makes me cringe a bit too) software.

I don't see any constructive purpose served by viruses, and if anybody
in this group is advocating or even pursuing their development, I think
that has just brought the quality of the list down several notches, and 
really damaged the credibility of the speakers.  Definitely, they are
interesting to study, but the havoc they wreak is incalculable.  To the
extent that they encourage designers to create more straightjacket-type
security mechanisms, they are detrimental to the goal of simple and
straightforward access to computer technology, and significantly undermine
confidence in and use of that technology.





From jcoryell%nwu.edu at UICVM.UIC.EDU  Fri Feb 12 13:57:41 1993
From: jcoryell%nwu.edu at UICVM.UIC.EDU (John Coryell.)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 13:57:41 PST
Subject: Timed-Release Crypto
In-Reply-To: <9302112058.AA03778@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov>
Message-ID: <9302122157.AA22875@toad.com>


>I guess this might work, but now you have to be more specific in
>telling your escrow service where to look for public keys to decode
>you message.  With just a few standard time-key servers, this isn't
>needed, and perhaps we could all share the costs of monitoring their
>trustworthyness.  Needing just a few, the need might easily be met by
>charity.
>
>Robin

Considering what we've currently had to rely on, charity seems like
as good a place to start as any.  Perhaps when escrow clients operate
like wais in conducting a search of the available sources, and utilizing
feedback to reduce noise and identify likelihoods of correct decryption,
or perhaps this would never work at all.  Monitoring would still be
necessary.

John Coryell.





From ncselxsi!drzaphod at ncselxsi.netcom.com  Fri Feb 12 15:01:50 1993
From: ncselxsi!drzaphod at ncselxsi.netcom.com (DrZaphod)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 15:01:50 PST
Subject: MSDOS AnonMail.Bat
Message-ID: <36540.drzaphod@ncselxsi>


In Message Thu, 11 Feb 1993 22:41:04 -0600,
  Karl Barrus <Menudo.UH.EDU!elee9sf at netcomsv.netcom.com> writes:

> Also, in unix I can redirect stderr to /dev/null ( 2> /dev/null).
>Is there a way to do this in MSDOS (I can't seem to find a way).  This
>would make the hopmail.bat batch file (similar to hop.mail) easier to
>use since the PGP output will be suppressed.

     Use "> nul" to redirect to null.  IBM only used 3 character device
     names.

     And on WIRED.. now that I've heard the stories I'll have to pick up my
     copy! TTFN!

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod at ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized





From Absinthe at debug.cuc.ab.ca  Fri Feb 12 20:53:02 1993
From: Absinthe at debug.cuc.ab.ca (Absinthe at debug.cuc.ab.ca)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 20:53:02 PST
Subject: RSA
Message-ID: <m0nN9YG-0002hnC@debug.cuc.ab.ca>


Read about you guys awhile back in Mondo, seeing if I can get more info?
Also, recent byline in Sci Am about PGP,
   do you know a good source of RSA software?
   do you have info on either Zimmerman's E-Mail address or
      E.Miller's mailing list?
Any info appreciated, thanx.
 
-----------------------------------=>   The Crystal Wind is the Storm,
                                                and the Storm is Data,
                                                 and the Data is Life.
Absinthe at debug.cuc.ab.ca





From sdw at sdwsys.lig.net  Fri Feb 12 21:09:58 1993
From: sdw at sdwsys.lig.net (Stephen D. Williams)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 21:09:58 PST
Subject: anonymous script
In-Reply-To: <199302100657.AA06626@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9302130504.AA07864@sdwsys.lig.net>


> 
> Cypherpunks,
> 
> Out of curiosity, what are the approximate computer ratios among this
> list?  That is, how many people use MSDOS, how many use Mac's, how
> many Amigas, many have Unix, how many have VMS?  
Sun Unix, Interactive Unix, Linux, kids with a MSDOS game machine....
> 
> I'm just curious because it recently struck me that not everyone here
> is running Unix, and thus can't really use the scripts I've written
> (which help use the anonymous remailers).  So I wrote a helper program
> in C++ for MSDOS, but after looking at the code, I've decided to bury
> it and replace it with the following MSDOS script (at bottom of this
> message). 
...
> | Karl L. Barrus                    |
> | elee9sf at menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
> | barrus at tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |

sdw





From sdw at sdwsys.lig.net  Fri Feb 12 21:18:27 1993
From: sdw at sdwsys.lig.net (Stephen D. Williams)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 21:18:27 PST
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <1993Feb10.193843.20507@extropia.wimsey.bc.ca>
Message-ID: <9302130510.AA08073@sdwsys.lig.net>


> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> thug at phantom.com (Murdering Thug) writes:
> 
> >I don't know if CELP requires an error-free transmittion stream from
> >codec to codec.  If it doesn't then that's great, I hope it self-synchronizes
> >itself after a byte or two of garbage coming through. Big deal, so you hear
> >a click or pop of static, so what.. you get that with analog lines.
> 
> CELP resyncs.  Not sure how fast.  Maybe after a tenth of a second or so.
> 
> On a side note, we are finishing up an implementation of CELP on the
> TMS320C5x.  This is a 20 MIPS integer chip.  We are taking up less
> than 15 MIPS.  We also know how to write error corrected CELP (such
> that bits that cause more significant degradation are protected
> better).

Does everyone know that the new Zyxel's have CELP builtin?

Don't know details yet...

sdw






From Seth.Morris at lambada.oit.unc.edu  Fri Feb 12 23:42:46 1993
From: Seth.Morris at lambada.oit.unc.edu (Seth Morris)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 23:42:46 PST
Subject: Tagging copyrighted text
In-Reply-To: <9302121739.AA21361@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302130720.AA22872@lambada.oit.unc.edu>


Timothy May writes: 
> To make this very concrete, I just installed a new release of the American
> Heritage Dictionary, a complete edition with definitions, thesaurus,
> anagrams, roots in Latin, Greek, German, Indo-European, etc. Look up a word
> and one gets an entire screenful of stuff, including detailed etymologies,
> usages, etc.
> 
> Now what happens when a "dictionary server" offers to look up a word for,
> say, 10 cents? With fast enough networks, of the sort ld231782 proposes,
> this could replace the current system in which folks buy their own copies.
> (One would still need very high bandwidth programs like editors, word
> processors, drawing programs, etc., but some classes of software would be
> amenable to this kind of remote access use, especially with very fast
> networks.)
	I'd point out that with unlimited Telnet access, I can already use
dictionaries and quote books, thesauri and other references, at reates varying
from free to hundreds of dollars an hour....
	The only software I "need" to do this is an OS and a comm program.

	This sounds like a great way to convince the holdouts of the value
of encryption: if services are offered, over comm links, available easily
from the home, with a minimum of fuss, to perform popular, resource
intensive searches/services (quote books, dictionaries, come to mind,
many of the things Gopher does), then the only software a user needs is
(1) an OS
(2) X server (or other screen manager/UI manager)
(3) comm program (integrated into screen manager w/drag-and-drop probably
	necessary in this day and age, when using things like a baby is c
	considered "mature technology"
(4) encryption package...
	If I cannot sign my requests (automagically, I suppose), then I can
	disavow billing, and if the service cannot encrypt the reply, any
	listener can receive "free" responses, perhaps over time duplicating
	much of the work and creativity that went into creating the service
	and selling it. I hate to support something like encryption with
	economics (the issues are deeper than that), but it sounds like an
	argument that would please many people. I just have to look at 
	Prodigy (yech) sales with modems (or Windows (double-yech) with
	systems!) to see the infiltration of a useful and powerful thing
	like online service (or GUI/device independence) into a previously
	reluctant market to see what a little convincing can do. (Remember
	Nintendo? Before they started their ad campaign, noone was buying
	dedicated game machines, then they convinced everyone that everyone
	else was playing, soon they were as common as TV's, in a market
	still reeling from Atari!)
	I also hate to suggest charging for something already free! Hopehully
	I'm thinking of something (a) cheap, (b) convenient (which Gopher is
	not, I feel), and (c) better.

 It just jumped into my head how tied up with encryption ALL telecom issues
are, even ones we've been doing for years now. Just look at how CI$ has had
to change as more users jumped on, or the difference between CI$ and AOL or
Prodigy.
 I'm new to this list, and probably repeating something axiomatic, but it
seemed that with "extreme high speed networks" comes an assumption of extreme
load (seems reasonable to me), and that means (1) commercial exploitation
(possibly a good thing!), (2) need for security, and (3) the usual lag of
technological penetration from the trailblazers to the huddled befuddled,
with the trading of glitz for substance, name for talent, and pretty for
powerful. 
> There may be attempts to limit this, as with the laws which ban rental of
> CDs (but not videos, presumably because few people have two VCRS, while
> those renting CDs can presumably easily diub them onto cassettes).
	If you assume that some of these systems (like the ones already
online) will be legal and entreprneureal(sp?), this might still hold! 

> This could also reduce the costs of entry to the market, as new programs
> could be offered for sale or access in a low-cost way, such as through
> information markets like AMIX.
	Am I correct in deducing that encryption cannot be offered in this
way? What other services are in this category?
 
> I'm not taking a moral stand on either side, just noting one more
> consequence of extremely high-speed networks.
> 
	Oh, can someone drop me a line with more information on digital
cash? I'm new here, like I said. I'm a math major on leave of absence,
currently unemployed (interview monday... crossing fingers), lately
working as a programmer or in support. I've been interested in public
key cryptography since the '79(?) Scientific American article (I was 13 
when I read it, in '83... may have been one of the things that pushed me
towards math) and am glad to finally get to play. (20 digit keys in
BASIC/6502 on a VIC-20 were fun, but that's all!)

 Seth Morris (seth.morris at launchpad.unc.edu)





From gnu  Sat Feb 13 02:07:09 1993
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 02:07:09 PST
Subject: ["Vinton G. Cerf": Technology Policy and Information Infrastructure]
Message-ID: <9302131007.AA06784@toad.com>


I sent him some sound bites about Internet policy and about crypto policy.
I'll send them to Cypherpunks too.

	John

------- Forwarded Message

To: trustees:;@isoc.org, isoc-interest at sgi.com, ietf at CNRI.Reston.VA.US,
        iab at isi.edu, iesg at CNRI.Reston.VA.US, Members:;@isoc.org
Subject: Technology Policy and Information Infrastructure
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 08:25:06 -0500
From: "Vinton G. Cerf" <vcerf at CNRI.Reston.VA.US>
Message-Id:  <9302100825.aa02728 at IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US>

Dear Internauts and friends,

I have been invited to testify before the US House Subcommittee on
Technology on the subject of technology policy and information
intrastructure. To prepare my testimony, it would be helpful to
have SHORT (please!) comments, suggestions, "bullets" as input,
so that Internet Society ideas and considerations can be represented
(or, at the least, offer some national and international perspective
on a matter of global importance).

If you want to send something on this point, please send it ONLY
to: vcerf at cnri.reston.va.us. DO NOT SEND IT TO THE ENTIRE LIST OF
ADDRESSEES (or they will do something terrible to me).

Many thanks for letting me disturb your busy mailboxes, and thanks
in advance for your ideas.

Vint

p.s. I need any inputs by end of February

------- End of Forwarded Message






From gnu  Sat Feb 13 03:02:33 1993
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 03:02:33 PST
Subject: FCC Proposed Ruling on Scanners That Receive Cellphone Transmissions
Message-ID: <9302131102.AA09849@toad.com>


Please at least write a one-page letter in response to this
proposed ruling.  The idiots in Congress decided that banning radios
was preferable to allowing (or requiring) decent encryption in
cellular phones.  Now the FCC is making rules to implement the
Congressional ban.  They should hear from us, loud and clear,
that this is completely backwards and wrong.

Your letter should reference Docket Number 93-1 and should clearly
state the subject on which you are commenting.  *Then* comment...

	John

------- Forwarded Message

Message-Id: <199302111305.AA17580 at eff.org>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 1993 08:10:14 -0500
To: gnu at toad.com (John Gilmore), barlow at eff.org, jberman at eff.org,
        mkapor at eff.org, blau at eff.org, farber at central.cis.upenn.edu
From: Daniel J. Weitzner <djw at eff.org>
Subject: FCC Proposed Ruling on Scanners That Receive Cellphone Transmissions

The file attached here was received today and is too long for
inclusion in a regular issue of the Digest. It is submitted for your
comments and consideration. You might want to send your comments to
the FCC as well.

PAT

  From: raisch at ora.com (Rob Raisch)
  Subject: FCC Proposed Ruling on Scanners That Receive Cellphone Transmissions
  Organization: O'Reilly & Associates, Inc.
  Date: Thu, 11 Feb 1993 05:10:24 GMT

47 CFR Parts 2 and 15

[ET Docket No. 93-1; FCC 93-1]

Radio Scanners That Receive Cellular Telephone Transmissions

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

SUMMARY: This Notice of Proposed Rule Making proposes to deny
equipment authorization to radio scanners capable of receiving
transmissions in the Domestic Public Cellular Radio Telecommunications
Service. This action is taken in response to the Telephone Disclosure
and Dispute Resolution Act (Pub. L. 102-556). The intended effect of
this action is to help ensure the privacy of cellular telephone
conversations.

DATES: Comments must be submitted on or before February 22, 1993, and
reply comments on or before March 8, 1993.

ADDRESSES: Federal Communications Commission, 1919 M Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20554.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

David Wilson, Office of Engineering and Technology, (202) 653-8138.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's
Notice of Proposed Rule Making in ET Docket No. 93-1, FCC 93- 1,
adopted January 4, 1993, and released January 13, 1993. The full text
of this decision is available for inspection and copying during normal
business hours in the FCC Dockets Branch (room 230), 1919 M Street,
NW., Washington, DC. The complete text of this decision also may be
purchased from the Commission's duplicating contractor, Downtown Copy
Center, at (202) 659-8657 or 1990 M Street, NW., suite 640,
Washington, DC 20036.

Paperwork Reduction

   The following collection of information contained in this proposed
rule has been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for
review under section 3504(h) of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C.
3504(h)). Copies of this submission may be purchased from the
Commission's duplicating contractor, Downtown Copy Center, at (202)
659-8657 or 1990 M Street, NW., suite 640, Washington, DC 20036.
Persons wishing to comment on this collection of information should
direct their comments to Mr. Jonas Neihardt, Office of Management and
Budget, room 3235 NEOB, Washington, DC 20554, (202) 395-4814. A copy
of any comments filed with the Office of Management and Budget should
also be sent to the following address at the Federal Communications
Commission: Federal Communications Commission, Office of the Managing
Director, Paperwork Reduction Project, Washington, DC 20554. For
further information contact Ms. Judy Boley, (202) 632-7513.

   OMB Number: None.
   Title: Scanning Receiver Compliance Exhibit.
   Respondents: Businesses or other for profit, small businesses/organizations 
   Action: New collection.
   Frequency of Response: On occasion reporting.
   Estimated Annual Burden: 
   Number of respondents: 40.
   Annual hours per respondent: 0.25.
   Total annual burden: 10.

Needs and Uses: An exhibit accompanying a Form 731 Application for
Equipment Authorization will determine compliance of applicants
requesting authorization to market scanning receivers and frequency
converters with Congressionally mandated regulations. The regulations
prohibit the marketing of radio scanners capable of intercepting, or
being modified to intercept, cellular telephone conversations.

Summary of the Notice of Proposed Rule Making:

   1. By this action, the Commission proposes to amend 47 CFR parts 2
and 15 to prohibit the manufacture or importation of radio scanners
capable of receiving frequencies allocated to the Domestic Public
Cellular Radio Telecommunications Service.  This action is in response
to the Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act (Act), Pub. L.
102-556.

   2. The Domestic Public Cellular Radio Telecommunications Service
("Cellular Radio Service") provides telephone service to mobile
customers. Cellular telephones use frequencies in the bands 824-849
MHz and 869-894 MHz to connect their users to other cellular system
users and to the Public Switched Telephone Network.

   3. As defined in 47 CFR part 15 scanning receivers, or "scanners,"
are radio receivers that automatically switch between four or more
frequencies anywhere within the 30-960 MHz band. In order to control
their potential to cause harmful interference to authorized radio
communications, the rules require that scanners receive an equipment
authorization (certification) from the Commission prior to marketing.

   4. In the past five years, 22 different models of scanning
receivers capable of receiving cellular telephone transmissions have
been issued grants of equipment authorization. During this same
period, ten other models capable of tuning frequencies between 806 and
900 MHz except for the cellular bands have also been authorized.
Several publications currently on the market describe relatively
simple modifications that users can make to many of the latter
scanning receivers to enable that equipment to receive cellular
telephone transmissions.

   5. The Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act requires
that the Commission, by April 26, 1993, prescribe and make effective
regulations denying equipment authorization for any scanning receiver
capable of:

    Receiving transmissions in the frequencies allocated to 
the domestic cellular radio service,
    Readily being altered by the user to receive transmissions 
in such frequencies, or
    Being equipped with decoders that convert digital cellular 
transmissions to analog voice audio.

The Act also stipulates that, beginning one year after the effective
date of the regulations adopted to satisfy the above requirements, no
receiver having the above capabilities shall be manufactured in the
United States or imported for use in the United States.

   6. In accordance with the Act, we are proposing to deny equipment
authorization to scanning receivers that tune frequencies used by
cellular telephones. We are also proposing to require applicants for
the authorization of scanning receivers to include in their
applications a statement declaring that their receivers cannot be
tuned to receive cellular telephone transmissions.

   7. Also in accordance with the Act, we are proposing to require
that scanning receivers be incapable of being readily altered by the
user to operate within the cellular bands. To assist us in determining
whether a scanner complies with this requirement, we propose to
require applicants for scanning receiver equipment authorization to
include in their applications a statement pledging that their
receivers cannot be readily altered to receive cellular telephone
transmissions. We also propose to prohibit the authorization of any
scanning receiver for which cellular coverage can be readily restored
by the user. We solicit comment on this proposed reporting requirement
and on the definition of "readily altered."  We also seek comment on
whether additional information, such as why the receiver cannot be
readily altered, should be required.

   8. In further compliance with the Act, we propose to deny equipment
authorization to any scanning receiver that can be equipped with
decoders that convert digital cellular transmissions to analog voice
audio. We invite comment on the potential impact of this requirement
on existing models of scanning receivers.

   9. There currently are a number of frequency converters on the
market that can be used in conjunction with scanners that receive
frequencies below 800 MHz to enable the reception of cellular
telephone transmissions. We are proposing to deny equipment
authorization to converters that tune, or can be readily altered by
the user to tune, cellular telephone frequencies. We will require that
applicants for FCC equipment authorization of frequency converters
used with scanners include in their applications a statement pledging
that the converters cannot be easily altered to enable a scanner to
receive cellular transmissions. We seek comment on whether this
statement should also include evidence indicating why the converter
cannot be easily modified.

   10. The Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is contained in the
text of the Notice.

11. Comment Dates

   Pursuant to applicable procedures set forth in 47 CFR 1.415 and
1.419, interested parties may file comments on or before February 22,
1993, and reply comments on or before March 8, 1993. In order to
comply with the requirement of the Telephone Disclosure and Dispute
Resolution Act that FCC rules be promulgated within 180 days of
enactment, we will proceed with this Notice without furnishing a prior
text as provided by Article 607 of the United States-Canada Free-Trade
Implementation Act of 1988 (Pub. L. 100-499, 102 Stat. 1851). To do so
would frustrate achievement of a legitimate domestic objective. In
addition, the Commission is not likely to be able to accommodate
requests for extension of the comment periods. To file formally in
this proceeding, you must file an original and five copies of all
comments, reply comments, and supporting comments. If you want each
Commissioner to receive a copy of your comments, you must file an
original plus nine copies. You should send comments and reply comments
to Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, DC 20554. Comments and reply comments will be available
for public inspection during normal business hours in the Dockets
Reference Room of the Federal Communications Commission, 1919 M
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20554.

12. Ex-Parte Rules-Non-Restricted Proceeding

   This is a non-restricted notice and comment rule making proceeding.
Ex parte presentations are permitted, except during the Sunshine
Agenda period, provided they are disclosed as provided in Commission
rules. See generally 47 CFR 1.1202, 1.1203 and 1.1206(a).

   13. For further information on this proceeding contact David
Wilson, Technical Standards Branch, Office of Engineering and
Technology, 202-653-8138.

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Parts 2 and 15:

   Communications equipment, Wiretapping and electronic surveillance.

Federal Communications Commission.

Donna R. Searcy,
Secretary.

   Parts 2 and 15 of title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations are
proposed to be amended as follows:

PART 2-FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS AND RADIO TREATY MATTERS; GENERAL RULES
AND REGULATIONS

   1. The authority citation for part 2 continues to read as follows:

   Authority: Secs. 4, 302, 303 and 307 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 154, 154(i), 302, 303, 303(r) and 307.

   2. Section 2.975 is amended by adding a new paragraph (a)(8) 
to read as follows:

2.975   Application for notification.

   (a) * * *
   (8) Applications for the notification of receivers contained 
in frequency converters used with scanning receivers shall be 
accompanied by an exhibit indicating compliance with the provisions 
of 15.121 of this chapter.
*     *     *     *     *     
   3. Section 2.1033 is amended by adding a new paragraph (b)(12) 
to read as follows:

2.1033   Application for certification.
*     *     *     *     *     
   (b) * * *
   (12) Applications for the certification of scanning receivers under
part 15 shall be accompanied by an exhibit indicating compliance with
the provisions of 15.122 of this chapter.  
* * * * *

PART 15-RADIO FREQUENCY DEVICES

   1. The authority citation for part 15 continues to read as follows:

   Authority: Secs. 4, 302, 303 and 307 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 154, 302, 303 and 307.

   2. Section 15.37 is amended by adding a last sentence to paragraph
(b), and adding a new paragraph (f), to read as follows:

15.37   Transition provisions for compliance with the rules.
*     *     *     *     *     
   (b) * * * In addition, receivers are subject to the provisions in
paragraph (f) of this section. 

 * * * * *

   (f) The manufacture or importation of scanning receivers, and
frequency converters used with scanning receivers, that do not comply
with the provisions of 15.121 shall cease on or before April 26, 1994.
Effective April 26, 1993, the Commission will not accept applications
for equipment authorization for receivers that do not comply with the
provisions of 15.121.  This paragraph does not prohibit the sale or
use of authorized receivers manufactured in the United States, or
imported into the United States, prior to April 26, 1994.

   3. Section 15.121 is added to read as follows:

15.121 Scanning receivers and frequency converters used with scanning
receivers.

   Scanning receivers, and frequency converters used with scanning
receivers, must be incapable of operating (tuning), or readily being
altered by the user to operate, within the frequency bands allocated
to the Domestic Public Cellular Radio Telecommunications Service.
Receivers capable of "readily being altered by the user" include, but
are not limited to, those for which the ability to receive
transmissions in the restricted bands can be added by clipping the
leads of, or installing, a diode, resistor and/or jumper wire; or
replacing a plug-in semiconductor chip. Scanning receivers, and
frequency converters used with scanning receivers, must also be
incapable of converting digital cellular transmissions to analog voice
audio.

------- End of Forwarded Message






From edgar at spectrx.Saigon.COM  Sat Feb 13 03:08:21 1993
From: edgar at spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 03:08:21 PST
Subject: anonymous script
Message-ID: <XVmwyB8w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>


My thanks to Karl Barrus.  I'm one of the MSDOS users and I appreciate
his effort in providing an MSDOS script for anonymous remailing.

--
edgar at spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca






From gnu  Sat Feb 13 04:19:30 1993
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 04:19:30 PST
Subject: [gnu@toad.com: Re: Technology Policy and Information Infrastructure ]
Message-ID: <9302131219.AA13076@toad.com>


------- Forwarded Message

To: "Vinton G. Cerf" <vcerf at CNRI.Reston.VA.US>, gnu at toad.com
Subject: Re: Technology Policy and Information Infrastructure 
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 01:43:31 -0800
From: gnu at toad.com

Sound bites for Congress re technology policy and information infrastructure:

  *  Government investment invariably brings government control, which
     is harmful to the development of a communications medium in a free
     and open society.

  *  The Government seized control of telegraphy, radio, and television
     early in their development, and they have never had full First Amendment
     protection.

  *  Private, interactive electronic media involve Fourth and Fifth Amendment
     issues as well.

  *  The Executive Branch is already advocating broad wiretapping, and 
     banning of privacy technologies, and they don't even own the network.
     If the government owned the network, there'd be no stopping them.

  *  The risk of moving society into media where individual rights are
     regularly abridged is too great.  Economics is pushing us into
     individual electronic communication, regardless.

  *  If Congress truly believes in the Bill of Rights, it should get the
     hell out of the networking business and stay out of it.

	John Gilmore
	(not speaking for) Electronic Frontier Foundation
	(but ask EFF if they want to say something like this...)

------- End of Forwarded Message






From gnu  Sat Feb 13 04:21:32 1993
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 04:21:32 PST
Subject: [Re: Crypto Technology Policy]
Message-ID: <9302131221.AA13150@toad.com>


------- Forwarded Message

Message-Id: <9302130952.AA06229 at toad.com>
To: "Vinton G. Cerf" <vcerf at CNRI.Reston.VA.US>
Subject: Re: Technology Policy and Information Infrastructure 
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 01:52:35 -0800
From: gnu at toad.com

Vint, if your testimony will touch on "technology policy" as it relates to
cryptograpy policy, then here are a few more "sound bits":

  *  Privacy and authenticity technologies are key to reliable
     and trustworthy social and business interactions over networks.

  *  Current government policies actively prohibit and inhibit the
     research, design, manufacturing, sale, and use of these technologies.

  *  Taxpayers have been investing many billions of dollars per year
     in these technologies, in the NSA "black budget", but have seen no
     return on this investment.

  *  Current "cold war" policy should be turned on its head.  Privacy
     is one of the fundamental rights from which the Bill of Rights was
     derived.  Government policy should encourage privacy technologies.
     Government controls on cryptography should be completely removed.

  *  The taxpayer investment in privacy technologies should be returned to
     the taxpayers by declassifying NSA research and encouraging its
     widespread deployment to protect domestic civilian communications.

------- End of Forwarded Message






From pozar at kumr.lns.com  Sat Feb 13 07:30:38 1993
From: pozar at kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 07:30:38 PST
Subject: FCC Proposed Ruling on Scanners That Receive Cellphone Transmissions
In-Reply-To: <9302131102.AA09849@toad.com>
Message-ID: <m0nNOo2-0000f6C@kumr.lns.com>


John Gilmore wrote:
> Please at least write a one-page letter in response to this
> proposed ruling.  The idiots in Congress decided that banning radios
> was preferable to allowing (or requiring) decent encryption in
> cellular phones.  Now the FCC is making rules to implement the
> Congressional ban.  They should hear from us, loud and clear,
> that this is completely backwards and wrong.
> 
> Your letter should reference Docket Number 93-1 and should clearly
> state the subject on which you are commenting.  *Then* comment...
> 
> 	John

   I should add, it needs to be formated properly or it will not be read
into the record and just tossed.   Some where around here I have an
example folks can use.  I will dig it up and post it in a day or so.

             Tim






From geoffw at nexsys.net  Sat Feb 13 13:40:46 1993
From: geoffw at nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 13:40:46 PST
Subject: PGP Customs investigation
Message-ID: <9302132122.AA13118@nexsys.nexsys.net>


This might be old news by now but for what it's worth ...



----- Begin Included Message -----

[stuff deleted ... ]

Subject: PGP Customs investigation
Content-Length: 1235
X-Lines: 34
Status: RO

>Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 14:47:55 -0800
>Originator: pgp-dev at oc.com
>Errors-To: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu
>Reply-To: pgp-dev at oc.com
>Sender: pgp-dev at oc.com
>Version: 5.5 -- Copyright (c) 1991/92, Anastasios Kotsikonas
>From: prz at sage.cgd.ucar.EDU (Philip Zimmermann)
>To:
>Subject: PGP Customs investigation
>
>
>I just got a call from a criminal investigator from the US Customs
>in San Jose.  She wants to fly out here to Colorado next Thursday to 
>ask me how PGP got out of the USA.  I told her I didn't export it,
>but software published on domestic Internet sites can leak overseas.
>She said I was not legally obligated to answer her questions, but that
>she would like to come here and ask me questions about the program, and
>any other information I wanted to provide on how it got exported.
>She had a copy of the PGP 2.0 User's Guide (and, I presume, the software).
>
>I thought this bit of news would be of general interest to PGPeople.
>
>
>Philip Zimmermann
>12 Feb 93
>
>
>

----- End Included Message -----






From ncselxsi!drzaphod at ncselxsi.netcom.com  Sat Feb 13 16:38:12 1993
From: ncselxsi!drzaphod at ncselxsi.netcom.com (DrZaphod)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 16:38:12 PST
Subject: Letter to FCC
Message-ID: <39954.drzaphod@ncselxsi>


In Message Sat, 13 Feb 93 7:29:25 PST,
  kumr.lns.com!pozar at netcomsv.netcom.com (Tim Pozar) writes:

>   I should add, it needs to be formated properly or it will not be read
>into the record and just tossed.   Some where around here I have an
>example folks can use.  I will dig it up and post it in a day or so.
>
     Well this is a nice little way for the government to bypass public
opinion.  "If it's not formatted right we won't read it."

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod at ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized





From pozar at kumr.lns.com  Sat Feb 13 17:17:34 1993
From: pozar at kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 17:17:34 PST
Subject: Letter to FCC
In-Reply-To: <39954.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
Message-ID: <m0nNXyA-00023FC@kumr.lns.com>


DrZaphod wrote:
> In Message Sat, 13 Feb 93 7:29:25 PST,
>   kumr.lns.com!pozar at netcomsv.netcom.com (Tim Pozar) writes:
> >   I should add, it needs to be formated properly or it will not be read
> >into the record and just tossed.   Some where around here I have an
> >example folks can use.  I will dig it up and post it in a day or so.
>
>      Well this is a nice little way for the government to bypass public
> opinion.  "If it's not formatted right we won't read it."

  Ever try to mail order tickets for Grateful Dead concerts? :-)

                       Tim
-- 
    Internet: pozar at kumr.lns.com     FidoNet: Tim Pozar @ 1:125/555
Snail: Tim Pozar / KKSF / 77 Maiden Lane / San Francisco CA 94108 / USA
                        Voice: +1 415 788 2022






From fnerd at smds.com  Sat Feb 13 17:45:13 1993
From: fnerd at smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 17:45:13 PST
Subject: Gold code?
Message-ID: <9302132253.AA24202@smds.com>


Could someone tell me (privately) what a Gold code is?
Or, could someone resend me the message that described it?
(I think it was in a thread about digital cellular phones.)

thanks,
-fnerd





From ssandfort at attmail.com  Sun Feb 14 13:38:28 1993
From: ssandfort at attmail.com (ssandfort at attmail.com)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 93 13:38:28 PST
Subject: BattleZone
Message-ID: <9302142138.AA24608@toad.com>


_________________________________________________________________
             FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ATTENTION:  Cypherpunks and Extropians--Free Fun

For those of you who live in the San Francisco Bay Area, or will
be visiting 25-26 February, you are invited to play a free game
at BattleZone.  BattleZone is an indoor, paintball combat field.
On the morning of either the 25th or the 26th, Channel 2 will be
doing a live report on BattleZone.

If you are interested in being televised while playing this very
intense, high adrenaline game, send me an e-mail note with your
voice phone numbers and the best times to get in touch with you.
I will call and/or e-mail you with details.

     S a n d y                         ssandfort at attmail.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From ssandfort at attmail.com  Sun Feb 14 13:41:12 1993
From: ssandfort at attmail.com (ssandfort at attmail.com)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 93 13:41:12 PST
Subject: Computer Game Software
Message-ID: <9302142141.AA24638@toad.com>


_________________________________________________________________
             FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ATTENTION:  Cypherpunks and Extropians--South East Asian Markets

If you are involved with recreational or educational software, I
can assist you or your company to distribute it overseas.  I have
a very aggressive, very reliable business associate in Singapore,
who would like to distribute your computer game and educational
software throughout South East Asia.

If you would like to know more, let me know and I will get in
touch with you.  This is a very easy way for you to increase the
profitability of your software products.

     S a n d y                         ssandfort at attmail.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From scott at shrug.dur.ac.uk  Mon Feb 15 04:26:29 1993
From: scott at shrug.dur.ac.uk (Scott A. McIntyre)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 93 04:26:29 PST
Subject: Join in?
Message-ID: <m0nO4rd-000M6BC@shrug.dur.ac.uk>



Could I be added to this list, if at all possible?

Thanks,

Scott





From root at rmsdell.ftl.fl.us  Mon Feb 15 22:07:46 1993
From: root at rmsdell.ftl.fl.us (Yanek Martinson)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 93 22:07:46 PST
Subject: dc-nets
Message-ID: <m0nOLIn-0002D8C@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us>


Just a quick note to let anyone interested know that I'm still 
working on a dc-net implementation.  I've had some problems
with the nodes getting out of synch and am implementing
some sort of ack/commit protocol.

I'm also trying to make it work over TCP links in addition to e-mail.

--
Yanek Martinson
yanek at novavax.nova.edu




From scott at shrug.dur.ac.uk  Tue Feb 16 03:16:24 1993
From: scott at shrug.dur.ac.uk (Scott A. McIntyre)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 93 03:16:24 PST
Subject: Cyphering on the NeXT
Message-ID: <m0nOQGY-000M6kC@shrug.dur.ac.uk>


I've got a NeXTstation colour and am dabbling with the various tools that are  
available for electronic encryption.  As you may know, NeXT developed a Fast  
Elliptical Encryption system (FEE) based on public key technology, but was  
prohibited from exporting it due to US law; so the dropped the tool from  
their NeXTmail system which was set for International distribution.

I have however found PGP recently (but can not get it to compile; I'm no  
programmer so I'm just bumbling throug the code fixing what I can by trial  
and error, not wise, I know), and a few other tools (kerberos)...

I'd be interested in hearing from anyone else who is using any form of  
encryption on their NeXTs for electronic mail, how they implemented it, what  
they see as alternatives and so on.

Ta,
Scott
---
EMAIL: S.A.McIntyre at durham.ac.uk   OR   scott at shrug.dur.ac.uk (NeXTmail)
SNAIL: Pyschment of Departology, University of Durham, Durham, DH1 3LE
	"Did you know that the computer invented itself?" - SNL





From scott at shrug.dur.ac.uk  Tue Feb 16 08:49:02 1993
From: scott at shrug.dur.ac.uk (Scott A. McIntyre)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 93 08:49:02 PST
Subject: Attn: Todd Steigerwald
Message-ID: <m0nOVSJ-000M6tC@shrug.dur.ac.uk>


Todd,

I am not able to mail you with the answer to your query as your mailer just  
said you were todd at imaginatio which is something less than complete...if you  
can mail me (S.A.McIntyre at durham.ac.uk) with your complete mail address, I  
can tell you how to get PGP working on the NeXT...I've been playing with it  
all afternoon!

Scott






From gkennedy at ccs.carleton.ca  Tue Feb 16 12:09:08 1993
From: gkennedy at ccs.carleton.ca (Garry Kennedy)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 93 12:09:08 PST
Subject: subscription
Message-ID: <9302162008.AA10150@superior.YP.nobel>


Subscribe.

Gary Kennedy
gkennedy at ccs.carleton.ca





From deltorto at aol.com  Wed Feb 17 11:10:02 1993
From: deltorto at aol.com (deltorto at aol.com)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 93 11:10:02 PST
Subject: Timed-Release Crypto
Message-ID: <9302171328.tn22198@aol.com>


Tim May contributed a fascinating bit of thinking on timed-release messages,
including this:

>>"Aha!," I hear you exclaim, "Tim's scheme depends solely on the trust of
>>these escrow agents, and that's no different from depositing a sealed
>>envelope with your friendly lawyer and asking him to promise not to peek."

Well, yes, Tim, but what about the MTBF rating fo disk drives and or other
storage media? Any such message would also be relying on the turst that the
disk it's stored on, the mail system and or the organization it was sent to
for storgae are still going to be around. Now, if there were dedicated places
where such t-r crypto msgs could be stored, such as a digital "bank" (where
they would no doubt charge a storage fee, possibly necessitating that each
such msg would be able to "peel off" digicredits from itself every year to
guarantee paying for it's own upkeep in case you were no longer aropund to
sign checks), the question of whether or not it would BE there in 30 years
might be moot, but that's a whole 'nother discussion.

Still, I find your idea very compelling and full of merit.

  dave





From tcmay at netcom.com  Wed Feb 17 12:18:04 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 93 12:18:04 PST
Subject: Timed-Release Crypto
Message-ID: <9302172016.AA12281@netcom.netcom.com>


Dave Deltorto writes (about my idea for timed-release crypto):

>Well, yes, Tim, but what about the MTBF rating fo disk drives and or other
>storage media? Any such message would also be relying on the turst that the
>disk it's stored on, the mail system and or the organization it was sent to
>for storgae are still going to be around. Now, if there were dedicated places

Loss of hardware over the years due to unreliability is unlikely to be the
main issue, for several reasons:

1. Modern MTBFs for large disk drives are approaching 100,000 hours, or
well over 10 years. The drives are likelier to be voluntarily retired
first. And newer drives, including archival optical drives, are even more
reliable (the  drives may crash, but optical media survive). For the drives
that _do_ fail, backup strategies exist, as with all storage of critical
files. To wit, if your point is correct, then the failures of some disk
drives at banks, insurance companies, etc., should be producing some
fraction of "unrecoverable losses" each year. That they are not, because of
robust backup and redundant storage methods, is evidence that crypto time
vaults will also be reasonably secure. (Granted, you wouldn't want to trust
your $100,000 deposit for 20 years on Joe Random's aging Amiga 1000.)

2. A relatively large file by today's standards, e.g., 10 megabytes, will
be a very small file by the standards of 10 years from now. The upshot is
that new and more reliable storage methods (and transmission methods) will
make storage of such small files quite trivial. (And remember that since
the pieces are encrypted, physical duplication for backups, redundant
storage, etc., is not a compromise of security.)

3. The most reputatable crypto time vaults will of course be careful not to
lose client files, especially not for such mundane reasons as disk drive
failures. 

4. M-out-of-n voting strategies are likely in any case, to deal with
collusion of some of the nodes. That is, a file will be split into pieces
such that any 8 out of 12 pieces, for example, are sufficient to recover
the original file. (Encryption is a separate issue, though obviously
related.)

5. The files are likely to be moved around a lot, anyway, making hardware
failures manageable on an instantaneous basis (that is, bad nodes, etc.,
can be compensated for when the time comes to reroute the files). Thus, a
critical file does not just get "parked" at one site for 30 years.

>where such t-r crypto msgs could be stored, such as a digital "bank" (where
>they would no doubt charge a storage fee, possibly necessitating that each
>such msg would be able to "peel off" digicredits from itself every year to
>guarantee paying for it's own upkeep in case you were no longer aropund to
>sign checks), the question of whether or not it would BE there in 30 years
>might be moot, but that's a whole 'nother discussion.

"Persistent institutions" is what I call these systems or trusts that last
for many decades. If such systems can be built, using some of the ideas
discussed here in this group, then interesting new financial and political
structures are possible. Imagine an anonymous, distributed trust that has
$10 billion in crypto-assets and a "goal" of funding nanotech or cryonics
research. (Lots of complicated stuff yet to be considered in enough detail
on how such "goals" might be stored, acted on, etc. For the sake of
simplicity, think of it as a kind of Howard Hughes Medical Foundation,
which once owned the Hughes Corporation, but which is not located in any
one single country....)

>Still, I find your idea very compelling and full of merit.

Thanks. Lots more work is needed.

-Tim May


--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.






From elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU  Wed Feb 17 14:35:24 1993
From: elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU (Karl Barrus)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 93 14:35:24 PST
Subject: digital store?
Message-ID: <199302172234.AA25466@Menudo.UH.EDU>



Cypherpunks,

	I've received mail from a bank user who wonders what to do
with the "money".
	I responded that there really isn't too much reason to spend
your money now, given that there isn't too much to buy :-)  I've been
trying to think of something the bank customers can do to trade bills,
sort of a fixed monetary economic experiment.  Anybody have ideas?
	Right now, bank customers can contact each other anonymously
by using remailing headers set up for the remailer
elee7h5 at rosebud.ee.uh.edu - use the get command to receive a list of
headers (for more info see the new help file).  The only thing I can
think of right now that people can do is play "mental poker" and use
digital bills.  Of course, messages back and forth need to be
encrypted because such activity can be seen as gambling, although of
course there is no real money involved.
	I'm working on a help file/FAQ for the bank, but I want to
finish writing hop.mail for MSDOS first, and that isn't going as fast
as I would like since I find the DOS scripting language to be, well...
inadequate.  

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf at menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus at tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/





From wayner at cs.cornell.edu  Wed Feb 17 15:30:07 1993
From: wayner at cs.cornell.edu (Peter Wayner)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 93 15:30:07 PST
Subject: Gambling...
Message-ID: <9302172328.AA29824@brokk.cs.cornell.edu>



If there is no "real" money involved then you might want
to consider running a betting operation on sports games
or some other popular betting activity. Of course, many of
us would probably rather bet on the release date of the 586 then
some random ball game because that is where our expertise lies... :-)


-Peter





From whitaker at eternity.demon.co.uk  Thu Feb 18 07:10:41 1993
From: whitaker at eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell E. Whitaker)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 07:10:41 PST
Subject: MEETING: 4th Cypherpunks U.K.
Message-ID: <1159@eternity.demon.co.uk>


4th Cypherpunks meeting, London
-------------------------------

Will be held Saturday, 20 February 1993, at 1400 in the office of:

  FOREST
  4th Floor
  2 Grosvenor Gardens
  London  SW1W 0DH
  071-823-6550

This location is 2 blocks from Victoria Station, at the corner
of Hobart Place, near Buckingham Palace.  The entrance is the
very last at the end of the office block, and is diagonally
across the street from a cabbie shelter and a bank of BT
payphones.  If you have trouble finding us, call the above
number or page me on 081-812-2661.

Attendees, as always, are encouraged to bring their laptop and
portable computers, for on-site PGP public key exchange and
certification.  Those who have already generated PGP 2.n public
keys, but who aren't bringing their own machines, should bring
diskettes with their public keys.  As is usually the rule in
this crowd, please don't copy your secret key on these
diskettes...

Amongst the usual topics of discussion will be:

    *  An introduction to data privacy for novices
    *  Further developments in U.K. anonymous remailers
    *  Further developments in U.K. PGP key servers (telnet,
         ftp, email)

.. and some interesting developments in re attempted
anti-privacy legislation in the U.K. and elsewhere.

Our special guest Saturday will be Dr. Whitfield Diffie, who
will join us informally for the meeting, before his return to
the U.S.  It looks to be a good meeting.  All are welcome.

In liberty,

Russell Earl Whitaker                   whitaker at eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor                                 AMiX: RWhitaker
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)
================ PGP 2.0 public key available =======================







From ssandfort at attmail.com  Thu Feb 18 09:56:43 1993
From: ssandfort at attmail.com (ssandfort at attmail.com)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 09:56:43 PST
Subject: Trapdoors
Message-ID: <9302181756.AA28225@toad.com>


_________________________________________________________________
             FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I'm relatively new to the list, so this may be an idea that's
already been dealt with.  If so, please let me know off-line.

PGP was created as an end-run to legislation that would have
mandated trapdoors in all encryption hardware/software sold in
the U.S.   Fortunately, such legislation has been defeated to
date.

How do we know the proposed legislation wasn't just a smoke
screen?  Isn't it possible that the Feds have already compromised
Intel or MicroSoft?  Is there some way to be sure that the new
486 chip running your computer isn't recording each PGP or RSA
private key you generate?

     S a n d y                         ssandfort at attmail.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From lefty at apple.com  Thu Feb 18 10:45:53 1993
From: lefty at apple.com (lefty at apple.com)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 10:45:53 PST
Subject: Trapdoors
Message-ID: <9302181844.AA06137@apple.com>


Sandy Sandfort wonders:
>How do we know the proposed legislation wasn't just a smoke
>screen?  Isn't it possible that the Feds have already compromised
>Intel or MicroSoft?  Is there some way to be sure that the new
>486 chip running your computer isn't recording each PGP or RSA
>private key you generate?

No, nor do we having any particular way of knowing that Packard-Bell
doesn't install an extremely tiny person into each keyboard they sell,
studiously copying down each one of your key strokes.

How in the world would the computer's CPU be able to distinguish the
generation of a PGP or RSA private key from any other computation?

--
Lefty (lefty at apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.







From tcmay at netcom.com  Thu Feb 18 10:50:25 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 10:50:25 PST
Subject: Trapdoors
Message-ID: <9302181848.AA20187@netcom.netcom.com>



>How do we know the proposed legislation wasn't just a smoke
>screen?  Isn't it possible that the Feds have already compromised
>Intel or MicroSoft?  Is there some way to be sure that the new
>486 chip running your computer isn't recording each PGP or RSA
>private key you generate?

>     S a n d y                         ssandfort at attmail.com

Sandy has discovered the deep dark secret of crypto! I worked for Intel
from 1974 to 1986 and can confirm this to be the case.

Every crypto key is secretly recorded by Intel microprocessors. Motorola
processors do not yet record keys, which I why use a Macintosh. The
specific instruction is the so-called "NSA instruction" which John Gilmore
identified some time ago. 

Sun Microsystems was ordered by the NSA to redesign their chips to capture
keys, which is why the SPARC processor was introduced. SPARC stands for
"Sun Processor Allowing Remote Capture."

Once the keys have been captured and stored on the user's hard disk (notice
how the drives occasionally turn on a night?), they are forwarded to the
NSA and National Surveillance Organization by "screen saver" programs, like
"After Dark," which were actually written by the Berkeley Microsystems
cut-out operation of the NSO. Real hackers don't use cutesy screen saver
programs.

This new automated system is much more convenient than the previous system,
where the FBI and NSO had to break into homes and offices in order to
retrieve the keys the Intel processors had recorded.

-Klaus! von Future Prime, Cypherpunk and Extropian






From root at rmsdell.ftl.fl.us  Thu Feb 18 11:42:43 1993
From: root at rmsdell.ftl.fl.us (Yanek Martinson)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 11:42:43 PST
Subject: Trapdoors (Not Very Likely)
Message-ID: <m0nPGWp-0002m0C@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us>


> Intel or MicroSoft?  Is there some way to be sure that the new
> 486 chip running your computer isn't recording each PGP or RSA
> private key you generate?

This is not very likely.  There would be several problems for anyone
attempting this.  First, where do you store it?  On-chip non-volatile
memory?  Second, how would the chip know that it was generating
a private key?  This would almost require artificial intelligence. 
You can't just scan for a sequence of instructions currently used
by PGP, for they change with each version released.  Or would it
store ALL data that passes through it?  Third, how useful would
that be?  What if you generate your keys on a sub-notebook computer 
which you carry with you or store in a secure place at all times.

So, no, this is not something you need to worry about.

--
Yanek Martinson
yanek at novavax.nova.edu




From kelly at netcom.com  Thu Feb 18 12:50:01 1993
From: kelly at netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 12:50:01 PST
Subject: Chip Level Back Doors
In-Reply-To: <9302181756.AA28225@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302182048.AA04620@netcom.netcom.com>


> 
> _________________________________________________________________
>              FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> I'm relatively new to the list, so this may be an idea that's
> already been dealt with.  If so, please let me know off-line.
> 
> PGP was created as an end-run to legislation that would have
> mandated trapdoors in all encryption hardware/software sold in
> the U.S.   Fortunately, such legislation has been defeated to
> date.
> 
> How do we know the proposed legislation wasn't just a smoke
> screen?  Isn't it possible that the Feds have already compromised
> Intel or MicroSoft?  Is there some way to be sure that the new
> 486 chip running your computer isn't recording each PGP or RSA
> private key you generate?
> 
>      S a n d y                         ssandfort at attmail.com
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> 
> 


Actually I would like to respond to this one, from a technical level
silicon compilers use a process known as auto_insert logic,
this a a process where known gate libraries are automatically
inserted in the design of a chip, a gate level trapdoor may then be
created by designing a multiple level interdiction program, (virus
tech immediately came to mine on this one do to my work in
both the MS-DOS and Unix virus/security area, the first attack is
on the base OS that the OS for the cad package, generally its some variety of
Unix(tm), next the CAD package that manages the chip design, and finally the
silicon compiler itself, now while all these steps are essentially
trivial to an informed engineer in the business they are
essntially opaque to those outside of the design/foundry end for chip
design, could they be attacked in this fashion to create a gate level backdoor
??? With a modest investment intime and money by an attacker no,doubt
if he subverts an engineer on the project of interest.,-- whish could be at
the CAD software ivendor, the OS vendor for the cad platform,
now while design verification techniques are used in most chip houses
it should be relatively trivial to bypass that
given the complexity of todays designs... is it possible?? damn right,
Has it happened yet ??? I wouldnt know you tell me...
I worked on the CAD end, the OS end, and the Silicon compiler end
as well as having the skills needed to the the open holes in the whole
process... finding out a chip design had been
compromised wouldnt surprise me in the least...
A Chip level backdoor to reach into the middle of a running systems and grab
public keys is another magnitutde of complexity above what
we are
discussing on the gate level... is it possibile? most certainly...
It would cost immensely however, and would require the coorperation
or subversion of several steps in the chain  A LOT more code has to
be hidden in those auto_insert libraries and the
design verification process has to be MUCH more widely compromised,
and I believe performance hits WOULD be detectable at the end user level



       WHAT do YOU  think
       cheers
       kelly





From jim at tadpole.com  Thu Feb 18 12:58:33 1993
From: jim at tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 12:58:33 PST
Subject: Trapdoors
Message-ID: <9302182057.AA00885@tadpole.tadpole.com>


> The specific instruction is the so-called "NSA instruction" which John Gilmore
> identified some time ago. 
> 
> Sun Microsystems was ordered by the NSA to redesign their chips to capture
> keys, which is why the SPARC processor was introduced. SPARC stands for
> "Sun Processor Allowing Remote Capture."

Interestingly enough, V9 SPARC has a population count (number of bits
set in word) instruction that was put in specificly at the request of
No Such Agency.

Jim





From pmetzger at shearson.com  Thu Feb 18 13:42:33 1993
From: pmetzger at shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 13:42:33 PST
Subject: Trapdoors
Message-ID: <9302181938.AA10578@maggie.shearson.com>


> From: ssandfort at attmail.com
> 
> How do we know the proposed legislation wasn't just a smoke
> screen?  Isn't it possible that the Feds have already compromised
> Intel or MicroSoft?  Is there some way to be sure that the new
> 486 chip running your computer isn't recording each PGP or RSA
> private key you generate?

If you could actually build a 486 such that it was capable of this task,
you are a far better chip designer than any I know of. Not merely are
we to expect that the 486 is capable of recording anything, but we
are also to expect that its capable of solving a computationally
undecidable problem as well.

Perry





From dmandl at shearson.com  Thu Feb 18 13:45:42 1993
From: dmandl at shearson.com (David Mandl)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 13:45:42 PST
Subject: Trapdoors
Message-ID: <9302181948.AA21706@tardis.shearson.com>


> _________________________________________________________________
>              FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

[...]

> Isn't it possible that the Feds have already compromised
> Intel or MicroSoft?  Is there some way to be sure that the new
> 486 chip running your computer isn't recording each PGP or RSA
> private key you generate?
> 
>      S a n d y                         ssandfort at attmail.com
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

You may be right.  For example, I know for a fact that all 386/486
chips trap files with the string "Liz" in them--this is so that the
NSA can capture and read love letters from me to my girlfriend.  I
have been getting around this by changing my pet names for her
constantly, and placing the string "Liz" at random points in massive
junk files to waste the spooks' disk space.  Inconvenient, but it
works.  Ciao.

   --Dave.





From gnu  Thu Feb 18 17:30:29 1993
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 17:30:29 PST
Subject: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
In-Reply-To: <9302181507.14268.w8sdz@TACOM-EMH1.Army.Mil>
Message-ID: <9302190130.AA08277@toad.com>


Keith, Kenneth:

I have been busy both cutting a GDB release (which isn't done yet) and
dealing with immediate management needs at my company.  But your
concerns are also of grave concern to me, so I'll take the time to
answer you fully.


I am uninterested in censorship of discussion of *any* topic on
mailing lists through my machine.  Your opinion is that this is
inappropriate use of the Internet.  I own the machine free and clear.
I personally pay its network bills.  If you examine its net
connectivity and the associated connection contracts, you will find
that the machine is attached via a worldwide network that explicitly
promises not to censor any traffic UNLESS AND UNTIL a court of law --
not you -- has decided that that traffic is actually illegal.  And my
machine sends email traffic for any host (other than a short list
known to be on uncensored networks) to uunet, which is explicitly
authorized by NSF to forward uncontrolled outside traffic (e.g. from
uucp sites) into the NSFnet.

You see, I anticipated that third parties would want to control what I
and my friends might want to talk about using this wonderful
networking technolgy.  And we aren't interested in your opinion.
No offense intended, Keith -- I think you have done some truly great
work for the community.  But when you imply that conversations though
my machine are in any way illegal or inappropriate, you've overstepped
my respect for you.

> 				 This person appears to be a virus
> author, one who knows virus authors, and/or one who encourages such
> activity. 

Thank you, Senator McCarthy.  I believe that thug at phantom.com is not
a smart-card-carrying member of the virus authors' guild, but I'm not sure.

I think that the attitude that it's OK for "computer scientists" or
"virus researchers" to talk about viruses, to dissect them in detail,
and to write or modify them, but it isn't OK for anyone else to do so,
is two-faced and objectionable.  Security by obscurity -- forcing
people to be unaware of issues and threats like these, whether by
explicit censorship, pressure on intermediate sites, or by social
ostracism -- not only doesn't remove the threat, but is an affront to
our open society.

If you think that the public should be protected from the *content* of
the particular message that was forwarded to me, I recommend that you
look at recent issues of Info Security News (formerly ISPNews), one of
the better trade rags covering security products.  They seem to be
running an article series by Alan Solomon on exactly how stealth
viruses work, and they provided a lot more details than the overview
posting that came through toad.com.  I've seen articles in the Sep/Oct
and Nov/Dec 1992 issues so far.

Just as important to the cypherpunks posting was the author's
exploration of the impacts on society resulting from the technology
(the movement toward memory-protected and permission-controlled
operating systems, the impacts of automating virus creation so that
children can do it, etc).  The Solomon articles focused completely on
technical issues, leaving the reader in the dark about how to cope
over the next few years.

My own opinion is that viruses are what will finally put a stake
through the heart of DOS.  It's a dirty job, but somebody has to do it.
If true, or even 10% likely, it's something that a hundred million
people had better talk about, so they can prepare for it.

	John Gilmore
	gnu at toad.com





From gnu  Thu Feb 18 17:40:18 1993
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 17:40:18 PST
Subject: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
Message-ID: <9302190140.AA08377@toad.com>


This is the message I received which complained about "inappropriate
use of the Internet".  He also phoned me to complain.

I know the cyperpunks already know this, but Dave Farber's audience
might not have thought about the implications for free speech of
having the government build a multi billion dollar Internet
replacement.  Bureaucrats and random complaints from third parties on
such a network *will* cause you grief about what you are allowed to
say and do.  The company I buy networking from is Alternet, and
because they exist, I can protect myself from this sort of meddling.
They will not be able to compete with the taxpayer funded "national
information infrastructure", and my only option, if I want to be on
the net, will be to hook up under the government's rules.

If after seeing this this exchange you still don't believe me, talk to
someone at a controversial broadcast radio station.  Radio is living
under that yoke *now*, and they have some real stories to tell.

	John

Date: Tue, 16 Feb 1993 12:53:14 -0500 (EST)
To: gnu at cygnus.com (John Gilmore)
Cc: CMcDonald at WSMR-SIMTEL20.Army.Mil (Chris McDonald),
        krvw at cert.org ("Kenneth R. van Wyk")
Subject: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
From: w8sdz at TACOM-EMH1.Army.Mil (Keith Petersen - MACA WSMR)
Message-Id: <9302161253.16494.w8sdz at TACOM-EMH1.Army.Mil>

John, below is the posting I called about.  In my opinion this is
inappropriate use of the Internet.  This person appears to be a virus
author, one who knows virus authors, and/or one who encourages such
activity. 

What is the policy of toad.com concerning such postings?

Keith
--
Keith Petersen
Maintainer of the MS-DOS archive at WSMR-SIMTEL20.Army.Mil [192.88.110.20]
Internet: w8sdz at TACOM-EMH1.Army.Mil     or      w8sdz at Vela.ACS.Oakland.Edu
Uucp: uunet!umich!vela!w8sdz                         BITNET: w8sdz at OAKLAND

> From: thug at phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
> Subject: Re: Viral encryption
> To: cypherpunks at toad.com
> Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 11:47:43 EST
> 
> As Mr. Ferguson pointed out, polymorphic viruses are making their way into the
> DOS world.  This is a problem in the short term, but not in the long term
> because people will be changing to memory-protected & file-permission based
> operating systems like NT, OS/2 and Unix, where it is very difficult for
> most kinds of virus to spread.
> 
> I myself am very familiar with the virus underground, so for those who are
> not, let me explain the two newest and most deadly virus techniques which
> are being seen in the DOS world.
> 
> The first is something called "Stealth" viruses.  Stealth viruses imbed
> themselves into DOS and intercept disk read calls from applications. If
> those read system calls are reading non .EXE or .COM files, then they are
> processed normally.  However when an application such as virus scanning
> program is reading in .COM and .EXE files (in order to scan them for virus
> code), the stealth code in DOS intercepts this and returns to the application
> what the .EXE or .COM file would look like if it wasn't infected by the
> stealth virus.  Thus, all virus checking programs can be decieved in this
> manner.  There are steps to get around this, like booting off of a
> write-protected floppy disk (with a clean copy of DOS on it) and running
> the virus checking program directly from that floppy.  But people seldom
> do that, so the stealth technology is a worthwhile one for virus creators
> to pursue.
> 
> The second is called "Polymorphic" viruses.  These are viruses which
> contain a tiny encryption/decryption engine.  The great thing about
> polymorphic viruses is that they encrypt themselves with a different key
> each time they replicate (make a new copy of themselves).  The small
> amount of virus bootstrap code which is not encrypted is changed in each
> replication by dispursing random NOP's throughout the virus boostrap code.
> Thus each sample of polymorphic virus looks completely different to
> virus checking programs.  The virus checking programs cannot use
> "signature" byte strings to detect polymorphic viruses.
> 
> I have seen something called D.A.M.E., also known as Dark Avenger
> Mutation Engine.  This is a freeware polymorphic library/kernel/toolkit
> which allows anyone to take an ordinary virus and wrap it in a polymorphic
> shell.  Thus each new copy of the virus will look completely different
> as it replicates.  D.A.M.E. is a great toolkit for those who want to
> release new viruses but don't have the skills to write a virus from
> scratch.  DAME works very well with Turbo Assembler and MASM.
> I believe that DAME II will be coming out sometime this spring. At
> least that is what the author has promised.  Among the new features
> will be more powerful encryption, stealth capabilities, and compatibility
> with Stacker and DR DOS compressed file systems.  I have read that the
> author of DAME and DAME II will be coming out with a Virus Construction
> Set, which will allow point-n-click building of new viruses using
> object oriented techniques.  It works sort of like a Mr. Potatohead,
> you point and click on the parts/modules you want and it builds it for
> you.  You select the replication method, stealth capability,
> polymorphism, and payload module (there are several payloads, varying
> from playing music and showing graphics, to printing a text message on
> screan, to complete wipe out of the HD). The really wonderful thing
> is that you will be able to build your own modules and link them into
> the virus.  I am sure a flourishing of third-party modules will occur.
> 
> With the VCS, a 9 year old can build a competely new virus just by
> pointing, clicking, and dragging, popping up windows and choosing options.
> 
> My oh my, aren't we in for fun times ahead...
> 
> Thug





From thug at phantom.com  Thu Feb 18 18:25:31 1993
From: thug at phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 18:25:31 PST
Subject: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
In-Reply-To: <9302190140.AA08377@toad.com>
Message-ID: <m0nPNK9-000jqZC@phantom.com>



With regard to Mr. Peterson:

I think we are finally seeing the net gestapo coming out of the woodwork.
We all knew they are on the net, we just couldn't pinpoint who exactly
they were.

This Peterson fellow seems to think he is the self-appointed protector of
decency on the net.  I have run across this Peterson fellow before, and
he seems to have this crazed desire to call up (by voice) system
administrators to complain about the net postings and mailing list postings
of users at those sites, and then threaten further action if his demands
are not met.

My previous encounter with Mr. Peterson occurred rather indirectly.
Apparently, a novice user here at phantom.com mistakenly mailed a posting
about gay lifestyles to some mailing list that Mr. Peterson was on.  Being a
net nazi, Mr. Peterson proceeded to call up the sysadm of phantom.com and
threatened to call up phantom.com's feed site (PSInet) complaining about
"inappropriate use of the net" and threatened to ask PSI to cut phantom.com
from the net.  This would not have worked since PSI is a commercial feed
provider, but I can see where this gestapo tactic would work on sites who
get their feeds for free/cheap from universities and other non-commercial
sites.

Is this guy on a power trip or something? And who the fuck appointed him
to watch over what is being said on the net?


Re: my virus posting

As you can read from the posting itself, there is nothing in there that
technically allows anyone to write a virus based on my words.  Nor is
there anything in there that encourages people to write viruses.  But
that's not the real issue, even if my post contained such information,
I think I am free to send it along to whever I wish.  The fact that my
post was devoid of such information, only makes Peterson look even more
foolish than he already does.

If anything, my post was meant to be humerous and sarcastic.  Especially
that part about how 9 year olds will be able to point-and-click together
viruses within a year, and how overpaid underachievers like Peterson and
his cronies in the virus-protection-racket are powerless to stop
this from occuring.

I think the other thing that made Peterson fly off the handle was the
fact that I am writing under an alias, an especially offensive one like
"Murdering Thug".  I'm sure if my virus post came from a "respected"
and "approved" individual like McAfee or John Dvorak, he wouldn't have
raised an eyebrow.  In fact Dvorak wrote an Editorial in PC Magazine
about a year back which was VERY similar to my post.  In his editorial
he discussed D.A.M.E. and Stealth viruses, and explained how they worked
in similar detail as I have done.  Did Mr. Peterson write a letter to
PC Magazine to complain?  I think not. He knows that someone like Dvorak
could make him look like the true idiot that he is.

Mr. Peterson, I am glad your are showing your gestapo personality
in front of the entire net.  Your underhanded tactics of threatening
system administrators with harassing voice phone calls will be exposed
to the net community at large, and YOU will be the one who is mocked
and censured, and rightly so.


Respectfully,

Murdering Thug 





From tcmay at netcom.com  Fri Feb 19 07:10:33 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 07:10:33 PST
Subject: Defending Free Speech and Liberty
Message-ID: <9302190714.AA23494@netcom.netcom.com>



Cheers for John Gilmore in his defense of free speech and liberty! The
Net.Nazi who apparently criticized him for inappropriate use of the Net
clearly understands neither the nature of free exchange of ideas nor the
relative innocuousness of Murdering Thug's article on viruses.

Thug's article on polymorphic viruses was factual and made some good
points, and certainly was not very controversial. And even if it was
controversial, so what? Frankly, Thug's article was pretty tame (no
offense, Thug...a lot of our postings are pretty tame). I've seen more
details elsewhere on the Dark Avenger Mutation Engine, so big deal! 

(The "virus construction kit" idea was also recently the subject of an
article in one of the trade rags, and I recall Steve Gibson writing at
least two fairly alarmist and detailed articles on polymorphic viruses for
"Infoworld." And the trade journal "Computers and Security" has extensive
coverage of all of these virus technologies.)

As with so many things that the cop and spy mentalities want kept secret
from the riffraff, who gains by keeping the secrets? The Bulgarian virus
writers (could this whole "Bulgarian" thing be just part of the propaganda
campaign by the SPA and GoreTechs to ensure a "safe" network, a la NREN?
Just a thought.) certainly will be a lot more current than casual readers
of a brief article.

If discussion of viruses is discouraged--or even banned--who will benefit?
Ordinary citizens will be kept in the dark, while the virus guys at Los
Alamos and the Army Center for Signal Warfare (Vint Hill Station, VA) will
continue to let out contracts for virus warfare to MITRE and their ilk,
while bogus stories get out (like the supposed viruses planted in equipment
bound for Iraq just before the war started), and while the supposed "good
guys" like Fred Cohen (he wrote the first big study of viruses and
brunnering) are busy proposing "good viruses" that would seek out tax
evaders, deadbeat Dads, and other subversives! (Lord, save us from the
fools!).

Meanwhile, the French SDECE is spying on everyone they can and probably was
behind CLODO (Comite Liquidant ou Detoumant les Ordinateurs), the
anti-computer terrorist group. The better to scare the populace, don't you
know?

I say, let's expand the scope of the Cypherpunks list to include more
discussion of viruses. We can't let it become a monopoly of the Authorities
(the Brunner Authority instead of the Turing Authority?)

The "Cypherpunk Ethic" says we don't trust authority to tell us how to
compute, and we don't understand defense methods until we understand attack
methods. QED.

Frankly, I expect the next target of the powerfreak authorities to be our
work on anonymous remailers and digital money. They'll come to see that as
a bigger threat than mere viruses.

-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.






From ssandfort at attmail.com  Fri Feb 19 07:10:51 1993
From: ssandfort at attmail.com (ssandfort at attmail.com)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 07:10:51 PST
Subject: LIST RULES
Message-ID: <9302190553.AA16486@cygnus.com>


_________________________________________________________________
             FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In a recent post, John Gilmore wrote:

    "Keith, Kenneth . . . I am uninterested in censorship of
    discussion of *any* topic on mailing lists through my
    machine . . .  the machine is attached via a worldwide
    network that explicitly promises not to censor any
    traffic UNLESS AND UNTIL a court of law --not you -- has
    decided that that traffic is actually illegal."

Because I agree COMPLETELY with what John wrote, I'm somewhat
miffed at him for his seeming lack of constituency.  Recently, I
posted a notice on this list about a software business contact I
have in South East Asia.  John sent me a terse note asking me not
to "advertise" on the list.

I was a bit surprised at his response for several reasons.
First, a founding Cypherpunk regular, Tim May, suggested I post
my question the list when I asked him if he knew anyone working
on recreational software.  Second, I have had several polite
enquiries from list members who where interested in what I
posted.  Finally, nobody else was offended enough to complain.

I sent a respectful note to John asking him, among other things,
if I had violated some prohibition of which I was unaware.
John's response was:

    "Please consider this message a prohibition against
    advertising.  Apparently nobody else on the list needed
    to hear it, except you, since you are the first person
    to abuse the list in this way."

Now I fully agree that it's John's ball, and I will play by his
rules, but I find it hard to reconcile John's public tolerance
with his private prohibition.  Does ANYONE else feel abused?  I
hope not.  What do others on this list think about "commercial"
postings?

I will not "advertise" on the list as long as John prohibits it.
But I sincerely hope his prohibition does not discourage others
from discussing the issues it raises.  I would like to hear what
the rest of you think.

     S a n d y                         ssandfort at attmail.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From phiber at eff.org  Fri Feb 19 07:10:55 1993
From: phiber at eff.org (Phiber Optik)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 07:10:55 PST
Subject: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
In-Reply-To: <9302190140.AA08377@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199302190537.AA28048@eff.org>


Granted the idiocy of Mr. High-and-Mighty Army Man's opinion of what people
can and can't say, I couldn't help but point out two silly things in the
message he's complaining about:
[stuff deleted]
> > each time they replicate (make a new copy of themselves).  The small
> > amount of virus bootstrap code which is not encrypted is changed in each
> > replication by dispursing random NOP's throughout the virus boostrap code.
> > Thus each sample of polymorphic virus looks completely different to
> > virus checking programs.  The virus checking programs cannot use
> > "signature" byte strings to detect polymorphic viruses.
> > 
Either he's explaining it wrong, or the author is actually foolish enough to
think that people won't simply just IGNORE the randomly placed NOPs and only
consider the other instruction codes in forming a signature(s).  Wowie.
Real programmers know that the strength of polymorphic code lies in the fact
that the same instruction can be coded as numerous different opcodes on Intel
processors.

And...
> > I have seen something called D.A.M.E., also known as Dark Avenger
> > Mutation Engine.  This is a freeware polymorphic library/kernel/toolkit

Why does he keep referring to MtE, as "DAME"???

It never ceases to amaze me how such an elementary and sophomoric subject as
viruses can cause the strangest reactions from some people.  I think it has
something to do with the noxious connotations of the word 'virus'.  Maybe if
we all just agreed to call them 'nuisance programs', like flies on a horse's
rear-end, they wouldn't cause such fool panic.
On a finer note, I know a couple more of my "non-privacy in the phone system"
messages are in order, I was pleased by the response I got.  I'll try and work
myself into the mood.






From honey at citi.umich.edu  Fri Feb 19 07:11:30 1993
From: honey at citi.umich.edu (peter honeyman)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 07:11:30 PST
Subject: the revocation blues
Message-ID: <9302190448.AA10424@cygnus.com>


this certainly presents a challenge for the trust web.
i suppose the key ring needs a "kill" list.

		peter

------- Forwarded Message

Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,sci.crypt
From: perry at jpunix.com (John A. Perry)
Subject: Key Revocation Problems
Organization: J. P. and Associates, Dickinson, TX
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 1993 23:56:35 GMT
Message-ID: <C2KFuC.7Iw at jpunix.com>
Keywords: PGP keys

- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hello Everyone!

	Several of us have been wrestling with a key revocation
problem for some time now. When I first installed PGP 2.1 I had a
weird chain of events follow. I generated my personal key and sent a
copy of my public key to Vesselin Bontchev and Ken van Wyk. This key
was posted to one of the large keyrings almost immediately. Several
hours later, I was still playing with PGP and suffered a disk crash. I
had not yet had a chance to back up my keyring. Needless to say, I
lost the keyring and now I have no way to revoke the key. The specific
key I'm talking about is 0x76A3. The key I currently use, 0xB199 is
the one I plan on using from now on. It is backed up frequently of
course. About a week ago I sent a signed message to Vesselin
explaining the problem and he agreed to add his own comments, sign it,
and post it to alt.security.pgp and sci.crypt. The message seems to
have fallen through the cracks which is why I'm posting this message.
I'm sure if Vesselin, explorer at iastate.edu, and warlord at mit.edu are
reading this, they will add their own verifications of this problem.
If I receive the errant message from Vesselin, I'll repost it also.

	In the meantime, if you feel this is enough verification to
remove the public key 0x76A3 from your public keyring, I sure would
appreciate it. If you require further verification, I will be glad to
discuss it on the phone. My home number is 713-534-3653 and my work
number is 409-772-2706 (the secretary). I apologize for any
inconvenience. At least this fluke chain of events may show everyone
the importance of backing up your PGP keyrings often.

	Remember 0xB199 is the good one!!



- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1e

iQCVAgUBK4F/K1oWmV4X/7GZAQHRvAP/QYDZU8xD7v4y4SJbE1bgp2FVTQWOt106
YJjOAXSyKQuZKQVxLOSF2c4kq0PS3+kUQedWTvccxB6koUAp6gscBg4UFWYQAQc5
Tu5QIE/c9XHhmergEKGpVz9GDVPiolMJbKh3Ni6q/Wul8T65vtT+y9alN8KDIJZt
IGTeSspNtVo=
=whcq
- -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
- -- 
 John A. Perry  -  perry at jpunix.com
                   jpunix!perry

 PGP 2.1 signature available by fingering perry at phil.utmb.edu

------- End of Forwarded Message






From elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU  Fri Feb 19 07:11:44 1993
From: elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU (Karl Barrus)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 07:11:44 PST
Subject: hopmail.bat for MSDOS
Message-ID: <199302190429.AA10835@Menudo.UH.EDU>



Cypherpunks & cypherpunkettes :-)

At long last I beleive a working version of hopmail written in the
MSDOS scripting is finished.  I've tested it and it seems to work (and
I even sent messages with DOS CRLF's instead of unix NL and had no
problems), but if you find problems let me know.  I'm assuming you are
like me in that my pc doesn't have a dedicated net connection, so the
scripts just prepare file, but don't mail them.  You would upload the
file to your network account and go from there.

Warning: the code is ugly, but I plead innocence, citing the
constraints of the language!  I've never used so many goto's since my
last BASIC program ~11 years ago.

I think in the future I'll just write DOS stuff in C/C++, with system
calls, and offer source with executables, so you can recompile if
you've think I've added secret password catching commands :-)  I'd use
4DOS and other enhancements like some people have suggested (thanks!)
but I want to be sure as many people as possible can use the script,
so using just plain old DOS seems the best way to go.  Well, the best
way to go in DOS.

I'll write a help file and offer it, the script, and anonmail.bat up
for ftp.  Quickly, because getting input from the user in DOS is a
real pain/impossible without resorting to extra programs/assembly
hacks , all parameters are just entered on the command line.  Type
hopmail and a short help screen will appear.

Now I'll clean up the digital bank and circulate the source to those
interested. 

---------8< -- cut here -- >8----------
@echo off
rem hopmail.bat - allows routing a message through various remailers
rem extropia not supported just yet
rem Karl Barrus - elee9sf at menudo.uh.edu

rem if no parameters, print help file
if '%1'=='' goto help

rem get file name
shift
set filename=%0
if not exist %filename% goto errnofile

rem check mode
shift
set mode=0
if '%0'=='1' set mode=1
if '%0'=='2' set mode=2
if '%mode%'=='0' goto errmode

rem set up encrypted pgp header
echo :: > zzztemp1.txt
echo Encrypted: PGP >> zzztemp1.txt
echo. >> zzztemp1.txt

rem create null message
echo. > zzztemp3.txt

rem get email address
shift
set to=%0
if '%to%'=='' goto errmail

:repeat
shift
if '%0'=='' goto finish

if '%0'=='1' set rto=hh at pmantis.berkeley.edu
if '%0'=='2' set rto=hh at cicada.berkeley.edu
if '%0'=='3' set rto=hh at soda.berkeley.edu
if '%0'=='4' set rto=hal at alumni.caltech.edu
if '%0'=='5' set rto=remailer at rebma.mn.org
if '%0'=='6' set rto=elee7h5 at rosebud.ee.uh.edu
if '%0'=='7' set rto=phantom at mead.u.washington.edu
if '%0'=='8' set rto=hfinney at shell.portal.com

rem set up remailing request header
echo :: > zzztemp2.txt
echo Request-Remailing-To: %to% >> zzztemp2.txt
echo. >> zzztemp2.txt

rem append previous message
copy zzztemp2.txt + zzztemp3.txt zzztemp4.txt > nul
del zzztemp2.txt
rename zzztemp4.txt zzztemp2.txt

if '%0'=='1' goto none
if '%0'=='2' goto none
if '%0'=='3' goto none

pgp -ea zzztemp2.txt %rto% > nul
copy zzztemp1.txt + zzztemp2.asc zzztemp3.txt > nul
goto next

:none
copy zzztemp2.txt zzztemp3.txt > nul

:next
set to=%rto%

goto repeat

:finish
if '%mode%'=='1' goto incmessage

rem append, user chose create to receive
echo -----cut here---- >> %filename%
copy %filename% + zzztemp3.txt  zzztemp4.txt > nul
echo. >> zzztemp4.txt
echo To reply, save everything below the cut here marks >> zzztemp4.txt
echo Type your reply below the blank line two lines above >> zzztemp4.txt
echo Mail resultant file to %to% >> zzztemp4.txt
del %filename%
rename zzztemp4.txt %filename%
goto done

:incmessage
rem user chose create header to send
copy zzztemp3.txt + %filename% zzztemp4.txt > nul
del %filename%
rename zzztemp4.txt %filename%
echo Remember to mail %filename% to %to% 

goto done

:help
echo Usage: hopmail filename mode address remailer# [remailer#]...
echo Mode:
echo 1: Mail a file via anonymous remailers
echo 2: Create a remailing header and append to a file
echo.
echo Address:
echo for mode 1, destination address
echo for mode 2, your address
echo.
echo Remailers:
echo 1: hh at pmantis.berkeley.edu
echo 2: hh at cicada.berkeley.edu
echo 3: hh at soda.berkeley.edu
echo 4: hal at alumni.caltech.edu
echo 5: remailer at rebma.mn.org
echo 6: elee7h5 at rosebud.ee.uh.edu
echo 7: phantom at mead.u.washington.edu
echo 8: hfinney at shell.portal.com
rem echo 9: remail at extropia.wimsey.com
goto end

:errmode
echo Error: mode must be 1 or 2
goto end

:errmail
echo Error: no destination specified
goto done

:errnofile
echo Error: file %filename% does not exist
goto end

:done
del zzz*.*

:end






From wixer!jonl at bigtex.cactus.org  Fri Feb 19 07:11:58 1993
From: wixer!jonl at bigtex.cactus.org (Jon Lebkowsky)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 07:11:58 PST
Subject: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
In-Reply-To: <9302190130.AA08277@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302190302.AA17901@wixer>


> > 				 This person appears to be a virus
> > author, one who knows virus authors, and/or one who encourages such
> > activity. 
> 
> Thank you, Senator McCarthy.  I believe that thug at phantom.com is not
> a smart-card-carrying member of the virus authors' guild, but I'm not sure.
> 
> I think that the attitude that it's OK for "computer scientists" or
> "virus researchers" to talk about viruses, to dissect them in detail,
> and to write or modify them, but it isn't OK for anyone else to do so,
> is two-faced and objectionable.  Security by obscurity -- forcing
> people to be unaware of issues and threats like these, whether by
> explicit censorship, pressure on intermediate sites, or by social
> ostracism -- not only doesn't remove the threat, but is an affront to
> our open society.

I agree completely. thug was doing me & others like me a favor by
explaining in clear terms this next in a series of viral threats to our
systems' integrity, and I figger I owe him thanks...burning him at the
stake would be kinda rude, considering....

jonl






From Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU  Fri Feb 19 08:07:20 1993
From: Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU (Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 08:07:20 PST
Subject: PGP anonymous remailer
Message-ID: <9302191606.AA13301@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>


Ok, I have finally decided that my remailer is ready for public use.
I think I have finally worked all the bugs out of it enough so that
it runs very smooth.

In case you want to write something to me...
Here is my *own* PGP key.  Rajesh (Rusty) Babani - babani at cs.buffalo.edu
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1

mQCNAislEwoAAAEEAKpPvevD7zlGmpbB9nYhqJghthanWvfoQlKXPa/sJe6B+Ztt
lbCVcLHZ4IpQfmcZ0hZqsKjQRunRFk1pT4woQsDSHJjax80xnrUwaLkPTOADahay
FCQ6+NqV/7vWLR/XaJ7wxTGwtoCi/69jOfidKIj1HY6cpnImue7qIk/4gBkDAAUR
tC1SYWplc2ggKFJ1c3R5KSBCYWJhbmkgPGJhYmFuaUBjcy5idWZmYWxvLmVkdT4=
=wZaf
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----


The address where I am running an anonymous remailing server based on
Eric Hughes' perl scripts is: <babani at cs.buffalo.edu>

To use the server, put "Request-Remailing-To: <destination-address>"
into the header of the message, and send it to the server address.  If
your mailer won't let you put things into message headers, instead make
the first line of your message body be just the two characters "::",
and make the next line be "Request-Remailing-To: <destination-address>",
and make the next line be blank.  The "::" tells the remailer to take
the following lines, up to a blank one, and put them into the header.

Also, make sure that you include a subject: line in your message,
otherwise, the messge will be sent to a black hole.  You will not hear
from the message again.

To use PGP with the remailer, first compose a message like above then
encrypt the message using the remailer's public key.  Then, in the
message body, make the first line be just the two characters "::", and
make the next line be "Encrypted: PGP" and make the next line be
balnk.

Here is my anonymous remailer's PGP public key:
Anonymous Remailer - babani at cs.buffalo.edu
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1

mQCNAitx/vQAAAEEAOUPjAfSeFmMsq7eWN47LzOwdSXmXoArMJOcBZ0bB3NRR3Nc
BF7ZIIbY5m/b/rBn6+IimthV/aa39hKOSPPnFZn7kxIAUwoolMmxUUPJRzcRcTDK
bsgLMCPfDuE8MWj0R960oaAFEE+yCCoDNiyPl6goN3XluVeie+ehVSuMvgdRAAUR
tCpBbm9ueW1vdXMgUmVtYWlsZXIgPGJhYmFuaUBjcy5idWZmYWxvLmVkdT4=
=BdRu
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----









From Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU  Fri Feb 19 08:15:39 1993
From: Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU (Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 08:15:39 PST
Subject: Test the new remailer
Message-ID: <9302191614.AA13658@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>


I encourage everyone to at least send a test message through the
remailer so that I can lay my fears thtat the reamailer is not working
down to rest.

Not only that... it's really easy.  Try it!

-- 
+==== Internet: babani at cs.buffalo.edu ===+======== Amateur-Radio: N2LYC ======+
!      Bitnet: V078LNGT at ubvms.BITNET     |        UUCP: rutgers!ub!babani     !
! Alternate: an173 at cleveland.freenet.edu | Plsure dpnds on the othrs prmison. !
+==  PGP key available. (If you don't know what a PGP key is... find out!)  ==+





From pcw at access.digex.com  Fri Feb 19 08:35:03 1993
From: pcw at access.digex.com (Peter Wayner)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 08:35:03 PST
Subject: For other news on SDECE and foreign intell ops...
Message-ID: <199302191633.AA04683@access.digex.com>



Check out a new book by Peter Schweitzer entitled _Friendly Spies_.
(Atlantic Monthly Press). It tells plenty of stories about how
many US companies are the targets for foreign economic intelligence.
To me, it is the best argument for the government to _encourage_
the widespread use of strong cryptography.

-Peter





From geoffw at nexsys.net  Fri Feb 19 09:17:43 1993
From: geoffw at nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 09:17:43 PST
Subject: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
Message-ID: <9302191709.AA02257@nexsys.nexsys.net>


> Subject: Re: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
> From: w8sdz at TACOM-EMH1.Army.Mil (Keith Petersen - MACA WSMR)
> Content-Type> : > text> 
> Content-Length: 2643
> X-Lines: 59
> Status: RO
> 
> John, by quoting and reposting without my permission, my private
> message to you to a public mailing list you have violated the Federal
> Communications Privacy Act of 1986. 
> 
>                PUBLIC LAW 99-508--OCT. 21, 1986   
>      
>         TITLE II--STORED WIRE AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICA-
>             TIONS AND TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS
>      
> ss. 2702. Disclosure of contents
>      
>      "(a) Prohibitions.--Except as provided in subsection (b)--
>           "(1) a person or entity providing an electronic
>      communication service to the public shall not knowingly
>      divulge to any person or entity the contents of a
>      communication while in electronic storage by that service;
>      and
>           "(2) a person or entity providing remote computing
>      service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any
>      person or entity the contents of any communication which
>      is carried or maintained on that service--
>                "(A) on behalf of, and received by means of
>           electronic transmission from (or created by means of
>           computer processing of communications received by
>           means of electronic transmission from), a subscriber
>           or customer of such service; and
>           "(B) solely for the purposed of providing storage or
>           computer processing services to such subscriber or
>           customer, if the provider is not authorized to access
>           the contents of any such communications for purposes
>           of providing any services other than storage or
>           computer processing.

Keith,
	Maybe you should read more carefully...


>      "(b) Exceptions.-- A person or entity may divulge the
> contents of a communication--
>           "(1) to an addressee or intended recipient of such
>      communication or an agent of such addressee or intended
>      recipient;
>           "(2) as otherwise authorized in section 2516,
>      2511(2)(1) , or 2703 of this title;
>           "(3) with the lawful consent of the originator or an
>      addressee or intended recipient of such communication, or
>      the subscriber in the case of remote computing service;

I think John is the "intended recipient of such communication"
as I am also an "intended recipient" of this communication 
from you, which I will post to cypherpunks so others can see
what kind of person you are.  If your intention is to "threaten"
with this kind of foolishness, then I must warn you, I consider
this type of behavior harassment due to the confrontive nature of 
your post.  Let it go on record that I don't expect to be harassed,
intimidated or "threatened" and I think the Internet rules are
VERY clear about this type of behavior. 

				Geoff White (GW67)
				geoffw at nexsys.net





From nobody at pmantis.berkeley.edu  Fri Feb 19 09:51:53 1993
From: nobody at pmantis.berkeley.edu (nobody at pmantis.berkeley.edu)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 09:51:53 PST
Subject: anonymous mail
Message-ID: <9302191753.AA12638@pmantis.berkeley.edu>


This message routed through 7 remailers, sent around 11:45 CST 2/19/93:
pmantis -> soda -> alumni -> rosebud -> mead -> shell -> buffalo

All welcome the new remailer Rusty has set up!
Also, congrats to Chael Hall for his efforts - I'm testing his remailer
as well for inclusion in various scripts.

(Eric, I'm not getting any responses back from your remailer @cicada
for some reason, even if I just use it as a single hop)

Look for the 8 remailer routing confirmation coming soon - also
through rebma.

If there's some temporary problem with cicada and it's fixed, look for
the 9 remailer hopping message.

And if that shows, look for the 10 remailer routed message (now that's
security) utilizing extropia if I have to build the headers myself!!

Question: of the unix users, who does NOT have access to ksh (via your
login shell or #!/bin/ksh or somewhere else)?  Rewriting hop.mail in
ksh would allow me to support extropia, and reverse the chaining
direction (that is, route the mail as you specify and not actually in
reverse)

DOS folks can expect hopmail.exe (source + executable) because I don't
think its possible in the native batch language.

Well, I guess you can figure out who this is, so

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf at menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus at tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/








From shipley at tfs.COM  Fri Feb 19 10:27:47 1993
From: shipley at tfs.COM (Peter Shipley)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 10:27:47 PST
Subject: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
In-Reply-To: <9302190302.AA17901@wixer>
Message-ID: <9302191826.AA23693@edev0.TFS>



>> Thank you, Senator McCarthy.  I believe that thug at phantom.com is not
>> a smart-card-carrying member of the virus authors' guild, but I'm not sure.

where do I sign up to join the "virus authors' guild"?  I hear that
the news letter is wonderful/informative and self propagating.






From ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu  Fri Feb 19 11:08:08 1993
From: ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 11:08:08 PST
Subject: the revocation blues
In-Reply-To: <9302190448.AA10424@cygnus.com>
Message-ID: <9302191906.AA05283@longs.lance.colostate.edu>


peter honeyman <honey at citi.umich.edu>
>this certainly presents a challenge for the trust web.
>i suppose the key ring needs a "kill" list.

From: perry at jpunix.com (John A. Perry)
>Several of us have been wrestling with a key revocation
>problem for some time now.
>Several
>hours later, I was still playing with PGP and suffered a disk crash. I
>had not yet had a chance to back up my keyring. Needless to say, I
>lost the keyring and now I have no way to revoke the key.

I don't get it. The point of revocation is to remove a *compromised*
key, one that someone has potentially copied, etc.  If there is no
chance that the key can be accessed, how is this a problem? I guess the
problem is that only one key can be associated with one person
(identity) per keyring?  Then I would say the thing to do is propagate
the new key through the trust network in the same way it was originally
established...? This isn't really a deficiency in the software, is it?





From ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu  Fri Feb 19 11:11:39 1993
From: ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 11:11:39 PST
Subject: Defending Free Speech and Liberty
In-Reply-To: <9302190714.AA23494@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302191910.AA05405@longs.lance.colostate.edu>


[t.c. May]
>I say, let's expand the scope of the Cypherpunks list to include more
>discussion of viruses. We can't let it become a monopoly of the Authorities
>(the Brunner Authority instead of the Turing Authority?)

I say, unless it has to do with cryptography, please don't. Does
anybody else want a lot of virus articles on this list?  I found the
original thug article a bit questionable, as I said. But a new list
(viruspunks?) might be a good idea.





From kelly at netcom.com  Fri Feb 19 11:23:14 1993
From: kelly at netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 11:23:14 PST
Subject: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors (fwd)
Message-ID: <9302191921.AA20295@netcom.netcom.com>


Forwarded message:
> From cypherpunks-request at toad.com Fri Feb 19 07:53:56 1993
> From: Phiber Optik <phiber at eff.org>
> Message-Id: <199302190537.AA28048 at eff.org>
> Subject: Re: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
> To: gnu at toad.com (John Gilmore)
> Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 0:37:18 EST
> Cc: cypherpunks at toad.com
> In-Reply-To: <9302190140.AA08377 at toad.com>; from "John Gilmore" at Feb 18, 93 5:40 pm
> 
> Granted the idiocy of Mr. High-and-Mighty Army Man's opinion of what people
> can and can't say, I couldn't help but point out two silly things in the

  BY Jove I think you have hit it, People go nto the military because
they have an inner need to be controlled and to control to the point of 
violence if need be( for the military in general and the
 army , marines and and special intelligence agencies>, they 
are after all as their prime mission capable of extreme violence and the
taking of human life, as a means of social control.
Law enforcement seems to have very similiar mentality as well,
with CONTROL being the agenda and reason for existance-- 
Suppose we think of guerilla products such as PGP and anoynmous
posting mechanisms and forwarders  in their larger social sense
As behaviour modification for those who would have our privacy
as well as our lives. No social insult is intended by this message about
mr peterson or the military /intelligence/police community.
We should remember however that with the same body of individuals
as just described we are dealing with seriously maladjusted
individuals who have an inate need to control others,
such has been adequately demonstrated by the individuals
attempted supression of Murdering Thug's constitutionally
protected speech, instead of taunting them maybe we should be
finding ways to prevent our tax dollars from
supporting them in their evil OBSCENE fantasies of violence and Control
I for one am DAMN TIRED of being censored supressed and persecuted
by the military/Law Enforcement/Intelligence community . I
am also putting my time in next project with peace/activist/political
groups such as the christic action peace groups(you know the folks
who use to sue the fed over intelligence abuses by the CIA/NSA/DEA/DIA
crouwd) Well i their national organization was wiped out by lawsuit by bush and 
and company and changes in their tax status. These were and are the same
people suing the CIA over the La-penca bombing in honduras of
Journalists during the times of the contras in Nicgura. They while their
agenda is a good bit more political than ours have been the only ones for years
keeping the federal government at bay by lawsuit.
They need technical assistance, hookins to peacenet and Econet and general help,
considering the widespread nature of the problem
we are fighting here maybe we should consider very actively
promultagating PGP and DC style anoymous networks among the
pease/political/human rights group. It would provide
convenient crypto-noise of PGP messgaes and greatly increase
the amount of money that the federal government has to spend investigating and
force them to spread themselves even more thinly...:)

It should also be remembered that the primary impact of products like
PGP and DC style nets beyond the privacy implications is economic.
Investigating citizens cost real tax dollars, the intelligence
oversight committees are not going to let the NSA et al keep
asking for more money year after year and the same
holds true for the law enforcement community, where a witch hunt was possible
before public domain crypto systems such as PGP were available, now
because of the blackout in communications to the intelligence community, 
they are getting very nervuous, people can now communicate secretly
about the best way to end the influence of a massively overbloated
cold war community and stop paying the bills for same...


if you were in THEIR shoes wouldnt you be seeking ways to keep

ATLAS from shrugging???

     
     cheers
      kelly
P.s. sorry for the long and drawn out nature and the rambling style
and the non-techical content, and I do feel it was 
important to express myself in the fashion I have...






From pozar at kumr.lns.com  Fri Feb 19 11:29:02 1993
From: pozar at kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 11:29:02 PST
Subject: Letter to FCC
In-Reply-To: <39954.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
Message-ID: <m0nPdNc-0000f9C@kumr.lns.com>


(Tim Pozar) writes:
>   I should add, it needs to be formated properly or it will not be read
>into the record and just tossed.   Some where around here I have an
>example folks can use.  I will dig it up and post it in a day or so.


  Here is the format of the letter.  It need to be in there by this
Monday!  So Fed-Ex today!

---

                                 Before the
                     FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
                             Washington, DC 20554
 
In the matter of                       )
                                       )
Amendment of Parts 2 and 15 to         )
Prohibit Marketin of Radio Scanners    )   ET Docket No. 93-1
Capable of Intercepting Cellular       )
Telephone Conversations                )
 
                      _COMMENTS OF [FULL NAME OF COMPANY]_
 
                                 _INTRODUCTION_
 
[Full name of company] (hereinafter "[abbreviation of company]") respectfully
submits its comments to the above captioned _Notice of Proposed Rule Makeing_
("NPRM"). [Abbreviation of company] is a [description of company].
 
                                  _BACKGROUND_
 
blah, blah, blah
 
                                 _DISCUSSION_
 
blah, blah, blah
 
                                 _CONCLUSION_
 
blah, blah, blah
 
                                      Respectfully submitted
 
 
 
 
                                      [Name of Person]
                                      [Full name of company]


-- 
    Internet: pozar at kumr.lns.com     FidoNet: Tim Pozar @ 1:125/555
Snail: Tim Pozar / KKSF / 77 Maiden Lane / San Francisco CA 94108 / USA
                        Voice: +1 415 788 2022




From geoffw at nexsys.net  Fri Feb 19 11:52:27 1993
From: geoffw at nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 11:52:27 PST
Subject: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
Message-ID: <9302191941.AA00340@nexsys.nexsys.net>



Boy,
	some people... They get a .mil on the end of their
	logins and they think their the cops of the world or something :)


		geoffw





From kelly at netcom.com  Fri Feb 19 12:07:36 1993
From: kelly at netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 12:07:36 PST
Subject: Defending Free Speech and Liberty (fwd)
Message-ID: <9302192006.AA26951@netcom.netcom.com>


Forwarded message:
> From cypherpunks-request at toad.com Fri Feb 19 11:55:16 1993
> Message-Id: <9302191910.AA05405 at longs.lance.colostate.edu>
> To: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
> Cc: cypherpunks at toad.com
> Subject: Re: Defending Free Speech and Liberty 
> In-Reply-To: Your message of "Thu, 18 Feb 93 23:14:44 PST."
>              <9302190714.AA23494 at netcom.netcom.com> 
> Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 12:10:23 -0700
> From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu>
> X-Mts: smtp
> 
> [t.c. May]
> >I say, let's expand the scope of the Cypherpunks list to include more
> >discussion of viruses. We can't let it become a monopoly of the Authorities
> >(the Brunner Authority instead of the Turing Authority?)
> 
> I say, unless it has to do with cryptography, please don't. Does
> anybody else want a lot of virus articles on this list?  I found the
> original thug article a bit questionable, as I said. But a new list
> (viruspunks?) might be a good idea.
> 
 Count a vote in for viruspunks... I too wish to keep cipherpunks clean
even though I love viruses and I wish to have a pure thread about
applied crypto and anonymity techniques...

-- 





From tcmay at netcom.com  Fri Feb 19 12:08:34 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 12:08:34 PST
Subject: Spreading Encryption to Political Groups
Message-ID: <9302192007.AA27273@netcom.netcom.com>



Kelly Goen expresses his outrage about the powerfreaks controlling the
police/spy/military agencies and encourages us to help spread encryption
and privacy technology to the groups figthing the government:

>and company and changes in their tax status. These were and are the same
>people suing the CIA over the La-penca bombing in honduras of
>Journalists during the times of the contras in Nicgura. They while their
>agenda is a good bit more political than ours have been the only ones for years
>keeping the federal government at bay by lawsuit.
>They need technical assistance, hookins to peacenet and Econet and general
>help,
>considering the widespread nature of the problem
>we are fighting here maybe we should consider very actively
>promultagating PGP and DC style anoymous networks among the
>pease/political/human rights group. It would provide
>convenient crypto-noise of PGP messgaes and greatly increase
>the amount of money that the federal government has to spend investigating and
>force them to spread themselves even more thinly...:)

I agree completely.

Even though I'm a libertarian (small "l") anarchocapitalist who happened to
vote for Perot (who has his defects!), I support some (but not all) of the
liberal agenda. Especially as regards getting the government out of our
lives. (And where I part company with many on the left is in the areas of
interference in free markets, anti-discrimination laws, and other statist
invasions of freedom and privacy.)

>From the Cypherpunks I have met, either at the physical meetings or at
places like the Hackers Conference, I would say that about 50% are strongly
libertarian/anarchist, about 20% are liberal/leftist, and the rest I don't
know about.

What's the point? That we should follow Kelly's advice and make some
contacts with those in other movements. I suspect this may be happening
anyway, as Phil ZImmermann has said he wrote PGP partly to help peace
activists and the like.

Just my opinion, of course.

-Tim May

--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.






From wcs at anchor.ho.att.com  Fri Feb 19 12:36:31 1993
From: wcs at anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_StewartHOY0021305)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 12:36:31 PST
Subject: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
Message-ID: <9302192035.AA03205@anchor.ho.att.com>


John - thanks for opposing censorship, having integrity, finding ways to set up a
	non-censorable system, and for letting us know about Keith's letter.
AlterNet folks - thanks for providing Internet access in a way that's not only 
	usable for commercial communications, but is outside government funding and control.
	If Al Gore's plans go through, I just can't *wait* to see what happens when
	Jesse Helms discovers that Congress controls the Next Generation Cable TV net....
Thug - never did like your psuedonym :-).  But thanks for writing a somewhat crypto-related
	note that lets us non-DOS followers know a bit more about what virus problems 
	may be hitting the machines around us - interesting stuff.
Geoff - thanks for posting Keith's mail with the ECPA excerpt.  It's nice to
	have confirmation that the ECPA explicitly permits originators, addressees,
	and intended recipients of electronic communication to divulge its contents,
	and interesting that it does not forbid service providers to divulge the contents
	of communication if they are otherwise authorized to see it, which John obviously was.
Keith - neither of us are lawyers, but if you wanted to complain about the legality of
	posting email by the recipient, you'll have to look at copyright laws,
	presuming that the ECPA language doesn't override copyright where the two conflict.
	But threatening people like that was in poor taste, just as requesting censorship was.
	John's posting of your request for censorship was appropriate - if you wanted to
	complain about Thug's public postings, an open letter to him would have been more appropriate.
	You've been a big help to the computing community, and we appreciate it,
	and I realize that viruses are a major problem to providing a site like Simtel.
	But lighten up, man!
Miss Manners, if you're reading this (:-)) - thanks for your recent comments on NPR's 
	Morning Edition about email ettiquette!  (She said that it was generally informal,
	and that expectations of it staying private are unrealistic, given the ease of 
	misrouting mail as well as people's tendencies to repeat things, and we might as 
	well get used to it.)  We're doing what we can to improve the technology for
	private communications, but technology isn't the whole problem, and it's
	going to take a while before we figure out the sociology of it....


				Bill Stewart, somewhere in New Jersey




From pozar at kumr.lns.com  Fri Feb 19 12:39:12 1993
From: pozar at kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 12:39:12 PST
Subject: Letter to FCC
In-Reply-To: <m0nPdNc-0000f9C@kumr.lns.com>
Message-ID: <m0nPeTY-00029rC@kumr.lns.com>


   I just got a call back from Dave Wilson of the FCC and told me that
there is a minor change in the form I sent out. Everything after the
"INTRODUCTION" line should be double spaced.

               Tim
-- 
    Internet: pozar at kumr.lns.com     FidoNet: Tim Pozar @ 1:125/555
Snail: Tim Pozar / KKSF / 77 Maiden Lane / San Francisco CA 94108 / USA
                        Voice: +1 415 788 2022




From kelly at netcom.com  Fri Feb 19 12:43:43 1993
From: kelly at netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 12:43:43 PST
Subject: Spreading Encryption to Political Groups (fwd)
Message-ID: <9302192042.AA03154@netcom.netcom.com>


Forwarded message:
> From cypherpunks-request at toad.com Fri Feb 19 12:28:13 1993
> Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 12:07:00 -0800
> Message-Id: <9302192007.AA27273 at netcom.netcom.com>
> To: cypherpunks at toad.com
> From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
> Subject: Spreading Encryption to Political Groups
> 
> 
> Kelly Goen expresses his outrage about the powerfreaks controlling the
> police/spy/military agencies and encourages us to help spread encryption
> and privacy technology to the groups figthing the government:
> 
> Even though I'm a libertarian (small "l") anarchocapitalist who happened to
> vote for Perot (who has his defects!), I support some (but not all) of the
> liberal agenda. Especially as regards getting the government out of our
> lives. (And where I part company with many on the left is in the areas of
> interference in free markets, anti-discrimination laws, and other statist
> invasions of freedom and privacy.)
> 
> -Tim May
> 
> --
> Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
> tcmay at netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
> 408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
> W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
> Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.

As a further note I have been in communication with John Dinardo
who has been spreading a LOT of information of this type
around the net and who was responsible for my personal
awareness of the PROMIS/INSLAW/BCCI/Cabazon affair , A reporter
named Danny Casarlo lost hist life in the middle of this,
The investigative journalist and whistleblower community
has many among it who would come forward if onyl
a anonymity guranteed by technology(not by a sysadms promise not to look)
type of network such as David Chaums thoughts express...
The information that could then come forth could make the effects
of crypto spread to the common man MUCH more pronounced and help
us put ALL of the cold warriors in therapy where
they so obviously need to be... JUST for the record I am a randist...
not a socialist AND it makes nodifference to me what a socialist
says he/she/it no matter what political stripe or pursuasion or
sexual orientation has an equal right of access to privacy and anonymity
if our constitution is to survive the onslaught of the federal intelligence
communitys move from the cold war to the drug war.

         cheers
         kelly

> 


-- 





From kelly at netcom.com  Fri Feb 19 12:53:46 1993
From: kelly at netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 12:53:46 PST
Subject: Spreading Encryption to Political Groups
In-Reply-To: <9302192007.AA27273@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302192052.AA04411@netcom.netcom.com>




 By the way thanks for your support and I LOVE your .sig

do you mind if I plagarize parts of it??? 


    cheers
    kelly
--------





From kelly at netcom.com  Fri Feb 19 13:24:17 1993
From: kelly at netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 13:24:17 PST
Subject: Political reasons to spread Crypto(warning FLAME-BAIT)
Message-ID: <9302192122.AA08664@netcom.netcom.com>


To All,
      For those of us who have chosen to stand up and be counted as leaders
in our electronic democracy, it is important  to remember the economic
impact activities and experiments such as the ones cypherpunks conduct
have on the social fabric of control that the government seeks to
have pervasive throughout our society. Leaders in other communities
such as the Black/Gay/Minorities/Women have been crushed, murdered/assasinated
and have had their rights trampled on by the Federal Intelligence community.
Buses such as COINTELPRO/MK ULTRA and other actions against american
citizens have been legion thoughout the existance of the federal
 intelligence community Their budgets for intelligense, spying, murder
are secret, so called black budgets and their activities among us have
been largely hidden being covered up by what ever means necessary.
The federal government has perverted virtuall every instrument,concept,iand
theory that has been handed it all in this insane reasoning of
"For reasons of National Security", Well I for one am DAMN sick
of seeing the constitution flushed down the drain by those marching
morons in their haste of expediency, I am damn sick of seeing my hard
 earned dollars go to support Wars of suppression in El Salvador and Brazil
where torture and Murder is both taught by the intelligence
community in this country and promulgated, Death squads and other
instruments of suppressiooon are still commonplace south of the border
and the DRUG war is now listed as the reason, GIVE ME A BREAK
what about the CIA retrofit base in Mena, Arkansas. What about
the contra/drug scandal. What About That damn rascal ex-president
BUSH, and dont think that means Clintons are any cleaner.
Well I for one am taking that stand I earlier suggested
and making DAMN sure this gets into all the hands of the
groups mentioned, as in my original publication of PGP 1.0
for Phil 2 years ago.... I am scared very scared, and
when I get scared I dont cower I fight back by whatever legal means are
left me... PGP and DC style protocols are effective LEGAL weapons
that have an extreme economic impact on the gathering of
illicit electronic intelligence by the federal intelligence community
from the citizens of this country and others in the political movements
WE as leaders in spreading this new technology to those groups
can have a very REAL WORLD effect in stopping murder, torture and political
supression. US readers have to be cautioned NOT to export Crypto technology from
 our borders telling others where to find it and how to set it up
and use it is PERFECTLY LEGAL however.
OK I will shut up now and let the flames roar!!!! :)

    A slightly agitiated CryptoAnarchist/Peace Activist/cypherpunk
    cheers
    kelly
--------





From jholder at phobos.unm.edu  Fri Feb 19 13:46:24 1993
From: jholder at phobos.unm.edu (Sauron ( Who did you expect? ))
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 13:46:24 PST
Subject: SUBSCRIBE
Message-ID: <9302192145.AA24096@phobos.unm.edu>


SUBSCRIBE





From geoffw at nexsys.net  Fri Feb 19 13:53:14 1993
From: geoffw at nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 13:53:14 PST
Subject: code that works with mailtool
Message-ID: <9302192126.AA00662@nexsys.nexsys.net>


Anybody have some code that lets me use pgp with sun's v3 mailtool
In a selective way?





From kelly at netcom.com  Fri Feb 19 15:55:44 1993
From: kelly at netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 15:55:44 PST
Subject: Social effects of UNrestricted Crypto
Message-ID: <9302192354.AA00932@netcom.netcom.com>


     "What does the Federal Intelligence  Community Fear"


#1. President Bush in a little notice move during the height of the
Iraq war had a ceratin statute in the vast body of
(un)LAW that compromise the National Security Act.
It became a violation of that same act to publish a
photo or information about a federal intelligence community member.
Thus all their actions are effectively hidden from view. With
anonymous posting and forwarding mechanisms it becomes easily for 
whistle-bloweres and Political activists to circumvent that
antithesis to the 1st amendment of the constitution and
expose all of the hidden plots of a vastly overbearing federal bueracracy
 The Federal Government knows this fact as their actions regarding
cryptography for the past 40 years shows it. Cryptography has a very
REAL world effect in exposing corruption while preventing
or inviting retribution from those selfsame federal lawbreakers
Truly anonymous posting/forwarding networks being totally beyond their ability
to coerce/interdict or penetrate scare the living hell out of them.
Imagine a SUNDEVIL type federal operation(witchhunt) where ALL
of the defendents email/posting are either encrypted or anonymized
:) it would pose some very hard problems for the investigators(witchunters)



   what are your thoughts?

   cheers
   kelly
p.s. Imagine an federal investigation where the investigators
became the investigated with the help of anonymous networks
digitized video clips and photos and easily obtainable/
publicly available investigative Databases
oops is this forbidden speech also???
 better watch what I say the Godamn US ARMY may be listening!!






From ssandfort at attmail.com  Fri Feb 19 16:02:43 1993
From: ssandfort at attmail.com (ssandfort at attmail.com)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 16:02:43 PST
Subject: LIST RULES
Message-ID: <9302200002.AA11651@toad.com>


Todd is new to the nets.  He sent the following to me by mistake.
He sent me another message and asked me to forward it to Cypherpunks.
------------- Begin Forwarded Message -------------
Date: Fri Feb 19 12:08:02 -0700 1993
From: internet!alembic.com!todd (Todd Steigerwald)
Subject: Re: LIST RULES
To: !ssandfort
Content-Length: 956



I will not "advertise" on the list as long as John prohibits it.
But I sincerely hope his prohibition does not discourage others
from discussing the issues it raises.  I would like to hear what
the rest of you think.


I do not argue with the decision to prohibit blatant advertising,  
however, with the increasing awareness of the internet and its  
potential, there is going to be more and more individuals that will  
want to extend beyond what it is currently being employed for.
	Regardless about individual feelings and ideals as to how and  
what the net should be used for, the issues WILL become increasingly  
debated, more than likely resulting in the eventual acceptance of  
advertising.  Simply put it is the new marketing frontier- many many  
people are seeing that already, and the beliefs of the few will not  
serve to stop it-as bad or good as that may be.

I will apologise beforehand since I am new to the net, but who is  
John?






From p00258 at psilink.com  Fri Feb 19 16:10:54 1993
From: p00258 at psilink.com (A.J. Janschewitz)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 16:10:54 PST
Subject: Political reasons to spread Crypto(warning FLAME-BAIT)
In-Reply-To: <9302192122.AA08664@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <2939240668.3.p00258@psilink.com>


Not flame bait in this forum, I hope. I posted a message (very genteel 
by comparison) in alt.security.pgp and was informed of my ignorance for 
advancing the theory that legislated standards should always be suspect, 
lest we lose what little privacy we have left.

If keeping the details of my life out of the government's data maw is 
anarchy, give me a brick.

==a.j.==

PGP key available on request or from the usual servers.





From marc at MIT.EDU  Fri Feb 19 16:57:56 1993
From: marc at MIT.EDU (Marc Horowitz)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 16:57:56 PST
Subject: LIST RULES
In-Reply-To: <9302200002.AA11651@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302200056.AA22028@deathtongue.MIT.EDU>


It is conventional to avoid blatant commercial traffic on the Internet
and the USENET.  Part of this is because of the Acceptable Use
Policies which exist on parts of the net.  But a lot of it is that
people generally don't want to see random advertisements.  I throw
them away when the come in the paper mail; I don't want them in my
email, either.

The exceptions are lists where advertising is explicitly permitted,
and lists whose purpose is advertisements.  Many vendors maintain
lists to which they send pricing information, new product
announcements, etc.  This is fine, because I can ignore those lists
without missing anything I might really be interested.

If someone were involved with, say, selling licenses to use PGP
legally, or an electronic bank or escrow service, I think that might
be OK, since it is of *direct* interest to this list.  But even that
is a shady area.

If I want commercials, I subscribe to one of the appropriate lists.
You wouldn't want me discussing cooking techniques or airline travel
on cypherpunks , because it's not appropriate, and there are separate
forums for those topics.  Think of advertising the same way, and it
appears not like censorship, which it isn't, but simply staying on the
topic, which it is.

		Marc





From ncselxsi!drzaphod at ncselxsi.netcom.com  Fri Feb 19 20:47:54 1993
From: ncselxsi!drzaphod at ncselxsi.netcom.com (DrZaphod)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 20:47:54 PST
Subject: LIST RULEz
Message-ID: <58805.drzaphod@ncselxsi>


In Message Fri, 19 Feb 93 19:56:41 +45722724,
  Marc Horowitz <MIT.EDU!marc at netcomsv.netcom.com> writes:

>It is conventional to avoid blatant commercial traffic on the Internet
>and the USENET.  Part of this is because of the Acceptable Use
>Policies which exist on parts of the net.  But a lot of it is that
>people generally don't want to see random advertisements.  I throw
>them away when the come in the paper mail; I don't want them in my
>email, either.
>

     Is this a problem on CypherPunks?  I havn't seen a single message here
that made me jump out of my seat and scream "I don't need to see this on
CypherPunks!"  It's not like we're getting continual junk posts advertising
trucks or something!  I say, "Don't let it bug ya until we start seeing a
junk trend on the list."  What do you guyz say?  TTFN!

Oh.. and I'm an AnArChIsT if anybody [including NSAs database] was
wondering.

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod at ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized





From nobody at pmantis.berkeley.edu  Fri Feb 19 23:23:19 1993
From: nobody at pmantis.berkeley.edu (nobody at pmantis.berkeley.edu)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 23:23:19 PST
Subject: anonymous mail
Message-ID: <9302200724.AA17077@pmantis.berkeley.edu>


This message routed through 8 remailers, sent around 11:50 CST 2/19/93:
pmantis -> soda -> alumni -> rebma -> rosebud -> mead -> shell -> buffalo

Actually, rewriting hop.mail and anon.mail in PERL might be a good idea...

Signed,  ?@?.?[.?]*






From deltorto at aol.com  Sat Feb 20 01:43:45 1993
From: deltorto at aol.com (deltorto at aol.com)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 01:43:45 PST
Subject: Back-Door Man
Message-ID: <9302200128.tn02698@aol.com>


>> How do we know the proposed legislation wasn't just a smoke
>> screen?  Isn't it possible that the Feds have already compromised
>> Intel or MicroSoft?  Is there some way to be sure that the new
>> 486 chip running your computer isn't recording each PGP or RSA
>> private key you generate?
>> 
>>      S a n d y                         ssandfort at attmail.com

Sheesh. I guess you just have to stand back and admire this level of
paranoia.
Can we establish a 'Cypherpunks Paranoia Achievement Award' for this?

Shortly thereafter Sandy sez: "Hey, wait a minnit... just _why are you voting
for ME?"

Technically, Kelly G.'s suggestion notwithstanding, I think this is
definitely a computationally-impossible task. However: in a very specific
circumstance, such as some foreign spook who's already under surveillance by
the feds, I suppose it's possible to create a one-time special chip that
might record keystrokes (or transmit them to a van, etc.) and then be
replaced *physically* with a replacement. The intelligence necessary to
coordinate an operation such as this, however, is pretty involved.
Personally, since I have NO interest in offing the President, I doubt they're
gonna bother with me.

Not only that, but also this: imho, it's more than _probable_ that the Feds
have compromised both Intel & Microsoft, but, as the old Polish saying goes:

     "You can put your shoes in the oven, but that don't make 'em biscuits."

   d-d-dave





From gg at well.sf.ca.us  Sat Feb 20 02:44:18 1993
From: gg at well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 02:44:18 PST
Subject: LIST RULES
Message-ID: <199302201041.AA02340@well.sf.ca.us>


I agree with ssandfort that a total ban on advertising on the list is a
not-good thing.  Commercial speech is still speech, and censorship is still
censorship.

Here's a possible win-win solution: on any commercial message, the subject
header should say "advertising included" or some obvious words or
abbreviations to that effect.  This way, those who wish to avoid such
messages can do so painlessly, those who wish to read them can do that, and
one more potential for restriction is eliminated.  

-gg





From strat at intercon.com  Sat Feb 20 07:04:10 1993
From: strat at intercon.com (Bob Stratton)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 07:04:10 PST
Subject: anonymous mail
In-Reply-To: <9302200724.AA17077@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302201442.AA21465@intercon.com>


>>>>> On Fri, 19 Feb 1993 23:24:43 -0800, nobody at pmantis.berkeley.edu said:
	nobody> Remailed-By: Tommy the Tourist <tommy at out>

	nobody> This message routed through 8 remailers, sent around
	nobody> 11:50 CST 2/19/93: pmantis -> soda -> alumni -> rebma
	nobody> -> rosebud -> mead -> shell -> buffalo

Are you sure? If that's true, then someone along the way is munging
the headers pretty badly, because my Received: lines show it going
from

pmantis -> toad.com -> me

--Strat, being a mailer weenie







From visionary at peg.apc.org  Sat Feb 20 07:04:17 1993
From: visionary at peg.apc.org (visionary at peg.apc.org)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 07:04:17 PST
Subject: Advertising on the net
Message-ID: <9302201420.AA14623@igc.apc.org>



Whilst the arguments "against" online advertising are many
and are BOUND to be the most vocal, I'd just like to put in
a pitch that counters that thread.

I really like to see what people are up to - if that means
they are tryin to earn a living from their activities, then thats
fine by me. So I like to see good, clever, informative and
interesting advertising material - PROVIDED it is NOT posted
repeatedly ad nauseam - i'd forgive once, twice, thrice over
a period of a month or so - then if it came in again I'd shout!

If you look closely at what actually comes across from all quarters
i think you'd agree that we do receive a lot of "advertising" in
many subtle guises. Gee - even crediting a magazine from which an
article is swiped is a form of advertising ;-)

I view the net as a way of life... as such i would even LIKE to
be able to order all sorts of things via email. For instance
if some of the more prolific writers among us wanted to earn
something from their writing, then i believe it would be very
acceptable to make books, journal subscriptions, limited print-runs
etc available in an online catalog - again, providing it was
interesting, informative reading in its own right then I would
have no objection whatsoever.

I could probably wax lyrical with many other examples, but i'm
sure you get my drift. I'm very interested in this debate and
hope that some sensible guidelines may be formulated by such
discussion. Naturally, in moderated newsgroups, this issue is
clearly dealt with... but yet is it correct that the moderator
be the "all-powerful" hand of CUT or KEEP.

You may also gather from the above that i am totally against
censorship of ANY sort - fully knowing what a can of worms that
opens up in regard to online communications.

...looking forward to hearing more...  enuf from me :-)

Michael Ney
PO Box 566 Milsons Point NSW 2061 Australia  
Tel: (+61-2) 692-8168
Email via APC: peg:visionary
via Internet: visionary at peg.apc.org
Engaged in graphic design, photography, journalism and publishing.
No job too small - will work within budget limitations - fast service!

...But that wasnt an advert - I was just telling you about myself :-)

________________ VISIONARY MEDIA _____________________________________







From jordan at imsi.com  Sat Feb 20 08:06:37 1993
From: jordan at imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 08:06:37 PST
Subject: Advertising on the net
Message-ID: <9302201549.AA12245@IMSI.COM>


It's not so much the advertising I object to, but all the
"conversation" that gets repeated each time the issue comes up.  Give
it a rest.  Stay on the topic.  Keep your laser handy.

Anyone get very far with the CELP stuff yet?  I forget: is it or isn't
it "acceptable use" to implement Diffie-Helman in code you don't sell?
What if you sell it later?  At what point do you need to license it?

/jordan





From Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU  Sat Feb 20 09:15:46 1993
From: Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU (Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 09:15:46 PST
Subject: anonymous mail
Message-ID: <9302201714.AA11332@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>


Bob Stratton stated in the last message:
>Received: by toad.com id AA00166; Sat, 20 Feb 93 07:04:10 PST
>Return-Path: <strat at intercon.com>
>Received: from cygnus.com by toad.com id AA00161; Sat, 20 Feb 93 07:04:08 PST
>Received: from intercon.com by cygnus.com (4.1/SMI-4.1)
>	id AA18518; Sat, 20 Feb 93 06:43:27 PST
>Received: by intercon.com (911016.SGI/920928.RS)
>	for cypherpunks at toad.com id AA21465; Sat, 20 Feb 93 09:42:09 -0500

>>>>>> On Fri, 19 Feb 1993 23:24:43 -0800, nobody at pmantis.berkeley.edu said:
>	nobody> This message routed through 8 remailers, sent around
>	nobody> 11:50 CST 2/19/93: pmantis -> soda -> alumni -> rebma
>	nobody> -> rosebud -> mead -> shell -> buffalo
>
>Are you sure? If that's true, then someone along the way is munging
>the headers pretty badly, because my Received: lines show it going
>from
>
>pmantis -> toad.com -> me


This is correct in the same way I can see that the message sent from you
was sent from intercon.com -> cygnus.com -> toad.com -> me


-- 
+==== Internet: babani at cs.buffalo.edu ===+======== Amateur-Radio: N2LYC ======+
!      Bitnet: V078LNGT at ubvms.BITNET     |        UUCP: rutgers!ub!babani     !
! Alternate: an173 at cleveland.freenet.edu | Plsure dpnds on the othrs prmison. !
+==  PGP key available. (If you don't know what a PGP key is... find out!)  ==+





From elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU  Sat Feb 20 09:27:34 1993
From: elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU (Karl Barrus)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 09:27:34 PST
Subject: anonymous mail
In-Reply-To: <9302201442.AA21465@intercon.com>
Message-ID: <199302201726.AA25317@Menudo.UH.EDU>



Earlier, Bob Stratton wrote:

>Are you sure?  If that's true, then someone along the way is munging
>the headers pretty badly, because my Received: lines show it going
>from

>pmantis -> toad.com -> me


That's right, because each remailer attempts to discard as much of the
header as possible.  Otherwise it wouldn't be anonymous - if I were to
send a message to you through rosebud and the headers showed the path
from me to rosebud and rosebud to you, you'd know where the message
really came from!

So the header of an anonymously mailed message should make it look
like the message originated from the last hop.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf at menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus at tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/





From deltorto at aol.com  Sat Feb 20 09:28:45 1993
From: deltorto at aol.com (deltorto at aol.com)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 09:28:45 PST
Subject: Quiet Nights @ the Keyboard with Ren & Stimpy
Message-ID: <9302201228.tn04104@aol.com>


To Keith Peterson:

I guess it must get a bit quiet there at your keyboard in the room where you
sit chillin' day in and day out Maintaining that ol' MS-DOS archive at
WSMR-SIMTEL20.Army.Mil, huh? I guess I can understand wanting to bust out in
expression if indeed you find it inconvenient to do literally.

I mean no disrespect - after all, I don't know you at all, but _really_ now -
these comments of yours are so misplaced! Even a cursory view of Mr. Thug's
missal cannot possibly construe his comments as encouraging virus authors!
His observations are in the finest spirit of our treasured Fourth Estate -
the dissemination of information for the protection of everyone concerned.
For example, being a non-DOS user, I had never before heard of these Stealth,
etc. viruses before reading his description and I can sure tell you that I
will now know to warn every DOS user I meet to immediately switch their OS to
one where there is less inclination and more barriers to the construction of
destructive viruses. Okay that was a bit tongue-in-cheek, but you get the
idea.

To put this in martial terms for you, I recommend a strategy where you
acquire your targets a bit more carefully before launching. Lao Tsu offers
good advice on this sort of thing - 'premature attack reveals one's own
weaknesses' etc. Since your weakness appears at first glance to be a fickle
respect for the rights of other citizens to privacy and free speech, I
encourage you to instead get out and oxygenate your lungs and shake out all
that tension before you open your metaphorical mouth and insert your
figurative foot. Remember, we all go about defending this great nation of
ours in our own ways and though my way may not be your way, it may be a good
way anyway.

This is not to say that I don't encourage you to voice your opinion about
anything you want to at any time. I am proud to live in a country where we
can all agree to disagree. Just don't touch my freedom, Keith. I will defend
to the death your, Thug's and my right to say whatever the hell we want to
about anything we fucking well please anytime and anywhere. In future, then,
please be more judicious in the pursuit of your ideals.

To My Fellow Cypherpunks:

Be always vigilant, my friends. Those who would tell you that up is down and
right is left might well be coming out of the sun above and behind you even
now. It's a hard thing to express clear views of something so rotten to the
corps, but _someone_ has to do it.

Happy Trails,

   d2t






From deltorto at aol.com  Sat Feb 20 09:28:46 1993
From: deltorto at aol.com (deltorto at aol.com)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 09:28:46 PST
Subject: LIST RULES
Message-ID: <9302201229.tn04106@aol.com>


>>_________________________________________________________________
>>             FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
>>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>>[etc. etc.]
>>What do others on this list think about "commercial" postings?

Sandy,

I have to agree with John that it's philosophically inappropriate to discuss
non-cryptographic topics on this list. Like many others, I come here to
discuss ideas and technical concepts in an intellectual environment and to
learn about how to protect everyone's privacy from people who know a hell of
a lot more than I do about the mechanics of digital privacy. Anything that
deviates from that had better, imho, do it quickly and as an aside to
something more in line with the purpose of this list.

I think you're respectful of that, and I don't have any _particular_ problem
with what you posted, but probably because your msg stuck out _like a sore
thumb_ (and thus the hyperbolic characterization of it as 'abuse') from the
body of the normal discussion here and because he is a naturally cautious
(thank goodness for that!) person, John probably mentioned this to you in the
best terse way he knows how. My impression of John is that he is not prone to
overreact, but rather that he prefers to deliver a srtaightforward warning
with sufficient emphasis to avoid having to do it twice.

Please get in touch with those of us who might have responded to your posting
through more discrete channels. I sense that we need not discuss this any
further here.

  d2t

PS: As an aside to the topic of commercialism, I'd just like to point out
what a hell of a nice job Zig is doing with the latest build of MacPGP
(2.1e87). Attaboy, Zig!





From thug at phantom.com  Sat Feb 20 11:12:04 1993
From: thug at phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 11:12:04 PST
Subject: Free Speech Is Not The Issue, Opression/Harassment Is.
Message-ID: <m0nPzVi-000jrDC@phantom.com>



With regard to the Peterson affair:

I am very glad to read all the responses that I have seen both publically
on the cypherpunks list, and privately in encouraging letters I have
received in mail.  I want to write responses to all these great letters,
but I have received far too many.  I would like to thank all of you who
support first ammendment rights, and who have told me that found my virus
post informative and useful. 

However, let us really ask ourselves if free speech is the real issue
here.  Yes, I know free speech is a major theme that comes out of all
this, but I don't think that it's the most imporant one.

There are always loonies who wish to yell and hollar about what should
be censored.  Whether it's on the radio like the FCC/Howard Stern affair,
on television, in the movies, on records/tapes/CD's (like Tipper Gore and
her gang).  Those kinds of people will always exist, and I don't see why
people expect them not to exist on Usenet/Internet as well.

What *REALLY* pisses me off about Peterson is his use of underhanded
tactics like threats, intimidation, and harassment.  I don't want to
go toe to toe with Peterson, because when it comes to underhanded tactics,
I can teach him a thing or two, and make his life a living hell should I
decide to do so.  Fortunately for him, I am well beyond that adolescent stage
and mode of thinking.

I think Peterson should realize that there are people out there who can
and will retaliate against him should he harass them in any way.  Just
because so far he has run into compliant and intimidated system admins,
doesn't mean his luck will hold up.  Eventually he will run into someone
who takes this kind of stuff VERY personally, especially if they are
awaken from their nap by a harassing and threatening phone call from Peterson.

If Peterson keeps up his reign of terror, I would not be surprised if he is
not dragged into court one of these days by someone whose personal, moral and
financial interests conflict with Peterson's desire to squash free speech.

A case can easily be made against Peterson in a court of law for harassment,
intimidation, and various civil rights charges having to do with trying to
deny others their constitutional rights.  And I guarantee you that there will
be plenty of system administrators and others who would be happy to testify
against him.

I recommend to Mr. Peterson that he watch his step in trying to step on
other people's constitutional rights. One day he may just step on a
land mine.  I phrase this in terms that a person in the military could
understand. 

Until such time as Peterson blows his legs off, I think it's up to all of
us to guard free speech by telling all system administrators on the net
about Peterson and his reign of terror, and asking them to publically
expose him each and every time he tries to assault our freedom of speech
through threats, initimidation, and harassment.


Murdering Thug






From nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Sat Feb 20 12:04:46 1993
From: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 12:04:46 PST
Subject: Remailer changes
Message-ID: <9302202001.AA28280@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>



     After playing around with my .maildelivery file for a while, I
figured out how to make messages to the remailer go to it even if
nothing in the header indicates that it should be remailed (just
the "::" as the first line) and still receive all of my other mail.
So, you can use it just like the other Cypherpunks remailers out
there now.

     Could somebody send me the official instructions for another
remailer so I can *plagarize* them and save myself some work?  :)
Thanks in advance.

NoWhere Remailer:  nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL at BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL at CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST





From kelly at netcom.com  Sat Feb 20 12:10:10 1993
From: kelly at netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 12:10:10 PST
Subject: WHAT Can we do?
Message-ID: <9302200614.AA15345@netcom>


 OK So I am preparing a posting for
alt.activism, misc.activism.prog alt.activism.d and alt.conspiracy,
alt.anarchy and alt.society.revolution. As well as alt.native!!.
I also plan to spread these postings into peacenet and econet.

     I plan a Monograph series with titles such as

      How to get find and use PGP for political and non-technical types.

      How to use PGP for the Investigative reporter.

      How to use PGP and a PAX anonymous posting Mechanism to
      become a whistle blower.

      Political/Whistleblowing/Investigative uses of 
      David Chaum anonymous networks.

      101 Political uses for an Anonymous Remailer

      How to investigate and expose the investigators
      safely and easily via use of DC Networks
      and Investigative Databases.

      How to digitise Video and Still photos and
      spread them anonymously via DC style networks and
      PAX Encrypted Anonymous posting Mechanisms.

Ad nauseam, I need volunteers to work on the monograpghs and
people to proofread. Some of the soures I am using are
the Security, Anonymity and Privacy FAQ parts 1-3. And
at present although  PAX has been shutdown we can use combinations of
multihop anonymnous remailers and sites like the penet site in
finland to ensure anonymity. Sites and Volunteers are needed for
more remailers, PGP key Servers and PAX anonymous Posting mechanisms
-- 





From stuk at microsoft.com  Sat Feb 20 12:17:03 1993
From: stuk at microsoft.com (Stu Klingman)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 12:17:03 PST
Subject: LIST RULES and Advertising
Message-ID: <9302202014.AA00308@netmail.microsoft.com>


I know my reaction when being hit with the ad was,
"Hey! what the fuck is this!?", followed by,
"Okay, this person doesn't know any better".
If you've been on the net for a while, you'd know
that ads are >most< tre gauch.

If we really want to resolve the censorship stigma
and still be able to ignore the ads, perhaps we
could put AD: in front of any ad that was RELEVANT
to the list, and then we could filter them out, or
not, as the case may be.I've got to admit, the idea
of reading ads pertinent to the cypherpunks list
intrigues me.

Judges?






From SANDBERG at GUMBY.BCASD.AZ.HONEYWELL.COM  Sat Feb 20 14:34:09 1993
From: SANDBERG at GUMBY.BCASD.AZ.HONEYWELL.COM (Jabe Sandberg)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 14:34:09 PST
Subject: UnSubscribe
Message-ID: <930220153249.2400045b@GUMBY.BCASD.AZ.HONEYWELL.COM>


Please remove me from the list.
Thanks.
sandberg at gumby.bcasd.az.honeywell.com






From RFORBES at Gems.VCU.EDU  Sat Feb 20 15:03:15 1993
From: RFORBES at Gems.VCU.EDU (RFORBES at Gems.VCU.EDU)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 15:03:15 PST
Subject: Remove from list
Message-ID: <01GUYCFQ63Z690O773@Gems.VCU.EDU>


Please remove my name from this list. Interesting stuff but I can't keep
up, only signing on 1-2 times a week.

Thanks.







From ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu  Sat Feb 20 19:35:48 1993
From: ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu (ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 19:35:48 PST
Subject: whistleblower newsgroup?
Message-ID: <9302210334.AA02268@longs.lance.colostate.edu>



Mulling over K. Goen's somewhat rambling, irate, and paranoid prose 
(but nevertheless mildly entertaining) has caused various random 
ideas to pop into my head on how to get pseudonymity/anonymity 
into the mainstream and even the spotlight, toward the goal of 
widespread public recognition, acceptance, and use to the point of
dependence, all in a nonthreatening way.

First of all, there have been a lot of famous uses of anonymity and 
pseudonymity, esp. in literature. It might be interesting for PR purposes
to collect a long list of everyone who has used aliases.  When people
start saying `wow, he's my favorite author, I didn't know he was someone
else' that would be great.  A sort of long history of anonymity and 
pseudonymity would be perfect. Deep Throat, Voltaire, Mark Twain, I think
even Scott Fitzgerald was a pseudonym.  Also, what about anonymous letters?
Did Martin Luther first post the `indulgence complaints' anonymously?  
I'm sure there's some cases where anonymous information changed the course 
of world history significantly (esp. during wars). Anonymous tips leading
to big busts, that kind of thing. (Remember the Lockerbie plane terrorist
crash? There was an anonymous tip to authorities that virtually pinpointed
the flight origination and bomb mechanism.)  Anybody know any, please 
send them to me, and I'll summarize to the group and credit you.  (please
give references where possible.)  If it works out I'll donate it to
K. Goen, assuming he hasn't been arrested or hospitalized by then :)

Next idea:  

How about a newsgroup devoted to `whistleblowing' 
where anonymity is encouraged? It could even be `anonymously moderated' 
where all the postings are guaranteed to go through an anonymous server 
before posting. (Whoever wanted to be *really* sure could anonymize the
message before posting.) I haven't seen *any* newsgroups dedicated to looking 
at government abuses from the "inside" (this would be for employees esp.) 
I can imagine all kinds of neat little secrets about our government's
illustrious practices leaking out..  The potential for `good' is good, 
esp. if the notices refer to ways of *saving money* and *eliminating waste*.
A sort of patriotic taxpayer watchdog group!  Although the possibility 
for `bad' is good too, people might just use it as a way of getting 
revenge. (Despite what others may think here, I hope it wouldn't turn into
a sort of perpetual incitement to revolution and anarchy...)  
The group might overlap into private industry too, although 
the federal government assuredly provides the most fodder...

Now, think about how much immense *press* and *publicity* 
that some government abuses get.  They can really be legendary (remember 
the $600 toilet seats?). Now, suppose that just coincidentally a major 
press story that got out *originated* in this anonymous group. 
Wow! That would be a story in itself, worthy of the
evening news. Can't you imagine some blank-faced, clueless reporter saying
``the story was first reported on a network bulletin board devoted to 
anonymous reporting of government abuses.'' Allright! Hey, it could get
to the point where reporters start watching it for hot tips!  There are
already a lot of big Washington groups that try to monitor the government,
and this could be a real catalyst for them.

So I'm putting out the idea. Maybe someone well-versed in the newsgroup
addition protocol can take care of the details.

(Ladies and gentlemen, fasten your seat belts, I think we're in for some 
hellacious turbulence ahead...)







From ctd at bach.udel.edu  Sat Feb 20 19:55:59 1993
From: ctd at bach.udel.edu (Christo Delaroderie)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 19:55:59 PST
Subject: Unscribe me
Message-ID: <199302210354.AA03588@bach.udel.edu>



	Please remove me from your mailing list.
						ctd





From John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG  Sat Feb 20 23:58:41 1993
From: John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 23:58:41 PST
Subject: FINE, BUT NOT HERE
Message-ID: <4976.2B873232@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>



from:  john.nieder at f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org

 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks
 
 > [t.c. May]
 > >I say, let's expand the scope of the Cypherpunks list to include more
 > >discussion of viruses.

 > I say, unless it has to do with cryptography, please don't.

 BK> I too wish to keep cipherpunks
 BK> clean even though I love viruses and I wish to have a pure thread about
 BK> applied crypto and anonymity techniques...

Roughly my sentiments as well.  Virii are interesting, but so are
handguns & the Swedish Bikini Team; none belong in CYPHERPUNKS, however,
in Mr. Nieder's opinion (which may or may not be humble).
        JN

... "A dog in a sidecar is always a treat for other motorists." M. Stirner
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG





From John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG  Sun Feb 21 05:59:43 1993
From: John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 05:59:43 PST
Subject: FINE, BUT NOT HERE
Message-ID: <4983.2B878448@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>



from:  john.nieder at f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org

 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks
 
 > [t.c. May]
 > >I say, let's expand the scope of the Cypherpunks list to include more
 > >discussion of viruses.

 > I say, unless it has to do with cryptography, please don't.

 BK> I too wish to keep cipherpunks
 BK> clean even though I love viruses and I wish to have a pure thread about
 BK> applied crypto and anonymity techniques...

Roughly my sentiments as well.  Virii are interesting, but so are
handguns & the Swedish Bikini Team; none belong in CYPHERPUNKS, however,
in Mr. Nieder's opinion (which may or may not be humble).
        JN

... "A dog in a sidecar is always a treat for other motorists." M. Stirner
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG





From covin at cs.uchicago.edu  Sun Feb 21 07:08:13 1993
From: covin at cs.uchicago.edu (covin at cs.uchicago.edu)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 07:08:13 PST
Subject: whistleblower newsgroup?
Message-ID: <9302211506.AA18925@tartarus.uchicago.edu>


Well, now here's an idea that might help to sell anonymity: what if a
major world power were governed under a republican system in which votes
for public officials were filed anonymously, to protect each citizen's
right to unrestricted political opinions?

                            -David





From Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU  Sun Feb 21 11:56:43 1993
From: Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU (Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 11:56:43 PST
Subject: whistleblower newsgroup?
Message-ID: <9302211955.AA12769@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>


>How about a newsgroup devoted to `whistleblowing'
>where anonymity is encouraged? It could even be `anonymously moderated' 
>where all the postings are guaranteed to go through an anonymous server 
>before posting. (Whoever wanted to be *really* sure could anonymize the
>message before posting.) I haven't seen *any* newsgroups dedicated to looking 
>at government abuses from the "inside" (this would be for employees esp.) 
>I can imagine all kinds of neat little secrets about our government's
>illustrious practices leaking out..  The potential for `good' is good, 

Excellent idea. I am a government official who has blown the whistle on 
several major abuses, and have trusted friends in the media. I can see 
to it that if alt.whistleblowers becomes real, it will be read.

Submissions should be to a mailbox that renders the articles anonymous 
before they go public. There might be an alt.whistleblowers.d for 
discussion where members of the press could (here's where crypto-tech 
comes in) post requests for further information. PGP (or whatever) sigs 
could serve as press "credentials" and interested reporters could post 
their public keys to a trusted repository.

This has a lot of merit.

Since we know that the press is the only effective means by which a tale 
of government abuse can be told, this could change the way government 
does business, knowing that honest people have nothing to fear by 
pointing out the crooks. I've seen it happen ... makes you feel good.


-- 
+==== Internet: babani at cs.buffalo.edu ===+======== Amateur-Radio: N2LYC ======+
!      Bitnet: V078LNGT at ubvms.BITNET     |        UUCP: rutgers!ub!babani     !
! Alternate: an173 at cleveland.freenet.edu | Plsure dpnds on the othrs prmison. !
+==  PGP key available. (If you don't know what a PGP key is... find out!)  ==+





From babani at cs.Buffalo.EDU  Sun Feb 21 12:05:55 1993
From: babani at cs.Buffalo.EDU (Rusty Babani)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 12:05:55 PST
Subject: Last message about wistleblowing.
Message-ID: <9302212004.AA13024@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>


The last message about whistle blowing ended up in my mailbox because
the request-remail-to line was formatted wrong.  I simply forwarded on
to the list seeing as it wasn't too much work.  I just want people to 
know that *I* wasn't the originator of the messgae even though it has
my signature on it!  Thanks.  The anonymimity of the original sender
was still protected, howver.





From ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU  Sun Feb 21 13:01:24 1993
From: ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU (Eli Brandt)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 13:01:24 PST
Subject: anonymous mail
In-Reply-To: <9302191753.AA12638@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302212101.AA26262@toad.com>


> Question: of the unix users, who does NOT have access to ksh (via your
> login shell or #!/bin/ksh or somewhere else)?

You might want to work in perl, which would make the scripts work under
Unix and DOS, at least.  Is there a Mac perl?

Oh, you might want to add the remailer on this account to your
circumnavigation.  It could use some more traffic -- I've seen about
5K through here in the past couple of months.  Still no PGP; has
anyone gotten it to work (generate keys, specifically) on a Symmetry?

> | Karl L. Barrus                    |

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt at jarthur.claremont.edu





From gnu  Sun Feb 21 13:27:06 1993
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 13:27:06 PST
Subject: Remarks of John Perry Barlow to the First International Symposium on National Security & National Competitiveness
Message-ID: <9302212127.AA26790@toad.com>


Date: Sun, 21 Feb 1993 07:35:20 -0500
To: interesting_people at aurora.cis.upenn.edu
From: Dave Farber <farber at central.cis.upenn.edu>

Remarks of John Perry Barlow
to the First International Symposium on
National Security & National Competitiveness

McLean, Virginia
December 1, 1992

I can't tell you the sense of strangeness that comes over someone who earns
his living writing Grateful Dead songs, addressing people who earn their
livings as many of you do, especially after hearing the last speaker. If
you don't appreciate the irony of our appearing in succession, you have no
sense of irony at all. You and I inhabit very different worlds, but I am
pleased to note, as my presence here strongly suggests, these two worlds
may be growing closer. 

The reason I am here has absolutely nothing to do with the Grateful Dead.
I'm here because I met a fellow named Mitch Kapor in 1989. Despite obvious
differences, I felt as if we'd both been up in the same saucer or
something...that we shared a sense of computers being more than just better
adding machines or a better typewriters. We saw that computers, connected
together, had the capacity to create an environment which human beings
could and did inhabit. 

Yesterday, I was encouraged to hear evidence that [former Presidential
Science Advisor] Dr. Jay Keyworth and [Conference Organizer and former CIA
agent] Robert Steele, might have been up in that saucer too.  The people
who share this awareness are natives of the future.  People who have a hard
time with it may always be immigrants.  

When Mitch and I saw that computers had created a place, we started asking
some questions about what kind of place it was....what were the operating
terms and conditions of this place, what kinds of people already lived
there, who was going to inhabit it, what was going on in it, did it have a
name?

We decided to name it Cyberspace, after Bill Gibson's description of a
futuristic place rather like it which we found in his novel Neuromancer. 
Rather than being a figment of Bill's imagination, we felt that Cyberspace
was already up and happening. 

Indeed, if you're having trouble with the concept, ask yourself where phone
conversation takes place.  That's right. Cyberspace is where you are when
you're on the phone. It's also where most of your money is, unless you keep
it in Krugerands buried out in the garden...which I suppose some folks in
this room might just do.  It's also...and I think this is very important...
the place where the greater part of the world's business is happening now.

So it's a highly significant locale, and yet it's invisible to most of the
people who are in it every day of their lives.  I believe it was Marshall
McLuhan who said, "We don't know who it was that discovered water, but
we're pretty sure it wasn't a fish..."  

In any case, when EFF first got together, our principal concern was making
certain the U.S. Constitution applied to Cyberspace.  We could see the
government, specifically the Secret Service, taking actions which made it
obvious that they didn't quite get it.  They didn't seem to be acting out
malice, but they were, at best, differently clued.  They clearly didn't
understand that the First Amendment applied as certainly to bytes as it did
to ink on paper. 

At the time we thought that we could just hire a few nasty civil liberties
lawyers from New York to put the fear of God in them, and that would be
that.  But it's been like tugging at a thread on your sweater, where you
begin to pull, and pretty soon you have more thread on the ground than on
your back.  It turns out that there are questions raised in this
environment to which we don't have good answers.

Indeed, it turns out that this is a place where the First Amendment...along
with just about every other law on the planet...is a local ordinance. 
There are no clean jurisdictional boundaries. This is a place which may
always be outside the law. This may be an unwelcome concept, but it is
true, and it is something we will all have to grapple with as society moves
into the virtual world. 

I believe you folks in the Intelligence Community are going to challenged
by these issues as directly as anyone. This is because intelligence, and
especially the CIA and NSA, are supposed to work under stern guidelines
intended to separate the domestic from the foreign.  You're not supposed to
be conducting domestic surveillance.  Well, in Cyberspace, the difference
between domestic and foreign, in fact the difference between any country
and any other country, the difference between us and them, is extremely
blurry. If it exists at all... 

This is also an economic environment in which everyone seems to be
everywhere at once.  I hear you're becoming interested in protecting
American Business from foreign espionage. But against this "everywhereness"
it becomes very difficult to say, "Alright, this is our guy, this is
General Motors, we're going to take care of his interests."  Nothing is so
cleanly delineated.   

These are a few of the fundamental changes which arise as a result of
literally moving out of the world of experience and onto the map of
information. Another one which is especially pertinent to the people in
this room, is what happens when you have direct e-mail access to every
member of your organization.  

This can have a terrifically decentralizing effect on structure.  It
weakens hierarchy.  It flattens the organization.  It can create one hell
of a lot of confusion, even as it speeds response time. There are in this
room representatives of some tall and rigid outfits.  Prepare for the
possibility that your organization is about to go all flat and squishy due
to tenderizing influence of e-mail.

We are also looking at a complete redefinition of ownership and property. 
I mean, we now have the mind as our principle source of commercial goods.
At last it seems we can we can really get something for nothing.  As
recently as fifteen years ago all new wealth derived from minerals
extraction or agriculture.  Everything else was simply passing it around. 
No longer must you rip your goods from the ground. You don't have to wait
for the sun to grow some.  New wealth can be had by just sitting around and
rubbing some facts together...essentially what you folks have been doing
all along.  This economy of virtual substance is a fundamental change and
one which you can exploit if you're willing.

We're also looking at some fundamental shifts in the nature of property.
This is going to be relevant to you as you move into a more open
interaction with the rest of the world.  In an information economy, much
depends on the sanctity of copyright. But copyright, it turns out, derives
most of its force from the physical manifestation of intellectual property.
 Copyright protects expression, the thing that happens when you print a
book or press a record.  In Cyberspace, you don't get that manifestation.
It never goes physical.

So the bottles we have been relying on for the protection of our
intellectual goods are disappearing, and, since we've been selling bottles
and not wine all along, we will soon have a lot of wine and nothing to put
it in. Interesting problems will arise. They're already upon us.

In any case, when EFF saw the multitude of things going on in this arena,
we battened ourselves down for the long haul, and we are dealing with a
whole range of issues, including the Open Platform initiative.  Which is
our effort to try to deploy something like universal data service.

We believe that the best thing that could happen for the American economy,
and actually the best thing that could happen for liberty on the Planet
Earth, would be to make everyone capable of jacking in if they want to.  

We find that other countries are lagging in this.  For example, the
Japanese see absolutely no use for high speed personal data connections.
The folks at NTT certainly can't see any reason to trade their 70,000
operators on digital switches.  So we have a significant leg up on the
Japanese that is not well known in this country.

Another thing that we are working on is the FBI's Digital Telephony
proposal which is, as you may know, the idea that we should stop all
telecommunications progress in this country in order to accommodate the FBI
is just amazing to me, and yet it somehow manage to live on Congress.  

Also, for those of you whose badges say U.S. Government [code for National
Security Agency], we are trying to overturn NSA's data encryption embargo. 
It's our position that trying to embargo software is like trying to embargo
wind. This is a fact that you are going to have to come to grips with. 
Digitized information is very to stamp classified or keep contained.

This stuff is incredibly leaky and volatile.  It's almost a life form in
its ability to self-propagate.  If something hits the Net...and it's
something which people on there find interesting...it will spread like a
virus of the mind.  I believe you must simply accept the idea that we are
moving into an environment where any information which is at all
interesting to people is going to get out.  And there will be very little
that you can do about it.  This is not a bad thing in my view, but you may
differ...

I'm going to talk a little bit now about the very nature of information. 
This conference, I must say, has blown me away.  I had no idea there were
people in your [the intelligence] community talking about these things.  I
am pleased and gratified by the folks I have met here and talked to
personally, but I want to reiterate Dr. Keyworth's phrase yesterday: which
is that government, especially  American government, must end its obsession
with secrecy.

We must do so because we are engaged in...and I don't want to use the word
warfare here...we are engaged in form of economic competition where our
principal advantage is our ability to distribute information. It is not our
ability to conceal it.  

Perhaps this has always been true. Let me tell you a story. Last year, I
was addressing the computer security establishment at the Department of
Energy.  These are the people in charge of protecting the computers that
nuclear weapons get designed on. 
The other keynote speaker at this conference was, uh, Edward Teller.
[Laughter.] Yeah, well, I was pretty sure if evil walked the planet, its
name was Edward Teller.  Anyway, I got up and said that I wasn't sure that
DOE's secrecy was an asset.  I wasn't going to say that it was a liability,
so much as beside the point. After all, I know how to make an atomic bomb.

You give me five and a half pounds of weapons grade plutonium and a week in
my garage and I'll give you a nuclear weapon.  It will be dirty, but it
will work.  The problem for anyone who wants to do this is that they can't
get enough industrial capacity ginned up to create the plutonium.  I mean,
I just can't get my high temperature gas diffusion centrifuges to work. 
Indeed, it takes a whole society to put them together, even if the design
information is available.  It is not the information, which is readily
available, that is crucial.  It is the ability to execute that is the
critical factor.

I was interested to see how Dr. Teller would respond to that. To my
surprise and satisfaction, he got up and agreed with me completely. He went
on to say that he had never found a nuclear secret that the Russians could
not obtain within a year of its development.  Where they couldn't compete
with us was in the areas where we were wide open.  He cited the electronics
industry, saying that at the end of World War II, we were about 20 years
ahead of the Russians in nuclear weapons design, and roughly neck and neck
in the electronics.  

Both sides entered a closed program on nuclear weapons design. And we went
into a wild free-for-all in electronics.  I mean, you should know that in
the computer business, there are so many loose lips, you actually have to
really try not to learn what you competitor is up to.  Computer scientists
are the meetingest bunch of people you ever saw, and when they meet, they
tell one anther everything.  

The results of this approach speak for themselves.  As Dr. Teller pointed
out, by the time the Russians quit being a threat, they had moved to a
position of parity with us in nuclear weapons, but they were 25 to 30 years
behind us in electronics.

I suspect one reasons for this conference is to figure out how you guys are
going to make your living now that the Party's Over.  I believe the
Intelligence Community still has a role.  We are entering the Information
Age.  And Information, after all, is what you do.  You have an edge in the
field, and I would hate to see you blow your lead.  

But there are some serious issues about information which must be dealt
with, and they have almost nothing to do with whether it is open or closed.
 The real questions regarding information relate to usability...whether or
not it is meaningful, whether or not it is relevant, whether or not it
accurate, whether or not it is genuinely useful.  

There is, for example, an enormous amount of information on the Net. But
the signal-to-noise ratio on the net is terrible. There's an awful lot of
racket.  So I suppose you do get a kind of secrecy, rather as in those
fancy restaurants with the highly reflective walls, where you can hear the
people shouting at you at your table, but you can't make out what anyone
else is saying for the hub-bub. It's the intimacy of white noise.

You folks have some expertise in an important function: sorting out that
which is relevant from the huge spray of data that is coming at everyone. 
That is an important problem that is largely overlooked...so far the
software solutions to it don't strike me as being much good.  We talk about
"smart agents" but they aren't smart, they're pretty dumb.  You send them
out and they return with too much.  

The problem is that the difference between data and information is meaning,
something machines know little of. To determine whether data are
meaningful, whether they are, in fact, information, you must pass them
through a human mind.  There is also a question of authority, reliability,
and bias.  For example, I think one of the things you will find in using
open sources is that most media are intentionally designed to evoke a
fearful response in the reader.  I mean, fear sells, as well you know.  

Perhaps you have an important role in certifying the reliability of
materials in open circulation. Perhaps you are already engaged in it. I
recently got a call from a friend who is an expert on computer networking
in the Confederation of Independent States, or whatever they call what's
left of the Evil Empire these days.  He was in a terrible state. He said,
"I just got visited by the CIA, I don't know what to do. They showed up and
wanted to know all about my most recent report. I'm afraid they're going to
try to make me a CIA agent!" A scary thought, eh?

I told him, "Look, it seems to me you already are a CIA agent." They're
just trying to figure out if you're a good one!" 

We may find that there are many CIA agents, of widely varying reliability.
The real CIA agents will have the subtler job of finding out which of them
is telling the truth.

The most important problem which the intelligence community must now
confront relates to your own bureaucratic sclerosis and the pace at which
information moves through your honeycomb of secrecy. The future, as IBM is
learning, will be to the supple and swift and not necessarily to the
mighty.

In a world moving as rapidly as this one, information becomes incredibly
time sensitive. Even if you do...as I think you absolutely must...eliminate
the unnecessary classification within and without your organizations, you
still have all the cumbersome buffers of bureaucracy to contend with. 

As I was preparing these remarks, I considered coming in here and
suggesting that you break up the CIA into about five different private
companies and go into business.  That's probably too good an idea to
implement.  But it seems worthy of consideration.  There is something that
happens to your sense of urgency when you have a bottom line.  You know
that if you don't deliver, someone else will, which might be exactly the
though to leave you on.

I would like to thank you very much for your indulgence of an entirely
different perspective.  I've genuinely enjoyed this opportunity to get to
know you.

------- End of Forwarded Message





From fergp at sytex.com  Sun Feb 21 13:42:20 1993
From: fergp at sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 13:42:20 PST
Subject: Anon mailers
Message-ID: <V8FcZB1w165w@sytex.com>


 
Greets.
 
Would someone be kind enough to post a listing of available anonymous
remailers?  And perhaps (as Kelly earlier interjected) be willing to
compose a "how-to" and "why-for" text as well.
 
As you might imagine, interest in this topic is picking up.
 
Cheers.

---
fergp at sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Access <=> Internet BBS, a public access internet site
Sytex Communications, Arlington VA, 1-703-358-9022





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Sun Feb 21 13:58:03 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 13:58:03 PST
Subject: Trapdoors
In-Reply-To: <9302182057.AA00885@tadpole.tadpole.com>
Message-ID: <9302212154.AA02012@soda.berkeley.edu>


Jim writes:
>Interestingly enough, V9 SPARC has a population count (number of bits
>set in word) instruction that was put in specificly at the request of
>No Such Agency.

Does anybody have a good idea what applications this is useful for?

My first thought is that it's a very quick way to do linear error
detection codes, since this instruction directly computes the Hamming
weight of a code word.

I can also see it being useful to detect correlations between
sequences, such as a trial random stream and a known pseudorandom
number generator.  One would XOR the streams together and then count
bits to calculate a correlation frequency.

Other ideas?

Eric





From mark at coombs.anu.edu.au  Sun Feb 21 14:19:32 1993
From: mark at coombs.anu.edu.au (Mark)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 14:19:32 PST
Subject: Sources for perl code
In-Reply-To: <9302212101.AA26262@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302212218.AA27312@coombs.anu.edu.au>


>You might want to work in perl, which would make the scripts work under
>Unix and DOS, at least.  Is there a Mac perl?

On coombs.anu.edu.au in /pub/perl/misc/perl.code.sources there is a list
of places to get perl source/binaries for Ataris, IBMs, Macs, and VMS.
Unix is available everywhere in the GNU sections of ftp archives.

Also there is a large number of scripts in /pub/perl/scripts.

See the README file for usage details and for the European mirror site.
The INDEX file lists each script and gives a short description.

Hope this helps,

Mark
mark at coombs.anu.edu.au





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Sun Feb 21 14:19:41 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 14:19:41 PST
Subject: New document for ftp.
Message-ID: <9302212215.AA05824@soda.berkeley.edu>


Hal Finney recently sent me an instruction manual for the cypherpunks
remailers.  Its on the ftp site.

    soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks/hal's.instructions

Spread the words.

Eric





From strick at osc.versant.com  Sun Feb 21 14:28:36 1993
From: strick at osc.versant.com (henry strickland)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 14:28:36 PST
Subject: Trapdoors
In-Reply-To: <9302212154.AA02012@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302212232.AA12362@versant.com>


# From cypherpunks-request at toad.com Sun Feb 21 14:14:43 1993
# 
# Does anybody have a good idea what applications this is useful for?

The old CDC CYBER machines had population count in its instruction
set.  Perhaps some scientific-type programmers would know what they
used it for.  The CYBER did not have a lot of instructions -- they
were pretty practical about what they put in.   i.e.  != VAX 

# My first thought is that it's a very quick way to do linear error 
# detection codes, since this instruction directly computes the Hamming 
# weight of a code word.

That was always my assumption.  Anyway, it's not unprecedented.

						strick
						strick at osc.versant.com





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Sun Feb 21 14:32:28 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 14:32:28 PST
Subject: RSA licensing policy
In-Reply-To: <9302201549.AA12245@IMSI.COM>
Message-ID: <9302212228.AA07818@soda.berkeley.edu>


>Anyone get very far with the CELP stuff yet?  I forget: is it or isn't
>it "acceptable use" to implement Diffie-Helman in code you don't sell?
>What if you sell it later?  At what point do you need to license it?

This letter is not intended to start a flame war about patent rights,
licensing, or anything similar.  Reply directly to me.

I've spoken with Jim Bidzos, president of RSADSI, about this very
issue recently.  They have a very easy to understand principle that
governs the use of their patents.  I am rephrasing it; at no time was
this actually spoken.  It's very simple: "If you make money with it,
so do we."  Their licenses are not out of line with patent licenses
generally (and not just computer-related ones).

If you make public domain software and use it for personal use, RSADSI
will not come after you.

If you make commercial software and sell it without obtaining a
license, they will after you.  If you use the software as a
"mission-critical" part of your business and do not obtain a license,
they will come after you.

There are grey areas between these two poles.  I do not address them.

Eric





From karn at qualcomm.com  Sun Feb 21 15:02:12 1993
From: karn at qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 15:02:12 PST
Subject: Trapdoors
Message-ID: <9302212253.AA14109@servo>


A bit count instruction would be very handy in a project I've been
working on lately, which is a new packet radio link level protocol
for amateur packet radio. This protocol uses forward error correction,
so it needs a highly reliable way to delimit the start of each
physical link frame. A pseudo-random "sync" sequence is the standard
way to do this, and you detect it with a correlator. The bit count
instruction would come in handy here, since the only other fast
way to do it is to use table lookup.

Phil





From crys at cave.tcp.COM  Sun Feb 21 17:14:04 1993
From: crys at cave.tcp.COM (Crys Rides)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 17:14:04 PST
Subject: anonymous mail
In-Reply-To: <9302191753.AA12638@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302220111.AA20996@ucunix.san.uc.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>>>>> On Sun, 21 Feb 93 13:00:03 PST, Eli Brandt <ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU> said:

Eli> You might want to work in perl, which would make the scripts work under
Eli> Unix and DOS, at least.  Is there a Mac perl?

Slight complaint:  The only available port of perl to DOS is 386 or
higher only, so will definately limit your effective use more than an
executeable or batch file.  As for a Mac Perl, a quick scan of my
Camel book doesn't turn up a mention of one.  I could have missed it.

Eli> 	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
Eli>    Eli   ebrandt at jarthur.claremont.edu

CrysRides

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK4gkOpSqD+bQ7So3AQEO/gP+PeGnx2c+pYJwjJmrX9pQS074sQj3/ZaC
WwOMLj6JOKxcuFBWmRru9u+bB9WWIVmswSmF7IN69RbmNCOuSxPkjzfyZXmMBqkk
HzUJFZVOI6CKTi8POmfUuJD6kORTUjgoW2Jj3NycCDb6mdX2ysLrVJfz4LXKEm0B
Yl5M/CBju+M=
=37Z/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From kelly at netcom.com  Sun Feb 21 18:09:47 1993
From: kelly at netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 18:09:47 PST
Subject: Political and social action, cypherpunk assisted (fwd)
Message-ID: <9302220208.AA04250@netcom.netcom.com>


Forwarded message:
> From gnu at toad.com Sun Feb 21 12:27:13 1993
> Message-Id: <9302212028.AA25645 at toad.com>
> To: farber at cis.upenn.edu, gnu at toad.com, barlow at eff.org
> Cc: kelly at netcom.com
> Subject: Political and social action, cypherpunk assisted
> Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 12:28:10 -0800
> From: gnu at toad.com
> 
> Kelly, I think you should also add some more mainstream groups like
> talk.environment, talk.politics.misc, alt.politics.homosexuality,
> alt.society.civil-liberty, alt.society.civil-disob,
> comp.society.privacy, alt.privacy, comp.org.eff.talk.  This is not
> just a tool for conspirators, anarchists, and revolutionaries, though
> the FBI and NSA would love to pigeonhole us that way.  It's for anyone
> who wants to exercise their Constitutionally-protected rights to
> privacy or anonymity.
> 
> 	John
> 
 I agree completely John, in fact I have had a talk with Phil Z. and
have his best wishes in this area, one thing
that has come up recently is putting together COMPLETE
packages of Binaries of PGP for various platforms, along
with hopper email preparation scripts, programs to email
or otherwise get news to a newsgroup, or emailing list.
minimal configurations for the amove.
EASY installation scripts and/or instructions to install
and verify correct installation of same,
perhaps a Video could be prepared that could be distributed
throught the community cable channel network
or borrowable thought a public for the community station
could be arrange, the main thing I see is spreading this tech far and
wide first to the groups that have the most need of it and
then to the mainstream. A foreign site at present is best for the
complete packages because of US ITAR regulations, although
uncoercible platforms such as toad.com and hosts in the edu
domain could also be perhaps a contribution to the situation.
I see the CLEAR and  present DANGER if we dont start treading this
new legal ground quickly and establish legal precedent by action
and litigaion if need be. Our rights will be abridged and condensed so fast you
wont even be able to reply "thank you Mr. Webster" before
 people start assuming a Maxmillian code of Justice instead of the one granted
us by the US Constitution. I see Privacy and
anonymity as Inalienable rights reserved to the people under the 9th amendment.
 I also view the ITAR regulations classifying crypto as a weapon/munition
as putting crypto under the purview of the second amendment
under the right to keep and bear arms. I also hold that expression of free
thoughts feelings and the tangilbe manifestion of same
known as software to be forms of protected speech under the first amendment.
 As I am a member of society who always will test the letter of the law 
n these areas to the limit, I now realize that the socalled
crypto-war with the federal government has to have a broad base
of public support before we are adjudged criminals by the govt controlled
press in this country and have our rights trampled under like
the way all groups have had theirs trampled under by the govt.
I for one dont wish to wake up in some morning with some
federal agents gun stuck up my nostril such as happened in the
sundevil raids. RICO seizures are currently illegally used by
the federal lackeys to totally circumvent
all the protections of the bill of rights and to acquire
shamelessly computer hardware for local, state and federal law
enforcement agencies. Can you say THEFT!!.. Can you say Violation of the
4th amendment of the US Constitution!!
Oh DAMN!! I went and got passionately political again... OK
I will shutup... for now... besides I have to answer
all of this fascinating e-mail I seem to be getting...
And work on this document...
     cheers
     kelly





From ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU  Sun Feb 21 19:42:22 1993
From: ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU (Eli Brandt)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 19:42:22 PST
Subject: msdos perl
In-Reply-To: <no.id>
Message-ID: <9302220342.AA07039@toad.com>


> Slight complaint:  The only available port of perl to DOS is 386 or
> higher only,

The perl419x.zip in simtel:msdos/perl doesn't even use the 386.
However, those without 386 + memory manager may have a bit of
a hard time with memory.  I don't know about the perl4019.zip in
the same directory; I snarfed it to check, but it has no docs (and
I don't care to disassemble for 386 code!)

> CrysRides

   Eli   ebrandt at jarthur.claremont.edu





From snake at Cadence.COM  Sun Feb 21 21:07:03 1993
From: snake at Cadence.COM (Kelly Goen)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 21:07:03 PST
Subject: New Directions on the Internet-Privacy what are the threats...
Message-ID: <9302220425.AA05986@cds9041>


Hi all,
     to John Gilmore in particular... John I would like to use the
incident I discussed with you in encrypted mail as a start to discussing what
the technical/programmed threats to privacy on the Internet
using just simple scripts and programs available on the Internet.
I agree that is does range somwhat far from the usual fare of crypto
but it began as a PGP-key-server to mailing list correlation and
it definitely illustrates the current threat there is to privacy...
I would like to use the toad.com site as an example while not revealing the
list contents in the open posting due to personal feelings and
ethics about privacy... how do you and the list feel about this new topic
area...

    thanx and cheers
    kelly (oklahoma) goen
p.s. The response I have gotten for my call to action has been gratifying
indeed I will get back to everyone of you as time and preparation
 of the FAQ permits... I welcome ALL of your suggestions, critiques and
help as well as pointers to programs and information...
btw is "Digital Privacy" off the presses yet and if so where
can I get a copy in the silicon valley area... best
of luck to all the members of this list  and thanx again...
--------





From jpp at markv.com  Mon Feb 22 00:57:57 1993
From: jpp at markv.com (Jay Prime Positive)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 00:57:57 PST
Subject: Computer Virus Origins
In-Reply-To: <9302190714.AA23494@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302220055.aa26050@hermix.markv.com>


  It has been a bit of a sore point with me for some years.  When Fred
Cohen wrote his thesis he credited Len Adelman ((the A in RSA) our
professor at the time) with coining the term "virus".  In fact it was
I who did this.  It was I who introduced the class to the concept of
computer viruses.  I developed the idea with a guy named Eric ??? with
whom I worked at the time.  It was in private with Eric that I came up
with the name (or perhaps he may have sugested it).  I based the idea
on the "worm" from one of John Brunner's novels which I had just read.

  The name is a natural choice for this class of program, and I don't
doubt that others may have nearly simultaneuosly come upon the same
idea.  I certainly didn't write the first virus.

j' (computer virus meme source)





From crys at cave.tcp.COM  Mon Feb 22 03:52:21 1993
From: crys at cave.tcp.COM (Crys Rides)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 03:52:21 PST
Subject: msdos perl
In-Reply-To: <9302220342.AA07039@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302221150.AA00474@ucunix.san.uc.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>>>>> On Sun, 21 Feb 93 19:41:06 PST, Eli Brandt <ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU> said:

> Slight complaint:  The only available port of perl to DOS is 386 or
> higher only,

Eli> The perl419x.zip in simtel:msdos/perl doesn't even use the 386.
Eli> However, those without 386 + memory manager may have a bit of
Eli> a hard time with memory.  I don't know about the perl4019.zip in
Eli> the same directory; I snarfed it to check, but it has no docs (and
Eli> I don't care to disassemble for 386 code!)

The executeable in the file you refer to can also be ftp'd from
tandem.com, it's source site, in the directory /pub/perl. To quote
the README file for that directory:

Last updated: Saturday, February 1, 1992
Latest bcdos version of Perl: 1.4

This is a port of Perl 4.019 to MS-DOS using Borland C++ V3.0.  It will
NOT compile with versions of BC++ prior to 3.0.

The port is complete given the functionality of DOS versus UNIX.  Support
will be added in the future for ndbm() routines using GNU-ndbm (when I
get around to it !).

The port makes use of Borland's VROOM technology and pretty much *requires*
access to extended memory.  There is approx. 300+ Kbytes of memory available
          ^^^^^^^^
for Perl scripts.  The amount of memory available can be checked using
two user subroutines added via Larry Wall's usersub.c hook.

	&heapfree()	- returns size of far heap in bytes
	&stkfree()	- returns size of free stack

The port also makes use of xspawn() (available from Simtel or Wuarchive
if you look hard enough) and will swap itself to either extended memory
or disk when Perl invokes the system() call.  This leaves about 605 Kbytes
of memory available for DOS apps on my 386 machine running DOS 5.0.

I've run this port of Perl against all the test cases supplied in the
normal Perl release.  They all work except those that call perl again
(not enough memory !) or have specific UNIX dependencies (that dont work
on DOS - too bad !).

This version of Perl has been tested on both 286 and 386 machines with
and without extended memory.  If you find problems on a specific machine
I would like to hear about them but don't necessarily commit to fix them.
As per the Artistic and GNU licenses, you get what you paid for and your 
on your own !


There are three files herein:

	bcv14_perl4-019.zip

		Contains all the source files.
		There are only one or two files that have changed from
		the standard 4.019 release (nice job lwall on portable
		code !).

	bcv14_perl4-019E.zip

		Contains the executeable for perl PERL.EXE and all the
		library files for perl.  If you don't intend to re-build
		PERL, then THIS IS THE FILE FOR YOU !

	xspawn34.zip

		This file contains the xspawn routine used by bcdos_Perl
		to swap out to extended memory or disk when running
		child processes.  It is identical to the the one that can
		be found on simtel or wuarchive.

Nota bene re extended memory;

This port attempts to reserve 128K bytes of extended memory for the
VROOM arena.  A 64K arena ran like a DOG so this is about the optimum 
size of memory versus speed.


Happy hacking !
Stuart G. Phillips N6TTO/G8HQA/DA4BM/OZ... (you get the idea)
[stu at tandem.com]

I've not encountered a non 286/386/486 with extended memory, which
this file says it requires.  Plus there is no testing on machines
other than those.  I've attempted to run this on an antiquated
8088.  It simply executes and drops back to the command line
without action.  Much as I feel perl would be an easy and useful way
to code this up, I don't feel it's a tool with the broadest reach
at this time for DOS.  Sorry.

> CrysRides

Eli>    Eli   ebrandt at jarthur.claremont.edu

CrysRides
again

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Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK4i64JSqD+bQ7So3AQGA9wP/bcK1XiUJD2fCv6DslWXF9SGJjpg+XmZT
UbIXgk34EpQV2dvbpIv8Rb8w9kKHEsj+sb+Koxad2m2qDJPa0rPYD4VzUbBHEmIC
DTctXvcemjlwzLRHp19Udn3nMchtvnEz2hb0ZkTyBkuVJYrkU5r8HgCr2etpPgyX
IWwBsIINGGo=
=6W7Q
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From scott at shrug.dur.ac.uk  Mon Feb 22 04:52:41 1993
From: scott at shrug.dur.ac.uk (Scott A. McIntyre)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 04:52:41 PST
Subject: PGP question
Message-ID: <m0nQccr-000M5rC@shrug.dur.ac.uk>



I'm sure this isn't the right place for this question, but what the hell.   
I've added a second mailing address to my public key, but this causes a  
validity error (unknown sigantor) when checked with -kc.  


How can I go about making that go away so that people who check will not be  
greeted by this message?  


Only been in PGP a week,
Scott





From elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU  Mon Feb 22 06:20:49 1993
From: elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU (Karl Barrus)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 06:20:49 PST
Subject: list of remailers
Message-ID: <199302221419.AA04336@Menudo.UH.EDU>



Paul Ferguson asks for a list of remailers.  Here's it the latest one
I have:

 1: hh at pmantis.berkeley.edu 
 2: hh at cicada.berkeley.edu 
 3: hh at soda.berkeley.edu 
 4: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
 5: ebrandt at jarthur.claremont.edu 
 6: hal at alumni.caltech.edu 
 7: remailer at rebma.mn.org 
 8: elee7h5 at rosebud.ee.uh.edu 
 9: phantom at mead.u.washington.edu 
10: hfinney at shell.portal.com 
11: babani at cs.buffalo.edu 
12: remail at extropia.wimsey.com 

NOTES:
#1-#5	no encrypted remailing requests
#5-#12	support encrypted remailing requests; public key available
#2	requires remailing request to appear in header (am working on a
	PERL script which will do this)
#12	requires encryption (message and header together)
#7,#12	introduce larger than average time delay (which is probably a
	desirable thing!)

It's been a good week for remailers - three of them came to my
attention (nowhere at bsu, ebrandt at jarthur, babani at cs)!

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf at menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus at tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/





From Bruce.Baugh at p23.f40.n105.z1.fidonet.org  Mon Feb 22 08:45:22 1993
From: Bruce.Baugh at p23.f40.n105.z1.fidonet.org (Bruce Baugh)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 08:45:22 PST
Subject: subscribe
Message-ID: <730377978.AA01324@therose.pdx.com>


Please add me to your mailing list. Thanks!
UUCP !qiclab!therose   INTERNET: therose.fidonet.org  FIDONET: 1:105/7.0 
UUCP <> FidoNet(tm) Gate is a public service provided by therose.pdx.com.
   **Reply messages should not be sent to/through therose.pdx.com**






From fnordbox!loydb at cs.utexas.edu  Mon Feb 22 09:27:50 1993
From: fnordbox!loydb at cs.utexas.edu (Loyd Blankenship)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 09:27:50 PST
Subject: Government Encryption
Message-ID: <9302220445.AA00b4f@fnordbox.UUCP>


Recently there was a thread on a public-key program that would involve a
central, government-backed-or-authorized agency to issue key pairs and
serve as a repository. Could someone please post some details on this --
I seem to have gotten it into my head that this is how PEM works, and I
don't know whether I'm right or just medicated. :-)

Loyd

***************************************************************************
* loydb at fnordbox.UUCP	     Call the Fnordbox BBS   *	Loyd Blankenship  *
* GEnie: SJGAMES	    2 v32bis lines, 24 hrs   *	PO Box 18957	  *
* Compu$erve: [73407,515]	 512/444-2323	     *	Austin, TX 78760  *
* cs.utexas.edu!dogface!fnordbox!loydb		     *	512/447-7866	  *
***************************************************************************







From eric_r at zeus.c-engr2.siu.edu  Mon Feb 22 09:59:31 1993
From: eric_r at zeus.c-engr2.siu.edu (Eric Rainbolt)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 09:59:31 PST
Subject: Cancel subsciption
Message-ID: <9302221755.AA08329@zeus.c-engr2.siu.edu>


please unsubscribe me from the mailing list

				ejr









From an5877 at anon.penet.fi  Mon Feb 22 10:18:03 1993
From: an5877 at anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 10:18:03 PST
Subject: Bug in the anon.penet.fi remailer
Message-ID: <9302221721.AA07390@anon.penet.fi>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I believe I have uncovered a serious bug in the Finnish anonymous
remailer, one that allows me to piece together anonymous id's and
actual email addresses.

I'm reluctant to publish the details here, but I'll explain how it
works if you send me your email address.

> DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4kCn/FZTpBW/B35AQEOkgF/euVoBz+q3iOb8oAFWaF5n/lPIIv76L0y
eT0bYJl7RebSiyV8tWzXWNibZrPn1aPc
=6ZVT
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From tcmay at netcom.com  Mon Feb 22 10:18:19 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 10:18:19 PST
Subject: Key Registration
Message-ID: <9302221816.AA13316@netcom.netcom.com>


>Recently there was a thread on a public-key program that would involve a
>central, government-backed-or-authorized agency to issue key pairs and
>serve as a repository. Could someone please post some details on this --
>I seem to have gotten it into my head that this is how PEM works, and I
>don't know whether I'm right or just medicated. :-)
>
>Loyd

The proposal was slightly different and has not been officially proposed as
any kind of law. Here are some more details:

* Dorothy Denning, noted cypto and security expert, floated a trial balloon
at the Computer Security Conference last fall. (I summarized it and posted
it to sci.crypt, where more than 1000 messages related to this thread, "A
Trial Balloon to Ban Encryption?," eventually appeared.)

* Under her proposal, a user of P-K methods would take his _private_ key
and encrypt it to the _public_ key of an agency like the Justice Department
(which I'll use from now on to represent the government side). The
encrypted key would then be placed in a repository with another agency,
perhaps a private agency like the CPSR or even the EFF. The key storage
agency obviously could not read the messages (as they would be encryped to
the Justice Deparment's key).

* A properly-obtained warrant could then be presented to the key
repository, obtaining the specific key. The Justice Department could then
decrypt with its private key and thus have the private key of the user.

* Ostensibly, this prevents the Justice Department from simply snooping
through whatever messages it wishes to read.

* There are some obvious practical and constitutional issues:

- What happened to constitutional rights to privacy? Analogously, must one
escrow personal diaries? Install tape recorders in all private places and
escrow copies of all tapes? (Lots of comparisons to free speech, to gun
control, etc.)

- What happens when people register the "wrong" key? Is this even detectable?

- If "noise" is sent, will the Justice Department demand the "key" be
presented? How? And what penalties for noncompliance?

- Many applications demand dynamic generation of keys---many public keys,
many session keys, etc. How will these be registered? What fees?

- It seems likely that a key registration scheme will also place limits on
many of the things we hold dear on this list--digital money, anonymous
systems, remailers, and all the other wonders of crypto anarchy.

There's a lot more. And there was a lot of debate in sci.crypt about this.

Fortunately, I don't see any further moves to make this a law. But it may
come in a few years.

-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.






From nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Mon Feb 22 10:29:05 1993
From: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 10:29:05 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302221825.AA18161@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I believe I have uncovered a serious bug in the Finnish anonymous
remailer, one that allows me to piece together anonymous id's and
actual email addresses.

I'm reluctant to publish the details here, but I'll explain how it
works if you send me your email address.

> DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4kCn/FZTpBW/B35AQEOkgF/euVoBz+q3iOb8oAFWaF5n/lPIIv76L0y
eT0bYJl7RebSiyV8tWzXWNibZrPn1aPc
=6ZVT
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From treason at gnu.ai.mit.edu  Mon Feb 22 10:33:42 1993
From: treason at gnu.ai.mit.edu (treason at gnu.ai.mit.edu)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 10:33:42 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302221832.AA09541@spiff.gnu.ai.mit.edu>


 Does anyone know the status of this product?  Is it proprietary? What
 encryption algorityhms does it use?  Are there any flaws in it?

treason at gnu





From ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU  Mon Feb 22 10:42:31 1993
From: ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU (Eli Brandt)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 10:42:31 PST
Subject: msdos perl
In-Reply-To: <no.id>
Message-ID: <9302221842.AA20199@toad.com>


> The executeable in the file you refer to can also be ftp'd from
> tandem.com, it's source site, in the directory /pub/perl. To quote
> the README file for that directory:

> The port makes use of Borland's VROOM technology and pretty much *requires*
> access to extended memory.  There is approx. 300+ Kbytes of memory available
>           ^^^^^^^^
(emphasis not mine)

Which means a 286, not a 386.  If there are a lot of people out there on
8086 machines, sorry.  People with that particular problem are going to
have a hard time running most modern software, let alone Unix ports.

> This version of Perl has been tested on both 286 and 386 machines with
> and without extended memory.

> CrysRides

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt at jarthur.claremont.edu





From 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM  Mon Feb 22 10:53:54 1993
From: 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM (Hal)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 10:53:54 PST
Subject: Government encryption
Message-ID: <930222183917_74076.1041_DHJ70-1@CompuServe.COM>


Loyd Blankenship asks whether PEM involves having a government agency create
key pairs.
 
I think this may be confusing two different issues.  PEM does not involve
having anyone else create key pairs for you.  You create your own keys and
keep the private key secret just as in any other public key system.
However, PEM requires you to get a "certificate" from an agency in order to
use the system.
 
The certificate-issuing agency is typically expected to be your employer or
your university, from my reading of the RFC's.  Large institutions like
these would issue certificates, which are basically similar to PGP's key
signatures, which certify that you are who you say you are.  The large
institutions themselves would have their own public keys signed by an agency
higher in some key-signing hierarchy.  Last I checked, the top of the
hierarchy was the company RSADSI; they would certify the companies and the
companies would certify the employees.  I think this part may have changed
a little in the last few drafts of the new RFC.
 
So, there's not really any government involvement.  There is a centralized
hierarchy for key signatures, but key generation is still an individual
activity.  Oh, yes, there may also be a charge for getting your key signed;
this charge might be borne by the company/university in some cases.  There
is also a provision to get a certificate outside this system; these
"persona" certificates wouldn't really vouch for anything but they would let
you use PEM.  I'm not sure what they will cost.
 
The other idea which Loyd might have been mixing up with this was Dorothy
Denning's proposal several months ago that all users of public key systems
be required to register their secret keys with some quasi-governmental
agency.  (Originally she proposed the Justice Department, then later
suggested an independent group.)  This way if the government wanted to spy
on your communications, it would have to get a court order (as it does now,
in theory, for wiretaps), and take this court order to the key-holding
agency to get them to reveal your secret keys.  Then it could read your
messages.
 
This proposal was subjected to a very strong attack led largely by our own
Tim May.  It soon became known as the "lead balloon" for its lack of support
and has not been heard of recently.  I don't think anyone would be terribly
surprised if some variant were to resurface, though.
 
Hal Finney
 







From pmetzger at shearson.com  Mon Feb 22 11:10:37 1993
From: pmetzger at shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 11:10:37 PST
Subject: Computer Virus Origins
Message-ID: <9302221811.AA14814@maggie.shearson.com>



> From: Jay Prime Positive <jpp at markv.com>
>   It has been a bit of a sore point with me for some years.  When Fred
> Cohen wrote his thesis he credited Len Adelman ((the A in RSA) our
> professor at the time) with coining the term "virus".  In fact it was
> I who did this.  It was I who introduced the class to the concept of
> computer viruses.  I developed the idea with a guy named Eric ??? with
> whom I worked at the time.  It was in private with Eric that I came up
> with the name (or perhaps he may have sugested it).  I based the idea
> on the "worm" from one of John Brunner's novels which I had just read.

Brunner's novel explicitly mentions the notion of viruses as well as
tapeworms. Remember the "phages"? A phage is a virus.

Perry





From julf at penet.FI  Mon Feb 22 11:23:05 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 11:23:05 PST
Subject: Anon bug
In-Reply-To: <9302221825.AA18161@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9302222030.aa09433@penet.penet.FI>



> I believe I have uncovered a serious bug in the Finnish anonymous
> remailer, one that allows me to piece together anonymous id's and
> actual email addresses.
> 
> I'm reluctant to publish the details here, but I'll explain how it
> works if you send me your email address.
> 
> > DEADBEAT

Hmm. How about letting me know about it so that I have a chance to fix
it?

	Julf (admin at anon.penet.fi)






From mccoy at ccwf.cc.utexas.edu  Mon Feb 22 11:49:17 1993
From: mccoy at ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 11:49:17 PST
Subject: Government Encryption
In-Reply-To: <9302220445.AA00b4f@fnordbox.UUCP>
Message-ID: <9302221947.AA12383@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>


Loyd Blankenship (fnordbox!loydb at cs.utexas.edu) writes:
> To: cypherpunks at toad.com
> Subject: Government Encryption
> 
> Recently there was a thread on a public-key program that would involve a
> central, government-backed-or-authorized agency to issue key pairs and
> serve as a repository. Could someone please post some details on this --

This "rumor" seems to be the result of two different, but not necessarily
better, events.  The first is an Usenet posting by Dorothy Denning (anyone
have a copy of this posting/report BTW, I seem to have lost mine and only
have the 400K or responses in sci.crypt...) and an article in the July 1992
CACM by Ron Rivest that suggested that people be required to register thier
_private_ keys with some government authority so that feds with a warrant
(and anyone with enough cash to bribe the civil servant sitting at the
"private-key desk") can break open messages and files encrypted using PKE.
The other is the PEM RFC that talked about certification authorities (and
mentioned that government institutions could be one type of, but not the
only type of, certification authority.  The two seem to have come together
into one nifty rumor that gives paranoid people ulcers and causes the rest
of us to be a little more vigilant... 

> I seem to have gotten it into my head that this is how PEM works, and I
> don't know whether I'm right or just medicated. :-)

No, not really.  PEM specifies a standard for exchange of encrypted mail
messages, but does not enforce a particular method of key certification.
They do talk a lot about certification authorities, but these are not
necessarily government institutions.  Check out RFC1113-1115 at your
friendly neighborhood RFC server.  The mrr-password.ps file on
soda.berkeley.edu in /pub/cypherpunks goes into a lot of detail about CAs
so you might also want to check that one out.

jim




From wcs at anchor.ho.att.com  Mon Feb 22 12:05:06 1993
From: wcs at anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_StewartHOY0021305)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 12:05:06 PST
Subject: Being kind to 8086 users - was: Re: msdos perl
Message-ID: <9302222004.AA00911@anchor.ho.att.com>



The discussion on porting perl to MS-DOS led to the following comment:
> >*requires* access to extended memory.  There is approx. 300+ Kbytes of memory available
> >           ^^^^^^^^
> Which means a 286, not a 386.  If there are a lot of people out there on
> 8086 machines, sorry.  People with that particular problem are going to
> have a hard time running most modern software, let alone Unix ports.

There's one part of the market that's still heavily populated with 8086 machines - portables.
Especially cheap, lightweight portables, and palmtops like the HP95LX,
which people might use to do their private email from, or carry around to exchange PGP keys with,
or use as a smartcard for digicash and remote access to networks.
Another part is DOS emulation running on real machines - I think lots of that is 8086-like.

640K RAM is a hard limit to live with, and sometimes you just can't do it,
but it's nice if people don't *gratuitously* make their software not fit here.
There's lots of real work that can still be done on them, and really patient people
can even run Unix-like operating systems such as Minix.

				Bill Stewart




From ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU  Mon Feb 22 12:43:38 1993
From: ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU (Eli Brandt)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 12:43:38 PST
Subject: Being kind to 8086 users - was: Re: msdos perl
In-Reply-To: <9302222004.AA00911@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9302222043.AA22967@toad.com>


> There's one part of the market that's still heavily populated with
> 8086 machines - portables.

Good point.  Perhaps maintaining compatibility with this particular
archaism is not a bad idea after all.  Urk.

> 				Bill Stewart

   Eli   ebrandt at jarthur.claremont.edu





From nobody at rosebud.ee.uh.edu  Mon Feb 22 12:44:13 1993
From: nobody at rosebud.ee.uh.edu (nobody at rosebud.ee.uh.edu)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 12:44:13 PST
Subject: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
Message-ID: <9302222044.AA22982@toad.com>


Beware of the message about the security bug in the anon.penet.fi software!

If you do as requested, and send your true email address to an5877 at anon.penet.fi
then he will see both your true email address and your anonymous address
(if you have one - if you don't, you will be assigned one and he will see
that).  Any future use you make of this anonymous server (say, to post
anonymously) will appear under that same anonymous address - and this
person will know your true email address that goes with it.

an5877's message appears to be a trick, designed to collect anonymous/real
address pairs.  Johan Helsingius should take action against this trickster.
Since he is learning other people's real addresses, perhaps it would be
appropriate for his own real address to be revealed.

But, this does point out that these systems which automatically assign
anonymous addrsses have several security flaws.  Johan has already had
to introduce a "password" feature to make it more difficult to send fakemail
that appears to be from a particular email address through the server,
thus revealing the corresponding anonymous address when it is delivered.

an5877's trick is a variant on one discussed in news.admin.policy where
it is pointed out that you can mail to someone via anon.penet.fi and
ask for information; when the return mail comes back it will be from that
person's anonymous address.  So again you can pair up real and anonymous
addresses.

These are serious problems.  We need some discussion of how to avoid these
simple tricks for defeating the anonymity while still having an easy-to-use
system.

::Xavier::






From cp at jido.b30.ingr.com  Mon Feb 22 12:58:17 1993
From: cp at jido.b30.ingr.com (Craig Presson)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 12:58:17 PST
Subject: Trapdoors
In-Reply-To: <9302212232.AA12362@versant.com>
Message-ID: <199302222055.AA18782@jido.b30.ingr.com>


In <9302212232.AA12362 at versant.com>, henry strickland writes:
|> # From cypherpunks-request at toad.com Sun Feb 21 14:14:43 1993
|> # 
|> # Does anybody have a good idea what applications this is useful for?
|> 
|> The old CDC CYBER machines had population count in its instruction
|> set.  Perhaps some scientific-type programmers would know what they
|> used it for.  The CYBER did not have a lot of instructions -- they
|> were pretty practical about what they put in.   i.e.  != VAX 

More precedent: DG Eclipses have a COB (COunt Bits) instruction.
Interestingly enough, there seems to be no such instruction in the
VAX (This from R'ingTFM. I have pitifully little VAX experience.)
        ^
       /
------/---- cp at jido.b30.ingr.com (Craig Presson)
     /
    /






From deltorto at aol.com  Mon Feb 22 13:00:39 1993
From: deltorto at aol.com (deltorto at aol.com)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 13:00:39 PST
Subject: Rambo Lives
Message-ID: <9302221330.tn00927@aol.com>


>>kelly at netcom.com
>>
>> [stuff removed]
>>                         ...the military in general and the
>>army , marines and and special intelligence agencies>, they 
>>are after all as their prime mission capable of extreme violence and the
>>taking of human life, as a means of social control.
>>Law enforcement seems to have very similiar mentality as well,
>>with CONTROL being the agenda and reason for existance-- 
>>Suppose we think of guerilla products such as PGP and anoynmous
>>posting mechanisms and forwarders  in their larger social sense
>>As behaviour modification for those who would have our privacy
>>as well as our lives

...and thus the government's decision to consider PGP (a privacy mechanism)
as "munitions." At first I thought it was outrageous, but it all makes
curious sense somehow when you bop yourself on the head the right way,
doesn't it?

I say we should ensure that as many citizens as possible get ahold of PGP as
soon as possible. After all, the NRA would have us believe that it's every
citizen's right to "bear arms," so why shouldn't we (especially those who
choose not to carry firearms like me) all have whatever sort of weapon we
choose to "carry?"

That's all for now, excuse me while I go hurl. All this crap really makes me
a bit ill, to tell you the truth. I only want the same respect I give to
other people, not a lot of static from a bunch of haircuts with sidearms.

  d2t

PS: Keep this in mind the next time you see someone you love patronize a
Rambo-style movie or play a game of shoot-'em-up Ninten
do - this is where the Bad Guys get their funding, lads.





From deltorto at aol.com  Mon Feb 22 13:00:39 1993
From: deltorto at aol.com (deltorto at aol.com)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 13:00:39 PST
Subject: Proposal - The 'Peterson.mil' Virus List
Message-ID: <9302221331.tn00928@aol.com>


Yo, Punks

I propose that we establish another list dedicated to the study of viruses
and name it after Keith Peterson. After all, why shouldn't he get some credit
for awakening a sleeping giant?

I want to know more about viruses so I can protect myself from
government-created viruses and so I can learn about the various mechanisms
involved.

In addition, the study of self-promulagting code has very positive
implications for the study of "smart email." For those of you who haven't
been following the exploits of General Magic and their Telescript protocol,
there will soon be mail which "delivers itself" to the right location. I'm
sure our members at General Magic can illuminate this subject further. The
implications of this technology reach into the world of encryption and
viruses and certainly further into the realm of privacy discussions.

Wot say, all?

   d2t






From elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU  Mon Feb 22 13:19:35 1993
From: elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU (Karl Barrus)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 13:19:35 PST
Subject: remailer scripts
Message-ID: <199302222118.AA18542@Menudo.UH.EDU>



Douglas Sinclair helped me uncover a subtle problem which may arise in
the use of the remailer scripts: since errors are redirected to
/dev/null or nul, if a key is untrusted (or isn't there), the script
will hang, waiting for input from a prompt you don't see.

New versions of hop.mail, hop.send, and anon.mail should be up at the
ftp site soon...

If anybody feels like porting these scripts to the Mac, Amiga, or VMS,
please feel free!  I know zippo about these platforms, as far as batch
languages.

Also, regarding compatibility with pc's - although the MSDOS script
language could stand some big time improvement, it seems the best to
use for max portability.  But I'll definitely attempt a PERL
translation and then the folks who can use PERL will be able to.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf at menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus at tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/






From sward+ at cmu.edu  Mon Feb 22 13:27:17 1993
From: sward+ at cmu.edu (David Reeve Sward)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 13:27:17 PST
Subject: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
In-Reply-To: <9302222044.AA22982@toad.com>
Message-ID: <YfWIGZe00iV346rPEa@andrew.cmu.edu>


Excerpts from list.cypherpunks: 22-Feb-93 Beware of anon.penet.fi mes..
by nobody at rosebud.ee.uh.edu 
> These are serious problems.  We need some discussion of how to avoid these
> simple tricks for defeating the anonymity while still having an easy-to-use
> system.

Perhaps a new header such as

X-Anon-Doubleblind: yes|no

defaulting to yes...?  As was said, the doubleblind system is a great
idea, but incomplete if you want to correspond to someone without
revealing your anon id.
-- 
David Sward    sward+ at cmu.edu






From jthomas at kolanut.mitre.org  Mon Feb 22 13:31:55 1993
From: jthomas at kolanut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 13:31:55 PST
Subject: Anon bug
Message-ID: <9302222129.AA02099@kolanut>


an5877 at anon.penet.fi (deadbeat) wrote:
>> I believe I have uncovered a serious bug in the Finnish anonymous
>> remailer, one that allows me to piece together anonymous id's and
>> actual email addresses.
>> 

>> I'm reluctant to publish the details here, but I'll explain how it
>> works if you send me your email address.

To which Julf replied:

>Hmm. How about letting me know about it so that I have a chance to  
fix
>it?

I'm worried that the "serious bug" might be that the system won't  
prevent the gullible from mailing "deadbeat" their e-mail addresses  
through penet.  Once they've done that, he can "piece together" their  
anonymous IDs and email addresses quite easily.

I hope I'm wrong about this, though...

Joe
(Who is not writing virii at the MITRE Corporation... not doing much  
at all, really)





From treason at gnu.ai.mit.edu  Mon Feb 22 14:30:13 1993
From: treason at gnu.ai.mit.edu (treason at gnu.ai.mit.edu)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 14:30:13 PST
Subject: moby crypt
Message-ID: <9302222227.AA01364@spiff.gnu.ai.mit.edu>


Ok ok, my mailer is geeking, it has no real mailer here anyway.  None the
less I wanted to know if moby crypt is available, wher and what encryption
method it utilizes...I was told it supported several formats...
What are they??
What are the flaws?

treason at gnu




From DDLEEDS at VM.CMP.ILSTU.EDU  Mon Feb 22 14:48:22 1993
From: DDLEEDS at VM.CMP.ILSTU.EDU (Jumping Jack Flash)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 14:48:22 PST
Subject: Mac HD Cypher...
Message-ID: <9302222248.AA25236@toad.com>


Does anyone know of a way or program that can completely encrypt a hard drive o
n a macintosh computer so that only the person that knows the key can decrypt i
t?  I am looking for a crypt that is completely IMPENETRABLE!!!
Your help would be appreciated,


Jumping Jack Flash





From mccoy at ccwf.cc.utexas.edu  Mon Feb 22 15:28:18 1993
From: mccoy at ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 15:28:18 PST
Subject: Mac HD Cypher...
In-Reply-To: <9302222248.AA25236@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302222327.AA14360@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>


Jumping Jack Flash <DDLEEDS at VM.CMP.ILSTU.EDU> writes:
> 
> Does anyone know of a way or program that can completely encrypt a hard
> drive on a macintosh computer so that only the person that knows the key
> can decrypt it?  

That depends, do you want to be able to use the drive once it has been
encrypted (e.g. decrypt on-demand for necessary files) or do you just want
to turn the whole thing into a lump of jumbled bits that must be decrypted
en masse to be usable again?  If you are looking for the former then I
believe that there is a product out there called FileLock or something
similar that will let you encrypt fils, folders, and entire drives in a
method that requires a password to gain access again.  I think that it also
does this "on demand" so that you can have an encrypted file that asks you
for the password when you pull it up in your word processor (or a folder
that asks for the password when you want to get a file from it), etc.  If
you just want to lock the whole drive then I believe that there is a DES
package that will let you crunch a while drive.

> I am looking for a crypt that is completely IMPENETRABLE!!! 

No such beast exists.

jim




From crys at cave.tcp.COM  Mon Feb 22 15:48:25 1993
From: crys at cave.tcp.COM (Crys Rides)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 15:48:25 PST
Subject: Being kind to 8086 users - was: Re: msdos perl
In-Reply-To: <9302222004.AA00911@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9302222334.AA07621@ucunix.san.uc.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>>>>> On Mon, 22 Feb 93 12:42:23 PST, Eli Brandt <ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU> said:

> There's one part of the market that's still heavily populated with
> 8086 machines - portables.

Eli> Good point.  Perhaps maintaining compatibility with this particular
Eli> archaism is not a bad idea after all.  Urk.

Second reason for compatibility that I was too sleep-depped to think
of this morning in my reply, is that do we really want to assume the
position that for the reasonable chunk of possible users out there
using 8088 or 8086 processors that we're going to tell them if they
don't plunk down the cash for a new system they can't get the
anonymity those more wealthy than them can?;>  Sounds just a trifle
arrogant to me, but then...

> 				Bill Stewart

Eli>    Eli   ebrandt at jarthur.claremont.edu

CrysRides

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK4lWZpSqD+bQ7So3AQHhhgP/TddlrWx4hKQCeudOD3/v11ObegGCyqzj
ul3ZrDjcDsr5UTunBwpuN3Dt+UP/LBO3kccDM6o3BWLo4LdlWQR1cHa+UGlBnhon
gUkXVaRTSq4J4yz0BH0yYMCgdLeZu9nMl/DwqZX1GUwT85XwwONbp28yky+v5RFp
Ok7D259A5q4=
=SZ9t
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Mon Feb 22 16:13:55 1993
From: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 16:13:55 PST
Subject: Remailer Use
Message-ID: <9302230010.AA11413@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>



     I would like to let everyone who hasn't already figured it out
know that I did *not* originate the message that was posted to
Cypherpunks through my account.  I do not know where it came from,
but it reached my account with the destination address of the
cypherpunks list because the message that came back to me from the
list said that "Anonymous <nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu>" originated the
message.  That indicates that it went through the remailer.  If it
were from me, it would say "Chael Hall <nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu>"
as the return address.  Another identifying characteristic is the
"X-Remailed-By: Anonymous <nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu>" header line.
Just remember, don't believe everything you read.

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL at BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL at CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST





From mccoy at ccwf.cc.utexas.edu  Mon Feb 22 16:33:42 1993
From: mccoy at ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 16:33:42 PST
Subject: Rambo Lives
In-Reply-To: <9302221330.tn00927@aol.com>
Message-ID: <9302230032.AA15285@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>


deltorto at aol.com
> >>kelly at netcom.com
[...]
> >>Law enforcement seems to have very similiar mentality as well,
> >>with CONTROL being the agenda and reason for existance-- 

Not meaning to be an appologist for law enforcement agencies (some of whom
have gone off the deep end, this much is true...) but the purpose of law
enforcement agencies is to enforce the laws and protect the populace.  If
you disagree with what they are doing, change the laws.  Most of them are
people doing a thankless job that I would never want to have...

> >>Suppose we think of guerilla products such as PGP and anoynmous
> >>posting mechanisms and forwarders  in their larger social sense
> >>As behaviour modification for those who would have our privacy
> >>as well as our lives
> 
> ...and thus the government's decision to consider PGP (a privacy mechanism)
> as "munitions." At first I thought it was outrageous, but it all makes
> curious sense somehow when you bop yourself on the head the right way,
> doesn't it?

While we now look at this classification as "munitions" as somewhat silly,
please remember when ITAR was established: 1943.  At the time the US was at
war, cryptographic devices were _real machines_, computers occupied entire
buildings.  The government did not decide to classify PGP as munitions, it
classified _all_ cryptographic machines and processes as munitions (materials
necessary for war) and at the time it was a very easy equivalence to make.
There is a very good article about this by Peter Denning (and other
crypto-related articles) in the July 1992 issue of Communications of the
ACM. Now advanced cryptographic methods are used in private communications
and business but the old definitions remain...

> I say we should ensure that as many citizens as possible get ahold of PGP as
> soon as possible.

Definitely.  Spread the source.


jim




From phantom at u.washington.edu  Mon Feb 22 16:51:07 1993
From: phantom at u.washington.edu (The Phantom)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 16:51:07 PST
Subject: Unbreakable MacHD encryption
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9302221616.A8601-9100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>



You could also look at the new Norton Utilities package -- It says it uses
DES as the encryption engine.


Matt Thomlinson
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom at u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 528-5732
PGP 2.1 key availaible via email or finger phantom at hardy.u.washington.edu






From nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Mon Feb 22 16:53:29 1993
From: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 16:53:29 PST
Subject: Remailer Changes
Message-ID: <9302230050.AA14615@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>



     I had an idea just a bit ago.  Here is the scenario:  a user wants
to know what my anonymous ID for nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu is on anon.penet.fi.
All he has to do is send a message like the following to my account:

From: whomever at wherever.com
To: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu
X-Anon-To: anXXXX at anon.penet.fi  <-- his anon ID

...

     Then, that message will eventually get to him with my remailer's
anonymous ID on it!  That ID is the same as my personal ID.  Oops...
So, I made up a refuse list for the remailer.  Any address that contains
a "to" address that is on my refuse list will not be mailed to.  Complete
addresses can be used or just partial ones (for example "anon.penet.fi".)
I know that this also makes it impossible to mail to other users on the
penet site...  Oh, well.

     I just implemented the refuse list, so it will just "eat" any message
that is sent to an address on the refuse list.  No error message is sent
back to the user, it just doesn't get sent.  So, I guess my anonymous ID
is safe afterall.  :)  I would suggest that everyone else (if they
haven't already) refuse to remail to anon.penet.fi if their remailer is
setup on their personal account.

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL at BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL at CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Mon Feb 22 17:00:03 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 17:00:03 PST
Subject: Remailer Use
In-Reply-To: <9302230010.AA11413@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9302230056.AA16126@soda.berkeley.edu>


Re: not discriminating between remailer mail and user mail.

The problem of persons uneducated in remailers not distinguishing
between different kinds of mail is a problem that will scale badly.
It looks like a problem that will have to be solved for any design
which relies on user accounts for remailing.  I have one suggestion,
but I'd like to hear others.

Suggestion--Put a big "Comment:" field in each remailed message which
explains what is going on.  Regular users will get tired of it, no
doubt.  Perhaps it could be called "X-Remailer-Education:"

Eric





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Mon Feb 22 17:21:05 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 17:21:05 PST
Subject: whistleblower newsgroup?
In-Reply-To: <9302210334.AA02268@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9302230117.AA18417@soda.berkeley.edu>



The moderator to alt.whistleblower, instead of a person's mail
address, could be a mail alias which invokes a header field stripper.
That way it would be impossible to post to the group with your
identity in the header.  Every posting anonymous!  Sort of like a
mathematical dual of alt.forgery.

I would also suggest a periodic posting explaining exactly how secure
that is.  (Proof against casual attack, but not against local or
global network monitoring.)

It seems easy enough.  I'd do it myself if I had root anywhere.  The
perl scripts for remailing would be easily hacked.  You could even
retain the automatic PGP decryption for the more informed, the more
paranoid.

Eric





From eric at Synopsys.COM  Mon Feb 22 17:53:47 1993
From: eric at Synopsys.COM (eric at Synopsys.COM)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 17:53:47 PST
Subject: Remailer Use
Message-ID: <199302230152.AA02878@gaea.synopsys.com>



Eric Hughes <hughes at soda.berkeley.edu> writes:

>> Suggestion--Put a big "Comment:" field in each remailed message which
>> explains what is going on.  Regular users will get tired of it, no
>> doubt.  Perhaps it could be called "X-Remailer-Education:"
>> 
>> Eric

My solution to this has two parts.

Part 1: mixes should refuse to resend mail to anywhere except the owner
of the mix or other (registered with it) mixes.

Part 2: someone should provide a service that sends a standard text
message to an arbitrary address.  The text message should tell the
recipient how to run a mix and register it with the network of mixes.
It will also say that someone wishes to contact them anonymously.

This should help calm people's fears that they might be held
responsible for abusive messages sent through a mix under their
control.  It is hard for someone to complain about receiving an
anonymous message when they had to explicitly run a piece of software
to be able to receive any anonymous messages at all.

The incentive structure for this system encourages people to run mixes
if they want to retain anonymity.  It has an advantage over filters
that keep a list of places to not send to:  it is a positive filtering
scheme, rather than a negative one, and thus should scale better.

The person who runs the standard text sender of part 2 can feel
comfortable being responsible for the messages sent out because they
wrote or approved the text.  They can throttle the service so the
message can only be sent occasionally to any given address, and block
it entirely for anyone who requests it.

For this to work, we need to have an easily installable mix package
that will run on a large variety of machines.  Not easy, but it should
be where we're heading anyway.

-eric messick (eric at synopsys.com)







From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Mon Feb 22 18:14:12 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 18:14:12 PST
Subject: PC Eudora
Message-ID: <9302230211.AA24235@soda.berkeley.edu>


I sent some mail to pc-eudora-info at qualcomm.com about the status of an
MSDOS version of eudora that worked over a straight serial line (i.e.
a modem dialup) rather than a TCP/IP stack.  The reply I got back said
that they had talked about it, but had not planned it in yet.

Anybody itching to do the world a favor who can do this should contact
them directly and volunteer.  Consider this an open invitation.

Eric





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Mon Feb 22 18:18:28 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 18:18:28 PST
Subject: Timed-Release Crypto
In-Reply-To: <9302101955.AA09009@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302230205.AA23892@soda.berkeley.edu>


By coincidence, I was thinking about time-release protocols the other
day.  I've got most of a system worked out, but I need to write it up
and look at it for a while to make sure it works.  what I think I have
is a system in which the sender is given a key by a beacon which he
can verify, at issuance time, will be revealed by the beacon at some
future time.  The implementation (but not the basic idea) relies on
using multiple public RSA keys with the same modulus.  I know there
are some attacks against this, but I don't know their nature.  If
someone who knows about this (or knows where to find out) could
contact me I would be most appreciative.

As far as sending money into the future goes, there are some tradeoffs
between anonymity of payment, length of time in the future, and
message size.  Anonymity of payment is difficult, since digital cash
has to expire in order for the bank not have to keep ever huger lists
of deposited numbers.  Large payments are less frequent anyway, and
provide less covering traffic.  If you continuously rotate your money
into the future, therefore, all the steps must be encapsulated, making
the size of the message grow linearly with the number of hops.  One
might be able to use a financial intermediary for anonymity, though.
It's not obvious to me that this will work.

Eric





From elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU  Mon Feb 22 18:57:37 1993
From: elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU (Karl Barrus)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 18:57:37 PST
Subject: remailers & anon.penet
Message-ID: <199302230256.AA03720@Menudo.UH.EDU>



Earlier, Chael Hall presented a creative and ingenious way to get
somebody's pseudonym on anon.penet.fi (well, at least the pseuodynm's
of remailers, if any).

But I think the attack won't work because Johan recently put a
password requirement into his software: with no password, the message
will bounce back.  Thus, in the attack described, the message will
wind up in your mailbox, alerting you that somebody is trying to
figure out your id!

Geez, this is somewhat exciting - reminds me of a _True Names_ world
in which others are constantly trying to figure out your real identity
while working to conceal theirs!

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf at menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus at tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/





From honey at citi.umich.edu  Mon Feb 22 19:24:15 1993
From: honey at citi.umich.edu (peter honeyman)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 19:24:15 PST
Subject: Being kind to 8086 users - was: Re: msdos perl
In-Reply-To: <9302222004.AA00911@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9302230324.AA00302@toad.com>


> There's one part of the market that's still heavily populated with
> 8086 machines - portables.

c'est what?  you must mean palmtops.  laptops and notebooks
run op systems like mach, bsd, plan 9, etc. -- they're not
running on 8086s.

of course, i can see wanting to run on an 8086 if it's guaranteed 
that it can't run perl.

	peter





From 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM  Mon Feb 22 19:25:06 1993
From: 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM (Hal)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 19:25:06 PST
Subject: Anon address attack...
Message-ID: <930223022107_74076.1041_DHJ66-1@CompuServe.COM>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

It seems like there are several problems that arise from this "automatic"
anonymization of messages sent through the Penet remailer.

You have these security threats which involve people being tricked into
sending messages through the remailer in such a way that the recipient
knows the true email address from where the messages are coming.

(I think that is what happened here with "deadbeat", because otherwise
why would he have asked people to send their email addresses?  He wouldn't
need email addresses since he could reply to people without knowing them,
by just using a "reply" command in his mailer.)

(It's interesting that he also sent his message via one of the Cypherpunks
remailers.  Maybe he thought they worked like the Penet remailer and
he could break anonymity on those as well.)

Another problem that people have complained about is when they respond
to an anonymous posting, they get a message from Penet saying that they
now have an anonymous ID assigned.  This confuses and bothers some people.

We had some debate about this issue here several months ago (before
Penet was operating, I think).  One question is, if I send mail to
anonymous person A, does that mean or imply that I should be made
anonymous to A?  This is to some extent a matter of expectations.  Some
people argued that should be no expectation of anonymity in this case;
A is the one who wants to be anonymous, not the people who are sending
to him/her.  Others replied that since some anonymous remailers already
worked this way, there would be an expectation of anonymity, and so
the safest assumption was to anonymize all messages since people can
always override the anonymity by revealing their true addresses.

I think these attacks on Penet re-open these questions.  Evidentally
there is positive harm that can occur by automatically anonymizing
all messages which pass through a remailer.

(BTW, I certainly don't mean here to be presuming to tell Julf what
he should or should not do with Penet.  I'm just taking that as an
example.  We have discussed adding similar functionality to our Cypher-
punks remailers.

The main problem occurs when sending a message to an anonymous Penet
address.  For the other uses of the Penet remailer, for anonymous posting
and for mail to a non-anonymous address, it's more reasonable to assume
that anonymization is desired.  (Otherwise, why would they be using
the service?)  But when sending a message to an anonymous address,
it's not known whether the sender wants to be anonymized or not.

One possibility (which might not be that easy technically) would be to
assign a new anonymous ID for each such message through the Penet server.
This means that you would get a _different_ anonymous ID for each
of these messages, preventing an attacker from pairing up your "usual"
posting ID with your email address.  (Perhaps this anonymous ID
creation could be suppressed with another X- command, as proposed
earlier, but this could be the default behavior.)  It might be hard
to keep track of that many anonymous ID's, but perhaps they could be
kept active for only a limited period of time (several weeks or months)
and retired after that.

It might seem that people should just be careful about what they
send through Penet, but there are some problems with this.  What do
you do if you get a message from an5877 at anon.penet.fi asking for
advice on cryptography mailing lists?  If you reply, your questioner
can figure out who the reply is coming from, and sees your Penet
alias.  There is no way to prevent this from happening currently.

Also, I have seen proposals that anonymous ID's should be made less
recognizable, so that instead of an5877 at anon.penet.fi we would have
joe at serv.uba.edu.  In such a situation it might be tedious to
scrutinize every email address we send to (via replies, for example)
to make sure it isn't a remailer where you have an anonymous ID.

All in all, I think some changes need to be made in how anonymous
addresses are used and implemented in order to provide reasonable
amounts of security.

Hal Finney

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK4lfIagTA69YIUw3AQGzQAQApOduiD7P2C26f7ml5tcOJf6xQff7bdV0
qw+zjOevW6hSBunOY59Qstkk5uQ2CoEALDAyUfKRsy7dionBAtCJYlwfX7uclHKL
Sonor8bg0NPHMP8SV/antacq00fK3b5wtiFFMn3WsjCvSEjhGoB9SIE/TB/zL9Et
Ow8JEodP488=
=cXHd
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From JTUCKER at VAX2.CSTP.UMKC.EDU  Mon Feb 22 19:35:54 1993
From: JTUCKER at VAX2.CSTP.UMKC.EDU (JTUCKER at VAX2.CSTP.UMKC.EDU)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 19:35:54 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <01GV1CASVU1C9QVVEO@vax2.cstp.umkc.edu>



Unsubscribe





From honey at citi.umich.edu  Mon Feb 22 19:38:12 1993
From: honey at citi.umich.edu (peter honeyman)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 19:38:12 PST
Subject: Trapdoors
In-Reply-To: <199302222055.AA18782@jido.b30.ingr.com>
Message-ID: <9302230338.AA00441@toad.com>


> Interestingly enough, there seems to be no such instruction in the
> VAX ...

but i believe the vax has ffs (find first set) instruction, which seems
to have similar uses (whatever they may be).

	peter





From huntting at glarp.com  Mon Feb 22 19:38:42 1993
From: huntting at glarp.com (Brad Huntting)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 19:38:42 PST
Subject: Rambo Lives
In-Reply-To: <9302230032.AA15285@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <199302230337.AA19045@misc.glarp.com>



>> I say we should ensure that as many citizens as possible get ahold of PGP as
>> soon as possible.

> Definitely.  Spread the source.

But to realy get PGP going (or PEM for that matter) will require
wide spread key distribution.  It's clear that such distribution
mechanisms are not going to arise out of any "respectfull" institutions
mostly because of the legal entanglements they present.

Perhaps the time has come for "alt.pgp.keyrings".  A standard format
for postings could allow them to be automatically added to global
keyrings at usenet sites everywhere.  Several security issues will
have to be addressed before this can work.


brad





From 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM  Mon Feb 22 20:34:43 1993
From: 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM (Hal)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 20:34:43 PST
Subject: Remailer to anon.penet.f
Message-ID: <930223033603_74076.1041_DHJ26-1@CompuServe.COM>


Chael Hall points out that remailer operators who use their personal
accounts for the remailing are vulnerable to having their anon.penet.fi
pseudonyms (if any) discovered by users who request remailing to that
site.

For those operating remailers based on the Perl scripts originally
written by Eric Hughes which I modified, I use the following maildelivery
file to prevent the attack Chael mentioned:

#
# field                 pattern action/ string 
#                               result  (quote included spaces)
#
Request-Remailing-To	anon.penet.fi	file	A	Bitbucket
Anon-To			anon.penet.fi	file	A	Bitbucket
Request-Remailing-To    ""      pipe A  remail.pl
Anon-To			""	pipe A  remail.pl
Encrypted               PGP     pipe A  pgpmail.pl
*                       ""      pipe ?  recurse.pl


This puts any message to anon.penet.fi into a file called Bitbucket.
My slocal.pl script does not support the slocal/maildelivery feature
which deletes a message, so this is the closest I can come.  (I suppose
another alternative would be to pipe it into "cat > /dev/null".  That
would look like:

Request-Remailing-To	anon.penet.fi	pipe	A	"cat > /dev/null"

I haven't tried this one.)

BTW, if anyone has made changes to the remailer scripts, please send
them to me.  I would like to clean up the scripts a little, add more
error checking, and submit a new version to the FTP site.

Hal Finney






From an5877 at anon.penet.fi  Mon Feb 22 20:56:30 1993
From: an5877 at anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 20:56:30 PST
Subject: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
Message-ID: <9302230431.AA28945@anon.penet.fi>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Xavier hit the nail on the head -- my note was a subterfuge, intended
to reveal the association between anonymous id's and email addresses.

I think it's wrong for anon.penet.fi to operate this way.

> DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4lD7/FZTpBW/B35AQGiCQF9HFeDhXk7FV9mhIMh9zGmxblLvCt8bszr
4daRmyo8/cJMK7Y5V7kfQN05CEdJo6oc
=KalQ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From fergp at sytex.com  Mon Feb 22 20:58:46 1993
From: fergp at sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 20:58:46 PST
Subject: Unforgotton topic
Message-ID: <gRqeZB1w165w@sytex.com>


I realize that this has already been an old topic amonst you folks,
but I just wanted to post a summary I found rather striking and an
issue I know still leaves a bad taste in our collective mouths -
 
"Threats to Privacy", "FBIs Wiretapping Proposal Thwarted", extracted
from Boardwatch Magazine, February, 1993, pages 19 - 22 ( BBS
Legislative Watch, Shari Steele, EFF) -
 
"In a move that worried privacy experts, software manufacturers and
telephone companies, the FBI proposed legislation to amend the
Communications Act of 1934 to make it easier for the Bureau to perform
electronic wiretappiing. The proposed legislation, entitled 'Digital
Telephony,' would have required communications service providers and
hardware manufacturers to make their systems 'tappable' by providing
'back doors' through which law enforcement officers could intercept
communications. Furthermore, this capability would have been provided
undetectably, while the communications was in progress, exclusive of
any communications between other parties, regardless of the mobility
of the target of the FBI's investigation, and without degradation of
service.
 
"The privacy implications are frightening. Today, all sorts of
information about who we are and what we do, such as medical records,
credit reports and employment data, are held on electronic databases.
If these databases have government-mandated 'tappability,' this
private information could be accessed by anyone tapping in. In
addition, the language in the proposed bill is vague. This is
especially troubling since, under the proposal, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) can keep communications products off the market if it
determines that these products do not meet the DOJ's own vague
guidelines. This will probably result in increased costs and reduced
competitiveness for service providers and equipment manufacturers,
since they will be unlikely to add any features that may result in a
DOJ rejection of their entire product. And to add insult to injury,
the FBI proposal suggests that the cost of this wiretapping 'service'
to the Bureau would have to be borne by the service provider itself,
which ultimately means you and I will be paying higher user fees.
 
"The Electronic Frontier Foundation organized a broad coalition of
public interest and industry groups, from Computer Professionals for
Social Responsibilty (CPSR) and the ACLU to AT&T and Sun
Microsystems, to oppose the legislation. A white paper produced by
the EFF and ratified by the coalition, entitled, 'An Analysis of the
FBI Digital Telephony Proposal,' was widely distributed throughout the
Congress. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) and Representative Don
Edwards (D-California), chairs of two key committees, referred to the
EFF paper as they delayed the introduction of the FBI's proposal. As
Leahy stated before the Senate, 'Our goal is to assist law
enforcement,' but 'without jeopardizing privacy rights or frustrating
the development of new communications technologies.' The Justice
Department lobbied hard in the final days to get Congress to take up
the bill before Congress adjourned, but the bill never even found a
Congressional sponsor (and was therefore never officially introduced).
The FBI will almost certainly reintroduce "Digital Telephony" when the
103rd Congress convenes in January."
 
8<------------ End Article --------------
 
Take a stance. Voice your opinion. Write your congressman!
 
Paul Ferguson                     |  "Sincerity is fine, but it's no
Network Integration Consultant    |   excuse for stupidity."
Alexandria, Virginia USA          |                       -- Anonymous
fergp at sytex.com     (Internet)    |
sytex.com!fergp     (UUNet)       |
1:109/229           (FidoNet)     |
         PGP public encryption key available upon request.

---
fergp at sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Access <=> Internet BBS, a public access internet site
Sytex Communications, Arlington VA, 1-703-358-9022





From phiber at eff.org  Mon Feb 22 21:00:43 1993
From: phiber at eff.org (Phiber Optik)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 21:00:43 PST
Subject: Trapdoors
In-Reply-To: <9302230338.AA00441@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199302230459.AA27220@eff.org>


> 
> > Interestingly enough, there seems to be no such instruction in the
> > VAX ...
> 
> but i believe the vax has ffs (find first set) instruction, which seems
> to have similar uses (whatever they may be).
> 
> 	peter
> 
But that's not a population count (all bits set count) instruction.
In the Motorola 68020/30/40, there's BFFFO, for Bit Field Find First One,
if anyone was curious about 'find first set' instructions.  Might as well
mention that the 386/486 have BSF and BSR, Bit Scan Forward and Reverse,
but now we're just getting into run-of-the-mill bit manipulation.






From nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Mon Feb 22 21:08:59 1993
From: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 21:08:59 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302230505.AA04240@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Xavier hit the nail on the head -- my note was a subterfuge, intended
to reveal the association between anonymous id's and email addresses.

I think it's wrong for anon.penet.fi to operate this way.

> DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4lD7/FZTpBW/B35AQGiCQF9HFeDhXk7FV9mhIMh9zGmxblLvCt8bszr
4daRmyo8/cJMK7Y5V7kfQN05CEdJo6oc
=KalQ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From shipley at tfs.COM  Mon Feb 22 22:28:37 1993
From: shipley at tfs.COM (Peter Shipley)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 22:28:37 PST
Subject: Rambo Lives
In-Reply-To: <199302230337.AA19045@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9302230626.AA08227@edev0.TFS>



>Perhaps the time has come for "alt.pgp.keyrings".  A standard format
>for postings could allow them to be automatically added to global
>keyrings at usenet sites everywhere.  Several security issues will
>have to be addressed before this can work.
>

the newsgroup alt.security.pgp has semi-regular keyring posting






From mark at coombs.anu.edu.au  Mon Feb 22 22:29:37 1993
From: mark at coombs.anu.edu.au (Mark)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 22:29:37 PST
Subject: Unbreakable MacHD encryption
Message-ID: <9302230628.AA10278@coombs.anu.edu.au>


I have used a product in the past called Hard Disk Deadbolt. It has from
memory three encryption methods; quick-and-nasty hard-disk-deadbolt's-own
(no idea on the security of this one) and DES. The first is fastest for
stuff you dont want anyone to read but isnt super secret, whilst DES takes
the longest.

I liked the package all things considered. It was friendly, files didnt
change size and it was speedy enough for my uses.

Availability is unknown at this stage, ask in comp.sys.mac.* if you want.

Mark
mark at coombs.anu.edu.au





From an5877 at anon.penet.fi  Mon Feb 22 22:33:29 1993
From: an5877 at anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 22:33:29 PST
Subject: Remailer Use
Message-ID: <9302230604.AA04598@anon.penet.fi>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>      I would like to let everyone who hasn't already figured it out
> know that I did *not* originate the message that was posted to
> Cypherpunks through my account.  I do not know where it came from,
> but it reached my account with the destination address of the
> cypherpunks list because the message that came back to me from the
> list said that "Anonymous <nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu>" originated the
> message.  That indicates that it went through the remailer.  If it
> were from me, it would say "Chael Hall <nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu>"
> as the return address.  Another identifying characteristic is the
> "X-Remailed-By: Anonymous <nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu>" header line.
> Just remember, don't believe everything you read.

In the case of pseudonymous mail, don't believe _anything_ you read!

I don't see why Chael Hall is going to all this trouble to refute
a message that I don't even remember ...  Did I miss something
important?  (Or outre?)

Or (duh!) is he talking about _my_ earlier message?

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4lx8vFZTpBW/B35AQGnfwF/YdHtdc6B+oslFno9+rCowlph7GteEZF+
ot8jlZRA+gW+Sa1bpBUkV6ZryBlHYQMQ
=KMZW
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From an5877 at anon.penet.fi  Mon Feb 22 22:33:49 1993
From: an5877 at anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 22:33:49 PST
Subject: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
Message-ID: <9302230604.AA04535@anon.penet.fi>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

This is a longer response to the warning posted by Xavier.

> Beware of the message about the security bug in the
> anon.penet.fi software!

Indeed.

> If you do as requested, and send your true email address to
> an5877 at anon.penet.fi then he will see both your true email
> address and your anonymous address (if you have one - if you
> don't, you will be assigned one and he will see that).  Any
> future use you make of this anonymous server (say, to post
> anonymously) will appear under that same anonymous address - and
> this person will know your true email address that goes with
> it.

You got me.  

I meant only slight malice here:  I had intended to "expose" a few
email/anon associations to highlight the problem.  The problem became
apparent to me when I sent pseudonymous mail to a prominent person on
this list; his reply exposed his pseudonymous id at anon.penet.fi,
surely without his knowledge.

> an5877's message appears to be a trick, designed to collect
> anonymous/real address pairs.  Johan Helsingius should take
> action against this trickster.  Since he is learning other
> people's real addresses, perhaps it would be appropriate for his
> own real address to be revealed.

Now that would be a _very_ serious "bug" in the anon.penet.fi remailer
(or, more accurately, in its administration); I am confident Johan
Helsingius will reject this suggestion.

> But, this does point out that these systems which automatically
> assign anonymous addrsses have several security flaws.  Johan
> has already had to introduce a "password" feature to make it
> more difficult to send fakemail that appears to be from a
> particular email address through the server, thus revealing the
> corresponding anonymous address when it is delivered.

I think that merely masks the real problem.

> an5877's trick is a variant on one discussed in
> news.admin.policy where it is pointed out that you can mail to
> someone via anon.penet.fi and ask for information; when the
> return mail comes back it will be from that person's anonymous
> address.  So again you can pair up real and anonymous
> addresses.

I missed that discussion, or I wouldn't have wasted your (our) time.

> These are serious problems.  We need some discussion of how to
> avoid these simple tricks for defeating the anonymity while
> still having an easy-to-use system.

Any ideas?  For starters, I think the default behavior of anon.penet.fi
is badly broken.  But a more serious problem with anon.penet.fi and the
other remailers I am aware of is the necessity that we pseudonymous
clients have to rely on the integrity of their administrators to keep
our pseudonyms private.  In the face of social pressure, such as
Xavier's, that may be asking a lot.

> ::Xavier::

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4lr4/FZTpBW/B35AQGqeAF/UBefmNprQacueYazdvhAKMF4nA+2vl44
/+FMACnWjd7yaoG99VeyhO/S6vptT1UB
=yZRb
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Mon Feb 22 22:43:07 1993
From: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 22:43:07 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302230639.AA09661@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>      I would like to let everyone who hasn't already figured it out
> know that I did *not* originate the message that was posted to
> Cypherpunks through my account.  I do not know where it came from,
> but it reached my account with the destination address of the
> cypherpunks list because the message that came back to me from the
> list said that "Anonymous <nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu>" originated the
> message.  That indicates that it went through the remailer.  If it
> were from me, it would say "Chael Hall <nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu>"
> as the return address.  Another identifying characteristic is the
> "X-Remailed-By: Anonymous <nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu>" header line.
> Just remember, don't believe everything you read.

In the case of pseudonymous mail, don't believe _anything_ you read!

I don't see why Chael Hall is going to all this trouble to refute
a message that I don't even remember ...  Did I miss something
important?  (Or outre?)

Or (duh!) is he talking about _my_ earlier message?

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4lx8vFZTpBW/B35AQGnfwF/YdHtdc6B+oslFno9+rCowlph7GteEZF+
ot8jlZRA+gW+Sa1bpBUkV6ZryBlHYQMQ
=KMZW
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Mon Feb 22 22:45:15 1993
From: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 22:45:15 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302230642.AA09719@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

This is a longer response to the warning posted by Xavier.

> Beware of the message about the security bug in the
> anon.penet.fi software!

Indeed.

> If you do as requested, and send your true email address to
> an5877 at anon.penet.fi then he will see both your true email
> address and your anonymous address (if you have one - if you
> don't, you will be assigned one and he will see that).  Any
> future use you make of this anonymous server (say, to post
> anonymously) will appear under that same anonymous address - and
> this person will know your true email address that goes with
> it.

You got me.  

I meant only slight malice here:  I had intended to "expose" a few
email/anon associations to highlight the problem.  The problem became
apparent to me when I sent pseudonymous mail to a prominent person on
this list; his reply exposed his pseudonymous id at anon.penet.fi,
surely without his knowledge.

> an5877's message appears to be a trick, designed to collect
> anonymous/real address pairs.  Johan Helsingius should take
> action against this trickster.  Since he is learning other
> people's real addresses, perhaps it would be appropriate for his
> own real address to be revealed.

Now that would be a _very_ serious "bug" in the anon.penet.fi remailer
(or, more accurately, in its administration); I am confident Johan
Helsingius will reject this suggestion.

> But, this does point out that these systems which automatically
> assign anonymous addrsses have several security flaws.  Johan
> has already had to introduce a "password" feature to make it
> more difficult to send fakemail that appears to be from a
> particular email address through the server, thus revealing the
> corresponding anonymous address when it is delivered.

I think that merely masks the real problem.

> an5877's trick is a variant on one discussed in
> news.admin.policy where it is pointed out that you can mail to
> someone via anon.penet.fi and ask for information; when the
> return mail comes back it will be from that person's anonymous
> address.  So again you can pair up real and anonymous
> addresses.

I missed that discussion, or I wouldn't have wasted your (our) time.

> These are serious problems.  We need some discussion of how to
> avoid these simple tricks for defeating the anonymity while
> still having an easy-to-use system.

Any ideas?  For starters, I think the default behavior of anon.penet.fi
is badly broken.  But a more serious problem with anon.penet.fi and the
other remailers I am aware of is the necessity that we pseudonymous
clients have to rely on the integrity of their administrators to keep
our pseudonyms private.  In the face of social pressure, such as
Xavier's, that may be asking a lot.

> ::Xavier::

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4lr4/FZTpBW/B35AQGqeAF/UBefmNprQacueYazdvhAKMF4nA+2vl44
/+FMACnWjd7yaoG99VeyhO/S6vptT1UB
=yZRb
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From julf at penet.FI  Mon Feb 22 22:52:31 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 22:52:31 PST
Subject: whistleblower newsgroup?
In-Reply-To: <9302230117.AA18417@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302230751.aa16701@penet.penet.FI>



> The moderator to alt.whistleblower, instead of a person's mail
> address, could be a mail alias which invokes a header field stripper.
> That way it would be impossible to post to the group with your
> identity in the header.  Every posting anonymous!  Sort of like a
> mathematical dual of alt.forgery.
> 
> I would also suggest a periodic posting explaining exactly how secure
> that is.  (Proof against casual attack, but not against local or
> global network monitoring.)
> 
> It seems easy enough.  I'd do it myself if I had root anywhere.  The
> perl scripts for remailing would be easily hacked.  You could even
> retain the automatic PGP decryption for the more informed, the more
> paranoid.

Well, I hereby volunteer anon.penet.fi for such use. I already have the
posting stuff in place, and .fi is outside US jurisdiction.... It would
be a one-line hack to disable the anon id generation for posters to that
group... So the security concerns re anon.penet.fi mentioned on this list
wouldn't apply... 

Now I only have to get PGP up on the damned Interactive UNIX... Or
switch to bsd/386 or something...

	Julf (admin at anon.penet.fi)






From an5877 at anon.penet.fi  Mon Feb 22 22:53:28 1993
From: an5877 at anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 22:53:28 PST
Subject: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
Message-ID: <9302230609.AA05038@anon.penet.fi>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Xavier hit the nail on the head -- my note was a subterfuge, intended
to reveal the association between anonymous id's and email addresses.

I think it's wrong for anon.penet.fi to operate this way.

> DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4lD7/FZTpBW/B35AQGiCQF9HFeDhXk7FV9mhIMh9zGmxblLvCt8bszr
4daRmyo8/cJMK7Y5V7kfQN05CEdJo6oc
=KalQ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From an5877 at anon.penet.fi  Mon Feb 22 22:56:28 1993
From: an5877 at anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 22:56:28 PST
Subject: Remailer to anon.penet.f
Message-ID: <9302230608.AA04938@anon.penet.fi>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> This puts any message to anon.penet.fi into a file called Bitbucket.
> My slocal.pl script does not support the slocal/maildelivery feature
> which deletes a message, so this is the closest I can come.  (I suppose
> another alternative would be to pipe it into "cat > /dev/null".  That
> would look like:
>
> Request-Remailing-To  anon.penet.fi   pipe    A       "cat > /dev/null"
>
> I haven't tried this one.)

I think this is exactly the wrong thing to do.  Cypherpunks remailers are
essential for preventing accidental exposure of Finnish pseudonyms.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4mwX/FZTpBW/B35AQF94gGAqqTUhXSKlb6CcsXNJ9T1eq2Hf5Qs3MKt
N18Y20a+azul5d/Y4DnMfD62sCWhMD/v
=A5c6
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Mon Feb 22 22:57:35 1993
From: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 22:57:35 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302230654.AA10264@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Xavier hit the nail on the head -- my note was a subterfuge, intended
to reveal the association between anonymous id's and email addresses.

I think it's wrong for anon.penet.fi to operate this way.

> DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4lD7/FZTpBW/B35AQGiCQF9HFeDhXk7FV9mhIMh9zGmxblLvCt8bszr
4daRmyo8/cJMK7Y5V7kfQN05CEdJo6oc
=KalQ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU  Mon Feb 22 23:00:28 1993
From: ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU (Eli Brandt)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 23:00:28 PST
Subject: Anon address attack...
In-Reply-To: <930223022107_74076.1041_DHJ66-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302230700.AA03047@toad.com>


> One possibility (which might not be that easy technically) would be to
> assign a new anonymous ID for each such message through the Penet server.

I was thinking of installing a trivial hack in my remailer, such that
upon demand it adds some random (essentially unrepeatable) cruft to
the From: line, placing it as a name field so as to have no
addressing significance.  I believe penet assigns IDs based on this
line, so chaining this to a penet-style remailer would provide
"hit-and-run" anonymity -- even if the remailer wants nothing of the
sort.  The social desirability of this could be questioned, but it
certainly seems more secure to built pseudonyms on top of something
like this (using PGP sigs to provide a solid identity) than through
the presently-popular approach.  Comments?  (Julf?)

> Hal Finney

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt at jarthur.claremont.edu





From an5877 at anon.penet.fi  Mon Feb 22 23:12:55 1993
From: an5877 at anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 23:12:55 PST
Subject: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
Message-ID: <9302230608.AA04870@anon.penet.fi>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

David,

> As was said, the doubleblind system is a great idea, but incomplete
> if you want to correspond to someone without revealing your anon id.

Well, I don't agree that doubleblind is a great idea.

For example, if at any time, Alice sends pseudonymously to Bob, Bob can
not reply directly: this would expose his identity at anon.penet.fi.
Bob must reply through a remailer.

Note the irony -- Bob must take special steps to protect his pseudonym
because anon.penet.fi is acting affirmatively to conceal his actual
identity.  If Bob slips up and simply replies, he is exposed.

Hal,

> (It's interesting that he also sent his message via one of the Cypherpunks
> remailers.  Maybe he thought they worked like the Penet remailer and
> he could break anonymity on those as well.)

Actually, I don't know why my message went through a Cypherpunks
remailer -- I didn't ask it to.  I don't know of any weaknesses in
the Cypherpunks remailers (other than extreme vulnerability to social
engineering).

> Evidentally there is positive harm that can occur by automatically
> anonymizing all messages which pass through a remailer.  ... For
> anonymous posting and for mail to a non-anonymous address, it's more
> reasonable to assume that anonymization is desired.  ... But when
> sending a message to an anonymous address, it's not known whether the
> sender wants to be anonymized or not.

I think it's imperative that the sender use X-Anon-To to be
pseudonymous.  This is consistent with the principle of least
astonishment.

> It might seem that people should just be careful about what they
> send through Penet, but there are some problems with this.  What do
> you do if you get a message from an5877 at anon.penet.fi asking for
> advice on cryptography mailing lists?  If you reply, your questioner
> can figure out who the reply is coming from, and sees your Penet
> alias.  There is no way to prevent this from happening currently.

A Cypherpunks remailer can be used to conceal the correspondent's
pseudonymous identity.

> Also, I have seen proposals that anonymous ID's should be made less
> recognizable, so that instead of an5877 at anon.penet.fi we would have
> joe at serv.uba.edu.  In such a situation it might be tedious to
> scrutinize every email address we send to (via replies, for example)
> to make sure it isn't a remailer where you have an anonymous ID.

It would be a real boon to make pseudonyms less prominent -- this
seems to have kicked over a hornet's nest on USENET (even though
pseudonyms have been quietly in use for years).  But were this the
case, scrutiny would be an understatement.

> All in all, I think some changes need to be made in how anonymous
> addresses are used and implemented in order to provide reasonable
> amounts of security.

I agree that more discussion is in order.  I'm especially concerned 
about the broader issues regarding anonymity through remailers.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4mrrvFZTpBW/B35AQE+PQGAh69FcaATFD05lIuhqqK8ZMmV+8xNi/LN
7kxDSgFgB9J/A9rRgAL6S1Ux2ojU4opP
=RGlc
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Mon Feb 22 23:13:41 1993
From: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 23:13:41 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302230710.AA11131@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> This puts any message to anon.penet.fi into a file called Bitbucket.
> My slocal.pl script does not support the slocal/maildelivery feature
> which deletes a message, so this is the closest I can come.  (I suppose
> another alternative would be to pipe it into "cat > /dev/null".  That
> would look like:
>
> Request-Remailing-To  anon.penet.fi   pipe    A       "cat > /dev/null"
>
> I haven't tried this one.)

I think this is exactly the wrong thing to do.  Cypherpunks remailers are
essential for preventing accidental exposure of Finnish pseudonyms.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4mwX/FZTpBW/B35AQF94gGAqqTUhXSKlb6CcsXNJ9T1eq2Hf5Qs3MKt
N18Y20a+azul5d/Y4DnMfD62sCWhMD/v
=A5c6
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Mon Feb 22 23:18:19 1993
From: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 23:18:19 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302230715.AA11401@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

David,

> As was said, the doubleblind system is a great idea, but incomplete
> if you want to correspond to someone without revealing your anon id.

Well, I don't agree that doubleblind is a great idea.

For example, if at any time, Alice sends pseudonymously to Bob, Bob can
not reply directly: this would expose his identity at anon.penet.fi.
Bob must reply through a remailer.

Note the irony -- Bob must take special steps to protect his pseudonym
because anon.penet.fi is acting affirmatively to conceal his actual
identity.  If Bob slips up and simply replies, he is exposed.

Hal,

> (It's interesting that he also sent his message via one of the Cypherpunks
> remailers.  Maybe he thought they worked like the Penet remailer and
> he could break anonymity on those as well.)

Actually, I don't know why my message went through a Cypherpunks
remailer -- I didn't ask it to.  I don't know of any weaknesses in
the Cypherpunks remailers (other than extreme vulnerability to social
engineering).

> Evidentally there is positive harm that can occur by automatically
> anonymizing all messages which pass through a remailer.  ... For
> anonymous posting and for mail to a non-anonymous address, it's more
> reasonable to assume that anonymization is desired.  ... But when
> sending a message to an anonymous address, it's not known whether the
> sender wants to be anonymized or not.

I think it's imperative that the sender use X-Anon-To to be
pseudonymous.  This is consistent with the principle of least
astonishment.

> It might seem that people should just be careful about what they
> send through Penet, but there are some problems with this.  What do
> you do if you get a message from an5877 at anon.penet.fi asking for
> advice on cryptography mailing lists?  If you reply, your questioner
> can figure out who the reply is coming from, and sees your Penet
> alias.  There is no way to prevent this from happening currently.

A Cypherpunks remailer can be used to conceal the correspondent's
pseudonymous identity.

> Also, I have seen proposals that anonymous ID's should be made less
> recognizable, so that instead of an5877 at anon.penet.fi we would have
> joe at serv.uba.edu.  In such a situation it might be tedious to
> scrutinize every email address we send to (via replies, for example)
> to make sure it isn't a remailer where you have an anonymous ID.

It would be a real boon to make pseudonyms less prominent -- this
seems to have kicked over a hornet's nest on USENET (even though
pseudonyms have been quietly in use for years).  But were this the
case, scrutiny would be an understatement.

> All in all, I think some changes need to be made in how anonymous
> addresses are used and implemented in order to provide reasonable
> amounts of security.

I agree that more discussion is in order.  I'm especially concerned 
about the broader issues regarding anonymity through remailers.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4mrrvFZTpBW/B35AQE+PQGAh69FcaATFD05lIuhqqK8ZMmV+8xNi/LN
7kxDSgFgB9J/A9rRgAL6S1Ux2ojU4opP
=RGlc
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From Bruce.Baugh at p23.f40.n105.z1.fidonet.org  Mon Feb 22 23:39:17 1993
From: Bruce.Baugh at p23.f40.n105.z1.fidonet.org (Bruce Baugh)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 23:39:17 PST
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <730436572.AA01330@therose.pdx.com>


I find that I must ask to have this address removed from your
mailing list. Sorry for the inconvenience.
UUCP !qiclab!therose   INTERNET: therose.fidonet.org  FIDONET: 1:105/7.0 
UUCP <> FidoNet(tm) Gate is a public service provided by therose.pdx.com.
   **Reply messages should not be sent to/through therose.pdx.com**






From mark at coombs.anu.edu.au  Mon Feb 22 23:54:15 1993
From: mark at coombs.anu.edu.au (Mark)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 23:54:15 PST
Subject: anon.penet.fi remailers
Message-ID: <9302230753.AA18385@coombs.anu.edu.au>


>For example, if at any time, Alice sends pseudonymously to Bob, Bob can
>not reply directly: this would expose his identity at anon.penet.fi.
>Bob must reply through a remailer.
>
>Note the irony -- Bob must take special steps to protect his pseudonym
>because anon.penet.fi is acting affirmatively to conceal his actual
>identity.  If Bob slips up and simply replies, he is exposed.

This, unfortunately, is true. I *have* to use a remailer to hide any
anon.penet.fi alias I have or the sender will see it and know I am
(for eg) anon1234 at penet.

I balk at Yet-More-F******-Header-Lines (YMFHL) but a _possible_ patch
is to have a:

X-Show-My-Anon: yes|no       (in the header),

or:

::
X-Show-My-Anon: yes|no       (in the body)

addition so people who reply to a message from penet can feed their real email
address through the system rather than having it bounced to the recipient as
their anon id.  This would require either a smart mailer, checking exactly who
the orig letter was addressed to (your anon or your real address) and
inserting the line as appropriate. It *should* be automatic actually. All it
has to do is check a local list of your anon addressed and if someone has
mailed it then alter the above line as needed.

This raises question of the security of local lists of your anon addrs of
course.. but you get the idea..

Comments?

(BTW I saw someone's .sig where they *advertised* their anon id on USENET.
 Presumably this was because he thought thats what you had to do so others
 could email them anonomously... obviously he wont be a whistle blower :)

Mark
mark at coombs.anu.edu.au





From 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM  Mon Feb 22 23:55:33 1993
From: 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM (Hal)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 23:55:33 PST
Subject: anon.penet.fi hacking
Message-ID: <930223074743_74076.1041_DHJ21-1@CompuServe.COM>


Well, I think I have deduced the identity of "Deadbeat" from his posting
style.  I don't think Julf should say who he is.  This was an important
demonstration of a weakness in the security of the remailers.
 
The Penet remailer seems now to require a password for all messages; at
least, I wasn't able to send to an5877 at anon.penet.fi ("Deadbeat") without
using my password.  So chaining through Cypherpunks remailers to Penet would
seem not to be possible now.
 
Unless Eli's suggestion works - having our remailers put out a random
"From:" line (perhaps just on mail to Penet?) might cause Penet to issue a
new pseudonym for that apparent new user.  This would be kind of wasteful
from Penet's perspective - all those pseudonyms are never going to be
re-used.  But it might allow this form of chaining, without compromising the
pseudonym of the remailer operator.
 
(I had put my patch into the maildelivery file before Johan instituted his
password system, when I realized this weakness existed.  I forgot to mention
it here at the time.  My motivation was to protect my own Penet pseudonym.)
 
Another possibility would be for there to be a command to Penet to allow
users to send truly anonymous mail, mail which does not have a meaningful
"From" line (and in particular which does not have the user's Penet
pseudonym displayed as the "From" address).  We could set our remailers to
use that command for any mail sent to Penet.  Mail sent with that command
would not need a password.  This would be an alternative way for users to
deal with some of the other attacks, such as the one Deadbeat demonstrated.
 
Hal
 
P.S. - My, the list has sure been lively today.  Looks like we beat
Extropians again on volume!
 







From julf at penet.FI  Tue Feb 23 00:04:20 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 00:04:20 PST
Subject: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
In-Reply-To: <9302230604.AA04535@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9302230851.aa19921@penet.penet.FI>



> I meant only slight malice here:  I had intended to "expose" a few
> email/anon associations to highlight the problem.  The problem became
> apparent to me when I sent pseudonymous mail to a prominent person on
> this list; his reply exposed his pseudonymous id at anon.penet.fi,
> surely without his knowledge.

I think this would be fixed by the "X-Anon-Anonymize: no" (or whatever)
hack. But for reasons I have outlined in the earlier round of
discussions, it can't be the default. Comments? 

> > an5877's message appears to be a trick, designed to collect
> > anonymous/real address pairs.  Johan Helsingius should take
> > action against this trickster.  Since he is learning other
> > people's real addresses, perhaps it would be appropriate for his
> > own real address to be revealed.
> 
> Now that would be a _very_ serious "bug" in the anon.penet.fi remailer
> (or, more accurately, in its administration); I am confident Johan
> Helsingius will reject this suggestion.

Definitely. I might block someone from using the server, but never (ok,
"never say never") expose somebody.

> > But, this does point out that these systems which automatically
> > assign anonymous addrsses have several security flaws.  Johan
> > has already had to introduce a "password" feature to make it
> > more difficult to send fakemail that appears to be from a
> > particular email address through the server, thus revealing the
> > corresponding anonymous address when it is delivered.
> 
> I think that merely masks the real problem.

It fixes *one* problem. I really appreciate suggestions for other
solutions.

> > These are serious problems.  We need some discussion of how to
> > avoid these simple tricks for defeating the anonymity while
> > still having an easy-to-use system.
> 
> Any ideas?  For starters, I think the default behavior of anon.penet.fi
> is badly broken.

There has been a lot of discussion about this, and I'm afraid it's too
late to change the *default* behavior now...

> But a more serious problem with anon.penet.fi and the
> other remailers I am aware of is the necessity that we pseudonymous
> clients have to rely on the integrity of their administrators to keep
> our pseudonyms private.  In the face of social pressure, such as
> Xavier's, that may be asking a lot.

True. And that's why PGP-based stuff & remailer chains is the way to go
for "hard" anonymity. But for posting to general newsgroups, we also
need a system with working return paths. This doesn't seem possible with
current remailer chain systems.

	Julf (admin at anon.penet.fi)

P.S. In case I forgot to announce it, as you could see from the message
I'm replying to, PGP stuff doesn't get stripped at anon.penet.fi
anymore.....





From julf at penet.FI  Tue Feb 23 00:21:49 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 00:21:49 PST
Subject: Anon address attack...
In-Reply-To: <9302230700.AA03047@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302230920.aa20039@penet.penet.FI>



> I was thinking of installing a trivial hack in my remailer, such that
> upon demand it adds some random (essentially unrepeatable) cruft to
> the From: line, placing it as a name field so as to have no
> addressing significance.  I believe penet assigns IDs based on this
> line, so chaining this to a penet-style remailer would provide
> "hit-and-run" anonymity -- even if the remailer wants nothing of the
> sort.  The social desirability of this could be questioned, but it
> certainly seems more secure to built pseudonyms on top of something
> like this (using PGP sigs to provide a solid identity) than through
> the presently-popular approach.  Comments?  (Julf?)

I think we should come up with a more socially acceptable solution.
Widespread use of hit-and-run abuse on the net would certainly lead to
actions against sites such as anon.penet.fi. Some method that preserves
a return path is needed for a *general* posting facility
(alt.whistleblowers etc. would be special cases). And... Please remember
anon.penet.fi has something like 13000 existing users. And most of them
have been using other anonymous posting hosts with the same
limitations/defaults as anon.penet.fi. So we can't change everything
overnight...

	Julf






From julf at penet.FI  Tue Feb 23 00:22:19 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 00:22:19 PST
Subject: 
In-Reply-To: <9302230654.AA10264@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9302230933.aa20090@penet.penet.FI>



> I think it's wrong for anon.penet.fi to operate this way.

Well, then, how *should* anon.penet.fi operate? I really am open to
suggestions...

	Julf






From julf at penet.FI  Tue Feb 23 00:52:04 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 00:52:04 PST
Subject: anon.penet.fi hacking
In-Reply-To: <930223074743_74076.1041_DHJ21-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302230955.aa20252@penet.penet.FI>



> Well, I think I have deduced the identity of "Deadbeat" from his posting
> style.  I don't think Julf should say who he is.  This was an important
> demonstration of a weakness in the security of the remailers.

Definitely!

> The Penet remailer seems now to require a password for all messages; at
> least, I wasn't able to send to an5877 at anon.penet.fi ("Deadbeat") without
> using my password.  So chaining through Cypherpunks remailers to Penet would
> seem not to be possible now.

Unless you include your password in the message! Remember that
anon.penet.fi can pick up the X-Anon-To: and X-Anon-Password: lines from
the start of the message text - they don't have to be header fields.

> Unless Eli's suggestion works - having our remailers put out a random
> "From:" line (perhaps just on mail to Penet?) might cause Penet to issue a
> new pseudonym for that apparent new user.  This would be kind of wasteful
> from Penet's perspective - all those pseudonyms are never going to be
> re-used.  But it might allow this form of chaining, without compromising the
> pseudonym of the remailer operator.

The social implications are more important.

> Another possibility would be for there to be a command to Penet to allow
> users to send truly anonymous mail, mail which does not have a meaningful
> "From" line (and in particular which does not have the user's Penet
> pseudonym displayed as the "From" address).  We could set our remailers to
> use that command for any mail sent to Penet.  Mail sent with that command
> would not need a password.  This would be an alternative way for users to
> deal with some of the other attacks, such as the one Deadbeat demonstrated.

I repeat: for general postings, we have to come up with a way to provide
anonymity while retaining a return path. Otherwise chaos ensues, just
look at the most blatant misuses of anon postings witnessed recently!

> P.S. - My, the list has sure been lively today.  Looks like we beat
> Extropians again on volume!

Yeah... Haven't ben able to get away from my machine to have my morning
shower yet (it's 10:30am in Finland).

	Julf






From julf at penet.FI  Tue Feb 23 00:52:21 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 00:52:21 PST
Subject: anon.penet.fi remailers
In-Reply-To: <9302230753.AA18385@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Message-ID: <9302231003.aa20289@penet.penet.FI>



> I balk at Yet-More-F******-Header-Lines (YMFHL) but a _possible_ patch
> is to have a:
> 
> X-Show-My-Anon: yes|no       (in the header),
> 
> or:
> 
> ::
> X-Show-My-Anon: yes|no       (in the body)

Yes. Thinking about something like this. But what is teh best syntax?

> (BTW I saw someone's .sig where they *advertised* their anon id on USENET.
>  Presumably this was because he thought thats what you had to do so others
>  could email them anonomously... obviously he wont be a whistle blower :)

Well, it could be somebody who doesn't care about his/her own anonymity,
but wants to make it as easy as possible to send anon mail to him/her.
It's so much easier to mail to anXXXX at anon.penet.fi than to use stuff
like user%host.domain at anon.penet.fi or hack around with strange extra
X-Anon-* headers (especially with anally-retentive mailers etc.).

	Julf






From julf at penet.FI  Tue Feb 23 01:12:12 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 01:12:12 PST
Subject: 
In-Reply-To: <9302230715.AA11401@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9302231011.aa20353@penet.penet.FI>



> Well, I don't agree that doubleblind is a great idea.

Neither do I. But many of the users of anon.penet.fi are
not very computer-and-email-literate, and they have been using other
services, providing double-blind. Unfortunate, but too late to change now...

What we can do is to provide better ways for those who *are* computer
literate enough to use extra headers etc.

> > Evidentally there is positive harm that can occur by automatically
> > anonymizing all messages which pass through a remailer.  ... For
> > anonymous posting and for mail to a non-anonymous address, it's more
> > reasonable to assume that anonymization is desired.  ... But when
> > sending a message to an anonymous address, it's not known whether the
> > sender wants to be anonymized or not.
> 
> I think it's imperative that the sender use X-Anon-To to be
> pseudonymous.  This is consistent with the principle of least
> astonishment.

But in this case I feel the principle of least astonishment is overruled
by the principle of least risk of accidental exposure.

> > Also, I have seen proposals that anonymous ID's should be made less
> > recognizable, so that instead of an5877 at anon.penet.fi we would have
> > joe at serv.uba.edu.  In such a situation it might be tedious to
> > scrutinize every email address we send to (via replies, for example)
> > to make sure it isn't a remailer where you have an anonymous ID.
> 
> It would be a real boon to make pseudonyms less prominent -- this
> seems to have kicked over a hornet's nest on USENET (even though
> pseudonyms have been quietly in use for years).  But were this the
> case, scrutiny would be an understatement.

I think that hornet's nest needed to be kicked. But I am also
disappointed that not enough people defend the need for anonymity in
places like news.admin.policy.

I think pseudonyms *should* be prominent - as you have noticed, anon.penet.fi
adds an explicit warning at the end of every message.

> > All in all, I think some changes need to be made in how anonymous
> > addresses are used and implemented in order to provide reasonable
> > amounts of security.
> 
> I agree that more discussion is in order.  I'm especially concerned 
> about the broader issues regarding anonymity through remailers.

Agree 100%.

	Julf






From deltorto at aol.com  Tue Feb 23 03:50:49 1993
From: deltorto at aol.com (deltorto at aol.com)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 03:50:49 PST
Subject: Mac HD Cypher... mostly
Message-ID: <9302230651.tn06929@aol.com>


>>From:  DDLEEDS at vm.cmp.ilstu.edu
>>Subj:        Mac HD Cypher...
>>
>>Does anyone know of a way or program that can completely encrypt a hard
drive
>>on a macintosh computer so that only the person that knows the key can
decrypt it?

Well, I don't know about "impenetrable" other than my first girlfriend when I
was 9's underpants, but FWB's Hard Disk ToolKit (aka HDT) provides, besides
very nice control over all aspects of SCSI drive configuration, three levels
of 'protection': a driver-level password (keeps yer granny out) and two
levels of block-by-block encryption - simple password-based (keeps your savvy
mate from editing the file blocks and recovering your loveletters) or DES
(keeps most non-Fed attackers out).

The advantage of this device-driver level encryption is that the drive can be
used normally as long as you know the password. Otherwise, if some spook with
a warrant tries to mount it down at his office, he has to fill out a shitload
of forms, FedEx it to Fort Meade and wait a few days for the lads in the lab
to crack it for him before he can come back with the 'cuffs.

I recommend giving the drive an HDT driver-level access password as well as
DES encryption if you're really concerned that your girlfriend is gonna see
the shit you been writing about her to that other chick. I use these options
on a couple of 44 MB SyQuest removeables. I sleep pretty well at night (when
I sleep, that is).

>>I am looking for a crypt that is completely IMPENETRABLE!!!

Dream on, Smedley. Anyone who's ever graduated from Paranoid U. can tell you
that when the chips are down (i.e. the New Sons of Armageddon come a-knockin'
at yer shack), DES is about as secure as my third girlfriend when I was 12's
panties - not very. OK, so I enjoyed puberty, sue me...

>>Your help would be appreciated,
>>
>>
>>Jumping Jack Flash

You can find HDT mentioned in any decent Mac 'zine. Happy Jumping.

   d2t

PS: I'd tell you FWB's phone number in the 415 (SF) area, but that might
sound like advertising.      :-)





From deltorto at aol.com  Tue Feb 23 03:50:51 1993
From: deltorto at aol.com (deltorto at aol.com)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 03:50:51 PST
Subject: Dead(beat) give-away
Message-ID: <9302230651.tn06928@aol.com>


"an5877 at anon.penet.fi" (aka "deadbeat") sez:

>> I believe I have uncovered a serious bug in the Finnish anonymous
>> remailer, one that allows me to piece together anonymous id's and
>> actual email addresses.
>> 
>> I'm reluctant to publish the details here, but I'll explain how it
>> works if you send me your email address.

I smell something, and it's not my FPU overheating!

Anyone who's "reluctant" to discuss a flaw in an anon remailer HERE...
is definitely NOT on the up-and-up.

Somebody "out" this weasel, PRONTO!  (please!)

  d2t





From julf at penet.FI  Tue Feb 23 04:52:26 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 04:52:26 PST
Subject: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
In-Reply-To: <YfWIGZe00iV346rPEa@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9302231407.aa21810@penet.penet.FI>



> Perhaps a new header such as
> 
> X-Anon-Doubleblind: yes|no
> 
> defaulting to yes...?

Sounds OK. Will implement it ASAP.

Thanks!

	Julf





From tony at morgan.demon.co.uk  Tue Feb 23 05:21:08 1993
From: tony at morgan.demon.co.uk (Tony Kidson)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 05:21:08 PST
Subject: anon.penet.fi hacking
Message-ID: <2497@morgan.demon.co.uk>


One reason the list has been so busy is that DEADBEAT's messages
seem to be being posted both through penet and through a cypherpunks
remailer.

Tony
+-----------------+-------------------------------+--------------------------+
| Tony Kidson     |`morgan' is an 8MB  486/33 Cat-| Voice +44 81 466 5127    |
| Morgan Towers,  |Warmer with a 670 MB Hard Disk.| E-Mail                   |
| Morgan Road,    |It  resides at Morgan Towers in| tony at morgan.demon.co.uk  |
| Bromley,        |Beautiful  Down Town  Bromley. | tny at cix.compulink.co.uk  |
| England BR1 3QE |Honda ST1100  ==*==  DoD# 0801 | 100024.301 at compuserve.com|
+=================+===============================+==========================+





From paul at fairgate.com  Tue Feb 23 05:50:52 1993
From: paul at fairgate.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 05:50:52 PST
Subject: anonymous mail
Message-ID: <m0nQzDn-0001cvC@gw.CrystalData.COM>


>Eli> You might want to work in perl, which would make the scripts work under
>Eli> Unix and DOS, at least.  Is there a Mac perl?
>
>...  As for a Mac Perl, a quick scan of my
>Camel book doesn't turn up a mention of one.  I could have missed it.

There is indeed a Mac perl; it exists as a standalone app and an MPW tool.
I'll post the location tomorrow if I remember to look it up; the
Internet-abled can try archie.

-Paul
--
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG       |  Fairgate Technologies: Macintosh support, 
paul at fairgate.com            |  training, and development.
..uunet!xavax!fairgate!paul |  'ripem' PEM key available.





From i6t4 at jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  Tue Feb 23 06:07:48 1993
From: i6t4 at jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca (Nickey MacDonald)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 06:07:48 PST
Subject: Some questions
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9302230950.A13475-b100000@jupiter>


{I have been reading the list for about a week now...  This is my first
post...  I hope this is not a FAQ...}

I am looking for solutions to a situation that people may find familiar...
Say you have a text file that contains sensitive configuration data (in a
particular case, the cross-index of anonymous ids and real mail addresses)
taht you want a program to be able to read, but you want it stored in
encrypted format.  (Which means you will decrypt it each time you read it,
and rewrite it in encrypted form when needed.  It will only exist in
decrypted in the computers RAM.)  Is there some sort of scheme that will
allow this, without having to have a user present to enter the password at
startup (a pain if its supposed to be an unattended program, such as a
remailer) or having the password compiled into the program...

Also, I have seen a number of references to DC nets...  I must confess I
have never heard of the term before...  can someone enlighten me?

---
Nick MacDonald
i6t4 at jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca







From 71562.3445 at CompuServe.COM  Tue Feb 23 06:08:33 1993
From: 71562.3445 at CompuServe.COM (Duncan Frissell)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 06:08:33 PST
Subject: Advertising on the net
Message-ID: <930223140021_71562.3445_CHT76-1@CompuServe.COM>


Nothing like jumping into the middle with one's first posting...

Denizens of the nets have to realize that there are some extreme social
deviates out here who go beyond sodomy, go beyond working for the FDA,
go beyond rape as an instrumentality of war, go beyond voting and actually 
believe that adverting is an ennobling human activity.

Think about it.  Poor Michael in the last few episodes of "Thirtysomething"
suffering existential angst because he was great at advertising but 
considered it an unworthy occupation for a man.  If he'd only known that
advertising=mass markets=low prices=wealth beyond the dreams of ancient 
Kings.

Lack of advertising=Moscow before 1990.

If we have to accept your deviations (voting for the short fascist with the
bad haircut and the funny ears par example) you have to accept ours.  We
can live with each other without too much trouble.

Duncan Frissell

****************************************************************************
*                                                                          *
*                                                                          *
*                           YOUR AD HERE                                   *
*                                                                          *
*                                                                          *
****************************************************************************

PS - If you post a message about the existence and availability of PGP, you
are *ADVERTISING*.  Naughty, naughty, naughty.







From robichau at lambda.msfc.nasa.gov  Tue Feb 23 06:12:07 1993
From: robichau at lambda.msfc.nasa.gov (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 06:12:07 PST
Subject: Mac Perl info
Message-ID: <9302231410.AA18658@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov>


As {promised | threatened} in my message to the list last night,
here's the info file for Mac Perl, available at fine FTP sites like
nic.switch.ch (the original site and holder of this file.)

I don't use Perl myself, but you can contact either Matthias or Tim
(see below); they have both been helpful with other stuff in the past.

Regards,
-Paul, posting from work for once





WELCOME TO MPW PERL

This is Perl for the Mac, ported to MPW C by Matthias Neeracher
<neeri at iis.ethz.ch> and Tim Endres <time at ice.com>. It runs every
program in the test suite that you could it reasonably expect to, and
some you probably didn't expect.  Feel free to give this program away
according to the terms stated in the README file.

System Requirements

Perl really likes MPW. The standalone version is not much use yet.
Some of the really cool features require ToolServer, System 7, and
enough RAM (Notably stuff like `CFront MacApp.cp`, while (<�.c>) or
open(XXX, "Catenate �.c |")) Some of the files barely compile with 5
megabytes of RAM.

Bugs, Suggestions, Damnations

Please send your bug reports and/or fixes to <neeri at iis.ethz.ch> (It
is rather unlikely that any of the bugs are relevant to the UNIX
version).

Mailing list

There is now a mailing list for announcing new releases, sharing
scripts, and discussions about how to make MPW Perl change your life.
To subscribe, send a mail to <mpw-perl-request at iis.ethz.ch>

Revision History

24Jan93	4.0.6

- choose() for files no longer includes the terminating null character.
- rename() and TCP sockets work better (thanks to Brad Pickering for reporting
  these bugs).
- standalone version can read scripts from its data fork and accepts more 
  startup files.
- (hopefully) improved the documentation a little. Added ObiWan support.
  
20Dec92	4.0.5

- Supports sockets and symbolic links.
- "ask", "answer" and "pick" are now builtins with a slightly changed syntax
  (sorry).
- A few mac scripts are now provided in :t:mac and :macscripts:
- The application now always searches for a #! line first. If none is found,
  the script is executed anyway, but the file has to be read twice.
  
27Sep92	4.0.4

This release upgrades the Mac version to UNIX patchlevel 35.

08Jun92	4.0.3

This release supports opendir (In fact, I thought the last one'd already support it.
Thanks to Mike Meckler <meckler at egg.gg.caltech.edu> for reporting this bug).

dbmopen & friends are now supported.

20Jan92	4.0.2

First public release.

-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG              | May explode if disposed of improperly.
Mission Software Development Div.   | Printed on recycled phosphors.
New Technology, Inc.		    | ** PGP 2.0 key available on request **





From honey at citi.umich.edu  Tue Feb 23 06:30:24 1993
From: honey at citi.umich.edu (peter honeyman)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 06:30:24 PST
Subject: Advertising on the net
In-Reply-To: <930223140021_71562.3445_CHT76-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302231430.AA10258@toad.com>


'scuse me if i'm failing to recognize sarcasm ...

you can think what you like, but the fact remains that
the cypherpunks list was created with a specific set
of topics in mind.  people subscribe to the list to 
discuss those specific topics.  

there is plenty of room in cyberspace for discussions 
of any sort you like, including the merits of advertising.  
but not here.  ok?

	peter





From mvario at inode.com  Tue Feb 23 07:11:00 1993
From: mvario at inode.com (MICHAEL VARI)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 07:11:00 PST
Subject: REQUEST
Message-ID: <3498908CAA@inode.com>


Subj: Request
To: cypherpunks-request at toad.com

I would like to request to be placed on the cypherpunks mailing
list.

Thank you,

Michael Vario

mvario at inode.com

 
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12





From an5877 at anon.penet.fi  Tue Feb 23 07:31:29 1993
From: an5877 at anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 07:31:29 PST
Subject: No subject
Message-ID: <9302231437.AA00626@anon.penet.fi>


In-reply-to: Johan Helsingius' message of Tue, 23 Feb 1993 10:52:16 +0200.
	     <9302231011.aa20353 at penet.penet.FI>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> > Well, I don't agree that doubleblind is a great idea.
> 
> Neither do I. But many of the users of anon.penet.fi are
> not very computer-and-email-literate, and they have been using other
> services, providing double-blind. Unfortunate, but too late to change now...

Can you elaborate on those other services?  The Finnish remailer is the
only one I'm aware of.

Also, I'm confused about these "not very computer-and-email-literate"
users -- aren't they forced to use an X-Anon-Password header?

I'm surprised there hasn't been more ruckus about the default
behavior.  There must be many folks whose identities have been
inadvertantly exposed.

> What we can do is to provide better ways for those who *are* computer
> literate enough to use extra headers etc.

I don't think this will help.  With my mail environment, I have to go
to lengths to send an anonymous message, concocting X-Anon-To and
X-Anon-Password headers.  It's worth the effort, since this helps to
preserve the secrecy of my pseudonymous identity.

But the first time I mess up, and send an unfettered message to an
anon.penet.fi client, I am unmasked.

What I'm saying is that I'm hip to headers; it's the simple stuff that
trips me up.

And I still don't understand how the unfettered message gets past the
X-Anon-Password filter.

> > I think it's imperative that the sender use X-Anon-To to be
> > pseudonymous.  This is consistent with the principle of least
> > astonishment.
> 
> But in this case I feel the principle of least astonishment is overruled
> by the principle of least risk of accidental exposure.

I think the risk of accidental exposure is heightened by the default
behavior of the Finnish remailer.  Maybe we're using the same words to
describe different things.

> I think that hornet's nest needed to be kicked. But I am also
> disappointed that not enough people defend the need for anonymity in
> places like news.admin.policy.

Some of us gave up on USENET policy long, long ago.  Personally, I stick
to the alt.* groups.

> I think pseudonyms *should* be prominent - as you have noticed, anon.penet.fi
> adds an explicit warning at the end of every message.

In time, I hope such warnings will be unnecessary, as people grow
accustomed to the use of pseudonyms.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4o0+PFZTpBW/B35AQGlcAF/UC0HNtSoIQe2arEoK5uzkjX+7fCwPUqC
l/2o0wifS7SLGLfoshQpd3vaczDktaBV
=TPtY
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Tue Feb 23 07:40:27 1993
From: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 07:40:27 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302231537.AA28187@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>


In-reply-to: Johan Helsingius' message of Tue, 23 Feb 1993 10:52:16 +0200.
	     <9302231011.aa20353 at penet.penet.FI>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> > Well, I don't agree that doubleblind is a great idea.
> 
> Neither do I. But many of the users of anon.penet.fi are
> not very computer-and-email-literate, and they have been using other
> services, providing double-blind. Unfortunate, but too late to change now...

Can you elaborate on those other services?  The Finnish remailer is the
only one I'm aware of.

Also, I'm confused about these "not very computer-and-email-literate"
users -- aren't they forced to use an X-Anon-Password header?

I'm surprised there hasn't been more ruckus about the default
behavior.  There must be many folks whose identities have been
inadvertantly exposed.

> What we can do is to provide better ways for those who *are* computer
> literate enough to use extra headers etc.

I don't think this will help.  With my mail environment, I have to go
to lengths to send an anonymous message, concocting X-Anon-To and
X-Anon-Password headers.  It's worth the effort, since this helps to
preserve the secrecy of my pseudonymous identity.

But the first time I mess up, and send an unfettered message to an
anon.penet.fi client, I am unmasked.

What I'm saying is that I'm hip to headers; it's the simple stuff that
trips me up.

And I still don't understand how the unfettered message gets past the
X-Anon-Password filter.

> > I think it's imperative that the sender use X-Anon-To to be
> > pseudonymous.  This is consistent with the principle of least
> > astonishment.
> 
> But in this case I feel the principle of least astonishment is overruled
> by the principle of least risk of accidental exposure.

I think the risk of accidental exposure is heightened by the default
behavior of the Finnish remailer.  Maybe we're using the same words to
describe different things.

> I think that hornet's nest needed to be kicked. But I am also
> disappointed that not enough people defend the need for anonymity in
> places like news.admin.policy.

Some of us gave up on USENET policy long, long ago.  Personally, I stick
to the alt.* groups.

> I think pseudonyms *should* be prominent - as you have noticed, anon.penet.fi
> adds an explicit warning at the end of every message.

In time, I hope such warnings will be unnecessary, as people grow
accustomed to the use of pseudonyms.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4o0+PFZTpBW/B35AQGlcAF/UC0HNtSoIQe2arEoK5uzkjX+7fCwPUqC
l/2o0wifS7SLGLfoshQpd3vaczDktaBV
=TPtY
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From ncselxsi!drzaphod at ncselxsi.netcom.com  Tue Feb 23 07:49:34 1993
From: ncselxsi!drzaphod at ncselxsi.netcom.com (DrZaphod)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 07:49:34 PST
Subject: posting and posting and posting.
Message-ID: <10525.drzaphod@ncselxsi>


In Message Tue, 23 Feb 93 12:16:29 GMT,
  Tony Kidson <morgan.demon.co.uk!tony at netcomsv.netcom.com> writes:

>One reason the list has been so busy is that DEADBEAT's messages
>seem to be being posted both through penet and through a cypherpunks
>remailer.

     I was just going to ask about that.. I've gotten the same message from
DEADBEAT about 4 times..

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod at ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized





From an5877 at anon.penet.fi  Tue Feb 23 08:19:50 1993
From: an5877 at anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 08:19:50 PST
Subject: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
Message-ID: <9302231520.AA03498@anon.penet.fi>


In-reply-to: Johan Helsingius' message of Tue, 23 Feb 1993 09:32:54 +0200.
	     <9302230851.aa19921 at penet.penet.FI>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> >                                                    The problem became
> > apparent to me when I sent pseudonymous mail to a prominent person on
> > this list; his reply exposed his pseudonymous id at anon.penet.fi,
> > surely without his knowledge.
>
> I think this would be fixed by the "X-Anon-Anonymize: no" (or whatever)
> hack. But for reasons I have outlined in the earlier round of
> discussions, it can't be the default. Comments?

If it's not the default behavior, then it will be a recurring problem.

> There has been a lot of discussion about this, and I'm afraid it's too
> late to change the *default* behavior now...

Why?  It seems to me the X-Anon-Password header was a pretty major
change, yet you made that change to preserve people's pseudonymous
identities.  The instant challenge is just as grave, don't you think?

> P.S. In case I forgot to announce it, as you could see from the message
> I'm replying to, PGP stuff doesn't get stripped at anon.penet.fi
> anymore.....

Great stuff.  Thanks.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4o8FfFZTpBW/B35AQFQgwF/QU9NQmgtFKfv+KMoghtSwTL/e8vh3G4b
vwlZy3yWF6D4+LVAnOEcuh0gvxJSNi51
=hD4O
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Tue Feb 23 08:29:37 1993
From: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 08:29:37 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302231626.AA01332@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>


In-reply-to: Johan Helsingius' message of Tue, 23 Feb 1993 09:32:54 +0200.
	     <9302230851.aa19921 at penet.penet.FI>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> >                                                    The problem became
> > apparent to me when I sent pseudonymous mail to a prominent person on
> > this list; his reply exposed his pseudonymous id at anon.penet.fi,
> > surely without his knowledge.
>
> I think this would be fixed by the "X-Anon-Anonymize: no" (or whatever)
> hack. But for reasons I have outlined in the earlier round of
> discussions, it can't be the default. Comments?

If it's not the default behavior, then it will be a recurring problem.

> There has been a lot of discussion about this, and I'm afraid it's too
> late to change the *default* behavior now...

Why?  It seems to me the X-Anon-Password header was a pretty major
change, yet you made that change to preserve people's pseudonymous
identities.  The instant challenge is just as grave, don't you think?

> P.S. In case I forgot to announce it, as you could see from the message
> I'm replying to, PGP stuff doesn't get stripped at anon.penet.fi
> anymore.....

Great stuff.  Thanks.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4o8FfFZTpBW/B35AQFQgwF/QU9NQmgtFKfv+KMoghtSwTL/e8vh3G4b
vwlZy3yWF6D4+LVAnOEcuh0gvxJSNi51
=hD4O
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From an5877 at anon.penet.fi  Tue Feb 23 08:32:23 1993
From: an5877 at anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 08:32:23 PST
Subject: anon.penet.fi hacking
Message-ID: <9302231549.AA05587@anon.penet.fi>


In-reply-to: Tony Kidson's message of Tue, 23 Feb 1993 12:16:29 +0000.
	     <2497 at morgan.demon.co.uk>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> One reason the list has been so busy is that DEADBEAT's messages
> seem to be being posted both through penet and through a cypherpunks
> remailer.

I don't know why this is happening -- my messages are being sent with
headers

    To: anon at anon.penet.fi
    X-Anon-To: cypherpunks at toad.com

Yet two copies are arriving, one from "an5877 at anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)"
and another from "nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)."  Personally, I
think the latter remailer is broken.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4pBIPFZTpBW/B35AQGqcAF9FmuI1E+L0hsWVFbshFQo96mmQoo3pRKt
22+lrGbZge7san/4PQnWmd93HjJEc97u
=KGNP
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU  Tue Feb 23 08:36:38 1993
From: elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU (Karl Barrus)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 08:36:38 PST
Subject: pgpshell
Message-ID: <199302231635.AA18689@Menudo.UH.EDU>



Cypherpunks:

A user new to unix, pgp, the net, etc. wrote to me asking for a "menu
type of shell" to protect from switch overload.  So I hacked this
together pretty quickly and have given it a once over testing.  It is
meant for new pgp users; something which will help until they are more
comfortable.  I mailed to the original user, but I thought there may
be wider interest.

pgpshell: it pretty much just passes on arguments to pgp, nothing
fancy, minimal functionality.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf at menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus at tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/

------8< cut here >8-----
#!/bin/sh
# pgpshell: minimally functional script to help users of pgp
# (I'm not claiming this yet) :-)
# last update 2/23/93

echo " 1: encrypt a file"
echo " 2: decrypt a file"
echo " 3: conventionally encrypt a file"
echo " 4: sign and encrypt a file"
echo " 5: sign a file, result in ascii file"
echo ""
echo -n "choice: "
read choice

echo -n "Name of file? "
read filename

if [ ! -f "$filename" ]
then
  echo "File $filename not found."
  exit 1
fi

case "$choice" 
in
  1) echo -n "User id? ";
     read user;
     pgp -ea $filename $user;;
  2) pgp $filename;;
  3) pgp -c $filename;;
  4) echo -n "User id? ";
     read user;
     pgp -esa $filename $user;;
  5) pgp -sat +clearsig=on $filename;;
  *) echo "Improper choice."; exit 1;;
esac






From nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Tue Feb 23 08:39:34 1993
From: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 08:39:34 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302231636.AA02040@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>


In-reply-to: Tony Kidson's message of Tue, 23 Feb 1993 12:16:29 +0000.
	     <2497 at morgan.demon.co.uk>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> One reason the list has been so busy is that DEADBEAT's messages
> seem to be being posted both through penet and through a cypherpunks
> remailer.

I don't know why this is happening -- my messages are being sent with
headers

    To: anon at anon.penet.fi
    X-Anon-To: cypherpunks at toad.com

Yet two copies are arriving, one from "an5877 at anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)"
and another from "nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)."  Personally, I
think the latter remailer is broken.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4pBIPFZTpBW/B35AQGqcAF9FmuI1E+L0hsWVFbshFQo96mmQoo3pRKt
22+lrGbZge7san/4PQnWmd93HjJEc97u
=KGNP
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM  Tue Feb 23 09:01:58 1993
From: 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM (Hal)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 09:01:58 PST
Subject: Beware of anon.penet.fi
Message-ID: <930223165258_74076.1041_DHJ23-1@CompuServe.COM>


I'd like to verify that
 
X-Anon-Doubleblind: no
 
would mean that no X-Anon-Password would be needed with the message.  This
way, remailer operators who use their personal accounts for remailing could
establish a Penet anonymous ID and password for personal use, and be
confident that remailer users would not be able to send mail through Penet
that would be delivered with that anonymous ID exposed.
 
Also, we could patch the remailers to add the X-Anon-Doubleblind: no line to
mail which goes out to Penet, just in case the user forgets.  (I don't think
there is a need for mail through one of our remailers to be delivered to
Penet with an X-Anon-Password, since only the remailer operator knows the
correct password to use, so virtually no one would be able to use this
feature.)
 
I am confused about the exact rules that Penet uses to decide when a
password must be given.  I get the impression that if no password has been
registered, anonymous posting and mailing to non-anonymous addresses is
forbidden, but you can still mail to anonymous addresses.  If a password has
been registered, you must give it to do any of these three things.  Is this
right?
 
Hal
 







From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Tue Feb 23 09:31:42 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 09:31:42 PST
Subject: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
In-Reply-To: <9302230851.aa19921@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9302231728.AA20762@soda.berkeley.edu>


Currently to mail to person 1234 at penet, you send mail to 

	anon1234 at penet.fi

This mail goes out anonymously from the sender, either using an
existing mail address or creating one.  But if one were able to reach
person 1234 also with the email address, say,

	name1234 at penet.fi

the behavior could be _not_ to make this posting anonymous.

To wit, the 1234 indicates that you are replying to a pseudonymous
recipient, and the anon/name pair indicate whether the sender is
anonymous.  Thus no change in default behavior, and no new header
lines.

Eric






From 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM  Tue Feb 23 09:38:43 1993
From: 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM (Hal)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 09:38:43 PST
Subject: Doubled penet messages
Message-ID: <930223173029_74076.1041_DHJ36-1@CompuServe.COM>


I see what's causing the double messages from Deadbeat.
 
Penet puts an X-Anonymously-To: cypherpunks at toad.com into the header that it
sends.  (I'm not sure why it has to do this; isn't this redundant with the
"To:" header?)  The cypherpunks mailing list rebroadcaster keeps this
header.  The mailing list goes to Chael Hall's remailer.  That remailer sees
the X-Anonymously-To line in the header and thinks this message is a
remailing request.  (The other Cypherpunks remailers uses a different header
line for their remailing requests.)  That remailer then obediently sends the
mail to Cypherpunks, and so we get two messages.
 
Either Chael's remailer should not accept X-Anonymously-To as its remailing
request, or Penet should not put X-Anonymously-To into the outgoing message
headers.
 
Perhaps this would be a good time to standardize the supported set of
headers for remailing requests.
 
Hal
 







From eggo at STUDENT.umass.edu  Tue Feb 23 09:43:18 1993
From: eggo at STUDENT.umass.edu (Bullet in the Head)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 09:43:18 PST
Subject: Finding Mac PGP software?
Message-ID: <9302231740.AA09941@titan.ucs.umass.edu>


	I'm sure this is a FAQ, but can anyone point me to an FTP site
where I can obtain PGP for the Macintosh?  Does such a beast exist?
Thanks for your time.

+-    eggo at titan.ucc.umass.edu                 Eat Some Paste    -+
+-          Yorn desh born, der ritt de gitt der gue,            -+
+-      Orn desh, dee born desh, de umn bork! bork! bork!        -+





From Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU  Tue Feb 23 09:55:59 1993
From: Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU (Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 09:55:59 PST
Subject: two copies of deadbeat's mail...
Message-ID: <9302231754.AA16626@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>


Attention deadbeat...

I'm getting two copies of your postings to cypherpunks from both
anon.penet.fi and from nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu.

One copy is enough.

Thanks.





From an5877 at anon.penet.fi  Tue Feb 23 09:56:24 1993
From: an5877 at anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 09:56:24 PST
Subject: posting and posting and posting.
Message-ID: <9302231710.AA11001@anon.penet.fi>


In-reply-to: DrZaphod's message of Tue, 23 Feb 1993 02:55:22 -0600.
	     <10525.drzaphod at ncselxsi>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>      I was just going to ask about that.. I've gotten the same message from
> DEADBEAT about 4 times..

I don't think I'm to blame for this.  I think the problem is with the
"nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu" remailer.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4pTXvFZTpBW/B35AQGOngGAuhLA0SX22r0UVC9kMVfK31SjSSrCLc5k
+bRhYyMZXyQ/TfneslZ4/mIh/xAPD4MB
=V7Fj
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU  Tue Feb 23 10:08:40 1993
From: elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU (Karl Barrus)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 10:08:40 PST
Subject: double messages
Message-ID: <199302231807.AA28212@Menudo.UH.EDU>



Cypherpunks,

This double & unexpected message problem reminds me of the problems I
had when I attempted to chain pax and penet together.  But that
resulted in unexpected userids, not duplicate messages.  And if an
unexpected userid occured, then it would show in the message to
cypherpunks from penet, assuming an5877 would say that that isn't his
normal pseudonym.

>From what I understand, if someone does not have a penet id and uses
penet to send to this list, that someone will be allocated a penet id,
and allocation will be sent back to the original sender.  Then, mail
to penet with the remailing request to this list will show up as
originating from the pseudonym established.  So how in the world is
Chael's remailer getting hold of the messages and forwarding them to
this list?

I know a few times in the past I've received mail addressed to me and
the list (cc: cypherpunks at toad.com) and I've replied without noticing
the cc: header, so my reply showed up in both places (now I try to
look for the carbon copy header and delete it out!).  But an5877 says
that the header only contains the header he specified.

Now Chael wrote the remailer software himself (is this true?) and I
think he said there were several remailing request specifiers, one of
which is X-Anon-To: user at host - the same one penet uses.

So maybe an5877 is replying to messages with this header:

To: anon at anon.penet.fi
X-Anon-To: cypherpunks at toad.com
Cc: nowhere at bsu-cs.cs.edu

(If the header were this obvious, then I'm sure an5877 would catch it.
But sometimes extra stuff shows in the header, like message id's, etc.
so the cc: is hidden a bit)  Then, the nowhere remailer would
dutifully resend the message as instructed in the X-Anon-To: header.
Of course, to get the cc: nowhere at bsu in the header in the first place
would indicate that an5877 did try to use it at some point - for the
original message?

Well, its a bit far-fetched, but it does explain what is going on.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf at menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus at tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/





From tcmay at netcom.com  Tue Feb 23 10:10:18 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 10:10:18 PST
Subject: Dining Cryptographers Nets--An Introduction
Message-ID: <9302231808.AA22381@netcom.netcom.com>


Nickey MacDonald writes:

>Also, I have seen a number of references to DC nets...  I must confess I
>have never heard of the term before...  can someone enlighten me?

Here's a summary of the "dining cryptographers net" I wrote back in the
pre-Cypherpunks days (which I later posted to the nascent Cypherpunks
list). I'm posting it here because of the question just asked, thinking
that others may be similary confused. (A "Glossary" also exists, and is in
the "soda" archive site.)

(I could apologize for the volume, but cyherpunks ought to be able to
handle a few measly kilobytes of stuff. Besides, at least this won't go out
multiple times to the list!)

Understand that DC-Nets are further off in the future than the
Cypherpunks-PAX-PENET-style remailers being discussed these last few
months. Chaum-style mixes, based on his 1981 CACM letter, have yet to be
implemented, let alone the more advanced DC-Net-style systems. Hal Finney,
Marc Ringuette, and Yanek Martinson are some of the folks on this list who
are interested in working on DC-Nets....Yanek even claims to have a
primitive one running on his local machine and is interested in volunteers
to test it on a larger basis.

The "Information Liberation Front" also posted Chaum's entire 1988 paper,
"The Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender and Recipient
Untraceability." I suppose you could ask them to repost the article or
forward it to you.

Hope the newcomers enjoy this.


To: Extropians at gnu.ai.mit.edu
From: uunet!netcom.com!tcmay (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Dining Cryptographers
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 92 15:45:34 PDT
Reply-To: uunet!gnu.ai.mit.edu!Extropians

Marc R. has opened the door for me to get into some really exciting
stuff:
> 
> Tim May mentioned a new method from Chaum for defeating traffic analysis:
> 
> > Chaum has since improved the tamper-responding "mix" by going to a pure
> > software scheme which he calls "the Dining Cryptographers Protocol." It's
> > described in Vol. 1, Number 1 of "Journal of Cryptology," 1988. If there's
> > interest, I'll summarize it.
> 
> Yes, please, Tim!
> 
> 
> M.

Complexity Warning: This stuff (I'm being informal) is easy once you
get the basic idea. But getting the basic idea usually involves reading
several articles on what RSA, digital signatures, etc., are all about,
working out some examples, thinking about it, drawing pictures with
other folks, and finally having an "Aha!" experience (in Werner Erhard's
terms, you "get it"). The ASCII nature of the Net is not conducive to learning
this stuff, despite the excellent summaries of crypto by Marc R. and Perry M.

The almost-latest "Scientific American," August, has an article by David Chaum
on digital money, and the latest "Spectrum," available at selected newstands,
has several articles on security and cryptography. Also, there are lots of
books. Look 'em up in a university library or flip through them at a large
technical bookstore and pick the one you like the most. (I like a slim
Springer-Verlag paperback, "Modern Cryptology," by Gilles Brassard, 1988, as
a good intro to "modern"--as opposed to "classical"--crypto.)

If the stuff in this posting, and on crypto in general, is beyond your
current understanding, either ignore it, skim it and try to get the gist,
or dig into the articles and books. 

Anyway, back to "The Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender and
Recipient Untraceability," David Chaum, Journal of Cryptology, I, 1, 1988.
Since this journal is hard to get, I'll discuss the article in some detail.
(The techniques have major implications for anarchocapitalism and for
Extropian ideas.)

Abstract: "Keeping confidential who sends which messages, in a world where any 
physical transmission can be traced to its origin, seems impossible.
The solution presented here is unconditionally or cryptographically secure,
depending on whether it is based on one-time-use keys or on public keys.
respectively. It can be adapted to address efficiently a wide variety of 
practical considerations."

A word on terminology: "Unconditionally secure" means what it says: no
computer will ever crack it. One-time pads are unconditionally secure...no
code or cipher is involved, except the one-time pad, so the message is
secure as long as the pad has not been compromised. "Cryptographically
secure" means secure so long as various crypto ciphers are secure, which
may be for a very, very long time (e.g., with very large primes, in RSA).

Chaum describes some "dining cryptographers," which I will playfully change
to "dining Extropians." (The term is of course a variant of the seminal
"dining logicians problem" in computer science)

Three Extropians are having dinner, perhaps in New York City. Their waiter
tells them that their bill has already been paid, either by the NSA
or by one of them. The waiter won't say more.

The Extropians wish to know whether one of them paid, or the NSA paid. But
they don't want to be impolite and force the Extropina payer to 'fess up,
so they carry out this protocol (or procedure):

Each Extropian flips a fair coin behind a menu placed upright between himself
and the Extropian on his right. The coin is visible to himself AND to the
Extropian on his left. Each Extropian can see his own coin and the coin to his
right.

STOP RIGHT HERE! Please take the time to make a sketch of the situation I've
described. If you lost it here, all that follows will be a blur. I'm sparing
you folks my attempt at an ASCII drawing!

Each Extropians then states out loud whether the two coins he can see are the
SAME or are DIFFERENT, e.g., "Heads-Tails" means DIFFERENT, and so forth. For
now, assume the Extropians are truthful.

A little bit of thinking shows that the total number of "DIFFERENCES" must
be either 0 (the coins all came up the same), or 2. Odd parity is impossible.

Now the Extropians agree that if one of them paid, he or she will SAY THE
OPPOSITE of what they actually see. Remember, they don't announce what their
coin turned up as, only whether it was the same or different as their neighbor.

Suppose none of them paid, i.e., the NSA paid. Then they all report the truth
and the parity is even (either 0 or 2 differences). They then know the NSA
paid.

Suppose one of them paid the bill. He reports the opposite of what he actually
sees, and the parity is suddenly odd. That is, there is 1 difference reported.
The Extropians now know that one of them paid. But can they determine which
one?

Suppose you are one of the Extropians and you know you didn't pay. One of the
other two did. You either reported SAME or DIFFERENT, based on what your 
neighbor to the right (whose coin you can see) had. But you can't tell which
of the other two is lying! (You can see you right-hand neighbor's coin, but
you can't see the coin he sees to his right!)

This all generalizes to any number of people. If none of them paid, the parity
is even. If one of them paid, the parity is odd. But which one of them paid
cannot be deduced. And it should be clear that each round can transmit a bit,
e.g., "I paid" is a "1". The message "Attack at dawn" could thus be "sent"
untraceably with multiple rounds of the protocol.

The Crypto Ouija Board: I explain this to people as a kind of ouija board.
A message, like "I paid" or a more interesting "Transfer funds from.....,"
just "emerges" out of the group, with no means of knowing where it came 
from. Truly astounding.

Now there are many interesting wrinkles and elaborations to this protocol. I'll
note just a few.

1. Collusion. Obviously the Extropians can collude to deduce the payer. 
This is best dealt with by creating multiple subcircuits (groups doing the 
protocol amongst themselves). Lots more stuff here. Chaum devotes most of the
paper to these kind of issues and their solutions.

2. With each round of this protocol, a single bit is transmitted. Sending
a long message means many coin flips. Instead of coins and menus, the 
neighbors would exchange lists of random numbers (with the right partners,
as per the protocol above, of course. Details are easy to figure out.)

3. Since the lists are essentially one-time pads, the protocol is 
unconditionally secure, i.e., no assumptions are made about the difficulty
of factoring large numbers or any other crypto assumptions.

4. Participants in such a "DC-Net" (and here we are coming to the heart
of the "crypto anarchy" I have mentioned several times, and which is
perhaps foolishly advertised in my .sig) could exchange CD-ROMs or DATs,
giving them enough "coin flips" for zillions of messages, all untraceable!
The logistics are not simple, but one can imagine personal devices, like
smart card or Apple "Newtons," that can handle these protocols (early 
applications may be for untraceable brainstorming comments, secure
voting in corportate settings, etc.)

5. The lists of random numbers (coin flips) can be generated with standard
cryptographic methods, requiring only a key to be exchanged between the 
appropriate participants. This eliminates the need for the one-time pad,
but means the method is now only cryptographically secure, which is 
often sufficient. (Don't think "only cryptographically secure" means
insecure....the messages may remain encrypted for the next billion years)

6. Collisions occur when multiple messages are sent at the same time. Various
schemes can be devised to handle this, like backing off when you detect
another sender (when even parity is seen instead of odd parity). In large 
systems this is likely to be a problem. Solutions are left as an exercise.

7. Noise. Some participants may try to flood the circuit with spurious
messages, to defeat the system or for whatever other reasons. This is
still an issue. (If there's anything to take away from crypto, it's that
nothing is as simple as it looks, that there are always devious ways to 
spoof, jam, and forge. I expect you've seen this from some of the debate
on digital voting schemes.)

What Can "DC-Net" Be Used For?:

* Untraceable mail. Useful for avoiding censorship, for avoiding lawsuits,
and for all kinds of crypto anarchy things.

* Fully anonymous bulletin boards, with no traceability of postings or 
responses. Illegal materials can be offered for sale (my 1987 canonical
example, which freaked out a few people: "Stealth bomber blueprints for
sale. Post highest offer and include public key."). Think for a few minutes
about this and you'll see the profound implications.

* Decentralized nexus of activity. Since messages "emerge" (a la the ouija
board metaphor), there is no central posting area. Nothing for the government
to shut down, complete deniability by the participants.

* Only you know who your a partners are....in any given circuit. And you can
be in as many circuits as you wish. (Payments can be made to others,
to create a profit motive. I won't deal with this issue, or with the issue
of how reputations are handled, in this posting.)

* The tamper-responding "digital mixes" can still be useful, and may supplement
this purely software-based approach.

* Digital money gets involved, too, both for payments in this system, and in
terms of "alternative currencies." I'm not an economist, so I'll leave this 
for others to go into in more detail.

Enough for now. Chaum's work is just the start. These systems can initially be
set up for "innocuous" purposes like research into crypto techniques (not yet
banned in the U.S.), role-playing games, religions, and the like. Once
they get going, it'll be too late to stop the other things.

Hope you liked this summary. Please read the articles...there's just no way
my posting can do justice to them (though I admit I've concentrated my efforts
on the political aspects, which "respectable" crypto researchers rarely
mention, so perhaps the flavor here is a bit more Extropian than you'll
find elsewhere.)

--Tim (part of the "Too Many Tims!" Conspiracy)

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | RSA MailSafe Public Key: by arrangement






From nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Tue Feb 23 10:14:17 1993
From: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 10:14:17 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302231810.AA09342@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>


In-reply-to: DrZaphod's message of Tue, 23 Feb 1993 02:55:22 -0600.
	     <10525.drzaphod at ncselxsi>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>      I was just going to ask about that.. I've gotten the same message from
> DEADBEAT about 4 times..

I don't think I'm to blame for this.  I think the problem is with the
"nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu" remailer.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4pTXvFZTpBW/B35AQGOngGAuhLA0SX22r0UVC9kMVfK31SjSSrCLc5k
+bRhYyMZXyQ/TfneslZ4/mIh/xAPD4MB
=V7Fj
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From an5877 at anon.penet.fi  Tue Feb 23 10:20:48 1993
From: an5877 at anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 10:20:48 PST
Subject: No subject
Message-ID: <9302231704.AA10557@anon.penet.fi>


In-reply-to: Johan Helsingius' message of Tue, 23 Feb 1993 10:14:27 +0200.
	     <9302230933.aa20090 at penet.penet.FI>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> Well, then, how *should* anon.penet.fi operate? I really am open to
> suggestions...

I'll restrict my comments to anonymous email, but the application to
anonymous USENET posting is analogous.

I'll ignore messages of the sort

	From: Alice
	To: anon at anon.penet.fi
	X-Anon-To: Bob
	X-Anon-Password: zzz

since it's clear that Alice's identity should be concealed in this
case.  The problem we're dealing with is the message of the sort

	From: Alice
	To: Bob <anxxxx at anon.penet.fi>

Should the remailer expose Alice's identity in the message that it
forwards to Bob?  If it does so blindly, Alice's anonymous identity is
subject to accidental exposure.  If it does not conceal Alice's
identity, then certain expectations of anonymity might not be realized
(according to Johan).

Here's a way out that will satisfy me and Johan: assign Alice a new
pseudonym here and now, one that will be good for replies only.  If
Alice has registered with the remailer in the past, i.e., if she has a
password, then she knows how to X-Anon-To:, but has opted not to.  If
she has not registered, then it is also appropriate to assign her a new
ID.  However, should she later register, I suggest she be given a new,
permanent, password-protected ID, just in case her earlier reply
inadvertently exposed her real ID (in the way we have been discussing).

In essence, I'm suggesting that the Finnish remailer have two classes
of anonymous IDs, one that is password protected, and one that is not.
The former should never be used without the X-Anon-Password header.

DEADBEAT

P.S.: Another suggestion I would make is that the remailer _not_ strip
In-Reply-To: headers.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4pRavFZTpBW/B35AQGC2AF/Q+LZt6T+SupvLftQom7xlon7+8LOGLpX
bSy1lT0XEyzPQ1nwCDGOr0+MF9KdwPEO
=AoKd
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Tue Feb 23 10:34:52 1993
From: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 10:34:52 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302231831.AA12396@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>


In-reply-to: Johan Helsingius' message of Tue, 23 Feb 1993 10:14:27 +0200.
	     <9302230933.aa20090 at penet.penet.FI>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> Well, then, how *should* anon.penet.fi operate? I really am open to
> suggestions...

I'll restrict my comments to anonymous email, but the application to
anonymous USENET posting is analogous.

I'll ignore messages of the sort

	From: Alice
	To: anon at anon.penet.fi
	X-Anon-To: Bob
	X-Anon-Password: zzz

since it's clear that Alice's identity should be concealed in this
case.  The problem we're dealing with is the message of the sort

	From: Alice
	To: Bob <anxxxx at anon.penet.fi>

Should the remailer expose Alice's identity in the message that it
forwards to Bob?  If it does so blindly, Alice's anonymous identity is
subject to accidental exposure.  If it does not conceal Alice's
identity, then certain expectations of anonymity might not be realized
(according to Johan).

Here's a way out that will satisfy me and Johan: assign Alice a new
pseudonym here and now, one that will be good for replies only.  If
Alice has registered with the remailer in the past, i.e., if she has a
password, then she knows how to X-Anon-To:, but has opted not to.  If
she has not registered, then it is also appropriate to assign her a new
ID.  However, should she later register, I suggest she be given a new,
permanent, password-protected ID, just in case her earlier reply
inadvertently exposed her real ID (in the way we have been discussing).

In essence, I'm suggesting that the Finnish remailer have two classes
of anonymous IDs, one that is password protected, and one that is not.
The former should never be used without the X-Anon-Password header.

DEADBEAT

P.S.: Another suggestion I would make is that the remailer _not_ strip
In-Reply-To: headers.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4pRavFZTpBW/B35AQGC2AF/Q+LZt6T+SupvLftQom7xlon7+8LOGLpX
bSy1lT0XEyzPQ1nwCDGOr0+MF9KdwPEO
=AoKd
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From pmetzger at shearson.com  Tue Feb 23 10:39:34 1993
From: pmetzger at shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 10:39:34 PST
Subject: Rambo Lives
Message-ID: <9302231649.AA00522@maggie.shearson.com>



> From cypherpunks-request at toad.com Mon Feb 22 23:23:46 1993
> To: cypherpunks at toad.com
> Subject: Re: Rambo Lives 
> Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1993 20:37:25 MST
> From: Brad Huntting <huntting at glarp.com>
> Content-Length: 649
> 
> 
> >> I say we should ensure that as many citizens as possible get ahold of PGP as
> >> soon as possible.
> 
> > Definitely.  Spread the source.
> 
> But to realy get PGP going (or PEM for that matter) will require
> wide spread key distribution.  It's clear that such distribution
> mechanisms are not going to arise out of any "respectfull" institutions
> mostly because of the legal entanglements they present.
> 
> Perhaps the time has come for "alt.pgp.keyrings".  A standard format
> for postings could allow them to be automatically added to global
> keyrings at usenet sites everywhere.  Several security issues will
> have to be addressed before this can work.

I see statements like this over and over again and I can't help but believe
it is due to extremely widespread ignorance about PGP keys.

There is no need for widespread key distribution, folks. If you want
to communicate with someone, provided their key has been signed by
someone who's signature you trust, you can just ask them, in the clear,
to email you their key, and all should be just fine. Some people seem
to obsessively keep hundreds and thousands of keys around. Why? Whats
the point? You can always just get keys from people any time you like.
There is no problem.

Perry





From pete at cirrus.com  Tue Feb 23 10:45:18 1993
From: pete at cirrus.com (Pete Carpenter)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 10:45:18 PST
Subject: KQED FM tuesday
Message-ID: <9302231841.AA04053@ss2138.cirrus.com>



	The reference to a San Francisco radio station may seem a 
bit parochial, but I promise its related...  I just heard a few 
minutes of their 'Forum' program. The topic was local reaction to 
Clinton's visit by spokesmen for SIA and AEA, plus the head of SGI. 
(Semicon Industry Assoc, American Electronics Assoc, Silicon Graphics)

Someone called with concerns about privacy and wide spread use of 
encryption in cyberspace. If he had left it at that, a question 
about privacy, which everyone can grasp, he might have had his 
question answered. I would like to hear what these people had to 
say on this important topic. 

But no, the guy went off into a 'statement' about how the goverment 
wants to interfere with 'digital money', and the moderator cut him off, 
dry. No disscussion - substitute some other question about jobs.

The moral of the story is - KISS! keep it simple, when talking about
these issues to the general public. Privacy in the electronic age is 
something that everyone can understand. And quite a few 'regular' people 
are very much concerned. Offer wide spread public encryption technology 
as a solution to the problem.  

But PLEASE, don't gum up (public) disscussion with esoterica like 
'digital money'.  Most people don't even understand how 'regular' 
money works :-)


Pete Carpenter                           pete at cirrus.com
                                
Talk about your plenty, talk about your ills,
One man gathers what another man spills. - Robert Hunter






From Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU  Tue Feb 23 10:56:17 1993
From: Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU (Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 10:56:17 PST
Subject: anonymous return addresses
Message-ID: <9302231856.AA13893@toad.com>


The recent penet troubles are a reminder that secure anonymous return
addresses are a lot harder than secure anonymous mail with no return
capability.  Maybe it's time to go over the options available to us
for anonymous return?

  1. Remailer memorizes a pseudonym.  I don't like this, mainly because
     it leaves the remailer operator vulnerable to pressure to reveal
     the correspondence between real and anonymous id's.  It
     also opens up about a million possible security holes, as
     we've noticed.

  2. The anonymous message includes a cryptographic "stamped
     self-addressed envelope" which contains a layered list of
     remailer addresses encrypted at each layer.  This requires
     modified behavior of remailers; they must be willing to "unwrap"
     an address-list separately from the message body, and then
     "wrap" the entire message with the destination's public key,
     in order to disguise the correspondence between input and output.
     I think this has been discussed here before.  Has anyone
     implemented it?
        I strongly suggest that this method be implemented in
     the cypherpunks remailers.  Let's call it the SASE feature.
     What do you think?

  3. The reply to an anonymous message can be posted in a public place
     encrypted for a key known only to the sender.

Have I missed any important methods?

-- Marc Ringuette (mnr at cs.cmu.edu)





From tcmay at netcom.com  Tue Feb 23 11:23:32 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 11:23:32 PST
Subject: The Futility of General Crypto Education?
Message-ID: <9302231921.AA01808@netcom.netcom.com>


Pete Carpenter (welcome, Pete!) writes:

....stuff about a radio call-in show elided....
>But no, the guy went off into a 'statement' about how the goverment 
>wants to interfere with 'digital money', and the moderator cut him off, 
>dry. No disscussion - substitute some other question about jobs.
>
>The moral of the story is - KISS! keep it simple, when talking about
>these issues to the general public. Privacy in the electronic age is 
>something that everyone can understand. And quite a few 'regular' people 
>are very much concerned. Offer wide spread public encryption technology 
>as a solution to the problem.  
>
>But PLEASE, don't gum up (public) disscussion with esoterica like 
>'digital money'.  Most people don't even understand how 'regular' 
>money works :-)

Point well taken. Most of the stuff we talk about is almost too esoteric
for _ourselves_ (well, at times), let alone for the public. 

Pete's point is that we should keep our message very simple, mostly by
focussing on privacy. (This is a theme Tom Jennings has also pushed, even
urging this list to drop references to "crypto," which he thinks connotes
spies and secrets, and instead replace it with "privacy," which he thinks
most people will find more palatable.)

But I think trying to educate the public is an absolutely lost cause. The
Libertarian Party has been trying for years, and just got the lowest vote
percentage in their history. (I suspect the Peace and Freedom Party, or
other parties, would admit the same thing.)

The average voter believes in UFOs, ghosts, brain cancer from cellular
phones, the dangers of nuclear power, psychics, the War on (Some) Drugs,
and the whole "democracy" thing. She certainly won't take the time to learn
about RSA, digital money, etc.

We won't get crypto liberty via the ballot box, we'll get it only if the
technology is sound and is deployed widely enough so that attempts to stop
it are futile. This has been how the most important changes in society have
occurred, from agriculture to printing to telephones: the technology filled
some need, spread, and became unstoppable. Convincing the voters at the
ballot box was never an issue.

Having said this, I agree that there's some role for educating some
fraction of the public, so I applaud the many fine efforts of the EFF,
CPSR, and so on. And some of these efforts may delay legislation which
would make otherwise delay the "Crypto Phase Change."

And I suppose I agree with Pete that if and when public forums are held,
common sense dictates that the really abstruse stuff be avoided--I know I'd
flip to another station if the discussion turned to the intricacies of PERL
scripts in remailers! :-}


-Tim May


--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.






From nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Tue Feb 23 11:43:33 1993
From: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 11:43:33 PST
Subject: Remailer FIXED!
Message-ID: <9302231940.AA20219@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>



Dearest Cypherpunks,

     I am really sorry about the remailer problem.  It is unique to
the configuration of anon.penet.fi and nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu.  In
conjunction, they caused all of the anonymous postings to cypherpunks
to be echoed.  Anon.penet.fi inserts the "X-Anonymously-To" header
field into outbound messages.  Nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu searches for
"X-Anonymously-To" header fields and auto-remails to that address.
I just changed the program so that the only header fields it will
respond to are "X-Anon-To" and "Request-Remailing-To."

     Personally, I think that anon.penet.fi should use a different
name than X-Anonymously-To *or* put it at the end of the message instead
of within the header.  I admit that my remailer was "broken" in the
terms of others, so I have fixed it.  This problem would have been
fixed sooner if I had realized what was going on, but since I foolishly
thought I didn't need to keep logs for my remailer anymore, I never
saw the incoming messages, just the ones that cypherpunks at toad.com
mailed back to me with *my* account name on them.

     I am terribly sorry for the inconvenience.

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL at BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL at CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST





From ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu  Tue Feb 23 12:03:18 1993
From: ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 12:03:18 PST
Subject: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <930223022107_74076.1041_DHJ66-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302232001.AA01786@longs.lance.colostate.edu>


A few notes on the progress in anonymity:

Eric Hughes suggests an alt.whistleblower with localized anonymizing. I
like this, but I don't see how NNTP provides it. Wouldn't every server
have to be modified or upgraded to support anonymizing? It would be
trivial but I think we will find that the people in charge of NNTP are
looking for ways to increase authentication and validation mechanisms,
and would be hostile to the idea, althought that's definitely the place
for it.  As I hinted in an earlier message, the possibility of a
centralized moderator stripping addresses, while already currently
supported in the software mechanisms, is problematic because it is a
single location with all the traffic--hence the need to go through
independent anonymous servers first. But I think the localized
header-stripping is totally superior to all this. Having a message
bounce around a net a bit with *real* information is very vulnerable,
when the ID could be stripped off at the source.

Regarding the alt.whistleblower group, someone has proposed starting a
.gov hierarchy on news.admin.policy very recently, and I sent along the
proposal to him. Watch for new RFCs and vote with your email.  For now
I think the route to go is to get a group and let independent servers
take care of anonymizing the traffic. Maybe the moderating address
could pick a random remailer from a list of active ones--?

I'd like to say a few things about what's going on in news.admin.policy
right now. The thing has turned into quite a conflagation. But most
notable is that Julf at penet has broken his silence on the really
voracious drubbing he's getting, and come forward to say that he has
taken actions against abusive posters, and is under severe amounts of
stress--he said he spends 5 hrs some days answering email
(administrative queries?) on the server. In one case an abusive poster
crashed his system by mailbombing (filling it up with junk). K.
Kleinpaste, who wrote original scripts that julf is using, IMHO is at
best a hypocrite and at worst a traitor to the cause. He has attacked
julf repeatedly on news.answers (most recently calling him a `bastard')
for not implementing the `fire extinguisher' (killing abusive posters)
or restricting group access, or using his own software for any of these
purposes, despite originally providing it.  In private email to him I
find him very authoritarian and narrowminded on issues of anonymity and
am frankly quite stunned he ever partook in the project.  I think
history will show very clearly that the great and tremendous popularity
of the penet server (10,000 users in a few months) is due *precisely*
to julf's decision to allow postings to all groups.

Anyway, if ever there was a call for other server operators (not just
account remailers)--this is it. We need people with as much control
over their own site as possible. Stuff that is running without the
knowledge of sysadmins at the site is great for experiments but its
just not going to cut it for some very serious future uses that are
approaching at the speed of light.  Also, if anyone from EFF is
listening, I think this could turn out to be one of the most important
net.issues over the coming years.  How about an EFF sponsored server?

I suspect, if anybody did a fairly impartial study, instead of all the
ranting and prejudice that is going on right now in news.admin.policy,
that anonymous abuse is not extremely problematic or unmanagable
compared to regular phantom/untraceable postings on Usenet. People are
so vocal about `abuses' right now, but only because they tend to be
highly visible. The anonymity is a red herring here. If julf at penet has
10,000 anonymous users, do we now have 10,000 times the problems on
Usenet in general?  Or *any* measurable fraction more than previously?

I think this anonymous use is getting very high use right now. We are
right in the midst of a major trend toward greater anonymized traffic.
Stats on news.lists show that a lot of traffic is starting to get
anonymized, traffic that was once (previously, probably) simply forged.
They'll be plenty of people complaining from upset status quo. Tell
them to take some virtual alkaseltzer.

- - -

I apologize for not bringing this to the attention of the list earlier,
as it sort of seems to be a recent epiphany on the list, but julf at penet
told me he added the password protection precisely for the forgery
questions that are popping up. Also, something to note on forgery is
that the forger may not necessarily *know* a person has an anonymous
mail address on a given server, and the forgery may result in
allocating a new anonymous ID for the forged address. The forger can
tell the difference if the message simply goes through or he gets back
a `you have been allocated xxx ID..'

Also, note the simple scheme of serially allocating anonymous ID's
could be a problem. If the infiltrator knows the rough date that
someone was allocated a new ID, he could narrow down the range of IDs.
For this reason randomly allocated IDs is a better idea.  The
infiltrator could even go around to new accounts all the time (or forge
them) to get an idea where the server is in the allocation cycle. It
seems to me that there are probably a lot of ID's that are not being
used on these servers and the issue of when to get rid of old ID's is a big problem.

Regarding some notes from Mr. Finney:

>You have these security threats which involve people being tricked into
>sending messages through the remailer in such a way that the recipient
>knows the true email address from where the messages are coming.

These are completely analogous to users being tricked into supplying
passwords in regular login situations. Not a new problem. And anybody
who hasn't figured out that you should *never* put any identifying
information in the message itself is probably a little too clueless to
be using the service in the first place. However, the idea of giving a
warning in the use introduction is ok: ``under NO CIRCUMSTANCES EVER DO
THIS'' type thing.

>Another problem that people have complained about is when they respond
>to an anonymous posting, they get a message from Penet saying that they
>now have an anonymous ID assigned.  This confuses and bothers some people.

Tell them to try not to be so sensitive that a breeze causes themselves
to panic.  Its a new scheme but they need to get used to it. They can
throw off the anonymity voluntarily any time they want by just
including their ID in their message. But they shouldn't do this if they
ever want to use the server in the future.  Really, all this comes down
to is that they get one extra reply in their mailbox other than
usual--the one from the server saying `you now have this ID'.  I think
most people are recognizing that people complaining about this are just
trying to be troublesome. The argument was called `pedantic' on news.admin.answers.

>Evidentally
>there is positive harm that can occur by automatically anonymizing
>all messages which pass through a remailer.

The problem is that the anonymity is implicitly requested by a message
to the server. Hence replies are getting this anonymity. One
possibility is an override switch in the header that leaves it entirely
intact and the server just acts like another hub forwarder. But what is
this `harm'? We have to recognize these complaints as completely
frivolous and without merit.  Please, don't find a problem where there
is none, you will only complicate simplicity.

One thing I'd like to see that no one has done is an `unlink' feature
for servers that carry address alias tables, so the user can erase all
trace of any previous transactions through the server (other than the
mail).  But maybe this is too close to the hit-and-run abuse out there.
Maybe there is a compromise somewhere, like a waiting period before
unlinking, during which complaints can be registered and possibly
prohibit future use.







From covin at cs.uchicago.edu  Tue Feb 23 12:22:27 1993
From: covin at cs.uchicago.edu (covin at cs.uchicago.edu)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 12:22:27 PST
Subject: Digital Money/Anonymous mailing: an idea
Message-ID: <9302232021.AA03088@zinnia.uchicago.edu>



I haven't yet read enough on digital money to know the intricacies,
but here's a possible use (note that a variant of this is possible *now*,
due to the extremely insecure way that credit card charges are handled):

If a good way of implementing digital cash were found (maybe it has been?),
it would be possible to operate a truly anonymous *commercial* remailer.
You send the remailer a message, encrypted by its public key, containing
the message you want re-sent, the destination, and *payment for the service*.
For hit&run anonymity the remailer doesn't even need to ever know who you
are...

The main advantage of this is that it would allow someone to run a remailer
without having to fund it out of the goodness of their heart...  It's a
valuable service, and I'm sure there's a market... Also, it would provide a
*real* use for digital cash, thus starting the ball rolling on that...

Comments?

                            -David





From julf at penet.FI  Tue Feb 23 12:35:12 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 12:35:12 PST
Subject: 
In-Reply-To: <9302231626.AA01332@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9302231822.aa23742@penet.penet.FI>



> > There has been a lot of discussion about this, and I'm afraid it's too
> > late to change the *default* behavior now...
> 
> Why?  It seems to me the X-Anon-Password header was a pretty major
> change, yet you made that change to preserve people's pseudonymous
> identities.  The instant challenge is just as grave, don't you think?

It still didn't affect much of the functionality. You can still post,
and mail to anXXXX users without knowing anything about passwords or
X-Anon headers. And you only need to set your password to "none" to get
the old behaviour.

	Julf






From julf at penet.FI  Tue Feb 23 12:35:15 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 12:35:15 PST
Subject: 
In-Reply-To: <9302231537.AA28187@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9302231817.aa23700@penet.penet.FI>



> > Neither do I. But many of the users of anon.penet.fi are
> > not very computer-and-email-literate, and they have been using other
> > services, providing double-blind. Unfortunate, but too late to change now..
 > .
> 
> Can you elaborate on those other services?  The Finnish remailer is the
> only one I'm aware of.

The operating principles (and the early code) was copied from the
general service Karl Kleinpaste was running at godiva. There has been
two long-running servers serving some alt.* groups (alt.sex.*,
alt.sexual.abuse.recovery) for years.

> Also, I'm confused about these "not very computer-and-email-literate"
> users -- aren't they forced to use an X-Anon-Password header?

No. Not until now. And you can still post withaout it, and answer
anonymous mail without it, and of course set the password to "none", 
disabling passwords altogether.

> I'm surprised there hasn't been more ruckus about the default
> behavior.  There must be many folks whose identities have been
> inadvertantly exposed.

I know, looking at the error messages and missent mail, that there would
have been hundreds of persons exposed without the default double-blind.

> > What we can do is to provide better ways for those who *are* computer
> > literate enough to use extra headers etc.
> 
> I don't think this will help.  With my mail environment, I have to go
> to lengths to send an anonymous message, concocting X-Anon-To and
> X-Anon-Password headers.  It's worth the effort, since this helps to
> preserve the secrecy of my pseudonymous identity.
> 
> But the first time I mess up, and send an unfettered message to an
> anon.penet.fi client, I am unmasked.

No, once you set a password, the server won't let your message through
unless it's OK!

> And I still don't understand how the unfettered message gets past the
> X-Anon-Password filter.

Can you elaborate? I don't understand your question. Sorry, my english
isn't what it ought to be...

> > But in this case I feel the principle of least astonishment is overruled
> > by the principle of least risk of accidental exposure.
> 
> I think the risk of accidental exposure is heightened by the default
> behavior of the Finnish remailer.  Maybe we're using the same words to
> describe different things.

I beg to disagree.

> > I think that hornet's nest needed to be kicked. But I am also
> > disappointed that not enough people defend the need for anonymity in
> > places like news.admin.policy.
> 
> Some of us gave up on USENET policy long, long ago.  Personally, I stick
> to the alt.* groups.

Right. Unfortunately. Because had you followed the discussion in
news.admin.policy you would have realized thet sticking your head in the
bush isn't going to help.

	Julf






From julf at penet.FI  Tue Feb 23 12:36:02 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 12:36:02 PST
Subject: Beware of anon.penet.fi
In-Reply-To: <930223165258_74076.1041_DHJ23-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302231843.aa23893@penet.penet.FI>



> I'd like to verify that
>  
> X-Anon-Doubleblind: no
>  
> would mean that no X-Anon-Password would be needed with the message.


X-Anon-Doubleblind: no would imply that the message goes straight thru,
without any checks, stripping, or anything to the intended anonymous
user.

> I am confused about the exact rules that Penet uses to decide when a
> password must be given.  I get the impression that if no password has been
> registered, anonymous posting and mailing to non-anonymous addresses is
> forbidden, but you can still mail to anonymous addresses.  If a password has
> been registered, you must give it to do any of these three things.  Is this
> right?

Right, except that if you don't register a password, you can still post.
And if you set the password to "none" no password is needed for
anything.

	Julf






From julf at penet.FI  Tue Feb 23 12:36:32 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 12:36:32 PST
Subject: Doubled penet messages
In-Reply-To: <930223173029_74076.1041_DHJ36-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302231927.aa24699@penet.penet.FI>



> Penet puts an X-Anonymously-To: cypherpunks at toad.com into the header that it
> sends.  (I'm not sure why it has to do this; isn't this redundant with the
> "To:" header?) 

No. The To: shows the real receiver, X-Anonymously-To: shows the address
the message was originally sent to. Thus you know if the message was
sent to your anonymous or real address.

> Perhaps this would be a good time to standardize the supported set of
> headers for remailing requests.

Agree. Here is the anon.penet.fi set:

	X-Anon-To:	 - set by user, stripped by server
	X-Anon-Password: - set by user, stripped by server
	X-Anonymously-To: - set by server

 Julf






From julf at penet.FI  Tue Feb 23 12:36:33 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 12:36:33 PST
Subject: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
In-Reply-To: <9302231728.AA20762@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302231921.aa24595@penet.penet.FI>



> Currently to mail to person 1234 at penet, you send mail to 
> 
> 	anon1234 at penet.fi
> 
> This mail goes out anonymously from the sender, either using an
> existing mail address or creating one.  But if one were able to reach
> person 1234 also with the email address, say,
> 
> 	name1234 at penet.fi
> 
> the behavior could be _not_ to make this posting anonymous.
> 
> To wit, the 1234 indicates that you are replying to a pseudonymous
> recipient, and the anon/name pair indicate whether the sender is
> anonymous.  Thus no change in default behavior, and no new header
> lines.

A great idea, Eric! Thanks!

Oh, a minor correction, it`s an1234, not anon1234.
So in the name of symmetry the non-anonymous path should be na1234.
Now we only have to fight about what the From: line in anonymous
messages ought to say, an1234 or na1234?

	Julf






From nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Tue Feb 23 12:48:41 1993
From: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 12:48:41 PST
Subject: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302232001.AA01786@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9302232045.AA28686@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>


>Also, note the simple scheme of serially allocating anonymous ID's
>could be a problem. If the infiltrator knows the rough date that
>someone was allocated a new ID, he could narrow down the range of IDs.
>For this reason randomly allocated IDs is a better idea.  The
>infiltrator could even go around to new accounts all the time (or forge
>them) to get an idea where the server is in the allocation cycle. It
>seems to me that there are probably a lot of ID's that are not being
>used on these servers and the issue of when to get rid of old ID's is a big 
>problem.

     Here's an idea....  What if I added anonymous ID's to my remailer such
that the following would occur:

Messages with "Command: Create ID" header field will result in a random ID
being allocated to that user's account (if one does not already exist) and
mailed to the account.

Messages with "X-Allow-Reply: yes" header field (for example) will result
in the user's anonymous ID being sent to the recipient in a header field
(not From: because I do not have alias capabilities on this system).

Messages with "X-Anon-To: <an anon ID>" will get forwarded to the anon ID's
actual address.

     This is a sort of on-demand reply mechanism.  I could make flags on the
anon ID's so that I can disable a user's ID, set send/reply privileges, etc.
If a user wants to change his ID, he could send "Command: Change ID" or
"Command: Delete ID" to the remailer.  Then, I could either setup a waiting
period, make it require manual attention, or make it automatically do as
requested.  Since the program is written in C, about half of this is
trivial.  Making it secure is the most difficult part.  By default, of
course, messages would have no reply ability.  Any user who replies will
send mail to me.  They would have to specifically place the X-Anon-To header
line with the person's anon ID into the message.

     On the other hand, I could institute a serial number scheme where each
message receives a serial number.  Replies to that message for the period
of a week or a month or whatever I choose will be forwarded to the sender.
Each one has a different serial number no matter who it came from.  Of
course, this would require both a self-maintaining cross-reference list
and an extra header field and/or work on the part of the person who replies.

     I was wondering, what is the opinion on this list (just reply to me,
so we won't clog up cypherpunks any more than we (my remailer) already have)
as to whether or not I should append a footer to remailed messages saying
"Remailed by: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu" or some such nonesense that will let
the recipient know that I did not write the message.  My software already
supports footer files, but I haven't been using them.

>One thing I'd like to see that no one has done is an `unlink' feature
>for servers that carry address alias tables, so the user can erase all
>trace of any previous transactions through the server (other than the
>mail).  But maybe this is too close to the hit-and-run abuse out there.
>Maybe there is a compromise somewhere, like a waiting period before
>unlinking, during which complaints can be registered and possibly
>prohibit future use.

     I tried to incorporate this unlink idea of yours into my above
proposal.  The above is the way I understand your idea.  Is this correct?

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL at BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL at CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST





From 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM  Tue Feb 23 13:08:34 1993
From: 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM (Hal)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 13:08:34 PST
Subject: anon.penet.fi fixes
Message-ID: <930223205851_74076.1041_DHJ65-1@CompuServe.COM>


Eric Hughes suggests:

> Currently to mail to person 1234 at penet, you send mail to 
> 
>         anon1234 at penet.fi
> 
> This mail goes out anonymously from the sender, either using an
> existing mail address or creating one.  But if one were able to reach
> person 1234 also with the email address, say,
> 
>         name1234 at penet.fi
> 
> the behavior could be _not_ to make this posting anonymous.
> 
> To wit, the 1234 indicates that you are replying to a pseudonymous
> recipient, and the anon/name pair indicate whether the sender is
> anonymous.  Thus no change in default behavior, and no new header
> lines.

I'd extend Eric's idea
to say that mail to a non-anonymous address (like Deadbeat's postings to
Cypherpunks) should be shown as coming from "name5877" rather than
"an5877".  Then when we gullibly sent our true email addresses to him,
our Penet anonymous ID's would not be revealed (because the "reply"
command would send to "name5877" which would prevent the double-blinding).

But, what would we do for anonymous Usenet posts (assuming those are
still allowed)?  If they are shown as coming from "an5877" as they
are now, then Deadbeat's trick would work via posting to Usenet.
("Please send your current email address for information on the latest...").
If they are shown as coming from "name5877" then users who are
accustomed to the old way of working will find themselves not being
anonymized when they thought they would be.

Deadbeat suggests:

> Here's a way out that will satisfy me and Johan: assign Alice a new
> pseudonym here and now, one that will be good for replies only.  If
> Alice has registered with the remailer in the past, i.e., if she has a
> password, then she knows how to X-Anon-To:, but has opted not to.  If
> she has not registered, then it is also appropriate to assign her a new
> ID.  However, should she later register, I suggest she be given a new,
> permanent, password-protected ID, just in case her earlier reply
> inadvertently exposed her real ID (in the way we have been discussing).
> 
> In essence, I'm suggesting that the Finnish remailer have two classes
> of anonymous IDs, one that is password protected, and one that is not.
> The former should never be used without the X-Anon-Password header.

A problem with this is that I would have to remember, for each different
anonymous communicant I send to, whether I am using my "password" ID
or my "non-password" ID.  The difference would come down to what method
was used when I initially began communicating with this person.  If
the initial contact was in response to mail they sent to my "real" email
address, then I must remember to use the "non-password" ID for all
succeeding communication, on the theory that they know my real email
address.  OTOH, if the initial contact was to my anonymous address, then
I have to remember to use my "password" ID for all following communication,
so that I don't accidentally reveal my "non-password" ID, which some people
can link to my real address.

>From this point of view, part of the problem appears to be the desire
to live in both worlds - the real world and the shadow world.  It will
be hard to keep track of which world each communication is in.

Perhaps Deadbeat's and Eric's ideas could be combined, where mail to
real email addresses would come from "name5877", and replies to such
addresses would use the "non-password" ID.  This might help people keep
track of how to reply to each message.  I still think there is a problem
with how anonymous posts should be labelled, and how replies to such
posts should be handled.

Hal






From 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM  Tue Feb 23 13:08:41 1993
From: 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM (Hal)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 13:08:41 PST
Subject: anonymous return addrs.
Message-ID: <930223205911_74076.1041_DHJ65-2@CompuServe.COM>


Marc.Ringuette writes:

  2. The anonymous message includes a cryptographic "stamped
     self-addressed envelope" which contains a layered list of
     remailer addresses encrypted at each layer.  This requires
     modified behavior of remailers; they must be willing to "unwrap"
     an address-list separately from the message body, and then
     "wrap" the entire message with the destination's public key,
     in order to disguise the correspondence between input and output.
     I think this has been discussed here before.  Has anyone
     implemented it?
        I strongly suggest that this method be implemented in
     the cypherpunks remailers.  Let's call it the SASE feature.
     What do you think?

I do think this is worth trying.  The current remailers will do the
"unwrapping" but they won't "re-wrap" in the public key of the next
remailer.  This means that the incoming and outgoing messages can
be easily matched up since the non-address portion is the same.

I'll look into trying something like this.  One issue is how the
remailer finds the public key of the next one in the chain.  The
simplest way would be for it to simply try a lookup on its PGP keyring
using the outgoing email address, and if it matches, encrypt it.
You'd want a special PGP keyring for this which had only remailer keys
on it.

(Or, it might be interesting to encrypt _all_ outgoing mail (even
to destinations) if we had a key for that outgoing address.  This might
increase the utilization of PGP, although users probably would complain!)

Even if not every remailer did this, you'd still get pretty good
security if several of them did.

Hal






From newsham at wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu  Tue Feb 23 13:27:05 1993
From: newsham at wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu (Timothy Newsham)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 13:27:05 PST
Subject: link encryption
Message-ID: <9302232127.AA17003@toad.com>



I have been working lately on a program to encrypt my modem
traffic between home and the unix.  I call the program 'link'
for link encryption.  Currently it uses DES and RSA,  RSA to
exchange a random session key and DES to encrypt all general
traffic.  I spent some time today cleaning up some of the
code so that it would be more modular and portable.  The unix
end  i is presentable now but would require a remote end to
work along with it.  I dont feel that my Amiga end is
good enough to even use regularly, there are some bugs in the
Amiga end, and I haven incorporated the most recent changes into
it either.  I wrote the code to be modular and hopefully
easily attached to other term programs in hopes that people would
patch some code into their favorite term program and use it.
If anyone wants the unix code I'm giving it out now,  It is
a bit long so I wont post it to the list unless I get enough
replies (aand not too many "dont post it!" replies).  If anyone
has an ftp site they wish to put it on that is fine too.  I'm
releasing the code into the public domain, do with it what you
please.  Its in no way complete, I plan to add more features
and hopefully robustness to the code in the future.
                                ...





From tcmay at netcom.com  Tue Feb 23 13:33:18 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 13:33:18 PST
Subject: Congratulations to All!
Message-ID: <9302232131.AA17884@netcom.netcom.com>



With all the volume on this list, and the controversy over "Deadbeat" (in
both his/her content and the multiple postings), and the flame wars (not
here, of course!) over the anonymous postings, I wanted to say a few
things. I'll be brief.

* Congratulations to all on the amazing progress being shown. The
"problems" are themselves valuable learning experiences, spurring on new
developments and forcing important issues to the fore.

* The escapades of "Deadbeat" are especially valuable, as weaknesses are
revealed and fixes are implemented. The sociology of anonymous systems is a
largely unexplored territory. (From the phrasing he uses, "Deadbeat" seems
to be one of our regular posters, and is clearly not some malicious
outsider intent on destroying our system--and even if so, he's still doing
us a service!).

* Our own Lance Detweiler posted to sci.crypt a very long and excellent
summary of anonymous mail, remailers, and general issues. It is still
there, titled, "IDENTITY, PRIVACY, and ANONYMITY on the INTERNET."   I'm
surprised it hasn't been mentioned here more often. In fact, it ought to be
posted to _this_ list, in case someone isn't reading sci.crypt (that's hard
to believe, though). Others, like Hal Finney, have also posted recent
summaries of remailers.

* The "whistleblower" group idea is a good one, as is the "pools" idea. The
whistleblower application is already in use via a modem system in
Washington (I saw this mentioned about a year ago...I can dig up the
details, maybe), though not using any form of crypto anonymity. I confess
to having similar ideas some time back, which I mentioned at the first
physical Cypherpunks meeting, in September, though I completely missed the
importance in terms of _public relations_. In other words, I think it's a
great idea.

(The obvious benefits of an anonymous whistleblower group will make it hard
for government types to object. Even if a lot of "noise" is posted
(spurious claims, rumors, etc.), the exercise will be beneficial. And
journalists who begin to dip into such a group for possible articles, will
thus become educated themselves.)

* The actions of the "*.army.mil" guys may have also spurred on some of our
activists. What Kelly Goen is proposing to do--spreading these crypto
anarchy methods to other politically active groups--is also a wonderful
development.

* It seems we are getting lots of newcomers to the list (though I keep
seeing cancellations posted to the general list, too!). It might be nice to
hear from them about their reactions. And perhaps Eric Hughes could
occcasionally summarize list statistics, as he did several months back. For
example, how many are now on the list? How many "*.mil" sites? Etc.

* The recent interest by "Mondo 2000," "Wired," and "The Village Voice" in
Cypherpunks activity and in digital privacy in general suggests we are
doing something quite important and interesting.

* All in all, I think amazing progress is being made.

-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.






From mbrennan at netcom.com  Tue Feb 23 15:03:28 1993
From: mbrennan at netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 15:03:28 PST
Subject: RE>Congratulations to All!
Message-ID: <9302232301.AA28595@netcom.netcom.com>


Reply to Message-Id: <9302232131.AA17884 at netcom.netcom.com> from
tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)

> It seems we are getting lots of newcomers to the list (though I keep
> seeing cancellations posted to the general list, too!). It might be nice to
> hear from them about their reactions. 

Actually, I may (regretfully) be sending in my cancellation as well. This
group is fascinating, but I find most of the discussion goes right over my
head. Also, the mail generated is just too voluminous. I log into my netcom
account by modem (and use Eudora to retrieve my mail). Yesterday I had
about 40 messages from this list, today I had over 70! Whew!!! That's a lot
of mail to retrieve by modem.

What I'd really like to see is a digest form of this list. Also, for
newcomers like myself a FAQ would be of tremendous benefit.

> The recent interest by "Mondo 2000," "Wired," and "The Village Voice" in
> Cypherpunks activity and in digital privacy in general suggests we are
> doing something quite important and interesting.

I'd say you're quite right about that. Keep up the great work!

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Brennan
Internet:   mbrennan at netcom.com 
Applelink:  M.BRENNAN  
Compuserve: 76206,2462






From mdiehl at triton.unm.edu  Tue Feb 23 15:27:21 1993
From: mdiehl at triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 15:27:21 PST
Subject: Newbie comments.
Message-ID: <9302232326.AA26860@triton.unm.edu>


I've been listening to this list quietly for about 2 weeks. Althought the
signal to noize ration as been a bit low lately, ;^) it's been very interesting.

I like the idea of alt.whistle.blowers, and support anything that promotes
privacy, and Constitutional rights.

But I have a (newbie?) question.  Isn't it true that, at the network level, it
is still possible to tell where a message came from and where it's going.  That
is, given the proper motivation, couldn't "and entity" sniff out all of this 
information and find out which machine a particular message came from.  And 
from logs at that machine, which The Entity  naturally has access to, It could
find out who send the message.  Just wondering.....

Major suggestion:  We need a FAQ!

Well, that's about it.  I'm still trying to get up to speed with pgp.

+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl at triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder at forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+





From newsham at wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu  Tue Feb 23 15:46:40 1993
From: newsham at wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu (Timothy Newsham)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 15:46:40 PST
Subject: scheme
Message-ID: <9302232346.AA19000@toad.com>



I posted this to sci.crypt,  I would also like the opinion
of the people on this list:

---------------------------------------
I have posted about this before, but this time I decided
to whip up some code so you can all see what I'm talking
about and all the details.

This encryption scheme uses XOR to encrypt data 1 character
at a time.  Because of this it is suitable for protocols
where you need to send single bytes (or less) at a time.
Examples of this would be interactive ascii.  Also it
is easily applicable to crippled lines like 7 bit lines.
This is because if the plaintext is 7 bits you can send
just the 7 bits after the XOR.  Even more general you can
use it to encrypt any size at a time, down to single bits
if you just have 1 bit to send immediately and dont want
to wait for more data to become applicable.

Ok.  So what are its disavantages?  Syncronization, as
soon as synchronization is gone thats it, its all over.  Each
block of 'pad' is generated from previous plaintext,  if you
cant figure out the previous plaintext you are lost.

Notice it uses a hash() function,  this could be anything, ie
DES,  or perhaps a one way function (no unhash() is ever needed).
The algorithm is fairly simple, the beginning is a bit wierd
and could have been done several ways.  The first 8 bits in
this implementation are used for synchronization.

prog -e key <file >file2
prog -d key <file2 >file3

ok.. here it is..  poke holes in it.  What are the weaknesses,
is it totally unsecure?  Is it as secure as the hash function
(ie. if DES was used, is strength equivalent to the strength of
DES?)


-------------cut here---------------------------------------------

#define SIZE 8
#ifdef MEMCPY
#define bcopy(s,d,l)   memcpy(d,s,l)
#endif

usage(s)
char *s;
{
  printf("%s [-e|e|-d|d] key\n",s);
  exit(1);
}

main(argc,argv)
char **argv;
int argc;
{
  char data[SIZE],pad[SIZE],c[1],c1[1],*p,key[SIZE];
  int cnt,encrypt=0;
  
  if(argc!=3) 
   usage(argv[0]);
  for(cnt=0;cnt<SIZE;cnt++)  /* fill in extra characters in key */
    key[cnt]=0xaa;
  strncpy(key,argv[2],SIZE);
  p=argv[1];
  if(*p=='-') p++;
  if(*p=='e')
    encrypt++;
  else
    if(*p!='d') usage(argv[0]);

  if(encrypt) {
  /* to start off encryption, we send a bunch of random bits */
  /* then we hash those bits and use them as pad             */
    blkrand(data,SIZE);
    write(1,data,SIZE);
    hash(data,key);
  } else {
  /* to start off decryption, we receive the random bits and */
  /* hash them (just like the encryptor did) and we should   */
  /* have the same starting pad as the encryptor             */
    read(0,data,SIZE);
    hash(data,key);
  }
  bcopy(data,pad,SIZE);
  
  cnt=0;
  while(read(0,c,1)>0) {
  /* read characters, send them with our pad       */
  /* every time we run out of pad, we make new pad */
  /* by hashing old data                           */
    *c1 = *c ^ pad[cnt]; 
    if(encrypt)        /* data is the plain text always */
      data[cnt]=*c;
    else
      data[cnt]=*c1;
    write(1,c1,1);
    if(++cnt==SIZE) {
      cnt=0;
      bcopy(data,pad,SIZE);
      hash(pad,key);
    }
  } 
}   
  
/* provide a block of random bits */
blkrand(block,len)
int len;
char *block;
{
  srand(time(0));
  while(len--) 
    *block++ = (rand() >>7)&0xff;
}

/* hash a block, could be DES, or even a one way function */
hash(block,key)
char *block,*key;
{
  char b2[SIZE];
  int i=SIZE;  

  while(i--) 
    b2[i] = *block++ ^ *key++;
  bcopy(b2,block,SIZE);
}


  
  






From warlord at MIT.EDU  Tue Feb 23 15:53:46 1993
From: warlord at MIT.EDU (Derek Atkins)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 15:53:46 PST
Subject: Newbie comments.
In-Reply-To: <9302232326.AA26860@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9302232352.AA05451@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>


> But I have a (newbie?) question.  Isn't it true that, at the network
> level, it is still possible to tell where a message came from and
> where it's going.  That is, given the proper motivation, couldn't "and
> entity" sniff out all of this information and find out which machine a
> particular message came from.  And from logs at that machine, which
> The Entity naturally has access to, It could find out who send the
> message.  Just wondering.....

That is the point of encrypted, anonymous remailers.  Since the
message is encrypted, it looks like a random set of bits.  If it gets
re-encrypted at every stage, then the remailers can add random bits of
data to change the size.  They already change the headers.

So, the only thing left to worry about is a FIFO problem.  But that
is easily solved.

So, here is what happens:
  A message comes into a remailer (actually, a bunch of messages do,
but that's not important).  It comes in encrypted, so you can't read
the message.  The headers are stripped off in the remailer and the
message is re-encrypted, so the data changes.  If it gets stored an
arbistrary length of time, and the outgoing order is different than
the incoming order, than there is no way to figure out which message
came from or went to where.

There is a lot more to this, and a lot of other problems that need to
be solved, but this is it in a nutshell.

I hope it answers your question.  I'm sure people will correct any
mistakes I inadvertantly left in.

-derek

PGP 2 key available upon request, on the key-server:
	pgp-public-keys at toxicwaste.mit.edu
--
  Derek Atkins, MIT '93, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
      Chairman, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
           MIT Media Laboratory, Speech Research Group
           warlord at MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH





From tomj at fido.wps.com  Tue Feb 23 16:11:12 1993
From: tomj at fido.wps.com (Tom Jennings)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 16:11:12 PST
Subject: Law&Disorder (fwd)
Message-ID: <9302240009.AA00948@fido.wps.com>


A friend sent this to me... MODERN TIMES is a good bookstore! They've got
lots 'o tech stuff, like internet info... definitely worth checking out.
Anyways, the firs tone (Feb) was "Navigating the Internet: a crash
course" by Eric Theise. How-to email, gopher, etc. I didn't know about
it in time.

I think this could be a good crowd to bring up cypherpunk issues with a
more social, less hardcore tech perspective... time to stop preaching to
the choir! (It's taken a while to find the door leading out of the
choir... :-)

		Tom Jennings



> From jerod23 at well.sf.ca.us Tue Feb 23 10:35:44 1993
> Date: Tue, 23 Feb 1993 10:34:18 -0800
> From: Jerod Pore <jerod23 at well.sf.ca.us>
> Message-Id: <199302231834.AA12863 at well.sf.ca.us>
> To: tomj at fido.wps.com
> Subject: Law&Disorder
> 
> 
> Something closer, cheaper and probably more interesting than CFP
> 
> news.1174: Monthly cyberspace series begins at Modern Times
> 
> news.1174.39: fork: Not enough memory (estheise)  Mon 22 Feb 93 15:44
> 
>  Here's the press release for show number 2:
>  
>  
>  Jacking In: A Monthly Series on Cyberspace Literacy presents
>  LAW AND DISORDER ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
>  
>  Computer and telecommunications technologies hold great promise for 
>  individuals and society.  Increased access to information can enhance 
>  transborder commerce, informed political participation, community 
>  development, and public health, education, and safety.
>  
>  But, between activities of questionable legality and the countermeasures 
>  taken by private parties and law enforcement officials, these 
>  technologies are raising fundamental questions about our notions of 
>  privacy, property, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly.
>  
>  Join us for a evening of provocative readings and presentations by:
>  
>  - Bruce Sterling, journalist, editor, and author of *The Hacker 
>    Crackdown*, *Islands in the Net*, *Schismatrix*, and co-author (with 
>    William Gibson) of *The Difference Engine*
>  - Mike Godwin, General Counsel, Electronic Frontier Foundation, leading 
>    advocate for extending Constitutional protections to cyberspace
>  - John Draper (a.k.a. Cap'n Crunch), wanted by the FBI for phone 
>    cracking in the '60s, working to promote data encryption in the '90s
>  - Mitch Ratcliffe, Editor at Large, MacWEEK, and cofounder of This!Group, a 
>    northern California organization working to publicize the benefits and 
>    dangers of a highly-networked information society
>  - Bruce Koball, General Chair, Third Conference on Computers, Freedom 
>    and Privacy, being held March 9-12, San Francisco Airport Marriott
>  
>  Sunday, March 7th, 7 pm
>  $3-$5 sliding scale
>  Modern Times Bookstore
>  888 Valencia (19th/20th)
>  San Francisco, CA 94110
>  (415)282-9246


-- 
  Tom Jennings / tomj at fido.wps.com / World Power Systems / San Francisco CA 





From cplai at csie.nctu.edu.tw  Tue Feb 23 17:44:40 1993
From: cplai at csie.nctu.edu.tw (cplai at csie.nctu.edu.tw)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 17:44:40 PST
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9302240144.AA03740@csie.nctu.edu.tw>


unsubscribe





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Tue Feb 23 18:49:18 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 18:49:18 PST
Subject: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302232001.AA01786@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9302240246.AA03185@soda.berkeley.edu>


>Eric Hughes suggests an alt.whistleblower with localized anonymizing. I
>like this, but I don't see how NNTP provides it. Wouldn't every server
>have to be modified or upgraded to support anonymizing? 

In an already supported sense, yes.  As I understand it, when a
moderated group is created, an email address for the moderator is
propagated with it.  So every time a moderated group is created, every
server already is "modified".

But the anonymity does not take place in NNTP.  The news server mails
every posting to the moderator's address.  The header filtering take
place on that machine, unbeknowst to the original NNTP server.  I hear
that this mechanism didn't used to work reliably, but that it now
basically does.  Comments?

In addition, the direct mail address should be advertised
independently, so that those without easy access to Usenet news can
still use the system.

>[...] I think we will find that the people in charge of NNTP are
>looking for ways to increase authentication and validation mechanisms,

The way to forge a posting to alt.whistleblower would be to post with
your real address in it!  That's not exactly a positive feedback loop
for the outlaw.

> [...] a centralized moderator stripping addresses, [...]  is
>problematic because it is a single location with all the traffic

Granted.  Thus the need for a periodic posting stating exactly what
the security level of the system is.

>But I think the localized header-stripping is totally superior to all
>this.

Agreed.  That's why you publish the newsgroup entry point.  Then a
more sophisticated whistleblower could use a remailer chain to get to
the access point.

Eric





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Tue Feb 23 19:00:22 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 19:00:22 PST
Subject: anonymous return addresses
In-Reply-To: <9302231856.AA13893@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302240257.AA03919@soda.berkeley.edu>


Re: options for anonymous return

Marc writes:
>  1. Remailer memorizes a pseudonym.  

>  2. The anonymous message includes a cryptographic "stamped
	self-addressed envelope" which contains a layered list of
	remailer addresses encrypted at each layer.  

>  3. The reply to an anonymous message can be posted in a public place
	encrypted for a key known only to the sender.

>Have I missed any important methods?

A variant of (1) greatly increases the security.  Have the remailer
memorize an anonymous return address of type (2).  The information
that is contained in a remailer then, per pseudonym, is

  a.  the pseudonym
  b.  the address of the next remailer to use
  c.  a block of stuff to be prepended to the outgoing mail.  Presumably
        this is forwarding instructions for the next remailer.  It would
	also be encrypted with the public key of the next remailer.

Thus, even if the whole pseudonym mapping list were compromised, it
would only reveal a list of sites to try and compromise next.  And at
some point the private remailer keys have to be compromised as well,
since all the remailing instruction are encrypted with them.

This system can also be chained, creating "routing pseudonyms" on
various remailers and encrypted instructions pointing one pseudonym to
another.

Eric






From banisar at washofc.cpsr.org  Tue Feb 23 20:22:33 1993
From: banisar at washofc.cpsr.org (Dave Banisar)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 20:22:33 PST
Subject: Finding Mac PGP software?
Message-ID: <9302232325.AA06567@hacker2.eff.org>


MacPGP is available at mac.archives.umich.edu via gopher and FTP.

FYI. The most recent copies of the pgp site list are available from the CPSR 
archive at cpsr.org /cpsr/crypto along with quite a few other files on crypto 
and privacy  that may be of interest to the cypherpunks readers.



> 
> 	I'm sure this is a FAQ, but can anyone point me to an FTP site 
> where I can obtain PGP for the Macintosh?  Does such a beast exist? 
> Thanks for your time. 
> 
> +-    eggo at titan.ucc.umass.edu                 Eat Some Paste    -+ +-   
>        Yorn desh born, der ritt de gitt der gue,            -+ +-      
> Orn desh, dee born desh, de umn bork! bork! bork!        -+ 
> 
> 







From ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU  Tue Feb 23 21:20:04 1993
From: ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU (Eli Brandt)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 21:20:04 PST
Subject: anonymous return addresses
In-Reply-To: <9302240257.AA03919@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302240519.AA24254@toad.com>


> A variant of (1) greatly increases the security.  Have the remailer
> memorize an anonymous return address of type (2).  The information
> that is contained in a remailer then, per pseudonym, is
> 
>   a.  the pseudonym
>   b.  the address of the next remailer to use
>   c.  a block of stuff to be prepended to the outgoing mail.  Presumably
>         this is forwarding instructions for the next remailer.  It would
> 	also be encrypted with the public key of the next remailer.

This is an excellent idea!  It would provide decent security without
forcing J. Random User to figure out how to use the SASE block.
You'd want to have a list of address/SASE pairs to use, choosing
randomly from those that have not yet died.

Oh, a complication.  It would probably be necessary to be able to
add new address/SASEs as they become available, to avoid death of
your pseudonym through cumulative remailer attrition.  But nobody
but the owner can be allowed to add destinations, for obvious
reasons.  The only apparent way to handle this is to require a
password at the time of pseudonym creation.  One-way-hash it, and
require it to add and remove destinations.  It should be
PK-encrypted on its way to the remailer, if possible.  This approach
does not require an identity to be irrevocably tied to a destination
address, interestingly -- you can remove chains to your old address,
and add ones to your new.

Suggestions?  Holes?  Implementations?

> Eric

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt at jarthur.claremont.edu





From sommerfeld at orchard.medford.ma.us  Tue Feb 23 21:28:49 1993
From: sommerfeld at orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 21:28:49 PST
Subject: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302240246.AA03185@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302240423.AA00434@orchard.medford.ma.us>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

   Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 18:46:17 -0800
   From: Eric Hughes <hughes at soda.berkeley.edu>

   >Eric Hughes suggests an alt.whistleblower with localized anonymizing. I
   >like this, but I don't see how NNTP provides it. Wouldn't every server
   >have to be modified or upgraded to support anonymizing?

   In an already supported sense, yes.  As I understand it, when a
   moderated group is created, an email address for the moderator is
   propagated with it.  So every time a moderated group is created, every
   server already is "modified".

That's how it *should* work, not how it *does* work.  In real life,
moderator addresses are distributed "out of band" to a relatively
small number of "backbone" sites; all the rest of the sites merely
forward the mail to a "backbone" site.

Making a newsgroup moderated in the absence of a moderation address is
an easy way to make it "read-only"; I think the folks who run the fj.*
groups do this instead of sending rmgroups (which are generally
ignored).

					- Bill

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCWAgUBK4r4H69wjZexL7jBAQGBagQBAbrZ42usqd/JhdWqtMNbS6PmXHfSCcA7
5qvi34i/vSe0lKc4t5JFys4S7+4OCkR8URniwOhcDGMXoXMTfeonbqNakselMJn3
m3l0Zz/vmA8ZcY0eS0F27AVwydooIVSdRiI5TFVFOLrnOzSpmyBxYzgzavnG0jRm
T8vecJTtYqXf
=VFG/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU  Tue Feb 23 21:29:16 1993
From: ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU (Eli Brandt)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 21:29:16 PST
Subject: Social engineering tips
Message-ID: <9302240529.AA24454@toad.com>


It might be helpful for those involved in the penet flamewar to
refer to the service it provides as "pseudonymity" rather than
"anonymity".  This suggests some level of continuity,
responsibility, moral fiber... well, maybe not *that*.  But it's
worth pointing out that getting a penet pseudonym is no different,
really, than getting an account called "u7364250 at csvax.uza.za".

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt at jarthur.claremont.edu





From fnerd at smds.com  Tue Feb 23 21:33:09 1993
From: fnerd at smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 21:33:09 PST
Subject: Crypto goals
Message-ID: <9302231806.AB16915@smds.com>


>How about making a list of features we want, and/or a list of scenarios 
>we want to be able to handle?
>...
>    executable but non-disassemblable code [is it possible?]
>...
>Have I missed anything?
>
>-- Marc Ringuette (mnr at cs.cmu.edu)

Encrypted computing.  This is even harder than non-disassemblable code.
The idea is that you couldn't even tell what happened to the data if you
watched it compute, tried again with slightly different inputs, etc.
I've heard that some restricted sort of encrypted computing is possible
with an exponential time cost!

The main application I have in mind is a mix that would be trustworthy
even if it was run by your worst enemies with the best computers in the
world.

This seems impossible but I don't have proof.

-fnerd
fnerd at smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)






From kelly at netcom.com  Tue Feb 23 21:39:13 1993
From: kelly at netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 21:39:13 PST
Subject: Newbie comments. (fwd)
Message-ID: <9302240537.AA06252@netcom.netcom.com>


Forwarded message:
> From cypherpunks-request at toad.com  Tue Feb 23 15:40:37 1993
> From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl at triton.unm.edu>
> Message-Id: <9302232326.AA26860 at triton.unm.edu>
> Subject: Newbie comments.
> To: cypherpunks at toad.com
> Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 16:26:08 MST
> X-Also-Known-As: Thunder
> X-Goal-In-Life:  To make a lot of money -- Wanna make a donation?
> X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL8]
> 
> I've been listening to this list quietly for about 2 weeks. Althought the
> signal to noize ration as been a bit low lately, ;^) it's been very interesting.
> 
> I like the idea of alt.whistle.blowers, and support anything that promotes
> privacy, and Constitutional rights.
> 
> But I have a (newbie?) question.  Isn't it true that, at the network level, it
> is still possible to tell where a message came from and where it's going.  That
> is, given the proper motivation, couldn't "and entity" sniff out all of this 
> information and find out which machine a particular message came from.  And 
> from logs at that machine, which The Entity  naturally has access to, It could
> find out who send the message.  Just wondering.....


 Hi there, 
        well acutally at the network interface level all sorts of tricks are
available... for example at the smtp daemon level all
a snooper has to do is the following

telnet toad.com smtp

when the sendmail banner is seen then
type
VRFY cypherpunks
That will yeild yet another line referring to cypherpunks-real
which verifying will obtain ALL the mail addresses on this cypherpunks mailing
list... I have a small fragment of perl which does the same
trick recursively for every address on the cypherpunks mail list...
why did I write such a thing... well I am writing a mail list to PGP
key server extractor so I can automatically extract keys for members of
cypherpunks-real... I didnt think of the privacy issue until
some moments after I debugged the perl script and got it working...
Similiar open holes exist at EVERY level of the Network and associated
daemons and software, Johh and I have discussed this earlier via email
and he as well as I dont feel its a REAL exposure as the means to
protect yourself is well at hand...
AND yes ALL network traffic can theoretically be traced thats
when crackers and security admins start playing games with
connection laundries and firewall as well as early warning systems...
there are constraints to real world tracing... the Firewalls mailing
list at Firewalls at GreatCircle.COM discusses these and other
issues having to do with security at the network interface level

> 
> Major suggestion:  We need a FAQ!
> 
> Well, that's about it.  I'm still trying to get up to speed with pgp.
> 
> +----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
> | J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
> |                      +----------------------------------------------------+
> | mdiehl at triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
> | Thunder at forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
> | (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
> +----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
> 

    cheers
   kelly
-- 





From 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM  Tue Feb 23 23:23:25 1993
From: 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM (Hal)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 23:23:25 PST
Subject: Front lines of anon.
Message-ID: <930224071703_74076.1041_DHJ29-1@CompuServe.COM>


Lance Detweiler writes:

> >You have these security threats which involve people being tricked into
> >sending messages through the remailer in such a way that the recipient
> >knows the true email address from where the messages are coming.
> 
> These are completely analogous to users being tricked into supplying
> passwords in regular login situations. Not a new problem. And anybody
> who hasn't figured out that you should *never* put any identifying
> information in the message itself is probably a little too clueless to
> be using the service in the first place. However, the idea of giving a
> warning in the use introduction is ok: ``under NO CIRCUMSTANCES EVER DO
> THIS'' type thing.

It's not that simple.  "Deadbeat" reported that he discovered this problem
when he sent mail via Penet to a list member asking a question.  When that
person replied, it exposed his anonymous ID.  There was no need to put
identifying information in the message itself.  The mere fact that a
particular message is being replied to gives away the true email address
of the sender (because that is the address to which the question was
directed).

This means that if you receive mail asking an innocent question, like,
"what is the address to subscribe to cypherpunks?", you need to be aware
of whether that question came from the Penet remailer or one like it.  If
so, you need to take extra care when you respond so that your anonymous
ID is not revealed.

> The problem is that the anonymity is implicitly requested by a message
> to the server. Hence replies are getting this anonymity. One
> possibility is an override switch in the header that leaves it entirely
> intact and the server just acts like another hub forwarder. But what is
> this `harm'? We have to recognize these complaints as completely
> frivolous and without merit.

I don't think so.  It seems to me that the current system makes it easy
to accidentally expose your anonymous ID.  If more people start operating
pseudonym-based remailers it will be that much more difficult to keep
track of whether you want to be anonymized or not.

I think technical solutions are needed along the lines suggested by Eric
Hughes and Deadbeat.

Hal

P.S. How about Deadbeat posting a public key?  He keeps signing his
messages but I can't check them.






From newsham at wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu  Wed Feb 24 00:21:07 1993
From: newsham at wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu (Timothy Newsham)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 00:21:07 PST
Subject: Crypto goals
In-Reply-To: <9302231806.AB16915@smds.com>
Message-ID: <9302240821.AA27032@toad.com>


> 
> Encrypted computing.  This is even harder than non-disassemblable code.
> The idea is that you couldn't even tell what happened to the data if you
> watched it compute, tried again with slightly different inputs, etc.
> I've heard that some restricted sort of encrypted computing is possible
> with an exponential time cost!
> 
> The main application I have in mind is a mix that would be trustworthy
> even if it was run by your worst enemies with the best computers in the
> world.
> 
> This seems impossible but I don't have proof.
> 
> -fnerd
> fnerd at smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
> 
> 
How can multiple keys be chosen?  The decryption key is needed
to execute the code, it can either be (1) built into the hardware
or (2) loaded in.  In #2, if its loaded in, it can be had before
it is loaded.  In #1,  how do you change keys?  only people who
know how to encrypt for that key can program the thing.  If a
public key scheme was used,  the processor could be built with
a private key inside, and you assemble and then encode in the
public key,  only the processor (and whoever else has the 
private key) can check the code.  Quite a bit of complexity, 
also how do you do encryption in small enough units for the
cpu to use?  How do you decrypt w/ random access any part
of the data?  If you choose too large blocks (ie. cache) how
do you keep enemy programs from grabbig already decrypted data?
obviously some data must go out as plaintext (for I/O)  then
you have to keep track of which data is to always remain crypted
and which needs to go to plaintext..   wow..  what a nightmare.
I think its probably possible...
sorry for the free-form :)







From fergp at sytex.com  Wed Feb 24 01:13:36 1993
From: fergp at sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 01:13:36 PST
Subject: Enough's enough already
Message-ID: <4JPgZB2w165w@sytex.com>


Excuse me for dropping my two cents in here, but just what's the big,
hairy deal?
 
I apologize for initially bringing up the topic of self-encrypting
viruses; had I known that folks would have reacted in such a childish
manner, I would never have posted that topic at all.
 
For those of you who wish to discuss it further, I'd suggest posting
to comp.virus in the future. I suppose I would take it a tad more
seriously when reading some of the posts that have drifted through
this area, if they were originally posted to an area that was
designed for virus banter.
 
If this sounds like a plea for some sort of sanity check, then I
must be coming across loud and clear.
 
Now, I'd like to ask the cypherpunk readership to clarify the need (or
perhaps a better term may be "desire") for anonymous remailers? Maybe
I'm not getting the "big picture", but it would appear to me that
insurance of private communications is the area of intended interest
here. I know that someone may declare my query as naive, but if you
feel strongly enough about a topic, why wouldn't you want the
recipient to know who you are, where you are and who they can respond
to?
 
I think my train of thought is geared towards anon remailers
protecting those who may operate in less than honorable means, without
ethical guidelines and wishing to "hide" behind a veil of anonymity.
 
Somehow, that just strikes me as less-than-honorable. (No, I was never
a Marine. Army, yes. Marine, no.)
 
Gee, I sure feel better.

Paul Ferguson                     |
Network Integration Consultant    |  "All of life's answers are
Alexandria, Virginia USA          |   on TV."
fergp at sytex.com     (Internet)    |           -- Homer Simpson
sytex.com!fergp     (UUNet)       |
1:109/229           (FidoNet)     |
         PGP public encryption key available upon request.





From M..Stirner at f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG  Wed Feb 24 05:11:21 1993
From: M..Stirner at f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 05:11:21 PST
Subject: Pgp v 2.2
Message-ID: <5029.2B8B3A11@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>



According to a message I read today on the Fidonet Public Keys
conference, PGP is now in version 2.2 & is available off CompuServe.
Has anyone seen this yet?  If this is for real, let's get this thing
circulating pronto.
.   ~
.   M.


... "Huh?  BILL Clinton???  I thought I voted for GEORGE Clinton!!!"
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET - M..Stirner at f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG





From 71562.3445 at CompuServe.COM  Wed Feb 24 07:24:55 1993
From: 71562.3445 at CompuServe.COM (Duncan/Lois Frissell)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 07:24:55 PST
Subject: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
Message-ID: <930224151344_71562.3445_CHT28-1@CompuServe.COM>


To compensate the List for consuming bandwidth with my "political" posting
on advertising yesterday, I thought I'd offer some ideas on easy anonymous
posting -- no remailers required.

Isn't an account that can't be traced to you anonymous?  How about an (email
only) account for $3/month billed to you (no credit cards required).

AT&T Mail (desperate for customers) charges $3/month per Email box with no
setup fee.  They do charge a minimum of 70 cents per message sent (50 cents
if you use their pricy communications software) but they charge nothing
to receive mail and give you an Internet address that looks like
dfrissell at attmail.com.

If you open a mail receiving service box in a nome de guerre (which is not
hard to do in spite of what you might have heard), call AT&T Mail at (800)
624-5672 and sign up.  After you receive your signon info, you can drop the
box at the mail receiving service and just pay your future bills without
a printed bill.  They'll be happy to tell you what your balance is.  You can 
logon to AT&T Mail anytime at (800) 624-5123.  Use a payphone if you are 
really careful and enjoy anonymous posting without outside help and without 
having to worry about flaky remailers.

Duncan Frissell








From rubin at citi.umich.edu  Wed Feb 24 07:51:40 1993
From: rubin at citi.umich.edu (rubin at citi.umich.edu)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 07:51:40 PST
Subject: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
In-Reply-To: <930224151344_71562.3445_CHT28-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302241551.AA05783@toad.com>


I'm not sure I agree that it is a good idea to start having
many accounts all over the place that are not traceable to 
their users. It seems like this would be a cracker's dream.





From ghabrech at ultrix.ramapo.edu  Wed Feb 24 08:07:14 1993
From: ghabrech at ultrix.ramapo.edu (The Knight of Ni)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 08:07:14 PST
Subject: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
Message-ID: <9302241608.AA09746@ultrix.ramapo.edu>


I think the idea is just that it is an e-mail account.  I don't think you have
any disk quota or such and probably can't even telnet or ftp from it.  The
idea for this is privacy.  The best way to keep someone from reading your
files is to make it so that they can't get their hands on 'em.

George





From mjr at netcom.com  Wed Feb 24 08:22:13 1993
From: mjr at netcom.com (Matthew Rapaport)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 08:22:13 PST
Subject: Anonymity vs accountability - a balanced view (maybe?)
Message-ID: <9302241620.AA25561@netcom2.netcom.com>


Concerning the discussions of privacy, and anonymity on various USENET
groups, attacks on Johan Helsingus, etc. I'd like to add my two cents...

If we are going to convince the USENET community as a whole of the value
of anonymity it seems to me we must also recognize the propriety and
value of what seems to be the dominant sentiment on the USENET now, that
being that accountability and responsibility (for what you say)
reflected in a real identification is also valuable, and under most
ordinary circumstances is more desirable then not.

Putting it another way, I think most of the USENET community would
accept the argument that access to anonymity is something that we should
all have. It is a desirable thing, but it becomes desirable only under
certain circumstances (e.g. active persecution, or a real threat of
same, by a government or corporation, etc). Most of the time, it is better
that people "stand for what they say" and accept the accountability that
goes with non-anonymized postings.

If we approach it this way I think we could achieve consensus at least to
the degree that the existence of alias servers are generally supported.

matthew rapaport     Philosopher/Programmer At Large      KD6KVH
           mjr at netcom.com     70371.255 at compuserve.com





From kelly at netcom.com  Wed Feb 24 08:38:42 1993
From: kelly at netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 08:38:42 PST
Subject: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer (fwd)
Message-ID: <9302241637.AA20822@netcom.netcom.com>


Forwarded message:
> From cypherpunks-request at toad.com  Wed Feb 24 08:24:42 1993
> Date: Wed, 24 Feb 1993 11:08:17 -0500
> From: ghabrech at ultrix.ramapo.edu (The Knight of Ni)
> Message-Id: <9302241608.AA09746 at ultrix.ramapo.edu>
> To: cypherpunks at toad.com, rubin at citi.umich.edu
> Subject: Re: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
> 
> I think the idea is just that it is an e-mail account.  I don't think you have
> any disk quota or such and probably can't even telnet or ftp from it.  The
> idea for this is privacy.  The best way to keep someone from reading your
> files is to make it so that they can't get their hands on 'em.
> 
> George
> 

 it really doesnt work out... MANY ways are inherent in the scheme
to eventually match a face with an account. If you always pay
in cash, if you always where a mask(WAIT MASK??? well I think you get the IDEA)
credit cards will; eventually be traced and bank accounts discovered
unless one started taking their precautions before the information age...
now the only absolute privacy/anonymity will be the ones that can
insure it with technology
   cheers
    kelly
-- 





From rubin at citi.umich.edu  Wed Feb 24 09:02:15 1993
From: rubin at citi.umich.edu (Aviel David Rubin)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 09:02:15 PST
Subject: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
Message-ID: <9302241702.AA06872@toad.com>


> it really doesnt work out... MANY ways are inherent in the scheme
> to eventually match a face with an account. If you always pay
> in cash, if you always where a mask(WAIT MASK??? well I think you get the IDEA)
> credit cards will; eventually be traced and bank accounts discovered
> unless one started taking their precautions before the information age...
> now the only absolute privacy/anonymity will be the ones that can
> insure it with technology
>    cheers
>     kelly  

No here's another application for anonymous cash.





From mbrennan at netcom.com  Wed Feb 24 09:30:25 1993
From: mbrennan at netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 09:30:25 PST
Subject: Law&Disorder (fwd)
Message-ID: <9302241728.AA27534@netcom.netcom.com>


Everything is happening in the Bay Area. And I'm stuck down here in the
L.A. wasteland (sigh).

Oh well. At least there's mailing lists.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Brennan                                 Internet: mbrennan at netcom.com
                                              Compuserve: 76206,2462
                                               Applelink: M.BRENNAN






From treason at gnu.ai.mit.edu  Wed Feb 24 10:13:58 1993
From: treason at gnu.ai.mit.edu (treason at gnu.ai.mit.edu)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 10:13:58 PST
Subject: a project for those who like it
Message-ID: <9302241812.AA12695@spiff.gnu.ai.mit.edu>


I have been working on an idea or a secure chat system for internet and have 
up with some ideas.  The concept is to runa server(a single server) to 
process the chat for up to say 50 users(more may lag you to death) using
public key to secure the system.  The server would be on an internet machine
and the client would be on the users home pc.  We use the home pc concept
to avoid transporting raw data(unencrypted) over internet and phone lines.
The basic gist (in a pseudo pseudocode) is this:

CLIENT SIDE

User runs client
client asks for password (from pgp key)
client checks for servers pgp public key
user then connects to the network and such(dumb teminal, with hotkey to
   activate encryption/decryption)
client connects to sever sending userid and hostname
client asks for alias
client sends server userid hostname
start main function
when message sent
   client encrypts with servers public key
   client sends message to server
when message received
   client decrypts message with users public key (using password supplied
      at initiation)
   client displays it to users screen
loop to start main function

SERVER SIDE

Admin starts server with server pgp password as a parameter
server waits for connection
server gets connection receives host and id
server checks id table looking for legal user
user is valid
   connect
else
   boot user
check and see if user is logged more than once
if true
   boot both users
   alarm admin
(* This is to make sure noone is lending out their account *)
server matches user with pgp key
start main function
if message sent
   encrypt message with users pgp public key and sends it out
if message received
   decrypt message sent by user using server secret key and password
   reencrypt it for each user on the server
   send message to each user
loop to start main function

The server would have a copy of each users public key, and a look up table
with this format to tell which key is paired with which user:

userid at host pgpkeyname

When I say a user is logged in more than once in the above comment, I mean
logged in on the server, not on his account.

The id or hostname of the user is never displayed and cannot be retrieved.
There is no similarity to irc, no channels, just one stream going to all users.
The data will be encrypted in blocks, and sent out in blocks.

There will need to be made some slight changes in pgp to get this to work.

flaws:  When entering a pgp password, and containing it in memory, this may be
retreivable by the root or the server machine.  Information will be
temporarily stored in kmem, although disorderly, raw.  People are stupid.

Tell me what you think.  People are already wrking on this project, but many
more may be needed to bring it to its completion.  Since I am not
the IP programmer from hell, at this point I am doing the pc client.

iI expect bitches about people saying people will use the server for illegal 
purposes, but because people can use a bathtub for illegal purposes if
they wanted to, I will ignore them.

Treason at gnu 




From bmullane at ultrix.ramapo.edu  Wed Feb 24 10:18:15 1993
From: bmullane at ultrix.ramapo.edu (JamesBond_007)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 10:18:15 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302241821.AA19804@ultrix.ramapo.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

So, has pgp 2.2 really been released?
does anyone know?
Brian

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aTEldUjbjNc=
=Uje7
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Wed Feb 24 10:23:56 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 10:23:56 PST
Subject: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
In-Reply-To: <9302231921.aa24595@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9302241820.AA11378@soda.berkeley.edu>


Re: an1234 vs. na1234

Julf writes:
>Now we only have to fight about what the From: line in anonymous
>messages ought to say, an1234 or na1234?

You can determine the From: line by looking at the destination.

If the destination is to another alias, then you use "an1234", since
the reply should appear to be coming from another alias.  Using the
"an1234" address triggers the aliasing mechanism.  

On the other hand, if the destination is to a non-alias mailbox, then
use the "na1234" form.  In this way the alias mechanism is not invoked
upon reply.

For messages with more than one addressee, split all the alias
destinations into one message, and all the non-alias destinations into
another.  Set the From: line accordingly in each message.  This avoids
the attack of using a two-recipient message to invoke an incorrect
alias behavior.

For newsgroup postings, where no particular addressee is listed, and
for mailing lists, I would suggest using "na1234", but this probably
is a change in the default behavior for newsgroups.  You would like
newsgroups and mailing lists to act the same, and that means either
keeping a list of mailing list entry points (ick), or using the
"na1234" form.

Eric





From 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM  Wed Feb 24 10:29:13 1993
From: 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM (Hal)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 10:29:13 PST
Subject: When's enough enough?
Message-ID: <930224182016_74076.1041_DHJ43-1@CompuServe.COM>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Paul Ferguson asks:

> Now, I'd like to ask the cypherpunk readership to clarify the need (or
> perhaps a better term may be "desire") for anonymous remailers? Maybe
> I'm not getting the "big picture", but it would appear to me that
> insurance of private communications is the area of intended interest
> here. I know that someone may declare my query as naive, but if you
> feel strongly enough about a topic, why wouldn't you want the
> recipient to know who you are, where you are and who they can respond
> to?

There are several different advantages provided by anonymous remailers.
One of the simplest and least controversial would be to defeat traffic
analysis on ordinary email.

Two people who wish to communicate privately can use PGP or some other
encryption system to hide the content of their messages.  But the fact
that they are communicating with each other is still visible to many
people: sysops at their sites and possibly at intervening sites, as well
as various net snoopers.  It would be natural for them to desire an
additional amount of privacy which would disguise who they were communicating
with as well as what they were saying.

Anonymous remailers make this possible.  By forwarding mail between
themselves through remailers, while still identifying themselves in the
(encrypted) message contents, they have even more communications privacy
than with simple encryption.

(The Cypherpunk vision includes a world in which literally hundreds or
thousands of such remailers operate.  Mail could be bounced through
dozens of these services, mixing in with tens of thousands of other
messages, re-encrypted at each step of the way.  This should make traffic
analysis virtually impossible.  By sending periodic dummy messages which
just get swallowed up at some step, people can even disguise _when_
they are communicating.)

The more controversial vision associated with anonymous remailers is
expressed in such science fiction stories as "True Names", by Vernor
Vinge, or "Ender's Game", by Orson Scott Card.  These depict worlds in
which computer networks are in widespread use, but in which many people
choose to participate through pseudonyms.  In this way they can make
unpopular arguments or participate in frowned-upon transactions without
their activities being linked to their true identities.  It also allows
people to develop reputations based on the quality of their ideas,
rather than their job, wealth, age, or status.

The idea here is that the ultimate solution to the low signal-to-noise
ratio on the nets is not a matter of forcing people to "stand behind their
words".  People can stand behind all kinds of idiotic ideas.  Rather,
there will need to be developed better systems for filtering news and
mail, for developing "digital reputations" which can be stamped on one's
postings to pass through these smart filters, and even applying these
reputations to pseudonyms.  In such a system, the fact that someone is
posting or mailing pseudonymously is not a problem, since nuisance posters
won't be able to get through.

Other advantages of this approach include its extension to electronic
on-line transactions.  Already today many records are kept of our
financial dealings - each time we purchase an item over the phone using
a credit card, this is recorded by the credit card company.  In time,
even more of this kind of information may be collected and possibly sold.
One Cypherpunk vision includes the ability to engage in transactions
anonymously, using "digital cash", which would not be traceable to the
participants.  Particularly for buying "soft" products, like music,
video, and software (which all may be deliverable over the net eventually),
it should be possible to engage in such transactions anonymously.  So
this is another area where anonymous mail is important.

We anticipate that computer networks will play a more and more important
role in many parts of our lives.  But this increased computerization brings
tremendous dangers for infringing privacy.  Cypherpunks seek to put into
place structures which will allow people to preserve their privacy if they
choose.  No one will be forced to use pseudonyms or post anonymously.
But it should be a matter of choice how much information a person chooses
to reveal about himself when he communicates.  Right now, the nets don't
give you that much choice.  We are trying to give this power to people.

Hal Finney

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XCLX0Hi9BhE=
=8/HS
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From marc at MIT.EDU  Wed Feb 24 11:42:15 1993
From: marc at MIT.EDU (Marc Horowitz)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 11:42:15 PST
Subject: a project for those who like it
In-Reply-To: <9302241812.AA12695@spiff.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9302241940.AA21343@tla.MIT.EDU>


>> I have been working on an idea or a secure chat system for internet
>> and have up with some ideas.

A system such as this already exists at MIT.  It's called zephyr.
Currently, it uses kerberos (private-key) for authentication, and uses
cleartext, but the system just pushes around bits.  There's no reason
a message couldn't be a public key encrypted message.  ACLs already
exist (based on the kerberos authentication), but the system is
capable of supporting well over a thousand simultaneous clients, so
they might not be necessary.  The protocol is based on UDP, and is
well-documented.  Unix and macintosh clients exist; there are PC
clients in development.

If people want more information (up to and including the technical
papers), look on athena-dist.mit.edu (it's a mail server, too).  Or,
I'll be happy to discuss it on the list.

		Marc





From 71562.3445 at CompuServe.COM  Wed Feb 24 12:25:12 1993
From: 71562.3445 at CompuServe.COM (Duncan/Lois Frissell)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 12:25:12 PST
Subject: Dining Crypto -- An Introduction
Message-ID: <930224201510_71562.3445_CHT104-1@CompuServe.COM>


(Timothy May)

Thanks for your repost of your message from the "Dawn of Time" (August 
1992).  Your list of "What DC Nets are Good For" was not specific enough
for my taste.  What DC Nets (untraceable communications) are good for:

1)  Once voice/video/VR makes it to the nets and once we have enough 
bandwidth/speed even realtime communications can be untraceable:

It's December 2000 and President Elect Clinton (Hilary) calls me for advice.
The call goes to my "Virtual Communications Server" located "Somewhere on the
Nets".  The packets are forwarded to me after being split up and sent their
various ways through anonymous remailers.  My half of the conversation travels
back the same way.  The packets pay the anonymous remailers for their
services with digital cash attached to their address headers.  We notice 
no time lag because the nets are fast and the packets carry a "realtime"
priority.

With the proper setup, the President of the US will be talking to me without
knowing (or being able to find out) where (or who) I am.

2)  This means markets freed from even the theoretical possibility of regulation.
Anything that can be digitized can be sold with no restraints save the absence
of a willing buyer.  Books, movies, VR epics, financial products, and all
non-physical services can be traded without coercion (and without taxation).
Remember too that "non-physical services" includes almost all management and
professional services.  The technique of "anonymous credentials" can be
used to check out those you deal with.

3)  The lack of regulation in the "spiritual realm" will distort market
transactions in the still controlled "physical realm."  People will tend
to "unbundle" the non-physical aspects of their services and sell them on
the nets even if it is less convenient to do so because of the *tax* savings.

4)  The reduction is government "revenue" as economic activity transfers
to the nets will induce a beneficial downward spiral in the authority and
power of government.

5)  People who become used to freedom in one part of their lives (their
work and play on the nets) will not enjoy the coercion they suffer in the
remainder of their lives (the place they sleep).  They will have 
the motivation and the tools to liberate their whole lives.  All without
the Libertarian Party converting a single person.  Freedom is a powerful
recruiter.

Duncan Frissell








From Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU  Wed Feb 24 12:31:26 1993
From: Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU (Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 12:31:26 PST
Subject: Anonymous flooding
Message-ID: <9302242031.AA10553@toad.com>


I wonder if full crypto anonymity as we envision it will be stable?
I'm very concerned about the problem of anonymous users intentionally
flooding the network with garbage in order to bring it to its knees.
Current practice, in the non-anonymous world, is to trace excess
traffic to its source and stop it from being generated.  This will no
longer be possible when true anonymity is available.

This would particularly be a problem if a remailer is willing to forward
an incoming message to more than one destination.  In that case, by sending a
single anonymous message, a saboteur could generate an exponential amount
of net traffic.  This would be bad.

Two basic precautions for a remailer to take are
  1. To require a 1-1 correspondence between input and output messages.
  2. To require that the address portion of the message shrink at each step
     (preventing infinite loops).  
If this is done, then the saboteur's original message can be at most
n-fold replicated, where n is the maximum number of remailer hops
allowed.

However, I still have some fundamental concerns that an anonymity-based
system is vulnerable to flooding and denial of service by the bad guys,
including Big Brother, who may wish to prevent effective use of such
systems.  This may make operating a remailer a difficult proposition.

I'm discouraged.  Any thoughts?


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr at cs.cmu.edu)





From uri at watson.ibm.com  Wed Feb 24 13:15:37 1993
From: uri at watson.ibm.com (uri at watson.ibm.com)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 13:15:37 PST
Subject: Anonymous flooding
In-Reply-To: <9302242031.AA10553@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302242113.AA16811@buoy.watson.ibm.com>


Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU says:
> I wonder if full crypto anonymity as we envision it will be stable?
> I'm very concerned about the problem of anonymous users intentionally
> flooding the network with garbage in order to bring it to its knees.
> Current practice, in the non-anonymous world, is to trace excess
> traffic to its source and stop it from being generated.  This will no
> longer be possible when true anonymity is available.

Yes, this is a REAL danger. But if the network providers will
charge per-packet fee (what an ugly idea :-), and no packet
will be moved without being "taxed" (:-) - i.e. some
digital cash removed from it's header (:-) - well,
I see no reason, why somebody can't invest his
$1,000,000 in shutting y'all up for a day (:-).

> This would particularly be a problem if a remailer is willing to forward
> an incoming message to more than one destination.  In that case, by sending a
> single anonymous message, a saboteur could generate an exponential amount
> of net traffic.  This would be bad.

It only depends on who pays for each packet (:-).

> However, I still have some fundamental concerns that an anonymity-based
> system is vulnerable to flooding and denial of service by the bad guys,
> including Big Brother, who may wish to prevent effective use of such
> systems.  This may make operating a remailer a difficult proposition.

Yeah, THIS can be a problem: our Big Brother has enough
money to do all the smelly things we discussed above...
And if not - he'll tax us more...

> I'm discouraged.  Any thoughts?

There's no way to limit Big Brother's power, except
for getting rid of him altogether, I'm afraid...
--
Regards,
Uri         uri at watson.ibm.com      scifi!angmar!uri 	N2RIU
-----------
<Disclamer>






From tytso at Athena.MIT.EDU  Wed Feb 24 14:18:18 1993
From: tytso at Athena.MIT.EDU (Theodore Ts'o)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 14:18:18 PST
Subject: Anonymous flooding
In-Reply-To: <9302242031.AA10553@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302242216.AA16535@SOS>


   Date: Wed, 24 Feb 1993 15:11-EST
   From: Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU

   I wonder if full crypto anonymity as we envision it will be stable?
   I'm very concerned about the problem of anonymous users intentionally
   flooding the network with garbage in order to bring it to its knees.
   Current practice, in the non-anonymous world, is to trace excess
   traffic to its source and stop it from being generated.  This will no
   longer be possible when true anonymity is available.

I think the real problem won't be flooding, but the bad name full crypto
anonymity will get when lusers start abusing the system to send
harrassing email and hide behind the protection of an anonymous
remailer.

At MIT, we're considering to start up an anonymous remailer, but with
the proviso that if we get a complaint about a particular pseudonym is
used to send harassing email, or email with threatening violence, and
some other well-defined occassions, that we would reveal, to the proper
authorities, the email address used for sending replies back.

A warning to that effect would be sent back to an email address the
first time the anonymous contact service saw that particular email
address, and assigned it a pseudonym address for replies.  This way,
users would have the proper expectations of privacy.

Ultimately, I think this is the only way that anonymous remailers will
be able to function.  Otherwise, the public outcry the first time one of
these remailers are abused will cause these full remailers to be
shutdown, or otherwise cut off from the net.

						- Ted





From pbreton at cs.umb.edu  Wed Feb 24 14:42:18 1993
From: pbreton at cs.umb.edu (Peter Breton)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 14:42:18 PST
Subject: Poor Man's Anonymous Digital Mail Drop
In-Reply-To: <9302241637.AA20822@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9302241724.A12934-b100000@ra.cs.umb.edu>




On Wed, 24 Feb 1993, Kelly Goen wrote:

> > I think the idea is just that it is an e-mail account.  I don't think you have
> > any disk quota or such and probably can't even telnet or ftp from it.  The
> > idea for this is privacy.  The best way to keep someone from reading your
> > files is to make it so that they can't get their hands on 'em.
> > 
> > George
> > 
> 
>  it really doesnt work out... MANY ways are inherent in the scheme
> to eventually match a face with an account. If you always pay
> in cash, if you always where a mask(WAIT MASK??? well I think you get the IDEA)
> credit cards will; eventually be traced and bank accounts discovered
> unless one started taking their precautions before the information age...
> now the only absolute privacy/anonymity will be the ones that can
> insure it with technology
>    cheers
>     kelly
> -- 

 I'm not saying that the phony email-account scheme has a lot of merit,
but it could surely be implemented: simply pay by money order from your
local Christys each month, and, of course, order the initial service from
a mail drop or something. I actually think the most reliable privacy methods
are low-tech (e.g., pay for things w/ cash instead of checks or credit cards)
but they involve sacrificing some of the convenience we may be accustomed
to. Personally, I get my access free, and I wouldn't want to pony up the
bucks to pay for a duplicate account...

		Peter









From ncselxsi!drzaphod at ncselxsi.netcom.com  Wed Feb 24 15:31:12 1993
From: ncselxsi!drzaphod at ncselxsi.netcom.com (DrZaphod)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 15:31:12 PST
Subject: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
Message-ID: <33176.drzaphod@ncselxsi>


In Message 24 Feb 93 10:13:44 EST,
  Duncan/Lois Frissell <CompuServe.COM!71562.3445 at netcomsv.netcom.com> writes:

>Isn't an account that can't be traced to you anonymous?  How about an (email
>only) account for $3/month billed to you (no credit cards required).

     I think you're confusing pseunonymous with anonymous.  The goal is to
send data somewhere WITHOUT A TRACE as to where it came from.  If you used a
single e-mail address, [someone] could track it down, watch for logins, and
trace the line.  If you used MANY e-mail addresses it would clog the net..
remailers seem to be the way to go these days.  TTFN!

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod at ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized





From tcmay at netcom.com  Wed Feb 24 15:50:09 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 15:50:09 PST
Subject: Anonymous flooding
Message-ID: <9302242348.AA20887@netcom.netcom.com>


Marc Ringuette worries about anonymous messages flooding the nets:

>I wonder if full crypto anonymity as we envision it will be stable?
>I'm very concerned about the problem of anonymous users intentionally
>flooding the network with garbage in order to bring it to its knees.
>Current practice, in the non-anonymous world, is to trace excess
>traffic to its source and stop it from being generated.  This will no
>longer be possible when true anonymity is available.

The simple solution: paid transmissions. Remailers pass on messages only if
they receive the payment they've announced is their fee. While _some_
remailers may pass on messages for free (charity, policy, etc.), _their_
recipients are under no obligation (obviously) to continue to forward them
if no postage is attached.

This means the nets may indeed be filled with junk, but at least somebody
has to pay for it--and the remailers are making nice profits. Economics
thus provides a damping effect against runaway situations (as it does in so
many areas that at first seem unstable).

(The analogy with junk mail in the current postal system is apt: you may
not like getting 10 pieces of junk mail a day, but at least you never have
to pay for it directly...and the Postal System _likes_ "direct mail" (junk
mail), as it pays the bills.)

>This would particularly be a problem if a remailer is willing to forward
>an incoming message to more than one destination.  In that case, by sending a
>single anonymous message, a saboteur could generate an exponential amount
>of net traffic.  This would be bad.

Again, a remailer "willing to forward" to multiple destinations must pay
for the transmission--and the recipients will of course look to see that
_their_ remailing fees are paid. It is thus extremely expensive to "flood"
the nets, as each message costs some amount to transmit to remailers, to
remail, etc.

And don't forget that most folks will likely have various forms of
reputation filters running. The may scan incoming messages for interesting
content, for messages from senders known to them, etc. As with our ordinary
mail, the junk can be thrown away very quickly. 

>
>Two basic precautions for a remailer to take are
>  1. To require a 1-1 correspondence between input and output messages.
>  2. To require that the address portion of the message shrink at each step
>     (preventing infinite loops).  
>If this is done, then the saboteur's original message can be at most
>n-fold replicated, where n is the maximum number of remailer hops
>allowed.

Fine, some remailers may insist on a 1-1 correspondence, others may remail
to as many sites as postage is provided for. The market can then decide
which remailer to use. Businesses who take all paying customers generally
outcompete those with arbitrarily set policies or their own ideas of
rationing services (e.g., "But, sir, we can't let you buy five tubes of
toothpaste--what if _everyone_ tried to buy five tubes?").

>However, I still have some fundamental concerns that an anonymity-based
>system is vulnerable to flooding and denial of service by the bad guys,
>including Big Brother, who may wish to prevent effective use of such
>systems.  This may make operating a remailer a difficult proposition.
>
>I'm discouraged.  Any thoughts?

Little need to be discouraged. There are a great many "covers" for
anonymous mail, including legal consultations (attorney-client privilege),
psychiatric consultations (ditto), religions ("Digital Confessionals--the
Latest in Catholic Computing"), games (role-playing), and "personals" ads
(as in newspaper ads that match partners, dates, etc., except mediated
electronically in this case).

Stopping any one of these will be tough, stopping them all would be very
hard indeed.

-Tim May

--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.






From parish at cactus.org  Wed Feb 24 16:28:40 1993
From: parish at cactus.org (Tom Parish)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 16:28:40 PST
Subject: remove me from the list
Message-ID: <9302250027.AA14977@cactus.org>



Overload ... please remove me from the list.

Thanks,
Tom





From buchanan at rintintin.Colorado.EDU  Wed Feb 24 16:46:38 1993
From: buchanan at rintintin.Colorado.EDU (Timothy E. Buchanan)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 16:46:38 PST
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <199302250045.AA00274@rintintin.Colorado.EDU>


Please unsubscribe. 





From tcmay at netcom.com  Wed Feb 24 17:23:43 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 17:23:43 PST
Subject: Internet is Not the Long Term Solution
Message-ID: <9302250122.AA02771@netcom.netcom.com>



I want to clarify some points about my earlier posting on how remailer fees
fix the "anonymous flooding" problem which Marc Ringuette mentioned.

Implicit in my comments were some assumptions which I ought to break out
separately:

* The current Internet, glorious as it is, is not the likely long term
solution. The various bans and constraints on business interactions, on
fees, on commercial use, etc., are major limits to what we're talking about
here. (Some alternatives exist, like Alternet (sp?), but Internet is what
most of us are now using.)

* "Remailing fees" are the natural, free market solution to the costs of
transmitting, decrypting, storing, and forwarding messages. But these fees
run afoul of various Internet rules.

* The Internet policy statements are often invoked by sysadmins and
would-be censors (David Sternlight comes to mind) who are worried about
uses, abuses, and out of the ordinary situations. Ditto for Prodigy and
similar systems. The talk about bans on anonymous mail (nothing seriously
proposed, so far as I know) reflect the government-dominated nature of the
current Internet.

* Though what we are doing with anonymous mail, remailers, digital
pseudonyms, and even digital money is educational and even fun, I doubt any
of us expects our "constructions" to persist, to be a real foundation for
future digital economies. Well, at least I don't expect much to last.
Instead, what we learn with these systems will be carried over to new kinds
of networks, or on radically evolved descendants of today's networks.

* These new kinds of networks may look more like descendants of FIDONet
than of the Internet, in the sense of being more decentralized and outside
the control of institutions and government agencies. (Some have argued that
the Internet is already transnational and is already beyond the control of
governments. This sounds plausible in theory, but in practice most Internet
users _are_ subject to various rules about usage, about noncommercial use,
etc.)

* Some on this list have expressed distaste that remailing will have to be
_paid for_ by someone (other than themselves). This is the way economics
works. Remailers will act on the profit motive, and this in fact will do
more to increase the numbers and types of remailers than anything else.
When "Mom and Pop" remailer sites can be set up for the cost of a PC, hard
disk, and perhaps a "hardware mix" (a Chaum-style tamper-resistant  module
which mixes incoming messages, stores them for sufficient latency, then
remails them), then the profit motive will ensure lots of these remailers.

* I'm not saying the current Internet will not evolve into such a network.
In fact, the rapid growth in many countries and on many platforms may mean
it already has enough momentum to become the type of network we need to
develop these cyberspace constructs. But it's possible the form will be
quite different.

My crude timetable for the spread of crypto anarchy still has the 1993-5
period as a time of experimentation (such as we're doing), with more
robust, profit-oriented enterprises appearing around 1996 or so. (A few
brave souls may enter the market even earlier.) 

-Tim May

--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.






From tlr1 at acpub.duke.edu  Wed Feb 24 18:57:00 1993
From: tlr1 at acpub.duke.edu (Tristan Lanier Reid)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 18:57:00 PST
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9302250255.AA25442@soc2.acpub.duke.edu>


Please remove me from your mailing list...thank you for your time.

					Tristan Reid

					tlr1 at acpub.duke.edu




From Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU  Wed Feb 24 19:05:54 1993
From: Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU (Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 19:05:54 PST
Subject: Anonymous flooding
Message-ID: <9302250305.AA17098@toad.com>


[ Problem: anonymous flooding.  Solution: digital postage stamps. ]

Thanks, guys.  Problem solved.  Should've seen it myself.


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr at cs.cmu.edu)





From marc at Athena.MIT.EDU  Wed Feb 24 19:52:26 1993
From: marc at Athena.MIT.EDU (Marc Horowitz)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 19:52:26 PST
Subject: Internet is Not the Long Term Solution
In-Reply-To: <9302250122.AA02771@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302250351.AA18094@steve-dallas.MIT.EDU>


>> * The current Internet, glorious as it is, is not the likely long term
>> solution. The various bans and constraints on business interactions, on
>> fees, on commercial use, etc., are major limits to what we're talking about
>> here. (Some alternatives exist, like Alternet (sp?), but Internet is what
>> most of us are now using.)

Agreed.  The Internet, in it's current form, is not going to be the
information center of the future.

>> * "Remailing fees" are the natural, free market solution to the costs of
>> transmitting, decrypting, storing, and forwarding messages. But these fees
>> run afoul of various Internet rules.

Yup.

>> * These new kinds of networks may look more like descendants of FIDONet
>> than of the Internet, in the sense of being more decentralized and outside
>> the control of institutions and government agencies. (Some have argued that
>> the Internet is already transnational and is already beyond the control of
>> governments. This sounds plausible in theory, but in practice most Internet
>> users _are_ subject to various rules about usage, about noncommercial use,
>> etc.)

This is where I disagree strongly.  We are entering a time when the
commercial advantages of internetworking are strong enough to cause
the formation of a real, commercially built, non-government-controlled
internet (small "i").  This network will be devoid of any AUP beyond
simple legality, and will operate much like a common carrier:  They
won't care what you put on the wire unless someone brings it to their
attention.

I highly doubt that FIDONET is the model of the future.  People are
moving toward increased connectivity and real-time services, not the
slow, store-and-forward model of FIDO and UUCP.  The example of
encrypted, untraceable real-time video requires internet technologies.
Mail forwarding just doesn't cut it.

>> * Some on this list have expressed distaste that remailing will have to be
>> _paid for_ by someone (other than themselves). 

My major problem with this is that I'd rather not have to stamp each
piece.  I'd like to see a remailer sell me an unlimited-use ticket for
a month, say.  But this is what the free market is for.  I'm sure
someone will see their way to offering the service I want to buy.

		Marc





From banisar at washofc.cpsr.org  Wed Feb 24 21:11:05 1993
From: banisar at washofc.cpsr.org (Dave Banisar)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 21:11:05 PST
Subject: Clinton/Gore on export controls
Message-ID: <9302250013.AA39899@hacker2.eff.org>


------ Forwarded Message
       E X E C U T I V E   O F F I C E   O F   T H E   P R E S I D E N T



                             THE WHITE HOUSE

                      Office of the Press Secretary
______________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release                          February 22, 1993     

	
                         REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
                          AND VICE PRESIDENT TO
                        SILICON GRAPHICS EMPLOYEES
	
                             Silicon Graphics
                      Mountain View, California    


10:00 A.M. PST
	
....


(All sorts of higly intereresting but ultimately irrelevant to this list's 
purpose deleted)
	
	
	THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Let me start off on that.  As you may know, 
the President appointed as the Deputy Secretary of Commerce John 
Rollwagon who was the CEO at Cray.  And he and Ron Brown, the Secretary 
of Commerce, have been reviewing a lot of procedures for stimulating U.S. 
exports around the world.  And we're going to be a very export-oriented 
administration.
	
	However, we are also going to keep a close eye on the legitimate 
concerns that have in the past limited the free export of some 
technologies that can make a dramatic difference in the ability of a 
Gaddafi or a Saddam Hussein to develop nuclear weapons or ICBMs. 
	Now, in some cases in the past, these legitimate concerns have 
been interpreted and implemented in a way that has frustrated American 
business unnecessarily.  There are, for example, some software packages 
that are available off the shelves in stores here that are, nevertheless, 
prohibited from being exported.  And sometimes that's a little bit 
unrealistic.  On the other hand, there are some in business who are 
understandably so anxious to find new customers that they will not 
necessarily pay as much attention as they should to what the customer 
might use this new capacity for.  And that's a legitimate role for 
government, to say, hold on, the world will be a much more dangerous 
place if we have 15 or 20 nuclear powers instead of five or six; and if 
they have ICBMs and so forth.
	
	So it's a balance that has to be struck very carefully.  And 
we're going to have a tough nonproliferation strategy while we promote 
more exports.
	
	THE PRESIDENT:  If I might just add to that -- the short answer 
to your question, of course, is yes, we're going to review this.  And let 
me give you one example.  Ken told me last night at dinner that --he 
said, if we export substantially the same product to the same person, if 
we have to get one permit to do it we'll have to get a permit every time 
we want to do the same thing over and over again.  They always give it to 
us, but we have to wait six months and it puts us behind the competitive 
arc.  Now, that's something that ought to be changed, and we'll try to 
change that.
	
	We also know that some of our export controls, rules and 
regulations, are a function of the realities of the Cold War which aren't 
there anymore.  But what the Vice President was trying to say, 
and he said so well -- I just want to reemphasize -- our biggest security 
problem in the future may well be the proliferation of nuclear and 
nonnuclear, like biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction to 
small, by our standards, countries with militant governments who may not 
care what the damage to their own people could be.  So that's something 
we have to watch very closely.
	
	But apart from that, we want to move this much more quickly and 
we'll try to slash a lot of the time delays where we ought to be doing 
these things.
	

.....

(even more material deleted)



                            END10:41 A.M. PST

------ End of Forwarded Message

If anyone is interested in the whole conference, I weill put it up on the 
CPSR Internet Library at cpsr.org /cpsr/clinton.


Dave







From julf at penet.FI  Wed Feb 24 21:34:55 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 21:34:55 PST
Subject: Anonymous flooding
In-Reply-To: <9302242216.AA16535@SOS>
Message-ID: <9302250618.aa14970@penet.penet.FI>



Teodore Ts'o writes:

> At MIT, we're considering to start up an anonymous remailer, but with
> the proviso that if we get a complaint about a particular pseudonym is
> used to send harassing email, or email with threatening violence, and
> some other well-defined occassions, that we would reveal, to the proper
> authorities, the email address used for sending replies back.
> 
> A warning to that effect would be sent back to an email address the
> first time the anonymous contact service saw that particular email
> address, and assigned it a pseudonym address for replies.  This way,
> users would have the proper expectations of privacy.

Hmm... Could you briefly outline those "well-defined"
occasions? How about this case: I send you a complaint about somebody
who has repeatedly harrassed everybody soc.culture.india/tamil/srilanka
with anonymous postings about faked reports about then indian army
raping civilians in sri lanka?

> Ultimately, I think this is the only way that anonymous remailers will
> be able to function.  Otherwise, the public outcry the first time one of
> these remailers are abused will cause these full remailers to be
> shutdown, or otherwise cut off from the net.

Exactly as has happened to anon.penet.fi. ;-)

	Julf






From tytso at Athena.MIT.EDU  Wed Feb 24 22:03:27 1993
From: tytso at Athena.MIT.EDU (Theodore Ts'o)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 22:03:27 PST
Subject: Anonymous flooding
In-Reply-To: <9302250618.aa14970@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9302250602.AA25287@SOS>


   Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 07:01:04 +0200
   From: Johan Helsingius <julf at penet.FI>

   Hmm... Could you briefly outline those "well-defined"
   occasions? How about this case: I send you a complaint about somebody
   who has repeatedly harrassed everybody soc.culture.india/tamil/srilanka
   with anonymous postings about faked reports about then indian army
   raping civilians in sri lanka?

We haven't completely finished drafting those policies yet, so I can't
give you a comprehensive answer.  (If you have suggestions about where
to draw the line, please send me email!)

As far as your example goes: What I do now, when someone sends me a
complaint like that, is I go to the Usenet newsgroup myself, and take a
look at the flame war in progress.  (Usually both sides are behaving
like pre-schoolers fighting in a sandbox, but we'll let that pass.)
Whether or not we would need to impose sanctions on someone because of
their USENET postings is a very hard-to-define area, which ultimately
comes down to a judgement call.  Usually, we try not to censor people,
although we do usually send them a note suggesting that the follow some
basic Net Etiquette.  So that might not be grounds for digging up the
real email address.

On the other hand, if someone posts a message threatening to kill the
President, and the Secret Service shows up at your doorstep (and no,
this is not a Hypothetical Example), I think we would very clearly have
justification for trying to track down the identity of the person
posting the message.  Threats of violence in general would probably be
grounds for tracking the person down and issuing sanctions of some kind.

The basic idea is that there are certain uses of a psedonym remailer
(I'm not using the word anonymous remailer because we wouldn't be
offering true anonymity) which are obviously legitimate --- for example,
an anonymous suggestion box, alt.personals, etc.  On the other hand,
there are certain activities which are clearly out of bounds --- threats
of violence, harassment, etc.  What to do in the middle ground will
require some amount of judgement, so perhaps we won't be able to make
the list completely well-defined.  Although obviously, it would be best
if that list were as well-defined as possible.

						- Ted





From thug at phantom.com  Wed Feb 24 22:10:40 1993
From: thug at phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 22:10:40 PST
Subject: POOR MAN'S ANONYMOUS REMAILER
In-Reply-To: <33176.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
Message-ID: <m0nRbgo-000jpDC@phantom.com>



DrZaphod writes:
>      I think you're confusing pseunonymous with anonymous.  The goal is to
> send data somewhere WITHOUT A TRACE as to where it came from.  If you used a
> single e-mail address, [someone] could track it down, watch for logins, and
> trace the line.  If you used MANY e-mail addresses it would clog the net..
> remailers seem to be the way to go these days.  TTFN!

Getting an anonymous account on Compuserve, AT&T Mail, MCI Mail or any of
the other major services not only requires a mail drop, but also a number
where they can call you back.  Usually, a voice mailbox will do.  Then
it becomes a question of having enough phony id to get both the drop and
the VMB, usually not a problem considering any cyberpunk worth his wieght
in salt can get access to a 300 dpi color ink jet printer (ie: Deskjet 550C),
a Polaroid camera, and a laminating machine, and put together enough good
looking ID to fool almost anybody.  BTW, don't try using phony ID to get
a U.S. Mail Post Office box, because they are trained to spot that, not
for the reason of preventing people from renting P.O. Boxes but to prevent
people from cashing money orders under false names.

Let us assume that obtaining an account on a major online service or major
e-mail carrier is fairly easy.  The question of traceability can be put
to rest assuming that whatever e-mail provider you choose has offline
messaging capability (ala NuPOP, Eudora, QWK, Compuserve CIM).  Now assume
you have a notebook or handheld PC (like the new Gateway Handbook).  You
can walk up to a payphone, download all your mail, then go to the park
and reply to all the messages while sitting at a park bench eating a
sandwitch and drinking coffee, then go to another payphone, and upload
all your offline mail responses.  Offline mail capability allows one to
EASILY use payphones as points of access.  You can download 50k of new
mail in less than 2 minutes at 2400 baud, and in less than 30 seconds at
9600 baud from a payphone and then go about the rest of your day.
An e-mail upload is even quicker. What could be simpler? However, make sure
not to use a calling card when dialing up your e-mail service provider's
point of presence. It's possible to use coins since the call will rarely
be longer than 3 minutes, and never longer than 5 minutes unless you
have huge uuencoded files coming into your mailbox, in which case it's
probably best to be using a 9600 or 14,400 baud portable modem anyway.
By the way, I think AT&T Mail has an 800 # dial-up that's free of per minute
charges, it's used by people who don't have a local dialup in their area.

I just realized that it's actually possible to be an anonymous UUCP site
in the same manner, since UUCP is nothing more than an advanced offline
download/upload protocol for news/mail/files.  Assuming you can scam
UUNET or PSI or whatever other UUCP provider by giving them false info,
you could actually become a fully mobile, roaming, and anonymous UUCP site..
Scary, ain't it... :)


Murdering Thug





From mark at coombs.anu.edu.au  Wed Feb 24 23:05:32 1993
From: mark at coombs.anu.edu.au (Mark)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 23:05:32 PST
Subject: a project for those who like it
Message-ID: <9302250704.AA05982@coombs.anu.edu.au>


>I have been working on an idea or a secure chat system for internet and have 
>up with some ideas.  The concept is to runa server(a single server) to 
>process the chat for up to say 50 users(more may lag you to death) using
>public key to secure the system.  The server would be on an internet machine
>and the client would be on the users home pc.  We use the home pc concept
>to avoid transporting raw data(unencrypted) over internet and phone lines.
>The basic gist (in a pseudo pseudocode) is this:

>Tell me what you think.  People are already wrking on this project, but many
>more may be needed to bring it to its completion.  Since I am not
>the IP programmer from hell, at this point I am doing the pc client.

Hmmm, are you talking about '4m'? That is a similarly goaled communication
system as well. Currently it exists in plain text format, between the clients
and the (as of today, five) servers. The system has always been destined to
have encryption built into it, from triple des and PK for the key
transactions.

To get into it quickly ftp /pub/misc/4m-212.tar.Z from ftp.santafe.edu and
install. It runs on suns, bsd, aix and similar. I have an hpux port done by
someone if it is required.

It would seem smarter to develop an already existing and debugged instead of
reinventing the wheel.

Contact chasin at santafe.edu for details.

Mark
mark at coombs.anu.edu.au





From tcmay at netcom.com  Wed Feb 24 23:19:57 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 23:19:57 PST
Subject: Internet is Not the Long Term Solution
Message-ID: <9302250718.AA07261@netcom.netcom.com>


Marc Horowitz writes, referring to my comments:

>This is where I disagree strongly.  We are entering a time when the
>commercial advantages of internetworking are strong enough to cause
>the formation of a real, commercially built, non-government-controlled
>internet (small "i").  This network will be devoid of any AUP beyond
>simple legality, and will operate much like a common carrier:  They
>won't care what you put on the wire unless someone brings it to their
>attention.
>
>I highly doubt that FIDONET is the model of the future.  People are
>moving toward increased connectivity and real-time services, not the
>slow, store-and-forward model of FIDO and UUCP.  The example of
>encrypted, untraceable real-time video requires internet technologies.
>Mail forwarding just doesn't cut it.

I wasn't very clear, or detailed, about this. I certainly didn't mean "like
FIDONET" in the sense of a bunch of slow store-and-forward DOS-type
machines. I agree with Marc that fast networks are the way to go.

But the decentralized, privately-operated nature of FIODONET is intriguing,
especially if combined with high-speed fiber optic networks and such. 

And many of the packetized messages we expect to see in with digital mixes
will easily tolerate (and even require) some latency at each node. A large,
diverse system of store-and-forward nodes may be very suitable for much of
what we're talking about here. The long delays on the current FIDONET are
of course unacceptable. (No point in arguing how much latency, how much
delay is acceptable, etc., because it will all depend on the nature of the
communications.)

In summary, what I hope we get is a heterogeneous, decentralized,
market-oriented mixture of networks, some very high speed, some slower
speed, and some that are very slow but secure. So long as the Feds don't
force the development in one direction, this is what I expect to see.

>My major problem with this is that I'd rather not have to stamp each
>piece.  I'd like to see a remailer sell me an unlimited-use ticket for
>a month, say.  But this is what the free market is for.  I'm sure
>someone will see their way to offering the service I want to buy.

Like Marc says, perhaps someone will offer this, though I doubt it.
However, while passenger transportation systems can offer unlimited use
tickets, the same is not generally the case with freight transportation
(where someone might ship thousands of tons of freight on one ticket!). I
doubt anyone will offer unlimited data transport for some fixed time
period, for the same reason.

-Tim


--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.






From tcmay at netcom.com  Wed Feb 24 23:20:04 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 23:20:04 PST
Subject: Anonymous flooding
Message-ID: <9302250718.AA07276@netcom.netcom.com>


Johan Helsingius <julf at penet.FI> writes:

>> Ultimately, I think this is the only way that anonymous remailers will
>> be able to function.  Otherwise, the public outcry the first time one of
>> these remailers are abused will cause these full remailers to be
>> shutdown, or otherwise cut off from the net.
>
>Exactly as has happened to anon.penet.fi. ;-)
>
>        Julf

Have I missed something? Has anon.penet.fi been shut down or cut off from
the net?

Please fill us in. I think most of us are rooting for you and your system
(though some *.army.mil readers are probably not--they just can't stand the
thought of defense secrets being sold on crypto anarchy nets!).

-Tim
--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
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From julf at penet.FI  Wed Feb 24 23:28:55 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 23:28:55 PST
Subject: Anonymous flooding
In-Reply-To: <9302250602.AA25287@SOS>
Message-ID: <9302250805.aa15717@penet.penet.FI>



> We haven't completely finished drafting those policies yet, so I can't
> give you a comprehensive answer.  (If you have suggestions about where
> to draw the line, please send me email!)

If you can come up with hard and fast rules that don't ultimately
reflect your own views and biases, I would *love* to see them! What I'm
claiming is that there can't ever be a clean-cut line, thus I am going
for the policy of *never* releasing someone's true identity. Blocking is
another matter...

> As far as your example goes: What I do now, when someone sends me a
> complaint like that, is I go to the Usenet newsgroup myself, and take a
> look at the flame war in progress.  (Usually both sides are behaving
> like pre-schoolers fighting in a sandbox, but we'll let that pass.)
> Whether or not we would need to impose sanctions on someone because of
> their USENET postings is a very hard-to-define area, which ultimately
> comes down to a judgement call.  Usually, we try not to censor people,
> although we do usually send them a note suggesting that the follow some
> basic Net Etiquette.  So that might not be grounds for digging up the
> real email address.

Censoring is not pretty, but still a long way off from actually exposing
somebody.

> On the other hand, if someone posts a message threatening to kill the
> President, and the Secret Service shows up at your doorstep (and no,
> this is not a Hypothetical Example), I think we would very clearly have
> justification for trying to track down the identity of the person
> posting the message.

I don't think so. This morning there was an article in my local paper
about an estonian poet who was convicted to 10 years of prison for
having written songs threatening Stalin and the Party apparatchniks with
"real revolution". Yes, this was USSR in the 50's, but...

According to your example you would gladly have helped KGB to find out
the real address of the poet, right? And I hope the response isn't "but
the President of the USA is *not* Stalin, and The Secret Service is not
the KGB...".

> Threats of violence in general would probably be
> grounds for tracking the person down and issuing sanctions of some kind.

Ok. So how about the complaint I got today from rec.pets.cats where
somebody had posted something about how he was poisoning and shooting the
cats in the neighbourhood?

> The basic idea is that there are certain uses of a psedonym remailer
> (I'm not using the word anonymous remailer because we wouldn't be
> offering true anonymity) which are obviously legitimate --- for example,
> an anonymous suggestion box, alt.personals, etc.  On the other hand,
> there are certain activities which are clearly out of bounds --- threats
> of violence, harassment, etc.  What to do in the middle ground will
> require some amount of judgement, so perhaps we won't be able to make
> the list completely well-defined.  Although obviously, it would be best
> if that list were as well-defined as possible.

What is legitimate for you might be (and certainly is, in some part of
the world) for somebody else. And vice versa.

And my apologies if I sound a bit harsh. I am still only sipping my
morning coffee....

	Julf






From an5877 at anon.penet.fi  Thu Feb 25 00:35:58 1993
From: an5877 at anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 00:35:58 PST
Subject: Anonymity vs accountability - a balanced view (maybe?)
Message-ID: <9302250751.AA19616@anon.penet.fi>


In-reply-to: Matthew Rapaport's message of Wed, 24 Feb 1993 08:20:43 -0800.
	     <9302241620.AA25561 at netcom2.netcom.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Matthew argues for balance in the USENET battle over pseudo/anonimity.
Matthew is preaching to the choir.

Folks who have watched USENET for any appreciable length of time know
that reason is not highly prized there.  Volume is.

The self-apponted gods of the net can't stop us, they can only bitch
about us.  Let them.

This is no different than any other USENET issue.  The only way to win
is not to play.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4wpGPFZTpBW/B35AQFppwF/fACfJjSLzYDi7LNCRCndyZwxTIRbpuIp
G+G9pvcjA/dJQn6Z/AtDuyIe0guaihxS
=VpJU
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.





From newsham at wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu  Thu Feb 25 01:00:38 1993
From: newsham at wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu (Timothy Newsham)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 01:00:38 PST
Subject: link encryption
Message-ID: <9302250900.AA22090@toad.com>



ahh..  I just thought of something I should mention about that
code I have sent out.  I am releasing MY CODE to the public domain,
but parts of the package are not mine :)   In particular the 
RSA code and the DES code come from other places.  I dont think
there are any restrictions on the code, but they dont become
public domain with my code :)   Lets keep me out of trouble






From mbrennan at netcom.com  Thu Feb 25 01:03:13 1993
From: mbrennan at netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 01:03:13 PST
Subject: Finding Mac PGP software?
Message-ID: <9302250901.AA16429@netcom.netcom.com>


Dave Banisar <banisar at washofc.cpsr.org> writes:
> MacPGP is available at mac.archives.umich.edu via gopher and FTP.

Dave, I've tried ftp'ing to that site, but I get "unknown site". Is that
really the correct address? I appreciate the info.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Brennan                                 Internet: mbrennan at netcom.com
                                              Compuserve: 76206,2462
                                               Applelink: M.BRENNAN






From gg at well.sf.ca.us  Thu Feb 25 01:07:18 1993
From: gg at well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 01:07:18 PST
Subject: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
Message-ID: <199302250904.AA03970@well.sf.ca.us>


Duncan's posting about AT&T mail as a "poor man's anonymous mailbox" misses
one crucial fact.  The moment you dial an 800 number, you generate a record
of your phone number via ANI, which means AT&T gets that information in
realtime and can probably correlate it with your phone account and service
address and name.  If you want anonymity, never ever ever use any service
which requires you call in via an 800 number.  

-gg at well.sf.ca.us





From John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG  Thu Feb 25 05:00:34 1993
From: John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 05:00:34 PST
Subject: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
Message-ID: <5046.2B8CB524@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>


 ("L. Detweiler") states:

 BK> the
 BK> possibility of a centralized moderator stripping addresses, while
 BK> already currently supported in the software mechanisms, is problematic
 BK> because it is a single location with all the traffic--hence the need to
 BK> go through independent anonymous servers first. But I think the
 BK> localized header-stripping is totally superior to all this. Having a
 BK> message bounce around a net a bit with *real* information is very
 BK> vulnerable, when the ID could be stripped off at the source.

There is also the problem of those (like me) who access the internet
from outside, through gates.  The messages are not only marked with the
point of origin automatically by the originating BBS's software, but are
also subject to monitoring by any number of systems operators en route
to internet.  When all of the headers (including passwords for the
anonymous servers) are in plaintext, the entire anonymous system seems
compromised.  While some servers I haven't tried yet seem to be PGPed,
this doesn't seem to be the case with penet.fi.

 BK> How about an EFF sponsored server?

Yes, and preferably at a site outside the US, just for good measure.
There is an obvious appeal to having servers outside the jurisdiction of
American law-enforcement busybodies.

        JN


... "A Few Years in the Absolute Elsewhere..."  
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG





From John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG  Thu Feb 25 05:00:34 1993
From: John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 05:00:34 PST
Subject: Enough's enough already
Message-ID: <5047.2B8CB525@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>



 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks                    <INET>

Paul Ferguson writes:

 BK> I know that someone may declare my query as naive, but if you
 BK> feel strongly enough about a topic, why wouldn't you want the
 BK> recipient to know who you are, where you are and who they can respond
 BK> to?

I just had a chilling example of why last month.  Someone who made my
life a living hell (in real life, not cyberspace) "found" me again in a
discussion in a tech newsgroup and sent me a "yoo-hoo!" e-note.  I could
have gone a long time without that.  My identity was irrelevant to the
discussion, but was unfortunately very relevant to making this nasty
little surprise possible.

As the penet.fi helpfile mentions, one of the concerns was for the
privacy of those participating in theraputic discussions on such
touchy subjects as incest and abuse.  In that many theraputic
disciplines stress a confessional mode of treatment, the security
required for persons to "open up" must be (or appear to be) absolute.
These electronic therapy groups may not appeal to you or me, but they
have large followings and seem to serve a useful purpose for some.
Maximum anonymity is desirable for those participants.

I can think of several other very serious reasons for persons to desire
untracable communications, but they go beyond the scope of the matter at
hand.

More to the point, in my experience I have found very little to be
gained by revealing my true identity.  The less known about me, the
better for my personal security.  That's the whole point of the privacy
"movement."  Who I am is nobody's business but mine.

        JN


... "Is it too late to get the Russians to drop a nuke on Washington?"  
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG





From thug at phantom.com  Thu Feb 25 07:17:06 1993
From: thug at phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 07:17:06 PST
Subject: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
In-Reply-To: <199302250904.AA03970@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <m0nRkDb-000jw5C@phantom.com>


gg at well.sf.ca.us writes:
> Duncan's posting about AT&T mail as a "poor man's anonymous mailbox" misses
> one crucial fact.  The moment you dial an 800 number, you generate a record
> of your phone number via ANI, which means AT&T gets that information in
> realtime and can probably correlate it with your phone account and service
> address and name.  If you want anonymity, never ever ever use any service
> which requires you call in via an 800 number.  

There's an easy way to prevent your number from being passed to an 800
number owner via ANI.  Simply place the call using a TSPS/OSPS ("0") operator.
Say "I'm having trouble dialing 800-xxx-xxxx, could you please place the
call for me?" Once the call goes out over another trunk line, your number
is not passed on.  If you have ever dialed those ANI "Demo" 800 numbers
that read back your number via synthesized voice, and then tried calling
them again using a TSPS operator, you'll know exactly what I'm talking
about. This is at least the way it worked a while ago, I don't know if it
still applies or of they modified TSPS consoles pass on the number.
Perhaps Phiber could clarify this a bit and tell us if this still works,
and if it still works in all areas, or what areas it would not work in.  

Still, like I recommended in my previous post, the best way to implement
a poor man's anonymous mailer scheme is to use a notebook/handheld PC
and making all calls from payphones using coins or 800 dial-up, never using
your calling card.


Murdering Thug





From dmandl at shearson.com  Thu Feb 25 09:19:02 1993
From: dmandl at shearson.com (David Mandl)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 09:19:02 PST
Subject: Enough's enough already
Message-ID: <9302251454.AA10413@tardis.shearson.com>


> From: John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org (John Nieder)
> 
> Paul Ferguson writes:
> 
>  BK> I know that someone may declare my query as naive, but if you
>  BK> feel strongly enough about a topic, why wouldn't you want the
>  BK> recipient to know who you are, where you are and who they can respond
>  BK> to?
> 
> I just had a chilling example of why last month.  Someone who made my
> life a living hell (in real life, not cyberspace) "found" me again in a
> discussion in a tech newsgroup and sent me a "yoo-hoo!" e-note.  I could
> have gone a long time without that.  My identity was irrelevant to the
> discussion, but was unfortunately very relevant to making this nasty
> little surprise possible.
> 

Yup, there are dozens of reasons to want anonymity.  This should be completely
obvious to anyone moving in cypherpunk circles--or alt.sex circles, where,
amazingly, some well-respected sexosophists actually spoke out against anonymous
posting recently.  No offense intended, but anyone who can't think of situations
where anonymity is essential should get out more.  Any first grader can list
dozens of places where even mild blasphemy will get you locked up for a long
time. [Begin Zerowork tangent] And even if you think the U.S. isn't one of them
(which it is), keep in mind that most workplaces are effectively stalinist
dictatorships, and bosses may not be thrilled about having their employees
discuss crypto anarchy, the overthrow of governments, or S & M on the net.

   --Dave.





From pmetzger at shearson.com  Thu Feb 25 09:26:03 1993
From: pmetzger at shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 09:26:03 PST
Subject: Internet is Not the Long Term Solution
Message-ID: <9302251614.AA09427@maggie.shearson.com>


> From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
> 
> I want to clarify some points about my earlier posting on how remailer fees
> fix the "anonymous flooding" problem which Marc Ringuette mentioned.
> 
> Implicit in my comments were some assumptions which I ought to break out
> separately:
> 
> * The current Internet, glorious as it is, is not the likely long term
> solution. The various bans and constraints on business interactions, on
> fees, on commercial use, etc., are major limits to what we're talking about
> here. (Some alternatives exist, like Alternet (sp?), but Internet is what
> most of us are now using.)

Alternet is part of the Internet. There is no central control on the
internet -- only on segments of it.

UUCP is even more anarchic...

> * The Internet policy statements are often invoked by sysadmins and
> would-be censors (David Sternlight comes to mind) who are worried about
> uses, abuses, and out of the ordinary situations. Ditto for Prodigy and
> similar systems. The talk about bans on anonymous mail (nothing seriously
> proposed, so far as I know) reflect the government-dominated nature of the
> current Internet.

The NSF NET has policy statements. There are no policies for the internet
and indeed given that the internet spans at least thirty or so national
jurisidictions and tens of thousands of different networks its impossible
to have one policy statment. The risk is that Al Gore and Company will
manage to ram through their goverment managed internet which would
put PSI and company out of business and which would permanently assure
that most traffic passes through zones with draconian policies.

Perry





From julf at penet.FI  Thu Feb 25 09:33:59 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 09:33:59 PST
Subject: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <5046.2B8CB524@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
Message-ID: <9302251604.aa21585@penet.penet.FI>



> There is also the problem of those (like me) who access the internet
> from outside, through gates.  The messages are not only marked with the
> point of origin automatically by the originating BBS's software, but are
> also subject to monitoring by any number of systems operators en route
> to internet.  When all of the headers (including passwords for the
> anonymous servers) are in plaintext, the entire anonymous system seems
> compromised.  While some servers I haven't tried yet seem to be PGPed,
> this doesn't seem to be the case with penet.fi.

Penet.fi will be PGP:s as soon as I get PGP running reliably on the
Interactive UNIX system I use. This weekend, I hope... But if you all
keep coming up with other new features I have to add, I don't know how
long it's going to take. And I have to upgrade the hardware as well,
the load is getting so big the current server is running out of both CPU
and disk. This weekend I will upgrade to a 486SX motherboard and a
bigger disk.

>  BK> How about an EFF sponsored server?
> 
> Yes, and preferably at a site outside the US, just for good measure.
> There is an obvious appeal to having servers outside the jurisdiction of
> American law-enforcement busybodies.

Yeah, seems that (and the fact that I have 100% control not only of the
site but of the network as well) is what has kept anon.penet.fi up this
long...

	Julf






From Eric.Fogleman at analog.com  Thu Feb 25 09:48:11 1993
From: Eric.Fogleman at analog.com (Eric Fogleman)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 09:48:11 PST
Subject: problem installing pgp on a sun4...
Message-ID: <9302251745.AA26765@ack.adstest.analog.com>


Cypherpunks,

I downloaded 'pgp' from soda.berkeley.edu and 'unproto' from
win.tue.nl, ran the Makefile (make sun4cc) and got a binary that passes
the test given in setup.doc.

However, I got the following warnings:

"crypto.c", line 1445: warning: constant 256 is out of range of
unsigned char comparison 
"crypto.c", line 1445: warning: result of comparison is always true

(along with the same messages for line 2445.)

Here are the relevant lines...  from pgp.h:
		#define MAX_PATH        256

from crypto.c:
			unsigned char litfile[MAX_PATH];
			...
1445 -->                if (litfile[0] < MAX_PATH) 
2445 -->                if (litfile[0] < MAX_PATH)

I can see where this is a problem; 256 won't fit into eight bits.  What
is the correct way to fix this.  Should MAX_PATH be set to something else?

Thanks for your help,
Eric Fogleman





From julf at penet.FI  Thu Feb 25 10:24:25 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 10:24:25 PST
Subject: Anonymity vs accountability - a balanced view (maybe?)
Message-ID: <9302251927.aa23422@penet.penet.FI>


> Folks who have watched USENET for any appreciable length of time know
> that reason is not highly prized there.  Volume is.
> 
> The self-apponted gods of the net can't stop us, they can only bitch
> about us.  Let them.
> 
> This is no different than any other USENET issue.  The only way to win
> is not to play.

I have been trying to do that. But...

Unfortunately they *can* stop a lot of us. Let's take anon.penet.fi as
an example. A poor 386 box playing sitting duck for anyone who really
wants to flood it (and Karl Kleinpaste, among others, has spoken about
doing this on news.admin.policy). The other thing is that in some
official circles news.admin.policy is regarded as some kind of
semi-authority. If that group reaches a consensus to ban anon postings
I would get hassled by at least the academic network in Finland, for
"causing Finland a bad name on international networks". It wouldn't stop
me, but might make my life a bit unconfortable. And it has managed to
stop almost every anonymous posting service to date.

	Julf






From julf at penet.FI  Thu Feb 25 10:57:32 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 10:57:32 PST
Subject: Anonymous flooding
In-Reply-To: <9302250718.AA07276@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302252003.aa23700@penet.penet.FI>



> >Exactly as has happened to anon.penet.fi. ;-)
> 
> Have I missed something? Has anon.penet.fi been shut down or cut off from
> the net?

Notice the ";-)". I made a failed attempt at irony. Should have learned
never to try it in a foreign language ;-)

> Please fill us in. I think most of us are rooting for you and your system
> (though some *.army.mil readers are probably not--they just can't stand the
> thought of defense secrets being sold on crypto anarchy nets!).

Thanks! Appreciated!

	Julf






From ctd at bach.udel.edu  Thu Feb 25 11:13:35 1993
From: ctd at bach.udel.edu (Christo Delaroderie)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 11:13:35 PST
Subject: Unsubscribe me
Message-ID: <199302251912.AA14389@bach.udel.edu>




	Please unscribe me.
	ctd





From ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu  Thu Feb 25 12:00:28 1993
From: ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 12:00:28 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <9302251959.AA02941@longs.lance.colostate.edu>


The question as to what specifically to prohibit being posted
anonymously has come up, and is by far one of our most serious and
sensitive considerations. Of course, the decision is largely in the
hands of the anonymous server operator, but no generally accepted
guidelines currently exist, and we might help some people and advance
the cause by codifying `legitimate use'. First, let me assure you my
intent and preference is that it should be as liberal as possible. 
Let's look at some of the options (I'm tiptoeing on eggshells here,
please don't flame me too much):

1) operator makes decision for every posting brought to his attention. 

Things that would test this system: what about revisionists (not
ugly-enough term) who claim that the Holocaust never happened? Or
someone who is posting extremely provocative but fabricated data?  (The
first case happened on Prodigy--the censors let it through at one
point, and was documented in a column by Alan Dershowitz, famous
American lawyer defending e.g. Mike Tyson, and other major celebrities.
The second case happened with the now infamous challenger transcript
posting, where anonymous user of penet posts without any comment a
`transcript' of shuttle crew dialog during the crash.)

Here, I think one policy might be that if the poster seems to be
repeatedly and blatantly fabricating the data himself, maybe some
restriction or warning is in order. But if ever the poster includes
`real source' (no matter how trashy) from the outside world, and makes
it clear that they are not the originator, only the purveyor
(`messenger'), perhaps this is less serious.  (I think Mr. Helsingius'
current standards in this area should be held up as an outstanding
model of commitment to privacy and free speech.)

2) some kind of global system for keeping track of `abusive' posters.

Here are some interesting ideas--how about lists circulated among
anonymous server operators only (not public) that record barred users
by their email address or even real identity? The lists could be
categorized and tagged so that the administrator can prohibit use based
on the seriousness of the offense.  Here are some things that operators
`might' look at:

1) ad hominem attacks
2) flame baiting
3) lying outright
4) defying Usenet conventions: posting copyrighted material, binaries
to regular groups, massive amounts of data, etc.
5) number or existence of *any* complaints
6) `racist' remarks
7) terrorism
8) `harassment'
9) anything illegal in the poster's country (yes, tricky I know)

ad infinitum ad nauseam. Maybe we could try to organize the severity of
this kind of stuff, and classify servers as `type 1' or `type 2' and we
can get a feel for how liberal or conservative the operator is. The
operator would say which lists he subscribes to, and which lists your
email address will go on if you abuse the site. Really extreme
operators (like Mr. Kleinpaste) might actually be interested in
`public' lists -- abusers get their email addresses, along with the
offense, posted on the public list, i.e. `outed'.  Now, I think a lot
of this is pretty unpalatable, but we have things to gain by
formalizing these mechanisms, and as long as the anonymous user is
*warned* in the server intro-use message, and possibly even has ways of
redress, and has choice of different servers, then the system could be
fairly agreeable by most.  Remember, no one is preventing operators
from being conservative or liberal as they like, the only thing wanted
is adherence to their stated policies.

Look what we have to gain. Currently, there is a lot of censorship
(attempts? conquests?) going on behind the scenes, as a recent episode
here attests. No one really knows how effective in general it is
currently to hunt down and bar `abusive' users (hence a lot of
misinformation and paranoia about the effects of anonymous servers). If
we could have some *statistics* that show x% of nonanonymous users get
complaints and y% of anonymous ones do, this would be very useful for
gauging the social impact of our technologies.  (There could be some
very surprising results---I get the impression that many very
responsible people *prefer* anonymity, and conceivably the overall
complaints on anonymity could even be *less*).

3) Possibility of net.trials

Ok, so don't flame me too much on this one. But if `abusers' (this
could be for anonymity on a local server, but eventually involve to
other realms) were subject to a `trial by peers', imagine what this
could do to enhance the legitimate reputation of networks. Suddenly, a
judicial system. I certainly don't want to be known as an advocate of
bringing in lawyers and bureaucrats. Actually, that's precisely why I'm
proposing this, to prevent that scenario. Imagine that the net
establishes these formal self-regulating mechanisms.  People in the
real-world law enforcement would be much less likely to become enraged
by perceived abuses when they realize that there are intrinsic
mechanisms for quelling the psychopaths (uhm, maybe, anyway).  Also, if
people weren't added to blacklists just by the caprice of one operator
but after a perceived fair `trial', people at other sites would be much
more willing to enforce the sentences of suspension, expulsion or
whatever.  An electronic trial by peers? (with voting at the end?)  A
very interesting idea.  Each server may develop a kind of peer or
family structure, keeping kin in line. 

Maybe everyone that replies to an anonymous message could vote in their
header whether to get rid of the user, with the default `one vote of
approval' (limit voting regularity). Approves add, complaints subtract.
The user starts with some initial balance. If he gets down to zero,
*poof*.  Lots of `approval'? No problemo. Post something really
outrageous? You might get enough zaps to lose it all.  Imagine, this
could improve the accountability of users in *general* (the mechanisms
could be applied to new Usenet groups, for example, or if very
trustworthy and fair even logins themselves).

I've been a bit vague and ambiguous in some of these statements. This
is because, as I hope has become clear, the kind of things that start
out on anonymous servers could eventually have a much greater scope, so
that it `behooves' us to develop effective and dynamic mechanisms for
self-regulation.  Keep in mind a lot of these things are happening
already albeit in much less formal ways. For example, the convention is
to send complaints to the system adminstrator at a site regarding their
users, and they act as judge and jury (or use whatever other local
procedures are in place).  The user may or may not be able to justify
their actions (redress).  There is already a loose confederation of
cooperation between administrators, esp. over extremely abusive
posters.  We already get somewhat public `trials' of extremists, where
people put forward all the evidence on Usenet and argue both sides. 
`Enforcement' and `punishment' sometimes consists of revoking logins,
feeds, or whatever.  I think we ultimately stand to gain by
`formalizing' a lot of the currently informal mechanisms in place.  

My feeling is that if we don't head off these issues at the pass, so to
speak, Real World (tm) courts will start deciding them for us. Let's
develop something we can be proud of and will be a model of excellence
for the future, and not something frail and unstable.


Perhaps our anonymous motto:

``I disagree with what you say but will defend to my death your right
to say it.'' --Voltaire 
(written pseudonymously)





From dnorris at ibeam.intel.com  Thu Feb 25 12:09:26 1993
From: dnorris at ibeam.intel.com (Dave Norris)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 12:09:26 PST
Subject: Job Available
Message-ID: <m0nRorq-0004rGC@ishark.intel.com>



Intel (Mobile Software Architecture and Technology group)  is seeking a person
to be responsible for all security issues related to mobile computers.  

Applicant should have a BS/MS Degree in Computer Science, and more than 2 years
experience in software architecture.  Experience in MSDOS and/or Windows 
development environment is required.  Experience with software, network
and/or portable computer security is desired.  Authentication and
Encryption experience is required.  Experience with challenge/response
devices and Defender(TM) type devices is desired.

This individual will be a senior level individual contributor that will be
responsible for all aspects of security in a laptop/palmtop environment.
Problems must be identified and solutions advocated within Intel and
to outside vendors.  Prototypes and Proof-of-Concept software must be developed.

Partial responsibilities include: Work with Corporate Business Development to
recommend investment in outside security companies.  Evaluate security products
from outside vendors.  Present portable security vision at trade shows and
conferences.  Be an Intel expert on security.  Work with Corporate Information
Services to incorporate new security products within Intel.

The position is available in Hillsboro Oregon (a suburb of Portland).

For more information please contact either
Nancy Ohlson  (503) 696-2572 or
David Norris  dnorris at ibeam.intel.com

Please do not post responses to cypherpunks.






From corwin at Cayman.COM  Thu Feb 25 14:53:44 1993
From: corwin at Cayman.COM (Lord Among Panthers)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 14:53:44 PST
Subject: archives
Message-ID: <9302252252.AA22873@cuba.Cayman.COM>


Is there an archive for this list?

thanx,

corwin





From mark at clio.kram.org  Thu Feb 25 15:02:39 1993
From: mark at clio.kram.org (Mark Turner)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 15:02:39 PST
Subject: Finding Mac PGP software?
In-Reply-To: <9302250901.AA16429@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302252151.AA01607@clio.kram.org>


Michael Brennan is rumoured to have said....
> 
> Dave Banisar <banisar at washofc.cpsr.org> writes:
> > MacPGP is available at mac.archives.umich.edu via gopher and FTP.
> 
> Dave, I've tried ftp'ing to that site, but I get "unknown site". Is that
> really the correct address? I appreciate the info.

Also available in ftp.demon.co.uk:/pub/pgp.

Regards,

Mark.

-- 
/\/\ark Turner                       Demon Systems / Demon Internet
Home: mt at kram.org (PGP key available)        42 Hendon Lane, London
Office: mark at demon.co.uk (+44 81 3490063)           N3 1TT, England
*** IP level dialup Internet connectivity for a tenner a month! ***
PGP server: email to pgp-public-keys at demon.co.uk with subject 'help'




From phiber at eff.org  Thu Feb 25 18:15:09 1993
From: phiber at eff.org (Phiber Optik)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 18:15:09 PST
Subject: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
In-Reply-To: <m0nRkDb-000jw5C@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <199302260212.AA10770@eff.org>


> 
> gg at well.sf.ca.us writes:
> > Duncan's posting about AT&T mail as a "poor man's anonymous mailbox" misses
> > one crucial fact.  The moment you dial an 800 number, you generate a record
> > of your phone number via ANI, which means AT&T gets that information in
> > realtime and can probably correlate it with your phone account and service
> > address and name.  If you want anonymity, never ever ever use any service
> > which requires you call in via an 800 number.  
> 
> There's an easy way to prevent your number from being passed to an 800
> number owner via ANI.  Simply place the call using a TSPS/OSPS ("0") operator.
> Say "I'm having trouble dialing 800-xxx-xxxx, could you please place the
> call for me?" Once the call goes out over another trunk line, your number
> is not passed on.  If you have ever dialed those ANI "Demo" 800 numbers
> that read back your number via synthesized voice, and then tried calling
> them again using a TSPS operator, you'll know exactly what I'm talking
> about. This is at least the way it worked a while ago, I don't know if it
> still applies or of they modified TSPS consoles pass on the number.
> Perhaps Phiber could clarify this a bit and tell us if this still works,
> and if it still works in all areas, or what areas it would not work in.  

It's OSPS, by the way, referring to AT&T's Operator Service Position System,
operating on 5ESS switches, and the successor to TSPS.  And it's double zero,
('00'), not a single one.  '0' gets you your local BOC operator.  Also, TSPS
has been defunct for a number of years.
Currently, ANI is not passed along by OSPS, but the area code is, so you're
not completely anonymous.  I wouldn't expect this to last for any stretch of
time either, it isn't the most difficult thing in the world to simply pass
the entire number along.






From trump at pluto.ee.cua.edu  Thu Feb 25 19:51:12 1993
From: trump at pluto.ee.cua.edu (Louis Edward Trumpbour)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 19:51:12 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302260351.AA17473@pluto.ee.cua.edu>


things on my mind

well i am relatively new to the cypherpunks list so i have a

few comments to make on my behalf.

 

(1) i read in a message about the current rise in the member

    of subscribers and this rise was passively related to

    Mondo. There was also some concern expressed in this

    message about the number of people dropping the list and

    from those comments i reply that the list does generate

    an awful lot of mail.  And this mail is often quite

    technical (well if i was talking from a technically

    illiterate point of view it would very technical...

    i generally can follow the idea and their technicality

    though) and this technicality is a turn off to the Mondo

    type. I know that Mondo has said allot about the problems

    of personal security on the information age but not in

    tech-speek... i believe that most of the Mondo types will

    unsubscribe from this list because it is not a part of

    their focal of interest. Yes the list talks about current

    issues but again from a technical point of view and for

    the Mondo crowed n general it is a real turn off.

 

(2) Att Mail is nice. If anyone cares i will find out about

    what features it has... i.e. ftp, telnet, irc, etc... My

    sister is an Att employee and she is given an attmail.com

    address for her on the go and work sight mail... it is

    nice because i can stay in contact with her because

    Att mail has a 800 international dialup. My sister has a

    portable NCR computer with modem and can get my mail

    where ever she is. In 1992 she was back and forth from

    Puerto Rico and New Jersey for AT&T now she is all over

    Europe. A very nice convenience for the (wo)man on the

    run.

 

(3) Am I from D.C. and i am unsure if the world knows about

    this but in November the Secret Service raided our 26oo

    meeting at the Pentagon City mall. I know that we here in

    D.C. have all the more concern about security and

    frequently use are PGP keys because there is little doubt

    that our BBS are being taped et cetera and i am certain

    that in the near future there will be an upsurge of us

    D.C. boyz to your list.

 

(4) About DES.

    The data encryption standard is, no doubt in my mind,

    quite cracked by NSA. If it is not completely cracked it

    is at least very easy to get into by these boys. I have

    found that there is too much evidence that NSA has gotten

    in to DES pretty well. For starters (not a proof by the

    way) the cryptographers who work for NSA spend most of

    their time breaking encryption and its pretty mind

    boggling to think that no short cuts have been found to

    DES by a bunch of dedicated cyptographers. Damn if that

    was my job and my field of knowledge i am sure i would

    have at least a little short cut of some sort.  So i have

    been doing a little work on DES but i am unsure about the

    validity of my ideas and their effects on encryption...

    if i do feel that i find something i will certainly let

    it out but i was just wondering if people had any DES

    source in all or any languages??? it would be very

    helpful to get cross language DES source...

 

Well i hope that this note wasn't too boring but i felt that

i had to get it out to the list. so hopefully i will get some






From jpp at markv.com  Thu Feb 25 20:10:40 1993
From: jpp at markv.com (Jay Prime Positive)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 20:10:40 PST
Subject: Law&Disorder (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9302241728.AA27534@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302252008.aa03961@hermix.markv.com>


Ok, there are two of us here in LA.  Any one (else) want to do a
cypherpunk meat meet?

j'





From vtessier at vela.acs.oakland.edu  Thu Feb 25 20:10:55 1993
From: vtessier at vela.acs.oakland.edu (Vince Tessier)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 20:10:55 PST
Subject: Overload! Unsubscribe with regrets
Message-ID: <199302260409.AA00210@vela.acs.oakland.edu>


I regret that I do not have time to keep up with the volume of mail
this list generates, and must unsubscribe.

If, however, you are able to digestify all the mail into a single
piece, I would be interested again.

	-- Vince
-- 
Vince Tessier (vtessier at vela.acs.oakland.edu)
"When guns are outlawed, only Carl Rowan will have guns."




From marc at Athena.MIT.EDU  Thu Feb 25 21:36:58 1993
From: marc at Athena.MIT.EDU (Marc Horowitz)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 21:36:58 PST
Subject: No Subject
In-Reply-To: <9302260351.AA17473@pluto.ee.cua.edu>
Message-ID: <9302260534.AA27732@bill-the-cat.MIT.EDU>


>> (4) About DES.
>>     The data encryption standard is, no doubt in my mind,
>>     quite cracked by NSA. If it is not completely cracked it
>>     is at least very easy to get into by these boys. I have
>>     found that there is too much evidence that NSA has gotten
>>     in to DES pretty well. For starters (not a proof by the
>>     way) the cryptographers who work for NSA spend most of
>>     their time breaking encryption and its pretty mind
>>     boggling to think that no short cuts have been found to
>>     DES by a bunch of dedicated cyptographers. Damn if that
>>     was my job and my field of knowledge i am sure i would
>>     have at least a little short cut of some sort.

I've heard this argument before.  The NSA has a whole lot of people
doing crypto, but (again, with no proof) I can't imagine that they
have whole armies of people dedicated to breaking DES.  The fact is,
there are a lot of very good cryptomathemeticians in academia, who do
publish their results.  Shamir is an excellent example of this.  The
fact is, the best known attack requires 2^37 *chosen* plaintexts, more
if the plaintexts must be ASCII.

I also believe that nobody's security is perfect, and that if
something as big as DES was broken, even at the NSA, we would have
heard about it.  If the world banking industry trusts DES for their
trillions of dollars a day, I'm willing to trust it for my little,
insignificant messages.

		Marc





From mccoy at ccwf.cc.utexas.edu  Fri Feb 26 00:37:48 1993
From: mccoy at ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 00:37:48 PST
Subject: Dining Crypto -- An Introduction
In-Reply-To: <930224201510_71562.3445_CHT104-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302260836.AA23943@tigger.cc.utexas.edu>


[...]
> 2)  This means markets freed from even the theoretical possibility of
> regulation. Anything that can be digitized can be sold with no restraints
> save the absence of a willing buyer.  Books, movies, VR epics, financial
> products, and all non-physical services can be traded without coercion (and
> without taxation).  Remember too that "non-physical services" includes
> almost all management and professional services.  The technique of
> "anonymous credentials" can be used to check out those you deal with.

There is no way you can get around taxation if you intend on using this
system in real life.  Your system is much like that of a drug dealer, he
gets all this money, but has no where to spend it until it has been
laundered.  They will get you at the banks or wherever you go to spend your
money.  The "War on Drugs" has really caused this kind of banking service
to dry up, and unless you are moving millions of dollars a day no one is
going to even look at you if you want to make your money untraceable...

> 3)  The lack of regulation in the "spiritual realm" will distort market
> transactions in the still controlled "physical realm."  People will tend
> to "unbundle" the non-physical aspects of their services and sell them on
> the nets even if it is less convenient to do so because of the *tax* savings.

Death and taxes.  You can't escape them, so lets drop that fantasy and
concentrate on the rest.  Your digital/untracealbe/untaxable cash can only
purchase items from this shadow world of non-physical things, and that just
doesn't pay the rent or put food on the table.  The appetite of the
taxation-beast will not diminish, and everyone will just end up having
higher taxes on the physical elements of daily life that can't be stuffed
on the wire.  Sounds like this is going to be a world of info-elite tax
dodgers...the public will love you...

The unbundling of the physical and non-physical aspects are nice, but how
many non-physical aspects of a service are there?  There are a lot of
things that can be done through a network, but there are still a lot of
things that will never escape thier own tangibility; these are generally
the things in life one cannot do without, like food, shelter, etc.  

> 4)  The reduction is government "revenue" as economic activity transfers
> to the nets will induce a beneficial downward spiral in the authority and
> power of government.

Yeah.  Right...  If only it were true...

jim




From julf at penet.FI  Fri Feb 26 00:43:04 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 00:43:04 PST
Subject: Moral dilemma.
Message-ID: <9302260807.aa01498@penet.penet.FI>



This is a typical example of the dilemmas faced by an anon posting
operator. Here is my reply to the complaint from an user in
rec.music.gdead. Don't feel good about it, but...

------- Forwarded Message

To:      <DELETED>
Subject: Re: abuse of internet access

> To whom it may concern:
> 
> I direct your attention to the following post made on the rec.music.gdead 
> newsgroup:
> 
> Article 30001 (26 more) in rec.music.gdead:
> From: an13488 at anon.penet.fi
> Subject: Tickets available
> Organization: Anonymous contact service
> X-Anonymously-To: rec.music.gdead
> Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1993 20:48:01 GMT
> Lines: 28
>  
>  
> We have the following tickets available:
>  
> Rosemont:
> 3/9  12 tickets
> 3/10 6 tickets, 4 taper tickets
> 3/11 10 tickets, 8 taper tickets
>  
> Richfield:
> 3/14 12 tickets
>  
> Landover:
> 3/16 12 tickets
> 3/17 12 tickets, 6 taper tickets
>  
>  
> 3/17 12 tickets, 6 taper tickets
> 3/18 6 tickets, 2 taper tickets
>  
> Tickets will be sold for best offer.  Include your phone number with your
> bid.  Winning bidders will be contacted by phone to arrange payment
> and delivery of tickets.  We accept Visa and  Mastercard.  Bids are
> taken up to 5 days before the show, although we may contact you earlier
> if we feel your bid is suficient to warrant immediate sale.
> - -------------------------------------------------------------------------
> To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help at anon.penet.fi.
> Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
> and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
> Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin at anon.penet.fi.
> *IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update at anon.penet.fi for details.
> 
> 
> This is ticket scalping, pure and simple (selling a ticket for higher than its 
> value.  This is extremely illegal in the United States.  This is also a posting
> promoting a private enterprise for profit on the internet, extremely unethical.
>   
> 	Furthermore, the people who are doing this are selling what are known a
> s
> "taper tickets".  These tickets are only available through the Grateful Dead Ti
> cket Service via mail order.  The reason GDTS does this is to help deter scalpe
> rs.  I hereby request 2 courses of action from you:
> 
> 1)You immediately suspend Internet access priveleges of the individual(s)
> responsible for this posting.
> 
> 2)You provide the individual's (or individuals') name(s) to the Grateful
> Dead Ticket Service so they may take legal action against these criminals.
> 
> I hope my letter is merely one of many that have reached you concerning this su
> bject.  I assure you, there are many people who will not tolerate this and
> will do everything in their power to see that these people are caught and stopp
> ed.  Furthermore, if you are going to offer people anonymous Internet access, 
> be prepared to face the consequences when your clients break U.S. law.  As far
> as I am concerned, you are an accessory and should do everything in your power
> to rectify this situation.
> 
> I hope you take the time to respond and tell me what measures you have taken.


I have sent the person a message informing him/her that the account will
be blocked if the inappropriate postings continue. In an international
world, where laws, customs and morals vary from one place and culture to
another, and where a lot of people are trying to force their views onto
others, the only way a service like anon.penet.fi can operate is by very
simple and firm rules that are followed without exception. One rule is
that I *never* reveal the true identity of an anon user, and another is
that I *never* block access to the server without warning and without
giving the person a chance to defend him/herself.

I do understand your views, and I am very sympatetic to them, but I hope
you also realize that inpartial service requires "blind" abiding to
these rules.

	Julf



------- End of Forwarded Message






From exabyte!smtplink!mikej at uunet.UU.NET  Fri Feb 26 01:20:53 1993
From: exabyte!smtplink!mikej at uunet.UU.NET (Mike Johnson)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 01:20:53 PST
Subject: scheme
Message-ID: <9302251625.A02767@smtplink.exabyte.com>


> This encryption scheme uses XOR to encrypt data 1 character
> at a time.  Because of this it is suitable for protocols
> where you need to send single bytes (or less) at a time.
> Examples of this would be interactive ascii.  Also it
> is easily applicable to crippled lines like 7 bit lines.
> This is because if the plaintext is 7 bits you can send
> just the 7 bits after the XOR.  Even more general you can
> use it to encrypt any size at a time, down to single bits
> if you just have 1 bit to send immediately and dont want
> to wait for more data to become applicable.

> Ok.  So what are its disavantages?  Syncronization, as
> soon as synchronization is gone thats it, its all over.  Each
> block of 'pad' is generated from previous plaintext,  if you
> cant figure out the previous plaintext you are lost.
>
> Notice it uses a hash() function,  this could be anything, ie
> DES,  or perhaps a one way function (no unhash() is ever needed).
> The algorithm is fairly simple, the beginning is a bit wierd
> and could have been done several ways.  The first 8 bits in
> this implementation are used for synchronization.
> ...(source code omitted)

If you use DES, you are just using a variation of DES in cipher
block chaining mode.  If you use some other hash function, your
cipher is as weak as the hash function.  If you use key bytes
directly to XOR with, and never reuse key material, you have a
variation of the one time pad (which is good, but takes LOTS of
key material).  If you reuse key material when XORing it directly,
you have a weak cipher vulnerable to a known plain text attack.

There is nothing really new here...

For more info on this, if you have a PC and a modem, you can call
a BBS at 303-938-9654, download CRYPTMPJ.ZIP, and read THESIS.DOC
in that file.  Perhaps one of you could put this file at an ftp
site for wider distribution?  The stuff in that file about data
compression is kind of out of date, but the cryptographic
information (including some source code) might be of interest to
some others in this group.

Mike Johnson
mikej at exabyte.com






From 71221.413 at CompuServe.COM  Fri Feb 26 01:23:26 1993
From: 71221.413 at CompuServe.COM (bill powell)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 01:23:26 PST
Subject: my pgp key
Message-ID: <930226091524_71221.413_EHL28-2@CompuServe.COM>


-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1

mQCNAirtyeIAAAEEALTnTD+eyIxauah9U6TfH+aSW1oawYnF/MWiPvxdPAI5oGaN
xoMoJvmoGnidIxjNai7N16n4/suKAGta1eL5CXB7YYkRmDgkSYgP7phYQvZU4D6U
8TpdQ9pazK4DPdkS6EErS2PM0Pi184NJRpslh+FAfmNPWSWuO4bhudIf3n7fAAUR
tClXaWxsaWFtIFBvd2VsbCA8NzEyMjEuNDEzQGNvbXB1c2VydmUuY29tPg==
=45AN
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----






From gg at well.sf.ca.us  Fri Feb 26 01:38:21 1993
From: gg at well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 01:38:21 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <199302260935.AA06571@well.sf.ca.us>



Re your posting on categories of offenses and so on.  Agreed strongly that
sites should post banners stating the policies they adhere to.  I'd suggest
the following division of offenses:

1) Anything involving physical violence, threats of violence, incitement to
violence.  (this includes acts such as rape, pedophelia etc., since these
acts involve power as much as anything and can be seen as primarily violent
acts)  (this also includes things like Nazi propaganda where there is a
historic precedent or strong undertone that violent acts are encouraged)

2) Other (not violent) crimes against persons or property.  

3) Antisocial or questionable actions such as victimless crime, propagation
of lies (for instance a faked Challenger transcript), violation of Net
rules.

Obviously these have descending levels of severity by most reasonable
standards.  I would not in any way make sysops or admins responsible for
postings which may be illegal in their country of origin: both for pragmatic
reasons (no one can possibly be held to know the laws in all the other
participating countries) and for ethical reasons (stalinist coup in Russia;
fascist consolidation in ex-Yugoslavia, now you have to play cop against
dissidents from both; no thanks!).  

I believe unpopular opinions ought to be protected as long as they don't
encourage illegal or violent actions.  The test case for this is racism or
some equivalent.  If someone wants to argue a case that their race is the
Master Race or whatnot, I can't see squelching them for making opinion-noise
unless they're also e.g. advocating violence.  Once we get in the
opinion-censoring biz, it's a steep slippery slope.  OTOH, we also shouldn't
be an arm of LE, and hence the idea that discussing victimless crimes ought
to be a very bottom-of-the-list kind of thing.  

-gg





From fergp at sytex.com  Fri Feb 26 01:44:59 1993
From: fergp at sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 01:44:59 PST
Subject: 1000 points of light?
Message-ID: <qF1JZB1w165w@sytex.com>


<dmandl at shearson.com> David Mandl writes -
 
DM> Yup, there are dozens of reasons to want anonymity.  This
DM> should be completely obvious to anyone moving in cypherpunk
DM> circles--or alt.sex circles, where, amazingly, some
DM> well-respected sexosophists actually spoke out against anonymous
DM> posting recently.  No offense intended, but anyone who can't think
DM> of situations where anonymity is essential should get out more.
DM> Any first grader can list dozens of places where even mild
DM> blasphemy will get you locked up for a long time. [Begin Zerowork
DM> tangent] And even if you think the U.S. isn't one of them (which
DM> it is), keep in mind that most workplaces are effectively stalinist
DM> dictatorships, and bosses may not be thrilled about having their
DM> employees discuss crypto anarchy, the overthrow of governments, or
DM> S & M on the net.
 
 Point taken, however there will be those who will argue that, "S & M
 has no business being discussed on the net in the first place." Not
 exactly my sentiment, but you know the spiel. That type  of
 "Stalinist dictatorship" mentality inherently exists in every nook and
 cranny of society, including the nets.
 
 My original post was not issued as a challenge, but merely a question
 to gauge some of the responses and justifications I hoped to receive. 
;-)
 
 Cheers.

Paul Ferguson                     |
Network Integration Consultant    |  "All of life's answers are
Alexandria, Virginia USA          |   on TV."
fergp at sytex.com     (Internet)    |           -- Homer Simpson
sytex.com!fergp     (UUNet)       |
1:109/229           (FidoNet)     |
         PGP public encryption key available upon request.





From gg at well.sf.ca.us  Fri Feb 26 02:00:32 1993
From: gg at well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 02:00:32 PST
Subject: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
Message-ID: <199302260956.AA08793@well.sf.ca.us>


Re Thug & Phiber on the long-term chances that OSPS will forward the entire
number to the destination....

The solution to this is Anonymous Diverters.  You have pairs of telephone
numbers set up.  Callers come in on one side, and are connected to the other
side behind a toll-restrictor that only allows calls beginning with 1-800+.
The minimum configuration is two lines, one in and one out.  With a PBX you
can handle from three patches at one time all the way up to 10,000.  I can
provide hardware and associated programming to anyone who is interested in
starting one of these services.   

When using an Anonymous Diverter, the destination 800-number only gets the
ANI of the diverter's outgoing side.  Now of course, Big Brother can simply
watch the incoming side of the diverter if he wants to, but at least this
keeps your originating number secret from the destination 800-number.  

Right now there are 900/976 numbers set up with this kind of service, but I
don't see any evidence that they are designed for data applications; and the
per-minute rates are typically way high.  What is needed is a network of
local service providers who can do the same job either free as a public
service or at a reasonable cost.  One way to provide service at reasonable
cost is to have prepaid flat-rate cash accounts from regular subscribers and
give each of them some kind of password (no ID there either; you pay cash
and choose your password, it never ties in to your name or anything else).
This is also something we can set up on our larger PBXs if you're
interested.

Come to think of it, we have a client whose PBX would be ideal for this, but
we have to check with them.  It would only be open on an after-hours basis
of course, when they're not using the lines.  And it won't cost them
anything since those 800+ calls are free.  Now also, if anyone in the Bay
Area wants to set up one of these, the actual monthly cost is less than
$50.00 for lines, plus line cards at the rate of about $600 per each eight
trunks (four links through the system).  Anyone interested...?

We're going to be putting in a larger switch later this year which will also
give us the ability to do those anonymous cash accounts such that you could
have toll-call dialling privileges through the system on a prepaid basis.  
Anyone interested in *that*...?

-  gg at well.sf.ca.us





From gnu  Fri Feb 26 02:42:34 1993
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 02:42:34 PST
Subject: Moral dilemma. (not really)
In-Reply-To: <9302260807.aa01498@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9302261042.AA18729@toad.com>


> This is ticket scalping, pure and simple (selling a ticket for higher
> than its value.  This is extremely illegal in the United States.  This
> is also a posting promoting a private enterprise for profit on the
> internet, extremely unethical.

This person, like most such complainers, is uninformed.  They are
taking advantage of your physical and informational distance from the
actual situation:

(1)  It's completely a matter of local law whether "ticket scalping"
is legal or not.  Many jurisdictions have no problem with businesses
investing in "ticket futures" in the hope that the price will rise.
In any case, it is not "extremely illegal".  Murder is "extremely illegal",
except when done on behalf of a government.  Scalping is a minor crime
when it's a crime at all -- like jaywalking.

(2) Promoting a private enterprise for profit on the Internet is
completely legal and ethical.  The Transatlantic link is certainly
open to commercial business.  Now, if they'd said "...on the Usenet"
then there would be guidelines to follow, which mostly include
sticking to the topic and not posting repetitive ads.  I think that a
single ticket ad in the Grateful Dead newsgroup is not out of line on
either count.  Especially given the number of people who end up looking
for tickets because of bogus Grateful Dead Ticket Service policies.

(3)  Individuals selling things in "garage sale" mode are exempt from any
ethical or moral Usenet/Internet restrictions on "commercial use" anyway.

> Furthermore, the people who are doing this are selling what are known
> as "taper tickets".  These tickets are only available through the
> Grateful Dead Ticket Service via mail order.  The reason GDTS does
> this is to help deter scalpers.

Scalping tickets is a perfectly legitimate business enterprise.
Scalping Grateful Dead tickets is even a commendable activity,
considering the hassles that the Dead scene puts you through to get
tickets.  Personally, I only go when some friend offers me tickets,
since it ain't worth the bullshit of tracking when to order (via
email list or polling their phone service), sending in money orders
within half a day of then, and following all the little regulations
about the size and shape of the envelope, etc.

A lot of places that have little `protected' markets like this, are going
to find out what a free market is like.  Good.

	John





From gnu  Fri Feb 26 03:01:57 1993
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 03:01:57 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <199302260935.AA06571@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9302261101.AA18976@toad.com>


We have to keep an eye on each others' knees here -- there's a
tendency for a knee-jerk reaction not based on reality.

Squabbling over what "crimes" or "antisocial acts" should disqualify one
from being able to use anonymity is ***WAY*** missing the point.  It is
the people who have crossed one of those lines who need the protection the
most!  And, at least the US Supreme Court thinks it is in society's interest
to protect them:

    The case is Talley v. California, 362 US 60 (1960), in which the
    Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance which prohibited the
    distribution of any handbill not bearing the name and address of the
    person who prepared it.  The Court rejected the state's claim that the
    ordinance was necessary to help identify those responsible for fraud,
    false advertising, or libel.  According to Tribe, the Court reasoned
    that "a ban on anonymous pamphleteering falls with much greater force
    upon individuals and groups who fear majoritarian disapproval and
    reprisal -- upon dissidents and upon the unpopular -- than upon those
    with widely approved messages to deliver."

To quote a cypherpunk who usually has more sense:

> I believe unpopular opinions ought to be protected [as long as they don't
> encourage illegal or violent actions].
> 						 Once we get in the
> opinion-censoring biz, it's a steep slippery slope.

I inserted the [ and ].  He forgot to note that he's *already*
advocating opinion-censoring, and yes, he's already sliding down the
slope.

	John Gilmore

PS:  There is no way to enforce rules on the content of messages sent
through encrypted anonymous remailers.  Think about it for a minute.

All there needs to be is *one* remailer anywhere in the world, which will
send any message to the final destination.  Anyone can send an encrypted
message to the "freedom-loving" remailer, via their local remailer.  Even
if the inputs to the freedom-loving remailer were tapped, the messages
that arrived there would already be anonymous (headers stripped) and
encrypted.

Since what passes through the rest of the "freedom-hating" anonymous
remailers is encrypted, they can't see the content anyway.  You could
prohibit encrypted messages through your freedom-hating remailer, but
(1) that's easy to circumvent, and (2) what would be the point of
your running a remailer?





From gg at well.sf.ca.us  Fri Feb 26 04:02:15 1993
From: gg at well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 04:02:15 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <199302261159.AA19219@well.sf.ca.us>



John, I missed where I might have been advocating censorship... maybe it's
so late at night that my logic filter is getting fuzzy...  Of course one
can't see the content of an encrypted anonymised message, but the case I'm
concerned with here is where someone receives an encrypted threat message or
some such, and wants it traced.  In that case there ought to be some means.
I'm speaking from recent experience, having received what the Berkeley PD
considered a credible death threat on my answering machine last week...

Okay, maybe your point hinges on the "advocating violent acts" item.  Well
this is a pretty tight issue: hard to differentiate between someone
advocating insurrection, advocating race war, and advocating going out in
your own neighborhood and killing (whoever).  Either way it is advocacy of
violence against someone.  And I honestly don't have a simple answer to that
one.  The main point I was trying to go for is pretty unambiguous, that
direct threats of violent actions are much more significant than for
instance advocacy of committing some victimless crime or another... but
that's a dull-obvious one compared to the advocating violence item.  

Somehow I believe we're going to need to consider the threats & violence
questions sooner or later, if for no other reason than to have some
solutions at hand when it happens and people start clamoring for
restrictions on public access to crypto and anonymity.  (jeez my writing is
a mess at this hour!)

-gg





From Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU  Fri Feb 26 06:25:49 1993
From: Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU (Anonymous at cs.Buffalo.EDU)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 06:25:49 PST
Subject: Was: Poor man's anon server ...
Message-ID: <9302261424.AA22409@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>


There was a mention uptopic of ANI "demo" numbers. Anyone have one of
them kicking about?





From elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU  Fri Feb 26 07:24:55 1993
From: elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU (Karl Barrus)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 07:24:55 PST
Subject: archives
In-Reply-To: <9302252252.AA22873@cuba.Cayman.COM>
Message-ID: <199302261523.AA06027@Menudo.UH.EDU>



Cypherpunks,

Recently, Corwin (one of the Nine Princes of Amber??) asked for an
archive of the list.  I've been saving articles since I joined - not
all of them! - and currently sent them to another person.  So right
now I have them in my account in tar compressed format.  I can also
easily get MSDOS arj format.  So if anyone else, especially folks new
to the list, wants the back articles I've been saving, let me know.
Eventually the FAQ for the list will be finished and new members can
retreive that.

My archive is split into different areas: digital cash, dc nets,
anonymous mail, pools, timed crypto, misc topics, and probably some
other stuff.  My home computer is an MSDOS compatible, so files are
named to comply with DOS restrictions!

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf at menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus at tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/





From John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG  Fri Feb 26 07:41:22 1993
From: John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 07:41:22 PST
Subject: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
Message-ID: <5068.2B8E35E2@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>



 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks             <INET>
 julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius) writes:

 BK> Penet.fi will be PGP:s as soon as I get PGP running reliably on the
 BK> Interactive UNIX system I use. This weekend, I hope... But if you all
 BK> keep coming up with other new features I have to add, I don't know how
 BK> long it's going to take.

It must seem a thankless task sometimes, I'm sure.  One thing I noticed
about penet.fi's processing of messages is that it at least scrapes off
the trailing addresses automatically tacked on at the end of every
outgoing message leaving all Fido BBSs.  A test message sent via the
babani remailer arrived anonymously, but with all three lines of the
address footer (see below) attached.  Hardly anonymous...

 > Yes, and preferably at a site outside the US, just for good measure.
 > There is an obvious appeal to having servers outside the jurisdiction of
 > American law-enforcement busybodies.

 BK> Yeah, seems that (and the fact that I have 100% control not only of
 BK> the site but of the network as well) is what has kept anon.penet.fi up
 BK> this long...

Yes, and don't think that we don't appreciate your efforts!

        JN

... Criticism is nothing but a mild form of envy.
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG





From John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG  Fri Feb 26 07:41:26 1993
From: John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 07:41:26 PST
Subject: DES
Message-ID: <5067.2B8E35E1@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>



 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks              <INET>
 marc at Athena.MIT.EDU (Marc Horowitz) writes:

 BK> I also believe that nobody's security is perfect, and that if
 BK> something as big as DES was broken, even at the NSA, we would have
 BK> heard about it.  If the world banking industry trusts DES for their
 BK> trillions of dollars a day, I'm willing to trust it for my little,
 BK> insignificant messages.

I'm surprised that you haven't had 53 replies to this already, but in
that you haven't I suppose I ought not let this go by unchallenged.
        In a _MicroTimes_ article by Jim Warren of the EFF, the
unreliability of DES was discussed at length.  In a nutshell, Marty
Hellman of Stanford broke the "unbreakable" 54-bit DES _prior to its
adoption as a standard_.  He promoted the idea of a 64-bit DES instead,
but was _opposed by the NSA_ for reasons we can all speculate upon at
length.  This opposition is the basis of the rumors (?) of DES being
backdoored by the NSA.  The upshot was that DES was adopted _after_
being demonstrably compromised.
        The postscript to this is that Hellman's proposed "unbreakable"
64-bit DES variant was later cracked as well.
        The post-postscript is an apocryphal story I personally got from
an Israeli communications tech and minor spook.  He claimed that DES was
broken by the cryptanalytic arm of Israeli intelligence _in two hours_.
        It is relatively certain that a DES-encrypted cyphertext can be
easily decrypted by well-equipped agencies.  Whether decryption is now
trivially accomplished by private parties is another question.

        JN

... "He isn't my president & these aren't my people."
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG





From 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM  Fri Feb 26 10:04:55 1993
From: 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM (Hal)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 10:04:55 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <930226173222_74076.1041_DHJ72-1@CompuServe.COM>


I want to add to John Gilmore's point about the practical difficulty of 
controlling anonymous postings and mailings if you are going to allow 
them at all.
 
Johan is taking a very principled position by promising not to reveal 
true identities behind the pseudonyms.  Instead, he offers to warn 
abusers, and if problems continue, to block their access to the service.
 
Unfortunately, as more remailer sites develop, this tactic may become 
ineffective.  It will be possible to chain remailers together in 
different ways, so that the effect is that you can post through Johan's 
system from many different addresses.  With multiple remailers and 
chaining there is no way for the final remailer in the chain to know 
when two messages are coming from the same person.
 
This will mean that it will not, in practice, be possible to block 
access for a given user.
 
We discussed this earlier in the context of anonymous email.  I had 
received a complaint from a young lady about receiving some offensive 
anonymous mail through my remailer.  (This story was resolved 
surprisingly, BTW: it turned out that it was a joke message sent by a 
good friend of hers, someone who knew one of the Cypherpunks and who 
knew about the remailers.  So she is no longer upset about the message 
at all.  But I didn't know this at the time.)  Realizing that it would 
not be practical to do source blocking, my suggestion was to implement 
destination blocking: no mail from my remailer would go to this person.
 
Eric Messick expanded upon this idea recently so that only people who 
had actually requested anonymous mail would receive it.  (A variation 
would be to first send a note to a person saying, "I have some anonymous 
mail for you; please reply within 48 hours if you'd like to receive it, 
otherwise it will be deleted.")  Other variations upon this approach 
could help to keep anonymous remailers politically acceptable.
 
But the idea doesn't generalize well to anonymous posting, except to do 
as Johan has done and forbid posting to certain newsgroups (sci.*, 
news.*, I'm not sure what else).  This throws out the good postings 
along with the bad, though.
 
I think the bottom line is that it will be difficult to provide 
anonymous/pseudonymous postings in a way which won't elicit the kinds of 
strong objections Johan has been facing.  His controls are OK for now, 
but in the long run I think they won't work.
 
What would happen if Johan just started ignoring the objectors?  What if 
he stopped reading his mail for a while and left the service operating?  
Would his newsfeed eventually get cut off by Finnish authorities goaded 
into action by email complaints?  Are there ANY sites in the world which 
would be immune to such pressures?
 
I read that at the Hacker's Conference, the owner of Portal offered to 
run a remailer.  Would he be able to stand up to these pressures?  How 
about John Gilmore's machine?  He made a powerful argument recently that 
he was not subject to various restrictions.  Would it be possible to run 
a remailer there, perhaps based on Johan's code, which simply ignored 
complaints and allowed anonymous postings to all groups?
 
Hal Finney
 






From phiber at eff.org  Fri Feb 26 11:06:38 1993
From: phiber at eff.org (Phiber Optik)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 11:06:38 PST
Subject: DES
In-Reply-To: <5067.2B8E35E1@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
Message-ID: <199302261905.AA23369@eff.org>


> 
> 
>  * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks              <INET>
>  marc at Athena.MIT.EDU (Marc Horowitz) writes:
> 
>  BK> I also believe that nobody's security is perfect, and that if
>  BK> something as big as DES was broken, even at the NSA, we would have
>  BK> heard about it.  If the world banking industry trusts DES for their
>  BK> trillions of dollars a day, I'm willing to trust it for my little,
>  BK> insignificant messages.
> 
> I'm surprised that you haven't had 53 replies to this already, but in
> that you haven't I suppose I ought not let this go by unchallenged.
>         In a _MicroTimes_ article by Jim Warren of the EFF, the
> unreliability of DES was discussed at length.  In a nutshell, Marty
> Hellman of Stanford broke the "unbreakable" 54-bit DES _prior to its
> adoption as a standard_.  He promoted the idea of a 64-bit DES instead,
> but was _opposed by the NSA_ for reasons we can all speculate upon at
> length.  This opposition is the basis of the rumors (?) of DES being
> backdoored by the NSA.  The upshot was that DES was adopted _after_
> being demonstrably compromised.

Slow down.  Firstly, DES encrypts a 64-bit block with a 56-bit key.  Are
you talking about key lengths?  It was originally proposed to use a 128-bit
key space, alla IBM's LUCIFER.  But they opted on the smaller key, which
fuels this NSA conspiracy theory.  The other major thing, are the S-boxes,
which no one has been able to deduce the reasoning behind the choice of the
values, and that's the source of the "backdoor" theory.
Saying that Hellman "broke" anything is a bit strong.  I remember reading
a published paper, I believe by Hellman and one other, describing that they
were able to WEAKEN DES (with a smaller key space for their experiment), using
a statistical approach, and that this could possibly be applied to the DES
standard.

>         The postscript to this is that Hellman's proposed "unbreakable"
> 64-bit DES variant was later cracked as well.
>         The post-postscript is an apocryphal story I personally got from
> an Israeli communications tech and minor spook.  He claimed that DES was
> broken by the cryptanalytic arm of Israeli intelligence _in two hours_.
>         It is relatively certain that a DES-encrypted cyphertext can be
> easily decrypted by well-equipped agencies.  Whether decryption is now
> trivially accomplished by private parties is another question.
> 
>         JN
Now this is just hearsay with no basis in fact, only rumor.
It remains that DES's only real "weakness", is that a major corporation,
sparing no expense, can have many massively-parallel machines at their
disposal, and do an exhaustive search of the key space.  Which is just
to state the obvious, that as computing speed increases, the amount of time
to do an exhaustive search decreases.  This has nothing to do with crypto-
graphic weaknesses in DES, as you're suggesting.
If you're not just some NSA-paranoid wacko, reference some papers to back
up your claims.  Otherwise, you're just another NSA-conspiracy theorist,
and part of the noise.  We're all capable of suspecting underhandedness
on the part of the NSA, but when you start misrepresenting your opinions
as fact, you're being nonconstructive. 
It would be of interest to all cypherpunks to be kept abreast of the academic
research being done in this area, and someone may wish to post a list of
recommended papers to read on developments in cryptographic weaknesses.






From marc at MIT.EDU  Fri Feb 26 11:28:46 1993
From: marc at MIT.EDU (Marc Horowitz)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 11:28:46 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <930226173222_74076.1041_DHJ72-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302261927.AA06725@tla.MIT.EDU>


All of Hal's quesions are excellent, but I'm afraid he's asking the
wrong people.  The people we should be asking are people like Rick
Adams and Bill Schraeder, since utimately, it is people like them who
decide whether or not to sell their service to any given site in the
face of unpopular activites.  If any of you actually buy network
service from these guys, drop them a note and ask!

		Marc





From hkhenson at cup.portal.com  Fri Feb 26 11:55:13 1993
From: hkhenson at cup.portal.com (hkhenson at cup.portal.com)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 11:55:13 PST
Subject: DES
Message-ID: <9302261100.2.21205@cup.portal.com>


My take on breaking DES would be to just try all 2**56th keys on a 
massively parallel machine, though there may be better approaches.
Keith





From rubin at citi.umich.edu  Fri Feb 26 12:14:25 1993
From: rubin at citi.umich.edu (rubin at citi.umich.edu)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 12:14:25 PST
Subject: DES
In-Reply-To: <9302261100.2.21205@cup.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9302262014.AA00768@toad.com>


> My take on breaking DES would be to just try all 2**56th keys on a 
> massively parallel machine, though there may be better approaches.
> Keith

This isn't breaking DES. The best any encryption scheme can hope
for is to only be broken by exhaustive search.





From cjack at u.washington.edu  Fri Feb 26 12:46:55 1993
From: cjack at u.washington.edu (Coyote Jack)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 12:46:55 PST
Subject: subscribe
Message-ID: <9302262045.AA111886@mead.u.washington.edu>


subscribe cjack at mead.u.washington.edu





From mccoy at ccwf.cc.utexas.edu  Fri Feb 26 13:00:41 1993
From: mccoy at ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 13:00:41 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <199302261159.AA19219@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9302262059.AA25682@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>


George A. Gleason <gg at well.sf.ca.us> writes:
> 
> John, I missed where I might have been advocating censorship...
[...]
> 
> Okay, maybe your point hinges on the "advocating violent acts" item.  Well
> this is a pretty tight issue: hard to differentiate between someone
> advocating insurrection, advocating race war, and advocating going out in
> your own neighborhood and killing (whoever).  Either way it is advocacy of
> violence against someone. [...]

In the U.S. at least, there is nothing illegal about advocating race war or
violence against groups and classifications of members of society.  What
is illegal is inciting others to violent acts against a specific person or
target.  Saying "Kill all WASPs!" is not illegal, but saying "Kill John
Doe!" could get you arrested.   

You are treading a thin line (and I would say have passed onto the wrong
side....) if you begin establishing policy such that a particular group or
set of beliefs is denied access without justification, but just because
"they are X."  If you try to censor the communications of those who you
despise then you are no better than they are... 

jim




From tytso at Athena.MIT.EDU  Fri Feb 26 16:05:42 1993
From: tytso at Athena.MIT.EDU (Theodore Ts'o)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 16:05:42 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302261101.AA18976@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302270004.AA06652@SOS>


   From: gnu at toad.com (John Gilmore)
   Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 03:01:53 -0800

   Squabbling over what "crimes" or "antisocial acts" should disqualify one
   from being able to use anonymity is ***WAY*** missing the point.  It is
   the people who have crossed one of those lines who need the protection the
   most!  

It is perhaps tempting to say that people committing antisocial acts and
crimes should be protected, if the image that comes to your mind is the
courageeous freedom fighter.  On the other hand, it behooves us all to
remember that "protecting criminals" also includes protecting the people
who threaten rape, murder or other violence.  

It may be the case that in order to protect the "freedom fighter", we
must also strike down the laws that protect us from the "axe murderer".
But we must make this choice consciously.  It is silly and stupid of us
to be obsessed with protecting ourselves from the axe murderer, that we
we are also surpressing basic freedomes.  At the same time, however, we
must not wax over-romantic thinking about the plight of the "freedom
fighter", of the "angry young man", without remembering that there are
also some really nasty people out there.

While anonymity has its features, we would do well to acknowledge that
it also has its dark side.  That people may hide behind a remailer, and
send hateful, petting, harrassing things that they might otherwise not
say if they actually had to take personal responsibility for their
actions.   Keep in mind that part of the mystique of the "freedom
fighter", who takes on the government in his/her selfless task of
Democracy and the American Way, is his courage and his willingness to
take personal risk and personal injury in his Quest For the Right.

Would we have the same respect for a coward who evades his personal
responsibility by sending petty, hateful mail through a remailer; who
breaks laws that he/she thinks are unjust, but is unwilling to face the
consequences of breaking said laws?  Remember, a big part of civil
disobedience is the willingness to be arrested.

						- Ted





From tcmay at netcom.com  Fri Feb 26 16:59:15 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 16:59:15 PST
Subject: What We Need to Censor
Message-ID: <9302270057.AA04000@netcom.netcom.com>


I, too, am disturbed and worried by the abuses and politically incorrect
postings being sent through anonymous remailers, so I support the calls by
some on this list for censorship of various "bad" postings. 

Topics for banning:

- hatred, such as the hatred some have for particular operating systems
(unless the hatred is for DOS, which is justifiable, and hence acceptable).

- advocacy of violence, which is why postings about Rambo movies and
various porno movies (violence against women, don't you know?) need to be
blocked by remailers. "Women Against Pornography" will be happy to instruct
us on what media materials are acceptable and what are not. Jesse Helms,
who is working closely with Andrea Dworkin and other feminists, will be
happy to provide a list of banned topics.

- this ban on advocating violence will also of course cover discussions of
the Mideast, Bosnia, and the student uprisings in China several years ago
(there was a lot of advocacy of violence then--can't have a repeat of
that!). Let's all chant: "Hey Ho, Hi Ho, "rec.guns" has got to go."

- ethnic slurs and advocacy of racial superiority (unless it involves the
heartfelt calls for action by our oppressed African-American brothers and
sisters, who have every right to call us honkies and advocate burning down
our cities--we just can't tolerate those who call themselves
"Aryan-Americans").

- advocacy of illegal acts, including nearly all postings to alt.drugs,
alt.sex.children, talk.bizarre, and sci.crypt.underground. Come to think of
it, perhaps those groups should just be shut down?

- anonymous phone calls apparently are possible...perhaps we can require
all phone calls go through government-cleared operators? And I have even
heard that anonymous letters--even threats, blackmail (wonder where _that_
name came from?), pornography, and extortion demands--are possible using
the U.S. mail system! How can this be? What can we do? I know, let's censor
the mail system the same way we plan to censor the Net!

So, you anarchists, let's implement these bans on what goes through remailers!

One small problem: how can we do this when everyone's a remailer? When
multiple routes exist? When sites are in many countries?

Hmmmhhh...perhaps we censors just need to shut down the nets and stop all
this loose talk.

-Tim, applying for a job as a Usenet censor



--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.






From huntting at glarp.com  Fri Feb 26 17:36:21 1993
From: huntting at glarp.com (Brad Huntting)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 17:36:21 PST
Subject: DES
In-Reply-To: <9302261100.2.21205@cup.portal.com>
Message-ID: <199302270134.AA07742@misc.glarp.com>



> My take on breaking DES would be to just try all 2**56th keys on a 
> massively parallel machine, though there may be better approaches.

A massively parallel colection of dedicated DES encryption hardware
might be more cost effective if had alot of these things to crack.

Speaking of which, does anyone know who makes "the DES chip" (is
there more than one?)? I'd like to find a data sheet for it.


brad





From root at rmsdell.ftl.fl.us  Fri Feb 26 18:42:34 1993
From: root at rmsdell.ftl.fl.us (Yanek Martinson)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 18:42:34 PST
Subject: DES chips
Message-ID: <m0nSHSH-0002xnC@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us>


> Speaking of which, does anyone know who makes "the DES chip" (is
> there more than one?)? I'd like to find a data sheet for it.

There's no such thing as "the DES chip".

"Since publishing the Data Encryption Standard, NBS has validated 45
(as of May 7, 1991) hardware and firmware implementations.
Approximately three implementations are validated each year.  The list
of companies with validated chips is quite varied.  It contains very
small companies as well as many of the large U.S. electronics
corporations.  The implementations range from firmware programmable
read-only memories (PROMs), which implement only the basic DES
algorithm, to electronic chips that provide several different modes of
operation running at speeds up to 45 million bits per second."

...

"Hardware implementations of DES are widely available in the United
States at prices under $100; DES encryption boards that can encrypt
stored and transmitted data in a personal computer are available for
under $1000; and stand-alone encryption units may be purchased for
under $3000."

(This is from "The Data Encryption Standard, Past and Future" by Miles
Smid and Dennis Branstad, first appeared in Proceedings of the IEEE,
vol. 76, no. 5, May 1988)

I'm sure that since this was written the number of implementations has
increased, the prices decreased, and the speeds increased.

--
Yanek Martinson
yanek at novavax.nova.edu






From root at rmsdell.ftl.fl.us  Fri Feb 26 19:44:49 1993
From: root at rmsdell.ftl.fl.us (Yanek Martinson)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 19:44:49 PST
Subject: timestamps and signatures
Message-ID: <m0nSIOf-00030IC@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us>


> ||use electronic ... public-key signatures, the kind that make it impossible
> ||for one to deny having signed something.                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> ||^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> | Nice theory, but too simple.
> | I can always deny signing something by claiming that my private key was
> | compromised.  I can even deliberately let it be known, if it's important
> There's some very nice work by two people at Bell Labs (whose names I can't

One of them is Stuart Haber (stuart at bellcore.com)

> unforgeable digital timestamps.  This is a much trickier problem than it firs
> appears to be, but they have a nice solution.  

It's not too complicated.  Basically, what you do is produce a hash
of your text, and publish it widely in a medium that is being
archived, and likely to be accessible and authenticable at a later
time, for example by posting it in a classified ad in a large
newspaper.

Later, when verifying the timestamp one can get a copy of that
newspaper from a library (or from several libraries, for greater
security) and compare the published hash with that of the text.

For greater efficiency, there's a simple way to combine a lot of
messages and produce only one hash which is published.  The
information you get back and store as a part of the timestamp is
enough to prove that this particular hash was one of the many combined
to produce the published value.

This system is actually operating, look in any Sunday New York Times
in the Business Classifieds.


> Given timestamps, we can then require that messages be not just
> signed but dated.  If my key becomes compromised, I revoke all
> my signatures from some time on.  By looking at the timestamp
> that goes with the signature, we can determine whether it was
> created before or after the compromise, and discard it if "after".

Once can always claim that they "just found out" that their key
has been compromised a year ago, and so deny having signed that
signature.


--
Yanek Martinson
yanek at novavax.nova.edu




From phiber at eff.org  Fri Feb 26 20:31:22 1993
From: phiber at eff.org (Phiber Optik)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 20:31:22 PST
Subject: DES
In-Reply-To: <199302270134.AA07742@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <199302270428.AA02963@eff.org>


> 
> 
> > My take on breaking DES would be to just try all 2**56th keys on a 
> > massively parallel machine, though there may be better approaches.
> 
> A massively parallel colection of dedicated DES encryption hardware
> might be more cost effective if had alot of these things to crack.
> 
> Speaking of which, does anyone know who makes "the DES chip" (is
> there more than one?)? I'd like to find a data sheet for it.
> 
> 
> brad
> 

Many manufacturers make DES chips.  One that comes to mind is American Micro
Devices, though I don't remember a part number off hand.  I can find out and
post it to the list.  I do remember reading the data sheet, and it looked
like a nice implementation.  If I'm not mistaken, Motorola makes one as well,
though it may have been obsoleted by improvements in speed.






From 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM  Fri Feb 26 20:38:18 1993
From: 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM (Hal)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 20:38:18 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <930227024147_74076.1041_DHJ57-1@CompuServe.COM>


Ted Ts'o is right that anonymity can be used for many harmful purposes.  
On the other hand, as Tim May suggests, attempts to control the flow of 
information can easily lead to restrictions which do more harm than what 
they try to prevent.
 
Although I assume that most people here share a commitment to the 
overall goals of what Tim calls "crypto anarchy", it's possible that we 
all have different reasons for our support.  My own angle is that these 
techniques enhance privacy and provide power to individuals which can 
counterbalance the influence and authority of large institutions.  I've 
been influenced in this mostly by the papers of David Chaum.  For me, 
crypto anarchy is a way to oppose the constantly growing databases of 
information about each person, a way for individuals to take control of 
information about their own lives.
 
This is why I like one particular justification for anonymous posting 
that I read, that people should be free to choose for themselves how 
much information to reveal when they post.  I worry that, although the 
networks are in their infancy today, there may come a time when all 
information ever posted to Usenet is online, accessible, and searchable 
in a few seconds.  The posters' email addresses may be cross-linked to 
their current names and addresses.  Anything you post today may come 
back twenty years from now to haunt you.  (Already, the archives are 
being kept, so all that is needed is technological improvements to put 
the information on-line and allow that huge volume of data to be 
usefully searched.)
 
Now, you may say, so what, 99% of what is posted on Usenet couldn't 
possibly interest anyone anyway, and besides, I'm not posting anything 
anyone would care about.  This may be true, but think about how much you 
reveal about yourself over a period of time if you are an active poster.  
Imagine all of that information being available to every potential 
employer or new neighbor.  Imagine trying to run for public office!  I 
simply don't like the idea of everyone I meet potentially knowing my 
hobbies, interests, political affiliations, sexual preferences, and so 
on.
 
These same considerations apply in many other areas of our lives.  
Financial transactions can supply a lot of the same information.  So can 
phone records.  Perhaps someday our cars will be tracked routinely to 
collect information about where we go.
 
Uncomfortable as I may be with personal and private facts being used by 
marketers and employers to evaluate me, there is also the possibility of 
even more sinister uses.  Imagine how a dictatorship could exploit this 
much detailed information about the daily lives of its subjects.  
Probably "that will never happen here" but the mere possibility should 
provide another reason to guard our privacy.
 
I imagine most people here agree with the thrust of these arguments, so 
I won't go on.  But the point is that anonymous/pseudonymous 
communications can provide real benefits to all members of society.  
It's not just a romantic attraction to bomb-throwing revolutionaries or 
an elitist desire to escape the clutching hands of the greedy masses 
whcih drives us.  I believe that the benefits that crypto anonymity can 
provide to society will clearly outweigh the problems.
 
Hal Finney
74076.1041 at compuserve.com






From marc at Athena.MIT.EDU  Fri Feb 26 22:17:19 1993
From: marc at Athena.MIT.EDU (Marc Horowitz)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 22:17:19 PST
Subject: Biham and Shamir on cracking DES
Message-ID: <9302270616.AA21786@milquetoast.MIT.EDU>



This is, I believe, the state of the art in published techniques to
break DES.  Note that this attack is basically useless against
one-time or short-lived keys, since there's no chance to make repeated
chosen plaintext attacks against the key.

Short form:  If you can get me to encrypt 2**37 plaintexts *of* *your*
*choice* against my key, you can crack it.

		Marc

This info is forwarded from a friend.

Eli Biham and Adi Shamir, "Differential Cryptanalysis of the full
16-round DES," December 19, 1991.  

The paper was announced in Dec. '91 on the net, and paper copies
circulated from people who had gotten copies directly from Biham &
Shamir.  The paper was submitted to Crypto '92 and presented there on
August 20, 1992.  The Crypto '92 proceedings will be published by
Springer-Verlag at some point, so you could also reference it this
way:

{\sl E.~Biham and A.~Shamir}, Differential Cryptanalysis of the full
16-round DES, {\sl Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Crypto '92},
E.~Brickell, ed., {\sl Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
Springer-Verlag, New York, to appear.

Biham is at Technion - Israel Inst. of Tech.
Shamir is at Weizmann Inst. of Science.

I don't know of an FTP site where the paper is available.  





From jpp at markv.com  Sat Feb 27 01:01:40 1993
From: jpp at markv.com (Jay Prime Positive)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 01:01:40 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302270004.AA06652@SOS>
Message-ID: <9302270059.aa04036@hermix.markv.com>


  Umm.. Isn't all this talk about anonymous remail abuse really beging
for an pseudonymous/anonymous certificate service?

j'





From gg at well.sf.ca.us  Sat Feb 27 04:01:42 1993
From: gg at well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 04:01:42 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <199302271158.AA29653@well.sf.ca.us>


I agree with Jim that I may be treading a thin line on censorship, but
consider the following: someone posts a series of inflammatory statements
with the intent of stirring up trouble, attracts a following, and starts
organising them for some kind of violence.  Then one day along comes a
message to start the race war or whatever.  The next day there are a bunch
of random acts of violence.  Uh-oh...

The point is that this is a broadcast medium, though without the limitations
of conventional broadcast.  I think we may end up facing these issues one
way or another, sooner or later.  Hopefully, LE can prevent violent acts by
conventional means without resorting to limiting privacy.  

The thing is though, given the increasing cultural diversity in society and
its resulting flattening of the normal curve of acceptable behavior, we're
more and more going to be facing issues which are located in the depths of
murky gray areas and in which we may find ourselves needing to tread fine
lines, split hairs, and make all kinds of distinctions where there are no
firm certainties.  (run-on sentence alert!)  

-gg





From deltorto at aol.com  Sat Feb 27 04:49:08 1993
From: deltorto at aol.com (deltorto at aol.com)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 04:49:08 PST
Subject: Real World Kinda Guys Unite
Message-ID: <9302270749.tn34786@aol.com>


>>Hal
>>
>>P.S. How about Deadbeat posting a public key?  He keeps signing his
>>messages but I can't check them.

Yeah. How 'bout that, 'Beat? At _least_ we'd have the false security of being
able to check your Pkey now and then...

I feel full of Piss and Vinegar, so I'm volunteering to help get this
WhistleBlowers thingus up and rolling.

First, we need to disseminate PGP in it's various forms (UNIX, Amiga, Mac,
DOS, etc) to some news agencies (e.g. TV stations, newspapers, radio like
KQED, etc.). I need each person who represents a platform to send me a full
package of PGP with Docs that I can have duped for mailing (for educational
purposes only). No charge. We'll begin with a core group of media people and
see how it goes. I have floated a few trial balloons and they're ready to
bite. I suspect that we'll see it take off like a rocket, as Tim May
suggested.

All this discussion is truly fascinating, but if it doesn't get out into the
real world it ain't worth the media it's magnetized on. I guess I'm just a
real world kinda guy.

1. Let's get a reasonably friendly anon remailer process going for them. It
*must* come with complete instructions for the hapless many. Get writing and
send 'em to me. I am working on some simple instructions for MacPGP and will
post an example as soon as I can get through all the damn mail in my various
mboxes. (Overload!)

2. Let's hook some Govt. employees into it ASAP and really get this
whistleblowing thing going. I want to stir up some mud at the bottom like
Kelly suggests and I want it done NOW.

3. I need help from ALL of you to do this. I am beginning to compile a
comprehensive list of Govt Officials from the White House on down thru the
Congress to the Cabinet and the Joint Chiefs. This database will include
their various addresses (USM and email), their many phone and fax numbers,
and other pertinent info (party, salary, etc.). Anyone can have a copy when I
finish it. I hope to make it fairly administration-independent so it will
last and will probably set up a process on CompuServe so that public can send
in updates as officials are un-appointed, die and/or are voted out of office,
etc.

4. Eventually, we'll do an anonymous posting to a massive number of Govt
sites inviting WBlowers to post to the list and inviting Press people to log
on and download the dirt.

I will be at the Modern Times bookstore event on March 7th in San Francisco
if anyone wants to discuss this. I would also dearly like to attend CFP, but
I haven't yet found a way to do it without money (anyone who knows a way I
can volunteer my way in and help out please say so - I'll sweep up after,
anything...).

  d2t






From julf at penet.FI  Sat Feb 27 07:13:52 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 07:13:52 PST
Subject: What We Need to Censor
In-Reply-To: <9302270057.AA04000@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302270942.aa21741@penet.penet.FI>



> So, you anarchists, let's implement these bans on what goes through remailers!
> 
> One small problem: how can we do this when everyone's a remailer? When
> multiple routes exist? When sites are in many countries?

Er.. How about setting up net.interpol? A international net.police
co-operation agency?

> -Tim, applying for a job as a Usenet censor

Julf, dreaming of traveling all over the world shutting down sites as a
net.interpol undercover agent.... Way cool...






From John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG  Sat Feb 27 07:19:45 1993
From: John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 07:19:45 PST
Subject: DES
Message-ID: <5085.2B8EFE60@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>



 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks         <INET>

 phiber at eff.org (Phiber Optik) writes:

 BK> Slow down.  Firstly, DES encrypts a 64-bit block with a 56-bit key.
 BK> Are you talking about key lengths?

Yes.

 BK> It was originally proposed to use a
 BK> 128-bit key space, alla IBM's LUCIFER.  But they opted on the smaller
 BK> key, which fuels this NSA conspiracy theory.

As was their reaction to Hellman's proposal for a 64-bit key and any
other proposed out-of-house improvement at that time.

 BK> Saying that Hellman "broke" anything is a bit
 BK> strong.  I remember reading a published paper, I believe by Hellman and
 BK> one other, describing that they were able to WEAKEN DES (with a smaller
 BK> key space for their experiment), using a statistical approach, and that
 BK> this could possibly be applied to the DES standard.

I refer you to Warren on this.  It was my understanding of the article
that Hellman had actually decrypted DES cyphertext prepared with the
then-proposed 54-bit key standard.
 
 BK> If you're not just some NSA-paranoid wacko,
 BK> reference some papers to back up your claims.  Otherwise, you're just
 BK> another NSA-conspiracy theorist, and part of the noise.

Please, there's no need for abuse here.  I was referring to a published
column by Jim Warren of the Electronic Frontiers Foundation in
_MicroTimes_, a Bay Area computer paper.  I do not know if you consider
Warren or the EFF to be reputable.  I assumed Warren's statements were
factual.  The assertion that Israeli intelligence made short work of DES
was presented as I got it - an interesting rumor from someone who has
been a fairly-reliable source of information in the past.

 BK> We're all
 BK> capable of suspecting underhandedness on the part of the NSA, but when
 BK> you start misrepresenting your opinions as fact, you're being
 BK> nonconstructive.

I was merely relating published assertions by the EFF.  If you believe
these to be incorrect, then I'd advise you to take the issue up with
Warren.  I have no "opinion" in the matter, only suspicions.  A great
many people with academic background superior to mine also share these.
My own background is in applied rather than theoretical security.  I
defer to academics in academic matters, but know that in matters of top
security it is difficult to invest confidence in any mechanism as mired
in continuing controversy as DES.  That's all.

        JN
        

... "Oceania, 'tis for thee..."
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder at f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG





From banisar at washofc.cpsr.org  Sat Feb 27 07:38:09 1993
From: banisar at washofc.cpsr.org (Dave Banisar)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 07:38:09 PST
Subject: Hellman and DES
Message-ID: <9302271040.AA45880@hacker2.eff.org>



I've talked to Martin Hellman quite a few times (he came to my last crypto 
conference and gave an overview of the field), he has never said that he 
could crack true DES. When DES first came out, he was one of the people most 
actively opposing the 56 bit key as being too small. At the time, he 
estimated that a machine of parallel processors could be built for $10M that 
would crack DES keys easily. DES at the time was only supposed to be for 10 
years and then a new system was supposed to replace it.

Today, he advocates for security that you triple-DES your 
communications/files.

At last word (and I may have missed any advancements in the flame wars on 
sci.crypt), Shamir and Biham had cracked up to 2^^46, thats still quite a 
ways computationally from 2^^56.

Dave







From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Sat Feb 27 11:33:57 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 11:33:57 PST
Subject: March 13 cypherpunks meeting
Message-ID: <9302271922.AA00053@soda.berkeley.edu>



Announcing:  The First Annual Post-CFP cypherpunks meeting.

The next physical meeting of cypherpunks will be March 13, 1993, at
the usual time, noon, in the usual place, Cygnus Support Offices.

This is one day after CFP-93, the third Conference on Computers,
Freedom, and Privacy.  CFP is an increasingly important conference
concerning an only slightly broader spectrum of privacy issues than
are normally discussed on the cypherpunks list.  At the first CFP
conference I met David Chaum, who awakened a latent interest in
cryptography.  This awakening led indirectly to the formation of this
list.

There will be people from all over the country there.  We have set the
date of our meeting so that they could attend.  We are, in fact, going
to give out an open invitation there.

I would urge all of you who have been considering making a trek to
come to one of these meetings to do so this time.  And while I do not
expect Dorothy Denning to show up (although she would be welcome, if
uncomfortable), I do expect some surprises.  Please surprise me
yourself.  If you need a place to stay, ask on the list.  I myself am
already putting up some friends before the conference.

For that matter, I would urge all of you to come to the conference
itself.  If you can't afford to go, just remember that while the
sessions you have to pay for, the hotel bar you do not.  A word to the
wise is sufficient.

Thank you all.

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

MEETING

Date: Saturday, 13 March 1993
Time: 12:00 noon
Where: Cygnus Support Offices, Mt. View, California


SCHEDULE

Meeting 12-6
Dinner 7-?


AGENDA

We have Arthur Abraham's talk on hash functions left over from last
time, which was interrupted by a photo shoot.  Scott Collins intimated
that he'd have more results on random numbers.

With the opportunity given to have so many people there, I'd suggest
that discussion of cryptographic infrastructure would be appropriate,
together with a goal setting session.

Please discuss this on the list.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

DIRECTIONS

	Cygnus Support
	1937 Landings Drive
	Mt. View, CA  94043
	+1 415 903 1400   switchboard
	+1 415 903 1418   John Gilmore

Take US 101 toward Mt. View.  From San Francisco, it's about a
40-minute drive.  Get off at the Rengstorff Ave/Amphitheatre Parkway
exit.  If you were heading south on 101, you curve around to the
right, cross over the freeway, and get to a stoplight.  If you were
heading north on 101, you just come right off the exit to the
stoplight.  The light is the intersection of Amphitheatre and
Charleston Rd.  Take a right on Charleston; there's a right-turn-only
lane.

Follow Charleston for a short distance.  You'll pass the
Metaphor/Kaleida buildings on the right.  At a clump of palm trees and
a "Landmark Deli" sign, take a right into Landings Drive.  At the end
of the road, turn left into the complex with the big concrete
"Landmark" sign.  Follow the road past the deli til you are in front
of the clock tower that rises out of one of the buildings, facing you.
Enter through the doors immediately under the clock tower.  They'll be
open between noon and 1PM at least.  (See below if you're late.)

Once inside, take the stairs up, immediately to your right.  At the top
of the stairs, turn right past the treetops, and we'll be in 1937 on 
your left.  The door is marked "Cygnus".

If you are late and the door under the clock tower is locked, you can
walk to the deli (which will be around the building on your left, as
you face the door).  Go through the gate in the fence to the right of
the deli, and into the back lawns between the complex and the farm
behind it.  Walk forward and right around the buildings until you see
a satellite dish in the lawn.  Go up the stairs next to the dish,
which are the back stairs into the Cygnus office space.  We'll prop
the door (or you can bang on it if we forget).

Or, you can find the guard who's wandering around the complex, who
knows there's a meeting happening and will let you in.  They can be
beeped at 965 5250, though you'll have trouble finding a phone.

Don't forget to eat first, or bring food at noon!  I recommend hitting
the burrito place on Rengstorff (La Costen~a) at about 11:45.  To get
there, when you get off 101, take Rengstorff (toward the hills) rather
than Amphitheatre (toward the bay).  Follow it about ten blocks until
the major intersection at Middlefield Road.  La Costen~a is the store
on your left at the corner.  You can turn left into the narrow lane
behind the store, which leads to a parking lot, and enter by the front
door, which faces the intersection.  To get to the meeting from there,
just retrace your route on Rengstorff, go straight over the freeway,
and turn right at the stoplight onto Charleston; see above.

See you there!

	John Gilmore







From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Sat Feb 27 12:11:00 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 12:11:00 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302270059.aa04036@hermix.markv.com>
Message-ID: <9302272007.AA03400@soda.berkeley.edu>


>  Umm.. Isn't all this talk about anonymous remail abuse really beging
>for an pseudonymous/anonymous certificate service?

Well, yes.

There has been a huge conflagration on the pem-dev list lately
concerning naming issues, X.500, etc.  I am somewhat disturbed by what
I see as a fundamental mentality of PEM: the desire to lift intact all
existing political, economic, and social relationships into the
electronic domain.

Naming is done in the ISO way, that is, subordinated to existing
national boundaries.  Individuals are expected to be registered in the
naming hierarchy.  Identities in the electronic world are expected to
map to entities in the real world.

Does this not seems fundamentally limiting to the potential of the
electronic world?

I agree with Tim that we have made good progress.  But we need more
than simple remailers.  We need people to use remailers, and we need
to make that easy to do.  We need key distribution mechanisms.  We
need better meeting spaces than mailing lists and Usenet newsgroups
and private mail.  We need markets and contracts.

If we wish to re-envision the world, we must do so while there is time
to implement it.  Let us proceed quickly.

Onward.

Eric







From strat at intercon.com  Sat Feb 27 12:40:04 1993
From: strat at intercon.com (Bob Stratton)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 12:40:04 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302272007.AA03400@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302272038.AA04777@intercon.com>


>>>>> Eric Hughes <hughes at soda.berkeley.edu> writes:

	Eric> There has been a huge conflagration on the pem-dev list
	Eric> lately concerning naming issues, X.500, etc.  I am
	Eric> somewhat disturbed by what I see as a fundamental
	Eric> mentality of PEM: the desire to lift intact all existing
	Eric> political, economic, and social relationships into the
	Eric> electronic domain.

That doesn't surprise me in the least. There's a paradigm shift going
on in the networking community, but it's difficult to tell which way
it's going to land. The US, in have a very open, almost anarchic
protocol development process based highly in meritocracy, built
the core of the Internet while everyone else in the world was working
to start passing 128-byte X.25 packets, and trying to decide how much
to charge per packet.  

The unfortunate reality is that the same people overseas have found
the "golden goose", and are trying to figure out how to domesticate
it. The U.S. Government and the industry marketeers aren't helping,
either. I see a growing bureaucratization of the standards process
which may well not advance development much.

	Eric> ...Identities in the electronic world are expected to
	Eric> map to entities in the real world.

I think a lot of this is a combination of the "One lifetime phone
number would be great" phenomenon, and a lack of imagination regarding
pseudonymity. I think that we should start writing RFCs for any and
all applicable technologies and throwing them into the arena. At best,
we might get stellar contributions, at worst, we might slow down the
juggernaut that is the ISO.


	Eric> I agree with Tim that we have made good progress.  But
	Eric> we need more than simple remailers.  We need people to
	Eric> use remailers, and we need to make that easy to do.  We
	Eric> need key distribution mechanisms.  We need better
	Eric> meeting spaces than mailing lists and Usenet newsgroups
	Eric> and private mail.  We need markets and contracts.

I think that remailer authors should seriously consider spec'ing out
their technology and publishing RFC's as soon as possible. The
development of on-line markets seems to be one of the best-kept
secrets on the Net. I only know of a handful (if that) of companies
actively working on such things, but they're not known outside of
their own backyards.

Laissez faire,
---Strat






From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Sat Feb 27 12:44:52 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 12:44:52 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <930227024147_74076.1041_DHJ57-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302272041.AA05983@soda.berkeley.edu>


Hal writes:
>For me, crypto anarchy is a way to oppose the constantly growing
>databases of information about each person, a way for individuals to
>take control of information about their own lives.

For many transactions, identity is not an issue fundamental to the
transaction.  If I pay cash to you for an item, I have not made any
implicit promise to pay you at a later date, as I have if I've paid
with credit (card or account).  Every obligation I might have to you I
have already fulfilled, fulfilled by paying cash.  My name is not
relevant here.

If I perform some service for you, and you acknowledge that the
service is complete as performed, then you have no need for my
identity.  (As far as the two of us are concerned.  Other parties
intrude on this interaction usually.)

Therefore, should not discrimination against anonymity when names are
not germane be considered (depending on one's ideology) unreasonable,
inefficient, coercive, intrusive, or illegal?

Eric





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Sat Feb 27 13:02:53 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 13:02:53 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302251959.AA02941@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9302272059.AA07351@soda.berkeley.edu>


>[...] and we might help some people and advance the cause by
>codifying `legitimate use'.

The only perfectly unambiguous position is that every use is a
legitimate use.

Eric





From geoffw at nexsys.net  Sat Feb 27 13:15:50 1993
From: geoffw at nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 13:15:50 PST
Subject: March 13 cypherpunks meeting
Message-ID: <9302272107.AA05936@nexsys.nexsys.net>



I live in Mountain View about 2 miles from Cygnus
(a short drive or long walk) and can have a few people crash at my house.
I have lots of floor space But not many beds (I do have two sofas)
I think I can comfortably sleep 3 and sleep 5-6 in a pinch.

My address is 316 Escuela Ave. #62
		MTV CA.

I have an apartment not a house, It's clean but not lavish.
I do have a small internet so you can get e-mail and I'm one-hop
away from the Internet.  You don't have to pay me money but you do
have to buy your own food and bring your own supplies.  No smoking
in the house but you can smoke out on the balcony.

send me e-mail if you are interested.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NEXUS SYSTEMS/CYBERTRIBE-5	
Editor/Instigator/Catalyst : Geoff White <geoffw at nexsys.net>
Production Crew		   : Universal Movement Trinity <umt at nexsys.net>

		--PGP Public key available upon request--
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Sat Feb 27 13:18:50 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 13:18:50 PST
Subject: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302240423.AA00434@orchard.medford.ma.us>
Message-ID: <9302272115.AA08914@soda.berkeley.edu>


Re: alt.whistleblower moderation

I wrote:
>So every time a moderated group is created, every server already is
>"modified".

Bill writes:
>That's how it *should* work, not how it *does* work.  In real life,
>moderator addresses are distributed "out of band" to a relatively
>small number of "backbone" sites; all the rest of the sites merely
>forward the mail to a "backbone" site.

Well, we can weekly publish the submission address.  It would take
slightly more intelligence on the part of the would-be poster.

What are exactly the politics of propagating this moderator's address,
anyway?  Is it particularly difficult?  Is it automated?

Please advise.  alt.whistleblower, in addition to being a public good,
is a great way to raise hell.

Eric





From mjr at netcom.com  Sat Feb 27 15:02:13 1993
From: mjr at netcom.com (Matthew Rapaport)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 15:02:13 PST
Subject: More ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <9302272259.AA29137@netcom2.netcom.com>


        Hal <74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM> writes...
>I think the bottom line is that it will be difficult to provide
>anonymous/pseudonymous postings in a way which won't elicit the kinds of
>strong objections Johan has been facing.  His controls are OK for now,
>but in the long run I think they won't work.

This may be an example of an intractable problem. A case where
legitimate interests are mutually exclusive at least in practice of not
in theory.

If Johan has restricted output due to pressure from those communities,
then he has already been forced to hobble his service's most significant
*potential* benefit to the community. If a serious whistlblower were to
come along with some serious evidence and credibility, it is likely that
he/she would want to post his/her evidence in one or more of the groups
Johan has locked out! I mean no aspersion on Johan here, he is laboring
under pressure I'm sure, and he is a pioneer in all of this, and we are
sharing his experience. I don't mean to take political sides either,
both sides of the debate have legitimate arguments. In the one other
post I made on this topic before, I received but one reply remarking
that I "was preaching to the choir".

On the one hand, we have the principle of free speech and the right to
privacy and even anonymity if we so choose it. Taken in an unrestricted
way, this principle is rather radical (politically). True there are
areas of our social and political lives where a right to privacy and
anonymity are both desirable and generally accepted/practiced (these
vary of course in different parts of the world). But there are other
equally common areas in which they are not.

The strongest pressure against anonymity on the Usenet comes from
quarters where a strong positive pressure exists, on *principle* for
posters to "declare themselves", to "stand behind their words". In a
realm where egalitarianism, semi-anarchy, and bad signal/noise ratio
already make for a questionable mix or product value, "naming yourself"
is a significant benchmark. Even in these groups, most participants
would recognize the need for access to anonymity when it was really
"justified", but such cases are believed to be fairly few and far
between. as gg pointed out:

>The point is that this is a broadcast medium, though without the
>limitations of conventional broadcast.

The mutually exclusive nature of these principles emerges in practice
from what a former boss of mine called the human "ornery" factor. In
this case that some number of individuals will exercise their "right to
anonymity" not because they have to, but just because it's there.
Believe me I sympathize with this view. It keeps authorities and
would-be authorities on notice that there are those who will test the
limits of their rights and signal the rest of us if they are eroding. I
also accept Hal's argument that we are protecting ourselves from
possible future abuses of central authority. But I also sympathize with
the sentiments of the other side, that most of the time it is desirable
to put your name where your mouth/keyboard is. A consensual solution to
this problem depends on a common political viewpoint, something that is
certainly not in the cards for contemporary net participants. Of course
a solution may one day be "imposed", but that will not likely be to
anyone's liking. The likely direction of such an imposition is signaled
by what Dave Clunie experienced at PAX and what Johan is now
experiencing as well.

matthew rapaport     Philosopher/Programmer At Large      KD6KVH
           mjr at netcom.com     70371.255 at compuserve.com





From thug at phantom.com  Sat Feb 27 16:31:17 1993
From: thug at phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 16:31:17 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302272041.AA05983@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <m0nSbit-000jr0C@phantom.com>


Eric Hughes writes:
>
> For many transactions, identity is not an issue fundamental to the
> transaction.  If I pay cash to you for an item, I have not made any
> implicit promise to pay you at a later date, as I have if I've paid
> with credit (card or account).  Every obligation I might have to you I
> have already fulfilled, fulfilled by paying cash.  My name is not
> relevant here.
> 
> If I perform some service for you, and you acknowledge that the
> service is complete as performed, then you have no need for my
> identity.  (As far as the two of us are concerned.  Other parties
> intrude on this interaction usually.)
> 
> Therefore, should not discrimination against anonymity when names are
> not germane be considered (depending on one's ideology) unreasonable,
> inefficient, coercive, intrusive, or illegal?
> 

Try telling this to the person behind the counter when you're trying to rent
a car, rent a hotel room for the night, or rent a mailbox for 6 months.  Not
only do these people often ask for ID, but they get very upset if you're
not paying by credit card.  Discrimination against cash is widespread and
rampant.  Sure, if you bitch enough at them, and threaten to take them to
court, they might allow you to rent a hotel room without ID and paying in
cash.

The thing is, they never ask for ID if you're paying by credit card since
they assume the credit card is enough proof of who you are.  But as soon
as you start flashing some paper currency, they immediatly think that you're
up to no good and won't let you purchase their product/service without some
ID.  Hotels, airlines, and car rental companies are notorious for doing this,
especially if they think you're under 21. 

This brings up the question of using False ID when conducting perfectly legal
transactions, in order to preserve one's privacy.  Can anyone reading this
list with a legal background answer whether this is legal or not?  I am under
the, perhaps erroneous, assumption that it is illegal to use false ID only
when committing a crime (ie: purchasing alcahol while underage, renting a
mail drop specifically for use in mail fraud, gaining admission to private
property using false ID (trespassing)).  However, is it illegal to use
false ID in order to conduct perfectly legal transactions in order to
preserve privacy/anonymity?  How about it, any of you guys associated with
the CPSR, EFF, or ACLU, can you answer this one?


Murdering Thug





From ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu  Sat Feb 27 19:00:25 1993
From: ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu (ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 19:00:25 PST
Subject: A Modest Proposal
In-Reply-To: <9302272059.AA07351@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302280259.AA20523@longs.lance.colostate.edu>


me:
>[...] and we might help some people and advance the cause by
>codifying `legitimate use'.

Eric Hughes <hughes at soda.berkeley.edu>
>The only perfectly unambiguous position is that every use is a
>legitimate use.

Once again I'm very seriously disturbed at the sentiments presented by
some eminent members of this list.  I believe in free speech perhaps as
rabidly as the next guy, but many of the most rabid advocates recognize
that there are limitations on `freedom'.  Everyone, please take the
following remarks impersonally but seriously.

Let me be very clear about this: I'm highly committed to pseudonymity
and anonymity as new, revolutionary social tools. However, completely
unrestrained anonymity (which, by the way, is related to but not
equivalent to freedom of speech) is unworkable and extremely dangerous
to *everybody* (not just corrupt government officials or big businesses
that were so ignorant they didn't hire you). Anybody here that thinks
that an anonymous service can act something like a Unix pipe that just
passes the raw stuff through forever unhindered and uninterrupted is
seriously deluding himself. Whoever does is ultimately discrediting and
detrimental to the cause itself.  If you think the problem is
exclusively because of self-appointed puritannical `censors' on the net
(which, I admit, exist), you are *wrong*. It gives me great anguish,
dread and fear to read of `limitation' of anonymity misguidedly
satirized as nothing but brutish censorship.

You can submit and agree to some minor and essential self-regulating
mechanisms, such as barring illegal and unrepetant users, `convicted'
email addresses circulated among anonymous server operators
voluntarily, a complaint-and-response system, perhaps even automated,
etc. Or you can call it all the most obnoxious and insidious stab at
your true God-given freedoms ever to ooze out of the sewer. But one
exemplary and commendable somebody who posts here and has committed
superhuman energy and dedication and commitment to the ideal of
anonymity for the Usenet masses, running a server TODAY, recognizes
that certain basic limitations are unpalatable but NECESSARY and
CRUCIAL. And if you don't sufficiently protect yourselves (and
unrestrained anonymity transfers to operators the most supreme exposure
and vulnerability) you will inevitably be rudely, shockingly surprised
at your liability and loss.

``Be careful what you wish for, you might get it.'' Everybody here that
thinks anarchy is kinda neato should reconsider.  By one meaning of
anarchy, at least, you cannot have even the most basic of conveniences
you have taken for granted, e.g. longtime social contacts or clothes,
food, privacy, or whatever (and you'll not easily convince me there are
more appealing variations thereof). Enclosed, an essay by a friend of mine...



WHY DIGITAL ANONYMITY SHOULD BE UNRESTRICTED
by D. Lewdud

I want net anonymity to be completely unrestrained, and anybody who
thinks otherwise is an unAmerican communist censor sleazebag Puritan
prude spy who should be ruthlessly exposed and stoned for the sheer
criminality of their ideas. 

I happen to like it when the Usenet groups I'm reading have a lot of
irrelevant junk, with the signal-to-noise ratio approaching absolute
zero.  Anonymity is great for vicious flame wars and haranging
diatribes, but anonymously posted binary files in science groups are
the best, especially if they are posted multiple times and take many
megabytes. In fact, if they crash my newsserver, that's even better. It
gives me an enviable vacation during which I can look forward to the
next assault and relish the inspiring poetry of it all.  But then the
narrowminded ignoramuses talk about shutting down some system or
excluding some users, depriving me of my sheer joy.

All this idiotic drivel about pornography and copyright violations
sanctioned by taxpayer money. OF COURSE!  That's everyone's right, to
exploit all that gushing money in our government--that's why it's
there.  Clearly our corrupted officials don't know what to do with it
besides pocket it.  Why, if some bloated bureacrat misses his snack of
caviar to subsidize this lovely GIF specimen, this masterpiece of
nudity spread before me lasciviously, posted by some exemplary
anonymous user, that's one small favor for humanity and a giant drool
for me.  Wow, think of what we could achieve and accomplish if we
completely dismantled the NSA, the FBI, the CIA, and my local pig
trough!  (Ah, but not everybody objects to pornography, so maybe I'm
preaching to the choir on that one.)

I want to be able to get mailbombed with regularity, I like it when my
system goes down and I am helpless and the cruel butt of other's jokes.
Its fun! Esp. when I know where the mail is originating from, but the
operator makes eloquent, impassioned, and irate speeches against
stopping the flow based on Constitutional rights. I've started a
collection of all the neat stuff I've received (millions of lines of
exquisite profanity and threats), and to make room for it have gotten
rid of all the other junk on my account like mail from my friends and
family and my previously-favorite programs, which pale in comparison to
records of the heights of eloquence of my tormentors. To think that
others pay for this gives me great pangs of ecstasy.

I paid good money for all my hardware, and my network connection is my
pride and joy, and finaly I'm getting a return on my serious
investment. Why, I'm so happy I'm going to buy another new computer to
replace the last three that have crashed. Rather than put in the many
hours required to repair them (which would definitely be gleeful), I've
decided they'll go up on my mantle as monumental testaments to the
grandeur of the great anonymous feats of humanity.

I want to see illegal, sinister, and evil groups like the Mafia to
flourish, using new technology like networks to perpetrate their
patriotic services.  The net is such a close-knit set of orderly people
and upstanding citizens, I'm sure they'll love to join the party. I
want them to be able to terrorize me without consequence. Anybody who
objects clearly is wholly ignorant of the beautiful social implications
wrought by this wonderful technological innovation, a blind mute living
in a black and white closet and a zealot of thin line-drawing. 

Although I haven't personally yet had the great joy of this, I can't
wait to receive an anonymous death threat or ransom notice via email,
possibly even directed at a close relative or loved-one. In fact, I'm
saving up as much digital money as possible right now for exactly this
eventuality.  Its my digital insurance fund.  That this can all be
completely untraceable with anonymity, well that's something as
exhilarating as a quivering digital orgasm.

Imagine the splendor of delivering an anonymous note to the mayor of
New York and the world that in 15 minutes a large chunk under a large
building, a symbol of international unity, will be conveniently
rearranged, at only minor risk to nearby inhabitants!  Wow, this could
really advance the cause of establishing a vast electronic
infrastructure for promoting all the splendid possibilities of digital
anonymity. Considering what's happened to the country's `real'
infrastructure, we need another! If the assurance of anonymity was
absolute, it would really encourage everyone to find similarly noble
uses of their own.

Don't get me wrong.  I'm totally free of bias for and prejudice against
various uses of anonymity (anything less, of course, would be fascist
totalitarianism).  For example, I like individual terrorists just as
much as the organized collections.  They sound like they could be
really completely uninhibited in their creative grasps of our true
freedoms, and more numerous with their stellar utilizations.  In fact,
the potential for individual, unassociated citizens to thwart the
abuses, and profoundly destabilize the foundations of frigid, faceless
bureacracies like big telephone companies, and even the government, I
find spine-tinglingly majestic---it even looks like this could soon
happen.  Imagine: nothing left but pure, omnipresent cyberspace!





From marc at Athena.MIT.EDU  Sat Feb 27 20:39:53 1993
From: marc at Athena.MIT.EDU (Marc Horowitz)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 20:39:53 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <m0nSbit-000jr0C@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9302280438.AA26643@steve-dallas.MIT.EDU>


>> > If I perform some service for you, and you acknowledge that the
>> > service is complete as performed, then you have no need for my
>> > identity.
>> 
>> > Therefore, should not discrimination against anonymity when names are
>> > not germane be considered (depending on one's ideology) unreasonable,
>> > inefficient, coercive, intrusive, or illegal?
>>
>> Try telling this to the person behind the counter when you're trying
>> to rent a car, rent a hotel room for the night, or rent a mailbox for
>> 6 months.

Thug, you didn't seem to get Eric's point.  When I walk up to the
newspaper guy on the corner, I hand him 35 cents, he hands me a paper.
We're both happy.  My name is irrelevant, because there's not a hell
of a lot either of us can do to screw the other one over, so he
doesn't need to know my name.  I don't need to know his.

With certain exceptions, like the mailbox example, most situations of
"rent foo" require the lessor to take a risk, and he wants *some*
assurance that he'll get his rented thing back.  I'm not going to rent
a car to someone without ID, for cash, because I have no guarantee
that he isn't going to drive away with it and never come back.

I'm not saying discrimination against cash doesn't exist.  It does,
and that's reprehensible.  But not all cases of "plastic, yes, cash,
no" are discriminatory.

>> This brings up the question of using False ID when conducting
>> perfectly legal transactions, in order to preserve one's privacy.  Can
>> anyone reading this list with a legal background answer whether this
>> is legal or not?  

This is a very good question.

		Marc





From tcmay at netcom.com  Sat Feb 27 21:10:31 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 21:10:31 PST
Subject: Censorpunks Demand Action Against "D. Lewdud"
Message-ID: <9302280508.AA08174@netcom.netcom.com>



The "Censorpunks" now demand that action be taken against the rantings of
one "D. Lewdud," an apparent newcomer to this list! His calls for complete
anonymity and even anarchy are dangerous and impermissable. He writes:

>WHY DIGITAL ANONYMITY SHOULD BE UNRESTRICTED
>by D. Lewdud
>
>I want net anonymity to be completely unrestrained, and anybody who
>thinks otherwise is an unAmerican communist censor sleazebag Puritan
>prude spy who should be ruthlessly exposed and stoned for the sheer
>criminality of their ideas. 

(rest of this excellent, er, I mean "unacceptable," posting elided)

Censorpunks, we cannot allow garbage like this to pollute our net! There
ought to be a law!

.......

But seriously, Lance Detweiler does raise some serious points. And I hope
neither Lance, nor George Gleason, nor anyone else was too offended by my
satire about censorship. I felt John Gilmore and others had made the
"slippery slope" arguments well enough, and I would add my comments in the
form of a satire (as I like to do...you ought to see some of my spoofs over
on the Extropians list!).

A few comments on Lance's points:

Nobody has ever said the transition to crypto anarchy will be pleasant
(remind me sometime to discuss how easy assassinations for pay will become,
once untraceable and robust digital cash becomes possible--it'll curl your
hair!).

The key is that it's essentially unstoppable by simple legalistic means.
New kinds of solutions, like "positive reputations," will have to evolve.
(In this context, a positive reputation system means people only accept
e-mail from names or digital pseudonyms they know or have reason to be
interested in.)

The stratagem of controlling flaky, bad, or illegal posts by cooperation of
the remailers will not really work, as new digital pseudonyms will be
easily generated (and only the last remailer, the one sending it to a pool
or a newsgroup, has any real hope of "controlling" the content by reading
the plaintext). 

At the risk of sounding like another satire, I could point to the obvious
problems we have in free and open societies with _verbal_ abuse, threats,
blackmail, lies, propaganda, and other unsavory behavior. I could then
suggest that controls on free speech are needed (I can expect someone to
chime in here with the chestnut about how you can't shout "Fire!" in a
crowded theater...the Supreme Court justice who coined this later said he
regretted ever doing so, as every censor used it to justify controls on
speech). 

The price paid to reduce these nuisances is too high.

By the way, I have some scenarios for how crypto anarchy may be fought, how
it may fight back, what law enforcement may do, etc. These are from a 2.2
MB file for my still-unfinished novel on these topics. The relevant
sections on crypto and crypto anarchy are about 200K. They're mostly in
"MORE" format (an outliner for the Mac), and conversion to ASCII tends to
produce some ugly line indentation problems (the subsections indent OK, but
the following lines wrap back to the left margin). Still, perhaps I'll try
to convert them into readable essays for this list, if there's any
interest.

-Tim May


--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.






From tcmay at netcom.com  Sat Feb 27 21:23:28 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 21:23:28 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <9302280521.AA00526@netcom.netcom.com>


Marc Horowitz writes:

>With certain exceptions, like the mailbox example, most situations of
>"rent foo" require the lessor to take a risk, and he wants *some*
>assurance that he'll get his rented thing back.  I'm not going to rent
>a car to someone without ID, for cash, because I have no guarantee
>that he isn't going to drive away with it and never come back.

Precisely. The car rental company _does_ have a continuing relationship
with you, at least until you return their car.

(BTW, digital escrow services may allow relative anonymity--and perhaps
true anonymity--while still assuring the rental car company that they'll
get paid and will get their car back. Think of this as a surety
bond...though I suppose that many of those who don't have credit cards, for
economic reasons, will also not have $10,000 in cash laying around to post
such a bond.)

>I'm not saying discrimination against cash doesn't exist.  It does,
>and that's reprehensible.  But not all cases of "plastic, yes, cash,
>no" are discriminatory.

I see nothing reprehensible about discrimination against certain kinds of
payment. Maybe I don't want to carry $10,000 around in East L.A. and
instead want to be paid with a cashier's check. Maybe I just think folding
money has too many germs on it. 

The point is, nobody is being coerced into an economic transaction. If I
offer my car for sale for $10,000 in copper pennies, that's the way it is.

(There is some confusing legalistic stuff about debts and "legal tender,"
applying, as I understand it, to debts already incurred. But I'm arguing
the principle, not the situaion in these Beknighted States.)

-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.






From tcmay at netcom.com  Sun Feb 28 00:13:48 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 00:13:48 PST
Subject: Reasons for Anonymity--A Long Selection
Message-ID: <9302280811.AA12278@netcom.netcom.com>


The  following is part of an outline dealing with the topics on this list,
maintained since 1990 for a novel-in-progress (the writing, that is) I've
been working on for several years, off and on. In addition to using various
databases and hypertext systems (ArchiText, from Brainpower, and
StorySpace, from Eastgate Systems) for character developoment and plots, I
have also relied heavily on MORE, a powerful outline processor from
Symantec (MORE 3.0 is the direct descendent of ThinkTank, and feature
"cloning," where a branch of the outline can be replicated in many places,
allowing immediate hypertext-like jumps to distant parts of the outline,
and also maintaining database coherency). 

Several people have requested that I make good on my offer to post certain
parts of these notes, especially the parts dealing with "crypto anarchy"
and how it may get developed, how it may be fought by the law enforcement
types, what it can be used for, etc.

As an exeriment, I'll post here just one medium-sized branch, from deep in
the outline tree. "Reasons for Anonymity" seems in line with current list
interest. (Note that most of these comments were written in 1990-91, so
they may be slightly dated.) 

If the reaction is favorable, maybe I'll post more. Or, there may be other
options, such as placing parts of the outline in the archive site.

I've converted the nested outline structure to a flattened,
Harvard-labelled text file. It may still not be the easiest to read,
especially as many of the entries are intended only to jog my memory and to
help me organize my thinking.

Hope someone likes it.


Reasons for Anonymity and Digital Pseudonyms

I.  many of the same reasons as with Caller ID, but many 
new reasons as well

II.  Physical Threats

A.  "corporate terrrorism" is not a myth: drug dealers and 
other "marginal" businessmen face this every day

1.  extortion, threats, kidnappings

B.  and many businesses of the future may well be less 
"gentlemanly" than the conventional view has it

1.  witness the bad blood between Intel and AMD, and 
then imagine it getting ten times worse

2.  and national rivalries, even in ostensibly legal 
businesses (think of arms dealers), may cause more 
use of violence

3.  Mafia and other organized crime groups may try to 
extort payments or concessions from market 
participants, causing them to seek the relative 
protection of anonymous systems

a)  with reputations

4.  Note that calls for the threatened to turn to the police 
for protection has several problems

a)  the activities may be illegal or marginally illegal (this 
is the reason the Mafia can often get involved and 
why it may even sometimes have a positive effect, 
acting as the cop for illegal activities)

b)  the police are often too busy to get involved, what 
with so much physical crime clogging the courts

C.  extortion and kidnappings can be done using these 
very techniques of cryptoanarchy, thus causing a kind 
of arms race

D.  battered and abused women and families may need 
the equivalent of a "witness protection program"

1.  because of the ease of tracing credit card purchases, 
with the right bribes and/or court orders (or even 
hacking), battered wives may seek credit cards under 
pseudonyms

a)  and some card companies may oblige, as a kind of 
politically correct social gesture

b)  or groups like NOW and Women Against Rape may 
even offer their own cards

(1)  perhaps backed up by some kind of escrow fund

(2)  could be debit cards

E.  people who participate in cyberspace businesses may 
fear retaliation or extortion in the real world

1.  threats by their governments (for all of the usual 
reasons, plus kickbacks, threats to close them down, 
etcl)

2.  ripoffs by those who covet their success...

III.  Needed for Certain Kinds of Reputation-Based 
Systems

A.  a respected scientist may wish to float a speculative 
idea

1.  and be able to later prove it was in fact his idea

IV.  Legal Protection

A.  many transactions may be deemed illegal in some 
jursidictions

1.  even in some that the service or goods provider has no 
control over

a)  example: gun makers being held liable for firearms 
deaths in the District of Columbia (though this was 
recently cancelled)

2.  the maze of laws may cause some to seek anonymity 
to protect themselves against this maze

B.  "deep pockets"

1.  it will be in the interest of some to hide their 
identities so as to head off these kinds of lawsuits 
(filed for whatever reasons, rightly or wrongly)

2.  postings and comments may expose the authors to 
lawsuits for libel, misrepresentation, unfair 
competition, and so on (so much for free speech in 
these beknighted states)

3.  employers may also be exposed to the same suits, 
regardless of where their employees posted from

a)  on the tenuous grounds that an employee was acting 
on his employer's behalf, e.g., in defending an Intel 
product on Usenet

4.  this, BTW, is another reason for people to seek ways to 
hide some of their assets-to prevent confiscation in 
deep pockets lawsuits (or family illnesses, in which  
various agencies try to seize assets of anybody they 
can)

5.  and the same computers that allow these transactions 
will also allow more rapid determination of who has 
the deepest pockets!

C.  moonlighting employees (the original concern over 
Black Net and AMIX)

1.  employers may have all kinds of concerns, hence the 
need for employees to hide their identities

2.  note that this interects with the licensing and zoning 
aspects

D.  to beat zoning and licensing requirements

E.  Scenario: Anonymous organ donor banks

1.  e.g., a way to "market" rare blood types, or whatever, 
without exposing one's self to forced donation or other 
sanctions

a)  "forced donation" involves the lawsuits filed by the 
potential recipient

b)  at the time of offer, at least...what happens when the 
deal is consummated is another domain

2.  and a way to avoid the growing number of 
government stings

F.  avoidance of prosecution or damage claims for 
writing, editing, distributing, or selling such 
"damaging" materials is yet another reason for 
anonymous systems to emerge: those involved in the 
process will seek to immunize themselves from the 
various tort claims that are clogging the courts

1.  producers, distributors, directors, writers, and even 
actors of x-rated or otherwise "unacceptable" material 
may have to have the protection of anonymous 
systems

2.  imagine fiber optics and the proliferation of videos 
and talk shows....bluenoses and prosecutors will use 
"forum shopping" to block access, to prosecute the 
producers, etc.

V.  Anonymity in Requesting Information, Services, 
Goods

A.  a la the controversy over Caller ID and 900 numbers: 
people don't want their telephone numbers (and 
hence identities) fed into huge consumer-preference 
data banks

1.  of the things they buy, the videos they rent, the books 
they read. etc. (various laws protect some of these 
areas, like library books, video rentals)

2.  subscription lists are already a booming resale 
market...this will get faster and more finely "tuned" 
with electronic subscriptions: hence the desire to 
subscribe anonymously

B.  some examples of "sensitive" services that anonymity 
may be desired in (especially related to computers, 
modems, BBSes)

1.  reading unusual or sensitive groups: alt.sex.bondage, 
etc.

a)  or posting to these groups!

b)  recent controversy over NAMBLA may make such 
protections more desirable to some (and parallel calls 
for restrictions!)

2.  posting to such groups, especially given that records 
are perpetual and that government agencies read and 
file postings (an utterly trivial thing to do)

3.  requesting help on personal issues (equivalent to the 
"Name Witheld" seen so often)

4.  discussing controversial political issues (and who 
knows what will be controversial 20 years later when 
the poster is seeking a political office, for example?)

a)  given that some groups have already (1991) posted the 
past postings of people they are trying to smear!

5.  Note: the difference between posting to a BBS group 
or chat line and writing a letter to an editor is 
significant

a)  partly technological: it is vastly easier to compile 
records of postings than it is to cut clippings of letters 
to editors (though this will change rapidly as scanners 
make this easy)

b)  partly sociological: people who write letters know the 
letters will be with the back issues in perpetuity, that 
bound issues will preserve their words for many 
decades to come (and could conceivably come back to 
haunt them), but people who post to BBSes probably 
think their words are temporary

c)  and there are some other factors

(1)  no editing

(2)  no time delays (and no chance to call an editor and 
retract a letter written in haste or anger)

(3)  and letters can, and often are, written with the 
"Name Witheld" signature-this is currently next to 
impossible to do on networks

(a)  though some "forwarding" services have informally 
sprung up

C.  Businesses may wish to protect themselves from 
lawsuits over comments by their employees

1.  the usual "The opinions expressed here are not those 
of my employer" may not be enough to protect an 
employer from lawsuits

a)  imagine racist or sexist comments leading to lawsuits 
(or at least being brought up as evidence of the type of 
"attitude" fostered by the company, e.g., "I've worked 
for Intel for 12 years and can tell you that blacks make 
very poor engineers.")

2.  employees may make comments that damage the 
reputations of their companies 

a)  Note: this differs from the current situation, where 
free speech takes priority over company concerns, 
because the postings to a BBS are carried widely, may 
be searched electronically (e.g., AMD lawyers search 
the UseNet postings of 1988-91 for any postings by 
Intel employees besmirching the quality or whatever 
of AMD chips), 

3.  and so employees of corporations may protect 
themselves, and their employers, by adopting 
pseudonyms

D.  Businesses may seek information without wanting to 
alert their competitors

1.  this is currently done with agents, "executive search 
firms," and lawyers

2.  but how will it evolve to handle electronic searches?

3.  there are some analogies with filings of "Freedom of 
Information Act" requests, and of patents, etc.

a)  these "fishing expeditions" will increase with time, as 
it becomes profitable for companies to search though 
mountains of electronically-filed materials

(1)  environmental impact studies, health and safety 
disclosures, etc.

(2)  could be something that some companies specialize in

E.  Anonymous Consultation Services, Anonymous 
Stringers or Reporters

1.  imagine an information broker, perhaps on an 
AMIX-like service, with a network of stringers

a)  think of the arms deal newsletter writer in Hallahan's 
The Trade, with his network of stringers feeding him 
tips and inside information

(1)  instead of meeting in secretive locations, a very 
expensive proposition (in time and travel), a secure 
network can be used

(2)  with reputations, digital pseudonyms, etc.

2.  they may not wish their actual identities known

a)  threats from employers, former employers, 
government agencies

b)  harassment via the various criminal practices that will 
become more common (e.g., the ease with which 
assailants and even assassins can be contracted for)

(1)  part of the overall move toward anonymity

c)  fears of lawsuits, licensing requirements, etc.

3.  Candidates for Such Anonymous Consultation 
Services

a)  An arms deals newsletter

(1)  an excellent reputation for accuracy and timely 
information

(2)  sort of like an electronic form of Jane's

(a)  with scandals and government concern

(3)  but nobody knows where it comes from

(4)  a site that distributes it to subscribers gets it with 
another larger batch of forwarded material

(a)  NSA, FBI, Fincen, etc. try to track it down

b)  "Technology Insider" reports on all kinds of new 
technologies

(1)  patterned after Hoffler's Microelectronics News, the 
Valley's leading tip sheet for two decades

(2)  the editor pays for tips, with payments made in two 
parts: immediate, and time-dependent, so that the 
accuracy of a tip, and its ultimate importance (in the 
judgment of the editor) can be proportionately 
rewarded

(3)  PK systems, with contributors able to encrypt and then 
publicly post (using their own means of diffusion)

(a)  with their messages containing further material, such 
as authentications, where to send the payments, etc.

c)  Lundberg's Oil Industry Survey (or similar)

(1)  i.e., a fairly conventional newsletter with publicly 
known authors

(2)  in this case, the author is known, but the identities of 
contributors is well-protected

d)  A Conspiracy Newsletter

(1)  reporting on all of the latest theories of misbehavior 
(as in the "Conspiracies" section of this outline)

(2)  a wrinkle: a vast hypertext web, with contributors able 
to add links and nodes

(a)  naturally, their real name-if they don't care about 
real-world repercussions-or one of their digital 
pseudonyms (may as well use cryptonyms) is attached

i)  various algorithms for reputations

(1)  sum total of everything ever written, somehow 
measured by other comments made, by "voting," etc.

(2)  a kind of moving average, allowing for the fact that 
learning will occur, just as a researcher probably gets 
better with time, and that as reputation-based systems 
become better understood, people come to appreciate 
the importance of writing carefully

e)  and one of the most controversial of all: Yardley's 
Intelligence Daily

(1)  though it may come out more than daily!

(2)  an ex-agent set this up in the mid-90s, soliciting 
contributions via an anonymous packet-switching 
sysem

(a)  refined over the next couple of years

(b)  combination of methods

(3)  government has been trying hard to identify the 
editor, "Yardley"

(4)  he offers a payback based on value of the 
information, and even has a "Requests" section, and a 
Classifed Ad section

(5)  a hypertext web, similar to the Conspiracy Newsletter 
above

(6)  Will Government Try to Discredit the Newsletter 
With False Information?

(a)  of course, the standard ploy in reputation-based 
systems

(b)  but Yardley has developed several kinds of filters for 
this

i)  digital pseudonyms which gradually build up 
reputations

ii)  cross-checking of his own sort

iii)  he even uses language filters to analyze the text

(c)  and so what?

i)  the world is filled with disinformation, rumors, lies, 
half-truths, and somehow things go on....

f)  Other AMIX-like Anonymous Services

(1)  Drug Prices and Tips

(a)  tips on the quality of various drugs (e.g., "Several 
reliable sources have told us that the latest Maui 
Wowie is very intense, numbers below...")

(b)  synthesis of drugs (possibly a separate subscription)

i)  designer drugs

ii)  home labs

iii)  avoiding detection

(2)  The Hackers Daily

(a)  tips on hacking and cracking

(b)  anonymous systems themselves (more tips)

(3)  Product evaluations (anonymity needed to allow 
honest comments with more protection against 
lawsuits)

4.  Newspapers Are Becoming Cocerned with the Trend 
Toward Paying for News Tips

a)  by the independent consultation services

b)  but what can they do?

c)  lawsuits are tried, to prevent anonymous tips when 
payments are involved

(1)  their lawyers cite the tax evasion and national security 
aspects

F.  Private Data Bases 

1.  any organization offering access to data bases must be 
concerned that somebody-a disgruntled customer, a 
whistleblower, the government, whoever-will call 
for an opening of the files

a)  under various "Data Privacy" laws

b)  or just in general (tort law, lawsuits, "discovery")

2.  thus, steps will be taken to isolate the actual data from 
actual users, perhaps via cutouts

a)  e.g., a data service sells access, but subcontracts out the 
searches to other services via paths that are 
untraceable

(1)  this probably can't be outlawed in general-though 
any specific transaction might later be declared illegal, 
etc., at which time the link is cut and a new one is 
established-as this would outlaw all subcontracting 
arrangements!

(a)  i.e., if Joe's Data Service charges $1000 for a search on 
widgets and then uses another possibly transitory 
(meaning a cutout) data service, the most a lawsuit 
can do is to force Joe to stop using this untraceble 
service

(b)  levels of indirection (and firewalls that stop the 
propagation of investigations)

G.  Medical Polls (a la AIDS surveys, sexual practices 
surveys, etc.)

1.  recall the method in which a participant tosses a coin 
to answer a question...the analyst can still recover the 
important ensemble information, but the "phase" is 
lost

a)  i.e., an individual answering "Yes" to the question 
"Have you ever had xyz sex?" may have really 
answered "No" but had his answer flipped by a coin 
toss

2.  researchers may even adopt sophisticated methods in 
which explicit diaries are kept, but which are then 
transmitted under an anonymous mailing system to 
the researchers

a)  obvious dangers of authentication, validity, etc.

H.  Medical testing: many reasons for people to seek 
anonymity

1.  AIDS testing is the preeminent example

2.  but also testing for conditions that might affect 
insurablity or employment (e.g.,  people may go to 
medical havens in Mexico or wherever for tests that 
might lead to uninsurability should insurance 
companies learn of the "precondition")

3.  except in AIDS and STDs, it is probably both illegal 
and against medical ethics to offer anonymous 
consultations

a)  perhaps people will travel to other countries

VI.  Anonymity in Belonging to Certain Clubs, Churches, 
or Organizations

A.  people fear retaliation or embarassment should their 
membership be discovered, now or later

1.  e.g., a church member who belongs to controversial 
groups or clubs

B.  mainly, or wholly, those in which physical contact or 
other personal contact is not needed (a limited set)

C.  similar to the cell-based systems described elsewhere

D.  Candidates for anonymous clubs or organizations

1.  Earth First!, Act Up, Animal Liberation Front, etc.

2.  NAMBLA and similar controversial groups

E.  all of these kinds of groups have very vocal, very 
visible members, visible even to the point of seeking 
out television coverage

F.  but there are probably many more who would join 
these groups if there identities could be shielded from 
public group, for the sake of their careers, their 
families, etc.

G.  ironically, the corporate crackdown on outside 
activities considered hostile to the corporation (or 
exposing them to secondary lawsuits, claims, etc.) may 
cause greater use of anonymous systems

1.  cell-based membership in groups

H.  the growth of anonymous membership in groups 
(using pseudonyms) has a benefit in increasing 
membership by people otherwise afraid to join, for 
example, a radical environmental group

VII.  Anonymity in Giving Advice or Pointers to 
Information

A.  suppose someone says who is selling some illegal or 
contraband product...is this also illegal?

B.  hypertext systems will make this inevitable

VIII.  Anonymous Voting in Clubs, Organizations, 
Churches, etc.

A.  a major avenue for spreading CA methods: "electronic 
blackballing," weighted voting (as with number of 
shares)

1.  e.g., a corporation, perhaps one of JH's, issues "voting 
tokens," which can be used to vote anonymously

a)  or even sold to others (like selling shares, except 
selling only the voting right for a specific election is 
cheaper, and many people don't much care about 
elections)

2.  a way to protect against deep pockets lawsuits in, say, 
race discrimination cases

a)  wherein a director is sued for some action the 
company takes-anonymity will give him some legal 
protection, some "plausible deniability"

3.  is possible to set up systems (cf. Salomaa) in which 
some "supervotes" have blackball power, but the use 
of these vetos is indistinguishable from a standard 
majority rules vote

a)  i.e., nobody, except the blackballer(s), will know 
whether the blackball was used!

b)  will the government seek to limit this kind of 
protocol?

(1)  claiming discrimination potential or abuse of voting 
rights?

B.  will Justice Department (or SEC) seek to overturn 
anonymous voting?

1.  as part of the potential move to a "full disclosure" 
society?

2.  related to antidiscrimination laws, accountability, etc.

C.  Anonymous Voting in Reputation-Based Systems 
(Journals, Markets)

1.  customers can vote on products, on quality of service, 
on the various deals they've been involved in

a)  not clear how the voting rights would get distributed

b)  the idea is to avoid lawsuits, sanctions by vendors, etc. 
(as with the Bose suit)

2.  Journals

a)  a canonical example, and one which I must include, 
as it combines anonymous refereeing (already 
standard, in primitive forms), hypertext (links to 
reviews), and basic freedom of speech issues

b)  this will likely be an early area of use

3.  this whole area of consumer reviews may be a way to 
get CA bandwidth up and running (lots of 
PK-encrypted traffic sloshing around the various nets)

IX.  the 100% traceability of public postings to UseNet and 
other bulletin boards is very stifling to free expression 
and becomes one of the main justifications for the use 
of anonymous (or pseudononymous) boards and nets

A.  there may be calls for laws against such compilation, 
as with the British data laws, but basically there is 
little that can be done when postings go to tens of 
thousands of machines and are archived in perpetuity 
by many of these nodes and by thousands of readers

B.  readers who may incorporate the material into their 
own postings, etc. (hence the absurdity of the British 
law)









From tony at morgan.demon.co.uk  Sun Feb 28 01:11:48 1993
From: tony at morgan.demon.co.uk (Tony Kidson)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 01:11:48 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <2829@morgan.demon.co.uk>


In message <9302272006.AA16075 at SOS> you write:
>    Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 00:58:46 GMT
>    From: Tony Kidson <tony at morgan.demon.co.uk>
>
>    Yes, we can justify protecting those who threaten these acts.
>    This is a *far* cry fpom protecting those who *commit* those
>    acts.
>
> Ah, I see you are an absolute free-speach advocate.  The problem is that
> the line between speech and acts can be fuzzy at times, especially in
> the world of cyperspace model.

What you say is true, but I still think that you need to have a 
substantive act,  before you can apply *legal* sanctions.  The 
way to prevent threats, is, as people have said in other posts, 
to prevent the reception of anonymous mail by those who do not 
want to receive it.  

I freely admit that I *am* a free speech advocate.  I do not 
believe that you improve the condition of the world by preventing 
the speaking of undesirable words; Words should be countered by 
other words.  Many people plan to put the world to rights over a 
beer in a bar.  This may or may not include violent revolution. 
Are we to decree that this constitutes a violent criminal 
conspiracy?  

Speech does not harm anybody.  People acting on other's speech is 
what does the harm.  *Free* speech is indeed useful. It's when 
widely disseminated speech is in the hands of the few that its 
power can be wielded against the citizen and then it is 
unhealthy.

Tony
+-----------------+-------------------------------+--------------------------+
| Tony Kidson     |    PGP 2.1 Key by request     | Voice +44 81 466 5127    |
| Morgan Towers,  |                               | E-Mail                   |
| Morgan Road,    |         This Space            | tony at morgan.demon.co.uk  |
| Bromley,        |          to Rent              | tny at cix.compulink.co.uk  |
| England BR1 3QE |Honda ST1100  ==*==  DoD# 0801 | 100024.301 at compuserve.com|
+-----------------+-------------------------------+----------------------------+





From julf at penet.FI  Sun Feb 28 02:13:59 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 02:13:59 PST
Subject: More ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302272259.AA29137@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302281129.aa16174@penet.penet.FI>



> This may be an example of an intractable problem. A case where
> legitimate interests are mutually exclusive at least in practice of not
> in theory.

True. Sigh.

> If Johan has restricted output due to pressure from those communities,
> then he has already been forced to hobble his service's most significant
> *potential* benefit to the community.

Just want to clarify this... I did block access to groups outside alt.*
and soc.* for a week while the worst storm was raging, especially as
Karl Kleinpaste was threatening to kill the server by flooding. I did
re-establish the service as soon as there had been enough opposition to
Karl's suggestion.

At this point, only two groups are blocked, rec.nude and soc.singles,
both as a result of a formal poll on the group in question.

> If a serious whistlblower were to
> come along with some serious evidence and credibility, it is likely that
> he/she would want to post his/her evidence in one or more of the groups
> Johan has locked out!

I suppose this is why we are creating alt.whistleblowers. Other people
could forward those messages to any potentially blocked groups.

> I mean no aspersion on Johan here, he is laboring
> under pressure I'm sure, and he is a pioneer in all of this, and we are
> sharing his experience. I don't mean to take political sides either,
> both sides of the debate have legitimate arguments. In the one other
> post I made on this topic before, I received but one reply remarking
> that I "was preaching to the choir".

Well, I freely admit this is a learning experience for me. And I have
also started to realize that at some point I'm going to have to shut
donwn anon.penet.fi and set up Mark II, based on all the experience we
all have gained in this process. And I really do appreciate all the
enormously valuable experience and input this group has given me in this
matter!

> The mutually exclusive nature of these principles emerges in practice
> from what a former boss of mine called the human "ornery" factor. In
> this case that some number of individuals will exercise their "right to
> anonymity" not because they have to, but just because it's there.

Yes, I think I have seen enough good (bad) examples of this in action by
now, but I am afraid I'm going to see a lot more...

> Believe me I sympathize with this view. It keeps authorities and
> would-be authorities on notice that there are those who will test the
> limits of their rights and signal the rest of us if they are eroding. I
> also accept Hal's argument that we are protecting ourselves from
> possible future abuses of central authority. But I also sympathize with
> the sentiments of the other side, that most of the time it is desirable
> to put your name where your mouth/keyboard is. A consensual solution to
> this problem depends on a common political viewpoint, something that is
> certainly not in the cards for contemporary net participants.

Right. So for now we will just have to do a tightrope act... Anyone know
where I can get a pair of glittering thights?

	Julf






From julf at penet.FI  Sun Feb 28 02:53:34 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 02:53:34 PST
Subject: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302272115.AA08914@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302281154.aa16279@penet.penet.FI>



> Please advise.  alt.whistleblower, in addition to being a public good,
> is a great way to raise hell.

True. Actually, I want to ask for some help/advice. I am about to
implement alt.whistleblower on anon.penet.fi. But one thing I think I
would like some input on is the description text of the newsgroup for
the newsgroups file.

A more important matter is the way the group should be implemented.
Moderated or unmoderated doesn`t matter, as the server already knows how
to send messages to moderated groups to the moderator. But how should it
differ from other groups on anon.penet.fi? All groups will be able to
accept PGP-encrypted messages, but I was thinking of making a.w a
special case where id's aren't allocated at all, and every message would
just come from "an000000" or something. Is this a good idea? Pros are
that it would make it very hard to track down the real poster, cons that
it would be impossible to tell the different posters from each other,
thus not enabling informers to earn good or bad reputations, unless they
include key signatures or something.

Comments?

	Julf






From julf at penet.FI  Sun Feb 28 03:25:51 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 03:25:51 PST
Subject: anon user on cypherpunks list
Message-ID: <9302281238.aa19179@penet.penet.FI>


Er... Seems somebody has added an13556 at anon.penet.fi to the mailing
list, causing every message on the list to go through the server. This
results in everyone sending to the list being allocated an anon id!
Could you please change the address to be na13556 at anon.penet.fi instead,
thus avoiding the problem (yes, I've implemented the feature, but I
don't want to announce it yet, as there are some implications I want to
fix first...). Also a *WARNING*... an13556 at anon.penet.fi now knows the
anon id of everyone who have not set a password on anon.penet.fi, and have
sent messages to the list recently. So if you have been allocated an id
as a result of mailing to the list, you probably want to mail me and ask
to be deleted from the anon database.

	Julf (admin at anon.penet.fi)






From thug at phantom.com  Sun Feb 28 06:59:19 1993
From: thug at phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 06:59:19 PST
Subject: Real life pseudonyms (was re: more ideas on anonymity)
In-Reply-To: <9302280245.AA59295@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
Message-ID: <m0nSpMf-000jqtC@phantom.com>


Douglas Sinclair writes:

> I don't know the US laws on pseudos.  However, here in Canada one is allowed
> to go by whatever name one wishes PROVIDED it is not for fraudulent reasons.
> This also includes signatures -- I can sign as whoever I wish.  However,
> if the contract has a clause saying "This is the name by which I am
> legally and correctly known" then you are commiting fraud by signing with a
> psuedo.  This is in the fine print of a surprising number of things <sigh>.

I remember reading or hearing something similar as it applies in the United
States.  It seems that, as long as you're not committing a crime or a fraud,
in the process, you may identify by whatever name you wish. Can anyone with
a legal background confirm or deny this?

However, I am wondering if it also legal to present false ID in order to
insure your privacy/anonymity.  And isn't misrepresenting your true identity
considered to be a fraud in and of itself?

For instance, can I walk into a U.S. bank, present false ID, and obtain a
checking account to use for legitimate reasons?  How about a credit card?
Is this legal? I mean, I'm not stealing any money/products/services from
anybody, I'm only using a pseudonym.

 





From strat at intercon.com  Sun Feb 28 08:41:31 1993
From: strat at intercon.com (Bob Stratton)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 08:41:31 PST
Subject: Real life pseudonyms (was re: more ideas on anonymity)
In-Reply-To: <m0nSpMf-000jqtC@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9302281640.AA13450@intercon.com>


>>>>> On Sun, 28 Feb 93 9:51:36 EST, thug at phantom.com (Murdering Thug) said:


	MT> I remember reading or hearing something similar as it
	MT> applies in the United States.  It seems that, as long as
	MT> you're not committing a crime or a fraud, in the process,
	MT> you may identify by whatever name you wish. Can anyone
	MT> with a legal background confirm or deny this?


Not being a lawyer, but an engineer with unhealthy interest in such
matters, I've looked a few things up and it appears that in most
relationships, using an assumed name is not fraud, unless "intent to
defraud" is present. Needless to say that's not very clear-cut these
days.

	MT> However, I am wondering if it also legal to present false
	MT> ID in order to insure your privacy/anonymity.  And isn't
	MT> misrepresenting your true identity considered to be a
	MT> fraud in and of itself?

Again, using aliases does not appear to be "malum in se", that is,
evil in and of itself. 

BUT, one thing I found in the course of doing a Westlaw search on the
use of Social Security Numbers:The federal laws on SSN use were
amended for the purpose of preventing welfare fraud, and wound up with
a potentially threatening modification. The law used to say that it
was illegal to give an invalid SSN in certain circumstances, for the
purpose of obtaining gov't benefits inappropriately.

The bad news is that it says that, but with "or for any other purpose"
appended. Thus, it appears that tossing around bogus SSNs (which are
still on many driver's licenses - sigh) could well be an offense in
and of itself. I'll try to dig up the citations.

--Strat






From chrmsync at mindvox.phantom.com  Sun Feb 28 09:03:03 1993
From: chrmsync at mindvox.phantom.com (Chrome Sync)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 09:03:03 PST
Subject: Real life pseudonyms
Message-ID: <J3XoZB3w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>


In the US, you can use any identity you like, provided you're not doing so
to defraud anyone ... that is, if you do it to escape child care payments,
that's fraud. If you do it to rent a mailbox, *provided you don't do
anything otherwise illegal using the mailbox*, it's kosher. Start a
checking account -- I don't see why not.

I have a casual background in law/law enforcement, but got the first two
examples from a law school grad. who is currently working for a law
enforcement agency. I'lll have to run the third one by him ...

	Best,


                [ Cyber-Renaissance Man ]
                ||                     ||
                ||     Chrome Sync     ||
                ||                     ||
                [* & Frank Sinatra Fan *]





From swc at uc1.ucsu.edu  Sun Feb 28 09:09:37 1993
From: swc at uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 09:09:37 PST
Subject: a few opinions, unasked
Message-ID: <9302281720.AA28414@uc1.ucsu.edu>


1) Within a couple of years I am going to be setting up a network of
systems incorporating (among other functions) remailing.  I won't know
the 'true' identity of my subscribers any more than anyone else will.
If someone PROVES to me that a particular pseudonymous account has been
used for conspiracy to initiate force or committ fraud, I will shut it down.
But then, the (former) user can just obtain a new pseudonymous account
from me, and I won't even know it is the same guy.  So what's the point?
Quit discussing whether or not we SHOULD restrict anonimity or pseudonymity.
We CAN'T, because there are jerks like me who will set up systems which
will provide for total anonymity of subscriber applications.
End of thread, I hope.

2) Use of false ID is illegal in New York State, and (I think) throughout
the United States.  The definition of false ID is fuzzy, however.  If you
modify your driver's license or other government-issued ID, definitely a
crime.  However, if you obtain legitimate ID from someone under a name other
than the one you mostly use, that is not necessarily fake ID.  for instance,
if I am known to Joe's ID Cards-Are-Us as Mr. John Smith, and he issues me
an ID card in that name, neither of us has committed a crime, UNLESS there is
intent to use it to defraud or committ some other crime (such as obtain
admission to an alcohol-serving establishment if under legal drinking age).
How do I know? I moonlight as a bouncer at a bar, and (unique!) have actually
read SOME of the applicable law.

3) The ratio of philosphical ramblings to pragmatic how-to information is
pretty high.  For me personally, that means (S+N)/N < 0 dB.  Is there a
forum for discussion strictly of how to do it on a commercial basis or
society-affecting scale? I already have my philosophical house in order
(IMnotsoHO) and can't afford to waste time in discussion vs action.  I don't
wish to insult anyone, this discussion here has tremendous value, just not
to me right now.

4) Anyone got any idea how I plan to provide pseudonymous accounts on a
commercial (read, I MAKE MONEY AT IT) basis, while maintaining total
anonymity of subscriber applications (and pseudonymity of payments on
account)? I have a plan, but would like to see if it is obvious before
explaining it; also, I would like to see if there ar other ways to do it.

Who is John Galt?

--
Stuart W. Card <swc at uc1.ucsu.edu>





From jordan at imsi.com  Sun Feb 28 09:22:36 1993
From: jordan at imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 09:22:36 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <9302281608.AA14296@IMSI.COM>


	From thug at phantom.com Sat Feb 27 20:56:03 1993

	Try telling this to the person behind the counter when you're
	trying to rent a car, rent a hotel room for the night, or rent
	a mailbox for 6 months.

These are examples of transactions that are *ongoing* and thus are
*not* satisfied by an initial cash payment.  When you rent a car or
hotel room, the transaction does not finish until you have left and the
room has been inspected.  At my mailbox service, I can incur charges
for all kinds of things (receiving COD packages, receiving faxen, etc.)
during the term of my rent.

	The thing is, they never ask for ID if you're paying by credit
	card since they assume the credit card is enough proof of who
	you are.

No, the credit card says they can recover damages if you trash the room.

/jordan





From jordan at imsi.com  Sun Feb 28 09:22:41 1993
From: jordan at imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 09:22:41 PST
Subject: Real life pseudonyms (was re: more ideas on anonymity)
Message-ID: <9302281619.AA14306@IMSI.COM>


	From thug at phantom.com Sun Feb 28 10:48:57 1993

	For instance, can I walk into a U.S. bank, present false ID,
	and obtain a checking account to use for legitimate reasons?

Banking and Tax regulations provide solid legal ground for requiring
banks to verify identity and Tax status in the US.  Answer: no.  By
definition, there are no "legitimate" reasons for having a checking
account in this country that is unaccountable.  There are plenty of
other ways of hiding cash and money transactions without involving the
US banking system.  They don't want you to do this ...

	I'm not stealing any money/products/services from anybody, I'm
	only using a pseudonym.

No, you're just avoiding the accountability of your money.  This is
akin to not reporting income.  It's patently illegal.  You can stand
down your color PostScript printer now ...

/jordan





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Sun Feb 28 09:58:36 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 09:58:36 PST
Subject: anon user on cypherpunks list
In-Reply-To: <9302281238.aa19179@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9302281755.AA13087@soda.berkeley.edu>



I have changed the subscription name in the list to the "na" form, so
the immediate problem for cypherpunks is fixed.

But this problem will persist.  Many, if not most, mailing lists are
running automated list software and the address given in the
subscription request is the address added.  Even if the administrator
manually changes the entry, the old one can be added right back.
Mailing list software could be changed to notice penet anonymous
addresses, but don't hold your breath for that to be deployed soon.

There are two problems with the current anon at penet design that I see
as fundamental.  The first, widely discussed and the proximate cause
of the above problem, is automatic pseudonym generation.  The second
is ensured by the first and is subtler: the remailer does not allow
multiple pseudonyms per incoming email address.

Multiple pseudonyms allow compartmentalization and has two benefits.
The first benefit is unlinkability.  I have sometimes wanted to argue
both sides of an issue, but refrained because that is too confusing
for most to follow.  (The semiotics of "consistency/ignorability" and
"one mind/one opinion" are fascinating and, here, digressing.)  I
might also wish to argue in two completely different fora and not have
these seen as the same person.

For every reason you might want a pseudonym in the first place, you
might also want a "pseudonym from your pseudonym," especially if you
use it a lot.

The second benefit of compartmented identities happens when the
pseudonym is revealed, either by choice or by chance.  There are many
situations when a temporary identity might be desired; I leave it to
others to list them.  With the current single-pseudonym system, one
revelation of identity reveals all others.  When there is no
particular benefit to being seen as the same identity, I would rather
have multiple identities for exactly this reason.

As far as implementations go, having multiple pseudonyms requires that
a separate "request for pseudonym" be added, as well as a way to
indicate from which pseudonym (or none of them) mail should be from.
I would suggest bouncing mail to "an" style addresses unless a
pseudonym has been declared; the bounce message would, of course,
contain instructions on how to obtain a pseudonym or use the "na"
form.

Therefore, I would suggest that a second version of the pseudonymous
system at penet do away with automatic generation and support multiple
pseudonyms.

Eric





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Sun Feb 28 10:09:40 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 10:09:40 PST
Subject: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302281154.aa16279@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9302281806.AA13608@soda.berkeley.edu>



>A more important matter is the way the group should be implemented.
>Moderated or unmoderated doesn`t matter, as the server already knows how
>to send messages to moderated groups to the moderator. 

Actually, I was thinking that whistleblower at anon.penet.fi would _be_
the moderator.  Then you just post directly.  All the messages would
come from that address, and no id's would be assigned.  Since all
messages are from "whistleblower", replies to a poster go right back
out to the list, also anonymized.

It's actually a much simpler system than is currently implemented,
since id's arenit involved at all.

>Pros are that it would make it very hard to track down the real
>poster, cons that it would be impossible to tell the different
>posters from each other, thus not enabling informers to earn good or
>bad reputations, unless they include key signatures or something.

PGP 2.1 contains the cleartext-signature feature, and the periodic
posting to the list should mention this.  This allows a real pseudonym
to develop, just like we want.

Eric





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Sun Feb 28 11:54:03 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 11:54:03 PST
Subject: A Modest Proposal
In-Reply-To: <9302280259.AA20523@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9302281950.AA17286@soda.berkeley.edu>



I wrote:
>The only perfectly unambiguous position is that every use is a
>legitimate use.

and then L.D. wrote:
>Once again I'm very seriously disturbed at the sentiments presented by
>some eminent members of this list.  I believe in free speech perhaps as
>rabidly as the next guy, but many of the most rabid advocates recognize
>that there are limitations on `freedom'.  

Gotcha.

I make no claim above as to the propriety of an unambiguous position,
merely that there is one and only one completely clear position.
(There is another, that no use is legitimate, and we here conveniently
ignore that one :-)

The consequences of unambiguity must affect our discussions of this
matter.  If we desire unambiguity, then there is no need to
distinguish between uses.  If, however, the unambiguous solution is
not desirable, then there must be decisions made about propriety.  As
with every other question of power, the real question is

	"_Who_ decides propriety?"

The questions "What are significant criteria?", "When is the decision
made?", and others are all subordinate to the question "Who decides?"
Roughly speaking, there are three situations regarding anonymous
communication: the sender, the carrier, and the receiver.  In each of
these, we can examine what decisions they are _able_ to make.

As sender, I can choose who I present myself as, whom I send to to,
what carriers I want, and what I want to say.  As carrier, I can
choose whom to accept messages from, whom to send them to, what
content I am willing to pass.  As receiver, I can choose what carriers
to receive messages from, and from whom to accept mail.

>Anybody here that thinks that an anonymous service can act something
>like a Unix pipe that just passes the raw stuff through forever
>unhindered and uninterrupted is seriously deluding himself.

Well, an anonymous service _can_ do just that.  Whether or not the
rest of the world continues to communicate with them is a separate
question, an important question in the short run to be sure.

Acknowledgement that a procedure is an exigency does not make that
procedure desirable of itself.  All differential carriage based on
content is censorship.  I acknowledge the exigency of certain forms of
censorship in currently deployed anonymous systems.

Nonetheless, I will never desire censorship for its own sake and I
will also fight to remove the conditions which make censorship exigent
in the first place.

The problem is, who decides what is exigent?  We can either answer
that question, or change the world so that we never need ask it.

I decline to respond to the essay by Mr. D. Lewdud.

Eric





From MJMISKI at macc.wisc.edu  Sun Feb 28 11:55:56 1993
From: MJMISKI at macc.wisc.edu (Matthew J Miszewski)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 11:55:56 PST
Subject: Fake ID to protect ID
Message-ID: <23022813532303@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>


 
 
  With regard to Thug's question about the use of false identification for legal
purposes, I did some cursory legal research on the subject.
 
  A search through LEXIS brings up only three cases throughout all of the
federal and state scourts.  The first case, and in fact the one most on point is
a 1991 US court of appeals case (LEXIS 219121).  In this case, the defendant
attempted to utilize the 'Thug defense' of no intent to defraud.  Unfortunately,
the court held that the actual making of false identification papers was the
illegal act and that the potential for illegal use was sufficient to merit
prosecution.
 
  There are a few possible ways a good attorney could get around this ruling
though.  First of all, the case is not a 'published' decision.  Therefore it
really holds little fmore than persuasive authority:).  Secondly, the defendant
in this case actually was involved in a conspiracy to commit illegal acts
(whereas Thug is only interested in protecting his true identity).  Finally,
there is an incredible void of case law on this specific subject.  That means
that a few cyber test cases making there way through the correct legal channels,
argued in the correct way, could start an actually legally recognized 'thug
defense'.
 
  Unfortunately, there are other problems (legal0 with the use of false ID.
Misrepresentation can be both tortious and can be utilized to weasel out of
otherwise sufficient contracts.  For the interests on this list, it would
probably be best to balance all of your interests and only use Thug's
suggestions when you are in realistic fear of abuse of your identity.
 
  I will do further research on the subject (This was only a quick search).
Anyone with other legal questions (NOT people looking for legal advice per se)
that I might hellp out with (RESEARCH ONLY) mail me privately.
 
mjmiski at macc.wisc.edu
 
-  Although I may detest what you say, I will defend with my life your right to
say it  - Voltaire
 





From Seth.Morris at lambada.oit.unc.edu  Sun Feb 28 12:04:18 1993
From: Seth.Morris at lambada.oit.unc.edu (Seth Morris)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 12:04:18 PST
Subject: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302281154.aa16279@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9302281941.AA23759@lambada.oit.unc.edu>


> accept PGP-encrypted messages, but I was thinking of making a.w a
> special case where id's aren't allocated at all, and every message would
> just come from "an000000" or something. Is this a good idea? Pros are
> that it would make it very hard to track down the real poster, cons that
> it would be impossible to tell the different posters from each other,
> thus not enabling informers to earn good or bad reputations, unless they
> include key signatures or something.

	I like the idea, but would this make it impossible to respond
anonymously and/or privately to a whistleblower? I couldn't write back
privately to compare evidence if I didn't want to go public with my
information yet (assuming that I had a similar interest, of course).
 	Of course, if they have included a public key I could post an
encrypted message to them, but is the idea to create a newsgroup where
much of the traffic could conceivably be encrypted E-mail?
	But, on yet another hand (I feel like I'm in _A Mote in God's 
Eye_), if a regular informational posting in a.w discussed these issues,
a whistleblower would be warned to post a publik key, a nom de guerre, and
(maybe) a regular anon ID, if they wished, or to join an anon pool.

 	To repeat: I do like the an00000 idea. But I think people may want 
E-mail response.

 Seth <seth.morris at launchpad.unc.edu>
	(Yay, I finally figured out +clearsig=on ! Now I need an option to
add a oublic-key block to a message before signing automatically!)





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Sun Feb 28 12:11:20 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 12:11:20 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302280438.AA26643@steve-dallas.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9302282008.AA17976@soda.berkeley.edu>



>With certain exceptions, like the mailbox example, most situations of
>"rent foo" require the lessor to take a risk, and he wants *some*
>assurance that he'll get his rented thing back.  I'm not going to rent
>a car to someone without ID, for cash, because I have no guarantee
>that he isn't going to drive away with it and never come back.

Privacy costs.  It is possible to create a company which offers
insurance against damage and loss, paid for by the user, assigned to
the owner.  Such a policy could be presented to a car rental agency in
lieu of your name.  Your transaction with the rental agency would then
be anonymous, even if your transaction with the insurer were not.

Such an arrangement might even be preferable to a rental agency, since
it means they don't have to go after individuals with shallow pockets
in the event of damage or loss.

I can even imagine such a company which offers standard policies for
any number of different objects, written and digitally signed over the
phone.  Want to rent and apartment?  Get your damage and last month's
rent insured.  

There is already such a thing as "completion insurance" for
construction and the like, purchased by the builder as a condition of
contract.  If the transaction costs of this and similar types of
insurance were lowered, anonymity in the real world would increase.

Eric





From tytso at Athena.MIT.EDU  Sun Feb 28 13:57:19 1993
From: tytso at Athena.MIT.EDU (Theodore Ts'o)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 13:57:19 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <2829@morgan.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <9302282156.AA25135@SOS>


   Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 23:59:30 GMT
   From: Tony Kidson <tony at morgan.demon.co.uk>

   > Ah, I see you are an absolute free-speach advocate.  The problem is that
   > the line between speech and acts can be fuzzy at times, especially in
   > the world of cyperspace model.

   What you say is true, but I still think that you need to have a 
   substantive act,  before you can apply *legal* sanctions.  The 
   way to prevent threats, is, as people have said in other posts, 
   to prevent the reception of anonymous mail by those who do not 
   want to receive it.  

   Speech does not harm anybody.  People acting on other's speech is 
   what does the harm.  *Free* speech is indeed useful. It's when 
   widely disseminated speech is in the hands of the few that its 
   power can be wielded against the citizen and then it is 
   unhealthy.

I see.  So you don't believe in libel or slander laws.

And NBC was perfectly justified in faking an explosion in a GM truck to
show it was unsafe, and broadcast it on prime-time TV.  And it didn't do
anybody any harm at all.  Uh huh.

Try again.....

						- Ted





From hkhenson at cup.portal.com  Sun Feb 28 14:22:39 1993
From: hkhenson at cup.portal.com (hkhenson at cup.portal.com)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 14:22:39 PST
Subject: EFF Speaks to CIA
Message-ID: <9302281359.2.6481@cup.portal.com>


A substantial number of you have probably seen this already, but if it
missed--well, it is worth reading.  Keith Henson
------
Remarks of John Perry Barlow
to the 
First International Symposium on National Security & National 
Competitiveness 
McLean, Virginia
December 1, 1993


I can't tell you the sense of strangeness that comes over 
someone who earns his living writing Grateful Dead songs, 
addressing people who earn their livings as many of you do, 
especially after hearing the last speaker. If you don't 
appreciate the irony of our appearing in succession, you have 
no sense of irony at all. You and I inhabit very different 
worlds, but I am pleased to note, as my presence here strongly 
suggests, these two worlds may be growing closer.

The reason I am here has absolutely nothing to do with the 
Grateful Dead. I'm here because I met a fellow named Mitch 
Kapor in 1989. Despite obvious differences, I felt as if we'd 
both been up in the same saucer or something...that we shared 
a sense of computers being more than just better adding 
machines or a better typewriters. We saw that computers, 
connected together, had the capacity to create an environment 
which human beings could and did inhabit.

Yesterday, I was encouraged to hear evidence that [former 
Presidential Science Advisor] Dr. Jay Keyworth and [Conference 
Organizer and former CIA agent] Robert Steele, might have 
been up in that saucer too. The people who share this 
awareness are natives of the future. People who have a hard 
time with it may always be immigrants.

When Mitch and I saw that computers had created a place, we 
started asking some questions about what kind of place it 
was....what were the operating terms and conditions of this 
place, what kinds of people already lived there, who was going 
to inhabit it, what was going on in it, did it have a name?

We decided to name it Cyberspace, after Bill Gibson's 
description of a futuristic place rather like it which we found in 
his novel Neuromancer. Rather than being a figment of Bill's 
imagination, we felt that Cyberspace was already up and 
happening.

Indeed, if you're having trouble with the concept, ask yourself 
where phone conversation takes place. That's right. Cyberspace 
is where you are when you're on the phone. It's also where 
most of your money is, unless you keep it in Krugerands buried 
out in the garden...which I suppose some folks in this room 
might just do. It's also...and I think this is very important... the 
place where the greater part of the world's business is 
happening now. 
So it's a highly significant locale, and yet it's invisible to most of 
the people who are in it every day of their lives. I believe it 
was Marshall McLuhan who said, "We don't know who it was 
that discovered water, but we're pretty sure it wasn't a fish..."

In any case, when EFF first got together, our principal concern 
was making certain the U.S. Constitution applied to Cyberspace. 
We could see the government, specifically the Secret Service, 
taking actions which made it obvious that they didn't quite get 
it. They didn't seem to be acting out of malice, but they were, 
at best, differently clued. They clearly didn't understand that 
the First Amendment applied as certainly to bytes as it did to 
ink on paper.

At the time we thought that we could just hire a few nasty civil 
liberties lawyers from New York to put the fear of God in them, 
and that would be that. But it's been like tugging at a thread on 
your sweater, where you begin to pull, and pretty soon you 
have more thread on the ground than on your back. It turns 
out that there are questions raised in this environment to 
which we don't have good answers. 
Indeed, it turns out that this is a place where the First 
Amendment...along with just about every other law on the 
planet...is a local ordinance. There are no clean jurisdictional 
boundaries. This is a place which may always be outside the 
law. This may be an unwelcome concept, but it is true, and it is 
something we will all have to grapple with as society moves 
into the virtual world.

I believe you folks in the Intelligence Community are going to 
be  challenged by these issues as directly as anyone. This is 
because intelligence, and especially the CIA and NSA, are 
supposed to work under stern guidelines intended to separate 
the domestic from the foreign. You're not supposed to be 
conducting domestic surveillance. Well, in Cyberspace, the 
difference between domestic and foreign, in fact the difference 
between any country and any other country, the difference 
between us and them, is extremely blurry. If it exists at all...

This is also an economic environment in which everyone seems 
to be everywhere at once. I hear you're becoming interested in 
protecting American Business from foreign espionage. But 
against this "everywhereness" it becomes very difficult to say, 
"Alright, this is our guy, this is General Motors, we're going to 
take care of his interests." Nothing is so cleanly delineated.

These are a few of the fundamental changes which arise as a 
result of literally moving out of the world of experience and 
onto the map of information. Another one which is especially 
pertinent to the people in this room, is what happens when you 
have direct e-mail access to every member of your 
organization.

This can have a terrifically decentralizing effect on structure. It 
weakens hierarchy. It flattens the organization. It can create 
one hell of a lot of confusion, even as it speeds response time. 
There are in this room representatives of some tall and rigid 
outfits. Prepare for the possibility that your organization is 
about to go all flat and squishy due to tenderizing influence of 
e-mail.

We are also looking at a complete redefinition of ownership 
and property. I mean, we now have the mind as our principle 
source of commercial goods. At last it seems we can we can 
really get something for nothing. As recently as fifteen years 
ago all new wealth derived from minerals extraction or 
agriculture. Everything else was simply passing it around. No 
longer must you rip your goods from the ground. You don't 
have to wait for the sun to grow some. New wealth can be had 
by just sitting around and rubbing some facts 
together...essentially what you folks have been doing all along. 
This economy of virtual substance is a fundamental change and 
one which you can exploit if you're willing. 
We're also looking at some fundamental shifts in the nature of 
property. This is going to be relevant to you as you move into a 
more open interaction with the rest of the world. In an 
information economy, much depends on the sanctity of 
copyright. But copyright, it turns out, derives most of its force 
from the physical manifestation of intellectual property.  
Copyright protects expression, the thing that happens when 
you print a book or press a record. In Cyberspace, you don't get 
that manifestation. It never goes physical.

So the bottles we have been relying on for the protection of our 
intellectual goods are disappearing, and, since we've been 
selling bottles and not wine all along, we will soon have a lot of 
wine and nothing to put it in. Interesting problems will arise. 
They're already upon us. 
In any case, when EFF saw the multitude of things going on in 
this arena, we battened ourselves down for the long haul, and 
we are dealing with a whole range of issues, including the Open 
Platform initiative. Which is our effort to try to deploy 
something like universal data service. 
We believe that the best thing that could happen for the 
American economy, and actually the best thing that could 
happen for liberty on the Planet Earth, would be to make 
everyone capable of jacking in if they want to. 
We find that other countries are lagging in this. For example, 
the Japanese see absolutely no use for high speed personal data 
connections. The folks at NTT certainly can't see any reason to 
trade their 70,000 operators on digital switches. So we have a 
significant leg up on the Japanese that is not well known in this 
country. 
Another thing that we are working on is the FBI's Digital 
Telephony proposal which is, as you may know, the idea that 
we should stop all telecommunications progress in this country 
in order to accommodate the FBI is just amazing to me, and yet 
it somehow manages to live on Congress. 
Also, for those of you whose badges say U.S. Government [code 
for National Security Agency], we are trying to overturn NSA's 
data encryption embargo. It's our position that trying to 
embargo software is like trying to embargo wind. This is a fact 
that you are going to have to come to grips with. Digitized 
information is very hard to stamp "classified" or keep 
contained. 
This stuff is incredibly leaky and volatile. It's almost a life form 
in its ability to self-propagate. If something hits the Net...and 
it's something which people on there find interesting...it will 
spread like a virus of the mind. I believe you must simply 
accept the idea that we are moving into an environment where 
any information which is at all interesting to people is going to 
get out. And there will be very little that you can do about it. 
This is not a bad thing in my view, but you may differ...

I'm going to talk a little bit now about the very nature of 
information. This conference, I must say, has blown me away. I 
had no idea there were people in your [the intelligence] 
community talking about these things. I am pleased and 
gratified by the folks I have met here and talked to personally, 
but I want to reiterate Dr. Keyworth's phrase yesterday: which 
is that government, especially American government, must end 
its obsession with secrecy.

We must do so because we are engaged in...and I don't want to 
use the word warfare here...we are engaged in a form of 
economic competition where our principal advantage is our 
ability to distribute information. It is not our ability to conceal 
it.

Perhaps this has always been true. Let me tell you a story. Last 
year, I was addressing the computer security establishment at 
the Department of Energy. These are the people in charge of 
protecting the computers that nuclear weapons get designed 
on.
The other keynote speaker at this conference was, uh, Edward 
Teller. [Laughter.] Yeah, well, I was pretty sure if evil walked 
the planet, its name was Edward Teller. Anyway, I got up and 
said that I wasn't sure that DOE's secrecy was an asset. I wasn't 
going to say that it was a liability, so much as beside the point. 
After all, I know how to make an atomic bomb. 
You give me five and a half pounds of weapons grade 
plutonium and a week in my garage and I'll give you a nuclear 
weapon. It will be dirty, but it will work. The problem for 
anyone who wants to do this is that they can't get enough 
industrial capacity ginned up to create the plutonium. I mean, I 
just can't get my high temperature gas diffusion centrifuges to 
work. Indeed, it takes a whole society to put them together, 
even if the design information is available. It is not the 
information, which is readily available, that is crucial. It is the 
ability to execute that is the critical factor.

I was interested to see how Dr. Teller would respond to that. To 
my surprise and satisfaction, he got up and agreed with me 
completely. He went on to say that he had never found a 
nuclear secret that the Russians could not obtain within a year 
of its development. Where they couldn't compete with us was 
in the areas where we were wide open. He cited the electronics 
industry, saying that at the end of World War II, we were 
about 20 years ahead of the Russians in nuclear weapons 
design, and roughly neck and neck in the electronics.

Both sides entered a closed program on nuclear weapons 
design. And we went into a wild free-for-all in electronics. I 
mean, you should know that in the computer business, there 
are so many loose lips, you actually have to really try not to 
learn what you competitor is up to. Computer scientists are the 
meetingest bunch of people you ever saw, and when they meet, 
they tell one anther everything.

The results of this approach speak for themselves. As Dr. Teller 
pointed out, by the time the Russians quit being a threat, they 
had moved to a position of parity with us in nuclear weapons, 
but they were 25 to 30 years behind us in electronics.

I suspect one reason for this conference is to figure out how 
you guys are going to make your living now that the Party's 
Over. I believe the Intelligence Community still has a role. We 
are entering the Information Age. And Information, after all, is 
what you do. You have an edge in the field, and I would hate to 
see you blow your lead. 
But there are some serious issues about information which 
must be dealt with, and they have almost nothing to do with 
whether it is open or closed.  The real questions regarding 
information relate to usability...whether or not it is meaningful, 
whether or not it is relevant, whether or not it accurate, 
whether or not it is genuinely useful. 
There is, for example, an enormous amount of information on 
the Net. But the signal-to-noise ratio on the net is terrible. 
There's an awful lot of racket. So I suppose you do get a kind of 
secrecy, rather as in those fancy restaurants with the highly 
reflective walls, where you can hear the people shouting at you 
at your table, but you can't make out what anyone else is 
saying for the hub-bub. It's the intimacy of white noise. 
You folks have some expertise in an important function: sorting 
out that which is relevant from the huge spray of data that is 
coming at everyone. That is an important problem that is 
largely overlooked...so far the software solutions to it don't 
strike me as being much good. We talk about "smart agents" 
but they aren't smart, they're pretty dumb. You send them out 
and they return with too much.

The problem is that the difference between data and 
information is meaning, something machines know little of. To 
determine whether data are meaningful, whether they are, in 
fact, information, you must pass them through a human mind. 
There is also a question of authority, reliability, and bias. For 
example, I think one of the things you will find in using open 
sources is that most media are intentionally designed to evoke 
a fearful response in the reader. I mean, fear sells, as well you 
know. 
Perhaps you have an important role in certifying the reliability 
of materials in open circulation. Perhaps you are already 
engaged in it. I recently got a call from a friend who is an 
expert on computer networking in the Confederation of 
Independent States, or whatever they call what's left of the 
Evil Empire these days. He was in a terrible state. He said, "I 
just got visited by the CIA, I don't know what to do. They 
showed up and wanted to know all about my most recent 
report. I'm afraid they're going to try to make me a CIA agent!" 
A scary thought, eh? 
I told him, "Look, it seems to me you already are a CIA agent." 
They're just trying to figure out if you're a good one!" 
We may find that there are many CIA agents, of widely 
varying reliability. The real CIA agents will have the subtler 
job of finding out which of them is telling the truth.

The most important problem which the intelligence community 
must now confront relates to your own bureaucratic sclerosis 
and the pace at which information moves through your 
honeycomb of secrecy. The future, as IBM is learning, will be to 
the supple and swift and not necessarily to the mighty.

In a world moving as rapidly as this one, information becomes 
incredibly time sensitive. Even if you do...as I think you 
absolutely must...eliminate the unnecessary classification 
within and without your organizations, you still have all the 
cumbersome buffers of bureaucracy to contend with. 
As I was preparing these remarks, I considered coming in here 
and suggesting that you break up the CIA into about five 
different private companies and go into business. That's 
probably too good an idea to implement. But it seems worthy of 
consideration. There is something that happens to your sense of 
urgency when you have a bottom line. You know that if you 
don't deliver, someone else will, which might be exactly the 
though to leave you on.

I would like to thank you very much for your indulgence of an 
entirely different perspective. I've genuinely enjoyed this 
opportunity to get to know you.





-- 
                    <<*>><<*>><<*>><<*>><<*>><<*>>                         
Cliff Figallo                                     fig at eff.org
Electronic Frontier Foundation                    (617)576-4500 (voice)
Online Communications Coordinator                 (617)576-4520 (fax)





From tlr1 at acpub.duke.edu  Sun Feb 28 15:37:08 1993
From: tlr1 at acpub.duke.edu (Tristan Lanier Reid)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 15:37:08 PST
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9302282335.AA16782@soc13.acpub.duke.edu>


Please unsubscribe me as I am unable to handle the volume of 
your mail.

Thank you for your time.
				Sincerely,
				Tristan Reid

				tlr1 at acpub.duke.edu

				




From tcmay at netcom.com  Sun Feb 28 15:45:58 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 15:45:58 PST
Subject: CFP Costs Too Much!
Message-ID: <9302282344.AA12538@netcom.netcom.com>


(I'm copying Bruce Koball, General Chair of the CFP Conference, on this
message, as I don't know if he gets the Cypherpunks list.)

Dave Deltorto is one of several people I know, including myself, who don't
like the prices of the upcoming Computers, Freedom, and Privacy Conference:

>.... I would also dearly like to attend CFP, but
>I haven't yet found a way to do it without money (anyone who knows a way I
>can volunteer my way in and help out please say so - I'll sweep up after,
>anything...).

In my opinion, $405 is way too much to pay for this conference. Science
Fiction conventions routinely get the use of major hotels at a far lower
per head price (from $40-$125 is typical). The BayCon convention takes over
most of the public facilities in San Jose's Red Lion Inn (several
ballrooms, many smaller rooms, and most of the public lobby areas), has
about 500 attendees (same as CFP), and charges less than $100 for 4 days
(and one-day memberships are typically around $30). And the "Hackers
Conference" has kept its cost down to around $300, which includes two
nights lodging and all meals (very sumptuous meals, too).

Granted, CFP puts out a nice transcript of the talks--credit them $20 for
that. Granted, a couple of meals are thrown in--credit them another $30 or
so. What's left is still too much. Yes, a "register early" discount
exists/existed, but inasmuch as there's a nonzero risk someone can't attend
(and hence loses what they paid, or some fraction of it), counting such
discounts is not really kosher. 

There are several possible reasons for the high fees: 

1. Price insensitivity. $405 is what the traffic will bear. Most attendees
are subsidized by their law firms (which often charge $200 or more per
hour, so $400 for a conference is practically invisible to them), their
corporations, or the government (taxpayers). I suspect most targeted
attendees are price-insensitive. 

I'm price-sensitive, because I have to _earn_ about $700-800 before taxes
to pay for the $405 being charged, and I have better uses for $405 (like a
new DAT machine).

2. "Everyone else is doing it." Conference prices have been skyrocketing
the last few years, although some conferences (like the SF conventions I
mentioned) are still price-conscious and hold down prices. 

If CFP meets their attendance goal of 550, I guess they'll have been
justified to price it as they did (though the mix of attendees could still
be an issue to consider). And if they fail to meet the goal of 550, even
with the comped or subsidized attendees, perhaps they can reconsider their
pricing.

3. Subsidies of journalists. In talking to several journalists and
journalistic wannabees, I've found they're getting "comped" passes. Thus,
the paying attendees are subsidizing the shmoozings and barhoppings of our
journalist friends! (This is not meant as an insult to the journalists out
there...I just can't see why they get subsidized attendance.) How important
a factor this is depends on the number of journalists, of course.

(With hundreds of new magazines every year, 50 channels of shit on the t.v.
(to borrow a phrase), and thousands of newsletters on every conceivable
subject, I am waiting for the day when there are more journalists at these
kinds of conferences than nonjournalists! They can all talk to themselves,
I guess.)

4. Other costs. And profits. Maybe it costs CFP much more to put on this
conference than it does some of the other conferences I've mentioned. Maybe
they have fewer volunteers.

In any case, I wish them luck. They are free to set their rates as they wish.

I don't plan to attend, in case I haven't already made that clear.

-Tim May


--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.






From ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU  Sun Feb 28 16:23:50 1993
From: ebrandt at jarthur.Claremont.EDU (Eli Brandt)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 16:23:50 PST
Subject: anon user on cypherpunks list
In-Reply-To: <9302281755.AA13087@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303010023.AA07585@toad.com>


> For every reason you might want a pseudonym in the first place, you
> might also want a "pseudonym from your pseudonym," especially if you
> use it a lot.

A specific example: I am presently running a survey of drug prices,
and suggested that respondents might wish to reply through penet.
Unfortunately, I realized that I could not respond to these messages
without blowing my penet pseudonym.  Fortunately, I had never
actually used it, so I could safely "blow it".  At present, if I
need another penet pseudonym, I guess I'll create it through mail
games.  But IWBNI there were a built-in way to do this --
particularly for those who aren't able to hack mailers, who are the
ones who really need a service such a penet in the first place.

> Eric

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt at jarthur.claremont.edu





From Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU  Sun Feb 28 16:43:02 1993
From: Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU (Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 16:43:02 PST
Subject: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
Message-ID: <9303010042.AA07783@toad.com>


Lance Detweiler lists some problems with freely available anonymity, and
suggests that those of us who are pushing for unrestricted anonymity are
unwise.  Many others on the list argue that unrestricted anonymity and
privacy are necessary and even inevitable.

First off, I should say that I think this is absolutely the most
critical issue that we cypherpunks must address:  how desirable
is anonymity, what restrictions should we accept and/or push for,
and what technological options can we offer as solutions?

Secondly, I think that some of us are talking past each other, by ignoring
the distinction between short-term and long-term solutions.  Lance, for
instance, concentrates on short-term problems with anonymity while ignoring
some easy-to-implement fixes for these problems in the medium to long term.
Tim May emphasizes the long-term inevitability of crypto anarchy while
skipping lightly over the practical problems of sysops trying to keep their
systems running in the short term.  Let's recognize the distinction between
short-term and long-term.  To help you out, I offer this handy diagram, which
I've filled in with my own opinions.

  Are restrictions
  on anonymity...           Desirable         Necessary         Feasible
                        ----------------------------------------------------
  Short-term  (3yrs)   |       No                Some             Yes       |
  Medium-term (10yrs)  |       No                No               Partly    |
  Long-term   (20yrs)  |       No                No               Partly    |
                        ----------------------------------------------------

More discussion of specific issues to follow in another message.  To sum
up, my opinions are that in the short term, remailers must try to be good
network citizens in order not to get kicked off the "one and only" network.
  In the long term, 


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr at cs.cmu.edu)



Subject: Future of anonymity (SHORT-TERM)

Lance Detweiler lists a few problems with freely available anonymity:
  -  newsgroup noise
  -  pornography GIFs
  -  email bombs / crashed computers
  -  Mafia & terrorist uses

He seems to believe that the best way to combat these problems is to
provide only limited anonymity, which is to be broken at the request
of the proper authorities.  [If I've misconstrued what you're saying,
Lance, I apologize.  Some cypherpunks are certainly saying this.]

I disagree that it is necessary for a remailer operator to reveal the sender
of a piece of mail under any circumstances, and I will not trust a remailer
which does not IMMEDIATELY THROW AWAY the correspondence between input and
output addresses.

I won't try to argue in detail that partial anonymity is not very useful.
I'll just say this:  if a remailer operator must be a moral arbiter of
when to release an anonymous address, then my assurance of anonymity
becomes much more tenuous and subjective, and the legal burdens on the
remailer operator become much greater.

---

I'd now like to deal with the practical objections to this suggestion
in the SHORT TERM.

First, let's postulate that anonymity is a desirable thing to have, if
we can limit its bad effects.  If we could solve the worst of the
practical problems, without keeping logs which allow tracing a message
to its source, wouldn't it be desirable to do so?

I would divide the problems into two types:  problems with volume and
problems with content.  The first three of Lance's objections were volume
problems; the last was a content problem.  My answer to the problems with
content:  tough.  It's a freedom of speech thing.

The only legitimate concern I see, in the short term, is anonymous
flooding.  This is going to be one of the toughest objections to
deal with in implementing an anonymous remailer, and one of the
biggest practical concerns, because there is the real possibility
of abuse of our poorly-controlled networks (for which the only
remedy to date has been to trace the problem to its source).



Here's my suggestion:  let's provide remailers which guarantee not to
flood the network with high volume, but keep no logs and are unable to
trace messages back to their source.  We can deal with the actual
mechanism of such volume control later; my point is that I'm suggesting
that the ONLY limitation we place on remailed messages is a volume limitation.
This restriction could of course go away once we have digital postage stamps,
but seems a reasonable one for remailers which don't charge money.



Remailer operators will have 

I propose the following solution:  that remailer operators voluntarily
compile aggregate "volume reports" 




I would predict that the primary means by which anonymity will be
restricted are:

    short-term:  crackdowns on anonymous remailing sites
    medium to long term:  by convincing most people to participate in 
        "real person only" newsgroups and to use "real person only" 
        email handlers.  These limitations could be implemented via 
        the PEM public key hierarchy, for instance.





From edgar at spectrx.saigon.com  Sun Feb 28 16:44:46 1993
From: edgar at spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 16:44:46 PST
Subject: anon.penet.fi hacking
Message-ID: <DR9LZB7w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>


On Feb 23, Hal said:

    Unless Eli's suggestion works - having our remailers put out a
    random "From:"  line (perhaps just on mail to Penet?)  might cause
    Penet to issue a new pseudonym for that apparent new user.  This
    would be kind of wasteful from Penet's perspective - all those
    pseudonyms are never going to be re-used.  But it might allow this
    form of chaining, without compromising the pseudonym of the
    remailer operator.

I would be cautious about a random "From:" line.  I think penet will
probably reject input that at least has does not have a valid (but not
necessarily truthful) return address.

For a while, Miron Cuperman's wimsey remailer was generating a bogus
>From address, something like "yeltsy at kremlin.vax.ru".  I tried
chaining this to penet to post to newsgroups, but my anonymous
messages never appeared in the newsgroups.  This was because,
I think, penet sends a confirmation back to the sender. Since
"kremlin.vax" is not in penet's net tables, this would cause
the confirmation send to fail; my hypothesis is that this also
causes the newsgroup post at penet to fail.

One good From address to generate, at least for wimsey, would be

        pool0 at extropia.wimsey.com

but you would need to add some boilerplate explaining to the
recipient that "pool0" is a group address and a return message may
be seen by up to (number? 10-100?) persons unless it is encrypted.

Wimsey could also establish its own penet password and automatically
insert it whenever it detected a "to" address ending in penet.fi.

It could also substitute the penet anonxxxx address for "pool0" in the
above boilerplate. This would allow a penet return to pool0. Note that
I don't mind too much if people know that they can reach Edgar Swank
through pool0, because pool0 is also an address for many other people,
so I can "plausibly deny" that any particular message addressed to
pool0 is for me.

I'd like to point out that so far the wimsey remailer is the only
useful remailer from my point of view because it's the only one
which allows me to delete the automatic sig.  This is because it
only forwards encrypted text and discards any appended unencrypted
text.

The other remailers were supposed to add a "kill line" to do the
same thing, but as far as I know this never happened.

--
edgar at spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca






From Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU  Sun Feb 28 17:03:49 1993
From: Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU (Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 17:03:49 PST
Subject: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
Message-ID: <9303010103.AA08082@toad.com>


Sorry, I sent my last message before it was ready (and before it got
divided into two separate messages).  It mostly says what I wanted it
to, so I won't bother you with another version.

On the SHORT-TERM end of things,  I have two more thoughts on how to
make truly anonymous remailers good net citizens:

  1.  Agree on a header line which identifies all messages coming out of 
      our remailers.  If someone wants to filter out all anonymous messages,
      I think we should help them to do so.

  2.  Here's my proposal for what kind of remailer logging to do:
          logging of source-to-destination mapping:  NONE.
          destination logging:  NONE.
          source logging:  on a machine-by-machine basis, log the total
              input volume over a fairly long period, with some random
              noise added.  When a source is providing too much volume,
              and it's not on your local list of "friendly" remailers,
              then take action to reduce the volume.  I suggest that the
              first action should be to INCREASE THE DELAY to reduce the
              volume-per-unit-time of messages from that site.  If the
              volume of spooled traffic from a site reaches a threshold, 
              only then start throwing away messages.


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr at cs.cmu.edu)





From wcs at anchor.ho.att.com  Sun Feb 28 17:06:13 1993
From: wcs at anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_StewartHOY0021305)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 17:06:13 PST
Subject: Real life pseudonyms (was re: more ideas on anonymity)
Message-ID: <9303010106.AA15307@anchor.ho.att.com>


Jordan Hayes incorrectly (IMHO) states that "Banking and Tax regulations provide
solid legal ground for requiring banks to verify identity and tax status in tehe 
US."  There are really two halves to the problem:
- accounts paying interest - this is taxable, so they DO need your SSN,
	and you even have to tell them if they should do backup withholding.
	So you can have multiple accounts under different names if you're
	energetic about it, but they'll have the same SSN if you've only got 1.
	So of course the IRS will know.
- non-interest-paying checking accounts - remember those, from long ago ? :-)
	You could probably legally run a bank that didn't require SSNs 
	for these, though most banks don't.
	I haven't read through the immense pile of bank laws to find out
	what it takes to become a bank, or how much you can do if you're
	not a registered bank.

As far as "true names" go, in some states in the US, you can use any name
you want unless it's for fraudulent purposes, e.g. California ;
in other states they have this racket called "legally changing your name",
where you have to convince a government honcho to let you rename yourself,
with the implication that all your future transactions will happen under
your _new_ true name; New York and New Jersey are into this sort of thing.

(Offering a "name registration service" is a different game entirely,
though the free market is less likely to do so if there's a government
service already provided that you *have* to use for some purposes.)

Some places make it easier than others to build up ID under a new name;
the people I've known in the acting profession haven't had much trouble,
and if you're young and keeping the same first name, the line 
"my parents were divorced and I used the other name when I lived there"
seems to work fine; if you're female and keeping the same first name
you can mumble something about your first husband or maiden name.
In either case, the SS number is usually something you're stuck with,
so you just have to avoid using it when you can.

# Bill Stewart    wcs at anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030




From nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Sun Feb 28 17:08:13 1993
From: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 17:08:13 PST
Subject: anon.penet.fi hacking (fwd)
Message-ID: <9303010104.AA23332@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>



>I'd like to point out that so far the wimsey remailer is the only
>useful remailer from my point of view because it's the only one
>which allows me to delete the automatic sig.  This is because it
>only forwards encrypted text and discards any appended unencrypted
>text.
>
>The other remailers were supposed to add a "kill line" to do the
>same thing, but as far as I know this never happened.
>
>--
>edgar at spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
>SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca

     Alright, I hear you, Mr. automatic sig (you really ought to
append it only when you want it).  I implemented a "kill line" in
my remailer.  All you have to do is put the line "--ignore--" exactly
as that, no spaces after it, no spaces before it, just a line precisely
like that and neither it nor the rest of the message will be put into
the outgoing message.  Edgar, you can test it by sending to my remailer
on this account.

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL at BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL at CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST
[non-automatic sig]






From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Sun Feb 28 17:14:14 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 17:14:14 PST
Subject: anon.penet.fi hacking
In-Reply-To: <DR9LZB7w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
Message-ID: <9303010111.AA12729@soda.berkeley.edu>


>The other remailers were supposed to add a "kill line" to do the
>same thing, but as far as I know this never happened.

Your call for this went unacknowledged but nevertheless listened to.
It was not until a week or two after the sig-kill stuff was over that
I came up with a solution.

The next revision of the remailer will have something like

	Body-Termination-Regex: <regex>

The first character in the body that matches the regex, and every
character after it, will be dropped.  This not only makes it a
one-liner in perl (!), but it means that the user can be as
arbitrarily complex in recognizing sig blocks as the are able.
Of course, we'll document the most common of these:

	Body-Termination-Regex: ^--$

For those of you who know nothing about regular expressions, this
recognizes a line containing two minus signs and nothing else.  If
your signature adder does it some other way, it's pretty much
automatically supported.  You could also put more of your signature in
the regex to ensure that it doesn't interfere unexpectedly with body
content.

Summary: user-defined, almost every case handled, not automatic.

I hate my sample header field name.  Please, someone think up a better
one.

Eric






From wcs at anchor.ho.att.com  Sun Feb 28 17:39:52 1993
From: wcs at anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_StewartHOY0021305)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 17:39:52 PST
Subject: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
Message-ID: <9303010139.AA15551@anchor.ho.att.com>


X-Real-Subject: Re: not assigning IDs for alt.whistleblower
X-Real-From: Richard M. Nixon
X-Real-Message-Body-Begin:
It's probably a reasonable policy - anybody who wants to can add a 
signature line or equivalent giving themselves a pseudonym, and
if they want private replies they can provide a PGP or RIPEM public key.
A clean way to avoid the problem of encrypted replies cluttering up the
newsgroup is to also create alt.whistleblower.followup or a.w.crypt,
with similar non-assignment of ids, so readers can easily skip over
the crypted private replies.
If some whistleblower, or some whistlelistener, is more trusting,
they can even post their an12345 address.

I *would* recommend the following policies -
- accept email in PGP, RIPEM, and also unencrypted MIME, X.400, and vanilla 
	formats- not everybody who wants to blow a whistle has the right-shaped
	whistle handy.  
- publish an "official" method for defining what part gets posted - e.g.
	Anonymous-Subject: Use me instead of the main header Subject:
	Begin-Anonymous-Message-Body:    .....
	End-Anonymous-Message-Body:
	as part of the *text* of the message, so that people with different
	mailers can be sure about what parts get kept and what don't -
	it would be real annoying to have the signature-stripper delete
	the good parts of a message because they looked like signatures,
	or leave on the signatures because they looked like text,
	but some mailers won't let your do what you want with headers.
	Also publish a policy for messages that _don't_ contain them.

	A proper approach might be to use the MIME headers, but accept them
	from inside the message body as well as from the headers of
	proper MIME messages, so people can do them by hand.
	This has the added advantage of supporting Content-Transfer-Encoding:
	headers so you can tell more easily which encryption was used,
	and so senders of unencrypted messages can use compression or 
	rot13 :-) to avoid having their message sent in obvious ascii.
	
X-Real-Signature:		"Maybe I _was_ a crook" 
X-Real-Message-Body-End:

				Bill

# Bill Stewart    wcs at anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030




From tytso at Athena.MIT.EDU  Sun Feb 28 17:44:25 1993
From: tytso at Athena.MIT.EDU (Theodore Ts'o)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 17:44:25 PST
Subject: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
In-Reply-To: <9303010103.AA08082@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303010143.AA25226@SOS>


   Date: Sun, 28 Feb 1993 19:59-EST
   From: Marc.Ringuette at GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU

     1.  Agree on a header line which identifies all messages coming out of 
	 our remailers.  If someone wants to filter out all anonymous messages,
	 I think we should help them to do so.

This would indeed be a considerate thing to do.  In the short run, the
only way a mailing list maintainer can avoid being abused by someone
twit determined to hide behind your network of maintainers is to
disallow anonymous postings altogether.

Since John Gilmore, the maintainer of the Cypherpunks mailing list, is
one of the absolute free speach advocates --- let me ask a question
directly at you:  What would you do if sometime next week, someone
decided to flood the Cypherpunks mailing list with a large amount of
trash postings, routed through different combinations of remailers?  Let
us assume that the trash is generated by grabbing varying snippets from
USENET articles, so that current AI technology is not able to
distinguish a true Cypherpunks submission from the flooded trash
postings.  What would you do?  Now let's also suppose someone does the
same thing to all of the GNU newsgroups.  What would you do then?

I ask these questions well aware that somewhere out there, some immature
twit might get an idea from this scenario, and make the above questions
less hypothetical.  :-( 

(Sorry for sounding so cynical, but after being a News admin at MIT for
a long time, and dealing with a lot of people suffering from severe
cases of freshmanitis, I have a less than optimistic view about human
nature.)

	     source logging:  on a machine-by-machine basis, log the total
		 input volume over a fairly long period, with some random
		 noise added.  When a source is providing too much volume,
		 and it's not on your local list of "friendly" remailers,
		 then take action to reduce the volume.  I suggest that the
		 first action should be to INCREASE THE DELAY to reduce the
		 volume-per-unit-time of messages from that site.  If the
		 volume of spooled traffic from a site reaches a threshold, 
		 only then start throwing away messages.

This doesn't work.  Someone clever could easily redirect the message
through different (non-anonymous) SMTP servers before the message
entered the remailer network; this would completely defeat the volume
logging, and while the first hop would still be logged somewhere, unless
the remailer administrator reveals the input/output address mapping,
you'd still have no way to trace the message from the destination to the
source.

							- Ted






From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Sun Feb 28 17:51:38 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 17:51:38 PST
Subject: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
In-Reply-To: <9303010103.AA08082@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303010148.AA16696@soda.berkeley.edu>



Marc's short-term suggestion of bandwidth limiting from a particular
source seems like a reasonable exigency.  Let me suggest a way of
doing that which does not require keeping long-term logs.

Suppose your bandwidth limiter kept totals of all bytes sent in the
last week.  In order to keep that data current, it needs to know when
to remove byte counts that are a week old.  Thus it needs to keep logs
of the last week's worth of messages, at least in byte count form.

Instead of that, you can just make the byte count decay.  Once a day,
a process goes through the byte counts and reduces them.  Remove any
entries are <= 0.  If this decaying byte count is bigger than some
threshold, bounce the message.

I would suggest that the reduction equation be linear: multiply by
some constant between one and zero, and subtract off a fixed amount,
drop the fractional part.  The multiplicative factor, which I would
set between .9 and 1.0, means that an occasional large file could be
sent through without completely eliminating email delivery for a
while.  The subtractive amount cleans out the database more quickly.

Comments?

Eric





From thug at phantom.com  Sun Feb 28 17:58:11 1993
From: thug at phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 17:58:11 PST
Subject: Real life pseudonyms (was re: more ideas on anonymity)
In-Reply-To: <9302281619.AA14306@IMSI.COM>
Message-ID: <m0nSze4-000jqOC@phantom.com>


Jordon Hayes writes: 
> 
> 	From thug at phantom.com Sun Feb 28 10:48:57 1993
> 
> 	For instance, can I walk into a U.S. bank, present false ID,
> 	and obtain a checking account to use for legitimate reasons?
> 
> Banking and Tax regulations provide solid legal ground for requiring
> banks to verify identity and Tax status in the US.  Answer: no.  By
> definition, there are no "legitimate" reasons for having a checking
> account in this country that is unaccountable.  There are plenty of
> other ways of hiding cash and money transactions without involving the
> US banking system.  They don't want you to do this ...

Yes, I know they don't want me to do this because they don't respect my
privacy.  Not because I am doing anything illegal.  If I pay my taxes on
the money, I should be allowed to stash it anywhere I fucking please.

> 	I'm not stealing any money/products/services from anybody, I'm
> 	only using a pseudonym.
> 
> No, you're just avoiding the accountability of your money.  This is
> akin to not reporting income.  It's patently illegal.  You can stand
> down your color PostScript printer now ...

I never said the checking account would be used for tax evasion.  Assuming,
I pay taxes on all my income, I don't see why it should be illegal to 
deposit it in a checking account under, let us say, my dogs name. Hell, there
are these old ladies who die and leave all their money to their cats, right?
So I assume the cats must have somekind of bank accounts / trusts.  What if
I want to set up a bank account for my dog? I don't see why that should
be illegal.  I mean if it's a problem with setting up accounts under
non-existant people's identities, one could always use the family pet as
the bank account holder.

Thug





From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Sun Feb 28 18:05:54 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 18:05:54 PST
Subject: header field indicating an anonymous address
Message-ID: <9303010202.AA17864@soda.berkeley.edu>


Marc R. suggests that we standardize on a header field to indicate
that a message was anonymous.

I suggest "Anon-Sender:".  There's already a "Sender:" field in
RFC-822, indicating who sent the message, as separate from who wrote
the message.  The "Anon-Sender:" field should contain an email address
for the maintainer of the remailer. 

Why? To facilitate complaints. :-)

Eric





From strat at intercon.com  Sun Feb 28 18:28:35 1993
From: strat at intercon.com (Bob Stratton)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 18:28:35 PST
Subject: header field indicating an anonymous address
In-Reply-To: <9303010202.AA17864@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303010227.AA18304@intercon.com>


>>>>> Eric Hughes <hughes at soda.berkeley.edu> writes:

	Eric> Marc R. suggests that we standardize on a header field
	Eric> to indicate that a message was anonymous.

	Eric> I suggest "Anon-Sender:".  There's already a "Sender:"
	Eric> field in RFC-822, indicating who sent the message, as
	Eric> separate from who wrote the message.  The "Anon-Sender:"
	Eric> field should contain an email address for the maintainer
	Eric> of the remailer.


I think that's certainly a viable idea. Of course, the Sender: field
is more honored in the breach than the observance by many mailers.
Another thing to remember is "Errors-To:" which can save a lot of
grief when handling bounces. 

	Eric> Why? To facilitate complaints. :-)

It would warm my heart to see questions like this come up at IETF
meetings. Keep up the good work.

--Strat







From ssandfort at attmail.com  Sun Feb 28 18:40:51 1993
From: ssandfort at attmail.com (ssandfort at attmail.com)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 18:40:51 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <9303010240.AA10573@toad.com>


_________________________________________________________________
             FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Today, Theodore Ts'o raised the specter of libel and slander to
justify some forms of censorship for anonymous remailers.  He
assumed, rhetorically, that if you believe in total freedom of
speech, than you must not believe in libel or slander.

He is correct, of course.  Nevertheless, his implied conclusion
is in error.  He would have us give up free speech to uphold
libel and slander.  I say, let's give up the artificial concepts
of libel and slander and uphold our freedom of speech.

Can people be harmed by speech?  Maybe yes, maybe no.  But if so,
that is the price that must be paid to avoid a far greater harm.
Damnum absque injuria--there are some loses for which there is no
remedy at law.

If your girlfriend impugns your manhood, there may be harm.  But
should her speech be ILLEGAL?  I think not.

I'm sure that what NBC did was NOT libel or slander.  It may have
been fraud, though.  In any event, if a free society chose not to
make what NBC did illegal, that in no way implies that NBC was
"perfectly justified" in faking an explosion.  It just says
society takes any remedy out of the hands of the state.  Of
course, NBC's acts have already damaged its own reputation karma.
Serves 'em right, too.

One last note about practicality.  We live in a world with pay
telephones, which anyone may use to threaten anyone else,
anonymously.  Shall we eliminate pay phones?  Today in the United
States, a uniformed agent of the government will deliver your
anonymous threat to your victims door for only US$0.29.  Shall we
eliminate the Postal Service?  (The answer is "yes," but for
other reasons.)  So what's the point?  Why should we be any
harsher on the networks than we are on all the other anonymous
channels?

There is only one realistic and moral solution to threats of
violence.  Punish the perpetrators, not the messenger.  Even in
today's world, crimes are rarely solved by wiretaps, forensic
science or any of that.  Perps gets fingered by someone they
know; perps confess; perps screw up and accidentally give
themselves away; or the intended victim blows the perp's head off
during an attempt to carry out the threat.  Again, punish the
perpetrators, not the messengers.

     S a n d y                         ssandfort at attmail.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~






From tytso at Athena.MIT.EDU  Sun Feb 28 19:21:00 1993
From: tytso at Athena.MIT.EDU (Theodore Ts'o)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 19:21:00 PST
Subject: Piercing anonymitiy and censorship
Message-ID: <9303010319.AA25260@SOS>


I noticed that in several postings, people have made the jump that
revealing the real person (or the previous hop in a remailer chain) from
an anonymous remailer is tantamount to censorship.  I'd like to call
into question that assumption.

In many ways, I have a lot of sympathy with the Libertarian position ---
whether or not I think it would realistically work as a system of
governement is another question.  In any case, I don't like censorship
in any form.  But disclosing who sent a particular piece of anonymous
mail is not the same as censorship.  I believe in free speach, but
today, if someone violates the responsibility that goes along with free
speach --- by yelling at the top of his/her lungs at 4am in the morning,
when I am trying to sleep, or by libelling or slandering me ---- I have
legal recourse; I can call the police and have him/her arrested for
disturbing the peace, or I can sue him/her for libel or slander.

But by making anonymous remailers airtight, you are removing the
possibility for recourse, and thus removing the burden of personal
responsibility from the sender of these messages.

Perhaps there are people who believe Free Speech should be so much of an
absolute that you should be allowed to scream at the top of their lungs
at 5am in the morning in a residential area, and that libel and slander
laws shouldn't exist.  But it's not fair to call that a mainstream
position.  And it is unreasonable to assume that as an axiom.

						- Ted

P.S.  It is true that by revealing the identity of an user of a
remailer, you are breaching their privacy --- however, most people also
don't believe that the right to privacy is absolute.  It certainly
isn't explicitly listed in the U.S. Constitution.   While, I also
believe very strongly in a right to privacy, there are certainly times
--- for example when someone is operating under a false name to commit
fraudulent acts --- that a person's privacy should be breached.  

While it is much simpler to say "the right of privacy is always supreme
over all other considerations", or "the right of free speech is supreme
over all other considerations," that is a very simplistic view which I
don't believe is very realistic.   In any case, it is certainly not
widely held.





From jordan at imsi.com  Sun Feb 28 20:08:21 1993
From: jordan at imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 20:08:21 PST
Subject: Real life pseudonyms (was re: more ideas on anonymity)
Message-ID: <9303010324.AA24305@IMSI.COM>


	>>> So I assume the cats must have somekind of bank accounts
	...

[ maybe you're kidding? ]

The way those old coots leave their money to their cat is to set up a
trust with an executor (human) who pays the bills incured by the cat.
The cat never actually receives money, just services that are paid for
by the executor.

-----

This is silly.  You must (under US Banking Regulations) provide a SSN
to open any kind of account.  This includes (but is not limited to)
non-interest bearing accounts.  Any bank that would open you an account
without proof of who you are is asking for a lot of trouble.

/jordan





From jordan at imsi.com  Sun Feb 28 20:08:42 1993
From: jordan at imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 20:08:42 PST
Subject: Real life pseudonyms (was re: more ideas on anonymity)
Message-ID: <9303010316.AA24294@IMSI.COM>


	From wcs at anchor.ho.att.com Sun Feb 28 20:56:24 1993

	non-interest-paying checking accounts - remember those, from
	long ago ? :-) You could probably legally run a bank that
	didn't require SSNs for these, though most banks don't.

Banks need your SSN (at least) for being able to report to the IRS
anything they are required to report.  This can include interest
payments, but also includes things like making cash transactions of
more than $10k.  Bank accounts *must* be fully documented in this
country.  Switzerland, and certain small islands have more lax rules.

The USA does not.

Privacy is one thing.  Money is another, at least in this country.

/jordan





From tytso at Athena.MIT.EDU  Sun Feb 28 20:39:48 1993
From: tytso at Athena.MIT.EDU (Theodore Ts'o)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 20:39:48 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9303010240.AA10573@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303010438.AA25312@SOS>


   From: ssandfort at attmail.com
   Date: 1 Mar 93 02:36:10 GMT

   There is only one realistic and moral solution to threats of
   violence.  Punish the perpetrators, not the messenger.  Even in
   today's world, crimes are rarely solved by wiretaps, forensic
   science or any of that.  Perps gets fingered by someone they
   know; perps confess; perps screw up and accidentally give
   themselves away; or the intended victim blows the perp's head off
   during an attempt to carry out the threat.  Again, punish the
   perpetrators, not the messengers.

I agree 1000%!!!!  But in order to punish the perpetrators, it is first
necessary to *identify* the perpetrators......

							- Ted





From 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM  Sun Feb 28 20:43:20 1993
From: 74076.1041 at CompuServe.COM (Hal)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 20:43:20 PST
Subject: Censorship...
Message-ID: <930301043312_74076.1041_DHJ75-1@CompuServe.COM>


Ted Ts'o writes:

> I noticed that in several postings, people have made the jump that
> revealing the real person (or the previous hop in a remailer chain) from
> an anonymous remailer is tantamount to censorship.  I'd like to call
> into question that assumption.

"Censorship" is an emotional term.  My New World Dictionary defines it as the
act of censoring, and a censor as "an official with the power to examine
publications, movies, television programs, etc. and to remove or
prohibit anything considered obscene, libelous, politically objectionable,
etc."  I think this corresponds pretty closely with how we use the
word.  It suggests that a good test for whether an action is censorship
is whether the prohibition is based on the content of the message along
the lines above, where a message is controversial, obscene, etc.

(Many Libertarians would argue that no private action can be censorship,
that only government actions backed up by the threat of force can be.
They might point to the word "official" in the definition above.  I
think that the more common use of the word would include the concept
of private censorship; as, for example, in the case of a newspaper
editor who kills a story because it attacks a powerful political friend
of the editor.  He can be considered an official of the newspaper.)

Ted then gives the example of someone yelling at 4AM in the morning.
Stopping this action would not be censorship by this test.  You don't
care about the content of his speech, just the volume.

Ted also mentions libel and slander.  Stopping these would apparently be
censorship by the definition above (which explicitly mentions "libelous").

For the remailer cases, stopping usage due to excessive volume would not
be censorship.  It would be analogous to stopping someone from yelling
at 4AM.  Your restriction is not based on content.

On the other hand, stopping usage due to the content of a message would
be censorship, especially if it was due to the message content being
"obscene, libelous, politically objectionable, etc."  I think many of
the attacks on anonymous messages based on content would in fact fall
into these categories.

I am not arguing here that censorship is wrong, although certainly the
word has acquired negative connotations.  It's interesting to see that
stopping libel can be considered censorship, and this fact might cause
those who believe in laws against libel to consider whether censorship
may sometimes be good.  If they do feel comfortable with that, then they
can openly call for censorship by remailer operators without mincing words.

Hal Finney






From marc at MIT.EDU  Sun Feb 28 21:15:28 1993
From: marc at MIT.EDU (Marc Horowitz)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 21:15:28 PST
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9303010240.AA10573@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303010514.AA05974@deathtongue.MIT.EDU>


>> One last note about practicality.  We live in a world with pay
>> telephones, which anyone may use to threaten anyone else,
>> anonymously.  Shall we eliminate pay phones?  Today in the United
>> States, a uniformed agent of the government will deliver your
>> anonymous threat to your victims door for only US$0.29.  Shall we
>> eliminate the Postal Service? 

This is different than anonymous remailers currently.  Why?  Because
pay phones and letters *cost* *money*.

So, I have a proposal.  Have someone *sell* signed keys, for real
money.  The only purpose of the signature is so that someone can
verify that it's been paid for.  It can be bought out of band.  For
example, I can email the signing agent my public key, and paper-mail a
money order with no return address.  Maybe in the future, we can just
use digital money.  When he gets my money, he signs my key and sends
it back to me, possibly via some remailer or whatever.

Now, when I send a message via a remailer, the mailer checks to see if
the message has been signed by a key which has been signed by the key
signing agent.  If it has been, then it forwards the mail.  If not, it
doesn't.

Now, here's the trick.  If too many people complain about a particular
sender (see below), the key gets revoked by the signing service.  This
means flooding newsgroups, slander, etc., *costs* *real* *money*.
This is a big encouragement not to abuse the net, because it costs
money.  Perhaps we even have different levels of signing, based on
costs.  Pay $1, and the remailers will let you send to alt groups
only.  Pay $10, and you can send to alt, soc, misc, talk, and some set
of high-traffic, low-signal lists. Pay $100, and you can post
anywhere, including individuals.  These are all example numbers, of
course.

 - People can easily remain pseudonymous.
 - There is a monetary incentive not to be a bonehead.
 - Revocation is possible.  There's no punishing wrongdoers, but
people aren't likely to put much credence behind anonymous claims.
 - This works like the Real World.  People with enough money can
create false identites for themselves, anyway.
 - Remailer owners can choose which signing agents to trust.  Other
than monetary schemes might be able to be set up.  For instance, if
you can get five real, trustable people to vouch for your pseudonym,
you win.  If you screw up, their reputations become tarnished, as
well.

I guess all this is is a positive reputation scheme, bootstrapped by
money, which is more important to some people than reputation, anyway.
I mean, someone willing to go through the bother of spending $10 to
get his key signed is either very bored, or has to have something to
say.

Now, back to complaints.  What constitutes a complaint?  Each
certifier would probably have to decide this on their own.  Some might
choose never to revoke a signature.  Some might do it only after some
number of complaints.  Some might come up with systems of arbitration,
with judges, voting, and everything.  The remailers can vote with
their feet: whichever signing agents match the policies they like,
they trust.  And recipients (like newsgroups, mailing lists, or even
individuals) can choose to accept messages only from remailers they
"trust".

So, we have a fairly complex system with multiple degrees of freedom,
where endusers can pick and choose from among the policies they like
best.  This is sort of like credit card purchases.  Hertz is willing
to rent me a car based on Visa's evaluation of my creditworthyness.
Similarly, large-public-mailing-list at site.domain can decide to accept
messages from a given remailer, based on their published policies.
Actually dealing with signatures isn't their problem.  It's to the
signing agent's advantage to be trustworthy, or else nobody will pay
attention to his signatures, and nobody will give him money to sign
their keys.  Poof, a free market.

It isn't simple, but I think one thing we can all agree on is that no
solution to these problems we are facing will be both adequate and
simple.

		Marc





From ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu  Sun Feb 28 21:18:45 1993
From: ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu (ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 21:18:45 PST
Subject: some PRACTICAL ideas on ...
Message-ID: <9303010517.AA10570@longs.lance.colostate.edu>


Ahem, well, there have been some complaints of too much impractical
philosophizing and ranting of late, so here's my penance. Notes on how
to protect alias files, ideas on digital money, and an excerpt on
computer raid techniques from The Hacker Crackdown by Bruce Sterling. 
(Disclaimer: In no way should any of this be contrued as encouraging or
advocating destruction of evidence.)

self-Encryption time bombs
--------------------------
Some lost soul asked an excellent question about a week ago regarding
how to protect things like the alias file of an anonymous server from
attack, possibly using encryption. This is actually a very interesting
and difficult problem, and I've been rolling it around in my brain a
bit, and some things are now rattling out onto the keyboard. The
question applies really in general: how do you simultaneously use and
protect data from prying eyes?  I don't think there are really any
simple and ingenious approaches, or they might have been suggested by
now. Actually, the silence on the topic assures me that its indeed rather difficult.

One idea is to keep the only the encrypted version in permanent
storage. Keep the usable copy in something volatile like memory (e.g. a
Ramdisk). This makes it much less solid.

Another idea is to have a `time-bomb' encryption device. Here's the
idea applied to  a remailer. Every few hours the remailer asks for the
owner to type a password. If the meow isn't answered, it panics and
locks up everything, electronically `burning' anything important and
encrypting stuff that needs to be kept around.

This of course is problematic because if someone grabbed the server
they could utilize it in the time window. Ok, so imagine that the
server can somehow `sense' whether its real owner is present and
typing. This could mean that the owner types in a certain way or runs a
dummy command at least once an hour or whatever, or has his foot on a
footpedal or whatever.  Again, the server panics if it sees something awry.

Also, note that usually computers are switched off and cables unplugged
when confiscated. If the interesting stuff is in only in RAM, no
problemo.  This gives other ideas though. When a certain cable is
unplugged, *poof* goes certain data or whatever. Ideally there would be
a daemon that is always alive (even with switched off power) that could
deal with the signal that something bad has happened.

Another idea is to check for operator signals at boot time.  When the
confiscator boots the computer (assuming they do, and not unplug the
hard drive for analysis) the computer could look for the cue and say
something like ``one monent, loading system'' while it is in a mad dash
to encrypt everything important (but it must delete the password used
for this at the end, of course!). Then it could give a regular login
prompt and even let in the infiltrator.

Finally, note that in raids usually the operator is taken away from the
computer immediately (see attached notes) while the confiscators (I'm
trying to stay neutral here) grab all the hardware. Hence, a `direct'
signal to the computer that requires the operator to do something and
the computer to respond is difficult in these situations. But the
possibility of rigging panic-encrypt buttons in surreptitious places
all over your house (flush!!!)  is not completely outlandish.

digital $$$
-----------

There seems to be a lot of interest in this topic. Now, unfortunately I
think anyone who wants to set up a *real* bank on the internet right
now and handle transactions via email would really swiftly arouse the
fearsome ire and wrath of vast segments of the net.  Whatever, I'd like
to point out that it is entirely feasible *right now* using *credit
cards*. There are obviously automated credit card machines that can
make transactions solely electronically based only on that lovely
*data* cypherpunks love so much (card # and exp. date).  Maybe some
even have RS232 interfaces! (for the brain dead, that means they'd be
as trivial and familiar to interface to a computer as MODEMs!).

Imagine this scenario: a banking server! user registers with the server
by giving card data.  He can then let other businesses make debits
through the server to his account, with all the
cryptographic/authentication assurances that this can only happen when
he permits, of course.

Anybody who ever started doing this, I think there should be at first
*huge* amounts of verification, like email sent to the user asking for
confirmation of every transaction, monthly statements, ceilings, etc. 
But *wow* think--its all entirely doable right now!  If the banker
wanted to he could even deal with requests to open real accounts with
regular money.  But this is probably much farther off--the idea of the
server as nothing but a link to credit cards is very convenient and
more accessable, it seems to me. (The case could be made, if initially
the service was free, that no commercial service was being performed.)
Imagine being able to write programs that send mail to a server to bill
users for services. Neat!  But OOH the phreakers would have a field day
with this kind of thing if it wasn't AIRTIGHT SECURE.

* * *

Now a little transcription gift to the net. I found the following
account of the typical `hacker raid' interesting.  It comes from the
book `The Hacker Crackdown' by Bruce Sterling (1992 Bantam books). p160
 The account is mostly based on U.S. police tactics during the
Operation Sun Devil raid in the early 1990s.

A typical hacker raid goes something like this. First, police storm in
rapidly, through every entrance, with overwhelming force, in the
assumption that this tactic will keep casualties to a minimum. Second,
possible suspects are removed immediately from the vicinity of any and
all computer systems, so that they will have no chance to purge or
destroy evidence.  Suspects are herded into a room without computers,
commonly the living room, and kept under guard--not *armed* guard, for
the guns are swiftly holstered, but under guard nevertheless. They are
presented with the search warrant and warned that anything they say may
be held against them. Commonly they have a great deal to say,
especially if they are unsuspecting parents. 

Somewhere in the house is the `hot spot'--a computer tied to a phone
line (possibly several computers and several phones). Commonly it's a
teenager's bedroom, but it can be anywhere in the house; there may be
several such rooms. This `hot spot' is put in the carge of a two-agent
team, the `finder' and the `recorder.'  The finder is computer-trained,
commonly the case agent who actually obtained the search warrant from a
judge.  He or she understands what is being sought and actually carries
out the seizures: unplugs machines, open drawers, desks, files,
floppy-disk containers, and so on.  The recorder photographs all the
equipment, just as it stands--especially the tangle of wired
connections in the back, which can otherwise be a real nightmare to
restore.  The recorder also commonly photographs every room in the
house, lest some wily criminal claim that the plice had robbed him
during the search.  Some recorders also carry videocams or tape
recorders; however, it's more common for the recorder simply to take
written notes.  Objects are described an numbered as the finder seizes
them, general on standard preprinted police inventory forms.

Even Secret Service agents were not, and are not, expert computer
users.  They have not made, and do not make, judgments on the fly about
potential threats posed by various forms of equipment.  They may
exercise discretion, they may leave Dad his computer, for intance, but
they don't *have* to.  Standard computer crime search warrants, which
date back to the early 1980s, use a sweeping language that targets
computers, most anything attached to a computer, most anything used to
operate a computer---most anything that remotely resembles a
computer--plus most any and all written documents surrouding it. 
Computer-crime investigators have strongly urged agents to seize the works. 






From elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU  Sun Feb 28 21:24:01 1993
From: elee9sf at Menudo.UH.EDU (Karl Barrus)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 21:24:01 PST
Subject: Cypherpunk remailers 03/01/93
Message-ID: <199303010522.AA03559@Menudo.UH.EDU>



The list of cypherpunk remailers known to me:

 1: hh at pmantis.berkeley.edu 
 2: hh at cicada.berkeley.edu 
 3: hh at soda.berkeley.edu 
 4: nowhere at bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
 5: ebrandt at jarthur.claremont.edu 
 6: hal at alumni.caltech.edu 
 7: remailer at rebma.mn.org 
 8: elee7h5 at rosebud.ee.uh.edu 
 9: phantom at mead.u.washington.edu 
10: hfinney at shell.portal.com 
11: babani at cs.buffalo.edu 
12: remail at extropia.wimsey.com 

NOTES:
#1-5	no encryption of remailing headers
#6-12	support encryption of remailing headers
#2	requires remailing request to appear in header
#12	requires text to be encrypted along with remailing request
#7,#12	introduce larger than average delay

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf at menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus at tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/





From tcmay at netcom.com  Sun Feb 28 21:37:49 1993
From: tcmay at netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 21:37:49 PST
Subject: Handling Abuses of Remailers
Message-ID: <9303010536.AA10591@netcom.netcom.com>


I'll keep this one very short.

* To handle _abusive volumes_ through remailers, charge for remailing.
Short term, this may be a problem, but this is the long term market
solution.

* To handle _abusive messages_ through remailers, ignore them. "Sticks and
stones" and all that. Put positive reputation filters in place. Accept
e-mail only through those you know or have reason to trust.

As Sandy Sandfort so cogently put it, punish the perps, not the words of
the perps. This is the basis of our society, and a good basis, too. 

-Tim May

 
--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay at netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.






From hughes at soda.berkeley.edu  Sun Feb 28 21:40:04 1993
From: hughes at soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 21:40:04 PST
Subject: A Modest Proposal
Message-ID: <9303010536.AA07263@soda.berkeley.edu>



I wrote:
>Acknowledgement that a procedure is an exigency does not make that
>procedure desirable of itself.  All differential carriage based on
>content is censorship.  I acknowledge the exigency of certain forms of
>censorship in currently deployed anonymous systems.

A member of the list wrote back to me to say that this went over his
head because he wasn't a lawyer.  I am not a lawyer either.  Since a
compact statement has been too compact, allow me to be more verbose.

An exigency is something you do because you have to in order to
accomplish something else.  It's not something you do because someone
told you to or because you promised to do it.  Exigencies, if you
don't like them, are often called 'necessary evils,' with all the
connotations of that phrase.  In this case, restrictions on remailers
are an exigency, something you might have to do to stay on the net.

Now just because you have to do something doesn't mean that's a good
thing.  In California, you have to give out your thumbprint in order
to get a driver's license.  Giving the thumbprint is an exigency.  I
did not want to do that; I don't think it's a good thing; I did it
anyway because I wanted a driver's license more than I wanted my
thumbprint not to be digitized.

Differential means that two things are not the same and has the
connotation that one is preferable to the other.  Carriage is the noun
form of the verb 'to carry' and in this context refers to the act of
carrying an electronic message.  Thus differential carriage is
carrying some messages preferentially, such as refusing to mail to or
from a particular site, or to delay or alter some messages but not
others.

I claim that all differential carriage where the differences in how
the messages are carried arise from the content (or expected content)
of those messages is, in fact, censorship and should be called such.
If am operate an anonymous service and I refuse to pass a message
because someone has complained about it, I have exercised a preference
and created a difference in the way I treat the message.  I have
exercised censorship over that message.  I have presented my service
as a public utility, and yet I have created a difference in how I
treat messages.  My domain of potential censorship is not large, but
it is there.

It is an unfortunate fact of the internet that there will be pressure
brought to bear against the operators of anonymous remailers, and that
in the interim such pressure might be strong enough to force such
operators off the net.  Some restrictions against content might be
necessary to keep these services online.  If so, then I believe that
these restriction should be implemented.  I'd rather have the services
running.

Nonetheless, I deplore any such restrictions.

And if it not perfectly clear by now, let me finally state that I am
in agreement with Lance Detweiler on this point, that some restriction
may be necessary in order to keep anonymous services online.  But that
said, I still don't like it.

I will continue to dislike it, and I will work to make the necessity
for restrictions disappear.

Eric





From ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu  Sun Feb 28 21:41:19 1993
From: ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu (ld231782 at longs.lance.colostate.edu)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 21:41:19 PST
Subject: more annoying philosophizing on anonymity
Message-ID: <9303010540.AA10913@longs.lance.colostate.edu>


OK, I'll keep this brief. Yes, the postal service delivers anonymous
mail. Yes, you can make anonymous telephone calls using pay phones. 
But like all hastily construed analogies, they fail in the magnified
specifics.  The problem here is that the fragile remailers being built
right now are operated by *individual users*, while these other
services are parts of vast public infrastructures. Now, until anonymous
servers become part of the vast public infrastructure (I'll give us all
the benefit of the doubt on this one), operators will be *extremely*
vulnerable to what goes through their remailers. 

All this idealistic ranting about free speech is really inspiring (uhm,
occasionally) but it doesn't help people whatsoever (in fact, it
clearly is a very strong turn-off!) who want to establish remailers and
anonymous posting services *right now*.  For their sake, please switch
off the impassioned speeches for unattainable lofty heights.  (My
previous message is my own feeble gesture of penance.)  These people
will go somewhere else if they find that our ideas are hopelessly
naive, impractical, unrealistic, etc.

Somehow, I just get the feeling that people won't be quite so
uninhibited and be a bit more subdued when the first cypherpunk
operator is jailed on contempt-of-court charges for refusing to decrypt
his log/alias files, or prosecuted for destruction of evidence, or
whatever. (Or maybe this would be a call-to-arms on the level of the
Alamo or Pearl Harbor.)

Mr. Ringuette is discerning in his view that some
talking-past-each-other is going on based on issues of time frames and
assumed/hidden agendas; and that the issue is the most serious one
facing us *right now* is right on target.

Please accept some minor sacrifices in the short term for some vast
gains in the future.  I think if we take the position that some ugly
and gross mechanisms for anonymity limitations are put into place right
now, they can be training wheels that will eventually mostly be taken
off in the future, but in the meantime help to convince the world of
our `good faith' intent, and serve as practical models for future
systems. (What, you say we don't have good faith or practical systems? 
Maybe I'm seriously deluding *myself*.)





From phiber at eff.org  Sun Feb 28 21:50:55 1993
From: phiber at eff.org (Phiber Optik)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 21:50:55 PST
Subject: CFP Costs Too Much!
In-Reply-To: <9302282344.AA12538@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199303010549.AA21368@eff.org>


It should be noted that journalists aren't the only people eligible for
free admission.  There's a scholarship program open to students/hackers/etc.
If you can't get in free (it's obviously too late now), or otherwise be
sponsored by an employer or other, the pricey fee does tend to exclude people
who would otherwise benefit the conference and vice versa.
What I can suggest, knowing the hotel it's going to be at (same as first),
is hang out in the spacious lobby and mingle/eat/drink/etc.  A number of
people did this.  Much of the "conference" is interaction with people, outside
of the panels.






From nobody at alumni.cco.caltech.edu  Sun Feb 28 22:05:13 1993
From: nobody at alumni.cco.caltech.edu (nobody at alumni.cco.caltech.edu)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 22:05:13 PST
Subject: Infrastructure
Message-ID: <9303010605.AA10013@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Some time back there was some debate here about whether MIME
("Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions") features could be exploited
to make encryption easier to use.  I didn't pay much attention at the
time, because I didn't know anything about MIME.  But then a couple of
weeks ago John Gilmore posted about Metamail, a software system
designed to make it easy to integrate MIME into commonly-used mailers.

I've played with Metamail a bit, and I do think this could be a good
approach.  Metamail basically performs a mail-sorting function,
automatically passing mail which has the MIME "Content-type" header to
a filter or display program based on a very flexible "mailcap" file.
To add PGP (or PEM, or RIPEM) support would be a matter of defining a
Content-type header for this application, then creating the
appropriate 1-line entry in the mailcap file.  This does sound like a
pretty easy way to add this capability.

The nice thing is, Metamail has already done the work of figuring out
how to patch a whole bunch of different mailers to add this support.
By using metamail we would be leveraging off this already-existing
work.  Here are some excerpts from the "mailers.txt" file that comes
with the distribution, written by Nathaniel S. Borenstein:

>  Abstract
>  
>  It is surprisingly easy to use the RFC1049 "Content-type" header to turn
>  virtually any mail reading interface into a multi-media mail reading
>  interface.  Mail readers are simply modified to use the new "metamail"
>  program whenever they receive non-text mail.  The metamail program is
>  itself easily customizable by the use of a "mailcap" file that specifies
>  the media types supported by a given site or user.  Given the existence
>  of the metamail program,  this document explains how to add multimedia
>  support to sixteen very different mail reading programs, including all
>  of the most popular UNIX mail reading programs and (so far) one DOS mail
>  reading program.  
>  [...]
>  The Basic Idea
>  
>  Basically, there are only two things you have to do to each mail reading
>  program:
>  
>  1.  Make the mail reader notice the special header ("Content-type") that
>  marks a message as a non-text message.  (In the case of mail readers
>  that already understand certain content-types, such as Andrew, the mail
>  reader must be modified only to deal with the content-types it does not
>  already know how to handle.
>  
>  2.  When the special header appears, instead of (or, if it's much
>  easier, in addition to) showing the user the body of the message, the
>  mail reader must send that body off to the metamail interpreter.  The
>  metamail interpreter includes features that deal with the diverse
>  situations of terminal-oriented and window-oriented mail readers.
>  [...]
>  A Variety of Mail and Bulletin Board Reading Interfaces 
>  
>  With this document, you can patch all of your site's mail reading
>  interfaces to support whatever multimedia formats are deemed useful at
>  your site.  This means that those who regularly use the multimedia tools
>  can begin to send mail in those formats freely, without worrying about
>  the ability of any local user to interpret the mail.  It is my intent to
>  make this document exhaustive; as time goes on, I hope it will grow to
>  include an ever widening set of mail reading interfaces.  Currently it
>  includes all of the mail reading interfaces that I know to be in use
>  anywhere in Bellcore's research laboratories.
>  
>  Currently this document describes how to add support for the following
>  mail readers:
>  
>        Berkeley Mail (/usr/ucb/Mail, /usr/ucb/mail, and Tahoe mail)
>        SunMail (another version of Berkeley mail, but rather different)
>        Xmail (an X11 interface to Berkeley mail)
>        Mailtool (older versions of a SunTools interface to Berkeley mail)
>        Imail (Bellcore MICE mailer)
>        PCS readmail/rdmail/sreadmail (another Bellcore mailer)
>        MH -- Rand Message Handling System
>        XMH -- X11 Interface to Rand Message Handling System
>        Rmail -- GNU Emacs mail reading package
>        VM -- Another GNU Emacs mail reading package
>        MH-E -- Yet another GNU Emacs mail reading package (GNU interface to MH)
>        CUI -- Andrew low-end mail reader 
>        VUI -- Andrew termcap-based mail reader
>        Messages -- Andrew multimedia mail reader
>        BatMail -- Andrew Emacs mail-reading interface
>        Elm -- Mail reader from HP.
>        Mush -- Yet another popular mail reader
>        Msgs -- simple Berkeley bulletin board reader
>        UUPC --a mail reading program for MS-DOS
>        TRN -- a threaded netnews reader.
>  
>  
>  If you have mail readers that are not dicussed here, you will still
>  probably find some of this code useful as a model.  If you develop a
>  patch for some other mail reader, and you send it back to me, I'll
>  include it in future versions of this document.

I am very impressed with the range of mailers covered here.
Unfortunately, access to source is needed for most of the patches.
But my guess would be that patched versions would become available
even to people who don't have source.

I'm not really sure what is happening with PGP specifically in terms
of MIME.  I think there has been some work done with PEM integration.
There doesn't seem to be any reason why these programs can't integrate
nicely with MIME, and this Metamail package looks like it might be the
most cost-effective way of getting widespread encryption into use.

Hal

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK5EwE6gTA69YIUw3AQHa3gP/d9rJg8FTE4glB3CbUy5skG8j0AS4qvGn
ugFhor0RZYpZIrsZn+XXJaiaO6+7je8fdEuwO2SkFBS90p6D7vtR40hqPUPnc4io
q4z4UYRwV3aIVMjWZqyDncYQUouUltXh9utwH7nsbZX4Md9vDWwuq9ck7DHZhT+m
O7Zx1+44kRY=
=4Kad
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From phiber at eff.org  Sun Feb 28 22:12:28 1993
From: phiber at eff.org (Phiber Optik)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 22:12:28 PST
Subject: more annoying philosophizing on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9303010540.AA10913@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <199303010611.AA21525@eff.org>


> 
> OK, I'll keep this brief. Yes, the postal service delivers anonymous
> mail. Yes, you can make anonymous telephone calls using pay phones. 
> But like all hastily construed analogies, they fail in the magnified
> specifics.  The problem here is that the fragile remailers being built
> right now are operated by *individual users*, while these other
> services are parts of vast public infrastructures. Now, until anonymous
> servers become part of the vast public infrastructure (I'll give us all
> the benefit of the doubt on this one), operators will be *extremely*
> vulnerable to what goes through their remailers. 
[stuff deleted]

You fail to realize the obvious.  Anyone who makes use of "vast public
infrastructures" is also usually defenseless against the POWERS THAT BE,
and fall victim to them abusing this power.
Your snail mail can be intercepted/stolen and read at the command of the
federales, any and all telephone calls can be intercepted/blocked/eavesdropped
on.
Sorry, but I'll take my chances with "fragile remailers", and the choice of
use dictated by the positive reputations of both the remailer and the sender.
Simple.






From dorn at indigo.mese.com  Sun Feb 28 22:45:09 1993
From: dorn at indigo.mese.com (ALAN DORN HETZEL JR)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 22:45:09 PST
Subject: anonymity + untraceable digital money = potential problems
Message-ID: <00968D43.DD87FB00.21534@INDIGO.MESE.COM>



Dear Group,

I believe that I see a potential serious problem with they onset of
truly unbreakable anonymous communication combined with untraceable
digital cash.

The problem is that crimes such as blackmail and extortion would become
absolutely impossible to defend against.  Kidnapping for ransome would
get a LOT easier.

One of the serious deterrents to crimes such as kidnapping is the 
probability that one will get caught attempting to communicate ones
demands or collect the payment.  If one can make TRULY anonymous demands
and receive payment which is TRULY untraceable, one can strike without
warning and then proceed virtually without risk.

I could send you an anonymous note threating to poison your dog, kill
your wife, burn down your house, whatever..., ... unless you pay me
$$$ in untraceable digital cash.  What can you do?  You pay and I go
my merry way with your money, or you assume I am bluffing and don't pay.

MANY PEOPLE WILL NOT CALL THIS BLUFF, and there is the serious problem...

I foresee a great way for jerks to "earn extra income in their spare time"
threatening hundreds of people in mass anonymous mailings.  Some of these
folks will be scared enough to pay off.  Where is the risk to the person
who commits these acts?  He's COMPLETELY anonymous!

Food for thought.

Dorn






From julf at penet.FI  Sun Feb 28 23:02:24 1993
From: julf at penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 23:02:24 PST
Subject: anon.penet.fi hacking
In-Reply-To: <9303010111.AA12729@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303010721.aa25945@penet.penet.FI>



> The first character in the body that matches the regex, and every
> character after it, will be dropped.  This not only makes it a
> one-liner in perl (!), but it means that the user can be as
> arbitrarily complex in recognizing sig blocks as the are able.
> Of course, we'll document the most common of these:
> 
> 	Body-Termination-Regex: ^--$

Ok... Now.. Show me the regex that strips anything starting with '--',
such as '-----------------------------', except a PGP boundary line...

	Julf






From wcs at anchor.ho.att.com  Sun Feb 28 23:09:07 1993
From: wcs at anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_StewartHOY0021305)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 23:09:07 PST
Subject: RISKS for alt.whistleblowers
Message-ID: <9303010709.AA18343@anchor.ho.att.com>


I would expect two kinds of people to cause trouble for alt.whistleblowers:
amateurs and professionals.  Amateur troublemakers may cause the most volume
of trouble, and the largest signal-to-noise problem, but the more serious
concern is what happens if there's enough signal in the noise to be a threat
to professionals, whether governments, corporations, or criminals.

If I were a professional who wanted to stop a group like this, and options
like court orders, violence, or confiscation weren't appropriate,
I'd consider a few approaches like the following:
- Flooding - it's really not hard, even with automatic protections -
	if you can emulate, or abuse, all the neighboring anon-remailers,
	you may even force disconnects from them.
- Crying wolf, and other disinformation - if there are enough bogus posts,
	people will stop reading the newsgroup, and the talk.bizzare crowd
	wil take over because they're the only ones who can handle the noise ..
- Posting libel, slander, child pornography, calls for violence, bomb threats
	followed by real bombings, blackmail requests, photographs of local
	politicians in real or fake compromising situations, and enough other
	legally dangerous material that the moderator and/or people who carry
	the newsgroup wouldn't be able to take the heat.

It's really not all that hard, if somebody's serious about it.
Crypto-anarchy is a good thing, but governments and other bad guys can 
hide behind it just as effectively as anarchists can.

.... and the last count I've heard on the radio was that 19 separate groups
have called in to claim responsibility for the World Trade Center bombing;
some even called 911, though presumably they used pay phones ...

			Bill Stewart, somewhere out in Cyberspace




From hkhenson at cup.portal.com  Sun Feb 28 23:22:10 1993
From: hkhenson at cup.portal.com (hkhenson at cup.portal.com)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 23:22:10 PST
Subject: more annoying philosophizing on anonymity
Message-ID: <9302282241.1.9858@cup.portal.com>


Re this thread, and picking up a current theme, what do you think would
happen if a message claiming to be responsible for the WTC blast came
through an anon remailer?  Keith Henson





From gnu  Sun Feb 28 23:31:30 1993
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 23:31:30 PST
Subject: Anonymity in the real world
In-Reply-To: <9302280259.AA20523@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9303010731.AA18617@toad.com>


> I want to see illegal, sinister, and evil groups like the Mafia to
> flourish, using new technology like networks to perpetrate their
> patriotic services...

> Although I haven't personally yet had the great joy of this, I can't
> wait to receive an anonymous death threat or ransom notice via email,

> Imagine the splendor of delivering an anonymous note to the mayor of
> New York and the world that in 15 minutes a large chunk under a large
> building, a symbol of international unity, will be conveniently
> rearranged, at only minor risk to nearby inhabitants!  Wow, this could

The person who wrote this stuff hasn't thought it through.  Any of these
things can and do happen right now over the telephone (anonymously)
and through postal mail (anonymously).  Somehow, society has not fallen
into anarchy because anyone can drop a letter in a mailbox.  Why not?

(pause here and actually think about it...)








> Wow, think of what we could achieve and accomplish if we
> completely dismantled the NSA, the FBI, the CIA, and my local pig
> trough!

Now you are closer to reality.  It appears that at least the DEA is
getting *severe* funding cuts under President Inhalation.  It's about time
someone fired those thugs.

> 		  For example, I like individual terrorists just as
> much as the organized collections.  They sound like they could be
> really completely uninhibited in their creative grasps of our true
> freedoms, and more numerous with their stellar utilizations.  

There are two problems with terrorism.  The first is that it is regularly
practiced by governments -- against their own populations as well as
against non-citizens -- so governments can't truly be too opposed to it.
I'll give you the definition of terrorism from the CIA in 1980
(as reported by Admiral Stansfield Turner):

	Terrorism:  The threat or use of violence for political
	purposes by individuals or groups ... when such actions
	are intended to shock, stun, or intimidate a target group
	wider than the immediate victims.

("Terrorism and Democracy", ISBN 0-395-43086-0, p. 181).

If forcibly arresting someone and putting them in jail for selling
drugs to a willing buyer doesn't fall squarely into this definition, I
don't know what does.  Every law that Congress passes "to send a message"
falls into this definition -- it's to intimidate a group wider than
the group who will be arrested and tried.

The second problem is *not* that it's too hard to tap the phones of
identified terrorists -- it's that you can't pick out the terrorists
from the billions of other humans.  Even police states have trouble
with this, but they tend to provoke more people to become terrorists.
Anonymity makes it possible (as in alt.whistleblowers) for people who
know terrorists to safely expose them.  Have you noticed that the way
the Feds have attacked the Mob has been by convincing insiders to
testify and giving them untraceable new identities (the "Witness
Protection Program")?

The beauty and the strength of an open society is that it brings all
kinds of problems and conflicts out where everyone can see them and
they can potentially be worked out -- BEFORE anyone sees a need to
escalate to mass violence.  In a rigidly structured society, by the
time the government knows it needs to change, it has already been deposed.

> In fact,
> the potential for individual, unassociated citizens to thwart the
> abuses, and profoundly destabilize the foundations of frigid, faceless
> bureacracies like big telephone companies, and even the government, I
> find spine-tinglingly majestic---it even looks like this could soon
> happen.

It has already happened.  A small number of individuals have done this
-- Freud, Marx, Moses, Jefferson, for example.  Most profoundly
destabilizing ideas are derived from the work of a single mind
(nanotechnology for example).  But most destabilization of
bureacracies comes from ordinary change, not profound change, and
the improved communication tools we're building will *help*
individuals and bureacracies to deal with change.

	John Gilmore